{"article": "On March 8th, 2014, several citizens of Montgomery, Alabama, who had been imprisoned for failing to pay traffic fines, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, against the City of Montgomery, Alabama. The plaintiffs, represented by Equal Justice Under Law and private counsel, asked the court for a declaratory judgment that the plaintiffs' rights were violated, compensation for the damages caused by the city's conduct, and attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs alleged they did not have the ability to pay for the traffic tickets and that the City should not have imprisoned them for failing to pay the traffic tickets when they did not attempt to determine whether the plaintiffs had an ability to pay. On May 1, 2014, the district court (Judge Mark E. Fuller) granted a motion for a preliminary injunction. The injunction enjoined the city from attempting to collect monies owed to the city associated with traffic tickets by the plaintiffs. The city was also required to submit a comprehensive plan on how they will determine an individual's ability to pay for traffic fines. On August 20, 2014, the case was reassigned to Judge Myron H. Thompson, and on August 21, 2014, Judge Thompson extended the injunction until the court ordered a change. On October 31, 2014, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the case because they entered into a settlement agreement about the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court granted this dismissal on November 17, 2014, and the court agreed to the plaintiffs\u2019 request to maintain jurisdiction over the settlement in case of any breaches by the defendant. Within the settlement, the Municipal Court of the City of Montgomery agreed to numerous changes in its operations, including using a microphone in its courtroom proceedings, notifying this plaintiff's counsel within 12 hours of a defendant being jailed for nonpayment of a fine, and training public defenders and prosecutors on compliance with Bearden v. Georgia and Turner v. Rodgers. The terms of the settlement agreement lasted up to three years. On December 12, 2014, Judge Thompson formally closed the case, though the court retained jurisdiction over the settlement and allowed the parties to resolve the issue of attorneys' fees, which was subsequently resolved on January 16, 2015. On April 2, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a notice with the court that the defendants willfully violated the settlement agreement. The matter seemed to be resolved quickly because on April 7, 2015, Judge Thompson ordered that no further action would be taken on the notice because defendants had taken corrective action. The case is now closed.", "summary": "The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit on March 8, 2014, alleging that the City of Montgomery, Alabama, improperly imprisoned them for failing to pay traffic fines. They alleged that they did not have an ability to pay the fines due to their financial circumstances and that the city did not consider their ability to pay. On May 1, 2014, the District Court granted the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, preventing the city from collecting more money from traffic tickets of plaintiffs'. On October 31, 2014 the parties filed to dismiss the case pursuant to a settlement agreement, which included numerous changes to Municipal Court proceedings. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On August 28, 2013, an indigent detainee in the Montgomery Municipal Jail filed this lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama. The plaintiff sued the City of Montgomery and the Honorable Milton J. Westry under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The petitioner, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, requested the court quash the Municipal Court order requiring the petitioner to serve an imprisonment term of 54 days. Petitioner claimed that the Municipal Court order violated Sixth Amendment, due process, and equal protection clause. The plaintiff was an indigent woman who accumulated $2,714.00 in fines and fees on traffic tickets that she received in 2008 and 2009. On August 20, 2013, the plaintiff was arrested and brought to the Montgomery Municipal Jail. The next day, the plaintiff appeared before Defendant Judge Westry, who told the plaintiff that she must pay $1,554.00 immediately or serve 31 days in jail. When the plaintiff informed Judge Westry that she would not be able to pay after only recently securing a part-time job, Judge Westry ordered the that her outstanding fines be converted into a term of imprisonment in the Montgomery Municipal Jail. Petitioner was not appointed a lawyer during the previously described court proceeding. After filing an emergency petition for writ of certiorari, the case was removed from state court to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama on October 4, 2013. On the same day, the petitioner filed an amended complaint, seeking declaratory relief. Another indigent detainee filed a similar suit after he was taken into custody to serve a 54 day sentence for his inability to pay his traffic fees. Cleveland v. City of Montgomery, 2014 WL 6461900, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Nov 17, 2014). On October 28, 2013, the petitioner filed a motion to consolidate both cases. On November 12, 2013, petitioners amended their complaint and additionally sought injunctive relief. Judge Mark E. Fuller granted the motion to consolidate both cases on November 14, 2013. Discovery began on December 23, 2013. During discovery, a similar case raising comparable claims, Mitchell v. City of Montgomery, was filed. 2014 WL 6461900, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Nov 17, 2014). The court in Mitchell v. City of Montgomery entered a preliminary injunction that ordered the City of Montgomery to submit a comprehensive set of judicial procedures to implement for the collection of future fines. On May 14, 2014, petitioners motioned to have limited participation in the Mitchell v. City of Montgomery hearing regarding the proposed judicial procedures. 2014 WL 6461900, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Nov 17, 2014). On May 27, 2014, Judge Fuller granted the petitioners\u2019 motion in part and denied it in part. Judge Fuller determined that the petitioners were only permitted to participate in the Mitchell hearings orally and through ancillary briefings to provide perspective on the legal sufficiency of the City\u2019s proposed plan. Cleveland v. City of Montgomery, 300 F.R.D. 578, 581 (M.D. Ala. May 27, 2014). Following the petitioners' participation, all parties decided to engage in private mediation to create judicial procedures that would satisfy federal and state-law requirements. 2014 WL 6461900, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Nov 17, 2014). On August 28, 2014, both parties submitted a joint motion to approve the proposed settlement agreement. In the initial agreement, both parties submitted an agreement to pay the plaintiffs\u2019 attorneys fees and provide a list of basic premises and procedures that the Montgomery Municipal Court would abide by with regards to indigent defendants unable to pay any court-ordered monies, including fines, court costs, or restitution. The parties filed an amended joint motion for entry of agreed settlement order on September 12, 2014. The amended motion included a joint brief in support and requested that the court issue three declarations: <blockquote> (1) Under the current status of the law, the constitutional principles set out in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983), regarding incarceration for non-payment, and Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011), regarding notice, apply in municipal-court proceedings, and that, to the extent applicable in a particular case, the judges of the Montgomery Municipal Court are legally required to follow them. (2) that the proposed judicial procedures facially comply with the constitutional principles set out in Bearden, regarding incarceration for non-payment, and Turner, regarding notice. In Bearden, the Supreme Court held that, under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause, a trial court cannot \u201cautomatically revok[e] probation because [a] petitioner could not pay his fine, without determining that petitioner had not made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay or that adequate alternative forms of punishment did not exist.\u201d 461 U.S. at 662. (3) the proposed judicial procedures facially comply with the requirements of the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, \u00a7\u00a7 13, 64, and 225 of the Alabama Constitution, and Rule 26.11 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. </blockquote>2014 WL 6461900, at *3-5 (M.D. Ala. Nov 17, 2014). Judge Myron H. Thompson submitted an opinion granting the parties\u2019 joint motion for entry of agreed settlement order and subsequent final judgment on the docket on November 17, 2014. The case is closed.", "summary": "In 2013, indigent detainee filed a complaint against the City of Montgomery and a Municipal Court Judge for unconstitutionally ordering the petitioner to serve time for her inability to pay court-order fines and fees for their traffic violations. The complaint was originally filed in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama and then transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, where it was consolidated with a similar case. In the amended complaint, petitioners alleged that the imprisonment orders violated their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. Petitioners sought remedy through injunctive and declaratory relief. In 2014, the parties reached a settlement that provided new judicial procedures for the Municipal Court to follow regarding indigent defendants and nonpayment. It also included three declarations, most importantly, it declared that the constitutional principles set out in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), and Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) applied to municipal court proceedings, and awarded plaintiff's attorney fees. The case closed in November 2014."}
{"article": "On May 1, 2006, an inmate awaiting execution at the Supermax Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction filed this action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Represented by the Federal Public Defender, the inmate claimed that the procedures used to carry out lethal injections in Arkansas\u2014specifically the use of potassium chloride in the lethal cocktail of drugs\u2014risked unnecessary conscious suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the execution practices employed by the Arkansas Department of Corrections (ADC). He did not challenge his sentence or challenge the use of lethal injection. On May 4, 2006, a second death row inmate in Arkansas moved to intervene. A few days later, his execution was scheduled for July 5 of that year. On May 26, the district court (Judge Susan Webber Wright) allowed him to intervene as a plaintiff. On June 16, following his addition to the case, the second plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants from carrying out executions in accordance with the lethal injection protocol. At the hearing on the motion, a medical expert testified that the state's lethal injection procedure created medically unacceptable risks of inflicting pain and suffering. Judge Wright granted the motion on June 26, noting that the plaintiff had not delayed in filing to intervene because he had had to wait to exhaust all of his appeals. The order granting the preliminary injunction stayed the State of Arkansas from implementing the order for execution of the second plaintiff. And four days later, the defendants appealed. In the midst of ruling on the preliminary injunction appeal, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the original complaint, arguing that the plaintiff could not state a claim. First, they argued that the plaintiff had not exhausted all of the remedies available to him under the Department of Correction\u2019s grievance policy. Second, the claim fell outside the statute of limitations for \u00a7 1983 actions. Judge Wright disagreed and denied the motion to dismiss on June 19, 2006. On November 22, 2006, a third death row inmate sought to intervene. On December 1, 2006, Judge Wright granted the motion. On July 7, 2007 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction granted by the district court and vacated the stay of execution issued to the second plaintiff. The Court of Appeals found that the district court abused its discretion in granting the stay of execution and the preliminary injunction. Because the inmate could have brought his \u00a7 1983 claim before it was necessary to grant a stay, the district court exceeded the scope of its power to grant the preliminary injunction. 491 F.3d 804. On July 17, 2007 the defendants filed for summary judgment. They argued that Arkansas's lethal injection protocol was substantially identical to the protocol used by the state of Missouri, which was upheld against constitutional challenge by the Eighth Circuit in <i>Taylor v. Crawford</i>, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007). In their reply to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs argued that they had not been provided with the opportunity to engage in discovery, and that a significant number of genuine issues of material fact remained even without discovery. On August 5, 2008 the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dissolved the stay of execution. The district court relied on the Eighth Circuit's approval of Missouri's lethal injection protocol, which the court found was sufficiently similar to Arkansas' protocol. The district court found that the plaintiffs had failed to come forward with evidence that Arkansas' protocol for execution by lethal injection \"subject[ed] them to constitutionally significant risk of pain.\" On August 29, 2008, the plaintiffs filed an appeal. On February 8, 2010 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment for the defendants. The Court found that Arkansas' protocol was substantially similar to Missouri's protocol upheld by the Court of Appeals and to Kentucky's protocol upheld by the Supreme Court. On November 10, 2010, the United States Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari. At the time of this writing, the original plaintiff had not been executed. The second plaintiff was granted a stay in 2017. The third plaintiff was executed on April 24, 2017. The case is now closed.", "summary": "A prisoner facing the death penalty in Arkansas sued over the form of lethal injection used by the state. The case was dismissed because of a lack of evidence that Arkansas's use of lethal injections subjected prisoners to a significant risk of pain. The case is closed, and one of the three plaintiffs was executed in 2017."}
{"article": "On August 23, 2018, three Maricopa County, Arizona residents who were referred to Maricopa County's Marijuana Diversion program filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued Maricopa County and Treatment Assessment Screening Center, Incorporated, a private company, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Civil Rights Corps and private counsel, sought injunctive and monetary relief, claiming violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs alleged that the Maricopa County Attorney's Office and Treatment Assessment Screening Center jointly operated a marijuana possession diversion program that discriminated against the poor in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and led to unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the defendants were, under threat of felony prosecution, subject to longer terms of imprisonment, repeated drug tests and increased fee payments due to their inability to pay fees associated with the program. One class member individually sought injunctive relief to prevent Maricopa County from keeping her in the diversion program if she could not pay the fees associated with completing the program. The case was assigned to Judge James A. Teilborg but immediately reassigned to Judge Steven P. Logan. On October 12, 2018, the case was reassigned to Judge James A. Soto. That same day, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 12, 2018, adding a third representative to the class. In January 2019, the parties agreed to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction and the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Eric J. Markovich. After the submission of the amended complaint, several defendants filed motions to dismiss the case with regards to the allegations leveled against them specifically. Magistrate Judge Eric J. Markovich denied all these motions in a June 18, 2019 order (2019 WL 2515950). He stated that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the elements of a 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 claim and that, because the violations of rights were ongoing, there is no statute of limitations concerns. As for the Treatment Assessment Screening Center, he stated that the group was not subject to qualified immunity because it was being sued as an organization, not in individual capacity. He also wrote that the County Attorney was eligible for suit because he oversaw what the plaintiffs allege is a discriminatory practice. He added that as a municipality, the County Attorney was not subject to sovereign immunity. On September 23, 2019, the plaintiffs submitted a second amended complaint adding another representative to the class. Discovery is ongoing in the case.", "summary": "On August 23, 2018, three Maricopa County, Arizona residents who have been referred to Maricopa County's Marijuana Diversion program filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, Phoenix Division. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief, claiming that the Maricopa County Attorney's Office and Treatment Assessment Screening Center jointly operated a marijuana possession diversion program that discriminated against the poor in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and led to unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs amended their complaint twice to include new named plaintiffs for the class. The District Court denied the defendant's motions to dismiss the complaint, and discovery is ongoing both for class certification and the underlying claims."}
{"article": "On March 8, 2006, the Pacific News Service filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the California Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants had violated the constitutional rights of the press and the public to attend, meaningfully observe, and gather and report on important information at executions being carried out by the defendants at the California State Prison at San Quentin. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants' use of pancuronium bromide, a paralytic agent, acted as a chemical curtain over the lethal injection process. The plaintiffs alleged that this chemical made it impossible for witnesses to determine whether the executed inmates were being subjected to substantial and unnecessary pain before dying. As a result, the plaintiffs claimed that the witnesses were denied the information necessary for the public to decide whether and how executions should be conducted. On the same day the plaintiffs filed the lawsuit, they asked the court to consolidate their case with Morales v. Woodford (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9823\">CJ-CA-0004</a> in this Clearinghouse). On March 28, 2006, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (Judge Jeremy Fogel) denied without prejudice the request to consolidate the cases. On October 10, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in response to the plaintiffs' second amended complaint. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs did not have a First Amendment right to dictate the method that the state uses to perform a lethal injection execution. Furthermore, the defendants argued that there were legitimate and constitutional reasons for using pancuronium bromide. On November 3, 2011, the court entered a scheduling order that included a discovery cut-off date, but the plaintiffs moved to vacate the order and to direct the parties to submit a new proposed schedule \"when viable lethal injection regulations are in place.\" On April 5, 2012 court denied the motion to vacate the scheduling order, reasoning that the ongoing state case, <i>Sims v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation </i> (CDCR), could affect this case when concluded and therefore the motion was premature. In <i>Sims v. CDCR</i>, the Marin County Superior Court had issued a judgment on February 21, 2012 and held that CDCR failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act. The state court had issued an injunction prohibiting CDCR from executing anyone until new lethal injection regulations complied with the APA. In July 2012, the parties stipulated that the court should vacate the current scheduling order. On August 10, 2012, the Court vacated the order and stipulated that the parties should submit a new proposed schedule once (1) viable lethal injection regulations were in place; or (2) the Marin County Superior Court's decision invalidating the regulations was overturned on appellate review, whichever occurred first. On May 30, 2013, the appellate court affirmed the trial court\u2019s judgment in the Sims case and held that CDCR\u2019s lethal injection regulations were invalid for failure to comply with the APA. The court permanently enjoined CDCR from carrying out the execution of any condemned inmate by lethal injection until their new regulations complied with the APA. The plaintiff dismissed the case voluntarily on December 7, 2017 because Pacific News Service was going out of business. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On March 8, 2006, the Pacific News Service filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the California Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants had violated the constitutional rights of the press and the public to attend, meaningfully observe, and gather and report on important information at executions being carried out by the defendants at the California State Prison at San Quentin. On May 30, 2013, the issue in this case became moot due to a state court decision. In Sims v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), the California Court of Appeals held that CDCR\u2019s lethal injection regulations were invalid for failure to comply with the APA. The court permanently enjoined CDCR from carrying out the execution of any condemned inmate by lethal injection until their new regulations complied with the Administrative Procedure Act. This case closed after a voluntary dismissal filed by the plaintiff organization."}
{"article": "On April 20, 2012, a state prisoner filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiff sued the California Department of Corrections under \u00a71983 and California state administrative law. Represented by UnCommon Law, he asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that officials of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and its Board of Parole Hearings, acted unfairly by refusing to authentically consider the appropriateness of parole for prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment. On October 18, 2012, Magistrate Judge Gregory G. Hollows granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, but allowed the plaintiff to file an amended complaint within 28 days. 2012 WL 5187779. On November 15, 2012, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging with more detail that officials of the State of California--including the Governor, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), and various officials of the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH)--implemented a system to fabricate evidence to support their decisions to deny parole, particularly for inmates serving a life sentence (\"Lifers\"), and that this discriminatory scheme was used to protect their decisions from judicial scrutiny so that they could maintain the low rate of granting parole to Lifers. On March 31, 2014, U.S. District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification of a class consisting \"of California state prisoners who are serving life sentences and are eligible.\" Judge Mueller also granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' equal protection and state law claims, but denied the defendants' summary judgment motion as to the plaintiffs' due process claims. 2014 WL 1309289. The defendants appealed this decision but their petition for permission to appeal was denied on June 12, 2014. On September 26, 2014, the defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which Magistrate Judge Claire recommended be denied in part and granted in part. Though the defendants objected to the magistrate's findings and recommendations, they were adopted by the District Court in a May 14, 2015 order. 2015 WL 2358583. As a result, the defendants got judgment on counts four (alleging \"that their Due Process rights ha[d] been violated by the denial of 'notice of the evidence being used to consider their suitability for parole.'\"), five (alleging \"that the refusal to provide access to the data underlying the FAD reports also deprive[d] them of their Due Process right to be heard at their parole hearings\"), nine (alleging \"that they ha[d] a 'limited' Due Process right to 'confront and cross examine [the] putative experts' whose FAD reports [were] used to deny plaintiffs parole\"), and twelve (alleging \"that they ha[d] a Due Process right to call witnesses, including adverse witnesses, at their parole hearings\") of the plaintiff's complaint. The Court allowed the plaintiffs to, within 30 days, file an amended complaint as to the remaining counts. The plaintiff decided against amending a complaint. In a joint status report filed on July 17, 2015, the parties indicated that they had entered into negotiations and were working toward a settlement. On October 2, 2015, the parties entered into a finalized stipulation and settlement agreement, which required reforms in the psychological risk assessment process used by the parole board, including an opportunity for Lifers to challenge factual errors in risk assessments through counsel. The defendants also agreed to consult experts on the use of risk assessments in the correctional setting and make information presented by the Board of Parole Hearing's Psychologist available to the plaintiffs and be posted online. Furthermore, the Court was to retain jurisdiction over this case until January 1, 2017. If within 30 days after January 1, 2017, the plaintiffs believed that the defendants had not abided by the terms of the settlement, the plaintiffs could seek an extension of the Court's jurisdiction over this matter for no more than 12 months. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, once the Agreement was approved, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all but one of the defendants--the Executive Officer of the Board of Parole Hearings. The plaintiffs' motion to do so was granted in an order by Magistrate Judge Claire on June 24, 2016. The issue of attorneys fees was raised in a separate motion on October 16, 2015, which was referred to Magistrate Judge Claire. On November 10, 2015, she granted the plaintiff's motion for attorneys fees, and the defendants had 30 days to pay $119,796.05 to the plaintiff. The defendants challenged this order, filing a motion for Reconsideration of Timing of Fee and Cost Payment. On December 1, 2015, Magistrate Judge Claire granted the defendant's request for reconsideration and edited the last sentence of the court's order to read: \"Defendants shall remit payment to Plaintiffs' counsel in the amount of $119,796.05, within thirty (30) days after the Court grants final approval of the parties Amended Stipulated Settlement, subject to interest thereafter as provided in 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1961.\" On October 6, 2017, the court extended its jurisdiction for another year, finding that the defendants had not complied fully with the Settlement. Specifically, the court limited the extension of its jurisdiction to the following issues: (1) revision of timelines for CRAs, objections, and responses; (2) revision of provision allowing CRA reports that contain factual errors to remain in an inmate's file; (3) defendant compliance with provision that \"[a]ll future CRAs will clarify that the Overall Risk Rating is relative to other life prisoners; and (4) defendant compliance with provision that \"CRAs will inform the reader of the report that, generally speaking, the current recidivism rates for long term offenders are lower than those of other prisoners released from shorter sentences.\" On February 4, 2019, District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller issued an order stating that, because one year had passed since the October 6, 2017, the case was to be closed.", "summary": "This civil rights class action was filed in 2012 in the Eastern District of California; it alleged due process violations when the state arbitrarily denied parole to nearly all lifers who had served their minimum sentence. On October 2, 2015, the parties entered into an agreement by which the defendants agreed to make changes to the psychological risk assessment processes used by the parole board. The Court approved the settlement in May 2016, and retained jurisdiction over the case until January 1, 2017, with the plaintiffs' able to get an extension of the Court's jurisdiction if the defendants fail to abide by the agreed upon terms. In February of 2019, the court issued an order stating that the defendants had complied with the order. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On June 9, 2018, the plaintiff in this case was arrested in Denver, Colorado; he was then unable to make his $10 bond, because the government imposed numerous additional fees. He brought this law suit against the City and County of Denver on October 10, 2018 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. He proceeded under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for allegedly violating his 14th Amendment right to due process and equal protection. Specifically, he complained about a Colorado requirement that individuals arrested pay at minimum a $50 before release. The plaintiff claimed Denver had detained him solely because of his inability to make monetary payment, wrongfully depriving him of his liberty. He was represented by the ACLU and sought compensation and policy reform. The case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge N. Reid Neureiter, and later reassigned to Judge Wiley Y. Daniel and again reassigned to Christine M. Arguello on December 6, 2018. The plaintiff entered jail with $64.24, sufficient to pay for his $10 cash bond and even an additional $50 bond fee. However, Denver took an additional $30 for booking fees, which the plaintiff could not afford to pay. The charges against the plaintiff were later dismissed. Shortly after the lawsuit was filed, Denver stopped collecting the <a href=\"https://aclu-co.org/aclu-and-denver-settle-case-of-man-held-in-jail-over-a-50-fee/\">$30 booking fee, the $50 bond fee</a>, and the <a href=\"http://www.denvergov.org/content/denvergov/en/department-of-safety/news/2018/department-of-public-safety-waives-pretrial-electronic-monitorin.html\">pretrial electronic monitoring fees</a>. On December 13, Denver submitted an Offer of Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and agreed to pay $30,000 to cover attorney\u2019s fees and costs. On December 21, the plaintiff accepted the offer, and then on January 30, 2019, voluntarily dismissed the case. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In October 2018, a plaintiff sued Denver over its bond fee requirement. Within a few months, the defendants changed their policy and submitted an Offer of Judgment. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On May 1, 2012, a D.C. resident whose car was seized by Metropolitan Police Department officers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the District of Columbia under <i> Bivens</i>, claiming that their actions were a violation of the Fifth Amendment due process clause. The plaintiff, represented by the D.C. Public Defender Service, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff claimed that the D.C. policy of seizing and retaining private vehicles pending civil forfeiture proceedings without providing vehicle owners with a post-deprivation hearing before a neutral arbiter was unconstitutional. The plaintiff was charged with several crimes relating to alleged possession of a firearm and was acquitted of all charges by jury trial. When seeking the return of his car, the police officers required him to pay a bond of over $1200 in order to challenge their possession of the vehicle. After reducing the bond to $800, the plaintiff began civil forfeiture proceedings but was not allowed to use the car in the interim. On July 6, 2012, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the District's failure to provide a post-seizure hearing to plaintiff violated his due process rights and ordered District to release the vehicle pending the forfeiture hearing, ordered the plaintiff to keep his vehicle and maintain insurance during the hearing, and gave the plaintiff a security deposit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) for $1000. On October 19, 2012, the parties agreed to a private settlement that is not publicly available.", "summary": "In 2012, U.S. District Court of D.C. found that the policy of seizing and retaining private vehicles pending civil forfeiture proceedings without providing a post-deprivation hearing was unconstitutional."}
{"article": "The city of Doraville relied on its municipal court as a source of revenue. The city received millions of dollars of its budget from court fines and forfeitures. As Doraville\u2019s City Council heavily relied on these revenues to balance the city\u2019s budget, its municipal court personnel, who serve at the pleasure of the City Council, had a financial incentive to convict defendants. In addition, the city\u2019s law enforcement personnel, who also ultimately serve at the pleasure of its City Council, had an incentive to ticket and prosecute to raise revenue. On May 23, 2018, four individuals who had been ticketed or threatened to be ticketed by the City of Doraville filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court Northern District of Georgia. The case was assigned to Judge Richard W. Story. Represented by Strickland Brockington Lewis, LLP, and the Institute for Justice, the plaintiffs sued the City of Doraville under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 and the Declaratory Judgments Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the City\u2019s policy and practice of using its law enforcement and municipal court system for revenue generation violated the plaintiffs' due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the complaint claimed that the \u201cfinancial incentive to ticket and prosecute injects an unconstitutional financial bias or an appearance of such bias into law enforcement and prosecutorial discretion.\u201d The plaintiffs sought declarative and injunctive relief from Doraville\u2019s policy and practice of budgeting to receive revenues from fines and fees. The defendant sought to dismiss the complaint on July 2, 2018, claiming that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the complaint failed to state a claim as a matter of law. On April 1, 2019, the court (Judge Richard Story) denied in part the motion to dismiss. The court found that the plaintiffs successfully alleged standing, as the complaint is replete with allegations showing that plaintiffs were personally harmed, and are likely to be harmed in the future, from the city\u2019s allegedly unlawful actions. Regarding the complaint\u2019s failure to state a claim as a matter of law, the court found itself \u201cunable to adequately assess whether Plaintiffs\u2019 claims are legally cognizable...as a result of the paucity of relevant case law.\u201d As such, the court ordered a hearing to address the proper standard of review and its application in this case. 2019 WL 3557893. This hearing was held on June 4, 2019. After reconsidering the motion to dismiss, the court denied the motion on July 9, 2019. Stating that \u201cto state a plausible due process claim for institutional bias, Plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts to establish two things: (1) that there is a conflict of interest and (2) that the conflict of interest is substantial\u201d, the court found that the plaintiffs established both. 391 F.Supp.3d 1207. As of June 2020, this case is ongoing.", "summary": "On May 23, 2018, four individuals who had been ticketed or threatened to be ticketed by the City of Doraville filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The case was assigned to Judge Richard W. Story. Represented by Strickland Brockington Lewis, LLP, and the Institute for Justice, the plaintiffs sued the City of Doraville under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Declaratory Judgments Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the city\u2019s policy and practice of using its law enforcement and municipal court system for revenue generation violated the plaintiffs' due process rights. The plaintiffs sought declarative and injunctive relief from Doraville\u2019s policy and practice of budgeting to receive revenues from fines and fees. The defendant sought to dismiss the case on July 2, 2018; the court denied the motion to dismiss on July 9, 2019. This case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On May 22, 2012, several national and local news agencies filed a \u00a7 1983 lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho, Southern Division, against the state of Idaho. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the policy of the Idaho Department of Correction to prohibit public viewing of the preparatory phase of the execution process, during which the inmate is restrained and the IV is inserted, violates the First Amendment right to free speech and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Along with their complaint, plaintiffs filed an expedited motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking to have the procedures in question enjoined before the execution of Richard Leavitt on June 12. The District Court (Judge Edward J. Lodge) granted the motion to expedite on May 24, but on June 5 the court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge Lodge found that while the plaintiffs have a strong case on the merits and the public has an interest in viewing an execution in its entirety, the motion was not filed in a timely manner, and to allow it would disrupt a scheduled execution that the public has an even greater interest in seeing carried out. Plaintiffs immediately filed an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit. On June 8, 2012, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court. A three-judge panel (Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, Judge Stephen R. Reinhardt, and Judge Marsha S. Berzon) stated in an opinion by Judge Reinhardt that its ruling in California First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002), had clearly indicated that Idaho's policy was unconstitutional for the reasons noted by the plaintiffs, that Idaho had had a decade to correct this policy, and thus that any problems of timing were the fault of the state and not of the plaintiffs. It further found that the District Court had abused its discretion in balancing the four elements the plaintiff must prove for a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the appeals panel reversed the District Court and remanded for entry of an injunction prior to the execution of Richard Leavitt. The District Court (Judge Lodge) entered an injunction on June 11 and directed the parties to submit a joint litigation plan by June 22. On July 10, 2012, Judge Lodge entered a permanent injunction ordering the Idaho Department of Corrections, and responsible parties associated therewith, to modify their procedures to allow the witnesses to the execution of a condemned inmate to observe the entire execution from the moment the inmate enters the execution chamber through, to and including, the time the inmate is declared dead. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On May 22, 2012, several national and local news agencies filed a \u00a7 1983 lawsuit against the state of Idaho, alleging that the policy of the Idaho Department of Correction to prohibit public viewing of the preparatory phase of the execution process, during which the inmate is restrained and the IV is inserted, violates the First Amendment right to free speech and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The District Court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on June 5, 2012, but the Ninth Circuit reversed the denial, on June 8, in time for the injunction to apply to the scheduled execution of Richard Leavitt. On July 10, the District Court entered a permanent injunction ordering the Idaho Department of Corrections to modify their execution procedures to allow witnesses to the execution throughout the entire execution process."}
{"article": "On December 12, 2016, seven prisoners in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs sued the State of Illinois and its attorney general under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. Represented by private counsel, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Illinois, by its policies regarding individuals convicted of sex-related offenses, had violated their rights under the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments. The case was assigned to Judge Virginia M. Kendall. Individuals convicted of certain sex-related offenses under Illinois law are subject to overlapping statutory and regulatory schemes that make it difficult for prisoners to satisfy conditions required for their release from prison. The Illinois Unified Code of Corrections provides that for all felony convictions, the sentencing court must provide within the sentencing order a term of parole or mandatory supervised release (MSR). Individuals convicted after July 1, 2005 of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual criminal assault, or criminal sexual assault, and individuals convicted after January 1, 2009 of aggravated child pornography or manufacturing or dissemination of child pornography were subject to a mandatory indeterminate term of MSR. The indeterminate duration of MSR could range from three years to life: an individual could only apply for termination of his indeterminate MSR sentence after completing three years of MSR outside of prison. A prisoner could not receive credit for MSR time served while in custody. The Prison Review Board (PRB) required that before inmates could be released from IDOC custody, they had to have an approved \u201chost site\u201d to reside at while serving their MSR term. IDOC only approved host sites that met all housing restrictions imposed by statute, by IDOC, and by the Prison Review Board. Illinois did not provide housing resources for inmates, and halfway homes and homeless shelters automatically rejected individuals with sex-related convictions. Each plaintiff had either submitted multiple host sites and been denied by the IDOC, or was indigent and had no housing options to select for their host site. The plaintiffs alleged that the multiple restrictions created an unmeetable condition that forced them to spend the duration of their MSR term incarcerated. For the plaintiffs that were given an indeterminate MSR sentence, the unmeetable conditions resulted in life imprisonment. On February 17, 2017, IDOC moved to dismiss the complaint on three grounds:<ol><li>Two of the plaintiffs\u2019 claims lacked standing because they had not yet completed their incarceration sentences; <li>The plaintiffs\u2019 claim against the duration of their confinement should have been raised as a habeas action, not under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983; and <li>The plaintiffs\u2019 claims failed to allege sufficient facts for their constitutional claims.</ol>On August 18, 2017, the court granted in part IDOC\u2019s motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs did not need to file a habeas action in order to receive the requested relief, and that all constitutional claims were appropriate except for the due process claim. The court granted, however, IDOC\u2019s motion to dismiss with respect to two plaintiffs because their claims were based on post-release conditions and the plaintiffs had not yet been released. She further granted the motion with respect to the plaintiffs\u2019 procedural due process claim because of vagueness. On December 6, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for class certification and appointment of class counsel. They sought to certify a class of inmates who had completed their sentenced term and were currently detained in the IDOC and denied release because of their inability to find an approved host site. The court approved the unopposed motion on April 6, 2018, defining the class as all individuals sentenced to serve \u201cthree-years-to-life\u201d on MSR, currently detained in IDOC, who have been approved for release on MSR but have been denied release from IDOC custody because of their inability to obtain an approved host site. Once discovery ended, both parties sought summary judgment. On March 31, 2019, the court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment in part and denied IDOC\u2019s cross-motion for summary judgment. The court held that the state\u2019s host site requirement resulted in the continued deprivation of the plaintiffs\u2019 Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. The court also addressed whether the proper vehicle to bring the plaintiffs\u2019 claims was 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 or a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and determined that the plaintiffs properly brought their claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 because they were not seeking release from custody, but rather the proper application of law to their situation. The court found that there was a genuine issue material fact as to whether IDOC offered a procedure for determining the validity of a decision to deny a host site, and denied summary judgment on that claim. Both parties met on May 1, 2019, for a settlement conference and held further status hearings on June 18, 2019, October 1, 2019, December 3, 2019, January 2, 2020. On January 15, 2020, the court granted a permanent injunction. According to the order, IDOC was required to present a plan, as well as quarterly reports outlining steps that would be taken to ensure that by January 2, 2021, no class member would remain in IDOC custody due to an inability to locate a host site. On January 29, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a bill of costs, and on February 18, 2020, the court awarded costs to the plaintiffs in the amount of $3,015.41. On February 27, 2020, IDOC presented a compliance plan to the court, pursuant to the injunction. The plan outlined the steps that IDOC had already taken to assist class members, such as host site policy changes and a review of host site denials. It also outlined additional steps that IDOC was then undertaking to release class members, such as finalizing a Request for Proposal for licensed transitional housing locations for sex offenders, and cooperation with the Illinois Department of Human Services to identify appropriate placements and/or services for class members who would likely qualify for that department\u2019s services upon their release. On June 15, 2020, IDOC presented a quarterly report further outlining the steps that it was then taking to release class members. As of July 2020, the court\u2019s supervision of the settlement is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2016, prisoners that had completed their sentences but remained incarcerated by the Illinois Department of Corrections filed this class action against the state in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs alleged that the Illinois statutory scheme governing mandatory supervised release (MSR) for sex offenders and the requirement for offenders to have an approved \u201chost site\u201d in order to be released from custody violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court awarded the plaintiffs summary judgment on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court entered a permanent injunction on January 15, 2020, requiring IDOC to present a plan for releasing class members from custody, and quarterly reports outlining steps that were being taken to ensure that all class members would be properly released by January 2, 2021. As of July 2020, the court's supervision of IDOC's progress is ongoing."}
{"article": "On October 21, 2015, an arrestee filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas. The plaintiff sued Dodge City and Ford County under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiff alleged that the Dodge City's wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and a declaratory judgment that the City's wealth-based detention practices were unlawful. The plaintiff, a Native American citizen of Dodge City, was arrested and held at the Ford County Jail because he could not pay $250 to the City of Dodge City. In Dodge City, arrestees faced two different outcomes depending on their wealth status: Wealthy arrestees paid an amount set by the bail schedule and were not held in jail, while poor arrestees were put in jail for 48 hours because they could not afford to pay the City's pre-determined bail for their offense. Bail amounts ranged from $250-$2500. Under the City's scheme, the sole criterion for determining whether a pretrial arrestee walked free or sat in jail was the amount of money that he had. The plaintiff alleged that this policy and practice of using a fixed \"bail schedule\" to determine the amount of money necessary to secure post-arrest release and the practice of requiring cash up-front to avoid post-arrest detention violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The plaintiff sought to certify a class on behalf of himself and all other arrestees unable to pay for their release pursuant to Dodge City's fixed bail schedule who were, are, or who will become in the custody of Dodge City. On November 25, 2015 and on February 24, 2016, the court (Judge Teresa J. James) granted motions to stay all proceedings to allow the parties to explore a non-litigation resolution. On April 22, 2016, the parties submitted a joint motion for entry of final declaratory and injunctive relief and joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice. On April 26, 2016, the court (Judge Daniel D. Crabtree) issued a declaratory judgment, stating that persons cannot, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, be held in custody after a non-warrant arrest because they are too poor to post a monetary bond. It also entered an injunction, ordering the release of individuals arrested for non-warrant arrests in Dodge City for violation of municipal ordinances on Own Recognizance Bonds without further conditions of release and without requiring posting any monetary bond. The court dismissed the plaintiff\u2019s motion for class certification, motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and remaining claims with prejudice. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the injunction, but the case appears closed otherwise. 2016 WL 9051913.", "summary": "On October 21, 2015, a private plaintiff sued the City of Dodge City, Kansas and Ford County in a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiff alleged that the Dodge City's wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and a declaration that the City's wealth-based detention practices were unlawful. The parties agreed to settle that the City would be enjoined from holding an arrestee in custody after a non-warrant arrest on the basis of inability to post bond. The court retains jurisdiction to enforce the injunction but the case otherwise appears closed."}
{"article": "On November 30, 2015, a resident of Clark County, Kentucky, who was arrested and admitted to jail filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky against the Clark County Detention Center (Jail). The complaint alleged that the Jail wrongly deprived the plaintiffs of property without due process of law and charged costs of their incarceration absent court order, including for plaintiffs who were subsequently acquitted. The complaint alleged that this violated Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) \u00a7441.265, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs were represented by private counsel. The individual plaintiff who filed the suit had been arrested and admitted to the Jail on October 26, 2013; he remained incarcerated until his release on December 15, 2014. Plaintiff maintained that the criminal charges for which he was incarcerated were dismissed midway on April 2, 2015, because the plaintiff proved he was entirely innocent of such offenses. After release, plaintiff received a written demand from the Jail to pay in excess of $4,000 in fees relating to his incarceration. As of November 30, 2015, the plaintiff paid $20 and refused to pay the remaining balance on the grounds that KRS \u00a7441.265 allowed a jail to charge detainees the costs of their confinement only with a court order and consideration of the detainee's financial obligations. Moreover, the plaintiff alleged, the jail could not charge innocent detainees and was required to accounting for the funds collected. The plaintiff further maintained that if KRS \u00a7441.265 is interpreted otherwise, then it violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Kentucky Constitution. The plaintiff sought both compensatory and punitive damages arising from the conduct of the defendants, and declaratory judgment and permanent injunction of the practice. On January 14, 2016, the defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's claims. On March 11, 2016, the court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed all claims alleged in the complaint with prejudice, and all pending motions were denied moot. In the opinion, district judge Joseph Hood found that the plaintiffs were \"prisoners\" within the definition of KRS \u00a7441.005(3), which allows courts to impose detention fees without the order of a sentencing court and without respect to guilt or innocence. Judge Hood found, moreover, that the facts pleaded did not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation and that the state had a legitimate interest in recouping costs from inmates. Accordingly, on March 11, 2016, the court ordered judgment in favor of the defendants. 2016 WL 1050743. The plaintiffs appealed. On December 19, 2016, the 6th Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion. 2016 WL 7338530. In that opinion, by Judge Rodgers, the Court of Appeals explained that at oral argument, counsel for the defendants \"disavowed any further efforts to obtain the $4,000 beyond the $20 already received.\" Because the county was no longer trying to collect the bill, the court said, plaintiff didn't have a property interest to assert. Plaintiff sought rehearing en banc, but the 6th Circuit denied that motion. This case is closed.", "summary": "In 2015, prisoners in the Kentucky Clark County Jail filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, alleging that the state did not afford adequate procedural right prior to unlawfully charging inmates a fee for their incarceration without an order from the sentencing court. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment, permanent injunction of the practice, and monetary damages. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissed all claims alleged in the complaint with prejudice, and all pending motions were denied moot. In 2016, the plaintiffs appealed but the appeals court affirmed the judgment of the district court."}
{"article": "On August 7, 2017, two residents of East Baton Rouge Parish filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued East Baton Rouge Parish and Rehabilitation Home Incarceration (RHI) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1964(c), the Federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), and state law. The case was assigned to Judge Shelly D. Dick. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and the Southern Poverty Law Center, sought monetary relief and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had violated federal and state anti-racketeering law, Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. According to the plaintiffs, RHI purported to provide pretrial supervision services and profited from individuals in East Baton Rouge Parish by requiring them to pay hundreds of dollars to RHI to be released from jail, effectively holding them for ransom. People awaiting trial before a criminal court were coerced into paying hundreds of dollars to companies before and after they were released from jail, even after paying bail. The complaint alleged that RHI turned pre-trial release into a for-profit concern that fueled wealth-based incarceration, harming low-income people who had not been convicted of a crime. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding the Sheriff of East Baton Rouge as a defendant on August 8, 2017. A few days later the plaintiffs filed a notice voluntarily dismissing East Baton Rouge Parish as a defendant. On September 27, 2017, the court approved the dismissal. On October 27, 2017, the Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish filed a motion to dismiss all claims against him for failure to state a claim, arguing that even if the plaintiffs\u2019 constitutional rights were violated, the alleged policy of the sheriff was not the \u201cmoving force\u201d behind the alleged violations. In February 2018, RHI and its executive director also filed a motion to dismiss with similar arguments. On June 5, 2018, Judge Dick granted the Sheriff\u2019s motion to dismiss, finding that there was no plausible basis to support the conclusory allegations that the Sheriff was \u201cin agreement\u201d or part of a \u201cscheme\u201d with RHI. 2018 WL 2708752. Judge Dick also dismissed RHI's motion to dismiss on September 12, 2018, claiming, among other things, that Defendants utterly failed to brief the elements of both the federal and state RICO claims and failed to argue how the Complaint fails to state a claim, and the facts asserted in the complaint plausibly plead that RHI was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation. 2018 WL 4355199 The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on June 12, 2019. This complaint replaced an individual plaintiff with another individual plaintiff and removed the Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish as a defendant. On July 2, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming, among other things, that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The parties reached a settlement agreement-in-principle and notified the court on Dec 5, 2019 that they are currently finalizing the final written settlement agreement to conclude this matter. Upon receiving this notification, the court dismissed the case, stating that upon good cause shown within sixty days, the court will reopen the action if the settlement is not consummated. The plaintiffs, having reached a confidential settlement agreement with the defendants on this case, moved to dismiss the case with prejudice on February 20, 2020. The court dismissed the case with prejudice on the same day.", "summary": "This 2017 class lawsuit was brought by two residents of East Baton Rouge Parish in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs alleged that, in charging fees in addition to bail to be released from prison before trial, the defendant RHI had violated federal and state anti-racketeering law, their Due Process and Equal Protection rights, and the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The parties reached a private settlement, and the case was dismissed on February 20, 2020."}
{"article": "On September 17, 2015, indigent former criminal defendants filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued the City of New Orleans, the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court (OPCDC), the court\u2019s judges, judicial administrators, and the city\u2019s sheriff department, all under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Civil Rights Corps and private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had a practice of imprisoning individuals who had failed to pay court debts without meaningfully determining whether the individuals had the ability to pay the debt. Moreover, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants issued unlawful warrants for their arrest and illegally kept them imprisoned. The defendants moved to dismiss the sheriff from the lawsuit on October 3, 2015, and later on November, 2, 2015, the defendants moved to dismiss several of individual defendants from the lawsuit. The defendants argued three points: first, that there was a lack of jurisdiction to retain the defendants in this lawsuit, second, that the plaintiff did not join indispensable parties to the lawsuit, and third, that the judicial defendants enjoyed qualified immunity. On April 21, 2016, Judge Sarah Vance denied the defendants request to dismiss the defendants on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and failure to join indispensable parties. 186 F.Supp.3d 536. On May 3, 2016, Judge Vance granted in part and denied in part the defendants' request to dismiss the judicial defendants on the grounds that they enjoyed absolute and qualified immunity. On May 11, 2016, the court dismissed the judicial administrator along with several other defendants from the lawsuit. However, the court still allowed the plaintiffs to seek declaratory relief. 184 F.Supp.3d 349. The parties began settlement negotiations. On December 13, 2017, Judge Vance granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The Court found that (1) judges had a policy/practice of failing to conduct any inquiry into plaintiffs\u2019 ability to pay court debts before plaintiffs are imprisoned for non-payment; (2) this failure to inquire violated due process; (3) judges\u2019 control over both fines and fees revenue and ability-to-pay determinations violated due process; and (4) judges faced a substantial conflict of interest when they were determining the ability to pay fines and fees. On April 24, 2018, the plaintiffs and the Orleans Parish Sheriff reached a compromise about two related civil actions, and so the court ordered partial dismissal without costs and without prejudice to the right to reopen those actions, retaining jurisdiction to enforce that settlement if it was not consummated within 60 days. On August 2, 2018, Judge Vance granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification as all persons who owe or will incur court debts arising from cases adjudicated in OPCDC, with the subclass of all members whose debts are at least partly owed to the OPCDC Judicial Expense Fund. On August 3, 2018, the court filed a declaratory judgment, holding that the Judges\u2019 policy or practice of not inquiring into the ability of the persons falling within the certified class to pay before they are imprisoned for non-payment of court debts was unconstitutional, and that the Judges\u2019 failure to provide a neutral forum for determination of such persons\u2019 ability to pay was also unconstitutional. The court invoked the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits a state actor from arresting or detaining a criminal defendant solely for failure to pay a court-imposed debt absent a determination of ability to pay, and which also requires a state court to provide a neutral forum in which to adjudicate ability to pay. 2018 WL 3657447. On August 21, 2018, the defendants appealed to Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court on August 23, 2019. 937 F.3d 446. The defendants petitioned the Fifth Circuit to rehear the case en banc on September 6, 2019, but the court denied rehearing on September 30. The defendants filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court on December 20, 2019. Cert was denied on March 3, 2020. Meanwhile, back in the district court, the plaintiffs moved the court for supplemental relief on February 25, 2019. The plaintiffs argued that a more specific declaratory judgment was appropriate and asked the court to decree it unconstitutional for any Orleans Parish Criminal District Court debtor to be imprisoned for willful nonpayment absent (1) a meaningful inquiry into the debtor\u2019s ability to pay, preceded by notice of the importance of that issue and including an opportunity for the debtor to be heard on it, and (2) a finding that the debtor is able to pay. The defendants filed an opposition motion on March 19. On March 30, 2021, Judge Vance granted the plaintiff's request for more specific declaratory relief. As of March 29, 2021, this case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2015, indigent former criminal defendants filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Plaintiffs alleged that that the defendants had a practice of imprisoning individuals who had failed to pay court debts without meaningfully determining whether the individuals had the ability to pay the debt. In August 2018, granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification, and held that the Judges\u2019 policy/practice of not inquiring into the ability of the persons falling within the certified class to pay before they are imprisoned for non-payment of court debts was unconstitutional, and that the Judges\u2019 failure to provide a neutral forum for determination of such persons\u2019 ability to pay was unconstitutional. The defendants appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court on August 23, 2019. The defendants petitioned the Fifth Circuit to rehear the case en banc on September 6, 2019, but the court denied to rehear on September 30. The defendants filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court on December 20, 2019. Cert was denied on March 3, 2020."}
{"article": "On November 11, 2019, a pretrial detainee filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana alleging that twelve judges of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court (\"OPCDC\") unlawfully imposed secured financial conditions of release in an amount that individuals cannot afford, without any inquiry into or findings concerning their ability to pay or alternatives to incarceration. The lawsuit was brought under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2201\u2013 02 alleging violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and seeking declaratory relief. The Plaintiff, represented by the MacArthur Justice Center and Civil Rights Corps, sued on behalf of a putative class consisting of all individuals with pending state misdemeanor or felony cases who would, after acceptance of their charges by the District Attorney, appear before the Defendant Judges for proceedings concerning pretrial release. The complaint alleged that the Defendant judges\u2019 imposition of bail without inquiring whether the arrestee could pay it constituted de facto orders of pretrial detention for those unable to pay. This constitutional violation was allegedly incentivized by the Defendants\u2019 institutional financial conflict of interest. If (and only if) an arrestee uses a commercial surety to secure pretrial release, the OPCDC judges receive 0.8% of the amount of that bond that goes into a general fund used to pay a variety of expenses related to the judiciary. The Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on December 20 which added one more Plaintiff to represent the class. The case was initially assigned to Judge Greg Gerard Guidry, but after he recused himself it was reassigned to Judge Carl Barbier. It was then transferred to Judge Eldon Falon who oversaw the proceedings in <i>Caliste v. Cantrell</i>, a similar case that alleged improper bail practices against a magistrate judge in the Criminal District Court. Read more about <i>Caliste v. Cantrell</i> <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15935\">here</a>. On March 13, 2020, the Defendants moved to dismiss the claims for lack of jurisdiction. The Defendants argued that the Plaintiffs\u2019 claim was not redressible because the court cannot eliminate the Judges\u2019 roles as both adjudicators of criminal matters and administrators of the general fund. Defendants argued that Louisiana law established the Judges\u2019 role as adjudicators and fund administrators, and the Plaintiffs attacked the Judges\u2019 impartiality but did not challenge the constitutionality of the Louisiana statutes. The defendants filed a second motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on March 31. A hearing was held on May 27, 2020 regarding Plaintiffs\u2019 motion to certify the class and both of Defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Also, Judge Fallon granted Plaintiffs\u2019 motion to consolidate this case with <i>Matthews v. Herman</i> (No. 20-cv-1275) as the cases involved common parties and questions of law. 2020 WL 3036065. The Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on July 6, contending that the injuries were too speculative and could not be attributed to any particular judge. On August 21, Judge Fallon denied the Plaintiffs' motion to certify, finding that there was not sufficient evidence to support the assertion that the Defendant-judges acted in a uniform manner. Judge Fallon noted that the Plaintiffs could seek certification again after engaging in discovery. In the same order, Judge Fallon also denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss as the Court declined to determine whether the Plaintiffs had standing before deciding the class certification question. 2020 WL 4923626. Additionally, on July 7, the parties agreed to a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of the Plaintiffs' due process claim based on a financial conflict of interest in Defendants\u2019 pretrial detention practices. As of September 7, the case is ongoing.", "summary": "A class-action lawsuit sought declaratory judgment against twelve Louisiana judges, alleging that the judges violated Plaintiffs' Due Process and Equal Protection rights by imposing bail without determining whether arrestees could pay. The complaint also alleged an improper financial incentive for judges to impose bail in order to receive a portion of the money for their general expense fund."}
{"article": "COVID Summary: This is a class action suit regarding the legality of detention orders that are holding detainees at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison for up to years and detrimental to life during the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on December 14, 2020, but withdrew the request for a temporary restraining order in January 2021. A settlement conference is scheduled for March 11, and a joint status report is due on March 21. This case is ongoing. <hr> On December 14, 2020, four individuals who were being held at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (EBRPP) filed this class action lawsuit against 5 officials of the 19th Judicial District Courthouse, the sheriff, and the warden of EBRPP in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued for violations of their Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by the MacArthur Justice Center, Advancement Project, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, release of class members, and attorneys' fees. The case was assigned to Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick and Magistrate Judge Scott D. Johnson. The plaintiffs alleged that hundreds of individuals, most of whom were poor and black, were confined at EBRPP for up to years as a result of the defendant judicial officials' actions. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants ignored the detainees' likelihood to appear at trial, risk of danger to the community, and ability to pay monetary conditions of release, which violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants ignored procedural protections, including failing to provide the detainees notice of hearing, opportunity to present evidence, and assistance to counsel prior to issuing pretrial detention orders, which violated due process. Additionally, they alleged that the defendants denied plaintiffs' counsel to make substantive arguments prior to issuing detention orders in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Lastly, the plaintiffs noted that EBRPP 's dilapidated conditions and history of poor medical care placed the detainees at an increased risk of the COVID-19 pandemic. On December 14, 2020, the plaintiffs moved to proceed anonymously and for certification of the proposed class of \"all individuals who are in the custody of the East baton Rouge Sheriff's office after their arrest and who have been or will be subjected to the bail practices of the Judges and Commissioners of the 19th Judicial District Court.\" The following day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the defendant sheriff and warden. The plaintiffs requested release of the named plaintiffs and for the court to enjoin the defendant sheriff and warden from detaining individuals whose bail conditions were determined at hearings that violated due process and equal protection. The plaintiffs filed declarations from *** pretrial detainees, some of whom have illnesses that make them vulnerable to COVID-19, have had arraignments delayed due to COVID-19, or cite inappropriate social distancing or hygiene practices. On December 17, the plaintiffs moved for expedited discovery and on January 12, 2021, the plaintiffs filed an emergency second motion for expedited discovery and request for status conference. The court granted the motion in part and scheduled a status conference to discuss the plaintiffs' discovery request. At the January 14 conference, the court denied the plaintiff's first motion for expedited discovery as moot and granted in part the emergency second motion. The parties agreed to the scope of expedited discovery and set a discovery deadline of January 20, 2021. On January 17, the plaintiffs moved to withdraw the request for temporary restraining order, which was granted on January 19. The plaintiffs then filed a joint motion to continue hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction, which was granted on January 21 and set a deadline of March 21 for the parties to file a joint status report. The case remains ongoing with a settlement conference was scheduled for March 11, and with the defendants' responsive pleading to the complaint due on March 22, 2021.", "summary": "In December 2020, four individuals at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (EBRPP) filed this class action lawsuit alleging violations of their Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment rights by judicial and prison officials. On December 15, the plaintiffs filed a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The request for a temporary restraining order was later withdrawn in January 2021. A settlement conference is scheduled for March 11 and the deadline for the parties to file a joint status report is March 21. The defendants' responsive pleading to the complaint is due on March 22, 2021. This case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On January 19, 2006, a death-sentenced inmate of the Maryland Correctional Adjustment Center in Baltimore, Maryland filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Maryland Department of Correction in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiff, whose execution was scheduled to take place during the week of February 6, 2006, sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from carrying out his execution using their current practices and procedures for lethal injection. The plaintiff's specific objection was to the three-drug cocktail (sodium pentothal, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride) used in Maryland's lethal injections. He alleged that particular skill was required to properly administer sodium pentothal, which was intended to induce general anesthesia, and that improper administration of the drug would lead to excruciating, torturous pain during the administration of the other two drugs. Due to this, the plaintiff argued that the defendants' lethal injection procedures arbitrarily and unnecessarily created a grave risk that he would suffer extreme pain during his execution, thus violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The next day, the plaintiff filed a similar complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, naming as co-plaintiffs the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Maryland (ACLU), and the Maryland Citizens Against State Executions (MCASE). In this complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had failed to follow Maryland law (Md. Code Ann., State Gov't \u00a73-905) in adopting their execution protocol because it had not been formally adopted under the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA), thereby depriving the state's citizens of the opportunity to ensure that executions were carried out in a proper and humane manner and increasing the risk that the executed prisoners would suffer unnecessarily during their executions. They asked the court to issue a temporary restraining order and to enjoin the defendants from performing any executions until they had come into compliance with the law. On February 1, 2006, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland (Judge Benson Everett Legg) denied both the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and his motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that Maryland's three-drug protocol did not endanger the plaintiff's constitutional rights. The court reasoned that thirty-five of the thirty-seven states who used lethal injection as a means of execution used the same protocol as Maryland, and that the Fourth Circuit had already ruled that this protocol did not run afoul of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiff appealed the following day, asking the District Court to stay the execution pending the outcome of the appeal. On the same day, the District Court (Judge Legg) denied the request to stay the execution. On February 3, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Judge James Harvie Wilkinson III) denied without opinion the plaintiff's motion for an injunction pending appeal. On February 13, the plaintiff asked the Fourth Circuit to dismiss the appeal, and on February 15, 2006, the Fourth Circuit (Judge Wilkinson) granted that motion. From September 19-22, 2006, the U.S. District Court held an evidentiary hearing, and both sides filed motions for summary judgment. On December 1, 2006, the District Court ordered the defendants to explore the potential availability of surgeons, anesthesiologists, and certified registered nurse anesthetists to assist in the execution. On December 7, 2006, the Court ordered the defendants to submit a written plan describing the parameters of a proposed search. Meanwhile, on December 19, 2006, the Maryland Court of Appeals invalidated the Maryland execution protocols until such time as they were properly adopted under the MAPA or exempted from that requirement by an act of the Maryland General Assembly. The court enjoined the defendants from utilizing its current lethal injection protocol and checklist until one of these two events occurred. Evans v. Saar, 396 Md. 256 (Md. Ct. App. 2006). On January 29, 2007, Senate Bill 239 was introduced in the Maryland General Assembly and assigned to committee. If adopted that bill would exempt the death penalty protocols from the requirements of the MAPA. On the same day, House Bill 225 was introduced in the Maryland General Assembly and assigned to committee. If adopted, that bill would repeal the death penalty in Maryland. In light of these rapid changes, the parties issued a joint motion asking the District Court to stay the proceedings in this case until the passage of one of the two proposed bills in the legislature. On February 21, 2007, the District Court agreed to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of the legislation and ordered the parties to file a status report every 90 days. On March 14, 2011, the parties filed a joint status report pursuant to the Court's order of February 22, 2007. The status report stated that all executions in Maryland had been stayed until the administrative regulations governing the death penalty process are properly adopted. On August 16, 2012 the Court ordered that the case be administratively closed. Subsequently, in May 2013, the Maryland legislature repealed the death penalty for all future convictions, and in December 2014 Governor O'Malley <a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/gov-omalley-commutes-sentences-of-marylands-remaining-death-row-inmates/2014/12/31/044b553a-90ff-11e4-a412-4b735edc7175_story.html\">commuted the death sentences </a>of the four remaining death-row inmates to life without the possibility of parole.", "summary": "On January 19, 2006, a death-sentenced inmate of the Maryland Correctional Adjustment Center in Baltimore, Maryland filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Maryland Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiff objected to the three-drug cocktail (sodium pentothal, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride) used in Maryland's lethal injections. The plaintiff argued that the defendant's lethal injection procedures arbitrarily and unnecessarily created a grave risk that he would suffer extreme pain during his execution, thus violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiff also filed a similar complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City alleging that the defendants failed to follow Maryland law because the execution protocol had not been adopted under the Maryland Administrative Procedures Act (MAPA). On December 19, 2006 the Maryland Court of Appeals invalidated the Maryland execution protocols until such time as they were properly adopted under MAPA or exempted from that requirement by an act of the Maryland General Assembly. On January 29, 2007, two bills were introduced in the Maryland General Assembly, one that would exempt the death penalty protocols from the MAPA requirement and one that would repeal the death penalty in the state. The judge agreed to stay the proceedings of this case pending the outcome of the legislation. According to the status report on March 14, 2011, all executions in Maryland had been stayed until the proper administrative regulations were adopted. On August 16, 2012 this case was administratively closed. In May 2013 the Maryland legislature repealed the death penalty for all future convictions and in December 2014 Governor O'Malley commuted the death sentences of the four remaining death-row inmates to life without the possibility of parole."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a case challenging the legality of the Small Business Administration's decision to exclude small business owners from parts of the CARES Act, passed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. On July 21, the court granted a preliminary injunction extending the deadline to apply for a loan for the named plaintiffs. <hr> In response to the economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020, Congress passed the CARES Act, which created, among other things, the \u201cPaycheck Protection Program.\u201d Under this program, small business owners could apply for a loan from the Small Business Administration; if they later certified that all of the loan funds had been used for qualifying expenses, the loan would be forgiven. The Act authorized the SBA to use a streamlined rulemaking process, in order to distribute the $669 billion fund as quickly as possible. The SBA\u2019s Interim Final Rules rendered many small business owners with criminal records ineligible; the Interim Final Rules were changed several times between April and June 2020. On June 16, 2020, three organizations and two individual plaintiffs filed this lawsuit challenging the legality of the SBA\u2019s decision to exclude small business owners based on their criminal histories. Represented by the ACLU, the Public Interest Law Center, the Washington Lawyers\u2019 Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, and private counsel, they sued the Small Business Administration in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. Their complaint alleged that the SBA had no statutory authority under the CARES Act to add the criminal record exclusions; that the exclusions were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act; that the exclusions had a disparate impact on communities of color; and that the multiple changes to the Interim Final Rules had made it impossible for some qualifying small business owners to apply before the June 30 application deadline. The case was assigned to Judge Catherine C. Blake. The plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring unlawful and setting aside the SBA\u2019s rulemaking action. They also sought an injunction that would:<ol><li> bar the SBA from denying Paycheck Protection Program funds to applicants because of their criminal records,<li>compel the SBA to extend the application deadline three weeks (to July 21, 2020) in all of the states where the plaintiffs operated (Maryland, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, New York, and Washington), and <li>reserve sufficient funds ($31,500) to fill the plaintiffs\u2019 loan requests.</ol>They also sought attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The SBA issued a new set of rules on June 24, which made all of the plaintiffs eligible to apply for loans. However, in a June 29, 2020 ruling, the court declined to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 claims as moot. The SBA had not demonstrated that the plaintiffs would not again be excluded from loan consideration; additionally, the SBA had not granted the requested deadline extension. In that decision, the court found that the June 24 Interim Final Rule was a permissible interpretation of SBA\u2019s statutory authority under the CARES Act. The plaintiffs were thus unlikely to prevail on their claims that the June 24 Interim Final Rule was arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law. The court found, however, that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their arbitrary-and-capricious claims regarding the earlier incarnations of the Interim Final Rule; for that reason, the court granted a preliminary injunction ordering the deadline extended to July 21 for the named plaintiffs, but declined to issue any other requested relief. On July 4, 2020, President Trump signed follow-up legislation that gave all business owners eligible under the June 24 Interim Final Rule until August 8, 2020 to apply. As of July 29, 2020, further developments in the litigation are pending.", "summary": "In response to the economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020, Congress passed the CARES Act, which created, among other things, the \u201cPaycheck Protection Program.\u201d Under this program, small business owners could apply for a loan from the Small Business Administration; if they later certified that all of the loan funds had been used for qualifying expenses, the loan would be forgiven. The SBA\u2019s rules disqualified many small business owners with criminal records. Several small business owners brought this lawsuit against the SBA in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, challenging this criminal record exclusion. On June 29, the court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the SBA to extend the application deadline for the named plaintiffs from June 30 to July 21, 2020. The following week, Congress passed follow-up legislation extending the deadline for all applicants to August 8, 2020. As of July 29, 2020, further developments in the litigation are pending."}
{"article": "On February 8, 2015, persons jailed for failing to pay fines imposed by the City of Ferguson that they could not afford filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. They made a number of allegations against Ferguson, including: (1) that the City failed to conduct an inquiry into whether plaintiffs were able to pay their fines before jailing them, in violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) that the City failed to provide plaintiffs with legal counsel during the proceedings leading to their incarceration, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) that the City jailed plaintiffs indefinitely and without an adequate legal process through which they could challenge their detention, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) that the squalid and unhealthy conditions of Ferguson's jail constituted Cruel and Unusual Punishment, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (5) that the City used jail time and the threat of jail time to deny plaintiffs the substantive and procedural protections that Missouri debtors would have against private creditors, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (6) that the City issued arrest warrants against impoverished persons for failure to pay traffic fines without any finding of probable cause, in violation the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (7) that the City detained plaintiffs arrested without a valid warrant for an extended period without a legitimate government interest, in violation the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Represented by ArchCity Defenders, the Civil Rights Corps, Equal Justice Under Law, lawyers from St. Louis University School of Law, and private counsel including White & Case LLP, the plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201. They sought class action certification, declaratory relief, injunctive relief requiring Ferguson to change its practices and policies to stop violating the U.S. Constitution, damages, and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. On May 26, 2015, the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss in part, dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 claims (5) and (6). 2015 WL 3417420. However, on July 13, 2015, the court granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion for reconsideration, reversing the May 26 order. 2015 WL 4232917. On January 29, 2016, the parties were told to select neutral parties to act as mediators and to schedule mediation to see if they could come to a settlement agreement. On May 10, 2016, the neutral parties reported that though they had mediated in good faith, they were unable to reach a settlement. On April 13, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint. The defendant subsequently filed a partial motion to dismiss two weeks later in response. The plaintiffs in July filed a motion with the court to compel production of emails from the defendant in support of its claim that the City of Ferguson engaged in a \"widespread scheme\" of jailing individuals who could not afford small debts. While the motion to dismiss the amended complaint was denied in November, the court subsequently granted the defendant's claim of privilege on the documents and held a hearing on that issue. The motion to compel documents was eventually granted in part and denied in part to the extent that plaintiffs sufficiently narrowed search terms for the electronic documents. The case proceeded through discovery in 2017. Plaintiffs sought class certification again in June 2017 and simultaneously moved to disqualify defendant's counsel due to a conflict of interest. In August, the court granted the motion to disqualify counsel and extended a stay on the issue of class certification. According to <a href=https://www.propublica.org/article/a-lawsuit-over-ferguson-debtors-prison-drags-on>ProPublica</a>, the firm was disqualified because it had hired a lawyer who had previously represented one of the plaintiffs while working for ArchCity Defenders. The court denied class certification on January 29, 2018 without prejudice to refiling. Once the defendant obtained replacement counsel in September, it moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on Counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 due to sovereign immunity. This further stayed proceedings until resolution on the issue on February 13, 2018, when the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. 2018 WL 10245936. On February 15, the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals of the decision against sovereign immunity. Subsequently, the defendant moved to stay proceedings pending appeal. The plaintiffs had opposed the motion to stay, claiming that there was no ruling for the defendant to appeal. The original trial date in April was vacated. On March 12, 2018, the court granted the stay. The case was administratively closed until resolution of the interlocutory appeal. On January 10, 2019, the Eighth Circuit (Judges Steven Colloton, Raymond Gruender, and L. Steven Grasz) dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that the City was not itself entitled to sovereign immunity and could not invoke the state's sovereign immunity to justify dismissing the suit. 913 F.3d 757. The district court lifted the stay and litigation resumed. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 on March 5, 2020. After briefing, the court denied this motion in full on August 6, 2019. The court found that, contrary to the defendant's arguments, the state municipal court was not a required party whose absence (here due to sovereign immunity) required dismissal. 2019 WL 3577529. Later that month, on August 28, the defendant appealed this order to the Eighth Circuit. The defendant filed a motion to stay proceedings pending appeal the following day. The district court denied this motion on September 19, 2019, and discovery continued. On October 10, 2019, the Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction without explanation. 2019 WL 8194959. The defendant appealed the October 10 Eighth Circuit decision on February 13, 2020. On March 23, 2020 the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. 140 S. Ct. 2515. As of April 2020, discovery is ongoing in the district court.", "summary": "On February 8, 2015, persons jailed for failing to pay their legal fines sued the City of Ferguson in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, arguing that the City violated the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S Constitution. They asked the court for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, monetary damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. The court denied multiple motions to dismiss, and the parties have engaged in extensive discovery. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On May 27, 2015, this lawsuit was brought in the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri by a person arrested by the City of St. Ann (the City), Missouri, who was jailed for a prolonged period after he was unable to pay the fee demanded for his release under the city\u2019s \u201csecured bail\u201d policy. Under that policy, persons arrested for ordinance violations were required to post a bail from $150-350 or spend upwards of 3 days in jail, without any consideration of the person\u2019s ability to pay. The plaintiff argued that the City\u2019s policy violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Represented by public interest organizations ArchCity Defenders and Equal Justice Under Law, the plaintiff brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiff asked the court for class certification to represent other similarly situated individuals, for a declaration that the City had violated the constitutional rights of arrestees who were unable to pay the City\u2019s secured bail, for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief requiring the City to stop jailing arrestees for their inability to pay the City\u2019s secured bail, for damages to the named plaintiff to compensate for his period of confinement, and for legal costs and attorneys\u2019 fees. That same day, plaintiffs moved for class certification for the proposed class: \"all arrestees unable to pay for their release pursuant to St. Ann's fixed bail schedule who are or will become in the custody of St. Ann.\" The next day, the parties asked the judge assigned to the case, Judge Rodney W. Sippel, to grant them a stay in proceedings so that they could conduct settlement negotiations. To that end, plaintiffs dropped their request for preliminary injunctive relief pending the outcome of the negotiations. The day after that, on May 29, 2015, Judge Sippel granted a stay, and asked the parties to report the outcome of the negotiations to him by August 3, 2015. On September 2, 2015, Judge Sippel asked the parties, who had failed to meet his August 3 deadline, to show cause for why he shouldn\u2019t dismissed the case with prejudice or issue sanctions. That same day, the parties issued a joint motion showing the judge their provisional settlement agreement, and explaining that they wanted to see how the changes that the agreement required in the City\u2019s policies worked over the coming year. The next day, Judge Sippel agreed to give the parties twelve months to test the effects of the policy changes, and ordered the defendants to comply with the provisional settlement agreement during that period. Under the provisional settlement agreement, the plaintiffs agreed to drop most of their non-equitable claims (the claims for monetary damages). The defendants agreed to meet most of plaintiff\u2019s demands for injunctive relief, and to give the named plaintiff a $10,000 fee for acting as a class representative. Namely, the defedants agreed to stop requiring arrestees to post a secured bail for release. Instead, they agreed to release arrestees if they agreed to provide an unsecured bond (a bond which requires persons to pay the court only if they fail to adhere to the conditions of their bail) or a recognizance (an alternative set of conditions for preventing persons from violating the terms of their bail to the payment of a monetary fee), except for cases in which the arrestee was a threat and detention was required to protect the community. The defendants also agreed to improve their procedures for notifying arrestees of their court dates, and to release persons arrested for failure to attend court dates on unsecured bonds. The parties agreed that the plaintiff and their counsel would notify defendants of any perceived breach in the agreement, and that the plaintiff and their counsel reserved the right to pursue judgment against defendants if they failed to remedy the breach. The parties also reserved the right to seek modification of the agreement, and if they fail to reach an agreement on modification, to terminate the agreement and resume litigation. On June 5, 2017, Judge Sippel ordered the parties to show cause for why their respective cases should not be dismissed. He noted that both parties had failed to file official settlement documents by the required date he had set. Both parties responded, and a status conference was set. A consent judgment was filed by the defendant and signed on May 4, 2018 by Judge Sippel. In the consent judgement, the defendant specifically agreed to (1) not utilize secured money bail for persons in the custody of the Defendant on arrest; (2) offer any arrested person release from the custody of the Defendant on recognizance or on an unsecured bond as soon as practicable after booking (with the only exception are persons charged with assault, or if release would pose a danger to the community); (3) notify all arrestees in writing upon release from custody when and where they are required to appear in court; (4) specific procedures in relation to traffic stops; (5) mail a notice of a motion for bond forfeiture, should the released person fail to appear in court; and (6) to take appropriate and lawful steps to convert any unsecured bond into a money judgment at any time after non-appearance. The court retained jurisdiction over the consent judgement for two years starting on May 4, 2018. Subsequent to the dissolution of the consent judgment, the defendant agreed to continue to (1) ensure that indigent persons arrested were afforded the necessary protections under the law; and (2) comply with applicable state and federal laws pertaining to the setting of conditions upon pre-trail release from custody. As of May 20, 2020, there has been no further action in the docket and the case is presumed to be closed.", "summary": "On May 27, 2015, a person jailed by the City of St. Ann, Missouri (the City), for failing to pay the fee required under the City's secured bail system, sued the City in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, arguing that the City had violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and asking for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. On September 3, 2015, the Judge assigned to the case, Judge Rodney W. Sippel, granted a stay in the proceedings to allow the parties to test the effects of a provisional settlement agreement, under which plaintiff agreed to drop his non-equitable claims, and under which the City agreed to end its secured bail policy and pay the plaintiff a $10,000 fee for acting as a class representative. On May 4, 2018, a Consent Agreement was signed by Judge Sippel, whereby most of the original relief sought was agreed to by the Defendant. The Court retains jurisdiction for two years, which may be extended for one more year upon agreement."}
{"article": "On August 9, 2016, a group of individuals who were placed in jail because of an inability to pay fines, penalties, and other charges, filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs sued thirteen St. Louis County municipalities under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and \u00a7 2201. The plaintiffs, represented by ArchCity Defenders and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief, claiming violations of the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In their complaint, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant municipalities, through their police departments, municipal court systems, city prosecuting attorneys\u2019 offices, and jails, engaged in a deliberate and coordinated conspiracy to fill their coffers by extorting money from thousands of poor, disproportionately African-American people in the St. Louis region. Specifically, they claimed that the municipalities imprisoned people for a failure to pay debts owed for minor offenses without inquiring as to their ability to pay in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; failed to provide adequate legal counsel at hearings in which indigent people were imprisoned in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; incarcerated people indefinitely and without adequate procedural protections in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; sought, issued, and served warrants without probable cause in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; and imposed unduly restrictive methods of debt collection, through incarceration and the threat of incarceration, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 30, 2016. On December 2, 2016, in response to the amended complaint, the court (Judge Rodney W. Sippel) denied the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants. The defendants again moved to dismiss on December 14, 2016. On April 24, 2017, Judge Sippel dismissed the claims against all defendant municipalities except the City of St. Ann, finding that the amended complaint failed to state a claim for conspiracy. Judge Sippel ordered the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint against the City of St. Ann and to limit their claims to actions taken by St. Ann. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the conspiracy claim and the dismissal of all other defendants aside from St. Ann, which Judge Sippel denied on July 5, 2017. On July 21, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint limited to the actions and policies of the City of St. Ann. On September 8, 2017, the City filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's \u00a7 1983 claims for lack of jurisdiction, claiming that the real defendant in interest in the matter was the St. Ann municipal division of the Missouri State Circuit Court, an arm-of-the-state entitled to sovereign immunity. The same day, the City filed a motion to dismiss the remaining count alleging Fourteenth Amendment violations for failure to state a claim. The court denied the defendants' motion on September 14, 2018. The court issued an order on October 4, 2018 severing the plaintiff's count relating to conditions of the City of St. Ann's jail. It was then placed on the court's docket as a separate action, and discovery proceeded for the remaining claims. On March 16, 2019, defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings for failure to join an indispensable party. Before oral argument on that motion, however, Judge Sippel referred the case to mediation. The parties filed a joint motion to vacate the mediation order on June 19, 2019, but Judge Sippel denied this motion the following day. In a memorandum and order issued on September 3, 2019, the court denied the defendants' motion. 2019 WL 4169215. As of April 18, 2020, the mediation deadlines have been extended several times and are currently set to terminate on June 30, 2020. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "On August 9, 2016, a group of individuals who were placed in jail because of an inability to pay fines, penalties, and other charges filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs sued thirteen St. Louis County municipalities under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and \u00a7 2201. The plaintiffs, represented by ArchCity Defenders and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief, claiming violations of the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In their complaint, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant municipalities engaged in a deliberate and coordinated conspiracy to fill their coffers by extorting money from thousands of poor, disproportionately African-American people in the St. Louis region. On April 24, 2017, the case was dismissed as to all defendant municipalities except the City of St. Ann. The case (including mediation efforts) is ongoing against the City."}
{"article": "On June 14, 2017, a man awaiting criminal trial and Lexington National Insurance Corporation, a bail bond company, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The case was assigned to Judge Jerome Simandle. The plaintiffs sued the state of New Jersey under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that a New Jersey state law, the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA), violated the bail provision of the Eighth Amendment, due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The CJRA required that pretrial release by monetary bail occur only if a criminal court court found that non-monetary conditions were inadequate. The plaintiffs sought damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. On the same day that the plaintiffs filed their complaint, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction that would enjoin the provisions of the CJRA that they deemed unconstitutional. On July 28, 2017, the state filed a brief in opposition to the motion for a preliminary injunction and moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. The same day, the American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, Drug Policy Alliance, Latino Action Network, and National Association for the Advancement of Colored People \u2013 New Jersey State Conference jointly moved to participate as amici curiae in support of the defendant. All of these civil rights organizations would be represented by one ACLU lawyer. These prospective amici also filed a brief in opposition to the plaintiff\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction. On September 21, 2017, the court denied the the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction. The court held that the plaintiffs\u2019 case was unlikely to succeed on the merits and that the plaintiffs were unlikely to suffer irreparable harm without an injunction. Judge Simandle also stated that the accused plaintiff was a bad class representative for a potential class action because the crime that he was on pretrial release for was particularly violent. 277 F. Supp. 3d 707. (Though the plaintiffs had not yet moved for class certification, their complaint indicated that they intended to seek it.) Four days later, on September 25, 2017, the plaintiffs appealed the court\u2019s decision regarding the preliminary injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. (Docket Number: 17-03104). In the meantime, the plaintiffs sought to pause litigation in the District Court pending a decision in the Appellate Court. The defendant protested; the Appellate Court\u2019s decision would not affect the District Court\u2019s decision on the merits of the case, so the state wanted to move forward. Still, the District Court granted the stay, holding that the litigation would not continue in the District Court until the Third Circuit had decided the appeal. The District Court therefore terminated the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, holding it in abeyance until after the Court of Appeals rendered its decision. The Third Circuit heard oral arguments on this case on February 21, 2018. The panel was made up of Judge Thomas L. Ambro, Judge Luis Felipe Restrepo, and Judge Julio M. Fuentes. In an opinion issued on July 9, 2018, they affirmed the district court's denial of preliminary injunction. The opinion held that there is no \"federal constitutional right to deposit money or obtain a corporate surety bond to ensure a criminal defendant's future appearance in court as an equal alternative to non-monetary conditions of pretrial release.\" 895 F.3d 272. The plaintiff petitioned for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court on October 1, 2018. His petition was denied on October 29. 139 S.Ct. 440. The plaintiff subsequently dismissed the suit voluntarily, and the case was terminated on October 31, 2018.", "summary": "In June 2017, a man awaiting criminal trial and Lexington National Insurance Corporation filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The plaintiffs alleged that that the Criminal Justice Reform Act violated the bail provision of the Eighth Amendment, due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment because the act favored non-monetary pre-trial release conditions over bail. After and appeal to the Third Circuit regarding denial of preliminary injunction and a subsequent denial of certiorari in the Supreme Court, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case. This case is now closed."}
{"article": "On May 11, 2011, three individuals given extra-judicial sentences of post-release supervision filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The named defendants were the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and the New York State Division of Parole (DOP). They claimed that the defendants administratively assigned sentences of post-release supervision (PRS) and that only a judge could impose an additional sentence under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, class certification, and compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 20, 2011, which added two named plaintiffs to the action, bringing the total to three. On November 15, 2011, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on the ground of qualified immunity. On February 10, 2012, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin denied the motion. <i>Bentley v. Dennison</i>, 852 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The court found that the plaintiffs had made plausible factual allegations that the defendants were responsible for the deprivation of their constitutional rights and that the plaintiffs' rights were clearly established under <i>Earley v. Murray</i>, 451 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2006). The defendants appealed from the denial of their motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's holding on July 8, 2014. The appeals court held that, under <i>Earley</i>, the administrative imposition PRS terms not imposed by the court was unconstitutional, thus precluding a finding of qualified immunity in this case. On July 16, 2014, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge James C. Francis for settlement purposes. On January 28, 2015, Judge Scheindlin granted the plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class. The court found that the plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of class certification. The class consisted of \u201call persons who were sentenced to prison in New York State for a fixed term that did not include a term of PRS, but who were nevertheless subjected to PRS after the maximum expiration dates of their determinate sentences and after June 9, 2006.\u201d On May 8, 2015, the defendants requested summary judgment. They argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity and that the plaintiffs had failed to establish the personal involvement of certain defendants. The defendants also moved to modify the class to exclude certain class members\u2019 claims that they alleged were barred by statute of limitations, and to exclude class members whose claims they alleged were precluded. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the question of personal liability for three officers. On August 6, 2015, Judge Scheindlin granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment and granted the plaintiffs' partial motion for summary judgment. The court found that since the defendants had failed to make reasonable efforts to comply with precedent that the imposition of post-release supervisory sentences was unconstitutional, they were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court further found that the three individual defendants cited in the plaintiffs' motion could be held personally liable as a matter of law, while the court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to the remaining DOP defendants. Regarding the defendants' remaining claims, the court held that the action was not barred by the statute of limitations or collateral estoppel. The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on qualified immunity grounds. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for an order certifying defendants' interlocutory appeal as frivolous. On October 14, 2015, the District Court found that dual jurisdiction was warranted between the District Court and the Court of Appeals because the defendants' renewed qualified immunity claims were frivolous. Thus, the District Court determined that it retained jurisdiction despite the interlocutory appeal. However, on December 16, 2015, the Court of Appeals ordered a stay of proceedings in the District Court pending resolution of the defendants' interlocutory appeal. On September 16, 2016, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's denial of qualified immunity to the defendants. <i>Betances v. Fisher</i>, 837 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2016). During this period of time, the case was reassigned to District Judge Deborah A. Batts. On May, 30 2018, the parties consented for the rest of the case to be heard by a magistrate judge. The case was then assigned to United States Magistrate Judge Robert Lehrburger. Following several years of additional discovery and intermittent attempts at settlement discussions, in August 2018 the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and to modify or decertify the class. Specifically, the defendants sought to: (1) dismiss class members whose claims were untimely; (2) dismiss class members who had claims for compensatory damages and award them nominal damages; (3) if the court deemed any class members' damages could be more than nominal, dismiss claims for damages not caused by the defendants; (4) modify the class to exclude plaintiffs if they were referred for resentencings, or limit their damages; (5) decertify the class for purposes of damages; and (6) preclude claims for false imprisonment. Judge Lehrburger decided the defendants' motions for summary judgment and class certification on February 21, 2019. He denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, except to the extent that it applied to plaintiffs who had sentences of PRS imposed to fix clerical errors by their sentencing courts. Judge Lehrburger barred these plaintiffs from receiving more than nominal damages. He also completely denied the class decertification motion. After the defendants' motions were denied, the case slowly crept towards trial, which was delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic. On March 1, 2021, Judge Lehrburger set a trial date of June 16, 2021. As of April 12, 2021, the case remains pending.", "summary": "Persons in the custody of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) brought this class action against DOCS and the New York State Division of Parole (DOP) for the extra-judicial imposition of sentences requiring post-release supervision. The defendants' motion to dismiss was denied by the District Court, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted with respect to several defendants, but denied on the issue of qualified immunity; and plaintiffs' cross motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability for three officers was granted. The defendants appealed the qualified immunity decision, but the Second Circuit affirmed. On remand, the defendants moved for summary judgment again, but that motion was denied. The case is currently scheduled for trial in Summer 2021."}
{"article": "Individuals incarcerated in the Tulsa jail sued Tulsa County, the Tulsa County Sheriff, fifteen Special Judges and a district court judge in challenging the constitutionality of the county's wealth-based pretrial detention system. On June 6, 2018, the four plaintiffs, represented by Civil Rights Corps, filed this class-action lawsuit in the Northern District of Oklahoma. The case was assigned to Judge Claire Eagan. The plaintiffs brought claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Declaratory Judgement Act, alleging that defendants violated their Equal Protection, Due Process, and Sixth Amendment rights by depriving them of their fundamental right to pretrial liberty and failing to provide counsel at bail hearings. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, as well as preliminary and permanent injunctive relief preventing the defendants from assigning bail without inquiring as to whether criminal defendants can pay it. The plaintiffs also asked the court to permanently enjoin the defendants from denying the putative class-members the right to a speedy, individualized hearing with counsel. The plaintiffs were each arrested and informed that they had to pay bail ranging from $500 to $50,000 in order to be released from jail before their hearing. They were not asked whether they could afford the bond; because none of them had the financial resources to post bail, they were held for up to 11 days before their hearing without access to legal counsel. The plaintiffs alleged that this \"wealth-based detention scheme\" jailed presumptively innocent people for at least a week before they are able to challenge their detention. Such a system, the plaintiffs contend, violates the the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The same day that the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs asked for the court to certify their class. The plaintiffs proposed class consisted of \"all people who are or will be detained in the Tulsa County Jail because they are unable to pay a secured financial condition of release.\" The Tulsa County Sheriff answered the complaint on August 3, 2018, and the defendant-judges moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The defendant-judges argued that the plaintiffs failed to use available state court remedies, such as criminal appellate or habeas processes, that could provide relief. Additionally, the defendant-judges also argued that the plaintiffs failed to allege specific misconduct beyond the judges' lack of addressing bail at arraignments. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 22, 2018. However, on November 19, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' amended complaint, the plaintiffs' motion for class-certification, and the defendant-judges' motion to dismiss as moot. 2018 WL 6048016. The court found that the plaintiffs paid their bonds and were released from jail in the days following the original complaint and therefore no longer suffered an actual injury. The court also determined that the \"capable of repetition, yet evading review\" exception did not apply because these four plaintiffs were expected to comply with the law and therefore this injury was not expected to repeat with regards to these plaintiffs. Additionally, the Court found that the claims were not \"inherently transitory.\" On December 11, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the court's judgment. The plaintiffs objected to the court's characterization of their claims. The plaintiffs argued that they did not challenge their pretrial detention per se, but rather challenged their pretrial detention without counsel and a hearing. The plaintiffs argued that this characterization fit the \"inherently transitory\" exception to mootness because the Court could not reasonably consider a class certification motion before any named plaintiffs\u2019 individual claims became moot. Judge Eagan agreed with the plaintiffs and, on March 15, 2019, granted their motion for reconsideration. 2019 WL 1231675. The court reinstated the plaintiff's amended complaint and motion for class certification, and also reinstated the defendant-judges' motion to dismiss. With the case active again, the defendant-judges filed their answer on March 25, 2019, and responded in opposition the plaintiffs' motion for class certification on April 15. The defendants also moved to stay the proceedings until the Oklahoma Senate considered a bill that would require individualized considerations of the ability to pay bail. On May 9, Judge Eagan granted the motion until the end of the legislative session or until the bill was signed into law. On June 14, the stay was lifted as the legislative session had ended. The defendant-judges again moved to dismiss the claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on December 10. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing, since their pre-trial detention had ended and therefore they were no longer suffering an injury. After engaging in settlement talks but failing to reach an agreement, the plaintiffs filed a motion seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. They contended that the COVID-19 pandemic altered the conditions of detention such that injunctive relief was required in order to prevent irreparable harm to people detained solely based on their inability to pay bail. Judge Eagan denied the plaintiffs' motion on May 11, finding that the preliminary relief was inappropriate given the lack of COVID cases in Tulsa County jails at that time and because a preliminary injunction would not solve the bail issue raised before the pandemic began. 2020 WL 2393855. As of January 13, 2021, the case remains ongoing.", "summary": "Civil Rights Corps sued Tulsa County and various judicial officers, alleging that the court system operated a wealth-based detention system by detaining arrestees without inquiring into their ability to pay bail. While the plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction was denied, the plaintiffs motion for class certification is still pending."}
{"article": "On March 25, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a consumer class action on behalf of consumers nationwide who had been the subject of misleading and inaccurate background reports sold by the defendant, RealPage, Inc., to landlords. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from Community Legal Services, sued in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), asking the court for damages and declaratory relief. They alleged that the defendant, RealPage, Inc., adopted and maintained a policy and practice of failing to timely update the criminal record information it maintained so as to eliminate records of cases that have been expunged, thus not accurately reflecting the final disposition of these cases. Moreover, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant systematically violated FCRA by failing to provide complete and accurate disclosures of all information the defendant maintained about consumers to these consumers upon request. On October 26, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to stay, which was granted in a January 25, 2016 opinion by U.S. District Court Judge John R. Padova. This order further stated that the case would be stayed until the U.S. Supreme Court decided <i>Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins</i>. On June 20, 2016, the case was put back on the docket for final disposition. On June 24, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss count two of the plaintiffs' complaint, but this motion was denied in an October 18, 2016 order by Judge Padova. On June 19, 2017, this case was consolidated with Jenkins v. Realpage, No. 15-cv-3894, for purposes of settlement. On June 30, the parties moved for preliminary approval of settlement, which the court granted on August 3. The settlement established the following three classes: \"The Chart Settlement Class: All persons residing in the United States of America (including its territories and Puerto Rico) who, from November 5, 2012 through the date when the Court enters its Preliminary Approval Order, requested a copy of their consumer report from Defendant, and received with the disclosure a chart that failed to provide the full address and phone number for every agency responsible for enforcing any provision of the FCRA.\" \"The Expungement Settlement Class: All persons residing in the United States of America (including its territories and Puerto Rico) about whom, from March 3, 2013 through the date when the Court enters its Preliminary Approval Order, Defendant prepared a consumer report which included information regarding one or more criminal cases which at the time the report was prepared by Defendant had been expunged or sealed and a Lifecycle File identified the record as having been expunged or sealed prior to the date of the report.\" \"The Source Settlement Class: All persons residing in the United States of America (including its territories and Puerto Rico) who, from November 5, 2012 through the date when the Court enters its Preliminary Approval Order, made a request pursuant to Section 609(a) of the FCRA [15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1681g(a)] for a file copy, and received a disclosure containing a criminal record in their file which did not include the identity of the public record vendor which had retrieved the criminal record(s) included in their file disclosure.\" For the Chart Settlement Class, the parties agreed to ask the court for an injunction ordering that the \"Defendant shall provide the complete chart of federal agencies responsible for enforcing any provision of the FCRA, including the address and any appropriate phone number of each agency.\" For the Expungement Class, the parties agreed to move for the court to issue an injunction compelling the defendant to ensure that any criminal records identified as expunged would not be included \"in any database used to produce its tenant screening reports.\" The injunction was to last for two years, and each subclass member was to receive an equal share from a $143,000 settlement fund up to a maximum of $1,100. For the Source Settlement Class, the parties agreed to ask the court to issue an injunction ordering that \"[w]hen a consumer makes a request...for a copy of that consumer\u2019s file, Defendant agrees to disclose the name of the vendor that retrieved any criminal record information in the consumer\u2019s file at the time of such request.\" The injunction was to last for two years, and each subclass member was to receive an equal share from a $936,200 settlement fund up to a maximum of $200. On February 6, 2018, the court granted final approval of the settlement, issued the requested injunctions, and awarded class counsel $359,733.33 in attorney's fees. The plaintiffs filed an opposed motion for approval of the second distribution to class members on November 7, 2018. After oral arguments on the motion on February 7, 2019, Judge Padova granted the motion and the distribution proceeded. There was no further docket activity during the settlement term, which expired in 2020, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "On March 25, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a consumer class action on behalf of consumers nationwide who had been the subject of misleading and inaccurate background reports sold by the defendant, RealPage, Inc. to landlords. The plaintiffs sued in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), alleging that the defendant, RealPage, Inc., adopted and maintained a policy and practice of failing to timely update the criminal record information it maintained so as to eliminate records of cases that have been expunged, thus not accurately reflecting the final disposition of these cases. Moreover, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant systematically violated FCRA by failing to provide complete and accurate disclosures of all information the defendant maintains about consumers to these consumers upon request. The parties settled, and the defendant agreed to provide consumers additional information about federal agencies responsible for enforcing FCRA, refrain from including expunged criminal records in tenant screening reports, and disclose the names of vendors who retrieved criminal record information to consumers, plus damages. The settlement term ended in 2020, and the case is now closed."}
{"article": "This federal civil rights case successfully challenged a Davidson county Tennessee rule requiring garnishment of bail bonds, as applied to a non-profit bail bond service. Davidson County, TN, has a local rule that allows the County Criminal Court to garnish bond deposits made by criminal defendants to pay prior judgment fees--including fines, court costs, and restitution. If incarcerated people do not agree to potential garnishment, they are not allowed to post bond. In practice, the Nashville Community Bail Fund (NCBF), a non-profit that provides bail bonds to indigent arrestees, was exempted from this rule for years. But in September 2019, the County Criminal Court judges revoked the exemption. On February 5, 2020, the NCBF filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee (in Nashville). The plaintiff sued the Davidson County Criminal Court Clerk under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by the ACLU, Civil Rights Corps, and a Nashville-based non-profit law firm Choosing Justice Initiative, the plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief. NCBF claimed that the revocation of its longstanding exemption violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive bail as well as the Fourteenth Amendment doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, and the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s right to due process. On March 17, 2020 District Judge Aleta Trauger granted NCBF\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction. This injunction prohibited the County Criminal Court Clerk from requiring NCBF to agree to the garnishment rule for bonds that it sought to post. 446 F. Supp. 3d 282. Judge Trauger denied the plaintiff\u2019s request to enjoin the enforcement of the garnishment rule altogether in the Davidson County court system. The Court also denied two government motions to dismiss the case, first in the Preliminary Injunction opinion on March 17, 2020, and again in an opinion on October 26, 2020, 496 F. Supp. 3d 1112. With the strength of these preliminary victories, on November 11, 2020, the plaintiff sought final summary judgment. Instead, the parties entered into a consent decree which was approved by Judge Trauger on December 19. The settlement made the preliminary injunction permanent. Although the defendant reserved the right to appeal the prior denial of his motion to dismiss in the consent decree, in fact he never filed such an appeal. The settlement permanently preserved the district court's jurisdiction to enforce its terms. The matter is ongoing as the parties are litigating over who should pay attorneys fees and how much.", "summary": "In 2020, the Nashville Community Bail Fund filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The plaintiff alleged that a local rule which required it to agree to garnishment of judgment fees from bail bonds before it could post bail for indigent arrestees violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution and threatened its ability to operate as a non-profit. The District Judge granted a preliminary injunction in March 2020 enjoining the County Criminal Court Clerk from garnishing fees from bonds posted by the Bail Fund. In December 2020, the District Judge approved a consent decree where the Bail Fund and the County Government agreed to make the injunction permanent. The matter is ongoing as the parties are litigating over who should pay attorneys fees and how much."}
{"article": "On May 3, 2016, two indigent citizens who were jailed for not paying traffic and misdemeanor fines, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued the City of El Paso under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Texas Constitution. Represented by lawyers from the Texas Civil Rights Project, the plaintiffs alleged that the City violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as their rights under the Texas Constitution. The plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking to enjoin the defendants from enforcing their current debt collection program. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the City adopted a 25-percent plan in 2006 that required those assessed fines, including fines from Class C Misdemeanors and traffic tickets, to either pay 25 percent of their fines or go to jail. The plan did not account for people unable to pay 25 percent of their fines. The repayment plan, alleged the plaintiffs, was adopted as a method of revenue generation for the city. The plaintiffs asserted in their complaint that the City made $19 million from such fines in 2015 and that the policy was pursued purposely, by training municipal court clerks to tell debtors that their only options were the 25-percent payment or jail. The plaintiffs were never informed of their right to assert indigence, and they alleged that the City became aware of issues with its debt collection process but failed to reform the system. On January 12, 2017, Judge David Guaderrama issued an order denying in part and granting in part the City's motion to dismiss, which was filed on June 6, 2016. Judge Guaderrama only looked at the due process claims because the City failed to address the equal protection claims. The plaintiffs' main due process claim was that the City's clerks failed to inform indigent debtors of their right to assert indigence. The court dismissed this claim. Judge Guaderrama held that the city had no constitutional duty to inform the plaintiffs of their right to assert their indigence. Judge Guaderrama only addressed the \u00a7 1983 action concerning the violation of the plaintiffs' due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He allowed the equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and Texas Constitution to stand because the City had failed to address them in their motion to dismiss. On January 20, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, and on February 3, 2017, the City responded with a new motion to dismiss, which the Court denied on April 25, 2017. One month later, the Court scheduled a jury trial to take place in March of 2018. After some months of discovery disputes and negotiation between the parties, the defendants again moved to dismiss the case, but the Court rejected the motion as untimely on December 11, 2017. The parties continued negotiating and ultimately did reach a settlement agreement, which led the parties to file for a stipulated dismissal on May 23, 2018. That same week, on May 29, 2018, the Court reviewed the stipulated dismissal and entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice. This case is now closed, but the parties may litigate noncompliance with the contractual terms of the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement included the following: a full release of any and all claims by both sides; an agreement that each side would bear its own costs; and an agreement that the City would, for three years following the settlement, continue certain administrative practices. These administrative practices related to: (a) notices to defendants of policies and procedures; (b) forms and procedures associated with payment plans, including a policy that payment plans required no money down, and that defendants could request an extension at any time; (c) notices to defendants regarding court hearings and court schedules; (d) policies and procedures related to indigency hearings and the issuance of warrants; and (e) a promise by defendants not to create any notice, form, procedure or policy that is inconsistent with the notices, forms, policies, and procedures that were attached to the settlement agreement.", "summary": "In May of 2016 two indigent people brought a suit against the City of El Paso in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas for jailing them for failure to pay fines, despite their inability to do so. The plaintiffs brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and allege that the Defendants violated their Due Process and Equal Protection rights under the 14th Amendment. The plaintiffs request declaratory and injunctive relief. They want to enjoin the Defendants from enforcing their current debt collection program, which jails people who can't pay a certain portion of their fines for traffic and misdemeanor offenses. The Plaintiffs allege that Defendants adopted their debt collection program to generate revenue for they city, and the individual plaintiffs were not informed that they could assert their indigence. Rather, the Plaintiffs were simply told they had to pay or go to jail. On January 12th, 2017 Judge David Guaderrama granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss in part. Judge Guaderrama dismissed the Due Process claims, but did not reach the Equal Protection claims. The Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in January 2017, and after the Court denied two motions to dismiss filed by defendants over the course of 2017, the parties stipulated to dismissal of the action pursuant to a settlement agreement. In the settlement agreement, defendants agreed to maintain certain administrative practices for three years. Among other things, these practices related to notice to defendants, policies and procedures for: payment plans; notice to defendants of court hearings and schedules; and indigency hearings and warrants issued for non-payment."}
{"article": "On January 14, 2016, two indigent women that previously served imprisonment terms at the Randall County Jail filed this complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiff sued the city of Amarillo under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought compensatory damages, claiming the City of Amarillo violated their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Rights. The plaintiffs claimed that the City of Amarillo installed its own debtor\u2019s prison through its municipal code that required residents that owed fees and fines to \u201cPay or lay.\u201d Although the city provided an installment plan in order to make payments, once an individual missed a payment, a warrant for his or her arrest would be immediately issued. Hearings to determine a person\u2019s indigency or alternate methods of enforcement are not required by the municipal code. The plaintiffs were both single mothers with part-time jobs as their only source of income. Both struggled to secure consistent employment. One plaintiff had an income of $40.00 a month and the court ordered a payment plan that required her to pay $232.00 in biweekly payments until her debt was paid. When the plaintiff informed the court she would be unable to meet this plan and request modification, she was immediately denied modification and sent to jail for eighteen days. The other plaintiff was unaware that she could assert indigency or request a payment plan, she believed her only option was to \u201cpay or lay.\u201d The plaintiff did not have the money to pay all of her fines and served eighteen days in jail. The plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of all indigent persons adjudicated by the City of Amarillo Municipal Court that owed fines or court costs and ordered to serve imprisonment terms for failure to pay the adjudicated fines and costs. The defendant responded to the complaint with a motion to dismiss on February 11, 2016. The defense argued that a city could not be liable under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for an alleged policy of wrongfully jailing persons because the decisions are solely made by the municipal judges who are acting in their judicial capacity and the city of Amarillo have no control or influence. The defendant further argued that the complaint failed to allege an official policy promoted by a municipal policymaker that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation claims. The Court did not immediately address the defendant\u2019s motion, instead, it permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. The plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on March 2, 2016. In the amended complaint the plaintiffs addressed the concerns provided by the defendant in its earlier motion to dismiss and expanded its Fourteenth Amendment violation claim to include court administrators and the police department. The plaintiffs alleged that the police department had a policy and practice of jailing indigent people without inquiring as to their reasons for nonpayment, determining whether they were indigent, or considering adequate alternatives to incarceration. On March 16, 2016, the City of Amarillo filed another motion to dismiss on similar grounds of its previous motion to dismiss and that the plaintiffs\u2019 new claims were conclusive and not supported by any factual underpinnings. Once again, the Court did not immediately address the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss and permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. The discovery period began and plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint on April 4, 2016. The new complaint addressed the defendant\u2019s previous issues and added four new plaintiffs that also served imprisonment terms as punishment for their inability to pay ticket fines and court fees. On April 13, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify class on behalf of all indigent persons adjudicated by the City of Amarillo Municipal Court that owed fines or court costs and ordered to serve imprisonment terms for failure to pay the adjudicated fines and costs. The defendant filed several briefs in response to the plaintiffs motion and discovery continued. On August 8, 2016, Senior Judge Mary Lou Robinson entered an opinion and order granting the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as to all of the plaintiffs\u2019 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 claims. The Court also denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion to certify class as moot due to the previous order to dismiss the case. Judge Robinson entered her final judgment in favor of the defendant and declared that the defendant was entitled to reasonable and necessary costs as a result of the action. The plaintiffs objected to the defendant\u2019s bill of costs on August 30, 2016. On October 12, 2016, Judge Robinson partially sustained the plaintiffs\u2019 objections and ordered for the plaintiffs\u2019 to pay $3,660.00 to the defendant in costs. There are no further entries on this docket, inferring that this case is closed.", "summary": "In January 2016, two indigent women that served imprisonment terms at the Randall County Jail filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Plaintiffs alleged that the City of Amarillo's municipal code created a modern-day debtors' prison and violated their Fourteenth Amendment Rights. In August 2016, the Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and ordered the plaintiffs to pay $3,660.00 in litigation costs."}
{"article": "The advocacy organization Children's Rights, Inc. filed this lawsuit in June 2002 against the state of Georgia and the Departments of Family and Children Services (DFCS) in Fulton and DeKalb Counties, on behalf of children in foster care in Fulton and DeKalb counties. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Georgia State Constitution, the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, the Medicaid Act, and the Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994. The complaint alleged that children did not receive necessary treatment and services while spending months in emergency shelters, experienced abuse and neglect as a result of an insufficient number of caseworkers, and received inadequate health care and emotional services while in foster care. Plaintiffs originally brought suit in Georgia state courts, but the stated removed the case to federal court because the cause of action included federal laws. Judge Marvin Shoob of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification in August 2003, and at the same time granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in part regarding certain claims about the operation of emergency shelters, because the shelters had been closed. The Court denied a later motion for summary judgment filed by the counties and found that children in foster care in Georgia have a state statutory and constitutional right to effective counsel in child abuse and neglect proceedings. Kenny A. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2005). In July 2005, Georgia agreed to a settlement that limited the caseload of case workers and required the state to meet benchmarks in numerous areas of service to children, including medical, dental, and mental health screenings and treatment. The court assigned two independent monitors to report on Georgia's progress towards meeting the benchmarks. The county defendants entered into a consent decree with plaintiffs in May 2006; it approved the right-to-counsel settlements and established independent monitors for each county until the counties remain in substantial compliance for a continuous eighteen month period. The consent decrees established staffing requirements and caseloads for child advocate attorneys, and other bureaucratic changes to how Fulton County manages its County Child Advocate Attorneys office. DeKalb County and Fulton County were released from federal oversight in October 2008 and April 2011, respectively, because they had improved the quality of representation provided to foster children. In August 2008, the plaintiffs filed a contempt motion against the state, citing its failure to meet court-ordered requirements to place hundreds of children in permanent homes. The state and plaintiffs jointly filed an agreement to consult national welfare experts in order to review the cases of all children in the backlog and to place them in permanent homes. The court Monitor has made six-month reports on the Georgia's progress towards meeting benchmarks. On November 2, 2015, the parties agreed to a joint stipulation and order to modify the consent decree. The original consent decree required two independent accountability agents, but the parties agree to reduce that to one agent. On February 16, 2016, the independent monitor team submitted a report finding the State was still not compliant with the court-ordered benchmarks. On February 24, 2016, the case was transferred from Judge Shoob, who had had it since its inception in 2002, to Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. On December 5, 2016, the court granted a joint motion to modify the consent decree, adding additional clarifications and stipulations regarding placements, visitation, outcome measures, process and infrastructure requirements, terms upon which State Defendants may move for the termination of the consent decree, and dispute resolution provisions. The modified consent decree also provided for biannual reports from the Monitoring and Technical Assistance Team on the ongoing and attained outcomes. The civil case was closed on August 17, 2017, but biannual monitoring reports continue to be filed. As of June 2018, the monitoring report noted that the Dekalb and Fulton County directors were prioritizing increasing the staff size and quality of training while emphasizing keeping families together and reducing the foster population. However, the report also found that there were inconsistencies in the data relating to caseload, vacancies, new hires and turnover. As of April 2020, the biannual monitoring reports continue to be filed. The January 2020 report shows that the counties have continued to increase their efforts to initially search for and place children with relatives, visitation has improved in all areas, and the state met the threshold for timelines to adoption and guardianship after parental rights have been terminated or released. However, the region continues to struggle with children and teenagers re-entering care and with meeting educational and mental health needs of children in care. <i>Attorneys fees</i> In addition to the litigation regarding enforcement of the consent decree, this case also included extensive litigation regarding the award of attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. The consent decree with the State did not resolve the issue of attorney's fees and the parties had left that to the court to decide. The plaintiffs submitted a request for more than $14 million in attorney's fees. Half of that amount was based on their calculation of the lodestar (the number of hours spent working on the case multiplied by the attorneys' hourly rate). The other half was a fee enhancement for superior work and results. The defendants objected to the fee request, contending that some of the proposed hourly rates were too high, that the hours claimed were excessive, and that the enhancement would duplicate factors that were reflected in the lodestar amount. On October 3, 2006, the district court awarded fees of approximately $10.5 million. 454 F.Supp.2d 1260 (N.D.Ga.2006). The court determined that the lodestar was $6 million and then enhanced that amount by 75% to account for superior performance and results. The defendants appealed this determination to the Eleventh Circuit. After oral argument, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's award because it was not an abuse of discretion to award that amount of attorney's fees on July 3, 2008. 532 F.3d 1209 (2008). The eleventh circuit judges were divided over the district court's enhancement. The Eleventh Circuit denied the defendants' request for a rehearing en banc but was also divided over this ruling. The defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari seeking review solely as to the $4.5 million enhancement, which the Supreme Court granted. The Supreme Court heard oral argument on October 14, 2009. Then, on April 21, 2010, the Supreme Court reversed the award of attorney's fees and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that enhancements are permitted in extraordinary circumstances, but held that the district court had not provided proper justification for the enhancement it awarded in this case. The Supreme Court outlined standards for enhancements: 1) there is a strong presumption that the lodestar is sufficient; 2) factors subsumed in the lodestar calculation cannot be used as a ground for increasing an award above the lodestar; and 3) a party seeking fees has the burden of identifying a factor that the lodestar does not adequately take into account and proving with specificity that an enhanced fee is justified. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded because the District Court had not applied these standards. 559 U.S. 542 (2010). Accordingly, on September 2, 2010, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order and judgment entered on October 3, 2006, awarding the plaintiffs attorney's fees, costs, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's decision and opinion. 616 F.3d 1230 (2010). The parties submitted new briefs and the district court heard oral argument on the issue. On July 19, 2011, the district court held that plaintiffs were not entitled to an enhancement under the new guidelines established by the Supreme Court.", "summary": "Foster children in Georgia's Fulton and DeKalb Counties brought suit against the state and counties Division of Family and Children Services. The class of children alleged that they did not receive necessary treatment and services while spending months in emergency shelters, experienced abuse and neglect as a result of an insufficient number of caseworkers, and received inadequate health care and emotional services while in foster care. In 2005 and 2006, the plaintiffs reached settlement agreements with the state, Fulton County, and DeKalb County. As of November 2018, the State is still under the supervision of the independent monitor in order to meet the court-ordered benchmarks, having not yet completed sufficient improvements."}
{"article": "On August 4, 1999, a group of children in the legal and/or physical custody of the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) filed this lawsuit against the State of New Jersey and DYFS in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. Represented in part by Children's Rights, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged that DYFS failed to protect them from abuse, failed to provide them with services such as medical care, and failed to provide DYFS caseworkers with adequate resources and training. The plaintiffs claimed these actions violated federal common law and federal statutes. They named, in particular, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended by the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 620-27, 670-679; Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, as amended by the Interethnic Adoption Provisions of 1996; Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act; Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Treatment Program, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396 et seq; the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12131; and the Rehabilitation Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794. Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that New Jersey and DYFS\u2019s actions violated the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the rights to association, privacy and family integrity under the First and Ninth Amendments. With the complaint, the plaintiffs also moved for class certification. On October 12, 1999, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. On January 27, 2000, U.S. District Judge Garrett E. Brown granted the motion with respect to the plaintiffs\u2019 substantive due process cause of action. The court dismissed the substantive due process claim to the extent it was alleged on behalf of children who were voluntarily in state custody. The court held there was no substantive due process right to \u201cnot remain in state custody unnecessarily\u201d or \u201cto be housed in the least restrictive, most appropriate and family-like placement while in state custody.\u201d The court also dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 cause of action under the Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994 because the plaintiffs failed to allege that they were denied the opportunity to become an adoptive or foster parent on the basis of race, color, or national origin.. The court denied the motion for all the other asserted causes of action, and noted that \"[t]here [was] no term other than tragic to summarize the facts\" alleged in this case. <i>Charlie H. v. Whitman</i>, 83 F. Supp. 2d 476 (D.N.J. 2000). After some procedural wrangling, in October 2000, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint as well as a modified motion to certify class action. By March 2001, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants from conducting an audit of DYFS case records. The court then ordered the defendants to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be entered. On June 28, 2001, the court again denied the plaintiffs' motion to certify class action, concluding that the plaintiffs\u2019 class definition was overly broad. On July 30, 2001, the plaintiffs again filed a third motion for class certification, which the court granted on March 7, 2002. During this time, on September 28, 2001, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction after determining that the plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm and that injunctive relief was warranted. The parties proceeded towards trial and commenced discovery. Meanwhile, on January 27, 2003, the New York Times and other newspapers moved to intervene in the case in order to modify the confidentiality orders. The court granted the motions in part for purposes of reporting to the public about the state of the child welfare system. <i>Charlie H. v. Whitman</i>, 213 F.R.D. 240 (D.N.J. 2003). The New York Times published a series of articles focused on the New Jersey child welfare system, including several pieces about the death of Faheem Williams, a seven-year-old boy whose case had been closed by DYFS even though there were outstanding issues of abuse. Once discovery concluded, on February 27, 2003, the court entered an order referring the parties to mediation and appointed former New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Stewart G. Pollack. Through mediation, the parties reached a settlement agreement in July 2003. After a fairness hearing, the court approved the settlement agreement on September 2, 2003. Under the core principles that the foster care placements be as temporary an arrangement as possible, with its goal being to provide to children in out-of-home environment safe permanent placements, the settlement agreement mandated the creation of an expert panel (the New Jersey Child Welfare Panel) which was tasked to begin the planning process for improvements in the child welfare system and overall supervision and technical assistance during the 18 month period. The agreement also set out planning procedures, definition of improved outcomes for children, and review process. Areas of immediate mandates included securing funds ($14.3 million) to hire additional man power, conducting safety assessments, reviewing high-risk facilities individually, reviewing standards for licensing, reviewing hiring processes, among others. The agreement also mandated the appointment of a monitor. On February 26, 2004, the plaintiffs moved to appoint a guardian <i>ad litem</i> on behalf of three class members, currently in DYFS custody, to protect their interests in any claims for damages they may have against DYFS. On April 5, 2004, after oral argument on this motion, the court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion to appoint a guardian <i>ad litem</i>. The plaintiffs then moved for $150,000 in attorneys\u2019 fees and expenses on September 27, 2004. The court granted that motion on November 5, 2004. In October 2005, the court-appointed monitor found that the state was making \"seriously inadequate progress\" in implementing the terms of the settlement agreement. During this time, the Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO (CWA) were granted leave to appear as <i>amicus curiae</i>. After unsuccessful negotiations between the parties to improve progress levels, in December 2005, the plaintiffs moved to hold the defendants in contempt for noncompliance with the consent decree. However, the newly elected governor created a new cabinet-level children's agency and began new negotiations with the plaintiffs. As a result, the parties modified the settlement agreement in July 2006. The modified settlement agreement provided for phased implementation. In Phase 1, lasting from July 2006 to December 2008, the state committed to working in collaboration with the Monitor to develop a case practice model that addresses issues of regular case planning, development of individualized service plans, and training for caseworkers. Among the increased services for youth are mental health services, services for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and questioning youth, and regular medical examinations. Phase II, from January 2009 until termination of the agreement, required completion of certain outcomes based on numerous indicators\u2014e.g., that all children are safe from abuse and that siblings are placed together. The settlement provided for bi-annual reports by a monitor and established a dispute resolution process. Until November 2015, the monitor filed reports in accordance with the modified agreement. On November 4, 2015, the second modified settlement agreement was entered. The 2015 agreement identified as areas to be achieved: timely and quality completion of investigations on alleged child abuse and neglect, timely execution of initial and subsequent family team meetings, proper needs assessment, timely and quality planning of cases, proper management of intake/adoption workers' caseloads, proper parent-child/siblings visitations, stable placements (with siblings, where possible), prevention of repeat maltreatment and re-entry to placement, timely discharge to permanent placement, provision of services to support transition and independent living assessment of older youth. The agreement stipulated that once defendants demonstrated compliance during a period longer than 12 months, the court would terminate its jurisdiction over the case. The first monitor\u2019s report for the new agreement was filed in June 2016. Enforcement of the settlement agreement is ongoing.", "summary": "Plaintiffs, who are children in the custody of the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS), brought suit against the state alleging abuse, neglect, and lack of services. After the New York Times published several articles about the deaths of children in the care of DYFS due to lack of care, in 2003 the state entered into a settlement agreement providing for a systematic overhaul of the state child welfare system. The latest modification of the agreement was made in 2015 and remains in force."}
{"article": "This federal class action was brought by children in the custody of the New York City Child Welfare Administration (\"CWA\"), and children who, while not in the custody of CWA, are or will be at risk of abuse or neglect and whose status is known or should be known to CWA. It was filed on December 13, 1995 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by Children's Rights Inc., Lawyers for Children, and private counsel, sought class certification, declaratory and injunctive relief against both the city and the state (collectively, the defendants). The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment program of the Medicaid Act, the Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and state law. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants systematically:<ul><li> failed to protect the plaintiffs from abuse and neglect and to provide them and their families with appropriate, legally required services; <li> failed to appropriately accept reports of child abuse and neglect for investigation; <li> failed to investigate those reports of child abuse and neglect that are accepted in the time and manner required by law; <li> failed to provide mandated pre-placement preventive services to enable children at risk of being placed in foster care to remain at home safely with their families whenever possible; <li> failed to provide children in need of foster care placement with the least restrictive, most family-like placements designed to meet their individual needs; <li> failed to provide foster children, their birth families and their foster families with the services that are essential to ensuring that the children do not deteriorate in CWA's custody; <li> failed to provide foster children with disabilities with placements and services appropriate to their individual needs and necessary to allow these children fully to participate in the City's child welfare system; <li> failed to provide foster children with appropriate case management, case plans and services; <li> failed to provide children for whom adoption is appropriate with services necessary to ensure that they are adopted quickly; <li> failed to provide teenage children who will leave the foster care system to live on their own with services adequate to prepare them to live independently; <li> failed to provide foster children with the administrative, judicial and dispositional reviews to which they are legally entitled; <li> failed to provide caseworkers with sufficient training, support and supervision; and <li> failed to maintain an adequate information system to monitor, track and plan for children, and to manage the child welfare system effectively. </ul>As a result of these systemic deficiencies, the plaintiffs contended that the defendants jeopardized their well being. On June 18, 1996, District Judge Robert J. Ward certified a class of children in foster care and those reported to be abused or neglected. The court also denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, interpreting children's constitutional right to protection from harm to include harm that results from unnecessary separation from parents and from extended stays in foster care without a permanent family. Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662 (1996). Some procedural skirmishes dealing with the defendants' interlocutory appeal followed. On September 26, 1997, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's certification of the plaintiff class and directed that the district judge divide the classes into subclasses for organizational and management purposes. Marisol A. v Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997). In July of 1998, the parties began settlement negotiations. Over the objections of would-be intervenors representing a subclass of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender youths in the custody of the city agency, the court approved separate settlement agreements with the city and the state defendants in March 1999. Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 185 F.R.D. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Objectors appealed, but on July 10, 2000, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's approval of both the city and state settlement agreements. Joel A. v. Giuliani, 218 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2000). The class action settlement required the city to use independent outside child welfare experts to guide and assist it in undertaking systemic reform. The advisory panel had complete access to all aspects of the city's child welfare agency, and was empowered to provide recommendations, issue progress reports on the status of the reform effort, and determine whether the city is acting in good faith in implementing systemic reform. The city settlement was successfully concluded in 2001. The plaintiffs returned to court in January 2001, seeking an order directing compliance by the state with specific terms of the state settlement agreement. The areas of alleged noncompliance included the failure to implement a statewide child welfare management information system. After an August 2001 evidentiary hearing, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion in part, holding that the state had acted with insufficient diligence in implementing the information management system. Marisol A. ex re. Forbes v. Giuliani, 157 F. Supp. 2d 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Judge Ward extended the term of the agreement in this area, and directed that the state file semi-annual reports with the plaintiffs until the Court determined that the state had fully complied with the relevant portions of the agreement. Very little activity appears in the docket after that ruling. The state filed a report required by the settlement agreement in July 2008, and then there was nearly a 10-year gap. In 2017, the case was reassigned to Judge George Daniels and then Magistrate Judge Katharine H. Parker. Also, the New York State Office of Children and Family Services (\u201cOCFS\u201d) filed one of its required semi-annual reports stating that OCFS was taking reasonable efforts to develop and implement a diligent and sufficient information management system for child welfare needs. A status conference was held on July 26, 2018. After that conference, the court issued an order relinquishing its jurisdiction over that portion of the settlement agreement on August 6. Since the other parts of the settlement had terminated in 2001, the case is now closed.", "summary": "Plaintiffs, children in the custody of the New York City Child Welfare Administration (\"CWA\"), and children who, while not in the custody of CWA, are or will be at risk of abuse or neglect and whose status is known or should be known to CWA, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against both the city and state for systematic deficiencies that jeopardized their well-being. The case was filed on December 13, 1995, and the parties reached to two separate settlement agreements, one with the city and one with the state, on December 2, 1988. The plaintiffs returned to court in January 2001, seeking an order directing the state to comply with specific terms of the state settlement agreement. The court found that the state had acted with insufficient diligence in implementing the information management system, and therefore extended the terms of the agreement in this area and directed that the plaintiffs receive semi-annual reports. The defendants provided a January 2017 report to show that they were continuing to develop, implement, and update their information systems for child welfare needs. A year later, the court ended its supervision of the portions of the settlement that it had retained jurisdiction to enforce."}
{"article": "On May 12, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging that New York's Administration for Children's Services (ACS) routinely forces children in foster care to be unnecessarily institutionalized in psychiatric hospitals rather than placed in home-like settings. The plaintiffs alleged that ACS was using placement in psychiatric institutions as punishment for misbehavior and that many children placed in these hospitals did not have a diagnosis of mental illness. The plaintiffs also alleged that children were forced to stay in institutions long after it was determined that they could be placed in a less restrictive environment, but that ACS's policies made discharge difficult. The named plaintiffs, three currently institutionalized children, requested their release from institutions. They also sought to represent a class of children and demanded that the court order ACS to discontinue its \"illegal pattern and practice of 'dumping' children in foster care in psychiatric hospitals and refusing to let them out.\" The plaintiffs alleged that these policies violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, state laws and regulations, the New York Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The case moved quickly toward settlement, with the parties stipulating to certify the class and postpone a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The class was certified as:<blockquote> Children under the age of 18 who are in the custody of the New York City Administration for Children's Services (\"ACS\") and who are currently admitted or will be brought to and admitted to acute psychiatric hospitals and who, once admitted and deemed ready for discharge, are not moved by ACS and/or one of its contract agencies to the least restrictive setting appropriate to their needs.</blockquote>In November 2010, the parties submitted a settlement agreement to the court for preliminary approval. District Judge Brian M. Cogan held a fairness hearing on March 11, 2011, and gave final approval to the terms of the Stipulation and Order of Settlement filed on February 28, 2010. In the settlement, ACS agreed to promulgate new policies and procedures with respect to the placement of children in foster care in institutions. ACS will improve tracking, monitoring, and individualized planning so that children are not ignored and left to languish in institutions. They also agreed to develop new training programs for ACS staff and contractors. The agreement also provides for ongoing monitoring. A separate agreement, entered on June 29, 2011, provided specific relief (including damages and attorneys' fees) to the three named plaintiffs. On July 7, 2011, Judge Cogan entered a settlement order, in which the parties agreed to dismiss all claims and release defendants from liability in exchange for payment. The case was then dismissed with prejudice. On January 22, 2016, the parties filed a joint motion to alter the judgment. Judge Cogan signed the Stipulation and Order of Settlement the same day. The amended agreement extended the jurisdiction of the Court over the matter for an additional four months, until June 30, 2016, with the potential for extension of such jurisdiction for six months from the time the Court's jurisdiction was scheduled to terminate. The docket does not reflect any extension of the Court's jurisdiction, so it presumably expired on June 30, 2016.", "summary": "This was a class action challenge to New York's unnecessary institutionalization of children in foster care in psychiatric facilities. The initial settlement agreement, entered on February 28, 2011, provided for increased community-based placement opportunities for children in foster care with mental illness as well as individualized planning, staff training, and monitoring. In addition to the initial settlement agreement, on July 7, 2011, the plaintiffs agreed to release defendants from all liability in exchange for payment from defendants. On January 22, 2016, the parties agreed to extend the Court's jurisdiction until June 30, 2016, at which time its jurisdiction presumably expired."}
{"article": "On May 30, 2013, an eleven-year-old child in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Social Services (SCDSS), filed a lawsuit in the Court of Common Pleas, Abbeville County, South Carolina under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law against SCDSS, the Boys Home of the South (BHOTS), and individuals employed by both organizations. Plaintiff, represented by Children's Rights, Inc. and private counsel, asked the court for damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. Plaintiff claimed that Defendants' policies and customs failed to comply with federal and state law, which violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that their gross negligence caused him permanent mental harm and injury. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that while he was placed at BHOTS--a \"low management\" group home licensed by SCDSS that did not require awake staff at all times--he was repeatedly attacked and sexually assaulted by older boys at the home. He claimed that Defendants violated his rights to a safe and secure placement in state custody, his right to adequate supervision, and his right to prompt mental health treatment under both federal and state law. On June 28, 2013, Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. Over the next few months, the parties engaged in fact and expert discovery. As discovery proceeded, Plaintiff agreed to stipulate to the dismissal of several of the individual Defendants. The remainder of the Defendants, including SCDSS and BHOTS, moved for summary judgment. On February 4, 2014, while the motions for summary judgment were pending, Plaintiff and the BHOTS Defendants reached a settlement for an undisclosed sum of money, including $188,285.27 in costs. The settlement document did disclose, however, that as a result of the litigation, BHOTS was ceasing operations and would be filing for articles of dissolution with the South Carolina Attorney General. The Court (Judge Anderson) later approved the settlement on March 10, 2014. On February 14, 2014, the Court (Judge Anderson), in a brief, two-page order, denied the SCDSS Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court simply stated that, \"[b]ased on the filings of both sides, and their arguments during the hearing, this Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist.\" On March 28, 2014, following mediation and shortly before jury selection was to begin, Plaintiff and the SCDSS Defendants (the remaining Defendants) reached a settlement for an undisclosed sum of money, including $17,186.58 in costs. With the SCDSS settlement, all parties had either settled or been dismissed, and the case concluded.", "summary": "On May 30, 2013, an eleven-year-old child in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Social Services (SCDSS), filed a lawsuit in the Court of Common Pleas, Abbeville County, South Carolina, against SCDSS and the Boys Home of the South (BHOTS), alleging that, as a result of Defendants' failures, Plaintiff was sexually assaulted on multiple occasions, causing him severe and permanent mental injury. Following removal to Federal Court, in early 2014, Plaintiff settled with both SCDSS and BHOTS for an undisclosed sum of money. BHOTS also permanently closed as a result of the lawsuit."}
{"article": "On January 12, 2015, eleven named minor children in the legal custody of the South Carolina Department of Social Services (\"SCDSS\") filed this putative class action lawsuit (by their Next Friends) against the Governor of South Carolina and SCDSS in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The named plaintiffs were represented by two advocacy organizations, Children's Rights and Appleseed, and by private counsel. Plaintiffs intended to seek certification of a class of all children who are or will be involuntarily placed in foster care in the legal custody of SCDSS as a result of emergency protective custody and/or a referral, report, suspicion, allegation and/or adjudication of abuse or neglect. Plaintiffs asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging systemic deficiencies in the operation of SCDSS subjected children in the state's care to harm or an unreasonable risk of harm. The alleged problems included: whether SCDSS maintains an adequate number and kind of foster homes, resulting in over-institutionalization of foster children, repeated movement of children between placements, and deprivation of meaningful familial contacts; whether SCDSS has excessive caseworker caseloads, resulting in a workforce that cannot monitor children's safety, maltreatment in SCDSS care, and failure to investigate maltreatment; and whether SCDSS fails to provide initial and periodic medical, dental, and mental health assessments, treatments, and screens, leading to emotional and psychological deterioration of children in SCDSS custody. On March 16, 2015, Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On March 30, 2015, with Defendants' motion pending, the District Court (Judge Richard M. Gergel) entered a text order asking the parties to engage in early mediation. The Court indicated that Senior District Judge Michael Duffy had agreed to mediate, should the parties consent. Later that week, the parties indicated that they were willing to engage in early mediation. On September 28, 2015, the parties entered into an interim settlement agreement. As part of the \"Consent Immediate Interim Relief Order,\" the plaintiff class was certified and \"limited co-monitors\" were appointed. SCDSS also agreed to undertake several remedial steps, including phasing out use of SCDSS offices, hotels and motels as placements and no longer recommending that children remain in juvenile detention because of a lack of foster homes. SCDSS also agreed to undertake a workload study, adopt workload limits, conduct a placement needs assessment, and create a plan to end the placement of children ages six and under in non-family group placements. Judge Gergel approved the parties' final class action settlement agreement on October 4, 2016. The agreement defined the class as \"all children who are involuntarily placed in DSS foster care in the physical or legal custody of DSS either now or in the future.\" Pursuant to the agreement, the court appointed two co-monitors to issue periodic public reports on the parties' compliance with the settlement agreement. SCDSS agreed to (1) complete a foster care workload study and adopt workload limits; (2) ensure that worker-child visitation happens with appropriate frequency; (3) adopt enhanced investigation procedures; (4) adopt procedures to ensure appropriate child placement; (5) provide for family visitation; and (6) develop a health care improvement plan. The settlement agreement was to remain in effect until the Court issued an order dismissing the case. Regarding attorneys' fees, the parties agreed to submit the amount and terms of fees and expenses to final and binding arbitration by the mediator (District Judge P. Michael Duffy). In the September 2018 report, the co-monitors outlined several areas of accomplishment: leadership changes and internal restructuring; development of a five-year budget; building infrastructure to meet children's healthcare needs; conducting a data audit; and development of a training plan and case practice model. The co-monitors also identified several areas in need of focus and improvement. One of these areas was investigative practice within SCDSS\u2019s Out-of-Home Abuse and Neglect (OHAN) unit. The co-monitors noted that a lack of resources meant that staff had excessive case loads and did not have the time, direction, or tools to complete their work. Another area in need of improvement was SCDSS's placement array and processes. While SCDSS made some progress in reducing the number of children placed in congregate care and staying overnight at SCDSS offices, there had been little improvement in the period leading up to the September 2018 report. Finally, the co-monitors noted a need for improvement in the area of workforce recruitment and retention. In response to the September report, the plaintiffs filed a motion to hold the defendants in contempt for non-compliance with the settlement agreement on November 26, 2018. On December 5, 2018, the Court issued an order stating that, starting in January 2019, the Court will hold monthly status conferences to assess SCDSS's implementation of the reforms mandated by the settlement agreement. Prior to the first status conference, SCDSS must submit plans about the three main areas in need of reform: workloads, placement, and healthcare. The order also required that SCDSS appoint staff responsible for those three areas. Finally, the order required that the parties conduct a mediation session prior to the January status conference. The parties participated in mediation, and the monitoring arrangement continued with monthly status conferences. On August 15, 2019, the court issued an order stating that the settlement agreement required the defendants to have reached a set of benchmarks by July 1, 2020, that they had yet to achieve. The order further stated that the expectation remained that they would meet these benchmarks. As of May 22, 2020, the most recent biannual monitors' report was filed on March 2, 2020. The report detailed only moderate success, noting that budget restrictions created significant obstacles to compliance. Monitoring of the settlement is ongoing.", "summary": "On January 12, 2015, a class action lawsuit was filed against the South Carolina Department of Social Services (SCDSS) in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging numerous deficiencies in the operation of the state's child welfare system. On September 28, 2015, the parties reached an interim settlement agreement, providing for an end to certain SCDSS practices, as well as for studies of additional SCDSS practices. Monitoring revealed incremental improvements in conditions, and the settlement remains in effect."}
{"article": "On Aug. 22, 2005, a paraplegic individual who uses a wheelchair sued Chipotle, alleging that two of the defendant's restaurants did not provide full and equal access to customers in wheelchairs. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that when he had visited two Chipotle restaurants, one in Encinitas and one in San Diego, 44-inch high walls in front of the food preparation area obstructed his view, and thus he was denied full and equal access as non-disabled people have the opportunity to view foods available for selection and the construction of their food. He also alleged that there were structural barriers at the entrance to the restaurants, dining tables, parking lots, and restrooms, making them inaccessible to those in wheelchairs, in violation of (1) the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a712102; (2) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, \u00a7 504 (as amended 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794); (3) the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, codified as California Civil Code \u00a7\u00a7 51, 52, and 54.1, 54.3, and 55; and (4) other statutory measures which refer to the protection of the rights of \"physically disabled persons.\" The plaintiff sought an injunction ordering the defendants to provide full and equal access (by removing architectural barriers), statutory damages, compensatory damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. The defendant filed cross-complaints against the owners and operators of the properties on which the restaurants are located. The defendant also completed modifications to the restaurants to address the alleged lack of compliance with the ADA by Oct. 5, 2006. On Jan. 12, 2007, the defendant moved to dismiss the case or in the alternative, to consolidate it with <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11469&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7CAntoninetti%20v.%20Chipotle%20Mexican%20Grill%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B\">Antoninetti v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Case No. 3:06-cv-02671</a>, a lawsuit filed on Dec. 6, 2006 by the same plaintiff, involving the same defendant and questions of law, this time as a putative class action. On Mar. 20, 2007, Judge Napoleon A. Jones, Jr. for the U.S. District Court for the District of Southern California, denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the case and granted their motion to consolidate for purposes of discovery only and leaving open the question of consolidation for trial. Meanwhile, on Feb. 23, 2007, the defendant had implemented a written nationwide \"Customers with Disabilities\" policy (\"the Policy\"), and formally began training its employees on the policy between March and May 2007. Among other things, the Policy required managers to greet disabled customers and ask them whether they required accommodations, and instructed managers and crew that efficiency was secondary to ensuring a positive experience for disabled customers. On Apr. 16, 2007, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief under the ADA were moot because the defendant had modified the restaurants to comply with the Americans With Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (\"ADAAG\"), including adoption and implementation of the effective nationwide Policy. On June 14, 2007, the court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendant's food-preparation counters complied with state and federal accessibility laws and thus denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The defendant had argued that its Policy that required its staff to offer suitable accommodations for customers with disabilities (including, for example: (1) showing samples of the food to the customers in souffl\u00e9 cups, (2) offering customers an opportunity to see and even sample food at a table in the dining area, (3) describing foods and food preparation processes to customers if they wished, or (4) any combination of above accommodations that was requested or appropriate) provided \"equivalent facilitation\" under Section 7.2(2)(iii) of the ADA. As for parking, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's ADA claims, since the defendant cured the defects in both parking lots and only injunctive relief was available under the ADA. On the state law claims, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment and granted the plaintiff's because it was undisputed that parking at both restaurants previously violated the ADAAG and therefore, the Unruh Act and the California Disabled Persons Act (DPA). The court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on his claim that the tables at both restaurants violated the ADA because these claims were not part of the Complaint or any timely amendment to the Complaint. The court also granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claims relating to the entrances at the San Diego restaurant and the bathrooms at both restaurants. The court denied motions to reconsider by both parties. 2007 WL 2456223 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2007). On Sept. 6, 2007, the defendant moved to consolidate cases for trial. At this time, the individual case was already ready for trial, and the class action was still in the formative stages. On Sept. 7, 2007, the Court found that consolidation for purposes of trial was not merited because the potential for delay and prejudice outweighed any savings of time or effort. 2007 WL 2669531 (Sept. 7, 2007). The cases remained consolidated for discovery purposes. A four-day bench trial was held in late November 2007 and early December to determine the following issues: (1) whether the defendant\u2019s prior practice of accommodating customers with disabilities constituted equivalent facilitation; (2) whether the Policy constituted equivalent facilitation; (3) whether the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction requiring the defendant to lower the wall in front of the restaurants\u2019 food preparation counters; and (4) the amount of damages, if any, that the plaintiff is entitled to under the California Disabled Persons Act (CDPA) based on his visits to the restaurants. On Jan. 10, 2008, Judge Jones concluded that the defendant's prior practice of informally accommodating customers had been insufficient to comply with the ADA, but that the Policy was sufficient. The court also found that the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction requiring the defendant to lower the wall, but that the plaintiff was entitled to $5,000 in damages for the occasions on which he encountered barriers to his entrance into the restaurants. 2008 WL 111052 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008). On Apr. 21, 2008, the court denied the plaintiff's motion to amend findings of facts and for additional findings of fact. Later that month or in May 2008, the plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the defendant cross-appealed. On Feb. 6, 2009, Judge Jones awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiff in the amount of $136,537.83, less than a quarter of the $550,651.33 in fees and costs the plaintiff had sought, and ordered the parties to pay their own costs. The plaintiff appealed, and on May 15, 2009, Judge Jones ordered a stay regarding attorneys' fees pending the decision of the Court of Appeals. 2009 WL 1390811 (S.D. Cal. May 15, 2009). During this period, Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz replaced Judge Jones as the district judge assigned to the case. After a hearing on Nov. 16, 2010, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision that the Policy was compliant with the ADA, finding that the Policy was not equivalent because the \u201csubstitute experience\u201d for disabled customers lacked the customers\u2019 personal participation in the selection and preparation of the food that the full \u201cChipotle Experience\u201d furnished and, therefore, violated the ADA. The Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court to determine the scope of injunctive relief necessary to remedy the plaintiff's inability to view the food preparation counters. On Nov. 18, 2010, the Ninth Circuit awarded attorneys\u2019 fees on appeal to the plaintiff, and referred the determination of the appropriate amount of fees to the court\u2019s special master, Appellate Commissioner Peter L. Shaw. On Nov. 29, 2010, Judge Moskowitz entered judgment against the defendant for violation of the ADA. The district court declined to enter injunctive relief, as the defendant represented that its food-preparation counters at all of the defendant's restaurants in California, including the two restaurants at issue in this case, had been lowered to a suitable height that made them visible to wheelchair-bound customers. Because the defendant had not yet furnished evidence of these modifications or that the modifications would be permanent, the court ordered that limited discovery and briefing take place. Judge Moskowitz referred the question of additional damages to the magistrate judge for a settlement conference. Finally, the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to more than the $136,357.83 in attorneys' fees awarded in the original district court action, but would wait to determine the amount until the other issues were resolved. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, on Apr. 22, 2011, and for attorneys' fees, on Apr. 29, 2011. The plaintiff died on May 9, 2011, and on May 20, 2011, his widow and successor in interest to the claim filed a motion to substitute the plaintiff, and the motion was granted. On Mar. 21, 2012, Judge Moskowitz granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion for attorneys\u2019 fees and expenses. The plaintiff's death rendered moot any claim for injunctive relief under Title III of the ADA, thus the court denied the requested injunction requiring the defendant to maintain the current heights of the walls at the food preparation areas. Regarding damages, California Civil Code \u00a7 54.3 entitled a CDPA plaintiff to statutory minimum damages award of $1,000 for \"each offense\" established by the plaintiff. Upon determining that the defendant's unwritten policy constituted a violation of the ADA (and thus the CDPA as well) and that the original plaintiff had made five \"bona fide\" visits to the defendant's restaurants while that policy was in effect, the district court granted the plaintiff's request for $5,000 in statutory damages for each of his \"bona fide\" visits to the restaurant. Previously, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit had vacated the damages award and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the plaintiff sought an additional $3,000 in damages because the original plaintiff had made three additional visits for the purposes of gathering evidence for this litigation. Here, the district court denied the plaintiff's request for $3,000 in additional damages, finding that these litigation-related visits should not be considered for the purposes of assessing damages, as he admitted in his deposition that his goal during the visits was to have bad experiences, and \"allowing \u00a7 54.3 statutory damages for visits made with the <i>express</i> intention of advancing a CDPA plaintiff's position in litigation would enable CDPA plaintiffs essentially to write their own damages check.\" 2012 WL 12845619 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2012). Last, the court denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion for attorneys\u2019 fees without prejudice, finding that it was premature. On May 2, 2012, the plaintiff entered another motion for attorneys\u2019 fees. On July 17, 2012, Judge Moskowitz granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff\u2019s motion. The court granted the plaintiff an award of $545,079.05 in attorneys' fees and costs (in addition to the $5,000 in statutory damages). The plaintiff filed a motion in the Ninth Circuit for attorneys' fees and costs and was awarded an additional $353,469.95 in attorneys\u2019 fees and expenses related to the appeals work that took place in 2008-2010. As of January 22, 2014, the case appears to be closed.", "summary": "A paraplegic individual who uses a wheelchair sued Chipotle for violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and California state law in two of its California restaurants. The defendant implemented a new \"Customers with Disabilities\" which the district court found to be in compliance with the ADA, but the Ninth Circuit found otherwise, that viewing the ingredients behind the counter was part of the \"Chipotle Experience.\" Ultimately, the defendant lowered the heights of the walls in front of the food-preparation areas in all of its California locations so that customers in wheelchairs could see the ingredients, and the plaintiff was awarded $898,549 in attorneys' fees and costs and $5,000 in statutory damages."}
{"article": "In March 2012, the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) filed a complaint in the Alameda County Superior Court (San Francisco, CA) alleging that the Law School Admissions Council (LSAC) discriminated against and routinely failed to grant appropriate accommodations for test takers with disabilities on the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT). DFEH claimed that LSAC violated the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, which incorporated by reference all ADA violations. DFEH brought this claim on behalf of 17 California-based LSAT test takers. In April 2012, because the case involved alleged violations of a federal statute, LSAC removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. DFEH claimed that LSAC violated the ADA in several ways. First, DFEH alleged that LSAC counted \"mitigation measures\" (steps taken to reduce the effects of a disability) as undermining a claim by test takers that they had a disability, even though that approach was explicitly prohibited by the ADA under the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. Second, DFEH alleged that LSAC's disability policy failed to \"best ensure\" that the test measure what it intended to rather than the test taker's disability in violation of the testing provision of Title III of the ADA (42 U.S.C. 12189) and its accompanying regulation (28 C.F.R. 36.309). Third, DFEH alleged that LSAC's policy of \"flagging\" (annotating the score reports to indicate when a test taker has received an accommodation) violated the ADA, including its prohibition against intimidation or threats against the exercise of ADA rights. Finally, DFEH alleged that LSAC had a pattern of denying reasonable accommodations to test takers, again in violation of the ADA. On May 17, 2012, LSAC filed a motion to dismiss. It argued that 1) DFEH did not have subject matter jurisdiction; and 2) that even if DFEH was within its power under California law, it failed to state a federal claim upon which relief could be granted. On June 27, 2012, the United States Department of Justice filed a statement of interest supporting DFEH's interpretation of the ADA. DOJ then moved to intervene as a plaintiff in the case on September 5, 2012. In its motion, DOJ cited eight more complainants who were denied accommodations on the LSAT. The Legal Aid Society - Employment Law Center also filed a motion to intervene as plaintiffs on July 27, 2012. On September 18, 2012, Judge Edward M. Chen issued an order granting in part and denying in part LSAC's motion to dismiss. Judge Chen denied LSAC's motion with respect to each of the substantive claims in the complaint. The Judge granted LSAC's motion to dismiss the case with respect to the defendants whose names were unknown to DFEH at the time of filing. 896 F.Supp.2d 849 (N.D. Cal. 2012). On October 12, 2012, Judge Chen granted the United States' motion to intervene. The court also allowed the Legal Aid Society - Employment Law Center to intervene, but only to the extent that it represented its three individual complainants. 2012 WL 5077126 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2012). On November 9, 2012, LSAC filed a motion to partially dismiss on the basis of improper venue with respect to non-California residents added in the amended complaint. The defendant alleged that that unreasonable expansion of litigation beyond the scope of California residents would impose undue costs and burden. On January 29, 2013, the motion was denied. DFEH filed a First Amended Group and Class Action Complaint on February 7, 2013 seeking damages and injunctive relief. DFEH moved to proceed for class or group relief on February 21. On March 27, it filed a Second Amended Group and Class Action Complaint. The motion to proceed as a group or class was granted on April 22, 2013. On September 27, 2013, Judge Chen granted DFEH's motion to file a third amended complaint. The complaint added allegations that LSAC violated California Education Code 99161.5 by: [1] requiring excessive and unnecessary documentation before it would give accommodations; [2] providing an arbitrary and unreliable system of appeals from its accommodations decisions; and [3] by flagging tests that received accommodations in clear violation of the text of the statute. These charges were added after a California Court of Appeals Decision reversed a trial court injunction prohibiting California from enforcing 99161.5 of the Education Code as it violated LSAC's rights under the California Constitution. See LSAC v. California</i> <a href=http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13407>DR-CA-0047</a>. Meanwhile, the case was referred to Judge Joseph C. Spero for settlement conferences in March 2013. Conferences throughout 2013 and 2014 resulted in a settlement: on May 20, 2014, the parties entered into a proposed consent decree, which included injunctive relief. Set to last for 4 years, it required the LSAC to comply with the ADA, its implementing regulations and relevant California Law and cease from score flagging. The agreement requires:<ul><li>LSAC must permanently discontinue practice of \"flagging\" scores of individuals who received accommodations. <li>LSAC must provide the same or similar accommodations to individuals who have previously received them on tests for admission to any post-secondary educational institutions so long as the individuals provide documentation indicating that they were approved for such accommodations and the individual indicates that he or she is still experiencing the disability (there is an exception for testing accommodations that cannot be administered in one day) <li>LSAC's request for documentation shall be reasonable and limited to the testing accommodation requested. <li>LSAC must give \"considerable weight to accomodations previously received under 504 or IEP plan. <li>LSAC may not refuse accommodations based solely on the fact that the applicant has not previously received accommodations. <li>LSAC must remove its requirement for an explanation on a request for accommodation form from an evaluator why an individual with a mental impairment was not evaluated while on medication. <li>LSAC is required to appoint an independent monitor. <li>LSAC is required to diversify the variety of expert consultants it uses to evaluate requests for accommodations. <li>LSAC, the United States, and DFEH appointed members to a panel of experts in ADA compliance that will create best practices that LSAC will be required to follow in regard to among other things, the appropriate documentation LSAC can request, whether more than one qualified profession should review applications for accommodations.</li> <li>Any party could appeal the panel's report to the District Court if it believed that the recommendations violated the ADA or its implementing regulations, or California law where applicable, or conflicted with provisions of the Decree. <li>For the length of the decree the LSAC will keep records of all individuals requesting accommodations on the LSAT and make report of those records to the monitor, the United States, and the DFEH. <li>LSAC paid a total of about $8,730,000. This included a civil penalty of $55,000 for violating the ADA (though LSAC denied that it violated the ADA); $7,675,000 in compensatory damages to individual complainants and a fund to compensate those who took the test under the accommodations policies in place from January 2009 to May 2014; and $1 million in attorneys' fees to DFEH and the Legal Aid Society Employment Law Center.</li></ul> On January 26, 2015, the panel issued its report, which recommended many additional policy changes. Examples included automatic review by an outside expert when the council denies requests; submission of medical documentation dating to when the test taker was 13 years old, in certain cases; and different levels of supporting documentation depending on the accommodations sought. LSAC appealed the bulk of the report in court on March 26, 2015, arguing that the recommendations conflicted with the decree. The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Joseph Spero, who on August 7, 2015, granted in part and denied in part the defendant's appeal, holding that the panel had substantially stayed within its mandate. The ruling did invalidate several minor recommendations. For instance, he said, the council did not have to accept evidence that was more than five years old in support of a claim of mental or cognitive impairment; council staff who review accommodations didn't have to complete their reviews within two business days; and the council didn't have to allow at least one panel member to help train the staff who reviewed accommodation requests. 2015 WL 4719613 (N.D. Cal. Aug 7, 2015). On October 27, 2017, DFEH filed motions of contempt and in limine, claiming that the defendant had violated court orders and deficiencies in the monitor's reports. With the consent decree scheduled to lapse in May 2018, DFEH requested that the court extend the term of the consent decree by two years, replace the ADA monitor and require quarterly audits, grant the DFEH and DOJ access to LSAC's records, and award attorney's fees and costs. DFEH also sought to exclude any findings and reports found by the appointed Monitor. A number of organizations filed amicus curie briefs to support the plaintiffs' motion of contempt, alleging LSAC's history of disability discrimination in its accommodations practices. On March 5, 2018, Judge Spero granted the motion for a contempt finding and denied the motion in limine. Concluding that the Monitor's conclusions held no bearing on LSAC's contempt of the consent decree, the court found that LSAC's use of \"50% emails\" to respond to requests for accommodations was in violation of the court's order of compliance because it was an effective denial of disability accommodations in some instances and acted as a \"further inquiry\" into candidates' eligibility for accommodation. Additionally, \"no decision reports\" and LSAC's repeated refusal to grant DFEH access to certain files and records for candidates in California also violated the consent decree. LSAC did not substantially comply with the consent decree enough to shield it from an order of contempt. The court granted an extension of two years of the term of the consent decree, incorporation of the Best Practices report into the decree, additional audits by the Monitor, and fees and costs. 2018 WL 1156605. The consent decree will run until six years of the original court filing date, ending on May 20, 2020. While expressing concerns for the Monitor's performance, the court did not order replacement. Instead, it laid out concrete expectations for his duties moving forward with the decree, including two additional annual audits of LSAC for the remainder of the term. This case closed.", "summary": "The California Department of Fair Employment and Housing filed this ongoing lawsuit on behalf of several LSAT test takers against the Law School Admissions Council (LSAC). The State claims that LSAC routinely denies reasonable accommodations to test takers with disabilities in violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. In 2014, the parties have agreed to a consent decree that the court approved."}
{"article": "On May 11, 2000, plaintiffs with mobility impairments sued a public transit agency the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, for violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act alleging their bus system presented numerous barriers to access, subjecting the plaintiffs to delay, embarrassment, and ridicule by passengers and drivers. Specifically, Plaintiffsclaimed that the buses had inoperative lifts; drivers did not know how to operate the lifts; the defendant failed to provide adequate alternatives when accessible buses were not available; drivers, staff, and passengers harassed the plaintiffs and did not assist them; that drivers retaliated against the plaintiffs when they complained; and many other problems, all in violation of Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12131 et seq., 28 C.F.R. Part 35, and 49 C.F.R. Parts 37 and 38; the Americans With Disabilities Act provision that deals with retaliation, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12203 and 28 C.F.R. \u00a7 35.134(a); and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. On June 28, 2001, the court approved a consent decree. The decree required the defendant to make the following changes to its bus operation: implement a computerized system to track complaints and reports on disabled access; ensure all buses have operating lifts; train drivers and make changes to the driver disciplinary policy; require drivers to test the lifts before each shift; provide alternate transportation if a disabled individual could not use a lift; and give disabled passengers the option of being secured on the bus, rather than requiring their wheelchair or other devices to be secured. Undercover disabled individuals would monitor compliance with the decree. They would make three monitoring trips per day on random routes for the first year and one trip per day for the second year. The decree would last five years from the date of approval. The defendant was to pay $250,000 in damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. For each violation of the decree, the defendant agreed to pay $75 in liquidated damages. Any disputes would be resolved through mediation and, if that failed, the district court. The settlement concluded without further litigation, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "Disabled plaintiffs sued a public transit agency for violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging their bus system presented numerous barriers to access, subjecting the plaintiffs to delay, embarrassment, and ridicule by passengers and drivers. The parties entered a consent decree, in which the defendant agreed to remedy the problems with its bus system and pay $250,000 in damages, fees, and costs."}
{"article": "On July 23, 1997, patrons of a concert venue who use wheelchairs for mobility, their relatives, and an advocacy group filed a class action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the owners and operators for obstructing wheelchair seating areas. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that though the state-of-the-art concert venue had a capacity of 18,000, the wheelchair seating area accommodated only about 20 wheelchairs. The plaintiffs complained that this area was often blocked with equipment or additional staging, obstructing the view and restricting the movement of the plaintiffs when they attended concerts. The staff were either unhelpful or offered the plaintiffs seating on a steep slope or in an aisle way where people were constantly moving. They claim these conditions violate the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12181 et seq; the Colorado Revised Statute \u00a7 24-34-601, the Public Accommodations Law; the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, C.R.S. \u00a7 6-1-112(1); negligent misrepresentation; and constituted fraud and fraudulent concealment. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief and certification of two classes: 1) all persons with permanent disabilities who use wheelchairs or electric carts for mobility who have been denied full and equal enjoyment of the services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations at Fiddler's Green on the basis of disability, and 2) all persons with a relationship or association with members of the first subclass who, as a result of the relationship or association, have been denied full and equal enjoyment of the services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of Fiddler's Green.\" On September 28, 1998, the District Court certified a settlement class. On December 23, 1998, the District Court approved a class action settlement agreement. The agreement required the defendants to pay $1750 to each of the named plaintiffs and $25,000 in attorneys' fees for work before February 17, 1998 and reasonable fees for work thereafter. To the class members, the Defendants agreed to pay each class member a maximum of $175.00. The defendants also agreed to make \"capital improvements\" to the facility, set forth in a separate exhibit, and not to obstruct or place equipment in wheelchair seating areas. On December 30, 1998, the District Court dismissed all claims and entered a notice regarding attorneys' fees and costs.", "summary": "Disabled patrons of a concert venue filed a class action against the owners and operators of the venue for failure to remove barriers to access. The parties settled, with Defendants agreeing not to obstruct wheelchair areas and to pay damages and attorneys' fees and costs."}
{"article": "On December 2, 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint against the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (\u201cAmtrak\u201d) for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (\u201cADA\u201d), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12131-12165, by failing to make its intercity rail stations accessible to individuals with disabilities by July 26, 2020, as required by the Act. The government sought to enjoin Amtrak from discriminating on the basis of disability and require the company to comply with the ADA. The government also sought compensatory damages for disabled individuals who had been harmed by Amtrak\u2019s inaccessible stations. The case was not docketed or assigned to a judge, however, because the government reached a settlement with Amtrak on the same day it filed its complaint. The settlement agreement required Amtrak to design at least 135 accessible stations, finish construction at 90 stations, and be in the process of constructing at least 45 stations within 10 years of the settlement date. The agreement also required Amtrak to train staff on ADA compliance and to establish a monitor-approved process for managing ADA complaints. Pursuant to these obligations, Amtrak created the Office of the Vice President of Stations, Properties, and Accessibility. Amtrak also created a $2.25 million settlement fund to compensate mobility-impaired individuals who traveled or attempted to travel at Amtrak\u2019s 78 most inaccessible stations. The settlement was monitored by the Federal Railroad Administration and the Department of Justice.", "summary": "On December 2, 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint against the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (\u201cAmtrak\u201d) for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12131-12165, by failing to make its intercity rail stations accessible to individuals with disabilities by July 26, 2020, as required by the Act. The case was never properly docketed or assigned to a judge, however, because the government announced its settlement with Amtrak on the same day. The settlement agreement required Amtrak to design at least 135 accessible stations, complete construction at 90 stations, and be in the process of constructing at least 45 stations within 10 years of the settlement date. The agreement also required Amtrak to train staff on ADA compliance, establish a monitor-approved process for managing ADA complaints, and create a settlement fund to compensate individuals who were harmed by Amtrak\u2019s most inaccessible stations. The settlement was monitored by the Federal Railroad Administration and the Department of Justice."}
{"article": "On July 22, 2013, attorneys from United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division (DOJ) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against the State of Florida. The DOJ alleged that nearly two hundred children with disabilities were unnecessarily segregated from their communities and the general population by the State, which had placed them in nursing homes. The DOJ sought an injunction requiring the State to comply with Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12131-12134, which, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), forbids the unnecessary institutionalization of disabled individuals, and mandates that their rehabilitative and medical needs be provided in a manner that enables disabled individuals to be independent and integrated members of the community. The federal regulations implementing the ADA require that disabled recipients of government benefits receive those benefits in the most integrated setting,\" i.e., and environment that \"enables individuals with disabilities to interact with nondisabled persons to the fullest extent possible...\" 28 C.F.R. \u00a7 35.130(d), App. B., at 673 (2011). According to the DOJ's complaint, the unnecessary institutionalization of children denies them the opportunity to develop bonds with family and limits their ability to interact with people without disabilities. The DOJ also asserted that placement in nursing homes denies children important experiences that contribute to healthy child development. The nursing homes in which these children were institutionalized resembled hospitals, with children housed in rooms shared by one to three other patients. According to the DOJ's complaint the facilities did not prove adequate, age-appropriate stimulation. The children had limited very limited control over how they spent their time. The complaint provides as an example an instance an institutionalized teenager asked to be taken in his wheelchair to an activity area. The teen was taken to a room where he was left with a group of toddlers listening to nursery rhymes. The DOJ also alleged that Florida's policies and practices of limiting community-based services and its reductions to these services, and the State's unnecessarily burdensome recertification processes for individuals receiving these services, put at risk of unnecessary institutionalization children who were dependent on these services and who received care in their family homes or in small, community-based facilities. The complaint noted that Florida's reimbursement rates for home-based health services had not been raised or modified since 1987. The complaint also noted that the State's reductions to in-home care services coincided with an increase in the number of children placed in nursing facilities. In 2004 there were about 136 spots in nursing facilities designated to serve children, and by 2012, more than two hundred children resided in such facilities, in addition to a significant number of adults who remained in the facilities after entering as children. In September 2012, after conducting a six-month investigation, the DOJ had provided notice to Florida that it had found the State to be in violation of the ADA. The complaint acknowledges that Florida had made some improvements to its policies, but alleged that the State's processes for transitioning institutionalized children into community-based settings remained deficient. After several months of negotiations, the DOJ determined that the State would not comply with the ADA requirements voluntarily, and therefore it filed this suit. The DOJ sought injunctions barring Florida from failing to provide adequate community-based services and support for institutionalized disabled children and those children at risk of institutionalization. They also sought compensatory damages for injuries suffered by these children as a result of Florida's failure to comply with Title II of the ADA, and a declaratory judgment holding Florida to have violated the ADA. On June 26, 2014, the Court consolidated this case with another pending case, <i> A.R. v. Dudek </i>, No. 0:12-cv-60460-WJZ in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and ordered that no more filings occur with this docket entry. The consolidated case is in the Clearinghouse as PB-FL-0007.", "summary": "On July 22, 2013, attorneys from United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against the State of Florida. The DOJ alleged that nearly two hundred children with disabilities were unnecessarily segregated from their communities and the general population by the State, which had placed them in nursing homes. The DOJ sought an injunction requiring the State to comply with Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12131-12134, which, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), forbids the unnecessary institutionalization of disabled individuals, and mandates that their rehabilitative and medical needs be provided in a manner that enables disabled individuals to be independent and integrated members of the community. In June 2014, the case was consolidated with another pending case, which is in the Clearinghouse as PB-FL-0007."}
{"article": "The lead plaintiff in this action was a Detroit-based 501(c)(3) non-profit that assisted and advocated for people with disabilities. On September 9, 2005, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, suing the City of Detroit and claiming that the city had failed to meet federal and Michigan accessibility standards in altering intersections and sidewalks. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff claimed that the city had violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, (\"ADA\") (42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12111 et seq.), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 701), and Michigan state accessibility laws codified at M.C.L. \u00a7 37.1301-02. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory damages. On December 6, 2005, the plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint that added Michigan Paralyzed Veterans of America as a plaintiff in the action. This complaint added more specific allegations as to the city's alleged failure to provide accessible surfaces. On June 29, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction. Before a ruling could be issued on this motion the parties entered into negotiations and reached a partial settlement. On August 31, 2006, the district court (Judge Gerald E. Rosen) approved a plan for correcting the affected city surfaces. The plan required that any future alterations of streets, intersections, sidewalks, or curb ramps would be done in compliance with ADA requirements and Michigan state disability laws. It also required that the City of Detroit install curb ramps into all resurfaced intersections. The City of Detroit was required to file annual reports proving their compliance with the order. The City of Detroit was also required to pay attorneys fees and costs accrued by the plaintiffs. On October 16, 2006, the City of Detroit submitted a corrective action plan pursuant to the Court's August 31, 2006 order. This showed how the City planned to implement the settlement agreement in its existing resurfacing projects. After this, the City began remedying the affected areas, filing periodic status reports on their progress. On August 13, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, alleging that the City's rebuilding of sidewalks on Bagley Avenue failed to meet ADA standards. The Court denied the plaintiffs' motion, stating that the plaintiffs had not met the high standard for obtaining a temporary restraining order. Instead, the court scheduled a status conference for the parties to discuss the issues raised in the motion. 2008 WL 3833764 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2008). On September 30, 2008, Judge Rosen appointed a special master to organize the corrective action plan of the settlement. The special master continues to work with the parties in carrying out the agreement. On February 10, 2012, the court issued a stipulated order regarding partial settlement as to retrofitting of 397 intersections. The District Court then issued periodic orders directing the defendant to pay attorney and special master fees. As of May 13, 2020 the City of Detroit was still working on updating its sidewalks and surfaces in compliance with the settlement agreement.", "summary": "In 2005, two organizations that advocates for people with disabilities filed this lawsuit n the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the City of Detroit, claiming that the city had failed to meet federal and Michigan accessibility standards in altering intersections and sidewalks. In 2006, the parties negotiated a plant to correct the affected intersections and sidewalks. As of 2018, a special master continues to monitor implementation of the agreement."}
{"article": "An individual who uses a wheelchair and his mother filed this Fair Housing suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on July 27, 2006. The plaintiff had moved into a ground floor unit in a development known as the Uptown Apartments, part of a \"new urbanism\" complex that includes about 300 apartments, a pool, club house, exercise gym, meeting areas and a business office. The developers had also cooperated with Canton Township to build adjacent shopping and entertainment facilities. When the plaintiff moved in, he discovered multiple accessibility problems inside the unit. Defendants assured him they would be fixed, but they never were. Additionally, at the front door to the apartment, there were concrete steps, making it impossible for him to enter. Instead, he had to use the back door after navigating driveways and parking lots whose slopes made entering his home treacherous. The conditions at the development trapped the plaintiff in his home. His only outside access was the back parking lot. He was unable to get to the common areas and had virtually no contact with his neighbors. Finally, after making repeated requests that the necessary modifications be made, the plaintiff filed suit against the owner/contrator, the architect, and the engineer responsible for constructing and operating the inaccessible development. His mother intervened as a plaintiff because the conditions, along with her own disabilities, made it extremely difficult for her to visit her son. The local fair housing center (\"the FHC\"), which had first taken the plaintiffs' complaint and investigated, also intervened, and on September 7, 2007, the individual plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding Canton Township as a party. After months of acrimonious meetings, the parties entered into various settlement agreements. The individual plaintiffs entered a confidential settlement agreement with the non-public-entity defendants for an undisclosed sum of money, plus attorney fees and costs, after significant modifications had been made, including rebuilding the front of the building to eliminate the steps. They then settled with the Township for $75,000.00 and retrofitting of sidewalks and curb ramps On July 28, 2009, the FHC entered into a settlement with the owner/ contractor, engineering, and architect defendants requiring exterior modifications to the development, including accessible routes and parking, and interior modifications to the covered residential units including, at the request of the tenant, beveling exterior sides of primary entry doors, increasing turning space, retrofitting of bathrooms, and other modifications required by the Fair Housing Act and its implementing regulations. Defendants agreed to pay $45,000.00 in damages to the FHC. The case was closed on July 29, 2009.", "summary": "This was a case brought to make a 300 unit apartment complex in Canton Township, MI accessible to persons with mobility impairments. It was filed in 2006 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan by two individuals and the Fair Housing Center of Southeastern Michigan. The suit eventually resulted in about three quarters of a million dollars in retrofits, damages to the plaintiffs and attorney fees and costs."}
{"article": "On July 10, 2012, a class action lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, against the Mississippi Department of Education (MDE), under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1400 et seq. The proposed plaintiff class, represented by a named plaintiff, consists of disabled students in the Jackson Public School District (JPS). The complaint alleged individual and systemic violations of IDEA by the School District, and that the State has continually failed to ensure that the School District meets its federally mandated obligations under IDEA. IDEA requires that a state provide a free appropriate public education to all students with disabilities, and that this education be provided in the least restrictive environment with minimal segregation from their non-disabled peers. The Plaintiffs allege that the State's failure to enforce IDEA has resulted in potentially thousands of students being denied their guaranteed free and appropriate public education, and seek injunctive relief requiring the State to execute its responsibilities under IDEA. The named plaintiff and a class of similarly situated students had, in September 2010, filed an administrative complaint against the Jackson Public School District with the State, alleging systemic violations of IDEA and the failure to provide a free and appropriate public education(\"FAPE\"). Alleged violations included: that the School District denied the students an appropriate level of related services to address their behavioral needs and goals, and denied many students with any such services; that the School District failed comply with IDEA's disciplinary regulations with regards to functional behavioral assessments (\"FBA\"), behavior intervention plans (\"BIP\"), and manifestation determination reviews (\"MDRS\"); that the School District failed to confer meaningful educational benefit; that they failed to comply with the substantive and procedural requirements relating to the development and implementation of individualized educational programs (\"IEP\"); that they failed to provide educational services in the least restrictive environment (\"LRE\"); that the School District failed to provide students with necessary and appropriate transition services; and that it failed to provide students with necessary and appropriate extended school year (\"ESY\") services. The State Department of Education investigated and in November of 2010 issued a report that substantiated every one of the violations. The Plaintiffs alleged in the July 2012 complaint that the School District continued, despite this investigation, to violate the rights of the Plaintiff class, and that the State exhibited complete indifference to the ongoing violations, and that it failed to take appropriate action to compel JPS to correct its violations of IDEA. The Plaintiffs allege that the State bears the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that local school districts comply with IDEA, and that the State has completely failed to exercise this responsibility. Less than ten percent of students with disabilities graduate from the School District. During the 2010-2011 school year, only 9% of eighth grade students with disabilities scored proficient or above in state-wide science testing, while only 4% of eighth grade students with disabilities were considered proficient in language arts as measured on the Mississippi Curriculum Test. The Plaintiffs seek a declaration from the court that the State's failure to comply with the mandates of IDEA is unlawful. They seek an injunction enjoining the State from subjecting disabled students to practices that violate their rights under IDEA and compelling the State to fulfill its duties under IDEA. They also seek reasonable costs and attorney's fees. On September 17, 2012, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint that added two additional named plaintiffs and which made minor changes to the formulation of their arguments. The allegations remained substantially the same. One November 4, 2012, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Certify Class, on November 11, 2012 the Plaintiffs filed a motion for a Preliminary Injunction, and on November 27, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. These motions remained pending until May 28, 2013. See below. At a January 23, 2013 settlement conference, the parties agreed to put a temporary stay on the case while they pursued settlement. Two days later, one of the added named plaintiffs from the Amended Complaint withdrew from the case. His claims were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. Apparently settlement negotiations failed, because on May 28, 2013 the stay was lifted and the pending motions terminated without decision. The parties were instructed to refile their motions, in light of any new facts that may have developed in the intervening period. On June 14, 2013 the plaintiff refiled their motion for class certification and on June 28, 2013 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs responded with a motion for discovery and an accompanying request to convert the defendant's motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment due to the advanced stage of proceedings. However, the plaintiff's motion was denied on September 6, 2013. The parties continued to file responses and replies to the defendant's motion to dismiss until April 18, 2014 when parties filed a joint motion to stay proceedings while they attempted to negotiate a settlement. Judge Daniel P. Jordan III granted the order and recommended the case back to Magistrate Judge F. Keith Ball for settlement negotiations. After approximately four and a half months, on September 29, 2014, the parties filed a joint motion to administratively close the case after reaching a settlement agreement. The agreement noted that as of February 12, 2014, JPS had corrected any and all violations under the IDEA. The agreement further stipulated that the MDE would assist JPS with the implementation of a Program Sustainability Plan for the 2014-2015 school year. The agreement also included that the MDE would conduct quarterly assessments of JPS's progress, compile a report regarding progress, and supply the reports to the plaintiff. On September 11, 2015 District Court Judge Daniel P. Jordan III granted a motion to dismiss with prejudice, and it seems the case is closed.", "summary": "A class action lawsuit was filed on July 10, 2012, against the Mississippi Department of Education, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 (IDEA), alleging that the defendant had failed to execute its responsibilities under IDEA, by not ensuring that the Jackson Public School District provide disabled students with a free and appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment, even after conducting an investigation into the School District and identifying its systemic failure to meet its IDEA obligations. The parties reached a settlement on September 29, 2014 stipulating the implementation of a Program Sustainability Plan for the 2014-2015 school year. On September 11, 2015 District Court Judge Daniel P. Jordan III granted a motion to dismiss with prejudice."}
{"article": "On August 3, 2005, a group of people with disabilities filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the New York Human Resources Administration (NYHRA). The complaint was brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, alleging violation of these Acts, as well as the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and New York Constitutions and the New York State and City civil rights statutes and regulations. Represented by the Legal Aid Society and private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that the NYHRA discriminated against them by involuntarily transferring their public benefits cases from their neighborhood welfare center to one of three \"hub\" centers that were exclusively designated for people with disabilities. The plaintiffs further claimed that these \"hub\" centers segregated people with disabilities and failed to provide reasonable accommodations to those whose disability made it difficult to travel. The plaintiffs asked the court for a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, injunctive and declaratory relief, and attorney's fees. On September 19, 2005, Judge Laura Taylor Swain approved a stipulation between the two parties where the defendant agreed to (1) transfer the named plaintiffs back to their local welfare centers, (2) stop the involuntary transfer of disabled persons, (3) provide the plaintiffs with notice of any voluntary transfers and (4) combine the hearing on the temporary restraining order with the hearing on the preliminary injunction. On November 11, 2005, the Court approved another stipulation where the defendant agreed to stop involuntary transfers and give notice of voluntary transfers. On April 19, 2006, Judge Swain certified a plaintiff class defined as \"recipients of public assistance, food stamps and/or Medicaid who have received or will receive a notice from the New York City Human Resources Administration involuntarily transferring their case to one of three 'hub centers' in Manhattan, the Bronx or Brooklyn in connection with the WeCARE program\". In the same order, Judge Swain issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the NYHRA from reassigning class members' cases to the hubs and requiring the NYHRA to give the transferred plaintiffs the right to return their case to their local center. This preliminary injunction was suspended on May 16, 2006, after the NYHRA informed the court that it was closing the hub centers. On December 11, 2006, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to request that the court order the defendant to reopen cases that were closed due to class members failing to attend mandatory meetings at the hub centers. For the next five years, discovery and negotiations dominated the case. The case was reassigned in November of 2011 to Judge Katherine B. Forrest. On March 27, 2012, the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether any of the plaintiff class would be excluded from the collection of compensatory damages, which was denied by Judge Forrest as premature. Following two more years of discovery, on November 25, 2014, the parties entered into a partial settlement. The agreement included compensation for foregone Cash Assistance benefits, reimbursement for Medicaid-covered expenses, and expungement of sanctions incurred while class members were assigned to hubs. Then, on March 11, 2015, Judge Forrest reviewed a proposed settlement of all claims, preliminarily approving it subject to a fairness hearing. Under the proposed settlement, the defendant agreed to implement a broad set of policies and practices for class members. This included implementing \"Disability Inquiry Methods\", written scripts and screening protocols for the staff to identify client disabilities that may pose barriers to complying with program requirements and maintaining access to benefits, as well as any needed Reasonable Accommodation (as defined by the ADA). The agency agreed to have a non-exhaustive list of reasonable accommodations available to identified clients. The agency agreed to help facilitate successful federal disability benefit applications, including a referral to a vendor to assist with appealing a denial of benefits. The agreement also outlined procedures for mandatory pre- and post-reminders for appointments, and protocols for hospitalized and homeless class members. The agency also agreed to additional training, to accept feedback from a Disability Advisory Community Panel, to have court supervised monitoring, and to have more accessible materials available. On June 22, 2015, Judge Forrest approved the class action settlement. After three years of negotiations and the parties agreeing to multiple extensions, on January 26, 2018, the City of New York agreed to pay attorney's fees in the amount of $6,500,000, with $5,434,936 going to The Legal Aid Society and the remainder going to private counsel. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On August 3, 2006, plaintiffs, a group of disabled persons receiving public benefits filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the South District of New York against the New York Human Resources Administration alleging that it discriminated against disabled persons by involuntarily segregating them by transferring their public benefits cases from local benefit centers to three hub centers that only serviced people with disabilities. The Court approved a proposed settlement agreement in June of 2015."}
{"article": "On January 26, 2021, this class-action suit was filed against the New York City Department of Education, the City of New York, and the Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education on behalf of a class of nearly 2,000 Staten Island children with disabilities who alleged that they were being taught in segregated and unequal settings in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and the New York City Human Rights Law. The three named plaintiffs were students with disabilities and the advocacy group Disability Rights New York. The plaintiffs were represented by The Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Disability Rights Advocates, Disability Rights New York, and private counsel. The case was assigned to Judge LaShann DeArcy Hall and Magistrate Judge Robert M. Levy. The New York City Department of Education maintained and operated an entirely separate school district for students with disabilities known as District 75. Students in District 75 were pulled from Staten Island public schools. Across the city, 25,000 students with disabilities attended District 75 schools, and 2,000 students with disabilities attended Staten Island District 75 schools. Students attending District 75 schools were taught in settings that were almost entirely segregated by disability, with very little facetime between students with disabilities and students without disabilities. Students with disabilities were funneled into the Staten Island District 75 system in violation of the IDEA's requirement that students be educated in the \"least restrictive environment\" possible. Additionally, Staten Island District 75 schools lacked many of the amenities that traditional public schools provide to their students like elective courses, extracurricular activities, and sports programs. The students did not seek monetary damages; instead, they sought injunctive relief in the form of a permanent injunction to stop the defendants from violating the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the IDEA, and state law. They also sought to order the defendants to create and implement a remedial plan to ensure that students can learn in the most integrated environment possible. The case remains open.", "summary": "Students sued the New York City Department of Education, the City of New York, and the chancellor of the New York City Department of Education to seek injunctive relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and New York state law. The student plaintiffs are either student in Staten Island District 75 schools or vulnerable to being sent to those schools, which are separated from New York City community schools. District 75 students receive their education in a restrictive setting where they are largely isolated from interactions with students who do not have disabilities. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief in the form of a permanent injunction against future violations and an order for a remedial plan to reimagine policies, practices, and norms that will permit each student to learn in the most integrated setting possible. The case remains open."}
{"article": "On May 2, 2012 Brown and three other blind or visually impaired individuals filed a lawsuit against the Free Library of Philadelphia, the city's public library system, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking relief under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794, and Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12132. The Plaintiffs alleged that they had been discriminated against by the Library, which had developed a program to make e-reading devices available to be borrowed at no cost by patrons 50 years old and older. To implement this program, the Library purchased 65 Nook Simple Touch e-reading devices, which the plaintiffs alleged were completely inaccessible to blind users. The plaintiffs alleged that accessible alternative devices were readily available on the market. The e-reader program was funded in part by a $25,000 federal grant from a program established by the Library Services and Technology Act, 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 9121, et seq. The Plaintiffs, in their complaint, argued that the Library had been alerted by several groups of the federal requirement to acquire only accessible technology and its obligation to conform its practices to federal law. Among these sources were the American Library Association, of which the Library is a member; in 2009 it passed a resolution recommending that members ensure electronic resources comply with federal accessibility guidelines. In addition, a 2010 \"Dear Colleague Letter\" from the United States Departments of Justice and Education had warned educational institutions not to procure or use inaccessible e-reader technology because the use of such technology would violate federal law. On October 22, 2012, the parties reached a settlement, and on October 23 the parties filed a Notice to Dismiss the case with prejudice, referencing the settlement. In the Settlement Agreement, the library denied any legal liability related to the allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint, but agreed to make its e-reader program fully accessible to blind patrons. To this end, the settlement implements a timetable, committing to procure 10 mainstream e-reader devices accessible to both sighted and blind patrons within sixty days of the Settlement Agreement, which initially were to be available to patrons with visual impairments or other print disabilities. The library agreed that, within four years of the agreement, it would stop lending inaccessible devices and ensure the full accessibility of all the e-readers it made available. The Library also agreed to train relevant staff members on the accessibility features of the devices, and to publicize the availability of the accessible devices. It further agreed to use its best efforts to ensure that all new contracts with its vendors contain an accessibility clause requiring that information technology products and services sold to the Library to not cause the Library to be in violation of its obligations under the Rehabilitation Act or Title II of the ADA. The agreement remains in effect until 2016.", "summary": "Four blind or visually impaired library patrons sued the Free Library of Philadelphia in in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking relief under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Title II of the ADA. They alleged that the Library's new program to lend e-reading devices was discriminatory, because the Nook Simple Touch devices the library had procured were inaccessible to visually impaired users, and because accessible alternative devices were available. The parties entered a settlement and the case was dismissed. The library agreed to transition to the exclusive use of accessible devices within four years, and to add ten accessible e-readers within 60 days of the settlement date."}
{"article": "On January 20, 2011, Voices for Independence, a non-profit disability advocacy group, and a class of disabled individuals, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, against Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), and Millcreek Township. The Plaintiffs alleged that the pedestrian walkways, sidewalks, and intersections in Millcreek Township were not in compliance with the accessibility mandates of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12101 et seq. and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 701. They alleged that the walkways and intersections were dangerous and that people using wheelchairs were forced to travel in the streets because of the absence of curb cuts. They further alleged that PennDOT and Millcreek had altered the sidewalks, walkways, and intersections, using federal and state funds, in ways that triggered mandatory compliance with ADA guidelines. The number of proposed class members was large; at the time the complaint was filed, Millcreek Township was home to approximately 2000 residents categorized by the US Census Bureau as \"Go Outside of Home-Disabled Residents, Noninstitutionalized,\" and 1000 residents in the category \"Sensory-Disabled Residents, Noninstitutionalized.\" The Plaintiffs alleged that members of the proposed class were segregated from full participation in Millcreek because of the lack of accessible sidewalks. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees. On October 12, 2011, the court approved a Consent Decree and Partial Settlement between the Plaintiffs and Millcreek Township. PennDOT was not a party to this agreement. Millcreek agreed to ensure all future alterations to or construction of roads made by the Township would have ADA-compliant curb cuts at the intersections. Millcreek agreed to report all road work to the plaintiffs. The agreement contained provisions allowing exceptions where curb cuts were technically unfeasible. Millcreek also agreed to make a report of all newly constructed or altered roads dating back to January 1992 (when the ADA came into effect). The Plaintiffs and Millcreek agreed that they would meet and confer, when this list was completed, to determine a timetable for the retrofitting of these areas where necessary. The agreement acknowledged that Millcreek was not responsible for ensuring the compliance of state roads and highways running through the town. Millcreek agreed to pay $27,2479.97 in attorneys' fees and costs to the Plaintiffs. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Consent Decree. Between 2014 and 2016, the parties continued to negotiate for a total of four Consent Decrees and Partial Settlement orders between Plaintiffs and Millcreek Township. Additionally, the court approved three Partial Settlements between Plaintiffs and PennDOT. On November 23, 2016, the court approved a Joint Partial Settlement Agreement among all parties. The Joint Partial Settlement Agreement resolved both of Plaintiff's claims (the Bus Stop claim and the Road Shoulder claim) and required Plaintiffs to make updates to existing infrastructure to comply with ADA requirements. Additionally, the parties agreed that any sidewalk construction within Millcreek Township would comply with ADA guidelines. On November 30, 2017, the parties proposed a fifth Consent Decree and Partial Settlement, which Judge Hornak approved on December 1, 2017. Under the fifth Consent Decree, the requirements of the four prior consent decrees remain in effect, with the additional incorporation of the Millcreek Transition Plan. The Transition Plan, consistent with the April 2017 preliminary agreement of the parties, identifies the \"remaining physical obstacles that limit accessibility of the facilities or park where Millcreek offers a program, service, or activity.\" It outlines and provides a timeline for the planned improvements and corrections to ensure that Millcreek's programs, services, and activities will be readily accessible to and useable by individuals with disabilities. The case is ongoing but administratively closed as of May 10, 2019. The court retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this and the prior consent decrees.", "summary": "Plaintiffs filed a suit in federal court on January 20, 2011, against Millcreek Township, PA and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT). Plaintiffs alleged that the sidewalks and intersections in Millcreek were not in compliance with the disability accessibility mandates of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and sought injunctive and declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees. On November 23, 2016, the parties partially settled, with the Township and PennDOT committing to adhere to ADA requirements in the future and to retrofit sidewalks and intersections where necessary. A series of consent decrees, over which the court retains jurisdiction, have been entered and the case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On December 13, 1996, parents of a student with autism filed this lawsuit on his behalf in the Eastern District Court of Arkansas. The plaintiffs sued the Arkansas Department of Education, the Williford School District, and individuals acting in their official capacities under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Section 504, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest attorneys, asked the court for injunctive relief, including compensatory education for the student, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys fees. The plaintiffs claim that the Williford School District failed to implement any method of teaching to assist or promote the disabled students' learning. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that the student was not provided with an integrated and appropriate education that would meet state standards. The plaintiff was diagnosed with autism at age 5, though the claims about his education begin with his enrollment in 7th grade. Plaintiff's parents claim that the school district failed to provide \u2014 and the state failed to oversee \u2014 an education that benefited the student. He was excluded altogether from Williford classrooms and schools, leaving him isolated from his peers. The plaintiff was only given \"home bound\" instruction, at a frequency well below the state's standards, and he was deprived of large parts of the high school curriculum. Furthermore, plaintiff's parents claim that the classes their son did take at the school \u2014 performance art and drawing \u2014 were pursued under their own initiative and required them to forego jobs and other necessities in order to assist the instructors in teaching their son. Additionally, the \"home bound\" instruction was primarily done on the computer, and required the parents to obtain the materials and teach their son themselves, instead of the district personnel. Plaintiffs claim that the defendants' treatment of the student deprived him of a proper education, and thus placed them in violation of the IDEA, ADA, and Section 504. In a case proceeding the one at hand, the family complained to the Arkansas Department of Education about the student's education in an IDEA hearing. The family then complained to the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) for a failure of due process. The DOE found that the Arkansas Department of Education delayed 3 of its 5 hearing decisions, ruling well beyond the 45 day limit. On November 21, 1997, Judge Moody granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, but stayed the proceedings pending the 8th Circuit Court of Appeal's ruling on whether the 11th Amendment barred a federal court from having jurisdiction over an IDEA claim. The 8th Circuit held that Arkansas had waived its 11th Amendment immunity with respect to the IDEA claims by participating in the federal spending program, and the case was remanded to the district court. In December 1997 the plaintiff filed a cross-appeal, but the 8th Circuit dismissed his claim in September the following year. In November 2000 this case was consolidated with <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13401\"> Jim C. v. Arkansas Department of Education</a> with this as the leading case. After an initial denial, Judge Moody granted class action certification for school-age children with disabilities and their parents and guardians in September 2001. On September 18, 2001, both defendants were denied summary judgement. Defendants appealed. On November 4, 2002, The 8th Circuit held that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden under Section 504, failing to show that school officials acted in bad faith or with gross misjudgment. Furthermore because the plaintiffs failed to ask for appropriate remedy under \u00a7 1983 and IDEA, the state officials were entitled to immunity. The 8th Circuit reversed Judge Moody's decision and remanded for further proceedings. On May 12, 2003, Judge Moody dismissed all claims for money damages against individual defendants. Following a trial, Judge Moody found that neither the state nor Williford School District violated the federal statutes. He held that the school district had developed a reasonable program to educate the plaintiff, and that, under the totality of the circumstances, had not created a hostile educational environment. On September 10, 2004, Judge Moody issued a judgement for the defendants and dismissed the case with prejudice. A subsequent appeal to the 8th circuit ultimately affirmed the judgement in May 2006.", "summary": "In 1996, parents of a student with autism filed this lawsuit on his behalf against the Arkansas Department of Education and the Williford School District under the IDEA, the ADA, Section 504, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The parents claimed that their son was unfairly discriminated against due to his disability and was deprived of an appropriate education. In 2004, the Eastern District of Arkansas Court held that neither defendant had violated the federal statutes and found for state and the school district."}
{"article": "On September 29, 2000, a former high school student harassed for his perceived sexual orientation (\"student plaintiff\"), filed this federal lawsuit, pro se, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the Visalia Unified School District and school administrators and officials. On January 24, 2001, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, now represented by both private counsel and the ACLU of Northern California, and joined by a second, organizational plaintiff, the Gay-Straight Alliance Network (\"GSA Network\"), a youth-led non-profit organization dedicated to eliminating intolerance and homophobia in schools, was added to the first amended complaint. In the amended complaint, filed under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and California state law, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, a declaratory judgment, and damages for the creation of a hostile school environment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clause. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that from 1996 to 2000, the defendants participated in and failed to take effective measures to remedy continuing and severe harassment that the student plaintiff experienced due to his sexual orientation. This harassment created a climate hostile to LGBT students, interfered with their enjoyment of educational opportunities, and caused them physical and emotional harms. On March 28, 2001, the Court (Senior Judge Oliver W. Wanger) granted the defendants' request for judicial notice of certified copies of official records showing registration of school district with public agencies, and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, motion for more definite statement, motion to strike (in part), motion for summary judgment/summary adjudication. The Court found that the GSA Network had standing to bring their claims, but struck GSA Network's prayer for punitive damages against the District. Gay-Straight Alliance Network v. Visalia Unified Sch. Dist., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2001). However, on April 11, 2001, the Court corrected its March 28 opinion and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the student plaintiff's request for punitive damages against the School District, finding the School District immune from exposure to punitive damages from state law claims. The parties then settled the case: On August 15, 2002, the Court entered a consent decree and granted the parties' stipulation of dismissal, dismissing the case with prejudice. The decree required the defendants to provide for a mandatory staff training program, revise its policies, select compliance coordinators, develop systems for reporting harassment and discrimination, allow students to form a gay-straight alliance, and create a community advisory group. It was scheduled to last for six months. The docket does not indicate any subsequent substantive activity.", "summary": "This federal lawsuit was filed in 2000 in the Eastern District of California; in it, a former high school student and the Gay-Straight Alliance Network sued his school district for failure to take effective measures to remedy continuing harassment that he faced based on his sexual orientation. The case settled for a consent decree entered August 15, 2002, which required the defendants to implement a mandatory staff training program, revise its policies, select compliance coordinators, develop systems for reporting harassment and discrimination, allow students to form a gay-straight alliance, and create a community advisory group. The decree implementation period was 6 months."}
{"article": "On Oct. 27, 2016, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. (SFFA) sued the U.S. Department of Education in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to compel compliance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552. In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that on Jan. 11, 2016 it submitted a request under FOIA, seeking all documents pertaining to the investigation of Princeton University in Case No. 02-08-6002. The defendant allegedly acknowledged receiving the request in a letter dated Jan. 13, 2016, but repeatedly stated that it did not have a specific completion time available or did not respond to the plaintiff's numerous requests for updates about when the request would be completed. As of Oct. 27, 2016, the date that the suit was filed, the defendant had still not produced the requested records. The plaintiff requested that the court (1) order the defendant to search for the records, (2) order the defendant to produce the records, (3) enjoin the defendant from continuing to withhold the records, (4) grant the plaintiff attorneys' fees and costs, and (5) grant the plaintiff such other relief the court found just and proper. On Oct. 28, 2016, the case was assigned to Judge Tanya S. Chutkan. On Dec. 1, 2016, the Department of Education (DOE) notified Princeton University that the plaintiff had requested documents related to the DOE's investigation of Princeton and that the plaintiff had filed a lawsuit to compel the DOE to produce the requested materials. Princeton objected to the disclosure, arguing that the materials were exempt under FOIA Exemptions 4, 6, and 7(c). On Mar. 1, 2017, the DOE informed Princeton that it had reviewed the objections and concluded that none of FOIA's exemptions required it to withhold the materials from the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the DOE informed Princeton that it would be producing the requested materials to the plaintiff, with personally identifiable information redacted, in 10 business days. On Mar. 17, 2017, Princeton filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the DOE seeking to enjoin the disclosure of the materials identified in the plaintiff's FOIA request. <i>Trustees of Princeton University v. U.S. Dep't of Education</i>, No. 17-cv-00485 (D.D.C.). This case was also assigned to District Judge Chutkan. On the same day, the defendant notified the plaintiff that it would not be producing the requested documents due to Princeton's lawsuit. Soon after, the plaintiff notified Princeton and the DOE that, due to the overlapping nature of the parties' cases, the plaintiff would move to intervene in <i>Trustees of Princeton University v. U.S. Dep't of Education</i>, No. 17-cv-00485, and to consolidate it with the present case. Both Princeton and the DOE consented to the motion. On Mar. 30, 2017, the DOE moved to stay the proceedings pending resolution of the parties' anticipated cross-motions for summary judgment in the related case. On May 9, 2017, the present case was consolidated into <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16470\">Case No. 17-cv-00485</a>. On. Dec. 7, 2017, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of this case without prejudice. On Dec. 11, 2017, in light of the joint stipulation of dismissal filed by the parties, Judge Chutkan issued an order converting the administrative dismissal into a dismissal without prejudice.", "summary": "The plaintiff, Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) sued the U.S. Department of Education to compel compliance with its FOIA request related to its investigation of Princeton University. The defendant notified Princeton of the request and the lawsuit, and Princeton then filed a lawsuit against SFFA to enjoin the disclosure of the materials requested under FOIA. The present case was consolidated into that suit, and the parties jointly stipulated to this case's dismissal."}
{"article": "On Mar. 17, 2017, the plaintiff, Princeton University, filed a \"reverse Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)\" lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Education and its sub-agency, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR), pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act; 5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 701-706; FOIA; 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552; the Trade Secrets Act; and 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1905, in order to prevent the disclosure of certain commercially sensitive documents and information relating to the University's undergraduate admissions program submitted to the OCR in the course of an OCR compliance review. The materials at issue were the subject of a pending FOIA request and accompanying lawsuit to compel disclosure, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16210\"><i>Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Education</i></a>. The materials fell into two categories: documents and information about undergraduate applicants to the University, and documents and information about the University's proprietary admissions processes. The materials pertained to an OCR compliance review had begun in January 2008 after OCR received a complaint alleging that the plaintiff had discriminated against the complainant on the basis of race and national origin in the admissions process. OCR concluded its investigation in September 2015, finding no evidence that the plaintiff had discriminated against the complainant specifically, nor against Asian applicants generally. The plaintiff maintained that the materials at issue were exempt from disclosure pursuant to a FOIA exemption that exempts from disclosure \"trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.\" 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552(b)(4). The plaintiff argued that disclosure of the materials would put it at a substantial competitive disadvantage to identify, evaluate, and enroll prospective students, while potentially also discouraging applicants from applying to the University in the future if they questioned the confidentiality of their application materials. The plaintiff sought permanent injunctive and declaratory relief to set aside the Department of Education and OCR's final decision to disclose the documents and information as arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. The case was assigned to District Judge Tanya S. Chutkan. On March 30, 2017, Students for Fair Admissions filed a consent motion to intervene as a defendant in the present case and consolidate the case with <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16210\">Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Education</a>. On May 9, 2017, the order was granted and the cases were consolidated. On July 17, 2017, the defendants filed an unopposed motion to remand and stay. The motion was granted on a week later, on the condition that the parties submit a status report to the court by September 25, 2017, and every 30 days thereafter. On October 25, 2017, the Department of Education informed the court that it had received and was reviewing supplementary material that the plaintiff had submitted. On November 24, 2017, the Department provided an update stating that it planned to respond to the plaintiff on or before December 8, 2017, informing the school of whether the agency found the records exempt from production. On December 8, 2017, the parties jointly stipulated to dismissal. Three days later, Judge Chutkan signed an order of dismissal, converting the administrative dismissal to a dismissal without prejudice. Each party had to pay their own costs. The docket does not include any details about the conditions of the parties' joint stipulation to dismissal. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Princeton sued U.S. Department of Education and OCR in a \"reverse FOIA\" to stop them from releasing documents related to an OCR compliance review to Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., which had submitted a FOIA request and filed a lawsuit against the DOE to compel disclosure. Parties voluntarily dismissed case."}
{"article": "On October 26, 2010, a group of students with disabilities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the Louisiana Department of Education and the Orleans Parish School Board. The plaintiffs, represented by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Southern Poverty Law Center, and private counsel alleged that the defendants acted and continued to act in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEA) of 2004 (20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1400), \u00a7 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (ADA) of 1973 (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12101). The plaintiffs sought to represent a class consisting of all New Orleans students with disabilities. Plaintiffs alleged that the New Orleans public schools had denied admission to students with disabilities; refused to evaluate needs for special education; failed to implement individualized education plans; and used abusive restraint techniques on students with disabilities. They sought a declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctions requiring the defendants to: (1) make their facilities and programs accessible to all students with disabilities; (2) adequately evaluate children with disabilities; (3) implement appropriate education accommodations; (4) and provide students with disabilities with a free appropriate public education. On March 12, 2014, there was a hearing on the motion for class certification. The District Court (Judge Jay C. Zainey) ordered a stay for filing post-hearing briefs pending the outcome of settlement negotiations between the two parties. The parties engaged in settlement negotiations during the spring and summer of 2014. On December 19, 2014, the parties submitted a proposed Consent Judgment. The Consent Judgment defined the affected class as present or future New Orleans students who have requested but not received a special education evaluation; have disabilities, attend charter schools, and have been removed from school for 10 days or more without the timely provision of the disciplinary safeguards required by IDEA; have not received services contained in their Individualized Education Plans; have a disability and have been denied admission or told not to apply to a public school because of their disability; or have mobility impairments and have been denied access to programs and services of New Orleans schools because of physical barriers. Judge Zainey issued preliminary approval of the Consent Judgment on January 8th, 2015. Following preliminary approval of the settlement, in early February, 2015, several parents of class members submitted objections to the Consent Judgment. Before the final hearing on the Judgment, plaintiffs' counsel met with those parents to discuss their concerns. On March 25, the court entered an order granting final approval of the Consent Judgment. The Consent Judgment required schools to develop processes for finding and evaluating students with disabilities for special education services, implement special education services and related services, review and reform disciplinary policies, and educate charter schools about their legal obligation to enroll students with disabilities. It also dictated reporting requirements and appointed an Independent Monitor to periodically assess defendants' progress. The state would cover the costs of the Independent Monitor. It also provided for the State defendants to seek $700,000 in legislative appropriations to cover their share of plaintiff's attorneys' fees. Additionally, the intervenor defendants, the Orleans Parish School Board, would pay $100,000 to plaintiff's counsel for their share of attorneys' fees. The Consent Judgment would remain in effect until the state achieved substantial compliance with each of the substantive provisions for two consecutive years. In a July 17, 2018 order regarding the status of the proceedings, the court noted that this meant defendants must first achieve substantial compliance and then maintain that compliance for an additional two consecutive years. The court also clarified that substantial compliance would be interpreted with regard to the compliance with the Consent Judgment itself, not individual compliance with the IDEA. The August 9, 2018 monitoring report found that the defendants had been in substantial compliance with the Settlement Agreement's substantive provisions for the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 periods. But in response to an inquiry from the Southern Poverty Law Center, the monitors discovered substantial data errors which led to schools being improperly selected for monitoring. The independent monitors then identified the schools that were improperly subjected to monitoring and the schools that should have been monitored. Finally, the monitors recommended that in light of these errors, the parties meet and discuss an appropriate resolution for moving forward in compliance with the consent judgment. The court set a status conference to discuss the school selection problems in October 2019, and there have been no further docket entries as of May 2020. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On October 26, 2010, a group of students with disabilities filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the Louisiana Department of Education for failing to provide accessible free public education to students with disabilities. After negotiations, the court approved a Consent Decree in March 2015. An Independent Monitor continues to file periodical assessments as the State works toward full compliance under court supervision."}
{"article": "On January 13, 2003, several student members of the Westfield High School L.I.F.E. Club filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201, against the City of Westfield, Massachusetts. The complaint alleged that the defendant violated the plaintiffs' freedom of speech, assembly, and free exercise of religion under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause, and unlawfully discriminated against them based on the religious content of their speech in violation of the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 4071, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs also alleged violation of their freedom of expression under Massachusetts state law. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and Alliance Defending Freedom (formerly \"Alliance Defense Fund\"), a Christian non-profit organization, requested a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages. More specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Westfield High School's policies and practices which prohibited and punished them for distributing religious literature, were discriminatory, content-based, vague, and acted as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. The alleged discrimination began during the 2001-2002 school year, when the plaintiffs were denied permission to distribute candy canes along with a religious story of the candy cane and Bible verses, to students at the school during non-instructional time. In 2002, the plaintiffs were again denied permission to distribute the literature, on the basis that the material was \"offensive.\" The plaintiffs distributed the materials with the religious content anyway and were suspended as a consequence. On January 13, 2003, along with their complaint, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, requesting the Court enjoin the defendants from enforcing the allegedly unconstitutional policies and the suspensions on the plaintiffs. Both the ACLU of Massachusetts and the United States filed briefs as amici curiae in support of the plaintiffs' motion, on February 26 and February 20, respectively. Following a hearing, the District Court (Judge Frank H. Freedman) granted the plaintiffs' motion on March 17. Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98, 108-109, 127-28 (D. Mass. 2003). On April 7, 2003, the defendants filed a motion to stay, which the Court denied on April 16. On April 16, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add the City of Westfield as a defendant and remove Westfield Public Schools as a party. The plaintiffs also moved for summary judgment. On June 13, 2003, the Court entered a stipulation of dismissal of the claims against the individual defendants. On June 16, 2003, the Court entered a consent decree, which proclaimed that the defendants had replaced the school speech policies with new agreed-upon rules. The defendants also agreed to rescind punishment of the plaintiffs for the distribution of the religious materials, remove prior restraints and content-based restrictions of distribution of materials during non-instructional time without complying with substantive and procedural safeguards, so long as distribution doesn't substantially and materially disrupt the operation of the school or the new policies. The plaintiffs were awarded $28,500 in attorneys' fees and costs and the case was closed.", "summary": "Several student members of a high school religious club brought suit against the city of said high school alleging violation of their freedom of speech, assembly, and free exercise of religion under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause. The plaintiffs also alleged unlawful discrimination based on the religious content of their speech in violation of the Equal Access Act and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, in addition to violation of their freedom of expression under Massachusetts state law. On June 16, 2003, the Court entered a consent decree between the school and the plaintiffs. As per the decree, the defendants agreed to rescind punishment of the plaintiffs for the distribution of the religious materials, remove prior restraints and content-based restrictions of distribution of materials during non-instructional time without complying with substantive and procedural safeguards, so long as distribution doesn't substantially and materially disrupt the operation of the school or the new policies. The plaintiffs were awarded $28,500 in attorneys' fees and costs and the case was closed."}
{"article": "On May 31, 2018, The National Federation of the Blind filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland (Northern Division). The plaintiff brought this lawsuit under the Administrative Procedure Act (\u201cAPA\u201d). It sued the U.S. Department of Education and the Secretary of Education along with the Acting Assistant Secretary, claiming that the changes to the U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights Case Processing Manual (\u201c2018 OCR Manual\u201d) violated the federal Administrative Procedure Act (\u201cAPA\u201d), and was contrary to the mission of the Office of Civil Rights (OCR). These changes in the 2018 OCR Manual included (1) new provisions to require mandatory dismissal and (2) the elimination of the appeal rights of complainants. In effect, the newly revised 2018 OCR Manual meant that the OCR would dismiss claims of illegal discrimination if the claim was either part of \"a pattern\" of complaints against multiple recipients, or if the complaint placed an unreasonable burden on OCR's resources. \"Pattern\" was left undefined and could cover as little as two complaints. The provision was not even limited to those instances where prior complaints were meritless or where they would involve similar allegations. \"Unreasonable burden\" would also be judged based on unknown factors. In addition, the DOE made a third change that eliminated complainants' right to appeal OCR findings of insufficient evidence. Thus, according to the plaintiff, the new restrictions would block those who had been subjected to more than one incident of illegal discrimination, and also those entities that represent multiple individuals that cannot afford to bring claims on their own. The plaintiffs stated this was arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with the law, as this unilaterally eliminated the right of claimants to have their claim of discrimination investigated if it indicated a possible failure to comply with federal civil rights laws. As such, plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and attorney\u2019s fees. This case was assigned to Judge Theodore D. Chuang. On December 3, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint naming the newly appointed Department of Education Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights. After this complaint, on August 21, 2019, Judge Chuang granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, saying that while the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded particularized injuries, the complaint did not take into account an amendment to the OCR manual that removed the language that the parties are contesting. He did grant the plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint to address the issue. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 3, 2019 which added a section on how the new OCR manual did not change the underlying issues from the old one, and that it does not provide for redress of formerly removed complaints. These complaints were again made under the APA. Litigation on the case continued, but the parties jointly moved to dismiss the case on account of a settlement agreement that they came to on February 4, 2020. The settlement reopened cases that had been dismissed under the contested rules, and allowed parties that had cases dismissed for insufficient evidence under the old rules to petition the Department to have their cases reopened. The Department of Education also agreed to pay $50,000 to the plaintiffs for legal fees. The parties can move to file for further enforcement of the order until February 5, 2021; no such motion has been filed as of June 2020.", "summary": "On May 31, 2018, The National Federation of the Blind filed this lawsuit in the U.C. District Court for the District of Maryland (Northern Division). The plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Education and the Secretary of Education along with the Acting Assistant Secretary, claiming that the changes to the 2018 OCR Manual violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 551 et seq., and was contrary to the mission of the OCR. These changes in \u00a7 108(t) of the 2018 OCR Manual require mandatory dismissal of complaints if the claim is either part of \"a pattern\" of complaints against multiple recipients, or places an unreasonable burden on OCR's resources. These changes also eliminate the appeal rights of complainants. The parties came to a settlement agreement reopening complaints dismissed under the contested rules of the manual and allowing parties that had their cases dismissed under the rule to petition the Department to reopen their cases. The case is not officially closed until February 2021, when the parties can no longer file for further enforcement."}
{"article": "On May 14, 2020, a group of public interest organizations focused on helping student-victims of sexual assault and harassment, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, against Secretary of Education Betsy Devos, in her official capacity, and the Department of Education (ED). The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, alleged that regulations issued by ED \"sharply limit educational institutions' obligations to respond to reports of sexual harassment and assault\" and therefore contravened Title IX of the Education Amendmentsof 1972. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and alleged that ED's rule making process violated the Administrative Procedure Act. Judge Richard D. Bennett was assigned the case. The complaint argued that ED's regulations ran counter to both the spirit and intent of Title IV by narrowing the definition of sexual harassment, directing university officials to ignore Title IV reports of off-campus conduct, and holding schools accountable only when they were \"deliberately indifferent\" to sexual assault and harassment. These policies, the plaintiffs contended, created a higher standard for race- or national origin-based discrimination and a lower one for sex-based discrimination. As a result, the plaintiffs alleged that ED's rulemaking process violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it was \"arbitrary and capricious\" for failing to adequately consider important aspects of sexual harassment and assault problems. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On May 14, 2020 the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the Department of Education (ED) in the United States District Court in the District of Maryland. The complaint alleged that regulations issued by ED \"sharply limit educational institutions' obligations to respond to reports of sexual harassment and assault\" and therefore contravened Title IX of the Education Amendmentsof 1972. The case is ongoing with responses to the complaint due on July 31, 2020."}
{"article": "Until and through the latter part of 2006, the University of Michigan's admissions policies allowed for the consideration of race among the factors it considered in making admissions decisions. In 2003, this policy was expressly approved by the United States Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). On November 7, 2006, the people of Michigan approved by majority vote a statewide ballot initiative, Proposal 2, which amended the Michigan Constitution to prohibit discrimination or preferential treatment based on race or gender in the operation of public employment, public education or public contracting in the State. Under the Michigan Constitution, the proposal was scheduled to go into effect on December 23, 2006. In response to the enactment of Proposal 2, the University of Michigan announced that it would change its admissions and financial aid policies so that its \"admissions and financial aid processes will not discriminate, nor grant preferential treatment to, any individual on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin,\" apparently by altering its admissions procedures \"such that race and gender will have no effect on the decision-making process\" except to \"recognize exceptions provided in [Proposal 2] including one for programs that receive federal funds.\" Both Proposal 2 and the university's announcement triggered litigation. On November 8, 2006, several civil rights organizations, students, labor organizations, a political organization, and a former petition circulator (for the initiative that resulted in enactment of Proposal 2) filed, as plaintiffs, a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Represented by Detroit-based private counsel, they named as defendants the state's governor and the regents of three large state universities, including the University of Michigan, as well as broadly identifying as additional defendants unnamed \"trustees of any other public college or university, community college, or school district.\" The plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 lawsuit sought declaratory and injunctive relief to block the implementation of Proposal 2, claiming it violated the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964, Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the First Amendment. On December 12, 2006, the university defendants filed a cross-claim against the governor, saying that they were unsure of the meaning and constitutionality of Proposal 2, were in the middle of their admissions and financial aid cycles, and wanted to continue to act in accord with past policy and practices until the uncertainties about Proposal 2 were resolved. Accordingly, the universities sought an order preserving the status quo and permitting them to act until the court ruled upon the injunctive relief requested by the initial plaintiffs. The universities, too, were represented by private counsel. Two days later, District Judge David D. Lawson granted the state attorney general's motion to intervene as a defendant in the case. The attorney general had cited his duty to defend the constitutionality of the new provision. On December 17, 2006, the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint. Basically, the amendment added the state's attorney general as a defendant, asserted more factual detail about racial discrimination and its myriad effects, asserted that Proposal 2 violated federal constitutional and statutory law, and added the assertions that federal statutes preempted Proposal 2 and that the provision also violated Executive Order 11246. The amended complaint sought the same declaratory and injunctive relief and added a claim for an award of attorneys' fees and costs. The next day, the district court received a stipulation from all parties consenting to the temporary injunctive relief sought by the universities and agreeing to the dismissal of the request in the cross-claim for an injunction. In an unpublished order on December 19, 2006, Judge Lawson accepted the stipulation and enjoined the application of Proposal 2 against the university defendants until July 1, 2007, unless the injunction should be earlier vacated. Also on December 19, other plaintiffs (\"the Cantrell plaintiffs\") filed a separate complaint in the same court, also seeking to enjoin the effect of Proposal 2 (Docket #: 06-cv-15637-DML-SDP). Meanwhile, motions to intervene in the initial lawsuit had been filed by various parties. On December 27, 2006, Judge Lawson ruled upon three of these motions. The American Civil Rights Foundation and the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative Committee had moved to intervene as plaintiffs on December 14, while a group called Toward a Fair Michigan, and an individual seeking admission to the University of Michigan Law School in the fall, had moved to intervene as defendants on December 18. That same day, the City of Lansing filed a motion to intervene as a plaintiff. Applying federal civil procedure rules governing intervention of right and permissive intervention, Judge Lawson granted only the individual's motion to intervene. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 240 F.R.D. 368 (E.D. Mich. 2006). The day Judge Lawson issued the temporary injunction (December 19, 2006), the individual intervenor and Toward a Fair Michigan had filed a motion requesting a stay of the order enjoining enforcement of Proposal 2 before its effective date-December 23. Having heard nothing from the district court and with the effective date fast approaching, on December 21, these two would-be intervenor-defendants filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The next day, they filed in that court both an emergency motion for a stay, pending appeal, of the preliminary injunction and a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to grant their then-pending motion to intervene and to vacate its preliminary injunction. Also in the Sixth Circuit, on December 28, the organizations whose intervention was denied by Judge Lawson's December 19's ruling filed appeals of that ruling. Circuit Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton wrote the panel opinion for the appellate court, which decided that (1) the prospective student had standing; (2) the stipulated injunction was invalid; (3) Proposal 2 did not violate the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause; (5) neither the Civil Rights Act or Title IX preempted Prop. 2; and (7) a stay of the district court's order granting the injunction was warranted. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237 (6th Cir. 2006). On January 5, 2007, Judge Lawson issued an unpublished order consolidating the two cases seeking to enjoin Proposal 2, noting that the proposal was also known as Proposal 06-2 and, now, as Article 1, section 26 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963. Also, the parties were directed to work toward joint proposed stipulations of fact, to submit a discovery plan, and to have lead counsel for the parties attend a status and scheduling conference in March 2007. On January 17, 2007, the first amended complaint after consolidation was filed. In more measured tones than used in the complaints filed by the initial plaintiffs, this amended complaint described a variety of plaintiffs (high school, undergraduate, and graduate and law students, as well as university professors) who sought class action status for the case and asserted that Proposal 2 violated their equal protection rights by placing on them and racial minorities a substantial and unique burden in seeking legislation, because groups seeking beneficial legislation including considerations of race face a different and much more onerous burden in the political process than do those seeking beneficial legislation based on other characteristics. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and costs. This amended complaint reflected a host of attorneys serving plaintiffs, including private counsel, counsel from numerous organizations (i.e., Detroit Branch NAACP, ACLU Fund of Michigan, ACLU Foundation of Southern California, NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Michigan State Conference-NAACP, ACLU Foundation Racial Justice Program), and several law professors from a variety of law schools. On March 28, 2007, the original plaintiffs' counsel filed a second amended petition. It added a gender discrimination component to their earlier equal protection arguments, as well as claims that that Fourteenth Amendment clause was violated by racial and gender discrimination in the very structure of government in Michigan. The second amended complaint added university presidents as defendants, sought class action status for the case, and re-asserted earlier federal constitutional and statutory claims, including those based on preemption under the Supremacy Clause. It extended the claims based on the asserted violation of First Amendment rights by contending students' rights were violated, too, by the state enactment. Plaintiffs continued to seek declaratory and injunctive relief, together with attorneys' fees and costs. On October 5, 2007, the Cantrell plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment as to intervening defendant Russell, arguing that he should be dismissed from the litigation because he no longer represented an interest distinct from that of the attorney general. On October 17, 2007, the university defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On November 30, 2007, the attorney general filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment on the merits as to all Plaintiffs. Russell and the Cantrell Plaintiffs likewise filed motions for summary judgment the same day. On March 18, 2008, District Court Judge Lawson issued two orders ruling on these motions. In the first published order, the court denied the University Defendants' request to be dismissed as parties and the Cantrell plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted the attorney general's motion for summary judgment, rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments that Proposal 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of University of Michigan, 539 F.Supp.2d 924 (E.D. Mich. 2008). In the second published order on the same day, Judge Lawson adjudicated a series of other motions. Among other things, the court granted the Cantrell plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to intervening defendant Russell, denied the motion to intervene by Jennifer Gratz, and denied as moot plaintiffs' respective motions for class certification. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of University of Michigan, 539 F.Supp.2d 960 (E.D. Mich. 2008). (The Cantrell plaintiffs subsequently moved the court to reconsider the first order, but the court denied the motion on December 11, 2008. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the University of Michigan, 592 F.Supp.2d 948 (E.D. Mich. 2008).) Multiple appeals followed the district court's decisions on March 18 and December 11, 2008. The university defendants appealed the court's denial of their motion to be dismissed as parties. Russell appealed the court's grant of the Cantrell plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment dismissing him as a party to the action. The Cantrell plaintiffs appealed the court's grant of the attorney general's motion for summary judgment and its denial of their motion for reconsideration. Similarly, the Coalition plaintiffs appealed the court's grant of the attorney general's motion for summary judgment. On July 1, 2011, in an opinion delivered by Judge R. Guy Cole, Jr., the Sixth Circuit found that Proposal 2 unconstitutionally altered Michigan's political structure by impermissibly burdening racial minorities. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants and ordered the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Also, the appellate court affirmed the district court's decision granting the Cantrell plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to intervening defendant Russell, and affirmed the district court's decision denying the university defendants' motion to be dismissed as parties. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the University of Michigan, 652 F.3d 607 (6th Cir. 2011). On September 9, 2011, the Sixth Circuit granted en banc rehearing; the panel decision/judgment was vacated, and the mandate was stayed. After a new round of briefing and argument, on November 15, 2012, in an opinion delivered by Judge R. Guy Cole, Jr., the Sixth Circuit en banc majority found, as the panel had, that Proposal 2 created a comparative structural burden that undermined the Equal Protection Clause (which the court calls the \"political process\" argument). Accordingly, the en banc court found Proposal 2 unconstitutional and reversed the judgment of the district court on this issue. The Court affirmed the denial of the University Defendants' motion to be dismissed as parties (deferential to lower court on this type of issue), and affirmed the grant of Cantrell Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to Russell (because he is no longer an interested party). The majority explained that equal protection of the laws includes \"a guarantee that minority groups may meaningfully participate in the process of creating laws and the majority may not manipulate the channels of change so as to place unique burdens on issues of importance to them.\" The Court found that \"Proposal 2 targets a program that 'inures primarily to the benefit of the minority' and reorders the political process in Michigan in a way that places special burdens on racial minorities.\" It reorders the political process because admissions procedures are set by the popularly elected governing boards of the universities. To enact other preferential admissions criteria (the court uses the example of legacy applicants), a citizen need only convince the existing officials on the board or seek to elect someone who shares their views. But to enact a race-conscious preference, a citizen must first obtain a constitutional amendment, and then seek to persuade the board or elect board members who agree. It was the process, not the outcome, that the Court held to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court did not reach the question of whether the Proposition violates Equal Protection under what it called the \"traditional analysis\" (impermissibly classifying individuals on the basis of race). Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the University of Michigan, --- F.3d ---, 2012 WL 5519918 (6th Cir. 2012). The Michigan Attorney General sought certiorari review in the Supreme Court, and on March 24, 2013, the Court granted cert. On October 15, 2013 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case. In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, the court reversed the Sixth Circuit (134 S. Ct. 1623). There were two concurring opinions and a single dissent. Writing for the Court, Kennedy asserted that this case was not about resolving the debate of racial preferences, but whether or not it is constitutional for Michigan to allow its voters to decide the issue. The Court held that there was no authority in the Federal Constitution or in the Court\u2019s precedents for the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit to the voters the determination whether racial preferences may be considered in governmental decisions, in particular with respect to school admissions.", "summary": "On November 7, 2006, the people of Michigan approved by majority vote a statewide ballot initiative-Proposal 2-which amended the Michigan Constitution to prohibit discrimination or preferential treatment based on race or gender in the operation of public employment, public education or public contracting in the State. Both Proposal 2 and the University of Michigan's announcement that it would comply triggered litigation. On November 15, 2012, the en banc Sixth Circuit held that Proposal 2 created a comparative structural burden that undermined the Equal Protection Clause (which the court called the \"political process\" argument). Accordingly, the court found Proposal 2 unconstitutional. On March 24, 2013, the Supreme Court granted review of the case. Argument will be after the Court's summer break. On October 15, 2013 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case. In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, the court reversed the Sixth Circuit. There were two concurring opinions and a single dissent. In his opinion Kennedy asserts that this is not a case about resolving the debate about racial preferences, but rather about whether it is constitutional for Michigan to allow its voters to decide the issue. The court holds that there is no authority in the Federal Constitution or in this Court\u2019s precedents for the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit to the voters the determination whether racial preferences may be considered in governmental decisions, in particular with respect to school admissions."}
{"article": "On December 12, 2003, several New York City public school students with disabilities filed a lawsuit in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs filed under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (\"IDEA\"), the14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794 (\"Section 504\"), and New York State Education Law \u00a7\u00a7 4401. The acton was brought against the New York City Department of Education and the New York City School Board. The plaintiff, represented by private and public interest council asked the court for injunctive relief, claiming that the defendants violated IDEA by not adhering to the results of impartial hearings regarding the payment for services necessary for the plaintiffs' special education needs. On April 15, 2004, an amended complaint was filed to include a class action for those of a like situation with the plaintiffs. In order to receive funding under IDEA, New York State law allows an aggrieved parent of a child with a disability to have an impartial hearing in respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child. The plaintiffs in this case all were to receive compensation or funding for special education tuition or services as a result of one of these hearings. Despite these decisions, the defendant, who could have appealed the decision within 30 days and failed to do so, either did not compensate, or failed to fully compensate the plaintiffs. On April 10, 2008, Judge Richard J. Howell approved a class settlement agreement between the parties. The settlement required the New York Department of Education to implement all impartial hearings within a given time frame, or 35 days if no time frame is given. Any order from a hearing that requires action must be implemented within seven days. Implementation of the orders is now reviewed by an independent auditor. If an order is not implemented in time, parents are notified in a letter which can be used to enforce the order.", "summary": "In late 2003, several students with disabilities filed a lawsuit against the New York City Department of Education and the New York City School Board for failing to follow the orders of impartial hearings requiring them to compensate or fund tuition and services for the special education needs of the plaintiffs. In 2008 a settlement agreement was approved which included injunctive and compensatory relief."}
{"article": "This case is about the denial of access to a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to educationally disabled students in the Buffalo City School District. A student with an educational disability received an Individualized Education Program (IEP) for the 2011 school year that included speech and language therapy. Though the IEP projected services to commence with the school year, the school district delayed the start of IEP related services until the third week. The student's parent claimed the delay was a result of the school district\u2019s policy and not the result of any discussion with the parent or an individualized assessment of their child\u2019s needs. The student\u2019s parent, individually and on behalf of their child, filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York on October 11, 2012. They alleged this policy denied parents meaningful participation in the educational decision-making process, denied individualized determinations of IEPs, and, therefore, denied students of a FAPE. The plaintiff sued the Buffalo City School District Board of Education and its superintendent under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDIEA), and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by private attorneys specializing in disability law, sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, additional services for the student to compensate for delayed implementation of therapy, and attorneys\u2019 fees and cost. The case was automatically referred to mediation on December 18, 2012 and assigned to Judge Leslie G. Foschio. The parties agreed to and selected a private mediator in March 2013. On November 2, 2012, the plaintiffs sought class certification of those students with learning disabilities and their parents who had been similarly denied services in the first two weeks of school and meaningful participation by the parents in their children\u2019s educational decision-making process. The defendants sought to stay the decision on class certification, but on June 30, 2013 Judge William M. Skretny granted class certification and denied the defendant\u2019s motion to stay. 2013 WL 3354424. The court defined the certified class as: <div style=\"margin-left:5%; margin-right:5%;\">[C]hildren, and parents of children, between the ages of 5 and 21 residing in the Buffalo City School District, present and future, who are classified as disabled per the definition in [IDEA] . . . and receive related services.</div> On July 3, 2013, the defendants appealed Judge Skrenty\u2019s decision granting class certification to the Second Circuit. On June 17, 2014, the appeals court affirmed Judge Skrenty\u2019s decision to grant class certification because the plaintiffs\u2019 case was based on a policy that applied uniformly to all students, satisfying the class commonality requirement. (Circuit Judges Rosemary S. Pooler, Peter W. Hall, Susan L. Carney). 569 Fed.Appx. 41. Mediation and settlement discussions continued throughout the remainder of 2014, and on January 27, 2015 the parties reached a written settlement subject to approval of the Buffalo Board of Education and the court. Judge Skrenty finalized and approved the settlement on March 24, 2015. The settlement involved injunctive relief, compensatory services in the form of 10 hours of speech and language therapy services to the named plaintiff, and attorneys\u2019 fees. The Board of Education agreed to void any practices or procedures indicating that speech and language services shall begin no later than a certain date. They agreed that the start date for speech and language services would be made basis of individual assessments and data of each child, and individual speech and language therapy would be presumed to begin at the start of the school year. Additionally, they agreed that group therapy would begin no later than two weeks after the start of each school year. The firm representing the plaintiffs was assigned to conduct monitoring during the 2015\u20132016 and 2016\u20132017 school years. Within 90 days, the Board of Education was to provide notice to class members of the settlement. Any disputes related to the implementation and/or interpretation of the settlement were agreed to be handled through arbitration. The attorneys were awarded $165,000. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2012, a parent, individually and on behalf of their student-child with an educational disability in the Buffalo City School District, filed this class action complaint in the the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that the Buffalo City School District Board of Education and its superintendent denied free appropriate public education to children with educational disabilities, failed to promptly provide children with disabilities related services, and failed to provide parents with meaningful participation in their children's educational decision-making process. In 2015, the parties reached a settlement that required more timely speech and language therapy for members of the class and awarded attorneys' fees. The case closed in March 2015."}
{"article": "On February 15, 1996, parents, as next friends of their minor daughters, filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District Of Oklahoma against Owasso Public Schools (\"OPS\") and individual District employees. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and attorneys from the National Women's Law Center, claimed that OPS had violated Title IX, the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 by denying female students an equal opportunity to participate in interscholastic athletics. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that OPS had intentionally discriminated against female OPS students based solely on their gender in the scheduling of games and practice times; the provision of equipment, lockers rooms for both practice and competition, opportunity to receive qualified coaching, publicity and supplies; and the assignment and compensation of coaches. The plaintiffs also sought compensatory damages in their individual capacities. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification was granted by the Court (Judge Terence C. Kern) on June 28, 1996. On October 2, 1996, the Court (Judge Kern) entered a consent decree terminating the case and setting out the agreements reached regarding OPS's sports programs' availability to female students. Specifically, OPS was obligated to survey female students, urge female teams' coaches to play the maximum number of games permitted, and to engage in consistent efforts to provide intramural opportunities for 7th and 8th grade students. Finally, OPS was required to comply with various requirements related to budget and expenditures; coaches; equipment and supplies; facilities, including weight facilities; grievance procedures; policies, including maintenance of records related to compliance; publicity and support organizations; scheduling of games and practice times; Title IX personnel training; travel; and uniforms. On November 22, 1996, the parties jointly agreed to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice. On May 21, 1997, the Court (Judge Kern) awarded plaintiffs $32,941 in attorney's fees and costs. On August 16, 1999, OPS tendered a report in support of its compliance with the consent decree, detailing OPS's obligations and related compliance. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On February 15, 1996, students filed a class action lawsuit against Owasso Independent School District (\"OPS\"), claiming that it had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 by intentionally denying female students an equal opportunity to participate in interscholastic and other school-sponsored athletics. On October 2, 1996, the Court entered a consent decree, which settled each of the claims stated in the Complaint and resolved all claims asserted against individuals who were named in their official and individual capacities, dismissing claims for damages."}
{"article": "On August 10, 1999, parents, on behalf of their minor daughters, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma against Independent School District No. 32 of Mayes County, alleging that the school district had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment, 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1681, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment through disparate treatment of female students with respect to providing an equal opportunity to participate in interscholastic and other school-sponsored athletics. The plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of all present and future female students enrolled at Chouteau Public Schools who participate, seek to participate, or are deterred from participating in interscholastic and/or other school-sponsored athletics at Chouteau Public Schools. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the school district violated the female students' rights by knowingly and intentionally offering sports and levels of competition in a manner which discriminates against female students. Additionally, the complaint alleged that the defendants had discriminated against female students with respect to equipment and supplies provided, scheduling of games and practice times, travel, the opportunity to receive qualified coaching, the assignment and compensation of coaches, provision of locker rooms and facilities for both practice and competition and publicity. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the defendants had violated the students' rights and an injunction requiring the defendants to cease their discriminatory practices and remedy the effects of such practices and discriminatory conduct. The District Court (Judge Michael Burrage) certified the class in an order dated October 28, 1999. On November 2, 1999, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Claire V. Eagan) set a settlement conference for March 13, 2000. The parties entered a joint stipulation of dismissal on May 25, 2000, and Judge Burrage approved a settlement agreement on June 27, 2000. In the agreement the school district agreed to take affirmative steps to increase female student participate in athletics. They agreed to conduct a survey to determine interest in women's volleyball and soccer at the high school level, and volleyball, soccer and fast and slow pitch softball at the middle school level, and to add those sports for which there was interest. The school district also agreed to establish a system for accounting for revenues and expenditures for male and female sports. The district also agreed to schedule basketball games on a gender-neutral basis and to treat female students equivalent to male with respect to travel, food, lodging and other similar privileges. The District Court (Judge Burrage) dismissed the case on July 17, 2000.", "summary": "Parents, on behalf of female students of Chouteau Public Schools, brought suit against the school district alleging that the school had violated female students' rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX of the Education Amendment through disparate treatment with respect to interscholastic athletics and programs. In a settlement agreement, the school district agreed to take steps to remedy the discriminatory actions by, among many things, providing coaching, facilities and equipment to both male and female athletic teams on a gender-neutral basis."}
{"article": "The Public Interest Law Center filed this lawsuit on June 30, 1994 on behalf of a class of 280,000 special education students, 12 named plaintiffs, and 11 disabilities advocacy organizations against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs alleged that the Pennsylvania Department of Education violated the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiffs claimed that all school-age students with disabilities in Pennsylvania had been denied a free appropriate education in regular education classrooms with individual supportive services, and had been placed in regular education classrooms without the supportive services, individualized instruction, and accommodations they need to succeed in the regular education classroom. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed defendants failed to identify disabled students, develop individual educational programs or plans, and provide a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment to the maximum extent reasonably possible. Also, the plaintiffs claimed that defendants excluded disabled students solely because of their disability from participating in or from receiving the benefits of any program that received federal funding. The plaintiffs sought to increase the number of children with disabilities educated with their non-disabled peers, and to make sure schools provided real supports to make sure inclusion would work as required by the IDEA. The lawsuit sought to change Pennsylvania\u2019s systems for training districts in inclusion and for monitoring and enforcing inclusion compliance. On August 29, 1994, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, and the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. On March 8, 1995, the plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction. No further information about the requested injunction is available, but on April 7, 1995, the court (Judge Eduardo Robreno) denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction as moot. On March 31, 1995, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. The court also granted Pennsylvania State education Association and The Educational Support Personnel Association's motion to intervene. On June 12, 1995, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification. The parties continued to engage in extensive discovery, providing multiple case management plans extending the discovery period. The discovery led to the production of thousands of documents, taking of dozens of depositions, and exchanging of eighteen expert reports. The discovery encompassed the inclusion practices of every public school in the state. On June 2, 1999, the plaintiffs deposed special education and general education teachers, and completed surveys of ten sample school districts. With help from experts, the plaintiffs conducted a scientific survey of ten school districts to determine what services actually were being provided to special education students; reviewed selected IEPs in those districts to see if the resources and services were actually delivered; and interviewed teachers and administrators to determine the basis of their placement decisions. The plaintiffs also reviewed the state\u2019s compliance and monitoring systems, as well as statistics concerning placements in all state districts. The parties continued up to filing a thirteenth amended joint case management plan on October 3, 2001. On July 22, 2012, following a discovery dispute, the Court appointed Judge Louis Bechtle, former Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, as Discovery Master in the case. With Judge Bechtle\u2019s guidance, the parties completed discovery on May 30, 2003. Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, along with responses and replies. On March 24, 2004, the Court heard oral argument on the summary judgment motions. After the oral argument, at the Court\u2019s suggestion, on September 9, 2004, the parties agreed to participate in court-supervised mediation regarding settlement, with Judge Bechtle serving as a mediator. On December 21, 2004, the parties filed a joint motion for approval of settlement agreement, memorandum, proposed order, and proposed settlement agreement. A hearing was held to consider provisional approval of the settlement agreement on April 20, 2005. At the Fairness Hearing, which was held on June 24, 2005, the court heard oral argument from the parties and other interested persons and received testimony from a special-education expert, Commonwealth officials, parents of several named plaintiffs, and certain representatives from advocacy groups. The parties submitted additional evidence through declarations and reports. The court ordered the parties to file a joint motion for final approval of the proposed settlement agreement. The joint motion was filed on August 5, 2005. On September 19, 2005, the court granted the motion for final approval of the Settlement Agreement, ending 11 years of litigation regarding the education of students with disabilities in the least restrictive environment with supplementary aids and services in their neighborhood schools. Despite receiving several objections to the settlement agreement, the Court found the settlement agreement to be fair, reasonable, and adequate. On October 28, 2005, one of the pro se beneficiaries of the settlement filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, but on August 18, 2005, the appeal was dismissed. The settlement agreement required an overhaul of the state\u2019s systems for helping school districts comply with the IDEA\u2019s inclusion mandates and then monitoring the defendant's compliance. It established tools for the Department of Education to monitor the quality of education for children with disabilities, require corrective action, and offer training for teachers and administrators. In the settlement agreement, the Pennsylvania Department of Education agreed to make systemic changes pursuant to its general supervisory role over special education. The settlement agreement, effective for 5 years, included: increasing the state\u2019s focus on districts with the worst records of inclusion, requiring corrective action plans; changing the complaint resolution process to increase parents\u2019 rights; changing the approval process of districts\u2019 special education programs; increased the state\u2019s commitment to training and technical assistance; creating of an Advisory Panel to guide and assess progress in implementing the agreement other reforms in the state\u2019s training, monitoring, and enforcement procedures. Specifically, the Department of Education agreed to develop display materials for all public school showing all children are welcome; provide increased professional development for teachers and other school personnel; expand information and training that supports parents of children with disabilities; ensure that individualized education program teams determine the appropriateness of implementing goals in general education classrooms with supplementary aids and services; provide a single individualized education program for a student with a disability who also qualifies for gifted support; modify portions of the individualized education program to provide more information related to students participating in general education; clarify complaint resolution and investigation procedures; monitor of least restrictive environment requirements to ensure that districts comply with federal and state laws related to student placement. The most significant aspect of the settlement agreement involved the provision for compliance monitoring, intended to ensure that local school districts are adhering to the IDEA and other federal and state laws that protect the rights of children with disabilities. The parties agreed that those school districts failing to comply with PDE\u2019s corrective action plans--created to rectify deficiencies identified through any type of compliance monitoring--will be subject to sanctions and enforcement powers. Under the agreement, the defendants agreed to pay plaintiffs $350,000 in full, final, and complete settlement and release of the plaintiffs\u2019 claims for compensatory damages that have been asserted in this case. The plaintiffs would be responsible for allocating the $350,000 among themselves. Additionally, defendants would pay plaintiffs\u2019 counsel $1,825,000 in full, final, and complete settlement and release of all claims by plaintiffs or their attorneys for attorneys\u2019 fees and litigation costs. On April 11, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The parties agreed to enter mediation to discuss enforcement of the settlement agreement, and on December 15, 2008, the plaintiff's motion to enforce settlement agreement was denied without prejudice by the court. There are no additional updates on the trial court docket, and the case is presumed closed. In the final months of the agreement\u2019s five-year life, however, Advisory Panel established in the settlement released a report on June 3, 2010, condemning the Department\u2019s failure to make significant improvements in the education of children with disabilities. The panel concluded that the promise of the settlement agreement had not been realized. Overall, inclusion increased very slightly \u2013 Pennsylvania improved its standing from 49th in the country to 43rd \u2013 but inclusion for many more severe disabilities remained the same or even decreased. Further, the panel noted that they had no way to assess whether the services and supports necessary to make inclusion succeed were ever provided. Small improvements included a \u201cSupplementary Aids and Services Toolkit\u201d developed to help Individualized Education Program teams plan for inclusion, as well as marginal regulatory and training improvements. The Panel\u2019s report most harshly criticized the Department\u2019s failure to substantively monitor the state\u2019s worst performing districts and to take meaningful corrective action in those districts.", "summary": "A lawsuit was filed on behalf of all school-age students with disabilities in Pennsylvania seeking to increase the number of children with disabilities educated with their non-disabled peers, and to make sure schools provided real supports to make sure inclusion would work as required by the IDEA. After eleven years, the parties reached a settlement; however, the final report demonstrates many of the terms of the agreement was not met."}
{"article": "On June 11, 2015, Gavin Grimm, a sixteen-year-old transgender boy filed this lawsuit against the Gloucester County School Board in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiff, represented by the national and Virginia ACLU, proceeded under Title IX and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. He sought a preliminary and permanent injunction allowing him to use the boys' restroom at school, claiming that the school board's policy of requiring transgender students to use a private restroom facility violated his rights under Title IX and the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that after he had used the boys' restroom with the school's permission for seven weeks without incident, the school board released a policy stating that students' access to restrooms was restricted based on their \"biological gender\" and that students who were unable to use the corresponding restroom because of \"gender identity issues\" were to use an alternative private facility. At the time, plaintiff was the only student at the school required to use the private facility. The ACLU had previously filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) on December 18, 2014, only days after the school board instituted the restroom policy. The ACLU's complaint stated that the school board's behavior was a violation of Title IX in that discrimination based on a person's transgender status is discrimination based on sex. Additionally, the complaint alleged that, since there had never been any complaints regarding the plaintiff, any privacy concerns were nothing more than irrational prejudice or stigma against transgender people. On September 4, 2015, the court (Judge Robert Doumar) denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Then on September 17, 2015, the court also granted the school board's motion to dismiss. The school board argued that discrimination based on gender identity is not sex discrimination, and therefore, not covered under Title IX. the court agreed, ruling that the plaintiff failed to state a valid claim under Title IX because schools are permitted to keep separate restrooms based on sex as long as the restrooms are comparable. The court also explained that it had denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction on the basis that allowing him to use the boys' restroom would violate other students' constitutional right to privacy. 132 F.Supp.3d 736. The plaintiff appealed the court's denial of the preliminary injunction. In the Fourth Circuit, on October 28, 2015, the DOJ filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the plaintiff's appeal. The DOJ, citing a letter issued by the U.S. Department of Education (DOE), took the position that discrimination based on transgender status constitutes discrimination based on sex, denying a student access to the restroom that corresponds to their gender identity denies the student equal educational opportunity, and general invocations of privacy and safety do not override Title IX's prohibition on sex-based discrimination. This marked the first time the administration took this position in an appeals court. On April 19, 2016, the Fourth Circuit reversed and vacated in part the district court\u2019s ruling. The circuit court found that Title IX is ambiguous on how gender should be determined for purposes of finding impermissible sex discrimination. The court also found that the DOE\u2019s interpretation of Title IX, which required schools to treat transgender students consistent with their gender identity, was the result of the agency\u2019s fair and considered judgment, and was neither a convenient litigating position nor a post hoc rationalization. Based on those findings, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the school board, finding that the DOE\u2019s interpretation was entitled to deference. The Fourth Circuit further found that the district court had improperly excluded evidence in deciding whether to grant the plaintiff preliminary injunctive relief. The Fourth Circuit then remanded the question of whether to grant the plaintiff injunctive relief with instructions to consider the improperly excluded evidence. 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016). The plaintiff had also asked for the case to be reassigned to a different judge on remand. He argued that various statements by Judge Doumar expressing opinions about medical facts and gender dysphoria indicated that the judge had pre-existing views that he would be unwilling to set aside in the face of contrary evidence about gender and sexuality. The Fourth Circuit denied reassignment, finding that there was insufficient evidence that Judge Doumar would refuse to consider and credit sound contrary evidence, and that his methods were idiosyncratic but not fundamentally unfair. On May 31, 2016, the Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en banc; it also denied a stay of its mandate. 824 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2016). On remand, on June 23, 2016, the district court issued an order granting the plaintiff a preliminary injunction allowing him to use the boys' restroom. The court, noting that the plaintiff had not asked for access to the boys' locker rooms, specified that the preliminary injunction was limited to plaintiff\u2019s ability to access the boys' restrooms. 2016 WL 3581852. On June 27, 2016, the defendants appealed the preliminary injunction, and asked it to be stayed pending the outcome of that appeal. The Fourth Circuit denied the stay on July 12, 2016. 654 Fed.Appx. 606. The defendants then sought relief from the Supreme Court. On August 3, 2016, the Court granted the application to stay the district court's preliminary injunction. If the Supreme Court declined to hear the full case, the stay would automatically end; if the Supreme Court ultimately heard the full case, the stay would end once the Court made its final judgment. 136 S.Ct. 2442. The school board then filed an unopposed motion to stay in the district court on August 18, 2016. The court granted this motion on August 31, 2016. On August 29, 2016, the defendants sought full review of the case from the Supreme Court. Three questions were presented in this petition. First, whether the Court should retain the <Auer/i> doctrine, which allows deference to agencies\u2019 regulations even when the regulations are ambiguous. Second, whether the <i>Auer</i> deference extends to an unpublished agency letter that does not carry the force of law. Third, whether the DOE\u2019s Title IX interpretation is valid. On October 31, 2016, the Court agreed to hear the appeal of only the second and third questions presented. 137 S.Ct. 369. On February 22, 2017, the new Trump administration withdrew the guidance that the Fourth Circuit had relied on in its rulings, and took no position on whether or how gender identity was covered under Title IX. Argument before the Supreme Court was set for March 28, 2017, but on March 6, the Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the government's change in position. 137 S.Ct. 1239. On remand from the Supreme Court, on April 7, 2017, the Fourth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction. 853 F.3d 729. It remanded the case back to the district court to determine whether the case was rendered moot by the original plaintiff's graduation. Back in district court, the was reassigned to Judge Arenda Wright Allen on June 6, 2017. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 22, 2017, alleging he would be subject to the School Board's policy as an alumnus. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on September 22, 2017, alleging that the plaintiff failed to state a claim because the Board's locker room and restroom policy was consistent with Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, and because alumni were not subject to the School Board's policies (which only apply to current students), this added claim was not a justiciable controversy. On October 26, 2017, Judge Arenda L. Wright Allen deferred a ruling on the defendant's motion to dismiss, pending resolution of the issue of mootness. On November 2, 2017, the plaintiff filed a notice of consent to dismissal as to his third and fourth requests for relief. The plaintiff agreed to dismiss his request for prospective declaratory judgment and permanent injunctive relief, but maintained his request for retrospective declaratory judgment and nominal damages. Following this approved withdrawal of requested prospective relief, the defendant filed an amended motion to dismiss on January 5, 2018. On May 22, 2018, the court denied the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff had sufficiently pled that the school board\u2019s policy was not substantially related to protecting other students\u2019 privacy rights, \u201cbecause there were many other ways to protect privacy interests in a non-discriminatory and more effective manner.\u201d She also found that the board\u2019s argument that the policy did not discriminate against any one class of students was \u201cresoundingly unpersuasive.\u201d On February 15, 2019, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint that alleged additional facts regarding the defendant\u2019s ongoing violations of the plaintiff\u2019s rights. According to the second amended complaint, the plaintiff had obtained a Virginia court order declaring his sex as male and an updated birth certificate reflecting his sex as male. However, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant continued to refuse to update his official school transcript to match the male gender marker on his birth certificate. On March 26, 2019, the plaintiff and the defendant separately filed motions for summary judgment. Specifically, the plaintiff sought permanent injunction requiring the Board to update his school records to reflect his male identity along with the summary judgment. On August 9, 2019, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court stated that in order to obtain relief for claims alleging a violation of Title IX, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he or she was excluded from participation in an education program because of his or her sex; (2) the educational institution was receiving federal financial assistance at the time of his or her exclusion; and (3) the improper discrimination caused the plaintiff harm. The court found that the plaintiff demonstrated all three criteria. With respect to the Equal Protection Clause claim, the court held that intermediate scrutiny must be applied in analyzing claims of discrimination against transgender individuals. The court also granted the plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction. 400 F.Supp.3d 444 On August 30, 2019, the defendant appealed the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (USCA Case Number 19-1952). The oral argument was held on May 26, 2020; the case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2015, a transgender boy filed a lawsuit against his school district because they would not allow him to use the boys' bathroom. The court granted the school district's motion to dismiss, but the appeals court reversed and remanded, and the district court has since granted a preliminary injunction allowing plaintiff access to the boy's bathroom. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the school district's appeal in 2016, but later remanded the case after the Department of Education and Department of Justice withdrew their prior guidance on the issue. The case was remanded to the district court to determine whether the plaintiff's graduation from high school rendered the case moot. On May 22, 2018, the district court denied the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on February 15, 2019, and a motion for summary judgment on March 26, 2019. On August 9, 2019, the court granted the summary judgment; the defendant appealed the case. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On August 11, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Alabama under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 against Tyson Foods, Inc, one of the world's largest food production companies. On the same day, fourteen current and former African American Tyson employees who worked for the defendant's Ashland, Alabama plant filed their own complaint in the same court, 1:05-cv-01720, and a motion to intervene in this lawsuit. The individual plaintiffs sought relief under both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981. The cases were consolidated on November 1, 2005. Plaintiffs asked the court for injunctive relief and monetary damages, claiming that Tyson had maintained racially segregated facilities and had subjected African American employees to a racially hostile work environment and retaliation and threats. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that in Tyson's Alabama plant African American employees were locked out of one of the two bathrooms, and that bathroom was marked with a \"Whites Only\" sign. Managers had knowledge of this practice and did not correct it, and additionally closed the break room frequently used by African American employees for lunch and established a new break room where only certain white employees had keys to the locked refrigerator and cabinets. Plaintiffs further alleged that their white supervisors and fellow employees would harass them and refer to them in racially derogatory terms. Finally, Plaintiffs claimed that during a training session for plant employees, the corporate personnel conducting the session threatened that if an employee filed a racial discrimination lawsuit, the plant would be shut down. On March 9, 2006, the case was stayed until September 18, 2006 so that the parties could negotiate a settlement through mediation. The court dismissed the case on October 26, 2006, noting that a settlement had been reached by both parties. On November 7, 2006, the case was re-opened and the Consent Decree and Final Judgment entered. The consent decree, which bound the parties for three years, stipulated that Tyson would not violate Title VII or \u00a7 1981 at its Ashland facility by engaging in any discriminatory or retaliatory practices. Tyson was also required to develop a clear policy prohibiting discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, as well as an Equal Employment Opportunity training program for its Ashland employees. The individual plaintiffs and the EEOC were awarded a gross sum of $871,000.", "summary": "In 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Alabama against Tyson Foods, Inc. Fourteen current and former African American employees at Tyson's Ashland, Alabama plant filed a lawsuit over the same issues, and the cases were consolidated. Plaintiffs claimed that Tyson had maintained racially segregated facilities and had subjected African American employees to a racially hostile work environment and retaliation and threats. On November 7, 2006, the parties settled and Plaintiffs received $871,000, while Tyson was required to institute anti-discrimination policies and programs at its Ashland plant."}
{"article": "In August 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\") filed this lawsuit against Eagle Produce L.L.C. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona alleging wage discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the complaint alleged the defendant paid male Quality Control Inspectors more than female Inspectors ones despite their performance of substantially similar work duties. The complainants sought a permanent injunction ending the pay disparity and damages for the individual named plaintiffs. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Eagle Productions argued that the EEOC lacked evidence to support its claims because the female employees did not perform work equal to that performed by the two comparative male employees. It further argued that the Title VII claim was time-barred. The EEOC sought summary judgment as to Eagle Produce\u2019s statute of limitations defense, its laches defense, and its claim that one of the plaintiffs failed to mitigate her damages. On June 6, 2008, Judge Neil Wake granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff and defendant\u2019s motions for summary judgment. Specifically, he held that all claims for conduct prior to August 7, 2004 under both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act were barred because of the statute of limitations. All claims under the Equal Pay Act for conduct occurring after August 7, 2004 were still valid. This removed one complainant from the case. Judge Wake further granted the Plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment as to the failure to mitigate damages. 2008 WL 11339627. The EEOC moved for reconsideration of the order, but Judge Wake denied this motion on July 18th. 2008 WL 2796407. The parties then entered into settlement conversations. They submitted an agreement to the Court on October 3, 2008, and the Court subsequently dismissed the case with prejudice and required the parties to pay their own attorney fees. Under the settlement, the defendant agreed not to engage in similar discrimination in the future, to pay $9,000 in monetary relief (including back pay and payroll taxes, liquidated damages, and compensatory damages), and to expunge all references to this action and litigation from the complaining employee's employment file. Further, Eagle Produce agreed to provide training on the Equal Pay Act and discrimination, review and modify written policies regarding wage and gender discrimination, promptly investigate future claims of discrimination, and file required reports with the EEOC District Office for the duration of the settlement agreement. The Court retained jurisdiction over the case for one year to enforce the settlement. There was no further action and the case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2006, the EEOC filed this case against Eagle Produce in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The EEOC alleged sex and wage discrimination. In 2008 the parties reached a settlement agreement which included monetary compensation, as well as requirements for training and reporting."}
{"article": "On August 9, 2006, the San Francisco office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California under Title VII against Robert G. Aptekar, MD, Inc. and the Arthritis and Orthopedic Medical Clinic. The EEOC alleged that the defendants had violated the rights of the complainant by subjecting her to racial harassment, subjecting her to a hostile work environment, and by retaliating against her when she filed a complaint with the EEOC. On November 17, 2006, the case was referred to mediation. On March 6, 2007, the parties settled the case during mediation. On July 16, 2007, the parties entered a consent decree, which the District Court (Judge Ronald M. Whyte) approved on August 20, 2007. Among other things, the defendants agreed to pay the complainant $44,000 in unspecified damages. The District Court (Judge Whyte) retained jurisdiction over the decree, which lasted for 18 months.", "summary": "On August 9, 2006, the San Francisco office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a lawsuit under Title VII against Robert G. Aptekar, MD, Inc. and the Arthritis and Orthopedic Medical Clinic in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The EEOC alleged that the defendants had violated the rights of the complainant by subjecting her to racial harassment, subjecting her to a hostile work environment, and by retaliating against her when she filed a complaint with the EEOC. On July 16, 2007, the parties entered a consent decree set to last 18 months, which the District Court (Judge Ronald M. Whyte) approved on August 20, 2007. Among other things, the defendants agreed to pay the complainant $44,000 in unspecified damages."}
{"article": "On September 27, 2006, the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Easter District of California. The EEOC sued Foam Works, LLC under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, bringing this suit on behalf of a female employee who sought a permanent injunction enjoining Foam Works, LLC from discriminating against employees on the basis of sex or from discriminating against employees for opposing unlawful employment practices. The EEOC also sought backpay and punitive damages for the female employee. In the complaint, the employee claimed that she had experienced sexual harassment in the form of derogatory comments. When the employee complained about the harassment her employer retaliated against her by reducing her hours and duties. She was ultimately discharged. On October 12, 2007, District Judge Morrison C. England approved and ordered a proposed consent decree. The consent decree required the defendant to pay the complainant $21,500 in compensatory damages. The defendant was also required to conduct annual training on harassment, institute a confidential complaint procedure, retain pertinent records, and allow the EEOC to inspect documents with twenty days notice. Its effective period was 3 years, and there's nothing more on the docket--so presumably the matter ended in 2010.", "summary": "On September 27, 2006, The EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Easter District of California. The plaintiff sued Foam Works, LLC under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging sexual harassment and a hostile work environment. On October 12, 2007, District Judge Morrison C. England approved and ordered a proposed consent decree. The consent decree required the Defendant to pay the complainant $21,500 in compensatory damages. The Defendant was also required to conduct annual training on harassment, institute a confidential complaint procedure, retain pertinent records, and allow the EEOC to inspect documents with twenty days notice."}
{"article": "On September 29, 2006, the Los Angeles District Office of the EEOC filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. The plaintiffs sued Hometown Buffet Inc. under for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged sexual harassment and a hostile work environment. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, back pay, and punitive damages. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, a motion for partial summary judgment. The EEOC filed a cross motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, a motion for partial summary judgment. On March 7, 2007, the court denied the defendant's motions and granted the EEOC partial summary judgment on the issue of the EEOC discharging its statutory obligation to conciliate before filing suit. 481 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (S.D. Cal. 2007). The parties proceeded with discovery. On January 23, 2008, the defendant notified the court that it had started Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Six months later, the defendant filed another motion for summary judgment, and the EEOC responded with a motion for partial summary judgment. The court set multiple dates to hear these motions, but they were continued at the parties' request. On July 21, 2009, the parties submitted a proposed consent decree to the court. The next day, Judge Michael M. Anello approved the proposed consent decree put forth by the parties. The consent decree included monetary damages ranging from $25,000-$35,000 for each plaintiff and injunctive relief enjoining the defendant from future discrimination, harassment, or retaliation. Its effective period was two years, and there is nothing more on the docket - so presumably the matter ended in 2011.", "summary": "On September 29, 2006, the Los Angeles District Office of the EEOC filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. The plaintiffs sued Hometown Buffet Inc. under for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged sexual harassment and a hostile work environment. On July 22, 2009, Judge Michael M. Anello approved the proposed consent decree put forth by the parties. Its effective period was two years, and there is nothing more on the docket - so presumably the matter ended in 2011."}
{"article": "On September 29, 2005, the San Francisco District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The EEOC sued Paragary's Management Group, Paramoor, Inc., and PDK Partnership under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, representing claimants who alleged the defendants had subjected them to a hostile work environment and disparate treatment. The EEOC sought a permanent injunction enjoining the decedent from future harassment or discrimination, and also sought backpay and monetary compensation. Specifically, the claimants alleged sexual harassment in the form of verbal and physical acts. They further alleged that the defendant had discriminated against them as Mexican females by providing different terms and conditions of employment, requiring them to do the work of non-Mexican female employees, and denying them breaks and requested leave. On April 29, 2009, U.S. District Judge Morrison C. England approved and ordered a consent decree to be in effect for three years. The consent decree required the defendant to issue an anti-harassment policy, impose a complaint procedure, use outside consultant to train all employees, and prepare reference letters for the claimants. The decree also required that the defendant pay $60,000 in damages to the claimants. There's nothing more in the docket, so presumably the matter ended in 2012.", "summary": "On September 29, 2005 the San Francisco District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiff sued Paragary's Management Group, Paramoor, Inc., and PDK Partnership under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC represented claimants who alleged the defendants had subjected them to a hostile work environment and disparate treatment. On April 29, 2009 Judge Morrison C. England approved and ordered a consent decree to be in effect for three years. The decree granted permanent injunctive relief and $60,000 in monetary damages. There is nothing more in the docket, so presumably the matter ended in 2012."}
{"article": "In December 2005, the EEOC district office in San Francisco, California brought this action against Pizzeria Uno Lombard, Inc., a regional restaurant chain, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California The EEOC alleged that the defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it subjected female employees to a sexually hostile work environment. The defendant never answered the complaint, and an entry of default was entered against it on September 8th, 2006. The EEOC voluntarily dismissed the action in April 2007 before the magistrate judge's report and recommendation for judgement was entered.", "summary": "In December 2005, the EEOC district office in San Francisco, California brought this action against Pizzeria Uno Lombard, Inc., a regional restaurant chain, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California The EEOC alleged that the defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it subjected female employees to a sexually hostile work environment. The defendant never answered the complaint, and an entry of default was entered against it on September 8th, 2006. The EEOC voluntarily dismissed the action in April 2007 before the magistrate judge's report and recommendation for judgement was entered."}
{"article": "On September 29, 2005, the EEOC filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California under Title I and Title VII against Taylor Made Digital Systems. The EEOC sought injunctive relief and damages, alleging that the defendant discriminated against one of its employees on the basis of her sex and race. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant discriminated against the employee by refusing to allow her to return to her previous position after her pregnancy, despite the fact that she could perform all her job functions. The complaint also alleges that the defendant replaced, demoted, and eventually terminated the employee on account of her being female/pregnant and African American. The suit was filed after the employee filed an initial charge with the EEOC alleging violations of Title VII by the defendant. On December 21, 2005, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint against Rioch Corporations, a successor to the original defendant, Taylor Made Digital Systems. On October 18, 2006, the court (Judge Maxine M. Chesney) entered a consent decree. The consent decree required the defendant to pay $30,600 to the employee who brought the initial charge. The defendant also agreed to comply with Title VII, not to engage in retaliation against any employee because of the employee's opposition to discrimination, and to continue to post an anti-discrimination policy on its company intranet. Finally, the consent decree required all inquiries about the employee who filed the initial charge to be directed to a specific member of human resources, who was prohibited from referring to the present lawsuit. The consent decree terminated after one year.", "summary": "In September 2005, the EEOC filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California under Title I and Title VII against Taylor Made Digital Systems. The EEOC sought injunctive relief and damages, alleging that the defendant discriminated against one of its employees on the basis of her sex (female/pregnant) and race (African American). In October 2006, the court (Judge Maxine M. Chesney) signed a proposed consent decree. The consent decree required the defendant to pay $30,600 to the employee who brought the initial charge. The defendant also agreed to comply with Title VII, not to engage in retaliation against any employee because of the lawsuit, and to continue to post an anti-discrimination policy on its company intranet. Finally, the consent decree required all inquiries about the employee who filed the initial charge to be directed to a specific member of human resources, who was prohibited from referring to the present lawsuit. The consent decree terminated after one year."}
{"article": "On December 8, 2005, six employees filed a class action complaint against their employer, Best Buy Co., Inc. under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981, and California Government Code \u00a7 12940 et seq. in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged gender and racial discrimination, and they sought injunctive and declaratory relief, punitive damages, back pay, and front pay. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Best Buy had discriminated against women and minority individuals -- Latinos and African Americans -- on the basis of gender, race, color, and/or national origin with respect to recruitment, hiring, job assignments, transfers, promotions, compensation, allocation of weekly hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. Further, the plaintiffs alleged that Best Buy operated through a corporate culture of racial and gender stereotypes and enforced a nationwide corporate policy of preferring white male employees. On January 6, 2009, the plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Class Action Complaint against all of the defendants. Subsequently, there were many administrative tasks and declarations in support of class action certification. On June 17, 2011, the parties submitted a proposed consent decree. The consent decree awarded $200,000 to the named parties and required the defendant to implement neutral hiring, training, and promotion procedures, perform manager assessments, institute a complaint and dispute resolution process, and undergo monitoring. On August 17, 2011, the plaintiffs moved for attorney fees and reimbursement of costs and expenses in the amount of $9,999,999. The court approved both on November 9, 2011. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the consent decree for four years. At the end of the four-year period, the monitor filed a certification of compliance on December 8, 2015, indicating the expiration of the term of the consent decree. The monitor was satisfied that Best Buy had complied with the consent decree. Best Buy had done so by, among other things, maintaining non-discrimination and anti-harassment policies and internal complaint and anti-retaliation procedures, ensuring dissemination and awareness of such policies, adopting policies to promote diversity in management positions, and improving training of employees. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2008, six Best Buy employees filed a class action lawsuit against Best Buy alleging discrimination on the bases of race and sex. In 2011, the parties settled. The settlement agreement provided for the implementation of policies to protect employees against discrimination and monetary relief. On December 8, 2015, the monitor reported that Best Buy had complied with the terms of the consent decree and it thus expired."}
{"article": "On December 29, 2004, employees of El Paso Corporation filed a lawsuit under ERISA and the ADEA against their employer in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief, claiming that changes made to their pension plans violated federal law. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that their pension plans were negatively impacted when El Paso Corporation changed to a cash balance formula for determining pension benefits. On March 22, 2007, the court (Judge Walker Miller) dismissed one of the plaintiffs' claims under ERISA (Claim III) but denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on all other claims. The Court found that the statute of limitations did not bar the remaining claims from proceeding. 2007 WL 891378 (D. Colo. Mar. 22, 2007). On March 19, 2008, the court granted the defendant's motion for judgments on the pleadings, and granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The court dismissed Claims II and IV; as a result, only Claims I and V remained. Claim I alleged that the \"wear-away period\" in the pension plan violated the ADEA. Claim V alleged that the Summary Plan Description violated ERISA section 102 (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1022). The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification and conditionally approved the ADEA collective action on the condition that they resubmit a class definition in accord with the Court's dismissal of some of their claims. 2008 WL 762456 (D. Colo. Mar. 19, 2008). On January 21, 2009, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider the dismissal of Claims II and IV. The court also granted the defendant's motions for summary judgment on the ADEA claim, holding that it was time-barred because the conversion to a cash balance formula was a \"discrete act\" under Ledbetter v. Goodyear. Further, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' remaining ERISA (alleging inadequate notice in the Summary Plan Description) claim because there was no evidence that the plaintiffs relied on the Summary Plan Description or that they suffered prejudice because of it. After this decision, Plaintiffs had no remaining claims. 2009 WL 151532 (D. Colo. Jan. 21, 2009). The court granted plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend judgment on August 28, 2009. As a result of the Ledbetter Legislation, the court decided that the plaintiffs' ADEA claim (Claim I) was not time-barred. 2009 WL 2766718 (D. Colo. Aug. 28, 2009). On September 17, 2009, the defendants filed a renewed motion for summary judgment on the merits of ADEA claim. On July 26, 2010, the court found for the defendants and granted summary judgment, finding that the pension transition did not violate ADEA. On August 6, 2010, the court entered its judgment against the plaintiffs and in favor of defendants on claim 1. On August 19, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to bifurcate attorneys' fees. On August 25, the court granted the motion upon the condition that their motion included a good faith estimate of the dollar amount of their claim. On August 20, 2010, the defendants submitted a motion seeking $141,423.03 in costs; approximately $98,000.00 of that amount was attributable to \u201cMercer electronic discovery ordered by Court.\u201d After a hearing, the court awarded the defendants $5220.25, representing $4,086.35 for the costs of transcripts, witness fees of $1,021.00, and copying charges of $120.90. On August 24, 2010, the plaintiffs filed an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. On August 27, 2010, the defendants filed a motion for attorneys' fees under ERISA for fees incurred in defending against the plaintiffs\u2019 ERISA claims up until the January 21, 2009 order dismissing the plaintiffs\u2019 final ERISA claim. The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that attorneys\u2019 fees should not be awarded. On March 30, 2011, the court denied the defendant's motion for attorneys' fees. On June 9, 2011, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion for taxation of costs. The court increased its award from $5,220.25 to $7,995.90, but denied the other motions. On August 11, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. In its opinion, the court explained that \u201cwear-away\u201d periods were caused by giving a transition period that employers were not obligated by law to give. The court refused to punish the defendants for giving a benefit it was not obligated to give in the first place. Second, the court recognized that the cash balance benefit continued to grow equally for everyone, irrespective of the age of the employee. Finally, the court noted that older workers had the option of choosing the \u201cfrozen\u201d final average pay benefit rather than the cash balance benefit, if any employee found that to be more valuable. The court also made clear that when employers make major changes to their pension plans they must give notice of those changes to employees. The court analyzed and approved the notices that the defendants sent out to its employees, making specific and detailed findings regarding what employers must include in Summary Plan Descriptions \u2013 and what they need not include \u2013 when changes are made to pension plans. On December 22, 2011, the plaintiffs filed Petition for Writ of Certiorari, but it was denied on February 28, 2012. This case is now closed.", "summary": "This case was brought by employees of El Paso Corporation against their employer alleging violations of ERISA and the ADEA as a result of the conversion of their pension plans to a cash balance formula. However, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the defendant\u2019s conversion to a cash balance plan was legal, as were the means the company utilized to transition to the new pension plan."}
{"article": "On September 29, 2011, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\") brought this lawsuit against Beverage Distributors Company, LLC (\"BDC\") on behalf of a visually impaired company employee in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (\"ADA\") and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The EEOC claimed that BDC discriminated against the employee when it conditioned his employment on the results of a medical exam and subsequently refused to hire him as a night warehouse loader upon learning that he had a disability. The EEOC asked the Court for a permanent injunction preventing BDC from discriminating on the basis of disability, reinstatement for the employee, compensatory and punitive damages, and back pay. The employee has been legally blind since birth. He began working for BDC in 2003 as a driver's helper and performed well in that role. In early 2008, BDC informed him of its decision to eliminate the helper position and use contract labor to do the job instead. The employee was then offered a position as a night warehouse loader, but after the medical exam, the company rescinded the offer because it believed he could not drive a forklift safely, even though operating a forklift is not a job entry-level warehouse loaders perform. BDC also failed to engage in the ADA's required interactive process to determine whether it was possible to accommodate the employee in performing the job safely. BDC moved for summary judgment and invoked the ADA's \"direct-threat\" defense, contending that the employee could not perform the essential functions of the warehouse loader position and therefore would pose a \"direct threat\" to others in the workplace. The District Court (Judge Christine Arguello) denied the motion on December 7, 2012, because there were issues of material fact about whether BDC's decision was reasonable. <i>EEOC v. Beverage Distribs. Co.</i>, No. 11-cv-02557-CMA-CBS, 2012 WL 6094152 (D. Colo. Dec. 7, 2012). The EEOC also moved for summary judgment, and it was partially granted and partially denied. <i>EEOC v. Beverage Distribs. Co.</i>, No. 11-cv-02557-CMA-CBS, 2012 WL 6547782 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2012). Specifically, the District Court (Judge Arguello) rejected BDC's affirmative defense that the EEOC failed to conciliate in good faith before bringing suit. It also rejected the affirmative defenses of waiver, equitable estoppel, and unclean hands. The Court did, however, rule in favor of BDC in sustaining the affirmative defense of laches. It held that there remain issues of material fact about whether the three-year delay between the EEOC's investigation and its lawsuit was reasonable. Finally, the Court struck BDC's affirmative defense under which the company claimed that its due process rights would be violated if the Court did not bifurcate the trial to consider separately the EEOC's request for punitive damages. After pointing out that bifurcation is not an affirmative defense because it does not affect whether the defendant should be held liable, the Court declined to rule on the issue until a later date. Following a four-day trial in April, a jury agreed with the EEOC that BDC intentionally violated the ADA when it withdrew its job offer to the employee because of his impaired vision. The jury initially awarded $132,347 in back pay but found that his damages should be reduced by $102,803 because he could have mitigated those damages by finding a comparable position. 2013 WL 3829474. This is confirmed by the final judgment on April 15, 2013, and the amended final judgment on the same day. On December 9, 2013, however, the District Court (Judge Arguello) vacated the jury's finding that the employee could have mitigated his damages, holding that BDC failed to prove there were any available comparable jobs that the employee could have performed. <i>EEOC v. Beverage Distribs. Co.</i>, No. 11-cv-02557-CMA-CBS, 2013 WL 6458735 (D. Colo. Dec. 9, 2013). In addition, the Court ordered BDC to hire the employee as a night warehouse loader with the same seniority that he would have had if BDC had not withdrawn the job offer due to his eyesight. The Court also indicated that, pending a hearing on the tax consequences of the award, the employee might be entitled to a tax penalty offset because of the lump-sum nature of the damages. Finally, the Court required BDC to hire an outside consultant to provide training and assistance in revisions to its policies, updates to its job postings, notice posting, and reporting and compliance review. BDC was required to report its compliance with this order to the Court within six months. BDC appealed this decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and subsequently asked the District Court to stay the requirement that it hire an outside consultant pending the outcome of the appeal. On November 1, 2014, the District Court (Judge Arguello) denied BDC's request, holding that it failed to meet its burden by showing that a stay was justified. <i>EEOC v. Beverage Distribs. Co.</i>, No. 11-cv-02557-CMA-CBS, 2014 WL 5591430 (D. Colo. Nov. 1, 2014). On March 16, 2015, the Tenth Circuit (Judges Timothy M. Tymkovich, Jerome A. Holmes, and Robert E. Bacharach) reversed the district court, holding that the direct-threat jury instruction inaccurately conveyed the standard and therefore constituted reversible error. <i>EEOC v. Beverage Distribs. Co.</i>, 780 F.3d 1018 (10th Cir. 2015). More specifically, the Tenth Circuit held that the instruction erroneously required BDC to prove that the employee posed a direct threat when the company in fact had to prove only that it reasonably believed the job would pose such a threat. On the tax issue, however, the Tenth Circuit rejected BDC's argument that the district court erred in awarding a tax offset. That decision fell within the district court's discretion, and the employee may be entitled to an offset if the EEOC wins on retrial. On April 30, 2015, the EEOC filed a petition for panel rehearing and/or rehearing en banc. The EEOC argued that the Court\u2019s holding was inconsistent with its own precedent on evaluating jury instructions, as well as its past interpretations of the ADA. Specifically, it highlighted past 10th Circuit decisions that required proof that an employee posed a direct threat, not that the company reasonably believed as much. The 10th Circuit denied the petition for rehearing on May 27, 2015. On December 4, 2015, Judge Arguello approved a consent decree between the parties. 2015 WL 10097367. Judgment was entered against BDC for $160,000; $80,000 was for total back pay for the employee, and $80,000 was for compensatory damages. BDC was required to provide a letter of recommendation for the employee. In return, BDC was able to expunge the case and all related allegations of discrimination from its records. BDC was ordered to not engage in discrimination of the basis of disability, nor retaliate against employees who opposed an action because of its violation of the ADA. In consultation with an outside consultant, BDC was ordered to develop an anti-discrimination policy and reasonable accommodations guide, and to update its EEOC policy to be consistent with the ADA. It agreed to provide training for managers, human resources personnel, and employees, and to maintain detailed records and provide written reports to the EEOC for six months. Each party was responsible for its own attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The decree had a two-year duration, and the matter appears to be closed as of March 2018.", "summary": "On September 29, 2011, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\") brought this lawsuit against Beverage Distributors Company, LLC (\"BDC\") on behalf of a visually impaired company employee in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (\"ADA\"). The EEOC claimed that BDC discriminated against the employee in violation of the ADA when it conditioned his employment on the results of a medical exam and subsequently refused to hire him as a night warehouse loader upon learning that he had a disability. The jury initially awarded the employee $132,347 in back pay, but it found that his damages should be reduced by $102,803 because he could have mitigated those damages by finding a comparable position. On December 9, 2013, the District Court vacated these findings and awarded injunctive relief, only to be reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit because of erroneous jury instructions. The 10th Circuit denied the EEOC's petition for rehearing in May 2015. The parties entered into a consent decree in December 2015, and the matter appears to be closed."}
{"article": "On June 22, 2006, female financial advisers employed by Morgan Stanley, a financial services firm, filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging that Morgan Stanley had a systemic pattern and practice of discriminating against female employees in compensation, promotions, and other areas. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Morgan Stanley discriminated against them in promotions, compensation, business, referrals, training, mentoring, and partnership agreements. The complaint requested to certify a class of \"[a]ll women employed by Morgan Stanley as financial advisers at any time between August 5, 2003 and the present.\" Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought: a declaratory judgment; front pay, benefits, back pay, compensatory and punitive damages; liquidated damages for the ADEA claim to the individual plaintiffs; injunctive relief barring Morgan Stanley from engaging in discriminatory practices and compelling them to develop new policies; and attorneys' fees, experts' fees, and costs. On April 24, 2007, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement agreement. They filed two revised settlement agreements on July 11 and July 17, respectively. On October 1, 2007, the plaintiffs requested final approval of the settlement. On October 26, 2007, District Judge Richard W. Roberts certified the class, approved the settlement agreement, and approved attorneys' fees and costs. The Court retained jurisdiction over administration of the settlement. The plaintiff class was defined as \u201call women who were employed as Financial Advisors or Registered Financial Advisor Trainees in the Global Wealth Management Group of Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated (\u201cMorgan Stanley\u201d) or its predecessor(s) at any time from August 5, 2003 through June 30, 2007.\u201d The agreement contained a five-year enforcement period and required the defendant to pay $46 million, $32.5 million of which was allocated for class members' claims and $13.5 million for attorneys' fees, costs as well as monitoring and compliance. A special master was appointed to determine class members' awards based on their contributions to the defendant's business, the discrimination they faced, and other factors according to a formula detailed in the settlement. The injunctive relief included distribution of an anti-harassment policy to all employees; posting positions on an internal job bank; establishing objective promotion and hiring criteria; implementing diversity training; revising the \"power ranking\" system that ranks financial advisors' production; changing account distribution and referral policies; implementing a complaint process; and other changes. The parties also agreed to appoint a diversity monitor who would report semi-annually to class counsel and to appoint industrial psychologists to develop programs to recruit and promote more women. Only September 19, 2011, the parties jointly proposed to seek transfer of a related case from the Northern District of California to this court for consideration of a proposed consolidated settlement agreement. Judge Roberts approved the consolidation on December 8, 2011 and administratively closed Amochaev v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc. [Case No. C-051298 (PJH)]. The parties filed a consolidated settlement agreement on June 22, 2012. On February 15, 2013, Judge Roberts approved the consolidated class action settlement agreement. The class from the second case was defined as \u201call women employed as Financial Advisors in (i) the United States branches of Smith Barney\u2019s retail brokerage division at any time from August 30, 2003 forward or (ii) the California branches of Smith Barney\u2019s retail brokerage division at any time from June 25, 2003 forward.\u201d Other terms of the consolidated settlement agreement were similar to the one from before, except that the consolidated agreement added the following: developing a computerized system to generate mail notification of new entry level positions; making recommendations for programs to increase the participation of women; reporting quarterly on efforts in areas of sourcing, recruiting, mentoring a diverse workforce, etc. This settlement agreement was binding on the parties until October 1, 2015. On September 29, 2015, the plaintiffs moved to extend the consolidated settlement agreement for two additional years because the original agreement was set to expire on September 30, 2015. On April 6, 2016, the case was reassigned to Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly because Judge Roberts has retired. Judge Kollar-Kotelly granted the motion to extend the settlement agreement, which was effective October 1, 2015 through September 30, 2017. There has been no docket activity since the deadline passed, so this case is presumably closed.", "summary": "Female financial advisers employed by Morgan Stanley sued under Title VII and the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, alleging that Morgan Stanley had a systemic pattern and practice of discriminating against female employees in compensation, promotions, and other areas. The parties settled, with Morgan Stanley paying $46m in damages, fees, and costs of administration, and agreeing to injunctive relief. This case was later consolidated with Amochaev v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc."}
{"article": "On October 29, 2001, more than 250 African-American current or former U.S. Capitol Police Officers filed this race discrimination lawsuit under the Congressional Accountability Act (\"CAA\"), 2 U.S.C. \u00a7 1311, against the United States Capitol Police Board in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs also included claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981a. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the disproportionately low number of African-Americans in the police force and in leadership positions within the force demonstrated rampant racial discrimination. Even though African-Americans comprised more than 60% of the D.C. general population, they made up only 31% of the police force and 16% of ranking positions. The plaintiffs sought compensatory damages and injunctive relief. On September 30, 2004, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan granted the police boards' motion to dismiss the complaint. Judge Sullivan held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not cover legislative branch employees. Therefore, he held that the plaintiffs could only bring suit under the CAA to challenge employment discrimination. This too was barred because the court only had subject matter jurisdiction over claims in which the plaintiff completed counseling and mediation regarding the alleged violation within the time limits specified by the CAA. Although several plaintiffs had requested mediation, they had failed to participate. Judge Sullivan held that such actions could not satisfy the \"completing mediation\" requirement within the CAA, but he granted the plaintiffs the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration if they properly complied. 338 F.Supp.2d 97. The plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider on January 14, 2005. Judge Sullivan denied their motion without prejudice on August 4, 2005, in an unpublished order. He referred the issue to Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola to determine whether any individual class members were entitled to relief. Throughout 2006, there was extensive litigation over the plaintiffs' attorneys' motions to withdraw as counsel to individual plaintiffs who had failed to pay or communicate with attorneys. These motions were denied and granted in part as to certain plaintiffs. 2006 WL 891163; 2007 WL 841019. The case was also consolidated with several others against the Police Board. Magistrate Judge Facciola issued a Report and Recommendation on March 19, 2007, in which he lamented the plaintiffs' failure to comply with Judge Sullivan's September 30, 2004, order requiring parties to clearly demonstrate their compliance with counseling and mediation as demanded under the CAA. Magistrate Judge Facciola noted that much of the evidence subsequently provided by plaintiffs was either inconsistent or insufficient. It was therefore only a \"place to start.\" Based on the evidence provided, he:<ol><li>dismissed with prejudice claims where the plaintiffs had clearly failed to exhaust administrative remedies;</li><li>dismissed without prejudice claims where the plaintiffs seemed to have exhausted the administrative remedies, but failed to provide the court with sufficient evidence; and,</li><li>upheld claims where the plaintiffs had clearly exhausted administrative remedies.</li></ol>2007 WL 841019. On May 15, Magistrate Judge Facciola dismissed with prejudice the second group after the plaintiffs had failed to provide supporting documents to demonstrate compliance with the CAA. 2007 WL 1438763. On August 15, 2007, the Court adopted the recommendations of Magistrate Judge Facciola, thereby dismissing with prejudice a substantial number of the remaining claims. 2007 WL 6847408. The plaintiffs appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia issued its opinion on July 31, 2009. The case was heard before Judge David Bryan Sentelle, Judge Douglas Ginsburg, and Judge Judith Rogers. There were three aspects of the district court's ruling at issue: (1) whether the three-step process requiring counseling and mediation before an employee could file a complaint was jurisdictional, (2) whether in-person attendance by the employee was required at counseling or mediation, and (3) whether receipt of end of counseling and mediation notices demonstrated completion of counseling and mediation. The Court of Appeals (with the opinion written by Judge Rogers) affirmed the district court's ruling with respect to whether the three-step process was jurisdictional, holding that it was. Yet, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's in-person ruling, holding that the CAA did not require in-person attendance by the employee at counseling or mediation. Lastly, the Court of Appeals held that receipt from the Office of Compliance of written notice of the end of mediation did demonstrate the employee's completion of counseling and mediation. The case was then remanded. 575 F.3d 699. On May 10, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a Joint Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint, re-alleging that the defendant had violated the CAA and that the action was properly maintainable as a class action under FRCP 23(a). On August 12, 2010, the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint, alleging lack of jurisdiction. While awaiting the court's ruling, the parties continued to dispute discovery matters. On March 9, 2012, the court referred the case again to Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola for resolution of defendant's motion to dismiss the fourth amended complaint. On December 14, 2012, the Magistrate Judge Facciola issued a report and recommendation regarding whether the complaint should be dismissed. In it, Magistrate Judge Facciola noted that vast majority of the plaintiffs should be dismissed for failure to exhaust their administrative remedies as required under the CAA, while the plaintiffs who submitted enough evidence of exhaustion should proceed past the motion to dismiss (\"Appendix II\"), and the rest of remaining plaintiffs should be dismissed with prejudice. Finally, Magistrate Judge Facciola identified five plaintiffs for whom additional clarification was necessary. Both parties responded and objected to the Magistrate Judge Facciola\u2019s report and recommendation. On July 10, 2013, the plaintiffs sought to amend or correct the amended complaint. The defendant opposed the motion, and the court did not issue an order on the matter. From September 2013 through April 2015 there was no activity on the docket. On April 21, 2015, counsel for the plaintiffs moved for a hearing on a motion to withdraw. In a May 1, 2015, minute order, the court ordered the plaintiffs to file a motion to withdraw, and Judge Sullivan temporarily stayed the case to allow the plaintiff time to acquire new counsel. Hearings were rescheduled several times throughout 2015 and 2016. On October 13, 2016, U.S. District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan issued a memorandum opinion resolving the plaintiffs' objections to Magistrate Judge Facciola's dismissal of most of their claims, and the plaintiff's motion to file a fifth amended complaint. Judge Sullivan adopted in part and rejected in part Magistrate Judge Facciola's recommendations, thereby dismissing many, but not all, of the plaintiffs' claims on jurisdictional grounds. He also denied the plaintiffs' motion to file a fifth amended complaint. On February 14, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on one of the claims Judge Sullivan dismissed, which was denied on March 30, 2018. On February 19, 2019, one plaintiff filed a motion for appointment of a mediator to assist in the mediation of settlement discussion of all claims by this plaintiff. The court also agreed to provide court-appointed counsel for the pro se plaintiffs during the mediation phase. By July 30, 2019, one plaintiff was represented by private counsel and the other eight represented themselves pro se. On that day, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's August 12, 2010, motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction for the reasons laid out in the October 13, 2016, memorandum opinion. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration on August 21, 2019. In their August 27, 2019 status report, the plaintiffs stated that the defendant's counsel had been unresponsive to communication from the plaintiffs. At the end of 2019, and again at the end of 2020, the defendant found new counsel. The court granted the plaintiff's August 21, 2019 motion for reconsideration on March 18, 2021. The court also denied without prejudice the individual plaintiff's motion for mediation from February 19, 2019, wanting to wait until the court ruled on the defendant's anticipated motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "This case was brought by several African-American current or former U.S. Capitol Police Officers against the United States Capitol Police Board. Plaintiffs sought compensatory damages and injunctive relief, alleging that Defendant engaged in a pattern and practice of race discrimination in employment. On October 13, 2016, the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss most of plaintiffs' claims. The plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider which the court denied, and the court reaffirmed its reasoning on July 30, 2019. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On August 24, 2006, the Wilmington office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a lawsuit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act against I.G. Burton of Seaford in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. The EEOC alleged that the defendants had violated ADEA-protected rights of the complainant, who worked for the defendant as a \"runner,\" driving and delivering vehicles, by firing him on the basis of his age. On December 17, 2007, the parties entered into a consent decree, which the court adopted two days later and closed the case. Under the decree, the defendants agreed to pay $70,000 in damages to three former employees that they terminated on the basis of age. The decree enjoined the defendants from discriminating unlawfully on the basis of age, and it required them to post notice of their employees' rights in a conspicuous location at their place of business. Under the decree, the EEOC had the right to send a representative (unannounced) to the defendants' place of business to determine whether they were in compliance with the terms of the consent decree that required them to post such notice. The defendants agreed to provide EEO training to all management personnel within 180 days of the entry of the consent decree, and annually thereafter during the life of the decree. The defendants were required to send a report to the EEOC within 10 days of their completion of the training requirements of the decree. The defendants agreed to provide the EEOC with a copy of all training materials that they used to train their management personnel. They also agreed to give the EEOC the right to prior approval of the person that they hired to administer the training. The terms of the agreement were to run for 3 years. The docket sheet does not show any further enforcement took place; the case was presumably closed in 2010.", "summary": "The EEOC filed this Age Discrimination in Employment Act case against I.G. Burton of Seaford alleging that the defendant had fired an employee due to his age. The parties entered into a three-year consent decree. Under the decree, the defendant agreed to pay $70,000 in damages to three former employees and provide training and take other steps to prevent further violations."}
{"article": "On September 29, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this lawsuit against Autozone, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The EEOC alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and sought injunctive and monetary relief. More specifically, the complainant, a female employee who intervened in this lawsuit, was allegedly subjected to sexual harassment and then illegally discharged for asserting her rights. Judge Timothy Corrigan and Judge Monte Richardson were assigned to this case. The defendant sought summary judgment, but the court denied this on July 1, 2008. Judge Corrigan ordered the case to be set for settlement conferences before Judge Richardson on July 28, 2008. After some settlement discussions, the parties came to an agreement. On December 24, 2008, the court approved the parties\u2019 consent decree. Pursuant to the consent decree, the court retained jurisdiction over the matter for two years. This decree required that: 1. The defendant was prohibited from engaging in conduct in violation of Title VII, and was prohibited from sex discrimination and retaliation. 2. The defendant was required to provide anti-discrimination training to its employees. 3. The defendant was required to pay the plaintiffs $150,000.00 for monetary relief. Around $100,000 went to the individual claimants, and $50,000 was to be used to cover attorney's fees. 4. The defendant had to report all complaints of sexual harassment or retaliation to the EEOC. 5. The defendant had to keep a record of all complaints of sex discrimination and retaliation for EEOC inspection. 6. The defendant had to post on its employee bulletin board a notice that would detail this lawsuit. The two year consent decree was carried out without any further litigation. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the complainant, who intervened to become a plaintiff, brought this suit against Autozone, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The complaint alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. The case ended in a consent decree."}
{"article": "On June 30, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this sex discrimination and retaliation suit in the Fort Lauderdale U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against DTG Operations, Inc., (doing business as Dollar Rent A Car) on behalf of a female employee. The EEOC alleged that DTG had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et. seq.) by subjecting the employee to a hostile work environment and firing her in retaliation for opposing the harassment. According to the EEOC, the employee's direct supervisor subjected her to frequent physical and verbal sexual harassment. The EEOC sought its costs and monetary and injunctive relief for the employee, including policy reform, back pay, reinstatement, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages. The Court (Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga) allowed the employee to intervene in the case on October 14, 2004. The employee amended her complaint on April 21, 2005, seeking substantially the same relief as the EEOC but suing for violation of Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (Fla. Stat. 760 et seq.), for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The parties reached a settlement, which the Court (Judge Kenneth A. Marra) entered as a consent decree on October 7, 2005. The 3-year decree provided the employee with $395,000 ($15,000 in lost wages, $220,805.58 in compensatory and punitive damages, and $159,194.42 in attorneys' fees and costs) and subjected DTG to a variety of injunctive provisions. Under the terms of the decree, DTG agreed not to engage in sexual harassment and not to retaliate against employees who file charges or otherwise cooperate with the EEOC. DTG was required to distribute its anti-harassment policy to all employees, to provide 4 hours of sex discrimination training annually to all managers and supervisory personnel at the facility in which the employee worked, to post an equal employment notice, to report sexual harassment claims and their resolution to the EEOC every six months, to expunge the employee's personnel file, and to provide a letter of reference. No further court activity appears on the docket, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "On June 30, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this Title VII sex discrimination and retaliation suit in the Fort Lauderdale U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against DTG Operations, Inc., (doing business as Dollar Rent A Car) on behalf of a female employee. The employee intevened in the case. The parties entered a consent decree that provided for monetary relief ($395,000) and injunctive relief, such as antidiscrimination, antiretaliation, training, and notice-posting provisions. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "After an unsuccessful attempt to reach a pre-litigation settlement through its conciliation process, on January 25, 2013, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\") filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The EEOC alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\"ADEA\") and the Fair Labor Standards Act (\"FLSA\") against Bay State Milling Company. Specifically, the EEOC alleged that the defendant discriminated against a qualified applicant when the hiring manager rejected him because of his age. The hiring manager informed the applicant of the company's desire to hire a younger individual for the job. The company ultimately hired a 22-year-old with less experience than the applicant. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief as well reinstatement of the affected individual. District Judge Donald L. Graham was assigned to this case. The parties agreed upon a settlement agreement on November 12, 2013. The two-year consent decree settling the lawsuit, approved by the court on December 10, 2013, included injunctive relief to ban the defendant from considering age as a factor when making hiring decisions, mandatory training for the hiring manager, and interviewing officials and the company's human resources department, with an emphasis on age-related discriminatory practices and age sensitivity. The decree also provided for a number of reporting requirements, subjecting the company to additional monitoring by the EEOC for a period of two years. The monetary award was $80,185.66, which included back pay and liquidated damages. On May 5, 2014, the individual plaintiff moved to vacate the settlement, proceeding pro se because of a dispute in the settlement amount. The defendant opposed the plaintiff\u2019s motion. On July 25, 2014, the matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman who issued a Report and Recommendation. On August 17, 2014, District Judge Graham adopted the Magistrate\u2019s reports. He denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion to vacate the settlement agreement and granted in part and denied in part the defendant\u2019s motion to enforce settlement by: (i) ordering the plaintiff to execute a W-9 form; (ii) requiring defendant to, as soon as practicable, pay the plaintiff after he provides defendant with his W-9 form; and (iii) denying defendant's request for attorney's fees. This case is closed.", "summary": "On January 2013, the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Bay State Milling Company, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). . The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief as well reinstatement of the affected individual. The parties agreed upon a settlement agreement on November 12, 2013."}
{"article": "On May 8, 2013, the EEOC filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000 against Dynamic Medical Services, Inc. The EEOC brought the matter on behalf of several salespeople employed by Dynamic Medical Services, a medical and chiropractic practice, and sought injunctive and monetary relief on their behalf. The plaintiffs alleged disparate treatment based on religion and a hostile working environment. Three named employees later intervened in the case as plaintiffs on their own behalf, alleging retaliation under Florida state law. Specifically, the complaint alleges that the salespeople at Dynamic Medical Services were coerced into adopting Scientology religious views and practices. The complaint states that they were required to attend weekly meetings consisting of Scientology readings and practices and coerced into attending meetings at the local Church of Scientology; one plaintiff alleges a retaliatory firing for not doing so. Examples of Scientology practices here include screaming at an ashtray and staring silently at another person for eight hours. In filing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, defendants argued that the Scientology practices in question were actually business training methods, and thus not the basis for a claim under the Civil Rights Act. Further, defendants contended that plaintiffs failed to allege that employees articulated sincerely held religious beliefs in conflict with the practices or provide evidence of disparate treatment. On December 20, 2013, the District Court (Judge Kathleen M. Williams) issued a consent decree approving a settlement in the case. Dynamic Medical Services agreed to pay $170,000 in compensatory damages and consented to a variety of injunctive measures. Dynamic Medical Services agreed to refrain from discriminating on the basis of religion and to accommodate requests based on religious practice. Specifically, they agreed to draft an anti-discrimination policy and submit it to the EEOC for approval. Further, Dynamic Medical Services agreed to ensure that employees are not subjected to hostile work environments. The decree outlined a mechanism for complaint reporting and allowed the EEOC to review compliance with the decree. Finally, the decree called for annual employee training for each year the decree is in effect on procedures for reporting discrimination, harassment, or retaliation and procedures for requesting a religious accommodation. The decree did not include attorneys' fees. The District Court retained jurisdiction to enforce this decree for four years. As of December 8, 2018, there has been no further activity on the docket and presumably the monitoring period has ended.", "summary": "On May 8, 2013, the EEOC filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000 against Dynamic Medical Services, Inc., on behalf of several sales employees. Plaintiffs alleged that they were coerced into adopting Scientology religious views and practices. In December of 2013, the case was settled for $170,000 and a series of anti-discrimination measures on the part of Dynamic."}
{"article": "In September 2002, the Chicago District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit against HQ Global Workplaces, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Specifically, the EEOC alleged that the defendant maintained policies on leave and part-time status availability precluding reasonable accommodation in violation of the ADA, terminated complainant based on her disability, and disciplined complainant's manager for providing complainant with a reasonable accommodation. Following some discovery, the parties jointly dismissed the lawsuit in May 2003.", "summary": "In September 2002, the Chicago District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit against HQ Global Workplaces, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Specifically, the EEOC alleged that the defendant maintained policies on leave and part-time status availability precluding reasonable accommodation in violation of the ADA, terminated complainant based on her disability, and disciplined complainant's manager for providing complainant with a reasonable accommodation. Following some discovery, the parties jointly dismissed the lawsuit in May 2003."}
{"article": "In November 2004, the EEOC's Chicago District Office filed suit in United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, against Sears Roebuck and Company, alleging a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. According to the complaint, Sears Roebuck failed to live up to its obligations under the ADA to make reasonable accommodations when it enacted an inflexible company policy mandating a maximum of one year leave time and refused to grant exceptions for employees with disabilities. Sears Roebuck moved to dismiss the case, but the motion was denied. On March 14, 2008, the parties notified the court that they would participate in mediation. The parties held settlement discussions while still undergoing discovery, and advised the court in the summer of 2009 that they had reached a settlement. On September 29, 2009, Judge Wayne R. Andersen signed an order approving a consent decree. The consent decree required Sears to make payment to individual claimants from a $6.2 million Qualified Settlement Fund, prohibited it from discriminating against employees by not providing reasonable accommodations and from retaliating against employees who made allegations of discrimination, and required it to provide training to human resources personnel. The order also required Sears to post notice of the decree to its employees, and required detailed record keeping and reporting. Finally, the order required revision of Sears\u2019 workers compensation policies. Each party bore its own costs and attorneys\u2019 fees. The consent decree lasted for three years, and the matter appears to be closed.", "summary": "The EEOC filed suit against Sears Roebuck and Company, alleging that Sears violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by enacting an inflexible workers compensation policy, and failing to provide reasonable accommodations to employees seeking to return to work after injury. The court approved a consent decree, which required payment to individual claimants, revision of policies, recordkeeping, reporting, and training. The matter appears to be closed."}
{"article": "On February 8, 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against the Board of Trustees for Southern Illinois University (SIU) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e, et seq. (\"Title VII\") in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The Department of Justice asked the court for injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant had violated Title VII by discriminating against non-specified minorities on the basis of race and white males on the basis of race and gender. The plaintiffs alleged that the Proactive Recruitment of Multicultural Professionals for Tomorrow (\"PROMPT\"), the Bridge to the Doctorate (\"BRIDGE\"), and the Graduate Dean's fellowship programs were each only open to members of \"underrepresented minority groups\"--namely, Hispanics, African Americans, Asian Americans, Native Americans, Alaskan Natives, and Pacific Islanders as well as women. These discriminatory practices, they argued, amounted to employment discrimination against persons not members of those groups, on the basis of race, national origin, and/or sex. The day after the lawsuit was filed, Judge J. Phil Gilbert approved and entered a consent decree whereby SIU agreed to hire, employ, compensate, provide terms, conditions and privileges of employment to, persons for any paid fellowship position without discriminating on the basis of race, national origin or sex. In addition, the SIU Board agreed to provide mandatory training to all academic recruiters and employees in recruiting activities regarding Title VII\u2019s prohibitions against discrimination within 6 months. There were also additional records and reporting requirements in the consent decree. The consent decree was scheduled to dissolve at the end of two years from February 9, 2006. On December 2, 2008, Judge Gilbert terminated this case pursuant to the consent decree. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On February 8, 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against the Board of Trustees for Southern Illinois University under Title VII in the Southern District of Illinois. The Department of Justice asked the court for injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant discriminated against non-specified minorities on the basis of race and white males on the basis of race and gender. The day after, the parties entered into a consent decree with injunctive reliefs and the case was dismissed on December 2, 2008."}
{"article": "On January 11, 2001, two female employees of Mid-West Wire Specialties, an Illinois company, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs sued their employer alleging that it had subjected them to a sex-based harassment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Represented by private counsel, they sought injunctive and monetary relief. Both plaintiffs claimed that male employees repeatedly harassed and mistreated them by forcefully kissing them, grabbing their bodies, demoting one of the plaintiffs when she rejected her supervisor\u2019s sexual gestures, lowering their salaries, making sexually explicit comments, and asking to take off their clothes, among other actions. The plaintiffs alleged that as a result of these actions by the defendant and its employees, they were harmed in many ways, including loss in pay, mental anguish, and damages to their employability and earning capacity. On August 30, 2001, the plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint, which added a female complainant and added claims that the two initial plaintiffs represented a class of employees affected by a pattern and practice of a hostile work environment, quid pro quo sexual harassment and retaliation. On June 25, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, which added a fourth female complainant. The complaint asked that the class consist of all female employees, temporary employees, and applicants for employment, who have been employed or applied to be employed by the defendant on or after July 1996 and who are subject to the defendant\u2019s employment and human resources policies, including but not limited to current or former employees, and who have been, continue to be, or may in the future be, adversely affected by the defendant\u2019s practices. On July 26, 2002, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement, which provided damages for the named plaintiff and a class of employees, and some injunctive relief. The settlement class in the agreement covered A) all current and former full-time female employees of the defendant who worked there at any time between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2001; B) all temporary female workers at the defendant company and performed services there for any 20 consecutive work-days between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2001. The settlement agreement awarded monetary damages of as follows: 1) $500 in punitive damages to each temporary worker in the class; 2) $2,000 in punitive damages to each employee in the class; 3) $20,000 to each of the two complainants that were added in the first and second amended complaints, $15,000 of which was punitive damages and $5,000 was backpay; 4) $35,000 to each of the two initial plaintiffs, $30,000 of which was punitive damages and $5,000 was backpay. The defendant was also obligated to pay $130,000 in attorney fees. The total was capped at $283,500. In addition, there was non-monetary relief. It was all scheduled to happen within 60 days of the settlement; no period was set for enforcement. It provided: 1) Purge of specified disciplinary notices in class member personnel files 2) A ban on rehiring of a named employee (who had been accused of the most egregious harassment) 3) Retention of a Spanish-speaking administrator to report directly to the defendant's President, responsible for enforcing the Company's harassment policy, including the investigation of complaints. 4) Enforcement of a Harassment Policy promulgated February 15, 2002. After a fairness hearing, Judge Sidney Schenkier approved the settlement agreement on August 2, 2002. No further entries appear on the docket sheet. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2001, four former employees of Mid-West Wire Specialties, Inc. filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant discriminated against them on the basis of their sex, female, in violation of Title VII, in that they were sexually harassed by other employees of the defendant and faced retaliation for resisting the sexual advances. In 2002, the parties reached a settlement that awarded monetary damages and backpay for for class members. The case closed in August 2002."}
{"article": "On July 12th, 2000 eight female employees filed suit in the United States District Court in the Northern District of Illinois against DaimlerChrysler Corp. All of the plaintiffs worked at DaimlerChrysler's assembly plant in Belvedere, IL. They alleged a variety of claims that varied from plaintiff to plaintiff including age, gender, and race discrimination, and violations of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA). The principle specific allegations concerned DaimlerChrysler's failure to promote and train fairly and to accommodate one plaintiff's diabetes. Judge Philip G. Reinhard referred the case to Magistrate Judge P. Michael Mahoney who presided over discovery. As discovery progressed the configuration of the plaintiff group changed. Several plaintiffs dropped the private counsel they had jointly employed and appeared pro se. The court dismissed the complaints of several plaintiffs with prejudice for failure to prosecute when they failed to attend discovery hearings. On May 15th, 2001 four of the original plaintiffs filed an amended complaint setting out common allegations of age, race, and gender discrimination, and violations of the ADA. On July 9th, 2001 DaimlerChrysler filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiffs were tardy in serving the original complaint. Plaintiffs' counsel had missed the deadline by a day. The district judge (Judge Reinhard) agreed that DaimlerChrysler was correct but exercised judicial discretion and extended the deadline, and denied the motion. Discovery continued over the next year. Several more plaintiffs were dismissed, one with and one without prejudice. Eventually individual settlements were reached with each of the remaining plaintiffs. The exact terms of these settlements are not available. The case was completely dismissed on October 29th, 2002.", "summary": "On July 12th, 2000 eight female employees filed suit in the United States District Court in the Northern District of Illinois against DaimlerChrysler Corp. They alleged DaimlerChrysler engaged in age discrimination, gender discrimination, race discrimination, and violations of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA). As discovery progressed various plaintiffs were added and some were dismissed from the case. Settlement negations concerning the remaining plaintiffs resulted in individual settlement agreements. The exact terms of these settlements are not available. The case was completely dismissed on October 29th, 2002."}
{"article": "On October 24, 2008, a group of male and female African-American financial advisors filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against their employer, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for declaratory, monetary and injunctive relief, alleging that Merrill Lynch had engaged in a nationwide pattern and practice of race and gender discrimination and employed policies and practices that had a disparate impact on African-American and female financial advisors. Specifically, the employees claimed Merrill Lynch's recently announced bonus procedure disadvantaged African Americans and women because they were paid less than their white male colleagues. All nine plaintiffs in this action were involved in another action against their employer for race discrimination, which ultimately reached settlement in August 2013. In this case, on March 29, 2011, the District Court (Judge Gettleman) granted Merrill Lynch's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It held that the plaintiff's complaint contained insufficient factual allegations to make it plausible that the defendant's production-based compensation system was adopted with the intent to discriminate on the basis of race. Under Title VII Section 703(h), employers are allowed to compensate employees differently on the basis of seniority, merit, or quality or quantity of production unless the differences in compensation result from an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. On October 3, 2012, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiffs did not assert any new claims from their earlier suit.", "summary": "Financial advisors who sued their employer, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., for race and gender discrimination in compensation did not state a plausible claim, so their complaint was dismissed pursuant to Title VII Section 703(h), which allows employers to compensate employees differently on the basis of seniority, merit, or quality or quantity of production. The differences in compensation are only unlawful when they result from an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin."}
{"article": "On December 23, 2013, the Indianapolis District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiffs sued Bright Petroleum under Title VII of 42 U.S.C \u00a72000e. The plaintiffs alleged Bright Petroleum subjected a female employee to unwarranted scrutiny and discipline and discharged her because she filed and maintained a charge of sex discrimination with the EEOC. The EEOC asked the court for a permanent injunction enjoining Bright Petroleum from engaging in retaliatory practices or any other employment discrimination practices; an order for Bright Petroleum to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities; an order for Bright Petroleum to compensate a discharged employee; and punitive damages. Bright Petroleum answered the complaint on March 6, 2014 and the EEOC moved to strike insufficiently pleaded defenses on March 12, 2014. On December 19, 2014, Judge Sarah Evans Barker entered a consent decree. The consent decree stipulated that any business owned, managed, or operated by the owners of Bright Petroleum were permanently enjoined from discriminating or retaliating against any person because of opposition to any practice made unlawful under Title VII, because such person files a charge of discrimination alleging an unlawful employment action, or because such person participates in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII. Bright Petroleum paid the plaintiff $15,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. The consent decree further required Bright Petroleum to write plaintiff a recommendation letter, modify plaintiff\u2019s personnel file to remove reference to this suit, and to not reference plaintiff\u2019s termination, charge of discrimination, or participation in the suit if contacted for references, a provision that survives the expiration of the decree. The court retained jurisdiction of the case for the three years of its term. This case is presumably closed because as of March 2019, no further docket activity has occurred.", "summary": "In December 2013, the EEOC brought this suit against Bright Petroleum for scrutinizing, disciplining and discharging against its female employee who filed a charge of sex discrimination with the EEOC. The EEOC and Bright Petroleum entered a three-year consent decree on December 12, 2014."}
{"article": "On December 19, 2005, former employees of the Boeing Company filed this class action in the United States District Court of Kansas against Boeing, Spirit Aerosystems Inc., the Onex Corporation, and Midwestern Aircraft. The employees alleged violations of various laws during the layoff and rehire process that took place in connection with Boeing's sale of its commercial airplane manufacturing facilities to Onex. In 2005, Boeing sold its Wichita and Oklahoma facilities to Onex, which created Spirit as a subsidiary specifically for the purpose of purchasing the facilities. As part of the sale, Boeing terminated all employees at those facilities in two mass layoffs in May and June of 2005. Some but not all of those laid-off employees were then hired by Spirit. Those not hired by Spirit filed this lawsuit, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, and class certification. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that Boeing's layoff process started in 2002 as part of a plan to reduce the average age and wage of its workforce in order to make the facilities more attractive to potential buyers. The plaintiffs asked the court to certify a class of all former Wichita or Oklahoma facility employees who were terminated or laid off by Boeing and not re-hired by Onex and who were over age 40 or older on the date of termination, layoff, or non-hire. On February 27, 2006, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all claims against Midwestern, leaving Boeing, Spirit and Onex as the only co-defendants. And on November 15, 2006, the District Court (Judge Monti L. Belot) granted the plaintiffs' motion for conditional class certification and notice under the ADEA. On December 18, 2006, the Court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings in part and dismissed the plaintiffs' recordkeeping and OWBPA claims. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment; on October 30, 2007, the Court found that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and dismissed both the ADEA claim stemming from conduct that occurred prior to January 1, 2005 and the retaliation claim. 2007 WL 3231526. Because the Court ruled that the ADEA claims could only be granted from January 1, 2005, part of the previously certified class was dismissed as well. The claims remaining after these dismissals were the ADEA claim for conduct after January 1, 2005, the ERISA claim, and the LMRA claim. During the discovery process, the plaintiffs moved to amend the complaint to dismiss all claims against Onex and add factual allegations and a civil conspiracy claim. The defendants opposed the plaintiffs' citation to documents protected by an agreed protective order and argued that the conspiracy claim was futile. On May 21, 2008, the Court (Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys) ordered the parties to confer on the discovery issues and granted the plaintiffs' motion in part but denied them leave to add the conspiracy claim. The claims against Onex were dismissed on June 24, 2008, while claims against Boeing and Spirit remained. <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detailDocument.php?id=52041\">2008 WL 191418</a> (D. Kan. Jan. 22, 2008); <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detailDocument.php?id=52079\">2008 WL 5211001</a> (D. Kan. Dec. 9, 2008). The case was reassigned to Judge Eric F. Melgren on October 21, 2008. The plaintiffs moved to recuse Judge Melgren for his previous representation of Boeing and his position as a partner at the law firm representing Boeing in this case. Judge Melgren denied the motion on July 2, 2009. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' remaining claims and asked the Court to decertify the class under the ADEA. The Court granted summary judgment on June 30, 2010 with regard to the ERISA claims, the LMRA claims, ADEA pattern or practice of intentional age discrimination claim, and ADEA disparate impact claim. 722 F. Supp. 2d 1218. The Court found that the statistical disparities in the experts' reports were not significant enough to suggest an inference of discrimination in this case. And by this point, the plaintiffs' motion for class certification was moot. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration and asked the Court for additional time for discovery, which was denied on March 28, 2011. 2011 WL 1118835 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 2011). The only claim remaining was the disparate treatment claim under the ADEA. The plaintiffs appealed the Court's two summary judgment decisions and the denial of reconsideration to the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court's decision. 691 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2012). On December 6, 2012, the plaintiffs requested an order to determine whether the single file rule applied based on this Court's decision and subsequent affirmation by the Tenth Circuit, determine the date that the statute of limitations began to run again, and toll that date by 90 days after the Court's ruling. Both parties jointly filed a motion to sever the pro se plaintiffs for their individual ADEA claims of disparate treatment, which was granted by the Court on January 10, 2013. Those who did not pursue their individual claims against the defendants were subsequently dismissed. On March 22, 2013, the remaining 87 plaintiffs filed a fifth amended complaint against the defendants, claiming disparate treatment in violation of the ADEA. On July 15, 2013, Magistrate Judge Humphreys denied the defendants' motion to sever. After the defendants requested a Bill of Costs, Magistrate Judge Humphreys ordered $50,425.49 in costs for the defendants on August 26, 2013. The plaintiffs appealed this estimate on September 24, 2013 while the parties continued to litigate over the ADEA violation. On December 9, 2013, Judge Melgren denied the plaintiff's motion for the single file rule and to toll the date on the statute of limitations. 2013 WL 6440229. The plaintiffs appealed the order on January 7, 2014. During discovery disputes that followed, a number of individual plaintiffs settled with defendants and were subsequently dismissed. On June 20, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On July 11, 2014, the remaining plaintiffs appealed the order for costs granted for the defendants. Judge Melgren held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on October 22, 2015, and the plaintiffs failed to appear at the hearing. On January 7, 2015, Judge Melgran denied the motion on costs and granted the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the remaining 26 plaintiffs had repeatedly failed to comply with discovery requests or adequately participate in the proceedings; the court had warned that if they continued to fail to comply, the case would be dismissed. 2015 WL 93653. On February 9, 2015, the plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Tenth Circuit. However, this appeal was not filed timely and the plaintiffs were forced to file a motion allowing a late appeal citing a personal emergency. On April 8, 2015, Judge Melgran denied the motion because the plaintiffs had consistently demonstrated a lack of interest in the case and had not adequately pled reason for the late filing. 2015 WL 1549107. The plaintiffs appealed the motion on April 17, 2015. On June 3rd, the court ordered that the plaintiffs also file an appeal of the dismissal of the February 9th appeal within ten days of the order. When the plaintiffs failed to do so, the appeal was dismissed on June 16, 2015 for failure to prosecute. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On December 19, 2005 a group of former employees of the Boeing Company filed suit in the United States District Court of Kansas against the Boeing Company (Boeing), Spirit Aerosystems Inc. (Spirit), the Onex Corporation (Onex) and Midwestern Aircraft (Midwestern). The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief as well as class certification, alleging pattern or practice of age discrimination, disparate impact and disparate treatment by the defendants during the layoff and rehire process, in connection with Boeing's sale of its commercial airplane manufacturing facilities to Onex. The plaintiffs brought eight claims, two of which were dismissed during the pleading stage, five were dismissed as the District Court granted summary judgment in the defendants' favor in two separate opinions. The plaintiffs appealed to the 10th Circuit Court, but the 10th Circuit affirmed the lower court's decisions. The remaining claim in the case after the Circuit Court decision was the plaintiffs' ADEA claim of disparate treatment. A number of individual plaintiffs settled with defendants. After the plaintiffs failed to appear at a hearing on a motion to dismiss, Judge Melgran granted the motion. The plaintiffs appealed on February 9, 2015, and the appeal was dismissed on June 16, 2015 for failure to prosecute. The case is closed."}
{"article": "In February 2001, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) district office New Orleans, Louisiana brought this action against the Jonesboro Manufacturing Company in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The complaint alleged that the defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it discriminated against her because of her sex. Specifically, she alleged that a male coworker repeatedly made inappropriate sexual comments to her, and after she complained nothing was done. The defense immediately filed a motion to dismiss for failure to timely serve the summons and complaint. While this motion was pending, the EEOC voluntarily dismissed the case.", "summary": "In February 2001, the EEOC brought this Title VII sex discrimination action against the Jonesboro Manufacturing Company on behalf of an employee who claimed that a male coworker repeatedly made inappropriate sexual comments to her, and after she complained nothing was done. The defense immediately filed a motion to dismiss for failure to timely serve the summons and complaint. While this motion was pending, the EEOC voluntarily dismissed the case."}
{"article": "On August 22, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this Title VII retaliation claim against Tasa, Inc., (doing business as Orr Minden Country Chevrolet) on behalf of a black employee who had a pending race discrimination charge against Tasa and who had been fired with no discipline or warnings prior to the firing. The complaint was filed with a joint motion for a consent decree, which the Court (Donald E. Walter) approved on November 11, 2005. The terms of the decree provided for damages ($60,000 to the employee) and injunctive relief. The parties bore their own costs. Under the decree, Tasa, Inc., had to provide annual Title VII training to all its employees in Louisiana, to post an EEOC poster in a conspicuous location, to report to the EEOC annually the date, attendees, and subject matters of the Title VII trainings, and to institute and follow a promotion policy. The promotion policy required that all vacant positions be posted before an employee is promoted to the positions, that all qualified candidates be interviewed, and that all applications, resumes, and interview notes be maintained. The decree expired automatically after three years. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On August 22, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this Title VII retaliation claim against Tasa, Inc., (doing business as Orr Minden Country Chevrolet) on behalf of a black employee who had a pending race discrimination charge and no discipline or warnings at the time of his firing. The complaint was filed with a joint motion for a consent decree, which the Court (Donald E. Walter) approved on November 11, 2005. The terms of the decree provided for damages ($60,000 to the employee) and injunctive relief. The parties bore their own costs. Under the decree, Tasa, Inc., had to provide annual Title VII training to all employees in Louisiana, to post an EEOC poster in a conspicuous location, to report to the EEOC annually the date, attendees, and subject matters of the Title VII trainings, and to institute and follow a promotion policy. The promotion policy required that all vacant positions be posted before an employee is promoted to the positions, that all qualified candidates be interviewed, and that all applications, resumes, and interview notes be maintained. The decree expired automatically after three years. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On April 13, 2015, a transgender man who was fired because he refused to agree to dress and be treated as a woman while at work filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiff sued his employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 200e <i>et seq.</i>). The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and the Southern Poverty Law Center, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, in addition to back pay and compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiff alleged that the local branch of his former employer had discriminated against him on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the vice president of the company flew to his branch office shortly after learning that the plaintiff was a transgender man. The vice president then attempted to get the plaintiff to sign a statement that required the plaintiff to either present and be treated as a woman while at work or lose his job. The plaintiff refused to sign and was terminated. The plaintiff then filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which found that the plaintiff had been discriminated against and issued a Notice of a Right to Sue. On September 1, 2015, the EEOC filed a notice of intent to intervene in the case, and the intervention was granted on September 16, 2015. The case was assigned to District Judge Carl Barbier. On September 2, 2015, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case based on improper venue, which the court denied on October 2, 2015. 135 F. Supp. 3d 540. On November 5, 2015, the defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings. The defendant pointed out that the plaintiff signed an employment agreement that included an arbitration provision. The court agreed with the defendant that enforcement of the arbitration provision did not violate plaintiff's Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury, citing the standard stated by the Fifth Circuit that \u201cin enacting the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress declared a national policy in favor of arbitration.\u201d Therefore, the court granted the motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings on December 10, 2015. 150 F. Supp. 3d 709. The EEOC's motion to reconsider staying the EEOC's claims because its claims are not referable to arbitration was denied on March 7, 2016. The EEOC's claims were then stayed pending completion of the arbitration. 2016 WL 879995. On December 1, 2016, the plaintiff notified the court of the arbitrator\u2019s decision. The arbitrator found that the defendant had discriminated against the plaintiff because the defendant had used sex and gender stereotypes in its treatment of the plaintiff. The arbitrator found that, by trying to force the plaintiff to present and be treated as female, the defendant had violated Title VII. The arbitrator awarded the plaintiff $43,162 for lost wages and $10,000 for emotional distress. No injunctive relief was granted by the arbitrator. After the plaintiff filed the arbitrator's award with the court, the EEOC continued to litigate the case. On October 5, 2017, the court entered a consent decree. The defendant agreed to revise its equal employment opportunity policies within 60 days, train employees to conform to the new policies, and post notice of what constitutes a violation of equal employment opportunity policies. The decree was to last 18 months, and was set to terminate on April 5, 2019. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission retained its ability to seek relief for any alleged violation of the decree. The parties also agreed to bear their own attorneys fees and costs. The consent decree ran without any further actions in court, so presumably the case is now closed.", "summary": "On April 13, 2015, a transgender man who was fired when he refused to sign an agreement to present and be treated as a woman at work as a condition of his employment filed a Title VII sex discrimination claim in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The EEOC later intervened in the case. District Judge Carl Barbier directed the parties to arbitrate the case pursuant to an arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and his employer. After the conclusion of the arbitration, which yielded monetary relief for the individual plaintiff, the EEOC continued to litigate the case to obtain injunctive relief. Judge Barbier entered an 18-month consent decree which required the defendant retrain its employees and post notice of what constitutes a violation of equal employment opportunity policies."}
{"article": "On July 8, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a black female, filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Maryland, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against Avado Brands, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant violated the terms of a prior Negotiated Settlement Agreement with the plaintiffs due to a racially hostile work environment. On September 15, 2004, the complainant filed a complaint as the plaintiff-intervenor. On October 13, 2005, the District Court (Judge Richard D. Bennett) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $9,166.21.", "summary": "On July 8, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Maryland, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against Avado Brands, Inc, alleging that it violated the terms of a prior Negotiated Settlement Agreement with the plaintiffs due to a racially hostile work environment. The parties entered into a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay $9,166.21."}
{"article": "On September 30, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of an African American employee (plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Maryland under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant did not promote the plaintiff-intervenor because of his race. On April 28, 2005, the complainant filed a motion to intervene and a complaint as plaintiff-intervenor. On December 17, 2007, the District Court (Judge Benson Everett Legg) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to promote the plaintiff-intervenor to a higher-paying position as well as pay him $60,500.", "summary": "On September 30, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of an African American employee (plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Maryland, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant did not promote the plaintiff-intervenor because of his race, African American. The parties entered into a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to promote the plaintiff-intervenor to a higher-paying position as well as pay him $60,500."}
{"article": "On March 6th, 2003, African American employees of Friedman's jewelry store filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 against Friedman's Inc., along with Federal Insurance Company and St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company. The lawsuit was brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, Southern Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought equitable and injunctive relief, alleging that they had suffered a racially hostile work environment, discriminatory policies and practices, and a pattern or practice of race discrimination in hiring, promotion, compensation, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. This case was brought after plaintiffs allegedly suffered various forms of racial discrimination. One plaintiff, a former African American employee of Friedman's, claimed to have been repeatedly turned down for promotional opportunities due to the way her hiring would affect the \"racial mix\" in the store. Another plaintiff was allegedly discharged from his position after opposing Friedman's racially discriminatory policies and practices. Plaintiffs also claimed that management at Friedman's had been repeatedly instructed not to hire \"too many African Americans at any one store.\" Additional claims included African Americans being routinely paid less in similar positions that were also held by white employees and that these and other factors contributed to a racially hostile work environment and a pattern and practice of racial discrimination. In 2004, the parties reached an agreement which included monetary and injunctive relief. However, on January 14, 2004, after reaching this settlement, Friedman's Inc. filed for a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Due to the bankruptcy proceedings, the settlement could not be completed. The parties agreed to a revised class settlement which included a reduced amount of monetary relief and injunctive relief, however Friedman's went into bankruptcy once again and the settlement could not be completed. After the second bankruptcy, Friedman's chose dissolution. The parties entered a final settlement in 2009. A final consent decree was approved by Judge Alexander Williams Jr. on February 12, 2009, and the named plaintiffs and class members received over a million dollars, including attorneys' fees and costs.", "summary": "The case was brought by African American employees of Friedman's, a jewelry store, and sought equitable and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs alleged they had suffered from working in a racially hostile work environment and alleged that Friedman's had engaged in a pattern and practice of racial discrimination in hiring, promotion, compensation, and other terms and privileges of employment. The case was finally settled on February 12, 2009, after Friedman's had entered into bankruptcy two times. The named plaintiffs and class members received over a million dollars for costs with a portion to cover attorneys' fees."}
{"article": "On August 28, 2017, six transgender individuals currently serving in the United States military filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs sued the President of the United States and various Department of Defense officials, arguing that they had violated the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment rights, in particular the Equal Protection clause and the Due Process clause. In an amended complaint, the plaintiffs also brought a cause of action under 10 U.S.C \u00a7 1074 which entitles military members to medical care benefits. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Maryland and private counsels, sought declaratory judgments stating the Transgender Service Member Ban violated Equal Protection clause and Due Process of by denying their ability to serve and denying them access to medical treatments previously provided by their military employment. They also sought an order to permanently enjoin the defendants from enforcing the Transgender Service Member Ban, in addition to attorney\u2019s fees. The plaintiffs comprised a group of transgender individuals that, under the Open Service Directive, publicly revealed their transgender status and were receiving medically necessary treatments related to their gender transition. The complaint alleged that President Trump\u2019s memorandum entitled \u201cMilitary Service by Transgender Individuals\u201d set aside the Open Service Directive and replaced it with a policy that contained animus against transgender individuals. The complaint singled out the policy directives that rescinded protection against discharge of existing service members, banned new enlistments and commission, and banned medically necessary care. The plaintiffs claimed these directives directly violate their Fifth Amendment rights and discriminated against each of the plaintiffs and other service members who identified as transgender on the basis of sex. On September 14, 2017, the plaintiffs filed for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendants from enforcing President Trump\u2019s memorandum until final judgment was given on the case. On November 21, 2017, Judge Marvin Garbis granted the preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their Equal Protection claims against the three policy directives and the claims under due process were sufficiently plausible to withstand dismissal. Judge Garbis also dismissed the plaintiffs' cause of action under 10 U.S.C \u00a7 1074 without prejudice. 280 F.Supp.3d 747. The defendants filed an appeal against the preliminary injunction on December 6, 2017 to the Fourth Circuit and later filed a motion for clarification and stay in the appeals court and the district court. The motions for clarification and stay were denied in both courts. Following, the defendants filed a voluntary dismissal motion for their appeal of the preliminary injunction on December 29, 2017 and the court approved soon after. Back in district court, the defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion to partially dissolve the preliminary injunction on March 1, 2018. The plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint and removed the 10 U.S.C \u00a7 1074 claim on April 27. On May 11, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and motion for summary judgment. On May 25, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. In June of 2018, Judge Garvis retired, and the case was reassigned to Judge George Russell III on July 18, 2018. On March 1, 2019, the defendants told the court that they would shortly file a petition for a writ of mandamus in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The writ of mandamus would request the appellate court to direct the district court to stay its nationwide preliminary injunction of November 21, 2017 because the Supreme Court stayed two nationwide injunctions in two similar cases on January 22, 2019. Judge Russell issued an opinion on the writ of mandamus on March 7, 2019. He stayed the preliminary injunction based on the Supreme Court's decision to stay a nationwide injunction on the transgender military ban in <i> Stockman v. Trump</i> and <i>Karnoski v. Trump</i>. The plaintiffs attempted to suspend the stay as it relates to their individual cases, but Judge Russell did not agree with this motion, because the <i>Stockman</i> and <i>Karnoski</i> decisions attempted the same argument, and the Supreme Court rebuffed it. 2019 WL 5697228. The defendants filed a notice with the court on June 18, 2019 that the Ninth Circuit had issued an opinion regarding the stayed nationwide injunction on the transgender service ban in <i>Karnoski v. Trump</i> (for more on the <i>Karnoski</i> case, see <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16119\">here</a>. In that opinion, the Ninth Circuit vacated the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington's order striking the motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction because the revised 2018 policy was significantly different from the 2017 guidance that inspired the injunction. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to review if the revisions warranted dissolution of the preliminary injunction. Back in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, the defendants used this opinion to support their arguments put forth in their motions to dismiss and extend the stay of the preliminary injunction. In addition, the defendants moved for reconsideration of the motion to stay portions of discovery based on this opinion on June 27. Judge Russell ruled on various outstanding motions on August 20, 2019. He granted the defendant's motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction, writing that while the 2018 policy makes serving in the military while transgender more difficult, the new policy is not a blanket ban like the one the injunction was intended to correct. Using a similar argument, Judge Russell dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims related to the 2017 policy as moot. In addition, he found several of the current plaintiffs lack standing; the 2018 policy imposes restrictions on those seeking to join the military, not those that are already in, and many of the plaintiffs were already in the military. However, he refused to dismiss the plaintiff's equal protection claims, and allowed for discovery to continue on the issue. Similarly, he dismissed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, looking to further discovery to settle the issues. 400 F.Supp.3d 317. Judge Russell turned to the defendant's motion for reconsideration on September 3, granting it in part and denying it in part. He denied the motion to stay discovery, saying that it would only be necessary if the defendants sought review at the Fourth Circuit, which they have not petitioned for at this time. However, he granted the motion for reconsideration on the level of deference various military documents found in discovery will be given. 402 F.Supp.3d 153. After these discovery disputes were settled, the plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on November 6, 2019. The new complaint amended the factual allegations section to account for new developments since the case started, focusing on stigmatic injuries associated with serving as a transgender service member. Discovery in the case is ongoing.", "summary": "On August 28, 2017, six transgender individuals currently serving in the United States military filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland Maryland contesting the President's ban on transgender service in the U.S. military. Judge Garbis initially granted a motion for a preliminary injunction in September, but this was later stayed in 2019 when the Supreme Court issued a stay of this nationwide injunction in two factually similar cases contesting the ban. This case changed dramatically in 2018 when the government altered its policy on transgender service in the military, eliminating an outright ban and instead putting new guidance on transgender men and women entering the service. Judge Russell, reassigned to the case in 2018, dissolved the preliminary injunction, saying that it was only meant to stay a complete ban on transgender service in the military. This also dismissed all claims against the 2017 outright ban as moot, and removed all plaintiffs that were already in the service and not seeking to join. Discovery is ongoing in the case."}
{"article": "This case is about racial discrimination in employment and retaliation for employees filing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\u201cEEOC\u201d) complaints. Three Pocomoke City, Maryland police officers brought this lawsuit on January 20, 2016 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against Pocomoke City, the Pocomoke City Police Department, the Worcester County Sheriff\u2019s Office, the Department of Maryland State Police, and a number of individuals associated with these organizations. Represented by private counsel, the Washington Lawyer\u2019s Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, and the ACLU of Maryland, the officers sued under 42 U.S.C \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983, and 1985, and the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 201) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as front and back pay, damages for physical and psychological harms, and attorneys\u2019 fees. The officers alleged that they were subjected to a hostile environment because of their race. They also alleged that two of the officers were fired in retaliation for filing EEOC complaints against their employer. The officers asserted that the racial discrimination and retaliation they suffered while employed by the Pocomoke City Police Department violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The case was assigned to Judge J. Frederick Motz. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on January 27, 2016. On March 16, 2016, the officers filed an amended complaint, changing the named defendants. In mid-April of 2016, the defendants again moved to dismiss the complaint. In June, Judge Motz granted in part and denied in part the defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted against the defendants in their official capacities under U.S.C \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1983 and against defendant Wells as to the plaintiffs\u2019 retaliation claim. Two months later, Judge Motz also dismissed the claims against Worcester County State\u2019s Attorney Beau Oglesby, holding that they were barred by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. On September 29, 2016, the officers filed a final amended complaint, adding the State of Maryland as a defendant. Shortly thereafter, the United States Department of Justice moved to intervene in the case, filing an intervenor complaint against Pocomoke City, the Worcester County Sheriff, and Maryland to enforce the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and national origin. Before and after the intervenor complaint, the defendants again moved for dismissal or summary judgment. Judge Motz granted the United States\u2019 motion to intervene and denied the defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss on March 20, 2017, without clearly explaining his reasoning. On May 15, 2017, Judge Motz denied motions by both the State of Maryland and the plaintiffs for reconsideration of his earlier decisions on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. Both parties sought an interlocutory appeal. The State of Maryland filed a motion to stay pending appeal, which was granted by Judge Motz on August 3. On July 13, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court\u2019s decision to dismiss the charges against Oglesby on the basis of prosecutorial immunity. 896 F.3d 260. It reversed the decision of the District Court with regard to the State of Maryland, holding that the plaintiff had failed to make a Title VII retaliation claim against the State\u2019s Attorney and could therefore not make a Title VII claim against Oglesby\u2019s employer. On remand, the case was reassigned to Judge Ellen L. Hollander, who promptly dismissed the Title VII complaint against the State of Maryland. After almost two years of on and off settlement talks, two of the officers notified the court that they had accepted settlement offers from Pocomoke City on March 27, 2019. The judgment included a consent decree enforceable for three years requiring the Pocomoke City Police Department to refrain from engaging in racial discrimination and retaliatory practices, to adopt or amend written policies and procedures to ensure proper handling of discrimination complaints and prohibit retaliation against individuals raising or participating in the investigation or litigation of such claims, and to provide training, at its own cost, to its employees on these policies and procedures. In addition, the settlement awarded monetary damages in the amount of $450,001.00 to one of the plaintiffs and $200,001.00 to the other, in addition to attorneys\u2019 fees. Defendant also agreed to provide neutral references for the officers to any potential employers. A second settlement conference was held on May 2, 2019. On December 4, 2019, the remaining parties agreed to a settlement by consent decree. The terms of the December 2019 settlement are unknown at this time. As of September 30, 2020, the case is ongoing, but stayed pending consent motions to amend the earlier settlement.", "summary": "In 2016, three Pocomoke City, Maryland police officers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs alleged that they suffered racial discrimination and retaliation by their employer in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In 2019, two of the officers reached a partial settlement with Pocomoke City requiring adoption of anti-discrimination policies and procedures by the police department and awarding monetary damages to the officers. As of September 30, 2020, the case is still ongoing pending a final settlement."}
{"article": "On August 15, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against A & R Truss Company for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et. seq.). Alleging that Defendant had repeatedly subjected a black employee at the New Buffalo facility to racially offensive epithets and had met the employee's complaints with threats and intimidation, the EEOC sought monetary and injunctive relief, including compensation for emotional harm and punitive damages. The parties consented to have the case handled by a magistrate judge on December 7, 2005. The parties reached a settlement agreement, which the Court (Magistrate Judge Joseph G. Scoville) entered as a consent decree on March 2, 2006. The one-year decree provided monetary and injuctive relief. The employee was paid $25,000. The decree required A & R Truss to comply with Title VII's prohibition of racial harassment and retaliation. A & R Truss further agreed to develop a Title VII-compliant harassment policy, post an equal employment rights notice, to provide all new employees with the employee handbook containing the new harassment policy, and to train all current and new managers on Title VII, racial harassment, and how to respond to an incident. The parties bore their own costs and attorneys' fees. No further court activity appears on the docket, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this Title VII racial-harassment and retaliation suit against A & R Truss Company for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et. seq.). Alleging that Defendant had repeatedly subjected a black employee at the New Buffalo facility to racially offensive epithets and had met the employee's complaints with threats and intimidation, the EEOC sought monetary and injunctive relief, including compensation for emotional harm and punitive damages. The parties entered into a one-year consent decree that provided monetary and injunctive relief. The employee received $20,000. A & R Truss was subject to an array of anti-harassment, anti-retaliation, training, policy, and notice provisions. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "In December 2013, the Detroit field office of the EEOC brought this suit against Guardsmark in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complaint alleged that an employee who worked as a security guard for Guardsmark observed a co-worker using the security cameras to zoom in on women's private parts on a number of occasions. He complained to the co-worker and also informed a female victim. After that incident, he was discharged by his employer. EEOC alleged that Guardsmark deprived the employee of equal employment opportunities. EEOC asked the court for: (a) a permanent injunction enjoining Guardsmark from engaging in sexual discrimination and perpetuating a sexual hostile work environment, and retaliating against any employee who opposes such behaviors; (b) an order requiring Guardsmark to institute and carry out policies, practices and programs that provide equal employment opportunities; (c) to order Guardsmark to compensate the discharged employee; and (d) to pay punitive damages. The employee also filed his complaint against Guardsmark as an intervenor plaintiff claiming loss and damages. In 2015, motions for partial summary judgment were put before the court by the EEOC, plaintiff-intervenor, and defendant. On April 8, 2016, District Judge Victoria A. Roberts denied all of them. In its motion for summary judgment, Guardsmark argued plaintiffs did not have standing because Title VII does not protect employees from retaliation for opposing discrimination against non-employees. The Court found Plaintiff had standing because a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from opposing sexually inappropriate conduct in the workplace if he knew that he would be fired. Whether or not the underlying claim of sexual harassment had merit is unimportant the Court stated, because the employee engaged in protected activity by opposing what he believed was unlawful sexual harassment by another security guard. The EEOC and plaintiff-intervenor sought summary judgment because they had presented direct evidence of discrimination and retaliation and there were no issues of fact remain to be decided. The Court denied their motions because it found that genuine issues of material fact remained, including whether Guardsmark knew at the time plaintiff-intervenor was removed, that he had engaged in protected activity, and whether Guardsmark\u2019s business reasons for removing plaintiff-intervenor from his position were sufficient to warrant removal or were instead pretextual. Meanwhile, the parties had been engaged in settlement negotiations, which led to a consent decree on September 9, 2016, which the Court approved the same day. The consent decree was to last one year. It provided that Guardsmark would not retaliate against any employee who opposed discriminatory practices made unlawful by Title VII, filed a charge of discrimination or assisted or participated in the filing of such a charge, or assisted or participates in an investigation or proceeding brought under federal laws prohibiting discrimination or retaliation. Additionally, Guardsmark would post a notice for one year informing readers that retaliation and discrimination were illegal under Title VII and listing the EEOC's contact number. Guardsmark would also pay $115,000 in monetary relief to plaintiff-intervenor: $36,641.80, in back pay, $36,641.80 in compensatory damages, and $41,716.40 in attorneys\u2019 fees. Guardsmark also agreed to provide training to employees on sexual harassment and retaliation. An amended consent decree, with no significant changes, was entered on September 16, 2016. The consent decree ran its course without any further litigation, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "In December 2013, the EEOC brought this suit against Guardsmark, LLC for discharging its employee who opposed sexually inappropriate conduct in the workplace. The parties entered a consent decree in September 2016, which provided Guardsmark would not retaliate against employees, would train employees on retaliation and sexual harassment, and Guardsmark would pay 115,000 in monetary relief to plaintiff-intervenor. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On May 25, 2007, employees terminated by the defendant, Seagate, LLC, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 USC \u00a72201. Plaintiffs, represented by private attorneys, asked the court for declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act relating to the enforceability of a purported release and waiver signed by many of the Plaintiffs upon their termination. Plaintiffs claimed that they were subjected to adverse treatment in the terms, conditions, and privileges of their employment and termination due to their age. Plaintiffs also alleged that they did not knowingly and voluntarily waive their ADEA claims because the signed releases were invalid under the OWBPA, which sets specific criteria for effective written releases of federal age discrimination claims. The plaintiffs claimed that among other defects, the releases misrepresented the number of employees selected for termination, omitted employees from the list of those selected for termination, were not written in a manner reasonably calculated to be understood by the average employee, and failed to disclose the selection criteria and eligibility factors used to select individuals for termination. Plaintiffs claimed they suffered actual damages in the form of lost salary and wages, retirement and insurance benefits, and other forms of compensation reasonably believed to exceed $100,000 per plaintiff. The claim is pursuant to events in 2004, when Seagate laid off employees at its Normandale and Shakopee facilities in Minnesota. It gave the terminated workers severance benefits conditioned on the signing of a release that purported to waive any age discrimination claims against the employer. Plaintiffs claimed that they were asked to sign the releases immediately, without allowing them to consider it or to consult with an attorney, and that a Seagate Human Resources employee stood at the door of the facility to collect the signed releases from the terminated employees. Two of the terminated employees who did not sign releases filed the age discrimination charges with EEOC. Some 19 additional plaintiffs joined the plaintiffs in the ADEA class suit, even though they had signed releases and never filed EEOC charges. The court also said the administrative charges filed by the plaintiffs referred to the 2004 terminations and indicated that the pair were bringing charges on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated employees over age 40 that Seagate had terminated. On November 20, 2007, Seagate submitted a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that those 19 plaintiffs lack any claim for declaratory relief under the OWBPA or for individual relief under the ADEA. The company contended the waivers are valid as a matter of law, fully compliant with the OWBPA's requirements, and effectively block the plaintiffs' ADEA claims. Seagate also contended that plaintiffs who did not file EEOC charges may not seek individual relief under the ADEA. Seagate contended that its written release form complied with the OWBPA and specified that terminated employees had 45 days in which to decide to sign, as required by the act. The company argued that the plaintiffs are imposing a \"hypertechnical statutory application\" in interpreting the releases. Seagate contended that the pressure plaintiffs reported was \"nothing more than the reality that eligibility for separation benefits was lawfully conditioned on signing the releases.\" Observing that plaintiffs' allegations must be accepted as true at the motion to dismiss stage, Judge Michael J. Davis denied Seagate's motion regarding the validity of the releases under OWBPA. He pointed out that under relevant case law, an effective release must comply with each OWBPA prerequisite and that \"substantial compliance\" with the act's requirements is \"not adequate.\" The plaintiffs may proceed with their bid for a declaratory judgment that the releases are invalid under OWBPA and therefore do not block their age bias claims, the court decided. On January 22, 2008, defendants moved for an order to certify, for interlocutory appeal, the November 20, 2007 denial of their motion to dismiss. Defendants sought certification on two grounds: whether the plaintiffs had properly exhausted their administrative remedies with respect to their age discrimination claims, and whether the Special Incentive Retirement Plan (SIRP) release that a plaintiff signed is valid and enforceable. On February 14, 2008, Judge Davis denied the motion for certification, stating that the defendants were simply challenging the Court's application of settled law. Judge Davis also stated that the defendants failed to demonstrate substantial grounds for a difference of opinion warranting interlocutory relief. On May 28, 2008, plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment as to the invalidity of the releases signed by the employees upon their termination. Under the OWBPA, an individual cannot waive any right or claim under the ADEA unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary. Some of the terms were different for waivers that involved \"reduction in force\" (RIF) releases. Some of the terminated employees signed RIF releases, and others signed Special Incentive Employment Program (SIRP) releases. 154 employees were affected by the RIF at the Normandale facility. The RIF releases were declared invalid because they failed to disclose the proper required information of all terminated employees at the Normandale facility with respect to the 2004 RIF, they were unintelligible, and they prohibited signers from filing EEOC charges, all of which violate the OWBPA. Judge Davis declared that the releases offered to those plaintiffs terminated pursuant to the 2004 RIF were invalid as a matter of law. On October 23, 2008, Judge Davis granted plaintiffs' motion to authorize notice to potential class members, which consisted of all individuals who were employed by defendants in any United States location and who were 40 years of age or more on the date in 2004 when defendants offered them a retirement separation agreement or a termination separation agreement. On February 8, 2011, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to the invalidity of the 2004 SIRP releases because they violated the 45-day consideration period for such releases under federal law. Then, on August 15, 2011, the defendants' motion for decertification was granted in part and denied in part. The court declared that only those plaintiffs terminated through RIF may proceed as a collective action. This was because the SIRP was a separate employment action that was different in scope, communication and effect than the RIF, and employees terminated through one program are not similarly situated to those employees terminated from the other program. Seagate also asserted that the SIRP was intended as a voluntary program, while the RIF was involuntary, so the employees who volunteered to participate in SIRP suffered no adverse employment action and were thus not similarly situated with the RIF plaintiffs. Taking into consideration the relevant factors in determining whether to decertify a class--age variance, type of termination, division in the company in which they worked, employment status, supervisors and salaries--the Court found that employees terminated through SIRP were not similarly situated with employees terminated through RIF. Thus, the defendants' motion for decertification was granted for the plaintiffs who signed the SIRP releases. With respect to the RIF program, the court held that at this stage, the plaintiffs have met their burden of putting forth sufficient evidence that age discrimination may have been the standard operating procedure with respect to those employees selected for termination through the RIF, and defendants' motion to decertify was denied with respect to employees who signed the RIF releases. Additionally, on August 15, 2011, defendants' motion for partial summary judgment as to plaintiffs' disparate impact claim was granted. On September 29, 2011, the court dismissed without prejudice the claims of 9 plaintiffs who had signed the SIRP releases. Then, on November 15, 2011, the parties reached a settlement. On January 24, 2012, the parties stipulated that the case be dismissed with prejudice. The case was then dismissed with prejudice on January 26, 2012.", "summary": "Plaintiffs filed an age discrimination action against Seagate US, LLC. Plaintiffs alleged that they were terminated under false pretenses. Upon termination, plaintiffs were forced to sign a release of liability, stating that they would not bring action against Seagate. The court declared that the Releases offered to those Plaintiffs terminated pursuant to the 2004 RIF (\"reduction in force\") are invalid as a matter of law. The court declared that the releases signed by Plaintiffs pursuant to the 2004 SIRP (\"special incentive retirement plan\") were valid, and the claims of those plaintiffs were dismissed. A private settlement was reached on November 15, 2011. The case was dismissed with prejudice on January 26, 2012."}
{"article": "On November 17, 2004, employees of Best Buy Co. filed a complaint against their employer in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. The plaintiffs alleged that Best Buy had discriminated against employees on the basis of their age, and that such action constituted a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\"ADEA\") of 1967, 29 US.C. \u00a7 621. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that Best Buy had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination whereby they used performance plans, job assignments, ratings, quotas, rankings or other measures to pressure its older employees and other similarly situated employees to quit and/or to justify their terminations. The plaintiffs also contended that Best Buy had discriminated with respect to training opportunities and job assignments, such as by giving younger employees the opportunity to learn new technology and assigning those employees to positions where they could utilize that new technology, while channeling many of the older employees into positions involving older technology which was becoming obsolete. They asked the court for back pay plus benefits, as well as reinstatement at their old positions or a comparable financial award. The plaintiffs never sought class certification in the case at hand, and they could not reach a settlement agreement when they tried in 2006. The court (Judge Michael J. Davis) ultimately dismissed the case with prejudice on June 12, 2007.", "summary": "The case was brought by employees against their place of employment, Best Buy Co., seeking compensation for back pay and benefits, as well as reinstatement of old positions or a comparable financial award. Plaintiffs alleged that Best Buy had discriminated against them on the basis of their age. The case was dismissed on June 12, 2007 by Judge Michael J. Davis."}
{"article": "On December 1, 2004 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. EEOC sued UMB Financial Corporation (UMB) under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. With the assistance of private counsel, the complainant intervened in the lawsuit shortly after the EEOC filed this lawsuit and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as punitive damages. Specifically, EEOC and the plaintiff claimed that the defendant engaged in unlawful employment practices by failing and refusing to hire the plaintiff to their sales department because of his disability, quadriplegia. The case was assigned to Judge Howard Sachs. On November 28, 2005, EEOC filed a motion for partial summary judgment. It alleged that it made a good faith effort to conciliate with the defendant to resolve the claims before filing suit. On January 25, 2006 Judge Sachs recused himself and the case was reassigned to Judge Gary A. Fenner. On March 17, 2006, Judge Fenner denied the motion for partial summary judgment and the case was stayed for 60 days. 432 F. Supp. 2d 948. The court found that EEOC refused to meet face-to-face with the defendant to conciliate, and therefore failed to satisfy its duty to conciliate in good faith. In January 2007, the case then went to trial before a jury. At the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant filed for judgment as a matter of law, which was denied. The jury found in favor of the defendant and awarded $11,478.87 in costs against the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on August 3, 2007 (Docket No. 07-02901). On March 13, 2009, the court issued an opinion affirming the lower court judgment. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In December 2004 plaintiff, a quadriplegic who was not hired by defendant, alleged that defendant's employment practices were discriminatory under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and under Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The case went to trial and the jury found in favor of the defendant and awarded $11,478.87 in costs against the plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed the judgment to the 11th Circuit and on March 13, 2009 the appellate court issued an opinion affirming the lower court. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On September 21, 2007, the EEOC filed a claim in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on behalf of two aggrieved female employees. The EEOC alleged that Defendant, Bodega Bars, engaged in unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex. Specifically, the EEOC claimed that the two female employees were subjected to egregious sexual harassment by one of Defendant's customers, and Defendant did not take appropriate corrective action despite the employees' repeated complaints. Furthermore, the propositions, touching, and graphic sexual comments by the customer allegedly created a sexually hostile work environment for the employees that was so oppressive that they were forced to resign their employment. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief. On November 30, 2007, the District Court (Judge Charles A. Shaw) granted a motion to intervene by the two employees. The plaintiff-intervenors filed their complaint that same day, making the same claims as included in the original complaint. The District Court (Judge Donald J. Stohr) then approved a settlement between the parties under a consent decree on July 2, 2008. The decree accorded general injunctive relief, requiring that Defendant not engage in sexual harassment or sex discrimination in any of its restaurants against its employees. The decree also provided that Defendant pay $64,000 in monetary damages ($32,000 each) to the two aggrieved employees. Defendant was also required to take reasonable steps to exclude from its premises the customer at issue. The decree further provided that Defendant establish a sexual harassment policy that would be distributed to all of its employees, as well as provide two hours of training on the policy to its managers. The consent decree was to be in effect for a period of two years. On June 28th, 2010, the Court extended the consent decree by a further six months, due to allegations by the Plaintiffs that the Defendant failed to comply with the terms of the consent decree. The Plaintiffs specifically alleged that the Defendants failed to pay the last $10,000 in monetary damages to the two aggrieved employees. There has been no further activity on this case since the June 28th, 2010 order, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "On September 21, 2007, the EEOC filed a claim in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on behalf of two aggrieved female employees. The EEOC alleged that Defendant, Bodega Bars, engaged in unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex. In 2008, the parties entered into a consent decree that required the Defendant to not engage in sex discrimination or sexual harassment of employees, establish a sexual harassment policy and training program for employees, as well as pay monetary damages to the two aggrieved employees. The case is presumed closed."}
{"article": "On September 14, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina against Quik-Chek, Inc. on behalf of a black employee. The EEOC alleged that Quik-Chek had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et. seq.) by firing the employee in retaliation for complaining about racial discrimination and threatening litigation. The EEOC sought its costs and monetary and injunctive relief for the employee, including a retaliation prohibition, implementation of equal employment policies, back pay, job search expenses, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages. The parties participated in mediation on May 19, 2006 and reached a settlement. The Court (Judge James A. Beaty Jr.) entered the settlement agreement as a consent decree on June 28, 2006. The employee was paid $11,500. The five-year decree required Quik-Chek not to discriminate or retaliate and to provide the employee a neutral reference letter. Quik-Chek had ceased operating by the time of the decree, but was also subject to a variety of provisions that would kick in if it resumed any business operations. The provisions included adopting an antidiscrimination policy, reporting procedures, and investigative procedures, distributing the policy to employees, posting the policy, providing annual Title VII training to all employees, and reporting all Title VII complaints and investigations to the EEOC. The parties bore their own costs and attorneys' fees. No further court activity appears on the docket and the case is now closed.", "summary": "The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this Title VII retaliation suit against Quik-Chek, Inc. on behalf of a black employee. The EEOC alleged that Quik-Chek had fired the employee in retaliation for complaining about racial discrimination and threatening litigation over the discrimination and the company's response to her complaints. The parties reached a settlement in mediation, which the Court entered as a consent decree. The decree provided $11,500 to the employee and contained an array of injunctive provisions. Defendant had ceased business operations, and the decree included provisions, such as antidiscrimination training and EEOC reporting, that would activate if Defendant resumed business activities. The case is closed."}
{"article": "On August 3, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought this suit against S.G.T. Cinelli's, Inc., doing business as Cinelli's Restaurant, and its related corporate entity Cinelli's Ristorante, Inc. The suit was filed in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. It alleged that the company violated Title VII by subjecting two female employees to a sexually hostile work environment that included frequent sexual harassment in the form of lewd gestures, comments, and touching. The plaintiff sought damages and injunctive relief. The case was assigned to Judge Terrence W. Boyle. On November 16, 2006, the EEOC amended its complaint to include both the main Cinelli\u2019s Restaurant and its related corporate entity, Cinelli\u2019s Ristorante. Starting in January 2007, the case was briefly stayed for settlement talks, but these were unsuccessful. In March 2007, Cinelli\u2019s (through each of its corporate entities) filed answers to the amended complaint. Shortly afterward, all of Cinelli\u2019s lawyers for all of its litigating entities sought to withdraw as counsel. The court granted the lawyers permission to withdraw on April 23, 2007. On January 11, 2008, the EEOC moved for default judgment, as a corporation cannot defend a suit without legal representation. The court deferred ruling on this request for several months before finally granting it on August 12 of that year, after Cinelli\u2019s continually failed to respond. 2008 WL 3539806. On August 27, the court held a hearing where a lawyer from the EEOC presented her case for the plaintiff. The defendant did not show up. On September 12, 2008, the court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and awarded approximately $87,674 in damages. Each of the injured employees received $25,000 plus interest in compensatory damages, and one of them received an additional $12,674 in back pay. They also received a gross $25,000 jointly and severally in punitive damages. The court did not grant injunctive relief. We do not know whether defendant paid the damages, but there is nothing further in the docket, so it seems likely that they did. Cinelli\u2019s Restaurant has since closed.", "summary": "In August 2006, the EEOC brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina on behalf of two female employees of Cinelli's restaurant. The EEOC alleged that the company violated Title VII by subjecting two female employees to a sexually hostile work environment. In 2008, the court entered a default judgment because the defendant failed to respond. The employees were awarded approximately $87,674 in back pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages."}
{"article": "EEOC's Charlotte, NC office filed this lawsuit alleging discrimination based on national origin against the defendant, Sears, Roebuck &amp; Co. in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina (Eastern Division) on 09/16/1998. The defendant operates the Sears store chain nationwide. EEOC alleged on behalf of a job applicant who was a naturalized American of Mexican origin that the defendant refused to hire him because of his national origin and specifically Spanish accent. EEOC claimed that the defendant instead hired a caucasian with less experience than the complainant. The complainant intervened in the suit. After postponing the trial date three times, the district court judge Malcolm J. Howard granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. Judge Howard believed that although the plaintiff made a prima facie case under the McDonnell-Douglas framework, he failed to show discrimination was the real reason for defendant's refusing to hire him. Both the EEOC and the individual complainant appealed to the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the case. The Fourth Circuit followed the Supreme Court's decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. The Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff did not need to prove pretext for discrimination. Sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false is enough to survive a summary judgment motion. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &amp; Co., 243 F.3d 846 (4th Cir. 2001). Upon remand of the case, the individual complainant voluntarily dismissed the case after settling with the defendant. The EEOC resolved its suit on 10/10/2001 with a consent decree with a one-year term. Under the consent decree, the defendant was prohibited from discriminating against future job applicants on the basis of national origin. The defendant was also required to provide training and post notice about EEO laws and policies.", "summary": "EEOC's Charlotte, NC office filed this lawsuit alleging discrimination based on national origin against the defendant, Sears, Roebuck &amp; Co. in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina (Eastern Division) on 09/16/1998. EEOC alleged on behalf of a job applicant who was a naturalized American of Mexican origin that the defendant refused to hire him because of his national origin and specifically Spanish accent. The district court's granting of summary judgement to the defendant was reversed on appeal. The defendant and the applicant settled and voluntarily dismissed his part of the case, while the EEOC and the defendant entered into a 1-year consent decree, which prohibited national origin discrimination and mandated training and posting of an Equal Employment notice."}
{"article": "On August 7, 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the University of North Carolina in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. The DOJ alleged that the defendant discriminated against two female employees by subjecting them to sexual harassment. The DOJ sought injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant from failing or refusing to take appropriate nondiscriminatory measures to combat the effects of discrimination, including an effective program to address and prevent sexual harassment; and monetary relief for the two female employees. The DOJ alleged this sexual harassment created a hostile work environment for the female employees. On August 17, 2007, the two female employees of UNC and its component institution, North Caroline Agricultural and Technical State University (A&T) filed a motion to intervene. On October 1, 2007, the Court (Judge Wallace Dixon) granted the motion to intervene as plaintiff-intervenors, and both plaintiffs filed intervenor complaints. The first intervenor plaintiff alleged she was subjected to sexual harassment by her supervisor, including conditioning her employment on agreeing to his advances and lewd, offensive remarks; and that her employer knew of the harassment, did not take any action and even promoted the supervisor. The second intervenor plaintiff alleged similar facts of sexual harassment, but she also alleged that she was retaliatory discharged after making complaints about the supervisor's conduct. She sought damages for discrimination and retaliation. On December 27, 2007, the intervenor plaintiffs filed a motion to consolidate the present case with Gloria Adams Smoot v. The University of North Carolina, Case No. 1:07-CV-00812. The plaintiff in that case also alleged sexual harassment on the hands of the same supervisor with knowledge of the employer, and discharge in retaliation. The motion was granted on January 9, 2008 and the cases were consolidated for pre-trial procedures and discovery. On February 5, 2008, the case was referred to mediation. However, the case settled prior to mediation. On April 28, 2008, the Court (Judge Thomas D. Schroeder) entered a consent decree. The decree applied to both UNC and A&T, and only resolved the dispute with respect to two intervenor plaintiffs.The decree contained two general injunctions: 1) prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex; 2) prohibition of retaliation. The defendant agreed to modify its anti-discrimination policies and procedures with respect to sexual harassment and hostile work environment in the following ways: 1) clarification of complaints procedures as to what is available, including posting links on their website; 2) ensuring confidentiality of complainants; 3) posting of information in public places; 4) mandatory training on equal employment law, subject to approval by the United States. The defendant agreed to keep records to allow monitoring by the United States. Two intervenor plaintiffs received awards of $29,000 and $26,000 (total of $55,000). The defendant agreed to provide them with neutral references in the future. The Court retained jurisdiction over the decree. The decree was to dissolve after two years from its entry. On May 23, 2008, two intervenor plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice.", "summary": "On August 7, 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the University of North Carolina in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. The DOJ, alleging that the defendant discriminated against two female employees by subjecting them to sexual harassment. On April 28, 2008, the Court (Judge Thomas D. Schroeder) entered a consent decree. The contained injunctions on gender discrimination and retaliation, and orders to modify harassment complaints procedure, and to provide anti-discrimination training. Individuals received monetary damages of $55,000 total."}
{"article": "On June 3, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the Camden U.S. district court for the District of New Jersey against Blackwell's Book Services on behalf of a black employee. After joining a company committee called the Staff Quality Forum, the employee received racial discrimination and harassment complaints about a white supervisor, which she passed on to the company vice president and the human resources officer. Investigation resulted in the supervisor's firing. The EEOC alleged that the employee was advised to resign from the committee and abruptly fired in retaliation for bringing forth those complaints, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et. seq.). The EEOC sought its costs and monetary and injunctive relief for the employee, including a retaliation prohibition, back pay, job search expenses, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages. The Court (Judge Joel B. Rosen) granted the employee's motion to intervene on October 20, 2004. The employee brought further claims for a racially hostile work environment, for racially discriminatory impairment of a contractual relationship in violation of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981, and for violation of New Jersey law. The employee voluntarily dismissed her claims with prejudice on May 25, 2005. The parties reached a settlement agreement, which the Court (Judge Freda L. Wolfson) entered as a consent decree on the same day. The employee received $65,000, subject to the execution of a release agreement. The 2-year decree required Blackwell's not to retaliate against employees for making claims or participating in investigations of unlawful discrimination, to post a notice of the lawsuit and its resolution, to provide Title VII training to all managers, supervisors, and Human Resources employees, and to maintain records of all complaints of discrimination or harassment and their resolution. Blackwell's also had to make the complaint records available to the EEOC for inspection and copying upon request. The docket shows no further activity and the case is now closed.", "summary": "The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this Title VII retaliation suit against Blackwell's Book Services on behalf of a black employee. The EEOC alleged that the employee was abruptly fired in retaliation for passing on complaints of racial discrimination and harassment and in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et. seq.). The EEOC sought its costs and monetary and injunctive relief for the employee, including a retaliation prohibition, back pay, job search expenses, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages. The employee intervened, bringing claims for hostile work environment, impairment of contract, and violation of New Jersey law. The employee later dismissed her claims voluntarily, and the EEOC and Blackwell's entered a settlement agreement, which the Court entered as a consent decree. Under the2-year decree, the employee received $65,000, and Balckwell's was subject to an array of injunctive provisions. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "The New York District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought this suit against U.S. Aluminum, Inc., United States Bronze Powders, Inc., and UAW Local 1668 in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey on August 11, 2006. The complaint alleged age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act because the collective bargaining agreement between the employers and the union reduced severance pay for employees over 60 years old who were entitled to pensions. Employees over 65 years who were entitled to pensions received no severance pay at all. The EEOC sought injunctive relief and damages for the charging parties, two employees over the age of 60 who received reduced severance pay after the plant where they worked shut down. The case was assigned to Judge Mary L. Cooper. The first complaint that the EEOC filed listed only the union and U.S. Aluminum, Inc. as defendant. On May 29, 2007, the EEOC filed its last amended complaint, which named all three defendants. In late October 2007, all three defendants moved for summary judgment. They did not dispute any of the EEOC\u2019s factual allegations, but they did dispute that their conduct had violated the ADEA. On December 3, the EEOC made a cross motion for summary judgment. On May 27, 2008, the court granted the defendants\u2019 motions for summary judgment, denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment, and entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that reducing severance pay for employees who are entitled to a pension did not violate the ADEA because the statute explicitly allowed for the coordination of severance pay and pension benefits in certain situations. 2008 WL 2224820. Reasoning that severance pay and pension benefits serve largely the same purpose (to provide a bridge to the newly unemployed person's next pursuit, either a new job or retirement), the court held that the agreement between the employers and the union was fair. No relief was awarded to any party. The EEOC appealed this case to the Third Circuit but voluntarily dismissed it on September 10, 2008. (Docket Number: 08-03253). The docket ends after this date; the case is presumably closed.", "summary": "In August 2006, the EEOC brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey on behalf of two employees over aged 60 who received reduced severance pay after their plant closed. It alleged that reducing the severance pay of employees over 60 who qualified for pensions violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. On May 27, 2008, the court ruled in favor of the defendants and awarded no relief."}
{"article": "On September 26, 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a complaint on behalf of two female employees in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Plaintiff sought injunctive and monetary relief, arguing that the female employees had suffered sexual harassment and had been subjected to a hostile work environment by two managers and a supervisor, who had made offensive comments, sexual questions, sexual suggestions and unwelcoming touching. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendants did not exercise reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct the sexual harassment. The Defendants answered the complaint on December 23, 2002, denying Plaintiff's allegations of unlawful employment practices, alleging that the Plaintiff failed to state a claim that would support injunctive relief and that the injunctive relief sought by the Plaintiff was not in accord with the injunctive relief prescribed under Title VII, besides being overly broad. Therefore, the Defendants requested that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. On January 13, 2003, the Plaintiff filed a motion to strike Defendants' answer, arguing it was untimely filed and filed without leave of the Court. Parties then discussed if the default should be set aside or not, until the Judge Leslie C. Smith granted Defendant's motion to set aside the default. On June 16, 2003, the judge ordered the action be consolidated with EEOC v. Bell Gas, Inc., et al., CIV 02-1212 BB/KBM. That lawsuit involved a claim of retaliation related to one of the employees, against one of the Defendants and other two companies. District Judge Bruce D. Black found these actions involved common questions of law or fact, hence, granted the motion to consolidate the actions at least for discovery purposes, to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. One of the employees entered into a consent decree with the Defendants, which was approved by Chief District Judge James A. Parker on January 14, 2004. The Defendants agreed to pay $20,000.00 to the employee. As a result, this individual employee's claims were dismissed with prejudice. The settlement expressly did not preclude the EEOC from prosecuting the remaining claims related to the other employee against the Defendants. After that, the consolidation order was rescinded on March 26, 2004, by a decision issued by District Judge Bruce D. Black on Case No. 02-1212. On July 20, 2004, District Judge Bruce D. Black issued a Memorandum, Opinion and Order, denying the Defendants' motions for summary judgment, which had been filed in both actions. The remaining employee and the Defendants settled on both actions. On September 22, 2004, District Judge William P. Johnson approved the consent decree in which the Defendants agreed to pay $ 36,000.00 to the remaining employee. On the same day, District Judge Bruce D. Black approved the consent decree filed on Case No. 02-1213, by which the Defendants agreed to pay $10,000.00 to the employee. In both, one of the Defendants recognized it was already the subject of a consent decree in another lawsuit (CIV-02-1090 WPJ/ACT) and agreed that it was obligated to undertake the policies and training provided in that consent decree. As a result, all claims asserted by the EEOC against the Defendants were dismissed with prejudice. The Court retained jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcement of the consent decrees during their two years term. The consent decrees ran the two years without any further litigation. The cases are now closed.", "summary": "In 2012, EEOC filed a complaint on behalf of two female employees of the Defendants, who had suffered sexual harassment. Plaintiff argues the Defendants violate Section 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a72000e-2(a). In 2004, the parties reached a settlement by which Defendants agreed to pay damages to the employees. The case then was closed."}
{"article": "On September 14, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this lawsuit against Nichols Gas and Oil, Inc. (Nicholas) in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. The complaint alleged discrimination based on sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. More specifically, the claimant alleged the defendants engaged in sexual harassment, retaliated against individuals who complained of sexual harassment, and caused the constructive discharge of claimants due to the ongoing pervasive sexual harassment. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief against the defendants. The case was assigned to Judge Marian Payson. Prior to submitting an answer to the complaint, defendant Nichols Gas and Oil, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss portions of the EEOC's complaint. The court denied this motion on March 13, 2016. As this lawsuit was moving through the court, Townsend Oil Corporation (Townsend) purchased defendant Nichols Gas & Oil. The EEOC filed an amended complaint in 2007, adding Townsend as a defendant to the lawsuit. In 2008, the parties\u2019 began discovery proceedings. On January 14, 2010, the court made a ruling on the defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment and the EEOC\u2019s cross motion for summary judgment. Both motions concerned whether Townsend--the entity that purchased Nicholas--should be liable for compensatory and punitive damages. The court found that Townsend could only be found liable for compensatory damages. On September 11, 2012, the court approved the parties\u2019 consent decree. This decree gave the court jurisdiction over the matter for ten years as to Nicholas and five years as to Townsend. The consent decree pertained to injunctive and monetary relief. For monetary relief, the defendants agreed to pay $150,000.00 to the claimants. For injunctive relief, the defendants agreed to refrain from sex discrimination and retaliation. Moreover, the defendants agreed to reform their policies and procedures to align with Title VII. To ensure compliance with Title VII, the defendant agreed to provide training to all employees through an EEOC approved entity and report to the EEOC any complaints of sex discrimination or retaliation. As of May 2020, the consent decree is ongoing, and there has been no further litigation.", "summary": "In 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought suit against Nichols Gas and Oil, Inc. (Nicholas) and Townsend Oil Corporation (Townsend) in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. The complaint alleged discrimination based on sex, female, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The case ended in and court approved consent decree granting monetary and injunctive relief."}
{"article": "On August 9, 2004, plaintiff filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, on behalf of all Hispanic and/or non-white refreshment concession personnel who were hired, employed or offered employment by the defendants, Restaurant Associates and RA Tennis Corp. The plaintiff sued the defendants, two New York corporations, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the New York State Human Rights Law. Represented by a private attorney, the plaintiff asked the court for damages and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged in unlawful employment discrimination on the basis of national origin and race respecting the assignment of positions and locations to food vendors employed at the U.S. Open Tennis Tournament. Specifically, that the defendants were deliberately and overwhelmingly assigning beer wagons to non-Hispanic white people over other demographics. Extensive settlement negotiations, supervised by the Court, did not result in a settlement. In December of 2005 plaintiff sought class certification, but before full briefing took place, settlement negotiations resumed and this time were successful. A class-wide settlement established a $90,000 settlement fund to be divided pro rata among non-white employees and employees of non-U.S. national origin who file claims, along with counsel fees of $50,000 and an incentive award to the named plaintiff of $7,500. Plaintiffs' counsel estimated that most class members suffered an individual wage loss of about $400. After notice to the class and briefing, on July 28, 2006, U.S. District Court Judge Robert M. Levy issued a final approval order of the proposed settlement of this action. In the agreement of settlement, Restaurant Associates was to make payment of $90,000 to be distributed equally among the claimants within 30 days after the entry by the Court of the final order of approval. The named plaintiff in the case was to receive $7,500 dollars. This case is closed.", "summary": "On August 9, 2004, the plaintiff filed this class action lawsuit in the Eastern District of New York on behalf of all Hispanic and/or non-white refreshment concession personnel who were hired, employed or offered employment by the defendants, Restaurant Associates and RA Tennis Corp. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants engaged in unlawful employment discrimination on the basis of national origin and race respecting the assignment of positions and locations to food vendors employed at the U.S. Open Tennis Tournament. Specifically, they alleged that the defendants were deliberately and overwhelmingly assigning beer wagons to non-Hispanic white people over other demographics. The parties soon reached a settlement which was approved by U.S. District Court Judge Robert M. Levy, and Restaurant Associates agreed to pay damages. This case is closed."}
{"article": "On November 12, 2003, an individual employee, filed a handwritten, pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California alleging thaf she was discriminated against by her employer, defendant Eastman Kodak Company on account of her race, African American. On March 10, 2004 the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of New York and on April 28, 2004, based on the parties' prior consent to jurisdiction by a U.S. Magistrate, the case was assigned to U.S. Magistrate Jonathan W. Feldman. On July 30, 2004, plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint asserting claims on behalf of the following named plaintiffs: Employees Committed for Justice (\"ECJ\"), an organization of past and current African American employees of defendant Kodak and eleven individuals. On March 1, 2006, plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint on behalf of a class of all past, current and future African American employees of Kodak. Plaintiffs claimed that Kodak \"engaged in an ongoing pattern and practice of discrimination against its African American employees.\" Specifically, plaintiffs allege (i) discrimination in compensation, (ii) discrimination in promotions, (iii) discrimination in wage classifications and job assignments, (iv) harassment/hostile work environment, and (v) retaliation. Plaintiffs asserted three causes of action against defendant, including claims for violations of (1) Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et seq., (2) The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981, and (3) The New York Human Rights Law, 15 N.Y. Executive Law \u00a7\u00a7 291 et seq. See id. at \u00b6\u00b6 174-187. Plaintiffs sought class-wide injunctive relief, compensatory damages and punitive damages. On March 29, 2007, the court (Mag. Judge Feldman) granted summary judgment against three individual named plaintiffs who had signed releases. On June 2, 2009 the parties reached a settlement agreement on behalf of a class of individuals composed of all African Americans employed by Kodak from January 1, 1999 through May 18, 2006. The settlement created a settlement fund of $21,376,500 with $9,655,500 to be distributed as monetary damages awarded to individual class members. Additionally, the settlement required Kodak to engage in a continued commitment to non-discrimination and retaliation, to employ an Industrial Psychologist to enforce and evaluate policies regarding discrimination, a new monitoring process, employee and supervisor EOE and diversity training and new system of reporting incidents of discrimination. On June 4, 2009, the court (Mag. Judge Jonathan W. Feldman) granted preliminary approval of the settlement and on September 3, 2010, Final Approval was entered.", "summary": "This case was brought in 2004 by a class of plaintiffs (composed of nearly 1,000 black current and former employees of Kodak) against Eastman Kodak Co. in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, alleging that Kodak engaged in an ongoing pattern or practice of racial discrimination against African-American employees. This case was settled in 2009 with Defendants agreeing to implement non-discriminatory employment practices and to pay damamges to the class."}
{"article": "On September 25, 2017, three detectives of the New York Police Department (NYPD) filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the City of New York, the NYPD Deputy Commissioner, and the NYPD Assistant Chief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief as well as attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Gregory H. Woods and referred to Magistrate Judge Barbara C. Moses. The plaintiffs filed this action to vindicate the rights of the many African American detectives in the NYPD\u2019s Intelligence Division whose promotions, according to the plaintiffs, were denied or delayed solely based on race. The plaintiffs claimed that NYPD\u2019s Intelligence Division had implemented a secretive and unstructured promotions policy, administered by white supervisors who refused to promote deserving African-Americans detectives. As a result of these policies, the named plaintiffs and other African-American detectives had been repeatedly denied promotions in violation of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. In 2011, the plaintiffs had filed a complaint against the department with the EEOC. In 2016, the EEOC found that the plaintiffs, and black detectives in general, received lesser and later opportunities for promotion than appropriate given their qualifications. After an attempt at conciliation failed, the EEOC recommended the case to the Department of Justice, which determined not to file suit. The Plaintiffs then brought this suit. On December 5, 2017, the court entered an order of automatic referral to mediation pursuant to the court\u2019s standing Administrative Order of May 24, 2015. The standing order required that all counseled employment discrimination cases, except those brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, were to be automatically referred to the Southern District of New York\u2019s Alternative Dispute Resolution Program of mediation upon the filing of an answer. On January 19, 2018, the parties entered into a stipulated confidentiality agreement, setting out terms for the rest of discovery. Discovery continued until April 4th, 2019, when the parties reached a confidential settlement agreement. The New York Daily News <a href=\"https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ny-black-intel-division-discrimination-settlement-20190410-5xaz4nbhwbeu5owhfxxoazucj4-story.html\">reported</a> that the agreement included $700,000 in damages to cover backpay and loss of reputation. On April 4, the court ordered that the action be discontinued with prejudice (since the court does not retain jurisdiction to enforce confidential settlements), unless the plaintiffs moved within 30 days to restore the action to the active calendar. The plaintiffs were granted three extensions to this deadline, but did not move to restore the action, and the court closed the case in July of 2019.", "summary": "This 2017 lawsuit was brought by three detectives of the NYPD in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs claimed that the City of New York and various agents of the NYPD had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by implementing a secretive policy of refusing to promote deserving African American detectives solely based on race. The parties reached a confidential settlement that was reported to include $700,000 in damages to cover backpay and loss of reputation."}
{"article": "On December 1, 2017, seven Black employees of the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) filed this class-action lawsuit against the City of New York in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs alleged racial discrimination in FDNY\u2019s hiring, promotion, and compensation practices and sought compensatory damages, in the form of back and front pay as well as lost benefits. Additionally, the employees sought attorney\u2019s fees and costs and injunctive relief in the form of internal agency policy changes. Represented by Valli Kane & Vagnini based in New York and Mehri & Skalet based in Washington, D.C., the employees sued under 42 U.S. \u00a7 1981 and \u00a7 1983, alleging that FDNY disproportionately hires few Black people relative to other City agencies and fosters a culture of managerial discretion that leads to favoritism and harms Black candidates seeking promotions or pay raises. Additionally, the employees sued under New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) for the same alleged racial discrimination. Judge James Paul Oetken was assigned to the case. On October 29, 2018, the case was automatically referred to mediation. Only once \u2013 on May 23, 2019 \u2013 has a mediation session actually been held. Plaintiffs sought class certification with respect to three groups: (1) Black FDNY workers who have been employed in a civilian position at any level below Department Leader and Black applicants who met the requirements listed in FDNY\u2019s job postings yet; (2) Black FDNY workers who have been employed in a civilian position at any level below Department Leader; and (3) Black FDNY workers employed as EMS lieutenants. On January 9, 2018, one plaintiff withdrew their claims against the defendant. This individual was the only named plaintiff representing the EMS class. On February 11, 2018, the City moved to dismiss the FDNY employees\u2019 complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. On September 28, 2018, the City\u2019s motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. Judge Oetken dismissed the employees\u2019 claims related to the EMS employees. Judge Oetken additionally dismissed the employees\u2019 claims under \u00a7 1981 and NYCHRL related to compensation and for occurrences prior to December 1, 2014 because the three-year statute of limitations on these claims had passed. However, the City\u2019s motion to dismiss was denied with respect to the claims relating to hiring and promotion practices within the FDNY. While the motion was considered, the Court stayed discovery, but fact discovery began shortly after, with the parties agreeing to a case management plan on November 27, 2018. Discovery ended on December 20, 2019. Plaintiffs filed a motion in response to amend their complaint on November 13, 2018, in order to address the deficiencies in the complaint, as the Court found it. This motion was granted on April 8, 2019. The employees filed their amended complaint on April 25, 2019. The amended complaint listed eight plaintiffs \u2013 five from the original filing and three new parties. In the amended complaint, the FDNY employees supplemented their pleading with additional information regarding pay disparities that analyzed a broader range of positions with FDNY. The employees also modified the sought classes to be (a) Black employees of FDNY that made below $150,000 and were not in administrator or manager positions and (b) Black applicants who possessed the requirements for non-administrator, non-manager positions within FDNY and were rejected. Within the former class, the employees listed a further subclass of employees who worked in Professional or Management Specialist positions to whom claims of pay raise or compensation disparities applied. The City moved for partial summary judgment on May 26, 2020, arguing that some of the class representatives had retired and thus could not seek injunctive or declaratory relief and that other plaintiffs could represent specific classes. The City additionally sought to strike claims relating to disparate impact class allegations pertaining to any policies that afforded employees within the FDNY to have discretion over hiring, promotion, or compensation decisions. On the same day, the FDNY employees moved to certify the class. As of February 11, 2021, the motions for partial summary judgment and class certification remained pending. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "Current and former Black FDNY employees sued the City of New York alleging racial discrimination in their hiring, promotion, and compensation practices. Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of individuals similarly situated who suffered from FDNY's policies that afforded too much discretion to higher-level individuals and fostered a culture of favoritism that harmed Black candidates for hiring and advancement. The City filed a motion to dismiss and the Court partially granted the motion, but sustained the plaintiffs' claims related to the hiring and promotion practices with the FDNY. The City moved for partial summary judgment in May 2020, arguing that the retired class representatives could not seek relief. At the same time, the plaintiffs moved to certify the class. Both motions were pending as of February 11, 2021."}
{"article": "The Philadelphia district office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this suit against Pitt-Ohio Express, Inc., a transport company, in March 2006, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The complaint was brought on behalf of a woman who had applied to work for Pitt-Ohio Express but had allegedly been denied employment as a truck driver or dockworker in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The complaint sought injunctive and monetary relief for the individual complainant and a class of similarly situated women. In August 2006, the court granted the complainant\u2019s request to intervene on behalf of herself and the class of women who had been refused employment due to their sex. The parties began settlement discussion on November 20, 2007. Almost a year later, on October 1, 2008, the court approved of the plaintiff-intervenor and Pitt-Ohio\u2019s settlement agreement. The settlement called for the defendant to pay $570,000.00 total to the plaintiff: the plaintiff-intervenor was awarded $265,000.00 in monetary relief and $305,000.00 in attorney fees and costs. In addition, the plaintiff-intervenor agreed to dismiss her claims against the defendant. On October 21, 2008, the court approved the EEOC and defendant\u2019s consent decree. The court retained jurisdiction for five years to ensure compliance. The terms of this decree were as follows: 1. The defendant was made to pay $2,430,000.00 to be distributed amongst the class of claimants, women that the EEOC determined to have been denied an opportunity to work as a driver and/or dockworker at Pitt-Ohio establishments. Specifically, the decree aimed at women that were not hired between September 1, 1997 through October 19, 2008. 2. The defendant was prohibited from discriminating against women applicants based on their sex. 3. The defendant was prohibited from retaliation. 4. The defendant was required to implement \u201cpriority hiring consideration.\u201d Priority hiring consideration required Pitt-Ohio to make employment offers for driver and dockworker positions to women that EEOC determined were not hired for a position at Pitt-Ohio for which she applied, but who was qualified under Pitt-Ohio\u2019s hiring criteria, and remained interested in employment at Pitt-Ohio as a driver and/or dock worker. 5. The defendant was obligated to provide EEOC approved anti-employment discrimination training for all employees. 6. In addition to training, the defendant had to ensure that managers and supervisors enforce anti-employment discrimination through management accountability. This directed managers and supervisors to take corrective action when necessary to counter individuals engaging in unlawful employment discrimination. Further, managers and supervisors were obligated to report incidents of unlawful discrimination or retaliation to Pitt-Ohio\u2019s human resources group. 7. Pitt-Ohio Express was obligated to post notices of the outcome of this case to its Ohio terminals and headquarters in areas where bulletins and notices are posted to employees and applicants. These notices were to remain posted for the duration of this consent decree. 8. Pitt-Ohio Express was obligated to give regular reports to the EEOC in regard to recruitment and hiring of women in the driver and dock worker positions in Ohio. 9. Both parties bear their own attorney fees and costs. This case is currently closed. The consent decree\u2019s duration has lapsed, and the court docket shows no further activity.", "summary": "In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the plaintiff-intervenor, the complainant, filed this class action lawsuit against Pitt-Ohio Express, Inc., a transport company, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The plaintiffs alleged that Pitt-Ohio discriminated against women by refusing to hire women as truck drivers or dockworkers, in violation of Title VII 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e. On October 1, 2008, the court approved a settlement agreement between the plaintiff-intervenor and Pitt-Ohio. The defendant agreed to pay $265,000 in monetary relief and $305,000 in attorney fees and costs. That same month, the court approved a consent decree between EEOC and Pitt-Ohio. This decree required the defendant to pay $$2,430,000 to EEOC (to be distributed to women that were affected by the defendant\u2019s discrimination), to adopt anti-discrimination policies, to offer driver and/or dockworker positions to the women that were discriminated against, and regularly report to the EEOC to ensure compliance. This decree had a duration of five years."}
{"article": "In August 2001, the Cleveland District Office filed this lawsuit against Sundance Rehabilitation Corporation in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complaint specifically alleged that the defendant required terminated employees to sign a waiver of claims against the defendant, including EEO violations, in order to receive severance pay. Following discovery and motions for summary judgment for both parties, the District Court granted summary judgment to the EEOC in July 2004. The defendant appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in September 2004. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's judgment in October 2006. The U.S. Supreme Court granted an extension of time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in June 2007. However, the docket does not indicate that this option was exercised.", "summary": "In August 2001, the Cleveland District Office filed this lawsuit against Sundance Rehabilitation Corporation in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complaint specifically alleged that the defendant required terminated employees to sign a waiver of claims against the defendant, including EEO violations, in order to receive severance pay. Following discovery and motions for summary judgment for both parties, the District Court granted summary judgment to the EEOC in July 2004. The defendant appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in September 2004. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's judgment in October 2006. The U.S. Supreme Court granted an extension of time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in June 2007. However, the docket does not indicate that this option was exercised."}
{"article": "On May 25, 2007 the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit against the Village of Woodmere, Ohio in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio to enforce Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a72000e, et seq. The D.O.J. asked the court for injunctive and compensatory relief, alleging the defendant had violated Title VII by discriminating against two employees in the defendant's police department on the basis of their race, white. The court granted motions of two separate plaintiffs, both white police officers, to intervene in the case. Both interveners alleged: (1) termination against the plaintiffs was disproportionate and racially discriminatory; (2) gross and discriminatory conduct by the Village of Woodmere police chief; (3) defendants, acting in their official capacities, furthered the village's plan of racial preference by terminating the plaintiff and terminating another white officer while being aware that black officers are not disciplined for actions significantly more serious that those of the plaintiff and by another white officer. The DOJ complaint alleges that the Village of Woodmere, Ohio violated Title VII by: (1) failing or refusing to confirm the one officer from probationary to regular status as a police officer approximately one year after she began employment as a probationary officer; (2) failure to provide said officer with any pre-disciplinary/termination hearing; (3) terminating both officers' employment; (4) failing or refusing to take appropriate action to remedy the effects of it's discrimination against either of the officers. The DOJ sought to remedy the effects of the discrimination by requiring the defendant to: (1) provide sufficient remedial relief to make the officers whole again as the result of losses suffered by the allegations in the complaint; (2) take other appropriate non-discriminatory measures to overcome the effect of the discrimination; (3) award compensatory damages to both officers to compensate for injuries resulting from defendant's discrimination. The parties reached a settlement agreement and filed a joint motion for entry of consent decree on August 11, 2008. The decree was entered by the Court (Judge Donald C. Nugent) on August 13, 2008. Under the agreement, the parties sought to ensure that the defendant did not discriminate against employees on the basis of race. For that purpose, the defendant agreed to maintain clear and well-publicized policies, provide adequate nondiscrimination training, appoint an equal opportunities officer (EEO) to administer its policies and procedures. The decree contained two general injunctions: 1) prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race; 2) prohibition of retaliation. The defendant agreed to the amend its policies to implement the following: 1) description of complaints procedures, written or verbal; 2) identification of persons responsible for handling race discrimination complaints; 3) prompt and objective investigation of complaints, with results no later than 30 days after filing of a complaint; 4) maintaining confidentiality of complainants to the maximum extent possible. One individual in the case received $125,000.00. The other individual was also to receive a monetary award, but the amount is unknown. One of the individuals was reinstated with retroactive seniority. Both of their records were expunged from negative references and both of them were to receive neutral references in the future. The defendant agreed to keep records pertinent to the implementation of the decree. The United States reserved a right to monitor compliance. The Court retained jurisdiction over the decree for its duration.", "summary": "On May 25, 2007 the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit against the Village of Woodmere, Ohio in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio to enforce Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a72000e, et seq. The D.O.J. asked the court for injunctive and compensatory relief, alleging the defendant had violated Title VII by discriminating against two employees in the defendant's police department on the basis of their race (white) in termination of their employment. The parties reached a settlement and the Court entered a three year consent decree on May 23, 2008. The defendant agreed to implement new policies to deal with racial discrimination complaints and provide mandatory nondiscrimination training. The individuals were to receive monetary awards, and one of them receive reinstatement."}
{"article": "On December 9, 2011, an openly gay former employee of Ohio Bell Telephone Company filed suit in U.S District Court for the Northern District of Ohio alleging that he had been dismissed in violation of both state and federal law. Specifically, Mr. Koren, who had taken the name of his husband, alleged that Ohio Bell violated the ADA, multiple sections of the Ohio Civil Rights Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act when it dismissed him under the guise of missing days of work when in reality he was fired because his actions did not conform to the gender stereotype and he had AIDS. On August 14, 2012, the court denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The case was dismissed after a settlement was reached on September 7, 2012.", "summary": "On December 9, 2011, an openly gay former employee of Ohio Bell Telephone Company filed suit in U.S District Court for the Northern District of Ohio alleging that he had been dismissed in violation of the ADA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and multiple sections of Ohio's Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff took his husband's last name after the couple was married in Massachusetts and had AIDS and alleged he was fired for those reasons. The court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss and the case settled in September 2012."}
{"article": "On January 18, 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice (\"D.O.J.\") filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the City of Sulphur in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma alleging that the City discriminated against a Mexican-American employee on the basis of his national origin. The D.O.J. sought injunctive and monetary relief. The D.O.J. alleged that the defendant, specifically the Sanitation Department failed or refused to promote the Mexican-American employee. The D.O.J. also alleged that the defendant failed or refused to take action to remedy the effects of the discrimination. On February 23, 2001, the district court (Judge Frank Seay) entered a consent decree in which the defendant agreed to implement a nondiscriminatory policy and train its supervisory employees on Title IV. The decree also included a general prohibition on retaliation. The consent decree further provided defendant would pay the employee $45,000 in damages including back pay. The City agreed to keep records pertinent to the implementation of the decree. The United States had a right to inspect the records and to monitor compliance. The decree was supposed to terminate within five years of its entry, unless any party moved to extend its duration. There is no further information on the case. The case is closed.", "summary": "On January 18, 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice (\"D.O.J.\") filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the City of Sulphur in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma alleging that the City discriminated against a Mexican-American employee on the basis of his national origin, when it failed or refused to promote him and took no action to remedy the effects of discrimination. The D.O.J. sought injunctive and monetary relief. On February 23, 2001, the Court entered a consent decree, containing injunctions on discrimination and retaliation, with orders to the defendant to implement a nondiscriminatory policy and antidiscrimination training. The individual received $45,000. The decree expired after five years."}
{"article": "On November 3, 2003, African-American employees of Kraft Foods filed a class action lawsuit against their employer in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and asked the court for class-wide injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and equitable financial relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that Kraft had discriminated with regard to discipline and hiring. On January 31, 2006, the court (Judge Paul S. Diamond) denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, holding that the plaintiffs did not meet the typicality requirement. Davis v. Kraft Foods, 2006 WL 237512 (E.D. Pa. 2006). The court approved a preliminary settlement agreement on May 1, 2007. Kraft agreed to pay $1.325 million, which included $1,000 for each plaintiff, plus $3,000 for each plaintiff who was suspended and $10,000 for each plaintiff who was terminated. Kraft also agreed to purge their disciplinary records, monitor their disciplinary system better using tracking, and conduct employee surveys.", "summary": "On November 3, 2003, African-American employees of Kraft Foods filed a lawsuit against their employer in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, contending that Kraft had discriminated with regard to discipline and hiring. <br /> <br />The court approved a preliminary settlement agreement on May 1, 2007 in which Kraft agreed to pay $1.325 million and grant other forms of non-monetary relief."}
{"article": "On May 13, 2008, the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the Western District of Pennsylvania against Latrobe Specialty Steel Company. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive relief and damages on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated claiming that Latrobe violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621. The plaintiffs alleged that Latrobe engaged in practices that discriminated against its older work force in conducting terminations and forced retirements over an extended period time. The four plaintiffs named in the complaint are all over the age of fifty and had worked at Latrobe for a number of years. They were all terminated after sending and receiving inappropriate material on their Latrobe email accounts, and were replaced by younger employees. The plaintiffs claimed that they suffered disparate treatment under the ADEA in that Latrobe's stated justifications for terminating the plaintiffs were a pretext for willful age discrimination, as well as disparate impact under the ADEA, because Latrobe favored younger employees and targeted older ones in deciding who would be terminated following the discovery of the emails. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the second claim regarding disparate impact on June 17, 2008. The court denied the defendant's motions for summary judgment on March 31, 2009, and April 23, 2009. The court then granted the defendant's motions to exclude any claims under the ADEA that accrued before May 17, 2007. Latrobe contended that it was entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiffs were unable to show any evidence that age was a determinative factor in its decision to terminate their employment. Latrobe conceded that the plaintiffs established a prima facie case of discrimination, but maintained that their decision to terminate the plaintiffs was based on their violations of Latrobe policy. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that \"but for\" their ages, Latrobe would not have terminated their employment for sending sexually explicit and pornographic emails. Additionally, the plaintiffs admitted that they sent the emails and could not dispute that doing so violated Latrobe's policies. On December 29, 2010, the Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted and dismissed the collective action claims. 761 F.Supp.2d 261 (W.D. Penn. 2010). The plaintiffs appealed this order. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the Western District of Pennsylvania's holding on November 17, 2011. The Third Circuit held that a reasonable jury could not find that the plaintiffs would not have been fired but for their ages. Additionally, given the conduct in which the plaintiffs engaged and the lack of sufficient evidence suggesting an atmosphere of age discrimination at Latrobe, there was no basis for a finding that Latrobe's proffered rationale was a pretext for age discrimination. 451 F. App'x 238 (3d Cir. 2011). The plaintiffs were subsequently taxed $21,863.88 in favor of the defendant.", "summary": "Four plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, filed a lawsuit against Latrobe Specialty Steel Company for violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). All four plaintiffs were over the age of fifty and were terminated following the discovery of inappropriate emails on their work email accounts. Despite the plaintiffs' claims that the emails were a pretext for age discrimination, the court held that there was no evidence that but for their ages, the plaintiffs would not have been terminated. Thus, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, which was affirmed by the appellate court. Taxation was assessed against the plaintiffs in the amount of $21,863.88."}
{"article": "On April 30, 2010, the plaintiff, an African American job applicant with a felony criminal record, filed this class action lawsuit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff, represented by Outten & Golden LLP, sued the defendants, a company and its affiliates which specialized in training truck drivers and placing them with trucking companies, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000(e). The plaintiff alleged that the defendants refused to procure placement for applicants with a felony conviction, and because of this practice, disparately impacted African American and Latino applicants. On July 2, 2010, defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the venue was improper, and the plaintiff failed to state a claim as the defendants are an employment Agency, and thus cannot be held liable under Title VII. On July 20, 2010, the Court (Judge J. Curtis Joyner) granted the parties a period for jurisdictional discovery and extended the time for the plaintiff to oppose the motion to dismiss. The plaintiff amended their complaint to include additional jurisdictional information about the defendants on July 23, 2010. The Court granted a stay of litigation for settlement discussions on August 13, 2010, which was continually extended through January 21, 2011. Discovery continued throughout this period. The parties returned to litigation at the end of January. The court dismissed as moot defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss on February 11, 2011, and on February 18, 2011, the plaintiff amended their complaint to join two additional defendants, both trucking companies who recruited through the defendant and allegedly played a role in developing the criminal background policy. Defendants re-filed their motion to dismiss on March 2, 2011. On July 8, 2011, the Court granted a stay of litigation for the parties to again engage in settlement negotiations. The plaintiff moved for preliminary approval of the settlement, conditional certification of the settlement class, appointment of plaintiffs\u2019 counsel as class counsel, and approval of the proposed notice of settlement on January 17, 2012. The settlement was preliminarily approved on February 13, 2012 (2012 WL 453234), and the Court granted final approval of the settlement on August 17, 2012. 2012 WL 3578856. For settlement purposes, the certified class was: All Latino and African American individuals who submitted applications to Defendants for a placement with one of the trucking companies for which Defendants recruit inexperienced truck drivers and whom Defendants rejected based on their criminal background between January 24,2009 and September 30, 2010. The settlement agreement created a fund of $475,000 for class members\u2019 awards, Court-approved attorneys\u2019 fees and costs, a Court-approved service payment for the named plaintiff, claims administrator\u2019s fees, and other expenses related to the distribution of the settlement payment. The allocation formula for class members worked as follows: for each week a claimant was unemployed between January 4, 2009 and August 17, 2012, the claimant earned one point. After a sixty-day claim period, all points would be added together, each claimant\u2019s individual points would be divided by the total number of points, and each claimant would receive that percentile of the net settlement fund. The plaintiff\u2019s counsel sought $158,333.33 of the settlement fund as attorneys\u2019 fees and $10,000 in costs. The named plaintiff sought an additional payment of $15,000 as a service award. In addition to the settlement, defendants agreed to injunctive relief of modifying their criminal background hiring policy. Under the revised policy, applicants cannot be barred for felonies greater than ten years old or misdemeanors greater than five years old, except for specifically designated crimes. If an applicant does have a record with a specifically designated crime, or has a felony or misdemeanor less than 10 or 5 years old respectively, defendants must consider: (1) the nature and gravity of the conviction; (2) whether there is a direct relationship between the conviction(s) and the duties and responsibilities of the sought job; (3) rehabilitation and good conduct by the applicant since the conviction; (4) the age of the applicant at the time of the occurrence; (5) the length of time since the conviction; and (6) the nature of the job held or sought. There has been no action on the docket since August 17, 2012.", "summary": "On April 30, 2010, the plaintiff, an African American job applicant with a felony criminal record, filed this class action lawsuit against the defendants, a company and its affiliates which specialized in training truck drivers and placing them with trucking companies. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants refused to procure placement for applicants with a felony conviction, and because of this practice, disparately impacted African American and Latino applicants. The parties settled on August 17, 2012."}
{"article": "In March 2006, the EEOC's Memphis office filed suit in U.S. District Court, Western District of Tennessee, against A&I Products, Inc., a company that manufactures and distributes agricultural parts. The complaint alleged that the defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by subjecting two female employees at its Memphis warehouse to sexual harassment. The employees alleged that a male co-worker repeatedly exposed himself and engaged in lewd conduct in their presence, that their employer failed to take any steps to remedy the situation for nearly a year, and that they were disciplined in retaliation when one of them filed a charge with the EEOC. The defendant moved for summary judgment, but the motion was denied. In November of 2007, the case was resolved via consent decree. The complainants were awarded a total of $30,000, and the defendants were ordered to implement anti-discrimination training for all employees at their Memphis facility. The decree was entered in 2007 and scheduled to last 2008. No further docket entries exist, so the case is closed.", "summary": "This sexual harassment case was brought by the Memphis office of the EEOC in 2006. The case was resolved by Consent Decree in November 2007 which provided individual relief and also required anti-discrimination training, posting of policies and reports to the EEOC."}
{"article": "The Memphis Office of the EEOC brought this suit against Paramount Staffing, Inc. in September 2006 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee (Memphis). The complaint alleged discrimination and retaliation based on race (African American) and national origin (American). The case was assigned to Judge John Phipps McCalla and Magistrate Diane K. Vescovo, and was later transferred to Magistrate Judge Gerald B. Cohn. The defendant moved for Summary Judgement in July 2008. In March 2009, Magistrate Judge Cohn denied the Summary Judgment motion and set a date for jury trial. 601 F.Supp.2d 986, 2009 WL 593729. The parties then proceeded to prepare for trial through 2009 and litigated discovery. On August 9, 2010, the parties reached a settlement. The parties entered into a consent decree 10 days later on August 19, 2010. The consent decree was not an admission of liability by the defendant; but the defendant was enjoined from discriminatory hiring practices on the basis of race. The decree also contained provisions for the defendant to hire an expert to develop and implement a fair hiring policy and awareness training, submit three reports to the EEOC, and award $585,000 in damages to the plaintiff and all eligible class members. The consent decree was in effect for two years from the date of entry. The case was dismissed with prejudice.", "summary": "The Memphis Office of the EEOC brought this suit against Paramount Staffing, Inc. in September 2006 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee (Memphis). The complaint alleged discrimination and retaliation based on race (African American) and national origin (American). The parties settled out of court on a two-year consent decree."}
{"article": "On September 16, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this lawsuit against Sharp Manufacturing Company in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The complaint alleged that Sharp violated the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) by failing to provide the complainant with reasonable accommodation and then discharging her because of her disability. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief against the defendant. Judge Daniel Breen was assigned to this case, but the case was later reassigned to Judge Thomas Anderson on May 21, 2008. On February 1, 2008, the court granted in part and denied in part Sharp's motion for summary judgment. Sharp contended that first, the EEOC could not produce sufficient evidence that the former employee had a disability. Second, Sharp claimed that the former employee was not a qualified individual with a disability who could be reasonably accommodated. The court considered whether the former employee\u2019s osteoarthritis, which limited her ability to stand for long periods of time, fell under the ADA as a protected disability. The opinion stated that the court found that the case should proceed on the issue of the former employee\u2019s physical limitations to stand. 534 F. Supp. 2d 797 The defendant went on to argue that the former employee was not a protected individual under the ADA because she would not have been able to work even with reasonable accommodations. In response, the EEOC explained that the former employee\u2019s health condition had deteriorated, but at the time of the discharge, she could have worked with reasonable accommodation. The court found the EEOC\u2019s argument compelling and stated that a jury could reasonably find that the former employee\u2019s condition got worse only after she left the defendant company. In addition, the court found an issue of fact regarding whether or not Sharp could have offered the former employee reasonable accommodations. Id. The court granted the defendant\u2019s motion in part in regard to the plaintiff\u2019s ADA claim that the former employee was substantially limited in her ability to walk because the proposed accommodation related only to the inability to stand. In addition, the court granted the defendant\u2019s motion in part on the grounds that the former employee was not otherwise qualified to be a casual employee as a reasonable accommodation, but the question remained whether other available accommodations were reasonable. Id. The parties met with a mediator on September 23, 2008. On November, 25, 2008, the parties notified the court that they had reached a settlement. The parties agreed to monetary terms of the settlement but were still in the process of finalizing a consent decree. On January 22, 2009, the court approved the parties\u2019 consent decree. The consent decree gave the court jurisdiction of one year to ensure compliance. This decree instructed the defendant to: refrain from unlawful employment discrimination and retaliation; report regularly to the EEOC to ensure compliance with Title VII; revise its policies on reasonable accommodations; post notices of this agreement in their offices; and pay $30,000.00 to the plaintiff. The docket shows no further activity, and the duration of the consent decree has lapsed. Therefore, the case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this suit against Sharp Manufacturing Company in the U.S. District for the Western District of Tennessee. The complaint alleged that Sharp violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by failing to provide the complainant with reasonable accommodation and discharged her because of her disability. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief as well as punitive damages against the defendant. In 2009, the court approved the parties\u2019 consent decree. This decree had a duration of one year and instructed the defendant to: refrain from unlawful employment discrimination and retaliation; report to the EEOC on compliance with Title VII; revise its policies on reasonable accommodations; post notices of this agreement in their offices; pay $30,000.00 to the plaintiff. The case is closed."}
{"article": "On January 22, 2004 a group of Fairfield Resorts employees filed this class action lawsuit against Cendant Corporation, Fairfield Resorts, and 15 individuals working at Fairfield Resorts in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division. On February 18, 2005 the complaint against Cendant Corporation, the parent corporation to Fairfield Resorts, was dropped. The plaintiffs sued Fairfield Resorts and individual employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive and equitable relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiffs were filing suit over alleged sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and retaliation they experienced on the job. On July 8, 2005 the plaintiffs and defendants brought a joint motion for preliminary approval of a proposed consent decree. The consent decree included monetary relief for all female employees who filed complaints with human resources, and between $75,000 and $250,000 for the named parties in the settlement. It required a commitment from the defendant to ensure equal employment opportunities for female employees and applicants. On October 28, 2005, Judge William J. Haynes approved the consent decree. The consent decree ordered the defendant to pay a total of $550,000 to the five complainants. It further ordered the defendant to commit to equal employment opportunities for female employees; revise its policy and trainings on sexual harassment, including a Zero-Tolerance Policy; modify its complaint system to ensure complaining parties receive information about corrective actions taken; and impose substantial discipline procedures for sexual harassment and gender discrimination. The decree left open the opportunity for the plaintiff to move for attorney fees. On January 25, 2006, Judge Haynes granted the plaintiff's unopposed motions for attorney's fees in the total of $1,439,235.00. After the initial joint motion for approval of the consent decree, one plaintiff severed his case. He submitted a separate complaint against the same parties under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 2000. The plaintiff asked the court for compensatory and punitive damages. He alleged that he was retaliated against after opposing the sexual harassment and gender discrimination he witnessed at Fairfield Resorts. The docket indicates no findings on the second plaintiff\u2019s complaints.", "summary": "On January 22, 2004 a group of Fairfield Resorts employees filed this class action lawsuit against Cendant Corporation, Fairfield Resorts, and 15 individuals working at Fairfield Resorts in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division. The plaintiffs were filing suit over alleged sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and retaliation they experienced on the job. On October 28, 2005, Judge William J. Haynes approved a consent decree granting monetary relief to plaintiffs and other female employees."}
{"article": "On September 28, 2006, The Dallas District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiff sued Beall Concrete Enterprises, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of U.S. Concrete, Inc. under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The plaintiff, representing a former employee of the defendant, asked the court for injunctive relief enjoining the defendant from discrimination on the basis of disability or age, and for monetary relief as compensation for harm. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant violated the ADA by failing to provide the employee with reasonable accommodations and then firing the employee due to his disabilities. In an amended complaint, submitted on May 7, 2007, the plaintiff further alleged that the defendant terminated the complainant's employment because of his age and failed to rehire him based on his disability and age. On November 14, 2007, the defendant moved for partial summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims under the ADA. On March 15, 2008, Judge Reed O'Connor granted the summary judgment. He found that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff on the job did not constitute a disability under the ADA. Judge O'Connor further found that the defendant's 12 month leave policy was not in violation of the ADA. 2008 WL 877769 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2008). On April 3, 2008, Judge Reed O'Connor approved a consent decree over the remaining claim that the defendant had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The consent decree required the defendant to pay the complainant $50,000 in backpay, conduct ADEA training for its employees for two years, and post a notice about federal anti-discrimination employment laws.", "summary": "On September 28, 2006, The Dallas District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiff sued Beall Concrete Enterprises, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of U.S. Concrete, Inc. under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. On April 3, 2008, Judge Reed O'Connor approved a consent decree over the remaining claim that the defendant had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The consent decree required the defendant to pay the complainant $50,000 in backpay, conduct ADEA training for its employees for two years, and post a notice about federal anti-discrimination employment laws."}
{"article": "On November 9, 1999, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a female employee, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District Court of Texas, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as amended, against Parfumes De Couer Limited, Inc. The EEOC sought reinstatement of the applicant, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant fired the complainant based on her sex because she was pregnant. On March 23, 2001, the District Court (Judge Sidney Allen Fitzwater) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $5,000.", "summary": "On November 9, 1999, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a female employee, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District Court of Texas, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as amended, against Parfumes De Couer Limited, Inc. The EEOC sought reinstatement of the applicant, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant fired the complainant based on her sex because she was pregnant. On March 23, 2001, the District Court entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $5,000."}
{"article": "On September 19, 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a black employee, filed a lawsuit in the Western District Court of Texas against Union Pacific Railroad Company, however the complaint was unavailable. On April 7, 2003, the employee filed a complaint as plaintiff-intervenor under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against the same defendant. The plaintiff-intervenor sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant discharged the plaintiff-intervenor when he lied about his criminal background on his application but did not discharge similarly situated white employees who also lied. On October 2, 2003, the District Court (Judge David Briones) granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment with regards to the plaintiff's racial discrimination claim filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981, and denied with regards to plaintiff's Title VII claims. The District Court (Judge Briones) filed an amended opinion on October 24, 2003 but with the same outcome. On January 21, 2004, the District Court (Judge David Briones) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $84,000.", "summary": "On September 19, 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a black employee, filed a lawsuit in the Western District Court of Texas against Union Pacific Railroad Company. On January 21, 2004, the District Court (Judge David Briones) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $84,000."}
{"article": "On January 12, 2006, individuals who were either current or former pilots for American Airlines brought this class action lawsuit against the airline under 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 4301, et seq. (USERRA) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiff class consisted of all past and present pilots of American Airlines who are or were members of the United States Armed Services and who took military leave from January 2001 to 2006. Represented by an attorney from the Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division, the plaintiffs asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that American Airlines had violated USERRA by discriminating against pilots who took military leaves of absence. They claimed that they were unfairly charged fewer \"in service\" days which prevented them from bidding on a number of benefits including flight schedules, paid vacation time, and earned sick leave. Pilots who had taken comparable types of non-military leave were not similarly penalized. On October 6, 2006, U.S. District Court Judge Barbara M.G. Lynn, issued a memorandum and order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, and allowing the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint concerning trip bidding. After filing two amended complaints, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify class, preliminarily approve settlement agreement, and approve forms of class notice on April 17, 2008. On May 13, 2008, Judge Lynn issued an order conditionally agreeing to the plaintiffs' motion, and on August 1, 2008, the Judge issued a final order granting the plaintiffs' motion. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, American Airlines agreed to comply with the provisions of USERRA, and provide all currently employed pilots who are in the Uniformed Services and who take a Qualified Leave all vacation and sick leave benefits that would be afforded such polite if they were not absent for such Qualified Leave. The agreement also provided that counsel for the class could, for nine months after the effective date, make up to three written inquiries upon American Airlines regarding the status of distributing monetary awards and providing the other remedial relief set forth in the agreement. The trip bidding claim was declared mooted by a separate settlement agreement between the parties and dismissed here. In February 2009, American Airlines certified to the Court that implementation of the settlement had been completed. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This class action suit was filed on January 12, 2006, under 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 4301, et seq. (\"USERRA\") in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiff class consisted of all past and present pilots of American Airlines who are or were members of the United States Armed Services and who took military leave from January 2001 to 2006. They asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that American Airlines had violated USERRA by discriminating against pilots who took military leaves of absence. They claimed that they were unfairly charged fewer \"in service\" days which prevented them from bidding on a number of benefits including flight schedules, paid vacation time, and earned sick leave. Pilots who had taken comparable types of non-military leave were not similarly penalized. After filing two amended complaints, and the court denying the defendants' second motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs motion to certify class, preliminarily approve settlement agreement, and approve forms of class notice. This motion was granted by U.S. District Court Judge Barbara M.G. Lynn in a final order on August 1, 2008."}
{"article": "On August 22, 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a female employee, filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of Washington, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Huntwood Industries, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant subjected the plaintiff-intervenor to a sexually hostile work environment because of her sex, female, resulting in her constructive discharge. On January 26, 2004, the plaintiff-intervenor filed a complaint against the defendant. On July 21, 2004, the District Court (Judge Frederick Van Sickle) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $100,000.", "summary": "On August 22, 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a female employee, filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of Washington, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Huntwood Industries, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant subjected the plaintiff-intervenor to a sexually hostile work environment because of her sex, female, resulting in her constructive discharge. On July 21, 2004, the District Court (Judge Frederick Van Sickle) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $100,000."}
{"article": "The Seattle District Office of the EEOC brought this Title VII suit against Laidlaw Inc., a school bus company, in March 2002, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The complaint alleged that the defendant discriminated against her because of sex. The complainant intervened in the suit in May 2002 adding causes of action under the Washington Law Against Discrimination and state tort law. The defendant moved for summary judgment, which was granted in part and denied in part. The sex discrimination claims were allowed to proceed, but Judge Thomas Zilly dismissed the claims related to negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligent hiring and retention. The case went to trial in June 2003 and the court issued a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on claims under federal and state law, but for the defendant on the issues of punitive and injunctive relief. The court ordered an amended judgment a year later that required the defendant to offset adverse tax consequences of the damages, which were $3,029.78 in economic damages and $30,000 in non-economic damages. All parties filed notices of appeals in September 2004, but dismissed the appeals in October 2004.", "summary": "In March 2002, the Seattle District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued Laidlaw Inc., a school bus company, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complainant intervened in May 2002, alleging that the defendant violated the Washington Law Against Discrimination and state tort law by discriminating against her on the basis of sex. The defendant moved for summary judgment, which was granted in part and denied in part. The case went to trial in June 2003. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on their federal and state law claims and in favor of the defendant with regard to punitive and injunctive relief. The court awarded $3,029.78 in economic damages and $30,000 in non-economic damages. The parties appealed in September 2004, but the appeals were dismissed in October 2004."}
{"article": "On June 26, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Council's (EEOC) Milwaukee District Office filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin on behalf of two female employees and a class of similarly situated employees of the Defendant companies. The three Defendants were: 1) Management Hospitality of Racine, doing business as International House of Pancakes (IHOP); 2) the company's former president; and 3) Flipmeastack, Inc (Flip), an Illinois corporation doing business in Illinois and Wisconsin. The Plaintiff sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e) and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981a). Specifically, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants engaged in unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex and retaliation, and that the Defendants had subjected female employees to a sexually hostile work environment. It also alleged that at least one female employee had been fired in retaliation for complaining about the way she was being treated. EEOC sought permanent injunctive relief, monetary damages (backpay, benefits, and compensation for emotional pain, suffering, and humiliation), and punitive damages. The case was assigned to Judge Lynn Adelman. The parties' initially held a settlement conference on January 18, 2007, but the efforts proved futile. EEOC subsequently filed an amended complaint on July 2, 2007 only to add the third Defendant, Flip. After the settlement efforts fell through, the parties focused their efforts on the discovery process, which went on between January 2007 and November 2009. At the close of discovery, jury trials were finally held in four-parts from November 16 to 19, 2009, and the verdict was for the Plaintiff. The jury ordered the Defendant to pay two claimants $5,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. In February 2010, the EEOC subsequently moved for damages and injunctive relief. The Defendants in turn also moved for judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative a new trial or a remittitur (lowering of the damage amount by the judge). On August 31, 2010, when Judge Adelman ruled in favor of the EEOC and granted its motion while denying the Defendants' motion. He ordered the Defendants to pay the $105,000 in damages the jury had awarded. He did not order payment of attorneys' fees and costs. He also ordered that Flip comply with the following injunctions: - Prohibit a sexually hostile work environment. - Create a new sexual harassment program for all employees. - Provide the EEOC with a proposal for creating the above program. - Post a written notice informing employees of this order. - Report to the EEOC of any sexual harassment complaint. - Maintain records of its compliance with this injunction. 780 F.Supp.2d 802 (E.D.Wis. 2010). This decision led the parties to cross-appeal: the Defendant appealed on September 24, 2010, while the EEOC cross-appealed on November 1, 2010 to dismiss the case. While the appeal was pending, the parties encountered further problems. Flip had allegedly failed to comply with three specific parts of the injunction. Judge Adelman held a Contempt Hearing on May 20, 2011 regarding this noncompliance. He held in favor of the EEOC, finding Flip and IHOP's president guilty of civil contempt for violating the injunction entered on August 31, 2010. In addition to ordering that the Defendants abide by the previous injunction order, Judge Adelman added another requirement-- that the EEOC shall be allowed to conduct random inspections of the seventeen restaurants during business hours to ensure that the notices have been posted in accordance with the injunction and this order. 794 F.Supp.2d 921 (E.D.Wis. 2011). On March 2, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Chief Judge Easterbrook, Circuit Judge Bauer, and District Judge Young) made its decision on the parties' cross appeals. The Court of Appeals: - Affirmed the district court\u2019s denial (from August 31, 2010) of the Defendants\u2019 motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for new trial with respect to Defendants. - Reversed the district court\u2019s grant of the EEOC\u2019s Post-Trial Motions. - Reversed and remanded the judgment against Flip, thereby dissolving the injunction. - Remanded the decision on punitive damages. - Confirmed no award of costs. 666 F.3d 422. Because USCA dissolved the injunction, the parties strived to reach a settlement. On August 14, 2012, the parties submitted to the court a Proposed Settlement Agreement. Judge Adelman approved a Consent Decree a week later, which included all the details of the Agreement. The Decree was set to continue in effect for 2 years. The terms of the Agreement were as follows: Monetary relief: - Flip shall pay a combined $65,000 to two female claimants. Injunctive relief: - Flip shall not allow a sexually hostile work environment to exist at any of its seventeen restaurants at which it provides restaurant management consulting services. Restaurant management consulting services refer to sexual harassment, diversity and discrimination training, prevention, compliance, and investigation services. Flip shall advise EEOC in writing if any restaurants are added or deleted from that list during the term of the Consent Decree. - Flip shall provide sexual harassment training for all employees at any restaurants. - In a conspicuous location in its restaurants, Flip shall post a written notice that explains this lawsuit and employees' rights to complain to the EEOC about sexual harassment. - Flip shall report to the EEOC within 30 days of any complaint of sexual harassment at any of its restaurants. Judge Adelman closed the case in 2012.", "summary": "In June 2006, the EEOC filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin against the restaurant chain International House of Pancakes (IHOP), its former president, and another company that together with IHOP operated restaurants throughout Illinois and Wisconsin. The EEOC sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e) and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981a) on behalf of two female employees and similarly situated employees of the Defendants. Specifically, the EEOC alleged that the Defendants engaged in unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex and retaliation, and that they had subjected female employees to a sexually hostile work environment. In 2009, the jury held for the EEOC. In 2012, the parties settled, and the Court approved a Consent Decree/Settlement Agreement (lasting 2 years) that awarded monetary damages to two female claimants and promised injunctive relief. The case closed in 2012."}
{"article": "On July 15, 2015, five non-profit organizations concerned with environmental justice filed this lawsuit against the Environmental Protection Agency (\"EPA\") in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Represented by Earthjustice, the plaintiffs sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs claimed that the EPA violated the APA by failing to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000d <i>et seq.</i> (\u201cTitle VI\u201d). (The plaintiffs did not bring a Title VI claim.) They sought declaratory and injunctive relief along with attorney\u2019s fees. Specifically, the plaintiffs singled out five specific cases in which they said the EPA violated the APA by failing to issue preliminary findings in response to Title VI complaints they had filed between 1994 and 2003 alleging that environmental harm disproportionately affected people of color. The plaintiffs also claimed that the EPA's pattern and practice of failing to issue preliminary findings violated the APA. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the EPA\u2019s failure to meet its mandatory duty and comply with the deadline set forth in 40 C.F.R. \u00a7 7.115, which requires the EPA to issue preliminary findings and recommendations for voluntary compliance within 180 days of initiating its investigation into a Title VI complaint, constituted agency action \u201cunlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed\u201d under the APA. The plaintiffs also sought an injunction compelling the EPA to issue preliminary findings and recommendations for voluntary compliance for the investigations into each of plaintiffs\u2019 Title VI complaints within ninety days of this Court\u2019s order and complete the complaint investigation procedures in response to each of plaintiffs\u2019 Title VI complaints in compliance with the timelines set forth in the federal regulations. The case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore. On September 3, 2015, the case was reassigned to Judge Saundra Brown Armstrong. On January 19, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint but did not alter any of their claims or prayer for relief. The EPA filed a motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment on January 26, 2017; the plaintiffs also filed a motion for summary judgment. On March 30, 2018, Judge Armstrong ruled on the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment and the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. The court found that the defendant had a mandatory duty to issue preliminary findings within 180 days after accepting a complaint for investigation, and that the defendant failed to comply with that duty. While declaratory relief was available to the plaintiffs, the court found that there could be no injunctive relief awarded with respect to the underlying Title VI complaints because the EPA had resolved them. However, the court stated that it could issue a prospective injunction requiring the defendant to timely process plaintiffs\u2019 future Title VI complaints that are accepted for investigation by the defendant. Based on these findings, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part. The court also granted summary judgment for the EPA on the plaintiffs' pattern or practice claim. However, the court did not determine the remedy; it requested that the plaintiffs submit proposed prospective injunctive relief. 2018 WL 1586211. On July 11, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to alter the judgment, arguing that Judge Armstrong\u2019s orders regarding prospective injunctive relief were overbroad and unwarranted by the plaintiff\u2019s claims. On the same day, noting that the defendants were \u201capparently dissatisfied with the Court\u2019s resolution,\u201d Judge Armstrong referred the case to Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler for settlement conferences. Due to budget constraints and appropriations withholdings by the federal government, the EPA filed a motion to stay proceedings on December 26, 2018, which Judge Beeler granted. Appropriations were restored on January 29, 2019, and the settlement conference, which had originally been scheduled for January 10, was rescheduled to April 9, 2019. While the parties had originally agreed to update the court by April 30 with the results of their settlement efforts, they were still unable to reach a consensus by May 17. In light of the parties\u2019 continued inability to come to a settlement, the court invited both parties to respond to the defendants\u2019 July 11 motion to alter judgment. As of August 14, 2019, the plaintiffs had filed a response to which defendants had replied, and the case is ongoing.", "summary": "Five non-profit organizations focused on environmental justice filed this lawsuit against the Environmental Protection Agency for failing to issue preliminary findings in Title VI complaints. Judge Armstrong granted the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss with regard to each individual claim addressing a specific complaint in which the EPA failed to issue preliminary findings. Judge Armstrong granted the defendant's motion to dismiss with regard to the claim that the EPA's pattern and practice of failing to issue preliminary findings violated the APA. The parties entered settlement talks which have, as of October 2019, been unsuccessful, and the case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On July 27, 2016, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The Tribe, represented by Earthjustice, sued the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to block the Corps\u2019 actions related to the Dakota Access Pipeline (a 1,168-mile crude oil pipeline running from North Dakota to Illinois). The Tribe sought injunctive and declaratory relief and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs under the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA). The case was assigned to Judge James E. Boasberg. The Tribe challenged the application of Nationwide Permit 12, which authorized discharges into federal waters, but which was issued without meeting NHPA requirements. The Tribe also challenged the issuance of multiple federal authorizations that were needed to construct certain segments of the pipeline. The plaintiff alleged that these authorizations were made in violation of the CWA and its governing regulations and without compliance with NHPA and NEPA. On August 4, 2016, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the Corps to withdraw Nationwide Permit 12 as applied to the Dakota Access Pipeline and to withdraw verifications issued for the Dakota Access Pipeline to discharge in federally regulated waters at 204 sites along the pipeline route. The following day, Dakota Access, LLC (the company authorized to construct the pipeline), filed an unopposed motion to intervene as a defendant. The court granted this motion on August 8, 2016. On August 10, 2016, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe moved to intervene as plaintiff. The court granted this motion on August 19, 2016. To prevent further destruction of sacred and culturally significant sites near Lake Oahe, North Dakota, the Standing Rock Tribe filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO). The Cheyenne River Tribe filed a separate motion for a similar TRO, additionally asking the court to enjoin Dakota Access from harming and antagonizing members of the Tribe who were peacefully protesting at the site of construction. On September 8, 2016, the Cheyenne River Tribe filed an amended complaint with allegations similar to the complaint of the Standing Rock Tribe. Additionally, it alleged violations of the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851, the Sioux Nation Treaty of 1868, and the Flood Control Act of 1944. On September 9, 2016, the court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the court could prevent damage to important cultural resources by enjoining the Corps\u2019 issuance of pipeline-related permits. 205 F.Supp.3d 4. That same day, the plaintiffs appealed the court\u2019s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. On January 18, 2017, the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the appeal. On November 15, 2016, Dakota Access filed an answer to Cheyenne River Tribe\u2019s first amended complaint that included crossclaims against the Corps. This cross-claim sought a judgment declaring that Dakota Access had legal right-of-way, within the meaning of the Mineral Leasing Act, to build and operate an oil pipeline beneath the federal land that borders Lake Oahe. On December 5, 2016, Dakota Access moved for summary judgment on this cross-claim. On January 6, 2017, the Corps moved to dismiss Dakota Access\u2019 cross-claim, arguing that Dakota Access did not plausibly allege that the United States Department of the Army had completed the administrative decision-making process required to grant Dakota Access an easement to install a pipeline under Corps-managed Federal land at Lake Oahe, pursuant to the Mineral Leasing Act. On that same day, the Cheyenne River Tribe moved to dismiss Dakota Access\u2019 cross-claim for lack of ripeness, as its claim challenged an agency action that was not yet final. In the alternative, it requested the court to enter summary judgment against Dakota Access\u2019 cross-claim. On February 9, 2017, the Cheyenne River Tribe moved for a preliminary injunction directing the Corps to withdraw the easement/right-of-way allowing Dakota Access to drill an oil pipeline under federally-owned lands. On March 7, 2017, the court denied this motion, finding that the Tribe had failed to show that the Corps\u2019 decision to grant an easement to Dakota Access constituted a substantial burden on its members\u2019 free exercise of religion. 239 F.Supp.3d 77. The Tribe appealed this decision to the District of Columbia Circuit but then voluntarily dismissed the appeal. Also on February 9, 2017, the Cheyenne River Tribe moved for an ex parte TRO to halt construction and drilling of an oil pipeline under federally-owned lands. In the meantime, President Donald Trump took office. Within days of his inauguration, President Trump directed the Corps to \u201creview and approve\u201d pipeline permits on an expedited basis. The Corps obeyed this direction, and on February 8, 2017, it issued the easement and summarily terminated the environmental impact statement process. After the permit was issued, construction began. On February 14, 2017, the Standing Rock Tribe sought partial summary judgment on this issue, claiming that this easement decision, as well as the Corps\u2019 July regulatory actions and accompanying NEPA analysis, violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The Cheyenne River Tribe made a similar motion; the Corps and Dakota Access also moved for summary judgment (in two motions that are not available on the docket). In response to all of these motions, on June 14, 2017, the court found the Corps\u2019 environmental analysis unlawful, and remanded the matter to the Corps for further analysis. 255 F.Supp.3d 101. While those motions were pending, in March 2017 the court ordered that this case be consolidated with <i>Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Engineers</i> and <i>Oglala Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Engineers</i>. The Cheyenne River Tribe filed a second amended complaint against Dakota Access and Corps on June 14, 2017, seeking additional declaratory relief. The Standing Rock Tribe filed a first amended complaint, alleging violations under the Mineral Leasing Act, the Fort Laramie Treaty, and the Flood Control Act. On December 4, 2017, in order to mitigate the risk of potential oil spills during the pendency of the litigation, the court ordered the parties to coordinate to finalize a spill response plan for the tribal areas in dispute. 280 F.Supp.3d 187. The court also ordered Dakota Access, with input from the Tribes, to select a third-party independent expert to review conditions and assess the pipeline\u2019s compliance. Finally, Dakota Access was required to submit bi-monthly reports to the court. On March 19, 2018, the court dismissed the Tribes\u2019 NHPA claims as moot (in light of the completed construction of the pipeline), and granted summary judgment to the Corps and Dakota Access on the treaty-based claims and the NEPA claims. 301 F.Supp.3d 50. On December 12, 2018, the court entered judgment in favor of the Corps and Dakota Access on the plaintiffs\u2019 RFRA claims (by the plaintiffs\u2019 consent). The court also ruled that the Tribes could argue that their NHPA claims were not, in fact, moot. On January 3, 2019, the court permitted the plaintiffs to file 4 supplemental complaints, alleging that the Corps\u2019 decision to affirm its original decision (on remand) was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, NEPA, and the Tribes\u2019 treaty rights. On March 25, 2020, the court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs, ruling that the Corps had violated NEPA by determining that an environmental impact statement was unnecessary; it ordered the Corps to complete an environmental impact statement. Correspondingly, the court ordered the parties to brief the question of whether the original easement should be vacated during the pendency of this second remand. In the same order, the court granted summary judgment to the Corps and Dakota Access on the Tribes\u2019 renewed NHPA claims and on the Oglala Tribe\u2019s claims under the Mni Waconi Act of 1988. 2020 WL 1441923. In May 2020, the court received nearly a dozen amicus briefs. These included a brief from 14 states, another from 37 members of Congress, and a third brief from 28 federally recognized Indian tribes and related organizations. On July 6, 2020, the court vacated the easement which had authorized construction of the pipeline under the Missouri River near Lake Oahe. It ordered that the pipeline must be closed and emptied by August 5, to remain closed until the Corps completed an Environmental Impact Statement (which was expected to take until 2021). 2020 WL 3634426. Dakota Access immediately appealed to the D.C. Circuit; the district court denied a motion for stay on July 9, 2020. On July 14, 2020, the D.C. Circuit (Judges Rogers, Griffith, and Pillard) issued an administrative stay of the district court\u2019s order regarding closure of the pipeline. On August 5, it denied the motion to stay the district court\u2019s order vacating the original easement; however, although that ruling stood (and the pipeline was therefore not legally authorized), the D.C. Circuit found that the district court had not made the \u201cfindings necessary for injunctive relief\u201d under the four-factor test in <i>Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council</i>. The court therefore remanded to the district court for further consideration, indicating that the Corps must clarify its position on continued operation of the pipeline in view of the vacated easement, after which the district court could take further action as appropriate. As of August 26, 2020, further proceedings are pending in the district court.", "summary": "This 2016 lawsuit was brought by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff, later joined by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, the Yankton Sioux Tribe, and the Oglala Sioux Tribe, sued the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, alleging that they had violated the NHPA, the CWA, and NEPA by authorizing the construction of a pipeline over tribal land. Dakota Access, LLC later intervened as a defendant. On July 6, 2020, the court ordered the pipeline closed until the Corps could complete an Environmental Impact Statement, expected to take until 2021; on August 5, the D.C. Circuit stayed that decision, and remanded to the district court for further consideration."}
{"article": "On March 19, 2013, the City of Evanston filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The City sued Chevron U.S.A. Inc., E-Town Community Ventures, LLC, Texaco, Inc., the Chevron Corporation, and the Chevron Environmental Management Company under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and local ordinances. The City also alleged that the defendants had committed trespass and created a private nuisance. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The case was assigned to Judge Gary Feinerman and Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox. This action concerned the release and migration of hazardous substances, specifically petroleum and its byproducts, from leaking underground storage tanks at a vacant commercial property in Evanston, IL, formerly owned and operated as a gasoline service station by the Texas Corporation. According to the City, the soil and groundwater at the Texaco Station and the City Property was contaminated with petroleum, gasoline and their byproducts, including, among other things: benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene and xylene; polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons; and lead as a result of Texaco\u2019s operations at the site. The City claimed that by allowing these contaminants to seep into the ground, the defendants had violated the RCRA. On August 6, 2013, the City filed an amended complaint, removing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. as a defendant, while retaining all other defendants. On October 7, 2013, the defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claim and that the RCRA claim failed to adequately and sufficiently allege the existence of an \u201cimminent and substantial endangerment.\u201d The defendants alternatively argued that the court should abstain from hearing Count 1 of the complaint because the relief sought could be obtained under the Illinois Environmental Protection Act in an administrative proceeding in front of the Illinois Pollution Control Board. On February 21, 2014, Judge Feinerman denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the complaint sufficiently alleged the threat of future harm, as it was plausible that contaminated subsurface water would migrate to the surface through the portions of the station uncovered by asphalt or through adjacent properties. After this decision, the parties agreed to a private settlement agreement that is not publically available. On April 15, 2015, the parties jointly filed a stipulation of dismissal of the action with prejudice. On April 23, 2015, the court granted the dismissal and retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the agreement. As of July, 20, 2018, the case is ongoing for settlement purposes.", "summary": "This 2013 lawsuit was brought by the City of Evanston, IL in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The City sued Chevron U.S.A. Inc., E-Town Community Ventures, LLC, Texaco, Inc., the Chevron Corporation, and the Chevron Environmental Management Company under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and local ordinances, alleging that the defendants have caused the release of hazardous substances at a vacant commercial property in the city. In 2015, the parties reached a private settlement agreement. The case is ongoing for settlement purposes."}
{"article": "On October 16, 2009, the Freedom From Religion Foundation and several individuals filed a complaint in the Eastern District of California against Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner, IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman, and California Franchise Tax Board Executive Selvi Stanislaus for violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs sought a declaration under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201 that 26 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7107 and 265(a)(6) violated the Establishment Clause by providing preferential tax benefits to ministers of the gospel. Section 107 provides a tax exclusion for the rental value of a home furnished to a minister as part of his compensation or the rental allowance paid to him as part of his compensation. In order to qualify for this exclusion, the home or rental allowance must be provided as remuneration for services which are \"ordinarily the duties of a minister of the gospel.\" Section 265(a)(6) allowed a minister of the gospel to claim deductions for residential mortgage interest and property taxes. Plaintiffs requested that the Court enjoin any allowance or grant of tax benefits for ministers of the gospel under \u00a7\u00a7107 and 265(a)(6). Plaintiffs also sought an injunction against the California Franchise Tax Board for sections 17131.6 and 17280(d)(2) of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, which provided similar tax benefits to ministers of the gospel. On October 22, 2009, an individual named pastor and 100 unnamed ministers moved to intervene in the action. On December 2, 2009, the District Court (Judge William B. Shubb) denied the requests to intervene on grounds the movants' interests were adequately represented by the federal defendants, and that they failed to show independent grounds for jurisdiction. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Geithner, 262 F.R.D. 527 (2009). The federal defendants and Selvi Stanislaus filed separate Motions to Dismiss on February 26, 2010. On May 21, 2010, Judge Shubb granted Stanislaus' motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiffs' claims under the California constitution and plaintiffs' claims challenging California Revenue and Taxation Code section 17280(d)(2), and denied the motion in all other respects. Judge Shubb further denied the federal defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiff's claim challenging Internal Revenue Code \u00a7 107 and granted the motion with respect to plaintiff's claim challenging Internal Revenue Code \u00a7 265(a)(6). The Pastors appealed the denial of the Motion to Intervene to the 9th Circuit. On May 9, 2011, the 9th Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of the motion for intervention as of right but vacated the denial of the motion for permissive intervention. The 9th Circuit explained that the District Court did not apply the correct legal rule; the Pastors were not required to make any further showing of independent jurisdictional grounds. On May 26, 2011, the federal defendants filed a motion challenging plaintiffs' standing in light of Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 131 S.Ct. 1436 (2011). On May 27, 2011, Selvi Stanislaus filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the same grounds. In Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, filed on April 4, 2011, the Supreme Court held that taxpayers lacked standing to bring an Establishment Clause claim on Arizona's tuition tax credit. On June 17, 2011, the parties jointly submitted a Stipulation of Dismissal to the Court and the matter was dismissed without prejudice on June 20, 2011.", "summary": "On October 16, 2009, the Freedom From Religion Foundation and several individuals filed a complaint in the Eastern District of California against the U.S. Treasury, IRS, and California Franchise Tax Board for violating the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs sought a declaration under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201 that 26 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7107 and 265(a)(6) violated the Establishment Clause by providing preferential tax benefits to ministers of the gospel. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 131 S.Ct. 1436 (2011), holding that taxpayers lacked standing to bring an Establishment Clause claim on Arizona's tuition tax credit, the parties submitted a joint Stipulation of Dismissal and the case was dismissed without prejudice on June 20, 2011."}
{"article": "On May 21, 2012, the Catholic Archbishop of Washington and several affiliated Catholic organizations filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the federal government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2)), and the First Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violated their sincerely held religious beliefs. On January 25, 2013, Judge Amy Berman Jackson granted the government's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for a lack of ripeness, as regulations regarding the contraceptive mandate were under review by the Department of Health and Human Services. On March 25, 2013, the plaintiffs appealed the court's dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. On October 31, 2013, the Court of Appeals dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as moot due to the newly issued regulations regarding the ACA contraception mandate. On September 20, 2013, the plaintiffs refiled this case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, joined by a number of additional affiliated Catholic nonprofit organizations, objecting to the final regulations updating the contraceptive mandate issued on June 28, 2013. They alleged that under the previous version of the regulations, nonprofit organizations affiliated with a house of worship that benefited from its self-insured plan could also benefit from its exemption to the mandate, and asserted this shelter was no longer available. Similar to the initial complaint, the plaintiffs objected to being required to notify their insurers and or third-party health insurance administrators of their objection to the contraceptive services mandate, and asserted violations of the RFRA, APA, and their rights under the First Amendment. On December 21, 2013, the plaintiffs appealed this case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and on December 23, 2013, the District Court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 request for an injunction pending appeal. On January 17, 2014, the government cross-appealed to the DC Circuit Court (14-5021). On January 23, 2014, the plaintiffs\u2019 appeal was consolidated with the the government\u2019s cross-appeal, and <a href=http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14373> Priests for Life v. Sebelius</a>. The Court of Appeals (Judge Cornelia T.L. Pillard) ruled on November 14, 2014, that the accommodation the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has designed for religious nonprofits to comply with the contraceptive coverage mandate does not burden the plaintiffs' religious freedom. 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014). On May 20, 2015, the Court of Appeals denied the plaintiffs' request for rehearing en banc, reasoning that the result in <a href=http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12661> Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius</a> did not compel them to credit the plaintiffs\u2019 misinterpretation of the regulation the plaintiffs were challenging. 808 F.3d 1. On June 10, 2015, the Circuit Court ordered that the mandate be stayed through August 26, 2015, pending petition for writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case in order to consider whether notifying the federal government by signing a form identifying the employer as a religious nonprofit that objects to the contraceptive services mandate (so that the government can work with the insurer or benefits provider to ensure employees have contraceptive coverage) violates RFRA, or constitutes the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. This case was consolidated with six other cases dealing with this issue. Together, the cases are known as <a href=http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13465>Zubik v. Burwell [II]</a>. This case was argued on March 23, 2016. On March 29, 2016, in an unusual move, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs suggesting a solution to their disagreement, in which employees could still receive contraception coverage without employers giving any notice to the government. On May 16, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that that \"accommodates petitioners\u2019 religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners\u2019 health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'\" 136 S.Ct 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of this case. Back in the Circuit Court, the parties submitted a series of status reports indicating they had entered into settlement negotiations with the new Trump administration. After the parties reached a settlement agreement in this and related cases on October 13, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeal. The settlement agreement detailed that new regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services granted religious nonprofits an exemption from the contraceptive mandate. The Government agreed that the contraceptive mandate could not be legally enforced against the plaintiffs in this matter or their health plans. The Government agreed that plaintiffs would be exempt from the contraceptive mandate and any materially similar regulation or agency policy. The Government also agreed that plaintiffs and their health plans would not suffer any adverse consequences as a result of the settlement agreement and that plaintiffs may reserve their right to challenge any new contraceptive-mandate-like law that the Government may enact. Finally, the Government agreed to pay plaintiffs $3 million in fees and costs. The circuit court dismissed the case on Nov. 6, 2017. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2012, the Catholic Archbishop of Washington and several affiliated Catholic organizations filed a lawsuit in the District of DC against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the First Amendment. The plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violated their sincerely held religious beliefs, and seek to enjoin their enforcement. This case was dismissed for lack of ripeness on January 25, 2013, and refiled on September 20, 2013. On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether the accommodation to the contraceptive services mandate violates the RFRA. This case was consolidated with six others, and is known as Zubik v. Burwell. After the case was argued in the Supreme Court on March 23, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order on May 16, 2016 remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals. The Court ordered that the parties be given time to come to agreement on ensuring contraceptive access without burdening religious freedom. 136 S.Ct 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of these cases."}
{"article": "On January 24, 2013, Freshway Logistics and Fresh Unlimited (d/b/a Freshway Foods) and their owners filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000bb) and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2)). The plaintiffs, represented by public interest attorneys from the American Center for Law and Justice, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violated their sincerely held religious beliefs and First Amendment rights. On March 3, 2013, the District Court (Judge Emmet Sullivan) denied the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. 926 F.Supp.2d 273. On March 5, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal of the denial of preliminary injunction. On March 29, 2013, the D.C. Circuit Court granted an injunction pending appeal. On November 1, 2013, the D.C. Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in denying the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction with the respect to the individual owners and remanded for consideration of other preliminary-injunction factors. The Court held the company owners' religious freedom was burdened when they chose between violating their beliefs and paying a penalty. The Court affirmed, however, the denial of a preliminary injunction with respect to the Freshway companies, holding that corporations could not exercise religious beliefs. 733 F.3d 1208. This case was remanded to the D.C. District Court. Both the government and the plaintiffs sought review in the Supreme Court. The two petitions were held at the Supreme Court while the Court decided <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12661\">Burwell v. Hobby Lobby</a> (also known as Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius). The Hobby Lobby <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-OK-0001-0015.pdf\">decision</a> issued on June 30, 2014: In 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. (The Court emphasized, however, that alternative methods for meeting the government's asserted interest were available.) The next day, the Supreme Court vacated the D.C. Circuit's opinion and remanded for further consideration. (Technically, the Court denied the government's petition, but granted the plaintiffs' petition, vacated the judgment, and remanded.) On August 18, 2014, the District Court granted a preliminary injunction to allow the plaintiffs to decide how they would like to proceed following the <i>Burwell v. Hobby Lobby</i> decision. On October 20, 2014, the District Court granted a permanent injunction for the plaintiffs against enforcement of the contraceptive services mandate and associated sanctions, with the agreement of the plaintiffs and the government. On March 27, 2015 the parties jointly filed a status report stating the parties had reached an agreement on attorneys' fees and costs and they were paid, and the case was awaiting an entry of final judgment. The case is presumed closed.", "summary": "On January 24, 2013, Freshway Foods and its owners filed a lawsuit in the DC District Court against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2)), and the First Amendment. Following the Hobby Lobby decision, the district court granted a permanent injunction."}
{"article": "On October 2, 2012, Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., a Christian Bible publisher, and its owner filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2)), and the First and Fifth Amendments. The plaintiffs, represented by the Alliance Defending Freedom, seek to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On November 16, 2012, the District Court (Judge Reggie B. Walton) granted a preliminary injunction. The government defendants appealed this interlocutory decision to the DC Circuit Court of Appeals on January 15, 2013, yet moved to voluntarily dismiss the appeal on April 25, 2013. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the government's motion on May 3, 2013. 2013 WL 2395168. On July 15, 2015, the District Court entered a permanent injunction, preventing the government from enforcing the version of the contraceptive mandate at issue in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12661\">Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius</a>. The plaintiffs requested an injunction with unusually broad language similar to the injunction entered by the District Court for the District of Colorado in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12712\">Newland v. Sebelius</a>, that would enjoin further regulations developed under the mandate, but the Court rejected their request. The injunction in this case (Tyndale House Publishers) did not prevent the plaintiffs from filing further civil lawsuits to challenge new regulations implementing the contraceptive services mandate. Any motions for attorney fees and costs were to be filed before October 30, 2015, but none were recorded with the court.", "summary": "In 2012, Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., and its owner filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Michigan against the Federal Government, seekingto enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On July 15, 2015, the District Court granted a permanent injunction for the plaintiffs, preventing the government from enforcing the version of the contraception mandate at issue in Hobby Lobby."}
{"article": "This is one of many lawsuits brought challenging the Obama administration's 2012 Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate requiring employers to pay for employees' contraception and abortifacients via medical insurance coverage. Many religious hospitals, charities, universities, and other enterprises owned or controlled by religious organizations or individuals who opposed contraception on doctrinal grounds, argued the mandate violated their religious beliefs. For a full list of these cases please see our collection of the Contraception Insurance Mandate cases <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=12\">here</a>. On November 4, 2013, the managing member of a private company, and the company, Encompass Develop, Design, and Construct, LLC, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the United States Department of Labor, the United States Department of Health and Human Services, and United States Department of the Treasury. The plaintiffs brought the suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), alleging defendants violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the First Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to issue a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that providing, paying for, or facilitating access to such services was inconsistent with its religious beliefs and contended that compliance with the contraception requirement was a substantial burden on their religious exercise. On February 28, 2014, plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for preliminary injunction and stay of proceedings pending the Supreme Court's ruling in <i>Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.</i>, the first case that the Supreme Court took up challenging the Contraception Mandate. The case had substantially similar facts to the case at hand, as it featured a closely-held for-profit company alleging that the Contraceptive Mandate violated the owner's religious beliefs. That case is discussed at length <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12661\">here</a>. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court released its decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 134 S. Ct.2751 (2014). There the Court held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) permitted for-profit corporations that are closely held (e.g., owned by a family or family trust) to refuse, on religious grounds, to pay for legally mandated coverage of certain contraceptive drugs and devices in their employees\u2019 health insurance plans. On February 2, 2015, the Court\u2014with both parties consenting\u2014entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and issued a permanent injunction, due to the ruling in Hobby Lobby. The defendant was enjoined from enforcing the \u201cContraceptive Coverage Requirement,\u201d that required the plaintiff to provide its employees with health coverage for contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and related patient education and counseling to which the plaintiff objected on religious grounds. It also barred defendant from taking any actions against plaintiff for noncompliance with the \"Contraception Coverage Requirement.\" All other complaints against defendant were dismissed. The only issue left undecided was the plaintiff's attorneys' fees. The parties reached an undisclosed agreement regarding attorneys' fees on June 1, 2015, and asked the court to close the case. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On November 4, 2013, the managing member of a private company filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the federal government seeking a permanent injunction from enfacement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act mandating contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. In light of the 2014 Hobby Lobby decision, the Court ordered a permanent injunction barring defendant from enforcing the \"Contraceptive Coverage Requirement\" against plaintiff, and taking any adverse action against plaintiff for noncompliance with that requirement. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On October 30, 2013, three business owners and their businesses filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the federal government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the First Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs, represented by the Thomas More Law Center, asked the court to issue both a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that they operate their business pursuant to their faith in God and that compliance with the contraception coverage requirement is a substantial burden on their religious exercise. On November 15, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for a preliminary injunction and an unopposed motion to stay the proceedings until thirty days after the substantially similar contraception mandate issues are settled by the Gilardi v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs. appeal. The court granted the motion on November 19, 2013. On November 5, 2014, following the Supreme Court's decision in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12661\">Burwell v. Hobby Lobby</a>, which held that closely-held for-profit corporations should have access to the contraception mandate accommodation, the District Court entered a permanent injunction against enforcement of the contraceptive services mandate and related fines against the plaintiffs. The Court entered judgment for the plaintiffs on their RFRA claim, dismissed all other claims, and instructed the parties to meet and confer on attorney's fees and costs. On January 7, 2015, the parties notified the court that they had come to an agreement on attorney's fees and costs and that no further proceedings were necessary.", "summary": "On October 30, 2013, three business owners and their business filed a U.S. District Court lawsuit in the District of Columbia against the Federal Government asking the court to issue both a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The court granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction and stayed the proceedings pending the Court of Appeals resolution of a substantially similar dispute. Following the Supreme Court decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the District Court entered a permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiffs, which will allow them to use the contraceptive services mandate accomodation."}
{"article": "On October 23, 2013, a non-profit organization filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff, represented by the Alliance Defending Freedom, asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate, even with the accommodation for non-profit religious organizations, was unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiff asked for a permanent injunction keeping the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate against the organization and other similarly situated religious non-profits. On January 10, 2014, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on the grounds that the accommodation to the ACA mandate does not substantially burden the plaintiffs' religious freedom under RFRA or cause the plaintiffs irreparable harm. On May 21, 2014, the District Court granted the plaintiffs preliminary injunctive relief on the basis that the plaintiffs had shown they were sufficiently likely to succeed on their merits, when considering the Eighth Circuit had twice granted injunctions pending appeal to similarly situated plaintiffs challenging the mandate. 22 F. Supp. 3d 934. On July 18, 2014, defendants filed notice to appeal the preliminary injunction. On September 17, 2015, the Eighth Circuit issued an opinion affirming the District Court's injunctive relief for the plaintiff. The Court accepted the the plaintiff's argument that they would be forced to violate their religious beliefs by complying with either the contraceptive mandate or the accommodation process or to incur severe monetary penalties for refusing to comply. The court argued that the current accommodation process was not the least restrictive means of furthering the government's interests and that the plaintiffs would be substantially likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the mandate and accommodation process substantially burdened their exercise of religion in violation of RFRA. 801 F.3d 946. On November 24, 2015, the parties jointly moved to stay proceedings pending Supreme Court review of related cases. The parties stated that the Supreme Court had recently granted review in seven other cases \"raising substantially similar Religious Freedom Restoration Act challenges to the same regulations that Plaintiffs challenge in this case.\" The parties further indicated that the government may seek review of this decision as well. In addition, the government may decide to seek review of the Eighth Circuit\u2019s September 17, 2015 decision. The court granted the stay on November 30. The government moved for review in the Supreme Court on December 15, 2015, which the court granted on May 16, 2016. In that order, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case in light of <a href=https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13465>Zubik v. Burwell</a>, in which the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court rulings in the various consolidated cases. Without ruling on the merits, the Supreme Court directed the parties to attempt to resolve their conflict as both sides had indicated a mutually beneficial resolution was possible. On June 12, 2018, the Court granted the plaintiffs permanent injunctive relief from compliance with the provisions of the ACA mandate that conflicted with their religious beliefs after defendants, the Department of Health and Human Services, conceded that these provisions violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.", "summary": "On October 23, 2013, a non-profit organization filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa against the U.S. government. The plaintiff challenged the Affordable Care Act's contraception insurance mandate. The district court granted the preliminary injunction. The Government appealed, but in 2015 the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The government ultimately conceded that the insurance mandate violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the court enjoined it."}
{"article": "This case was one of many filed in federal district courts across the country by non-profit Catholic organizations challenging the ACA's system for ensuring that employee health insurance covers birth control. Specifically, the plaintiffs objected to notifying the government or their health insurer that they were claiming a religious exemption from the ACA regulation's mandatory insurance coverage for contraception. The current regulatory accommodation allows religious organizations who object for religious reasons to providing contraceptive coverage for their employees to notify their insurer, or notify the government directly, of that objection. Then, the government will work with the insurer or health benefits provider to ensure the employees have access to contraception. The religious employers claim that this approach violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, because they see their action of notifying the government as starting a chain of events that results in their employees receiving contraception. This particular lawsuit was filed by the Catholic Diocese of Fort Worth-South Bend and affiliated Catholic organizations (Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc.; Saint Anne Home & Retirement Community of the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend; Franciscan Alliance, Inc.; Specialty Physicians of Illinois, LLC; University of Saint Francis; and Our Sunday Visitor, Inc.) on May 21, 2012 in the Northern District of Missouri against the federal government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the First Amendment. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The plaintiffs contended that the contraception coverage mandate violated their sincerely held religious beliefs. On Oct. 2, 2012, the plaintiffs moved to consolidate this case with <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13473&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Ctonn%20and%20blank%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B\"><i>Tonn and Blank Construction, LLC v. Sebelius</i></a>, a case with similar legal issues and the same defendants. Tonn and Blank Construction, LLC, the plaintiff, was a Catholic, wholly-owned subsidiary of one of the plaintiffs in this action. On Oct. 19, 2012, the case was reassigned from Judge William C. Lee to Judge Jon E. DeGuilio for the purpose of judicial efficiency, as Judge DeGuilio was already assigned to <i>Tonn and Blank</i>. On Apr. 1, 2013, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for consolidation, finding that the cases involve different outcome-determinative facts which will require a distinct legal analysis in each case, most notably the fact that the plaintiff in the <i>Tonn and Blank</i> case was a for-profit entity that was not eligible for the temporary safe harbor provision. Meanwhile, on March 14, 2013, Judge Jon A. DeGuilio had stayed the case pending (1) the finalization of contraceptive coverage rules from the Department of Health and Human Services; and (2) the appeal of <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13440&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7CUniversity%20of%20Notre%20Dame%20v.%20Sebelius%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B \"><i>University of Notre Dame v. Sebelius</i></a>, a case involving the same issues pending before the Seventh Circuit. The order required the parties to submit a joint report stating their intentions with respect to the lawsuit and an agreed-upon schedule by July 26, 2013, which they did. The court considered the joint notice, and lifted the stay on July 31, 2013. On Sept. 6, 2013, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to challenge the regulation as amended. They argued that the amended definition of \"religious employer\" continued to require them to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs by facilitating access to contraception services. This is because the amended law's accommodations required plaintiffs to self-certify to their insurance provider, setting forth their religious objections, which in turn triggers an obligation on the part of the insurance provider to procure the services that the plaintiffs found objectionable. The plaintiffs were, thus, the but-for cause of providing contraception coverage. The plaintiffs asked the court to grant a preliminary and permanent injunction against enforcement of the relevant provisions of the ACA. On Dec. 27, 2013, District Judge Jon E. Deguilio granted the Church's motion for a preliminary injunction. 2013 WL 6843012 at *1. The court recognized that while the Diocese itself was exempt from the contraception mandate as a religious employer, the remaining affiliated organizations were subject to the self-certification accommodation as put forth in the amended regulation. The court held that the remaining plaintiffs demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on their RFRA challenge, noting that requiring self-certification represented a substantial burden on their religious exercise by compelling them to facilitate and serve as the conduit through which objectionable contraceptive products and services are ultimately provided to their employees. The court also found that the application of the two regulations-the exemption and the accommodation-had the ultimate effect of dividing the Catholic Church into two separate entities which has created a substantial burden on the Diocese as well. The court found that the government did not show that the contraception mandate was the least restrictive means to further a compelling governmental interest, noting that were other ways to promote public health and gender equality that were not burdensome on religious liberty. On Feb. 24, 2014, the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit challenging the preliminary injunction. The interlocutory appeal was assigned USCA Case No. 14-1431. On Mar. 3, 2014, the Seventh Circuit, on its own motion, ordered that the appeal be consolidated with <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12688&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Cgrace%20schools%20v.%20sebelius%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B\">Grace Schools v. Sebelius</a> for purposes of briefing and disposition. <i>Grace Schools v. Sebelius</i> had the same legal issues as the underlying case, and the plaintiffs were underlying Grace Schools and Biola University, Inc., both Catholic non-profit organizations. On Aug. 28, 2014, the name of the case changed from <i>Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend v. Sebelius.</i> Sylvia Burwell was automatically substituted as petitioner in the pending Seventh Circuit appeal when she was approved by the U.S. Senate as the Secretary of Health and Human Services after being nominated by President Barack Obama to replace Kathleen Sebelius following Sebelius' resignation on Apr. 10, 2014. The appeal was argued on Dec. 3, 2014, before Circuit Judges Manion, Rovner, and Hamilton, for the Seventh Circuit. At the district court level, on Jan. 15, 2015, Magistrate Judge Roger B. Cosbey was added to the case, replacing Magistrate Judge Susan L. Collins. On May 21, 2015, the parties were ordered to file position statements explaining the consequences of the Seventh Circuit's opinion in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13440&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7CUniversity%20of%20Notre%20Dame%20v.%20Sebelius%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B \"><i>University of Notre Dame v. Sebelius</i></a>, in which the court had issued its decision two days earlier. The parties obliged. On Sept. 4, 2015, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had been forced to take actions that violated their sincerely held beliefs, but nonetheless held that the ACA's regulations did not impose a substantial burden under RFRA. The court maintained the injunction for a 60-day period in order to allow the district court adequate time to address additional arguments made by the parties but not addressed prior to the appeal. On Oct. 19, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing en banc. They argued that the panel decision conflicted with <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12661&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Cburwell%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B\"><i>Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores</i>, 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014),</a> on the question of what constitutes a \"substantial burden\" on religious exercise under RFRA. The court denied the plaintiffs' petition on Nov. 5, 2015. On Nov. 11, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a stay of mandate pending the petition for writ of certiorari, and the motion was granted the next day. On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari. On June 17, 2016, it vacated the Seventh Circuit's judgment, and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit in light of the Supreme Court's decision in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13465&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Czubik%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B\"><i>Zubik v. Burwell</i>, 136 S.Ct. 1557 (2016)</a>. In <i>Zubik</i>, the Supreme Court determined through supplemental briefing that insurance companies could provide contraceptive coverage to employees of organizations that objected to such coverage on religious grounds without the organizations needing to provide notification. The Court reached no decision on the merits of the case, but vacated the case for further consideration by the lower courts to determine how to proceed in a manner that would grant employees full contraceptive coverage while also respecting the organizations' religious exercise. Between July 21, 2016 and Sept. 13, 2017, the parties filed numerous joint status reports. Meanwhile, on Feb. 2, 2017, Burwell had been substituted by Thomas E. Price, so the name of the case in the Seventh Circuit was changed to <i>Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend v. Price</i>. On May 4, 2017, Edward C. Hugler and Thomas E. Perez, the Acting Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Labor, respectively, were substituted by R. Alexander Acosta, the new Secretary of Labor, after he was sworn into office. On Oct. 6, 2017, the defendants moved for a voluntary dismissal of the appeal, and Circuit Judges Manion, Rovner, and Hamilton, for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the consolidated appeals. On Oct. 17, 2017, the plaintiffs filed their response, and we believe that they consented to the motion. On Oct. 19, 2017, the Seventh Circuit issued a mandate dismissing the appeal. On Oct. 23, 2017, the plaintiffs jointly stipulated to dismiss the case, and the case was dismissed the next day.", "summary": "On May 21, 2012, the Catholic Diocese of Fort Worth-South Bend and affiliated Catholic organizations filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Missouri seeking to enjoin the federal government from enforcing provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The plaintiffs contended that mandatory contraception coverage violated their sincerely held religious beliefs. On Dec. 27, 2013, the District Judge granted the Church's motion for preliminary injunction. The defendants appealed the decision on Feb. 24, 2014, but on Dec. 23, 2017, the plaintiffs jointly stipulated to dismiss the case."}
{"article": "This case was filed by the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts on May 16, 2005 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff claimed that the department's provision of more than a million dollars of public funds to a ministry called \"The Silver Ring Thing\" (SRT) that uses federal abstinence education funding to bring \"unchurched\" students to Jesus Christ constituted an unlawful establishment of religion and a governmental endorsement and preference for religion in general and specific tenets of the ministry in particular. The ministry developed a three hour presentation that was meant to occur directly following a mandatory abstinence education assembly in public schools and which, according to the plaintiff, was \"permeated with religion.\" In a two-year settlement agreement entered on February 22, 2006, the defendants acknowleged that they had terminated the SRT grant effective January 31, 2006. The agreement provided that defendants would not fund SRT's abstinence eduction as it had been structured and implemented during the fiscal year 2005, that strict requirements would be made before considering funding any future proposals from SRT, and that extensive monitoring of SRT's activities would occur if SRT was given a grant.", "summary": "This case was filed by the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts on May 16, 2005 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff claimed that the department's provision of more than a million dollars of public funds to a ministry called \"The Silver Ring Thing\" (SRT) that uses federal abstinence education funding to bring \"unchurched\" students to Jesus Christ constituted an unlawful establishment of religion and a governmental endorsement and preference for religion in general and specific tenets of the ministry in particular. The ministry developed a three hour presentation that was meant to occur directly following a mandatory abstinence education assembly in public schools and which, according to the plaintiff, was \"permeated with religion.\" In a two-year settlement agreement entered on February 22, 2006, the defendants acknowleged that they had terminated the SRT grant effective January 31, 2006. The agreement provided that defendants would not fund SRT's abstinence eduction as it had been structured and implemented during the fiscal year 2005, that strict requirements would be made before considering funding any future proposals from SRT, and that extensive monitoring of SRT's activities would occur if SRT was given a grant."}
{"article": "On February 1, 2010, a Massachusetts citizen arrested for videotaping police practices filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and relevant state law, against the City of Boston and several police officers. The plaintiff, represented by an ACLU attorney and private counsel, sought monetary relief, alleging that the City of Boston failed to properly supervise, discipline, or train Boston police officers, which resulted in the plaintiff's being falsely arrested. He further claimed that the false arrest violated his rights under the First and the Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The defendant police officers arrested the plaintiff for his using of digital video camera to record their arrest of a young man in a park. One charge against the plaintiff was violation of the state wiretap statute. The judicial court dismissed the charge subsequently, because a conviction under the state wiretap statute required the recording to be secret, and the police officers admitted that the plaintiff's recording was not. On February 5, 2010, the plaintiff amended his complaint. On June 8, 2010, the Court (Judge William G. Young) denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the case after a hearing. Judge Young denied the defendant police officers' qualified immunity from both the plaintiff's First and Fourth Amendment claims. The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal to the First Circuit. On June 29, 2010, Judge Young denied the defendants' motion to stay proceedings in the District Court pending appeal. On the same day, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Leo T. Sorokin upon both parties' consent. The Court of Appeals grant a motion to stay on August 4, 2010. On August 26, 2011, the Circuit Court (Judge Kermit V. Lipez) affirmed the lower court's ruling that denied the defendant police officers' qualified immunity from the plaintiff's constitutional claims. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011). In the opinion, Judge Lipez found that the First Amendment protected the plaintiff in filming the on-duty police officers in public and that his right to film in this case was clearly established. The defendant police officers lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, thus violating his Fourth Amendment rights, and the lack of probable cause was clearly established, defeating the defendants' asserted qualified immunity from suit. (On September 27, 2011, the plaintiff in Strahan v. Rowley, Docket No. 1:11-cv-11235, filed a motion to consolidate his case with this case. The Strahan case was then assigned to Magistrate Judge Sorokin as well. Both the plaintiff and the defendants in this case filed oppositions to the consolidation on October 11, 2011. Magistrate Judge Sorokin denied the motion to consolidate cases on December 20, 2011, docketed only in the Strahan case.) On January 19, 2012, on remand from the First Circuit, the parties requested mediation and the case was referred to Alternative Dispute Resolution, with Chief Magistrate Judge Judith G. Dein appointed as the mediator. On March 5, 2012, the parties reached a settlement through the mediation. The defendants agreed to pay $170,000 to the plaintiff for damages, attorneys' fees and litigation costs. The lawsuit was subsequently dismissed. This ended the case. For more information, please see <a href=\"http://aclum.org/glik\">the ACLU's website</a>.", "summary": "On February 1, 2010, a Massachusetts citizen arrested for videotaping police practices filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts against the City of Boston and several police officers. The plaintiff sought monetary relief, alleging that the City of Boston failed to properly supervise, discipline or train Boston police officers, which resulted in the plaintiff's being falsely arrested. He further claimed that the false arrest violated his rights under the First and the Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution. On June 8, 2010, the Court (Judge William G. Young) denied the defendant police officers' qualified immunity from the plaintiff's constitutional claims. The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal to the First Circuit regarding this denial, and later the First Circuit affirmed the denial. On June 29, 2010, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Leo T. Sorokin. On January 19, 2012, the parties requested a mediation and the case was referred to Alternative Dispute Resolution. On March 5, 2012, the parties settled the case through the mediation. The lawsuit was subsequently dismissed. This ended the case."}
{"article": "On August 29, 2011, a resident of Baltimore County filed this \u00a7 1983 claim in Maryland State Circuit Court against the Baltimore City Police Department and three unnamed police officers. The plaintiff alleged that the Police Department had a practice and policy of arresting and destroying the property of persons engaged in recording the public actions of police officers, in violation of Constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. He also claimed that this practice amounted to a misapplication of the Wiretap Statute. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he had used his cell phone to videorecord the police arresting his friend in a public place. Three police officers subsequently arrested and detained him for the filming, confiscated his phone, and wiped all video data from the device. This action destroyed not only the video of the arrest, but also images of plaintiff's children and other personal events. The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction that would bar defendants from engaging in arrest and destruction of property for video recording police actions as well as compensatory damages. On October 11, 2011, the case was transferred to the U.S. District Court of Maryland. On November 30, 2011, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cognizable cause of action or for partial summary judgment in the alternative. The Police Department argued that the plaintiffs claims were no more than speculation as to a general practice and that the Department's existing training on bystander videotaping rendered any viable claim moot. On January 10, 2012, the United States filed a Statement of Interest, arguing that the District Court should deny the Police Department's summary judgment motion. On February 17, 2012, the District Court (Judge Benson Everett Legg) denied the Police Department's motion to dismiss the case or for partial summary judgment. In his opinion, Judge Legg noted that the First Amendment protected the plaintiff's right to photograph on-duty police officers in public, and that the defendants might have violated the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights by deleting videos from the plaintiff's phone if this was done without a legitimate reason. Judge Legg further recognized the factual dispute regarding the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim: whether the plaintiff voluntarily surrendered the phone to the police officers or not. Whether the Police Department promulgated or was deliberately indifferent to an illegal practice was also disputable. The claims proceeded and the parties began discovery. Settlement talks were unsuccessful and discovery disputes continued over the course of 2013 and early 2014. However, on April 7, 2014, the parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal which included a settlement agreement. The settlement included an award for the plaintiff of $25,000 in damages and $225,000 in attorneys fees, but the parties agreed that the payment could not be construed as an expression of liability or concession to the facts alleged. The Police Department also agreed to implement new policies that would properly preserve citizens' rights to record and provide training for officers on the right. On April 11, 2014, the stipulation of dismissal was granted by Judge Catherine C. Blake. The case was dismissed with prejudice subject to the Court's continuing jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the settlement agreement. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On October 11, 2011, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the Baltimore City Police Department and three unnamed police officers after they allegedly arrested and destroyed recordings he had taken of them arresting his friend. After many years of failed negotiations and discovery disputes, on April 7, 2014, the parties settled the case with terms favorable to the plaintiff."}
{"article": "On September 10, 2008, a non-profit religious organization, Child Evangelism Fellowship of Minnesota, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Minnesota, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, against the Elk River Area School District #728. The plaintiff, represented by attorneys from Liberty Counsel and private counsel, sought injunctive, monetary, and declaratory relief, alleging that the School District's denial of the plaintiff's request to attend school open house events and distribute its literature violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights to freedom of speech, equal protection, and free exercise, and also violated the Establishment Clause. On February 6, 2009, the District Court (Judge Ann D. Montgomery) granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the District from implementing its policy that disallowed the plaintiff to distribute literature to students and attend school open house events for the advertisement of its religious program for children. Child Evangelism Fellowship of Minnesota v. Elk River Area Sch. Dist. #728, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D. Minn. 2009). In addition, Judge Montgomery denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the case. The matter then settled, and on February 26, 2010, the Court (Judge Montgomery) ordered the case dismissed with prejudice, pursuant to their stipulation. The defendant had withdrawn the district policy at issue and paid attorneys' fees to the plaintiff's attorneys, and agreed not to reinstate the policy. This ended the case.", "summary": "On September 10, 2008, a non-profit religious organization, Child Evangelism Fellowship of Minnesota, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Minnesota against the Elk River Area School District #728. The plaintiff alleged that the School District's denial of the plaintiff's request to attend school open house events and distribute its literature violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights, including under rights to freedom of speech, equal protection, and free exercise, and against establishment of religion. On February 6, 2009, the District Court (Judge Ann D. Montgomery) granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the defendant from implementing the district's policy that disallowed the plaintiff to distribute literature to students and attend school open house events for the advertisement of its religious program for children. The case then settled; the school district withdrew the policy at issue and paid the plaintiffs' attorneys fees. On February 24, 2010, the case was dismissed on joint stipulation."}
{"article": "On May 21, 2012, the Archdiocese of St. Louis and an affiliated charity filed a U.S. District Court lawsuit in the Eastern District of Missouri against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the First Amendment. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On January 29, 2013, Judge John A. Ross granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court noted that because the contraception mandate was in the process of being amended, as noted by the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rule Making (ANPRM), in its present form mandate represent only a tentative agency position and are therefore not ripe for review. The Archdiocese similarly lacked standing for not alleging any imminent injury. Plaintiffs' case was dismissed without prejudice.", "summary": "On May 21, 2012, the Archdiocese of St. Louis and an affiliated charity filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Missouri against the Federal Government seeking to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contend that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On January 29, 2013, Judge John A. Ross granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case for lack of ripeness."}
{"article": "On December 12, 2012, a for-profit general business corporation, its owner, and two employees filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Missouri against the federal government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 551 et seq.). Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contend that this mandatory contraception coverage conflicted with their sincerely held religious beliefs and violated the First Amendment. The parties consented to adjudication by a magistrate judge, and on December 31, 2012, Magistrate Judge David Noce granted a temporary restraining order stopping the federal government from enforcing the contraception mandate. 2012 WL 6738489. This order was renewed on January 14, 2013 until the Court determined the merits of plaintiffs' case and whether further injunctive relief was needed. On June 14, 2013, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add three additional plaintiffs, including non-profit corporation <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13469\"> CNS International Ministries</a> (FA-MO-0011 in this Clearinghouse), and on June 28, 2013, Magistrate Judge David Noce extended preliminary relief to the newly added plaintiffs. On September 30, 2013, Judge Noce granted the defendants' motion to stay the case proceedings pending Eight Circuit rulings on two similar cases, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12665\">Annex Medical, Inc v. Sebelius, No. 13-1118</a> and <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12706\">O'Brien v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, No. 12-3357</a>. Judge Noce also extended the earlier preliminary injunction for all parties. On December 4, 2013, the plaintiffs amended their complaint again in response to updates to the contraceptive mandate implementing regulation which were finalized on July 2, 2013. Plaintiffs argued that by making \"an accommodation\" for religious non-profits wherein third party insurance administrators instead provide contraceptive materials, the new regulation was more like a \"shell game\" because the non-profit employees would still receive coverage through their employment at these non-profits. On December 30, 2013, Judge Noce ordered the earlier preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order be sustained as to non-profit and for-profit plaintiffs alike. 2013 WL 6858588. On February 28, 2014, the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal with the Eighth Circuit, against the district court's preliminary injunction, arguing that the third party insurance providers had an independent obligation under the ACA to provide contraceptive coverage to religious non-profit employees. The defendants further argued that, even if there were a substantial burden on the exercise of religion, the accommodation was the least restrictive means possible to accomplish its compelling interest in ensuring access to no-cost contraceptive coverage. In district court, Judge Noce entered a permanent injunction on February 13, 2015 against the defendants, prohibiting them from enforcing the July 2013 version of the contraception mandate against all plaintiffs. The district court stated that following the Supreme Court's June 2014 holding in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12661\">Burwell v. Hobby Lobby</a> that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. On June 17, 2015, the district court also awarded attorney fees and costs for the for-profit plaintiffs. 2015 WL 3773426. On September 17, 2015, the Eighth Circuit ruled on the defendants' February 2014 appeal, affirming the district court's preliminary injunctive relief for the non-profit plaintiffs. 801 F.3d 927. The Eighth Circuit rejected the defendants' arguments, but it did not address the First Amendment claims because it concluded that religious non-profits were entitled to relief based on the RFRA claims. The court accepted the the plaintiff's argument that they would be forced to violate their religious beliefs by complying with either the contraceptive mandate or the accommodation process or to incur severe monetary penalties for refusing to comply. The Eighth Circuit cited a Supreme Court injunction issued in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13893\">Wheaton College v. Sebelius</a> on July 3, 2014, which held that the nonprofit accommodation process, requiring the objecting organization to notify their insurer, or provide specifications about their employee insurance to HHS, could be satisfied by a general notification to HHS of their religious views. 134 S.Ct. 2806. On October 9, 2015, the district court entered a final judgment against the government and in favor of the for-profit plaintiffs. 2015 WL 13664031. Judge Noce wrote that the non-profit portion of this case would likely continue through to an appeal given the Circuit split on the application of the ACA's birth control mandate to non-profits, but that the decision would not likely affect the resolution for the for-profit plaintiffs. The defendants petitioned for certiorari, and on May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court granted cert and vacated the Eighth Circuit's ruling, remanding the case. 2016 WL 2842448. The Court ordered that the case be considered under its per curiam order in <a href=http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13465>Zubik v. Burwell [II]</a> that ordered lower courts to give religious nonprofits and the government time to come to agreement on an approach that \"accommodates petitioners\u2019 religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners\u2019 health plans receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.\" 136 S.Ct 1557. The case was held in abeyance from March 1, 2017 until October 6, 2017. The parties filed status reports requesting the case be held until the new Trump Administration issued orders on the contraception mandate. On October 6, 2017, the Trump Administration issued an order that would no longer require employers to provide contraception if they had religious objections. <a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/us/politics/trump-contraception-birth-control.html\">See the New York Times for more information</a>. As a result, also on October 6, the defendants moved to dismiss the case. The motion was granted on October 13, 2017. The issue of attorney's fees and costs was remanded to the district court on December 5, 2017. In accord with the Eighth Circuit order, on October 17, 2017, the district court ordered the parties to file a joint status report by November 13, 2017 on the status of the case and any further proceedings. On October 25, 2017, the defendants were ordered to pay $252.68 for the bill of costs taxed. On November 13, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a status report summarizing the litigation and stating that the plaintiffs intended to file a dispositive motion for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief. The defendants intend to oppose this motion because they viewed the issue as moot. On November 17, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion for injunctive relief. In the motion the plaintiffs requested the current injunctive relief be granted permanently. The defendants opposed the motion because they found the issue moot given the Trump administration's order to not enforce the contraception mandate against employers with religious objections. On December 5, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion to award attorney's fees in accordance with 42 USC \u00a7 1988 with themselves as the prevailing party. The plaintiffs requested the court award them $408,110 for attorney's fees and $1,753.72 in out-of-pocket expenses. On December 7, 2017, the court ordered the defendants to file a response to the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees by December 29, 2017. On December 12, 2017, the court ordered a hearing to be held on January 26, 2018 on the issue of the plaintiffs' motion for permanent injunction. On January 22, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion to have the court rule on the issue of the permanent injunction without a hearing. This motion was granted on January 26, 2018. On March 28, 2018, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for permanent injunctive and declaratory relief. 2018 WL 1520031. The court declared the contraceptive mandate in the ACA to be a violation of RFRA and enjoined the government from enforcing the mandate. On August 9, 2018, the court ordered that the defendants pay $394,000 in attorney's fees and $1,753.72 in expenses. 2018 WL 3772223. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2012, a for-profit general business corporation and its owners filed this lawsuit in the Eastern District of Missouri against the Federal Government challenging the contraception mandate of the Affordable Care Act. In 2014, the plaintiffs added three additional plaintiffs including two non-profit corporations. In 2015, the for-profit plaintiffs won a permanent injunction against the mandate, but in May 2016 the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case following its decision in Zubik v. Burwell [II]. The district court ultimately granted the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "This is one of twelve cases filed on May 21, 2012 in federal district courts across the country by Catholic organizations challenging the contraception mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Plaintiffs, a non-profit corporation of Catholic parishes, schools, and charities, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against the Federal Government under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to issue a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of provisions of the ACA extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that providing, paying for, or facilitating access to such services is inconsistent with its religious beliefs and contend that compliance with the contraception requirement is a substantial burden on their religious exercise. On December 20, 2012, the court (Judge Halil Suleyman Ozerden) granted the Federal Government's motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness. The court noted that because the contraception mandate was in the process of being amended, as noted by the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rule Making (ANPRM), in its present form the mandate represent only a tentative agency position and was therefore not ripe for review. Plaintiffs' case was dismissed without prejudice. 2012 WL 6831407. On January 8, 2013, plaintiffs moved to alter the courts' judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) on the basis that failure to do so would result in manifest injustice. They asked the court to hold the case in abeyance pending the ANPRM amendments or require the Federal Government to file regular status reports on the progress of these amendments. On February 15, 2013, the court (Judge Halil Suleyman Ozerden) denied plaintiff's motion, noting that plaintiffs had not requested these alternatives before final judgment and holding that dismissal without prejudice did not create a manifest injustice on them. 2013 WL 690990. The plaintiffs renewed their case on May 27, 2014 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Docket No. 1:14-cv-00146-LG-JCG. The complaint challenged the ACA as finalized. Plaintiffs alleged that, although under the amended ACA the Diocese itself likely fell within the \"religious employer\" exception, affiliated Catholic entities were only considered \"eligible organizations\" qualifying for an accommodation. This accommodation would require plaintiffs to provide self-certification to their insurance provider setting forth their religious objections to the ACA, in turn triggering an obligation on the part of the insurance provider to procure the services plaintiffs find objectionable. According to the plaintiffs, this series of events made them the but-for cause of providing contraception coverage in violation of their sincerely held beliefs. Plaintiffs continued to ask the court to grant a permanent injunction against enforcement of the relevant provisions of the ACA. On November 7, 2014, the parties moved to stay proceedings in this case pending the Fifth Circuit's decision in consolidated appeals--<i>East Texas Baptist University v. Burwell</i>, No. 14-20112, <i>University of Dallas v. Burwell</i>, No. 14-10241, <i>Catholic Diocese of Beaumont v. Burwell</i>, No. 14-40212, and <i>Catholic Charities, Diocese of Fort Worth v. Burwell</i>, No. 14-10661--raising substantially similar legal issues to those in this case. The court granted the motion to stay on November 24, 2014. On June 22, 2015, the Fifth Circuit (Judges Jerry E. Smith, Thomas M. Reavley, and James E. Graves) held that the ACA provisions challenged in the consolidated appeals did not violate the plaintiffs' rights under RFRA. 793 F. 3d 449. On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari for the Fifth Circuit consolidated appeals, consolidating the case with similar cases dealing with the issue in other circuit courts. Together, the cases are known as <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13465\">Zubik v. Burwell [II]</a>. This case was argued in the Supreme Court on March 23, 2016. On March 29, 2016, in an unusual move, the Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs suggesting a solution to their disagreement, in which employees could still receive contraception coverage without employers giving any notice to the government. On May 16, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that that \"accommodates petitioners\u2019 religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners\u2019 health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'\" 136 S.Ct 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of the case. The parties requested another stay pending the proceedings in the Fifth Circuit on the remand of the consolidated appeals, and on March 8, 2017, the court administratively closed the case pending disposition of the Fifth Circuit proceedings. Following a change in administration, and an executive order directing a change in regulations to allow for conscience-based exceptions to the ACA's contraceptive-care mandate, and the parties in this case filed a joint stipulation of dismissal on October 23, 2017.", "summary": "This is one of twelve cases filed on May 21, 2012 in federal district courts across the country by Catholic organizations challenging the contraception mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Plaintiffs, a non-profit corporation of Catholic parishes, schools, and charities, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against the Federal Government under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) asking the court to grant a permanent injunction against enforcement of the contraception mandate."}
{"article": "On Sept. 12, 2012, a family of evangelical Christian business owners filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (\"RFRA\"), and the Administrative Procedures Act (\"APA\"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (\"ACA\") violated their sincerely held religious beliefs by requiring them to provide coverage for contraception through their companies' group health insurance plans. Specifically, the plaintiffs objected to the ACA rules requiring them to provide coverage for emergency contraception, which the plaintiffs considered an abortifacient. The plaintiffs did not object to other forms of contraception. Claiming that providing coverage for emergency contraception would both contravene their Christian faith and compel speech contrary to their beliefs, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other business owners with similar religious objections. On October 15, 2012, the District Court (Judge Joe Heaton) denied a group of current members of Congress leave to file an amicus curiae brief arguing for a broad application of RFRA. Judge Heaton found that the interests of the Congressmen coincided wholly with the interests of the plaintiffs, and that additional submissions addressing the application of RFRA were unnecessary. In their brief opposing the injunction motion, filed October 22, 2012, the defendant Departments argued that the contraception mandate did not substantially burden the plaintiffs' religious liberty rights under RFRA, and that, regardless of the burden's magnitude, the regulations were the least restrictive means of advancing the government's compelling interests in public health and gender equality. The brief further argued that the mandate did not violate the plaintiff's religious freedom because it was a neutral law of general applicability. On November 19, 2012, the District Court (Judge Heaton) denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that secular, for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby did not have a constitutional right to religious freedom, and that the individual plaintiffs were not likely to prevail because the mandate was a neutral law of general applicability that was reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose. The Court further found that indirect financial support of subjectively objectionable conduct was not a substantial burden on the plaintiffs' religious freedom. Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012). The plaintiffs appealed the injunction denial to the 10th Circuit. On December 12, 2012, District Court Judge Heaton granted the defendants' joint motion to stay the district court proceedings pending the 10th Circuit appeal. On December 20, 2012, the Court of Appeals (Judge Carlos F. Lucero and Judge David M. Ebel) denied the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction pending appeal on the same grounds as the District Court's injunction denial. Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 6930302 (10th Cir.). Following this denial, the plaintiffs applied to the Circuit Justice for the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, for an injunction pending appellate review. On December 26, 2012, Justice Sotomayor denied this application, finding that the plaintiffs' entitlement to injunctive relief was not indisputably clear. Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, 133 S.Ct. 641 (2012). On March 29, 2013, the 10th Circuit granted initial and expedited en banc review. That is, the Court decided to hear the case not via ordinary panel process, with rehearing en banc as a subsequent possibility, but rather initially in front of all the circuit's judges. Oral arguments occurred May 23, 2013. On June 27, 2013, the 10th Circuit, en banc, reversed the District Court's injunction denial, finding that the plaintiffs were entitled to bring RFRA claims; that they had established a likelihood of successfully proving that the contraception mandate substantially burdened their RFRA rights; and that they had demonstrated irreparable harm. The 10th Circuit sent the case back to the District Court, asking the lower court to address two remaining prongs of the injunction inquiry (balance of equities and the effect on the public interest) and to decide whether to grant or deny the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 2013 WL 3216103 (10th Cir. en banc). The plaintiffs immediately filed an emergency motion asking the District Court to grant a temporary injunction pending the full injunction hearing. The District Court (Judge Heaton) granted this motion on June 28, 2013, followed up by a longer-lasting order on July 19, 2013 WL 3869832. The government sought certiorari review of the 10th Circuit decision in the Supreme Court; cert was granted on November 26, 2013. The Supreme Court consolidated this case with <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12705\">Conestoga Wood Specialties v. Sebelius</a>, a similar case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court affirmed. In 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. The Court emphasized, however, that alternative methods for meeting the government's asserted interest were available. To quote the syllabus (which summarizes the opinion), \"the Government could, e.g., assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives to women unable to obtain coverage due to their employers' religious objections. Or it could extend the accommodation that HHS has already established for religious nonprofit organizations to non-profit employers with religious objections to the contraceptive mandate. That accommodation does not impinge on the plaintiffs' religious beliefs that providing insurance coverage for the contraceptives at issue here violates their religion and it still serves HHS's stated interests.\" In addition, the Court insisted that its opinion was narrow: \"This decision concerns only the contraceptive mandate and should not be understood to hold that all insurance-coverage mandates, e.g., for vaccinations or blood transfusions, must necessarily fall if they conflict with an employer's religious beliefs. Nor does it provide a shield for employers who might cloak illegal discrimination as a religious practice.\" Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan (although Breyer and Kagan did not sign on to a few pages of the dissent that argued that for-profit corporations lacked rights under RFRA; they said this issue need not yet be decided). Please note that this case was previously titled <i>Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores.</i> Sylvia Burwell was automatically substituted as petitioner when she was approved by the U.S. Senate as the Secretary of Health and Human Services after being nominated by President Barack Obama to replace Kathleen Sebelius following Sebelius' resignation on Apr. 10, 2014.", "summary": "In 2012, evangelical Christian business owners filed a RFRA challenge to rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on their religious freedom by requiring them to provide coverage for emergency contraception through their group health insurance plan. In November 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the contraception mandate did not substantially burden the plaintiffs' religious freedom. The 10th Circuit granted expedited en banc review, and oral arguments occurred on May 23. On June 27, 2013, the 10th Circuit reversed the District Court's injunction denial and sent the case back to the District Court, with instructions to consider two prongs of the injunction inquiry and to rule on the plaintiffs' injunction motion. The next day, the District Court granted the plaintiffs' emergency motion for a temporary injunction pending the full injunction hearing. The Supreme Court granted cert., and on June 30, 2014, affirmed the 10th Circuit. The Court said other ways were open to the government to reach its asserted interest of ensuring the availability of contraception coverage."}
{"article": "On September 20, 2013, a group of religious-based universities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Western District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs sued the federal government under the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs, Southern Nazarene University, Oklahoma Wesleyan University, Oklahoma Baptist University, and Mid-America Christian University, alleged that the Affordable Care Act's requirement that employee and student health plans provide coverage of contraception violated their religious foundings. The plaintiffs, represented by Alliance Defending Freedom, asked the court to rule that the ACA's contraception insurance mandate, even with the accommodation for non-profit religious organizations, was unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked for both a preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate against them. On November 27, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. On December 23, 2013, the district court (Judge Stephen P. Friot) granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the government had not shown that the plaintiffs' objection to certain methods of contraception, including Plan B, frustrated the overall goal of ACA contraception coverage. The government appealed this case to the Tenth Circuit on February 11, 2014. On July 14, 2015, the Tenth Circuit (Judge Scott Matheson, Jr.) denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, (794 F.3d 1151) in an opinion that joined this case with <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13143\">Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius</a>. The same day, the plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The plaintiffs objected to using the expanded accommodation designed by the court, in which they would not have to notify their insurers directly about their religious opposition to contraception, but would have to communicate that opposition and the name of their insurer to the Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiffs requested a rehearing en banc, but the Tenth Circuit denied the request in an order on September 3, 2015. (799 F.3d 1315). On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case. The Court considered whether notifying the federal government by signing a form identifying the employer as a religious nonprofit that objects to the contraceptive services mandate (so that the government can work with the insurer or benefits provider to ensure employees have contraceptive coverage) violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or constitutes the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. This case was consolidated with six other cases dealing with this issue. Together, the cases are known as <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13465\">Zubik v. Burwell [II]</a>. This case was argued on March 23, 2016. On March 29, 2016, in an unusual move, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs suggesting a solution to their disagreement, in which employees could still receive contraception coverage without employers giving any notice to the government. On May 16, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that \"accommodates petitioners\u2019 religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners\u2019 health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'\" 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of this case. In the 10th Circuit, the plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss the case and the court granted the motion on October 23, 2017. In the District Court, the case proceeded with the parties filing joint status reports as they tried to negotiate a settlement amidst changing regulations. President Trump issued an Executive Order in May 2017 directing the Department of Health and Human Services to address conscience-based objections to the preventive care mandate. The Department of Health and Human Services followed the Executive Order, issuing an exemption to religious organizations like the Little Sisters of the Poor. On April 16, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for permanent injunction and declaratory relief, arguing that the new regulations proved that forcing religious organizations to provide contraceptive care violates the RFRA. The Court granted the motion on May 15, 2018 and entered judgment for the plaintiffs. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2013, a group of religious-based universities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Western District of Oklahoma under the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against federal government. The plaintiffs alleged the Affordable Care Act's requirement that employee and student health plans provide coverage of contraception violated their religious foundings. On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether the accommodation to the contraceptive services mandate as applied to religious nonprofits violates the RFRA. This case was consolidated with six others. The Supreme Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, and ordered that the parties be given time to come to agreement on ensuring contraceptive access without burdening religious freedom. Following revised HHS policies, the District Court permanently enjoined the defendants from forcing religious organizations to provide contraceptive care. The case is now closed"}
{"article": "This case is one of the many filed in federal district courts across the country by non-profit Catholic organizations challenging the ACA's system for ensuring that employee health insurance covers birth control. Specifically, the plaintiffs objected to notifying the government or their health insurer that they were claiming a religious exemption from the ACA regulation's mandatory insurance coverage for contraception. The current regulatory accommodation allows religious organizations who object for religious reasons to providing contraceptive coverage for their employees to notify their insurer, or notify the government directly, of that objection. Then, the government will work with the insurer or health benefits provider to ensure the employees have access to contraception. The religious employers claim that this approach violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, because they see their action of notifying the government as starting a chain of events that results in their employees receiving contraception. This particular lawsuit was filed by Bishop Zubik of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Pittsburgh, and the Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Pittsburgh. (Their first litigation effort, filed in 2012, was dismissed as unripe. See <a href=http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12038>Zubik v. Sebelius [I]</a> for that first case.) After the current regulations were finally issued in 2013, the plaintiffs filed this second lawsuit in the Western District of Pennsylvania on October 8, 2013. On October 8, 2013, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for expedited preliminary injunction asking the court to enjoin issuance, application, and enforcement of the contraception mandate's self-certification procedures. On November 21, 2013, the court (Judge Arthur J. Schwab) granted the plaintiffs' motion for expedited preliminary injunction. 983 F.Supp.2d 576. The court held that complying with the certification requirement contraception mandate would cause injury to the plaintiffs' religious liberties and that there was a high likelihood of success on the merits of the RFRA and First Amendment claims. On December 20, 2013, Judge Schwab granted the plaintiffs' unopposed motion to convert the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction. 2013 WL 6922024. The court recognized that the while the Diocese itself was exempt from the contraception mandate as a religious employer, the new regulation required the remaining affiliated organizations to tell the government about their religious objection to contraception. The Court held that the remaining plaintiffs demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on their RFRA challenge, noting that requiring self-certification represented a substantial burden on their religious exercise by compelling them to start the chain of events that ends with contraceptive products and services being provided to their employees. The Court was concerned that the Church and its affiliated nonprofits had different responsibilities under the mandate. On February 11, 2014, the government appealed the permanent injunction. This case was consolidated on appeal with <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12686\"> Geneva College v. Sebelius</a> and <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12040\"> Persico v. Sebelius</a>. On February 11, 2015, the Third Circuit (Judge Marjorie Rendell) reversed the injunction in an order that applied to all the consolidated cases, holding that the accommodation to the contraceptive services mandate does not significantly burden the religious expression of the nonprofit entities affiliated with the churches in this case. 778 F.3d 422 On April 5, 2015, in an order that applied to this case and Persico v. Sebelius, the Third Circuit denied the plaintiffs' petition for rehearing en banc. On April 15, 2015, the Third Circuit denied the plaintiffs' motion for stay pending petition for writ of certiorari. On April 16, 2015, the Supreme Court granted a stay pending a response to the plaintiffs' petition for writ of certiorari. 135 S. Ct. 1544. On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case on the issue of whether notifying the federal government by signing a form identifying the employer as a religious nonprofit that objected to the contraceptive services mandate violated the RFRA, or, rather, satisfies that statute's standard as the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. 136 S.Ct. 444. This case was consolidated with six other cases dealing with this issue: <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14373\">Priests for Life v. Sebelius</a>, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13267\">Southern Nazarene University v. Sebelius</a>, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12686\">Geneva College v. Sebelius</a>, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12032\">Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. Sebelius</a>, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12667\">East Texas Baptist University v. Sebelius</a>, and <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13143\">Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius</a>. This case was argued on March 23, 2016. On March 29, 2016, in an unusual move, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs suggesting a solution to their disagreement, in which employees could still receive contraception coverage without employers giving any notice to the government. On May 16, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that that \"accommodates petitioners\u2019 religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners\u2019 health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'\" 136 S.Ct 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of this case. Back in the Third Circuit, the parties submitted a series of status reports indicating they had entered into settlement negotiations with the new Trump administration. On Oct. 16, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion to voluntarily dismiss the case, which the court so ordered on Oct. 20. The settlement agreement is not currently publicly available. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2013, Bishop Zubik, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Pittsburg and the Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Pittsburg filed a U.S. District Court lawsuit in the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Federal Government challenging the the contraception mandate of the Affordable Care Act. After the Trump Administration took office, the parties settled and dismissed the case."}
{"article": "On November 22, 2013, a group of nonprofit religious organizations filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Administrative Procedure Act and the First Amendment against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that providing insurance coverage of contraception, even with the ACA's accommodation for religious organizations, would violate the organization's deeply held religious beliefs. On November 26, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. On December 11, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, or, alternatively, for summary judgment. On December 26, 2013, the district court (Judge Todd J. Campbell) denied a preliminary injunction on the grounds that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed in their lawsuit. The same day, the plaintiff filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (No. 13-6640) and filed a separate motion for injunctive relief pending appeal. On December 27, 2013, the district court denied this relief pending the appeal. On December 31, 2013, the Court of Appeals granted plaintiff's motion for emergency injunctive relief. On January 13, 2014, the Court of Appeals granted defendant's motion to consolidate this appeal with <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13451\"><i>Michigan Catholic Conference v. Sebelius</i> (No. 13-2723)</a>. Oral argument occurred on May 8, 2014, before Circuit Judges Karen Nelson Moore and John M. Rogers, and District Judge John Nixon (sitting by designation). On June 11, 2014, in an opinion by Judge Moore, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district judge's denial of a preliminary injunction, for all plaintiffs. Organizations exempt from the contraception mandate faced no burden on exercise of their religion, and they were therefore unlikely to succeed in proving a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. And organizations eligible to receive an \"accommodation\" under the law needed only to provide a \"self-certification\" that documented that they had a religious objection. This self-certification did not constitute an unlawful religious burden, Judge Moore explained. For similar reasons, the law did not violate the First Amendment's Free Speech, Free Exercise, or Establishment Clauses. On August 21, 2015, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court\u2019s decision denying preliminary injunctive relief to the plaintiffs on all claims. The plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on March 9, 2016. On May 26, 2016 the Supreme Court granted the petition, vacated the Sixth Circuit's ruling, and remanded the case back to the lower court in light of <i>Zubik v. Burwell</i> (See <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13465\">FA-PA-0016</a> in this Clearinghouse). On November 30, 2016, the case was reassigned to Judge Trauger following Judge Todd Campbell\u2019s retirement. Following the <i>Zubik</i> decision, the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury adopted new rules on October 6, 2017 that allowed for religious and moral objections to providing contraceptives under the ACA. As a result, on January 28, 2018 the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their lawsuit. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On November 22, 2013, a group of nonprofit religious organizations filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Administrative Procedure Act and the First Amendment against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. On December 26, 2013, United States District Court (Judge Todd J. Campbell) denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The same day, the plaintiff filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit (No. 13-6640). On June 11, 2013, the 6th Circuit affirmed, holding that the ACA did not unlawfully burden the plaintiffs' religion. The case was remanded back to the 6th Circuit in light of a Supreme Court case Zubik v. Burwell. Following the Zubik decision, the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury adopted new rules on October 6, 2017 that allowed for religious and moral objections to providing contraceptives under the ACA. As a result, on January 28, 2018 the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed."}
{"article": "On February 1, 2012, Criswell College, a nonprofit evangelical Protestant college located in Dallas, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2)), the First Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contend that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On January 7, 2012, defendant filed a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. On April 9, 2013, the Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. The court noted that the government had begun amending the regulations to provide further accommodations for religious employers by publishing an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) in the Federal Register in March 2012. 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501 (Mar. 21, 2012). The ANPRM sought to develop \"alternative ways of providing contraceptive coverage without cost sharing in order to accommodate non-exempt, non-profit religious organizations with religious objections to such coverage.\" And because the government was in the process of addressing the concerns that the college had expressed, the Court concluded that the case is not ripe for judicial consideration. The court dismissed plaintiffs' case without prejudice.", "summary": "On February 1, 2012, Criswell College, an evangelical Protestant college located in Dallas, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas against the Federal Government seeking to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contend that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On April 9, 2013, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it was not ripe for review."}
{"article": "On July 21, 2009, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a73601, against Defendants, operators of the Rolling Oaks Apartments, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The lawsuit alleged race discrimination, and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, along with civil penalties. The lawsuit was based on fair housing testing that DOJ had conducted between July 2008 and January 2009, in which rental agents made a series of racialized remarks, steering white testers away from certain locations, and implying that black applicants were more likely to fail criminal background checks. Both the DOJ and the defendants cross moved for summary judgment; the Court denied both sets of motions on December 10, 2010. Shortly thereafter, the parties reached a settlement agreement. On February 02, 2011, the Court (Judge Mark E. Fuller) approved a four-year consent decree. The Decree enjoined Defendants from refusing to rent a dwelling or offer information about a dwelling on the basis of race or color; required Defendants to implement and notify the public of their nondiscrimination policy; develop and implement uniform nondiscriminatory standards and procedures for informing persons of available units; and to pay civil penalties assessed individually to Defendants that total $15,500. The decree ended in 2015 without any further litigation, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "The lawsuit was based on fair housing testing that DOJ had conducted between July 2008 and January 2009, in which rental agents made a series of racialized remarks, steering white testers away from certain locations, and implying that black applicants were more likely to fail criminal background checks. On July 21, 2009, the United States Department of Justice filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a73601, against operators of the Rolling Oaks Apartments, seeking injunctive and monetary relief for race discrimination. After the court (Judge Mark Fuller) denied cross-motions for summary judgment, the matter settled. In February 2011, the Court entered a four-year consent decree enjoining the Defendants from discriminating on the basis of race in the operation of the Rolling Oaks Apartments and ordering $15,500 in civil penalties."}
{"article": "On September 30, 2009, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court Southern District of Alabama under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act against First United Security Bank. The Department of Justice claimed that the Bank engaged in a pattern or practice of home-mortgage lending discrimination against black applicants It asked the court to: 1) declare that the Bank's practices violated the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act; 2) enjoin the Bank from continuing the discriminatory practice; 3) award monetary damages to all victims of the Bank's allegedly discriminatory practices; and 4) asses a civil penalty against the Bank. Specifically, the Department of Justice claimed that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) had reason to believe that in 2004 the Bank discriminated against black applicants on the basis of race by setting higher interest rates for first-lien refinance loans and by failing to meet the lending needs of majority African-American tracts in west central Alabama on an equal basis with majority white tracts. The case was assigned to Chief Judge William H. Steele. On November 18, 2009, he entered an agreed order for resolution. This agreement stated that the Bank had implemented and would continue to implement policies and procedures that would ensure the pricing of its residential loans were not discriminatory. The bank would also compensate some African-American borrowers under a standard pricing matrix and opening branches in majority African-American areas that it serves. The bank also agreed to asses the credit needs of consumers in majority black areas and engage in consumer education. This agreement required annual reports by the bank, and was scheduled to terminate in 2014. However, on May 6, 2014 the parties filed a joint motion asking the court to extend the agreement because the bank had been unable to satisfy a provision that required a $500,000 investment in a special fund for lending to minority communities. The submission did not explain why the bank had been unable to make this investment. The agreement was extended for an additional four years or until the bank satisfied the investment requirement, and was approved by Judge Steele on May 7, 2014. On April 27, 2016, the parties filed a joint status report stating that all provisions of the agreement had been met. Judge Steele dismissed the case the same day.", "summary": "On September 30, 2009 the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against First United Security Bank under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The U.S. claimed that the Bank had engaged in a pattern or practice of home-mortgage lending discrimination against black applicants. On November 18, 2009 an agreement was entered that required the Bank to change several of its practices and to pay monetary damages to some African-American borrowers. The terms of the agreement were satisfied and the case dismissed in April 2016."}
{"article": "On November 18, 2011, two undocumented Mexican immigrants and three Alabama fair housing groups filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 3601 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the State of Alabama. The plaintiffs, represented by the National Immigration Law Center, the ACLU, the Southern Poverty Law Center, LatinoJustice, and private counsel, sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, compensatory damages, and attorneys' fees, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-AL-0008-0001.pdf\">alleging</a> that an Alabama law violated the Fair Housing Act and the Supremacy and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, and threated to leave families across the state homeless. Specifically, Alabama HB 56 prohibited any individual from entering into a business transaction with the State without proof of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status. A separate Alabama law required that owners of mobile homes obtain annual registration tags from the State. Together, these two laws put undocumented immigrant mobile home owners in a difficult position: renew the tags and be subject to a felony prosecution under HB 56, or refrain from renewing the tags and risk other civil and criminal penalties. On November 23, 2011, the District Court (Judge Myron H. Thomson) <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-AL-0008-0003.pdf\">granted </a>the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and temporarily enjoined the State from enforcing HB 56 against mobile home owners. <i>Cent. Alabama Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee</i>, 2011 WL 5878363 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2011). Two weeks later, after <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-AL-0008-0004.pdf\">denying</a> the State's motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order and <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-AL-0008-0005.pdf\">granting</a> the plaintiffs' motion to extend the order, the District Court imposed a preliminary injunction on the State. <i>Cent. Alabama Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee</i>, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (M.D. Ala. 2011). The Court <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-AL-0008-0006.pdf\">held</a> that the plaintiffs were substantially likely to prevail on their claims that the enforcement of HB 56 against individuals seeking to renew their mobile home registrations intentionally discriminates against and has an unlawful disparate impact on Latinos, in violation of the Fair Housing Act. The Court further held that the plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their claim that federal immigration laws preempted HB 56, and that they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction. Based on this holding, the District Court (Judge Thompson) enjoined the State from: (1) requiring any person who attempts to pay the annual mobile home registration fee to prove his or her U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status; and (2) refusing to issue mobile home registration tags to any person because that person cannot prove his or her U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status. The Court further declared that it is not a criminal violation of HB 56 for an individual to obtain a registration decal without providing proof of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status. On December 21, 2011, the State appealed the preliminary injunction. While this appeal was pending in the Eleventh Circuit, the parties conducted discovery. On May 17, 2013, the Eleventh Circuit (Judges Gerald Tjoflat, Charles Wilson, and Beverly Martin) dismissed the appeal as moot because in May 2012 the Alabama legislature amended HB 56 to exclude mobile home registrations. <i>Cent. Alabama Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Comm'r, Alabama Dep't of Revenue</i>, 2013 WL 2372302 (11th Cir. May 17, 2013). The Court also vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings. With the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief rendered moot by the amended statute, the parties turned to the issue of attorneys' fees and costs. On December 27, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for attorneys' fees and expenses, which was resolved after the State agreed to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys $230,000 in a private settlement. The District Court dismissed the case on May 6, 2014, upon stipulation of the parties.", "summary": "In November 2011, two undocumented Mexican immigrants and three fair housing groups filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama against the State of Alabama. The plaintiffs alleged that a state statute violated the Fair Housing Act and was preempted by federal immigration law because it required mobile home owners to pay for a government-issued registration while prohibiting undocumented residents from making payments to government officials. Because the law made it illegal to possess a mobile home without registration and because it was illegal for undocumented residents to obtain the registration, the law effectively made such persons homeless. The District Court (Judge Myron H. Thompson) enjoined the State from enforcing the law. The State appealed, but the Eleventh Circuit rendered it moot because in May 2012 the Alabama legislature amended the statute to exclude mobile home registration. The District Court dismissed the case in May 2014, upon stipulation of the parties."}
{"article": "This case, brought by the United States in December 2011 against Countrywide Financial Corporation, resulted in the largest residential fair lending settlement in U.S. history. $335 million was paid to compensate more than 200,000 African-American and Hispanic borrowers who were allegedly charged higher fees and interest rates because of their race or national origin. The United States also claimed that Countrywide and its subsidiaries (\"the Countrywide Defendants\") steered thousands of African-American and Hispanic borrowers into subprime mortgages when non-Hispanic white borrowers with similar credit profiles received prime loans. Prior to entry of the Consent Decree, the Countrywide defendants had stopped originating residential loans. In addition to the monetary relief, the consent decree contained remedial provisions to become effective in the event the Countywide defendants ever reentered this business. These included implementation of policies and practices to prevent and detect potential fair lending violations not only on the basis of race or national origin, but also on the basis of marital status. Regarding monetary relief, the court required that the defendants deposit $335 million to compensate allegedly aggrieved persons for monetary and other damages they may have suffered as a result of the defendants' alleged violations of the FHA and the ECOA. Each party bore its own costs and attorneys' fees. The Consent Decree had a four-year term, beginning December 21, 2011. On January 25, 2016, the Court (Philip S. Gutierrez) entered an amended Consent Decree which extended provisions of the settlement to December 30, 2016. The amended decree required the defendants to present a proposal to the court for the distribution of all money remaining in the Settlement Fund by October 14, 2016. On April 5, 2016, the court granted am April 4 disbursement order, which granted, among sums to other organizations: (a) The National Urban League $1,000,000.00; (b) National Council of La Raza $1,500,000.00; (c) Habitat for Humanity $1,000,000.00; (d) d. Self\u2212Help Ventures Fund $1,500,000.00; (e) Atlanta Neighborhood Development Partnership $1,000,000; (f) Opportunity Resource Fund $1,000,000.00; (g) Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago $1,500,000.00; (h) NHS of Los Angeles County $2,000,000.00. On October 27, 2016, the court approved the defendant's second disbursement plan. The was no further docket activity after this order and the case is now closed.", "summary": "This case resulted in the largest residential fair lending settlement in U.S. history, with $335 million being paid to compensate African-American and Hispanic borrowers who were allegedly charged more based on their race or national origin."}
{"article": "On September 26, 2013, the United States of America filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of California against Plaza Home Mortgage, Inc., under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The Department of Justice alleged that the defendant discriminated against African American and Hispanic borrowers in its residential mortgage lending and sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, compensatory damages to all of the victims of the defendant's discriminatory policies, and a civil penalty. This case was filed after years of monitoring by federal agencies. In 2009, the Federal Trade Commission (\"FTC\") determined that the defendant had substantial disparities in the rates given to minority versus non-Hispanic white borrowers. The FTC requested more information from the defendant, including loan data and the company's policies, and in 2011 the Department of Justice took over the investigation. The data obtained from the investigation showed that from 2006 through at least 2010, the defendant permitted its mortgage brokers to charge excessive fees beyond the fee caps to African American and Hispanic borrowers more frequently than white borrowers based solely on race and national origin. The defendant had a two-step process set in place where the first step determined whether the applicant satisfied objective criteria. The second step was more subjective and allowed mortgage brokers to charge fees with little checks on their discretion. The defendant did not set up objective criteria to guide the mortgage brokers in setting fees or interest rates. The disparities between the rates given to whites and minorities were prevalent in thousands of loans made in numerous states. On October 1, 2013, the District Court (Judge Marilyn L. Huff) entered a consent order between the parties. Although the defendant did not admit to any pattern or practice of discrimination, the order enjoined the defendant from engaging in any discriminatory act or practice and subjected the defendant to monitoring. The defendant was also required to pay $3 million into a settlement fund to compensate those affected by its discrimination. The order was set to terminate after three years if the defendant had complied during that time period. On September 28, 2016, the parties jointly moved to extend the consent decree by one month, which was the time that Plaza needed to achieve substantial compliance. The court granted this motion and on November 29, 2016, the parties moved to dismiss the case without prejudice.", "summary": "On September 26, 2013, the United States of America filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of California against Plaza Home Mortgage, Inc., under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, alleging that the defendant discriminated against African American and Hispanic borrowers because of race and national origin in its residential mortgage lending. On December 1, 2013, the District Court entered a consent order that prohibited the defendant from discriminating on the basis of race or national origin and required the defendant to place $3 million into a settlement fund. The case closed in 2016 after the defendant had substantially complied with the consent order."}
{"article": "On May 30, 2014, the City of Los Angeles filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The City sued JP Morgan Chase Bank under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and Fair Housing Act/Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA). The City sought damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the bank's lending practices were predatory, intentionally discriminated against minority borrowers, and had a disparate impact on minorities. Specifically, the complaint alleged disparate impact claims, based on statistical data, that: 1) lending practices resulted in disproportionate number of foreclosures in minority neighborhoods; 2) minority homeowners received disproportionate number of predatory loans. It also alleged the bank intentionally discriminated against minorities by: 1) targeting minorities for predatory loans; 2) underwriting adjustable loan rates that borrowers could not afford; and 3) inducing foreclosures by refusing to offer refinancing or loan restructuring on fair terms. The City claimed it was injured as a result of the bank's practices through loss of property tax and decrease in property value. The City also brought two other actions regarding discriminatory and predatory lending against Wells Fargo (City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Company, No. 2:13-cv-09007-ODW) and Citigroup (City of Los Angeles v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-09009-ODW), respectively. On June 25, 2014, the bank filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. On August 5, 2014, Judge Otis D. Wright granted the motion to dismiss but gave the City 21 days to amend its complaint. 2014 WL 3854332 (N.D. Cal. 2014). On August 26, 2014, the City filed an amended complaint that again alleged that the defendant had engaged in discriminatory and predatory lending practices, adding that minorities in fact received predatory loan terms from JP Morgan and that these loan terms led to rapid foreclosure. The complaint further alleged that the City had been injured by the bank's practices because it still had to provide costly municipal services for properties in minority neighborhoods that had became vacant as a direct result of discriminatory loans originated or purchased by the bank. On November 14, 2014, Judge Wright denied JP Morgan's motion to dismiss, stating that the City's allegations were sufficient to withstand the pleading stage. Judge Wright found the City's allegations regarding causation to be sufficient to assert standing, and ruled that Chase's arguments for dismissing the case for failure to state a claim went to the weight of the evidence, not the sufficiency of the pleading. In the related case against Wells Fargo, on July 17, 2015, the Court granted summary judgment against the City. 2015 WL 4398858 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015). As a result, on August 6, 2015, the City filed an ex parte application to stay this case pending appeal of the Wells Fargo action, in order to avoid duplicative litigation both in the trial court and on appeal. However, on September 2, 2015, the court (Judge Otis D. Wright II) dismissed the case with prejudice, as stipulated between the parties. We do not know if the matter was settled, or if Los Angeles simply withdrew it. No settlement papers are available.", "summary": "On May 30, 2014, the City of Los Angeles filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against JP Morgan Chase Bank, under Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and Fair Housing Act/Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA). The plaintiff sought damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants lending practices were predatory and intentionally discriminated against minority borrowers, and had a disparate impact on minorities. On August 6, 2015, the plaintiff field an ex parte application to stay the case pending appeal of related action. On September 2, 2015, the case was dismissed as stipulated."}
{"article": "On November 10, 2010, the United States brought a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a73601-3631, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, against the manager/supervisor and owners of an apartment complex. The Plaintiff sued on behalf of two female residents of the apartment complex, claiming that the manager/maintenance supervisor subjected female tenants to discrimination on the basis of sex, including unwelcome sexual harassment. The Plaintiff sought injunctive, declaratory, monetary damages, and civil penalties. Specifically, Plaintiff claims the Defendants made housing unavailable to female tenants because its manager engaged in a pattern and practice of offering quid pro quo agreements to provide services in exchange for sex, pervasive unwanted sexual advances, comments, and gestures, and other forms of sexual harassment, all of which interfered with the women's use and enjoyment of their tenancies. On September 22, 2011, the Court (Judge Linda R. Reade) approved a five-year Consent Decree agreed to by the parties. By that time, none of the Defendants was engaged in the residential rental business. The Consent Decree required that should the owners ever re-enter the business, they were prohibited in general from discriminating against tenants on the basis of sex and specifically required to adopt and distribute a Nondiscrimination Policy to be approved by the Justice Department, to train its employees in the policy, to develop a complaint procedure an retain all document pertaining to any complaints. The manager/maintenance supervisor was forever prohibited from having any involvement whatsoever in the management, rental, or maintenance of any dwelling. Defendants agreed to pay $80,000 in compensatory damages to aggrieved persons identified by Plaintiff and $15,000 in civil penalties. The consent decree terminated in September 2016, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "This sex discrimination fair housing case was brought by the United States in 2010 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa against the owners of an apartment complex and their manager, alleging sexual harassment by the manager of two female tenants. The women claimed they were subjected to offers of maintenance services in return for sex, pervasive, unwanted touching, gestures and remarks. The Plaintiff claimed these actions constituted a pattern and practice of sexual discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act. Though the owners had gone out of business during the course of the litigation, they entered into a five-year Consent Decree that included detailed prohibitions against sex discrimination, should they ever again engage in the business. The manager was forever banned from any job involved in any aspect of the operation of any dwelling. Defendants agreed to pay $80,000 in compensatory damages to aggrieved persons identified by Plaintiff and $15,000 in civil penalties."}
{"article": "On February 1, 2008, minority homeowners on behalf of similarly situated minority homeowners filed a class-action complaint in U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against H&R Block under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (\"ECOA\") and the Fair Housing Act (\"FHA\"). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants maintained a pattern or practice that had a discriminatory impact on minority applicants in their home financing policies and practices. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' policy authorizing unchecked, subjective surcharge of additional points and fees to an otherwise objective risk-based financing rate, had a discriminatory impact on minority homeowners, creating a significantly higher likelihood of exposure to discretionary points and fees. The plaintiffs sought injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief. On February 12, 2008, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On March 27, 2008, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Court (Judge Rya W. Zabel) granted the motion in relation to H&R Block Inc., but not in relation to its subsidiaries. However, the plaintiff could move to add H&R Block Inc. as a defendant after discovery. On July 9, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. The complaint added several named plaintiffs. On June 21, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify class. On March 21, 2011, the motion was granted, subject to limitation by time. A class of \"[a]ll African-American borrowers who obtained a mortgage loan from one of the Defendants\" was certified. However, three months later, the Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). The defendants filed a motion to decertify class On October 6, 2011, in light of that case. On September 18, 2012, the Court granted the motion and decertified class. After Wal-Mart, there was no longer sufficient evidence to satisfy the commonality requirement. Statistical analysis was no longer sufficient, and the plaintiffs could not show a common method of exercising discretion by the brokers. On February 7, 2013, the First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the plaintiffs' appeal. On August 21, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation to dismiss the case with prejudice. That ended the case.", "summary": "On February 1, 2008, minority homeowners on behalf of similarly situated minority homeowners filed a class-action complaint in U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against H&R Block Inc., H&R Block Bank and its wholly-owned subsidiary,under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1691, et seq. (\"ECOA\") and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 3601 et seq. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants maintained a pattern or practice that had a discriminatory impact on minority applicants in their home financing policies and practices. On August 21, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation to dismiss the case with prejudice."}
{"article": "On October 29, 2008, the United States filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a73601-3619, against a condominium association and its president. The U.S. brought the case on behalf of two residents of the condominium complex who claimed the defendants engaged in illegal discrimination on the basis of familial status by declaring in their Amended Master Deed and Declaration that no unit should be \"sold or leased to a person who has a child under the age of 16 who will occupy or reside in the unit 180 days or more a year.\" The complainants wished to sell their unit, but the U.S. alleged that they were unable to do so because the Association interfered with the sale by actively discouraging prospective buyers who had children. The complainants intervened in the case on August 10, 2009. After discovery, the parties entered mediation, and on March 3, 2010, the Court (Judge Warren K. Urbom) approved a three-year consent decree. In addition to a general prohibition against discrimination in the sale or rental of the condominium units, the decree required the defendants to develop and post a non-discrimination policy and to amend the master deed to excise the prohibition against families with children. Defendants agreed to pay $77,500 to the complainants, an additional $35,000 to other aggrieved parties, and a $15,000 civil penalty to the United States. The consent decree terminated in 2013 without any further litigation. The case is now closed.", "summary": "The defendant to this 2008 family-status discrimination lawsuit brought by the United States in the District of Nebraska, was a condominium association whose \"Amended Master Deed and Declaration\" stated that no unit should be \"sold or leased to a person who has a child under the age of 16 who will occupy or reside in the unit 180 days or more a year.\" The suit's complainants alleged that this clause posed an obstacle to their intended sale of their condo units. After discovery, the parties entered mediation, and on March 3, 2010, District Judge Warren K. Urbom approved a three-year consent decree. In addition to a general prohibition against discrimination in the sale or rental of the condominium units, the decree required the defendants to develop and post a non-discrimination policy and to amend the master deed to excise the prohibition against families with children. Defendants agreed to pay $77,500 to the complainants, an additional $35,000 to other aggrieved parties, and a $15,000 civil penalty to the United States."}
{"article": "On May 5, 2008, an association of residents of a New Jersey neighborhood filled a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The residents, represented by lawyers from South Jersey Legal Services, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming that the defendants' redevelopment plan for the Gardens neighborhood represented a violation of the Fair Housing Act, and of the Equal Protection clauses of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' redevelopment plan, which called for the razing of the existing homes located in the Gardens neighborhood, the only one with predominantly African American and Hispanic residents, made housing unavailable because of race. Moreover, the plaintiffs claimed that the redevelopment plan had a disparate impact on African-American and Hispanic households in violation of the Fair Housing Act because it destroyed their homes without providing adequate relocation assistance. The township had displaced hundreds of predominantly African American and Hispanic residents and, the plaintiffs claimed, \"devastated a once stable minority community in need of only modest improvement.\" Only about 70 homes out of 300 remain scattered throughout the neighborhood and no new homes were constructed in 10 years. On July 18, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction. On October 28, 2008, the Court (Judge Noel Hillman) issued an order with respect to the defendants' motion to dismiss. Three of the allegations under state law related to local redevelopment and housing laws and open meetings laws were dismissed as moot. Two counts related to denial of just compensation under state law were dismissed as moot. In other respects, the motion was denied. On November 25, 2008, the Court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint. The plaintiffs could not file allegations pertaining to denial of just compensation in light of the Court's opinion of October 28, 2008. On December 3, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, which added more facts and allegations of violation of the Due Process clauses under the U.S. and New Jersey constitutions. On February 13, 2009, the Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The injunction was sought with respect to disparate impact claim under the FHA, and the Court stated the plaintiffs did not show they were likely to succeed on the merits, and suffer and irreparable injury. Even if they lost housing, there was insufficient showing that monetary compensation would not be enough. On October 23, 2009, the Court granted in part, denied in part, and continue in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. The motions with respect to claims under the FHA, EEOC, Equal Protection claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, were treated as motions for summary judgment, and continued until later. The Court dismissed claims of Due Process violations under the U.S. and New Jersey constitutions, claims of discrimination under state laws, and claims of violations of local redevelopment and housing laws. On January 19, 2010, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On January 3, 2011, the district court (Judge Noel Hillman) granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Specifically, the district court found that the redevelopment plan of the Gardens neighborhood did not have a disparate impact on African Americans and Hispanics. The court found that the residents were unable to make a prima facie showing that the plan had a disparate impact on protected groups because they were unable to show that the plan had a greater adverse impact on protected groups than on others, and were unable to show that the township's legitimate interest in redevelopment could be accomplished with less discriminatory impact. Finally, the court held that the defendants had not acted with the discriminatory intent necessary to violate the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs appealed the district court's ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In an opinion filed September 13, 2011 the court (Judges Sloviter, Fuentes, and Fisher) vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court made clear that at the summary judgment stage, the district court is to take the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Under that standard, the evidence submitted was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act. Specifically, the court held that the evidence presented by the residents that African American and Hispanic citizens were 8 times more likely to be affected by the redevelopment plan was sufficient to show a disparate impact. Furthermore, the appellate court made it clear that the district court had erred by asking whether the defendants had treated minorities the same as other residents, rather than asking whether minority residents were affected differently than the other residents. On May 22, 2012, the Third Circuit's mandate was entered. On June 11, 2012, the defendants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United State Supreme Court, asking for review of the legal question whether disparate impact claims exist under the Fair Housing Act. This was an issue on which the Court had granted review in Magner v. Gallagher (Sup. Ct. Docket 10-1032), but then that case was withdrawn by its defendant, the City of St. Paul, after full briefing but before argument. The Court granted cert., and argument was scheduled for December 4, 2013. Observers expected the Court to strike down the disparate impact theory. Instead, on November 13, 2013, the case settled. The settlement--which news reports state was funded, in part, by an organization called The Reinvestment Fund--includes provision for construction of 44 new homes, with the first to be ready for occupancy before the end of 2014. Twenty homes will go to current residents in exchange for allowing redevelopment of their existing homes. All of the phased new construction will be completed by 2018. Seven households that have elected to relocate will be compensated based in part on the appraised value of their homes. The aggregate amount that the township paid to them was $691,000.00 On November 15, 2013, the Court entered the settlement agreement and dismissed the case and the proceedings with prejudice.", "summary": "An association of residents of a New Jersey neighborhood filled a lawsuit claiming that the defendants' redevelopment plan for the Gardens neighborhood represented a violation of the Fair Housing Act and the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' redevelopment plan, which razed numerous homes in a minority neighborhood, was discriminatory. The plaintiffs appealed the District Court's pretrial decision in favor of the town to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which reversed, and found that the plaintiffs were entitled to a trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the question whether disparate impact claims were available under the Fair Housing Act. About two weeks prior to the scheduled argument, the parties settled; the city will construct 44 new homes, 20 for current residents in exchange for allowing redevelopment. Seven households that elected to relocate will be compensated."}
{"article": "On December 13, 2007, low-income minority individuals in need of affordable housing filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the Town of Smithtown in the United States District Court, Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by both private counsel and public interest attorneys, asked the court for injunctive and monetary relief, claiming that Smithtown operated its voucher program with a residency preference that discriminated on the basis of race, color, and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they and others similarly situated were intentionally excluded from participation in the Town's voucher program. The plaintiffs moved for class certification and also sought for the parties' proposed settlement agreement to be approved on May 6, 2009. On August 28, 2009, the court (Joanna Seybert) entered an order and final judgment approving the parties' settlement agreement. The final certified class consisted of \"all African-American and Hispanic individuals who do not live or work in Smithtown, New York and who applied to the Smithtown Section 8 Voucher Program in 2002 or 2006 when the waitlist was opened and who subsequently were or would have been determined not eligible for the Section 8 Voucher Program because they did not live or work in Smithtown.\" Under the terms of the settlement the Town of Smithtown agreed to implement an anti-discrimination educational program for its employees, to affirmatively market the Section 8 Program to minority persons, to inform the public of its non-discriminatory policies, to maintain and preserve records for purposes of recordkeeping and reporting, and to pay $925,000 to the plaintiffs. This settlement remains in effect until 2019. This case is closed.", "summary": "Low-income minority individuals in need of affordable housing filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the Town of Smithtown, complaining that Smithtown operated its voucher program with a residency preference that discriminated on the basis of race, color, and national origin. The court entered an order and final judgment approving the parties' settlement agreement under which the Town of Smithtown agreed to implement an anti-discrimination educational program, to affirmatively market the Section 8 Program to minority persons, to inform the public of its non-discriminatory policies, to maintain and preserve records for purposes of recordkeeping and reporting, and to pay $925,000 to the plaintiffs. This settlement remains in effect until 2019."}
{"article": "On December 6, 2010, the United States filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The DOJ filed under 42 U.S.C. 3601 of the Fair Housing Act against the owner of the Burgundy Gardens Apartments, LLC. The U.S. Department of Justice asked the Court to 1) declare that the defendant's conduct was a violation of the Fair Housing Act, 2) enjoin the defendant and its workers from continuing to discriminate on the basis of race or color in the rental of dwellings, 3) award monetary damages to persons harmed by Defendant's discriminatory practices, and 4) assess a civil penalty against the defendant. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant engaged in racially discriminatory housing practices at Burgundy Gardens Apartments by failing to inform African-American prospective tenants about available apartments, telling African Americans prospective tenants that the prices for rental apartments were higher than the prices quoted to similarly situated non-African-America persons, and failing to show African-American prospective tenants available apartments, while at the same time, showing similarly situated non-African American persons available apartments and negotiating for the rental of such apartments. On April 4, 2012, the parties reached a settlement in which the defendant was enjoined from discriminating against any person in terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling because of race. The defendant also agreed to implement a Nondiscrimination Policy and to notify the public of its implementation. The defendant paid $150,000 to those harmed by its discriminatory practices. The defendant paid an additional $25,000 to the United States as a civil penalty. On June 13, 2016, Judge Kenneth M. Karas ordered the defendant to distribute $65,055.20 of the settlement fund to Legal Aid Society of Rockland County and New York Legal Assistance Group.", "summary": "On December 06, 2010, the United States filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 3601 of the Fair Housing Act against the owner of the Burgundy Gardens Apartments, LLC in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Judge Kenneth Karas). The Plaintiff, represented by the Untied States Department of Justice asked the Court to 1) declare the Defendant's conduct a violation of the Fair Housing Act, 2) enjoin the Defendant from discriminating on the basis of race in the rental of dwellings, 3) award monetary damages and 4) assess a civil penalty. Specifically, the Plaintiff claims the Defendant's rental practices discriminated against African American prospective tenants. On April 4,2012, the parties reached a settlement. The Defendant was enjoined from further discriminatory rental practices on the basis of rate, and paid $150,000 in damages and $25,000 as a civil penalty."}
{"article": "On September 09, 2011, the United States filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under the Fair Housing Act against the architects and developers of an apartment building. The plaintiff asked the Court for injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, claiming that the defendants designed and constructed the complex in a manner that was inaccessible to persons with disabilities. On October 5, 2011, the plaintiff entered into a consent decree with the developers which required extensive retrofitting of non-compliant areas in both the public/common use areas of the building and in the apartments themselves, payment of $60,000 to compensate aggrieved persons, and a $35,000 civil penalty. On January 26, 2012, the parties entered into a consent decree which required that the defendant comply with the FHA and pay a $20,000 civil penalty. The case terminated on January 26, 2012.", "summary": "The United States filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act against architects and developers of an apartment building claiming that the defendants designed and constructed the building so that it was inaccessible to persons with disabilities. The plaintiff entered into two separate three-year consent decrees; one requiring the architect to make all of its future designs compliant with the FHA and to pay a $20,000 civil penalty; the other with the developers requiring extensive retrofits to the building, $60,000 in damages and a $35,000 civil penalty."}
{"article": "On April 2, 2012, the United States filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act against New York-based correspondence mortgage lender GFI Mortgage Bankers, Inc., in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The United States, represented by the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, asked the court for injunctive and monetary relief. It alleged that between 2005 and 2009, GFI's loan officers engaged in a pattern and practice of charging African-American and Hispanic borrowers in New Jersey and New York higher interest rates and higher fees for residential mortgage loans than they charged similarly situated white borrowers. It further alleged that because of these disparities, African Americans and Hispanics paid or would need to pay between $4,000 and $5,000 more than similarly situated white borrowers over the first four years of their loans' terms, and more than $20,000 over the loans' full terms. The Department of Justice received this case as a referral from the Department of Housing and Urban Development. GFI moved to dismiss the case, arguing that conduct that has a disparate impact (but no discriminatory intent) is not actionable under the Fair Housing Act or the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. On August 27, 2012, after Judge Katherine Forrest expressed skepticism of the defendants' argument in a scheduling order, the parties entered into a Consent Order. GFI admitted that statistical analyses of data from 2005\u20132009 showed its loan officers charged African-American and Latino borrowers higher discretionary fees than similarly situated white borrowers. It also admitted that it provided financial incentives for its loan officers to use discretion and charge borrowers fees unrelated to their credit characteristics. The consent order required GFI to pay $3.5 million to damaged African-American and Hispanic borrowers, and to pay a $55,000 civil penalty to the United States. GFI was required to implement specific policies to prevent pricing discrimination and limit loan officers' discretion in the future, hire senior and managerial staff to ensure compliance with these policies, and develop a fair lending monitoring program that would allow it to identify and correct for lending disparities. The order required GFI to submit these policies for approval to the Department of Justice by the end of October 2012. After the United States approved the new policies, GFI was required hire an independent third-party to provide fair lending training to all of its employees engaged in the loan origination business. The consent decree was scheduled to last for four and a half years. After minor modifications to the consent order, the decree's enforcement period expired and the case is now closed.", "summary": "On April 12, 2012, the United States sued GFI Mortgage Bankers under the Fair Housing Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act for charging African American and Hispanic borrowers higher fees and costs for home mortgage loans than it charged similarly situated white borrowers. The parties entered a Consent Decree on August 27, 2012, which required GFI to pay $3.555 million and implement fair lending policies and a fair lending monitoring system. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "The Fortune Society, a non-profit organization that provides temporary and permanent housing to hundreds of formerly incarcerated individuals each year, tried to rent apartments at The Sand Castle, an apartment complex managed and owned by the Sandcastle Towers Housing Development Fund Corp. (the \u201cFund\u201d). When the Fund learned that the Fortune Society served formerly imprisoned individuals, they refused to rent apartments. On October 30, 2014, the Fortune Society filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiff sued the Fund (and related entities) under the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and New York State and City law. Represented by Relman, Dane & Colfax, the plaintiff sought injunctive, monetary and declarative relief. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant maintained a discriminatory policy that prohibited anyone with a criminal record from renting an apartment or living at The Sand Castle. Specifically, they claimed that the policy had the purpose and effect of discriminating against African Americans and Latinos. The court set up a discovery schedule, which proceeded for about a year. On May 1, 2015, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On June 25, 2015, the court ordered the parties to meet and discuss settlement in light of the recent Supreme Court decision <i>Inclusive Communities Project v. Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs</i>. (See <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13857\">here</a> in the Clearinghouse). That opinion held that the Fair Housing Act encompassed disparate impact liability, but emphasized that liability followed only if the challenged policy or practice actually caused, rather than merely accompanied, a racial disparity. The plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on its race discrimination claims based on disparate impact on September 30, 2016. On the same day, the defendant moved for summary judgment. The defendant claimed that summary judgment was appropriate because discovery confirmed that it did not maintain a blanket ban on residents with criminal records. On November 16, 2015, the parties met at a status conference to discuss settlement, as recommended by the court. But they failed to agree. On October 18, 2016, the United States entered a Statement of Interest. It suggested a three-step legal test that the court should use to evaluate the plaintiff's claims (Department of Justice press release available <a href=\"http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-files-brief-address-use-criminal-background-checks-housing-providers\">here</a>):<ol><li>The plaintiff must show the challenged practice has a discriminatory effect on a protected class;</li><li>The defendant must establish a legitimate justification for the challenged practice; and</li><li>The plaintiff must exhibit another policy to serve the same interests with less discriminatory effect.</li></ol>The court (Magistrate Judge Vera M. Scanlon) issued an order denying the plaintiff\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment and grating in part and denying in part the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment on July 3, 2019. The court denied the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff\u2019s disparate impact claim but granted it with respect to the plaintiff\u2019s disparate treatment claim. In addition, the court scheduled a status conference on August 20, 2019, to discuss settlement possibilities. The parties jointly filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice on October 11, 2019. On October 16, 2019, the defendant and the plaintiff filed a status report, stating that the matter has been resolved. According to the New York Daily News, the parties agreed to a $1,187,500 settlement. The <a href=https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ny-incarcerated-housing-suit-20191105-7nskiotbk5chpfxsqu5l2soxqu-story.html>article</a> did not mention any injunctive relief but did note that the Fund no longer controlled The Sand Castle or any other residential property. This case is closed.", "summary": "In 2014, a non-profit organization that provides housing assistance to formerly incarcerated individuals filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for Eastern District of New York. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, who owned and managed a multi-building apartment complex, had a discriminatory policy that unlawfully prohibited anyone with a criminal record from renting an apartment. After years of discovery and litigation, the parties settled for over $1 million."}
{"article": "On May 12, 2005, individual New York residents and the New York ACORN local chapter filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued Nassau County and the Village of Garden City under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, the Fair Housing Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, citing violations of these acts as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with discriminatory zoning practices; to order Garden City to approve a proposed zoning that would allow for affordable housing; and to order the defendants to take all actions necessary to assure that the Social Service Site be redeveloped to maximize the availability of affordable and integrated housing. The plaintiffs claimed that Nassau County and Garden City had engaged in discriminatory zoning with regard to the \"Social Service Site\" in Garden City. While there had initially been plans to develop affordable housing on the site, residents of Garden City strongly objected to such plans at a public hearing. Garden City acquiesced to the demands of the public and granted zoning that would allow for luxury, single-family housing rather than integrated affordable housing units. The plaintiffs claimed that this continued a practice of segregated housing in Garden City and denied individual plaintiffs the opportunity to live in integrated housing within Garden City. On November 30, 2005, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include New York ACORN Housing Company (NYAHC) as a plaintiff. NYAHC was a non-profit community developer of affordable housing that had attempted to develop affordable housing in Nassau County for many years. NYAHC had submitted a proposal for affordable housing at the Social Service Site. On March 10, 2006, both defendants submitted motions to dismiss the amended complaint. On July 21, 2006, District Judge Joseph F. Bianco denied these motions to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs did have standing in court and had not failed to state a claim. The parties engaged in discovery for several years. In late 2009, ACORN began facing organizational issues as a result of heavily edited videos that garnered public opposition to the organization. As a result, ACORN lost much of its funding and effectively closed. On June 15, 2010, District Judge Arthur D. Spatt ordered that the New York Communities for Change (NYCC) intervene as the practical, but not legal, successor to NY ACORN as plaintiff. On July 29, 2011, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On February 15, 2012, Judge Spatt granted defendant County's motion for summary judgment dismissing all claims against it. Judge Spatt found that the County lacked the legal power over the zoning of the Social Services Site. Further, Judge Spatt found that the County's stated goals for the site were to increase profits, and a zoning that allowed for luxury single-family homes allowed the County to meet this stated goal. In the same order, Judge Spatt dismissed Garden City's motion for summary judgement and granted intervenor-plaintiff (NYCC) motion to amend the intervenor complaint to include the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. 843 F.Supp.2d 287. The parties continued with discovery. On December 6, 2013, Judge Spatt found that the plaintiffs had failed to establish liability on the part of the defendants under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71982. Judge Spatt did find that the plaintiffs had established liability on the part of the defendant on its other charges: (1) the FHA, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 3601 et seq., based on a theory of disparate treatment and disparate impact; (2) 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981; (3) 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983; and (4) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, Judge Spatt found that in eliminating R-M zoning, which would have allowed for affordable housing units, and endorsing R-T zoning, which did not allow for affordable housing units, Garden City had acted with discriminatory intent. He based this finding on the discriminatory and racist language used by residents of Garden City at the public hearing about the housing development and based on the disparate impact of the zoning decision on minority communities. Judge Spatt directed the plaintiffs to submit a proposed remedial plan. 985 F. Supp. 2d 390. On April 22, 2014, Judge Spatt issued a final order stating: (1) Garden City cannot discriminate or interfere with fair housing opportunities; (2) Garden City must adopt a fair housing resolution for zoning and other land use process; (3) If the County decides to sell the Social Services Site, then Garden City will begin rezoning the site as an R-M site to allow for a residential multi-family development; (4) Garden City must meet an Affordable Housing Requirement in which 10% of newly constructed residential developments of five units or more will be reserved for affordable housing; (5) The city will develop fair housing trainings for all elected Garden City officials. The judgment was set to last for five years. The parties then began litigation over attorney's fees. On September 11, 2014 Judge Spatt ordered a temporary denial of attorney's fees because the case was going up on appeal. Garden City appealed Judge Spatt's judgment that it had violated the Fair Housing Act, Section 1981, Section 1983, and the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs appealed the 2012 grant of summary judgement dismissing claims against Nassau County. On March 23, 2016, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision with regard to Garden City's violations. The Second Circuit vacated the lower court's decision with regard to the defendant's liability as to disparate impact and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the plaintiff met their burden of proving that \"substantial legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.\" The Second Circuit also affirmed the lower court's finding that the County did not have legal responsibility over Garden City's zoning. The Second Circuit remanded for the district court to address Nassau County's steering of affordable housing to certain, predominately non-white, communities in violation of the Civil Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act. 819 F.3d 581. On September 19, 2017, Judge Spatt found that the plaintiffs had met their burden at trial in demonstrating that the Garden City\u2019s proffered reasons for its chosen zoning change could have been met by another practice, such as R-M zoning, that had a less discriminatory effect. Therefore, he reaffirmed his previous holding that Garden City was liable under a disparate impact theory. However, because the parties had agreed that further discovery was required, Judge Spatt did not address the Second Circuit\u2019s vacation and remand of his grant of summary judgment to the County on the plaintiffs\u2019 steering claims. 2017 WL 4174787. On November 30, 2017, Judge Spatt entered a final judgment against Garden City, finding that all the issues regarding the plaintiffs\u2019 claims against Garden City had been fully and finally resolved. On November 11, 2018, Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay awarded the plaintiffs $5,089,525.59 in attorneys\u2019 fees and $183,425.74 in costs, for a total award of $5,272,951.35 against Garden City. On December 10, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a letter to Judge Lindsay, requesting that she revise the total award amount to $5,255,108.94 due to some minor miscalculations by the court. On December 13, 2018, Judge Lindsay amended her original order and awarded the plaintiffs the total award amount of $5,255,108.94. Meanwhile, since the Second Circuit\u2019s remand, the plaintiffs and the County had engaged in discovery and settlement talks. On March 15, 2019, Judge Spatt signed the parties\u2019 stipulation of discontinuance with prejudice, except without prejudice as to the court\u2019s jurisdiction for the purpose of interpretation or enforcement of the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement required the County to pay $5,400,000 to the plaintiffs to be used for the purpose of furthering and promoting mixed-income affordable housing; $120,000 to NYCC to be used for activities related to fair and affordable housing; and $400,000 to plaintiffs\u2019 counsel for attorneys\u2019 fees. The settlement agreement also required the County to: prepare a development and outreach plan, within 18 months of the effective date of the settlement, to promote fairness and equity in housing; encourage the construction or development of mixed income multi-family rental housing; issue requests seeking developers who will purchase or lead land from the County on which to develop mixed-income housing; begin a campaign of advertising to provide fair housing education; allocate money towards assisting in the construction or development of mixed-income rental housing; and to not discriminate on the basis of race or color.", "summary": "On May 12, 2005, individual New York residents and the New York ACORN local chapter filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Easter District of New York. The plaintiffs sued Nassau County and the Village of Garden City under the Fair Housing Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with discriminatory zoning practices; to order Garden City to approve a proposed zoning that would allow for affordable housing; and to order the defendants to take all actions necessary to assure that the Social Service Site be redeveloped to maximize the availability of affordable and integrated housing. On February 15, 2012, Judge Arthur D. Spatt granted defendant County's motion for summary judgment dismissing all claims against it. On April 22, 2014, Judge Spatt issued a final order for the plaintiffs and ordered Defendant Garden City to take a number of steps to prevent discrimination and to increase access to affordable housing. After Judge Spatt's order, both parties appealed the decision. The Second Circuit affirmed in part and remanded in part. The case is back in the lower courts on remand. On remand, Judge Spatt found that the plaintiffs had met their burden at trial in demonstrating that the Garden City\u2019s proffered reasons for its chosen zoning change could have been met by another practice, such as R-M zoning, that had a less discriminatory effect. Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay thereafter awarded plaintiffs $5,255,108.94 in attorneys fees and costs from Garden City. On March 15, 2019, Judge Spatt signed the parties\u2019 stipulation of discontinuance with prejudice, except without prejudice as to the court\u2019s jurisdiction for the purpose of interpretation or enforcement of the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement required the County to pay $5,400,000 to the plaintiffs to be used for the purpose of furthering and promoting mixed-income affordable housing; $120,000 to NYCC to be used for activities related to fair and affordable housing; and $400,000 to plaintiffs\u2019 counsel for attorneys\u2019 fees. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On June 17, 2011, the United States filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a71691-1691f (\"ECOA\") against the Nixon State Bank. The Nixon State Bank is a community-based bank in Nixon, Texas that offers a range of loan products, including mortgage loans, consumer loans, commercial loans, and agriculture loans. The U.S. alleged that in making these loans, the bank exhibited a pattern or practice of anti-Hispanic discrimination, providing loans to Hispanics at higher rates than to non-Hispanics, without justification. Settlement negotiations preceded the filing of the complaint, and on June 21, 2011, the District Court (Judge Fred Biery) approved a consent order, under which the defendant agreed to develop and establish uniform pricing policies and procedures designed to ensure nondiscriminatory pricing, and to numerous other implementation provisions, including fair credit training, systemic monitoring, complaint resolution processes, and $91,000 in damages to aggrieved persons. The provisions of the order were scheduled to last 4 and 1/4 years.", "summary": "This 2011 federal fair lending lawsuit in the Western District of Texas was brought by the United States against a local bank the U.S. alleged had engaged in a pattern or practice of providing loans to Hispanics only at higher rates than to non-Hispanics, without justification. In the settlement, submitted simultaneously with the complaint, the bank agreed to develop and establish uniform pricing policies and procedures designed to ensure nondiscriminatory pricing, and to numerous other implementation provisions, including fair credit training, systemic monitoring, complaint resolution processes, and $91,000 in damages to aggrieved persons. The provisions of the order were scheduled to last 4 and 1/4 years."}
{"article": "On December 08, 2010, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court, Northern District of Texas under the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts against PrimeLending. The plaintiff asked the court for injunctive and monetary relief, claiming that the defendant displayed a pattern and practice of discrimination in lending on the basis of race against African-American borrowers. On January 11, 2011, the parties entered into a consent order in which Primelending agreed to, 1) refrain from engaging in any act or practice that discriminates on the basis of race in any aspect of a residential real estate-related transaction, 2) alter its lending policy and procedures to prevent the facilitation of race based discrimination, 3) submit to a monitoring and reporting program to ensure compliance with the consent order, 4) provide borrowers with a general notice of nondiscrimination, 5) provide equal credit opportunity training to its employees and officers, 6) provide a total of $2 million to be distributed among those aggrieved, 7) allocate any portion of the $2 million that remains unclaimed to organizations that provide credit counseling and general financial education to African-American borrowers, 8) maintain a complaint resolution program to resolve discrimination claims by borrowers. In September 2012, the defendants finished giving $2 million to those aggrieved as per the consent order and then received permission from the court to disburse the remaining $367,900 to 15 organizations supporting African-American borrowers. The consent decree terminated in 2015, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "The United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts against PrimeLending, claiming that the defendant displayed a pattern or practice of discrimination in lending on the basis of race against African-American borrowers. The parties entered into a consent order in which Primelending agreed to refrain from practicing race based discrimination, submit to a monitoring and reporting program, provide borrowers with a general notice of nondiscrimination, provide equal credit opportunity training to its employees, provide a total of $2 million to be distributed among those aggrieved, allocate any unclaimed portion of the $2 million to organizations that provide general financial education to African-American borrowers, and maintain a complaint resolution program to resolve discrimination claims."}
{"article": "On December 19, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-TX-0009-0001.pdf\">this suit</a> in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against Fort Davis State Bank (FDSB), alleging violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1691-1691f (ECOA). Specifically, the DOJ claimed that, from at least 2008 to 2010, FDSB engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of national origin by charging Hispanic borrowers higher interest rates on unsecured consumer loans compared to the rates it charged similarly situated non-Hispanic, white borrowers. DOJ asked the court for injunctive relief and an award of monetary damages to all persons harmed by these policies and practices. That same day, the parties jointly filed a proposed consent order, which the District Court (Judge Robert A. Junell) approved and entered on January 2, 2014. Under the consent order, FDSB did not admit to any violation of ECOA, but agreed to:<ul><li>Implement a monitoring program to ensure compliance with the consent order;<li>Display and provide to borrowers a notice of non-discrimination;<li>Provide ECOA training to its management officials, loan officers, and other relevant employees;<li>Deposit $159,000 into an escrow account for payment to the aggrieved borrowers;<li>Develop a complaint resolution process for customers alleging loan discrimination; and<li>Submit status reports to the DOJ.</ul>On November 3, 2014, the District Court (Judge Robert A. Junell) entered an order administratively closing the case but retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the consent order. The consent order remained in effect until early 2017. Since there has been no substantive docket activity after 2014, the case is presumably closed.", "summary": "On December 19, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas against Fort Davis State Bank, alleging that it charged Hispanic borrowers higher interest rates on unsecured consumer loans compared to the rates it charged white borrowers, in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. In January 2014, the District Court (Judge Robert A. Junell) approved a consent order in which the bank agreed to implement a variety of practices to address these alleged violations and to pay damages to aggrieved borrowers. The consent order remained in effect until early 2017. Since there has been no substantive docket activity after 2014, the case is presumably closed."}
{"article": "On September 26, 2013, the United States of America filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Wisconsin against Southport Bank, under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The plaintiff, represented by the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, compensatory damages to all of the victims of the defendant's discriminatory policies, and a civil penalty, alleging that the defendant discriminated against African American and Hispanic borrowers because of race and national origin in its residential mortgage lending. Based on statistical analyses made in 2007 and 2008, the FDIC determined that the defendant had substantial disparities in the rates given to minority versus non-Hispanic (\"white\") borrowers. The FDIC performed an investigation, and in 2012 referred the matter to the Department of Justice to continue the investigation since there was reason to believe that the defendant had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination. The data obtained from the investigation showed that in 2007 and 2008, when all other factors were accounted for, the defendant permitted its mortgage brokers to charge excessive broker fees to African American and Hispanic borrowers more frequently than white borrowers based solely on race and national origin. The defendant had a two-step process set in place where the first step determined whether the applicant satisfied objective criteria. The second step was more subjective and allowed mortgage brokers to charge fees with little checks on their discretion. The defendant did not set up objective criteria to guide the mortgage brokers in setting fees. On October 11, 2013, the District Court (Judge Joseph Peter Stadtmueller) entered a consent order between the parties. The defendant did not admit to any pattern or practice of discrimination. The order enjoined the defendant from engaging in any act or practice that discriminates on the basis of race or national origin in any aspect of a residential real estate-related transaction in violation of the Fair Housing Act or any credit transaction in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Among other things, the defendant's employees would participate in a fair lending training program and would be subject to monitoring and reporting requirements. The defendant also agreed to place $687,000 into a settlement fund to compensate for monetary damages that aggrieved persons may have suffered. After dispersing damages to eligible recipients who responded to notice, more than $200,000 remained in the settlement fund. On February 5, 2016, the court ordered the remaining money to be disbersed to the organizations proposed by the parties: Housing Resources, The Urban League of Racine and Kenosha, NeighborhoodWorks Badgerland, and Habitat for Humanity of Kenosha. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On September 26, 2013, the United States of America filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Wisconsin against Southport Bank, under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The plaintiff, represented by the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, compensatory damages to all of the victims of the defendant's discriminatory policies, and a civil penalty, alleging that the defendant discriminated against African American and Hispanic borrowers because of race and national origin in its residential mortgage lending. On October 11, 2013, the District Court (Judge Joseph Peter Stadtmueller) entered a consent order between the parties. The defendant did not admit to any pattern or practice of discrimination. The order enjoined the defendant from engaging in any act or practice that discriminates on the basis of race or national origin in any aspect of a residential real estate-related transaction in violation of the Fair Housing Act or any credit transaction in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Among other things, the defendant's employees will have to participate in a fair lending training program and will be subject to monitoring and reporting requirements. The defendant also has to place $687,000 into a settlement fund to compensate for monetary damages that aggrieved persons may have suffered. The order terminates after three years if the defendant has complied during that time period."}
{"article": "On May 1, 1984, the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division informed the Governor of Connecticut that it would investigate the living conditions at Southbury Training School, an institutional care facility for people with intellectual disabilities (ICF/MR) in Southbury, Connecticut, pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997 et seq. On September 11, 1985, the Department of Justice announced its findings. Three lawsuits, including this CRIPA lawsuit, followed. A class action, Messier v. Southbury Training School, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=440\">ID-CT-0003</a> in this Clearinghouse, appears to have been treated as a companion case at some points during litigation. Another private action, McCoy v. Belmont, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=5464\">ID-CT-0006</a>, appears to have been separately litigated. Judge Ellen B. Burns of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut adjudicated all or part of these three lawsuits. The United States filed this lawsuit against the State of Connecticut, its Department of Mental Retardation, and the Director of Southbury on July 25, 1986. The United States alleged that living conditions at Southbury placed residents in grave danger of bodily harm and death. According to the Complaint, the individuals with developmental disabilities placed at Southbury were subject to systematic abuse and neglect. Southbury did not provide adequate medical and psychological care and employed too few medical and direct care staff. In addition, Southbury's facilities were unsafe and unsanitary. Instead of offering residents individualized habilitative programming, Southbury used physical and chemical restraints to control most residents' behavior. On July 25, 1986, the parties also entered a consent decree, under which the State admitted no wrongdoing but agreed to dramatically change Southbury's operations. For instance, the State agreed to institute individualized habilitation programming for all residents and to only use chemical and physical restraints in emergencies or when medically or therapeutically indicated. In addition, the State agreed to improve medical care by hiring more medical staff, developing a medical recordkeeping system, and improving the availability and overall quality of medical care and physical therapy. In addition, the state agreed to improve staff-to-resident ratios by either hiring and training more direct care staff or reducing the number of Southbury's residents (in 1986, Southbury had over one thousand residents). In addition, Southbury agreed to strategically address any new deficiencies or risks to residents' health or lives. Although the consent decree could only be enforced by those party to it, the defendants agreed to submit quarterly progress reports to the court. The court approved the consent decree on December 26, 1986, just four days after denying the Messier plaintiffs' petition for intervener status. Connecticut's compliance with the consent decree was rocky from the start. On July 28, 1987, the State petitioned the court to extend some of the consent decree's original deadlines because approval of the remedial plan was taking longer than expected. The court did not approve the remedial plan until July 22, 1988. On April 24, 1990, the court issued a remedial order directed to deficiencies in individualized planning, program staffing, medical treatment, and mental health care. Under the 1990 remedial order, Southbury's staff was required to monitor medicated residents for side effects, especially tardive dyskinesia. In addition, the court mandated monthly human rights reviews for residents with aggressive or self-injurious behaviors and for residents on psychotropic medications. Finally, the State was instructed to hire more physicians (general practitioners and specialists) and nurses to serve residents at Southbury. On December 1, 1991, the court modified the 1990 remedial order. Dissatisfied with the effects of the consent decree, Southbury's residents filed Messier v. Southbury Training School in 1994. On March 5, 1996, the court denied the Messier plaintiffs' motion to consolidate their lawsuit with United States v. Connecticut. The court, however, agreed that Southbury was still not providing adequate services to persons with developmental disabilities. On June 19, 1996, the court held the State in contempt of the consent decree, remedial plan, and remedial orders and appointed a Special Master (David Ferleger) to oversee compliance. United States v. Connecticut, 931 F. Supp. 974 (D. Conn. 1996), appeal dismissed, No. 96-6218, 1997 WL 321594 (2d Cir. June 13, 1997). The court was especially concerned by the rates and causes of mortality at Southbury. For instance, one resident died from severe burns after he lit his clothes on fire while smoking. The court noted that Southbury knew that the resident smoked unsafely, but neither taught him how to smoke safely nor observed him when he smoked. Between July 30, 1997, and February 22, 2006, the Special Master submitted twenty-six status reports, sixty-three topic-specific reports, and numerous other reports, recommendations, and analyses. Based on the docket, it appears that the Special Master addressed (1) individualized planning, (2) community placement policies, (3) abuse and neglect, (4) the rights of persons with disabilities, (5) human rights and behavioral programming reviews, (6) occupational and physical therapy, (7) medical and dental care, (8) dosage benchmarks, (9) physical restraint techniques and standards, (10) mortality investigations, (11) case management and advocacy, (12) quality assurance plans, (13) facility upkeep, safety, and sanitation, (14) transportation, (15) employment of direct care staff, medical professionals, and specialized therapists, and (16) staff development. The defendants contested most of the Special Master's reports, but the court ultimately accepted all of them. For instance, on February 22, 2004, the court accepted and adopted the Special Master's report on Southbury's development of mortality review procedures. It appears that the court began removing components of the consent decree from active judicial oversight in August 2000. On November 22, 2002, the Messier plaintiffs again requested intervener status, but the court denied their request on January 7, 2003. On June 24, 2004, the court similarly denied a motion by the Messier plaintiffs to file an amicus curiae brief about compliance with the consent decree. On June 20, 2005, the parties filed a revised joint settlement agreement, which would have released all outstanding elements of the consent decree from active judicial oversight. The court, however, refused to endorse the agreement on July 21, 2005. The court was apparently concerned about continued deficiencies in habilitation programming and medical care. On September 16, 2005, the State filed a notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, but did not request that the district court proceedings be stayed. On January 17, 2006, the Special Master reported that the State had successfully implemented comprehensive habilitation programming for all persons served at Southbury. On February 26, 2006, the Special Master's medical consultant issued a similar report regarding the adequacy of medical care. On March 25, 2006, the court issued an order purging the defendants of contempt and concluding judicial oversight of the consent decree and remedial plan. The court, however, retained jurisdiction over the consent decree and remedial order for enforcement purposes. Between March 24 and June 25, 2006, the court declared all outstanding motions moot, finalized payment to the Special Master, and ordered the return of unused Special Master funds to the State. On June 25, 2006, Connecticut withdrew its joint settlement agreement appeal. Today, Southbury's website embraces the philosophy of community placement and acknowledges that future challenges will require Southbury to continue to grow and develop. On November 2, 2009, the Court granted a joint motion to dismiss the case because the parties agreed that the consent decree and remedial plan were fully implemented.", "summary": "Following an investigation by the United States Department of Justice, the U.S. filed this lawsuit against the State of Connecticut, its Department of Mental Retardation, and the Director of Southbury Training School (Southbury) on July 25, 1986, alleging that living conditions at Southbury placed residents in grave danger of bodily harm and death. On the same day, the parties also entered into a consent decree that required Southbury to provide better programming, disciplinary procedures, medical care, recordkeeping, and increase staffing. After some problems with compliance and placing the state in contempt, the Court assigned a special master to monitor Southbury. After making significant progress, on March 25, 2006, the court ended judicial oversight, but retained jurisdiction over the consent decree and remedial plan. On November 2, 2009, the Court granted a joint motion to dismiss the case because the parties agreed that the consent decree and remedial plan were fully implemented."}
{"article": "After budget cuts, an intermediate care facility serving individuals with intellectual disabilities operated by Washington State was ordered to cut costs by up to $1.8 million. To comply with the October 2010 order, management moved 27 residents from the intermediate care facility to its nursing facility and simultaneously reduced programs and staffing at both sites. After bringing problems to the attention of state agencies, investigations by Disability Rights Washington (DRW)\u2014the state National Disability Rights Network organization\u2014found materially significant loss of services, findings which were confirmed by the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS). In fact, CMS found over 40,000 violations of the NHRA pertaining to these 27 individuals alone. CMS found that Washington State failed to comply with Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA), that residents were housed in inappropriate settings, the transfer violated federal law, and as a result the state had received federal funds in error. CMS then announced an expansion of the investigation to other state-operated, Medicaid-certified nursing facilities. Pertinent state departments issued a corrective action plan in response to CMS\u2019s findings. DRW claimed the correction plan was inadequate in a complaint it filed on April 16, 2014 on behalf of a class of plaintiffs of people with intellectual disabilities. Filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, the plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services and the Director of the Washington State Health Care Authority in their official capacities under the Medicaid Act and the Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA). The plaintiffs, represented by both DRW and a private firm, sought injunctive and declaratory relief to require defendants to establish an adequate system to provide Pre-admission Screening and Resident Review (PASRR) screenings, assessments, specialized services, and, when appropriate, community-based integrated placement for class members who reside in privately-operated Medicaid-certified Nursing Facilities. Defendants filed an answer on May 8, 2014. The plaintiff moved for class certification on October 17, 2014 and filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of the proper standard for PASRR screenings and evaluations. On November 10, 2014 defendants responded to plaintiffs\u2019 motions and moved to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s claims and for partial summary judgment. The motions were resolved by the court on April 10, 2015 with Judge James L. Robart ruling mostly in favor of the plaintiffs. 99 F.Supp.3d 1297. The Judge granted part of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, but gave plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint and file a valid claim. The Court certified a class (April 10, 2015) comprised of all individuals who: (A) are or will be residents of Medicaid-certified, privately-operated nursing facilities in the State of Washington; and (B) who are Medicaid recipients with an intellectual disability or related condition(s) such that they are eligible to be screened and assessed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396r(e)(7) and 42 C.F.R. \u00a7 483.122 et seq. The defendants appealed the class certification on April 24, 2015 to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Docket #:15-80076. The defendants claimed that the plaintiff\u2019s only allegation was that he should have been a part of this class, so therefore was not qualified to represent it. On August 10, 2015, Judges Michael Daly Hawkins and Andrew D. Hurwitz of the Ninth Circuit denied permission to appeal. After negotiations, in August of 2016, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for approval of a settlement agreement, class certification, and a settlement approval hearing and process. The settlement agreement required copies to be sent to every member of the class. Class members would also be notified of the date and time of the final settlement hearing. Any objecting class member had an opportunity to speak at the final hearing. After giving time for notice to be provided to all class members, the final settlement hearing took place on January 9, 2017. The court approved the final settlement agreement on January 10, 2017. 2017 WL 123011. The settlement provided for a comprehensive reform of defendant\u2019s PASRR screenings required under the NHRA, establishing procedures for timeliness of evaluations, Post-PASRR meetings, provision of specialized services to increase class members\u2019 independence and/or discharge planning for class members who are medically able and willing to live in an alternative placement in the community. It also established metrics for monitoring implementation of new PASRR system, with reporting to class counsel on a quarterly basis. The court retained jurisdiction over the case and the settlement agreement. Lodestar attorneys\u2019 fees of over $600,000 were scheduled to be paid by defendants. The settlement is still ongoing and under court supervision through September 30, 2020. The settlement agreements provides for a joint court order to terminate the case if the defendants show that they have completed all requirements before the September 2020 date. EXTERNAL RESOURCES WEBSITE: https://www.disabilityrightswa.org/cases/dunakin-v-lashway/", "summary": "Disability Rights Washington filed this class action on behalf of individuals with intellectual disabilities in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington in April 2014. They sued the State healthcare authority and department of social services, alleging that budget cuts resulted in inadequate services in violation of the Nursing Home Reform Act. The parties reached a preliminary settlement one year later and the final settlement was approved in January 2017. The settlement is ongoing and under court supervision through September 30, 2020."}
{"article": "In 1990, prior to the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act, a group of residents of the Wyoming State Training School, an institution that housed individuals with intellectual disabilities, brought this lawsuit. Represented by the Wyoming Protection and Advocacy System, the plaintiffs sought to remedy unconstitutional conditions and statutory violations at the institution and aimed to force Wyoming to create community living options for many of its residents. Though it predated the ADA (and the ADA interpretation endorsed by the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C.), the lawsuit alleged numerous legal violations. The plaintiffs alleged violations of state and federal disability-focused statutes, most prominently Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Medicaid. The plaintiffs also alleged violations of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (now the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act) based on the institutions' failures to assess the individual needs of and provide educational services to school-age children in the institution. Finally, via 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the plaintiffs alleged that the institution and its officials violated the U.S. Constitution (including a number of Due Process-based liberty interests and Equal Protection). The Complaint detailed an extensive set of inhumane and neglectful circumstances that led to these violations. Individuals in the Wyoming State Training School were not individually assessed or provided with sufficient habilitation, training, and treatment for their needs. Staff routinely failed to protect residents from abuse and physical injuries (including self-inflicted injuries). There was insufficient space and lack of privacy for the residents. Residents were not provided socialization, stimulation, education, therapy, or training in self-care. Staff were overwhelmed, unsupported and not provided with adequate training. The Complaint further alleged that the plaintiffs had a right to live in the community where possible, and that the state was responsible for providing the services that would allow Training School residents to live in integrated settings. The litigation process moved toward settlement. On April 27, 1990, the parties stipulated to the certification of the class and entered a Stipulation to Establish the Framework for Settlement. In this Stipulation, the parties laid out areas to resolve, appointed an expert committee to carry out the negotiation, made plans to provide for the immediate needs of the plaintiffs, and set ground rules for future negotiation. In July 1990, the parties entered a stipulation on the immediate needs of the plaintiffs, which included the creation of an Immediate Needs Assessment Team to engage in the necessary individualized planning for each plaintiff. After several more months of discovery and negotiations, the parties entered a complete Settlement Agreement on March 31, 1991 to address the needs of both those residing at the institution and individuals with disabilities who would be at risk of placement in the institution without additional support services. The Agreement sought to substantially improve conditions at the Wyoming State Training School. It covered the nature of the institution, its staffing, educational opportunities, and individualized planning, with substantial monitoring and reporting requirements. The agreement also sought to increase the availability of community placement options. The parties selected a Compliance Advisory Board (CAB) composed of two experts who would both assist in carrying out the agreement and report to the court on its implementation. The CAB continued to report to the court until the fall of 1994. During this period, a bout of litigation emerged in the case over the placement of class member Sara Kawulok. With the Kawulok issue resolved and substantial progress documented, the parties agreed to relieve the CAB of its reporting requirements in late 1994. The parties entered a permanent settlement in October 1994 and in December 1994, the court dismissed its jurisdiction over the case.", "summary": "Individuals with intellectual disabilities residing in the Wyoming State Training School filed this lawsuit in 1990 to challenge conditions at the School and a lack of community placement options. The parties agreed in 1991 to a settlement that was designed not only to improve conditions in the institution, but also to prevent unnecessary institutionalization and create options for community living for individuals with intellectual disabilities in Wyoming. The court's jurisdiction was ended in 1994."}
{"article": "This case is the reincarnation of a previously filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the Legal Arizona Workers Act (the \"Act\"). The District Court (Judge Wake) dismissed that suit, Arizona Contractors Assoc., Inc. v. Napolitano, on December 7, 2007 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that there was no justiciable case or controversy against the Governor or Attorney General, as they did not have the power to enforce the challenged Act. The court noted that only county attorneys had that power. Immediately after the dismissal of Arizona Contractors, on December 9, 2007, a coalition of trade organizations and Arizona employers filed a lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2201 and 2201 in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Phoenix division [Arizona Contractors Ass'n v. Candelaria, 07-2496]. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel at this stage, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief and attorney's fees, challenging the constitutionality of the Act. The Act required Arizona employers to verify the employment eligibility of each employee through a federal verification program and established sanctions against Arizona employers that employed aliens who were not authorized to work. The Act provides the Superior Court of the State of Arizona with the power to suspend or revoke the business licenses of employers who intentionally or knowingly employ illegal aliens. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the Act was pre-empted by federal immigration law. A companion case was also re-filed on December 12, 2007 by the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the National Immigration Law Center, the ACLU Foundation Immigrants Rights Project and the Arizona ACLU. [Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Goddard, 2:07-cv-02518-SMM]. The District Court (Judge Neil V. Wake) consolidated these two remaining cases on December 14, 2007. Plaintiffs in the consolidated action alleged, as they had in the previously filed case, that the Act violated the Supremacy Clause of the U. S. Constitution as it was preempted by federal immigration law and the federal government's exclusive authority to regulate immigration. Plaintiffs also asserted that the Act violated the due process rights of employers and workers. The Arizona Contractor plaintiffs also asserted violations of the Commerce Clause, the Fourth Amendment and the Arizona state constitution. Prior to consolidation, plaintiffs had requested a preliminary injunction in each case. Defendants moved to dismiss the cases. On February 7, 2008 Judge Wake found that federal immigration law did not preempt the Act, and it did not violate the Due Process Clause or the Commerce Clause. Arizona Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Candalaria, 534 F.Supp.2d 1036 (2008). Specifically, Judge Wake found that Section 1324a(h)(2) of the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) expressly authorized the Act at issue in this case. The relevant section of the federal statute reads \"the provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.\" Judge Wake found that the Act was a licensing or similar law and thus fell within the federal statute's savings clause. Furthermore, Judge Wake held that the Act's requirement of mandatory use of the federal E-Verify program did not conflict with federal objects or purposes, even though Congress had decided to make the program optional. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, the plaintiffs renewed their argument that federal law expressly preempted the Act. Moreover, the Act's mandatory requirement to use E-Verify, the plaintiffs contended, was impliedly preempted by federal law because it conflicts with the policies envisioned in the voluntary nature of the program under federal law. On September 17, 2008 the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit (Judges Mary M. Schroeder, John M. Walker, Jr., and N. Randy Smith) affirmed the District Court's finding Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (2008). In doing so, the Court of Appeals held that federal immigration law did not preempt the Act. The court explained that the Act was not expressly preempted because it fell within ICRA's savings clause allowing for state licensing and similar laws to regulate the employment of unauthorized aliens. Moreover, the court found that federal law does not impliedly preempt the Act's provision mandating the use of E-Verify. The court found it telling that \"Congress could have, but did not, expressly forbid state laws from requiring E-Verify participation.\" On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the named petitioners of the consolidated cases that made it to the Supreme Court, argued that the Court of Appeals had misinterpreted ICRA's savings clause and consequently had incorrectly ruled that the Act was not preempted. Furthermore, the petitioners argued that even if the Act was not expressly preempted by ICRA, federal law impliedly preempted it because it conflicted with the structure and function of federal law. The respondents replied in their brief that the Court of Appeals had been correct when it held that federal law did not preempt the Act. On May 26, 2011 the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, affirmed the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit's judgment. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S.Ct. 1968 (2011). In doing so, the Court held that the Act fell within ICRA's savings clause and was thus not expressly preempted by federal law. Specifically the Court found that \"The Arizona law, on its face, purports to impose sanctions through licensing laws[,]\" which placed it squarely within ICRA's savings clause that allowed for States to regulate the employment of unauthorized individuals through licensing and similar laws. The Court was particularly unmoved by the petitioners' argument that the Act was not a licensing law because it only dealt with the revocation of licenses rather than the granting of them. In fact, the Court flatly rejected that argument. Moreover, the Court found that federal law did not impliedly preempt the Act because \"Arizona's procedures simply implement the sanctions that Congress expressly allowed Arizona to pursue through licensing laws.\" Lastly, the Court found that the Act's requirement that employers use E-Verify was not impliedly preempted because it did not conflict with federal law. The district court's dismissal of the matter therefore stood, and the case was ended.", "summary": "These 2007 consolidated cases were brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona to challenge the \"Legal Arizona Workers Act\", which mandates investigation and prosecution of employers who knowingly or intentionally employ unauthorized aliens and requires the revocation of the licenses of employers found to have done so. It also makes mandatory a previously voluntary verification process. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings, holding that the Act fell within ICRA's savings clause and thus was not expressly preempted by federal law."}
{"article": "On July 6, 2010, the United States filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Arizona against the State of Arizona and the Governor. The plaintiff, represented by the Department of Justice (DOJ), sought declaratory and injunctive relief, against the recently enacted S.B. 1070, which contained several provisions designed to \"discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens\" in Arizona. The DOJ argued that S.B. 1070 was a violation of the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and that it was preempted by federal law. The DOJ filed a motion for a preliminary injunction the same day to enjoin the defendant from enforcing S.B. 1070 until the Court made a determination as to its constitutionality. Specifically, the DOJ claimed that S.B. 1070 impermissibly infringed on the federal government's right to enact and enforce immigration policy. Note that this case was related to two others, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12123\">Friendly House v. Whiting</a> and <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12125\">League of United Latin American Citizens v. Arizona</a>, in which plaintiffs filed suit against the State of Arizona also seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the implementation of S.B. 1070. On July 28, 2010, the court (Judge Susan R. Bolton) granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (703 F.Supp.2d 980). The court found that the DOJ was not likely to succeed on the merits in showing that certain provisions of the legislation were preempted by federal law, but that the DOJ was likely to succeed on other provisions. Some of the enjoined provisions included a portion of Section 2 of S.B. 1070 \"requiring that an officer make a reasonable attempt to determine the immigration status of a person stopped, detained or arrested if there is a reasonable suspicion that the person is unlawfully present in the United States\" and Section 3 of S.B. 1070 \"requiring verification of the immigration status of any person arrested prior to releasing that person and creating a crime for the failure to apply for or carry alien registration papers.\" In the two weeks immediately following the complaint filing, several groups filed motions for amicus briefs, including a collection of states in support of the defendants and the American Bar Association in support of the DOJ. The court denied these amicus pleadings in an order on September 3, 2010, as moot, because the court had not considered the briefs before issuing the preliminary injunction. Immediately following the issuance of the preliminary injunction, the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit. The 9th Circuit (Judge Paez) upheld the district court's decision in an opinion filed on April 11, 2011. The court found that Congress intended for \"systematic state immigration enforcement (to) occur under the direction and close supervision of the Attorney General\" and that S.B. 1070 on its face impermissibly interfered with that intent. The court affirmed the preliminary injunction as issued by the district court. (641 F.3d 339) The defendants appealed that ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted cert on December 12, 2011, and arguments were held April 25, 2012. On June 25, 2012, Justice Kennedy announced the decision of the Court, affirming in part and reversing in part. The Court held that several provisions of S.B. 1070 were properly enjoined but declined to strike down Section 2(B), which required state police to check the immigration status of people arrested under non-immigration state law. However, the Court did not uphold the provision either, instead deciding that if it was construed to not authorize extra detention time, it might be constitutional. (183 L.Ed.2d 351). On August 8, 2012, the Ninth Circuit (Judges John T. Noonan, Richard A. Paez, and Carlos T. Bea) returned the case to the district court for \"further proceedings consistent with the opinion and judgment of the Supreme Court.\" (2012 WL 3205612) On September 18, 2012, pursuant to the stipulation between the parties and the prior Supreme Court ruling, the district court dissolved the preliminary injunction of Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070. The court also permanently enjoined Sections 3 and 6, which created criminal penalties for immigrant who did not federally register or carry federal registration documents, and authorized law enforcement officers to arrest without a warrant anyone they had probable cause to believe committed a removable public offense. On March 7, 2013, the parties filed a joint status report indicating two of the plaintiff's claims remained unresolved: (1) plaintiff's claim regarding Section 2(B), and (2) plaintiff's claim against Section 4 of S.B. 1070, which amended the Arizona statute that established criminal penalties for \"smuggling of human beings for profit or commercial purpose.\" The parties agreed to the voluntary dismissal without prejudice of plaintiff's claim against Section 2(B) in light of the Supreme Court decision. The parties proposed that adjudication of plaintiff's claim against Section 4 of S.B. 1070 be stayed pending the Ninth Circuit's decision in <i>Valle del Sol, Inc. v. Whiting</i> (No. 12-17152), because the courts' resolution in that case was likely to have an effect on the smuggling provision in Section 4. The plaintiffs in that case challenged a portion of Section 5 of S.B. 1070 that imposes criminal penalties under certain circumstances for transporting or harboring an unlawfully present alien and encouraging or inducing an alien to enter or reside in Arizona in violation of law. On October 8, 2013, the Ninth Circuit Court issued a decision in <i>Valle del Sol, Inc. v. Whiting</i>, 2013 WL 5526525. The court found that the challenged provision was both void for vagueness and preempted by federal law. The court therefore affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction against the provision. On April 21, 2014, the Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari filed by the State and Governor of Arizona in <i>Valle del Sol</i>, thus ending any further review of the Ninth Circuit decision. On May 29, 2014, the parties notified the court that they had reached an agreement in principle to resolve the plaintiff\u2019s claims regarding Sections 2(B) and 5 of S.B. 1070, under which the United States dismissed without prejudice its facial challenge to Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070, and the defendants stipulated to a permanent injunction against implementation of Section 5 of S.B. 1070. The parties noted that they had not been able to reach any agreement regarding Section 4 of S.B. 1070. On June 9, 2014, the court ordered all claims in the United States\u2019 complaint challenging on its face Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 to be dismissed without prejudice and Section 5 be permanently enjoined. On July 18, 2014, the U.S. moved for judgment regarding the one claim remaining in this action challenging Section 4 of S.B. 1070. On November 7, 2014, the court granted U.S.'s motion for judgment, stating that the Ninth Circuit\u2019s holding in <i>Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting</i> dictated that federal law preempted the state law on both field and conflict preemption grounds. On January 6, 2015, the defendants filed an appeal in 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, but subsequently filed a motion to dismiss. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On July 6, 2010, the United States filed a lawsuit under the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution against the state of Arizona and the Governor of Arizona in her official capacity in the U.S. District Court of Arizona. The plaintiff claimed that the recently enacted S.B. 1070, which contains several provisions designed to \"discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens\" in Arizona, impermissibly infringes on the federal government's right to enact and enforce immigration policy. On July 28, 2010, the district court issued a preliminary injunction. The defendant appealed the grant of the injunction. On April 11, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, issued an opinion upholding the injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court granted cert on December 12, 2011 and issued their opinion on June 25, 2012. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, striking down most of the challenged provisions of S.B. 1070."}
{"article": "On May 17, 2010, a group of organizations and individuals filed this lawsuit against the sheriff and district attorney of each of the fifteen counties in Arizona, in their official capacities, in the U.S. District Court of Arizona. The plaintiff, represented by organizations such as the ACLU and the National Immigration Law Center along with private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the recently enacted S.B. 1070 was a violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that S.B. 1070 conflicted with federal law and procedures and that local law enforcement agencies were ill-equipped to deal with the complexities of immigration law. For example, one provision of S.B. 1070 allowed police officers to ask for identification during a routine stop if there is a \"reasonable suspicion\" that the individual is not a U.S. citizen. The plaintiffs claimed that this provision was written primarily to provide a pretextual reason to stop an individual for some other state or local law violation in order to investigate that individual's immigration status. Immigration status, however, is not easily determined through an identification card of some kind\u2014federal authorities may be aware of an individual's presence in the country but may not be pursuing deportation proceedings. The plaintiffs contended that local law enforcement lacked the training and knowledge to investigate immigration status. On June 4, 2010, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction. The court (Judge Susan R. Bolton) held a hearing on June 22, 2010, and stated that the motions would be held under advisement. On June 18, 2010, the court granted the State of Arizona and the governor's motions to intervene as defendants. On June 25, 2010, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to transfer related case. In this order, the court allowed the transfer of four other cases challenging the constitutionality of S.B. 1070. On October 8, 2010, the court granted in part and denied in part motions to dismiss filed by several of the defendants. The plaintiffs' first preliminary injunction motion, regarding certain provisions of S.B. 1070, was denied. At oral argument, the plaintiff withdrew their motion for a preliminary injunction regarding part of S.B. 1070 based on the NInth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in <i>Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach</i>. The court found that a preliminary injunction was moot because an injunction was already issued in the related case <i>United States v. Arizona</i>. This case and <i>United States v. Arizona</i> challenged enforcement of the same provisions of S.B. 1070. On January 7, 2011, the plaintiffs filed another motion requesting a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendant from enforcing the provision of S.B. 1070 affected by the Redondo Beach case. On May 10, 2011, the court denied this motion without prejudice to its refiling at a later time because the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had not yet issued their opinion from the en banc court. In October 2011, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and a third motion for a preliminary Injunction. On February 29, 2012, the court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction and enjoined the defendants from enforcing A.R.S. \u00a7 13-2928 (A) and (B). This section of the law was intended to prevent employment solicitation on roadways where it interferes with the proper flow of traffic. The State of Arizona, as an intervenor-defendant, appealed the issuance of the preliminary injunction and, on May 9, 2012, filed their opening brief with the Ninth Circuit. The plaintiff sought class action status in their original complaint and on December 12, 2011, plaintiffs filed a motion to certify class. While that motion was pending, on June 25, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision in <i>Arizona v. United States</i>, affirming in part and reversing in part. The Court held that several provisions of S.B. 1070 were properly enjoined but declined to strike down Section 2(B), which required state police to check the immigration status of people arrested under nonimmigration state law. The Court explained that the legality of the provision would depend on how it was construed\u2014if it did not authorize extra detention time, it may be constitutional. Following that Supreme Court decision, the plaintiffs in this case filed a motion for preliminary injunction on July 17, 2012, seeking an injunction against two sections of the law. The plaintiffs requested that the court preliminarily enjoin \u00a7 2(B) on preemption, Fourth Amendment, and Equal Protection Clause bases, and A.R.S. \u00a7 13-2929 on preemption grounds. On March 27, 2013, the court affirmed the preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the day labor provisions. On April 9, 2013, the district court dismissed some of plaintiffs' claims in light of the U.S. Supreme Court\u2019s ruling in <i>Arizona v. United States</i>. The parties went through discovery and on March 17, 2015, the defendant moved for summary judgment with regard to plaintiffs' claims under the Supremacy Clause (Count One), Equal Protection Clause (Count Two), the First Amendment (Count Three), the Fourth Amendment (Count Four), Article II, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution (Count Five), the Due Process Clause (Count Six), and 42 U.S.C. \u00a71981 (Count Seven). On September 4, 2015, the district court granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment for Counts One, Two, Four, Five, Six, and Seven. The district court, however, entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs on the claim in Count Three. In other words, the court found that plaintiffs had not presented any evidence that police would enforce S.B. 1070 differently for Latinos than other people and that the plaintiffs failed to prove that \u00a7 2(B) was unconstitutional. The court also found that parts of the law targeting day laborers violated the First Amendment free speech protections. The parties filed cross-appeals to the Ninth Circuit. Before that appeal was decided, however, the plaintiffs and intervenor-defendants settled. The parties stipulated that the defendants would release an informal attorney general opinion, which would provide guidelines for the implementation of \u00a7\u00a7 2(b) and 2(d) of S.B. 1070, among other sections. The parties also stipulated that A.R.S. \u00a7\u00a7 28-3511A (1)(d) and (e) would be enjoined, and asked the court to enjoin those provisions. Finally, the plaintiffs would receive attorneys\u2019 fees and costs totaling $1.4 million. On September 19, 2016, the court entered an order enforcing all of these stipulations. There have been no further developments in this case; the case is presumably closed.", "summary": "On May 17, 2010, a group of organizations and individuals filed a lawsuit against the Sheriff and Attorney of each of the 15 counties in Arizona, in their official capacities, in the U.S. District Court of Arizona, Phoenix Division. The plaintiff, represented by organizations such as the ACLU and the National Immigration Law Center along with private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the recently enacted S.B. 1070 was a violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that S.B. 1070 conflicts with federal law and procedures and that local law enforcement agencies are ill equipped to deal with the complexities of immigration law. The district court granted a preliminary injunction in February 2012, which the defendants appealed. In a related case, Arizona v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down most of S.B. 1070. The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction against the remaining provisions of S.B. 1070 and while the parties were going through discovery disputes, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on March 17, 2015. The plaintiff filed a response to the defendant's summary judgment and on September 4, 2015, the district court ruled in favor of the defendant with regard to plaintiff's claims under the Supremacy Clause, Equal Protection Clause, the Fourth Amendment, Article II, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution, the Due Process Clause, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a71981. Notably, the court also entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on count three claim which was appealed. Finally, on September 15, 2016, both parties conferred and filed a joint case disposition in which the plaintiff settled for $1.4 million."}
{"article": "This is a class action about conditions of confinement in the \"hold rooms\" used by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for short-term detention of noncitizens apprehended near the border. The case deals with all the hold rooms in the Tucson Sector, which consists of nine \"stations\" covering most of Arizona and accounted for 18% of all border patrol apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border in 2014. Most recently, the District Court entered a comprehensive opinion finding conditions unconstitutional. On June 8, 2015, civil detainees confined in a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) \"hold room\" within the Tucson Sector of the U.S. Border Patrol filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). All plaintiffs were apprehended at or near the U.S. border with Mexico and then detained. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the ACLU of Arizona, the National Immigration Law Center, American Immigration Council, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, and the law firm Morrison & Foerster, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that they were subjected to inhumane and punitive conditions while being detained in holding cells. As expedited discovery proceeded, the plaintiffs moved in August 2015 for sanctions against defendants, asserting that defendants had violated discovery rules by destroying critical video evidence of unconstitutional conditions of confinement in the Tucson Sector CBP facilities. On Sept. 28, 2015, Judge Bury granted the plaintiffs' motion for sanctions in part. He found that defendants had caused spoliation of evidence and created prejudice against the plaintiffs because the destroyed videos contained the only visual evidence of conditions of confinement in these facilities. Consequently, Judge Bury ordered that defendants immediately produce all existing and retained video evidence of detainee holding areas that were the subject of this case. 2015 WL 13021467 (D. Ariz. 2015). On December 4, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking an immediate order for improved conditions in the hold rooms. Briefing on the motion was stayed for a short time until the resolution of the class action and motion to dismiss issues. On Jan. 11, 2016, Judge Bury certified the case as a class action. The class consisted of all individuals who at that time or in the future were detained for one or more nights at a Tuscon Sector CBP facility. 163 F.Supp.3d 630 (D. Ariz. 2016). A few weeks later, Judge Bury shifted the wording slighting, ordering that \"one or more nights\" be understood to mean \"more than 8 hours within the same calendar day.\" And on June 27, 2016, Judge Bury again amended the Jan. 11 order certifying the class, to include all individuals at that time or in the future who were detained at a Tuscon Sector CBP facility (regardless of duration). 2016 WL 8199309 (D. Ariz. 2016). The same day as he granted certification of the class, Judge Bury issued another order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs' APA claims were dismissed (on grounds that the challenged CBP conduct was not \"final agency action\"), but their constitutional claims remained. 2016 WL 3484403 (D. Ariz. 2016). Once the class was certified and the motion to dismiss denied, briefing continued on plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. The defendants sought to seal various court documents, but Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., moved to intervene for the limited purpose of opposing that motion. Judge Bury granted intervention on June 26, 2016, holding that the public interest in access to the record outweighed the defendants' rationale for keeping the documents sealed. Rejecting the defendants' general reasons based on privacy and law enforcement, Judge Bury asked the defendants for a more specific showing of harm from the disclosure of any document not already covered by a protective order, and ordered the unsealing of several documents. The preliminary injunction issue finally got to a hearing on Nov. 14-15, 2016; on Nov. 18, Judge Bury granted a preliminary injunction. He found that the plaintiffs had established a likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional claims and that violation of a constitutional right would constitute irreparable injury. Judge Bury stated that if defendants held detainees long enough for detainees to need to sleep, then defendants must maintain conditions of confinement adequate for the detainees' physical needs during that time (as there was no security rationale overriding this obligation). 2016 WL 8188563 (D. Ariz. 2016). The defendants moved for reconsideration on Dec. 2, which Judge Bury denied on Jan. 3, 2017. He did, though, clarify that the twelve-hour confinement period began when a detainee arrived at a CBP station. 2017 WL 467238 (D. Ariz. 2017). On Jan. 9, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for sanctions against the defendants for civil contempt, alleging violation of the court's Aug. 14, 2015, and Sept. 28, 2015, orders mandating that defendants produce relevant video evidence. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had failed to preserve from destruction videos of the Tucson Center hold rooms, and had failed to inform the plaintiffs or the Court of this problem. The defendants responded on Feb. 3. On Mar. 2, 2017, both parties filed notices to appeal to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, from Judge Bury's Nov. 18, 2016, and Jan. 3, 2017, orders. The 9th Circuit, on Mar. 3, opened two new dockets, Nos. 17-15381 and 17-15383, and set a briefing schedule. The 9th Circuit then set a mediation hearing for Mar. 20, but on that date, the Court declined to include the case in its mediation program. Back in the District Court, on Mar. 13, 2017, Judge Bury granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs' Jan. 9, 2017 motion for sanctions against the defendants for civil contempt. 2017 WL 7520602. Judge Bury found that the defendants had failed to take all reasonable steps within their power to preserve video evidence. While some violations were not good-faith or reasonable interpretations of court orders, other violations were merely technical or de minimis. Judge Bury ordered the defendants to improve certain aspects of their data archiving, to meet with plaintiffs about their progress, and to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this data discovery. Defendants responded on Mar. 20, stating that they were now either in compliance or on track to being in compliance with all requirements of the Court's Mar. 13 order. In the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, on Mar. 30, 2017, the plaintiffs filed their brief on cross-appeal. The plaintiffs acknowledged that the District Court had correctly recognized the detainees' due process rights to medical care, beds, and personal hygiene. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs argued, the District Court had erred as a matter of law by allowing CBP to deny detainees medical screenings and prescriptions by trained personnel, to deprive detainees of beds when held overnight, and to provide merely body wipes in lieu of showers. The defendants submitted their brief on cross-appeal on Apr. 27. They argued that the detainees' due process rights did not include sleeping mats for all detainees after twelve hours, and that the District Court had not abused its discretion in the terms of the preliminary injunction, considering the unique challenges faced by the Tuscon Sector Border Patrol. The plaintiffs filed another brief on cross-appeal on May 25, and the defendants filed a reply brief on June 8. The 9th Circuit (Judges Tallman, Callahan, and Ezra) held oral argument on Oct. 16. In the District Court, on Apr. 13, 2017, the defendants followed up on the Mar. 13 civil contempt order. The defendants informed Judge Bury of potential corruption and gaps in relevant video recordings, and maintained that these were good-faith errors and that defendants were working to fix them. Also on Apr. 13, the defendants moved to stay the District Court proceedings until the 9th Circuit ruled on the parties' cross-appeals of the District Court's preliminary injunction order. On May 25, 2017, Judge Bury granted in part and denied in part the motion to stay. Only expert discovery was stayed, while all other discovery was to proceed. Judge Bury stated:<blockquote>The hardship and inequity falls decidedly on the Plaintiffs. Staying this discovery, suspends not only resolution of the case but puts the Plaintiff at an evidentiary disadvantage. It creates a chronic state of evidentiary suspension, with any end in sight being totally dependent on the Government\u2019s ability to correct a problem which it has been unable or unwilling to correct for over a year.</blockquote> On Dec. 22, 2017, the Ninth Circuit (Judges Tallman, Callahan, and Ezra) affirmed the District Court's Nov. 18 preliminary injunction order. 878 F.3d 710. (The order had required defendants to provide detainees after 12 hours with mats and blankets, but not beds, showers, or medical care provided by medical professionals.) The opinion, written by Judge Callahan, found that the District Court had not abused its discretion in the limited preliminary injunction. According to the opinion, the District Court had broad discretion to craft this remedy to balance the detainees' constitutional rights with the government's interests. On Feb. 5, 2018, the plaintiffs petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a rehearing en banc. Plaintiffs argued that the Ninth Circuit's Dec. 22 decision conflicted with prior decisions of that court and the Supreme Court on (1) whether civil detainees' right to adequate medical care encompasses a right to screening conducted by properly trained individuals supervised by medical professionals, and (2) whether, having found the existence of constitutional violations, a district court may decline to fully remedy them based on government expense. However, on Mar. 13, the Ninth Circuit denied the rehearing petition. The Ninth Circuit mandate issued, putting into effect the judgment of its Dec. 22 decision. On May 4, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a sealed proposed motion for partial summary judgment. The clerk was to file the motion if the plaintiffs' motion to seal is granted. Throughout the rest of 2018, the parties litigated what evidence would be permitted in the motion for summary judgment and whether exhibits would be sealed. When this was resolved (by an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to seal) the clerk filed the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. The plaintiffs sought summary judgment on the issue of the defendants' obligation to provide beds. The plaintiffs asserted that civil pretrial detainees must be provided beds or mattresses raised off of the floor if held for any period requiring sleep and that \"anything less, including floor mats, is a violation of their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights.\u201d Further, the plaintiffs argued that the use of floor mats led to overcrowding and unsanitary conditions that are \u201creprehensible and dehumanizing.\u201d The plaintiffs contended that there are no disputed facts precluding partial summary for their claim that civil detainees are constitutionally entitled to beds. On March 15, 2019, Judge Bury issued an order denying the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. 2017 WL 7520603. Judge Bury held that Ninth Circuit case law does not support plaintiffs' request for judgment as a matter of law that providing floor mats rather than raised beds is an unconstitutional practice. Judge Bury concluded the court was to consider the severity and duration of the conditions, along with the operational needs of the detention facility, to determine whether these conditions constituted objective deprivation of the constitutional right to humane shelter. Judge Bury determined that this was a fact-intensive inquiry and could not be properly made on the summary judgment record. Judge Bury ordered a 13-day bench trial set for January 13, 2020. For the remainder of 2019, the parties litigated various issues in preparation for trial. Beginning on January 13, 2020, the parties participated in a seven-day bench trial. On February 19, 2020, Judge Bury issued the court's finding of fact and conclusions of law, finding in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants. 2020 WL 813774. Judge Bury concluded that the defendants' holding facilities were designed for short-term holds, \"lasting hours not days.\" Judge Bury found that the conditions of extended confinement in defendants' holding facilities were \"substantially worse than detainees face upon commitment to either a civil immigration detention facility or even a criminal detention facility, like a jail or prison.\" Accordingly, Judge Bury concluded that extended confinement in these facilities did not advance the government's legitimate interest in immigration enforcement and resulted in conditions, including detainees' inability to sleep for several nights, that were \"presumptively punitive\" and violated the Constitution. Based on these conclusions and finding of fact, Judge Bury issued an order enjoining defendants from holding detainees considered to be \"processing complete\" for longer than 48 hours unless defendants provide \"conditions of confinement that meet basic human needs for sleeping in a bed with a blanket, a shower, food that meets acceptable dietary standards, potable water, and medical assessments performed by a medical professional.\" Judge Bury adopted a \"no longer than 48 hour\" rule to accommodate logistic difficulties of transporting detainees after they are processed. Judge Bury maintained that anything beyond 48 hours forced CBP to perform the role of other civil immigration detention agencies and thus required it to provide the conditions of confinement standard at the facilities of other agencies. On April 17, 2020, the court entered an order for a permanent injunction, setting minimum standards with respect to detention length, available care, and compliance. The permanent injunction adopted many of the same standards as both the preliminary injunction and proposed permanent injunction. The court required defendants to collect and maintain data about each individual's time in the detention center, provide that data to the plaintiffs on a quarterly basis for a two-year period, and allow plaintiffs to request class access visits on a quarterly basis for two years. Further, the defendants were also ordered to conduct internal compliance evaluations and provide them to plaintiffs. The Court gave the defendants 90 days to attain compliance with the order. It also retained jurisdiction to reopen the case and enforce the permanent injunction and action. On September 11, 2020, two months following the defendants' third and final monthly status report, the plaintiffs filed a report alleging noncompliance. However, the court declined to act on the plaintiffs' report and instead noted on November 18, 2020, that the court's jurisdiction over the permanent injunction was to be narrow and only could be invoked if clear and convincing evidence of noncompliance were shown. Defendants filed appeals as to both the court's finding and the permanent injunction, and plaintiffs filed cross-appeals to each. On November 10, 2020, defendants voluntarily dismissed their appeal, after which plaintiffs also dismissed their cross-appeals on November 18, 2020. The case remained on the district court docket for overseeing compliance with the injunction. As of March 5, 2021, however, there was no additional activity on the docket.", "summary": "On June 8, 2015, civil detainees confined in the Tucson Sector of the U.S. Border Patrol filed a class action lawsuit, alleging violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the APA due to inhumane and punitive conditions while they were detained in holding cells. The district court granted a PI mandating that defendants must maintain conditions of confinement adequate for the detainees' physical needs and provide detainees with mats and blankets after 12 hours. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the PI order. In 2018 the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of defendants' obligation to provide raised beds for detainees held for any period requiring sleep; the district court denied this motion. After a 7-day trial in January 2020, the district court held that these extended confinement conditions violated the Constitution and issued an order enjoining the defendants from holding detainees for longer than 48 unless they provided conditions of confinement that meet basic human needs. This permanent injunction was ordered and has been in effect since April 2020."}
{"article": "This case challenged the hotel chain Motel 6 reporting guests to federal immigration officials. Eight individuals who stayed separately at Arizona Motel 6 locations filed a class action lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona on January 23, 2018. Suing under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, plaintiffs sued Motel 6 Operating L.P., its parent company G6 Hospitality LLC, and 10 unnamed Motel 6 employees in Arizona. The plaintiffs, represented by the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), requested class certification, and sought declaratory, monetary, and injunctive relief, as well as a civil penalty and attorneys' fees and costs. Judge David G. Campbell was assigned. Plaintiffs claimed Motel 6's policy of disclosing guests' information to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) without requiring a warrant or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity violated the Fourth Amendment, as well as federal and state laws. Defendants allegedly violated 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 by discriminating against plaintiff\u2019s race or national origin by denying Latino guests the full and equal enjoyment of the contractual relationship with Motel 6. Additionally, by assisting DHS and ICE agents, the plaintiffs alleged that Motel 6 violated 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1985(3) by engaging in a conspiracy to violate the plaintiff's rights. Thirdly, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by disclosing the plaintiffs' personal information to federal immigration officials without a warrant or reasonable suspicion of a crime. The plaintiffs also alleged a variety of state law violations, including various tort and breach of contract claims. The parties filed a joint notice of settlement on July 6, 2018. A joint request for conditional class certification and preliminary approval of settlement terms was filed on July 6, 2018. Plaintiffs sought one primary class and two subclasses. The primary class consisted of all persons who stayed at a Motel 6 between February 1, 2017, and November 2, 2018, and had their information shared with federal immigration authorities. The first subclass was all persons who were questioned or interrogated by federal immigration authorities at a Motel 6 as a result of guest information being shared. The second subclass was for all persons who had been placed in immigration removal proceedings due to disclosed guest information and the resulting encounters with federal immigration authorities at a Motel 6. The proposed settlement included a two-year enforcement period under a consent decree that would enjoin Motel 6 from providing guest information to DHS and ICE absent a warrant, subpoena, or the immediate risk of harm to a guest, employee, or another individual. Additionally, parties sought three categories of monetary damages totaling $7.6 million. First, $50 in damages per guest whose information was shared with federal immigration authorities, up to a class-wide total of $1,000,000. Second, $1,000 in damages to each class member questioned by federal immigration authorities during their stay. Finally, an amount of at least $7,500 to each Class Member who was placed in immigration removal proceedings in connection with their encounter with federal immigration authorities during their stay. On May 30, 2019, the court mooted the parties' joint motion. The parties had advised the court that they would be filing a new motion for preliminary approval of a class settlement. Plaintiffs filed an amended class-action complaint on June 5, 2019. The amended complaint contains largely the same allegations and claims as in the original complaint. Plaintiffs now sought a primary class and one subclass. The primary class was all persons who stayed at a Motel 6 and had their information disclosed to federal immigration authorities between February 1, 2015, and the date of judgment in the present case. The subclass included guests at a Motel 6 that had been interrogated, arrested, or placed in removal proceedings by federal immigration authorities due to guest information being disclosed. The parties again filed a joint motion for approval of the class action settlement and to certify class on July 5, 2019. The court granted preliminary approval of the class action settlement on August 2, 2019. On January 17, 2020, the parties filed a joint motion requesting five actions. First, final approval of the settlement. Second, certification of the proposed classes. Third, a consent decree for injunctive relief. Fourth, authorization to distribute the settlement monetary damages in accordance with the agreement. Finally, payment of attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The court granted final approval of the third amended class action settlement on February 18, 2020. The court found that the amount of funds going to class members was sufficient and that the amount of funds held for four immigration rights organizations was \"consistent with the underlying objectives of the claims in this case, serves the interests of the silent class members, and is not too remote from the class.\" Judge Campbell signed a consent decree on February 18, 2020, making effective injunctive and recordkeeping provisions for three years. The injunctive provisions mandated Motel 6 do the following:<ul><li>Maintain a 24-hour hotline for employee use when they receive a federal request for guest information.</li><li>Not share any guest information with federal immigration authorities without a warrant, subpoena, or credible risk of imminent danger.</li><li>Motel 6 to create an online form for guests to report if guest information was improperly shared.</li><li>Maintain documentation related to reporting.</li><li>Annual meeting with parties to ensure compliance with consent decree.</li></ul>The parties attended the first required annual meetings on March 4, 2021. According to a joint status report filed on March 29, 2021, Motel 6 had complied with the consent decree. The aforementioned 24-hour hotline, online reporting system, and policies have all been implemented. Motel 6 has explicitly required that franchise locations also adopt the above requirements. The court retains jurisdiction over the matter for the duration of the consent decree.", "summary": "In 2018, former Latino/a guests at Motel 6 locations in Arizona filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. They alleged that Motel 6's policy of disclosing guests' information to DHS and ICE agents without requiring a warrant or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity violated the United States Constitution and federal and state law. They also alleged Motel 6 conspired with DHS and ICE agents to violate guests\u2019 Fourth Amendment rights. In February 2020, the parties agreed to class action settlement terms and the district court approved the settlement agreement. The court retains jurisdiction over the matter for the duration of the consent decree."}
{"article": "On March 16, 2018, a prisoner at the Coconino County Detention Facility (CCDF), in Flagstaff Arizona, filed this class action lawsuit in the Superior Court of Coconino County, Arizona on behalf of himself and similarly situated prisoners. The complaint sought declaratory relief and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, challenging the prolonged detention of inmates for whom CCDF received a detainer from the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE). It named as defendants the Coconino County Sheriff, the Jail Commander, and other officials. The plaintiffs were represented by the ACLU\u2019s Immigrant Rights Project and by private counsel. The complaint explained that the plaintiffs had been arrested, criminally. But then their detention at CCDF was prolonged because the facility cooperated with an ICE detainer request. The ICE detainers asked local authorities to prolong the confinement of individuals accused of immigration violations until officers from ICE took custody of those individuals and placed them in removal proceedings. The named plaintiff, for example, claimed that there were people willing to post bond to secure his release, but they were told by CCDF personnel that he would be held for an additional 48 hours following the bond payment pursuant to the ICE detainer request. Fearing that posting bond would trigger the 48-hour hold and subsequent detention by ICE, he chose to remain in custody until his trial date. According to the plaintiffs, CCDF\u2019s policy of prolonging plaintiffs\u2019 detention despite meeting all conditions of pretrial release violated Article II, section 8 of the Arizona Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs requested preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, to secure the named plaintiff\u2019s immediate release upon the payment of his bond. and to enjoin the holding of other similarly situated detainees pursuant to CCDF\u2019s policy. The plaintiffs also sought a court declaration that the CCDF detainer policy was unlawful. Because the complaint raised a federal claim, the defendants removed it to the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona on April 2, 2018. It was assigned to District Judge David Campbell. On April 6, 2018, the plaintiffs sought an order to show cause as to their request for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order and to halt the continued implementation the CCDF\u2019s immigration detention policies. The plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint on April 30, 2018. In addition to repeating the allegations described in the original complaint, the amended complaint also asserted that CCDF\u2019s polices violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. On May 5, 2018, the U.S. Government filed a statement of interest, seeking to convince the District Court to deny the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a temporary restraining order. According to the Government, ICE\u2019s cooperation with local law enforcement in the detention of those accused of immigration violations was lawful under Arizona and federal law. Though the detainer authorized the confinement of an individual 48 hours beyond the time when the individual would have otherwise been released, the Government clarified that the detainer should not, \u201cimpact decisions about the alien\u2019s bail, rehabilitation, parole, release, diversion, custody classification, work, quarter assignments, or other matters.\u201d Further, the Government claimed that the named plaintiff did not have a basis to challenge the legality of ICE\u2019s cooperation with the County, because he never elected to post bond. On July 6, 2018, Judge Campbell denied the plaintiffs\u2019 request for a preliminary injunction. According to the Court, the plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, but nonetheless raised serious questions that required further litigation. The Court reached this decision by finding the plaintiffs\u2019 arguments inconclusive as to whether Arizona sheriffs possessed common law authority to cooperate with ICE without explicit statutory authorization. However, the Court also held that local law enforcement officers\u2019 unilateral authority to prolong the detention of an individual on immigration grounds absent a formalized agreement with the federal government was a serious question demanding further litigation. Because both the plaintiffs and the Government would sustain significant hardships on account of the absence or presence of court interference, the Court concluded that a preliminary injunction would not be appropriate relief in this case. 324 F.Supp.3d 1053. On July 30, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the case, to which the defendants provided no objection. According to plaintiffs\u2019 counsel (as reported in local news sources), the denial of the preliminary injunction made the dismissal necessary. They explained that continuing to fight the case would result in their client spending another six months to a year in jail. The Court granted the motion, dismissing the case as to the defendants without prejudice. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Following his arrest and confinement at the Coconino County Detention Facility (CCDF), plaintiff challenged the prolonged detention of inmates at CCDF triggered by detainer requests from the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE). Plaintiff claimed this policy violated Article II, section 8 of the Arizona Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He sought class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief for all CCDF detainees subject to this prolonged detention policy despite their eligibility for pretrial release. The U.S. District Court for the district of Arizona denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, citing his inability to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the case thereafter, which was accepted by the court."}
{"article": "On June 15, 2017, the Center for Biological Diversity brought this lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Plaintiff filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California and the case was assigned to Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel (whom Trump had previously <a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/02/05/the-judge-trump-disparaged-as-mexican-will-preside-over-an-important-border-wall-case/?utm_term=.c2ce8da18ba2\">disparaged</a> in an unrelated case). The case combined several different challenges to the Trump Administration's planned border wall, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. After an initial complaint and a First Amended Complaint, plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on Sept. 6. According to the Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff is \"an environmental conservation organization that works to protect native wildlife species and their habitats.\" In the wake of President Trump's Executive Order (EO) <a href=\"https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-01-30/pdf/2017-02095.pdf\">No. 13767</a>, authorizing expanded border wall construction, plaintiff feared that such construction would harm the environment, in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and other environmental statutes. Plaintiff was also concerned that the border wall would harm plaintiff's members who frequented borderland wildlife areas. The first issue was under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). On May 2, 2017, the plaintiff had submitted a FOIA request to DHS and CBP. The requested records related to the agencies' statutorily mandated environmental analysis, as well as compliance with other environmental laws, for the border wall prototype project. Plaintiff alleged that defendants, by failing to respond, had violated FOIA or alternatively the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The second issue was about compliance with NEPA's requirement of public participation in agency decisionmaking. On June 1, plaintiff notified DHS that it believed the wall would violate the environmental statutes. However, DHS provided no notice-and-comment or public participation procedure, nor did it respond to plaintiff's communications. This too was argued to violate NEPA, its implementing regulations, and the APA. The third issue was about both substantive and procedural application of the environmental laws. On Aug. 2, 2017, DHS announced that under its interpretation of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 and subsequent amendments, IIRIRA allowed DHS to waive the application of the NEPA, ESA, and many other federal statutes for the purposes of implementing the EO. Plaintiff claimed that in fact IIRIRA did not authorize this waiver, because its grant of waiver authority to DHS had already expired and had not been renewed. Plaintiff also alleged that in waiving the applicability of the environmental statutes, defendant had violated IIRIRA, NEPA, and ESA, as well as the U.S. Constitution's Take Care Clause, Separation of Powers Doctrine, Nondelegation Doctrine, and Presentment Clause. On Sept. 15, the court related this case to another recent case filed by environmental groups challenging the border wall, <i><a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16176\">Defenders of Wildlife v. Duke</a></i>, following the request of plaintiffs in the latter case. On Oct. 6, the government moved to dismiss. DHS first argued that, according to IIRIRA's waiver provision, the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's nonconstitutional claims. Moreover, DHS claimed, to the extent the Court could review the statutory claims, the government had not exceeded its authority under its executive power and IIRIRA's waiver provision. Turning to the constitutional claims, defendant then denied any violations. Finally, DHS argued that no APA claim existed because FOIA provided an adequate remedy. The parties jointly requested on Oct. 20 that this case be consolidated with <i><a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16176\">Defenders of Wildlife v. Duke</a></i> and <i><a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16178\">California v. U.S.</a></i>. On Oct. 24, Judge Curiel granted the motion. 2017 WL 4861650. The consolidated cases continue on this case page. On Nov. 22, all plaintiffs moved separately for summary judgment. The Center for Biological Diversity and the Animal Legal Defense Fund both argued that the Trump administration had exceeded its statutory authority under IIRIRA (or, in the alternative, its constitutional authority under the Take Care Clause, Presentment Clause, Separation of Powers Doctrine, and Nondelegation Doctrine), by reviving IIRIRA's waiver provision for the new border wall projects. The State of California advanced a similar argument and also alleged that the Trump administration had violated the APA, NEPA, and Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA). On Dec. 20, DHS opposed plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and cross-filed for summary judgment. First, DHS argued that California had not established standing. Substantively, DHS argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs' constitutional claims under IIRIRA's waiver provision. DHS also maintained that the provision was constitutional. Plaintiffs responded on Jan. 5, 2018, and DHS replied on Jan. 23. Judge Curiel held a Feb. 9 hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment. On Feb. 27, he issued an order denying plaintiff's motions for summary judgment and granting DHS's motions for summary judgment, except for plaintiffs' FOIA claim. First, Judge Curiel held that defendants had violated no clear and unambiguous interpretation of IIRIRA's waiver provision, and therefore that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear statutory, nonconstitutional claims under that provision. This bar applied to plaintiffs' statutory claims under IIRIRA, APA, NEPA, ESA, and CZMA. Turning next to the constitutional claims, Judge Curiel held that defendants had not violated the Nondelegation and Separation of Powers Doctrines, because Congress had properly delegated its legislative authority under an intelligible principle. Neither had plaintiffs sufficiently argued that defendants had violated the Take Care Clause, Congress' delegation to the executive of power to waive criminal laws, the Presentment Clause, or the Tenth Amendment. Further, plaintiffs had not shown that the challenged provision deprived them of their rights under the Due Process Clause, the First Amendment right to petition, or Article III. 284 F.Supp.3d 1092. Plaintiffs' FOIA claim survived Judge Curiel's Feb. 27 order. However, on Mar. 23, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the FOIA claim, because defendants had provided the requested records. On Mar. 26, Judge Curiel granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice. On Apr. 9, plaintiff appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit, which opened a new docket (No. 18-55474). On Apr. 19, 2018, the Circuit Court consolidated plaintiff's appeal with appeals from the consolidated cases (No. 18-55475 and 18-55476). The Ninth Circuit held oral argument on Aug. 7. While the Ninth Circuit's decision was pending, on Aug. 23, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. The issue that plaintiff requested the Supreme Court to answer was \"whether IIRIRA \u00a7 102(c)\u2014which grants the Secretary of Homeland Security sweeping power to waive any or all legal requirements in her sole discretion, and then insulates that exercise of discretion from judicial review\u2014violates the separation of powers.\" On Dec. 30, 2018, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari. 139 S.Ct. 594. On Feb. 19, 2019, the Ninth Circuit panel (Circuit Judges M. Margaret McKeown, Consuelo M. Callahan, and Jacqueline H. Nguyen) affirmed the district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment to defendants. The panel first concluded that the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider the \"predicate legal question\" of whether IIRIRA authorized the contested projects. Next, the panel held that under the plain text of the section, the defendants had the authority to construct the projects. This was because section 102(a) granted the Secretary of the DHS authority to \u201ctake such actions as may be necessary to install additional physical barriers and roads (including the removal of obstacles to detection of illegal entrants) in the vicinity of the United States border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into the United States.\u201d The panel found that the border barrier projects constituted \u201cadditional physical barriers\" and are \u201cin areas of high illegal entry into the United States.\u201d The panel further concluded that the fencing requirements and deadlines in Section 102(b) did not establish limits applicable to Section 102(a); \"Section 102(b)\u2019s provisions for priority projects do not swallow section 102(a)\u2019s independent authorization to build 'additional physical barriers.'\" Lastly, the panel held that that the environmental claims were precluded by the Secretary\u2019s waiver of the NEPA, the CZMA, and the APA and that it lacked jurisdiction to consider any argument challenging the waivers themselves. 915 F.3d 1213. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit took effect on April 5, 2019. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In June 2017, the Center for Biological Diversity sued DHS and CBP, bringing challenges to the Trump Administration's proposed border wall (FOIA, environmental statutes, APA, IIRIRA). After consolidation with several cases, on Feb. 2018, the Court granted the government's motion to dismiss (except for the FOIA claim) and denied plaintiffs' SJ cross-motions. The parties jointly moved to dismiss the FOIA claim. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. Lastly, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari regarding the constitutional issue of separation of powers in the IIRIRA. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On May 23, 2018 the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California (ACLU-NC) filed this lawsuit against U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The ACLU brought suit in the U.S. District Court for Northern California seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. ACLU-NC requested records relating to ICE\u2019s purchase of two private databases of automated license plate reader (ALPR) data. The complaint stated that \u201c[t]he potential use by ICE of data for civil immigration enforcement, an entirely different purpose for which it was originally collected by local police\u2014local criminal investigations\u2014has generated widespread media interest and public concern.\u201d The complaint maintained that access to information about ICE\u2019s use of ALPR databases was necessary to inform meaningful public debate over the scope of government conduct.\u201d According to the complaint, ACLU-NC submitted FOIA requests on March 19, 2018 and March 21, 2018. The requests sought records including impact assessments and communications between ICE and the vendor of ALPR data. ACLU-NC had yet to receive the requested information at the time of the complaint. ICE contended that, following the initial filing of the complaint, ACLU-NC had access to an interim release of records that occurred on July 13, 2018. In addition, ICE argued that further requested information may be exempt from public disclosure. As a result, ICE moved to dismiss the complaint all together. The parties later agreed that the remainder of the requested documents would be released on a rolling basis. ACLU-NC received the documents by November 2018. On February 26, 2019, Chief Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero granted a stipulation and settlement reached by the parties. The agreement required ICE to pay ACLU-NC $8,597.68 in attorneys' fees and would dismiss the case with prejudice. Following Judge Spero's order granting the settlement, the case closed in February 2019.", "summary": "On May 23, 2018 the ACLU of Northern California filed this lawsuit against Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under the Freedom of Information Act, alleging that ICE had not provided the ACLU with documents they had requested related to ICE's purchase of automated license plate reader data. The parties agreed to a schedule for the documents to be released on a rolling basis, which was completed in November 2018. A settlement also required ICE to pay attorneys' fees. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On March 27, 2018, immigrant detainees who had been held for more than six months without a bond hearing during the pendency of their removal proceedings petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California for a writ of habeas corpus; they also sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Represented by Centro Legal de la Raza, the American Civil Liberties Union of California, and private counsel, the plaintiffs brought this class action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1331, 2241, and 1651. The named plaintiffs were San Francisco Bay area fathers who had been arrested by ICE in fall 2017 and were subsequently detained for over six months without a bond hearing. The government was prohibited from deporting them because an Asylum Officer found that they each had a \u201creasonable fear of persecution.\u201d Consequently, they had live claims in the Immigration Court and were fighting deportation in \u201cwithholding only\u201d proceedings. They had also moved for bond hearings in their cases before the Immigration Court, but their motions were denied for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs sought a court order requiring that the defendants provide individualized bond hearings before an Immigration Judge after 180 days of detention and every 180 days thereafter if denied. The plaintiffs also sought a declaration that failure to provide such a hearing violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the statutory requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1101 and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 703. Once filed, the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley. On April 12, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to certify a class of \u201call individuals who are detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1231(a)(6) in the Ninth Circuit by, or pursuant to the authority of, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (\u201cICE\u201d), and who have reached or will reach six months in detention, and have been or will be denied a prolonged detention bond hearing before an Immigration Judge.\u201d The class was defined to exclude classes of similarly-situated individuals involved in other litigation, such as Rodriguez v. Hayes, available <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12492\">here</a> in this Clearinghouse and which reached the Supreme Court as Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). The relevant statute, 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1231(a)(6), authorizes the detention of individuals with final orders of removal. However, the plaintiffs in this case challenged their removal orders and, as a result, the government was prohibited from deporting them. On the same date, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the government from continuing to detain class members for over 180 days without a bond hearing. The defendants filed their opposition to these motions on May 3, 2018. The parties\u2019 primary disagreement related to whether the Supreme Court decision in <i>Jennings</i> had effectively overturned Ninth Circuit precedent on this issue. Specifically, the plaintiffs relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in <i>Diouf II</i> which held that an individual facing prolonged detention (i.e., over 180 days) under 8 U.S.C. section 1231(a)(6) \u201cis entitled to release on bond unless the government establishes that he is a flight risk or a danger to the community.\u201d Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1082 (9th Cir. 2011). The plaintiffs filed their reply on May 17, 2018. On June 5, 2018, Judge Corley found that <i>Jennings</i> did not overrule <i>Diouf II</i> and that they were not irreconcilable. She granted a preliminary injunction and class certification so that people who have been detained under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1231(a)(6) with \u201clive claims\u201d (i.e., before the Immigration Court, Board of Immigration Appeals, or a circuit court of appeals) cannot be held by the government for more than 180 days without a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. At these hearings, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would bear the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that prolonged detention was warranted (i.e., that a detainee is a flight risk or a danger to the community). According to the ACLU, the ruling is expected to affect hundreds of people detained throughout the Ninth Circuit. According to Centro Legal de la Raza, this order does not extend to arriving aliens held under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1225(b) or mandatory detainees held under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226(c). 325 F.R.D. 616. On July 20, 2018, Judge Corley issued an order clarifying her June 5, 2018 in response to a motion for clarification filed by the defendants on June 20, 2018. She ordered that the preliminary injunction applied only to immigration detainees who have \u201clive claims\u201d before an adjudicative body, and not to <i>any</i> detainee held in ICE custody for over 180 days. On August 3, 2018, the defendants appealed the class certification and injunction to the Ninth Circuit (docket no. 18-16465). On November 16, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion in the district court requesting enforcement of the court's June 5 order as to class members transferred to detention facilities outside of the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit. The plaintiffs claimed that, as class members, they are entitled to the protection of the court's order. Defendants argued that upon transfer outside the Ninth Circuit they are no longer class members and no longer entitled to prolonged detention bond hearings after 180 days. On January 25, 2019, Judge Corley denied the plaintiffs' motion. In her order, she explained that the plaintiffs' reading of the certified class was too broad to embrace class members transferred outside of the Ninth Circuit, and that the plaintiffs had not shown that the defendants had otherwise failed to comply with the June 5 order. 2019 WL 330466. On March 13, 2019, the District Court further required the defendants to provide the plaintiffs with a class list periodically in order to demonstrate compliance. On April 7, 2020 the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion affirming the district court's June 5, 2018 order. The Court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that \u00a7 1231(a)(6) requires the government to provide class members with an individualized bond hearing in accordance with <i>Diouf II</i>. It also agreed that <i>Diouf II</i> was not clearly irreconcilable with <i>Jennings</i> and that the burden was on the government to show that a detained class member was a flight risk or a danger in order to continue holding them without violating due process. 2020 WL 1684034. Back in the district court, on April 10, 2020, the plaintiffs moved to enforce and amend the preliminary injunction. On June 19, 2020, this motion was granted in part and denied in part. 2020 WL 3402227. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought to require the defendants to do three things: (1) hold bond hearings within seven days of a class member's 180th day in detention; (2) notify class members of their scheduled bond hearings by their 165th day in detention and (3) explain any delays in bond hearings that occur after seven days of a class member's 180th; day. The court denied the plaintiffs' second request (notification of their scheduled bond hearing by their 165th day in detention), reasoning that a detainee did not become a class member until their 180th day and thus relief could not be granted to non-class members. The court observed that the defendants were able to provide the vast majority of class members with a hearing within 15 days of their 180th day; thus, the court amended the June 2018 order to require an explanation by the defendants when they failed to provide a bond hearing within 15 days of a class member's 180th day in detention. Further, the court amended the June 2018 order to require defendants to post a notice of the preliminary injunction in detention facilities that includes a list of the requirements to qualify as a class member so that detainees may pro se identify their class membership in the event that the defendants erred in identification. The court further required the defendants to more clearly report bond hearing outcomes. Specifically, classifications of \"no action\" were required to be changed so that a clearer result of the hearings would be known. The court, however, denied the plaintiffs' motion as it pertained to requiring more information regarding how the defendants identified potential class members, reasoning that such heightened requirements were unnecessary. On September 11, 2020, the defendants filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court asking them to review the Ninth Circuit's April 2020 affirmance of the preliminary injunction. No. 20-322. As of April 16, 2021, this case is ongoing.", "summary": "Two San Francisco Bay Area fathers filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California after being detained for over 6 months in ICE custody without a bond hearing. The court granted a preliminary injunction and class certification ordering that individuals detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1231(a)(6) pending a determination as to whether they can remain in the United States with \u201clive claims\u201d before an adjudicative body cannot be detained for more than 180 days without a bond hearing. The government appealed both orders to the Ninth Circuit, and on April 7, 2020, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. Following plaintiffs' motion to enforce the preliminary injunction, the court granted it in part, finding that the defendants had not substantially complied with certain requirements, but denied it in part. As of April 16, 2021, this case is pending a writ of certiorari in front of the Supreme Court."}
{"article": "On June 7, 2018, attorneys from the Immigrants' Rights Clinic at Stanford Law School alongside the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the U.S. District Court of Northern California. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), claiming that DHS and ICE improperly withheld records related to the Trump administration\u2019s immigration prosecutorial discretion policies and practices. DHS and ICE failed to respond to a request for records sent on March 2, 2017. The case was certified for Alternative Dispute Resolution in August 2018 and negotiation discussions continued for two years. On August 10, 2020, the parties settled. Under the agreement, defendants agreed to turn over the documents that the plaintiffs requested. The defendants also agreed to pay $16,350.10 to the plaintiff. The court ordered the execution of the stipulation of settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On June 7, 2018, Community Legal Services in East Palo Alto and the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement for failure to comply with a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted on March 2, 2017. The parties settled in August 2020, resulting in a $16,000 litigation expenses and the release of the requested documents."}
{"article": "On April 18, 2018, a group of five unnamed plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of Iranian refugees and their U.S.-based family members who applied for refugee resettlement through the Vienna, Austria-based Lautenberg-Specter program and were denied. The plaintiffs alleged that they had applied for refugee resettlement through the Lautenberg program for members of Iranian religious minorities and had traveled to Vienna for processing. But they received mass denial notices in February 2018 with the sole explanation that the applications were denied \u201cas a matter of discretion.\u201d They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the denial notices violated the Lautenberg Amendment, the <i>Accardi</i> doctrine (agency cannot violate its own regulations), and Fifth Amendment due process. The plaintiffs were represented by counsel from the International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP) and the law firm Latham and Watkins LLP. The Lautenberg Amendment designates certain vulnerable groups, including certain persecuted religious minorities, for whom less evidence is needed to establish refugee status. If an application for refugee status submitted under the provision is denied, the Lautenberg Amendment requires that the denial be made in writing and \u201cstate, to the maximum extent feasible, the reason for the denial.\u201d Under the Lautenberg-Specter program, which extends the protections of the Lautenberg Amendment to Iranian religious minorities, U.S. residents submit an application on behalf of refugee applicants in Iran. Once applicants pass an initial screening, they travel to Vienna where their applications can be processed by the U.S. government. In the years prior to the events at issue in this case, applications submitted through the program had had a near 100 percent admittance rate. The plaintiffs' denials came after many of them had been waiting in Vienna for nearly a year, and now many of them are at risk of deportation back to Iran. On April 20, 2018, the plaintiffs sought class certification and partial summary judgment on their Lautenberg Amendment, <i>Accardi</i> doctrine, and Fifth Amendment due process claims. In response, DHS argued that all three claims were nonjusticiable because decisions over whether to admit or deny noncitizens outside the U.S. are immune from judicial review. In the alternative, DHS opposed class certification on the grounds that the Iranian plaintiffs and the U.S. plaintiffs were in fundamentally different positions, and that the wide array of familial relationships between the U.S. and Iranian class members meant that the five plaintiffs could not adequately represent the interests of the class. DHS also opposed partial summary judgment on the grounds that the \u201cas a matter of discretion\u201d language in the notices complied with the Lautenberg Amendment\u2019s requirement to explain the reason for the denial to the maximum extent feasible, and that the DHS regulations cited by the plaintiffs did not apply to this case. On July 10, 2018, the district court (Judge Beth Labson Freeman) granted the motion for class certification, and granted partial summary judgment as to the plaintiffs\u2019 Lautenberg Amendment and <i>Accardi</i> claims, while declining to rule on their due process claim. 357 F.Supp.3d 972. Judge Freeman explained that DHS\u2019s nonjusticiability arguments were not on point, because the plaintiffs were not challenging the decisions to admit or deny the applications, but were rather alleging that DHS failed to comply with the Lautenberg Amendment and the applicable regulations. She sided with the plaintiffs\u2019 arguments that the \u201cas a matter of discretion\u201d explanation contained in the notices did not comply with the Lautenberg Amendment\u2019s mandate to give the reasons for the denial \u201cto the maximum extent feasible,\u201d because it effectively prevented plaintiffs from requesting agency review. With respect to the <i>Accardi</i> doctrine claim, Judge Freeman also pointed out that DHS\u2019 own regulations require it to advise refugee applicants of any derogatory facts on which an adverse decision is based; she rejected DHS\u2019s arguments that the regulations at issue were inapplicable to the plaintiffs. Citing the fact that she already fully disposed of plaintiff\u2019s claims on statutory grounds, she declined to reach the plaintiff\u2019s due process claim. Judge Freeman thus set aside the February 2018 notices of denial as unlawful, and ordered DHS to re-issue new notices within 14 days containing their determinations to re-open processing or deny the plaintiffs\u2019 refugee applications. DHS filed an appeal to the partial summary judgment motion and the class certification with the Ninth Circuit on September 18, 2018. DHS moved to dismiss the appeal voluntarily on November 16, 2018, and the Ninth Circuit filed the dismissal on November 20. Meanwhile, discovery continued in the District Court. Discovery was fairly contentious with several motions to claw back, sequester, and compel; Magistrate Judge Virginia K. Demarchi assessed sanctions of $41,546.52 in attorney's fees against DHS on October 31, 2019. With the COVID-19 pandemic, proceedings on various discovery motions have moved to Zoom, with the most recent motion, a motion to redact portions of a hearing transcript, filed on June 2, 2020. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "A group of Iranian refugees and their U.S. sponsors filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) denied their refugee resettlement applications en masse in February 2018. The plaintiffs applied for refugee resettlement through the Vienna, Austria-based Lautenberg-Specter program for Iranian religious minorities, but received mass denials with the sole explanation that they were denied \"as a matter of discretion.\" The plaintiffs alleged that this violated the Lautenberg Amendment, which mandates that the denial state \"to the maximum extent feasible, the reason for the denial,\" as well as Fifth Amendment due process and DHS's own regulations. On July 2018, the court declared the denial notices unlawful, and ordered DHS to re-issue new notices. As of June 3, 2020, the case is still ongoing."}
{"article": "This case is another response to efforts by the Trump Administration to strip certain law enforcement funding from \"sanctuary\" cities and states unless their governments agree to participate in federal immigration enforcement. The city and county of San Francisco previously sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) over immigration conditions imposed on the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG) program twice in 2017, details of those cases can be found <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15608\">here</a> and <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16095\">here</a>. On August 22, 2018, the city and county of San Francisco filed this lawsuit in the Northern District of California. San Francisco, represented by the city attorney, sued Attorney General Jeff Sessions, the Acting Assistant Attorney General, the United States Department Justice (DOJ), and dozens of unnamed defendants also allegedly responsible for unconstitutionally conditioning grants of federal funding. San Francisco claimed that this violated the Spending Clause, separation of powers, and the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was assigned to Judge William Orrick. It was related to a similar case brought by the state of California on Sept. 10, 2018; that case can be found <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16743\">here</a>. San Francisco alleged that the defendants were again imposing unlawful immigration-related conditions on Byrne JAG grants (federal funds that go to a number of criminal justice programs in San Francisco) for fiscal year 2018. The plaintiff stated that several of these conditions were essentially the same as those imposed on FY2017 grants, but that the defendants had additionally imposed two new conditions. Those additional conditions require Byrne JAG recipients: (1) not to publicly disclose sensitive federal law enforcement information in attempts to harbor or shield fugitives from justice or aliens in violation of federal immigration law; and (2) to provide information about the applicant\u2019s laws and policies for purposes of assessing compliance with 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1373 (which bars local governments from restricting their employees from sharing citizenship and immigration status information with federal immigration authorities). These conditions are referred to as the \u201cnondisclosure\u201d and \u201cinformation\u201d conditions, respectively. Failure to cooperate with these conditions would deny the plaintiff up to $1.4 million in Byrne JAG funds for FY2018. The plaintiff claimed that compliance conflicted with existing state and county laws. On December 21, 2018, the City and County of San Francisco moved for summary judgment. Oral argument on that motion was scheduled for February 13, 2019. On March 4, 2019, Judge Orrick granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motion for partial dismissal or partial summary judgment. Judge Orrick found that the challenged conditions were ultra vires and violated the separation of powers; that 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1373 was unconstitutional; that the Attorney General exceeded the Spending Clause by imposing ambiguous conditions on Byrne JAG grants in FY2018; that the conditions were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act; that California was entitled to the mandamus relief it was seeking in its related case; and that a nationwide injunction was warranted but stayed. Judge Orrick focused his analysis on the two new conditions imposed for FY2018, incorporating by reference the arguments related to the duplicate conditions from FY2017. The DOJ relied on three statutory provisions to support its conclusion that Congress had delegated authority to the Assistant Attorney General to exercise discretion over formula grants, but Judge Orrick concluded that these provisions did not grant such an independent authority to impose the FY2018 conditions on Byrne JAG grants. On March 26, 2019, Judge Orrick issued his permanent injunction, enjoining the defendants from using the FY2018 Byrne JAG funding conditions for any California state entity, San Francisco, any California political subdivision, or any jurisdiction in the United States. The judge then stayed the nationwide aspect of the permanent injunction until further rulings from the Ninth Circuit (which had expressed concerns over the nationwide nature of the relief during the 2017 litigation over Byrne JAG funding conditions). On May 3, 2019, the defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit (Docket No. 19-15947). The parties subsequently entered mediation conferences. In November 2019, the Ninth Circuit stayed the appeals. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "The city and county of San Francisco brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that the Department of Justice (DOJ) had unlawfully conditioned states' acceptance of certain federal funds on their compliance with federal immigration enforcement efforts. The plaintiff alleged that these conditions violated the Spending Clause and the separation of powers under the Constitution. The Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff in March, 2019."}
{"article": "On February 14, 2019, a group of asylum seekers from Central America and several legal organizations filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs challenged the Trump Administration\u2019s new policy of forcing asylum seekers to return to Mexico while they await their removal proceedings: the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP). The plaintiff individual asylum seekers are currently residing in Mexico after having entered the U.S. to request asylum, and then been returned to Mexico under the MPP. The plaintiffs alleged that these asylum seekers are living in fear in Mexico, and that the plaintiff legal organizations are being thwarted from providing representation to such asylum seekers by the physical removal of them from the U.S. The case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero, and then reassigned to Judge Richard Seeborg on Feb. 19. On Feb. 20, 2019 the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, seeking to enjoin the MPP until a preliminary injunction could be obtained. The plaintiffs alleged that the MPP violate the section of the INA that purportedly authorizes them, violated the U.S.\u2019s duty of non-return, constituted arbitrary and capricious decision making under the APA, and violated the APA\u2019s notice and comment requirements. The defendants filed their response on March 1. The judge held a hearing on the motion on March 22. On March 28, 2019 the judge issued an order requesting expedited further briefing on the issue of whether jurisdiction of this case lies exclusively in the District of Columbia. On April 8, 2019 Judge Seeborg issued an order granting the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. 366 F. Supp. 3d 1110. The judge found that the INA section vesting DHS with the authority in some circumstances to return certain aliens to a contiguous territory (8 USC \u00a7 1225(b)(2)(C)) could not be read to apply to the plaintiff asylum seekers or others similarly situated. Additionally, he found that even if that statute could be applied to the plaintiffs, the MPP still need to be enjoined because they fail to sufficiently protect immigrants from being returned to places where their lives or freedom are at risk (in violation of the U.S.'s non-refoulement obligations). Judge Seeborg therefore enjoined the defendants from implementing the MPP nationwide and ordered that the named individual plaintiffs be permitted to enter the U.S. The defendants appealed the order to the Ninth Circuit and requested a stay of the preliminary injunction pending the appeal. On May 7, 2019, the Ninth Circuit granted a stay of the injunction. 924 F.3d 503. The panel found that the defendants were likely to prevail on the merits of the plaintiffs' INA and APA claims. It stated that the plaintiff asylum seekers were properly subjected to the contiguous-territory provision of the INA, and that the MPP were exempt from the notice-and-comment requirement because they are general statements of policy. On July 15, 2019, the district court agreed to stay proceedings in the case until the Ninth Circuit appeal was resolved. On February 28, 2020, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's nationwide injunction of the Migrant Protection Protocols. 951 F.3d 1073. The Court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their INA claims because the INA's contiguous territory return provision does not apply to bona fide asylum seekers, and that the MPP do not comply with the U.S.'s treaty-based non-return obligations codified in the INA. The Court also found that the nationwide scope of the preliminary injunction, which in practical effect would operate in only the four states along the southern border where the MPP are enforced, was warranted. However, that same day, the government filed an emergency motion requesting either a stay pending disposition of a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, or an immediate administrative stay. The Ninth Circuit granted an administrative stay that evening and requested expedited briefing by the parties addressing the government's request for a longer stay. On March 4, 2020, the Ninth Circuit granted in part and denied in part the requested stay. 951 F.3d 1073. The Ninth Circuit denied the stay with respect to the merits of its February 28 holding that the MPP violate federal law. However, it issued a stay of the injunction insofar as it operates outside the boundaries of the Ninth Circuit; this stay was set to begin on March 12. On March 11, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an order halting the Ninth Circuit's injunction of the MPP. 140 S.Ct. 1564. Consequently, the MPP remain in effect nationwide. On April 10, 2020, the government filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. On October 19, 2020, the Supreme Court granted cert. 140 S.Ct. 1564. However, after the President Biden won the 2020 election, the asylum procedure was changed to moot this case. As such, the Acting Solicitor General asked the Court to remove the case from its docket and the Court did so. Because the regulations at issue in this case were changed, this case is now closed.", "summary": "On February 14, 2019, a group of asylum seekers from Central America and several legal organizations filed this lawsuit against the Trump Administration in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that the Administration's new policy of forcing asylum seekers to return to Mexico while awaiting their court hearings (the Migrant Protection Protocols), violated the INA and APA. The district court issued a nationwide injunction which was later affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, but the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently halted the injunction, leaving the MPP in effect nationwide.On April 10, 2020, the government filed a petitino for certiorari with the Supreme Court. On October 19, 2020, the Supreme Court granted certi."}
{"article": "On June 16, 2019, plaintiffs--three immigration attorneys and two noncitizens who filed FOIA (FOIA) requests for individual immigration case files (known as A-Files)--filed this class-action suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (UCIS), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), alleging that the defendants had a nationwide pattern or practice of failing to make determinations regarding A-File requests within the time period of 30 days as mandated by 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552(a)(b), the FOIA statute. Plaintiffs, represented by the American Immigration Council and the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, sought declaratory relief that defendants\u2019 failure to make timely determinations on plaintiffs\u2019 and proposed classes\u2019 A-File FOIA requests violates FOIA, and a nationwide injunction requiring defendants to make timely determinations. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler. The plaintiffs argued that A-Files are crucial to determining a noncitizen's eligibility to apply for an immigration benefit and to change their existing immigration status. The only way that a noncitizen or her attorney can obtain an A-File is to submit an FOIA request. UCIS' FOIA backlog--which more than doubled between 2015 and 2017, despite no increase in requests--had resulted in average processing time for FOIA requests of 55-90 days, exceeding the 30-day deadline. The plaintiffs also asserted that UCIS exacerbated these delays by referring portions of requests to ICE, which also has a considerable backlog, resulting in further delay and incomplete record retrieval. The plaintiffs alleged that these backlogs and delays demonstrate a pattern or practice of unreasonable delay in responding to FOIA requests and that these delays caused \"emotional and financial hardship for individuals left in legal limbo\" while waiting to obtain these records. On July 2, 2019, the case was reassigned to Judge William H. Orrick because the parties did not consent to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. On August 8, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certification, seeking certification for two proposed classes. The first proposed class (\"USCIS Class\") consisted of \"all individuals who filed, or will file, A-File FOIA requests with USCIS which have been pending, or will be pending, with USCIS for more than 30 business days without a determination.\" The second proposed class (\"ICE Referral Class\") consisted of \"All individuals who filed, or will file, A-File FOIA requests with USCIS that USCIS has referred, or will refer, to ICE and which have been pending, or will be pending, for more than 30 business days from the date of the initial filing with USCIS without a determination.\" On October 15, 2019, Judge Orrick granted the Motion for Class Certification, concluding that the plaintiffs met their burden for certification of both the \"USCIS Class\" and the \"ICE Referral Class.\" 2019 WL 5191066. Discovery took place over the summer of 2020 and on September 30, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion of summary judgment. The defendants responded with a cross-motion for summary judgment on October 21. On December 17, 2020, Judge Orrick issued an opinion and order granting the plaintiff's motion and denying the defendants. Finding that the defendants systematically failed to meet statutory FOIA deadlines, Judge Orrick granted the plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief. Judge Orrick also enjoined the defendants from failing to meet FOIA deadlines, ordered them to make determinations on all backlogged FOIA requests within 60 days of his order, and ordered them to make quarterly reports on their compliance with the FOIA. The defendant's first status report is due on March 17, 2021, and Judge Orrick scheduled a case management conference for April 6, 2021. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On June 16, 2019, plaintiffs--three immigration attorneys and two noncitizens who filed FOIA (FOIA) requests for individual immigration case files (known as A-Files)--filed this class-action suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Plaintiffs, represented by the American Immigration Council and the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, sought declaratory relief that defendants\u2019 failure to make timely determinations on plaintiffs\u2019 and proposed classes\u2019 A-File FOIA requests violates FOIA, and a nationwide injunction requiring defendants to make timely determinations. The court granted the plaintiffs' request for declaratory and injunctive relief and ordered the defendants to provide quarterly reports on their compliance with the FOIA."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a lawsuit brought by the University of California regents regarding the July 2020 release of ICE regulations which, in effect, meant that students on F-1 visas would risk deportation if their school shifted to online learning. In a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same July directive, the plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the regulations rescinded. In order to effectuate the rescission, ICE removed the guidance from its website and replaced it with the previous guidance and as a result, plaintiffs withdrew their motion for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs in this case continued to monitor the alterations ICE made to its website between July and September and filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on October 6, 2020. <hr> <b>Background</b> Generally speaking, F-1 visas (colloquially \"student visas\") can be granted to international students who attend American universities. However, regulations on the granting of these visas limit the amount of online or distance learning the student can engage in. According to these regulations, an international student can engage in only one such class or three credits of that class per semester. 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 214.2(f)(6)(i)(G). The COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020 made this regulation untenable, as schools and universities had to shift to online learning systems. In response, defendant ICE issued an exemption on March 13, 2020, affirming that international students would be permitted to continue distance learning in the United States under their F-1 visas. The exemption would apply until the end of the emergency. However, on July 6, 2020, ICE issued a new directive stating that it would rescind that exemption. This directive would then mean that international students at schools that would still be fully online would have to either transfer to other schools that were at least partially in-person, go back to their countries voluntarily, or risk deportation. The directive also ordered schools that had gone fully online or had simply decided not to have classes to submit an \"operational change plan\" within nine days, and ordered schools that would have a hybrid system to certify each F-1 student to make sure that they were not taking entirely online courses. <b>The Lawsuit</b> In response to the new directive, The Regents of the University of California filed this lawsuit on July 10, 2020. They were represented by private and in-house counsel. The University sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Plaintiffs argued that the new directive violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in two ways. First, the directive was arbitrary and capricious. According to the plaintiffs, the directive failed to consider important aspects of the problem. It also did not address the reliance interests of higher education institutions that put resources into devising public health and safety plans for the upcoming year and it lacked any reasonable basis for the shift in policy. Second, the plaintiffs claimed that defendants failed to comply with notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures when they issued the new directive which violated the APA. Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, an order vacating and setting aside the new directive, an order preventing the defendants from enforcing the the directive, and attorney's fees and costs. Simultaneously, the plaintiffs submitted an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the new policy. They also filed a motion to shorten the time for consideration of the temporary restraining order and argued that the court must take immediate action to avoid doing irreparable harm to the academic community. The case was assigned to Judge Jeffrey S. White after plaintiffs decline to proceed before a magistrate judge. On July 13, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The next day the case was related to <a href= \"https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17694\">State of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security</a> and re-assigned to Judge Jon S. Tigar. On July 14, the parties filed a joint stipulation that stated that because the government agreed to rescind the July directive by removing it from its website and replacing it with the March guidance, California's claims were therefore mooted, and the state agreed to withdraw its motion for a preliminary injunction. Over the next two months, the plaintiffs continued to monitor the changes ICE made to its website in order to fully effectuate the rescission and submitted status reports to the court. On October 6, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal and the case is now closed.", "summary": "This lawsuit was filed in response to a July 6, 2020 ICE directive that would effectively force out of the country many international students studying remotely during the 2020 coronavirus pandemic. The University of California filed suit claiming that the directive was in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order and an order vacating and setting aside the policy. They also sought declarative relief and attorney's fees. In a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same July directive, the plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the regulations rescinded. In order to effectuate the rescission, ICE removed the guidance from its website and replaced it with the previous guidance and as a result, plaintiffs withdrew their motion for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs in this case continued to monitor the alterations ICE made to its website between July and September and filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on October 6, 2020."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a lawsuit brought by several international students regarding the July 2020 release of ICE regulations which, in effect, meant that students on F-1 visas would risk deportation if their school shifted to online learning. On July 15, in a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same July directive, plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the regulations rescinded. In order to effectuate the rescission, ICE removed the guidance from its website and replaced it with the previous guidance, but the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that sought a formal declaration that the July 6 directive was improperly issued and an order that the government administer the student visa program in accordance with the March guidance for the duration of the emergency. The court found that the students' claims were mooted by the rescission and granted the government's motion to dismiss on October 1, 2020. <hr> <b>Background</b> Generally speaking, F-1 visas (colloquially \"student visas\") can be granted to international students who attend American universities. However, regulations on the granting of these visas limit the amount of online or distance learning the student can engage in. According to these regulations, an international student can engage in only one such class or three credits of that class per semester. 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 214.2(f)(6)(i)(G). The COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020 made this regulation untenable, as schools and universities had to shift to online learning systems. In response, defendant ICE issued an exemption on March 13, 2020, affirming that international students would be permitted to continue distance learning in the United States under their F-1 visas. The exemption would apply until the end of the emergency. However, on July 6, 2020, ICE issued a new directive stating that it would rescind that exemption. This directive would then mean that international students at schools that would still be fully online would have to either transfer to other schools that were at least partially in-person, go back to their countries voluntarily, or risk deportation. The directive also ordered schools that had gone fully online or had simply decided not to have classes to submit an \"operational change plan\" within nine days, and ordered schools that would have a hybrid system to certify each F-1 student to make sure that they were not taking entirely online courses. <b>The Lawsuit</b> This lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on July 10, 2020, four days after the directive was issued. Plaintiffs were seven foreign nationals attending University of California schools at the post-graduate level. They were represented by Public Counsel and private attorneys. Defendants were the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The plaintiffs claimed that the new directive violated the Administrative Procedure Act in four ways: 1) the directive was arbitrary and capricious in that it failed to consider reliance interests of F-1 and M-1 visa holders; 2) the directive was arbitrary and capricious in that it failed to offer a reasoned basis to justify the policy; 3) defendants did not engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking when coming up with the new policy; and 4) the directive violated the Fifth Amendment in that it stripped plaintiffs of their visas without due process of law. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order as well as preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the agencies from enforcing the new directive. Plaintiffs also requested that the court vacate and set aside the new directive, in addition to declaratory relief and attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Cormac J. Carney and Magistrate Judge Karen E. Scott. The students filed an application for a temporary restraining order on July 14. Meanwhile, in a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same directive, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17677&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7CHarvard%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B\"><i>President and Fellows of Harvard College</i></a>, the parties conferred and the defendants agreed to rescind their implementation of the directive and to return to the March policy. On July 16, the parties filed a joint stipulation that stated the government agreed to rescind the July directive by removing it from its website and replacing it with the March guidance, which mooted the students original claims. However, in an amendment to the students' application for a temporary restraining order, they noted that despite the removal, the government failed to issue a formal statement of rescission or explanation and failed to issue a statement confirming that the March guidance would remain in effect for the duration of the emergency. They sought an order directing the government to administer the student visa program in accordance with the March guidance for the duration of the emergency. The government filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the students' application for a temporary restraining order. On August 3, the court denied the students' application for a temporary restraining order because the rescission satisfied much of the relief demanded by plaintiffs. The court also denied the government's motion to dismiss, allowing the students to amend their complaint to clarify the relief they continued to seek. The students filed an amended complaint on August 14. The complaint reiterated their demands from the amended application for a temporary restraining order. They sought a declaration that the July 6 directive was improperly issued in violation of the APA and the plaintiffs' due process rights and a directive that the government administer the student visa program in accordance with the March guidance for the duration of the emergency. The government filed a motion to dismiss on August 28. The court found that the students' claims were moot and granted the government's motion to dismiss on October 1, 2020.", "summary": "Seven unnamed individuals sued ICE and DHS over their new directive that would effectively force international students to take in-person classes or risk deportation. The suit alleged violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Due Process Clause. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief prohibiting the enforcement of the directive and an order vacating the directive. On July 15, in a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same July directive, plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the regulations rescinded. In order to effectuate the rescission, ICE removed the guidance from its website and replaced it with the previous guidance, but the plaintiffs in this case filed an amended complaint that sought a formal declaration that the July 6 directive was improperly issued and an order that the government administer the student visa program in accordance with the March guidance for the duration of the emergency. The court found that the students' claims were mooted by the rescission and granted the government's motion to dismiss on October 1, 2020."}
{"article": "In March 2018, Secretary Ross and the Department of Commerce announced that a citizenship question would be added to the 2020 Census, because of a request from the Department of Justice for data to enforce the Voting Rights Act. A number of lawsuits followed, culminating in the Supreme Court affirming that the asserted reason for including the citizenship question \u2014 to aid in Voting Rights Act enforcement \u2014 was pretextual. Subsequently, President Trump, in a continued effort to attempt to exclude immigrants from the 2020 Census count, issued a Presidential Memorandum on July 21, 2020 entitled \u201cExcluding Illegal Aliens From the Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census.\" This memorandum essentially sought to accomplish the same ends as the 2018 action by the Department of Commerce. Although no citizenship question appeared in the 2020 Census, the President asserted plans to exclude \"aliens who are not in a lawful immigration status under the Immigration and Nationality Act\" for the reapportionment following the Census. On July 28, 2020 the State of California, the City of Los Angeles, the City of Long Beach, the City of Oakland, and the Los Angeles Unified School District filed this lawsuit for declaratory and injunction relief in the Northern District of California. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent its implementation under the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs alleged that President Trump\u2019s July 21 Memorandum violates the constitutional mandates for the census (actual enumeration and apportionment) and the separation of powers under U.S. Const. art. I \u00a7 1 and U.S. Const. art. II \u00a7 3, as well as violating the Census Act. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants would not be able to accurately exclude undocumented immigrants from the apportionment count given the \"'lack of accurate estimates of the resident undocumented population' on a state-by-state basis.\" The case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley, but was reassigned twice \u2013 first to Edward M. Chen, then to Lucy H. Koh. Per the request of Judge Koh, on August 20, 2020, Chief Judge Sidney R. Thomas of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an order designating a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2284, a federal statute that requires convening a three-judge court in cases that challenge the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts. Following this order, Judge Richard R. Clifton of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and Judge Edward M. Chen of the Northern District of California were assigned to this case along with Judge Koh. On August 21, 2020, Judge Lucy Koh issued an order relating this case with <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17779&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7CNational%20Urban%20League%20v.%20Ross%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B\">National Urban League v. Ross</a>, and <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17745\">City of San Jose v. Trump</a>. On August 24, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The complaint added the County of Los Angeles as a plaintiff and added an allegation of an additional violation of the Census Act. On September 10, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for partial summary judgment. The case is ongoing as of October 9, 2020.", "summary": "In 2020, the State of California, the City of Los Angeles, the City of Long Beach, the City of Oakland, and the Los Angeles Unified School District filed this lawsuit in the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that President Trump's Memorandum violated the constitutional mandates for the census (actual enumeration and apportionment) and separation of powers, as well as violating the Census Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. The case is ongoing as of September 28, 2020."}
{"article": "On Feb. 7, 2018, the Colorado-based nonprofit organization Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center (CREEC) filed this suit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiff was an organization \"dedicated to protecting and defending the civil rights of individuals and educating the public concerning civil rights issues.\" Represented by its own counsel and by the private law firm Ballard Spahr, the plaintiff filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. According to the plaintiff, DHS operated many immigrant detention centers nationwide, including one in Adelanto, CA (the Adelanto Detention Facility [ADF]) in contract with the private-prison corporation GEO Group, and one in Gadsen, AL (the Etowah County Detention Center [ECDC]) in contract with the county sheriff's office. In both facilities, many detainees had alleged substandard conditions including inadequate medical care and mental health care, solitary confinement, and sexual assault. These conditions allegedly led to the death of detained individuals. The plaintiff sought information on conditions of confinement and the individuals detained at these facilities to inform public debate on the issue. The plaintiff alleged that it had submitted several FOIA requests to ICE on Aug. 15 and Sept. 29, 2017, seeking records related to both the detention centers. The complaint further claimed that, to date, the plaintiff had not received a substantive response from any of the defendant agencies and that the plaintiff had constructively exhausted all required administrative remedies. The plaintiff sought a disclosure order under FOIA, legal fees, and expedited action. On Feb. 7, 2018, this case was assigned to Judge Richard P. Matsch. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on June 29. In the amended complaint, the plaintiff included additional facilities run by DHS whose agency records and data had not been made public despite plaintiffs\u2019 FOIA requests. These facilities included the Denver Contract Detention Facility, located in Aurora, Colorado, which was operated by the defendants pursuant to a contract with GEO. Additionally, the Theo Lacy Facility, located in Orange County, California, was also added to the complaint. There, too, the defendants refused to make public agency records in response to the plaintiff's FOIA requests. The Theo Lacy Facility was operated by the defendants through a contract with the Orange County Sheriff\u2019s Office. The plaintiff alleged that both facilities have been the subject of numerous complaints, investigations by nongovernmental civil rights organizations, and reports concerning substandard conditions of confinement. The plaintiff also alleged noncompliance with a FOIA request seeking agency records as to the conditions of confinement at all facilities used by ICE for the detention of individuals during their immigration proceedings. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants exceeded the mandated statutory deadline as to all FOIA requests submitted as of the time of the filing of the first amended complaint. Accordingly, the plaintiff requested that the court declare the defendants' withholding of the requested records unlawful and enjoin any further noncompliance. Further, the plaintiff requested that the court order the defendants to make the records subject to the FOIA requests in controversy available and award the plaintiff costs and attorneys\u2019 fees. On May 30, 2019 this suit was reassigned to Judge John L. Kane. The plaintiff moved for leave to file second amended complaint on July 5, 2019. The defendants responded in opposition to the motion on Aug. 9, 2019. On Sept. 16, 2019, the plaintiff and defendants filed a joint notice of potential partial settlement. While tentative, the proposal indicated that the plaintiff may withdraw its motion for sanctions and the discovery order to produce documents. It would also end the litigation surrounding the plaintiff\u2019s opposed motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. On January 16, 2020, Judge Kane ordered that the parties file a joint status report by February 3, 2020, indicating whether it remains necessary for the Court to rule on the plaintiff's pending motions. On February 3, 2020, the court ordered the plaintiff's motions for sanctions and order to produce documents to be withdrawn as moot. Additionally, the court stated that if an agreement could not be reached as to the documents in question the defendants should then move for summary judgment. Before filing for summary judgment, the parties were able to reach a resolution on the plaintiff\u2019s FOIA requests on May 6, 2020. However, the parties could not reach an agreement regarding plaintiff\u2019s attorneys\u2019 fees and cost. The plaintiff\u2019s filed a motion for attorneys\u2019 fees and costs on June 8, 2020. As of March 25, 2021, the court had yet to resolve the dispute about plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs.", "summary": "The Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center (CREEC) filed this suit against DHS and ICE under FOIA, seeking information regarding substandard and abusive conditions of confinement against individuals detained at two immigration detention facilities. As of March 25, 2021, a settlement has been reached as to the evidence, but litigation continues for the plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs."}
{"article": "On August 10, 2007, attorneys and law student interns with the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization of the Yale Law School, filed a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552 (\"FOIA\"), in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, seeking to compel the release of government records regarding the immigration enforcement policies, practices, and activities of the Immigration and Custom Enforcement Division of the Department of Homeland Security (\"ICE\") in and around New Haven, Connecticut. Specifically, Plaintiffs sought the release of records relating to a June 6, 2007 immigration raid in New Haven, Connecticut, in which 29 individuals were arrested and detained. Plaintiffs alleged that the raid came on the heels of the approval of a municipal identification card program in New Haven. The Government filed an answer, generally denying Plaintiffs' allegations. In April of 2008, the Government moved for summary judgment. During oral argument, the District Court (Judge Mark R. Kravitz) suggested he conduct an in camera review of certain categories of documents in dispute. In September of 2008, the Court issued its Ruling on Documents Submitted In Camera, holding that certain categories of documents containing individually identifiable information were properly withheld from disclosure, but that certain email documents were not exempt from disclosure. Unidad Latina En Acci\u00f3n v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 253 F.R.D. 44 (D. Conn. 2008). The Court instructed the parties to use this ruling as a guide for resolving similar disputes. On December 9, 2008, the Court (Judge Kravitz) entered its ruling on the adequacy of the Government's search. The Court ordered the Government to submit an additional declaration detailing three discrete aspects of its search, but stated that once the Government did so, it would be inclined to grant summary judgment on the adequacy of the search. However, the Plaintiffs then moved for relief from the order, stating that the Government had included false statements in one of the declarations that the Court had relied upon. The Court subsequently granted the Plaintiffs' motion and allowed them to depose certain ICE FOIA officers on the adequacy of the Government's search. The Government also withdrew its summary judgment motion insofar as it pertained to the adequacy of the search. On January 30, 2009, the Court (Judge Kravitz) ruled on its second in camera review based on a certain set of redactions in the Government's documents. The Court ordered that the redactions were appropriate where the individually identifiable information could be matched to individuals, but held it was inappropriate to withhold such information when it was already in the public domain. With this ruling, the Court denied the Government's summary judgment motion as moot, as it had now conducted two in camera reviews and the Government had withdrawn another aspect of its motion. The Government then submitted a third round of documents for the Court's review, with the dispute now centered on the scope of Plaintiffs' FOIA request. On March 27, 2009, the Court entered a text order stating that, for reasons stated during oral argument, the Government had properly withheld certain documents but not others. In late May 2009, following the depositions of the ICE FOIA officers, the parties had worked out an agreement regarding the adequacy of the Government's searches. By November, the parties stipulated that, with the exception of costs and attorneys fees, no further relief was being sought from the Court, and stipulated to dismiss the claims with prejudice. The Court entered judgment for Plaintiffs in part and for the Government in part. In January of 2010, the parties settled the outstanding issues of costs and attorneys' fees, with the Government agreeing to pay Plaintiffs' counsel $64,000.00.", "summary": "On August 10, 2007, attorneys and Yale Law student interns filed a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act seeking documents from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security regarding an immigration raid in New Haven. After several rounds of in camera reviews by the District Court (Judge Mark R. Kravitz), the parties settled the dispute in November of 2009."}
{"article": "On Jan, 6, 2015, three Central American immigrant mothers and their children filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Plaintiffs, represented by private and public interest counsel including the ACLU, sought certification of a class of all persons who had been or would be detained in ICE facilities; who had been or would be determined to have a credible fear of persecution in their home countries; and who were eligible for release, but had been denied such release pursuant to ICE's blanket \"No-Release Policy.\" In addition to class certification, plaintiffs asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the No-Release Policy violated the APA (as arbitrary and capricious), the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (by denying plaintiffs individualized custody determinations, instead basing such determinations on a policy of deterring future immigration). Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction the same day they filed their complaint. On Feb. 20, 2015, the District Court (Judge James E. Boasberg) granted plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction and provisional class certification, and denied defendants' motion to dismiss. The Court found that, although an across-the-board ICE policy aimed at denying all release to asylum-seeking Central American families did not exist, there was \"ample support in the record\" to find that DHS required ICE officers \"to consider deterrence of mass migration as a factor in custody determinations, and that this policy has played a significant role in the recent increased detention of Central American mothers and children.\" The Court also found that this policy \"contributed to the near universal detention of Central American families since June 2014.\" The Court held that plaintiffs had standing to challenge this policy, as they satisfied the requirements for class certification under the relation back doctrine. In ruling on the merits of a preliminary injunction, the Court held that plaintiffs had a significant likelihood of succeeding on the merits of their claim, and stated that DHS's approach to detention did not comport with \"traditional purposes\" and was \"poorly substantiated.\" The Court also held that plaintiffs were likely to face irreparable harm without injunctive relief; the public interest would be served by an injunction; and the government could not be harmed by an injunction ending an unlawful practice. <i>R.I.L-R v. Johnson</i>, 80 F.Supp.3d 164 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2015). Though defendants at first asked the Court to reconsider the preliminary injunction, on May 13 they notified the Court that the government had announced it would stop invoking deterrence as a factor in family custody-determination cases. However, despite this policy change, the government maintained that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the case and that the challenged policy had been lawful. After conferring with the parties, on June 29, 2015, Judge Boasberg dissolved the preliminary injunction (except for the provisional class certification) and administratively closed the case. Judge Boasberg specified that if defendants wish to reinstate a policy of considering deterrence, they must notify the Court. If this happens, plaintiffs may move to administratively reopen the case and request a reinstatement of the preliminary injunction. As of February 20, 2021, the case remained administratively closed and there was no further activity in the case. Still, the district court\u2019s order requiring the government to inform plaintiffs if it resumes its practice of detaining families on deterrence grounds remains in effect.", "summary": "On Jan. 6, 2015, Central American immigrant mothers and children filed a class action lawsuit against DHS and ICE, challenging their \"No-Release Policy\" in making custody determinations for asylum-seeking families. On Feb. 20, 2015, the Court granted a preliminary injunction. Defendants ended the policy in May 2015. This case is now administratively closed. If the defendants reinstate a policy of considering deterrence in determining whether to detain a family, they must notify the court and the plaintiffs may move to administratively reopen the case. Since June 2015, there has been no additional activity in the case."}
{"article": "On April 18, 2017, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Council (\u201cADC\u201d) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The case was assigned to Judge Christopher R. Cooper. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sued the United States Customs and Border Protection (\u201cCBP\u201d) under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552). The plaintiff alleged that CBP unlawfully withheld records that the plaintiffs had requested under the Freedom of Information Act. (The FOIA request had sought records of CBP action revoking, suspending, or terminating participation in the Global Entry System for certain Arab and Muslim U.S. Citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents.) CBP failed to disclose the requested records within the time period specified by the statute, and did not offer any meaningful estimate of when the records would become available. Accordingly, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief compelling the agency to perform an expedited search for responsive records, and to produce all responsive records which were not subject to a FOIA exemption. The plaintiff also sought attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The court ordered the parties to submit joint status reports on the agency\u2019s document production. In the joint status report submitted on March 1, 2019, the parties informed the court that they had resolved their records production dispute. On July 26, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, informing the court that the parties had reached an agreement on attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The court dismissed the case the same day.", "summary": "On April 18, 2017, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Council filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking for the court to compel United States Customs and Border Patrol to comply with a Freedom of Information Act request. The plaintiffs sought records of CBP action revoking, suspending, or terminating participation int he Global Entry System for certain Arab and Muslim U.S. Citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents. The court ordered joint status updates. In March 2019, the parties informed the court that they had resolved the records production dispute. In July 2019, they informed the court that they had reached an agreement regarding attorneys\u2019 fees and costs, and requesting that the case be dismissed. The court dismissed the case on July 26, 2019."}
{"article": "On Oct. 24, 2017, the Protect Democracy Project filed this lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. According to the complaint, plaintiff is a nonprofit organization with a \"mission is to protect our democracy from descending into a more autocratic form of government by preventing those in power from depriving Americans of a free, fair, and fully-informed opportunity to exercise ultimate sovereignty.\" As part of its activities, plaintiff aims to inform the public about executive branch activity, including by filing FOIA requests and releasing the results on its website. The law firm Covington & Burling represented plaintiff in this case. Plaintiff sought disclosure of agency records by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component Customs and Border Protection (CBP) that would shed light on the extent to which defendants cooperated with armed private militia groups along the U.S.-Mexico border. In his Jan. 25, 2017 <a href=\"https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-01-30/pdf/2017-02095.pdf\">Executive Order 13767</a>, President Trump directed DHS to hire 5,000 additional CBP agents. According to plaintiff, public reports suggest that CBP agents may be informally working with unaffiliated militia groups to police the border. The complaint alleged that on Aug. 3, 2017, plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to DHS seeking copies of records related to the following: 1. DHS's interactions and involvement with unaffiliated border enforcement groups, including all communications between CBP field officers and any other component of DHS relating to such groups, and all communications between any DHS employee and any representative of such group; 2. CBP's interactions and involvement with such groups at the Sectors of Big Bend, Del Rio, Laredo, and Rio Grande Valley, TX; Tuscon and Yuma, AZ; and El Centro and San Diego, CA. The complaint further alleged that, to date, plaintiff had not received a substantive response from DHS or CBP. Plaintiff sought an expedited disclosure order under FOIA and sought legal fees. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and was assigned to Judge Randolph D. Moss. Also on Oct. 24, plaintiff filed a notice that this case was related to another with the same name, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16241\"><i>Protect Democracy Project v. DHS</i></a>, No. 1:17-cv-02118 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2017). Status reports filed from March through October 2018 indicated the parties continued to confer on the scope of the search and that the defendants produced responsive records periodically. A status conference was held on October 29, 2018, and the court ordered that CBP provide a description of the searches that the agency has conducted as well as hit counts for the searches by November 5 and 12, respectively. The court ordered DHS to meet and confer with the plaintiffs to discuss the plaintiff\u2019s request for an explanation of the agency\u2019s redactions. In the status report dated Nov. 16, 2018, the plaintiffs claimed that DHS had failed to respond to the requests to meet and confer for eleven days after the imposed deadline, and asked the court to enter an order requiring DHS to provide them with a summary of the basis for its redactions and withholdings and an explanation for its failure to respond to the meet and confer request. The court ordered the parties to meet and confer. The plaintiffs further submitted in a later report dated March 15, 2019, that DHS had failed to comply with the agreed ordered production schedule. The court ordered DHS to submit a declaration. DHS submitted a declaration stating that they were unable to process any records temporarily due to the government shutdown at the time and the high workload that resulted afterward. In the latest joint status report filed by the parties on June 12, 2020 the defendants reported that they continued to experience work disruptions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, but that they expected to complete their processing and release of remaining, non-exempt records by the end of July. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "On Oct. 24, 2017, the Protect Democracy Project sued DHS and CBP in D.D.C. under FOIA. Plaintiff sought disclosure of agency records on the extent to which defendants cooperate with armed private militia groups along the U.S.-Mexico border. This case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On August 23, 2018, Muslim Advocates filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the United States Department of Justice [DOJ] and United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE]. The complaint alleged that the defendants improperly withheld information in violation of the Freedom of Information Act [FOIA], 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552(a), and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Muslim Advocates had requested information from both defendants regarding Operation Janus, where the DOJ, in conjunction with other agencies, reviewed the files of naturalized citizens and began intensive denaturalization efforts. In-house counsel along with the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild and Davis Wright Tremaine LLP represented the plaintiff. The plaintiff had requested information from both defendants on January 11, 2018. The Civil Division of the DOJ denied the request in full on January 19, 2018, claiming that the release of the documents would be \"reasonably expected\" to interfere with law enforcement. The DOJ did not explain their reasoning for this determination. The plaintiff then requested a Vaughn index, in which the government provides an itemized index of withheld documents and justification for doing so. The DOJ did not respond to this request. On February 9, 2018, ICE informed the plaintiff that the scope of the request was too broad, and thus did not process the FOIA request. Even after the plaintiff amended its request for information on several occasions, ICE did not release any of the requested documents. The case was assigned to Judge Rudolph Contreras. Status reports indicate that the parties reached an agreement on all FOIA issues on January 13, 2020; that agreement has not yet been publicized. Negotiations over ICE's payment of plaintiff's attorneys fees are ongoing as of June 9, 2020; the next status report is due June 15, 2020.", "summary": "On August 23, 2018, Muslim Advocates filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the United States Department of Justice [DOJ] and United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE]. The complaint alleged violations of the Freedom of Information Act [FOIA], 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552(a). Muslim Advocates had requested information from both defendants regarding Operation Janus, where the DOJ reviewed the files of naturalized citizens and began intensive denaturalization efforts. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case moved to settlement negotiations; an agreement on all FOIA issues was reached on January 13, 2020, but negotiations over attorneys fees are ongoing as of June 2020."}
{"article": "On November 20, 2018, a group of asylum seekers challenged the federal government\u2019s latest asylum policy, which prohibited people who enter the United States along the southern border somewhere other than a designated port of entry from obtaining asylum. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged an interim final rule promulgated on November 9, 2018, declaring all those subject to a presidential proclamation concerning the southern border ineligible for asylum, as well as the \u201cPresidential Proclamation Addressing Mass Migration Through the Southern Border of the United States\u201d signed the same day blocking the entry of all people entering the United States without inspection at the southern border. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Act. Represented by the National Immigrant Justice Center, Human Rights First, and private counsel, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and assigned to Magistrate Judge Randolph D. Moss. The plaintiffs were six non-citizens who entered the United States seeking asylum. Two were a father and daughter who fled Honduras to escape a gang threatening to kill them, fearing the local police would not be willing to protect them. Another fled from Mexico, seeking safety from her gang-affiliated partner who repeatedly beat her and threatened to kill her. A fourth plaintiff was an unaccompanied minor from Honduras who sought to escape a credible fear of murder from his father\u2014a police officer who abused him\u2014and from a gang that the plaintiff refused to join on moral grounds. Another two plaintiffs were a mother and her son from Honduras seeking asylum to escape the violence and threat of death posed by her husband. None had been granted asylum. The plaintiffs argued that federal law allowed non-citizens to seek asylum regardless of their immigration status or how they entered the United States. Further, federal law established procedural safeguards that aimed to give asylum seekers a fair review process during removal proceedings. The plaintiffs also argued that under treaty obligations, the United States could not deny asylum on the basis of where the non-citizen entered the country. But the government\u2019s new rule, part of its broader \u201czero-tolerance\u201d policy on immigration, \u201cshutters access to the asylum system for thousands of men, women, and children that the Administration concedes are likely to have meritorious asylum claims.\u201d Faced with even longer wait times at the border, the complaint argued, asylum seekers already in dangerous situations and with scarce financial resources were thus left seriously vulnerable to violence from criminal organizations near the border. At the same time the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, to be followed by a preliminary injunction enjoining implementation and enforcement of the rule and the proclamation. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs, as did a group of seven United States Senators. On December 17, 2018, the court held a hearing on the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and consolidated the case with <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17043\">S.M.S.R. v. Trump</a>, designating this case as the lead case. On December 21, the court decided to hold the motion in abeyance. On December 18, 2018, the <i>S.M.S.R. v. Trump</i> plaintiffs filed an amended complaint listing seven additional asylum seekers as plaintiffs. At the same time, the plaintiffs in this case also filed an amended complaint seeking certification of a class consisting of all persons who had crossed the southern border since November 10, 2018, and had either gone into hiding to avoid detection, presented outside a port of entry and been detained, or presented and been released pending further immigration proceedings. On December 26, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to stay all briefing deadlines in light of the lapse in appropriations to the Department of Justice caused by the federal government shutdown. The court, however, denied this motion. On January 4, 2019, the plaintiffs in both cases filed motions for summary judgment and class certification. The defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment on February 25, 2019. Oral argument on these pending motions was scheduled for May 29, 2019. On August 2, 2019, the court granted in part the plaintiffs\u2019 summary judgment and class certification motions, denied the defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment, and denied as moot the plaintiffs\u2019 earlier motion for a temporary restraining order. The court held that the rule challenged by the plaintiffs was \u201cunlawful\u201d within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court also found both the plaintiffs\u2019 argument for an injunction and the defendants\u2019 argument against the injunction unpersuasive; as a practical matter, it would be impossible to vacate the challenged rule with respect to the organizational plaintiffs without vacating the entire rule. As such, the court agreed to vacate the rule but declined the plaintiffs\u2019 request to enforce the requested injunction. As to the class certification, the court found that, here, the class certification requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation were met. 404 F.Supp.3d 109. On September 30, 2019, the defendants appealed the case (D.C. Circuit docket number 19-5272); as of August 2020, the case is ongoing.", "summary": "On November 20, 2018, a group of asylum seekers challenged a federal government policy of denying asylum to people who entered the United States, without inspection, along the southern border. They claimed violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Act, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. This case was later consolidated with <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17043\">S.M.S.R. v. Trump</a>. The court granted class certification and partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on August 2, 2019. The defendants appealed the ruling. As of August 2020, the case is ongoing."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a federal lawsuit in D.C. District Court in which noncitizen families detained by ICE in \"Family Residential Centers\" (FRCs) are seeking release to avoid COVID-19 infection. On March 30, District Judge James Boasberg ordered ICE to provide appropriate infection protocols for the adults (a similar order from another case, <i>Flores</i>, applies to the children), to comply with CDC guidelines for congregate institutions, and to file a report regarding FRC capacity, implementation of the CDC guidelines, the number of detainees released, and videotape of the living conditions at the FRCs. The court denied the plaintiffs' later motion for a preliminary injunction demanding wholesale release of detainees on July 22. On December 10, the court dismissed the claim under the APA and the writs of mandamus. A hearing is scheduled for February 16, 2021. <hr> Full Summary: On March 21, 2020, 37 families detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement in three family residential centers (\u201cFRC\u201d) sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs were detained in three FRC's in Pennsylvania and Texas and represented by three public interest groups: ALDEA \u2014 the People\u2019s Justice Center, the Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services, and the Rapid Defense Network. The plaintiffs alleged that the conditions of their detention amidst the COVID-19 pandemic violated their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights, the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 551 et seq.), Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2201-02) and, with regards to detained minors, the Flores Agreement. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorneys\u2019 fees, and writs of mandamus. With regards to the injunctive relief, the plaintiffs requested the court order the immediate release of all detainees in the FRC\u2019s, the implementation of protocols designed to prevent the transmission of COVID-19, and the suspension of new detainments until the COVID-19 protocols have been implemented. The case was assigned to Judge James Boasberg. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their Fifth Amendment rights by subjecting civil detainees to a substantial risk of serious harm from the COVID-19 virus. The COVID-19 coronavirus spreads through respiratory droplets and can be transmitted when an infected person coughs or sneezes. The Center for Disease Control stated that it may be possible for someone to contract the virus if they touched a surface with the virus on it, then touched their own face. The plaintiffs alleged that the most effective means of prevention are improved hygiene and social distancing of at least six feet. FRC\u2019s are congregate environments, where detainees eat, sleep, and play together in confined spaces that do not allow for the recommended \u201csocial distancing.\u201d The FRC\u2019s are cleaned by detainees provided with allegedly inadequate supplies, which the plaintiffs believe put detainees at increased risk of infection because FRC surfaces are used to prepare meals, take showers, and perform all other functions of daily life. The plaintiffs alleged that the congregate environment and inadequate hygiene procedures, combined with the daily turnover of FRC staff, make an outbreak imminent. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants violated the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to implement policies and procedures to protect the plaintiffs\u2019 constitutional rights. They argued that the lack of policies constituted a final agency action, making it reviewable by a court. Finally, the plaintiffs stated that the Flores Settlement Agreement required the defendants to safeguard and protect immigrant children in their custody by making facilities safe and sanitary, and releasing minors without unnecessary delay in order to ensure their safety. The plaintiffs alleged that the conditions of detention violated the rights of minors under the Flores Settlement Agreement. For more information on the Flores Settlement, see <a href=https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9493><i>Flores v. Reno</i></a> in the Clearinghouse. Immediately, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and requested an emergency hearing. On March 30, Judge Boasberg granted in part and denied in part without prejudice the plaintiff's motion. Judge Boasberg ordered that the Government provide for the adults at the three Family Residential Centers the same protocols and procedures as ordered for the children there in Flores. The Government also must provide to FRC detainees CDC-compliant protocols and protections for congregate settings in civil-detention facilities. Additionally, Judge Boasberg ordered the Government to provide the Court with a report regarding the capacity of the three FRCs, the implementation of the CDC guidelines, and the number of detainees released, as well as a videotape of the living conditions at the FRCs. Public health experts and the American Academy of Pediatrics submitted a brief in support of the petitioner's motion for a temporary restraining order. The brief detailed that the highly contagious nature of the disease made an outbreak \"highly probable\" even if the three FRCs adopted CDC-recommended preventative measures. The authors recommended releasing families with children to enable social distancing and mitigate the risk. On April 13, the Court held a telephonic hearing with the parties. Judge Boasberg declined to grant immediate release of the immigrant families, finding that the government is \"continuing to make substantial progress\" to ensure that detainees are not infected. Judge Boasberg pointed to the installation of hand washing stations installed at some FRCs, and his belief that the FRCs are in compliance and CDC guidance for congregate settings. For the next hearing, Judge Boasberg ordered the defendant to file a notice detailing the statistics on detainees and releases in the three FRCs, ICE's compliance with CDC guidelines, and its response plan, including testing capabilities and PPE supplies. Judge Boasberg again declined to grant immediate release of detainees in a telephonic hearing held on April 27. He extended some conditions from the Flores Agreement to adults, but stopped short of requiring the government to explain why an adult has been in detention for more than 20 days. Judge Boasberg stated his continued belief that conditions are improving at the FRCs, and noted that the three centers are at least 16% under capacity. On May 20, Judge Boasberg held a telephonic conference in which the plaintiffs argued that any improvements by a reduced population were undermined by the government's closure of parts of the facilities, thereby pushing the remaining detainees closer together. The plaintiffs argued that extended detention in these conditions amounted to a Fifth Amendment due process violation. Judge Boasberg, though, rebuffed the proposition, stating that he did not have the authority to order the immediate release of all detainees based on the conditions alleged. On May 26, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss all counts of the complaint and a motion in opposition to the temporary restraining order. On June 25, the court ordered the defendants to notify the court and the plaintiffs of any positive tests of staff or detainees. Numerous new positive cases were noted between June and November. On July 2, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, arguing that the measures put in place by defendants as a result of the March 30 temporary restraining order were insufficient. The motion was denied on July 22 because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that \"nothing short of wholesale release - the only remedy Petitioners seek at this time - [could] redress their injuries.\" On July 17, defendants had filed a notice of an order in <i>Flores v. Barr</i>, 2020 WL 3488040, which was a decision issued pursuant to the Flores Settlement which had ordered the release of detainees, but only minors detained at an FRC, not adults, which meant that the plaintiffs' demands only applied to adult detainees. The parties had numerous status conferences throughout the summer and fall. On September 16, 2020, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to add more plaintiffs. On December 10, the court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissing all but the due process and FSA claims. 2020 WL 7264049. The judge dismissed the claim under the Administrative Procedure Act, claiming that the plaintiffs did not identify any final agency action and that the court did not have jurisdiction since the actions were under the Attorney General's authority. He further denied writs of mandamus on the grounds that the plaintiffs had received adequate remedy and the claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act, as the Act only provided relief rather than a cause of action. As the litigation proceeded, the parties continued to file status reports and notices regarding positive cases in the detention center. Certain plaintiffs filed notices of voluntary dismissal and on January 24, the plaintiffs filed a motion to join additional defendants, which the defendants opposed on February 12, 2021. The Clearinghouse does not have access to these documents at this time. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "37 families detained at three ICE-managed family residential centers sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security alleging violations of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights, violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, and violations of the Flores Settlement Agreement. The plaintiffs alleged that the congregate environment and unsanitary conditions of the detention centers make them a tinderbox for a COVID-19 outbreak. They sought immediate release until proper protocols could be implemented. The plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order which was granted in part and denied in part on March 30. The court ordered ICE to provide appropriate infection protocols for the adults (a similar order from another case, <i>Flores</i>, applies to the children), to comply with CDC guidelines for congregate institutions, and to file a report regarding FRC capacity, implementation of the CDC guidelines, the number of detainees released, and videotape of the living conditions at the FRCs. On May 26, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a motion in opposition to the temporary restraining order. The court denied the plaintiffs' later motion for a preliminary injunction demanding wholesale release of detainees on July 22. On December 10, the court dismissed the claim under the APA and the writs of mandamus. A hearing is scheduled for February 16, 2021. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: A group of transgender people in civil immigration detention requested an injunction ordering supervised release of all transgender people in immigration detention in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The court denied the motion for TRO on June 2, 2020. On January 6, 2021, the case was dismissed upon parties' stipulation of dismissal. <hr> On April 23, 2020, a group of transgender people in civil immigration detention filed this class action complaint and petition for a writ of mandamus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Represented by the Transgender Law Center and the Rapid Defense Network, along with private counsel, the plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Attorney General of the United States. They requested an injunction ordering supervised release of all transgender people in immigration detention. The plaintiffs argued that Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) did not provide sufficient measures to curb the spread of COVID-19 in its facilities and that transgender individuals are particularly vulnerable to infection because they are more likely to have underlying health conditions like HIV, diabetes, and high blood pressure. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that by subjecting them to a higher risk of infection, the defendants failed to ensure their safety and health and held them in conditions amounting to punishment in violation of their substantive due process rights. They also claimed that by continuing to refuse to establish and implement policies and procedures to prevent the transmission of COVID-19, the defendants acted arbitrarily and capriciously and abused their discretion in violation of the APA. The case was assigned to Judge Christopher R. Cooper. On May 1, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order in addition to a permanent injunction. On May 5, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, for a class consisting of all transgender people in civil immigration detention who are held, or who will be held, in any ICE detention center or facility across the country during the pendency of the COVID-19 pandemic. On May 11, they also sought to join two new plaintiffs. On June 2, the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for TRO, finding that ICE had taken steps to contain the virus in detention facilities. 2020 WL 2935111. The court also denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, limiting the case to the named plaintiffs. The defendants moved to dismiss the case on July 31. They claimed that most of the named plaintiffs were released from detention or removed, with only three remaining, rendering their claims moot. For the remaining plaintiffs, they argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the APA and for a writ of mandamus. On August 14, 2020, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint with additional requests for relief. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs sought an order requiring the defendants to issue an ICE bond for all plaintiffs and class members pending the completion of these proceedings. They further sought an order requiring ICE to incorporate the model procedures outlined in the 2015 Transgender Care Memorandum, claiming that ICE had systematically failed to protect transgender people. They also noted that on August 14, 2020, ICE had publicly reported 4,531 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 5 deaths, which is a significant increase from 285 reported cases in April. The defendants sought to dismiss the amended complaint on September 18, 2020 and the plaintiffs filed their response on October 16, 2020. On January 5, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal, and on January 6, 2021, the case was dismissed.", "summary": "On April 23, 2020, a group of transgender people in civil immigration detention filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs requested an injunction ordering supervised release of all transgender people in immigration detention in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. On June 2, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for TRO and motion for class certification. After filing an amended complaint in August, 2020, the case was dismissed on January 6, 2021."}
{"article": "<i>Note: This lawsuit is a challenge to the Department of Defense\u2019s failure to certify the honorable military service of MAVNI soldiers seeking expedited naturalization under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17531&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Csamma%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B\"><i>Samma v. United States Department of Defense</i></a> is a similar challenge brought by non-MAVNI soldiers who qualify for expedited naturalization under the same statute. <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17688&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseType%7CIM%3BcaseState%7CDC%3BcaseNum%7C0080%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B\"><i>Nio v. United States Department of Homeland Security</i></a> challenges the Department of Homeland Security\u2019s consideration and adjudication of applications following certification of honorable military service. </i> <hr> The Immigration and Nationality Act provides an expedited path to citizenship for non-citizens serving in the United States military, but in 2016, the Obama Department of Defense implemented a new internal policy adding substantive and procedural requirements. Objecting to new policy, three non-citizen service members, represented by private counsel, filed this class-action lawsuit against the Department of Defense. The complaint, filed on September 1, 2017 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and assigned to Judge Ellen S. Huvelle, alleged that the Department\u2019s policy violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Department\u2019s new requirements were unlawful; an injunction barring the Department from implementing the 2016 policy; and mandamus and APA relief compelling the Department to promptly process naturalization paperwork without adding extra-statutory requirements. They also sought to bar the Department from retaliation against soldiers participating in the lawsuit, and from discharging a soldier in order to avoid certifying her honorable service. Finally, they sought attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The plaintiffs had all joined the military through the MAVNI program (\u201cMilitary Accessions Vital to the National Interest\u201d), through which the Department of Defense enlisted non-citizen soldiers who had special medical or linguistic skills needed by the military. Under this program, which was authorized by 8 U.S.C. \u00a71440, MAVNI soldiers qualified for an expedited pathway to U.S. citizenship; the Department even contractually required MAVNI soldiers to apply for citizenship. This opportunity was a significant recruiting incentive. As part of the expedited naturalization process, the Department of Defense was required to certify to the Department of Homeland Security that an applicant\u2019s military service had been honorable; DHS created Form N-426 for this certification. The statute did not specify a particular duration of service; it simply required a soldier\u2019s service to be honorable. DHS regulations confirmed that a soldier could be eligible for expedited naturalization after one day of military service. Contrary to the express language of the statute, the 2016 policy indicated that the Department would not certify a soldier\u2019s honorable service unless she had served in active-duty status. The policy also restricted the pool of military officials authorized to sign the certification. The plaintiffs\u2019 certification requests had been denied or delayed because of the new policy. They alleged that the delay in naturalization deprived them of the protections that the statute was intended to provide, including access to United States consular services while deployed overseas, work and school authorization and benefits, and ability to sponsor family members. On October 25, 2017, the court granted a preliminary injunction, requiring that the Department \u201cuse its best efforts\u201d to complete each N-426 form within 2 days of receiving it. 285 F. Supp. 3d 21. The order provisionally certified a class for purposes of the preliminary injunction, comprising MAVNI recruits who had enlisted prior to October 13, 2017. Two days later, the Department sought an administrative stay of one week, to allow time for the Solicitor General to decide whether to appeal the order; the court denied that motion the same day. The court\u2019s order clarified that any application which had previously been returned to its applicant would have to be re-submitted in order to be certified. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 3, 2017. On November 15, they moved to enforce the preliminary injunction, alleging that the Department was not complying with the court\u2019s order: it was not promptly completing N-426 forms, it had \u201cimposed new administrative pre-conditions for issuance of N-426 forms,\u201d and it had not informed unit commanders or class members of the requirements of the preliminary injunction. The same week, the Department moved for dismissal or for summary judgment. Acknowledging that the court had already granted class certification in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17688&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseType%7CIM%3BcaseState%7CDC%3BcaseNum%7C0080%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B\"><i>Nio</i></a>, the Department did not oppose the plaintiffs\u2019 class certification motion in this case. It did, however, seek to limit the class to include only those who qualified as of the date of class certification. When the court granted certification on December 1, 2017, it specified no cut-off date for class membership; it simply specified MAVNI soldiers who had not received a duly authenticated N-426. On December 15, 2017, the court ordered the Department to submit regular status reports. (This order was eventually vacated in June 2020.) On January 11, 2018, the court dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 substantive due process claim, but denied the Department\u2019s motion to dismiss (or grant summary judgment on) the remainder of the plaintiffs\u2019 claims. 285 F. Supp. 3d 257. On May 23, the court denied the Department\u2019s motion to reconsider. 315 F. Supp. 3d 266. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Michael Harvey for mediation in December 2019; as of August 2020, negotiations continue.", "summary": "Three non-citizen soldiers in the U.S. military brought this class-action lawsuit against the Department of Defense in September 2017. The Department was refusing to certify their honorable military service for purposes of expedited naturalization under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court issued a preliminary injunction in October 2017, requiring the Department to certify honorable service within 2 days of a soldier\u2019s request, without imposing additional procedural or substantive requirements. As of August 2020, the plaintiffs and the Department of Defense are in mediation."}
{"article": "<i>Note: This lawsuit challenged the Department of Homeland Security\u2019s policy of delaying naturalization for MAVNI soldiers who had already received certification of their honorable military service. <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17673&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Ckirwa%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B\"><i>Kirwa v. United States Department of Defense</i></a> is a challenge to the Department of Defense\u2019s failure to certify the honorable military service of MAVNI soldiers seeking expedited naturalization; <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17531&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Csamma%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B\"><i>Samma v. United States Department of Defense</i></a> is a similar challenge by non-MAVNI soldiers.</i><hr>The Immigration and Nationality Act provides an expedited path to citizenship for foreign nationals serving in the United States military. However, in 2017, the Department of Homeland Security began (at the request of the Department of Defense) to delay soldiers\u2019 citizenship applications until the Department of Defense could complete an additional background check. Objecting to this new policy, 10 non-citizen service members, represented by private counsel, filed this class-action lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the Department of Defense. The complaint, filed May 24, 2017 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and assigned to Judge Ellen S. Huvelle, alleged that the Department of Homeland Security\u2019s policy was in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs had all joined the military through the MAVNI program (\u201cMilitary Accessions Vital to the National Interest\u201d), through which the Department of Defense enlisted non-citizen soldiers who had special medical or linguistic skills needed by the military. Under this program, which was authorized by 8 U.S.C. \u00a71440, MAVNI soldiers qualified for an expedited pathway to U.S. citizenship; the military even contractually required MAVNI soldiers to apply for citizenship. This opportunity was a significant recruiting incentive. When a soldier applied for expedited naturalization, the Department of Defense was required by law to certify the soldier\u2019s honorable military service (using DHS Form N-426), after which the Department of Homeland Security would process the soldier\u2019s naturalization application. The plaintiffs in this case had already received certification of their honorable military service; however, after issuing certification, the Department of Defense asked the Department of Homeland Security to delay the soldiers\u2019 applications while it conducted further background checks and investigations. When the Department of Homeland Security complied with this request, the resulting delay deprived the plaintiffs of the protections of citizenship that the statute was intended to provide for service members. The plaintiffs claimed that Congress had enacted the statute to make the naturalization process easier for soldiers, not harder, and that this enhanced background investigation process was directly contrary to congressional intent. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that it was not lawful for the agencies to put applications on hold to conduct background checks. They sought an injunction compelling the Department of Homeland Security to promptly process applications (and to expedite applications which had already been delayed); barring the Department of Defense from further interference with the processing of applications; and prohibiting either agency from retaliating against the plaintiffs or members of the proposed class. They sought similar mandamus and Administrative Procedure Act relief. Finally, they sought attorneys\u2019 fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on August 4, 2017. On August 24, the court ordered the agencies to begin submitting weekly status reports. On September 6, the court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction. Although they had demonstrated that the processing delay was causing them irreparable harm, they had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. Further, the plaintiffs\u2019 irreparable harm did not outweigh the seriousness of the national security concerns presented by the agencies. 270 F. Supp. 3d 49. On October 13, 2017, the Department of Defense <a href=\"https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Naturalization-Honorable-Service-Certification.pdf\"> further announced</a> that it would \u201crecall and de-certify\u201d its honorable service certifications for service members who had not yet completed a background check. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, objecting to this additional obstacle in the naturalization process. The court granted class certification on October 27, 2017. 323 F.R.D. 28. The class consisted of MAVNI soldiers who had enlisted prior to October 13, 2017; had received an N-426 certifying their honorable service; and whose naturalization had been delayed or withheld because of the agencies\u2019 new policies. The same day, the court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction, \u201cfor the reasons set forth in the <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-DC-0079-0003.pdf\">Court\u2019s opinion granting a preliminary injunction in <i>Kirwa</i></a>\u201d (issued two days earlier). The injunction prevented the Department of Defense from recalling or de-certifying a soldier\u2019s Form N-426 while awaiting the results of a background investigation. On January 23, 2018, the court denied the agencies\u2019 motion to dismiss. In an April 12, 2018 order, the court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for more extensive preliminary injunctive relief. The agencies were ordered to submit reports to the court every four weeks, and the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather for further proceedings. On June 20, 2018, the court denied another motion by the agencies for dismissal or for summary judgment. On July 16, 2018, the magistrate judge ordered the agencies to provide a redacted version of a confidential agency document that the plaintiffs sought in discovery. 314 F. Supp. 3d 238. A year later, on May 22, 2019, the court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs. Because the Department of Homeland Security\u2019s \u201cpurported reasons\u201d for delaying applications \u201c[did] not comport with the evidence before the Court,\u201d the court concluded that the policy of delay was \u201carbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.\u201d The court therefore vacated the MSSD portion of the delay policy (the MSSD was one of the key components of the background investigation). 385 F. Supp. 3d 44. In the same order, the court denied another motion by the defendants for summary judgment. The court continued to require the agencies to provide regular reports regarding the number of naturalization applications processed and the time it took to process them. On December 13, 2019, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Michael Harvey for mediation. On August 20, 2020, the court converted the preliminary injunction of October 27, 2017 into a permanent injunction. This ruling was based on the court\u2019s May 22 decision vacating the MSSD requirement. The plaintiffs\u2019 remaining claims were dismissed with prejudice and the case was closed; the court retained jurisdiction to enforce its orders.", "summary": "Non-citizen soldiers in the U.S. military brought this lawsuit in May 2017, challenging policies of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense that unlawfully delayed their naturalization applications. The court certified a class and granted a preliminary injunction against the agencies on October 27, 2017. On May 22, 2019, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, ruling that the agencies\u2019 policy of delaying naturalization applications was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court issued a permanent injunction on August 20, 2020, and retained jurisdiction to enforce the injunction."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This putative class action case challenges the government\u2019s use of an emergency public health order issued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 265 to restrict immigration of unaccompanied minors. Pursuant to the emergency public order, the government has expelled unaccompanied children without following usual immigration laws, saying the children could spread COVID-19 if the children were processed and detained under regular immigration laws. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the order, as well as class certification and a preliminary injunction. On November 18, the court granted the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction and certified the class. The defendants appealed on November 25 and moved to stay the case pending appeal, which the D.C. Circuit granted. The case and appeal remain ongoing. <hr> <b><u>Immigration Safeguards For Unaccompanied Children</b></u> Previously, unaccompanied children arriving at the border seeking safety were awarded protection under two laws. First, provisions in the Homeland Security Act vest care for unaccompanied children with the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), giving the minors access to legal care and housing. Second, the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) requires that minors must be transferred to ORR custody within 72 hours following apprehension, and removal of a child requires a decision by an immigration judge. Separately, statutes affirming internationally agreed upon protections permit unaccompanied children to seek shelter in the United States by claiming asylum, withholding of removal, and protection from torture. Furthermore, immigration laws recognize the possibility that immigrants arrive at the border with a communicable disease, however these statutes do not permit deportation without screening for persecution or torture. <b><u>CDC Issues Emergency Public Health Order (Title 42 Process)</b></u> On March 20, 2020, the President announced that public health provision of Title 42 of the U.S. Code would be used to suspend entry of all individuals at the border who lack proper documentation. Simultaneously, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) issued a regulation without notice and comment. Specifically invoking language contained in Section 265, the government claimed that the Surgeon General may prohibit introduction of persons that pose serious danger to the United States because of the presence of a communicable disease in their country of origin. Pursuant to the regulation, the CDC issued an order that other agencies may immediately suspend the introduction of these immigrants because of the danger they pose to Border Patrol personnel at ports of entry. The order gives the Department of Homeland Security discretion to allow exceptions based on the totality of the circumstances, and it remains silent on application for individuals seeking asylum, withholding of removal, Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection, and circumstances for unaccompanied children. In the complaint, this regulation and subsequent order is referred to as the Title 42 Process. <b><u>The Plaintiff\u2019s Apprehension Under the Title 42 Process and Subsequent Lawsuit</b></u> On August 11, 2020, border patrol agents apprehended the plaintiff, a 16-year-old unaccompanied minor fleeing persecution in Guatemala. Immediately, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) placed him into custody awaiting deportation pursuant to the Title 42 Process. Additionally, even with the presence of a relative in the United States and vacancy in an ORR facility, the plaintiff \u2013 exhibiting no COVID-19 symptoms \u2013 remained in CBP custody. In response to this treatment by the Border Patrol, on August 14, 2020, the plaintiff, represented by the ACLU, sued the leaders of numerous governmental departments, including the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of the Centers for Disease and Control, and officials leading CPB, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Office of Refugee Resettlement in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Administrative Procedure Act for unlawful agency action and arbitrary and capricious enforcement. The plaintiff alleged that the Title 42 Process violates the requirements of the TVPRA, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, and the Public Health Service Act. The plaintiff requested the court certify the class as \u201c[a]ll unaccompanied noncitizen children who (1) are or will be detained in U.S. government custody in the United States, and (2) are or will be subjected to the Title 42 Process.\u201d In addition, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the new Title 42 Process as applied to the plaintiff and class members, as well as attorney\u2019s fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Emmet G. Sullivan. The plaintiff filed a motion for classwide preliminary injunction on August 20th, asking the court to cease the application of the Title 42 Process to plaintiff and class members. The International Refugee Assistance Project filed an Amicus Brief in support of the plaintiff\u2019s motion. On September 6, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge G. Michael Harvey for the preparation of a report and recommendation on both the motions for a preliminary injunction and class certification. On September 25, Magistrate Judge Harvey recommended that Judge Sullivan grant the class certification and the preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 5793305. He found that the plaintiff was likely to succeed on his claim that the Regulation and Order exceeded the authority granted by the Public Health Service Act because the Act does not authorize the government to expel the plaintiff or putative class members from the US outside of the removal process of the Immigration and Nationality Act and other safeguards in Title 8 of the U.S. Code, including protections provided in the TVPRA. On November 18, Judge Sullivan adopted Magistrate Judge Harvey's recommendations and granted the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction and provisionally granted the motion to certify class. 2020 WL 6770508. The order declared that the removal of the plaintiff without due process exceeded the authority that public health emergency decrees usually confer. Judge Harvey noted that another court in the D.C. District Court examined the Title 42 Process in a case with similar facts also granted a preliminary injunction based on likelihood of success on the merits. For more information, see <a href=\"https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17601\"><i>J.B.B.C. v. Wolf</i></a>. On November 25, the defendants appealed the order to the D.C. Circuit, which was assigned USCA Case Number 20-5357. The defendants also filed a motion to stay pending appeal on December 3. Back in the district court, the defendants moved for reconsideration of the November 18 order, which the court denied on December 3. The defendants contended that, given the strain on the strain on the healthcare systems along the southern border and increased number of unaccompanied minors covered by the CDC Order, prohibiting the expulsion of class members deprived the government of an \"important tool\" to help address the public health emergency, increased the risk of transmitting COVID-19 into the United States, and further strained the country's limited healthcare resources. The court ruled that the government did not meet its its burden of showing that the circumstances justified a stay pending appeal. In response to the defendants' notices to the court regarding their compliance with the preliminary injunction, on January 22, the court ordered the parties to submit joint status reports addressing the defendants' compliance and, more specifically, updating the court on the situation regarding thirty-two minors who were returned to Guatemala in violation of the injunction. On January 29, the D.C. Circuit granted the defendants' motion to stay. On March 1, the defendants filed a joint motion to suspend the briefing schedule, which the Circuit Court granted the following day. In the District Court, the defendants filed multiple joint motions to hold the case in abeyance, which the court granted. A joint status report is due on April 22, 2021. The case remains ongoing.", "summary": "In August 2020, a persecuted minor seeking asylum in the United States who was instead detained filed this class action complaint in the D.C. District Court. The plaintiff alleged that the new regulations interpreting 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 265 violate protections of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the TVPRA and sought injunctive and declaratory relief for all members of the class. On November 18, the court granted the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction and certified the class. The defendants appealed on November 25 and moved to stay the case pending appeal. The D.C. Circuit granted the stay. The case and appeal remain.ongoing."}
{"article": "On December 21, 2020, Human Rights First, a nonprofit human rights organization, brought this lawsuit against then-Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad Wolf and others in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on behalf of refugees seeking to enter the United States for asylum. Plaintiffs challenged a new rule promulgated by the Department of Homeland Security that sought to change applicants' eligibility for asylum. The new rule would have restricted who qualified as a refugee, which refugees were able to seek asylum, and how likely a given applicant could succeed in their claim. Represented by Williams and Connolly in D.C., plaintiffs alleged that the rule changes amounted to overturning legal precedent as well as being counter to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Refugee Act, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. Specifically, plaintiffs argued that the Department of Homeland Security acted contrary to existing legal authority, in excess of the Department\u2019s given authority, in a manner inconsistent with how procedural rulemaking ought to occur, and without comprehensive consideration of the interests involved. Plaintiffs further argued that the rules were enacted by Wolf when the latter was without proper authority as the Acting Secretary. Plaintiffs thus sought declaratory and injunctive relief pertaining to their claims and to strike down the rules as well as attorneys\u2019 fees. Judge Tanya S. Chutkan was assigned to the case. On December 22, 2020, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. However, as a result of a nationwide preliminary injunction granted in the cases <i><a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=18018\">Pangea Legal Services v. DHS</a></i> and <i><a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=18019\">Immigration Equality v. DHS</a></i> on January 8, 2021, the motion in this case no longer required consideration. On January 28, 2021, as a result of the administrative transition and in accordance with the aforementioned two cases, this case was held in abeyance pending the status report due in <i>Pangea</i> and <i>Immigration Equality</i> on April 19, 2021, so that the government could review and potentially revise the regulations at hand.", "summary": "Plaintiff human rights organization sued the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security alleging that revisions to asylum eligibility violated several laws. Federal courts reviewing similar suits in other districts granted a nationwide preliminary injunction that applied here, and the cases are pending review and revision by the Biden administration."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This class action lawsuit for declaratory, injunctive and habeas relief, brought on behalf of detainees in civil immigration detention at three ICE detention centers in Florida. The petitioners sought a writ of habeas corpus, requesting the immediate release of all individuals in custody, as well as a declaration that continued detention violated the Due Process Clause, and an order prohibiting the respondents from placing new detainees in detention. The court partially granted the petitioners\u2019 temporary restraining order, ordering ICE to implement CDC sanitation guidelines and to review detainees for potential release, and then on June 6, granted a preliminary injunction. On July 17, the court appointed a Special Master to oversee compliance.<hr> On April 13, 2020, a group of 34 civil immigration detainees at three Florida detention centers within the jurisdiction of the Miami Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (\u201cICE\u201d) filed this federal class action lawsuit and petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Petitioners were represented by University of Miami School of Law\u2019s immigration clinic, the Southern Poverty Law Center, Rapid Defense Network, Legal Aid Service of Broward County, and private counsel. Petitioner-plaintiffs (\"the petitioners\") challenged the detention of noncitizens in South Florida as the spread of COVID-19 in ICE detention centers. The petitioners' cause of action arose under the Immigration and Nationality Act (\u201cINA\u201d), 8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1101 et seq.; the Administrative Procedure Act (\u201cAPA\u201d), 5 U.S.C \u00a7\u00a7 701 et seq.; and the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2441. The case was assigned to Judge Marcia G. Cooke and referred to Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman. First, the petitioners alleged that their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights were violated when the respondents failed to follow the CDC guidelines for social distancing, disinfecting, or recommended hygiene practices. They alleged that ICE\u2019s 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards (\u201cPBNDS\u201d) and National Detention Standards (\u201dNDS\u201d) required the respondents to follow CDC guidelines, and that a failure to do so violated the APA and the Due Process Clause. Second, the petitioners alleged that the respondents\u2019 continued detention of the petitioners was excessive in relation to any government purpose and that the petitioners were deliberately indifferent to their health and safety, which was a violation of their Due Process rights. Third, the petitioners alleged that their detention violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause because respondents affirmatively subjected petitioners to an unreasonable risk of danger with deliberate indifference to employing policies that drastically increased the risk of petitioners\u2019 contracting COVID-19. The petitioners sought to certify a class of all individuals in civil immigration detention, as of April 13, 2020, at three Florida detention centers: Krome Service Processing Center, Broward Transitional Center, and Glades County Detention Center. Petitioners also sought to certify the following subclasses: - Sub-class A: detained individuals with a stable location and/or place of residency in which they can self-quarantine and practice social distancing and hygiene pursuant to the CDC guidelines and Exec. Order No. 20-91 upon release. - Sub-class B: all other detained individuals without access to a stable location and/or place of residency in which they can self-quarantine and practice social distancing and hygiene pursuant to CDC guidelines and Exec. Order No. 20-91 upon release. The petitioners sought a writ of habeas corpus for immediate release of all individuals in the custody of ICE's three Florida detention centers, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief against unconstitutional conditions of confinement. On the same day, the petitioners also filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and a motion for a preliminary injunction. They requested the court to enjoin the respondents from transferring detainees in or out of the three detention centers and to order the respondents to implement CDC health guidelines and protocols, and to release petitioners into community-based alternatives to detention. On April 22, 2020, Magistrate Judge Goodman recommended the court grant in part the petitioners\u2019 motion for a temporary restraining order and recommended 13 specific measures the court could take. 2020 WL 1949737. The court adopted in part Magistrate Judge Goodman's Report and Recommendation on April 30, 2020. 2020 WL 2086482. The court ordered ICE to: 1. Evaluate each of the named petitioners consistent with its regulations and inform the court which of the petitioners could be released by May 7, 2020. 2. Submit a report by May 3, 2020 describing how it intends to accelerate its review of its protocols resulting in release of detained individuals with the goal of reducing the population to 75% of capacity by May 14, 2020. 3. File weekly reports every Friday with information on the detained individuals ICE is releasing. 4. File twice-weekly reports containing information on the detained individuals remaining in custody. 5. Comply \u201cimmediately\u201d with the CDC and ICE guidelines on providing adequate amounts of soap, water, and cleaning materials. ICE must have provided masks by May 2, 2020. 6. Provide appropriate training to its staff and detained individuals on the risks of COVID-19. Judge Cooke clarified the April 30 temporary restraining order on May 2, 2020, stating that the order included all named petitioners in the action and that ICE could still transfer detainees from all three facilities after first evaluating them and determining their eligibility for release. 2020 WL 2203576. On May 15, 2020, the court extended the temporary restraining order for an additional 14 days pending Magistrate Judge Goodman's Report and Recommendations on petitioners' motion for class certification and further hearing on the matter. On May 20, 2020, the petitioners filed a motion to compel compliance with the court's temporary restraining order, alleging that ICE had failed to comply with the court's order and CDC guidelines. On May 22, 2020, Magistrate Judge Goodman recommended that Judge Cook grant the class certification for the claims concerning conditions of confinement and for declaratory relief, but deny it for habeas corpus claims for release stating that those claims did not meet the commonality element because each release decision requires individual evaluation. The court held a remote hearing on the motion to compel and on May 28, Judge Cooke extended the temporary restraining order from April 30 for another seven days. On May 29, Magistrate Judge Goodman recommended the court deny the motion for class certification as to the requests for release, but grant class certification as to the other claims. Both parties filed objections to this report on June 3. On June 6, Judge Cooke certified the class as \"all current civil immigration detainees who are now held by ICE at Krome, BTC, and Glades when this action was filed, since this action was filed, or in the future.\" Judge Cooke granted the preliminary injunction, requiring ICE to comply with all ICE and CDC guidelines, including providing soap, hand sanitizer, and masks to detainees, and to limit transportation. The injunction also required ICE to educate detainees on mask-wearing and other prevention and to submit weekly reports to the court regarding the number of detainees being held and their detention status. 106 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1595. On June 16, the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel compliance with the June 6 order, stating that the facilities were not implementing social distancing and not educating detainees on the importance of masks. On July 5, the court granted the motion to compel compliance and appointed a Special Master, Michael B. Chavies of Akerman LLP, \"to assess whether ICE is committing an ongoing violation of the detainees\u2019 constitutional rights.\u201d The Special Master would have the authority to request any records, physically inspect the three facilities and take photos and videos of the conditions inside. The court vacated that order the following day and didn't issue another order on the motion until July 17, this time appointing Matthew C. Dates of Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson P.A. as Special Master instead. 2020 WL 4047334. Between July and September, several plaintiffs moved for release or home confinement, but none of the motions were granted. Several individuals also successfully moved to intervene. On January 4, 2021, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs\u2019 deliberate indifference claim because they've acted reasonably to implement measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 at Krome, BTC, and Glades. As to the due process claim, they argue it should be dismissed for failure to state a claim since the CDC Guidelines are not regulations with the force and effect of law. Finally, they argue that the state created danger claim also fails to state a claim for the same reason that the deliberate indifference claim fails. Plaintiffs responded on February 2, 2021, alleging that defendants ignored substantial evidence, including evidence recognized by the court in previous rulings, that contradict their claims for why summary judgment should be granted. On January 21, 2021, the court denied an emergency motion to intervene for a plaintiff that had been deported to Guatemala. The Court held that it did not retain jurisdiction over class members that had been deported out of the United States, so the motion to intervene was moot. On February 8, 2021, the court ordered that the Special Master give plaintiffs' counsel full access to his report on or before February 19, 2021, and file a redacted version of the Special Master\u2019s report and recommendations on CM/EMF. This report details the investigations that the Special Master made during the summer of 2020 into the conditions at these facilities. Discovery and attempts at mediation remain ongoing as plaintiffs file for release or to remove themselves from the case as their circumstances change. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2020, immigrant detainees in three Florida detention centers filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The detainees alleged that their detention violated their Due Process rights because the detention centers were not adhering to CDC guidelines to protect them against COVID-19. The court partially granted a temporary restraining order on April 30, 2020, requiring the respondents to implement CDC guidelines for sanitation. The court granted a preliminary injunction on June 6 and certified the class. On July 17, the court appointed a Special Master to oversee compliance."}
{"article": "On May 25, 2011, three foreign residents of Indiana filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, against the cities of Indianapolis and Franklin and the counties of Marion and Johnson. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Indiana, the national ACLU's Immigrants' Rights Project, the National Immigration Law Center, and private counsel, filed their suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1101 et seq., and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201, claiming that Indiana's Senate Enrolled Act 590 (SEA 590) violated the federal Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Section 19, which allowed local law enforcement officers to make warrantless arrests of people who were subject to a removal order issued by an immigration court or a detainer or notice of action issued by the Department of Homeland Security, or who had been indicted or convicted of an aggravated felony, was preempted by federal law and constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and a violation of due process under the Fourteenth. They also claimed that Section 18, which made the use of consular identification cards for identification within the state a civil infraction punishable by fine, was preempted by federal law and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that SEA 590 violated the Constitution and a peremptory injunction barring its enforcement before it came into effect on July 1, 2011. On June 13, 2011, Mexico moved for leave to file an amicus on behalf of plaintiffs, and Brazil, Guatemala, El Salvador and Columbia moved to join it. The District Court (Judge Sarah Evans Barker) granted these motions on June 21. In the meantime, the Court (Judge Barker), on joint motion from plaintiffs and county defendants, had issued an order to protect the privacy and confidentiality of any of the individual plaintiffs' immigration status that might be implicated in discovery. Following a hearing on June 20, 2011, on June 24 the Court (Judge Barker) granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, barring enforcement of Sections 18 and 19 of SEA 590 pending further order of the Court. Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, 797 F. Supp. 2d 905 (S.D. Ind. 2011). On July 14, 2011, the Court (Judge Barker) granted a stipulation by plaintiffs and county defendants that two classes should be certified: a class of people in Marion and Johnson Counties who were or would be subject to warrantless arrest pursuant to Section 19 of SEA 590 (Class A), and a class of people who possessed, or would possess, a valid consular identification card and were using it, or would use it, for non-fraudulent identification purposes (Class B). The court certified both classes and appointed counsel for them. On October 11, 2011, the county defendants filed a motion to join the United States as a necessary party. The Court (Judge Barker) denied this motion on January 9, 2012. Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:11-cv-00708, 2012 WL 76141, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3047 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2012). The Court (Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore) also denied a motion by defendants to stay the case pending the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182 (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12112\">IM-AZ-0015</a>), remarking that it was unlikely to be entirely dispositive of some of the unique issues presented by this case. Meanwhile, plaintiffs had filed a motion for summary judgment on November 20, 2011, and the City of Indianapolis had filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on December 21. On March 28, 2013, the District Court (Judge Barker) granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. According to the order, defendants are permanently enjoined from enforcing Section 18 and Section 20 of SEA 590, as they are both violated the Supremacy Clause and the Due Process Clause. Because plaintiffs' suit was dependent upon enforcement of these sections, the matter was dismissed without prejudice.", "summary": "On May 25, 2011, three foreign residents of Indiana filed a class action lawsuit against the cities of Indianapolis and Franklin and the counties of Marion and Johnson, seeking to enjoin enforcement of Indiana's Senate Enrolled Act 590, which would allow local law enforcement officers to make warrantless arrests of people who were subject to a removal order issued by an immigration court or a detainer or notice of action issued by the Department of Homeland Security, or who had been indicted or convicted of an aggravated felony, and would make the use of consular identification cards for identification within the state a civil infraction punishable by fine. On March 28, 2013, the District Court (Judge Barker) ruled in favor of plaintiffs, granting their motion for summary judgment, and permanently enjoining defendants from enforcing Sections 18 and 20 of SEA 590. Because plaintiffs' suit was dependent upon enforcement of these sections, the matter was dismissed without prejudice."}
{"article": "On Feb. 1, 2017, a J-1 visa holder filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, after being prevented from boarding a flight from Frankfurt to Boston on both Jan. 28. and Jan. 30, 2017. Represented by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, the plaintiff is Iranian-born and lives in Switzerland; she was traveling to Boston to commence work at Brigham & Woman's hospital as a researcher and expert on state-of-the-art genetic sequencing technologies focusing on pediatric susceptibility to infection. The complaint alleged that on Jan. 28, 2017, a gate operator at the Frankfurt airport, who introduced himself as a representative from the consulate of the United States, told the plaintiff that she was ineligible to board a flight to the United States pursuant to an executive order issued by President Donald Trump on Jan. 27, 2017 (suspending entry into the United States of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen). The complaint further alleged that when the plaintiff returned to the Frankfort airport on Jan. 31, with a copy of the Jan. 29 Temporary Restraining Order issued in <i>Louhghalem/Tootkaboni v. Trump</i> providing immediate protection to \"holders of valid immigrant and non-immigrant visas . . . who, absent the Executive Order, would be legally authorized to enter the United States,\" the plaintiff was once again prevented from boarding her flight to Boston, despite being subject to the TRO's protection as a valid J-1 visa holder. The plaintiff claimed that her continued bar to entry based solely on the Executive Order, which was enforced against her contrary to nationwide federal court stays, stood in violation of the defendants' duties owed to the plaintiff and to all persons similarly protected by the TRO. The complaint was filed as a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. This case was assigned on Feb. 2 to Judge Allison D. Burroughs and to Magistrate Judge Jennifer C. Boal, should the trial Judge refer the matter. Also on Feb. 2, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion seeking a Temporary Restraining Order enabling the plaintiff's counsel to determine the defendants' compliance or non-compliance with the Jan. 29 TRO, as well as requesting an emergency hearing before the court. That same day, the requested emergency hearing was set for Feb. 6, 2017. On Feb. 3, the plaintiff requested that the aforementioned emergency hearing be cancelled, as she was able to travel to the United States and clear customs. Judge Burroughs declared the motion moot on Feb. 8. On Mar. 6, prompted by adverse developments in the <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15606\"><i>Washington v. Trump</i></a> litigation, in the Ninth Circuit, the President rescinded the January 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, <a href=\"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/03/09/2017-04837/protecting-the-nation-from-foreign-terrorist-entry-into-the-united-states\">Executive Order 13780</a>. In light of the revised Executive Order, the parties on Mar. 31 jointly requested that the court stay the proceedings and postpone the defendants' deadline to answer, for sixty days until Jun. 5, 2017. This would allow the parties enough time to monitor ongoing litigation before deciding how to proceed. Judge Burroughs on Mar. 31 granted this request for a stay. On May 31, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, mentioning the Fourth Circuit's injunction of the revised Executive Order in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15637\"><i>IRAP v. Trump</i></a>. The court closed the case on June 1. This case is now closed.", "summary": "On February 1, 2017, an Iranian-born researcher and J-1 visa holder filed this lawsuit after being prevented from boarding a flight to the United States on both January 28, 2017 and January 30, 2017, pursuant to an executive order issued by President Donald Trump on January 27, 2017. On February 2, 2017 the plaintiff filed an emergency motion seeking a Temporary Restraining Order against the defendants, but on February 3, 2017 the plaintiff requested that the hearing on the TRO be cancelled, as she was able to travel to the United States and clear customs. On March 6, 2017, the President rescinded the January 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one. On May 31, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, mentioning the Fourth Circuit's injunction of the revised Executive Order in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15637\">IRAP v. Trump</a>. This case is closed."}
{"article": "COVID 19 Summary: A member of a class of immigrants and their spouses suing ICE over its removal policies was ordered released on March 25, 2020. On March 24 the plaintiffs filed a motion for immediate release of that class member because he was detained in a facility where an employee tested positive for COVID-19. On April 16, the parties filed a joint status report that altered the terms of release for the class member and the court lifted the stay on the class member's removal by ICE. ICE imposed conditions of supervision pursuant to the parties' agreement. The underlying case is ongoing. <hr> On February 5, 2018, an undocumented immigrant who was married to a U.S. citizen filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The case was assigned to Judge Mark L. Wolf. The plaintiff sued the United States and Suffolk County under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2241, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The plaintiff had been unexpectedly arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in January 2018 after going to an interview with her husband as part of the process of her becoming a lawful permanent resident. She was now being detained, without having had notice or a hearing, and in danger of being deported under a 2002 removal order. In addition to claiming that ICE\u2019s actions violated the INA and APA, the plaintiff alleged that her arrest and detainment violated her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Massachusetts and private counsel, sought habeas and injunctive relief. On February 6, 2018, the court ordered the parties to meet and attempt to settle the dispute by February 12. The parties met but were unable to reach an agreement. On February 13, 2018, the defendants released the plaintiff from custody, granted her a three-month stay of removal, and filed a motion for an extension of time to respond to the complaint. With the plaintiff released, the defendants stated that they planned to have the case dismissed for mootness. Judge Wolf was not convinced that the defendants\u2019 compliance with the plaintiff\u2019s demands actually mooted the case because the court could not be sure that the defendants would not simply arrest plaintiff again if the case were closed. On February 15, the court granted the motion for an extension of time. However, it also ordered that the parties confer again to discuss what, if anything, needed to be litigated and that the defendants should file an affidavit that contained details surrounding the plaintiff\u2019s detainment and release. On March 27, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the case was now moot and that the plaintiff had no due process right to stay in the United States while she sought permanent resident status. On April 5, 2018, Judge Wolf related two cases involving similar issues to the present case: Junqueira v. Souza (18-10307) and Dos Santos v. Nielsen (18-10310). On April 10, 2018, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, adding her husband and four other couples, each made up of one U.S. citizen and one non-citizen immigrant in danger of removal. The five couples sought injunctive relief on behalf of a class of all couples similarly situated. They also asked that one plaintiff, who was currently detained by ICE, be released or granted habeas relief. In response, the defendants filed a second motion to dismiss on April 23 with similar arguments as their initial motion to dismiss. On April 30, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. The proposed class would consist of any U.S. citizen and his or her noncitizen spouse who (1) had a final order of removal and had not departed from the U.S. under that order; (2) was the beneficiary of a pending or approved I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, filed by the U.S. citizen spouse; (3) was not \u201cineligible\u201d for a provisional waiver under 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 212.7(e)(4)(i) or (vi); and (4) was within the jurisdiction of the Boston ICE-ERO field office. The same day, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and preliminary injunctive relief. They requested that the court enjoin the defendants from unduly interfering with the plaintiffs' access to the provisional waiver process. On May 8, 2018, the court granted habeas relief to the one detained plaintiff to the extent she sought a bail hearing to determine whether she should be released. On June 11, the court issued an order finding that this plaintiff was being detained in violation of the Constitution because ICE had failed to follow its regulations, and that the court should itself decide whether her release was warranted. However, ICE had released the plaintiff subsequent to the court's May 8 oral ruling. ICE also released about 20 other noncitizens that it determined were being improperly detained. 317 F.Supp.3d 626. The parties then engaged in discovery for several months. On August 23, 2018, the Judge Wolf denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' first amended complaint in an oral ruling. On September 21, he issued a memorandum explaining his decision. Judge Wolf found that the court had jurisdiction over the case, that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that if their habeas petitions were dismissed, ICE would prevent them from pursuing provisional waivers in violation of due process, and that the previously-released plaintiff's claims regarding detention were not moot. 334 F.Supp.3d 370. Judge Wolf subsequently ordered the parties to confer and determine whether they could settle the case and, if not, provide additional information regarding how ICE's conduct was affecting the proposed plaintiff class. On December 7, 2018, Judge Wolf issued a decision finding that a statute prohibiting federal courts from granting class-wide injunctive relief against operation of noncitizen detention provisions did not prohibit the possible issuance of class-wide declaratory relief if a putative class was certified in this case. 399 F.Supp.3d 1. On April 18, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for the court to open discovery for the named plaintiffs. After several hearings, Judge Wolf issued an order on May 17, 2019, denying the defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiffs' claims under the INA, the Equal Protection clause, and the APA. He reserved judgment on the plaintiffs' contention that U.S citizen spouses have a liberty interest in remaining in the U.S. with their noncitizen spouses, and, therefore, a right to due process before their noncitizen spouses are deported. Judge Wolf also granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, certifying two different classes. For the purposes of the plaintiffs' INA, Equal Protection, and APA claims, the court certified the following class:<blockquote>\"Any U.S. citizen and his or her noncitizen spouse who (1) has a final order of removal and has not departed the U.S. under that order; (2) is the beneficiary of a pending or approved I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, filed by the U.S. citizen spouse; (3) is not 'ineligible' for a provisional waiver under 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 212.7(e)(4)(i) or (vi); and (4) is within the jurisdiction of the Boston ICE-ERO field office.\"</blockquote>For the purposes of the plaintiffs' Due Process claim, the court certified the following class:<blockquote>\"Any U.S. citizen and his or her noncitizen spouse who (1) has a final order of removal and has not departed the U.S. under that order; (2) is the beneficiary of an approved I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, and conditionally approved I-212, Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the U.S. After Deportation or Removal; (3) is not 'ineligible' for a provisional waiver under 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 212.7(e)(4)(i) or (vi); and (4) is within the jurisdiction of the Boston ICE-ERO field office.\"</blockquote> Judge Wolf again instructed the parties to confer regarding a potential settlement. On June 17, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and a stay of removal of a class member. Specifically, the plaintiffs wanted the court to compel the defendants to provide an explanation as to why ICE was detaining and intending to remove the class member. The class member later expressed that he did not want to delay his removal and the plaintiffs withdrew their motion. Judge Wolf held an evidentiary hearing on June 27. He instructed the parties to file a joint statement memorializing his oral rulings at the hearing regarding notice to class members and the information regarding class members that the defendants must provide to class counsel. Judge Wolf then issued an order on August 7, 2019, in accordance with those rulings. In the order, he instructed the defendants to report information regarding class members to class counsel at the beginning of each month and provide prompt notice to class counsel when a class member is detained or when ICE intends to effectuate the removal of a class member. On July 25, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for order to show cause. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had continued to violate the post-order custody regulations described above, and requested that the defendants be ordered to show cause why the court should not order the release of a group of detainees appearing on the defendants' July detention report. After months of back-and-forth, the parties reported to the court on January 8, 2020, that they had resolved the issues related to the motion for order to show cause. On January 27, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to enjoin the removal of two class members. The plaintiffs later partially withdrew the motion, leaving the motion pending with respect to one class member. Then, on March 24, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for immediate release of that class member. The plaintiffs alleged that the class member was currently detained in a facility in which an employee had tested positive for COVID-19. The plaintiffs stated that the defendants had not contended that the class member posed a threat to public safety, but rather had led to his prolonged detention by impeding the resolution of the plaintiffs' January 27 motion. Given the escalating threat to the class member's health, the plaintiffs requested that the court order his release during the pendency of the January 27 motion. In the alternative, they requested that the court hold a prompt telephonic hearing regarding the basis for the class member's removal. On March 25, Judge Wolf granted the plaintiffs' request and ordered the class member released no later than the following day, with the following conditions: he must reside with his wife and not leave their residence except for medical reasons, and he shall be subject to electronic monitoring by the defendants. In the transcript of the court's March 25 hearing where Judge Wolf orally ordered the class member's release, he explained that he concluded that district courts do have the power to order the release of immigration detainees on bail. He emphasized that the class member here was a civil detainee (someone who had never been charged or convicted of a crime), and concluded that a substantial claim had been raised by the class member's habeas petition. Finally, Judge Wolf noted that extraordinary circumstances (the COVID-19 pandemic) made the grant of bail necessary to make the habeas remedy effective. He noted that detention enhances the risk of infection and that given the mortality risk associated with COVID-19, the class member's release was required pending the resolution of the plaintiffs' January 27 motion. On April 7, 2020, Judge Wolf ordered the parties to confer and determine whether a noncitizen who had filed an emergency petition for a writ of habeas corpus and stay of deportation on April 6 is a member of the class certified in this case; and, if so, whether ICE violated any of the orders in this case with regard to him. The parties reported to the court that they agreed that this individual was not a class member and so Judge Wolf did not need to take any further action. On April 16, the parties filed a joint status report. The parties explained that they had reached an agreement whereby the plaintiffs would withdraw their January 27 motion to enjoin removal of the class member that Judge Wolf ordered released on March 25. They further requested that the court lift its stay of removal as to the class member, and lift its order requiring that he not leave his residence except for medical reasons. ICE would then impose conditions of supervision pursuant to the parties' agreement. Judge Wolf subsequently entered an order memorializing those terms. On November 18, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss both the habeas and equal protection claims. Defendants argued that the remedy plaintiffs requested, suspension of removal, is not available under habeas corpus and that intervening equal protection decisions have rejected claims that were based on an inference of animus from President Trump's campaign statements. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In February 2018, an undocumented immigrant who was married to a U.S. citizen filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiff alleged that her unexpected arrest and detainment without notice or a hearing violated her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). In April 2018, nine more plaintiffs were added, and they sought class certification, which was approved on May 17, 2019. On June 27, the district court instructed the defendants to begin providing monthly reports to class counsel regarding class members. On March 24, 2020 the plaintiffs filed a motion for immediate release of that class member because he was detained in a facility where an employee tested positive for COVID-19. On April 16, the parties filed a joint status report that altered the terms of release for the class member and the court lifted the stay on the class member's removal by ICE. ICE imposed conditions of supervision pursuant to the parties' agreement. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on November 18, 2020. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "This is a case about President Trump\u2019s July 21, 2020 memorandum titled \u201cExcluding Illegal Aliens from the Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census\u201d to the Secretary of Commerce. This memo instructed the 2020 Census to exclude undocumented immigrants from the population data created for the purposes of congressional apportionment. Many felt this action was taken to deter participation by immigrant communities and communities of color in the 2020 Census, which would in turn deprive these communities of the political representation and federal financial resources to which they are entitled, and filed suit as a result. In response to the memo, Haitian-Americans United, Inc., Brazilian Worker Center, Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. and Centro Presente\u2014all non-profits serving immigrants of color across Massachusetts\u2014filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District Of Massachusetts on July 27, 2020. The plaintiffs sued President Trump, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Director of the U.S. Census Bureau Steven Dillingham, and Secretary of the Department of Commerce Wilbur Ross under the Administrative Procedure Act and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1985. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the memo violated Article I, Section 2 of Constitution which specifies that congressional apportionment must be based on a total count of all persons because excluding undocumented residents will not result in the required of an \"actual enumermation\" of all persons and will chill immigrant participation in the 2020 census. The plaintiffs also alleged that the memo violated the right to equal protection as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment becuase the memo \"is motivated by racial animus towards immigrants of color, non-US citizens, foreign-born individuals, and undocumented individuals. The plaintiffs further argued that the President and the Secretary of Commerce have conspired to violate immigrants' and non-citizens' right to equal protection. Represented by Lawyers for Civil Rights, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief that the memo was unconstitutional and that any compliance with the memo's instructions to the Census Bureau to produce tabulations of population data excluding undocumented residents for congressional apportionment violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and injunctive relief preventing the defendants from providing information to the President that would permit him to exclude undocumented immigrants from the congressional apportionment base. In addition, the plaintiffs sought costs and reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees. The case was assigned to Judge Douglas P. Woodlock. On September 4, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an application for a three-judge court because Section 2284(a) requires the appointment of a three-judge court in actions challenging \u201cthe constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts.\u201d On September 11, 2020 Judge Woodlock granted the plaintiffs\u2019 application. Judge Bruce M. Selya and Judge Patti B. Saris were appointed to the three judge panel alongside Judge Woodlock. As of September 26, 2020, this case is ongoing and the defendants have yet to file an answer.", "summary": "On July 27, 2020, Haitian-Americans United, Inc., Brazilian Worker Center, Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. and Centro Presente filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District Of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs alleged that the Presidential Memorandum titled \u201cExcluding Illegal Aliens from the Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census\u201d is unconstitutional and that any compliance violates \u00a7\u00a7 706(2) of the APA because it is contrary to constitutional power, right, privilege, or immunity and in excess of statutory jurisdiction and authority, and without observance of procedure required by law. The case has been approved for a three-judge court and is awaiting the defendants' answer."}
{"article": "On Jan. 24, 2018, the NAACP filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. Represented by its own counsel, the NAACP challenged DHS's Nov. 2017 revocation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitians living in the United States. The plaintiff alleged that DHS violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment by relying on stereotypes based on race and national origin to deprive Haitians of their rights. The plaintiff sought mandamus (for DHS to carry out the Immigration and Nationality Act's procedures for reviewing TPS) and a declaratory judgment. The case was assigned to Judge Marvin J. Garbis. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Secretary of DHS may find that a country's conditions temporarily prevent its nationals from safely returning, or that the country is unable to adequately handle the return of nationals. In such a situation, the Secretary may grant TPS to these nationals for 6 to 18 months, with a possible extension following a review of country conditions. TPS allows recipients to remain and work legally in the United States. DHS had initiated TPS for Haitians following the Jan. 2010 earthquake in Haiti. After each 18-month period since then, DHS had reviewed the program, determined that Haitian nationals could not yet return safely (due to severe safety, health, housing, and infrastructure problems, exacerbated by subsequent hurricanes), and extended the program. This policy, however, ended with DHS' termination of TPS for Haitians in Nov. 2017. The NAACP argued that DHS' decision to end the program was not based on a change in conditions in Haiti, but rather on racially discriminatory stereotypes of Haitians. These stereotypes allegedly appeared in President Trump's remarks that the plaintiffs claimed disparaged Haitians, and DHS' alleged search for evidence of Haitians' criminality and welfare dependence. On Apr. 17, the NAACP filed an amended complaint, adding two other organizational plaintiffs that advocate for Haitians living in the U.S. On May 7, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction. The defendants argued that Congress had statutorily precluded judicial review of challenges to the Secretary's discretionary decisions regarding TPS designations. As to the plaintiffs' equal protection claims, the defendants argued that the rational basis standard of review applied and that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the Secretary's decision was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The case was reassigned to Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on July 24, 2018. On March 12, 2019, Judge Chasanow filed an opinion and order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. First, Judge Chasanow found that the court did have jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. Next, she held that the plaintiffs had alleged a plausible claim for relief. Instead of rational basis review, Judge Chasanow found that the proper question was whether the government's decision to terminate TPS was motivated by impermissible race or national origin discrimination; if so, the action would be presumptively invalid and only upheld if it were narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government purpose. Consequently, Judge Chasanow held that it was appropriate to view any circumstantial evidence to find proof of discriminatory motive, and that the plaintiffs had provided such evidence, which was to be viewed in their favor at this stage. Judge Chasanow then dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for mandamus and declaratory relief, as their constitutional claim would provide them with full relief. 364 F.Supp.3d 568. On April 8, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to stay or, in the alternative, to confine discovery to the administrative record. The defendants requested that the court stay this case pending final appellate review of the preliminary injunction issued in a parallel case, <i>Ramos v. Nielsen</i> (located <a href=\"https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16815\">here</a> in this Clearinghouse). In an April 26 order, Judge Chasanow informed the parties that if they could reach an agreement, discovery could be limited to what had already been produced by the government in other, parallel litigation. On March 23, 2020, Judge Chasanow granted the defendants' motion to stay. Due to the interconnected nature of the parallel litigation, particularly related to the scope of permissible discovery, and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, Judge Chasanow concluded it was best to stay proceedings in this case while the other cases were litigated. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "On Jan. 24, 2018, the NAACP sued the DHS over its Nov. 2017 revocation of Temporary Protected Status (first implemented after the Jan. 2010 Haitian earthquake) for Haitians living in the United States. The NAACP alleged that DHS violated the 5th Amendment by relying on racially discriminatory stereotypes to deprive Haitians of rights and sought mandamus and declaratory relief. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted in part and denied in part by the court on March 12, 2019. The court allowed the plaintiffs' 5th Amendment claims to move forward. Due to ongoing parallel litigation over the revocation of TPS for Haitians, the defendants requested a stay in this case. The court granted the stay in March 2020. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas action filed by immigration detainees in ICE facilities in Maryland, seeking release from detention. The detainees claimed their underlying medical conditions made them particularly vulnerable to serious illness or death from COVID-19. The court granted preliminary injunctions on April 30 and May 7, ordering the release of several detainees. Additionally, on September 18, the court granted the petitioner's motion for class certification. The court denied a motion for expedited bail hearings on January 26, 2021. <hr> On March 24, 2020, immigration detainees detained in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facilities in Maryland brought this action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. Represented by the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, Capital Area Immigrants' Rights Coalition, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Maryland, and the ACLU's National Prison Project and Immigrants' Rights Project, the detainees brought this action against ICE, the ICE Baltimore Field Office, the Worcester County Detention Center, and the Howard County Department of Corrections. Suing under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241 (the federal habeas statute), and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 701 <i>et seq</i>, the plaintiffs alleged violations of their Fifth Amendment rights. Specifically, they alleged that because they had underlying medical conditions, their continued detention was unconstitutional and in violation of the Rehabilitation Act because it put them at a higher risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and release from detention. The case was assigned to Judge Theodore D. Chuang. The detainees simultaneously filed a motion for temporary restraining order, seeking their immediate release from custody. The motion was denied on April 3, 2020, stating that the detainees could renew their motion in the event that a detainee or staff member at the Howard County Detention Center (HCDC) or Worcester County Detention Center (WCDC) tested positive for COVID-19, or if the defendants failed to file a Testing Certification by April 8. 451 F.Supp.3d 407. The detainees filed an amended complaint and a second emergency motion for temporary restraining order on April 26, 2020 seeking release for detainees in HCDC and WCDC. The court denied the temporary restraining order on April 27 for mainly procedural reasons, stating the current case management plan only allowed for a renewed motion for relief as to HCDC, and that relief for detainees in WCDC would require the detainees to file a notice of intent first. That same day the detainees filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to release the named plaintiff from HCDC, and on April 28, the detainees from WCDC filed a separate motion for preliminary injunction. The court granted the motion as to the HCDC plaintiff on April 30. 457 F.Supp.3d 460. On May 7, the court granted another preliminary injunction, releasing several detainees from WCDC. The detainees filed an amended complaint on May 29, adding additional named plaintiffs, then on June 19, they filed a motion to certify the class. On July 1, 2020, the court consolidated this case with <i>Mansaray v. Kavanaugh</i>(20-cv-01304-TDC), a habeas case brought by a petitioner seeking release from immigrant detention on similar grounds. The defendants appealed the preliminary injunction as to the detainee from HCDC on June 26 (USCA 20-6984). The defendants had additionally appealed the preliminary injunction as to the WCDC detainees on July 6 (USCA 20-7005) and the Fourth Circuit consolidated that appeal with <i>Cedillo v. Bounds</i> (8:20-cv-00780-TDC) on July 8. The Fourth Circuit dismissed these appeals on September 30, 2020. Back in the District Court on September 18, 2020, Judge Chuang granted in part and denied in part the June 19 motion for class certification. The court approved two subclasses: (1) the \"Howard County Subclass\" defined as \"All persons who are or will in the future be in ICE detention at the Howard County Detention Center who are age 50 or older or who have medical conditions that place them at heightened risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19;\" and (2), a \"Worcester County Subclass\" defined as \"All persons who are or will in the future be in ICE detention at the Worcester County Detention Center who are age 50 or older or who have medical conditions that place them at heightened risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19.\" However, the court denied the petitioner's request that the court hold expedited bail hearings for class members. The court reasoned that due to the reduced numbers of ICE detainees in the Detention Facilities, improved mitigation measures, and test results showing no cases among ICE detainees and limited numbers of positive tests among staff, it couldn't find that exceptional circumstances required bail hearings as the only way to protect the petitioners' health and safety. 2020 WL 5593338. In light of a growing number of positive tests, the petitioners renewed their motion for expedited bail hearings, asserting unconstitutional conditions of confinement. They argued that respondents' efforts to address COVID-19 failed to protect the petitioners from a known threat to their health and safety and that the plaintiffs' confinement was impermissible because they are civil detainees, not convicted criminal prisoners. Judge Chuang denied the plaintiffs' motion on January 26, 2021. The court determined that the petitioners did not have a high probability of success in establishing that the respondents acted with deliberate indifference to the health and safety of the plaintiffs. The court found that HCDC's recent measures to combat COVID-19 spread, including increased testing, the distribution of N-95 masks, and the offering of vaccination to all detainees, constituted a reasonable response to the detainees' health concerns. The court also found that the respondents' offer of vaccinations undermined the claim of impermissible punishment. The court concluded that the petitioners failed to identify any specific exceptional circumstances warranting bail determinations for all high-risk ICE detainees. 2021 WL 252718 The case is ongoing.", "summary": "This is a habeas action seeking the release of immigration detainees housed in ICE facilities in Maryland. The court initially denied the detainees' TRO, but eventually granted two preliminary injunctions that ordered the release of several detainees from their respective detention centers. The court also granted the petitioners' motion for class certification."}
{"article": "This lawsuit was filed in state court in March 2007 by a landlord in Valley Park, Missouri, to challenge the City's anti-immigration ordinances, which reached both housing and employment issues. The plaintiff was one of several parties to an earlier case, in which the court had ruled prior versions of the ordinances unlawful under state law. Reynolds v. City of Valley Park, IM-MO-1. The City then passed amended versions, which are the subject of this lawsuit, and also of a new iteration of the Reynolds case (\"Reynolds II\"). In Reynolds II, the plaintiffs won a temporary restraining order in April, which was then continued by consent of the parties until final resolution. See IM-MO-1 for more details on the ordinances and both Reynolds litigations. The plaintiff in this case filed a petition for a preliminary injunction, and the case was then removed by defendants to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, before Judge E. Richard Webber. In July 2007, the City repealed the immigration-related components of the housing ordinance. Accordingly, on August 9, 2007, the parties in this case agreed to dismiss the housing-related causes of action. The employment matters remained in issue; the plaintiffs argued that the employment ordinance was inoperative, because its enacting language stated that it came into effect only on the end of the injunction in Reynolds v. Valley Park, and that injunction had become permanent. After the filing of the dismissal, the City enacted legislation which made the employment ordinance effective immediately. Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking a declaration that the employment ordinance was invalid and unenforceable and moved to amend their complaint. Both parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On October 5, 2007, Judge Webber issued an order granting plaintiffs leave to take nine additional discovery depositions. Plaintiff's request to depose the City Attorney was, however, denied. The depositions were completed on October 19, 2007, and the parties supplemented their summary judgment briefs to address the additional factual information gleamed from the depositions. On January 31, 2008, Judge Webber issued his Memorandum and Order in which he held that the Ordinance at issue was not preempted by federal law, nor did plaintiffs prove that the Ordinance violated equal protection, due process or Missouri state law. Accordingly, the Court denied plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief and entered judgment in favor of the City. Following plaintiff's appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, affirmed the lower court's order on June 5, 2009. At the time this summary was written, there have been no further appeals.", "summary": "This lawsuit was filed in state court in March 2007 by a landlord in Valley Park, Missouri, to challenge the City's anti-immigration ordinances, which reached both housing and employment issues. Following removal to federal court, the U.S. District Court found in favor of the City. The judgment was affirmed in the U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas action brought by seven medically vulnerable detainees in Mississippi. They sought release from detention because their underlying medical conditions made them particularly vulnerable to COVID-19, which they alleged made their detention unconstitutional. The court denied a temporary restraining order on June 3, 2020.<hr> On April 16, 2020, seven medically vulnerable civil immigration detainees held in the Adams County Detention Center brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Represented by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers' Guild, and the MacArthur Justice Center at the University of Mississippi School of Law, the plaintiffs sued Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the New Orleans ICE field office and the warden of the Adams County Detention Center under the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 701) and the federal habeas statute (28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241). The plaintiffs alleged that the risks from COVID-19 rendered their continued detention unsafe and that the government did not have sufficiently compelling reasons to keep them detained, violating the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. They sought habeas, declaratory, and injunctive relief. At the same time, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), arguing that their detention was unconstitutional and that release from detention was the only action that could remedy the violation of their rights. The defendants filed a motion in opposition to the TRO on April 30. The case was assigned to Judge David C. Bramlette III and Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker. After a hearing, Judge Bramlette denied the TRO on June 3, 2020. While Judge Bramlette determined that habeas relief was available to detainees challenging conditions of confinement who requested release, he found that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits because (1) the government's interest in ensuring that detainees did not abscond justified continued detention; and (2) the defendants were taking steps to reduce the spread of COVID-19 in the detention center. So, Judge Bramlette concluded that the defendants were likely neither punishing detainees nor deliberately indifferent to their medical needs. 2020 WL 2949779. Two months passed without further substantive docket activity. On August 4, 2020, the plaintiffs stipulated to dismissal. The Clearinghouse does not know if the parties reached any private settlement agreement that led to the dismissal. The case is presumably now closed.", "summary": "This is a habeas action filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, seeking the release of seven medically vulnerable detainees in light of COVID-19, citing constitutional violations associated with their continued detention. The plaintiffs sought a TRO, but it was denied on June 3, 2020, and the plaintiffs dismissed the case on August 4, 2020."}
{"article": "On October 7, 2013, a group of Latino men and the Montana Immigrant Justice Alliance (MIJA) filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana. Plaintiffs sued the Montana Highway Patrol (MHP) and Montana Department of Justice under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, claimed violations of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures; and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000d et seq.). Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as attorney\u2019s fees. Plaintiffs sought class status to represent \u201c[a]ll Latino persons who, since October 7, 2010, have been or will be in the future, stopped, detained, questioned or searched by Montana Highway Patrol officers while driving or sitting in a vehicle on a public roadway or parking area in the State of Montana.\u201d Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants had a pattern and practice of seizing Latino residents and visitors of Montana and \u201cprolonging their detention\u201d for the sole purpose of contacting the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) based on suspicions of immigration status violations, which was not within the authority of MHP. Plaintiffs alleged MHP used racial profiling to form their suspicions regarding immigration status and used deceptive practices to detain Latino residents and visitors. Specifically, one of the named plaintiffs in this case alleged he was pulled over for a speeding violation, then asked repeated questions regarding his citizenship and whether he was in the country legally. He was a U.S. citizen, but was subjected to prolonged detention during which members of the MHP contacted U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), even after production of a valid Montana driver\u2019s license. A second named plaintiff alleged he was asked to produce identification as the passenger of a vehicle. He and the driver were detained for two hours while DHS was contacted to inquire about their immigration status; no traffic violation or any other citation was issued for this stop. On December 3, 2013, Judge Sam E. Haddon recused himself from the case. The case was reassigned to Judge Dana L. Christensen. On December 6, 2013, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. They argued that the state law claims were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity; that Title VI did not apply to individuals, yet plaintiffs were suing individuals; and that plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims were \u201cdoubled up\u201d with the equal protection claims. Based on an April 1, 2014 report issued by Magistrate Judge Carolyn S. Otsby, on July 25, 2014, Judge Christensen dismissed the state law claims but denied the motion to dismiss the Title VI and Fourth Amendment claims. The parties proceeded to discovery, but on April 3, 2015, Judge Christensen approved a settlement agreement. Under the terms of the settlement, MHP would adhere to its policy GR-9, which stated that Highway Patrol officers cannot detain individuals <i>solely</i> for the purpose of verifying immigration status or stop individuals on the basis of race or national origin, among other descriptors. The settlement further provided for training for MHP officers on this policy and also began requiring officers to log when and if they contacted DHS during the course of a traffic stop. In addition, the defendants agreed to pay for racial profiling studies done by an independent authority over a five year period; to post annual reports regarding racial profiling and steps taken to address it on the Montana Department of Justice website; and to establish an Independent Police Auditor to review investigations of complaints. Finally, the consent decree stated that the defendants would pay the plaintiffs' attorneys fees, but there was no later order as to the exact amount. The consent decree ended on April 3, 2020 without any motions for enforcement.", "summary": "A group of Latino men sued the Montana Highway Patrol after a series of traffic stops during which they alleged they were discriminated against and unlawfully detained for prolonged periods of time while their immigration status was checked. The case settled with the MHP agreeing to reform its operations, and the consent decree is ended on April 3, 2020"}
{"article": "The Jama lawsuit is a companion case to the class action, Brown v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., No. 98-1282(DRD) [IM-NJ-0003] and Joaquin DaSilva v. Esmor Correctional Services Incorporated, et al., No. 96-3755(DRD), which were also pending in to U.S. District Court District of New Jersey. All three cases, Jama, Brown and DaSilva were filed on behalf of undocumented aliens who were detained at a facility that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (''INS'') maintained in Elizabeth, New Jersey pending a determination of their asylum status. Plaintiffs in all cases alleged that during their detention they were subjected to torture, beatings, harassment and inhumane living conditions which included inadequate sanitation, exercise, and medical treatment. Brown was a class action, while Jama and DaSilva were filed and maintained on behalf of individual plaintiffs that opted out of the Brown class. All three cases were assigned to District Court Judge Dickinson R. Debevoise. Jama was filed on June 16, 1997 and named as defendants the INS, Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., the private corporation which operated the facility for the INS., and individual corporate officers and agents. Claims for relief included alleged violations of the First, Fifth, and Thirteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; numerous provisions of the New Jersey Constitution; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (''ICCPR''); customary international law; the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1350 (''ATCA''); the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000bb, et seq. (''RFRA''); the Fair Labor Standards Act; and New Jersey law. On April 24, 1998 the District Court (Judge Dickinson R. Debevoise) certified the Brown case as a class action consisting of a class of all detainees who were incarcerated at the Elizabeth, New Jersey facility from August 1994 to July 1995. Notice was sent to class members in March 1999. Class members were given the option to opt out of the class and pursue their own damage actions. Many of the class notices mailed out were returned as undeliverable, as detainees had been released or transferred. The defendants moved to dismiss the Jama case as applied to various groups. The District Court, Judge Debevoise) granted the motion in part and denied it without prejudice in part. Jama v. U.S. I.N.S., 22 F.Supp.2d 353 (D.N.J. Oct 01, 1998). On October 29, 1998, the Jama, Brown and DaSilva cases were consolidated for the purpose of discovery. Extensive discovery proceeded for four years. During that time, the parties also engaged in protracted litigation over whether plaintiffs in the Jama and DaSilva actions failed to timely opt-out of the Brown class action. See DaSilva v. Esmor Correctional Services Inc., 215 F.R.D. 477 (D.N.J. 2003); Jama v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., 2005 WL 2901899, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26060 (D.N.J. Nov 01, 2005); and Dasilva v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., 167 Fed.Appx. 303 (3rd Cir. 2006). The Jama plaintiffs eventually settled their claims against the U.S. and the INS, leaving Esmor and its officers as the lone defendants. In January 2003, the Esmor defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in the Jama Action. A similar motion was filed in the Brown class action case in September 2003. Individual INS defendants also moved to dismiss or for summary judgment Oral arguments on all the motions for summary judgment were conducted on June 29 and June 30, 2004. The District Court Debevoise, disposed of all pending motions in two separate orders. Jama v. INS, 334 F. Supp. 2d 662 (D.N.J. 2004) (addressing the Brown motions) and Jama v. U.S. I.N.S., 343 F.Supp.2d 338 (D.N.J. 2004) (addressing the Jama motions). Judge Debevoise held that the settlement agreement between plaintiffs and the U.S. settled any and all claims, that the INS was therefore entitled to be dismissed from the case. As to the Esmor defendants, Judge Debevoise ruled that plaintiffs had viable claims under 1) the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1350 (the \"ATCA\"); the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000 bb, et seq. (the \"RFRA\"); and state law claims based on Esmor's and its officers' alleged negligent failure to safeguard plaintiffs' property and negligent hiring, training, supervision and retention of employees. All other claims were dismissed. The Court then deconsolidated the Brown case from the Jama and DaSilva actions, finding that the Brown case was ready for trial. The DaSilva case was eventually dismissed without prejudice and its plaintiffs became members of the Brown action class. The Brown case ultimately settled in August 2005, while the Jama action proceeded to trial. The Jama proceedings were stayed briefly from November 2005 to February 2006, while the Courts resolved the objection that the Jama plaintiffs did not timely opt out of the Brown class action. See Jama v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., 2005 WL 2901899, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26060 (D.N.J. Nov 01, 2005) and Dasilva v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., 167 Fed.Appx. 303 (3rd Cir. 2006). After the stay was lifted, the parties completed discovery, including depositions of experts. Pre-trial motions were filed and the Court was called upon to resolve disputes over expert witness testimony. Jama v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., 2007 WL 1847385, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45706 (D.N.J. Jun 25, 2007). A jury trial began on September 25, 2007 and continued through mid-November. On November 13, 2007, the jury reached a verdict, finding as follows: 1. For defendants on the Alien Tort Claims Act claim and certain negligence claims. 2. For plaintiff Jama on Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim and awarded $1.00 in nominal damages. 3. For plaintiff Jama and against Esmor and several individual defendants on claim for negligent hiring, training, supervision and/or retention and awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages. No punitive damages were rendered. On November 20, 2007, the Court awarded plaintiffs attorneys' fees in the amount of $137,808.04 ($29,208.04 to Debevoise & Plimpton and $108,600.00 to the Rutgers Constitutional Litigation Clinic) in connection to a prior ruling concerning spoliation of evidence. Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., No. 97-3093(DRD), 2007 WL 4166016 (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 2007). On March 17, 2008, the District Court (Judge Debevoise) entered an opinion denying Defendants' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Court held that the trial record \"revealed a history of grievous abuses of the religious beliefs and practices not only of Jama but also of others, utterly without justification; and there is revealed a pattern of physical and emotional abuse of detainees, including Jama, perpetrated by untrained and often sadistic guards, all of which was known or should have been known by higher officers in Esmor.\" Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., No. 97-3093(DRD), 2008 WL 724337 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2008). On April 16, 2008, Defendants filed a notice of appeal, seeking review of the Court's denial of their motions for judgment as a matter of law. This appeal would subsequently be voluntarily dismissed on October 2, 2008. On April 23, 2008, the District Court awarded Plaintiffs attorneys' fees and expenses, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988, in the amount of $642,398.57. Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., 549 F. Supp. 2d 602 (D.N.J. 2008). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit subsequently vacated the order, holding that the District Court's \"degree of success inquiry under \u00a7 1988 was based on an impermissible reconstruction of the jury verdict,\" and remanded for further proceedings. Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs, Inc., 577 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2009). The parties subsequently reached a settlement agreement on the question of attorneys' fees (which was not filed with the Court). The case was dismissed with prejudice on August 9, 2010.", "summary": "On June 16, 1997, this lawsuit was filed on behalf of individual plaintiffs who opted out of the class action Brown v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., No. 98-1282(DRD) [IM-NJ-0003]., which was also pending in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Plaintiffs were undocumented aliens who were detained at a U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey pending a determination of their asylum status. In 2007, the jury returned a verdict, finding for plaintiffs on their Religious Freedom Restoration Act claims, as well as their claims for negligent hiring, training, supervision and/or retention, and awarded plaintiffs $100,001.00 in damages."}
{"article": "On September 20, 2007 several Latino families and individuals, represented by the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund and private counsel, filed a class action suit against the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) division of the Department of Homeland Security in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, challenging raids conducted as part of a program called \"Operation Return to Sender.\" Plaintiffs alleged that federal agents unlawfully raided the homes of Latinos in the New York City area without warrants and often under cover of darkness, in search of fugitive non-citizens. Plaintiffs claimed that they were detained, interrogated and subjected to physical abuse, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The complaint sought damages and an injunction restraining ICE's New York Regional Office from executing unconstitutional raids. On December 7, 2007, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim. On July 30, 2008, the District Court (Judge John G. Koeltl) dismissed this motion as moot, because Plaintiffs had amended their complaint. On December 21, 2009, Plaintiffs filed their fourth amended complaint, adding claims of Fifth Amendment violations (violations of Equal Protection due to the targeting of Latino communities); false imprisonment; reckless, negligent, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; trespass; assault and battery; and excessive force. They sought equitable relief, damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and damages under <i>Bivens</i>. After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in <i>Iqbal v. Ashcroft</i>, Defendants moved to dismiss the <i>Bivens</i> claim against the high-ranking official defendants on March 29, 2010. And they moved to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief on May 19, 2010, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek such relief because they were unlikely to again be subjected to the allegedly unconstitutional behavior. On December 22, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a petition to certify their class. However, in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in <i>Dukes v. Walmart</i>, the District Court withdrew Plaintiffs' petition for class certification and granted leave to amend. On November 22, 2011, Plaintiffs refiled their petition to certify their class. On April 16, 2012, the District Court (Judge Katherine B. Forrest) denied Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. 2012 WL 1344417. Plaintiffs moved for leave to appeal the District Court's decision, but this motion was denied on July 16, 2012 by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On August 1, 2011, the District Court (Judge Koeltl) dismissed Plaintiffs' Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims against all but two supervisory Defendants. 811 F. Supp. 2d 803. On October 28, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to their <i>Bivens</i> claim. Defendants responded with a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. On April 30, 2012, the District Court (Judge Forrest) denied both parties' motions. 2012 WL 1538431. On September 14, 2012, Defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. However, on September 27, the District Court (Judge Forrest) adjourned all pending motions, presumably due to ongoing settlement negotiations. On November 15, the court set a deadline of December 12 for the parties to submit a settlement or restore the action. This deadline was extended, after which the parties submitted a settlement agreement and voluntary dismissal on December 27. Judge Forrest signed the agreement on April 4, 2013. The settlement agreement stipulated to a payment of one million dollars from ICE to Plaintiffs ($36,000 to each Plaintiff, remainder to attorneys), termination of Plaintiffs' immigration proceedings, implementation of a policy of training ICE officers on how to obtain proper consent for home (and curtilage) entrance, and a discontinuance of \"protective sweeps\" unless there is a reasonable, articulable suspicion of danger. This agreement terminated the suit. Document destruction as required by the settlement continued into 2015. There has been no docket activity since 2015. The case is likely closed because the settlement required the defendants to disseminate training documents relating to the modified policies within 60 days of the settlement.", "summary": "Plaintiffs brought suit against U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement on September 20, 2007 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that officials unconstitutionally engaged in raids of Plaintiffs' residences as a part of a program called \"Operation Return to Sender.\" On April 4, 2013, Judge Katherine B. Forrest signed the parties' settlement agreement, which stipulated to a one million dollar payment to Plaintiffs, and an agreement to enact a policy of training officers how to properly obtain consent before entering a person's house or curtilage. This agreement terminated the suit."}
{"article": "On March 6, 2008 attorneys with the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund and Education Fund and New York Legal Assistance Group filed a class action lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security, USCIS, Attorney General of the U.S. and the FBI. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Foley Square Division), challenging the U.S. government's failure to timely adjudicate applications for naturalization made in New York City District Office of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (\"USCIS\"). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 555(b), 551(13), 706(1) and 553, and the Immigration and Nationality Act \u00a7 336(b), codified at 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1447(b). Plaintiffs sought certification of a class consisting of: lawful permanent residents residing in the counties served by the New York City District Office of USCIS, who have submitted or will submit applications to be naturalized as U.S. citizens, and whose applications have not been or will not be adjudicated within 180 days of the date of submission, and on behalf of a sub-class composed of those members of the class who reside in the Southern District of New York and whose applications have not been or will not be adjudicated within 120 days of the date of their initial examinations. On June 19, 2008, Defendants filed its motion to dismiss. On August 7, 2008, the District Court (Judge Lawrence M. McKenna) denied Plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction and for class certification, and granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. On August 19, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied on September 10, 2008. Plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On January 29, 2008, in a summary order, the Second Circuit vacated the judgments entered by the District Court on August 7 and September 10 of 2008, and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with the order. The parties entered settlement negotiations after the case went back to the District Court. On September 20, 2010, the District Court (Judge Lawrence M. McKenna) entered a Stipulation and Order of Dismissal which specified that it would place the matter in abeyance until July 29, 2011, and if Plaintiffs have not sought reinstatement by July 29, 2011, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement dated September 17, 2010, the action would be dismissed with prejudice. The action was dismissed with prejudice as of July 29, 2011. (Updated on 03/31/2012)", "summary": "This case was brought to challenge the U.S. government's failure to timely adjudicate applications for naturalization by lawful permanent residents of the state of New York. The case was resolve by a settlement whose terms are not available."}
{"article": "On May 18, 2010, two organizations comprised of day laborers and/or predominately Latino immigrant workers filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York under the First and Fourteenth Amendments against the Town of Oyster Bay. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and LatinoJustice PRLDEF, sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees and costs, claiming that the defendants, through the passage of an ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of labor from the town's streets and sidewalks, unlawfully prohibited speech related to employment and had a discriminatory animus against predominately Latino immigrant day laborers. In September 2009, the Town Board enacted the ordinance in question. It prohibited any person from standing on a street corner stopping or attempting to stop a passing car for employment-related purposes. It also prohibited drivers from stopping their cars for the same purposes. The proposed purpose of the ordinance was to promote the health, safety, and welfare of motorists and pedestrians on the streets of the town. However, the supervisor referenced the ordinance as a temporary solution to dealing with those who were not on the path to citizenship. Comments from the public showed that town residents feared groups of men unfamiliar to them standing on the streets. There was also proof of animosity towards immigrant day laborers, such as town residents saying the day laborers were unsightly, illegal, and not wanted in that town. Plaintiffs argued that since New York laws already addressed health and safety concerns on the streets, this animus against predominantly Latino immigrant day laborers was what actually motivated the passing of the ordinance and that this violated the First Amendment right to free speech and Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. They also argued that the law was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result of the ordinance, day laborers had suffered a significant loss of wages and harassment from police officers and people driving by them. Two days after the complaint was filed, on May 20, 2010, the District Court (Judge Denis Reagan Hurley) granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order preventing the town from enforcing the ordinance at issue. Then, on June 1, 2010, the District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance at issue, pending final resolution of the First Amendment claims. In response to this order, the defendants filed a notice of appeal with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on June 21, 2010. The case was argued in the Second Circuit under the docket number 10-2505-cv. Little docket activity occurred until May 17, 2011, when the Second Circuit (Judges Barrington D. Parker, Gerard E. Lynch, and Raymond J. Lohier, Jr.) affirmed the District Court's order converting the temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction and remanded the case back to the District Court for further proceedings. After a few months of discovery, on September 29, 2011, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The parties continued through the discovery process. On March 30, 2012, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Arlene Rosario Lindsay) granted the plaintiffs' motion for a protective order to withhold from discovery certain privileged documents: The identification documents and/or immigration status of the individual day laborers known to the plaintiffs. The parties then continued to go through more discovery litigation. On June 18, 2013, the District Court (Judge Hurley) affirmed Magistrate Judge Lindsay's protective order, allowing plaintiffs to withhold privileged documents in the discovery process. Additionally, the District Court rejected the defendants' arguments that the plaintiffs lacked standing in this case, dismissing the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment. 954 F.Supp.2d 127. On December 1, 2013, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment to permanently prevent the ordinance from ever taking effect, as it was unconstitutional. In the almost two-year interim, a similar court case, <i>Reed v. Town of Gilbert</i> was decided by the Supreme Court on June 18, 2015, which provided a rationale to dismiss this case as unconstitutional under the First Amendment and permanently enjoin the ordinance. On September 3, 2015, the District Court (Judge Hurley) cited this case as part of its rationale and issued a judgment that enjoined the ordinance permanently and declared the ordinance unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Because the District Court found that the ordinance did not withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment, it did not address the plaintiffs' due process or Equal Protection claims in its judgment. 128 F.Supp.3d 597. On September 15, 2015, the defendants appealed the District Court's decision to enjoin the ordinance. The appeal continued in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals under the docket number 15-2914-cv. During this appeal, the defendants also argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring this case. On August 22, 2017, the Second Circuit (Judges Dennis Jacobs, Barrington D. Parker, and Jane A. Restani) affirmed the District Court's ruling enjoining the ordinance. The Second Circuit found that the District Court did not err in finding the ordinance unconstitutional under the First Amendment and that the plaintiffs indeed had standing to bring suit against the defendants.868 F.3d 104. In the fall of 2018, the final stages of litigation began to determine how much defendants would pay to plaintiffs in attorney's fees and costs. In July of 2019, the Court ordered that defendants pay $1,505,806 to the plaintiffs' attorneys. On November 25th of that year, a satisfaction of the judgment was entered and the case was closed.", "summary": "On May 18, 2010, two organizations comprised of day laborers and/or predominately Latino immigrant workers filed a class action lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of New York under the First and Fourteenth Amendments against the Town of Oyster Bay. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and LatinoJustice PRLDEF, sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees and costs, claiming that the defendants, through the passage of an ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of labor from the town's streets and sidewalks, unlawfully prohibited speech related to employment and had a discriminatory animus against predominately Latino immigrant day laborers. After defeating the defendant's partial motion for summary judgment due to lack of standing, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was successful. On September 3, 2015, the District Court enjoined the ordinance and declared it unconstitutional as it violated the first amendment. On August 22, 2017, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. In July 2019, the court assessed attorney fees against the defendants, and the case closed later that year."}
{"article": "On October 21, 2014, the American Immigration Council, National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, and American Civil Liberties Union filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (\u201cDHS\u201d) under the Freedom of Information Act (\u201cFOIA\u201d). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, the National Immigration Law Center, the American Immigration Council, the National Immigration Project/NLG and the ACLU Foundation Immigrants\u2019 Rights Project sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as reasonable attorney\u2019s fees and costs. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to disclose documents regarding information and practices in an Artesia, New Mexico immigration detention center. Specifically, the defendants failed to disclose information concerning the expedited removal of families Artesia after 2014. There had been growing concern about the policies, procedures and practices related to the implementation of the expedited removal process in Artesia, sparking major concern from the media and the public. The facility in Artesia held women and minor children who had fled Central America, seeking refuge in the United States. Many of these migrants fled persecution and extreme danger in their home countries, and sought asylum in the U.S. However, some of these families have since been deported back to the countries from which they had fled, raising concern about the removal process. The plaintiffs sought to examine the extent to which these women and children had valid claims of asylum and if these families were receiving the process required by law. In order to understand this process, the plaintiffs submitted FOIA requests to each of the defendants for any agency records that the defendants prepared, received, transmitted, collected or maintained that concerned the policies, procedures and guidelines with respect to the Immigration and Nationality Act as well as a request for expedited processing. However, none of the defendants had made any determination as to whether they would comply with the plaintiffs\u2019 request for the documents. The defendants also denied the plaintiffs request for expedited processing, even though the plaintiffs claimed that these documents were necessary to educate the public about time critical government activities. On February 3, 2015, Judge Lorna G. Schofield ordered that the parties submitted to the Court a proposed schedule for the production of documents responsive to the plaintiffs' request. On February 13, 2015, the parties agreed on the number of pages each defendant should produce and review per month, until all responsive documents were gathered. The parties settled on June 6, 2017. The defendants agreed to pay different amounts of money to the Plaintiffs, as the following: (i) $16,800 should be paid by the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement; (ii) $21,600 should be paid by the US Citizenship and Immigration Services; and (iii) $9,600 should be paid by the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. The parties provided that the settlement agreement did not constitute an admission by the US or its agencies, including defendants, that plaintiffs or their counsels were entitled to fees and costs. The settlement agreement also provided that the Court should retain jurisdiction over any issue that may arise relating to it. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On October 21, 2014, the American Immigration Council, National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild and American Civil Liberties Union filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to disclose documents regarding information and practices concerning the expedited removal of families from an Artesia, New Mexico immigration detention center. The production of the requested documents was ordered. The parties settled on June 6, 2017."}
{"article": "Sixteen states, led by the State of New York, filed this lawsuit against the federal government on September 6, 2017, in response to a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) memorandum issued on September 5, ending the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. The states argued that ending DACA violated due process and equal protection rights, and also violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The states sought to enjoin the federal government from carrying out portions of the DHS memorandum and from using information about DACA grantees gathered in their applications to enforce immigration policy. The suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York and assigned to Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis. The complaint asserted that DACA helped its beneficiaries in several ways. First, since its inception in 2012, DACA protected approximately 800,000 young people from deportation. Second, DACA allowed individuals brought to the United States as children who met specific criteria to request deferred action for two years, subject to renewal. Indeed, the states pointed out that many of the grantees have spent most of their lives in the United States. Third, DACA allowed grantees to receive public benefits like social security, to enroll in higher education institutions, and to access other benefits like opening up a bank account and buying a car. And finally, the states noted that the federal government represented that it would not use the information obtained in the DACA application process to enforce immigration policy. The states argued that these grantees would now lose their protections and be at risk of deportation, especially since they provided the federal government with sensitive information in their applications. In light of the DHS memorandum, the federal government planned to immediately stop accepting new DACA applications. Further, it only issued renewals for grantees whose terms expired before March 5, 2018, provided they apply for renewal by October 5, 2018. The states highlighted that in addition to the losses DACA grantees will suffer, state and local economies, as well as many higher education institutions, have come to rely on the skills and productivity of the grantees and will therefore also suffer. The states pointed out that over half of DACA grantees are of Mexican origin and thus ending DACA \"is a culmination of President\u2019s Trump\u2019s oft-stated commitments...to punish and disparage people with Mexican roots.\" Further, the states argued that the grantees' sensitive information is at risk since President Trump took \"affirmative steps to reduce the privacy protections applicable to DACA data\" with a January 2017 Executive Order directing all agencies to \"exclude persons who are not United States citizens or lawful permanent residents from the protections of the Privacy Act regarding personally identifiable information\" Meanwhile, the states pointed out that the DHS Memorandum did not provide assurance to DACA grantees or direction to USCIS and ICE that this information could not be used for the purpose of immigration policy enforcement. Originally, the plaintiffs consisted of New York, Massachusetts, Washington, Connecticut, Delaware, District Of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia. Then Colorado joined as part of an amended complaint filed on October 4, which also claimed that the United States was equitably estopped from using or disclosing DACA beneficiaries\u2019 personal information that it previously promised to keep confidential. On October 6, the United States filed a partial administrative record in the related case <a href = \"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15462\"><i>Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen</i></a>, available <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-NY-0051-0008.pdf\">here</a>. The record included a series of government documents pertaining to DACA from its inception to the decision to rescind it. The <i>Batalla Vidal</i> plaintiffs then moved to compel the defendants to complete the administrative record, arguing that the defendants had not produced all of the documents leading to the rescission. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that they omitted documents that Acting Secretary Duke did not directly review. The judge in <i>Batalla Vidal</i> (also Judge Garaufis) granted the motion on October 19 and ordered the defendants to produce the full administrative record in both cases. The defendants appealed to the Second Circuit, which granted an emergency motion for a stay of discovery and record supplementation in the district court pending consideration by the Second Circuit on October 20. On October 27, the defendants filed a motion in the district court to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, arguing that the rescission was an enforcement action \"presumed immune from judicial review\" and that, alternatively, the government provided ample explanation for the rescission. On November 9, 2017, the district court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims that policy changes in how information provided for DACA applications could be used violated due process and equitable estoppel. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' claim that the government violated due process by failing to provide individualized notice of the rescission. In both cases, the court determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court found, however, that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the DACA rescission. The court reserved ruling on the government's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and denied all other parts of its motion. On December 15, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the government from rescinding DACA. Meanwhile, a series of entities filed amicus briefs in support of the plaintiffs: United We Dream, over 100 companies, educational justice organizations, the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, law enforcement leaders, workers' organizations, legal services organizations, New York University, the Mexican government, dozens of religious organizations, immigration nonprofits, various U.S. cities and counties, and civil rights organizations. On December 27, the Second Circuit lifted the stay on the district court's discovery orders. But the government still did not want to provide additional documents. It also wanted to appeal the district court\u2019s ruling on the motion to dismiss. So, two days later, the government moved to stay further supplementation of the administrative record in the district court pending its appeal on the motion to dismiss. The district court granted the government\u2019s motion to stay on December 30. It then certified the government\u2019s interlocutory appeal on January 8. On February 13, 2018, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, reasoning that the government likely lacked a legally sufficient basis for ending the DACA program. The court found that while the government could end DACA, the question was if they had provided legally adequate reasons for rescission. The court found that the decision to end DACA was based on an erroneous conclusion that DACA was unconstitutional and violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act, and that this conclusion in turn relied on the \"plainly incorrect factual premise\" that courts have found the \"somewhat analogous\" Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program to have \"constitutional defects.\" The court also found that the purported reason for rescission was contradictory in that the government claimed DACA must end because it was unconstitutional, and yet also provided for a wind-down period in which certain DACA renewal applications would continue to be adjudicated. As a result, the court held that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious and enjoined the government from ending the program on a nationwide basis pending the court's decision on the merits of the case. The government filed notice on February 20 that it had appealed the district court\u2019s decision to issue a preliminary injunction to the Second Circuit. On February 21, 2018, the Second Circuit again denied the defendants' request for a stay of the district court's discovery orders. On March 29, 2018, the district court granted in part and denied in part the government's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim that the rescission violated the Administrative Procedure Act\u2019s requirement for notice-and-comment, finding that the rescission memorandum was a general statement of policy exempt from the notice-and-comment requirement rather than a legislative rule. This finding led the court to further dismiss the plaintiffs' claim regarding Regulatory Flexibility Act violations since an RFA violation is contingent on a notice-and-comment requirement in the first place. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' claim that the government changed its information-use policy but left the door open to other challenges of that policy. The court sustained the plaintiffs' equal protection claim that the rescission was motivated by racial animus against Latinos, finding that the plaintiffs adequately alleged the rescission created disparate impact. Further, the court found that while the plaintiffs may not have sufficiently alleged that Acting Secretary Duke or the Attorney General had discriminatory intent, they did sufficiently allege that President Trump may have had such intent and that his influence on the rescission could not be ignored. The government promptly appealed the March 29 district court order denying its motion to dismiss. The Second Circuit decided to hear the government\u2019s appeal in tandem with the appeal of the preliminary injunction and the appeal of the district court\u2019s November 9, 2017, decision on the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and similar appeals in <i>Batalla Vidal</i>. On June 28, 2019, the Supreme Court agreed to hear three consolidated DACA cases: <i>Batalla Vidal</i>, <i>Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California</i>, and <i>Trump v. NAACP</i> (see related cases). The Supreme Court heard oral argument on November 12, 2019, on the issues of whether DHS's decision to wind down the DACA policy is judicially reviewable and whether DHS\u2019s decision to rescind DACA is lawful. On June 18, 2020, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that DHS's decision to rescind DACA was subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act and that the rescission was unlawful. 140 S.Ct. 1891. In accordance with the Supreme Court\u2019s decision, the Second Circuit vacated the district court\u2019s order granting preliminary injunction and affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court\u2019s denial of the government\u2019s motion to dismiss. On July 28, 2020, the Acting DHS Secretary issued a memorandum suspending DACA while DHS reviewed it. In response, on August 28, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging that the Acting DHS Secretary lacked the authority to issue the memorandum because he had not been lawfully appointed to his position. Accordingly, the plaintiffs alleged that the government\u2019s implementation of the memorandum was arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and in excess of DHS\u2019 statutory authority, and that it violated the Federal Vacancies Reform Act and the Homeland Security Act, which prohibit agency action by unlawfully serving acting officials from taking effect. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that the Acting Secretary was unlawfully serving in his position, to invalidate the memorandum, and to enjoin the government from terminating, amending, or interfering with DACA. The plaintiffs also filed a motion for summary judgment on August 28, 2020. Shortly thereafter, the government filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. On November 14, 2020, the court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion and denied the government\u2019s cross-motion, finding that the Acting DHS Secretary was not lawfully serving in his position and thus that the government's implementation of the memorandum was arbitrary and capricious. 2020 WL 6695076. The plaintiffs filed another partial motion for summary judgment on November 24, 2020. The court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion on December 4, 2020, vacating the memorandum issued by the Acting Secretary of DHS and ordering DHS to resume processing DACA applications and to notify the public accordingly. 2020 WL 7121849. The order required DHS to accept initial DACA applications, accept advance parole applications, and grant DACA renewals for two-years. On December 7, 2020 <a href = \"https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole/consideration-of-deferred-action-for-childhood-arrivals-daca\">USCIS</a> updated their website and indicated that effective that day, USCIS would accept initial applications, extend one-year DACA renewals to two-years, and accept applications for advance parole. As of December 19, the case is ongoing.", "summary": "Sixteen states filed this lawsuit against the federal government on September 6, 2017 in response to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) memorandum issued on Sept. 5 ending Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). The states sought to enjoin the federal government from carrying out portions of the DHS memorandum and from using information about DACA grantees gathered in their applications to enforce immigration policy. While the district court granted in part the government\u2019s motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs obtained a preliminary injunction. On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court held that DHS's decision to rescind DACA was subject to judicial review under the APA and that the rescission was unlawful. Shortly thereafter, the Acting DHS Secretary issued a memorandum suspending DACA while DHS reviewed it. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging that the Acting Secretary lacked the authority to issue the memorandum because he had not been lawfully appointed to his position. The district court agreed. Accordingly, the court vacated the memorandum and ordered DHS to resume processing DACA applications. This case is ongoing."}
{"article": "This case deals with the Trump Administration's effort to require state police departments to cooperate in immigration enforcement, which was part of the implementation of Executive Order 13768, which promised in January 2017 to deny federal grant funding to \u201csanctuary jurisdictions.\u201d The lawsuit began on July 18, 2018, when the States of New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Washington, Massachusetts, and Virginia (\u201cthe States\u201d) a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Justice (\u201cDOJ\u201d) (formally, the Attorney General) under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Ex Parte Young. The States, represented by their Attorneys General as well as outside counsel, claimed that the DOJ had violated the Separation of Powers, the APA and the Tenth Amendment Anti-Commandeering requirement; they sought declaratory and injunctive relief. In their complaint, the States challenged the DOJ\u2019s implementation of new conditional requirements for Byrne JAG funds in the 2017 Fiscal Year (\u201cFY\u201d). The Byrne JAG program provides funding for States, allowing them to prioritize chosen criminal justice programs. On July 25, 2017, the DOJ announced that applicants for FY 2017 Byrne JAG funds would have to agree to three immigration-related conditions: (1) to allow federal agents, upon request, access to correctional facilities in order to question suspected noncitizens about their right to be in or stay in the United States, (2) to respond to requests from the Department of Homeland Security to give advance notice of the scheduled release date and time of noncitizens at state or local correctional facilities, and (3) to comply with various conditions related to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1373, which included prohibiting states and localities from restricting their officials from communicating with immigration authorities regarding anyone\u2019s citizenship or immigration status, monitoring compliance of all subgrantees, and notifying the DOJ if the State became aware of evidence that a subgrantee was not in compliance. The case was assigned to Judge Edgardo Ramos on July 19, 2018. Shortly after, on July 26, 2019, the Court accepted the plaintiffs\u2019 request in <i> <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16713 \"> The City of New York v. Whitaker </a> </i>, 1:18-cv-06474 to relate that case, brought by the City of New York, with this one; the NYC action was against the same defendants for the same conduct. On July 20, 2018, the DOJ released the FY 2018 State Solicitation. In the FY 2018 version, the DOJ added to the conditions the States must meet in order to be eligible for the funds. In response, on August 6, 2018, the States submitted an amended complaint, adding the State of Rhode Island as a plaintiff and addressing the new FYI 2018 conditions. On August 17, 2018, both the States and the City filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The States requested summary judgment on the portions of the complaint related to FY 2017, seeking specifically declaratory judgment that the immigration conditions placed the program were unlawful, an injunction that enjoined the defendants from imposing those conditions nationwide, and a writ of mandamus directing the defendants to disburse New York City\u2019s FY 2017 award and to issue new awards without the three conditions to all grantees nationwide that previously received the award documents. The ACLU filed an Amicus Brief on August 31, 2018 in support of the plaintiffs. They argued that the actions taken by the defendants to put immigration-related conditions on the JAG funds were inappropriate claims to authority because they upset the balance of power between state governments and the federal government, and that their imposed conditions were negatively impacting the plaintiffs\u2019 ability to supervise their own police forces. On September 14, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss both this case and the related City of New York case, arguing that the immigration-related conditions on the JAG funds did not violate the Separation of Powers, that Congress delegated authority to the DOJ to place conditions on the grants, that the conditions did not violate the Spending Clause because the conditions bear a relationship to the purposes of the Byrne JAG Program, and that even if the Court were to grant an injunction it should be limited to the parties rather than nationwide. On November 30, 2018, Judge Ramos issued an opinion and order denying the defendant\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment, or in the alternative, motion to dismiss, and granting the plaintiff\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment. 343 F. Supp 3d 213. Judge Ramos granted summary judgment on the States\u2019 and the City\u2019s claims holding that: <ul><li>Notice, Access and Compliance conditions were ultra vires and not in accordance with law under APA (Counts II and III, City Count II) </li><li>8 U.S.C. sec. 1373(a)-(b) insofar as it applies to states and localities was facially unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment (Count V, City Count V and XI) </li><li>Notice, Access, and Compliance Conditions violated constitutional separation of powers (Count I, City Count I). Deny City Count IV (violation of the Spending Clause) as moot</li><li>The notice, access, compliance conditions were arbitrary and capricious under the APA (Count IV, city Count III) </ul>He ordered the defendants to: <ul><li>Disburse the FY 2017 Byrne JAG awards to the States</li><li>Stop enforcing the immigration-related conditions it tried to impose on the State\u2019s FY 2017 Byrne JAG awards</li><li>Reissue the States\u2019 FY 2017 Byrne JAG documents without the immigration-related conditions</ul>In his ruling, Judge Ramos declined to issue a nationwide injunction, as requested by the plaintiffs. He noted that such a move was not necessary to afford the plaintiffs\u2019 relief and that the scope of decisions by other district courts in like cases has been similarly limited. After a conference, Judge Ramos modified the opinion and removed the requirement to reissue the documents to the States on January 4, 2019. On January 28, 2019, the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit of the injunction issued against the defendants in the district court\u2019s November 30, 2018 opinion and order. Back in the district court, the plaintiffs again filed a motion for partial summary on March 1, 2019. The plaintiffs requested summary judgment on the portions of the complaint related to FY 2018 and sought declaratory judgment that the immigration conditions placed the program were unlawful, an injunction that enjoined the defendants from imposing those conditions, and a writ of mandamus directing defendants to disburse New York City\u2019s FY 2018 award and to issue new awards without the three conditions to all grantees that previously received the award documents. On April 12, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or alternatively, partial summary judgment. On February 26, 2020, a Second Circuit panel (Circuit Judges Ralph Winter, Jose Cabranes, and Reena Raggi) issued an opinion reversing the district court's award of partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs, vacating the district court's mandate and injunction, and remanding the case to the district court. Judge Raggi, writing for the panel, concluded that the plain language of the relevant statutes authorized the Attorney General to impose all three challenged conditions on Byrne grant applications. Judge Raggi found that these conditions help to enforce national immigration laws and policies and that they ensure that applicants \"satisfy particular statutory grant requirements imposed by Congress and subject to Attorney General oversight.\" Additionally, Judge Raggi, relying on a Supreme Court decision in <i>Arizona v. United States</i> that made clear States may not pursue policies that undermine federal law, held that the challenged conditions intrude on the powers reserved to the States. Finally, Judge Raggi concluded that in imposing the challenged conditions, the Attorney General did not overlook their important detrimental effects so as to make their imposition arbitrary and capricious. 951 F.3d 84. As of March 3, 2020, the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is pending before the district court and the case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2018, several states filed a complaint against the Department of Justice in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that the immigration-related conditions being placed on funding disbursed by the Department of Justice violated the Separation of Powers, the APA and the Tenth Amendment Anti-Commandeering. In 2018, a judge granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. In 2019, the defendants appealed this judgment. And later, the plaintiffs made a motion for summary judgment on the 2018 immigration-related conditions. In February 2020, a Second Circuit panel reversed the district court's order granting partial summary judgment, vacated the mandate and injunction, and remanded the case to the district court, concluding that the Attorney General was statutorily authorized to impose the challenged conditions and that the imposition of these conditions was not arbitrary and capricious. The plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is currently pending before the district court."}
{"article": "This is a case about whether the federal government must include undocumented immigrants in the 2020 Census count. On July 21, 2020, President Trump issued a memo ordering the exclusion of undocumented immigrants from the state-population totals used to calculate the states apportionments. In response, on July 24, 2020, several immigration advocacy and nonprofit organizations filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, sued the Bureau of the Census, the President of the United States, the Director of the United States Census Bureau, the United States Department of Commerce, and the Secretary of Commerce. The plaintiffs claimed that by excluding \u201cundocumented immigrants from: (a) the tabulation of the total population of the states; (b) the calculation and statement of the whole number of persons in each state; and (c) the calculation and statement of the apportionment of the House of Representatives among the states\u201d the defendants were violating the Constitution and the laws of the United States. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, a writ of mandamus compelling the President to apportion the House of representatives among states based on actual enumeration of the population, including undocumented immigrants, and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege excluding undocumented immigrants violated the Enumeration and Apportionment clauses of the US Constitution (Article I, Sec. 2, Cl. 3 and Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment) which require all persons to be included in the congressional apportionment base. They also alleged that the memo violated their right to equal protection because it denied undocumented immigrants personhood under the Constitution on the basis of race and national origin and was motivated by a desire to harm immigrant communities of color (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments ). The complaint further contended violations of the Census Act (2 U.S.C. \u00a7 2a(a); 13 U.S.C. \u00a7 141), Separation of Powers (Article I, Sec. 2, Cl. 3 of the Constitution, as amended by the Fourteenth Amendment), and the Administrative Procedure Act. The case was initially assigned to Judge Lewis J. Liman, but was quickly reassigned to Judge Jesse M. Furman. The case was related to State of New York v. U.S. Department of Commerce, another 2020 Census case assigned to Judge Furman. That case is in the Clearinghouse, <a href=\"https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16568\">here</a>. On July 28, 2020, Judge Furman ordered the parties in this case to confer and submit a joint letter addressing the ten issues he identified in the <a href=\"https://chadmin.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not_public/IM-NY-0079-0004.pdf\">order</a>. One of the issues was whether this case should be consolidated with <a href=\"https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17735\">State of New York v. Trump</a>. In their joint letter (<a href=\"https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.540946/gov.uscourts.nysd.540946.42.0.pdf\"> Re: State of New York v. Trump, No. 20 Civ. 5770 (JMF); New York Immigration Coalition v. Trump, No. 20 Civ. 5781 (JMF) </a>), submitted on August 3, 2020, the parties agreed that it should. On the same day, a rural voter entered a Motion to Intervene as a plaintiff. That motion failed to demonstrate a right to intervene, so Judge Furman was denied it the next day. On August 4, 2020, Judge Furman ordered this case to be consolidated with <a href=\"https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17735\">State of New York v. Trump</a>, and for \u201call future filings [to] be in 20-CV-5770 (JMF) alone.\u201d For additional information, on this case and State of New York v. Trump, please see State of New York v. Trump, located <a href=\"https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17735\">here</a> in the Clearinghouse.", "summary": "In July 2020, several immigration advocacy and nonprofit organizations filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs claimed that by excluding \u201cundocumented immigrants from: (a) the tabulation of the total population of the states; (b) the calculation and statement of the whole number of persons in each state; and (c) the calculation and statement of the apportionment of the House of Representatives among the states\u201d the federal government were violating the Enumeration and Apportionment clauses of the United States Constitution, Equal Protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Separation of Powers, the Census Act, and. In August 2020, this case was consolidated with State of New York v. Trump. For additional information, on this case, please see State of New York v. Trump."}
{"article": "On February 1, 2008, national, state and local chambers of commerce and other nonprofit organizations advocating for their members' business interests filed this lawsuit against the State of Oklahoma in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs, represented by private and public interest council, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that parts of the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act were preempted by federal legislation. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Sections 7 and 9 of that act, which impose tax penalties on businesses that do not check the work eligibility of all of their employees in a federal database and allow discharged employees to bring discrimination suits against their employers for employing unauthorized workers, were preempted by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on the same day that they filed their complaint, and defendants moved to dismiss the claim on February 20, 2008. On June 4, 2008, the Court (Judge Robin J. Cauthron) ruled on both motions, denying the motion to dismiss and granting the preliminary injunction. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Henry, 08-cv-109-C, 2008 WL 2329164 (W.D. Okla. June 4, 2008). The defendants appealed to the Tenth Circuit, and on February 2, 2010, the Court of Appeals (Judge Harris L. Hartz, Judge Paul Joseph Kelly, Jr., and Judge Carlos F. Lucero) affirmed the District Court's grant of a preliminary injunction barring the discrimination lawsuit provisions and the tax penalty provisions from taking effect, but reversed the grant of injunction as to the verification requirement. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742 (10th Cir. 2010). The case was remanded to the District Court. In June of 2010, the court granted a continuance of the case pending the Supreme Court's decision in Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting (<a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11755\">IM-AZ-0013</a>). On May 26, 2011, the Supreme Court (Justice Samuel A. Alito) issued its opinion, holding that federal law does not preempt an Arizona law that requires businesses to verify employees' work eligibility and allows the state to revoke the business licenses of employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). On June 23, 2011, the District Court (Judge Cauthron) granted another continuance to allow the parties to assess the impact of Whiting on their positions. On December 19th, 2012, the court entered the final judgment. Section 7(b) remained good law, which require persons to contract with the State to use the employment authorization system. However, section 7(c), which creates a cause of action for discrimination against employers who terminate an authorized employee while retaining an unauthorized employee and section 9, which requires businesses to verify individual independent contractors\u2019 authorization status and creates a withholding for work performed by individual independent contractors, were both struck down. Oklahoma is permanently enjoined from enforcing these provisions. The court ordered all parties to bear their own fees and costs in this matter. This case is now closed.", "summary": "On February 1, 2008, national, state and local chambers of commerce and other nonprofit organizations advocating for their members' business interests filed a lawsuit against the State of Oklahoma, claiming that Sections 7 and 9 of the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, which impose tax penalties on businesses that don't check the work eligibility of all of their employees in a federal database and allow discharged employees to bring discrimination suits against their employers for employing unauthorized workers, were preempted by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act. The Court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction on June 4, 2008, and on appeal to the Tenth Circuit the injunction was upheld except for as to the verification requirement. On remand to the District Court, the case was stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Whiting, which Supreme Court later held that an Arizona law requiring employers to use E-Verify was not preempted by federal law. Pursuant to this decision, the district court entered in a judgment on December 19th, 2012, holding that Oklahoma can require persons to contract with the State to use the employment authorization system. However, the provision creating a cause of action for discrimination against employers who terminate an authorized employee while retaining an unauthorized employee and the provision requiring businesses to verify individual independent contractors\u2019 authorization status and creating a withholding for work performed by individual independent contractors, were both struck down."}
{"article": "On July 11, 2008, two detainees filed a habeas petition and class action suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Warden of Allegheny County Jail challenging their continued detention pursuant to immigration detainers and alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite the fact that the criminal charges against plaintiffs had been dropped, they were continuously detained due to detainers placed on them by federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (\"ICE\") agents. Plaintiffs, represented by attorneys for the Community Justice Project, sought habeas relief. Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on July 23, 2008, seeking to certify a class consisting of all who are or will be detained in the Allegheny County Jail based solely on an immigration detainer and without the opportunity to object to their detention. The same day, the district court (Judge David S. Cercone) denied the habeas petition as moot, dismissed the action, and denied the motion for class certification because ICE had assumed custody of both petitioners.", "summary": "In 2008, two detainees filed a habeas petition and class action suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Warden of Allegheny County Jail challenging their continued detention pursuant to immigration detainers and alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought habeas relief and class certification. On July 23, 2008, the district court (Judge David S. Cercone) denied the habeas petition as moot, dismissed the action, and denied the motion for class certification because ICE had assumed custody of both petitioners."}
{"article": "On August 23, 2012, law enforcement officers employed by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a component agency of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging violations of 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1225 by the heads of DHS and ICE. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive relief preventing the implementation of a Directive issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security entitled \"Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children\" (\"the Directive\") and a Memorandum entitled \"Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens\" (the \"Morton Memorandum\"). Plaintiffs claimed that the Directive commanded ICE officers to violate federal law, compelled them to violate their oaths of office, violated the Administrative Procedure Act (\"APA\"), unconstitutionally usurped and encroached upon the legislative powers of Congress, as defined in Article I of the United States Constitution, and violated the obligation of the executive branch to faithfully execute the law, as required by Article II, Section 3, of the United States Constitution. On October 10, 2012, the ICE employees were joined by the State of Mississippi as a plaintiff in an Amended Complaint. On January 24, 2013, the Court (Judge Reed C. O'Connor) granted in part and denied in part the government's November 13, 2012 Motion to Dismiss. Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F.Supp.2d 724 (N.D. Tex. 2013). The Court held that venue was appropriate in the Northern District of Texas. With respect to several of the ICE Agent Plaintiffs' causes of action the Court found that these Plaintiffs had not suffered an injury-in-fact, and therefore lacked standing to pursue the claims. In particular, the Court found that even if following the Directive and the Morton Memorandum did require them to violate their oaths to uphold the Constitution, and to alter their employment conduct, neither effect injured them concretely enough to support standing. However, the Court found that the allegation that the Directive and Memo compelled the plaintiffs to violate a federal statute upon pain of adverse employment action did satisfy the requirements of standing. (With respect to one additional asserted cause of action, relating to the issuance of employment authorization to aliens covered by the Directive/Memo, the Court noted that the plaintiffs were not involved in employment authorization decisions and did not articulate a way in which employment authorization harmed them personally. Thus, the Court dismissed without prejudice Plaintiffs' third cause of action.) With respect to the State of Mississippi, the court found that Mississippi's asserted fiscal injury was purely speculative because there was no concrete evidence that the costs associated with the presence of illegal aliens in the state of Mississippi have increased or will increase as a result of the Directive or the Morton Memorandum. The Court held that Mississippi failed to allege an injury-in-fact sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements of standing and dismissed the state of Mississippi's claims without prejudice. The federal government also asserted that this Court lacks jurisdiction because Plaintiffs' claims are federal employment disputes subject to the Civil Service Reform Act (\"CSRA\"), but the Court deferred ruling on this claim until trial because Defendant's claim that the CSRA precludes federal-court jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims had been inadequately briefed. On April 23, 2013, the Court (Judge Reed O'Connor) held a hearing regarding Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunctive Relief. The Court concluded that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Directive and related provisions of the Morton Memorandum violate 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1225(b)(2)(A), but deferred ruling until the parties provided the Court with additional briefing regarding the CSRA dispute. Crane v. Napolitano, 2013 WL 1744422 (N.D. Tex. 2013). The CSRA was then fully briefed, and on July 31, 2013, the Court (Judge Reed C. O'Connor) dismissed the remainder of the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court found that since Plaintiff's claims were based on their challenge to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals after Plaintiff's non-compliance with the program led to the threat of workplace disciplinary action against them, the dispute must be governed by the CSRA's comprehensive and exclusive remedial scheme provided by Congress. Thus, the Court held that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to address Plaintiffs' claims. Crane v. Napolitano, 2013 WL 8211660 (N.D. Tex. 2013). Plaintiffs appealed. On July 22, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2015). This ended the case.", "summary": "On August 23, 2012, ICE Agents and the State of Mississippi filed claims alleging that deferred action Directive commands ICE officers to violate federal law, compels them to violate their oaths of office, violates the Administrative Procedure Act (\"APA\"), unconstitutionally usurps and encroaches upon the legislative powers of Congress, as defined in Article I of the United States Constitution, and violates the obligation of the executive branch to faithfully execute the law, as required by Article II, Section 3, of the United States Constitution. On January 24, 2013, the Court found that ICE Agent Plaintiffs had standing to proceed, but the State of Mississippi did not. On July 31, 2013, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the dispute must be governed by the Civil Service Reform Act. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court."}
{"article": "This case is part of the series of <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=33\">Signal International cases</a>. It is stayed during defendant's bankruptcy and settlement proceedings. On Aug. 7, 2013, 16 Indian guestworkers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. Plaintiffs filed this suit after District Judge Jay Zainey <a href=\"http://clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-LA-0010-0016.pdf\">denied class certification</a> on Jan. 3, 2012 in a related case, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14377\"><i>David v. Signal International</i></a>. The amended complaint, filed on behalf of 21 individuals, asserted claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. \u00a71589 (forced labor) and 18 U.S.C. \u00a71590 (trafficking)), the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. \u00a71962), the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. \u00a71981), the Ku Kux Klan Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. \u00a71985), the Thirteenth Amendment, as well as claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. Plaintiffs were represented by the Equal Justice Center and the Transnational Worker Rights Clinic. Plaintiffs were allegedly brought into the United States to provide labor and services to defendant Signal International. Signal was based in Pascagoula, Mississippi and was in the business of providing repairs to offshore oil rigs in the Gulf Coast region. One plaintiff worked in Pascagoula; the remaining plaintiffs worked at Signal's Orange, Texas site. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs paid defendant Signal's recruiters as much as $25,000 for travel, visa, and recruitment fees, but upon arrival in the United States found out they would not receive the green cards promised to them. Instead, Plaintiffs were forced to pay additional fees ($1050 per month) to live in racially segregated labor camps, and were subject to squalid living conditions and threats of both legal and physical harm if they complained about the conditions or decided not to provide labor. In July 2014, U.S. Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn denied Signal's motion to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs in this case only overlapped with the <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14377\"><i>David</i></a> case insofar as their FLSA claims in the <i>David</i> case were concerned. Magistrate Judge Hawthorn found the similarity in issues in the cases not substantial enough to warrant transfer because the current venue was otherwise proper. In June 2015, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn severed and transferred Signal's cross-claims against co-defendants (immigration attorneys, recruiters, and labor brokers) to the Eastern District of Louisiana. Trial was set for December 2015. However, in July 2015, the Court stayed the case after Signal filed for bankruptcy. <i>In re Signal Int\u2019l, Inc, et al.,</i> No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 12, 2015). As a part of the bankruptcy filings, the plaintiffs entered into a plan support agreement (PSA) which contemplated a settlement of the claims of this lawsuit against Signal entities through a consensual Chapter 11 plan proposed by Signal. The PSA, with a liquidation trust for distribution of settlement proceeds, became effective on Dec. 14, 2015. In Dec. 2015, in the <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14378\">related EEOC case</a>, the EEOC announced that the parties had reached a <a href=\"https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/12-18-15.cfm\">settlement</a> for all cases, approved by the bankruptcy court. Signal would pay $5 million to 476 guestworkers through a claims process. All aggrieved individuals included in the litigation could receive relief in spite of the bankruptcy proceedings. Signal's CEO also issued an apology for its conduct. In this case, the parties were to update the court every 120 days as to the status of the bankruptcy proceedings. The parties' report on July 5, 2018 noted that 20 of the 21 plaintiffs had reached a settlement with the Burnett (immigration attorney) defendants, and the remaining one plaintiff could not be located. The plaintiffs advised that they would be dismissing their claims against them soon because the Burnett defendants had met their obligations under the settlement. Plaintiffs requested the stay remain in effect as to the Signal defendants and Dewan (recruiter) defendants. On August 24, 2018, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn issued a report and recommendation to dismiss without prejudice the one remaining plaintiff who did not respond to the court\u2019s order. District Judge Ron Judge Clark adopted the report and recommendation on September 12, 2018 and dismissed this plaintiff without prejudice. The case is ongoing as to the Signal defendants and Dewan defendants. As of August 2, 2020, there has been no changes in the docket.", "summary": "On Aug. 7, 2013, 16 Indian guestworkers filed a lawsuit in E.D.Tx. for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme by Defendant Signal International. As of July 5, 2018, 20 of the 21 plaintiffs had reached a settlement with the Burnett defendants; the remaining plaintiff's claim was dismissed without prejudice. The case is ongoing as to the Signal defendants and Dewan defendants."}
{"article": "On October 26, 2015, sixteen undocumented immigrants formerly detained in Dallas County, Texas, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued Dallas County and the Dallas County Sheriff under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought damages and an injunction preventing the defendants from detaining the plaintiffs solely based on a request from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), an immigration hold, or an immigration detainer. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had violated their constitutional rights by holding them in Dallas County jails for an additional 48 hours after the time they would otherwise have been released, in order to facilitate their arrest by ICE. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants unlawfully detained them by prohibiting bond or by failing to release them even after they had been cleared. The case was assigned to Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater. On December 18, 2015, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, and to dismiss the claims against Sheriff Valdez based on qualified immunity. On January 8, 2016, the case was consolidated with another action brought by the same counsel against Dallas County on behalf of a group of plaintiffs asserting identical claims (3:15-cv-4008). On June 7, 2016, Judge Fitzwater granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, but also granted the plaintiffs leave to replead. Judge Fitzwater held that the plaintiffs had failed to plausibly alleged that they had either paid bail or were otherwise eligible for release but were detained solely on the basis of an ICE-issued request to detain. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged that Dallas County lacked probable cause to detain the plaintiffs after they were otherwise eligible for release. 2016 WL 3166306. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on July 5, 2016. The complaint provided facts demonstrating that Dallas County had not allowed pretrial release even where the detainee paid bond. Instead, the defendants would either continue holding the detainee for transfer to ICE, or would petition the court to find the bail insufficient. The plaintiffs alleged that because of this policy, some detainees chose not to pay bail because they knew doing so would be futile. The complaint further alleged that continuing to hold the plaintiffs after they would have otherwise been cleared for release without probable cause as to a different criminal offense constituted overdetention. The amended complaint did not list Sheriff Lupe Valdez as a defendant. Dallas County then moved to dismiss the amended complaint. On January 17, 2017, Judge Fitzwater denied in part and granted in part the defendant's motion. He held that the plaintiffs had standing and could bring suit for violations of the Fourth Amendment. He dismissed the plaintiffs' due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment because the claims were already 'covered by' the Fourth Amendment. 2017 WL 169102. On May 8, 2017, Judge Fitzwater granted a motion allowing the state of Texas to intervene as a defendant in the case. On June 16, 2017, Judge Fitzwater granted the plaintiffs\u2019 request to consolidate this case with a related one, <i>Delcid Bonilla v. Dallas County</i> (3:17-cv-201). The plaintiffs subsequently filed a second amended complaint reflecting the consolidation and the additional plaintiffs. Due to the complexity of the case, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a bellwether trial plan on November 15, 2017. They proposed using five exemplary plaintiffs to represent the 45 named plaintiffs in order to make discovery significantly less expensive and avoid a lengthy trial. On March 9, 2018, the case was reassigned to Judge Karen Gren Scholer. On March 30, 2018, Judge Scholer denied the plaintiffs' motion for a bellwether trial plain. On April 20, 2018, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Over the next several months, twenty-six of the plaintiffs dismissed their claims with prejudice. Eighteen other plaintiffs fell out of contact with counsel and were designated by the court as pro se. As of October 18, 2018, there was only one plaintiff still represented by counsel and pursuing a claim. That plaintiff had reached an oral agreement to settle his claim with the defendants. On October 26, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the pro se plaintiffs for lack of prosecution and failure to respond to discovery. On November 30, 2018, the parties filed a joint motion for entry of an agreed final judgment between the remaining plaintiff and the defendants. The motion stated that the parties had entered into a private settlement agreement. On December 4, 2018, Judge Scholer ordered entry of the final judgment, whereby the state of Texas agreed to pay the remaining plaintiff $9,500 in complete and total satisfaction of all his claims. On January 7, 2019, Judge Scholer dismissed the pro se plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. The case is closed.", "summary": "On October 26, 2015, sixteen undocumented immigrants formerly detained in Dallas County, Texas, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued Dallas County and the Dallas County Sheriff under 42 USC \u00a71983 for violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought damages and an injunction preventing the defendants from detaining the plaintiffs solely based on a request from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), an immigration hold, or an immigration detainer. Over time, the case was consolidated with two other lawsuits with identical claims. The state of Texas also intervened as a defendant. The district court initially granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, but allowed the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint. The court then dismissed the plaintiffs' due process claims, allowing them to move forward only with their Fourth Amendment claims. By October 18, 2018, only one plaintiff was still represented by counsel and pursuing a claim (26 had dismissed their claims with prejudice, and 18 had fallen out of contact with counsel and were designated as pro se; their claims were later dismissed). That plaintiff reached a private settlement with the defendants and the court ordered entry of the final judgment on December 4, 2018. The plaintiff was to be paid $9,500. The case is closed."}
{"article": "This suit challenges Texas's \"Sanctuary City\" legislation, Senate Bill 4 (SB4), which requires local Texas law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration officials and punishes them if they do not. Unlike the <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=46\">other suits in this special collection</a>, this suit does not challenge President Trump's \"Sanctuary City\" Executive Order. To start with an overview, there are, so far, four cases addressing SB4. The four cases are: Texas v. Travis County, No. 1:17-cv-00425 (W.D. Tex.), <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15767\">IM-TX-0044</a>, before Judge Sparks, and three matters before Judge Orlando L. Garcia: this one; City of El Cenizo v. State of Texas, No. 5:17-cv-00404 (W.D. Tex.), <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15825\">IM-TX-0045</a>; and City of San Antonio, Texas v. State of Texas, No. 5:17-cv-00489 (W.D. Tex.), <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15852\">IM-TX-0047</a>. The three cases pending before Judge Garcia were brought by pro-immigration cities and counties seeking an injunction barring implementation of SB4. The other case was brought by Texas seeking a declaratory judgment upholding SB4, against pro-immigration cities and counties. On June 6, Judge Garcia ordered a consolidation of this case with the San Antonio and El Cenzino cases, with El Cenzino becoming the lead case in the consolidation. Travis County, however, remains separate. This case was quickly consolidated with the two other before Judge Garcia; please refer to <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15825\">El Cenizo v. Texas</a> for further information and updates. This case was administratively closed on Oct. 24, 2017 in light of the consolidation.", "summary": "This suit challenges Texas's \"Sanctuary City\" legislation, Senate Bill 4 (SB4), which requires local Texas law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration officials and punishes them if they do not. Unlike the <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=46\">other suits in this special collection</a>, this suit does not challenge President Trump's \"Sanctuary City\" Executive Order. This case was quickly consolidated with the two other before Judge Orlando L. Garcia; please refer to <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15825\">El Cenizo v. Texas</a> for further information and updates. This case was administratively closed on Oct. 24, 2017 in light of the consolidation."}
{"article": "After being imprisoned in Bexar County Adult Detention Center (BCADA) for about 75 days after his criminal charges were dismissed, an individual filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas August 26, 2016. Bexar County detained the plaintiff, despite the dismissal, of his criminal charges under a Bexar County policy and practice that detains individuals whenever Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents asks them to do so. The plaintiff filed suit against Bexar County under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and against the ICE officers and employees responsible for his illegal detention under <i>Bivens</i>. He claimed violations of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments; and claims for declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2201 and 2202. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory relief, monetary relief and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The case was initially assigned to Chief Judge Orlando L. Garcia. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on October 18, 2016, adding claims for violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act and adding the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the Director of ICE as defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants failed to issue detainers in accordance with the Immigration and Nationality Act\u2019s requirements and that these defendants were charged with administering and enforcing the Act Both parties moved for summary judgment, and Judge Garcia granted in part and denied in part both motions on June 5, 2017. The court determined that the County's actions in detaining the plaintiff without establishing probable cause met the deliberate-indifference standard necessary to show a constitutional violation. The plaintiff was thus awarded partial summary judgment and damages on the \u00a7 1983 claim to be free from unreasonable search and seizures against the County. The court denied the \u00a7 1983 claim relating to the County's policy of requiring receipt of judicial authorization by fax or email before dismissing a detainee, because the plaintiff did not adequately plead that this policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violations. The court thus granted partial summary judgment to the defendant. 2017 WL 2896021. The defendants immediately filed a motion for reconsideration. At the same time, on May 23, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion to consolidate the present case with <i>Trujillo v. United States </i>, 5:17-cv-00054-OLG, because the legal and factual issues were similar. In <i>Trujillo v. United States </i>, 5:17-cv-00054-OLG, the same plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the United States seeking damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act for his false imprisonment. The following day, the court granted this motion to avoid unnecessary cost or delay and to promote the administration of justice. The Secretary of DHS, the Director of ICE, and the ICE San Antonio Field Officer moved to dismiss the FTCA claims and stay the case on August 18, 2017. The motion to dismiss was granted as to DHS, ICE, and other federal employees and the motion to stay was denied on October 18, 2017. 2017 WL 6033861. The plaintiff appealed to the Fifth Circuit on November 10, 2017 and the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (Docket #17-51005). Back in the district court, the court reconsidered the issue after briefing. On January 17, 2019, the court vacated their original granting of the plaintiff's summary judgment motion. They instead granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and ordered the case to be closed. On February 11, 2019, the plaintiff appealed the case to the Fifth Circuit (Docket # 19-50124). On November 7, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss because a settlement had been reached, and a day later, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the case. The Clearinghouse does not have access to the settlement agreement. As of February 24, 2020, the docket had no additional activity and the Clearinghouse does not have access to the terms of the settlement agreement or updates on its enforcement.", "summary": "An individual unlawfully detained in the Bexar County Adult Detention Center filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. The plaintiff sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for damages. The case settled in November 2019."}
{"article": "On May 3, 2011, a coalition of immigrant rights groups and individual immigrants filed this class action lawsuit against the State of Utah in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, challenging the state's immigration-enforcement law, House Bill 497 (HB 497). HB 497 was a severe, anti-immigrant law that criminalized everyday activities, such as driving an undocumented immigrant to the store and authorized police to stop and detail an individual simply to verify his or her immigration status. The plaintiffs, represented by the state and national ACLU, the National Immigration Law Center, and private counsel, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983; the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201; and state law, claiming that the law was unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that HB 497, in requiring state and local law enforcement to check the identification of all people they stop, arrest or detain and ascertain whether they are in the country lawfully; allowing them to make warrantless arrests on \"reasonable suspicion\" that a person is an alien who is (1) subject to a removal order by an immigration court, (2) subject to an immigration detainer request, or (3) charged or convicted in another state with one or more \"aggravated felonies;\" and criminalizing the act of encouraging or inducing illegal immigrants to come to, enter or reside in Utah, is preempted under the Supremacy Clause and in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs sought a declaration of the law's unconstitutionality and an injunction barring enforcement of the law before it came into effect on May 10, 2011. In passing HB 497, Utah became the first state to follow the lead of Arizona in enacting aggressive immigration-related laws at the state level; Indiana, Georgia, Alabama and South Carolina were soon to follow. For the case challenging the Arizona's SB 1070, see <i>United States v. Arizona</i> [IM-AZ-0015]; for the case challenging Indiana's SEA 590, see <i>Buquer v. City of Indianapolis </i> [IM-IN-0002]; for the case challenging Georgia's HB 87, see <i>Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal</i> [IM-GA-0007]; for cases challenging Alabama's HB 56, see <i>United States v. Alabama </i>[IM-AL-0005], Hispanic Interest Coalition v. Bentley [IM-AL-0006], and Parsley v. Bentley [IM-AL-0007]; and for cases challenging South Carolina's Act 69, see Lowcountry Immigration Coalition v. Haley [IM-SC-0001] and United States v. South Carolina [IM-SC-0002]. On May 6, 2011, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. After a hearing on May 10, the district court (Judge Clark Waddoups) issued a temporary restraining order on May 11, barring enforcement of HB 497 pending further order of the court and giving parties time to brief the court regarding the merits of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. 2011 WL 7143098 (D. Utah May 11, 2011). Over the course of the summer, various amicus curiae briefs were filed in support of plaintiffs, including those by the governments of Mexico and various Central and South American countries. On August 1, 2011, plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. On November 22, 2011, the federal government filed a separate lawsuit challenging the Utah law solely on preemption grounds. It was consolidated with this case on November 28, and on December 15, the Department of Justice filed its own motion for a preliminary injunction. Rather than deciding on any of the motions before it, on February 21, 2012, the district court declared that it would refrain from making any rulings until the Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Arizona (IM-AZ-0015) but confirmed that the restraining order would continue until it ruled on the pending motions for preliminary injunction. While the district court awaited the Supreme Court\u2019s decision, the plaintiffs filed several notices of supplemental authority in 2013 to support its pending motions for preliminary injunctions. The plaintiffs cited circuit court decisions and argued that those provided further support that HB 497 was unconstitutional on Supremacy Clause grounds. Once the Supreme Court ruled on all but few motions for United States v. Arizona, Judge Waddoups ruled on all three pending motions for preliminary injunctions on June 18, 2014. First, the court ruled against the United States and plaintiffs\u2019 overall facial challenge against HB 497 as a whole because the constitutional language did not expressly preempt all immigration-related state legislation, and the Supreme Court did not hold that the entire field of immigration regulation is either conflict or field preempted. But the court ruled against the key provisions of HB 497, such as Section 10 and 11, which granted warrantless arrest based solely on suspicion of immigration status and made it criminal to assist or encourage undocumented immigrants. The court also put strict limits on when the police could check the identification of detained individuals to verify immigration status. 26 F. Supp. 3d 1125. HB 497 was unconstitutional because it unlawfully interfered with federal power and authority over immigration matters in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and authorized and required unreasonable seizures and arrests in violation of the Fourth Amendment. On November 25, 2014, the parties filed a joint report regarding the discussions toward agreeing on a proposed final judgment in light of the court\u2019s preliminary injunction decision. In the proposed final judgment, the State of Utah agreed to permanently scrap the key problematic provisions of HB 497 and implement the remaining sections under restriction. For example, the parties agreed to severely limit Sections 3 and 4 of HB 497, which made it clear that police are not allowed to stop or detain an individual simply to verify their immigration status. The terms of the settlement made clear that the law does not require Utahns to carry identification with them at all times, following the federal district court decision. On December 4, 2014, the district court entered a judgment per the parties\u2019 proposed final judgment and dismissed without prejudice the plaintiffs\u2019 and the United States\u2019 remaining claims that were not yet adjudicated. On April 28, 2015, the parties notified the court about the settlement of attorney fees and costs and later advised the Court that the payment has been made. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This is one in a series of cases challenging comprehensive state immigration laws. In this case, a coalition of immigrant rights groups and individual immigrants challenged Utah's law, HB 497, on preemption grounds and as a violation of equal protection, the right to travel, and the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. A preemption case brought by the Department of Justice was later consolidated with this case. In 2011, the District Court for the District of Utah has issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the statute. Following the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Arizona, the Court ruled on the motions for preliminary injunctions in June 2014 and ruled against the key provisions of HB 497. In November 2014, the parties filed a joint report, in which the State of Utah agreed to permanently scrap the key problematic provisions of HB 497. On December 4, 2014, the Court entered a judgment per the parties' proposed final agreement and dismissed the remaining claims without prejudice. The parties settled on attorney fees and costs and the case closed."}
{"article": "On November 14, 2018, Migrant Justice, Inc. and four individual members of the organization filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), and the United States under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 and Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The plaintiffs, represented by the various public interest organizations including the ACLU of Vermont, Center for Constitutional Rights, the National Immigration Law Center, as well as private counsel, sought injunctive, monetary, and declaratory relief, claiming violations of the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Equal Protection Clause, as well as federal tort claims, including Invasion of Privacy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and False Imprisonment. The plaintiffs, organizers and advocates for immigrant farmworkers, alleged that ICE has retaliated against them in response to their advocacy and public criticism, thereby chilling their speech and interfering with their freedom of association. As a result, Migrant Justice claimed that it had to take extensive and costly precautions, limiting its overall reach to the community. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that ICE has infiltrated their meetings; targeted, surveilled, and engaged in disinformation campaigns to sow distrust among their members; and arrested and/or detained twenty active Migrant Justice members pursuant to an unlawful retaliatory policy. The plaintiffs further alleged that DMV employees consistently share personally identifying information about plaintiffs with ICE in a manner that disproportionately targets and impacts non-white and Latinx residents. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 7, 2019, removing one member of the organization as a plaintiff. There were no other substantive changes made to the complaint. On January 21, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice as to Wanda Minoli, the Commissioner of the Vermont DMV after entering into a settlement. The DMV agreed to not share immigration or citizenship information with ICE, DHS, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and to implement new protocols to protect against such disclosures, including training for its law enforcement employees, counter staff, and managers. The settlement also included improvements to the DMV's language access services. The DMV agreed to 18 months of auditing and $100,000 in attorneys' fees: $20,000 would go to the plaintiffs and $80,000 would be set aside for the DMV's costs in complying with the settlement. On October 28, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice after entering into a settlement with the remaining defendants. The U.S. agreed to pay $100,000 in damages. ICE granted the plaintiffs deferred action for five years (stopping their potential deportations), and said it would not use any information gathered during this lawsuit, deferred action requests, or employment authorization applications against the plaintiffs in any future immigration proceedings. ICE also promised to tell its agents that immigrants, regardless of immigration status, are protected by the First Amendment and have the right to freedom of speech and assembly. This included sending a memo to its Vermont employees to explain that they must act in accordance with the First Amendment, including its commitment to not profile, target on account of, or discriminate against any individual or group for exercising First Amendment rights.\" The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2018, Migrant Justice and four individual members of the organization filed this complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont. Plaintiffs alleged that the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) implemented retaliatory policies in response to their activism on behalf of immigrant farm workers, including extensive surveillance and false imprisonment, in violation of their First Amendment Rights and that the Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) aided these practices by consistently and intentionally sharing personally identifying information about the plaintiffs with ICE in a manner that violated their Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights. On January 21, 2020, the plaintiffs and the DMV settled, and the DMV agreed to implement new protocols to protect against disclosing immigration and citizenship information with ICE. The plaintiffs then settled with the remaining defendants on October 28, 2020. The settlement agreement included $100,000 in damages, deferred action for the plaintiffs so they would not be deported, and ICE informing its employees that all immigrants are protected by the First Amendment."}
{"article": "On July 31, 2018, two nonprofit organizations and fifteen individuals filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, challenging the Trump Administration's implementation of the waiver provision of the Travel Ban (Presidential Proclamation No. 9645). The Travel Ban indefinitely banned millions of nationals of five Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States. Pars Equality Center and OneAmerica are immigrant and refugee advocacy organizations, and the individual plaintiffs are U.S. citizens, foreign nationals lawfully present in the U.S., and individuals abroad who were been affected by the Travel Ban and the implementation of its waiver provision. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, alleging that the waiver process under the Travel Ban was being implemented in an unduly restrictive manner, violating the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs\u2014represented by private counsel, Asian Americans Advancing Justice, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the National Immigration Law Center, and the International Refugee Assistance Project\u2014sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. Specifically, the plaintiffs requested that the waiver provision be enjoined, that any agency guidance and policies implementing that provision be vacated and remanded to the agencies, and that the agencies be directed to issue new guidance in conformance with the APA, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Constitution. Furthermore, the plaintiffs sought to define the class as: \"Individuals in the United States with an approved petition to be reunited with family members who are (i) a national of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, or Yemen, (ii) subject to the Proclamation, and (iii) currently awaiting a decision on a waiver or have been denied a waiver; Nationals of the Designated Countries who are lawfully present in the United States who, but for the uncertainty created by the Proclamation and Defendants\u2019 implementation of the waiver provision, wish to travel abroad and return to the United States; and Individuals who have applied for a visa who are (i) nationals of the Designated Countries, (ii) subject to the Proclamation, and (iii) currently awaiting a decision on a waiver or have been denied a waiver.\" The case was assigned to Judge Benjamin H. Settle. On August 1, 2018, the plaintiffs notified the court of a related class-action case, <i>Doe v. Trump</i>, challenging the Travel Ban (<a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15635\">IM-WA-0030</a> in this Clearinghouse). The present case was reassigned to Judge James L. Robart, the same judge assigned to <i>Doe v. Trump</i>. On September 6, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to transfer this case, but the defendants disagreed with the plaintiffs about the relation of this case to <i>Doe v. Trump</i>. Instead, the defendants argued that this case should either be stayed or transferred to the Northern District of California, where another class-action case, <i>Emami, et al. v. Nielsen, et al.</i> was pending (<a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17045\">IM-CA-0140</a> in this Clearinghouse). On December 12, 2018, the court granted the defendants' motion to transfer this case to the Northern District of California. 2018 WL 6523135. The case was transferred and given a new docket number, 3:18-cv-07818. Judge James Donato was assigned to the case. On February 20, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to either consolidate this case with the <i>Emami</i> case or stay this case pending the outcome of the proceedings in <i>Emami</i> to avoid duplicative litigation. The plaintiffs opposed the defendants' proposed complete merger of this case with <i>Emami</i>, arguing that such a merger would unnecessarily delay these proceedings further and deprive this case of its independent character. The court heard oral argument on April 11, 2019, and decided to allow both cases to proceed, with the understanding that the parties would have to communicate so as to prevent any duplicative actions. The parties then proceeded with discovery. On June 13, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim; and, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. The court denied the motion to dismiss for the APA claim and granted the motion to dismiss for the Fifth Amendment claim on June 5, 2020. The court also denied summary judgment. For the Fifth Amendment claim, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to \"allege a deprivation of an interest protected by the Due Process Clause.\" Subsequently, discovery continued. After the Trump Administration concluded, President Biden revoked the Travel Ban and ordered that visa applications resume processing on January 20, 2021 (Presidential Proclamation No. 10141). The Secretary of State was also given 45 days to provide a report detailing the number of visa applicants being considered for a waiver when Trump signed the Travel Ban, a proposal for \"expeditiously adjudicating\" their pending visa applications, reconsideration of denied applications, and a way to ensure that cases of reapplicants are not prejudiced as a result of a previous visa denial. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On July 31, 2018, two non-profit organizations and fifteen individuals filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs challenged the Trump Administration's implementation of the waiver provision of the Travel Ban (Presidential Proclamation No. 9645), alleging that it violates the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment. The case was transferred to the Northern District of California. After the Trump Administration concluded, President Biden revoked the Travel Ban and ordered that visa applications resume processing on January 20, 2021. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: In this case filed on March 16, 2020 by nine particularly vulnerable immigration detainees, the court declined to grant preliminary relief. It held that ongoing detention was not unlawfully punitive notwithstanding the threat posed by congregate detention during the coronavirus pandemic and found that the immigration facility was taking adequate measures to stop the spread of COVID-19. The court has not yet resolved the case on the merits.<hr> On March 16, 2020, nine persons held in civil detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at the Northwest Detention Center (NWDC) in Tacoma, WA who, because their age or underlying medical conditions, were particularly susceptible to a serious COVID-19 infection filed this habeas petition and complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Represented by the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, the ACLU National Prison Project, and the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project, the plaintiffs sued ICE, two of its directors, and the warden of the Tacoma detention center. The plaintiffs alleged that harm posed to them by continued detention during the COVID-19 pandemic violated their right to substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment. They sought a writ of habeas corpus ordering their immediate release or, in the alternative, injunctive relief ordering ICE to release them. The plaintiffs also sought attorney\u2019s fees, costs, and declaratory relief that \"continued detention in civil immigration custody of individuals at increased risk for severe illness, including all people over fifty years old and persons of any age with underlying medical conditions that may increase the risk of serious COVID-19, violates the Due Process Clause.\" The case was assigned to Judge James L. Robart and Magistrate Judge Mary Alice Theiler. The Northwest Detention Center is located in the Seattle metropolitan area, which experienced the first and, as of March 17, 2020, largest COVID-19 outbreak in the United States. In response, public health measures throughout the area emphasized and enforced social distancing. However, immigration detention facilities are \u201ccongregate environments,\u201d or places where people live and sleep in close proximity and, thus, cannot practice social distancing. Given the crowding and lack of adequate medical infrastructure, if COVID-19 were introduced into the detention center, it would spread easily. The spread of COVID-19 (for which there was no vaccine, known treatment, or cure) would be especially dangerous for detainees over the age of 50 or those with certain underlying health conditions such as lung, heart, and kidney disease. The complaint included recommendations from public health experts that these high-risk individuals be released from detention for their own safety. The plaintiffs asserted that the Fifth Amendment guarantees that civil detainees, including immigrant detainees, may not be subjected to punishment, and that this right is violated when civil detainees are subjected to \"conditions of confinement that amount to punishment or [the federal government] does not ensure those detainees\u2019 safety and health.\" The plaintiffs contended that by continuing to detain high-risk individuals, the defendants subjected them to conditions that amounted to punishment and that failed to ensure their safety and health. The plaintiffs further claimed that continued detention with the possibility of a COVID-19 outbreak in the facility subjected the plaintiffs to a substantial risk of serious harm, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Lastly, the plaintiffs argued that ICE has the authority to exercise discretion in releasing vulnerable civil immigrant detainees like the plaintiffs. Immediately, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) for their immediate release. Three days later, on March 19, Judge Robart issued an order denying the plaintiffs' motion for a TRO. Judge Robart concluded that the continued detention of these vulnerable plaintiffs amidst an outbreak of COVID-19 in the surrounding area did not amount to punishment. Judge Robart found that the conditions did not amount to punishment because there were no allegations of \"express intent\" to punish plaintiffs and because continued detention of plaintiffs was not excessive relative to the government's objective of \"preventing detained aliens from absconding and ensuring that they appear for removal proceedings.\" Furthermore, Judge Robart decided that, because the plaintiffs only alleged the \"possibility of harm,\" not that an outbreak of COVID-19 actually existed at NWDC, plaintiffs did not show that irreparable harm was likely in the absence of an injunction. In a footnote, Judge Robart stated that \"the court is mindful of the gravity and rapidly changing nature of the COVID-19 pandemic. The court emphasizes that this order is based on and extends no further than the narrow set of facts, arguments, and requested relief presently before the court.\" 447 F. Supp. 3d 1047. The defendants' filing opposing entry of a TRO had argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court declined to rule on this in the March 19 order because the plaintiffs had not had an opportunity to respond. On March 20, the court ordered the plaintiffs to respond and explain why this case should not be dismissed for lack of standing. On March 24, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for a TRO premised on developments in how courts were responding to the possibility of a COVID-19 outbreak in immigration detention facilities. The plaintiffs cited to a Ninth Circuit decision \"releasing an individual from immigration detention '[i]n light of the rapidly escalating public health crisis, which public health authorities predict will especially impact immigration detention centers'\" (<a href=\"https://www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/aclu_socal_robles_20200330_tro.pdf\"><i>Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr</i></a>). The plaintiffs also referenced \"other federal court orders releasing individuals 'on bail or delay[ing] their imprisonment in light of the COVID-19 crisis'\" and the fact that individuals have tested positive for COVID-19 at other immigration detention facilities in the United States. In response, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' continued detention was not \"an excessive condition in relation to the legitimate objective of immigration detention.\" Defendants asserted that, at the time of filing, there were no confirmed cases of COVID-19, overcrowding was not an issue, and that ICE had \"implemented robust procedures and protocols to protect the detainees.\" The defendants also filed a notice of supplemental authority, citing cases in which courts in this district denied motions for TROs to release immigration detainees on Fifth Amendment grounds. On April 8, Judge Robart denied the plaintiffs' second motion for a TRO. First, Judge Robart found that the plaintiffs had standing, as they sufficiently alleged a concrete injury in the form of unsafe conditions, these conditions were traceable to defendants, and this injury was likely to be redressed by their release. Judge Robart also found that the court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion via a habeas petition. But Judge Robart concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits because there had not yet been a confirmed case of COVID-19 at the NWDC and because defendants submitted \"evidence that they are taking substantial measures at this moment to prevent an outbreak of COVID-19 at the NWDC and contain an outbreak should one occur.\" Judge Robart further stated that \"it would be improper for this court to rely on conditions at other detention facilities to conclude that the conditions at the NWDC represent a Fifth Amendment violation.\" Judge Robart also concluded that plaintiffs did not meet their burden of showing that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction: \"the court cannot conclude either that the spread of COVID-19 inside the NWDC is inevitable, or that Respondents will be unable to contain it if it occurs.\" Judge Robart also ordered defendants to inform the plaintiffs and the court \"within at least 24 hours after learning that any individual physically present at the NWDC tests positive for or is otherwise diagnosed with COVID-19.\" 2020 WL 1704324. The next day, Magistrate Judge Theiler issued an order for defendants to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted by April 30. Defendants were also ordered to file a status update with the court if the custody status of any plaintiff changed. On April 30, defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a memorandum showing why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. The Clearinghouse does not have access to many of the key documents filed during the summer and fall of 2020 because the documents are restricted on PACER. According to the docket:<ul><li>The defendants filed numerous notices in response to the court's April 8 decision (often several per week) and implemented a new COVID-19 testing protocol on June 8.</li><li>Magistrate Judge Theiler filed a report and recommendation on August 17.</li><li>The plaintiffs filed objections to the Magistrate's report on August 31, to which ICE responded on September 14.</li></ul>The court has not acted on the Magistrate's report as of November 16, 2020. Because the Clearinghouse does not currently have access to many recently filed documents, the status of the plaintiffs' conditions and COVID-19 spread in the NWDC are unclear. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In March 2020, during the outbreak of COVID-19 in the Seattle area, persons critically vulnerable to the disease and held in an immigration detention facility near Seattle filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs sued ICE and its directors for violation of their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs argued that continued detention in the face of a potential outbreak in the detention facility would expose the plaintiffs to substantial harm and amount to punishment in violation of the Due Process Clause. On March 19, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order seeking immediate release. The court also denied the plaintiffs' second motion for a temporary restraining order on April 8. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on April 30, which the court has not yet resolved. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On February 12, 2007, an arrestee, represented by private attorney Mark E. Merin, filed a 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in order to challenge the County Sheriff's policies and practices concerning the use of strip and visual body cavity searches in Santa Cruz County Jail. Plaintiff, who was arrested on outstanding warrants for vehicle code violations, alleged that officers routinely subjected detainees in their custody to strip and visual body cavity searches before they were arraigned and without having any reasonable suspicion that the detainees possessed contraband or weapons. He alleged that such practices violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as California state law. To remedy the alleged violations, Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and class certification. On July 2, 2008, the parties filed a settlement agreement. Under the terms of the settlement, the defendants agree to pay $3,875,000 in damages to a class of parties who had been wrongfully strip-searched by the defendants. Members of the plaintiff class would receive $1,250 if they had been wrongfully searched when booked for a misdemeanor, and they would receive $750 if they had been wrongfully searched when booked for a felony. They would receive an additional $500 if they were under 21 or over 60, had a physical or mental disability, or were pregnant at the time of the search. The settlement also covered attorneys fees and administrative costs of the settlement. On January 28, 2009, the district court (Judge Jeremy Fogel) issued a final approval of the settlement and dismissed the case.", "summary": "This class-action case was brought challenging the Santa Cruz County Jail's practice of strip searching individuals held in the jail. The case settled and was dismissed."}
{"article": "On February 8, 2005, private attorney Mark E. Merin filed a class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging the policies, practices, and customs concerning the use of strip searches and visual body cavity searches in the Humboldt County Jail. The named plaintiff, who was a female citizen arrested for a DWI, alleged that she was forced to strip naked, such that she was nude from the waist up in the presence of male officers not involved in her search. The search was videotaped. Plaintiff alleged that her treatment was the result of the official Humboldt County Jail policy, in which officers routinely subjected detainees in their custody to strip and visual body cavity searches before they were arraigned and without having any reasonable suspicion that the detainees possessed contraband or weapons, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and California state law. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages and class certification. After the parties engaged in discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment. The District Court (Saundra Brown Armstrong) found that plaintiff failed to present any evidence of similar complaints, which negated that a custom or practice of improper searches existed at the Jail. As such, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the County of Humboldt and its Sheriff on plaintiff's municipal liability claim. Spellman v. Humboldt County, 2006 WL 1626922 (N.D.Cal. Jun 09, 2006) Plaintiff appealed. While the case was on appeal, plaintiff refiled the case, individually naming the deputy sheriff that conducted the strip search as a defendant. That new case, which was filed on June 27, 2006, had the new case number 3:06-cv-03956-MHP and was assigned to District Judge Marilyn H. Patel. About three months later, the parties settled the matter. They filed a joint memorandum of voluntarily dismissal dated October 16, 2006, advising the Court that the parties mutually resolved their differences. Plaintiff also voluntarily dismissed the appeal of the 2005 case. The terms of the settlement were not made part of the Court record.", "summary": "A female arrestee filed this strip search case against the Humboldt County Jail and various officials challenging the jail's mandatory, blanket strip search policy. The court found no pattern or practice. The Plaintiff refiled, naming the deputy sheriff who conducted (and videotaped) the search, and the case was settled. We have no further information about this case."}
{"article": "On April 16, 2007, Plaintiff, represented by private attorney Mark E. Merin, filed a 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California in order to challenge the Sheriff's policies and practices concerning the use of strip and visual body cavity searches in Solano County Jail. Plaintiff, who was arrested on minor criminal charges, complained that he was subsequently strip searched in a group with ten other persons pursuant to a policy under which officers routinely subjected custodial detainees to strip and visual body cavity searches prior to arraignment and in the absence of any reasonable suspicion that the detainees possessed contraband or weapons. Plaintiff claimed that such a policy violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as California state law. To remedy the alleged violations, Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and class certification. On July 29, 2008, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint to add four new plaintiffs. The hearing and motions regarding class certification were then repeatedly pushed back as the parties continued discovery and settlement negotiations. On September 25, 2009, the parties presented their settlement to the court. The settlement was approved 4 days later. Parties agreed that class certification was inappropriate because defendants had revised their policy on November 20, 2003 and again in 2007 to comply with federal law. To remedy the individual violations that had occurred in spite of the policy revisions, the defendants agreed to pay $12,500 to each plaintiff, $100,000 in attorney fees, and $750-$1000 to each person who contacted plaintiff's attorney alleging that they fell within the allegations in the complaint. The defendants paid a total of $210,000, and on September 29, 2009, the case was dismissed with prejudice.", "summary": "On April 16, 2007, Plaintiff, represented by private attorney Mark E. Merin, filed a 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California challenging the Solano County Sheriff's policies and practices concerning the use of strip and visual body cavity searches in Solano County Jail. Plaintiff alleged that such searches, conducted in the absence of any reasonable suspicion of contraband or weapons, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In September 2009, two years after the defendants revised their search policies to comply with federal law, the parties settled with the defendant paying $110,000 in damages and $100,000 in attorney fees."}
{"article": "On December 13, 2011, four inmates of the Fresno County Adult Detention Facilities filed a class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the Fresno County Sheriff's Office under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. 2011 WL 11557976. The plaintiffs, represented by the Prison Law Office, Disability Rights California, and private counsel, sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant violated prisoners' Constitutional rights by failing to provide minimally adequate health care and failing to protect prisoners from injury and violence from other prisoners. The case was assigned to Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill and Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. On January 25, 2012, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add three individual plaintiffs to the suit, and brought additional claims against the defendants under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiffs also expanded the scope of the injunctive relief requested, seeking the compulsion of reasonable accommodations to prisoners with disabilities. The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint due to failure to state a claim for which the court could provide a remedy. Judge O'Neill denied this motion on May 16, 2012, finding that the plaintiffs' complaint had sufficiently pleaded their claims. 2012 WL 1799179. The parties stipulated to and the Court ordered the substitution of the individual defendants with the county of Fresno on November 16, 2012. This stipulation also dismissed the claims of three of the named plaintiffs, without prejudice. On May 28, 2015, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of the consent decree they had drafted. The parties agreed to an extensive remedial plan to be implemented by the defendants covering all of the substantive areas in dispute: health care, personal safety, and disability discrimination. The plaintiffs' counsel agreed to be responsible for monitoring compliance with the consent decree and the remedial plan. The decree was court enforceable, and the parties agreed it would last for four years after its approval -- unless the court earlier determined that the defendants were in substantial compliance, or it was extended based on non-compliance. The defendant also agreed to pay the plaintiffs' counsel $900,000 in attorneys' fees and $40,000 per year for monitoring fees and expenses. On July 21, 2015, Judge O'Neill preliminarily approved the settlement, setting it for a fairness hearing at the end of September. That hearing was held before Magistrate Judge McAuliffe on September 28, 2015; on October 7, 2015, she recommended approval of the decree without amendment. 2015 WL 5916741. On November 2, 2015, Judge O'Neill adopted Magistrate Judge McAuliffe's recommendations in full, granted final approval to the consent decree, granted certification of the settlement class, approved attorneys' fees for class counsel, and retained jurisdiction for monitoring of the consent decree. The class was defined as \"all prisoners who are now, or at some time in the future during the terms of this Consent Decree are, incarcerated in the Fresno County Jail.\" On December 11, 2015, Magistrate Judge McAuliffe denied a motion to unseal court records filed by a non-party to this action and sought support for a separate civil rights action against the Fresno County Jail. 2015 WL 13236882. She found that compelling reasons to keep them sealed, such as potential prejudice to the defendants if expert reports were unsealed, outweighed any minimal prejudice to the non-party. On February 1, 2016, she denied the non-party's motion for reconsideration. 2016 WL 374550. On February 12, 2016, the non-party sought a writ of mandamus from the Ninth Circuit, which was denied on April 4, 2016. On February 11, 2016, Judge O'Neill granted the parties' joint request for appointment of a court expert to complete a comprehensive review of the facilities and report on the County's progress regarding the remedial plan. A second expert was appointed on April 11, 2016. On October 3, 2018, Judge O'Neill granted additional attorneys' fees to plaintiffs's counsel to compensate their monitoring work which had become more intensive than previously anticipated. As of May 20, 2020, there has been no further action in the docket but presumedly the case remains open for monitoring of the consent decree.", "summary": "In 2011, several inmates of the Fresno County Adult Detention Facilities filed a lawsuit against the County of Fresno, California, alleging that it violated prisoners' Constitutional rights by maintaining dangerous facilities and failing to provide basic health care. In 2015, the parties settled the case. The defendants agreed to implement a remedial plan and to pay $900,000 in attorneys' fees and $40,000 per year for monitoring fees and expenses."}
{"article": "On March 4, 1993, prisoners at the Merced County Jail filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the County of Merced. Plaintiffs, represented by the Prisoner Rights Union and by private counsel, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging violations of their constitutional rights. Among other issues, plaintiffs challenged the overcrowding of the jail and their lack of access to a law library. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On March 25, the Court (Judge Garland E. Burrell) granted a lodged stipulation by the parties and ordered the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the content of which is unclear from the docket. On April 16, 1993, again following a stipulation by the parties, the Court (Judge Burrell) issued an injunction which granted the following relief: (1) the County was enjoined from bedding prisoners on the floor, (2) the maximum bed capacity at the mail jail was set at 182, (3) the addition of more beds was prohibited, (4) the sheriff was authorized to release prisoners if the jail system came within ten percent of being filled and to refuse additional prisoners if the jail was filled. The parties also stipulated that the class should be certified, and on June 30, 1993, the Court (Judge Burrell) issued an order granting certification. A settlement was preliminarily approved, and a hearing on its fairness, reasonableness and adequacy was scheduled for September 14, 1994, but there is no indication on the docket that the settlement ever received final approval. On February 9, 2000, after issuing an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed and receiving no reply, the Court (Magistrate Judge Gregory G. Hollows) dismissed the case.", "summary": "This is a class action suit brought in 1993 by prisoners at the Merced County Jail to challenge their conditions of confinement. The District Court for the Eastern District of California issued some initial injunctive relief to prevent overcrowding, and a settlement was preliminarily approved but seemingly never finalized. The case was dismissed in 2000."}
{"article": "On June 10, 2011, the plaintiffs--family members of the decedent--filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District for the Northern District of California. The decedent, a father to one of the plaintiffs, had been beaten and killed by several deputy sheriffs in Santa Rita Jail after he made a mess in his cell after being denied medical treatment for alcohol withdrawal. The plaintiffs sued Alameda Country as well as Corizon Health, Inc., the corporation responsible for providing medical treatment to the inmates of Alameda County under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief. Their complaint alleged that Alameda County had violated the decedent\u2019s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment as well as his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure; the complaint also included state law claims. On June 16, 2011, the case was assigned to Judge Claudia Wilken. Later, on Feb 12, 2013, the case would be assigned to Judge Jon S. Tigar. On November 19, 2012, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The parties began settlement negotiations, and on December 18, 2012, the defendant Corizon Health filed a motion to dismiss. On April 18, 2013, Judge Tigar denied this motion, finding that the plaintiffs had stated valid claims against Corizon Health. On August 30, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a notice of settlement. In November 2013, the defendants filed three separate motions for summary judgment or in the alternative, partial summary judgment. On April 11, 2014, Judge Tigar granted in part and denied in part the defendants\u2019 motions for summary judgment. The court ruled in the defendants\u2019 favor for all claims except the claim of assault and battery. On January 5, 2015, Judge Tigar referred the case to Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler for a mandatory settlement conference. The following month, the parties reached a settlement agreement and filed two stipulations with the court. One offered a proposed order of settlement. The other dismissed with prejudice all claims against the defendants pursuant to the settlement agreement. On February 27, 2015, the court granted both. The settlement agreement consisted of monetary relief in the amount of $8,300,000 and injunctive relief. The injunctive relief required Corizon Health to provide nurses for conducting patient assessments of all inmates in Alameda County. The settlement also required Alameda County to provide health training for the Alameda County Sheriff\u2019s Office as well as to provide documentation of the training processes. The injunctive relief is to last for four years and the court will retain jurisdiction over the settlement. Later that year, an individual with a similar case filed a motion to intervene in order to gain access to a deposition transcript from the present case. On January 21, 2016, Judge Tigar granted the motion to intervene. The injunctive relief was set to end February 1, 2019. Presumably, the settlement lapsed and this case is now closed.", "summary": "This 2011 lawsuit alleged that Alameda County had violated the decedent's constitutional rights in its agents' use of excessive force. The suit further alleged that Corizon Health, Inc. was negligent in its failure to provide decedent with treatment for alcohol withdrawal. In February, 2015, the parties settled for $8,300,000 in damages and injunctive relief that included health training. The injunctive relief is set to end February 1, 2019, and little activity had appeared on the docket since 2016."}
{"article": "On November 14, 2016, five prisoners in the Santa Clara County Jail system with mobility disabilities filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the County of Santa Clara under the American with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by Disability Rights Advocates and Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld, sought declaratory relief that the County had violated their rights and injunctive relief prohibiting further violations. The plaintiffs claimed that the Santa Clara County Jail system did not provide adequate facilities for people with mobility disabilities. Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that they were kept in restrictive medical units which prevented them from using jail facilities and common areas, were denied access to educational, religious, and rehabilitative programming due to their disabilities, were often denied access to devices intended to increase their mobility (including wheelchairs and canes), and did not have access to a functional grievance system to report any of these circumstances. On April 13, 2017, the case was referred to mediation. From August 17, 2017 to May 31, 2018, Magistrate Judge Nathaniel M. Cousins presided over nine settlement conferences. The parties' joint motion for class certification was approved by Judge Lucy H. Koh on February 6, 2018. The class of plaintiffs was defined as \u201c[a]ll individuals with mobility disabilities who are now, or will be in the future, incarcerated in the Santa Clara County Jails, which consist of three facilities: (1) the Santa Clara County Main Jail Complex (\u201cMain Jail\u201d), consisting of Main Jail North and Main Jail South, in San Jose, California; (2) facilities for male inmates at the Elmwood Correctional Complex in Milpitas, California (\u201cElmwood\u201d); and (3) the Elmwood Complex Women\u2019s Facility in Milpitas, California.\u201d Following class certification, the parties jointly moved for a preliminary class settlement on November 13, 2018. The preliminary settlement was approved by Judge Koh, and a joint motion for approval of a final settlement was made on January 14, 2019. The court granted approval on March 21, 2019. The settlement consisted of a consent decree that required Santa Clara County to make physical improvements to the jail system so that the jails would be accessible to inmates with mobility disabilities. The consent decree also directed Santa Clara County to incorporate features into a new jail, then under construction, so that the facility would be accessible when it was completed. The decree was administered by monitors who were to be chosen after the settlement was approved. The decree extends until one year after the completion of the new facility. The consent decree also provided for an attorney fee award for work performed prior to the consent decree, as well as work performed in the future until the expiration of the decree. Because the new jail is still under construction, this case is still ongoing.", "summary": "In 2016, prisoners in the Santa Clara County Jail System filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Plaintiffs alleged that the jail facilities were not accessible to inmates with mobility disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and state law. In 2019, the parties jointly settled the case under a consent decree which would force Santa Clara County to make its jails accessible. The case is ongoing"}
{"article": "On December 31, 2018, three female pretrial detainees housed at the Santa Rita Jail in Alameda County filed this class action lawsuit on behalf of a class of all women who were, or will be in the future, incarcerated in the Alameda County Jails, in the U.S. District Court in the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued Alameda County and the Alameda County Sheriff\u2019s Office under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 for violations of their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and state law. They claimed denial of basic human rights, cruel and unusual punishment, and intentional infliction of emotional stress due to the jail\u2019s practice of interrupting the sleep of the plaintiffs. Represented by a private counsel, they sought monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief. The case was assigned to Judge James Donato. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the jail had a policy of keeping lights on at all times and scheduling meals and activities designed to prevent inmates from sleeping for more than five and a half hours per night. The plaintiffs also contended that, in addition to the 24-hour light-on policy, the jail routinely engaged in actions that disrupt the inmates\u2019 sleep, such as repeatedly shining bright white flashlights into prisoners\u2019 eyes, banging keys and flashlights on metal doors, operating machines, and making announcements over the public address system. On January 31, the court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 <i>ex parte</i> motion for a temporary restraining order, but granted a preliminary injunction on March 27, 2019. In the order granting preliminary injunction, the court instructed the parties to jointly submit a proposal for a detailed version of the preliminary injunction that would meet the health needs of the prisoners while still satisfying the administrative requirements of the jail. The plaintiffs submitted a proposal, and the jail attempted to re-litigate the issuance of the injunction. The court adopted the plaintiffs\u2019 proposed injunction on April 22, 2019. 377 F. Supp. 3d 1027. On June 27, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for certification of a class on the question of whether the county\u2019s \u201cpolicies and practices depriving and disrupting women prisoners\u2019 sleep violates plaintiffs\u2019 and class member\u2019s constitutional rights.\u201d The court terminated that motion without prejudice on March 24, 2020. In September 2019, the parties jointly requested that the case be referred to a magistrate judge for settlement discussions. As of July 2020, settlement negotiations are in progress.", "summary": "In 2018, female prisoners at the Santa Rita Jail filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants\u2019 policy of keeping the lights on for 24 hours and other conduct that disrupt the inmates\u2019 sleep violated their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by denying the basic human right to sleep and serving as a cruel and unusual punishment. As of July 2020, settlement negotiations are in progress."}
{"article": "On November 11, 2019, prisoners at Santa Rita Jail in Dublin, California, filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the Alameda County Sheriff\u2019s Office, the California Forensic Medical Group and Aramark Correctional Services under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983, and 1988. Two private Bay Area civil rights lawyers represented the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claimed that defendants deprived plaintiffs of the rights to free speech and free association, to their right to the presumption of innocence, the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and the right to protection and due process under the law, in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that Santa Rita\u2019s unsanitary confinement conditions, wrongful denials of attorney visits, failure to provide medical care, and retaliation against inmates for speaking out and filing grievances violated these constitutional rights. In particular, this suit was filed less than one month after a sizable prisoner\u2019s strike on October 17, 2019, in Santa Rita Jail protesting these conditions. Plaintiffs sought injunctive, declaratory compensatory, and punitive relief. Plaintiffs sought class certification for all men incarcerated at Santa Rita Jail from November 12, 2017, through the present. Plaintiffs alleged that over 2,000 inmates were denied access to adequate food and conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment as well as violation of their First Amendment free speech and Fifth Amendment due process rights. Plaintiffs alleged that Alameda County Sheriff\u2019s Office, in conjunction with for-profit medical provider California Forensic Medical Group and for-profit food provider ARAMARK have established inhumane living conditions at Santa Rita Jail. These conditions included presence of human bio waste and infestations of insects in the bathrooms, infestation of rat and bird droppings in food, lack of clean linens and toiletries, denial of outdoor recreational time, and grossly inadequate medical care. Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendants violated state regulations permitting regular visits and grievance procedures for prisoners. As of February 9, 2020, the case is ongoing.", "summary": "On November 11, 2019 prisoners at Santa Rita Jail in Dublin, California filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the Alameda County Sheriff\u2019s Office, the California Forensic Medical Group and Aramark Correctional Services under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981, 1983, and 1988. The plaintiffs claimed that defendants acted in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that Santa Rita\u2019s unsanitary confinement conditions, wrongful denials of attorney visits, failure to provide medical care, and retaliation against inmates for speaking out and filing grievances violated these constitutional rights. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On January 4, 2018, six women prisoners filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California alleging systematic, misogynistic mistreatment of women prisoners at the Alameda County Jail in Santa Rita, California. The plaintiffs sued Alameda County and the Alameda County Sheriff\u2019s Office under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 for violations of their rights under the U.S. Constitution and state law. Represented by private counsel, they sought monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief. Specifically, the complaint alleges that pregnant women prisoners were denied medical attention and other accommodations including weather-appropriate clothing, nutritious food, feminine hygiene products, and fresh air. The specific conduct targeted toward pregnant women took place within an environment marked by general hostility toward women prisoners and indifference to women\u2019s medical and hygienic needs. Further, the complaint alleged that the Alameda County Jail systematically discriminated against the women prisoners, compared to men prisoners, in access to reasonable facilities and services. In the complaint, the women prisoners sought recognition of class certification consisting of a main class of women prisoners with a sub-class of pregnant prisoners. The plaintiffs claimed that the conduct of the Alameda County Jail staff violated women prisoners\u2019 rights protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. On the same day that the initial complaint was filed, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent further harm to the pregnant plaintiffs. The women prisoners also sought relief in the form of compensatory and punitive damages and attorneys\u2019 fees for the litigation. The case proceeded before Judge James Donato. On April 12, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. The plaintiffs elaborated on the allegations in the original complaint of the mistreatment against pregnant women prisoners and discrimination against women prisoners in general. The second amended complaint also added additional causes of action under California state law. The second amended complaint delineated the named plaintiffs into various groups: current women prisoners, women who were formerly imprisoned, pregnant prisoners currently in custody, and formerly pregnant prisoners who suffered a miscarriage due to mistreatment while in custody. The complaint also identified additional named defendants beyond the Alameda County Sheriff\u2019s Office and individuals employed therein, including the California Forensic Medical Group, retained to provide medical services to prisoners and Aramark Correctional Services, a for-profit food services provider at the Jail. The amended complaint also amended the relief sought by the women prisoners. The plaintiffs requested that the court certify the plaintiff class of women prisoners and the subclass of pregnant women prisoners, and that the court issue emergency remedy, by decree, to ensure that the women prisoners receive the medical care and other accommodations they needed to be safe while in custody at the Alameda County Jail. Finally, in addition to the injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages requested in the original complaint, the plaintiffs requested that the court affirmatively direct the defendants to fully comply with all state statutes and regulations regarding medical treatment, nutrition, activities, and personal hygiene for women prisoners. On December 31, 2018, one named plaintiff moved to relate the case to <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17341\">Upshaw v. County of Alameda</a>. The parties began engaging in settlement negotiations and entered an agreement in principle on May 14, 2018. Settlement proceedings were heard by Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler. The parties initially agreed to resolve money damages and other substantive relief and the plaintiffs agreed to withdraw the motion for class certification. The parties held a number of settlement conferences between May 14, 2018 and December 12, 2019. On May 7, 2019, one named plaintiff moved to relate the case to Gonzalez v. Ahern. Though opposed by the defendants, on May 15, 2020, the court related this case to Gonzalez v. Ahern. For further information, refer to the Clearinghouse page, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17341\">available at this link</a>.", "summary": "On January 4, 2018, six women prisoners filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California alleging systematic, misogynistic mistreatment of women prisoners at the Alameda County Jail in Santa Rita, California. The plaintiffs sued Alameda County and the Alameda County Sheriff\u2019s Office under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 for violations of their rights under the U.S. Constitution and state law. On April 12, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. The plaintiffs elaborated on the allegations in the original complaint of the mistreatment against pregnant women prisoners and discrimination against women prisoners in general. The second amended complaint also added additional causes of action under California state law and identified additional named defendants beyond the Alameda County Sheriff\u2019s Office and individuals employed therein, including the California Forensic Medical Group, retained to provide medical services to prisoners and Aramark Correctional Services, a for-profit food services provider at the Jail. The plaintiffs requested that the court certify a plaintiff class of women prisoners and the subclass of pregnant women prisoners, and that the court issue emergency remedy, by decree, to ensure that the women prisoners receive the medical care and other accommodations they needed to be safe while in custody at the Alameda County Jail. Finally, in addition to the injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages requested in the original complaint, the plaintiffs requested that the court affirmatively direct the defendants to fully comply with all state statutes and regulations regarding medical treatment, nutrition, activities, and personal hygiene for women prisoners. The parties began engaging in settlement negotiations and entered an agreement in principle on May 14, 2018. On May 7, 2019, one named plaintiff moved to relate the case to Gonzalez v. Ahern. Though opposed by the defendants, on May 15, 2020, the court related this case to Gonzalez v. Ahern. For further information, refer to the Clearinghouse page, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17341\">available at this link</a>."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This putative class-action lawsuit, brought by inmates in Orange County Jail, argued that county and the sheriff violated the U.S. Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in failing to provide adequate care amidst the 2020 coronavirus pandemic. The court granted the motion for provisional class-certification and partially granted a temporary restraining order, but the defendants appealed and the Supreme Court stayed the injunctive relief while the appeals to the Ninth Circuit proceeded.<hr> This putative class-action lawsuit was filed on April 30, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The lawsuit was filed by several inmates in Orange County Jail. The suit arose out of the COVID-19 pandemic that swept the world in early 2020. As the virus raged throughout the country, it became particularly problematic in jails and prison systems. This lawsuit alleged that Orange County Jail's management of the virus was wholly inadequate and in violation of the U.S. Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The suit alleged that requisite social distancing was not possible due to the high density of inmates in the jail, that the masks were simply pieces of fabric (and were not always used by guards), and that isolation policies were ineffective. The plaintiffs were medically vulnerable inmates in Orange County Jail and they were represented by ACLU National, ACLU Fund of Southern California, and ACLU Disabilities Rights Program attorneys, the UC Irvine Civil Rights Litigation Clinic, and private counsel. They sued Orange County and the Sheriff of Orange County. The complaint alleged that defendants' failure to adequately mitigate the spread of COVID-19 in the jail system represented violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. They argued that the conditions represented an unconstitutional punishment and unconstitutional confinement in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees that the state provide for reasonable health and safety of inmates. As for the Eighth Amendment, they argued that the lack of precautions constituted deliberate indifference to the health of the inmates as to be cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiffs also argued that the failure to protect medically vulnerable inmates (particularly those with co-morbidities), constituted discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs sought class certification, a writ of habeas corpus to identify all members of a Medically-Vulnerable Subclass and Disability Subclass and grant them release, injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, permanent injunction, or habeas corpus that would mitigate the spread of COVID-19, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees and costs. On May 11, the plaintiffs submitted an application for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction and a motion for provisional class certification. On May 26, the court granted the motion for provisional class-certification and granted in part and denied in part the application for a temporary restraining order. The grant of provisional class status created two classes, a Pre-Trial Class and a Post-Conviction Class. Under each of those were Disability Subclasses and Medically-Vulnerable Subclasses. The partial grant of the TRO mandated defendants to follow CDC social distancing guidelines, expand testing, and enhance sanitation efforts in the jails. It did not grant release to any prisoners, though. 2020 WL 2754938. Defendants appealed this decision two days later and applied to stay the case pending a decision from the 9th Circuit (docket #: 20-55568). In both the district court and the 9th Circuit, the defendants filed emergency motions to stay the lower court decision, but the district court denied this motion on June 2. 2020 WL 4039073. The 9th Circuit then denied this motion on June 17. However, they remanded the case to the district court to gauge whether any changed circumstances might require alterations to the TRO. 2020 WL 3547960. The defendants then filed an ex parte application with the district court to dissolve the TRO, which the district court denied yet again in late June. The defendants tried to argue that the declining rate of COVID-19 in the Orange County Jail represented a significant enough change to warrant dissolution of the preliminary injunction. On July 1, the defendants appealed once more to the 9th Circuit (docket #: 20-55668). And, once again, the 9th Circuit denied the motion on July 3. Then on July 21, the defendants brought the case to the Supreme Court, submitting an emergency application for stay of injunctive relief. In a 5-4 decision, the Court granted the stay on August 5. There was no majority, opinion, but Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissent arguing that, even if the majority would have granted the stay at the district court, it was not so clearly wrong as to warrant granting certiorari. 2020 WL 4499350. On August 25, the plaintiffs filed motions to dismiss as moot each of the pending appeals in the 9th Circuit. They argued that the preliminary injunction had expired and therefore the appeals were moot. The defendants sought to continue litigating the appeals and alleged that without review by the appellate court, there was nothing to stop the district court from entering preliminary injunctions every 90 days throughout the life of the case. On October 15, 2020, the two appeals were consolidated. The case is ongoing and in discovery as of February 17, 2021.", "summary": "This putative class-action lawsuit, brought by inmates in Orange County Jail, argued that county and the sheriff violated the U.S. Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in failing to provide adequate care amidst the 2020 coronavirus pandemic. Plaintiffs sought habeas corpus, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees and costs. The district court granted class certification and partially granted a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which mandated more social distancing, providing for more PPE, and improved sanitation policies. The defendants appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit, and applied in both the district court and the Ninth Circuit to stay the case in the lower court until the appeals court had ruled. Both denied these applications, however the Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court saying that the defendants could try to modify the injunction if there were any changed circumstances. Defendants did so, but the district court denied any modifications once again. The defendants appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit, which likewise rejected the defendants' motion. Finally, the defendants went to the Supreme Court and asked them to stay the injunction while the Ninth Circuit heard the case on the merits. The Supreme Court obliged on August 5, staying the injunction. The case is ongoing as of February 17, 2021."}
{"article": "On February 23, 2006, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, plaintiffs filed this 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 class action suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs claimed that D.C. Jail officials violated their Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights in detaining them beyond their release dates and violated their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights for conducting blanket strip searches. The Barnes case followed a nearly identical class action lawsuit styled Bynum v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 02-956 (RCL), <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=5502\">JC-DC-0004</a> in this Clearinghouse. The Bynum case resulted in a $14 million settlement. The Barnes plaintiffs alleged that while the District agreed to stop its practices of overdetention and strip searches, and did so in the context of the Bynum settlement. The Final Approval Order in the Bynum case did not require that those practices stop. The Barnes plaintiffs alleged that despite the Bynum settlement, the unlawful practices of overdetention and strip searches had been reconstituted, such that injunctive relief was now necessary. The Barnes plaintiffs, who were represented by some of the same attorneys as in Bynum, sought damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. The District moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. That motion was denied on March 26, 2007, by the District Court (Judge Royce C. Lamberth). The Court certified an Overdetention Class and a Strip Search class, just as it had done in the Bynum case. On January 20, 2011, the plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint for individual money damages and class injunctive relief and jury demand. Following the close of liability discovery, the parties cross-motions for summary judgment were granted in part and denied in part. On June 24, 2011, the District Court (Judge Lamberth) ruled on both parties' summary judgment motions. Judge Lamberth granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on their claims related to the strip searches and on the District\u2019s liability for overdetentions from 2005 to 2006. Judge Lamberth granted the District summary judgment on its claims of overdetentions from 2008 to the present. 793 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D.D.C. 2011). Then, the plaintiffs asked for leave to file another amended complaint. The parties moved again for summary judgement. But on December 7, 2011, the District Court (Judge Lamberth) held that 1) the court would not grant the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint and that the court would not entertain further motions for summary judgment. Judge Lamberth also addressed additional discovery issues, how the issue of general damages would be tried, and that the class would be decertified to try the issue of special damages. 278 F.R.D. 14 (D.D.C. 2011). After Judge Lamberth had decertified the special damages class, the plaintiffs had moved to stay the decertification order and to make the stay of decertification order retroactive to date of that order. On February 19, 2013, the District Court (Judge Lamberth) stayed the decertification order was appropriate, but only as of when the plaintiffs\u2019 moved for the stay. Leading up to the trial, both parties filed various motions regarding discovery and evidence that the court addressed. In March 2013, there was a week-long jury trial. Afterward, the District moved for judgment as a matter of law, which was denied. But on March 11, the jury found that the plaintiffs were unconstitutionally overdetained at the D.C. Jail between 2007 and 2008, but that the District wasn't liable; the jury didn't find evidence of \"deliberate indifference\" to the inmates' rights. Because Judge Lamberth had already granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on claims related to the strip searches and on the city's liability for overdetentions from 2005 to 2006, the parties moved for the case to be referred to mediation and the litigation stayed. On November 4, 2013, the parties reached a settlement agreement, which the Court approved on March 18, 2014. The District agreed to provide monetary compensation for each plaintiff, based on the length of time they were \"overdetained\" and for qualifying strip searches. The District also agreed to pay a total of $6.2 million to the plaintiffs, the class members, and to cover costs and attorney's fees. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the agreement. As of February 2016, the District had filed two status reports with the court on the payments to the plaintiffs.", "summary": "In 2006, inmates in the D.C. Jail filed this 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 class action suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs claimed that D.C. Jail violated their Constitutional rights by detaining them beyond their release dates and conducting blanket strip searches. In 2014, after summary judgment rulings and a jury trial in 2013, the parties settled the case and D.C. agreed to pay the plaintiffs $6.2 million."}
{"article": "On December 2, 2002, nine female plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, filed this 42 U.S.C \u00a71983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs challenged the practice of the U.S. Marshal's Service and the District of Columbia of conducting blanket strip, visual body cavity, and/or squat searches (\"strip searches\") of female arrestees that were being held in the Superior Court Cell Block of the D.C. Superior Court while awaiting presentment before a judicial officer. Specifically, the plaintiffs complained that the policy and practice of subjecting all female arrestees to strip searches in the absence of reasonable individualized suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment. The plaintiffs further complained that the practice of subjecting female arrestees but not similarly situated male arrestees to blanket strip searches violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and class certification. The class action complaint was amended twice in 2006. Defendants denied all allegations and, on May 31, 2006, sought dismissal of the case on numerous grounds, including the defense of qualified immunity. On November 14, 2006, the District Court (Judge Rosemary M. Collyer) denied Defendants' motion to dismiss in its entirety. Johnson v. District of Columbia, 461 F.Supp.2d 48 (D.D.C. 2006). Defendants initially appealed, but the appeal was subsequently voluntarily dismissed. Johnson v. Government of District of Columbia, 2007 WL 1760078 (D.C.Cir. Jun 11, 2007). On February 8, 2008, the District Court granted the plaintiff's motions for class certification. The Court designated two groups of classes, the Fifth Amendment Class and the Fourth Amendment Class. The court defined the Fourth Amendment Class as, \"Each woman who, during the Class Period (December 2, 1999, until April 25, 2003), was, (i) held in the Superior Court Cell Block; (ii) awaiting presentment under a statute of the District of Columbia; (iii) subjected to a blanket strip, visual body cavity and/or squat search; (iv) under similar circumstances for which male arrestees were not subjected to a blanket strip, visual body cavity and/or squat search.\" The court defined the Fifth Amendment Class as, \"each woman who, during the Class Period (December 2, 1999, until April 25, 2003), was, (i) held in the Superior Court Cell Block; (ii) awaiting presentment under a statute of the District of Columbia on either (a) a non-drug, non-violent traffic offense, (b) a non-drug, non- violent misdemeanor, or (c) a non-drug, non-violent felony; and (iii) subjected to a blanket strip, visual body cavity and/or squat search; (iv) without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that she was concealing drugs, weapons or other contraband.\" In this opinion, the District Court also dismissed all charges against the United States Marshall's Service. On February 28, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a cross-claim against United States Superior Court Marshall Todd Dillard on the grounds that he caused them (separately and concurrently) to be subjected strip searches at the D.C. Superior Court cellblock in violation of the 4th and 5th amendments. And that by instituting and implementing a policy which subjected the plaintiffs, all women, to strip searches without individualized suspicion, the co-defendant is liable to the District for all, or part of the claims asserted by the plaintiff against the District of Columbia in this action, by virtue of his practice and policy. This crossclaim was partially in response to the District Court having previously dismissed the plaintiff's claims against the United States Marshall's Service. On May 23, 2008, the District of Columbia filed for summary judgment for the charges against the District of Columbia. The District Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on October 31, 2008. The Court found that the District of Columbia cannot be liable to the plaintiffs as a matter of law on any of the theories they advance inasmuch as the Marshal was a federal official and not an employee, servant, agent or actor under the control of the District of Columbia, and inasmuch as the District of Columbia had no choice but to turn over arrestees to the Superior Court Marshal for presentment. This dismissal left the Marshall (Todd Dillard) as the sole defendant in this case. On January 14, 2010, the District Court denied the plaintiff's motion to amend their complaint for the third time. On April 5, 2010, the defendant filed for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' remaining claims against the Marshall. On April 21, 2011, the District Court issued an opinion that granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Court conceded that the record shows that during the class period female arrestees were subjected to a blanket practice of strip searches while many, if not most, male arrestees were not. It is nonetheless clear that former Marshal Dillard is entitled to qualified immunity from the Fourth Amendment claims. The Fifth Amendment claims similarly fail as the plaintiffs proffered no evidence that former Marshal Dillard purposefully discriminated by intending a gender disparity in search procedures. Summary judgment was denied to the plaintiffs on their Fourth Amendment claims and granted to Marshal Dillard on the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims. Accordingly the case was dismissed from District Court. On May 4, 2011, the plaintiffs filed an appeal to the DC Circuit Court. On August 13, 2014 the DC Court of Appeals issued an opinion affirming the District Court's summary judgment ruling for Superior Court Marshal, finding him entitled to qualified immunity. And also affirming the District Court's summary judgment ruling for the District of Columbia, concluding that because the Superior Court Marshal in charge of the cellblock was at all times a federal official acting under color of federal law, the city had no authority to prevent the strip searches.", "summary": "In 2002, nine female plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, filed this 42 U.S.C \u00a71983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs challenged the practice of the U.S. Marshal's Service and the District of Columbia of conducting blanket strip, visual body cavity, and/or squat searches (\"strip searches\") of female arrestees that were being held in the Superior Court Cell Block of the D.C. Superior Court while awaiting presentment before a judicial officer. After granting the plaintiffs class certification, the District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims."}
{"article": "On February 1, 2013, a deaf jail inmate filed this lawsuit on behalf of himself in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff claimed that the officials at DC\u2019s Correctional Treatment Facility denied him (1) effective access to qualified interpreters (2) effective access to telecommunications, (3) access to jail alerts and announcements, and (4) adequate access to visitation. This effectively prevented the plaintiff from communicating with staff and inmates inside the jail, and family and friends during visitation hours. The plaintiff sued the District of Columbia under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, the plaintiff sought damages and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The plaintiff claimed that officers at the D.C. Correctional Treatment Facility denied him adequate accommodations from the moment he arrived. The plaintiff\u2019s native language was American Sign Language. He had relied on interpreters and auxiliary aids when communicating with people who did not know American Sign Language. Although he could communicate via notes in written English, it was his second language and no substitute for the accommodations guaranteed by the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Yet no interpreter was present for intake, orientation, or at any point during the plaintiff\u2019s fifty-one day sentence. The lack of accommodation prevented the plaintiff from obtaining adequate health care, accessing the facility\u2019s rehabilitative services, and communicating with visitors. During in person visits, the plaintiff wore handcuffs. The plaintiff analogized that this was equivalent to gagging a hearing prisoner. On April 4, 2013 the case was reassigned to Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Over a year later on August 2, 2014, Judge Jackson referred the case to a magistrate judge for mediation. But by October, the parties had not reached a settlement. The case proceeded through discovery. On November 14, 2014 the plaintiff moved for summary judgment with respect to claim (1) that he had been denied access to an interpreter, and claim (2) that he had been denied effective telecommunication technology. On September 2, 2015, the judge granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment with respect to his claims that the facility had denied him adequate access to interpreters and telecommunications technology. 128 F.Supp.3d 250 (D.D.C. 2015). On September 29, 2015 the defendant filed a motion to reconsider the summary judgment the court had filed against them. Judge Brown denied this motion on November 25, 2015. 146 F.Supp.3d 197 (D.D.C. 2015). The case then went to trial with respect to the plaintiff\u2019s remaining Rehabilitation Act claims, and on May 11, 2016 the jury returned a judgment for the plaintiff and awarded $70,000 in damages. The city appealed. The District of Columbia sought and obtained an order to withhold attorneys' fees from the judgment until the appeal had been resolved. The Defendant appealed on the following issues: the calculation of the plaintiff's damages, whether there was a duty to conduct disability assessment before admitting the plaintiff, whether there was a genuine issue of fact that the jail afforded the plaintiff an interpreter and on the plaintiffs non-interpreter claims, and whether the court erred in allowing opinions from the plaintiff's experts. Before the appeal resolved though, the parties entered a settlement agreement on November 11, 2016. Information regarding this settlement is not available on the docket. Subsequently, the D.C. appellate court entered a stipulated dismissal, requiring each party to pay their own attorneys' fees and costs. The case is now closed.", "summary": "D.C. jail denies accommodation to plaintiff while they were incarcerated. As a result, the plaintiff could not participate in the court-ordered rehabilitation services offered by the jail. The D.C. jail later placed the plaintiff in voluntary solitary confinement without communicating to him that his solitary confinement was voluntary. The court found in favor of the plaintiff on summary judgment and a subsequent jury trail awarded him $70,000 in damages."}
{"article": "On June 29, 2009, two inmates at the Manatee County Jail filed a pro se lawsuit in the Middle District Court of Florida challenging the constitutionality of the jail\u2019s new mail policy. The inmates filed under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated at the jail, alleging that the new policy, which only allowed inmates to receive post-cards, was unconstitutional. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that jail personnel were opening their privileged mail and were allowing trainees to search legal bins and legal mail without the owner being present, and that the defendants were violating their constitutional rights by allowing trainees to perform training exercises on them and other prisoners, including cavity searches. The plaintiffs asked the court for injunction and declaratory judgment claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. On July 8, 2009, the case was dismissed without prejudice, because the plaintiffs raised several unrelated claims in the same complaint. Plaintiffs filed an amended pro se complaint on July 24, 2009, which only challenged the Manatee County Jail mail policy. The Court dismissed the amended complaint without prejudice because the plaintiffs were proceeding pro se and were purporting to bring a class action for themselves and all others similarly situated. On September 4, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 complaint on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, alleging that the new mail policy at Manatee County Jail and the Defendants' practice of opening privileged mail and censoring the newspaper given to inmates violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The court appointed counsel to the Plaintiffs on October 26, 2009. Plaintiffs' counsel--the Florida Justice Institute and private counsel--filed an amended complaint on February 18, 2010, claiming that the new mail policy violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the inmates and the inmates family members and friends. The plaintiffs' group included two inmates and two family members of inmates. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief. On April 15, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint. Later, on May 12, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to disqualify Judge Kovachevich for bias or prejudice. The defendants alleged that one of Judge Kovachevich's staff attorneys undertook a factual investigation regarding the plaintiffs' claim. Allegedly, the staff attorney contacted the jail and requested legal precedent regarding the defendants' mail policy. Additionally, the defendants claimed that the staff attorney made a sua sponte request for counsel to represent the plaintiffs. On May 28, 2010 Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. The court held that postcard only mail policies were reasonably related to penological interests and cited precedent from the Middle District of Florida. <i>Turner v. Safley</i>, 482 U.S. at 85, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987). On June 23, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the case. Specifically the plaintiffs argued that the case should be reconsidered because the case was dismissed while there was a pending motion for the recusal of Judge Kovachevich. Furthermore, the court dismissed the case sua sponte before the defendants explained why their practices carried out a legitimate penological interest, nor were the plaintiffs allowed to present evidence to the contrary. On March 11, 2011 the court issued an order to have both parties report on whether the case was moot before ruling on the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for reconsideration. The order stated that both inmates had been released from the jail and that any argument for granting injunctive relief on account that the plaintiffs might be future inmates was without merit. The plaintiffs\u2019 counsel responded on March 25, 2011 and argued that the case was not moot because the plaintiffs still had standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of the proposed class of persons similarly situated. On March 29, 2011 the defendants responded that the claims were moot because the plaintiffs were no longer inmates and thus no longer had a personal stake in the matter. What happened next is unclear. Two of the lawyers for the Florida Justice Institute filed motions to withdraw, because they were moving out of state. Both motions stated that other counsel would remain involved (both motions were granted). But there is no other recorded activity in the docket. As of October 15, 2016, there are no new orders regarding the motion, and apparently the <a href=\"http://www.manateesheriff.com/Bureaus/MailGuidelines\">Manatee County Jail</a> still has a strict post-card old policy in place. We assume the case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2009, inmates of the Manatee County Jail challenged the constitutionality of a post-card only jail policy in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. In 2010, the court ruled that the policy was reasonably related to penological interests. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, but as of October 15, 2016, the Court had not issued any orders regarding the motion."}
{"article": "On April 8, 1999, inmates at the Foster County Jail in Atlanta, Georgia, who had tested positive for HIV, filed this class action lawsuit against county officials. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights, brought the suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. They alleged that the defendants' policies, which denied even basic medical care to HIV-positive prisoners, were sufficient to meet the deliberate indifference standard required to show a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiffs alleged that the same practices also violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought improvements in medical care and a reduction in overcrowding. On April 16, 1999, the court (Judge Marvin H. Shoob) held a preliminary injunction hearing, at which the parties presented a proposed settlement. The court entered a consent order as to the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief on the same day. Subsequently, on January 10, 2000, the parties filed a joint motion to provide notice of class action settlement. On January 24, 2000, the court (Judge Shoob), after a hearing on the settlement, entered a final order and closed the case. The defendants were required to improve medical care and reduce overcrowding in the jail. The final settlement agreement specifically required that the defendant provide timely medical access to all present and future HIV-positive inmates [the class], and treatment that met the standard of care set forth by the United States Department of Health and Human Services. The court also appointed Dr. Robert B. Greifinger, MD, as healthcare monitor, to monitor the defendants' compliance with the Settlement Agreement and to work and consult with them as necessary. The defendants were required to pay all costs associated with the healthcare monitor's services. On March 3, 2000, the plaintiffs filed a non-compliance civil action, seeking monetary and injunctive relief alleging that the defendants were not complying with the settlement. The appointed health care monitor submitted a status report to the court on March 7, 2000, detailing areas in need of improvement at the jail. On April 11, 2000, the court (Judge Shoob) entered an order adopting the recommendations of the report, including that the scope of the settlement agreement reached to intake processes and medical care for all inmates, and aspects of communicable diseases. Furthermore, the agreement required the elimination of overcrowding at the jail. Foster v. Fulton Co., No. 1:99-CV-900-MHS, 2000 WL 34016360 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 11, 2000). For approximately the next two years, the monitors continued to submit status reports, and the defendants continued to adjust policies to comply with the court's orders. On November 5, 2001, the court directed the parties to respond to the monitor's report that ten areas were \"far from compliance\" with the settlement agreement. On April 16, 2002, the court (Judge Shoob) issued an order finding the defendants in breach of the settlement agreement, and requiring them to employ a sufficient number of trained staff, to refer HIV-positive inmates to outside specialists in a timely manner, and to improve overall jail conditions, including overcrowding, security, and nutrition. Foster v. Fulton Co., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (N.D. Ga. 2002). On July 12, 2002, the court (Judge Shoob) denied the defendants' motion to stay implementation of actions ordered in the April 12, 2002 opinion. The court held that the defendants were required to develop a unified system for providing counsel and the opportunity to review their charges for detainees within 72 hours of arrest, and to develop a meaningful discharge plan for physically and mentally ill prisoners. Foster v. Fulton Co., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (N.D. Ga. 2002). According to the PACER docket, on October 28, 2002, the court (Judge Shoob) withdrew portions of its orders issued on April 12, 2002, and on July 12, 2002, required the appointment of counsel to indigents charged with minor offenses and the provision of all purpose hearings in state court within 72 hours of arrest to combat overcrowding. On November 13, 2002 the Court terminated the case, with the consent of all parties, after the county promised to continue outside monitoring of jail health care for 18 months. The docket reflects no further entries regarding the litigation of this case. In 2003 and 2005 the plaintiffs filed copies of the notice they posted in the jail detailing the terms of the settlement. In addition, in 2011 there was an entry regarding \"unclaimed exhibits,\" which the plaintiffs' attorneys then retrieved. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 1999, inmates at the Foster County Jail in Atlanta, Georgia, who had tested positive for HIV, filed this class action lawsuit against county officials. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights, brought the suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. In 2000, the parties reached a settlement agreement that required improved medical care and reduced overcrowding."}
{"article": "On January 27, 2009, current and former detainees at the Cook County Jail (CCJ), in Chicago, filed this class action lawsuit against Cook County and the Sheriff of Cook County in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought certification of two sub-classes: \"all inmates housed at Cook County Department of Corrections on or after January 1, 2007, who have made a written request for dental care because of acute pain and who suffered prolonged and unnecessary pain because of lack of treatment\" and \"all persons presently confined at the Cook County Jail who are experiencing dental pain and who have waited more than seven days after making a written request for treatment of that pain without having been examined by a dentist.\" For the first class, the plaintiffs sought monetary relief. For the second class, the plaintiffs sought both monetary and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs alleged that the Jail's failure to provide adequate dental care constituted deliberate indifference to their medical needs in violation of their constitutional rights. The case was assigned to Judge Joan H. Lefkow. On November 18, 2010, the judge certified the second class of plaintiffs while denying the first class's certification. 2010 WL 4791509. Other judges in the same district had denied class certification in similar circumstances, and defendants (and the court) cited principles of comity to support denial of certification in this case. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of this denial, citing recent Supreme Court case law. On August 17, 2011, the judge granted this motion and certified both sub-classes. 2011 WL 13136965. The defendants then appealed the August 17 decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The sole issue on appeal was if a district court, when deciding a motion for class certification, should defer, based on the principles of comity, to a sister court's ruling of on a motion for certification of a similar case. On June 19, 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of class certification by holding that another federal district judge's rulings on class certification was not preclusive. 683 F.3d 373. On December 22, 2014, the district court issued an opinion decertifying the injunctive class, rendering the plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction moot. 2014 WL 7330792. The court also modified the definition of the damages class, narrowing it in a way to be determined at a later date. The court noted that positive changes in the provision of dental services at CCJ had made it so that injunctive relief would be so vague as to be pointless or too detailed to be practical. The plaintiffs immediately appealed the decision to deny the injunction to the Court of Appeals and moved to sub-divide the class to address the issues perceived by the court. The defendants also filed a motion for an interlocutory appeal of the decision not to decertify the damages class, but it was denied by the Seventh Circuit on February 25, 2015. On July 6, 2016, the Seventh Circuit denied the plaintiffs' appeal of the decertification and renewed request for injunctive relief. 828 F.3d 541. On October 13, 2016, Judge Lefkow denied the plaintiff's motion to sub-divide the class and strongly suggested that settlement would be appropriate. 2016 WL 5939704. Then, after many months of negotiations, the parties reached a settlement agreement and moved for preliminary approval of the agreement on May 1, 2018. The agreement required that the defendant County establish a settlement fund in the amount of $5,563,000 to cover damages for class members associated with their dental care, incentive awards, fees and costs of counsel, resolution of three separate lawsuits, and administration of this settlement. The court was to retain jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the agreement. After a fairness hearing on August 21, 2018, the court approved the settlement. As of April 9, 2020, the case remains open for the purposes of enforcement.", "summary": "On January 27, 2009, current and former detainees at the Cook County Jail filed a lawsuit against the Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County, IL in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs asked the court for damages and injunctive relief to improve their dental treatment. In May 2018, the parties reached a settlement whereby the defendant County would establish a settlement fund in the amount of $5,563,000. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On June 6, 2014, an inmate at the Cook County Jail filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, against Cook County. The plaintiff, represented by the Uptown People's Law Center and a private law firm, sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that overcrowding led to unsanitary living conditions and the deprivation of basic necessities. The plaintiff also claimed that Cook County was aware of severe overcrowding and failed to provide adequate funding to the jail. The court granted in part defendants' motion to dismiss on October 15, 2014 to the extent it sought to strike allegations of punitive damages against the sheriff in his official capacity and Cook County, since a municipality is not exposed to punitive damages because of the bad-faith actions of its officials. The court denied the rest of defendants' motion to dismiss. On August 24, 2015, the court granted plaintiffs' counsel's motion to withdraw class certification, and denied plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The court dismissed the motion on file based on counsel's representation that the two alleged counts were unsupported. <i>Malewski v. Preckwinkle</i>, 2015 WL 5037073 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2015). Plaintiff appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the filing fees on September 22, 2015, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the case on June 22, 2016. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In June 2014, an inmate at the Cook County Jail filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Cook County. The plaintiff sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, alleging overcrowding and lack of funding that led to violations of Indiana state law and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court dismissed the case based on counsel's representation that the alleged counts were unsupported. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On December 19, 2014, individuals who were incarcerated in the Marion County correctional system filed this class-action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiffs sued the Marion County Sheriff and the Consolidated City of Indianapolis and Marion County under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought money damages for a class of individuals who were incarcerated in the Marion County correctional system for unreasonable periods of time. The plaintiffs claimed the defendants violated their Fourth Amendment right to protection against unreasonable seizures and detentions and their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The plaintiffs also alleged the defendants incarcerated the plaintiffs for longer than legally authorized because the plaintiffs were detained after their release was ordered and/or after the legal authority for their detention had ceased. The case was assigned to Judge Richard L. Young. The Marion County Sheriff's Department stated to multiple individuals that the sheriff had a period of seventy-two hours after a release order to process prisoners out of jail. The plaintiffs argued that this is an unreasonable period of time. Additionally, the Sheriff had a practice of re-arresting and re-imprisoning individuals who had been released on their own recognizance or had their charges vacated or dismissed, at which point the Sheriff no longer had any legal right to detain them. The plaintiffs claimed that these procedures constituted unreasonable seizures and detentions, deprivation of liberty without due process, false imprisonment, and negligence. The plaintiffs sought the creation of a common fund from which all class members could claim compensatory damages and attorneys' fees and costs. Early in the litigation, the plaintiffs filed three separate amended complaints. The third amended complaint, filed on May 13, 2015, added three plaintiffs and factual allegations to accommodate the new plaintiffs. Two days prior, on May 11, 2015, a non-party to this case filed a motion to transfer this case to the Indiana Supreme Court. The court denied this motion on October 14, 2015, reasoning that the moving party was not a party to this action nor could he be a member of the putative class because the class had not yet been certified. Furthermore, Judge Dinsmore noted that the court did not have the authority to transfer the case to the Indiana Supreme Court. (Two-and-half years later, on January 19, 2018, this non-party filed a notice of appeal of this decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, however, noting that this pro se appellant had neither paid the $505.00 appellate fees nor filed a motion for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis in the district court.) On October 15, 2015, the plaintiffs moved for class certification of a general class and five subclasses. The general class consisted of \"all individuals who, from December 19, 2012 to the present, were held in confinement by the Marion County Sheriff after legal authority for those detentions ceased.\" The five subclasses were based on the reasons the Sheriff ceased to have authority. The reasons were that the defendants were: \"operating under a standard of seventy-two (72) hours to release prisoners who are ordered released\" (72-hour subclass); \"not accepting cash or surety bonds but instead outsourcing the payment and processing of these bonds to the Marion County Clerk\" (cash subclass); \"employing a computer system inadequate for the purposes intended with respect to the timely release of prisoners\" (computer system subclass); \"re-arresting and imprisoning individuals who are released on their own recognizance, found not guilty or acquitted, or who have had their criminal charges vacated or dismissed, and for whom the Sheriff no longer has any legal right to detain\" (wrongful arrest subclass); and, \"keeping inmates imprisoned who the courts have released to Community Corrections for electronic monitoring\" (Community Corrections subclass). On September 30, 2016, the district court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Judge Young granted the motion as to the wrongful arrest subclass and the Community Corrections subclass. The class was certified as: <blockquote>\"All individuals who, from December 19, 2012, to the present, were held in confinement by the Sheriff after legal authority for those detentions ceased due to the Sheriff\u2019s policies or practices of: (1) re-arresting and imprisoning individuals who are released on their own recognizance, found not guilty or acquitted, or who have had their criminal charges vacated or dismissed; and (2) keeping inmates imprisoned who the courts have released to Community Corrections for electronic monitoring.\"</blockquote> The court denied the motion as to the 72-hour subclass, the cash subclass, and the computer system subclass. Dissatisfied with this order, the plaintiffs appealed the district court's denial as to the 72-hour and computer system subclasses. 2016 WL 5946839. Subsequently, on November 2, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to stay case proceedings pending resolution of this appeal. On December 5, 2016, Judge Dinsmore filed a report and recommendation regarding the plaintiffs' motion to stay, recommending that the court grant the motion. Agreeing with Judge Dinsmore, Judge Young adopted the report and granted the motion. On June 15, 2017, the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion vacating the district court's decision and remanding the case. In this opinion, the appeals court found the district court's reasoning for denying the computer system subclass to be without base. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit noted that the district court erred in relying on a 48-hour presumption of reasonableness with regard to detention as a basis for denying certification of the 72-hour subclass. 859 F.3d 489. Given this opinion, the plaintiffs moved to amend the class certification order on July 10, 2017, asking the district court to certify the computer system subclass and modify its 48-hour presumption to a 6-hour presumption. In response, on September 19, 2017, arguing that the Seventh Circuit's opinion did not order the district court to certify the two subclasses, the defendants filed a motion to set a class certification hearing to resolve factual disputes. Agreeing with the defendants, the district court granted the defendants' motion for hearing and denied the plaintiffs' motion on December 14, 2017. The hearing was originally set for February 16, 2018, but was later rescheduled and held on October 8, 2018. The court certified the class of plaintiffs on November 5, 2019 with respect to the following classes: 1) the Sheriff's practice of operating under a standard allowing up to 72 hours to release prisoners who are ordered released; and 2) the Sheriff's practice of employing a computer system inadequate for the purposes intended with respect to the timely release of prisoners. On June 28, 2019, Indianapolis and Marion County moved for summary judgment. That same day, several of the named defendants also filed for partial summary judgment. As of April 9, 2020, they are still awaiting a ruling on these motions. This case is ongoing as of April 9, 2020.", "summary": "In 2014, individuals who were incarcerated in the Marion County correctional system filed this class-action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiffs sued the Marion County sheriff under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs sought monetary relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Marion County Sheriffs Office. The plaintiffs claimed that they were incarcerated for longer than legally authorized as a result of unreasonable processing and release procedures. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "Built in 1991, the Campbell County Detention Center was designed to hold 135 prisoners. It quickly became overcrowded. In the weeks before this lawsuit was filed in the district court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, on April 29, 2005, the jail's population reached a high of 276 prisoners, many of whom were forced to sleep on the floor. Many of the inmates were awaiting transfer to the Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC), which was also named as a defendant in this lawsuit. The KDOC addressed overcrowding at the jail by simply reducing the required floor space for each prisoner from 50 to 40 square feet. This lawsuit, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 by attorney Robert B. Newman of the Cincinnati, Ohio, law firm Newman & Meeks, alleged the overcrowding violated the prisoners' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs, the class of inmates at the detention center, sought injunctive relief and nominal damages. The parties reached a settlement agreement on November 23, 2005, and notice was provided to the class and a fairness hearing held on January 25, 2006. The Court (Judge William O. Bertelsman) approved the settlement, after allowing one class member to opt-out, signing the consent decree on February 7, 2006. To settle the suit, County officials and the KDOC agreed to a number of measures aimed at reducing overcrowding. These included the building of a new Restricted Custody Center to house felons headed for the KDOC, expansion and remodeling of the old jail, and the implementation of new policies to prevent overcrowding. At the detention center, County officials agreed to add 256 beds, as well as a new kitchen and laundry facility, and to convert the old kitchen and laundry space into an upgraded infirmary. A full time nurse position was also created and filled. The jail also agreed to install more bunk beds and renovate dormitory showers; replace a boiler and all air conditioning units; upgrade the security system; and replace a leaky roof. In addition, the County agreed to decline regular requests to house federal prisoners, and the KDOC agreed to remove prisoners from the detention center within 45 days or sooner after the imposition of a prison sentence. The county reached an agreement with Boone County to house up to 30 prisoners at Boone County's new jail if necessary. County officials agreed to appoint a \"Population/Pretrial Officer\" responsible for managing the number of prisoners at the detention center; implement a \"Pretrial Conditional Release Program\" to reduce the number of prisoners housed at the detention center; and initiate an objective jail classification system. Finally, a Criminal Justice Advisory Council (CJAC) was to be be created and maintained to foster communication between judges, defense attorneys, and probation and parole officers in order to address issues that might reduce jail population. As an element of the CJAC, Campbell County police chiefs agreed to instruct their officers to simply ticket and release misdemeanor offenders (except those charged with domestic violence or driving under the influence) who are not a threat to public safety or a flight risk. On April 14, the Court required that status reports be filed every six months. The first report was filed on October 16, 2006. Subsequent reports were filed on April 16, 2007, and November 2, 2007. Agreeing that the defendants had implemented the terms of the settlement agreement, the parties moved to dismiss the case. On June 30, 2008, the Court granted the joint motion to dismiss the case.", "summary": "Built in 1991, the Campbell County Detention Center was designed to hold 135 prisoners. It quickly became overcrowded. In the weeks before this lawsuit was filed in the district court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, on April 29, 2005, the jail's population reached a high of 276 prisoners, many of whom were forced to sleep on the floor. Many of the inmates were awaiting transfer to the Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC), which was also named as a defendant in the lawsuit. The KDOC addressed overcrowding at the jail by simply reducing the required floor space for each prisoner from 50 to 40 square feet. This lawsuit, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 by attorney Robert B. Newman of the Cincinnati, Ohio, law firm Newman & Meeks, alleged the overcrowding violated the prisoners' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs, the class of inmates at the detention center, sought injunctive relief and nominal damages."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This class action challenged COVID-related conditions at the Prince Georges County jail and sought mitigation and release for pretrial and post-conviction detainees. On May 21, the court granted in part the plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order. Defendants appealed and were denied a stay pending their appeal. On July 7, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint, pointing to the lack of mental health services during an indefinite lockdown. On August 27, the parties filed a joint motion to stay proceedings pending settlement talks. The case is ongoing. <hr> On April 21, 2020, pretrial and post-conviction detainees at Prince George\u2019s County Jail, many of whom have pre-existing medical conditions, some of whom were exhibiting COVID-19 symptoms, and all of whom were scared of contracting the virus, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs sued the Director of the Prince George\u2019s County Department of Corrections in her official capacity under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241. The plaintiffs, represented by Civil Rights Corps, sought constitutionally sufficient procedures to protect their health and safety consistent with CDC guidelines and the judgment of correctional health specialists. The plaintiffs claimed that they had been deprived of their rights to reasonably safe living conditions under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and that defendant\u2019s policy of detaining COVID-positive people in the jail who are legally entitled to release violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, a subclass of medically vulnerable pre-trial plaintiffs claimed they were being held in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs also filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction, requested a hearing, and moved to certify a class. On April 23, District Court Judge Paula Xinis ordered the defendant to file a response to plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a TRO by April 25, and for plaintiffs to reply by April 27. Judge Xinis also directed the parties to submit a joint recommendation for an Independent Inspector by April 27, or two recommendations each, with supporting documents, if they were unable to agree. The defendant filed their response in opposition to plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a temporary restraining order on April 25 under seal. The plaintiffs filed their reply on April 29. On April 30, each party individually recommended two experts. On May 1, Judge Xinis appointed Carlos Franco-Paredes, MD, MPH as inspector, pursuant to the plaintiffs' recommendation. On May 21, the court granted in part and denied in part the motion for the temporary restraining order. The court ordered a written plan or protocol to be completed within five days that addressed: 1. The identification, monitoring, treatment, and housing of detainees who are \u201chigh risk\u201d (aged 65 or over and/or have an applicable medical condition) for suffering adverse outcomes if infected with COVID-19. 2. The training, education, and supervision of defendant's staff (medical and corrections officers). 3. A protocol for testing and isolation of detainees. The court also ordered the defendants to submit the following within fourteen days: 1. The total number of tests administered and the total number of confirmed COVID-19 positive detainees. 2. A written plan or protocol regarding the provision of adequate cleaning supplies and face masks, as well as social distancing measures. On May 26, the defendants appealed to the Fourth Circuit and filed a motion to stay pending appeal. The defendant's motion to stay pending appeal was denied by the district court on June 3, and by the Fourth Circuit on June 10. The plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal on June 4. As of June 18, 715 individuals at the jail had been tested for COVID-19, with 26 positive results. Those with a positive test result were moved to medical isolation. Status conferences were held between June 22 and July 2. On July 2, the court denied the plaintiff's preliminary injunction and the temporary restraining order expired. On July 7, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint, stating that in the four months since the initial complaint was filed, indefinite lockdown had continued at the jail, with detainees reporting no more than one or two hours of time out of their cells per day. The plaintiffs alleged a violation of the detainees' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, pointing to a lack of mental health services while detainees are anxious, depressed, and suicidal due to the indefinite lockdown. On July 17, the defendant moved to dismiss the case, or alternatively, sought summary judgment. The defendant claimed that all of the released plaintiffs\u2019 claims are moot because they are no longer in their custody, and that therefore the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief. On August 12, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the defendant's appeal as moot, agreeing with the plaintiff that the district court recently extinguished the injunctive relief order and denied Plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction. The parties filed a joint motion to stay proceedings on August 27 pending settlement talks. Settlement conferences are currently ongoing. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In April 2020, pretrial and post-conviction detainees at Prince George's County Jail filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs alleged that in light of COVID-19, they were being held in conditions that violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. A subclass of pretrial, medically vulnerable plaintiffs also alleged that they are being held in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On May 21, the court granted in part the plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order. Defendant appealed and were denied a stay pending their appeal. On July 7, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint, pointing to the lack of mental health services during an indefinite lockdown. The parties filed a joint motion to stay proceedings on August 27 pending settlement talks. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On April 8, 2005, two inmates at the Camden County Jail in New Jersey filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Sheriff of the jail and Camden County officials in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages and attorneys' fees, alleging that the defendants had violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights by strip searching them at the jail. They argued that they should not have been strip searched because they had been charged only with petty crimes and traffic violations. They also argued that a subclass of plaintiffs had paid their bail and were unlawfully detained at the time of their strip search. On March 27, 2006, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Joel B. Rosen) dismissed without prejudice the City of Camden, the Camden City Police Department, and the police chief, and the deputy police chief. The Court noted that all parties had agreed to dismiss these defendants pursuant to the settlement talks that were in progress. On February 28, 2007, the District Court (District Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez) granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, pursuant to an agreement of the parties. On July 17, 2007, the parties asked the District Court to dismiss the case, notifying the Court that they had reached a settlement agreement. On June 9, 2008, Judge Rodriguez granted the request and issued an order of dismissal. In the settlement agreement, the defendants affirmatively stated that they had stopped strip searching detainees on a blanket basis as of April 27, 2005. They also stated that they had stopped strip searching non-indictable detainees in the absence of reasonable suspicion. The defendants maintained that their written policy as of 2007 was constitutional, and had been reviewed by the New Jersey Department of Corrections for compliance with state law, but they agreed to consider formally revising their policy as needed. The defendants agreed to retrain all corrections officers regarding the strip search policy, requiring all officers to sign a form reflecting their understanding of the policy. The defendants also agreed to release, in due time, inmates who had paid their bail, rather than holding them unnecessarily. Finally, the defendants agreed to pay $7.5 million into a settlement fund, to be distributed to plaintiffs as damages, with the named class representatives to receive $15,000 each, and with $200,000 also deducted from the larger sum to pay the costs of administration and notice regarding the settlement. Likewise, prevailing parties' attorneys fees would be deducted from the larger sum, leaving a \"distribution amount\" from which payments would be made to the class. Final Judgment was issued on September 22, 2008. The court maintained jurisdiction throughout the course of the consent decree. As of January 31, 2018, there was no further substantial activity in the court, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "On April 8, 2005, two inmates at the Camden County Jail in New Jersey filed a class action lawsuit against the Sheriff of the jail and Camden County officials in which they alleged that the defendants had violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights by strip searching them at the jail. On March 27, 2006, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Joel B. Rosen) dismissed without prejudice the City of Camden, the Camden City Police Department, and the police chief, and the deputy police chief. On June 9, 2008, Judge Rodriguez approved a settlement and dismissed the case."}
{"article": "In March of 2002, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, acting pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997 et seq., commenced an investigation into the confinement conditions at the Santa Fe County Adult Detention Center (SFCADC) in Santa Fe, New Mexico. Based on its investigation, the DOJ concluded that the conditions and practices at the Detention Center violated the constitutional rights of convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees. By letter dated March 6, 2003, the DOJ advised Santa Fe County of minimal remedial measures it should implement in order to remedy unconstitutional practices relating to: (1) medical and mental health care; (2) suicide prevention; (3) protection of inmates from harm; (4) fire safety; (5) sanitation; and (6) inmate grievance procedures (including court access). Santa Fe County agreed to make the recommended reforms. On November 11, 2004, to avoid litigation, the parties entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). MOA detailed the agreed reforms and set forth timetables for completion. By its terms, MOA was to last for a period of three years, after which it would expire if substantial compliance had been achieved. Because the County had not substantially complied with the MOA, on February 28, 2008, the United States filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. The U.S. sued the County under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The U.S. claimed that the defendants had engaged in and continued to engage in a pattern or practice of failing to protect inmates at the SFCADC from serious harm and undue risk of serious harm by failing to provide adequate medical and mental health care and failing to provide safe and sanitary living conditions. The case was originally assigned to District Judge Robert Hayes Scott and Magistrate Judge Alan C. Torgerson. After the United States filed a notice of refusal to proceed before Magistrate Judge Torgerson, however, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Christina Armijo. On March 6, 2008, the parties jointly moved for approval of a settlement agreement. The court granted this motion on April 30, 2008, retaining jurisdiction over the matter and conditionally dismissing the case subject to the defendants achieving substantial compliance with the agreement. This agreement replaced the MOA and required the defendant to provide adequate services to address the serious medical and mental health needs of all prisoners. The agreement required the defendants to have adequate staffing and provide training under the new policies. To ensure compliance, the agreement included monitoring, implementation of a grievance process, reporting, and record keeping. The agreement was to terminate after 2 years so long as the county had substantially complied with all provisions. On July 2, 2008, the parties filed a status report with the court showing no significant problems with compliance. On October 30, 2009, pursuant to the recommendations made by the parties, the court dismissed the case with prejudice and terminated the settlement agreement and its associated order. On November 1, 2009, after a two year extension to compel Santa Fe County to meet the benchmarks in the agreement, the DOJ allowed the terms of the agreement to expire. According an <a href=\"http://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/feds-to-stop-monitoring-county-jail/article_0e21779d-31ec-5e47-b488-d21dee8ae9fe.html\">article</a> in a local paper, the DOJ is no longer monitoring the county.", "summary": "In March of 2002, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, acting pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (\"CRIPA\"), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997 et seq., commenced an investigation into the conditions of confinement at the Santa Fe County Adult Detention Center in Santa Fe, New Mexico. The DOJ concluded that the conditions and practices at the Detention Center violated the constitutional rights of convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees. On November 11, 2004, the DOJ and Sante Fe County entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, which detailed the agreed reforms and set forth timetables for completion. By its terms, the Agreement was to last for a period of three years, and remedy unconstitutional practices relating to: (1) medical and mental health care; (2) suicide prevention; (3) protection of inmates from harm; (4) fire safety; (5) sanitation; and (6) inmate grievance procedures (including court access). On November 1, 2009, after a two year extension to compel Santa Fe County to meet the benchmarks in the agreement, the DOJ allowed the terms of the agreement to expire. The DOJ is no longer monitoring the county."}
{"article": "On June 16, 2008, people with mental disabilities who had been arrested and detained in the Do\u00f1a Ana County Detention Center (\u201cDACDC\u201d) brought this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. The plaintiffs sued the Board of County Commissioners for the County of Do\u00f1a Ana, the DACDC, and law enforcement. The Plaintiffs, represented by the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law and private counsel, sought sought class-wide preliminary and permanent injunctive relief for violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the New Mexico Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. Additionally, the named Plaintiffs sought damages for the violations of their rights and for the negligent acts and omissions that gave rise to tort claims. There were two groups of Defendants: County Commissioners and Law Enforcement, in this matter. The first group of Defendants encompassed the Board of County Commissioners for the County of Do\u00f1a Ana, which was responsible for all county operations including the Do\u00f1a Ana County Detention Center. The second group of Defendants was comprised of two subgroups of law enforcement, City of Las Cruces Police Department and Do\u00f1a Ana County Sheriff\u2019s Office. Specifically, the Plaintiffs alleged that at least thirty percent of DACDC\u2019s approximately nine hundred detainees had mental disabilities. According to the Plaintiffs, the DACDC Defendants had continually and persistently ignored the mental health needs of detainees, and had failed to provide them with constitutionally adequate mental health services. The Defendants never instituted an effective system for making routine assessments of detainees with symptoms of mental illness. Nor did the Defendants implement an effective system for tracking detainees who needed mental health care. The DACDC Defendants failed to provide regular monitoring of detainees\u2019 mental health care needs, and failed to provide the treatment they need. As stated in the Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint, failure in treatment led the Defendants to rely too heavily on the use of segregation for detainees with mental health care needs. A significant number of detainees in the segregation units exhibited obvious symptoms of serious mental illness. Notwithstanding isolation\u2019s particularly harmful effects on the mental health of detainees, the Defendants failed to conduct regular medical rounds and assessments of their needs. The Defendants also failed to engage in meaningful discharge planning for detainees with mental disabilities. The Defendants discharged detainees without access to the medications they may have been taking in jail, without referrals to community mental health programs, and without any other essential discharge planning services needed to manage their mental illnesses. The predictable result was recidivism and a cycle of arrests and detentions. The Law Enforcement Defendants were aware of the DACDC Defendants\u2019 failure to meet the serious mental healthcare needs of detainees. Nevertheless, according to the Plaintiffs, the Law Enforcement Defendants persisted in a discriminatory pattern and practice of arresting persons with mental disabilities and transporting them to DACDC, instead of taking them to appropriate community based services or otherwise diverting them from the criminal justice system. Additionally, the Law Enforcement Defendants\u2019 failed to effectively train law enforcement personnel to recognize the signs of mental disabilities and respond appropriately. On January 3, 2008 the Plaintiffs entered an amended complaint for Class Action injunctive relief and damages. On the same day the Defendants moved to remove the case to federal court. The Plaintiffs submitted multiple amended complaints, and the Defendants sought to dismiss the claims based on the U.S. Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution as well as the class action claims. In August 2008, the parties began engaging in settlement conversations. As these conversations continued, on May 2, 2009, the Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Defendants from continuing to subject the Plaintiffs and other people with mental disabilities to the actions and inactions set forth in the complaint. The injunction was denied on November 20, 2009 at the recommendation of Magistrate Judge Gregory B. Wormuth because public policy weighed against doing so without clarity of facts regarding key allegations. On July 2, 2009, Judge William P. Johnson affirmed Magistrate Judge Karen B. Molzen\u2019s Report and Recommendation to sanction the County Defendants for failure to report their change of position regarding settlement talks after a year and a half of attempted settlement discussions. Specifically, the County Manager, who had engaged in settlement conversations, failed to inform the Plaintiffs that the Board of Commissioners had rejected the new direction of the talks. The Court ordered that the County Defendants to pay sanctions to Plaintiffs in the amount of $7,394.00. On July 9, 2009, the Plaintiffs dismissed with prejudice their claims against the City Defendants, since the Plaintiffs and the City Defendants had reached a settlement in the case. Six months later, on December 15, 2009, the case was settled with the County Defendants before Judge William P. Johnson. The settlement, found on the <a href=http://www.bazelon.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Bravosettlement9-09.pdf\u201d>Bazelon Center website</a>, called for expanded training, new policies and procedures, increased resources to divert people with mental illnesses from the criminal justice system. It also included a monetary payment totalling $150,000 as damages for the named plaintiffs and attorneys fees. It included no payment to class members. . On January 15, 2010 the Plaintiffs dismissed with prejudice (closing the case) the matter against the County Defendants.", "summary": "This class action was brought on behalf of people with mental disabilities arrested and detained in the Do\u00f1a Ana County Detention Center (\u201cDACDC\u201d), to redress violations of their constitutional rights, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act. After two years of settlement talks, the parties reached a settlement agreement.."}
{"article": "On October 16, 1997, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and Article 1, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution against the City of New York, the New York City Police Department, a Detective, unknown female officers, and Plaintiff's cousin in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked for compensatory and punitive damages, alleging she was falsely arrested, police used excessive force when arresting her, that she was strip-searched in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that Defendants committed battery. Plaintiff alleged claims against her cousin for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress because Plaintiff was arrested after her cousin filed a complaint against her. On January 21, 1997, Defendant Detective arrested Plaintiff for a misdemeanor. Plaintiff alleged Defendant used excessive force by bruising her arm when the Detective handcuffed her. Plaintiff was subjected to a strip and body cavity search at Central Booking by two female Corrections Department employees, in accordance with a City policy of strip-searching all arrestees, and without any reasonable suspicion. Plaintiff was released on her own recognizance the following day and the charges against her were eventually dropped. Plaintiff was traumatized and humiliated, was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, entered therapy, and took antidepressants. On July 17, 1998, Defendants offered Plaintiff $25,001 plus reasonable attorney's fees accrued up to that date. Plaintiff did not accept the settlement offer. On April 26, 1999, Plaintiff settled her claims against her cousin for $2,500. On May 7, 1999, the United States District Court (Judge Robert P. Patterson, Jr.) awarded plaintiff $19,645 in compensatory damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages against the city according to a jury verdict following a three day jury trial. The Court granted a directed verdict for Plaintiff regarding the strip-search. The Court found that Defendant's strip-search policy violated the Fourth Amendment and there was no evidence the officers believed Plaintiff concealed contraband. The jury found for Defendants on Plaintiff's claims of unlawful arrest, excessive force, and battery. Defendant appealed award of punitive damages. On June 15, 2000, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges Guido Calabresi, Robert Katzmann, Pierre N. Leval) reversed and remanded. The Court held that the city was immune from punitive damages because municipalities are only responsible for punitive damages where taxpayers are directly responsible for perpetrating an outrageous abuse of constitutional rights. Judges Calabresi and Katzmann filed separate concurring opinions. Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236 (2nd Cir. 2000). Plaintiff moved for attorney's fees and costs. Defendants cross-moved for costs incurred subsequent to their offer of pre-trial judgment. On October 13, 2000, the District Court (Judge Patterson) granted these cross-motions. The Court held that Plaintiff was liable for Defendants' costs from the date of their offer because their offer was more than her jury award. Plaintiff was awarded attorney's fees and costs incurred prior to July 17, 1998, a total of $419,116.45. Defendants were granted $8,038.40. Ciraolo v. City of New York, No. Civ. 8208, 2000 WL 521180 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2000). On November 13, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari. Ciraolo v. City of New York, 531 U.S. 993 (2000).", "summary": "This case was brought by a woman who was arested, subjected to excessive force and a strip/cavity search all on the basis of a false complaint filed by a family member. A jury awarded her $19,645 in compensatory damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the punitive damages award as not available against municipalities, and reduced the compensatory damages award because Plaintiff had been offered slightly more as settlement."}
{"article": "On June 24, 2009, four individuals previously incarcerated at the Delaware County Jail filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs sued the Sheriff of Delaware County under 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought monetary relief for severe emotional distress, psychological damage, and significant pain and suffering, personal humiliation, and degradation. The plaintiffs claimed that the Sheriff failed to properly train, supervise, or control deputies and jailers while they were in charge of female inmates. They alleged that the jailers' negligence and misconduct deprived them of rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments\u2019 due process and equal protection clauses. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the Sheriff\u2019s Office of Delaware County had engaged in rape, sodomy, sexual battery, and blackmail. The parties commenced discovery the following year. Settlement conferences were anticipated as early as August 2010. Additionally, from the day of the initial complaint until February 11, 2011, the plaintiffs amended the complaint four times to increase the number of plaintiffs. The final complaint included 17 individuals with similar stories of sexual abuse by a law enforcement official while in vulnerable situations such as the bathroom or shower in the county jail as well as on medical visits. In June 2011, Judge James Payne granted an unopposed motion to dismiss one plaintiff. Additionally, later that month, the judge found a motion to dismiss another plaintiff as moot. Again, in September 2011, another plaintiff was dismissed by the judge on a joint stipulation from both parties. Settlement conference dates were pushed back multiple times until the parties filed a motion to enforce a settlement agreement and to enter judgment on November 7, 2011. On December 1, 2011, Judge Payne entered judgment enforcing a full and final settlement of the action. The agreement awarded $13,500,000 to the plaintiffs with no liability admitted on behalf of the Sheriff of Delaware County, or the Board of Commissioners of Delaware County or Delaware County. By May 2012, the defendant has paid the amount in full and the case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2009, former inmates at the Delaware County Jail filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs alleged that the Sheriff's Office of Delaware County was guilty of rape, sodomy, sexual battery, and blackmail. The alleged negligence and misconduct of jailers deprived inmates of their the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments Rights. The parties reached a settlement in 2011 for monetary damages. The case closed in May 2012."}
{"article": "On April 21, 2005, a woman represented by private attorneys from several Philadelphia, New York, and D.C. law firms filed a class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. She alleged that the City of Philadelphia of had an unconstitutional blanket policy and/or practice of strip searching all pre-trial detainees remanded to the custody of the Philadelphia Prison System, regardless of criminal charge or reasonable suspicion. Plaintiff alleged that the policy required all arrestees to disrobe in front of a corrections officer, who then conducted visual inspection of the genitals and body cavities, using a flashlight to illuminate body cavities. Plaintiff claimed the practice violated the Fourth Amendment and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and class certification for the thousands who allegedly suffered the same indignities. The City of Philadelphia, the prison system, and officials responsible for that system, as defendants, answered by generally denying the allegations. Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. By order dated June 9, 2006, the District Court (Judge Mary A. McLaughlin) denied the motions, advising the parties that the motions could be refiled after resolution of the issue of class certification. Plaintiff moved for class certification on February 16, 2007, and for a preliminary injunction on March 23, 2007. Both motions were still pending at the time of this summary. Between the motion filings, on February 23, 2007, plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding a male plaintiff and naming only the City of Philadelphia as the defendant. Discovery proceedings continued and, on July 3, 2007, Judge McLaughlin's unpublished order directed that the matter was set for a settlement conference on July 24, 2007, before Magistrate Judge Elizabeth T. Hey. On February 20, 2009, the parties entered into a $5.9 million settlement. The agreement established the following two settlement classes: Subclass I: All persons in the Settlement Class, EXCEPT for persons who (1) were charged with certain violence, drug and/or weapons (hereinafter \"VDW\") related misdemeanor charges at the time of their admission, or (2) were charged with bench warrants and/or probation violations where the underlying charge was a VDW misdemeanor charge, or (3) had convictions for felonies and/or VDW misdemeanor charges predating the date of their admission. Subclass II: All persons in the Settlement Class who were (1) charged with VDW misdemeanor charges at the time of their admission, or (2) were charged with bench warrants and/or probation violations where the underlying charge was a VDW misdemeanor charge, or (3) had convictions for felonies and/or VDW misdemeanor charges predating the date of their admission. On November 3, 2009, the court entered a Memorandum and Opinion and a separate Memorandum and Order, granting final approval of the proposed settlement.", "summary": "On April 21, 2005, a woman filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. She alleged that the City of Philadelphia of had an unconstitutional practice of strip searching all pre-trial detainees, regardless of criminal charge or reasonable suspicion. On February 20, 2009, the parties entered into a $5.9 million settlement. <br />The Court entered final approval of the settlement on November 3, 2009."}
{"article": "On August 22, 2007, a prisoner filed suit against the County of Lancaster and the Lancaster County Prison Board in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. He alleged that his constitutional rights were violated when he was strip searched in front of other inmates upon arrival at the Lancaster County Prison after being arrested for a parole violation. He claimed that the blanket policy of strip searching all newly-arrived detainees regardless of the offense and without judgment as to whether or not such a search was reasonable violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. His cause of action was 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and he was represented by private counsel. He sought class action certification, declaratory judgment, a preliminary and permanent injunction, and punitive damages. The parties proceeded into discovery and also pursued a settlement. In a one sentence opinion on June 13, 2008, the court (Judge Paul S. Diamond) denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification without prejudice. The parties continued negotiations and submitted a settlement agreement with the court on July 29, 2009. The settlement specified a class of those stripped searched upon admittance to Lancaster County Prison for minor offense not involving drugs, weapons, or violence between August 22, 2005 and July 28, 2009. It affirmed the new policy of the defendants not to strip search such detainees, specified that the defendant would train all of its employees to comply with the new policy, and allowed class counsel to monitor compliance. It also created a fund of $2,507,200.00 to be used to compensate class members. Provisional class certification and preliminary approval of the settlement was granted by the court (Judge Diamond) on September 1, 2009. The case came to a close on April 9, 2010 when the court (Judge Diamond) certified the class and granted final approval to the settlement. Two years later, documents under seal were unsealed pursuant to local rules. There has been no further activity, and the case now appears to be closed.", "summary": "On August 22, 2007, the plaintiff filed suit against the County of Lancaster and the Lancaster County Prison Board in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. He alleged that his constitutional rights were violated when he was strip searched in front of other inmates upon arrival at the Lancaster County Prison after being arrested for a parole violation. He sought class action certification, declaratory judgment, a preliminary and permanent injunction, and punitive damages. The parties entered a settlement agreement with the court on July 29, 2009 that affirmed a new policy of not strip searching detainees arrested for minor offenses and created a fund to compensate those who had been strip searched. The case ended on April 9, 2010 when the court certified the class and granted final approval to the settlement."}
{"article": "Plaintiff was an inmate in the Northampton County Prison (NCP); he brought \u00a7 1983 lawsuit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the county, the wardens of the jail, the medical service contractor, and specific health care providers for unsanitary conditions in the jail, the inadequacy of the medical care provided, and the failure of developing a quarantine protocol that lead to the plaintiff contracting multiple Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infections. MRSA infections can be deadly. After Magistrate Judge Perkins dismissed the case as to the specific medical staff working at the facility, the case was settled pursuant to Local Rule 41(b) on March 18, 2010, which allows a court-sanctioned dismissal after the parties have notified the court of reaching a settlement agreement. The terms of that settlement are unknown.", "summary": "Plaintiff, a county jail inmate who suffered scarring and isolation from multiple MRSA infections was successful in obtaining a settlement against county defendants for their alleged failure to implement appropriate quarantine protocols and correct medical care, and for maintaining unsanitary conditions at the jail."}
{"article": "On September 16, 2007, prisoners of the Dauphin County Prison (\"Prison\") filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the County of Dauphin, PA, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief, claiming that the Prison's blanket policy of strip searching all detainees regardless of criminal charge or reasonable suspicion violated the 4th Amendment. On October 11, 2007, Defendants moved to dismiss the original complaint. On November 20, 2007, the Plaintiffs submitted an Amended Class Action Complaint addressing some of the terms discussed by the Defendant's counsel in the motion. Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint; however, the motion was dismissed without prejudice by the Court (Hon. Thomas I. Vanaskie) on August 21, 2008. On December 18, 2009, the court entered its Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Judgment. Dauphin County was required to eliminate their strip search policy and create a new one, provide retraining of corrections officers, and guarantee enforcement of the new policy. In addition, the plaintiffs were awarded a sum of $2,160,500 in damages, costs, and attorneys' fees.", "summary": "This class action case was brought by prisoners of the Dauphin County Prison against the County of Dauphin, PA, seeking monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief for conducting unconstitutional and unnecessary strip searches upon all persons placed in the Dauphin County Prison, as of September 16, 2005. The case was settled in 2009, resulting in monetary and injunctive relief granted."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: The ACLU of Pennsylvania filed this class action suit on behalf of pretrial detainees in a PA jail and a subclass of those who were at a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19. The complaint alleged that the conditions in the jail failed to meet CDC recommendations and amounted to a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. The parties moved for settlement by entry of a consent order implementing public health measures on May 26, which mooted the request for a preliminary injunction. The remainder of the litigation concerning the ADA and habeas claims remains ongoing. <hr> Plaintiffs in this class action lawsuit, three people detained at the Allegheny County Jail (ACJ), filed this complaint in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on April 8, 2020. They were represented by the ACLU of Pennsylvania, Abolitionist Law Center, and Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project. The complaint alleged that the conditions in the jail increased the likelihood that they will contract COVID-19 in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as writs of habeas corpus. The case was assigned to Judge Cathy Bissoon and the named defendants were Allegheny County and the warden of the jail. The proposed class included a broader class with two subclasses. The broader class encompassed all current and future detainees at ACJ. The two subclasses were people who, by reason of age or medical condition, were particularly vulnerable to injury or death if they were to contract COVID-19 (\u201cMedically-Vulnerable Subclass\u201d), and persons who, by reason of their disability, were particularly vulnerable to injury or death if they were to contract COVID-19 (\u201cDisability Subclass\"). According to the complaint, after the declaration of a national emergency in light of COVID-19, the jail managed to decrease its population by 20% but failed to take the additional necessary steps to protect the people detained there. Rather than implementing best practices as recommended by the Centers for Disease Control, jail administration instead consolidated how people were housed, leaving an entire floor empty and increasing the number of people housed in cells with another person. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on April 9, 2020, seeking immediate release from ACJ. After a status conference in May, the parties began working jointly on a consent order. They moved for settlement by entry of consent order on May 26, 2020. The consent order included requirements that the defendants adopt and effectively implement a comprehensive policy entitled \u201cContinuing of Operations Plan: COVID-19 (Updated).\" This policy details updates to be made across all facets of operation in ACJ. The 17 major categories the policy covers are: 1) Employee screening; 2) Procedures for screening and housing determinations for new arrests/admissions to ACJ; 3) Treatment and isolation; 4) Specimen testing; 5) Contact study review; 6) Healthcare operations; 7) Prevention and education; 8) Non-essential services; 9) Courts, transfers, legal services, and releases; 10) Social distancing in general population units; 11) Dietary; 12) Environmental cleaning in employee areas, housing units, intake areas, and of restraints; 13) Inmate phone calls, hygiene, and recreation; 14) Population management; 15) Provision of sanitation and hygiene products; 16) Notification to PA Department of Health; and 17) Employee illness/staffing levels. The consent order also included weekly reporting requirements to plaintiffs' attorneys regarding illness in ACJ. The court granted the consent order on May 27 and in doing so denied as moot the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction in light of the agreement. The order explicitly did not resolve the plaintiffs' claims under the ADA or the habeas petitions. The plaintiffs moved to extend the consent order on August 24, which Judge Bissoon granted that same day. The consent order was further extended on November 23 and February 22. The case is ongoing in alternative dispute resolution and discovery.", "summary": "The ACLU of Pennsylvania filed this class action suit on behalf of pretrial detainees in a PA jail with subclasses of those who were at a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19. The complaint alleged that the conditions in the jail failed to meet CDC recommendations and amounted to a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on April 9, 2020 seeking immediate release from ACJ. The parties then began working on a consent order to implement public health measures to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 in the jail, which was approved by the court on May 27. The consent order was extended on August 24 and the plaintiffs habeas and ADA claims remain in dispute. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On October 6, 2010, the Prison Legal News filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for South Carolina under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Berkeley County. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, claiming that the defendants' unlawfully censored and excluded the plaintiff's books and magazines protected by the 1st and 14th Amendments, which are sent to individual subscribers in custody at the Berkeley County Detention Center (BCDC). On May 3, 2011, the United States filed a complaint in intervention pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 42 Persons Act of 2000, U.S.C. \u00a7 2000cc. The U.S. sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the Sheriff's Office and the Sheriff prohibited receipt and possession of virtually all mail and other expressive materials by persons incarcerated at BCDC. The U.S. specifically alleged that prisoners at BCDC could not receive books, magazines, newspaper or other expressive materials sent through the mail, regardless of whether the materials were routed directly from publishers or sent by friends, family members or community organizations. The U.S. also alleged that the defendants prohibited a wide range of religious materials to BCDC prisoners of various faiths, only allowing prisoners to possess the Bible. On January 10, 2012, the parties agreed to a settlement agreement requiring the defendants to pay $100,000 in full and final settlement of all plaintiff's claims for damages and $499,900 in full and final settlement for attorney fees and costs through January 13, 2012. On January 13, 2012, the Court (Judge Sol Blatt) issued the consent injunction requiring the defendants to implement an \"incoming publications policy\" (governing access to publications and publishers' right to send publications to detainees), a \"staples policy\" (governing access to publications containing staples), and a \"religious materials policy\" (governing access to religious materials). In addition, the defendants were ordered to train personnel on the new policies and allow the plaintiff and the U.S. to assess the defendants' compliance with the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The detainees were to be permitted to receive and retain any and all publications that do not threaten BCDC safety or security. On April 18, 2014, the Court granted the defendants' motion to terminate the consent injunction because the defendants had achieved the minimum of one year of substantial compliance with the provisions of the consent injunction. On July 2, 2014, the plaintiffs moved for attorneys' fees, but this issue was seemingly never resolved as the court dismissed the case on August 14, 2014. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On October 6, 2010, the Prison Legal News filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for South Carolina under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Berkeley County. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, claiming that the defendants' unlawfully censored and excluded the plaintiff's books and magazines protected by the 1st and 14th Amendments, which are sent to individual subscribers in custody at the Berkeley County Detention Center (BCDC). On May 3, 2011, the United States filed a Complaint in intervention pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 42 Persons Act of 2000, U.S.C. \u00a7 2000cc. On January 13, 2012, Judge Sol Blatt, Jr., issued the consent injunction requiring the defendants to implement new policies regarding incoming mail and access to religious materials."}
{"article": "On June 19, 2017, a former inmate of Davidson County Jail (DCJ), filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The plaintiff sued CoreCivic of Tennessee under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought monetary relief, including punitive damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The plaintiff alleged that, in deliberately failing to adequately screen those entering the DCJ, respond to inmate requests for medical attention, treat those infested with the parasite, quarantine the infected individuals in its care, or take any other precautions to prevent the spread of scabies outside the facility, the defendant violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the plaintiff and class members. The case was assigned to Judge Aleta A. Trauger. The plaintiff requested that the court permanently enjoin the Defendant from continuing to violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and to immediately cease intimidating, threatening, and retaliating against inmates for demanding medical care for their serious medical needs. The plaintiff also sought a permanent injunction requiring the Defendant to provide a full medical staff adequate to meet the needs of those infected with scabies and capable of dispensing medication and monitoring their treatment until completion. On September 24, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate the present case with the case of Wendy Snead v. CoreCivic of Tennessee. The following day, Judge Trauger granted the motion to consolidate. To read the subsequent proceedings in the consolidated cases, see <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16823\">Snead</a>.", "summary": "This 2017 class action lawsuit was brought by a former inmate of the Davidson County Jail in the U.S. District for the Middle District of Tennessee. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in failing to prevent the spread of scabies in the prison. The case is ongoing. The plaintiff has not yet filed a motion to certify class."}
{"article": "This jail conditions case was brought in December 2011 by a deaf man who speaks American Sign Language and has little or no ability to lip read. He has very limited ability to read or write in either Spanish or English. On March 2011, he was arrested and detained by El Paso County Sheriff's deputies and taken to the Downtown Detention Facility. His repeated requests for an interpreter were ignored. Late that night, he was driven to a store and approached by a woman whom the officers described as a judge. He again requested an interpreter and again was ignored. The following day, the plaintiff was placed in the Annex jail, where he was imprisoned with no explanation for 11 days. He was handcuffed and unable to use the old and malfunctioning TTY/TDD phone. Plaintiff, represented by the Paso Del Norte Civil Rights Project and other attorneys, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, claiming his treatment violated the Texas Human Resources Code, \u00a7 121.003(a), the Americans With Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. He sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. According to the docket, the parties stipulated to dismissal of the case after reaching a settlement on July 6, 2012. Although the settlement is not publicly available, according to reports, videophones have now been installed at the jails.", "summary": "A deaf prisoner of the El Paso County jails sued the County in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas for their failure to accommodate his disability. He was held for eleven days without access to an attorney or an interpreter, in violation of the Americans With disabilities Act ans Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. A private settlement was reached in July 2012 which, according to reports, required installation of videophones in the County jails. We have no further information about this case."}
{"article": "On March 15, 2012, a group of juvenile prisoners in Central County Jail in Polk County filed a lawsuit in the Middle District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Though plaintiffs amended their complaint twice to include different defendants, the lawsuit proceeded against the Sheriff of Polk County and Corizon Health, Inc., the health care provider retained by the Sheriff to provide medical services for the prisoners. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, asked the court for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, claiming that the youths' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The plaintiffs also requested class certification. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that, as juveniles, they were housed in an adult correctional facility. The plaintiffs claimed they were left unattended for long periods of time, and punished regularly with chemical agents, isolation and lockdown. The plaintiffs were forced to eat in their cells, and clean their own toilets with the soap provided for personal hygiene. The plaintiffs claimed a complete lack of rehabilitative services and extremely poor educational services. On May 4, 2012, the Court (Judge Steven D. Merryday) granted the motion to dismiss for two named individual defendants, but denied the overall motion to dismiss the case. On August 13, 2012, the Court issued an order stating that K.G. (the representative of the sub-class of juvenile prisoners needing mental health treatment), as a pre-trial detainee, could only represent other pre-trial detainees, and therefore K.G., and the resulting subclass could not sue under the Eighth Amendment. However, Judge Merryday once again denied the overall motion to dismiss the case. On November 19, 2012, the complaint was amended to include lack of adequate medical care. The plaintiffs alleged that medication was not provided to juveniles with serious mental and psychiatric problems, or that the medication was given irregularly and not in the way prescribed. The plaintiffs further alleged that no medical or counseling services were offered to children professing suicidal ideations. Instead, such children were put on \"suicide watch.\" \"Suicide watch\" consists of placing the child in a open cage, with only a hard bench along one side. The children would be left there for at least 23 hours, but often for days. \"Suicide watch\" was also given to children punitively. Children also had to strip publicly and put on a 'turtle' suit, which left them vulnerable to the chemical agents, which continued to be used against children on \"suicide watch.\" On April 30, 2013, the Court granted class certification and denied the requested preliminary injunction. The first subclass was defined as: \"each person who is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court (that is, including preadjudicates and excluding direct files) and who is now or in the future incarcerated in the Polk County Jail.\" A Second sub-class was compromised as each person: \"(1) who is now or in the future incarcerated in the Polk County Jail, (2) who is under eighteen or under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and (3) who suffers from a 'mental disorder.' \" With a person who suffers from a mental disorder defined as: \"diagnosed by a mental health care professional, qualified in Florida both to diagnose mental disorders and to prescribe psychotropic medication, and who is suffering from a 'moderate' or 'severe' 'mental disorder,' as defined in the American Psychiatric Association\u2019s DSM-IV and (2) whose current diagnosis, including any prescription for psychotropic medication, appears in the person\u2019s 'intake' records presented to the Polk County Jail at the time the person is presented to, and accepted by, the Polk County Jail for detention.\" On June 12, 2013, Judge Merryday denied defendants' motions for summary judgment, and the parties proceeded to a bench trial, which ran from November 18, 2013 to December 18, 2013. At its close, Judge Merryday ordered both parties to submit proposed finding of facts and conclusions from both the plaintiff and the defendant. On April 16, 2015, Judge Merryday issued an opinion denying relief to the plaintiffs, holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that either the Sheriff or Corizon demonstrated deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiffs and that plaintiffs failed to show that defendants' policies and customs violated their constitutional rights. Judgment was entered for the defendants and against the plaintiffs. On September 1, 2015, Judge Merryday denied the defendant's motion for sanction for insufficient proof of malicious intent by the plaintiff. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On March 15, 2012, a group of juvenile prisoners filed a lawsuit in the Middle District of Florida against the Polk County Jail, claiming violations of their physical and medical care. Preliminary injunction was denied. Class certification was granted. A bench trial was held on from November 18, 2013 to December 18, 2013. On April 16, 2015, Judge Merryday issued an opinion denying relief to the plaintiffs, holding that plaintiffs failed to show defendants' violations of their constitutional rights. The case closed in 2016."}
{"article": "On September 4, 2019, three minors represented by their legal guardians filed a complaint against the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiffs, represented by lawyers from the Southern Poverty Law Center, Florida Justice Institute, and Florida Legal Services, sought class action certification to represent several thousand juveniles (and several hundred in a subclass of juveniles with disabilities) who were or would be in custody in a Florida Department of Juvenile Justice operated secure detention center and subjected to solitary confinement. The plaintiffs alleged that through policy and practice, the DJJ subjected children to solitary confinement, often repeatedly and without any time limit. The plaintiffs cited scientific material that discusses the side effects of isolation: trauma, depression, anxiety, an increased risk of suicide and self-harm, and permanent interference with development. The plaintiffs also alleged that the DJJ failed to provide mental health exams prior to confinement and failed to provide meaningful mental health services during confinement to prevent the onset or exacerbation of mental illness. The plaintiffs brought claims of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, and claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiff class sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring defendants to cease the statewide policy and practice of using solitary confinement in secure detention centers. On October 28, 2019, the defendants filed to dismiss the case by arguing that the plaintiffs did not have a right of action. According to the defendants, the plaintiffs' complaint alleged entitlement to much more than the law required and failed to provide sufficient facts regarding the policy or actual injury from it. Judge Mark E. Walker denied the motion to dismiss on December 6, 2019, saying that the plaintiffs alleged actionable complaints on the quality of prison conditions and the awareness by Department of Juvenile Justice officials of the conditions. 424 F.Supp.3d 1109. Judge Walker referred this case to mediation on December 17, 2019. Mediation talks are ongoing as of May 25, 2020.", "summary": "Three minors represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, Florida Justice Institute, Inc., and Florida Legal Services, filed suit on September 4, 2019 in the Northern District of Florida against the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). Plaintiffs sought class action certification to represent children subject to solitary confinement in DJJ-run detention centers. The defendant's summary judgment motion on the merits was denied on December 6, 2019, and the case is in ongoing mediation talks."}
{"article": "On August 16, 2004, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) began this investigation of the conditions at the Hawaii Youth Correctional Facility (\"HYCF\") in Kailua, Hawaii, pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (\"CRIPA\"), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997, and the pattern or practice provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141 (\"Section 14141\"). Following an extensive investigation, the DOJ issued its findings letter on August 4, 2005 in which it detailed the numerous constitutional deficiencies at the HYCF. The findings letter described the HYCF \"as existing in a state of chaos\" and lacking any policies or procedures to govern the operation of the facility, which created an environment where abuse of youth often went unreported and uninvestigated. The DOJ also found that youth confined at HYCF were subjected to dangerous suicide risks at the facility. Access to mental health and medical care services and required education services were also lacking. Following the DOJ investigation and findings, the HYCF and various Hawaii state agency officials agreed to implement a series of DOJ recommended reforms at HYCF in the areas of protection from harm, training, and access to medical and mental health care and special education. The reforms were recorded in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that was executed by the parties. The MOA provided that Russell Van Vleet would serve as the Monitor to oversee the three-year remediation process. On February 7, 2006, the DOJ filed this lawsuit seeking an order to permanently enjoin the the defendants to provide legal and constitutional conditions of care to the detained youth. The same day, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Conditional Dismissal. In the joint motion, the parties requested that the Court enter the Order and place the case on its inactive docket while retaining jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement until it enters a final order dismissing the case with prejudice. The motion was granted by the District Court (Judge Samuel P. King) on February 9, 2006. The memorandum of agreement was extended for one year to terminate on February 9, 2010, as a mutually binding agreement. The case is closed but docket does not show that a final order was entered on the case.", "summary": "DOJ's investigation of the conditions at the Hawaii Youth Correctional Facility (\"HYCF\") in August 2004 concluded that the facility lacked policies to protect the detained youth from abuse or suicide risks. DOJ recommended reforms at the HYCF through a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that was executed by the parties. This case was brought to retain jurisdiction of the district court of Hawaii's jurisdiction over the case until a final order is entered to dismiss the case with prejudice."}
{"article": "On May 16, 2008, the Attorney General, on behalf of the United States, filed suit against the state of Ohio, its governor, the director of youth services, and the superintendents of its juvenile correctional facilities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141 for an alleged pattern or practice of violating the rights of juvenile detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 20 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1400-1482, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794 et seq. The United States alleged that Ohio failed to protect the youth at its facilities from harm and undue risk of harm, failed to meet their medical and mental health needs, and failed to provide adequate special education services. The alleged harm and undue risk included unwarranted use of force and seclusion, and inadequate grievance and investigation procedures, while the alleged inadequacies of the health and education services were more total and included lack of dental care, and inadequate intake, screening, and treatment. The facilities sued were Circleville Youth Center, Cuyahoga Hills Boys School, Indian River School, Marion Juvenile Correctional Center, Mohican Youth Center, Ohio River Valley Youth Center, Scioto Juvenile Correctional Center, and the Freedom Center. The suit was filed as a result of Department of Justice (DOJ) investigations into the conditions of confinement at the Scioto and Marion centers that began in 2005. On June 12, 2008 in accordance with a joint motion of the parties, the court (Judge Algenon L. Marbley) ordered the entry of a stipulation to injunctive relief for the Scioto and Marion centers and conditionally dismissed the claims against the other facilities. The other facilities were already under a stipulated injunction from the related case <i>S.H. v. Stickrath</i>, linked below (Clearinghouse code: JI-OH-0004), so the claims were dismissed on the condition that the United States have access to all relevant Ohio Department of Youth Services (ODYS) policies and the monitor from the <i>Stickrath</i>. The Independent Fact Finder's 214-page <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JI-OH-0004-0003.pdf\"> report</a> from that case contains useful background for the issues in this case. The Court entered the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief on June 24, 2008. The injunction required Ohio to develop a wide variety of policies, procedures and practices to remedy the undue harm, inadequate medical and mental health care access, and inadequate special education services to which it subjected the juveniles detained in its facilities. In addition, the injunction appointed a monitor, Fred Cohen, to conduct investigations and report periodically on the state's compliance and required the state to train its employees, develop any additional documents or forms necessary to comply with the injunction, and to create and collect data to assess its performance. The terms of the injunction also guaranteed the Department of Justice access to the youth and staff at the Scioto and Marion centers and to all relevant records. Ohio had one year to revise its policies, training materials, and assessment tools so as to comply with the injunction, which was to last for three years or terminate early upon a showing of a year of substantial compliance. Monitor Fred Cohen, who had acted as the monitor for both the <i>S.H.</i> case and this case, resigned from monitoring duties only for this case on September 24, 2009. On December 15, 2009, the Court approved modification of the stipulation to provide a new monitoring scheme in which the DOJ acted as monitor through a team of experts. The modification also recognized that the injunction ceased to apply to the Marion facility, which had been closed. On February 26, 2010, the court ordered ODYS to develop a new meal policy that would ensure that it fed the juveniles committed to the facilities. ODYS had promulgated a protocol that said that youth who refused to go to the cafeteria would not receive a meal. It was applied inconsistently and appeared to deny food to those who refused out of fear. The issue led to a show cause hearing because of discrepancies in the summaries and data provided to the court and to a subsequent order to submit a new policy. By the consent of the parties, the court amended the injunction on June 6, 2011, to remove many provisions. The monitoring section was redone, and the DOJ relinquished that role to a team of experts. Most notable was that the 3-year expiration clause was removed, making the injunction terminable only on a showing of substantial compliance for two reporting periods. The court adopted a revised version of the injunction that reflected the two amendments in a single document on June 28, 2011. On January 18, 2013, as a result of problems with the Progress Unit indicated in the Monitor's Third Report, the parties entered into a consent order that laid out a series of requirements meant to ensure that youth on the Progress Unit are not subjected excessive seclusion, that they receive structured programming, that they be screened to ensure they were not sent to the unit for symptoms of mental illness, and that they be given treatment plans that include reasonable goals designed to enable them to leave the unit. The order would be terminated only upon a showing of substantial compliance for six months. The Monitor's Fourth Report and the First Status Report on Progress Unit were completed in 2013 and included an evaluation of the Scioto Facility. Both reports stated that Ohio was not in substantial compliance with the respective injunctions. As a result of the State's inability to comply with the consent order, on March 12, 2014 the Department of Justice moved to supplement its original complaint by also including the state's use of unlawful seclusion at all of its juvenile correctional facilities. The court approved this motion on March 28, 2014 and DOJ filed a supplemental complaint on March 31, 2014. At the time that DOJ filed its supplemental complaint, it also sought a temporary restraining order to stem the state's seclusion of juveniles with mental health disorders. The Department of Justice announced a final agreement with the State of Ohio on Wednesday, May 21, 2014. While Ohio was working to eventually eliminate disciplinary seclusion of youth, this agreement included interim measures that would taken to ensure that seclusion only occurred under certain conditions and for a limited duration. The state also agreed to reduce the potential harms caused by seclusion by increasing access to therapeutic, educational and recreational services while a young person is in seclusion. On Feb. 11, 2015, the monitoring Correctional Institution Inspection Committee, issued a <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JI-OH-0006-0022.pdf\">report</a> showing a dramatic decline in use of seclusion. The court-appointed monitors submitted final reports in 2015, establishing that the defendant had achieved substantial compliance with the agreement's provisions. The report on the DYS facilities for boys was submitted June 10, 2015, and the report on the DYS-contracted facilities for girls was submitted on November 30, 2015. The monitors submitted their final status report, \"The Ohio Model: A Report on the Transformational Reform of the Ohio Department of Youth Services, 2007-2015,\" on December 7, 2015. The report documented improvements including recording and review of uses of force; a meaningful grievance system; abolition of disciplinary seclusion and dramatic reductions in pre-hearing seclusion; educational programming; increased family visitation; improved mental health treatment; and reduction of the incarcerated population. On December 3, 2015, the parties made a joint motion to terminate the consent decree. The consent decree was terminated on December 9, 2015, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "The Attorney General filed suit against the state of Ohio, its governor, the director of youth services, and the superintendents of its juvenile correctional facilities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141 for an alleged pattern or practice of violating the rights of juvenile detainees under the 14th Amendment, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The United States alleged that Ohio failed to protect the youth at its facilities from harm and undue risk of harm, failed to meet their medical and mental health needs, and failed to provide adequate special education services. The suit was filed as a result of Department of Justice (DOJ) investigations into the conditions of confinement at the Scioto and Marion centers that began in 2005. The Marion facility closed soon after the first injunction in this case. Ohio achieved substantial compliance in 2015, and the consent decree was terminated on December 3, 2015."}
{"article": "On November 1, 2000, a juvenile who had been arrested for violating curfew filed a civil rights class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of South Dakota, challenging the Minnehaha County Juvenile Detention Center policy of strip-searching all juveniles admitted to the Detention Center, without any reasonable suspicion that the juveniles were concealing weapons or contraband. Plaintiff sought damages and injunctive relief. The County and individual County officials denied the allegations and argued that the individual officials were entitled to qualified immunity. On March 20, 2002, the District Court (Judge Lawrence L. Piersol) certified the case as a class action, establishing a damages class and an injunctive relief class, consisting of: \"All persons ... who, when they were under the age of eighteen years, were charged with minor offenses at any time on or after November 1, 1997 and up to a date in the future to be set by the Court, or who were charged with non-felony offenses at any time on or after April 16, 1999 and up to a date in the future to be set by the Court, and were strip searched at the Minnehaha County Juvenile Detention Center.\" After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim. The District Court (Judge Piersol) entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on the Fourth Amendment claim and denied the individual officials' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Smook v. Minnehaha County, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (D.S.D. 2004). Reconsideration was denied. Smook v. Minnehaha County, S.D., 353 F.Supp. 2d 1059 (D.S.D. 2005), and the defendants appealed. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that (1) the search of the named plaintiff, requiring her to strip to her undergarments, was not a full strip search and did not violate the Fourth Amendment; (2) county officials were immune from suit even if the search was deemed illegal, because it did not vindicate a clearly established right; and (3) the plaintiff class lacked standing to seek injunctive relief. Since the claim of the named plaintiff was dismissed, the case was remanded to the District Court to determine whether the class should be redefined or decertified and whether there was an adequate class representative to replace the named plaintiff. Smook v. Minnehaha County, 457 F.3d 806 (8th Cir.(S.D.) Aug 09, 2006), rehearing and rehearing en banc denied (Sep 27, 2006). Plaintiff's petition for certiorari was denied. Smook v. Minnehaha County, S.D., 127 S.Ct. 1885 (2007). On remand, the plaintiffs added three additional individuals as named plaintiffs for the class. In an effort to avoid having to litigate the case again, the two sides agreed to a monetary settlement. The agreement included a payment of $450,000 by the defendants, including $182,500 in attorneys' fees and $182,500 to be divided among members of the class.", "summary": "The juvenile plaintiff brought suit against the Minnehaha County Juvenile Detention Center, challenging the center's policy of strip-searching all juveniles admitted to the Detention Center, without any reasonable suspicion that the juveniles were concealing weapons or contraband. The Eighth Circuit overturned the District Court's ruling, holding that the search of the named plaintiff did not violate the Fourth Amendment. On remand, the parties reached a monetary settlement before having to relitigate the case."}
{"article": "On May 7, 2004, individuals in the custody of the Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF) filed a civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, challenging the conditions of their confinement at the Florida Civil Commitment Center (FCCC) in Arcadia, Florida. Plaintiffs were all involuntarily civilly confined at the FCCC pursuant to Sexually Violent Predator Act \u00a7\u00a7 394.910, et seq. Fla. Stat. (2003). Plaintiffs alleged violations of their constitutional rights, specifically their 14th Amendment rights, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12131 et. seq. (ADA) by the denial of effective sex offender treatment programs, lack of appropriate mental health care, and the failure to identify and accommodate inmates with disabilities in a way that would allow them to participate effectively in sex-offender treatment. Attorneys for the Southern Legal Counsel, Inc., the Florida Institutional Legal Services, Inc. and the Legal Advocacy Center of Central Florida, Inc. represented plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. Defendants named in the Complaint were the DCF and the private corporation Liberty Behavioral Healthcare Corp. which operated the FCCC pursuant to a contract with the DCF. Discovery and discovery related disputes comprised the majority of the case activity for the next several years. On January 16, 2007, the District Court (Judge John E. Steele) granted Liberty's motion to be dismissed as a defendant, on the grounds that Liberty no longer operated the FCCC and that the plaintiff class sought declaratory and injunctive relief, but not money damages. Plaintiffs moved to join GEO Group, Inc., the company contracted to run the facility for a five-year term beginning on January 1, 2007, as a defendant. This motion was granted, but because of likely delays that would have resulted from GEO's participation as a party, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed GEO on June 4, 2007. The case continued against DCF. Discovery disputes and failed attempts by other inmates to join the case as intervening plaintiffs dominated the case docket for the next two and a half years. The case was scheduled to go to trial in September 2009, but on July 16, 2009 the parties moved to have the case stayed while a settlement was finalized. The case settled on November 23, 2009, and the case was dismissed with prejudice. The settlement established a Final Action Plan, which itself was not, the parties agreed, a judicially enforceable settlement or court issued injunction. The Plan called for improvements to the oversight and staffing of the inpatient mental health unit, the implementation of policies addressing the screening and referral process for the use of anti-androgens, comprehensive discharge planning for Phase IV residents, modifications to the special needs treatment track, and additional training for clinical staff and housing staff. The Final Action Plan also acknowledged significant improvements implemented by DCF and GEO during the pendency of the case. All of the issues in the plaintiffs complaint were either addressed by the terms of the Final Action Plan, or had been addressed by changes to FCCC's policies during the pendency of the case. The Final Action Plan was scheduled to be fully implemented by February 2010. The defendants agreed to pay $249,000 in fees and costs to the plaintiffs' attorneys. Several class members objected to the settlement. They argued, inter alia, that the settlement should have required a federal monitor or court oversight to ensure compliance. The district court rejected this argument when it approved the settlement, and several class members then filed separate appeals to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which denied each appeal, and on February 24, 2010 affirmed the District Court's approval of the settlement.", "summary": "This suit was filed May 7, 2004. Plaintiffs were individuals who had been involuntarily civilly confined pursuant to Sexually Violent Predator Act into the custody of the Florida Dept. of Children and Families in the Florida Civil Commitment Center (FCCC). Plaintiffs argued that the State failed to provide adequate rehabilitive treatment necessary for their eventual recovery and release. In November 2009, after five years of discovery and motions practice, the case settled, with the State agreeing to implement policies that addressed all the plaintiffs' allegations."}
{"article": "On February 27, 2002, four individuals involuntarily detained by the Illinois Department of Human Services pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (\u201cSVP Act\u201d) on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Northern Illinois. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by private counsel and the ACLU, they sought a declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, costs and reasonable attorney\u2019s fees, and the right of all class members to bring subsequent individual lawsuits for damages. The plaintiffs claimed that the state failed to provide adequate and meaningful health treatment to the plaintiffs and those similarly situated; the treatment and care that was given was, they alleged, punitive and constitutionally inadequate. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had failed to properly train their staff, provide individualized treatment programs, allow for family participation in rehabilitation efforts, allow for fair grievance procedures, afford reasonable opportunities to residents for activities, and to institute a procedure to guarantee appropriate therapist/patient confidentiality. The defendants also allegedly required, as a precondition to participation in all but the most basic treatment, that plaintiffs admit to many crimes for which they were not convicted. The conditions of confinement, according to the plaintiffs, were also unreasonable restrictive. Examples included routine strip searches, routine shackling with restraints used in \u201csuper-max\u201d prisons, intrusive and frequent cell searches, constant surveillance and in general having their freedom of movement restricted in a variety of arbitrary ways. On March 19, 2002, this case was reassigned from Judge Matthew F. Kennelly to Judge Harry D. Leinenweber. Shortly thereafter on March 27, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a motion to maintain class action. Judge Leinenweber granted the motion on June 28, 2002. 2002 WL 1433729 (N.D. Ill. 2002) On May 14, 2002, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 class action complaint. Judge Leinenweber denied the motion on July 25, 2002. 2002 WL 1732911 (N.D. Ill. 2002) Following trial, on January 13, 2005, Judge Leinenweber granted the plaintiffs declaratory relief concerning the Special or Secure Management Status (\u201cSMS\u201d) used at the Joliet Treatment and Detention Facility (the \u201cTDF\u201d), holding it unconstitutional. SMS referred to the status and set of conditions that a patient would be placed under when determined to be a danger to himself or others. However, he denied all of the plaintiffs\u2019 remaining claims. The court stated that while the low rates of treatment participation, progress, and release at the TDF was disappointing, it did not amount to a constitutional violation. In addition, because the SMS policy had been amended several months before trial, the court denied injunctive relief on that issue. The new SMS policy, the court held, cured the defects in the prior policy. 2005 WL 399300 (N.D. Ill. 2005) On January 28, 2002 the plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider. However, Judge Leinenweber denied the motion on March 25, 2005. Finally, on July 26, 2005 Judge Leinenweber declined to award attorney\u2019s fees or other costs to either party, directing both parties bear their own fees and costs. Outside of an acknowledgment of receipt of sealed document #75 on January 14, 2010, there has been no activity on the docket since October 3, 2005. Therefore, it seems that the case is closed.", "summary": "On February 27, 2002, four individuals involuntarily detained by the Illinois Department of Human Services (\"DHS\") pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (\u201cSVP Act\u201d) on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Northern Illinois. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to provide adequate and meaningful health treatment to the plaintiffs and those similarly situated and the treatment and care that was given was punitive and Constitutionally inadequate. In 2005, Judge Leinenweber granted the plaintiffs\u2019 demand for declaratory relief concerning the previous Special or Secure Management Status (\u201cSMS\u201d) used at the Joliet Treatment and Detention Facility (the \u201cTDF\u201d) stating that it was unconstitutional; however all of the plaintiffs\u2019 remaining claims were denied including the claim of inadequate treatment."}
{"article": "On August 14, 2014, a number of prisoners in Louisiana state prisons filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest attorneys, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that, despite their being found not guilty by reason of insanity of criminal offenses, they were still being incarcerated in Louisiana prisons. The named plaintiffs claimed that their continued imprisonment violated their Fourteenth Amendment right under the Due Process Clause, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504). The named plaintiffs were all found not guilty by reason of insanity during their criminal trials and they were all committed by the courts to the Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System (ELMHS), which runs a state mental health facility. Nevertheless, at the time of the complaint, all named plaintiffs still remained incarcerated in state prisons, despite the fact that no other criminal charges had been filed against them. Plaintiffs claim that by continuing to incarcerate them, the state is discriminating against them on the basis of their mental illness and denying them appropriate mental health services. After the plaintiffs filed an amended class-action complaint, the Judge Shelly Dick granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. 2014 WL 7334911. She granted the motion as to the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims seeking monetary damages against the Louisiana Department of Health and Human Services on sovereign immunity grounds. But she denied the motion as to all other respects. The Court denied then plaintiffs' class certification on December 22, 2014, finding that numerosity was not satisfied because the putative class consisted of only thirty-six individuals. 2014 WL 7338846. The plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint on January 26, 2015, and a third amended complaint on May 13. Discovery and litigation continued, and on February 3, 2016, this case was consolidated with <i>Advocacy Center v. Kliebert</i> (Docket No. 3:15-cv-00751). After several months of settlement discussions, on July 18, 2016, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice to the right to reopen it within sixty days if the parties did not settle. On September 2, 2016, the parties reported that they had reached a settlement, moving jointly to reopen the case for purpose of entering that agreement as a court order. The Court granted the motion and approved the settlement on November 16, 2016. The terms of the settlement agreement apply to \"All individuals who, after having been found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity or Incompetent to Stand Trial are remanded by a court to a mental health facility for treatment.\" The settlement requires the defendants to maintain a record of all such persons, conduct prompt behavioral health assessments after the court orders commitment or inpatient treatment, admit such persons currently on a waitlist to a mental health facility or appropriate program, create a procedure for expedited admission of such persons to the appropriate facilities in the event of an emergency need, maintain pre- and post-admissions procedures for ensuring appropriate placement of such persons, work to develop less constricting and new placement options, and report back to the plaintiffs on a monthly basis. The settlement agreement also awards the plaintiffs with attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $466,000 and possible future fees related to the execution of this settlement agreement. The case was set to remain open to enforce the settlement decree until November, 2020. Since no motions were filed to enforce the settlement decree by the deadline, the case is presumed closed.", "summary": "On Aug. 14, 2014, a number of prisoners in Louisiana filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 claiming that the state violated the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and their 14th Amendment due process rights by keeping them incarcerated despite their being found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed by the court to the state's mental health facility. On July 18, 2016, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice to the right to reopen it within sixty days if the parties did not settle. The parties subsequently settled, agreeing to send individuals found not guilty due to insanity to mental health institutions."}
{"article": "On October 31, 2001, the Center for Public Representation, the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee, and a private law firm filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396, against the Governor of Massachusetts and other state officials, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The lawsuit was filed on behalf of Rosie D. and eight other Medicaid-eligible children, aged 6 to 15, who were hospitalized or at risk of hospitalization due to a lack of home-based services. The class they sought to represent included tens of thousands of children in Massachusetts who were eligible for Medicaid (MassHealth) and had emotional, behavioral, or psychiatric disabilities. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had failed to provide medically necessary services as required under the federal Medicaid Act, and that it had failed to inform parents and children that they were entitled to these covered services. On December 19, 2001, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On March 29, 2002, the district court (Judge Michael A. Ponsor) denied the motion to dismiss and certified the case as a class action. The defendants appealed the denial of their motion to dismiss. On November 7, 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected the defendants\u2019 appeal, holding that children had an enforceable right under the Medicaid Act to medically necessary treatment. 310 F.3d 230. The district court issued an order compelling the defendants to produce requested documents for the plaintiffs on April 14, 2003. 256 F. Supp. 2d 115. On December 16, 2004, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On March 25, 2005, the district court denied the motion for summary judgment, and the case headed for trial. The case went through a six-week trial in the spring of 2005. On January 26, 2006, the court issued a 98-page decision that found that Massachusetts had violated the EPSDT provisions of the federal Medicaid Act (requirements for \u201cEarly and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment\u201d services) by failing to provide home-based services to thousands of children across the state. 410 F. Supp. 2d 18. The result of this failure was that thousands of Massachusetts children with serious emotional disturbance were forced to endure unnecessary confinement in residential facilities or to remain in costly institutions far longer than their medical conditions required. As a result of the judgment, the parties entered into negotiations to create a remedial plan. After six months of negotiations that failed to produce agreement, both sides presented separate plans to the court. On February 22, 2007, the court approved a modified version of the defendants\u2019 plan. 474 F. Supp. 2d 238. The court\u2019s adopted plan sought to restructure the children's mental health system by incorporating intensive home-based services, including behavioral health screenings, assessments, case management, crisis intervention, and in-home therapeutic supports. The plan\u2019s strict timelines required full implementation by June 2009. The court also appointed a monitor to oversee the implementation, to mediate disputes between the parties, and to determine compliance with the court\u2019s order. On January 16, 2009, the defendants filed a motion to modify the judgment and to give them until July 1, 2010 to implement the plan. On February 27, 2009, the district court granted some extra time to the defendants, allowing them until December 1, 2009, to fully implement the remedial plan. Both parties submitted periodical implementation reports on the remedial plan. On November 29, 2011, the court partially granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion to insure timely access to remedial services. The court ordered the defendants to propose a new plan for standards governing enrollment in Intensive Care Coordination, and a new timetable for implementation of these standards. The court also ordered that the defendants must appear before it every 60 days to report on their compliance progress. Over the next few years, both parties continued to submit status reports, and the court proceeded to extend the monitor\u2019s role in six-month increments and endorsed the parties\u2019 agreement regarding the monitor\u2019s budget. On February 7, 2019, the court denied the defendants\u2019 motion to terminate monitoring. It noted that despite \u201cpersistent prodding from the court, Defendants are still grossly failing\u201d to bring themselves into compliance with the remedial plan. Specifically, the defendants had failed to demonstrate they could provide \u201creasonably prompt\u201d care to a substantial portion of the plaintiffs, which was defined as offering an initial appointment within fourteen days after initial contact. Citing this, and the defendants\u2019 apparent lack of effort at compliance, the court retained its power to continue its supervision. The defendants appealed this decision to the First Circuit on March 11, 2019. On March 13, the court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 two outstanding motions, \u201cin light of the general rule that\u2026the filing of an appeal deprives a district court of the power to act substantively in a case until proceedings on appeal conclude.\u201d The same day, the case was reassigned to Judge Richard G. Stearns. On July 1, 2019, the district court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion to extend the appointment of the court monitor, subject to the First Circuit\u2019s ruling on appeal. On May 4, 2020, the First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court. It held that because the parties\u2019 agreement had provided for the monitor\u2019s appointment to conclude on December 31, 2018, the district court had improperly extended the monitor\u2019s appointment. On remand, the plaintiffs should have the opportunity to show \u201cgood cause\u201d to modify the agreement by extending the monitor\u2019s appointment; the district court should analyze the question in light of <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=126\"><i>Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail</i></a>. 958 F.3d 51 The First Circuit denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for rehearing <i>en banc</i> (before the entire court, rather than the typical 3-judge panel) on June 17, 2020. As of August 2020, further proceedings are pending in the district court.", "summary": "This was a class-action lawsuit in which the plaintiffs alleged that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had failed to provide medically necessary services as required under the federal Medicaid Act, and that it had failed to inform parents and children that they were entitled to these covered services. The district court found that the Commonwealth violated provisions of the federal Medicaid Act by failing to provide home-based services to thousands of children across the state. In 2007, the district court approved a remedial plan intended to restructure the children\u2019s mental health system by incorporating intensive home-based services, including behavioral health screenings, assessments, case management, crisis intervention and in-home therapeutic supports. It also appointed a monitor to oversee implementation and compliance. The parties agreed to extend the monitor\u2019s appointment several times, with the final extension expiring on December 31, 2018. In July 2019, the court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion to again extend the monitor\u2019s appointment; the First Circuit overturned this ruling on May 4, 2020. As of August 2020, the extension is before the district court on remand."}
{"article": "On August 11, 2016 , the Attorney General and Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of Mississippi. The DOJ sued the State of Mississippi under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA). The DOJ asked the court to enjoin the State of Mississippi from discriminating against adults with mental illness and from failing to provide them with appropriate integrated community programs. The DOJ claimed that Mississippi violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by \"administering the State's mental health service system in a manner that denies qualified adults with mental illness the benefits of the State's mental health services.\" See <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/MH-MS-0001-0001.pdf\">Complaint</a>. Further, the DOJ argued that State hospitals were segregated because they restricted contact with people without disabilities, and presented a lack of meaningful choice for patients in opportunities such as choosing friends, food, living space, activities, and employment. On October 24, 2016, the State filed a motion to consolidate this case with <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12480\">Troupe v. Barbour</a>, a case filed in the Southern District of Mississippi that commenced in 2010. In that case, four minor plaintiffs made claims against the State regarding its treatment of them as children with mental illness. On December 6, a magistrate judge found the cases to have common questions of law and fact and ordered their consolidation. But soon afterward, the plaintiffs in both cases filed a motion for reconsideration of the consolidation. On March 19, 2017, District Court Judge Henry T. Wingate vacated the December 6 consolidation order, finding that there were few common questions of fact between the cases and that consolidating them would result in undue delays and injustice to the plaintiffs. After months of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgement on December 21, 2018, claiming that the plaintiffs lacked standing under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and had failed to prove that a reasonable modification of Mississippi's mental health system was available. The court denied the motion on May 13, 2019, finding that plaintiffs had standing and that they had met the burden of suggesting a plausible accommodation to the mental health system (Judge Carlton W. Reeves). After four weeks of a bench trial, the court issued an opinion on September 3, 2019. The court found that Mississippi's health system fell short of the requirements established by law and that the state operated a system that unlawfully discriminated against persons with serious mental illness. As a remedy, Judge Reeves ordered that the parties propose three names of special masters to oversee the state's move to community-based care and set a hearing to discuss the potential special master. The master will be tasked to help the parties craft the appropriate remedy. The hearing was set for December 2, 2019. The case was ongoing as of November 27, 2019.", "summary": "The U.S. sued the State of Mississippi under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The U.S. alleged that the State knowingly failed to provide adequate mental health programs for adults with mental illness and segregated adults with disabilities in their State-run hospitals. After a four-week bench trial, the court found that the health system violated the ADA and required a special master to determine and oversee the remedial process. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "Plaintiff, a student at Hunter College of the City University of New York, referred to in this case as Jane Doe, brought this private lawsuit against the College on August 20, 2004. She also brought claims against the College's President, Jennifer Raab, and its Acting Vice President, Eija Ayravainen, in their individual capacities and their capacities as administrators of the College. Plaintiff suffered from Major Depressive Disorder and was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. In June of 2004, she attempted suicide in her dormitory room at the College. She had also overdosed on medication earlier that year while at school. Pursuant to a school policy stating that students who attempt suicide would be asked to take a leave of absence from their Residence Halls for a semester, following the incident on June 5, the College notified plaintiff that she would not be allowed to live in the dorm during the fall 2004 semester. The College also told her she would be required to visit with Deans and counselors on campus. In her Amended Complaint, filed on October 7, 2004, plaintiff brought the following claims: 1) intentional discrimination under the Fair Housing Act; 2) intentional discrimination and failure to accommodate in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act; and 3) intentional discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on October 27, 2004, alleging that as a state institution, the College and its officials were protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. On August 25, 2005, Judge Sidney H. Stein denied defendants' motion to dismiss and ordered the parties to begin discovery. The parties engaged in negotiations and, on August 22, 2006, jointly filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. On the same day, the parties filed a Settlement Agreement. The Agreement indicated that defendants would pay a total of $100,000 in attorneys' fees and would pay approximately $63,000 in damages to plaintiff over a period of 48 months. The case is closed.", "summary": "Plaintiff, a student at Hunter College of the City University of New York, brought this action against the College and its administrators on August 20, 2004, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiff, who was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, brought claims under the Fair Housing Act, the ADA, and Section 504 after the College forced her to leave its dormitory following her suicide attempt in June 2004. The case eventually settled, with defendants paying plaintiff attorneys' fees and damages."}
{"article": "On March 15, 1996, the United States filed a lawsuit under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997, against the State of Tennessee, the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation (DMH/MR) and the Memphis Mental Health Institute (MMHI), in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Memphis Division. The government asked the court for injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants were depriving patients of MMHI of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities. Specifically, the plaintiff contended that the defendants failed to provide adequate medical care, failed to provide individualized psychiatric care and treatment, and failed to provide adequate trained direct care and professional staff. The CRIPA investigation began in 1990. On November 2, 1990, the Department of Justice (DOJ) began sending internal memoranda recommending a CRIPA investigation of conditions at MMHI. The preliminary findings indicated that conditions there included inadequate psychiatric care and treatment, inadequate supervision and neglect caused by an inadequate number of professional and direct care staff, as well as general medical care deficiencies, including overuse and misuse of medication and an unsafe and unsanitary environment. On December 12, 1990, the DOJ sent the Governor of Tennessee a letter indicating an intention to investigate. And, on April 4, 1991, the DOJ sent another letter to the Governor presenting interim findings. In that letter, the DOJ indicated it found MMHI did not have a sufficient number of psychiatrists, nurses, or psychiatric technicians, and that DMH/MR planned to cut additional staff positions at MMHI. On February 6, 1992, the DOJ sent another letter to the Governor presenting its findings. In that letter, the DOJ indicated it found that MMHI failed to provide patients with adequate general and emergency medical care, had inadequate psychiatric care and medication practices, and employed improper and excessive use of physical restraints. Further, in its findings letter, DOJ demanded implementation of certain remedial measures. Apparently, the parties began negotiating a settlement before the CRIPA lawsuit was filed. On March 15, 1996, the same day as the complaint was filed, the parties submitted a joint motion for entry of a consent decree. Under the settlement agreement the defendants agreed to implement all policies, systems, procedures and rules currently in place, to provide quarterly status reports, provide the government access to the facilities, records, patients, and employees of MMHI, and to confer in good faith on the provisions of the consent decree. Further, the consent decree contained provisions detailing staffing requirements, patient treatment and discharge plans, and non-psychiatric medical care. On March 27, 1996, the District Court (Judge Julia S. Gibbons) approved the consent decree, and retained jurisdiction of the action until the consent decree was terminated with respect to all requirements. And, on May 21, 1997, the Court entered judgment in accordance with the consent decree and terminated the case, retaining jurisdiction for necessary enforcement of the decree. And, on September 18, 1998, the District Court (Judge Gibbons) granted the parties' joint motion for a stipulation and order, effectuating the consent decree. On June 21, 2005, the District Court (Judge Bernice B. Donald) granted the parties' joint motion for an order partially terminating the consent decree and approved the parties' stipulation for supplemental relief. We have no more information on this file.", "summary": "On March 15, 1996, the United States filed a lawsuit under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997, against the State of Tennessee, the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation (DMH/MR) and the Memphis Mental Health Institute (MMHI), in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Memphis Division. On March 15, 1996, the same day as the complaint was filed, the parties submitted a joint motion for entry of a consent decree. Under the settlement agreement the defendants agreed to implement all policies, systems, procedures and rules currently in place, to provide quarterly status reports, provide the government access to the facilities, records, patients, and employees of MMHI, and to confer in good faith on the provisions of the consent decree. On May 21, 1997, the Court entered judgment in accordance with the consent decree and terminated the case, retaining jurisdiction for necessary enforcement of the decree. And, on September 18, 1998, the District Court (Judge Gibbons) granted the parties' joint motion for a stipulation and order, effectuating the consent decree. On June 21, 2005, the District Court (Judge Bernice B. Donald) granted the parties' joint motion for an order partially terminating the consent decree and approved the parties' stipulation for supplemental relief."}
{"article": "Pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (\"CRIPA\"), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (\"DOJ\") conducted an investigation of conditions at the Nim Henson Geriatric Center (\"Henson\"), a county-operated skilled nursing facility in Jackson, Kentucky. The investigation resulted in a findings letter being sent to Breathitt County's judge executive on March 6, 2003. The letter stated that in June 2002, DOJ and certain of its expert consultants toured the facility, interviewed administrators, residents and staff, and reviewed medical and other records. The DOJ's investigation led it to conclude that certain conditions at Henson violated residents' federal constitutional and statutory rights. According to the DOJ, residents at Henson suffered from deficiencies in the following areas: 1) general medical care, 2) chemical restraints, 3) wound and nutritional care, 4) restorative care, 5) psychiatric care, and 6) incident management and quality assurance. The findings letter described that the DOJ investigators determined that the facility's medication management practices; its medical notes and documentation; and its oversight and management of medical care did not meet generally accepted standards of care. Among the identified systemic deficiencies were unjustified use on residents of polypharmacy and psychotropic medications, inadequate monitoring of medications' effects, and failure to re-evaluate the continued necessity or dosage units of certain drugs. The investigation found poor or absent (i) physician-pharmacist consultations, (ii) medication policies and guidelines, (iii) diagnosis and treatment of underlying disorders (rather than symptoms), (iv) medical notes and documentation, and (v) oversight and management of medical care. The facility employed sedation for reasons not associated with a medical condition, and the intermediate care unit within the facility provided substandard wound assessment, identification, care and tracking. Failure to appropriately respond to instances of weight loss and overuse of feeding tubes reflected poor nutritional care at the facility. Henson's failure to provide active (as opposed to passive) group activities, an absence of functional furniture, and care plans that failed to include restorative interventions addressing preventable declines in residents' functioning were other shortcomings described in the findings letter. Particularly in the intermediate care unit, DOJ found that the nursing staff lacked a systematized approach to resident assessment and to the provision of early intervention regarding significant changes in resident status. Additionally, at least half of the residents sampled were receiving psychiatric care that substantially departed from generally accepted standards. No psychiatric and no behavioral professionals were available to the facility; physicians and nurses at the facility had no training in geriatric psychiatry generally, or in treating individuals experiencing dementia or depression; and residents who badly needed acute psychiatric care were rarely transferred to psychiatric hospitals. Henson's incident management efforts failed to pull relevant disciplines together to identify and provide needed supports and services to prevent falls and injuries. Likewise, the facility lacked an effective quality assurance system to track significant trends and events and ensure that proper corrective action occurs. Regarding discharge planning, the DOJ found that Henson's staff did not adequately evaluate or assess residents for their discharge potential. It failed to have its treatment professionals periodically assess whether community-based treatment was appropriate. These latter inadequacies violated the Americans with Disabilities Act-imposed obligation to treat residents in the most integrated setting appropriate to their individual needs. See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12132 and 42 C.F.R. \u00a7 35.139(j). The DOJ findings letter proposed remedial actions to remedy the multiple deficiencies, invited the county to address the issues, and alerted the county to the possibility of a CRIPA lawsuit brought by the United States to compel remedial action. On February 17, 2004 the United States filed a complaint against Breathitt County, Kentucky, and Breathitt County Geriatric Corporation for violating CRIPA, 42 U.S.C. \u00a71997, within the Nim Henson Nursing Home for the violations noted in the findings letter above. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendants failed to protect residents from harm and, further, failed \u201cto provide adequate medical, nursing, nutritional, wound, restorative, and psychiatric care to residents\u201d in the nursing home. Moreover, the complaint alleged that the defendants failed to continually assess whether the treatment needs of residents were being met. On February 19, 2004, a settlement agreement was entered with the court. Through the settlement agreement the parties agreed to the following terms: Defendants would ensure that residents shall be promptly assessed, diagnosed, treated, monitored, and, when necessary, reassessed, diagnosed, and treated with current, generally accepted standards of care, including documentation adequate to withstand clinical scrutiny. Defendants would develop policies to fully monitor medication distribution, and the effects of medications on patients. Defendants would keep accurate, current, complete, and organized medical documentation. Defendants would cease using restrictive controls and chemical restraints except in narrow situations. Defendants would create and maintain a documentation system, as well as a formulary, for patient wound care. Furthermore, defendants would ensure that nurses knew \u201cthe wound status of each resident in their care.\u201d Defendants would monitor the weight and nutrition of residents and ensure that necessary interventions occurred. Defendants would ensure residents are able to have the highest quality of life possible and develop a restorative care plan for all residents. Defendants would provide necessary psychiatric care for residents. Defendants would investigate and follow up on all \u201cunusual incidents\u201d or incidents involving injury. Defendants would routinely assess residents to see if community placement is necessary. Defendants would provide the United States Department of Justice with status report within 90 days and provide continual, unrestricted access to buildings and facilities, staff, residents, and records relating to the settlement agreement, staff, or residents Two years after the settlement agreement, the government found that the Nim Henson Nursing Home had been complying with all the terms of the settlement agreement. As a result, the case was dismissed.", "summary": "On February 17, 2004 the United States filed a complaint against Breathitt County, Kentucky, and Breathitt County Geriatric Corporation for violating CRIPA, 42 U.S.C. \u00a71997, after the county failed to take action to remedy the violations laid out after the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (\"DOJ\") conducted an investigation of conditions at the Nim Henson. On February 19, 2004, a settlement agreement was entered with the cour, and two years after the settlement agreement, the government found that the Nim Henson Nursing Home had been complying with all the terms of the settlement agreement."}
{"article": "On January 31, 2006, AT&T telephone and internet customers filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against AT&T Corp. and AT&T Inc. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest and private counsel, asked the court to declare as unlawful the defendants' participation in the federal government's program to monitor and collect Americans' telephone and internet communications and sought an injunction against the defendants' continued or future participation in the program, claiming that the program was operated in violation of federal electronic surveillance and telecommunication statutes, as well as the First and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In 2006, the Multi District Litigation (MDL) Panel consolidated the case as the lead case in a multi-district litigation consolidation, In Re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13881\">NS-CA-11</a>, in this Clearinghouse. For information about what happened while the case was a part of the consolidation see <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12825\">NS-CA-0004</a>. On May 13, 2006, the United States moved to intervene as a defendant. The motion was unopposed and the District Court (Judge Vaughn R. Walker) granted the motion at a June 23, 2006 hearing. AT&T and the United States separately moved to dismiss the lawsuit. On July 20, 2006, the Court denied both motions to dismiss. Judge Walker ruled that the government could not rely on the state secrets privilege and that a telecom defendant could not assert immunity. The Court, however, certified the case for immediate appeal. Hepting v. AT & T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2006). The defendants' appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. On April 26, 2007, the Ninth Circuit consolidated Al-Haramain v. Bush, No. 06-36083, with this case. However, on November 16, 2007, the Ninth Circuit severed the two cases from each other and ordered that the cases would no longer be consolidated for any purpose. Hepting v. AT & T Corp., 508 F.3d 898, 899 (9th Cir. 2007). Oral argument was heard in August 2007. Prior to any Ninth Circuit decision, in July 2008, Congress enacted and President George Bush signed, the FISA Amendments Act that granted retroactive immunity to telecommunications companies for past violations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (\"FISA\") provided that the Attorney General of the United States certified to the relevant U.S. District Court that the surveillance did not occur, was legal, or was authorized by the president. The case was returned to the District Court in light of the FISA Amendments Act. Hepting v. AT & T Corp., 539 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). Attorney General Michael Mukasey filed the requisite certification in September 2008 and the United States moved to dismiss all claims against telecommunication company defendants in this lawsuit as well as dozens of other lawsuits that were ordered to be consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in a multidistrict litigation proceeding. On June 3, 2009, the District Court (U.S. District Judge Vaughn R. Walker) granted the United States' motion to dismiss based upon the retroactive immunity provision in the the FISA Amendments Act. Judge Walker dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, but without prejudice, saying that the plaintiffs could re-file if there was evidence of improper surveillance that fell outside the telecoms' immunity period found in the FISA amendments, which extended from Sept. 11, 2001 to Jan. 7, 2007. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal. On December 29, 2011, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges Harry Pregerson, Michael Daly Hawkins, and M. Margaret McKeown) affirmed the District Court's dismissal. However, Judge McKeown disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the immunity provisions were temporally limited. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case on October 9, 2012. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On January 31, 2006, subscribers to or customers of telephone or internet services that AT&T provided filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against AT&T Corp. and AT&T Inc., claiming that the defendants' participation in the federal government's program to monitor and collect Americans' telephone and internet communications was unlawful. The United States quickly intervened as a defendant. The lawsuit was dismissed based upon retroactive legislation. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal and the Supreme Court declined to hear the case."}
{"article": "On March 12, 2018, the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California (ACLU-NC) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) under the Freedom of Information Act (\"FOIA\"), 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552. The ACLU-NC claimed that it submitted a FOIA request to both TSA Headquarters and TSA's San Francisco Field Office for documents relating to searches of electronic devices of airline passengers, but neither provided any records. The plaintiff sought an order for the TSA to promptly process and release all responsive records, and a declaration that TSA's failure to disclose the requested records was unlawful. The plaintiffs claimed that the TSA violated FOIA by wrongfully withholding records, and specifically, they claimed that the TSA's searches of electronic devices at airports and borders (particularly of domestic air passengers) were a matter of significant public interest. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler. The TSA moved to dismiss the complaint on June 13, 2018, claiming that (1) the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (2) the TSA performed a reasonable and adequate search for records in response to the plaintiff's FOIA request; (3) the TSA lawfully and appropriately withheld information exempt from disclosure under the FOIA; and (4) the lawsuit was not necessary for the plaintiff to get the information it was entitled to under the FOIA. Between June and July 2018, the ACLU-NC and the TSA stipulated that they were working in good faith to resolve some of the claims and issues in this action. On August 9, 2018, the parties acknowledged that there were no prior or pending motions, and that they anticipated the matter could be resolved on summary judgment. TSA filed notice of settlement on December 20, 2018. According the the ACLU of Northern California's website, \"TSA ultimately provided a letter stating that it does not conduct device searches and that its personnel abide by TSA Standard Operating Procedures that do not allow device searches of passengers.\" On January 2, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion stipulating to the settlement and dismissing the case with prejudice. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In March 2018, the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff alleged that the Transportation Security Administration violated the Freedom of Information Act for wrongfully withholding its records about electronic device searches. The TSA ultimately provided a letter stating it does not conduct device searches, and the ACLU agreed to dismiss the case."}
{"article": "This Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) complaint, filed June 27, 2017, seeks to enhance knowledge about discriminatory immigration policy regarding Muslims, Latinos, and other members of groups disfavored by the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiffs are two non-profit organizations: Council on American-Islamic Relations - Connecticut (CAIR-CT) and Make the Road New York (MRNY). In the complaint, they cited various examples of anti-immigrant and anti-refugee rhetoric from President Trump, as well as the Trump administration's Executive Orders banning entry into the United States of individuals from certain majority-Muslim countries. The plaintiffs argued that these incidents directly impacted their work of enhancing public understanding of Islam and empowering immigrant and working-class communities. The plaintiffs submitted three FOIA requests in furtherance of their work to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and DOS. According to the complaint, the FOIA requests sought greater understanding of the administration's immigration enforcement policies out of a concern that the defendants have targeted individuals on the basis of actual or perceived religion, ethnicity, race, or national origin in enforcing their immigration policies. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought \"disclosure of agency policies, communications, and statistics related to visa processing and visa issuances for individuals applying abroad; to adjudication of entry document applications; and to screening and searching of individuals arriving at U.S. ports of entry.\" After the defendants did not produce any responsive records, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and \"to compel the disclosure and release of urgently needed records.\" The case was assigned to Judge Alfred V. Covello. The parties entered into settlement negotiations, which remain active. On Jan. 26, 2018, the parties filed a status report indicating the defendants had completed their search for potentially responsive documents. The government was to produce the first set of documents on or before Feb. 23, 2018, with further productions made on a rolling basis every six weeks through June 2018. The parties agreed to work together on a list of search terms for the government to use. Status reports filed March through November indicated the production was progressing and that the parties would confer about any anticipated changes to the timeline. The parties filed a joint motion to transfer the case to a Magistrate Judge on August 5, 2019. The court granted this motion; the case was transferred to Magistrate Judge Robert M. Spector on August 15, 2019. The defendants filed a motion to stay and extend the production schedule on April 2, 2020. Magistrate Judge Spector granted this motion on the following day; under the new order, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), a DHS agency, would be required to produce 1,500 pages per six-week reporting period. About six weeks later, the defendants filed a consent motion to modify the production schedule on May 18, 2020. The motion noted that CBP had largely complied with the production schedule, and that the remaining documents would require cooperation across different agencies to produce and analyze. Magistrate Judge Spector granted the motion, and removed production page limits for CBP for the next reporting period, though the agency needed to keep the parties abreast on updates for the remaining material. The next status report is due on June 19, 2020. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "This Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) complaint, filed on June 27, 2017, seeks to enhance knowledge about discriminatory immigration policy regarding Muslims, Latinos, and other members of groups disfavored by the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). According to the complaint, the FOIA requests sought greater understanding of the administration's immigration enforcement policies out of a concern that the defendants have targeted individuals on the basis of actual or perceived religion, ethnicity, race, or national origin in enforcing their immigration policies. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought \"disclosure of agency policies, communications, and statistics related to visa processing and visa issuances for individuals applying abroad; to adjudication of entry document applications; and to screening and searching of individuals arriving at U.S. ports of entry.\" The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On January 3, 2010, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the government seeking disclosure of documents related to the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) use of predator drones for the purpose of targeted killings of individuals, including a United States citizen. The Departments of Defense, Justice, and State provided some records but the CIA denied the request in a \"Glomar\" response, which declines either to confirm or deny the existence of any records. The ACLU filed an administrative appeal to the CIA in April 2010, but the agency failed to make a determination within the FOIA statutorily established timeline. The ACLU filed suit on June 1, 2010 against the government in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging violations of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552(a) and requesting injunctive relief in the form of disclosure of the requested documents. Under court supervision, the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State conferred with the ACLU and produced documents according to a mutually agreeable schedule. The CIA, however, moved for summary judgment in October 2010, arguing that whether it possessed the documents was itself exempt from disclosure under FOIA exemptions. The CIA argued that admitting the very existence of the documents would reveal whether it was involved or interested in drone strikes, which was classified information. The ACLU cross-filed for summary judgment and asserted that the CIA Director and other officials had already publicly acknowledged the existence of the drone program. The district court granted the CIA's motion for summary judgment on September 9, 2011. American Civil Liberties Union v. Dep't of Justice, 808 F. Supp. 2d 280 (D.D.C. 2011). The ACLU appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on November 9, 2011. The D.C. Circuit Court found the CIA's Glomar response was not justified. American Civil Liberties Union v. Central Intelligence Agency, 710 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Citing numerous examples of public statements by U.S. officials like the President and CIA Director, the court found it \"implausible that the CIA does not possess a single document on the subject of drone strikes.\" 710 F.3d at 430. In March 2013, the case was remanded to the district court for determination of the kinds of documents that the CIA possesses and whether exemptions apply to those documents. In May, the district court ordered briefing for summary judgment, following the recommendation of the CIA's briefing schedule. The schedule was delayed multiple times due to a series of government budget crises in the Fall of 2013. On February 12, 2014, the ACLU sent a notice to the court of a congressional transcript where the CIA publicly acknowledged drone operations. The court ordered a supplemental brief from the CIA regarding this public disclosure. On, June 6, 2014, the court granted the CIA's motion to stay the proceedings until the completion of any further review of a recent decision in the Second Circuit that involved FOIA requests for some similar types of records. New York Times Co. v. DOJ, 752 F.3d 123 (2nd Cir., April 21, 2014). The Second Circuit revised and superseded their opinion on June 23, 2014, finding that the government's secrecy and privilege had been waived for some of the documents containing legal analysis relating to drone strikes. New York Times Co. v. DOJ, 756 F.3d 100 (2nd Cir., July 10, 2014). On July 25, 2014, the court granted the defendant's request to dismiss the summary judgment motion. The court also found that the recent developments required further briefing and denied the ACLU's partial summary judgment without prejudice and scheduled further briefing. On November 25, 2014, the CIA moved for summary judgement. In response, the ACLU filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On June 18, 2015, the district court granted summary judgment and denied ACLU's cross-motion for summary judgment. The court held that the CIA had demonstrated that it has not withheld any segregable, non-exempt materials other than previously disclosed White Paper and therefore denied ACLU\u2019s request that it order the CIA to do so. 109 F.Supp.3d 220. On July 29, 2015, the ACLU appealed. On April 21, 2016, the DC Court of Appeals affirmed the judgement of the District Court, holding that the records were properly classified and therefore withheld under FOIA Exemption. 640 Fed.Appx. 9. On October 14, 2016, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.", "summary": "The American Civil Liberties Union filed suit in June 2010 in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the Central Intelligence Agency, alleging FOIA violations related to the ACLU's request for documents about the CIA's involvement in predator drone strikes. The D.C. District Court granted the CIA's motion to dismiss, but the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case in March 2013 for determination what documents the CIA possessed. On June 18, 2015, the Court granted summary judgment for the CIA."}
{"article": "In June 2009, the plaintiff, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to defendant National Security Agency (NSA) for records related to National Security Presidential Directive 54 (NSPD 54) and to the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). The defendant released several redacted documents. However, it informed the plaintiff that it had no records responsive to the Cybersecurity Initiative, and records responsive to the NSPD 54 request were withheld under FOIA exemptions for inter-agency memoranda, classified information, and presidential communications privilege. The plaintiff filed an administrative appeal, and brought suit in United States District Court for the District of Columbia in February 2009 against NSA and the National Security Council (NSC) under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552, and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706, seeking production of the records and a Vaughn index of withheld records and applicable exemptions. In July 2011, Judge Beryl A. Howell dismissed the NSC as a defendant because it was not an \"agency\" within the meaning of FOIA. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment in late 2011. Nearly two years later, in October 2013, the Court (Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell) ruled that NSPD 54 was not an agency record at all because it originated with the President or the NSC, and contained clear limits on its use and further dissemination. Thus, NSPD 54 was \"the type of document that is generally not ordered disclosed under the FOIA.\" However, the Court ruled that several portions of the plaintiff's FOIA request survived because the requested records originated within the Defendant. The Defendant was ordered to produce those responsive records or to submit a Vaughn index detailing the records and applicable exemptions. 2013 WL 5701645. On December 17, 2013, plaintiff appealed the October 2013 order, seeking review of whether the district court erred in holding that a Presidential Directive in the possession of a federal agency is not an agency record subject to FOIA. On June 5, 2014, defendant released an unclassified version of NSPD 54 to the plaintiff. On June 9, 2014, the parties jointly moved to dismiss plaintiff's appeal as moot, vacate the district court order holding that a Presidential Directive in the possession of a federal agency is not an agency record subject to FOIA, and remand to address any claim for fees. The Court (Judge Judith W. Rogers, Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh, and Senior Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg) granted the order and remanded the case on July 31, 2014. 2014 WL 12596363. The plaintiff moved for attorney fees and costs on October 31, 2014. The plaintiff sought $68,354.01 in attorneys' fees and $730.28 in costs, including fees and costs incurred prior to the January Judgment. The defendant argued that since the plaintiff was not the prevailing party under FOIA, they were not entitled to attorney's fees. Alternatively, the defendant contended that the plaintiff could not seek any fees for the period prior to the January Judgment and sought modification of the fees after the January judgment. The Court granted in part and denied in part plaintiff's motion on April 8, 2015. The Court held that the plaintiff was the prevailing party as the initial withholding of NSPD 54 was not correct as a matter of law because the Court's initial order regarding NSPD 54 was vacated. Since the defendant voluntarily released NSPD 54 to the plaintiff and requested the vacatur of the prior holding, the defendant had appeared to change its position regarding the requested information, thus, the plaintiff prevailed. The Court held the plaintiff was not able to recover fees and costs prior to January 27, 2014 as they were covered by the January Judgment. The Court also disallowed fees incurred by the plaintiff after October 1, 2014. The Court found that since the plaintiff offered two settlement agreements within 24 hours of the deadline for the parties to provide a status report to the Court and immediately withdrew them once the submission was filed, the plaintiff prolonged litigation. As such, the plaintiff was not allowed to recover fees following the withdrawal of their first settlement offer on October 1, 2014. Following these fee deductions, the defendant was ordered to pay $31,180 in attorneys' fees and costs. 87 F.Supp.3d 223. On April 8, 2015, the plaintiff moved to alter judgment regarding the Court's April 2015 order. On May 20, 2015, the Court granted the motion so as to amend the word \"judgment\" to \"settlement\" at one point in their opinion and otherwise denied their motion. (See Docket). The case is now closed.", "summary": "In June 2009, plaintiff Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to defendant National Security Agency (NSA) for records related to National Security Presidential Directive 54 (NSPD 54), aka Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 that was issued by President George W. Bush in January 2009, and to the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). in October 2013, the district court ruled that NSPD 54 is not an agency record at all because it originated with the President or the NSC, and contained clear limits on its use and further dissemination. Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Nat'l Security Agency, -- F. Supp. 2d --, 2013 WL 5701645, (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2013)."}
{"article": "On November 19, 2012, an individual plaintiff and National Security Counselors filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Justice, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence under the Freedom of Information Act (\u201cFOIA\u201d), the Privacy Act (collectively \u201cFOIA/PA\u201d), the Administrative Procedure Act (\u201cAPA\u201d), the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, and the All Writs Act. They sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The case was assigned to Judge Emmet G. Sullivan. The individual plaintiff had been employed as a nurse at the Federal Reserve Board\u2019s headquarters. In 2004, the Miami Field Office of the FBI received a document marked \u201cFISA Alert Report Form\u201d from the Financial Institution Security Association (\u201cFISA\u201d), requesting information on the plaintiff. FBI staff misunderstood the marking, reading \u201cFISA Alert Report Form\u201d to mean \u201cForeign Intelligence Surveillance Act Alert Form.\u201d Because the document was misinterpreted to be a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act alert, the plaintiff\u2019s name was subsequently added to national and homeland security watchlists, and she was fired. She submitted Freedom of Information Act requests to each of the defendant agencies, seeking records related to FISA alerts and records indicating whether her name appeared on the government\u2019s No Fly List. However, the agencies did not produce responsive documents, and after unsuccessfully filing an earlier lawsuit (<i>Crisman v. DOJ</i>, D.D.C. docket number 11-cv-658), the plaintiffs brought this lawsuit seeking to compel production of documents. On May 2, 2013, the court ordered the parties to engage in settlement negotiations. On August 15, 2013, the agencies moved for mediation. The following month, the court declined to appoint a mediator. On December 3, 2013, the agencies filed a motion for summary judgment, indicating that the government agencies had released reasonably segregable materials, conducted reasonable searches, and provided Vaughn indices (declarations explaining the justification for withholding requested documents). The case was reassigned to District Judge Tanya S. Chutkan in June 2014. On September 18, 2018, the court granted summary judgment to the agencies on most of the issues raised in the complaint. 332 F. Supp. 3d 139. On July 30, 2020, the agencies filed a renewed motion for summary judgment on the remaining issues; as of August 14, 2020, that motion is pending.", "summary": "When the FBI received in 2004 a \u201cFISA Alert Report Form\u201d seeking information on the plaintiff in this case, it was assumed to be related to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, when it was in fact merely from a private company called Financial Institutions Security Association. As a result of the misunderstanding, the plaintiff\u2019s name was erroneously placed on government watchlists, and she was fired from her job as a nurse working at the Federal Reserve Board. After unsuccessfully filing a Freedom of Information Act request seeking records relating to the error, she brought this lawsuit against several federal agencies, seeking to force the agencies to produce the requested records."}
{"article": "This lawsuit is a result of a consolidation of two separate cases. On January 19, 2006, Electronic Privacy Information Center (\u201cEIPC) first filed a complaint and a motion for preliminary injunction under the Freedom of Information Act (\u201cFOIA\u201d), 5. U.S.C \u00a7 552 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. On February 7, 2006, American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (collectively, \u201cthe ACLU\u201d) and the National Security Archive Fund filed a complaint against DOJ under FOIA in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. All plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, seeking the immediate release of records requested by the plaintiffs from DOJ, which dealt with the NSA\u2019s secret surveillance program to intercept, without prior judicial authorization, the telephone and Internet communications of people inside the United States. The two cases were consolidated on February 9, 2016. See <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0096-0002.pdf\">this Order</a>. On February 16, 2006, the district court (Judge H. Kennedy, Jr.) granted EPIC\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction and ordered the defendant to complete the processing of EPIC\u2019s December 16, 2005 FOIA requests and produce or identify all responsive records within 20 days of the date of this order. <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0096-0003.pdf\">416 F.Supp.2d 30 (D.D.C. 2006)</a>. The defendant filed a motion to stay the district court\u2019s order, which was granted on March 7, 2006. On September 15, 2006, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. On October 13, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion. On September 5, 2007, Judge Kennedy ordered that the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment was granted in part, denied in part, and held in abeyance in part, and that the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for in camera review must be denied without prejudice. For the documents that must be released, the defendant must submit to the court a detailed, document-by-document Vaughn index and declarations justifying the various departments\u2019 withholding decisions. <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0096-0004.pdf\">511 F.Supp.2d 56 (D.D.C. 2007)</a> . On October 19, 2007, the defendant filed a second motion for summary judgment. In December 2007, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to the second motion. On October 31, 2008, Judge Kennedy concluded that the defendant\u2019s renewed motion for summary judgment must be granted in part and denied in part, and that plaintiffs' renewed motion for in camera review must be granted in part and denied in part. Judge Kennedy ordered the defendant to submit ten memoranda of the Office of Legal Counsel (\u201cOLC\u201d) to the court for in camera review to determine the propriety of the DOJ\u2019s withholding of those documents. See <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0096-0005.pdf\">584 F.Supp.2d 65 (D.D.C. 2008)</a>. Litigation continued and on January 14, 2011, the parties jointly stipulated that the defendant would review the OLC memoranda as ordered by the court and disclose any segregable portions. On March 24, 2011, the defendant submitted to the court the portions of two OLC documents. This case was reassigned to Chief Judge Royce C. Lamberth. On March 31, 2014, Judge Lamberth granted the defendant\u2019s second motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the defendant properly decided to withhold ten records under Exemptions One, Three and Five, as each record contains confidential, legal advice protected by attorney-client communications privilege. 2014 WL 1279280. This case was dismissed with prejudice.", "summary": "On February 7, 2006, the plaintiffs, the ACLU and National Security Archive Fund, brought this action under the Freedom of Information Act (\u201cFOIA\u201d), 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, seeking the immediate release of records requested by the plaintiffs from the defendant DOJ. This was consolidated with another case, Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Department of Justice, in which plaintiff Electronic Privacy Information Center (\u201cEPIC\u201d) brought a FOIA lawsuit against the DOJ. On February 16, 2006, the district court (Judge Henry H. Kennedy, Jr.) granted the EPIC\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction and ordered that DOJ shall complete the processing of EPIC\u2019s December 16, 2005 FOIA requests and produce or identify all responsive records. This case was dismissed in March 2014."}
{"article": "On Mar. 3, 2017, plaintiffs The James Madison Project and Noah Shachtman sued the defendant agencies under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The James Madison Project (JMP) is an organization established \"to promote government accountability of reduction of secrecy, as well as [to educate] the public on issues relating to intelligence and national security.\" Noah Shachtman is the current Editor-in-Chief (Executive Editor at the start of this lawsuit) of news website The Daily Beast. Plaintiffs sought disclosure of agency records by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as well as by DHS's subordinate entities: the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Specifically, plaintiffs sought the disclosure of records that would shed light on the degree to which (if at all) the defendant federal agencies were consulted prior and subsequent to the implementation of President Trump's Jan. 27 <a href= \"https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-02-01/pdf/2017-02281.pdf\">Executive Order 13769</a> (EO). The complaint alleged that on Jan. 31, 2017, plaintiffs submitted a FOIA request to the defendant federal agencies seeking copies of records that memorialize the following: 1. Discussions between defendant agency staff and private/White House staff regarding the legality and implementation of an EO barring entry of foreign nationals based strictly on nationality; 2. Discussions between defendant agency staff and other federal agency staff regarding such an EO; 3. Discussions among defendant agency staff regarding such an EO; 4. Discussions between defendant agency staff and Members of Congress regarding such an EO; 5. Final determinations by defendant agency staff regarding the extent to which such an EO would apply to U.S. citizens with dual citizenship; and 6. Final determinations by defendant agency staff regarding the legality of such an EO. The complaint further alleged that, to date, plaintiffs had not received a substantive response from any of the defendant agencies, and that plaintiffs had constructively exhausted all required administrative remedies. Plaintiffs sought a disclosure order under FOIA, legal fees, and expedited action. (That same day, the James Madison Project and staff of Politico also filed another FOIA lawsuit seeking intra- and inter-agency communications relating to communications between DHS's agencies and airlines. That lawsuit is described <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15678\">here</a>.) On Mar. 3, the case was assigned to Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly. On Mar. 6, 2017, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 EO and replaced it with a narrower one, <a href=\"https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/06/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states\">Executive Order 13780</a>. On May 8, plaintiffs requested leave to file the first amended complaint. The amended complaint alleged that, on Mar. 24, 2017, plaintiffs submitted a FOIA request to the defendant agencies seeking the same information that they sought in the original Jan. 31 FOIA request, but clarified that the scope of information should encompass both EOs. Plaintiffs specifically asked that the defendant agencies use, but not limit themselves to, the search terms \"religious test,\" \"Christian ban,\" \"Jewish ban,\" and \"Muslim ban.\" Plaintiffs further alleged that, to date, they had not received a substantive response from any of the defendant agencies. Plaintiffs sought a disclosure order under FOIA, legal fees, and expedited action. On Jun. 16, the parties filed a joint status report noting that all defendant agencies had received and were processing plaintiffs' FOIA requests. The TSA had completed its processing of the request; the parties were not able to provide estimated release dates for the rest of the agencies. On Jul. 21, the parties filed a joint status report indicating that the government had initiated searches for the requested documents, that some responsive materials had already been produced, and that the parties were conferring regarding the remaining documents. On Sept. 5, the parties filed another status report indicating that the government continued to make progress on its searches, and that the parties conferred about the scope of the plaintiffs' request. On Jan. 19, 2018, the status report noted that DHS was processing approximately 600 potentially responsive records, and 600 others which it would review for responsiveness. The status report of Mar. 20 noted that ICE and USCIS would aim to complete production in the next month, whereas CBP, DHS, and DOJ had longer timeframes to complete production and would continue with monthly releases. Status reports filed in May through November indicated that the agencies were each in various stages of completing the production. ICE and USCIS had completed production by the Jan. 2019 status report, while TSA had completed its production according to the July 2019 status report. All other agencies are currently in varying stages of production, with status reports due every 60 days. Though the documents released by the government are not available online, <a href=\"https://www.thedailybeast.com/border-patrol-ordered-to-block-congressmen-during-travel-ban\">this news article</a> references some of their contents. The case is ongoing as of June 6, 2020.", "summary": "On Mar. 3, 2017, plaintiffs The James Madison Project and the news website The Daily Beast's executive editor sued various federal agencies under FOIA, seeking disclosure of agency records related to the implementation of President Trump's Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order. Production is ongoing as of June 6."}
{"article": "On May 2, 2017, the non-profit organization Muslim Advocates filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The suit aimed to shed light on the government's border searches of electronic devices in the possession of persons from the seven Muslim-majority countries covered by President Trump's Jan. 27 and Mar. 6 Executive Orders (Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen). Plaintiff additionally aimed to learn about the government's border searches of electronic devices in the possession of all persons -- including U.S. citizens -- whom U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents \"perceived to be Muslim.\" Plaintiff contended that DHS had yet to make the requested records available. Plaintiff, represented by the MacArthur Justice Center, Jenner & Block, and the National Lawyers Guild, therefore filed this suit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. In the complaint, plaintiff argued that it had submitted its FOIA request to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on Mar. 7, 2017. Specifically, plaintiff sought the following: 1. Records created on or after Jan. 24, 2017 related to CBP's search, review, retention, and dissemination of information located on or accessed through electronic devices in the possession of individuals who were encountered by CBP at the border (and the border's functional equivalents); and 2. Records created on or after Feb. 27, 2017 that pertained to the second Executive Order and were otherwise responsive to the first request. On May 2, this case was assigned to Judge Tanya S. Chutkan. Also on May 2, plaintiff filed notice that it believed this case should be marked related to <a href= \"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15701\"><i>Knight First Amendment Institute v. DHS</i></a>. On Aug. 4, Oct. 6, and Nov. 3, the parties filed joint status reports discussing the progress of the search and document turnover. On Nov. 28, the parties met for a status conference before Judge Chutkan, who ordered that the government, by Dec. 19, provide plaintiff with an estimate regarding the completion date of document production. The next status report of Jan. 29, 2018, detailed the parties' discussions about search terms. Plaintiff reported that CBP had estimated it would finish production by Sept. 2018 and DHS had provided no estimate. Plaintiff sought an earlier production, but defendants asserted they needed this time to properly review documents before releasing them. After a Feb. 21, 2018 status conference, Judge Chutkan ordered CBP to produce 275 pages per month. A May 14 order clarified that CBP was to process 500 email record pages per month and also 275 pages of incident-level reports per month. DHS was to process 775 email record and complaint pages per month. July and September status reports indicated the government's review and production were underway. Production of documents and status reports continued until Jan. 22, 2019, when the case was stayed until Congress restored appropriations to the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The stay was lifted on Feb. 27, 2019, and production of documents continued. The parties have been submitting status reports regularly. As of Apr. 14, 2020, this case is ongoing.", "summary": "Muslim Advocates filed this suit against DHS under FOIA, seeking information regarding the government's border searches of electronic devices in the possession of persons from the seven Muslim-majority countries covered by President Trump's Jan. 27 and Mar. 6 Executive Orders, as well as by all persons whom CBP agents \"perceived to be Muslim.\""}
{"article": "On May 2, 2017, the Protect Democracy Project filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). According to the complaint, plaintiff is an organization seeking to \"protect our democracy from descending into a more autocratic form of government by preventing those in power from depriving Americans of a free, fair, and fully-informed opportunity to exercise ultimate sovereignty.\" As part of its activities, plaintiff aims to inform the public about executive branch activity, including by filing FOIA requests and releasing the results on its website. Plaintiff sought disclosure of agency records by the Department of Justice (DOJ) that will shed light on the degree to which (if at all) the agency was consulted prior and subsequent to the implementation of President Trump's Jan. 27 <a href=\"https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-02-01/pdf/2017-02281.pdf\">Executive Order 13769</a>, the order restricting travel by nationals of 7 majority-Muslim countries. The complaint alleged that on Feb. 15, 2017, plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to DOJ seeking copies of records that memorialized the following: 1. Whether DOJ reviewed the EO before it was issued; 2. Whether the EO was transmitted to DOJ for review, comment, or awareness; 3. Whether there was any decision to seek or not seek input from DOJ on creating or implementing the EO; 4. Whether there was any process to obtain DOJ review of the EO; 5. Whether any other federal agency personnel reviewed the EO before it was issued. The complaint further alleged that, to date, plaintiff had not received a substantive response from DOJ. Plaintiff sought a disclosure order under FOIA and sought legal fees. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and was assigned to Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell. That same day, plaintiff filed another, similar, FOIA lawsuit against the Office of Management and Budget, described <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15759\">here</a>. On June 9, DOJ filed an unopposed motion to consolidate the two cases; Judge Howell granted the motion on June 12. The case was re-assigned to Judge Amit P. Mehta on June 15. The cases have now been consolidated and continue at <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15759\">NS-DC-0112</a> in this Clearinghouse.", "summary": "On May 2, 2017, the Protect Democracy Project sued DOJ under FOIA seeking records on whether DOJ was consulted regarding the travel ban EO. This case has been consolidated into and continues at <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15759\">NS-DC-0112</a>."}
{"article": "On May 2, 2017, the Protect Democracy Project filed this lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). According to the complaint, plaintiff is an organization seeking to \"protect our democracy from descending into a more autocratic form of government by preventing those in power from depriving Americans of a free, fair, and fully-informed opportunity to exercise ultimate sovereignty.\" As part of its activities, plaintiff aims to inform the public about executive branch activity, including by filing FOIA requests and releasing the results on its website. Plaintiff sought disclosure of agency records by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that will shed light on the degree to which (if at all) any federal agencies were consulted prior and subsequent to the implementation of President Trump's Jan. 27 <a href=\"https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-02-01/pdf/2017-02281.pdf\">Executive Order 13769</a>, which restricted travel to the U.S. by nationals of seven majority-Muslim countries. The complaint alleged that on Feb. 15, 2017, plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to OMB seeking copies of records that memorialized the following: 1. Whether any federal agency personnel reviewed the EO before it was issued, including whether DOJ reviewed it for lawfulness or deemed it lawful or unlawful; 2. Whether the EO was transmitted to any federal agency for review, comment, or awareness, including but not limited to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or DOJ; 3. Whether there was a decision to seek or not seek input from federal agency personnel on the creation or implementation of the EO, including but not limited to DHS or DOJ; 4. Whether there was any process for obtaining agency input regarding the EO. The complaint further alleged that, to date, plaintiff had not received a substantive response from OMB. Plaintiff sought a disclosure order under FOIA and sought legal fees. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and was assigned to Judge Amit P. Mehta. That same day, plaintiff filed another, similar, FOIA lawsuit against the Department of Justice, described <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15757\">here</a>. On June 9, OMB filed an unopposed motion to consolidate the two cases; Judge Mehta granted the motion on June 12. The cases have now been consolidated and continue on this page. OMB and DOJ both answered plaintiff's complaint on June 21. The parties filed a joint status report on July 10. Judge Mehta set the next status report to be due on Aug. 8, and every month subsequent until a further Court order. On Aug. 8, the parties filed the next joint status report. OMB anticipated releasing the requested records in September, and DOJ would provide a progress update in a subsequent status report. In the subsequent status report, on Sept. 12, OMB anticipated completing its records search by Sept. 22. DOJ reported that it had located and released only one responsive record so far, and would release more documents on a rolling schedule beginning in October. This case was reassigned to Judge Timothy J. Kelly on Sept. 19. In the parties' Oct. 10 joint status report, DOJ reported that it had found approximately 5,500 records responsive either to plaintiff's FOIA request or to the FOIA requests submitted by others seeking records related to the same general subject matter. DOJ anticipated beginning rolling releases of this material within the month of October. In the next status report of Nov. 14, OMB reported that it had completed its processing. DOJ reported that it had produced some documents in October and would continue to do so on a rolling basis. In the Dec. 12, 2017 status report, DOJ added that it had produced more documents in November and would continue to produce documents approximately monthly. All subsequent status reports have stated the same. Monthly status reports continued for the next 1.5 years except the month of January and February of 2019, for which an unopposed motion to stay due to the lapse of appropriations was granted. In the latest status report on April 9, 2019, the defendant indicated that they have continued to make monthly productions. The documents released by the government are available through this case page, below. On May 7, 2019 the parties filed a joint stipulation of voluntary dismissal with prejudice, with each party bearings its own attorneys\u2019 fees and costs.", "summary": "On May 2, 2017, the Protect Democracy Project sued OMB under FOIA to compel disclosure of records about federal agencies consulted prior and subsequent to the implementation of President Trump's Jan. 27 travel ban Executive Order 13769. After consolidation with another suit against DOJ. The parties agreed to a rolling production with monthly status reports. On May 7, 2019 the parties filed a joint stipulation of voluntary dismissal with prejudice."}
{"article": "On October 5, 2017, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (ACLUF) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on behalf of an American citizen being detained by the United States military in Iraq. The plaintiff sued the Secretary of Defense under the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. \u00a72241, the Non-Detention Act of 1971, and 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4001(a). The plaintiff sought injunctive relief, claiming violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Defense Department had detained the plaintiff since on or around September 14, 2017, after Syrian forces transferred him to U.S. Custody. The Defense Department asserted it was detaining the plaintiff because he was allegedly fighting for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (\"ISIS\") in Syria. The ACLUF claimed that the Defense Department held the plaintiff \"without charge, without access to a court or other meaningful opportunity to challenge his detention before a neutral decisionmaker, and without access to counsel.\" The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on October 30, 2017. They alleged that the ACLUF lacked standing to seek habeas corpus relief on the plaintiff's behalf and that the circumstances did not warrant the ACLUF's immediate access to the plaintiff. On December 23, 2017, District Judge Tanya S. Chutkan denied the motion. 286 F. Supp. 3d 53. She ordered the Defense Department to allow the ACLUF immediate and unmonitored access to the plaintiff for the purpose of determining whether the plaintiff wished for the ACLUF to continue this action on his behalf. She also ordered the Defense Department to refrain from transferring the plaintiff until the ACLUF informed the court of the plaintiff's wishes regarding his representation in this action. The plaintiff presumably requested that the ACLUF continue the action on his behalf. The plaintiff moved for the court to prevent the Defense Department from transferring him to another country while his case was pending. Judge Chutkan granted in part and denied in part this motion on January 23, 2018. She held that the court would not enjoin the Defense Department from transferring the plaintiff but would require it to provide the court and the plaintiff's counsel with seventy-two hours' notice prior to any transfer. 288 F. Supp. 3d 195. The defendants appealed this judgment on February 2, 2018. On April 18, 2018, the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the Defense Department from transferring the plaintiff from U.S. custody into the custody of another country. Judge Chutkan granted this motion on April 19, 2018. The defendants appealed this judgment on April 20, 2018. The defendants' two appeals were consolidated. On May 7, 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit sustained both of the district court's orders. The opinion for the court was filed by Circuit Judge Sri Srinivasan, with whom Circuit Judge Robert L. Wilkins joins. A dissenting opinion was filed by Circuit Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson. 889 F.3d 745. On June 22, 2018, the plaintiff filed a sealed motion for a preliminary injunction and the party underwent settlement discussions. On October 28, 2018, the Defense Department released the plaintiff and the parties agreed to dismiss this case with prejudice. On November 7, 2018, the court dismissed this case with prejudice and order each party to bear its own costs and fees. The plaintiff then filed an unopposed motion for extension of time to destroy documents and the court granted this order on February 28, 2019. In addition, the court ordered that the plaintiff must file any motion to challenge continued designation of materials by April 8, 2019. On April 8, 2019, the plaintiff moved to unseal documents relating to the government\u2019s proposed forcible transfer of the plaintiff into Syria, namely. The next day, the New York Times sought to intervene and filed a motion to unseal in the D. C. Circuit. In the district court, however, the plaintiff indicated that the parties had reached an agreement regarding the motion to unseal, in its motion to hold in abeyance the briefing deadline on June 8, and the court stayed the motion to unseal. On June 28, 2019, the D.C. Circuit granted the motion to intervene by the New York Times, withdrew the motion to unseal filed on April 9, and reissued an unredacted version of the appellate court opinion barring transfer. 928 F.3d 1.", "summary": "In 2017, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on behalf of an American citizen being detained by the United States military in Iraq. The plaintiff sued the Secretary of Defense under the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. \u00a72241, the Non-Detention Act of 1971, and 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4001(a) for injunctive relief, claiming violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Defense Department had detained the plaintiff since on or around September 14, 2017, after Syrian forces transferred him to U.S. Custody. On October 28, 2018, the Defense Department released the plaintiff and the case was dismissed with prejudice. On November 7, 2018, the court dismissed this case with prejudice and order each party to bear its own costs and fees. In April 2019, the plaintiff sought to unseal the documents relating to the government\u2019s proposed forcible transfer of the plaintiff into Syria. The court reissued an unredacted version of the opinion on June 28, 2019."}
{"article": "This case is related to the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse's coverage of the Carter Page Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrants. For more information on litigation to disclose the warrants that inspired this case, please see <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16844\">this link</a>. For a summary of the warrants and information on ongoing efforts by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to protect the confidential information in them, see <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17114\">this link</a>.<hr>The FISA requires the government to obtain a warrant from the FISC before it may conduct any domestic electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information. The warrant applications are made ex parte and must include a sworn statement by a federal officer of the facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the government's belief that the target of surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Once a FISC judge receives a warrant application, the judge can order approval of the surveillance only if the judge finds that there is probable cause to believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Because the orders only authorize surveillance up to 90 days, the government must file an application for an extension that meets the same requirements as the initial warrant application and obtain a renewal order from the FISC for continued surveillance. For the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse collection of FISA matters, see our <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=20\">special collection</a>. On November 27, 2020, an informal foreign policy advisor to the Trump 2016 presidential campaign, represented by private counsel, filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. He sued the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the United States, and former DOJ officials that sought the warrant against him in their individual capacities. He alleged violations of his right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures due to improperly filed FISA warrants against him. He sought $75 million in compensatory damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief to amend government records about him, and attorneys' fees for both this case and a previous, failed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request related to the suit. Page filed this case under FISA (50 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1801-1812) for each FISA warrant and renewal sought against him, <i>Bivens</i>, the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2674), and the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a). The plaintiff added that, at the time of filing, he had an active administrative claim under the Patriot Act pending before the DOJ, and if this claim was unsuccessful, he would add that to this complaint. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the government did not have probable cause to obtain a FISA warrant against him, because the information upon which the warrant was based came from one unreliable confidential source. He argued that the FBI and all of the agents involved in procuring this warrant were aware, either in an investigative or supervisory capacity, of the deficiencies in the source's testimony and did not follow up with relevant sub-sources to confirm the source's allegations. The plaintiff stated that the defendants still sought the warrants anyway, even after interviews with the plaintiff in connection to the warrant failed to establish probable cause that he was acting on behalf of a foreign power to sabotage the United States, the key preliminary findings needed to grant a FISA warrant. He added that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and subsequent FBI investigations found that the FISA warrant against Page and each of its renewals were unlawfully obtained. The case was assigned to Judge Kentaji Brown Jackson on November 30, 2020. It is ongoing as of December 16, 2020.", "summary": "On November 27, 2020, an informal foreign policy advisor to the Trump 2016 presidential campaign filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and various former DOJ and FBI officials that sought the warrant against him in their personal capacity violated his right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures in connection with Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrants issued against him during the 2016 campaign. He sought $75 million in compensatory damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees for this case and a related Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) case used to gain information for this litigation under FISA, <i>Bivens</i>, the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the Privacy Act. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On September 5, 2012, an individual U.S. citizen residing in Illinois, the American Friends Service Committee, and the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination League filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the U.S. Department of Treasury. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest and private counsel, asked the court for a declaration that the defendants' designation of the individual plaintiff as a \"specially designated terrorist\" was unlawful and an injunction against its continued application, claiming that the defendants' decision to use such a designation violated the Constitution and federal statutes. Specifically, the individual plaintiff claimed that the defendants' decision on July 24, 1995, to designate him as a \"specially designated terrorist\" was without any due process or probable cause of criminal wrongdoing, and under restrictions so severe that they prevent him carrying out basic life activities. The two organizational plaintiffs claimed that the designation violated their First Amendment rights because it prevented them from meaningfully advocating in coordination with the individual plaintiff against the unfairness of that designation. On November 5, 2012, the federal government removed the individual Plaintiff's name from the Specially Designated Terrorist List. The defendants' did not answer or otherwise respond to the plaintiffs' complaint. On November 16, 2012, the plaintiffs' voluntarily dismissed their lawsuit without prejudice.", "summary": "On September 5, 2012, an individual U.S. citizen residing in Illinois and two organizations that sought to advocate for that individual filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the U.S. Department of Treasury, seeking a declaration that the Defendants' designation of the individual plaintiff as a \"specially designated terrorist\" was unlawful and an injunction against its continued application. The Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit after the federal government removed the individual Plaintiff's name from the Specially Designated Terror List."}
{"article": "On September 15, 2012, the government initiated criminal prosecution of the defendant in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon after arresting the defendant the day before. The government charged the defendant with attempting to damage and destroy a building by means of explosion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2332a(a)(2)(D) and 844(i). The defendant allegedly attempted to bomb a bar in Chicago with a fake bomb provided by an FBI sting. In August 2013, the government added the charge of soliciting a crime of violence, murder for hire, and witness tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 373(a), 1958(a), and 1512(a)(1)(A), respectively. The defendant allegedly attempted to solicit someone to murder the undercover agent with whom he had dealt. This case is in this Clearinghouse because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh District addressed the tension between the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the evidentiary investigation required by the test laid out in <i>Franks v. Delaware,</i> 438 U.S. 154 (1978), for determining the legality of a warrant. The Franks test allows a defendant to challenge a search warrant on the ground that it was procured by a knowing or reckless falsehood by the officer who applied for the warrant. More details on the underlying criminal litigation are provided at the end. The government notified the defendant, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1806(c) and 1825(d)-sections of FISA, 50 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1801 et seq.-that it intended to present evidence at his trial derived from electronic surveillance that had been conducted under the authority of the Act. The defendant responded through counsel with a motion seeking access to the classified materials submitted in support of the government's FISA warrant applications in order to determine the legality of the warrant to obtain access to the defendant's communications. The defense counsel sought to show that the evidence obtained or derived from the electronic surveillance was based on information that was unlawfully acquired or that the surveillance was not made in conformity with an order of authorization or approval, both being grounds for suppression. The defense counsel argued that it would be too difficult to conduct a Franks hearing without the classified materials that the government relied on in obtaining the warrant. Anticipating this difficulty, the drafters of FISA devised a solution: the judge makes the additional determination, based on full access to all classified materials and the defense's proffer of its version of events, of whether it's possible to determine the validity of the Franks challenge without disclosure of any of the classified materials to the defense. In response to the defendant's motion, the government filed a heavily redacted, unclassified response, accessible to the defendant and his lawyers, and a classified version, accessible only to the district court, accompanied by an unclassified statement by the Attorney General that disclosure of the classified material, or an adversarial hearing with respect to it, \"would harm the national security of the United States.\" The harm was detailed in a classified affidavit signed by the FBI's Acting Assistant Director for Counterterrorism. Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman of the district court studied the classified materials to determine whether they should be shown to the defendant's lawyers, who had the necessary level of security clearances. On January 29, 2014, Judge Coleman ordered the materials to be turned over to the defense counsel. Judge Coleman acknowledged the unprecedented nature of the disclosure of FISA materials to a defense counsel, but held that \"the adversarial process is integral to safeguarding the rights of all citizens,\" and that \"the supposed national security interest at stake is not implicated where defense counsel has the necessary security clearances,\" Judge Coleman ruled that \"the probable value of disclosure and the risk of nondisclosure outweighed the potential danger of disclosure to cleared counsel.\" United States v. Daoud, 2014 WL 321384 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2014). The order, though interlocutory, was appealable immediately, and the government appealed. On June 16, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Seventh District reversed the district court's order. Judge Richard Posner, writing for the court, held that Judge Coleman had failed to to conduct a proper ex parte in camera review to determine whether the defense counsel was entitled to the FISA material. Judge Ilana Rovner filed a concurring opinion. In addressing the Franks issue, Judge Posner wrote, \"Thirty-six years after the enactment of FISA, it is well past time to recognize that it is virtually impossible for a FISA defendant to make the showing that Franks requires in order to convene an evidentiary hearing, and that a court cannot conduct more than a limited Franks review on its own. Possibly there is no realistic means of reconciling Franks with the FISA process. But all three branches of government have an obligation to explore that question thoroughly before we rest with that conclusion.\" United States v. Daoud, 2014 WL 2696734 (7th Cir. June 16, 2014). The defendant's attorneys appealed the Seventh Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court; he filed a petition for writ of certiorari on February 4, 2015. The Supreme Court denied the petition on February 23. Judge Coleman ruled on outstanding FISA-related motions on March 19, 2015. She declined to grant the defendant's motion to reopen investigation into the FISA warrant against him because of reports of abuse of the FISA system, saying that the incidents he flagged did not have anything to do with this case and that Executive Order 12333 that gives the Executive Branch surveillance capabilities is sufficiently broad to not warrant further investigation into the matter. She also denied the defendant's motion for a new <i>Franks</i> hearing, saying that, despite the defendant's assertions to the contrary, the Seventh Circuit settled the issue. Finally, she also denied a motion to disclose the identity of the FBI officer involved in his investigation, saying that the records already disclosed by the FBI gave the defense team enough information to conduct a meaningful cross. The defendant filed a motion on September 28, 2018 asking for clarity on Judge Coleman's January 29, 2014 opinion on FISA disclosures to defense attorneys. He noted that his motion that prompted the opinion asked for a ruling on the constitutionality of FISA, but Judge Coleman had not made an explicit ruling on the issue. Judge Coleman did not rule on the motion before the defendant pleaded guilty in the criminal trial. Here are additional details on the criminal case: The first indictment arose out of an investigation that began in May 2012 when the defendant, an 18-year-old American citizen and resident of Hillside, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago, joined an email conversation with two undercover FBI employees posing as terrorists who had responded to messages that he had posted online. The ensuing investigation, based in part on a series of surveillance warrants, yielded evidence that the defendant planned \"violent jihad\"-terrorist attacks in the name of Islam-and had discussed his plans with \"trusted brothers.\" He expressed interest in committing such attacks in the United States, utilizing bombmaking instructions that he had read both in Inspire magazine, an organ of Al Qaeda that is published in English, and through internet searches. One of his FBI correspondents put him in touch with an undercover agent (a \"cousin\") whom the correspondent represented to be a fellow terrorist. After meeting six times with the \"cousin,\" the defendant selected a bar in downtown Chicago to be the target of a bomb that the agent would supply him with. The agent told him the bomb would destroy the building containing the bar, and warned him that it would kill \"hundreds\" of people. The defendant replied: \"that's the point.\" On September 14, 2012, the defendant parked a Jeep containing the bomb in front of the bar. In a nearby alley, in the presence of the agent, he tried to detonate the bomb. Nothing happened, of course, because the bomb was a fake. The defendant was immediately arrested. It was while in jail a month later that, according to the second indictment, he tried to solicit someone to murder the undercover agent with whom he had dealt. The criminal trial went through an extremely long discovery process. The defendant underwent an extensive investigation into his capacity to stand trial starting in 2015, which took place under the guidance of Judge Samuel Der-Yehigian, a Judge on the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois who was overseeing a similar competency evaluation in another case. The court ultimately decided that the defendant was competent to stand trial on March 12, 2018. The defendant plead guilty to the crime, and judgment was entered on May 20, 2019. He appealed the decision on June 19, 2019 (Seventh Circuit, docket 19-2186). The Seventh Circuit has not issued a ruling on the appeal.", "summary": "In 2012, the government initiated criminal prosecution of Adel Daoud in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The government charged Daoud with attempting to damage and destroy a building by means of explosion. In 2013, the government added the charge of soliciting a crime of violence, murder for hire, and witness tampering. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the tension between the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the evidentiary investigation required by the test laid out in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), for determining the legality of a warrant. The Seventh Circuit reversed the order on June 16, 2014; the defendant appealed the decision to the Supreme Court but cert was denied on February 23, 2015. The underlying criminal case continues."}
{"article": "On October 17, 2013, the ACLU filed this lawsuit against the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552) (FOIA). The suit requested an injunction requiring the DOJ to disclose records regarding DOJ's policy on giving notice to criminal defendants against whom it intends to use evidence obtained from warrantless surveillance, including information obtained under surveillance orders authorized by Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. After the suit commenced, the DOJ began processing parts of the ACLU's initial FOIA request. The DOJ found several responsive documents, but withheld them, citing FOIA's Exemption 5, which allows the government to decline to disclose \"inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.\" 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552(b)(5). The ACLU responded by challenging the adequacy of the scope of the DOJ's search as well as the application of Exemption 5 to the documents in question. Both parties then filed cross motions for summary judgment. On March 3, 2015, the District Court (Judge Gregory H. Woods) ruled on the motions for summary judgment, holding that the ACLU's motion was granted with respect to the scope of DOJ's search, and that the DOJ's motion was granted with respect to the applicability of Exemption 5 to the documents that had already been found. The court ordered the DOJ to conduct a new search for documents including \"legal memoranda or opinions addressing or interpreting the [FISA Amendment Act's] notice provisions or requirements, as set forth in 50 U.S.C. \u00a7 1181e(a) and \u00a7 1806(c).\" The order required the DOJ to search for any relevant documents without limiting the search to \"governing\" documents, and to release any responsive documents that didn't fall under a FOIA exemption. Because the granted motions for summary judgment disposed of all issues in the case, the court also ordered the case closed. On March 5, 2015, the court issued an order reopening the case in order to allow the parties to litigate the issue regarding the search for responsive documents in United States Attorney's Offices that hadn't previously been searched. On November 23, 2015, the DOJ filed a motion for summary judgement on the adequacy of their second search, and claiming that the additional documents found were also entitled to FOIA's Exemption 5 protection. On December 23, 2015 the ACLU filed a cross-motion for summary judgement, challenging the DOJ's motion. On September 27, 2016 the District Court (Judge Gregory H. Woods) ruled on the motions for summary judgment, holding that the DOJ's motion was granted on the adequacy of their search and that the DOJ's motion was granted in regards to the additional documents, with the exception of one document. The ACLU's motion was denied in part and granted in reference to one of the documents, with the court finding that the DOJ did not provide sufficient information detailing why that document was due protection. The court directed the DOJ to submit revised submissions addressing the document in question and directed them to file a renewed motion for partial summary judgement no later than November 14, 2016. On May 2, 2017, the Court granted DOJ's renewed motion for summary judgment. The Court found that the remaining documents at issue were appropriately withheld under FOIA's Exemption 5 and that the documents at issue did not contain reasonably segregable non-exempt information that required disclosure. The court then terminated all pending motions and closed the case.", "summary": "On October 17, 2013, the ACLU filed a lawsuit requesting an injunction forcing the DOJ to comply with a FOIA request regarding their policy on giving notice to criminal defendants against whom it intends to use evidence obtained from warrantless surveillance, including information obtained under surveillance orders authorized by the FISA Amendments Act \u00a7 702. On March 3, 2105, the court granted part of each party's motion for summary judgment, and issued an order requiring the DOJ to conduct a further search for responsive documents, and disclose any that were not subject to FOIA exemptions. On September 27, 2016, the court granted part of each party's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the DOJ's searches were adequate, and that all but one of the documents found by the DOJ were protected by FOIA's Exemption 5. On May 2, 2017, the Court granted DOJ's renewed motion for summary judgment, finding that the remaining documents were properly withheld under FOIA Exemption 5."}
{"article": "On November 11, 2016, the American Civil Liberties Union and its Foundation filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking the processing and release of agency records from the National Security Agency (NSA), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to respond to the plaintiffs\u2019 FOIA Request submitted on September 14, 2016, which sought records containing information on the government\u2019s warrantless surveillance programs operated under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring the defendants to process the request immediately and an order enjoining the defendants from assessing fees for this processing. The plaintiffs also requested attorneys\u2019 fees. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that because Congress was considering whether to reauthorize Section 702 when it expired in 2017, the timely disclosure of these records was critical to the public debate about the authority\u2019s lawfulness. Therefore, the plaintiff sought information about the breadth of Section 702 surveillance and its policies and procedures, including the number of communications involving Americans that were subject to surveillance and rules setting the bounds of the surveillance. The plaintiffs specifically requested each individual agency\u2019s current targeting procedures and minimization procedures addressing Section 702 surveillance and its use to investigate or prosecute individual Americans. On January 13, 2017, the defendants filed an answer to the complaint admitting that they had not completed review of the plaintiffs' request but denying that the plaintiffs were entitled to relief. The defendants asserted that they had exercised due diligence in processing the request and that exceptional circumstances necessitated additional time to process it. Alternatively, the defendants argued that the information requested was exempt in whole or in part under FOIA, and that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the request for relief exceeding FOIA's statutory relief. On February 8, 2017, Richard M. Berman ordered the defendants to search for, process, and release non-exempt documents and set required release dates. As of September 17, 2017, the defendants had completed their production of partially or fully non-exempt documents in response to the plaintiff\u2019s FOIA request. The parties then began settlement negotiations that involved the plaintiff\u2019s request for attorneys\u2019 fees and litigation costs. On December 11, 2017, Judge Berman dismissed this case with prejudice due to a settlement agreement. NSA agreed to pay the plaintiff $11,000; CIA $6,500; National Security Division $6,500; FBI $6,500; and ODNI $4,500. The settlement amount totaled $35,000. The court retained jurisdiction over any issues relating to this order, but the case is now closed.", "summary": "On November 11, 2016, the American Civil Liberties Union filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking the processing and release of agency records from the National Security Agency (NSA), Office off the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), US Department of Justice (DOJ), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants wrongfully failed to respond to the plaintiffs\u2019 FOIA Request submitted on September 14, 2016, seeking records containing information on the government\u2019s warrantless surveillance programs operated under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. As of September 17, 2017, the defendants have completed their production of partially or fully non-exempt documents in response to the plaintiff\u2019s FOIA request. On December 11, 2017, Judge Richard M. Berman dismissed this case with prejudice due to a settlement agreement. NSA shall pay to the plaintiff $11,000, CIA shall pay $6,500, National Security Division shall pay $6,500, FBI shall pay $6,500, and ODNI shall pay $4,500. The settlement amount totaled $35,000. The court may retain jurisdiction over any issues that may arise relating to this order."}
{"article": "On September 7, 2016, the <i>New York Times</i> and one of its reporters specializing in national security issues filed a complaint under 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552 (the Freedom of Information Act) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). The complaint alleged that the reporter properly filed Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests with the DOJ for three documents related to counterterrorism issues, that the DOJ had not provided the requested documents in a timely manner, and that the Court should compel the DOJ to release the records at issue. Judge Lewis Kaplan presided over the case. The documents that the reporter sought and the status of the requests at the time of complaint are below: <ul> <li>the reporter initially submitted a FOIA request for the final reports by the Special Interagency Task Force on Detainee Disposition established by Executive Order 13,493 and the Special Interagency Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer Policies established by Executive Order 13,491 to the DOJ on October 28, 2015.</li> <li>the reporter initially submitted a FOIA request for a May 4, 2005 memo on discovery issues presented by the Stellarwind warrantless wiretapping and bulk data collection program on January 7, 2016.</li> <li>the reporter initially submitted an identical FOIA request to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the DOJ for unreleased documents from Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) Judge John Bates' redacted docket that yielded publicized opinions on October 3 and November 3 of 2011 on May 10, 2016 (the original case is available in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14043\">this Clearinghouse</a>). These requests sought information on the widely-cited statistics on the National Security Agency's (NSA) upstream internet surveillance program, and the 2008 version of the FBI's standard minimization procedures for data collection.</li> </ul>The government filed a response acknowledging receipt of the brief and the various FOIA requests, but alleged that the government was cooperating in the FOIA records request and no legal action was necessary on October 11, 2016. Outside of the court, the parties agreed to a document release schedule, and submitted a schedule for document release on March 1, 2017. The schedule was not publicized, though the docket shows that release dates for a few of the documents were slightly altered over the course of the year. On October 11, 2017, the plaintiffs submitted a status report to the court showing that the parties cooperated in releasing the requested documents. Judge Kaplan dismissed the case on October 26, 2017; it is now closed. The released documents provided important context to frequently cited surveillance and interrogation information, while leaving other important questions unanswered. A brief summary of the collected documents is available below:<ul> <li>For the Special Interagency Task Force on Interrogation reports, the reporter found examples of three new areas of information not previously publicized. The first noted that Obama-era officials asked the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) if it wanted to use anything other than the Army Field Manual detention policies, and the CIA did not suggest an alternative. Second, it added that the CIA maintained a policy of transferring detainees to countries where they might be abused on a case-by-case basis. Third, it noted that the CIA maintained policies allowing for prisoner separation in detention centers, which previously had been used to authorize torture techniques like sleep deprivation.</li><li>For the Stellarwind bulk collection discovery memo, the unredacted sections of the documents did not provide a clear policy for when the Justice Department needs to turn over classified information to a defendant in a terrorism case, in line with <i>Brady</i> prosecutorial standards. However, the memo did note that this is an issue that the DOJ needs to grapple with in the future.</li> <li>For the 2008 FBI Standard Minimization Procedures, the reporter found that it allowed the FBI to search for evidence of an ordinary crime in the warrantless surveillance repository.</li> <li>Finally, the 2011 FISC documents confirmed that Judge Bates' frequently cited statistic that nine percent of all internet communications picked up by the NSA came through the upstream surveillance program, which pulled its information from internet switchboards rather than email accounts, may be misleading. The released documents showed that the NSA referred to \"communication\" and \"transaction\" interchangeably, and that one transaction can contain multiple internet communications, like emails. As a result, the nine percent provided by Judge Bates could be a larger or smaller percentage depending on how many bits of internet communication were picked up in each \"transaction.\" The released documents demonstrated that some of these upstream communications contained information from purely domestic servers, though it was a small percentage.</li> </ul>", "summary": "On September 7, 2016, the <i>New York Times</i> and one of its reporters focusing on national security issues filed this lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act for documents on forced interrogation policy, statistics on the National Security Agency's (NSA) upstream internet surveillance program, and on issues related to discovery in classified terrorism cases. The parties amicably agreed to a document release schedule, and the case closed on October 26, 2017. Of interest in the released documents is the revelation that the government may have been collecting different percentages of communications through upstream surveillance than previously believed."}
{"article": "On February 5, 2014, two activists filed this lawsuit <i>pro se</i> in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued the National Security Agency and the U.S. Department of Justice under Bivens. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment Rights and requested declaratory relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants subjected the plaintiffs to a mass surveillance program which directed Verizon to collect telephone records for over one million Americans which, according to the complaint, was revealed by <a href=\"http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order\"><i>The Guardian</i> in an article published on June 6, 2013</a>. This case is part of a series of lawsuits filed against the NSA for its \"Bulk Telephony Metadata Program,\" which was authorized under Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (\"FISA\"). (These cases can be found as a part of a <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=22\"> special collection on the Clearinghouse</a>.) On January 23, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction and the plaintiffs failed to state claims on which relief may be granted. The plaintiffs responded that they did have valid Constitutional claims, and noted that in other cases--specifically, <i>ACLU v. Clapper</i> (<a href= \"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12867\">NS-NY-0003</a>), <i>Klayman v. Obama</i> (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13061\">NS-DC-0007</a>), and <i>Smith v. Obama</i> (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13771\">NS-ID-0001</a>)--courts had found that similar plaintiffs did have standing. On August 6, 2015, Judge Kathleen Cardone issued an order staying this case for six months and denying the defendants' motion to dismiss as moot. Judge Cardone noted that the plaintiffs' case was based on ongoing court proceedings in the aforementioned <i>Klayman</i>, <i>Smith</i>, and <i>ACLU</i> cases, and as such the plaintiffs were also waiting on the outcomes of these cases to determine how to proceed in this action. Judge Cardone allowed the plaintiffs to move to reopen this case in six months. This case was administratively closed. The case was not reopened within the allotted six months, and there have been no updates to the docket since August 2015.", "summary": "In 2014, two activists filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas against the National Security Agency and the U.S. Department of Justice, alleging violations of the plaintiffs' First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment Rights and requesting declaratory relief. On August 6, 2015, the District Court issued an order staying this case for six months since the plaintiffs' case was based largely on pending litigation in other courts. This case is administratively closed."}
{"article": "This 2017 lawsuit challenged the FBI\u2019s placement of a U.S. citizen on a terrorist watchlist; it was dismissed in 2019. The Terrorism Screening DataBase, also known as the \u201cterrorist watchlist,\u201d is maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), a division of the National Security Branch of the FBI. The watchlist includes sub-lists--a No Fly List and a Selectee List. People on the No Fly List are not allowed to fly on American airplanes or flights into the US. People included on the Selectee List are subject to additional screening by federal government officials at airports and land border crossings into the US. At airports, individuals on the Selectee List often have their boarding passes stamped with \u201cSSSS\u201d by airline agents. In this case, the plaintiff claimed that he was subjected to extra security procedures at airports as early as 2014, perhaps because he was a cleric at his mosque (in Salt Lake City). The events more directly leading up to this litigation commenced in June 2017 when the plaintiff was denied boarding to a commercial flight bound for the U.S. by airport officials in Nairobi, Kenya. Though he was eventually allowed to board a flight the following day, he missed his connecting flight in Los Angeles because of a long screening process. The plaintiff flew domestically on three other instances in 2017 and each time the ticketing agent called the TSC and marked his boarding pass with the \u201cSSSS\u201d stamp. He filed this lawsuit on June 17, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, alleging constitutional violations. In a final amended complaint filed November 2017, the plaintiff sued the Directors of the FBI and TSC, the Administrator of the TSA, and the Commissioner of the National Counterterrorism Center, all in their official capacities. Represented by attorneys from the Council on American Islamic Relations and private counsel, the lawsuit sought injunctive and declaratory relief based on four main claims. First, the plaintiff argued that his placement on the Selectee List violated his Fifth Amendment rights to procedural and substantive due process. Second, he asserted that his inclusion on the selectee list was an unlawful agency action in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7702, 706). Third, he argued that his inclusion on the watchlist violated his Fifth Amendment Right to equal protection. Fourth, he urged that the Executive branch\u2019s implementation of the terrorist watchlist amounted to a violation of the Constitution\u2019s non-delegation doctrine. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction. In an order dated April 20, 2018, District Judge Dee Benson rejected the government\u2019s jurisdictional arguments but granted its motion for failure to state a claim. For the procedural due process claim, Judge Benson found that the right to travel in a convenient or unimpeded fashion has not been recognized by the Supreme Court as a liberty interest protected by the Fifth Amendment and that the plaintiff failed to adequately allege reputational damage that satisfies a \u201cstigma plus\u201d standard. Judge Benson found the substantive due process claim unconvincing for similar reasons, writing that the plaintiff failed to provide case law supporting his contention that \u201cfreedom of movement\u201d is protected by the Fifth Amendment. Likewise, because a constitutionally protected interest had not been identified by the plaintiff, the District Judge held that the APA claim similarly failed. For the equal protection claim, Judge Benson found that the plaintiff did not produce evidence of intentional discrimination against Muslims and refused to allow the claim to proceed on a disparate impact theory alone. Lastly, the non-delegation claim was dismissed because the Judge found that Congress charged the TSA with \u201coverall responsibility for airline security\u201d and that this is general policy establishes an \u201cintelligible principle\u201d that does not violate the doctrine of non-delegation. 2018 WL 1940411. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of all claims in an opinion by Circuit Judge David Ebel. 942 F. 3d 1019 (Nov. 12, 2019).", "summary": "In 2017, an American Citizen who is a cleric at a mosque in Salt Lake City filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah. The plaintiff alleged that his placement on the FBI\u2019s \u201cterrorist watchlist\u201d violated his Fifth Amendment Rights, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Constitution\u2019s non-delegation doctrine. In 2018, the District Court granted the government\u2019s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in 2019."}
{"article": "On Apr. 12, 2017, the ACLUs of Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Delaware filed this lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented President Trump's Jan. 27 and Mar. 6 Executive Orders that ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, plaintiffs sought information \"concerning CBP\u2019s local implementation of President Trump\u2019s January 27, 2017 Executive Order...as well as any other judicial order or executive directive issued regarding Executive Order No. 1, including President Trump\u2019s March 6, 2017 Executive Order.\" The request concerned implementation at international airports within the purview of CBP's Baltimore Field Office, including Washington Dulles International Airport, Baltimore Washington International Airport, Philadelphia International Airport, Pittsburgh International Airport (\"Local International Airports\"), and Baltimore, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Port of Washington-Dulles and Wilmington (\"Port of Entry Offices\"). The request also concerned the number of individuals who were detained or subjected to secondary screening, extended questioning, enforcement examination, or consideration for a waiver at the aforementioned airports pursuant to the Executive Orders. In the complaint, plaintiffs argued that the requested records \"would facilitate the public\u2019s understanding of how Defendants implemented and enforced the Executive Orders here in the San Francisco Field Office\" and that \"[s]uch information is critical to the public\u2019s ability to hold the government accountable.\" On May 9, the government filed a motion to treat all of these FOIA cases as \"multi-district litigation,\" effectively seeking to consolidate them before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. For the transfer motion see <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15719\">this case</a>. On June 26, Judge Brinkema stayed all proceedings pending the decision on the motion to transfer. On Aug. 25, the parties filed a consent motion to reopen the case, given that the government's MDL motion to transfer was denied on Aug. 2. 261 F. Supp. 3d 1348. The Court granted this consent motion on the same day. On Jan. 11, Judge Brinkema ordered as follows: - CBP must process 200 pages of potentially responsive emails in its Baltimore office by Feb. 28, and 400 pages by Apr. 30; - CBP must produce responsive, non-exempt records to plaintiffs by Apr. 30; - CBP must make rolling productions every two months after that, achieving 95% production by Aug. 31; - CBP must complete production by Dec. 31. The parties will file joint status reports every two months. Any hearing is postponed until after the parties file their final joint status report. The latest status report, of Mar. 15, 2018, noted that defendants had completed processing over 900 pages. May through November status reports indicated the defendants were continuing to process and produce responsive records. The parties continued to cooperate over the next year, largely sticking to the schedule and producing documents on the agreed upon time frame. On June 5, 2019, the parties submitted a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice, which was granted that same day. The documents released by the government in all the ACLU cases are available through <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15719\">this case page</a>. This case is closed.", "summary": "On Apr. 12, 2017, the ACLUs of Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Delaware sued DHS under FOIA, for information on the implementation of the travel ban Executive Orders at regional airports. Defendants were unable to consolidate all nationwide ACLU cases in multidistrict litigation, and this case is proceeding here."}
{"article": "On October 13, 2015 two men and the estate of a third man, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. The plaintiffs sued two psychologists who \u201cdesigned, implemented, and personally administered an experimental torture program\u201d for the CIA under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) (28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1350) for human rights violations. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, sought monetary relief for \"physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering.\" The plaintiffs claimed that torture, non-consensual human experimentation, and war crimes had been committed against them during detention by the United States. On January 8, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that \u201c1) the court lacked jurisdiction due to the Political Question Doctrine; 2) Defendants were entitled to derivative sovereign immunity; 3) the ATS did not confer jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims; and 4) Plaintiff Obaid Ullah lacked the capacity to sue.\u201d 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121. A motion hearing was held on April 22, 2016 and the motion was denied on April 28, 2016. In doing so the court took \u201cthe well pleaded factual allegations as true\u201d and found that none of the contested grounds required the court to dismiss the case. Id. Following discovery litigation, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss on November 18, 2016, claiming that \u201cthe Military Commissions Act (\u2018MCA\u2019)...deprives this court of jurisdiction over 'non-habeas detention-related claims' brought by an alien when the alien was determined to have been properly detained by the United States as an \u2018enemy combatant.\u201d' A motion hearing was held on January 19, 2017 and Senior Judge Justin Quackenbush denied the motion to dismiss on January 27, 2017. The motion was denied on the grounds that the defendants had not demonstrated \u201can agency relationship with the Government\u201d and \u201c[n]one of the three Plaintiffs was determined by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal to be an \u2018enemy combatant.\u2019\u201d 2017 WL 390270. On May 22, 2017, both parties moved for summary judgment. A hearing on these motions occurred on July 28, 2017. On August 7, 2017, the court denied both motions for summary judgment, finding that \"neither side had demonstrated that judgment as a matter of law is appropriate.\" 268 F. Supp. 3d 1132. On August 17, 2017 the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the claim with prejudice, pursuant to a confidential settlement agreement between the parties. The court entered judgment that same day to dismiss the case, which is now closed.", "summary": "In 2015, two foreign nationals and the estate of a third foreign national filed this suit in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants committed human rights abuses against them, including torture, non-consensual human experimentation, and war crimes, during their detention by the United States. The parties settled via a confidential settlement agreement."}
{"article": "On April 12, 2016, two Cuban-born Americans filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Carnival Corporation and Fathom Travel Corporation. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a72000. The plaintiffs alleged the defendants did not allow Cuban-born persons to board its cruise line to Cuba. The lawsuit alleges that this policy violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by refusing service based on national origin. The plaintiffs requested a jury trial for all issues and demanded the court enjoin the defendant\u2019s conduct. The case was assigned to Judge Marcia Cooke. On April 28, 2016, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit after Carnival changed its discriminatory policies and began taking reservations from Cuban-born Americans on trips to Cuba. Cuba also changed its law to allow Cuban-Americans to arrive by ship. This case is closed.", "summary": "A class action lawsuit was filed in federal court against Carnival Corporation after two Cuban-born Americans were denied a ticket to Cuba. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case after Carnival changed its discriminatory policy."}
{"article": "This is one of several federal lawsuits addressing North Carolina Session Law 2016-3, House Bill 2 (\u201cH.B. 2\u201d), which was passed in March 23, 2016. For the others, see related cases section, below. On February 22, 2016, the Charlotte City Council passed Ordinance 7056, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity in public accommodations, passenger vehicle for hire, and city contractors. The city ordinance was set to take effect on April 1, 2016. In response, on March 23, 2016, the North Carolina legislature held a special session and passed House Bill 2; it was signed that same day by North Carolina Governor Pat McCrory. HB2 prohibited municipalities in North Carolina from enacting anti-discrimination policies and removed the statutory and common-law private right of action to enforce state anti-discrimination statutes in state courts. It also required that while in government buildings, individuals only use restrooms and changing facilities that correspond to the sex on their birth certificates. For many transgender people, this prevented them from using the restroom consistent with their gender identity (in North Carolina, only people who undergo sex reassignment surgery can change the sex on their birth certificates; some other jurisdictions have even more restrictive rules). In addition, the legislation changed the definition of sex in the state's anti-discrimination law to \"the physical condition of being male or female, which is stated on a person's birth certificate.\u201d This change prevented discrimination against transgender people from being classified as a type of sex discrimination. On May 4, in a letter to Governor Pat McCrory, the Justice Department informed him that the U.S. had concluded that HB2 violated federal law. The DOJ asked the Governor to respond by close of business on May 9 that he would remedy the violations, \"including by confirming that the State will not comply with or implement H.B. 2.\" Instead of providing the demanded assurances, the Governor sued the United States on the morning of May 9, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, seeking declaratory relief that HB2 didn\u2019t violate federal law. That case is <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15316\">McCrory v. United States</a>. On that same day, this suit was brought in the same court by the President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate and the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives. They sought the same declaratory relief sought by Governor McCrory as well as a declaration by the court that the DOJ had exceeded the federal government\u2019s separation of powers, violated the Tenth Amendment, and was arbitrary and capricious under section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 702-706). Plaintiffs made a number of constitutional arguments to support their position. They began by alleging that transgender people weren't a protected class under the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus could not be protected under Title VII, which is authorized by the Fourteenth Amendment. They based their Tenth Amendment federalism claims primarily on the argument that regulation of bathrooms didn't affect interstate commerce and were thus a police power reserved to the states. They also suggested that there was a constitutional right to privacy in bathrooms that would be violated if states were forced to allow transgender individuals access to bathrooms in accordance with their gender identities. Plaintiffs further made arguments that the DOJ\u2019s position wasn\u2019t acceptable under administrative law. Plaintiffs suggested that the DOJ\u2019s reasoning on the VAWA would require North Carolina to provide prisoners claiming transgender status access to bathrooms and showers matching their gender identities, which they claimed would violate earlier regulations promulgated by the DOJ on that subject. They also claimed that the states couldn\u2019t have foreseen that they would be forced to allow transgender individuals access to bathrooms when Title IX was enacted, which would mean that the DOJ was exceeding its authority by adding meaning to the statute that Congress hadn\u2019t originally intended or expected it to have. This case was assigned to Judge Louise Wood Flanagan. The plaintiffs sought consolidation with the <i>McCrory</i> case, which was before Judge Terrence W. Boyle. On June 13, 2016, Judge Boyle issued an order stating that he would allow the cases to be consolidated. On June 15, Judge Flanagan scheduled a hearing to determine whether the cases should be consolidated. In the hearing, the court denied the motion to consolidate and instead transferred this case to the Middle District of North Carolina, where three other HB2 cases were in progress, with no objection from any of the parties. The transfer order was given on June 29, 2016, and this case was assigned to Judge Thomas D. Schroeder and Magistrate Judge Joi Elizabeth Peake. On July 14, the judge ordered the parties in this case and the three associated HB2 cases in North Carolina to appear on August 1 on their various motions pending in a consolidated hearing, and indicated the trials would take place in October or November. The Judge requested they file a joint statement of agreements reached and explaining their respective positions by July 22 for a pretrial scheduling conference. On July 25, the court consolidated these cases for the purpose of discovery only. On July 28, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a voluntary dismissal given that they were pursuing the same claims as <i>United States of America v. North Carolina</i> and their claims were duplicative of those in that case. More information on the litigation in the consolidated case can be read <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15345\">here</a>.", "summary": "After the DOJ indicates that it believes a North Carolina law limiting transgender individuals access to bathrooms violates federal law, president Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate and the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives bring suit in federal court asking the Eastern District Court of North Carolina to declare that the law doesn't violate the laws cited by the DOJ and to declare that the DOJ action is illegal and unconstitutional."}
{"article": "On June 10, 2014, a same-sex couple who had been legally married outside the State of Alabama filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, against the State of Alabama. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Alabama's refusal to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples validly entered into outside of the State violated the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs were married in Massachusetts in June 2012. They have been together for 17 years and now reside in Alabama. The plaintiffs have a seven-year-old daughter. The plaintiffs' suit challenged the constitutionality of Section 36.03 of the Alabama Constitution and Alabama Code \u00a7 30-1-19 which prohibit the State from recognizing the marriages of same-sex couples entered into in other jurisdictions. The plaintiffs claimed that Alabama's refusal to recognize their marriage unlawfully denied them numerous benefits and legal protections available to opposite-sex couples, including the right to make medical decisions for an incapacitated spouse, file joint tax returns, and gain access to health insurance, retirement benefits, property protections, and inheritance. On September 22, 2014, the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama (Judge R. David Proctor) dismissed the claims against the Alabama governor, granting the parties' joint motion. On February 5, 2015, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's pending decision in Obergefell v. Hodges (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12787\">PB-OH-0003</a> in this Clearinghouse), Judge Proctor granted the parties' joint motion to amend the scheduling order: all potentially dispositive motions were due by July 31, 2015. On July 21, 2015 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss this claim on the grounds that the Obergefell decision resolved the question underlying plaintiffs\u2019 claim and that there was no longer a live case or controversy. On October 13, 2015, Judge R. David Proctor dismissed this case without prejudice, and costs were to be taxed against the defendants. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189368. On December 8, 2015, the district court denied plaintiffs\u2019 renewed motion for attorney\u2019s fees. The court held that there had not been any court-ordered change in the legal relationship between the parties, and that the plaintiffs have not shown that they (or their actions) generated any judicial relief. This case had become moot because the defendants voluntarily complied with new law created by decisions in other cases (namely, Obergefell), and the plaintiffs were therefore not \"prevailing parties\" entitled to an award of attorneys\u2019 fees. The plaintiffs appealed to the Eleventh Circuit on January 5, 2016. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189369. On January 30, 2017, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s ruling and concluded that there was no judicially sanctioned change in the relationship of the parties that would justify an award of attorney\u2019s fees. 678 Fed. Appx. 792. On May 26, 2017, the parties submitted informal notice that counsel no longer sought to pursue costs in this action. There has be no further action on this case.", "summary": "In June 2014, a same-sex couple who had been lawfully married outside the State of Alabama filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against the State of Alabama. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Alabama's refusal to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples validly entered into outside of the State violated the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Subsequent to the Obergefell decision in June 2015 by the Supreme Court, Judge R. David Proctor dismissed this case without prejudice in October 2015, and costs were to be taxed against the defendants. The plaintiffs\u2019 appealed to the Eleventh Circuit in January 2016, but in February 2017, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court\u2019s ruling that there was no judicially sanctioned change in the relationship of the parties that would justify an award of attorney\u2019s fees. Parties submitted informal notice that counsel no longer sought to pursue costs in this case in May 2017, and there has been no further action in this case."}
{"article": "On July 15, 2013, three same-sex couples filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, challenging the constitutionality of Arkansas' laws prohibiting the marriage of same-sex couples and forbidding the recognition of legitimate same-sex marriages entered into in other states. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Amendment 83 of the Arkansas Constitution violated plaintiffs' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Two of the plaintiff couples sought to marry under the laws of Arkansas. The third plaintiff couple, married under the laws of New York, sought recognition of their marriage in Arkansas. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked the court to declare that Amendment 83 and other Arkansas laws denying same-sex couples from marrying were unconstitutional, and to require that the State permit same-sex couples to marry and recognize same-sex couples married under the laws of other states. On July 18, 2013, Judge James Leon Holmes recused himself from the case due to long-standing, close personal and professional relationships with the drafters of Arkansas Amendment 83. The defendants answered on November 21, 2013 and moved to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment. The court (Judge Kristine G. Baker) heard both motions on November 20, 2014 and issued its opinion and order on November 25, 2014. Judge Baker struck down Arkansas' gay-marriage ban as unconstitutional on the basis that it restricted the plaintiffs' fundamental right to marry in violation of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, the district court put its ruling on hold pending a timely appeal to the Eighth Circuit; the defendants filed notice of appeal on December 23, 2014. The Eighth Circuit deferred further consideration on April 29, 2015, pending the Supreme Court's resolution of <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12787\">Obergefell v. Hodges</a>. On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court held that the 14th Amendment does not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. Justice Kennedy found that the right to marry is fundamental, and it demeans gay and lesbian couples to deprive them of access to marriage. On August 11, 2015, in light of the decision in Obergefell, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the challenged laws are unconstitutional. 796 F.3d 976. The district court awarded the plaintiffs $19,950.00 in attorneys' fees, and the Eighth Circuit granted the plaintiffs $7,463.75 in attorneys' fees for the appeal. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Three same-sex couples filed suit challenging Arkansas' ban on same-sex marriage. The couples sought a declaration that the Arkansas laws prohibiting same-sex marriage and denying recognition of same-sex marriages legal under the laws of other states were unconstitutional. Judge Baker struck down Arkansas' gay-marriage ban as unconstitutional, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed after the Supreme Court's ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges."}
{"article": "Clayworth Healthcare Pharmacy (a Medicaid service provider) and two Medicaid recipients filed a civil suit challenging California's then-pending 5% reduction in the reimbursement rate paid to Medicaid providers. The suit was filed on March 19, 2003 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, against Diana M. Bonta, the Director of the Department of Health Services of the State of California (DHS), in her official capacity, and against the DHS. On November 07, 2003, another suit raising substantially similar issues was filed by the California Medical Association and thirteen other groups representing Medicaid providers, together with the Disabled Rights Union, a non-profit association of disabled persons. The suit was brought against Ms. Bonta in her official capacity. The Court determined on November 19, 2003, that the two cases were sufficiently related that they should be heard before the same judge and magistrate, but declined to officially consolidate them as a single case with a shared docket. All the substantive orders and opinions subsequently issued by the Court decided issues relating to both cases. Both are included here. The Plaintiffs alleged that the 5% reduction in the reimbursement rate violated the quality of care and equal access provisions of the Medicaid statute. They also argued that the reduction was a de facto amendment to California's federally approved Medicaid plan, and that all such amendments required Federal approval. They sought a preliminary injunction preventing the DHS from implementing the reduction while the issue was in court, and a permanent injunction to enjoin California from reducing the rates paid to providers for services and to require the State to rely on cost studies to ensure rates were reasonably related to the cost to the providers of providing services to Medicaid recipients. They also sought a declaration from the Court that the 5% reduction was unlawful, and to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. The Court (Judge David F. Levi) granted the motions of the Plaintiffs in both cases for preliminary injunctions in an Order and Opinion dated December 23, 2003. He held that a cause of action existed under 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983 allowing private plaintiffs to sue states for denying Medicaid beneficiaries their federally guaranteed right to equal access to quality medical services. He held that California had approved the reduction in provider costs without considering the impact the reduction would have on such access, and that therefore the pending rate reduction was arbitrary and unlawful. In the same decision, he dismissed the claims against the DHS itself, but not those against Ms. Bonta, as barred under the Eleventh Amendment. Clayworth v. Bonta, 295 F.Supp.2d 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2003). On January 8, 2004, the remaining Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. On August 2, 2005, the three-judge panel unanimously reversed the decision of the of the lower court, holding that no cause of action existed under \u00a7 1983 that would allow Medicaid providers or recipients to challenge the State's level of compliance with the equal access and quality of care provisions of Medicaid, citing the decision in Sanchez v. Johnson (416 F.3d 1051), which was issued by the same three-judge panel on the same day as this opinion (see related cases). Clayworth v. Bonta, 140 Fed.Appx. 677 (9th Cir. 2005). In light of the decision from the Appellate Court, the District Court dismissed both cases, Cal. Med. Assoc. on November 1, 2006, and Clayworth on December 1, 2006.", "summary": "In March and November of 2003, two separate cases (Clayworth v. Bonta and Cal. Med. Assoc. v. Bonta) were filed by Medicaid service providers and recipients seeking to enjoin California from reducing its disbursement rate to Medicaid providers by 5%. The cases were both filed in U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, and the Court found that the issues in the cases were substantially similar and therefore chose to relate them, assigning them to the same Judge. The Judge at the District Court granted a preliminary injunction preventing California from implementing the rate reduction, finding that to do so would violate the federally guaranteed right to equal access to quality medical services for Medicaid beneficiaries. The Defendant appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision, finding that their was no cause of action that would allow Medicaid providers or recipients to challenge a State's compliance with the equal access provisions of Medicaid. The cases were later dismissed."}
{"article": "On April 30, 2010, the California Association of Health Facilities filed a lawsuit against the California Department of Health Care Services in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. On the same day, the Developmental Services Network and the United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children's Foundation of Los Angeles and Ventura Counties also filed a lawsuit against the same defendants in the same court. The plaintiffs in both suits were represented by private counsel. In the first case, the plaintiffs represented intermediate care facilities for the developmentally disabled as well as freestanding pediatric subacute care facilities. The plaintiffs in the second case also represented intermediate care facilities for the developmentally disabled. The plaintiffs in both cases sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent California from implementing aspects of legislation passed by the State Assembly that would freeze Medicaid reimbursement rates for these facilities at either their 2008-09 or 2009-10 levels (the Clearinghouse contains several related cases filed in response to this and similar legislation). Under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396 et seq. (the Medicaid Act), such modifications must be approved by the federal Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) prior to being put in place. The legislation passed by the California assembly was not conditioned on such approval. The plaintiffs alleged that no studies or other analyses had been conducted that could show that the rate freezes were consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care requirements of 42 U. S. C. \u00a71396a(a)(30)(A). The plaintiffs in both cases sought relief under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, arguing that the California law was incompatible with federal Medicaid law and therefore preempted. The plaintiffs in Developmental Services Network also claimed as a cause of action 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, which creates a private cause of action for state violations of federally guaranteed rights under color of law. On May 27, 2010, the plaintiffs in Developmental Services Network filed an amended complaint, which made further arguments in support of the plaintiffs' standing to bring the suit, but the complaint did not appear to have added any substantive claims or requests for relief. On June 15, 2010, the Court granted the defendants' motion to consolidate the two cases. From this point on, all orders and opinions referred to both cases, and the plaintiffs from both cases were required to file joint briefs. On June 24, 2010, Judge Christina A. Snyder stayed the case pending the outcome of several petitions for certiorari review to the Supreme Court from related cases. California Association of Health Facilities v. Maxwell-Jolly, 2010 WL 2612694 (C.D. Cal. 2010). On February 9, 2011, the Supreme Court granted cert in these cases, consolidating them for the purpose of review. See <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11829\">Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California.</a> On March 28, 2011, the Court granted the plaintiffs' ex parte motion to lift the June 2010 stay, and on May 5, 2011, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, preventing the implementation of the Medi-Cal reimbursement rate freezes for intermediate care facility services for the developmentally disabled as well as for freestanding pediatric subacute facilities. Cal. Assoc. of Health Facilities v. Maxwell-Jolly, 2011 WL 6938438 (C.D.Cal. 2011). The defendants appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on May 26, 2011 and the docket number 11\u221255852 was assigned. Pending the outcome of this appeal, the case was again stayed. On November 30, 2011, the Appellate Court (Judges Ferdinand Francis Fernandez, Consuelo M. Callahan, and Ralph R. Erickson, district judge sitting by designation) vacated the order granting the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the District Court, finding that although California did have an obligation to submit Medicaid plan amendments to CMS and obtain approval prior to implementing these amendments, there was no individual cause of action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 available to the plaintiffs. Developmental Services Network v. Douglas, 666 F.3d 540 (9th Cir. 2011). The defendants applied for a rehearing at the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the Court failed to address recent events and newly issued opinions which it argued should have led to a holding that a State may modify its reimbursement rates without receiving prior approval. The Appellate Court declined to grant a rehearing. In a February 7, 2014 status report, the parties reported a pause in action due to a stay pending the petitions for writ of certiorari in Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, et. al. and California Medical Association v. Sebelius, et. al., Supreme Court Docket Nos. 13- 253 and 13-380, respectively, which were denied on January 13, 2014. The parties were considering a joint motion to dismiss at this time. On March 19, 2014, the District Court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motions in both cases to amend their complaints. On the same day, the Court ordered the cases stayed, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Independent Living Center, which remanded that case and the related cases to the Ninth Circuit for further deliberation. On June 2, 2014, the court lifted the stay in the case. On June 9, 2014, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss the case with prejudice. The next day, Judge Snyder dismissed the consolidated case and each party would bear its own attorney\u2019s fees and costs. The case is closed.", "summary": "On April 30, 2010, entities that represented Medicaid service providers filed this lawsuit in federal court against the California Department of Health Care Services. The plaintiffs represented intermediate care facilities for the developmentally disabled and other facilities. The plaintiffs sought injunctions preventing California from implementing legislation that would freeze Medicaid reimbursement rates for these facilities. The Plaintiffs sought relief under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The Court granted a preliminary injunction, which was vacated and remanded following the defendants\u2019 appeal. On June 9, 2014, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss the case with prejudice. The next day, Judge Snyder dismissed the consolidated case and ordered each party to bear its own attorney\u2019s fees and costs. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is an action filed in response to the CARES Act and an interim final rule from the Department of Education regarding how funds could be distributed between private and public schools. The court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the interim final rule on August 26, 2020. On November 9, the court approved a permanent injunction that prohibited the defendants from implementing the interim rule and from taking any action inconsistent with the proportional share formula provided by Congress. The court retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes. <hr> This lawsuit arose out of the funding provisions for elementary and secondary schools in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) of 2020. Filed by eight states (California, Michigan, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin), Washington D.C., and four school districts (Chicago, Cleveland, New York City, and San Francisco), the lawsuit challenged a July 1, 2020 interim final rule from the Department of Education about how the funds may be distributed between private and public schools. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) of 2020 was passed on March 27, 2020 to provide trillions of dollars in financial relief, and other assistance, to Americans suffering from the effects of the coronavirus pandemic. The CARES Act set aside approximately $16 billion to help elementary and secondary schools, particularly those schools with low-income students. The money was to be allocated based on the amount of Title I funding each state and school district received in the most recent year. Private schools were eligible to receive funds in certain circumstances consistent with established Title I criteria-the number of children from low-income families who attend the school. The Department of Education issued non-binding guidance on April 30, 2020 directing that private schools should get a share of CARES Act money based on their overall student population not just their number of low-income students. Widespread pushback followed, but nonetheless, on July 1, 2020, the Department published an interim final rule instructing that CARES Act money be apportioned to private schools based on the number of all children enrolled, not just low income children, or apportioned based on low-income private school children and incur poison pill requirements on how the public school share of the money may be used. In response, Michigan, California, Washington D.C., Maine, New Mexico, and Wisconsin filed this lawsuit against the Secretary of Education (Betsy Devos) and the Department of Education in the U.S. District Court for Northern District of California on July 7, 2020. The plaintiffs argued that the rule exceeded the Department's authority, was not in accordance with the governing law, violated separation of powers principles, and violated the Constitution's spending clause. In addition, the states argued that the rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because the Department acted arbitrary and capricious and bypassed notice and comment procedures required by the APA. The plaintiffs sought attorneys' fees and costs, a declaration that the July 1 rule and the April 30 guidance document are unlawful, and preliminary and permanent relief preventing the Department from enforcing the rule. On July 17, 2020, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to add additional states (Hawaii, Maryland, and Pennsylvania) and four school districts (Chicago, Cleveland, New York City, and San Francisco) as plaintiffs. The case was assigned to Judge James Donato. With the school year approaching, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the rule on July 20, 2020, arguing that the rule threatens imminent and irreparable harm to to schools and students across the country. The plaintiffs stressed that as a result of the rule, public schools would lose CARES Act funding in contradiction to Congress intent. The court held a hearing on the preliminary injunction on August 18, 2020. On August 26, 2020 Judge Donato granted a preliminary injunction against the rule. 2020 WL 5074397 (Aug. 26, 2020). <i>Michigan v. DeVos</i>, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2020). Judge Donato explained that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim rule was an unlawful action under the APA because it exceeded the Department's authority. Congress's intent was plain and clear that the funds should be distributed according to formula in Section 1117 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act which is based on the number of low-income families who attended private schools. Judge Donato called the Department's argument for the rule \"'interpretive jiggery-pokery' in the extreme,\" and questioned why Congress would include Section 1117, if it did not intend the formula to be used: \"If Congress did not mean to use the formula in Section 1117, wouldn't it simply have omitted any reference to it in the first place? But since Congress expressly referred to Section 1117, what exactly does the Department think that means?\" On October 9, the Department of Education issued new guidance that replaced the rule. On November 6, the defendants consented to the entry of a permanent injunction that prevented the defendants from implementing the April 30 guidance and taking any action inconsistent with the proportional share formula in Section 1117 or other restrictions or penalties on the use of CARES Act funds. The defendants waived their rights to seek reconsideration of or appeal of the decision. On November 9, the court approved the permanent injunction and issued a judgment on November 11. The court retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.", "summary": "This lawsuit arose out of the funding provisions for elementary and secondary schools in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) of 2020. Filed by eight states (California, Michigan, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin), Washington D.C., and four school districts (Chicago, Cleveland, New York City, and San Francisco), the lawsuit challenged a July 1, 2020 interim final rule from the Department of Education about how the funds may be distributed between private and public schools. On August 26, 2020, the court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the interim final rule. On November 9, the court approved a permanent injunction that prevented the defendants from implementing the April 30 guidance and July 1 rule and from taking any action inconsistent with the proportional share formula in Section 1117 or other restrictions or penalties on the use of CARES Act funds. The court retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes."}
{"article": "Title XIX of the Social Security Act (SSA) has provided medical care assistance to certain vulnerable populations under a cooperative federal-state arrangement, approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). In 2010 Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA) (\u201cObamacare\u201d) that expanded Medicare coverage to include an additional group of low-income adults under the age of 65. While all states were obliged to comply with the Medicaid Act, states had a choice on whether to expand Medicaid. States that chose to participate in the program and comply with minimum federal requirements, such as expanding coverage, received funding from the federal government to provide the care. In certain narrow cases, states were permitted to waive certain Medicaid Act requirements under \u00a7 1115 of the SSA, but only when the waiver promoted the objectives of the Medicaid Act. Otherwise, states were forbidden from picking and choosing individuals within a covered group. Arkansas was one of the first states to expand Medicare after the ACA was passed, starting in January 2014 to include adults under the age of 65 through private care. The expansion was renamed \u201cArkansas Works\u201d (AW) when it was renewed in in 2016 and extended through 2021. At this time, Arkansas requested to institute a work requirement in Medicaid as a requirement for health coverage, which was denied by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) because it was inconsistent with the purposes of the Medicaid program. However, in 2017 the Trump Administration called on federal agencies to undo the ACA and introduced another purpose to Medicare, which was to promote enrollees to work. This resulted in CMS inviting states to implement exceptions to the SSA. In March 2017, Arkansas Governor Asa Hutchinson proposed amendments to the AW to institute a work requirement and shrink retroactive health coverage. Changing its original position from 2016, the Secretary of the HSS approved the Arkansas Works Amendments (AWA), including the work condition, on March 5, 2018. On August 14, 2018, three individuals filed a lawsuit against HHS and CMS in the US District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the SSA by the federal government in approving the AWA in March 2018. The AWA, according to the plaintiffs, sought to undermine the ACA and the expansion of Medicaid through a fundamental alteration of those statues. The plaintiffs claimed that the AWA was in violation of the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, which limits presidential power from rewriting congressional statutes, and ensures execution of laws passed by the Congress. All three plaintiffs were beneficiaries of Medicaid who lost or risked losing medical coverage due to changes in the AW program, which required 80 hours of employment per month for able-bodied adults from 19-49, reported online, as a requirement for health coverage. One of the plaintiffs lost his Medicaid coverage and subsequently his job after he failed to meet the AWA work requirement by not reporting his compliance in June 2018. The two other plaintiffs, employed at the time of the lawsuit, anticipated losing their Medicare coverage due to the new work requirements. The plaintiffs alleged that the HHS violated the US Constitution and federal laws in approving the Medicaid work requirement and that the SSA did not permit the Secretary of HHS to waive federal Medicaid requirements. Represented by Legal Aid of Arkansas, Southern Poverty Law Center, and the National Health Law Program, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the AWA and attorney fees. The case was assigned to Judge James E. Bosaberg. On November 5, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with additional plaintiffs who also faced loss of coverage. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the same day, asking the court to strike down the Medicaid work requirement, alleging that the federal government approved the requirements without due process. The state of Arkansas also intervened as a defendant on November 30, 2018. Judge Bosaberg held that government action was arbitrary and capricious if the government failed to adequately consider an important aspect of a problem under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which requires courts to set aside government actions that are \u201carbitrary, capricious\u201d or unlawful. The court stated that the Secretary had a duty to determine whether the proposed AWA would promote the objectives of Medicaid, including whether it advances or hinders health coverage to the needy. In considering the merits of the plaintiff\u2019s claims, Judge Bosaberg considered whether the Secretary, in concluding that the AWA program promoted the objectives of the Medicaid Act, acted arbitrarily or capriciously. This challenge was previously considered in a separate suit in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16440\"><i>Stewart v. Azar</i></a>, where the court determined if an agency had adequately considered whether a waiver proposal from Kentucky would advance medical assistance to its citizens. The court in <i>Stewart v. Azar</i> vacated the waiver in question, which also included a work requirement, because the agency failed to sufficiently consider the impact of the proposed project on Medicaid coverage. On March 27, 2019, the court found that the Secretary of the HHS failed to adequately consider how the AWA would lead to loss of coverage for a substantial number of Arkansas residents, including the needy. Because coverage to the needy was a core objective of Medicaid, the court held that the AWA did not advance the purpose of Medicaid. Therefore, its approval was arbitrary and capricious. Correspondingly, the court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants\u2019 cross-motions on April 10, 2019. Like the holding in <i>Stewart v. Azar</i>, the approval for Arkansas\u2019s program was also vacated. 363 F.Supp.3d 165. On April 10, 2019, the federal defendants and the state of Arkansas each appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, docketed as 19-5094 (federal defendants\u2019 appeal) and 19-5096 (state of Arkansas\u2019s appeal). The parties briefed the appeal and oral arguments were held on October 11, 2019. On February 14, 2020, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment vacating the Secretary's approval of the Arkansas Works Amendments. <i>See Gresham v. Azar</i>, 950 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir. 2020). The decision applied to both appeals as a consolidated matter. Written by Senior Circuit Judge Sentelle, the opinion emphasized that providing healthcare coverage is the primary purpose of Medicaid. The defendants' alternative objectives of better health outcomes, financial independence, and transition to commercial coverage, on the other hand, were not consistent with Medicaid. The appellate court found the Secretary's approval of the Arkansas program to be arbitrary and capricious due to the failure to consider whether the program would result in loss of coverage, an important aspect of the approval analysis. As of May 11, 2020, the defendants had not filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. The deadline to file was extended until July 13, 2020. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2010, the U.S. Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA) (\u201cObamacare\u201d) that expanded Medicare coverage to include additional groups of beneficiaries. Arkansas approved a work requirement in Medicaid as a requirement for health coverage in its amendments on March 5, 2018. On August 14, 2018, three individuals filed a suit against the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), as well as administrators involved in implementing the Arkansas Works Amendments (AMA) in the US District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the SSA and the Constitution in approving the AWA in March 2018. All three plaintiffs were beneficiaries of Medicaid who lost or risked losing medical coverage due to changes in the AWA. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the AWA and attorney fees. On March 27, 2019, the court held that the AWA work requirement does not advance the purpose of the SSA. The court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment and vacated the approval for Arkansas\u2019s program. On April 10, 2019, the defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. On February 14, 2020, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment vacating the Secretary's approval of the Arkansas Works Amendments. The court emphasized that providing healthcare coverage is the primary purpose of Medicaid. The defendants' alternative objectives of better health outcomes, financial independence, and transition to commercial coverage, on the other hand, were not consistent with Medicaid. The court found the Secretary's approval of the Arkansas program to be arbitrary and capricious due to the failure to consider whether the program would result in loss of coverage, an important aspect of the approval analysis."}
{"article": "This is a case concerning the addition of a citizenship question to the 2020 United States census. On July 30, 2018, the Campaign Legal Center (CLC), a nonprofit aimed at increasing access to democratic participation, brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The CLC sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), \u00a7 5 U.S.C. 552. Represented by private and staff counsel, the CLC sought injunctive relief to compel the DOJ to release documents responsive to a FOIA request concerning the addition of a citizenship question to the 2020 census, filed by the plaintiff on February 1, 2018. They claimed that, to date, the DOJ has produced no documents related to this \"citizenship question,\" despite the fact that the DOJ has sent a letter to the Commerce Department to include such a question on the 2020 census. The CLC's 2018 FOIA request sought the release of documents concerning several key words and phrases related to the inclusion of a citizenship question on the 2020 census. The CLC filed this request to find records pertaining to a request made by the DOJ to the Census Bureau to include such a question. The case was assigned to Judge Tanya Chutkan. In September 2018, the defendant released 59 pages of partially redacted responsive materials, while withholding an additional 43 pages of responsive materials. Then, in November 2018, the defendant released an additional 11 pages of materials. The CLC continued to contest the adequacy of the defendant's search for responsive materials, and the defendant claimed that the materials it withheld were privileged, and therefore fell under a FOIA exemption. On May 8, 2019, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. On May 22, 2019, the plaintiff filed a cross motion for summary judgment. On June 1, 2020, Judge Chutkan granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant's, holding that the defendant's search was inadequate and that the withheld materials were not protected by an exemption. The DOJ appealed on July 31, 2020. USCA 20-05233. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2018, the Campaign Legal Center filed this lawsuit to compel the Department of Justice to comply with a Freedom of Information Act request by produce documents pertaining to the inclusion of a citizenship question on the 2020 United States census. In 2020, summary judgment was granted for the plaintiff. The government has since appealed."}
{"article": "This is a case about the Trump Administration's limits on LGBTQ protections under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 18116). On June 22, 2020, a group of LGBTQ-focused private healthcare providers, organizations providing community services, health professional associations, and individual providers filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706), claiming that the defendants violated the First and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Represented by both Lambda Legal and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorney's fees. Specifically, they alleged that the revised regulation issued under \u00a7 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) by HHS under the Trump Administration limits protections for LGBTQ individuals and causes harm to them and healthcare providers. In 2010, President Obama signed the ACA into law. Section 1557 prohibits discrimination based on sex, race, color, national origin, age, and disability. In 2016, HHS enacted a final rule (the \"2016 Rule\") to implement the nondiscrimination requirements of Section 1557. The 2016 Rule defined sex discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sex stereotyping and declared that healthcare providers and insurers cannot discriminate against LGBTQ individuals in medical and coverage decisions. In June 2020, however, the Trump Administration issued a revised regulation (the \"2020 Rule\"), which rolled back the 2016 Rule. The 2020 Rule eliminated the unitary legal standard for enforcement of violations of Section 1557 and introduced broad exemptions for discrimination based on personal religious or moral beliefs. This case was assigned to Judge James E. Boasberg. On July 9, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction or, in the alternative, motion to stay pending judicial review. The defendants filed their opposition on July 24, and the plaintiffs answered the defendants' opposition on July 29. On September 2, the court enjoined the Administration from implementing two provisions: (1) the 2020 Rule's elimination of \"sex stereotyping\" from the 2016 Rule's definition of \"discrimination on the basis of sex\" and (2) the 2020 Rule's use of Title IX's exemption of certain religious organizations from the statute\u2019s nondiscrimination mandate. The court limited the injunction to claims it concluded had a likelihood of success, and thus denied relief for the plaintiffs' claims that the 2020 Rule erroneously eliminated the 2016 Rule\u2019s prohibition on categorical coverage exclusions for gender-affirming care, improperly repealed the 2016 Rule\u2019s notice requirements, and violated Section 1554 of the ACA. Because the court did not find those claims to have a likelihood of success, it also did not award relief for the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. The injunction applied nationwide. In its opinion addressing the motion for a preliminary injunction, the court also analyzed whether or not the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims. Citing the fear instilled in the LGBTQ community as evidence of imminent injury, the court found that the plaintiffs had organizational standing for their four common-injury claims and two of their five organizational-injury claims of injuries caused by the 2020 Rule. The court also held that the plaintiffs had third-party standing to assert the equal-protection, substantive-due-process, and free-speech rights of third-party LGBTQ patients. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "In June 2020, the Trump Administration's Department of Health and Human Services issued a revised regulation under Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act that limited protections for discrimination against LGBTQ individuals. A group of LGBTQ-focused private healthcare providers, organizations providing community services, health professional associations, and individual providers filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that the revised rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act, First Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment. On September 2, the court found that the plaintiffs had standing for most of their claims, and enjoined the Administration from implementing two provisions: (1) the 2020 Rule's elimination of \"sex stereotyping\" from the 2016 Rule's definition of \"discrimination on the basis of sex\" and (2) the 2020 Rule's use of Title IX's exemption of certain religious organizations from the statute\u2019s nondiscrimination mandate. It denied relief for the 2020 Rule's elimination of the 2016 Rule\u2019s prohibition on categorical coverage exclusions for gender-affirming care, repeal of the 2020 Rule's notice requirements, and alleged violation of Section 1554, in addition to the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "In 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice (Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section) launched an investigation into the treatment of individuals with mental illness in the Delaware Psychiatric Center (DPC), a state hospital. The investigation was later expanded to assess the state's liability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and its integration mandate under the Supreme Court precedent Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). On November 9, 2010, the DOJ issued a findings letter documenting violations of both the ADA and the U.S. Constitution. DOJ found that, in violation of the ADA, individuals were unnecessarily institutionalized when community placement would be appropriate, and that individuals with mental illness living in the community were placed at risk of unnecessary institutionalization. DOJ also found \"inadequate risk assessments; inadequate mental health treatment, especially the failure to provide appropriate behavioral interventions for individuals with identified risks; inadequate restraint and seclusion practices; inadequate investigations of serious incidents; and inadequate discharge planning/community integration to ensure individuals live in the most integrated setting.\" Following negotiations, the United States filed a complaint and settlement agreement concurrently in July 2011. The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware (Judge Leonard Stark) approved this consent decree on July 15. As part of the agreement, the state of Delaware agreed to augment its services to keep individuals with mental illness out of institutions, create additional supports, and reform the conditions at DPC to remedy constitutional violations. Delaware also agreed to create a crisis system to divert individuals from being hospitalized unnecessarily; develop case management and additional community supports; and support integrated housing options. The agreement was designed to reduce the institutionalized population by half and to replace institution-based services with Medicaid-reimbursable community-based services. In accordance with the agreement, a Court Monitor filed reports on the State's progress through 2016. On October 6, 2016, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the case. The parties' brief noted that the State had greatly improved its services for people with serious mental illness; expanded its capacity to deliver those services; and reduced its reliance on segregative institutions. Furthermore, the State had enacted legislation aimed at ensuring it could continue improving its outcomes for people with mental illness absent court supervision. As of that date, the State was in full compliance with the agreement. Accordingly, on October 11, 2016, Judge Stark dismissed the case.", "summary": "The U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division entered into this court-enforceable settlement agreement with Delaware in 2011 to remedy unconstitutional conditions in its state psychiatric hospital and to provide community-based services to prevent the unnecessary institutionalization of individuals with mental illness. The State achieved full compliance with the agreement, and the case was closed in 2016."}
{"article": "On January 15, 2008, a group of Medicaid-eligible adults with disabilities that were confined to a nursing-home facility filed a class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act against the state's Health Care Administration and Department of Elder Affairs. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest attorneys, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the state discriminated against them by failing to offer services that would enable them to live in a community setting. On June 7, 2008, the Court (Judge Robert L. Hinkle) denied defendants' motion to dismiss. On October 14, 2008, Judge Hinkle certified the class consisting of any Florida Medicaid-eligible adult who, at any time during the litigation, resided in a nursing home that received Medicaid funding, and who could and would have resided in the community with appropriate community-based services. At the same time, the judge granted a preliminary injunction with regard to one of the named plaintiffs, Clayton Griffith. Griffith lived in a nursing home, the cost of which was covered by the state's Medicaid program. He had applied for and been determined eligible for a waiver that should have allowed him to live in the community rather than an institution. But the state's long waiting list precluded him from accessing the program. Nevertheless, he moved out of the home and into an apartment. Judge Hinkle entered an injunction ordering the state to provide Griffith Medicaid coverage for a certified nursing assistant. The state appealed the preliminary injunction, which the 11th Circuit affirmed on June 22, 2010. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment; the judge denied both motions on January 19, 2011. After a February 2011 bench trial, Judge Hinkle issued an order and opinion on January 3, 2012 that made permanent the injunction regarding Griffith, dismissed the other named plaintiffs' claims as moot, and decertified the class. To start, all but one of the other named plaintiffs had died during the course of litigation; the remaining one had decided to stay in the nursing home. The judge decertified the class in part because the state legislature had passed a new law which greatly improved the rate at which Medicaid-eligible adults were transitioned from nursing homes to community living. Post-legislation, Judge Hinkle reasoned, it was no longer true that the state had refused to act on grounds that applied generally to the class. He concluded that where the conditions that made class-certification appropriate are no longer present, the court has discretion to decertify, which he chose to do.", "summary": "On January 15, 2008, a group of Medicaid-eligible adults with disabilities that were confined to a nursing-home facility filed a class action in U.S. District Court against Florida's Health Care Administration and Department of Elder Affairs. The plaintiffs claimed that the state discriminated against them by failing to offer services that would enable them to live in a community setting. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment for one of the named plaintiffs and decertified the class that he had previously approved. In part because of recent legislation that greatly improved the state's efficiency at moving eligible persons from nursing homes to community living, the court determined that the conditions allowing for the class no longer existed."}
{"article": "On September 6, 2011, a resident of Florida and applicant for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) assistance filed this 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 class action against the Florida Department of Children and Families in the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU of Florida and the Florida Justice Institute, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Florida's TANF application requirements violated the Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the requirement that all applicants undergo suspicionless drug testing in order to be considered for assistance constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Judge Mary S. Scriven was assigned to the case. The plaintiff moved on September 6, 2011 for a preliminary injunction and on September 13, 2011 for class certification. The plaintiff proposed a class consisting of all individuals residing in Florida who were applying for, or would in the future apply for, Temporary Cash Assistance (Florida's program to distribute TANF benefits) and who would be subject to defendant's suspicion-less drug testing. Defendant opposed both motions. On October 24, 2011, the District Court granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction but denied his motion for class certification. <i>Lebron v. Wilkins<i>, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2011). The court found that the plaintiff was likely to succeed on his Fourth Amendment claim and issued an injunction that barred the defendant from requiring the plaintiff to take a suspicionless drug test. Since the defendant stipulated that it would apply the court's ruling to all people similarly situated to the plaintiff, the Court found that class certification was unnecessary and dismissed the plaintiff's motion to certify without prejudice. Defendant appealed the injunction to the Eleventh Circuit. But the Circuit Court (Barkett and Jordan, Circuit Judges, and Hall, District Judge sitting by designation) affirmed the District Court's injunction in an opinion issued on February 26, 2013. See Lebron v. Sec\u2019y, Florida Dep\u2019t of Children & Families, 710 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2013). Defendant petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for a rehearing en banc. Defendant\u2019s petition was denied on April 23, 2013. On November 4, 2011, the plaintiff renewed his motion for class certification, arguing that certification would avoid litigation over mootness should the plaintiff find employment. The District Court (Judge Scriven) agreed and certified the class in an order dated December 7, 2011. <i>Lebron v. Wilkins</i>, 277 F.R.D. 664 (M.D. Fla. 2011). The parties continued with preparing for trial. On September 10, 2012 the plaintiff filed for Summary Judgment on the grounds that Section 414.0652 of the Florida Statutes, which requires all applicants for TANF benefits to submit to suspicionless drug testing, is not constitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. On the same day, the defendant filed a cross motion for summary judgment, arguing that TANF applicants consent to the drug testing and, even if the consent argument failed, that the State had a special need to drug test applicants. On December 31, 2013, the District Court issued summary judgment for the plaintiff on the grounds that the State had failed to establish a special need to drug test all TANF applicants. In the same judgment the Court declared the statute facially unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the State from reinstating and enforcing the law. The defendant appealed the District Courts issuance of Summary Judgment to the Eleventh Circuit. And on December 3, 2014, the Circuit Court (Hull and Marcus, Circuit Judges, and TOTENBERG, District Judge sitting by designation) affirmed the District Court\u2019s decision on the grounds that the State failed to meet its burden of establishing a substantial special need to drug test all TANF applicants without any suspicion of drug use. <i>Lebron v. Secretary of the Florida Department of Children and Families</i>, 772 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2014). The Circuit Court granted appellate costs for the plaintiff and against the defendant, but the plaintiff did not move for attorney\u2019s fees. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On September 6, 2011, a resident of Florida and applicant for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) assistance filed this 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 class action against the Florida Department of Children and Families in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division. The plaintiff claimed that Florida's TANF application requirement that all applicants undergo suspicionless drug testing in order to be considered for assistance constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The District Court has issued a preliminary injunction and has certified the class action; an appeal of the injunction to the Eleventh Circuit is pending."}
{"article": "On July 20, 2004, a lesbian couple living in Florida filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida against the U.S. Attorney General and Clerk for the Circuit and Country Courts of Hillsborough County, Florida, challenging the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and Florida's implementation of the statute. Plaintiffs brought their lawsuit after a clerk in the Circuit Court's Office in Hillsborough Country refused to recognize their Massachusetts marriage license. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to declare DOMA and the corresponding Florida statute unconstitutional and enjoin their enforcement. The plaintiffs alleged that the two statutes violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs asserted that Florida is required to recognize their valid Massachusetts marriage license because DOMA exceeds Congress' power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. They also argued that twelve U.S. Supreme Court Cases, beginning with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and ending with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), demonstrate a recent trend by the Supreme Court to expand the fundamental liberty of personal autonomy in connection with one's intimate affairs and family relations. The plaintiffs urged the Court in the case at bar to expand on these cases and find that the right to enter into a same-sex marriage is protected by the Constitution. On September 27, 2004, the U.S. filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that DOMA does not infringe on any of the plaintiffs' fundamental rights and is a legitimate exercise of the power granted to Congress by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. On January 19, 2005, Judge James S. Moody, Jr., granted the defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court rejected the plaintiff's interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, saying that Congress' actions are an appropriate exercise of its power to regulate conflicts between the laws of two different States, in this case, conflicts over the validity of same-sex marriage. Florida is not required to recognize or apply Massachusetts' same-sex marriage law because it clearly conflicts with Florida's legitimate public policy of opposing same-sex marriage. The Court went on to say that it was bound the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), who dismissed for want of a substantial federal question the appeal of Minnesota's Supreme Court ruling that the right to marry without regard to the sex of the parties is not a fundamental right of all persons (and thus a similar state statute to the one in the case at bar did not violate the Due Process Clause or Equal Protection Clause). Regarding Due Process, the Court said the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence only determined that a Texas statute prohibiting homosexual sodomy failed under the rational basis analysis, and in no way can be interpreted as creating a fundamental right to same-sex marriage. The Court also expressed its reservations about elevating rights to fundamental status, since to do so would remove policy decisions from the hands of the people and into the guardianship of unelected judges. Willams v. Pryor, 378 F.3d 1232, 1250. Therefore, the Court found that the right to marry a person of the same sex is not a fundamental right under the Constitution. On the issue of Equal Protection, the Court stated that the Eleventh Circuit has held that homosexuality is not a suspect class that would require subjecting DOMA to strict scrutiny, Lofton v. Sec. of Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 2004), and that DOMA does not discriminate on the basis of sex because it treats women and men equally, In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 143 (W.D. Wash. 2004), and therefore it must apply rational basis review. The Court held that encouraging the raising of children in homes consisting of a married mother and father is a legitimate state interest, See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819-20, and DOMA is rationally related to this interest. On March 7, 2005, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the remainder of the case (involving the State of Florida) and the case was closed on March 8, 2005.", "summary": "Plaintiffs were a lesbian couple who filed a complaint on July 20, 2004 challenging the Federal Defense of Marriage Act, as well as Florida's implementation of the statute, as violating the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and sought declaratory relief. On January 19, 2005, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida held that DOMA falls within Congress' power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the right to same-sex marriage is not a fundamental right under the Constitution, and that DOMA passes the rational basis review test and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court dismissed the case."}
{"article": "This case emerged from <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12503\">Haddad v. Arnold</a>. With slightly differing facts from others in the proposed class in Haddad, plaintiffs Luis Cruz and Nigel de la Torre filed this separate complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 2011. The plaintiffs have spinal cord injuries that caused quadriplegia. Both have paralysis, use a wheelchair for mobility, and require assistance in their homes in order to perform daily life activities. Although both plaintiffs receive some in-home nursing through Medicaid, this is insufficient to meet their needs (about 2 hours a day of care). They are both on the waitlist for Florida Medicaid's traumatic brain and spinal cord injury waiver services, and the state administrators have responded negatively to their inquiries, indicating limitations in the program that would prevent the plaintiffs from receiving waiver services in the foreseeable future. The plaintiffs argued that this placed them at risk of unnecessary institutionalization and thus violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (under the precedent Olmstead v. L.C.) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Following a Report and Recommendation from Magistrate Judge Andrea Simonton, District Court Judge Ursula Ungaro granted the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction on November 24, 2010, finding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and that they stood to suffer irreparable harm without waiver services. The injunction ordered the state to provide such services. With waiver services in place for the plaintiffs, the parties agreed to dismiss the case on April 15, 2011. The case was reopened for the purpose of determining attorney's fees and the parties litigated this issue for a year, with a Magistrate Judge finding in favor of the plaintiffs and awarding fees in February 2012. The parties settled soon after.", "summary": "Plaintiffs were individuals with quadriplegia who did not receive adequate in-home care services via Florida Medicaid and who were on the waitlist for the state's spinal cord injury waiver services. After arguing that this was a violation of the ADA and Section 504, the plaintiffs received a preliminary injunction in 2010 and the state initiated waiver services soon after. The case finally settled in 2012."}
{"article": "Represented by Disability Rights Florida (the Protection & Advocacy Agency for Florida), individuals with developmental disabilities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida on March 23, 2011, challenging their continued placement on the waitlist for Florida's developmental disability Medicaid waiver services. Some of the plaintiffs lived in the community but alleged that the state's inability to provide them with services via the waiver would put them at risk of unnecessary institutionalization. Other plaintiffs resided in ICF/DD institutions (intermediate care facilities for the developmentally disabled) but claimed that they could live in the community if the state provided them with waiver services. The plaintiffs allege that the state's current policy of only allowing limited waiver enrollment for individuals deemed \"in crisis\" violates the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Medicaid. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but the court (Judge Richard Smoak) denied the motion on August 30, 2011. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for class certification. On October 14, 2011, Judge Smoak denied the motion for class certification, finding that the institutionalized plaintiffs and the non-institutionalized plaintiffs did not sufficiently share interests. In fact, they would probably compete with each other for enrollment slots if any opened up on the DD Waiver. Institutionalized plaintiffs will necessarily never reach the point of being in \"crisis\" (and are thus categorically prevented from enrollment under the current policies), but plaintiffs in the community could possibly get off the waitlist if their lack of sufficient services caused a crisis situation. Because Disability Rights Florida, as the state Protection and Advocacy Agency, has organizational standing to sue on behalf of individuals with disabilities, however, the case was able to proceed. Discovery continued, and the parties litigated the issue of standing for some of the plaintiffs whose status had changed throughout the course of the lawsuit. In July 2012, the parties entered a private settlement agreement and agreed to dismiss the lawsuit. The settlement agreement contained a few separate provisions. First, the Florida legislature had recently included a budget proviso requiring funds to be made available to transfer individuals from ICF/DD placement to the DD waiver. The Agency for Healthcare Administration will request this budget proviso in future years. The state also agreed to expedite the enrollment of individuals deemed in crisis, and to provide employment support services. Finally, the state will create a DD Waiver working group and will include stakeholders representing the disability community.", "summary": "The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit to challenge their continued placement on the waitlist for Florida's Developmental Disability Medicaid waiver, alleging that the lack of available waiver services contributes to unnecessary institutionalization in violation of the ADA. After a period of litigation, the parties settled and the state agreed to help individuals in institutions receive waiver services."}
{"article": "The Plaintiffs, individuals with developmental disabilities and/or mental illness, challenged Georgia's reduction in coverage in home-based support services. The Plaintiffs were receiving services from Georgia Medicaid's Service Options Using Resources in a Community Environment (SOURCE) program when the state announced that it would change the program to cover only individuals over aged 65 who had physical disabilities. As a result of this change, each plaintiff was given a notice that he or she would be terminated from the program. The Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia on September 10, 2010, alleging that the reduction in coverage placed the Plaintiffs at risk of unnecessary institutionalization in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, asking the court to order the state to continue providing SOURCE benefits to the Plaintiffs during litigation. The United States filed a brief supporting this motion on October 6, 2010. On October 7, 2010, the court (Judge Timothy C. Batten) granted a 60-day preliminary injunction ordering the state to allow the Plaintiffs to continue receiving SOURCE benefits. Throughout the next two years, the parties successfully petitioned the court for extensions of the preliminary injunction. Ultimately, the parties entered a settlement agreement on December 17, 2012. The state agreed to provide Plaintiffs with either continuation of the SOURCE program benefits or other Medicaid-funded community-based services that would allow the Plaintiffs to remain in the community.", "summary": "Plaintiffs, individuals in Georgia with developmental disabilities and/or mental illness, challenged the state's change in coverage for a Medicaid-funded community-based program, alleging that this change put them at risk of unnecessary institutionalization in violation of the ADA. The parties ultimately settled and the state agreed to provide the Plaintiffs with community-based services."}
{"article": "On September 18, 2008, a child with severe mental and physical disabilities filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, under the Medicaid Act 42 U.S.C. \u00a71396, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, against the agency that is responsible for administering Medicaid in the state of Georgia. The plaintiff, represented by attorneys from the Georgia Advocacy Office, sought temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated his rights and due process in their procedure for deciding how many hours of private duty nursing hours he would receive. On September 9, 2008, the district court (Judge Thomas W. Thrash Jr.) granted a temporary restraining order compelling the defendants to provide all hours of private duty nursing that the plaintiff's treating physician had requested (168 hours/week). On November 3rd, the court (Judge Thrash) granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, preventing the defendants from enforcing any of their policies that would limit or reduce the number of private duty nursing hours a patient could receive that were not based on medical necessity. The injunction also decreased the number of hours of nursing the plaintiff received based on a schedule created by a physician working for the defendant. Following a surgical operation, plaintiff required increased nursing hours and filed for a second temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. On February 17, 2010, the District Court (Judge Thrash) granted these motions, compelling the defendants to provide significantly increased hours of private nursing. Counsel for the plaintiff filed its second, and final, amended complaint on September 27, 2011. This complaint named five plaintiffs, all of whom had significant health problems. This final complaint reaffirmed the allegations from the first while adding a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment cause for action, as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act's (ADA) prohibition on policies that have the discriminatory effect of segregating individuals with disabilities from the general population. Plaintiffs argued that the non-medically based denial of private, in-home nursing care will lead to the institutionalization, and thus segregation, of the plaintiffs. <i>See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring</i>, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). The district court (Judge Thrash) granted a motion on behalf of the only plaintiff who was eighteen years old for a temporary restraining order compelling the defendants to provide the nursing care requested by a treating physician. On June 15, 2012, the court entered an order and opinion granting a permanent injunction that extended the effect of that restraining order. The defendant initially appealed this decision but it was voluntarily dismissed. On August 2, 2012, the court denied the plaintiff's motion to certify the class because the plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence that indicated how many people would be able to make the same allegations against the defendant. The defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment on January 30, 2013, claiming that the plaintiffs had not provided enough evidence to prove their allegations regarding the Medicare Act, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the ADA. The United States filed a brief as an interested party hoping to clarify the law regarding the ADA claim, urging the District Court to deny the motion for partial summary judgment. On May 22, 2013, the court issued an order granting the motion for partial summary judgment as it pertained to some elements of the Medicare Act claim as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court denied the motion with regard to other Medicare Act allegations in addition to the ADA claim. On August 5, 2013, the defendants offered the four remaining defendants a settlement consisting of individual nursing care plans and admitting no fault. Two of the defendants accepted this settlement offer. On September 27, 2013, following a three day bench trial, the District Court (Judge Thrash) issued an opinion and order the prohibition of the defendant from reducing the number of hours of private nursing care below eighteen per day, for a period of 180 days or until further order of the court. This decision applied to both of the plaintiffs. On October 25, 2013, the defendant filed to appeal this order and the order granting the permanent injunction to the eighteen-year-old plaintiff (US Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit case #13-14950). The appeal was declared moot with regard to two of the plaintiffs, one of whom passed away, while the other turned twenty-one, precluding him from the relevant Medicare statute. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on January 5, 2015. The court denied plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees without prejudice on September 30, 2014. Plaintiff filed a second motion for attorneys' fees on January 20, 2015, and the court granted this motion on August 19, 2015, awarding the plaintiff $837,847.50 in attorneys' fees and $13,208.65 in expenses for a total award of $851,056.15. The defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision.", "summary": "In September of 2011, one eighteen-year-old and four minor residents of Georgia with significant medical issues sued the agency responsible for administering Medicaid in Georgia. They alleged that the agency's decisions to deny or reduce hours of in-home, private nursing care violated the Medicaid act, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Two of the Plaintiffs settled and some of the Medicare, as well as the Fifth an Fourteenth Amendment Allegations were dismissed on summary Judgment, however, the District Court found for the Defendants on the remaining allegations. The defendant appealed this decision and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. The district court also awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiff, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals."}
{"article": "On March 25, 2010, this class-action lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the Secretary of the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration (FSSA) and the Director of the Office of Medicaid Policy and Planning of FSSA. The named plaintiffs were minor Medicaid recipients with serious disabilities who had been receiving medically-necessary therapies, paid for by the State's Medicaid program and administered by the FSAA. The FSSA had denied the named plaintiffs and others similarly situated individuals continued access to these therapies. It cited two provisions of the Indiana Administrative Code, one of which limited the provisions of these therapies to two years unless patients demonstrated significant progress to a \"higher functional state,\" and the other which generally prohibited all \"maintenance therapies,\" i.e. therapies designed to prevent deterioration rather than improve a patient's condition. The plaintiffs filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and argued that the FSSA's refusal to provide the therapies unlawfully violated Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396, et seq. (the \"Medicaid Act\" or the \"Act\"), which require states that participate in Medicaid to provide early screening, physical therapy and related services, and preventative services, respectively. The plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from refusing or limiting Medicaid coverage for therapies recommended or prescribed by a Medicaid recipient's physician, and preventing the enforcement of both of the contested provisions of the Indiana Administrative Code. The plaintiffs also sought legal costs and attorneys' fees. On September 20, 2010, the parties filed a joint stipulation, wherein the defendants agreed to provide the named plaintiffs with funding for their therapies while the case awaited its final outcome. This was in lieu of a preliminary injunction. On October 1, 2010, the plaintiffs, upon order from the court, filed a document clarifying their claim that the FSSA had violated federal Medicaid law. The following day the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint integrating these changes. On November 22, 2010, the Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson certified the plaintiff class. The class was defined as: \"Any and all persons in Indiana who are or will be enrolled in the Medicaid program and who are or will be under the age of twenty-one (21) who have been or will be denied coverage for physical therapy, occupational therapy, respiratory therapy, and/or speech pathology (\u201ctherapies\u201d), or who have had or will have coverage for these therapies otherwise limited, which denial or limitation is based upon 405 IAC 5-22-6(b)(6) and/or 405 IAC 5-22-6(b)(7), notwithstanding the fact that a physician acting within the scope of his or her practice under Indiana law has or will recommend and/or prescribe these therapies for the Medicaid recipient.\" A.M.T. v. Gargano, 2010 WL 4860119 (S.D. Ind. 2010). On February 10, 2011, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, issuing a permanent injunction preventing the defendants and their successors from limiting or denying coverage for prescribed physical, occupational, or respiratory therapy, and/or speech pathology, for any person under 21 enrolled in the State's Medicaid program when such denial or limitation was based upon the two disputed provisions of the Indiana Administrative Code (405 I.A.C. 5-22-6(b)(6) and (b)(7).) The Court denied the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees and costs. A.M.T. v. Gargano, 781 F. Supp. 2d 798 (S.D. Ind. 2011) On February 23, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the final judgment and for attorneys' fees and costs. On June 9, 2011, they withdrew this motion, \"the parties having resolved the matters without the necessity of Court intervention.\" The docket reflects no further litigation activity after June 10, 2011, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "On March 25, 2010, plaintiffs, minors with serious disabilities who were Medicaid recipients, filed this class-action lawsuit was filed in federal court against the Secretary of the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration (FSSA) and Director of the Office of Medicaid Policy and Planning of FSSA. They all had been receiving medically necessary therapies paid for by the State's Medicaid program, administered by the FSAA, for several years. These therapies were necessary to ensure the plaintiffs' conditions would not deteriorate and that they would not lose functional ability. The FSSA had denied the named plaintiffs and others similarly situated continuing access to these therapies, citing two provisions of the Indiana Administrative Code. On February 10, 2011, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs, issuing a permanent injunction preventing the Defendants and their successors from limiting or denying coverage for prescribed physical, occupational, or respiratory therapy, and/or speech pathology, for any person under 21 enrolled in the State's Medicaid program when such denial or limitation was based upon the two disputed provisions."}
{"article": "On March 28, 2018 the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and Prince George\u2019s County, Maryland filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Census Bureau, the Secretary of Commerce, and the President of the United States for \u201cconspicuous neglect\u201d of their duty to ensure the \u201cactual enumeration\u201d required by Article I of the U.S. Constitution. The case was assigned to Judge Paul W. Grimm. The plaintiffs claimed that this neglect had led to undercounting in the past, and would lead to higher undercounting in the 2020 Census, particularly affecting disadvantaged and minority populations. Prince George\u2019s County alleged that its population had been undercounted by 1.9% in 2000 and 2.3% in 2010. These undercounts impacted redistricting, distribution of public funds, and apportionment of representation in the U.S. House of Representatives. The plaintiffs claimed that the 2010 Census undercounted African Americans by roughly 1.5 million, while overcounting other demographic groups such as home owners and non-Hispanic whites. Census design flaws, underfunding, and lack of staff and leadership, together with Prince George\u2019s County\u2019s demographics and history of being undercounted, suggested a likelihood that the detrimental effects of undercounting were likely to be exacerbated for the county in the 2020 Census. For example, whereas the Bureau\u2019s budget has typically grown with each successive Census, it has decreased from $4.2 billion in 2010 to $3.9 billion in 2020. Moreover, the plaintiffs claimed that the plan to administer more of the Census digitally would lead to undercounting for areas with little broadband access, and leave the Census open to cyber attacks. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that the government had an obligation to administer a fair and accurate census, and to enjoin the government from violating that duty. Moreover, the plaintiffs requested that the court issue an injunction requiring the government to propose and implement a policy that ensures a hard count subject to court monitoring. The plaintiffs subsequently filed two amended complaints adding the parties\u2019 addresses. The government moved to dismiss on July 13, 2018, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the claim was not ripe, the decision constituted a political question beyond judicial review, and that the Enumeration Clause required only that the government conduct a person-by-person headcount of the population. The plaintiffs responded a month later. They argued that they had standing, citing the specific injury of a \u201csevere differential undercount\u201d resulting in vote dilution and loss of federal funding. On ripeness, the plaintiffs claimed to be at imminent risk of harm, and waiting until the census began would leave them without remedy. Against the government\u2019s claim of unreviewable discretion in conducting the census, the plaintiffs cited decades of census-related litigation. In November 2018, the plaintiffs submitted a supplemental notice of Judge George Hazel\u2019s recent ruling in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16610\"><i>La Uni\u00f3n del Pueblo Entero v. Ross</i></a>, a similar case in the District of Maryland, rejecting government arguments in a similar motion to dismiss. The court set a hearing for January 14, 2019. However, the government moved to continue the hearing in light of the government shutdown and resulting lapse in appropriations. The plaintiffs opposed the motion, as the census count would occur in just over a year, and other courts had refused to delay ongoing census litigation for the same reason. They argued that the shutdown would disrupt census preparations, leading to further inaccurate results. The court denied the motion to continue the hearing, finding that the case involved the protection of property, that the shutdown supported the plaintiff\u2019s argument that the government would not be prepared to conduct an accurate census in 2020, and that this type of motion has been denied in similar pending cases. The court ruled on January 29, 2019, granting in part the motion to dismiss. 382 F. Supp. 3d 349. The court noted this case was unique from other pending census litigation, as this suit did not include a challenge to final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act. Instead, it challenged the agency\u2019s action before it had finalized the 2020 Census preparations. The court thus denied without prejudice the request for injunctive relief, finding this claim not yet ripe because preparations were ongoing. However, the court recognized the potential for declaratory relief to ensure sufficient funds for census preparations, found that the plaintiffs had standing on this claim, and allowed this claim to proceed. On February 28, 2019, the court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint, adding a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act, but not allowing a restatement of the Enumeration Clause claim. The government moved to dismiss the amended claims. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on April 1, 2019. This complaint, among other things, removed President Donald Trump as a defendant. On April 15, 2019, the government filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. This motion to dismiss was granted on August 1, 2019. The court found that \u201cthe 2019 Appropriations Act moots the funding claim,\u201d and \u201cthe Final Operational Plan is not final agency action\u201d reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. 399 F.Supp.3d 406 On August 6, 2019, the plaintiffs appealed. Oral argument was heard on October 30, 2019, and the Fourth Circuit (Judges Roger Gregory, Barbara Keenan, and Julius Richardson) issued its opinion on December 19, 2019. It agreed with the district court that \u201cplaintiffs\u2019 APA claims, as pleaded, do not satisfy the jurisdictional limitations on judicial review set forth in the APA.\u201d It disagreed, however, with the district court\u2019s dismissal of the plaintiffs\u2019 Enumeration Clause claim, \u201cmindful of the Supreme Court\u2019s recent guidance affirming judicial review of \u2018both constitutional and statutory challenges to census-related decisionmaking,\u2019 <i>Dept\u2019t of Commerce v. New York</i>.\u201d The Fourth Circuit remanded that portion of the case to the district court. 945 F.3d 183. The plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on January 10, 2020. In addition, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction on January 21, 2020, asking the court to compel the government to expend 2020 Census funds in specified ways. On February 11, 2020, the government sought to dismiss the case, and sought summary judgment on the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction. On March 5, 2020, the court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction. The court held, among other things, that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the government had \u201crefused to spend the appropriations from Congress in the specific manner that Congress directed,\u201d and \u201cif the census proceeds as planned, there will be a differential undercount of the magnitude they fear, or that if [the court] were to order the funds spent as they want, the 2020 census would not produce an equal or worse undercount for hard-to-count communities.\u201d In addition, the court granted the government\u2019s motion to dismiss, on April 16, 2020. The court held that the plaintiffs did not \u201cplausibly allege that the Census Bureau\u2019s plan fails to bear a reasonable relationship to an actual enumeration or that any of the Census Bureau\u2019s actions unreasonably compromise the distributive accuracy of the census.\u201d As such, the court ruled the remaining motions moot, and directed the clerk to close the case. 2020 WL 1890531. The case is closed.", "summary": "On March 28, 2018, the NAACP and Prince George\u2019s County, Maryland filed a claim against the U.S. Census Bureau and President Donald Trump for neglecting their constitutional duty to administer a fair and accurate census of the US population. The plaintiffs alleged that underfunding and the flawed design of the 2020 Census might lead to undercounts of the US population in violation of the Enumeration Clause and to the detriment of minority populations, as the census count is tied to both public funding and governmental representation. The plaintiffs requested an injunction to require the US to develop a plan to ensure a fair and accurate count. The court dismissed the claim for injunctive relief as unripe because census preparations were ongoing, but allowed the claim on underfunding to continue. The court also allowed the plaintiffs to add two claims under the Administrative Procedure Act. On April 16, 2020, the court granted the government\u2019s motion to dismiss; the case is closed."}
{"article": "On December 18, 2009, plaintiffs, three Medicaid recipients diagnosed with cerebral palsy, filed a lawsuit against the Commissioner of the Maine Department of Health and Human Services in her official capacity (DHHS). The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maine and sought relief under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Disability Rights Center, Maine Equal Justice Partners, and the National Health Law Program, alleged that DHHS had violated the Nursing Home Reform Amendments to the federal Medicaid Act (NHRA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396r(e); Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12131 et seq.; and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794. The plaintiffs alleged that DHS had failed to accommodate plaintiffs' disabilities and to provide medically necessary treatment in the most integrated setting possible, as required by the ADA, Section 504, and other federal law, and instead forced them into nursing homes where they were functionally segregated from the outside world. Plaintiffs claimed that they did not require intensive nursing care, and that with appropriate personal care and assistance, they all would be able to live in independently. In addition, none of the plaintiffs had ever been evaluated for or received individualized services appropriate to their needs during their confinement in the nursing facilities, contrary to the NHRA. Plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and declaratory relief, seeking to be placed in integrated, community settings such as their own apartments or houses, or small group homes located in the general community, or, if it was determined that their medical conditions were severe enough that they actually required treatment in nursing facilities, that they receive the personalized care required by the NHRA. They also sought litigation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. On August 10, 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, seeking to make the suit a class action. On August 11, 2010, the Court granted the motion, and plaintiffs filed an amended complaint immediately, defining the putative class as \"[all] Maine residents who currently are or in the future will be: (1) eligible for and enrolled in [the State's Medicaid program], (2) age 21 or older, (3) have [cerebral palsy, epilepsy, or a condition closely related to intellectual disabilities as defined by federal regulation 42 C.F.R. \u00a7 435.1010, not including mental illness, autism, Alzheimer's, or dementia], and (4) who are or should be screened for admission to nursing facilities pursuant to 42. U.S.C. \u00a7 1396r(e)(7) and 42 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 483.112 et seq.2.\" According to the amended complaint, more than 48 individuals had been identified as meeting this definition. On January 31, 2011, the Court (Judge John A. Woodcock, Jr.) granted the Plaintiffs' motion to certify the class. Van Meter v. Harvey, 272 F.R.D. 274 (D. Me. 2011). The amended complaint sought injunctions requiring that all class members be promptly screened and provided with personalized services as required by the NHRA, and also screened for eligibility for community-based services, and, where appropriate, transferred from nursing homes to community settings. They continued to seek declaratory relief and costs, as well. The parties began settlement discussions shortly thereafter. On August 25, 2011, the parties filed a joint motion seeking approval of their settlement, and a fairness hearing was held on April 24, 2012. On May 2, 2012, the Court (Judge Nancy Torresen) approved the settlement, dismissing the case with prejudice, retaining the level of jurisdiction required to enforce its terms for three years from the effective date of the settlement. The settlement agreement required the DHS to establish a Medicaid Home and Community Based Waiver (HCBW) program, which would provide a limited number of qualifying class-members the opportunity to live in community-based settings, providing them with \"home supports; community supports; employment specialist services; work supports; home accessibility adaptations; communication aids; transportation services; assistive technology; consultation services and assessments; counseling and crisis services; maintenance occupational, physical and speech therapy; [and] case management and specialized medical equipment to the extent that those services are subject to federal financial participation under the Medicaid program.\" DHS would allow fifteen class members to opt into the HCBW program in the first year, and add an additional ten spaces in the program each year, until the program reached its maximum size of 75 class members. The settlement indicated that the parties would prefer that the HCBW program be established as soon as possible, but acknowledged that the federal government might require the DHS first establish Intermediate Care Facilities for Other Related Conditions (ICFs-ORC) before accepting its proposal for an HCBW. The parties agreed that if ICFs-ORC were determined to be necessary, the parties would return enter mediation to determine an appropriate extension of the court's jurisdiction over the case. DHS also agreed to provide the Preadmission Screening and Annual Resident Review (PASARR) and personalized care required by the NHRA. It appears both parties bore their own costs. On July 16, 2013, the plaintiffs' filed a motion for mediation, seeking the Court's assistance resolving disputes relating to the PASARR program. They argued that mediation was necessary because the parties had failed to agree on a corrective plan for implementing PASARR within the 150 day window provided by the settlement. There have been no updates to the docket after the request for mediation, and it appears that the case is now closed.", "summary": "On December 18, 2009 three young adult residents of Maine who were Medicaid recipients and who were diagnosed with cerebral palsy, filed a lawsuit against the Commissioner of the Maine Department of Health and Human Services in her official capacity. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. The plaintiffs alleged that DHHS had violated Title II of the ADA and other federal laws. The Plaintiffs alleged that the State had failed to accommodate Plaintiffs' disabilities and to provide medically necessary treatment in the most integrated setting possible, instead forcing them into nursing homes where they were functionally segregated from the outside world. In August, 2010, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint reframing the case as a class action on behalf of all similarly situated Maine residents. The parties began settlement discussions shortly thereafter. On May 2, 2012, the Court (Judge Nancy Torresen) approved the settlement. The settlement agreement required the State to establish a Medicaid Home and Community Based Waiver (HCBW) program, which would provide a limited number of qualifying class-members the opportunity to live in community-based settings. The case is presumably closed."}
{"article": "On April 14, 2014, several same-sex couples married in Michigan on March 22, 2014 filed this \u00a7 1983 civil rights action against the State in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union and private counsel, asked the court to declare that the same-sex marriage ban was unconstitutional when applied to Michigan's same-sex couples, to enjoin the State of Michigan from refusing to recognize those marriages, and to award attorney's fees and costs. The complaint named the governor, and the directors of the Department of Human Services, the Office of Retirement Services, and the Department of Community Health as defendants in their official capacities. The case was assigned to District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith and referred to Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub. The plaintiffs had all been married in Michigan on March 22nd, 2014, during the window of time between the decision in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12811\">DeBoer v. Snyder</a>, which overturned the ban on same-sex marriage, and the stay issued by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had enjoined the state from enforcing the ban on same-sex marriage. The plaintiffs' marriages were legal at the time they were solemnized. After the stay, the governor of Michigan suspended the benefits and rights associated with the plaintiffs' marriages. The plaintiffs alleged the suspension put their marriages in a state of legal limbo and violated their rights to due process and equal protection. The plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction on May 29, 2014, and the defendants filed motions to stay, to dismiss, and to consolidate cases. On January 15, 2015, Judge Goldsmith ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, granting their motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the State of Michigan from refusing to recognize the marriages of all same-sex couples lawfully married in the state between the district court's decision in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12811\">DeBoer v. Snyder</a> and before the issuance of the stay by the Sixth Circuit. The judge also denied the defendants' motions to stay, to dismiss, and to consolidate cases. A final declaratory judgment permanently enjoining the defendants was issued on February 24, 2015. It is unclear from the docket whether the plaintiffs were awarded attorneys' fees in this case. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On April 14, 2014, several same-sex couples married in Michigan on March 22, 2014 filed this \u00a7 1983 civil rights action against the State in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union and private counsel, asked the court to declare that the same-sex marriage ban was unconstitutional when applied to Michigan's same-sex couples, to enjoin the State of Michigan from refusing to recognize those marriages, and to award attorney's fees and costs. On January 15, 2015, the District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs."}
{"article": "In July 2011, a group of minor children with developmental disabilities filed this civil rights class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina to prevent reductions in Medicaid waiver services. The plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (NCDHHS) and Piedmont Behavioral Healthcare (PBH). The plaintiffs had received home-based Medicaid-funded services through the North Carolina \"Innovations Waiver.\" On July 1, 2011, it was announced that the plaintiffs' services would be reduced because Piedmont Behavioral Health (PBH), a contractor of the state health department, implemented a new system to determine which services were \"medically necessary.\" The plaintiffs claimed that although their medical conditions remained constant, essential health services had been unreasonably and arbitrarily reduced by PBH's \"Support Needs Matrix\" and that they had not been offered an avenue to appeal their service reductions. They alleged that some plaintiffs would be threatened with placement in institutional settings far from their communities if the services needed to remain at home were not reinstated. According to the plaintiffs, this new reduction of services violated the U.S. Constitution's guarantee of due process and the federal Medicaid statute. They requested class certification, declaratory relief, preliminary relief, permanent injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs filed for class certification and for a preliminary injunction on August 29, 2011. After a period of discovery and a controversy regarding the disqualification of counsel and a motion to intervene, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order on December 20, 2011. District Judge Louise Wood Flanagan denied this motion on December 28, 2011, but noted that the motion for preliminary injunctive relief was still pending. After resolving the disqualification issue, the court held a hearing on the motion for preliminary relief in March 2012. On March 29, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion and certified the class. The court found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, in part because federal Medicaid provides that adequate notice and a fair hearing process be made available before denying benefits, and there was no notice or available appeal here. Such a process is also required by the Constitution and the plaintiffs had also demonstrated irreparable harm. PBH appealed the preliminary injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's decision on May 10, 2013. K.C. ex rel. Africa H. v. Shipman, 716 F.3d 107 (4th Cir. 2013). The Fourth Circuit held that it was speculative at best whether a decision in the appeal would enable PBH to engage in the conduct that the District Court enjoined. The Court explained that, because the NCDHHS had not appealed the grant of the preliminary injunction, the NCDHHS would remain obligated to obey the injunction, thus making PBH bound to comply with the injunction regardless of any appellate decision. The Court cited two reasons why PBH would still be required to follow the injunction. First, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2) requires that any injunction binding named parties also binds the parties' agents. Because PBH was an agent of the NCDHHS due to its contract to administer plaintiffs\u2019 Medicaid services on behalf of the state, it would be bound to follow the injunction under Rule 65(d)(2). Second, the Medicaid statute requires each state to designate a single state agency to administer its Medicaid plan, which is the NCDHHS in this case. Therefore, the NCDHHS's decision not to appeal the preliminary injunction controls. Following the Fourth Circuit's decision in May 2013, the parties engaged in extensive efforts to reach a settlement agreement. On December 12, 2014, the parties submitted a settlement agreement to the court for preliminary approval, notice to class members, scheduling of a fairness hearing, and clarification of the class definition. On January 2, 2015, the court preliminarily approved the proposed settlement agreement pending an opportunity for class members to object. Following a fairness hearing, the court approved the settlement agreement on April 6, 2015. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, the court dismissed the action with prejudice on December 31, 2015. The settlement agreement provided for improved notification and grievance-filing procedures with respect to changes or reductions in services. Additionally, the defendants agreed not to reduce any participant's base budget for one year after the implementation of the agreement and before dismissal of the case. For the two-year period following dismissal of the case, the defendants agreed to notify participants of any base budget reduction. The agreement also provided for increased procedural protections for individuals requesting an authorization of services. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs $375,000 for attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs incurred during the litigation. The agreement remained in effect for a two-year monitoring period following the dismissal of the case in December 2015. After the monitoring period, no further litigation had taken place and the case is now closed.", "summary": "Individuals with developmental disabilities who received home-based services under one of North Carolina's Medicaid waiver programs, challenged allegedly unreasonably and arbitrary reductions in their services under a new formula for calculating need. The District Court granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction in March 2012. The Fourth Circuit the denied the defendants' appeal of the preliminary injunction. On April 6, 2015, the District Court approved the parties' proposed settlement agreement and the case was dismissed with prejudice on December 31, 2015."}
{"article": "On May 20, 2003, Bill M. and other developmentally disabled Nebraska residents filed a lawsuit under Americans with Disabilities Act, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, federal Medicaid statutes, the Due Process Clause, against the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services Finance and Support in the United States District Court, District of Nebraska. The plaintiffs, represented by Nebraska Advocacy Services, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the State unlawfully provided inadequate funding for developmental disability services, thereby raising the risk that the plaintiffs would be placed institutional (as opposed to residential or community) settings. On August 6, 2004, the District Court (Judge Richard G. Kopf) denied defendants' motion to dismiss based on 11th Amendment sovereign immunity. Defendants took an interlocutory appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. On May 27, 2005, the Eighth Circuit (Judge Roger Wollman) reversed with respect to Plaintiffs' Title II claim and held that the claim should be dismissed based on Nebraska's sovereign immunity. Bill M. ex rel William M. v. Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services Finance and Support, 408 F.3d 1096 (8th Cir. 2005). The Court held, however, that plaintiffs could still proceed under an almost identical claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. On remand, on September 2, 2005, the District Court dismissed Plaintiffs' first claim for relief under Title II of the ADA. Magistrate Judge David L. Piester issued a Report and Recommendation regarding Plaintiffs' first motion for class certification and appointment of class counsel on June 20, 2005, that recommended that class certification be denied. On June 22, 2007, Magistrate Judge Piester issued his Report and Recommendation regarding Plaintiffs' second motion for class certification and appointment of class counsel, again finding that class certification should be denied. On July 17th, Judge Kopf adopted the Report and Recommendation and denied class certification. Bill M. ex rel William M. v. Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services Finance and Support, 2007 WL 2068187 (July 17, 2007, D. Neb.) The parties filed their settlement agreement with the Court on April 2, 2008. On April 9, 2008, the Court issued a memorandum and order requiring the parties to review the consequences of the Court granting the parties' joint motion and stipulation for approval of settlement. Subject to the limitations stated in the order, the Court approved the parties' settlement agreement on April 21, 2008. The Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees on June 20, 2008. Bill M. ex rel William M. v. Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services, 2008 WL 2550648 (June 20, 2008, D. Neb.) Plaintiffs appealed the denial of attorney fees to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Steven Colloton issued the Court's opinion, affirming the District Court's decision, on March 9, 2009. Bill M. ex rel William M. v. Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services Finance and Support, 570 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 2009). There has been no further activity in the case.", "summary": "This case was brought by individuals in Nebraska who were eligible for and had applied for or attempted to apply for home and community-based developmental disability services. Plaintiffs brought the case against the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services Finance and Support seeking declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants from violating the ADA and various Medicaid laws and requiring them to adopt practices aimed at providing eligible persons with developmental disability services in home and community-based settings. Plaintiffs also sought litigation expenses, costs, and attorney's fees."}
{"article": "On October 20, 2003, a lawsuit against various New York state officials was filed on behalf of individuals in New York City jails awaiting treatment for their serious chemical dependency and mental illnesses under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff, represented by private counsel and legal aid, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that they were incarcerated instead of being placed in treatment because the state failed to provide sufficient placements and programming. On August 11, 2005, the Court (Judge Richard Conway Casey) denied Defendants' motion to dismiss because it was not clear that Plaintiffs had not exhausted administrative remedies. On March 15, 2007, the Court (Magistrate Judge Kevin Nathanial Fox) denied Defendants' motion for a protective order and granted Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions against Defendants for failure to comply with discovery requests. Jobe O. v. Pataki, 2007 WL 844707 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2007). On December 5, 2007, the Court (Judge Colleen McMahon) issued a decision and order dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and granting leave to substitute an appropriate named plaintiff and move for class certification within ninety days. Jobie O. v. Spitzer, 2007 WL 4302921 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2007). The Court found that the named plaintiff was not appropriate because he had been released from incarceration long before the complaint was filed. When Plaintiff's counsel failed to substitute an appropriate named plaintiff within ninety days, the Court dismissed the complaint. Jobie O. v. Spitzer, 2008 WL 834002 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2008). There has been no further action, and the case has been closed.", "summary": "This case was brought on behalf of individuals in New York City jails with mental illness and chemical dependency seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to require the state to provide sufficient treatment programs instead of incarceration. The case was dismissed on March 11, 2008, because named Plaintiff's claims were moot."}
{"article": "On March 29, 2018, four transgender people seeking to correct their Ohio birth certificates to accurately reflect their gender identity filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio (in Columbus). The plaintiffs sued the Director of the Ohio Department of Health under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by the ACLU and Lambda Legal, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Michael H. Watson. The plaintiffs wished to change their birth certificates to avoid discrimination, privacy invasions, harassment, humiliation, stigma, harm to their health, and violence. They claimed that, in barring transgender people from obtaining accurate birth certificates matching their gender identity, the Department of Health had violated federal constitutional guarantees, including the rights to equal protection, due process, and freedom from compelled speech. On April 5, 2018, the court granted a request by the plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously and a protective order to be referred to pseudonymously in court documents. (2018 WL 8804858). On July 6, 2018, the state filed a motion to dismiss due to failure to state a claim, arguing that the plaintiffs did not state a true violation of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, Ohio argued that birth certificates purely express sex and not gender identity under Ohio statutes; that the plaintiffs failed to properly state a claim of due process violation; and that preventing birth certificate changes served state interests. On July 21, 2018, Ohio filed a motion to stay discovery until their motion to dismiss had been resolved. The state argued that the plaintiffs were already serving overly broad discovery requests at the expense of taxpayer money for a case that was primarily legal in nature, despite the fact that a successful motion to dismiss would resolve most actions in this case. The state argued that in the interests of saving resources, a stay of discovery should be ordered until a decision on their motion had been finalized. On October 10, 2018, the district court denied the state's motion to stay discovery, citing that a \u201cgarden-variety\u201d motion to dismiss, was not sufficient grounds to stay discovery. (2018 WL 4907080). Nearly a year later, on September 12, 2019, the judge denied the motion to dismiss. Specifically, the judge found that Ohio statutes were not clear on whether a transgender individual could obtain a birth certificate change, violations of due process were properly alleged, and that the argument that preventing birth certificate changes served a state interest lacked merit. (2019 WL 11791719) Both sides moved for summary judgment on January 16, 2020. On December 16, 2020, Judge Watson granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the government's; Judge Watson based this on a logical disconnect between Ohio\u2019s stated reasons for denying the documentation (historical accuracy and preventing fraud) and the fact that the state had, as recently as 2016, allowed transgender people to change the sex marker on state documents. (507 F.Supp.3d 925) On February 1, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney fees. On March 26, the court stayed this motion pending a joint status report detailing the discussions between the parties on the attorney fees motion and the government's compliance with the December 16 order. On June 23, 2021, Judge Watson signed a consent judgment which stipulated that the government would issue correct documents to the plaintiffs reflecting their gender identity, would seal the incorrect documents in a vault away from the public, and that the decision in this case would affect only the parties to the case and not other transgender people seeking similar relief in Ohio. The court ordered that a status report be submitted no later than July 26, 2021. As of the writing of this summary, the case remains open.", "summary": "On March 29, 2018, four transgender persons filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The plaintiffs sued the Director of the Ohio Department of Health under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by the ACLU, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on December 16, 2020, following a failed attempt by the government to have the case dismissed for failure to state a claim. On February 1, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney fees. On March 26, the court stayed this motion pending a joint status report detailing the discussions between the parties on the attorney fees motion and the government's compliance with the December 16 order. The court ordered that a joint status report be submitted no later than July 26, 2021."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is an ongoing lawsuit regarding Ohio state legislation that would criminalize certain abortions that was amended to include a request for relief in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order against the Department of Health's order which had banned all \"non-essential surgeries and procedures\" starting on March 18. The judge granted the temporary restraining order for a period of 14 days, which was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit on April 6. The judge granted a preliminary injunction on April 23, which allowed abortions in situations where a medical provider determined that a delay would not be possible. <hr> On May 15, 2019 the plaintiffs, for-profit and non-profit providers of medical and surgical abortions in Ohio and their doctors, filed an initial complaint in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against the Ohio State Department of Health, the State Medical Board of Ohio, and various county prosecutors. They contested the Ohio State Legislature's 6-week abortion ban, passed on April 10 of that year. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Ohio and the Planned Parenthood Foundation, sought a temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and costs under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. 2201. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Ohio S.B. 23, which would criminalize all abortions in which a fetal heartbeat can be detected (six weeks) except in cases that would jeopardize the health of the mother, would practically eliminate abortion in Ohio, because it often takes women longer than six weeks to determine that they are pregnant. They claimed that this violated the substantive due process precedent outlined in <i>Roe v. Wade</i>. On May 24, the court related another case <i>Preterm Cleveland v. Himes</i>, but determined that each case should remain with its assigned judge. Judge Michael R. Barrett granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction on July 3, 2019 (394 F.Supp.3d 796), in advance of the statute's effective date of July 11. He stated that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits and enacting the ban would cause irreparable harm to Ohio women. Following this, the plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on August 20, 2019. Both parties filed motions and answers surrounding the motion for judgment on the pleadings until the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 30, 2020, in response to the Ohio Department of Health's March 17 order. The order banned all \"non-essential surgeries and procedures\" to preserve personal protective equipment (PPE) starting on March 18 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs alleged that surgical abortions do not use a significant amount of PPE and that surgical abortions might be the only option for patients that are allergic to medical abortion pills. They also claimed that forcing patients to wait until the pandemic passed would not be sufficient, since abortion is a time-sensitive procedure. The order estimated the potential delay to be about eight weeks at minimum, but the order banning elective procedures was expected to possibly last up to a year. The complaint also added an equal protection claim that abortion providers were unfairly being singled out in comparison to other businesses. The plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order to block the Department of Health order and they sought the same relief requested in the initial complaint. Judge Barrett granted the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order against the Department of Health order on the same day (2020 WL 1932851). This temporary restraining order lasted for 14 days and was limited to situations where a medical provider decided that delaying a surgical abortion until after the pandemic subsided would not be possible. He denied a motion to stay the temporary restraining order filed by the defendants on April 2 (2020 WL 1932492). The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal contesting the temporary restraining order on April 1. A Sixth Circuit panel, composed of Chief Judge R. Guy Cole and Judges Ralph B. Guy and John K. Bush declined to reverse the temporary restraining order on April 6 (2020 WL 1673310), saying that the narrow tailoring of the restraining order meant that not many abortions would be performed and PPE supplies would not be diminished. They stressed that the time sensitive nature of abortions justified this protection. In order to preserve the status quo before ruling on the preliminary injunction, Judge Barrett extended the temporary restraining order for an additional two weeks on April 10, 2020 (2020 WL 1932540). Judge Barrett granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction on April 23, 2020 (2020 WL 1957173). He noted that, while he did not want unnecessary medical procedures being performed in Ohio, waiting to have an abortion was not an option in certain circumstances. He limited the bounds of the preliminary injunction to situations where a medical provider determined that a delay would not be possible. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On May 15, 2019 the plaintiffs, for-profit and non-profit providers of medical and surgical abortions in Ohio and their doctors, filed an initial complaint in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against the Ohio State Department of Health, the State Medical Board of Ohio, and various county prosecutors contesting the Ohio State Legislature's 6-week abortion ban, passed on April 10 of that year. The plaintiffs won on a motion for a preliminary injunction on July 3. The plaintiffs amended their complaint on March 30, 2020 to include the Ohio Department of Health's order banning all elective medical procedures, including surgical abortions, in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis. They won a preliminary injunction for that order, as well. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On November 17, 2017, six people with physical and/or intellectual impairments that relied on ADvantage waivers and/or In-Home Supports waivers to receive health services at their homes, filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District for the Western District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs sued Oklahoma Health Care Authority (OHCA) and Oklahoma State Department of Human Services (DHS) under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Oklahoma Disability Law Center, sought injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming violations of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs alleged that OHCA and DHS were planning to cut funding to the waivers that the plaintiffs depended on for home based health care services and put them in danger of forced institutionalization in a nursing home. More specifically, in October 2017, the plaintiffs received notices that their Medicaid ADvantage and In-Home Supports waivers would not be funded after December 1, 2017. This case was assigned to Judge Joe Heaton. On December 6, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On February 12, 2018, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint. They alleged that the plaintiffs\u2019 claims had become moot because DHS found a way to fully fund the waiver programs. Further, the defendants argued that, because there were no longer any violation of federal law, the plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief. Therefore, the amended complaint should be dismissed. The court agreed and dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint for mootness on March 26, 2018. This case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2017, six individuals, persons with physical and/or intellectual impairments that relied on ADvantage waivers and/or In-Home Supports waivers to receive health services at their homes, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District for the Western District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs sued Oklahoma Health Care Authority (OHCA) and Oklahoma State Department of Human Services (DHS) under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1331. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Oklahoma Disability Law Center, sought injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming violations of the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) and the 504 Rehabilitation Act. In 2018, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for mootness because the controversy had been resolved."}
{"article": "On December 19, 2013, two same-sex couples residing in Oregon who wished to have a state-recognized marriage filed a lawsuit in the District of Oregon U.S. District Court under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the state of Oregon. The plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and sought a declaration that Oregon laws banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, a permanent injunction requiring the state to grant to same-sex couples the same full and equal recognition, rights, and privileges given to different-sex couples and recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages, and an award of costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs claimed that by prohibiting residents from entering into a same-sex marriage, and by refusing to recognize legal same-sex marriages that took place out-of-state, the state of Oregon was violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. They also alleged that the ban injured them by denying them medical and government benefits available to married same-sex couples, as well as interfering with their dignity, autonomy, and family integrity. The case was consolidated with Geiger v. Kitzhaber (<a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13489\">PB-OR-0004</a> in this Clearinghouse). The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment a week later on February 18, 2014. Before the Court ruled on that motion, an anti-same-sex-marriage group, the National Organization for Marriage (NOM), moved to intervene to defend the ban. NOM appealed the denial of their intervention motion and sought a stay of the injunction pending disposition of that appeal. That stay was denied, first by the District Court on May 19, 2014, then by the Court of Appeals that same day, and then by the Supreme Court on June 4, 2014. On May 19, 2014, Judge Michael J. McShane granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and found that there was no legitimate state interest that would justify the denial of the full and equal recognition to the marriages of same-sex couples. The court declared that Oregon laws banning same-sex marriages violated the Equal Protection Clause and were unconstitutional, and permanently enjoined the defendants from enforcing them. The order also required that the defendants recognize same-sex-marriages formalized in other states. Rummell v. Kitzhaber, 2014 WL 2054264 (D. Oregon 2014). The Rummell plaintiffs reached a settlement with the defendants regarding attorney's fees and costs that was not disclosed to the Court. The Court approved the Geiger plaintiffs' agreement with the defendants over attorney's fees, by which the defendants agreed to pay $132,690 in total. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On December 19, 2013, two same-sex couples residing in Oregon who wished to have a state-recognized marriage filed a lawsuit in the District of Oregon U.S. District Court under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the state of Oregon. The plaintiff was represented by attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union and asked the court to declare that Oregon laws banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional. On May 19, 2014, the Court (Judge Michael J. McShane) granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and found that there was no legitimate state interest that would justify the denial of the full and equal recognition to the marriages of same-sex couples. The National Organization for Marriage's attempts to intervene were denied. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "This case, filed January 29, 2020, objected to the closure of two Pennsylvania intermediate care facilities for individuals with intellectual disabilities (ICF/IID) (the Polk Center and the White Haven Center) and the rights of the individuals residing in those facilities. It is what some describe as a \"reverse-Olmstead\" lawsuit. (See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (ADA guarantees the right to receive disability-related services in the community, where appropriate). The complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania by family members and guardians of residents of the two facilities in a class action lawsuit. Plaintiffs were represented by private counsel. Defendants were Pennsylvania Governor Wolf, the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services, the Deputy Secretary of the Pennsylvania Office of Development Programs, the Facility Director of the Polk Center, and the Facility Director of the White Haven Center. According to <a href=\"https://www.weny.com/story/41592749/commonwealth-faces-lawsuit-over-plan-to-close-state-centers\">WENY News</a>, in August of 2019 Governor Wolf announced a plan to close the state centers over the course of three years. Instead, the state planned to move residents to \"community residences,\" arguing that such residences are superior to \"institutional\" residences like Polk or White Haven. Plaintiffs alleged that this plan violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Medicaid Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the cause of action under the ADA alleged that residents cannot be discharged or transferred without consent from the residents themselves or the residents' guardians. The Section 504 cause of action alleged that Pennsylvania's new plan would not administer care for White Haven or Polk residents in \"the most integrated setting appropriate,\" therefore violating regulations that implement Section 504. Meanwhile, the Medicaid Act cause of action claimed that the new plan was not in compliance with obligations imposed on Pennsylvania by the federal government in return for federal funding. Those obligations included the option to live in an ICF/IID for qualifying Pennsylvanians. Finally, lawsuit alleged that the new plan constituted a violation of the residents' substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth and/or Fourth Amendment. The complaint claimed that moving residents \"to the community\" would deny residents \"a humane existence.\" The case is ongoing. Only the initial complaint, a summons to all defendants, a reissue of that summons, and a waiver of service by all defendants have been processed by the Court.", "summary": "Polk Center and White Haven Center were Pennsylvania state facilities that cared for individuals with severe mental and disabilities. The centers represented a type of care facility that function by providing intense care for their residents in isolation from the rest of society. In August of 2019, Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Wolf announced a plan to move residents from these two centers to \"community\" residences, which are not isolated and whose treatment is not as intense. The lawsuit alleged that this switch was in violation of the residents' rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Medicaid Act, and that the switch violated residents' substantive due process rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."}
{"article": "On May 24, 2017, six patients of South Carolina\u2019s G. Werber Bryan Psychiatric Hospital (Bryan Hospital), along with a non-profit corporation that advocates for the rights of people with disabilities - Protection and Advocacy for People with Disabilities Inc - filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina. This lawsuit was brought against the South Carolina Department of Mental Health and the South Carolina Mental Health Commission, which operated Bryan Hospital. The plaintiffs, represented by the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Protection and Advocacy for People with Disabilities Inc, and private counsels, claimed violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had a practice of arbitrarily preventing patients the opportunity to discharge from Bryan Hospital despite those patients being stable and capable of integrating with society. Furthermore, the defendants had a practice of isolating these patients, preventing them from contacting family and friends, and charging $503.00 daily for those that did not have access to medical insurance. The case was assigned to Judge Richard Gergel. On July 27, 2017, the court issued a scheduling order for discovery proceedings. The scheduling was amended twice. On April 3, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. The plaintiffs sought the class to be defined as: \u201cAll current and future adult, non-forensic residents of G. Werber Bryan Psychiatric Hospital (\u201cBryan\u201d) who, with appropriate supports and services, would now or in the future be able to live in an integrated community setting and who do not oppose living in an integrated community setting.\u201d The parties informed the court that they had begun mediation in July of 2018, but discovery continued during this time. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class on August 21, 2018, and subsequently denied their motion to reconsider the issue on September 7, 2018. Discovery and mediation continued into 2019. On February 25, 2019, after the death of one of the plaintiffs, plaintiffs' counsel stipulated to dismissal of the claims only so far as they related to that plaintiff. Two days later, on February 27, 2019, the attorneys for the defendants submitted a letter informing the court that the mediation had resulted in a successful settlement of the claims. That same day, the court dismissed the case without prejudice for 60 days, giving both parties the opportunity to reopen the action if the settlement was not consummated. The contents of the private settlement agreement were not made publicly available. On March 14, 2019, after stipulation to dismissal, the case was dismissed with prejudice. This case is now closed.", "summary": "On May 24, 2017, six individuals, persons with mental disabilities and patients of South Carolina\u2019s G. Werber Bryan Psychiatric Hospital (Bryan Hospital), and Protection and Advocacy for People with Disabilities Inc, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina. This lawsuit was brought against the South Carolina Department of Mental Health and the South Carolina Mental Health Commission, Bryan Hospital was operated by these entities. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as attorneys\u2019 fees and costs claiming violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had a practice of arbitrarily preventing patients the opportunity to discharge from Bryan Hospital, isolation these patients from the community, and charging them for their confinement. This case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On May 22, 2014, the plaintiffs, a group of same-sex couples, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, against various state and county officials. The plaintiffs included both same-sex couples with valid out-of-state marriage licenses and same-sex couples seeking to get married in South Dakota. Represented by private counsel, they sought a declaratory judgment that South Dakota's constitutional and statutory bans on same-sex marriage violated their rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as well as their right to travel. The plaintiffs also sought a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the state's same-sex marriage bans or from declining to issue a marriage license because the applicants were of the same sex. On November 14, 2014, the District Court (Judge Karen E. Schreier), on defendant's motion, dismissed the plaintiffs' right-to-travel claim. The plaintiffs had argued that South Dakota's same-sex marriage ban violated their right to travel by creating two Americas: one group of states where plaintiffs could travel and enjoy the protections that come with marriage and another group of states (including South Dakota) where they couldn't travel without being stripped of their marital status and accompanying legal protections. The District Court (Judge Karen E. Schreier) rejected this argument; the burden that plaintiffs identified applied equally to new and existing citizens of South Dakota and was dissimilar to cases in which a violation of the right to travel was found. 61 F.Supp.3d 845. On January 12, 2015, the District Court (Judge Karen E. Schreier) held that South Dakota's same-sex marriage bans violated the Constitution, granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Over the plaintiffs' objections, however, the court stayed the effects of the judgment pending appeal, citing the substantial and novel legal questions at stake. Thus, unlike in many states, no same-sex marriages occurred in South Dakota. 61 F.Supp.3d 862. On January 26, 2015, the defendants filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. A few days later, the Eighth Circuit granted the parties' joint motion for an expedited appeal. On February 10, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate the stay in the district court. On March 2, 2015, Judge Schreier denied this motion. She concluded that once the defendants filed their notice of appeal, jurisdiction over most issues in the case, including the stay, were transferred to the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the plaintiffs could file their motion to vacate the stay only in the Eighth Circuit, not in the district court. The Eighth Circuit ordered on April 29, 2015 that they would defer consideration of this case, pending the expected June 2015 resolution in the Supreme Court of <i>Obergefell v. Hodges</i>. While this case was pending, the plaintiffs filed a suggestion to summarily affirm a motion to vacate the stay, and the defendants filed a suggestion of mootness and a motion to vacate the District Court's judgment. On August 11, 2015, the Eighth Circuit held in a Per Curiam opinion that the Supreme Court's decision in <i>Obergefell v. Hodges</i> did not render this case moot, and affirmed the District Court's decision in favor of the plaintiffs. Although South Dakota made assurances of complying with the Court's ruling in <i>Obergefell v. Hodges</i>, the Eighth Circuit held that the assurances did not rendered the case moot. However, the Court did hold that the assurances may have had an impact on the necessity of the injunctive relief previously granted to the plaintiffs, but denied the current motion pending by plaintiffs, leaving that discretion to the District Court. 799 F.3d 918. Back in District Court on September 9, 2015, Judge Schreier granted the plaintiffs' motion to vacate the stay in light of the mandate from the Eighth Circuit. On September 28th, the Judge Schreier from the District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees and costs. Two days later, on September 30th, the Eighth Circuit awarded the plaintiffs' appellate attorney's fees and costs. The exact amount of attorney's fees and costs granted is not available in Pacer. A satisfaction of judgment was ordered by the District Court on October 13, 2015. This case is now closed.", "summary": "On January 12, 2015, the United States District Court for South Dakota (Judge Karen E. Schreier) declared that South Dakota's ban on same-sex marriage violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and enjoined the state from enforcing this ban or declining to issue a marriage license because the applicants are of the same gender. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment. The motion to vacate the stay was granted by the District Court on September 9, 2015. This case is now closed."}
{"article": "Adults with developmental disabilities who were institutionalized filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas alleging that they, along with the class of similarly situated individuals, were institutionalized unnecessarily as a result of the policies of the State of Texas. There are also two organizational Plaintiffs: the Arc of Texas and the Coalition of Texans with Disabilities. The Plaintiffs alleged that Texas failed to provide adequate habilitation and support services in the community that would allow them to avoid institutionalization or transition out of institutions. They alleged that individuals with developmental disabilities must enter institutions in order to receive necessary services in Texas. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs claimed that the state systematically violated a provision of the Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA) known as Pre-Admission Screening and Resident Review (PASRR), which would divert individuals slated to enter nursing facilities into community placements if institutionalization was deemed unnecessary. The Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the federal Medicaid Act, and the Nursing Home Reform Act. The Plaintiffs filed a complaint on December 20, 2010 and a motion for class certification on January 19, 2011. The Defendants filed a motion to abate the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, asking the court to delay a ruling on class certification until the parties could conduct further discovery and the court could consider a motion to dismiss. The court ultimately granted this motion on September 27, 2011. Class certification is still pending in this case. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on March 8, 2011, claiming that Plaintiffs lacked standing, claims against the Governor were barred by sovereign immunity, and that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim. The United States (Department of Justice) filed a brief opposing the Defendants' motion to dismiss, and on June 22, 2011, the United States moved to intervene in the case. The Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 4, 2011, and the Defendants filed a second motion to dismiss in response on November 4, 2011. The United States filed an additional brief opposing the Defendants' motion soon after. The court heard arguments on both motions on September 12, 2012 and took the motions under advisement. The court has repeatedly agreed to continue scheduled hearings and suspend deadlines and certain discovery requirements. The court granted the United States' motion to intervene on September 20, 2012, and the United States filed its complaint in intervention. The Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on July 19, 2013 as well as a second amended motion for class certification. On August 10, 2013, the Court stayed the case pursuant to a two year interim agreement that the parties had reached, which at the time was set to expire in July 2015. While the parties agreed to attempt to resolve all claims during this time, the case could be reopened at any time upon the request of any party or on the Court's own motion. After a status conference on June 6, 2015, the parties agreed to extend the interim settlement agreement until September 30, 2015, or until a court-appointed Special Settlement Master filed a report with the court stating that settlement discussions had concluded. While the Court did appoint a Special Settlement Master, and the parties did continue to negotiate for some time, settlement talks ultimately proved unsuccessful, and the litigation continued. On May 17, 2016, the Court denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss. It held that the United States and organizational Plaintiffs had standing; that the Plaintiffs stated a claim; and that the Nursing Home Reform Act created a private cause of action. 189 F. Supp. 3d 620. The Court granted class certification on May 20, 2016. The Plaintiff class was defined as: All Medicaid-eligible persons over twenty-one years of age with intellectual or developmental disabilities or a related condition in Texas who currently or will in the future reside in nursing facilities, or who are being, will be, or should be screened for admission to nursing facilities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396r(e)(7) and 42 C.F.R. \u00a7 483.112 et seq. The litigation continued for years and focused largely on various discovery disputes. On June 15, 2018, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on the United States' claims in intervention, arguing that the United States lacks authority to bring an enforcement action under Title VI, the Rehabilitation Act, and Title II of the ADA. The Court denied this motion on September 27, 2018, and it explained that the United States did not have to establish its own standing to proceed because it was an intervenor here, and the original Plaintiffs' standing satisfied Article III. In that same September 27, 2018 Order, the Court terminated the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and held that all requests for injunctive relief would be considered upon determination of the merits at trial. Since then, the litigation focused largely on discovery or evidentiary disputes as the case headed towards trial. A bench trial began on October 15, 2018, and seems to have gone on until November 15, 2018. The parties have continued filing motions regarding proposed findings of fact and law, but the Court has not issued any judgment following that trial. As of August 12, 2020, the litigation is ongoing.", "summary": "Institutionalized adults with developmental disabilities filed this challenge to policies in Texas they alleged promoted the unnecessary institutionalization of people with disabilities. The United States (DOJ) has intervened in the case, and the Court eventually granted class certification for a class of: All Medicaid-eligible persons over twenty-one years of age with intellectual or developmental disabilities or a related condition in Texas who currently or will in the future reside in nursing facilities, or who are being, will be, or should be screened for admission to nursing facilities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396r(e)(7) and 42 C.F.R. \u00a7 483.112 et seq. A bench trial was held in late 2018, and as of August 12, 2020, the litigation is ongoing as the parties await the court's decision."}
{"article": "On August 23, 2016, states and religiously-affiliated health organizations filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and its Secretary under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act claiming violations of these Acts and their First, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Amendment rights. The plaintiffs claimed that new regulations promulgated by HHS, which redefined the word \"sex\" to include gender identity, stereotypes, and termination of pregnancy, required health care providers to provide health programs and procedures which \"violate their medical judgment\" and \"their deeply held religious beliefs\" (including performing/referring transition procedures, discussing transition procedures as current standards of care, using appropriate gender-transition affirming language, providing sex-specific facilities based on gender identity, etc.). The plaintiffs, represented by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked the court to declare the regulations invalid, enjoin enforcement of the regulations, and award actual and nominal damages as well as the costs of the action and attorney fees. On September 16, 2016, the American Civil Liberties Union of Texas and the River City Gender Alliance (collectively, \"putative intervenors\") filed a motion to intervene as defendants. On October 21, 2016, plaintiffs filed a partial motion for summary judgment and, in the alternative, a motion for preliminary injunction. On November 1, 2016, District Judge Reed O'Connor denied the putative intervenors' motion to stay preliminary injunction proceedings pending resolution of intervention. A hearing was held on December 20, 2016, and Judge O'Connor granted the preliminary injunction on December 31, 2016 on the grounds that \"the regulation violates the Administrative Procedure Act ('APA') by contradicting existing law and exceeding statutory authority, and the regulation likely violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ('RFRA') as applied to Private Plaintiffs.\" The court did not consider the motions for summary judgment at this time. 227 F.Supp.3d 660. Defendants moved to stay the court's preliminary injunction, but the stay was denied on January 24, 2017. Furthermore, Judge O'Connor found that the putative intervenors could not intervene as of right then because it was yet unclear whether the defendants would adequately represent the putative intervenors' interests; he deferred ruling on the putative intervenors request for permissive intervention. On January 30, 2017, the putative intervenors filed an interlocutory appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On June 30, 2017, a panel of the Fifth Circuit, per curiam, dismissed the appeal because the district court had not ruled on the putative intervenors' motion for permissive intervention and therefore had not conclusively resolved the intervention issue. On May 2, 2017, while the putative intervenors' appeal to the Fifth Circuit was pending, the defendants filed a motion for voluntary remand and stay, arguing that HHS should be given the opportunity to reconsider the regulation at issue in this case, which would conserve the resources of both parties and the court. On July 10, 2017, Judge O'Connor declined to remand the case, but imposed a stay of all proceedings while HHS reconsidered the regulation. He also ordered the defendants to file a status report on or before August 4, 2017, identifying any rulemaking proceedings initiated with respect to the challenged regulation. Furthermore, he clarified that the December 31, 2016, preliminary injunction order would be unaffected by the stay and would remain in full force and effect throughout the stay. On August 4, 2017, the defendants filed a status report indicating that \"a draft of a proposed rule is going through the clearance process within the Executive Branch.\" On August 16, 2017, Judge O'Connor ordered the defendants to file another status report on or before October 16, 2017, and every 60 days thereafter. After multiple additional status reports, the parties filed a joint motion to lift the stay on December 17, 2018, which Judge O'Connor granted. The parties resumed litigating the case, with the ACLU of Texas and River City Gender Alliance renewing their motion to intervene on February 1, 2019 and the plaintiffs renewing their motions for summary judgment on February 4. On March 21, 2019, the plaintiff State of Wisconsin requested an order from the court dismissing it from the case because it \"no longer has an interest in pursuing its claims.\" Litigation among the remaining parties continued. HHS filed a notice of proposed rule-making that proposed to amend the HHS regulations implementing Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 18116. Shortly after, defendants filed a motion on May 31, 2019 renewing their request that the Court postpone ruling on Plaintiffs\u2019 summary judgment motions to allow HHS to amend the regulations. They argued that, \"the proposed rule, if finalized in relevant part, would likely moot this case and Plaintiffs will not be harmed in the interim because the relevant parts of the current regulations are presently enjoined nationwide.\" The notice would not include a definition of \"sex\" for purposes of discrimination on the basis of sex in the regulation, but instead incorporates the meaning as defined by Title IX. After a motion hearing on September 16, 2019, Judge O'Connor issued an opinion on October 15, 2019 that: 1) granted the ACLU of Texas and the River City Gender Alliance's motion to intervene; 2) Granted in part plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and permanent injunction; 3) Severed plaintiffs' APA and RFRA claims from their Title VII, Spending Clause, First Amendment, Tenth Amendment, and Eleventh Amendment claims; 4) Adopted the reasoning from the December 31, 2016 order granting preliminary injunction in holding that the Rule violates the APA and RFRA. The court vacated and remanded the rule for further consideration. 414 F. Supp. 3d 928. The court later went on to amend the judgment on November 21, clarifying that only the portion of the rule challenged in this litigation was vacated and remanded. On January 21, 2020, the plaintiffs appealed the October 15 ruling to the Fifth Circuit, challenging the order granting in part and denying in part the motion for summary judgment. Additionally, they challenged the November 21 amendment to the judgment. As of May 29, 2020, the case is ongoing in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.", "summary": "In 2016, states and religiously affiliated healthcare providers filed this lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that the Affordable Care Act's regulation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex (which included gender identity and termination of pregnancy) violated the Administrative Procedure Act, Religious Freedom Restoration Act and constitutional rights. In October 2016, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of this regulation, which was granted on December 31, 2016. Defendants' motion to stay the preliminary injunction was denied in January 2017. In May 2017, the defendants filed a motion for voluntary remand and stay, arguing that HHS should be given the opportunity to reconsider the regulation at issue in this case, which would conserve the resources of both parties and the court. In July 2017, Judge O\u2019Connor declined to remand the case, but imposed a stay of all proceedings while HHS reconsidered the regulation. He clarified that the December 31, 2016 preliminary injunction order would be unaffected by the stay and would remain in full force and effect throughout the stay. In December 2018, the stay was lifted, and the parties resumed litigating the case. In September 2019, Judge O'Connor vacated the rule's challenged provisions. An appeal is pending before the Fifth Circuit."}
{"article": "On August 1, 2013, two same-sex couples filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia against the state of Virginia, under 42 U.S. \u00a7 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The plaintiffs, represented by the national ACLU, the ACLU of Virginia, Lambda Legal and private counsel, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the state's refusal to allow same-sex couples to marry or to recognize same-sex couples married in other states violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The suit was filed just over a month after the Supreme Court's decision in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11970\">Perry v. Hollingsworth</a>. On August 16, 2013, the plaintiffs moved for class certification of same-sex couples under F.R.C.P. 23(b)(2). On the same day, the Robert McDonnell, the Governor of Virginia, moved to dismiss the case on grounds of sovereign immunity. On August 30, 2013, defendant Thomas Roberts moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The court (Judge Michael F. Urbanski) held a motion hearing on October 29, 2013 on these matters. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on September 30, 2013. On October 3, 2013 the State defendants filed a motion to stay the proceedings until an earlier case involving the same issues, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12807&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Cbostic%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B\">Bostic v. Rainey</a>, resolved cross-motions for summary judgment. In an opinion dated October 18, 2013, Judge Urbanski denied defendants' motion to stay the proceedings, but allowed the defendants additional time to file their summary judgment response; defendants filed that response on November 7, 2013. On December 23, 2013, Judge Urbanski granted the motion to dismiss Governor McDonnell on sovereign immunity grounds, but denied Defendant Thomas Roberts's motion to dismiss. 988 F.Supp.2d 603 (W.D. Va. 2013). The case moved forward as Harris v. Rainey after the dismissal of Governor McDonnell. On Jan. 31, 2014, Judge Urbanski certified this suit as a class action, with two classes: (1) all same-sex couples in Virginia who have not married in another jurisdiction, and (2) all same-sex couples in Virginia who have married in another jurisdiction. While this case proceeded towards its own resolution, on February 13, 2014, in the Bostic case, the District Court (Judge Arenda L. Wright Allen) granted summary judgment and a preliminary injunction for the plaintiff, and entered an order enjoining Virginia from continuing to enforce the marriage ban. In addition, defendant M. Rainey, the State Registrar of Vital Records, shifted position in this case (as in Bostic). She had originally argued that Virginia's same-sex marriage ban was constitutional. But in January Virginia's Attorney General decided not to defend the ban. The other defendant here, the Clerk of the Staunton Circuit Court, likewise changed his position, which had been in support of the laws--he then declined to take a position on their constitutionality. The Bostic case proceeded towards resolution in the appellate court, on an expedited briefing schedule. On March 10, 2014, the Fourth Circuit allowed these plaintiffs to intervene on the side of the plaintiffs-appellees and file their own briefs in Bostic, set to be heard in May 2014. Accordingly, in this case, Judge Urbanski ruled on March 31, 2014 to stay the proceedings pending the Fourth Circuit's decision in Bostic. On July 28, 2014 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in Bostic, agreeing with the district court that the same-sex marriage ban violated the Constitution. The majority opinion, by Judge Henry Floyd, found that the ban impermissibly infringed upon Virginians' fundamental right to marry. A dissent by Judge Paul Niemeyer said that the state had a right to define marriage as relationships between one man and one woman. 760 F.3d 352. The Supreme Court granted a stay to the Fourth Circuit's Bostic mandate on August 20, 2014, pending their decision on the defendants' petition for a writ of certiorari. However, the Supreme Court later denied writ on October 4, 2014. Same sex couples were then allowed to wed in Virginia. On October 16, 2014, the plaintiffs moved for to lift the stay in this case and enter judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their motion for summary judgment in light of the final decision in Bostic. On October 29, 2014, the defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that Bostic rendered the case moot, opposing the entry of any judgment in this case and arguing that the class is not a prevailing party. Though the parties had disagreements about attorneys' fees and whether the plaintiffs should be seen as a prevailing party for purposes of recovering fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. 1988, the parties decided against litigating the issues, and agreed to resolve any remaining claims and differences through a consent order submitted to Judge Arenda L. Wright Allen in Bostic. Judge Wright Allen entered the consent order on February 13, 2015. The consent order granted the Harris class the benefit of the declaratory and injunctive relief entered in Bostic, and provided for $60,000 in attorneys' fees and costs to the Harris class. On February 18, 2015, Judge Urbanski dismissed the case with prejudice following the parties stipulation of dismissal in accordance with the Bostic consent order.", "summary": "Same sex-couples filed suit in August 2013 against the State of Virginia challenging Virginia laws denying same-sex couples the right to marry and refusing to recognize same-sex marriages entered into in other states as unconstitutional. The case is pending but stayed, awaiting the Fourth Circuit's resolution of another case raising the same issue."}
{"article": "This case was brought by the United States pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA). On February 8, 1995, the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, served the Governor of Arizona with a notice letter regarding their intent to investigate allegations of sexual abuse and violations of privacy rights of female inmates in the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC). The Department of Justice sent its finding to Arizona governor J. Fife Symington on August 8, 1996. The investigation found significant evidence of physical sexual misconduct and constitutionally unacceptable invasions of privacy. This included sexual relations between inmates and employees, sexual assaults, and frequent, prolonged viewing during dressing and showering of inmates. In response to these findings the DOJ offered a series of recommendations which included: better screening of employees; improved training; investigation of any allegations of sexual misconduct or unlawful invasion of privacy; stronger sanctions including criminal prosecution for employee offenses; use of an independent outside agency to investigate allegations; as well as a number of proactive steps to address sexual misconduct and unlawful invasions of privacy. The findings letter also recommended the creation of a Women's Facilities Administrator to serve as a liaison between the women's facilities and ADOC's Director and Deputy Director. In conclusion, the findings letter provided a warning that should the ADOC not address these problems the Attorney General could institute a lawsuit to correct the deficiencies. On March 10, 1997, the United States filed a complaint against the State of Arizona and Gov. Symington in the District of Arizona (Judge Roslyn Silver). The complaint alleged that the Defendants were violating the constitutional rights of female inmates to be free from sexual misconduct and unlawful invasions of privacy. The complaint sought to enjoin the Defendants from &quot;&quot;continuing the acts, practices and omissions&quot;&quot; of allowing sexual misconduct and unlawful invasion of the privacy of female inmates. On October 2, 1998, Defendants moved for summary judgment. Prior to any ruling by the Court, the parties reached a settlement, which was filed on March 11, 1999. As part of the settlement, defendants did not admit any constitutional violations, but agreed to adopt policy and procedures from the Federal Bureau of Prisons, improve screening and training of employees, promote inmate awareness and comfort in reporting abuse, and thoroughly investigate allegations of abuse. The settlement required &quot;&quot;substantial compliance&quot;&quot; by the ADOC, to be determined by a jointly agreed monitor. The monitor would conduct three quarterly onsite tours following the filing of the settlement agreement. Provided the monitor found &quot;&quot;substantial compliance&quot;&quot; by the ADOC after the third tour, the lawsuit would be permanently dismissed. On December 13, 1999, the parties jointly filed a stipulation to dismiss which Judge Silver granted in a December 17, 1999 order.", "summary": "On March 10, 1997, the United States filed a complaint against the State of Arizona and Gov. Symington in the District of Arizona (Judge Roslyn Silver), alleging that the Defendants were violating the constitutional rights of female inmates to be free from sexual misconduct and unlawful invasions of privacy. The parties reached a settlement, which was filed on March 11, 1999. As part of the settlement, defendants did not admit any constitutional violations, but agreed to adopt policy and procedures from the Federal Bureau of Prisons, improve screening and training of employees, promote inmate awareness and comfort in reporting abuse, and thoroughly investigate allegations of abuse. On December 13, 1999, the parties jointly filed a stipulation to dismiss which Judge Silver granted in a December 17, 1999 order."}
{"article": "This lawsuit was filed pro se by prisoners on March 27, 1986, in the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the California Department of Corrections and the California Institute for Men under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the California Institute for Men (Chino) violated their Eighth Amendment and Fifth Amendment due process rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged issues regarding sanitation, classification, legal access, fire safety, and other conditions. In particular, the plaintiffs alleged violations caused by the prison's housing of 212 inmates in a gymnasium not designed to house inmates. The plaintiffs asked for injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. The prisoners moved for appointment of counsel but was denied twice. On August 14, 1986, the docket indicates a notice of association of counsel for the plaintiffs. Then on September 29, 1986, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to file an amended complaint. In 1987, the parties engaged in discovery and settlement negotiations, but a settlement could not be reached at the time. Instead, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on July 13, 1987. The parties engaged in additional discovery in preparation for a trial set for October 4, 1988. However, on September 20, 1988, the trial was postponed to allow more time for renewed settlement negotiations. On September 26, the parties notified the court that they had reached a tentative settlement agreement. The agreement addressed many aspects the inmates' conditions of confinement including: food, recreation opportunities, law library access, showers, laundry, medical care, procedures regarding placement when an inmate is transferred to the prison from a county jail, and asbestos removal from the facilities. The defendants also agreed to pay the plaintiffs $44,000 in attorney's fees. On October 6, 1988, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for $22,000 in attorney's fees--the first half of the agreed amount of attorney's fees. Once the settlement was finalized, the case was dismissed on October 2, 1989. The settlement agreement provided for compliance monitoring; according to the 1993 issue of the ACLU National Prison Project's Journal, this ended in 1993.", "summary": "This case litigated by the ACLU in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dealt with sanitation, classification, legal access and other conditions at the California Institute for Men (Chino). In 1988, the prison and the plaintiffs entered a settlement agreement, which provided for various improvements and compliance monitoring that ended in 1993."}
{"article": "On May 21, 2008, a California inmate filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). The plaintiff, originally proceeded pro se but eventually represented by private counsel and the Prison Law Center, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary damages, alleging that the CDCR acted unconstitutionally by segregating the prisoners by race and locking down an entire race of prisoners. The prison staff had informed the plaintiff that it was the policy of the CDCR that \"when there is an incident involving any race, all inmates of that race are locked up.\" During court mandated settlement negotiations, Judge Jones temporarily assigned counsel to the plaintiff. That counsel ultimately agreed to represent the plaintiff for the case and filed a leave to amend the complaint in order to transform the case into a class action challenging the allegedly race-based lockdowns throughout California's men's prisons. On September 23, 2011, Magistrate Judge Edmund Brennan granted that motion. 2011 WL 4458784. In the second amended complaint, three additional plaintiffs were added as representatives of a class of all prisoners who were currently or would be in the future subject to the CDCR's policy and practice of implementing race-based lockdowns. Following the filing of the second amended complaint, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On June 28, 2012, in his findings and recommendations, Judge Brennan concluded that the plaintiffs had indeed properly exhausted their grievances under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, so the defendant's motion to dismiss should be largely denied. 2012 WL 2521827. On July 27, 2012, the new district court judge, Judge John Mendez, adopted the findings and recommendations in full. 2012 WL 3070084. On March 5, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification as well as a motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendants then filed for summary judgment. On February 11, 2014, Judge Troy L. Nunley granted part of the defendants' motion for summary judgment, leaving the following claims: claims for injunctive relief based on Fourteenth Amendment violations, a claim for compensatory damages for violations of Fourteenth Amendment rights, and state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 2014 WL 546338. On June 25, 2014, Judge Nunley denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction finding that the plaintiffs had not met the high burden required to obtain the extraordinary relief sought. 2014 WL 2895232. A month later, Judge Nunley granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. 2014 WL 3689287. On October 20, 2014, the parties entered into a stipulated settlement agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, the CDCR agreed to a number of terms, including: to cease race-based modified programs or lockdowns; to use individualized threat assessment forms to determine who would be retained on a modified program or lockdown; to provide outdoor activity to prisoners in a modified program or lockdown for longer than fourteen days; to revise its policies concerning modified programs and lockdowns, including modifying its definitions; to train its staff; and to provide status reports to plaintiffs' counsel for a defined period of time. The defendants also agreed to pay attorneys fees and costs. The agreement specified that its provisions would control for 18 months after the Court's preliminary approval or 4 months after final approval, whichever was later; plaintiffs could seek 12 months' extension at the end of that period. The parties sought approval of the agreement on Feb. 27, 2015, and on May 5, 2015, the court granted preliminary approval. Then, the parties jointly moved for final approval on September 10, 2015 which the court granted on October 8, 2015. 2015 WL 5920755. That same day, the court also granted the plaintiffs\u2019 unopposed motion for attorneys\u2019 fees and costs, totaling $2.375 million in attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. 2015 WL 5920797. On June 2, 2016, the parties jointly proposed an order of dismissal of this action with prejudice. The following day, Judge Nunley dismissed the case with prejudice while retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the agreement until the settlement agreement ends. The agreement was to last 18 months after preliminary approval, leaving the settlement to terminate on November 5, 2016. On December 20, 2016, the parties filed notice that the court\u2019s jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement had terminated and that the case was dismissed with prejudice in its entirety. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2008, a California inmate filed a lawsuit against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, alleging that the CDCR acted unconstitutionally by segregating the prisoners by race and locking down an entire race of prisoners due to the actions of certain prisoners of that race. The case survived the defendants' motion to dismiss and class certification was granted. In October 2014, the parties entered into a stipulated settlement agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, the CDCR agreed to a number of terms, including to cease implementation of race-based modified programs or lockdowns; to provide outdoor activity to prisoners in a modified program or lockdown for longer than fourteen days; to revise its policies concerning modified programs and lockdowns, and to train its staff on modified programs and lockdowns. The defendants also agreed to pay attorneys fees and costs. The court retained jurisdiction for 18 months to enforce compliance with the agreement, and on December 20, 2016, the parties filed notice that the court\u2019s jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement had terminated and that the case was dismissed with prejudice in its entirety. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a putative class action by five individuals held at Lompoc, a low-security prison facing one of the largest outbreaks of COVID-19 among U.S. federal prisons. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to undertake reasonable preventative measures, which allowed the virus to spread to 60% of those in custody. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief for improved conditions of confinement, as well as a writ of habeas corpus for release. On July 14, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and granted provisional class certification. On September 18, the court denied the defendant's July 2 motion to dismiss the case. On September 10, the plaintiffs had submitted a motion to enforce compliance with the preliminary injunction and an order to show cause which was granted on October 8. The case is ongoing. <hr> On May 16, 2020, five individuals filed a putative class action against Lompoc, a low-security prison facing one of the largest outbreaks of COVID-19 among U.S federal prisons, for immediate relief on behalf of a proposed class of all current and future people in post-conviction custody at Lompoc. The plaintiffs alleged that the Warden of Lompoc and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) failed to adequately treat infected prisoners and implement reasonable health and safety measures, which resulted in 60% of the population at Lompoc testing positive. The plaintiffs also alleged that despite BOP\u2019s broadened discretion to allow for home confinement during the pandemic, prisoners reporting symptoms were instead placed in solitary confinement in converted warehouses without medical care. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that because Lompoc was incapable of providing adequate medical care, continued confinement amounted to a violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California and the Prison Law Office, the plaintiffs brought this action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241, an injunctive action, and as a declaratory action under \u00a7 2201. The plaintiffs sought enlargement of custody to home confinement and for mitigation measures to be adopted in Lompoc to prevent the spread of COVID-19, including: social distancing, free soap, paper towels and cleaning supplies, access to hand sanitizer, daily showers, identification procedures for potentially infected inmates, and proper medical care for those who have COVID-19. The case was assigned to District Judge Consuelo. B Marshall and referred to Magistrate Judge Pedro V. Castillo on May 18. On June 1, the plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction requiring Lompoc to undertake health and safety measures as well as a court-supervised process for individualized consideration of each prisoner\u2019s suitability for release on an accelerated schedule. The plaintiffs also moved for class certification on June 4. On July 2, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, claiming that the habeas claim failed because inmate placement decisions are not judicially reviewable and because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust other administrative remedies as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). They also argued that the Eighth Amendment claim should be dismissed because the defendant did not act with deliberate indifference. On July 14, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and granted provisional class certification. 107 Fed.R.Serv.3d 477. The defendants were ordered to provide the court a list identifying all members of the class and evaluate each provisional class member\u2019s eligibility for home confinement, giving substantial weight to the inmate\u2019s risk factors for severe illness or death from COVID-19 based on age (over 50) or underlying health conditions, among other things. On September 10, the plaintiffs submitted a motion to enforce compliance with the preliminary injunction and an order to show cause. The plaintiffs claimed that defendant's failure to promptly release approved class members and the denial of home confinement violated the terms of the preliminary injunction. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on September 18, finding that the plaintiffs asserted a proper habeas claim challenging the fact of their confinement, and that the habeas claim is not foreclosed by the requirements of the PLRA. The court also found that the plaintiffs plead sufficient facts to satisfy the objective prong of their Eighth Amendment claim by alleging that they are are at substantial risk of exposure to COVID-19 and to satisfy the subjective prong by alleging that the defendants have ignored, and therefore have been deliberately indifferent, to the known risks of COVID-19 based on the conditions at Lompoc. The court also disagreed with the defendants that the plaintiffs failed exhaust administrative remedies for their claims, noting that the plaintiffs' complaint alleges that \u201csince the COVID-19 outbreak in Lompoc, those incarcerated have been denied access to the administrative remedy process,\u201d and \u201c[s]taff have not been accepting the forms required to initiate the process, claiming they cannot do so due to the exigency of the COVID-19 pandemic.\u201d The court-appointed inspector submitted a status report on the Lompoc facility regarding the conditions and the adequacy of the defendant's response to the pandemic. The inspector identified several deficiencies in several areas, including COVID-19 screening among detained people, lack of timely access to health care, and lack of infection control in housing areas. On October 8, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to enforce compliance with the preliminary injunction and ordered defendants to confirm that all eligible class members were released to home confinement, and, if some class members were denied release to provide an explanation to the court. The parties attended multiple hearings over the next several months and on January 29, the plaintiffs filed another motion to enforce compliance with the preliminary injunction. After a motion hearing, the court set a March 26 deadline for the plaintiffs to provide support for their contention that the defendants impermissibly imposed categorical bars on inmates' eligibility for home confinement. In February, an individual attempted to intervene and file an amended complaint. On March 2, the court rejected the intervention and refused to file the letter on the grounds that individual class members could not file amended complaints in a class action suit. On March 19, 2021, the intervenor appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit. The appeal has not been assigned a USCA No. yet. On March 19, the plaintiffs filed an ex parte application to continue to modify the case schedule and authorize a doctor site visit, which the court granted on March 22. As of March 23, discovery is scheduled to be completed by April 30 and a pretrial conference is scheduled for July 13. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On May 16, 2020, five individuals filed a class action against Lompoc, a low-security prison facing one of the largest outbreaks of COVID-19 among U.S federal prisons, for immediate relief. The plaintiffs proposed a class of all current and future people in post-conviction custody at Lompoc, and sought enlargement of custody to include home confinement, and if the conditions of confinement violated constitutional rights, for prisoners to be released. The plaintiffs also sought a TRO (temporary restraining order), and a preliminary injunction requiring Lompoc to undertake health and safety measures, and attorney fees. On September 18, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the case and on October 8, the court granted plaintiff's motion to enforce compliance with the preliminary injunction. In January 2021, the plaintiffs filed another motion to enforce compliance with the preliminary injunction. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On August 22, 1980, Richard Bartkus filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut against the Connecticut Corrections Department. This case was consolidated and named lead case with five other cases filed against the defendant in 1981 and 1982. The plaintiffs in the other cases were Palmer Gaines, Joseph L. Letezeio, Jr., and Ernest Bradshaw. The plaintiffs were represented by the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union and Legal Assistance to Prisoners. Other non-profit organizations appear to have been involved in the litigation also. On June 15, 1982, the plaintiffs filed the first amended complaint for the consolidated class consisting of inmates confined at the Connecticut Correctional Institute at Somers, including pretrial detainees and sentenced inmates. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated because the facility was overcrowded, unsanitary, lacking in security, and unable to provide adequately the basics of general human living needs. Because the PACER dockets for these cases begin in 1991, there is little information regarding further proceedings in the 1980s. In July 1986, the class was certified and the parties reached agreement on a Proposed Consent Judgment in October of 1989. The Decree was forwarded to Judge Robert Zampano but there is no indication that the order was executed. The case was later consolidated with a lawsuit that was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut on August 15, 1988 (Doe v. White), which challenged certain policies of the defendant regarding HIV counseling, education, testing, and confidentiality. David Doe and other plaintiffs were represented by Jerome Frank Legal Services of Yale Law School, the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union, and the Center for Children's Advocacy. That action was certified as a class action on February 10, 1989 by order of Judge Peter C. Dorsey. On May 16, 1989, the parties entered into a Consent Judgment on Inmate AIDS Education and Pre- and Post-HIV Test Counseling and it was approved by the court. Discovery continued regarding issues not addressed in that judgment. On December 6, 1990, the court (Judge Jose A. Cabranes) approved and entered the Consent Judgment on Health Care for HIV-Infected Inmates and Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information. In Re: Connecticut Prison Overcrowding and AIDS Cases, Nos. H-80-506, H-88-562, 1990 WL 261348 (D. Conn. Dec. 6, 1990). The judgment required screening of all admitted inmates, individualized health care summaries for HIV-positive inmates, routine health examinations, and the use of drug therapies for HIV-positive inmates. It also mandated the creation of a uniform statewide system for maintaining information about medical and mental health status of HIV-positive inmates. It appears that another consent judgment, entered on November 2, 1990, called for monitoring of the facility. The court (Judge T. Graham) closed the case on April 26, 1994 but modified the Order of Dismissal so the action could remain under the court's supervision to monitor defendant's compliance with judgment. Litigation continued through July 1, 2004 concerning monitors' fees. Regarding Bartkus's overcrowding case, an amended Motion for Class Certification was granted in October of 1991 and settlement discussions began in July of 1993. On March 28, 1996, Judge Bauer entered judgment in accordance with a settlement agreement submitted by the parties. According to the Settlement Agreement, improvements had already been made in the facility and the State of Connecticut had built additional correctional facilities, reducing overcrowded conditions. The facility at Somers was converted from a maximum security prison into a medium security prison and its name was changed to Osborn Correctional Institute. The agreement required that Osborn not increase its inmate population, continue operating as a medium security facility, and allow plaintiffs' lawyers access to the facility. Litigation continued through June 15, 2000, mainly concerning monitors' fees.", "summary": "On August 22, 1980, inmates filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut against the Connecticut Corrections Department. This case was consolidated and named lead case with five other cases filed against the defendant in 1981 and 1982. The plaintiffs were represented by the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union and Legal Assistance to Prisoners. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated because the facility was overcrowded, unsanitary, lacking in security, and unable to provide adequately the basics of general human living needs. Judgments were reached that required screening of all admitted inmates, individualized health care summaries for HIV-positive inmates, routine health examinations, and the use of drug therapies for HIV-positive inmates; as well as requiring that the prison not increase its inmate population, continue operating as a medium security facility, and allow plaintiffs' lawyers access to the facility."}
{"article": "On August 4, 1986, the prisoners at the Occoquan Facilites of the District of Columbia's Lorton Correctional Complex filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the District of Columbia government officials responsible for these medium security facilities in violation of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that overcrowding at the facility violated their Eighth Amendment rights, and that the District of Columbia repeatedly failed to meet the standard of decent and humane prison conditions. Represented by ACLU National Prison Project attorneys and private counsel, prisoners sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that their rights were being violated by reason of an excessive inmate population and by deficiencies in environmental health and safety, food services, fire safety, medical and dental care, and mental health services. The case was assigned to Judge June L. Green. On August 13, 1986, Judge Green certified a plaintiff class that included present and future persons confined to the Occoquan Facilities. Following trial and post-trial briefing, Judge Green awarded judgment in plaintiffs' favor on December 22, 1986. Inmates of Occuquan v. Barry, 650 F.Supp. 619 (D.D.C. 1986). Judge Green found that the numerous deficiencies alleged by the plaintiffs were proven to be systemic in nature and, together with chronic overcrowding, subjected plaintiffs to cruel and unusual punishment. To remedy this Eighth Amendment violation, the judge imposed:<blockquote>- limits to the inmate population, both for the individual dormitories comprising the three Occuquan Facilities and for the institution, cumulatively. - that defendants must provide the Court with written reports. The reports were to address (1) planned compliance with the population caps; and (2) every thirty days, the steps being taken to address the institution's many deficiencies.</blockquote> In evaluating the evidence before her, Judge Green frequently referred to standards established by professional correctional, health, and safety associations. Her opinion concluded by encouraging the defendants to adopt a goal of compliance with these professional standards. The defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. On April 12, 1988, that appellate court, in a 2-1 decision (with its opinion written by Judge Kenneth Starr), vacated the District Court's ruling and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. Inmates of Occuquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Judge Starr wrote that the lower court's repeated reliance on professional agencies' standards erroneously failed to focus on whether prison deficiencies equated to deprivations of \"minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.\" Additionally, the appellate majority ruled that the district court exceeded its equitable powers by imposing population caps without first seeking to specifically correct deficiencies that the court had identified as constitutional violations. District Judge Harold H. Greene, sitting by designation on the appellate panel, filed a dissent. The plaintiffs sought a rehearing of the panel's ruling by the entire District Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, but this en banc review request was denied on July 8, 1988. Inmates of Occuquan v. Barry, 850 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Circuit Judge Starr filed an opinion concurring in the denial, and separate dissenting opinions were filed by Circuit Judges Pamela Wald and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Upon remand, the District Court (Judge Green) conducted a trial. Afterward, on June 30, 1989, she ruled that Eighth Amendment violations had been proven as to matters of sanitation, bathroom facilities, fire safety, health care, and staffing. Constitutional violations had not been proven regarding food services, inmate jobs, educational and drug programming, library facilities, and general idleness. Inmates of Occuquan v. Barry, 717 F. Supp. 854, 865-868 (D.D.C. 1989). The judge required the defendants to file a written report of how they anticipated correcting the constitutional violations. Additionally, Judge Green ordered the defendants not to cause the institution's population to exceed the level as of the date of her decision, in that then-planned renovations of certain dorms otherwise could cause population stress as inmates were shifted among available facilities. Over the next decade, in most years, the case generated occasional proposals, motions, and agreed-upon and supplemental plans, as well as consent orders and other orders addressing institutional conditions. These documents can be found in this Clearinghouse record, in documents 2 through 21. The 119-page court docket reflects that Special Officers of the Court were appointed during the litigation, including Grace M. Lopes and Karen M. Schneider, to act as Masters aiding the court. Included among the post-trial documents is a December 18, 1989, agreed plan by the parties to address deficiencies in hygiene, sanitation, ventilation, asbestos presence, fire safety, health care, mental health services, and physical safety. The plan was approved by Judge Green on December 21, 1989, as partial remediation. A supplemental agreed plan filed by the parties on January 26, 1990, addressed environmental health issues (lighting and airborne disease risks), fire safety and health care staffing. It, too, was approved by Judge Green as partial remediation, but her February 7, 1990, order added that monetary penalties would be imposed upon the defendants if they excessively delayed their compliance. During 1993 and 1994, the parties' counsel met with Special Master Grace Lopes and agreed, in filings of August 1, 1993, and April 8 and December 14, 1994, that monthly reports would be filed with the Special Master describing the mental health care provided at the Occoquan Facilities. The defendants' progress in complying with remedial directives lagged, which led to plaintiffs' filing in 1995 a contempt motion and a resultant supplemental plan agreed upon by the parties and made effective via a December 15, 1995 consent order. In the order, Judge Green imposed required correctional officer staffing levels, dormitory population limits, required a security audit, made provision for improving protected inmate separation from disciplined inmates, and addressed mental health issues. She directed development of an institutional mental health care plan, set a minimum level of psychologist staffing, ordered improved tracking and recall of inmates receiving psychological services, and called for medical record consolidation and mental health screenings of all inmates. Bimonthly compliance reports were required by the order, which also set a contempt fine schedule for instances of non-compliance and provided for defendants' payment of plaintiffs' attorney fees, as well as expert and monitoring expenses, resulting from prosecuting contempt or related proceedings due to defendants' non-compliance. On July 23, 1996, a consent order similarly provided that defendants pay such fees and expenses relating to non-compliance; however, this order largely dealt with environmental health and fire safety issues. It directed plumbing repairs, water temperature improvements, a preventive maintenance plan, ventilation repairs, carbon dioxide monitoring, window/screen and kitchen equipment repairs, housekeeping and vermin control plans, mattress sanitization and fireproofing, availability of cleaning supplies, correctional officer training, kitchen wall cleaning, and food temperature improvements, and set required distances between inmates' beds to limit air borne disease transmission. Judge Green also allowed for plaintiffs' compliance inspection of facilities, with 24-hour prior notice. Her fire safety directives included smoke detector, alarm, dryer vent and lighting repairs, certain structural improvements, an operational fire alarm system, and fire drills and evacuation plans. Bi-monthly reporting of compliance progress was also required. Two notable orders were entered with the parties' consent in 1997. Judge Green, on February 5, 1997, directed defendants to hire a system-wide medical coordinator with powers to enable compliance with the court's health-related orders. The judge's November 20, 1997 order authorized the Special Master to form and retain an expert team at defendants' expense. The team would review and make recommendations on matters of security, workforce utilization, classification and safety, and maintenance and sanitation. This latter order set a date for opening a new adjustment unit to house prisoners on administrative and disciplinary segregation. The following year, on January 20, 1998, a three judge panel of the District Court, including Judge Green, convened and granted a consent order adopting a population ceiling and related procedures for the institution. (The three-judge panel was a requirement for entry of such a ceiling, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act). Judge Green then, on February 5, 1998, amended her prior orders, upon the joint motion of the parties, to allow for a substituted correctional officer deployment plan and modification of ceiling numbers earlier set for beds per certain dorms. Continued use of a Special Master and the team of experts, at defendants' expense, was approved in order to provide management assistance, staffing and prisoner population limits, classification and maintenance aid, and to develop initiatives to limit prisoner idleness. Proceedings in the case continued well into 2003, with responsibility for rulings by then having been accepted by District Judge William B. Bryant. On April 26, 2003, Judge Bryant order that the District of Columbia pay Covington & Burling $275,000 in settlement of all of plaintiffs' remaining claims for fees and costs associated with monitoring compliance with the Orders entered previously. Throughout, occasional disbursements were made for Special Masters' and expert consultants' expenses and fees. These payments came from funds the defendants were periodically ordered to deposit into the court registry. In addition to these expenses, on one occasion a $40,000 payment from these defense-provided funds was directed by Judge Bryant to the Georgetown University Law Center for the operating expenses of the D.C. Family Literacy and Street Law programs. During this period, consent orders modifying prior orders relating to staffing, population, and institutional conditions were irregularly issued. The final docket entry presently in this database reflects receipt by the court of another deposit of funds by the defendants to the court's account for the funds to be paid to the Special Master. Since this deposit to the court's account in 2005, there has been no activity on this case, which indicates that the case is closed. Additionally, the court's docket reflect a relationship between this case and two other prison condition cases challenging conditions at other components of the Lorton Correctional Complex. Also filed in the D.C. District Court (docket numbers 79-1726 and 80-2136), these cases, John Doe v. District of Columbia and Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, are designated PC-DC-0007 and PC-DC-0008, respectively, in the Clearinghouse. These cases are closed.", "summary": "In 1986, the prisoners at the Occoquan Facilites of the District of Columbia's Lorton Correctional Complex filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that the District of Columbia government officials' overcrowding of the facility violated their Eighth Amendment rights. The court held that the defendants had violated the constitution, and required that the prison minimize its population. The case closed in 2003."}
{"article": "On September 13, 2005, Prison Legal News (PLN), a non-profit legal journal devoted to reporting news and litigation concerning detention facilities, filed this action against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. PLN sought declaratory and injunctive relief for the defendant's refusal to produce documents requested by PLN under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or grant a fee waiver for the document requests. The case was assigned to Judge Reggie B. Walton. PLN had submitted a FOIA request to the BOP on August 6, 2003, seeking documents related to litigation expenses incurred by the BOP between January 1, 1996 and July 31, 2003. In conjunction with the information request, PLN also asked the BOP to waive all associated search and duplication fees, citing the FOIA provision that required a waiver where \"disclosure of the information is in the public interest. . . and not primarily in the commercial interest of the requestor.\" The BOP refused to grant the fee waiver, claiming that PLN had failed to explain how the information request would be of public interest, and that the request was overbroad. PLN appealed the BOP's decision to the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Information and Privacy, which concluded that PLN's request for a fee waiver had properly been denied. Specifically, PLN did not demonstrate that the information would be communicated to the public and the release of the requested information would not enhance the public's understanding\u2014especially considering that some of the requested documents were already publicly available. After the plaintiff began this action, the defendant filed for summary judgment on November 30, 2005. PLN filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on December 30, 2005. On June 26, 2006, the court concluded that the plaintiff had sufficiently established that disclosure of the requested information was in the public interest because it was likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government. The court also found that the plaintiff had demonstrated its intent and ability to disseminate the information to the relevant public. The defendant stipulated to pay $48,709.72 in attorney's fees and costs. On February 15, 2007, the court first ordered the defendant to process the plaintiff's FOIA request by March 20, 2007. But the defendant continued to request extensions of time to comply. PLN did not oppose the extensions until September 2007, when it noted to the court that compliance was already long overdue. The defendant eventually produced approximately 11,000 pages in response to the plaintiff\u2019s FOIA request, but 2,993 of these pages contained redactions. The defendant stated that these redactions were allowed under specific FOIA exemptions, but the plaintiff claimed that the defendant\u2019s justification was insufficient. PLN filed for judgment on March 28, 2008 and a court order for the defendant to properly comply with the request. The defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On March 26, 2009, the court ordered the defendant to either search for the records sought by the plaintiff or submit an affidavit indicating that the documents could be properly withheld under FOIA exemptions. On February 25, 2011, the court granted in part and denied in part both parties' motions for summary judgment. It agreed that the defendant had adequately searched for the requested documents, but agreed with the plaintiff that the defendant had not sufficiently justified its use of FOIA exemptions to redact or withhold information. The court requested that the defendant provide additional explanations about the relative weight of competing public and private interests at stake in a sufficiently detailed manner to enable the court to assess whether the exemptions were properly asserted. The court issued a schedule for the defendant to bring itself into compliance with the requirements of <i>Vaughn v. Rosen</i>. A Vaughn index is an itemized, detailed justification of a party\u2019s claims that documents or portions thereof are exempt from FOIA. 484 F.2d 820. In May 2011, the defendant produced a new Vaughn index, which the plaintiff claimed did not sufficiently justify the redactions. In response, the defendant provided the plaintiff with newly redacted documents, and a second supplemental Vaughn index. The plaintiff was still unsatisfied, because the documents contained redactions of individual names, job titles, department descriptions, work addresses, dates of employment, dates of events and entire sentences of text. In a memorandum opinion issued on July 23, 2013, the court ruled in favor of the defendant: it held that the defendant had properly relied on an exemption that allows information to be redacted or withheld if there is a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy that is not outweighed by the public interest. At this time, the case was closed. The plaintiff appealed to the DC Circuit Court on August 22, 2013 (USCA Case Number 12-5269). PLN argued that the district court erred in balancing the individual's privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure. On August 5, 2015, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant had not sufficiently justified its redactions; the court reversed and remanded the district court\u2019s decision. The court concluded that the defendant had combined the privacy interests of all individuals whose information was redacted into categories based on the type of document within which the individual's information appeared. The court found several problems with this categorical methodology: because the categories were centered on specific types of filed documents, they included a wide range of claims covering various degrees of privacy interests. But these privacy interests could be different depending on the claim. The categorical approach failed to distinguish between redacting the identity of the alleged victim and the identity of the alleged perpetrator, and the defendant made no effort to distinguish between the privacy interests of employees who were victims and those who were perpetrators. The court also found that the defendant redacted inconsistently; the names of some alleged perpetrators were redacted while others were not. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals remanded the case, requiring the defendant to fashion a coherent catalogue of the documents still in dispute and instructing the district court to balance privacy and public interests in light of the defendant\u2019s new submissions. 787 F.3d 1142. On April 3, 2017, the district court approved a settlement. The parties stipulated that the defendant had acceptably produced the documents originally requested by the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to pay $420,000 in the plaintiff's attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The plaintiff agreed to forever discharge, release, and withdraw any claims of access to records or portions of records previously made in the lawsuit. The case was dismissed and is now closed.", "summary": "On August 6, 2006, Prison Legal News (PLN) submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) seeking documents related to litigation expenses. They asked the BOP to waive all search and duplication fees under the FOIA. BOP refused to grant the fee waiver and PLN appealed the decision to the Department of Justice.<br> <br>The DOJ upheld the denial of the request, so on September 13, 2005, PLN filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the District of Columbia. After several years of litigation, the parties settled in 2017. The BOP produced the requested documents and agreed to pay $420,000 in attorneys' fees and costs."}
{"article": "On October 1, 2012, four detained former Delaware prisoners, represented by private counsel, filed this lawsuit against Commissioner of the Delaware Department of Corrections (DDOC) and two directors of Central Offender Records (COR). They alleged that the defendants' failure to take steps to correct the allegedly well known and long-term (since at least 2008) dysfunction of COR constituted a violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that DDOC and COR maintained inadequate staff, training, discipline policies, and hours of operation, along with a host of other policies, that led to frequent overdetention, ranging from 12 hours to days, weeks, months, and possibly even years past court-ordered release. The plaintiffs filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, individually and as a class, on behalf of all those incarcerated in a DDOC facility as of October 1, 2008 or later who were not or would not be released within 12 hours of the expiration of their sentence or the forwarding of a court order for release. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent the defendants from pursing practices that caused overdetention, damages, appointment of a monitor to supervise COR, and attorneys\u2019 fees and cost. On December 4, 2012, an additional DDOC prisoner filed pro se to intervene in the case. He claimed that errors in the calculation of his date of imprisonment and his good time could lead to 8 years or more of overdetention. Additionally, on August 15, 2013, the prisoner filed a motion for partial summary judgment to adjust his date of imprisonment and good time credit. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Christopher J. Burke for mediation on January 24, 2013. While the intervenor's motions were still pending, the plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the complaint on June 2, 2014. The plaintiffs sought to add further factual support and examples of overdetained inmates. On September 29, 2014, Judge Leonard P. Stark denied the DDOC\u2019s prisoner\u2019s motions to intervene and for partial summary judgment because the prisoner failed to show how his interests would not be adequately represented as a member of the class. 2014 WL 4925227. At the same time, Judge Stark granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion to amend the complaint. On October 3, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the class and the defendants filed a motion to strike certain members of the class. The defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment a few months later in March 2015. Judge Stark denied class certification, denied the motion to strike certain members of the class as moot, and granted summary judgment to the defendants on September 30, 2015. 2015 WL 5768936. Judge Stark denied class certification to the plaintiffs because some members of the proposed class were overdetained due to delays in the court system while others were detained due to delays at COR. Judge Stark granted summary judgment to the defendants because the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the overdetention problem and found no causal connection between actions or policies by the defendants and the harm suffered by the plaintiffs. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment on October 28, 2014. Judge Stark denied the motion on March 21, 2016 because the plaintiffs\u2019 motion seemed like an attempt to rehash arguments already made at summary judgment without any new evidence. 2016 WL 1089408. On April 19, 2016, the plaintiffs appealed the denial of class certification, granting of summary judgment to the defendants, and denial of the motion to alter or amend the judgment to the Third Circuit. On April 19, 2017, the court of appeals affirmed Judge Stark\u2019s decision to grant summary judgment because the plaintiffs failed to establish deliberate indifference to the overdetention. (Circuit Judges Kent A. Jordan, Joseph A. Greenaway Jr., and Marjorie O. Rendell). 854 F.3d 234. Having affirmed the grant of summary judgment, the appeals court did not reach the other issues. This case is now closed.", "summary": "Four overdetained former Delaware prisoners, represented by private counsel, filed this \u00a7 1983 action against the Delaware Department of Corrections (DDOC) and Central Offender Records (COR). The plaintiffs claimed that inadequate staff, training, discipline, and hours of operation, along with a host of other policies, caused dysfunction and frequent over-detention. The plaintiffs brought suit individually and as a class on behalf of all those incarcerated in a DDOC facility as of October 1, 2008 or later who were not or will not be released within 12 hours of the expiration of their sentence or the forwarding of a court order for release. In 2015, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment because the plaintiffs' failed to demonstrate that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the overdetention problem. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment to the defendants. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "In 2004, a Mental Health Unit (MHU) prisoner at Georgia's Phillips State Prison brought this \u00a71983 suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights, plaintiff contended that the defendant prison administrators denied Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment by understaffing the MHU, as well as by staffing it with correctional officers without adequate mental health training. The plaintiff noted that the lack of trained staff led to overworked and overstressed staff, such as there were, who consequently took actions resulting in danger, violence, and death to prisoners. Such actions included correctional officers' excessive use of force against MHU residents and double-bunking prisoners without adequate screening or consideration of risks one presented to another. Class action certification was sought but not granted. The case's PACER docket reflects that discovery proceedings subsequently occurred, as did settlement negotiations. The latter led to the filing by the parties, on January 31, 2005 (the day before dispositive motions were due to be filed), of a joint stipulation of dismissal, which was approved by Judge Carnes on the same day. Court documents do not provide any details on settlement terms.", "summary": "In 2004, a Mental Health Unit (MHU) prisoner at Georgia's Phillips State Prison brought this \u00a71983 suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights, , plaintiff contended that the defendant prison administrators denied Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment by understaffing the MHU, as well as by staffing it with correctional officers without adequate mental health training. Class certification was sought but not granted. On January 31, 2005, the day before dispositive motions were due to be filed, the Court approved the parties' joint stipulation for dismissal."}
{"article": "On January 8, 2008, a group of inmates filed a class action civil rights lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging that officers with the Georgia Department of Corrections had engaged in a pattern and practice of systematically beating restrained inmates in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, the civil rights laws of the United States and the Georgia Constitution and laws. Plaintiffs alleged that the beatings and torture were afflicted primarily by members of CERT Team (\"Correctional Emergency Response Team\"). Plaintiffs were represented by private counsel and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages and class certification. On March 14, 2011, the Court (Judge Hugh Lawson) dismissed several claims pursuant to the defendants' motion to dismiss. The Court found that several of the prisoner plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Additionally, several defendants were dismissed for failure to plead the claims in adequate detail, as required by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937. On March 14, 2012, the Court severed the claims asserted by two of the plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 21, dismissed several more defendants, and set trial on the remaining claims for July 2012. On July 2, 2012, the plaintiffs stipulated to dismissal of the lawsuit.", "summary": "In January of 2008, several inmates filed suit against the Georgia Department of Corrections, alleging that it established a pattern and practice of systematic abuse of the inmates. Several claims and defendants were dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to plead claims in adequate details. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case in July 2012."}
{"article": "This case is the consolidation of two separate civil actions filed by the same plaintiff, a transgender woman housed at Rogers State Prison in Georgia, a single sex men's facility. The plaintiff was sexually assaulted several times by another prisoner while in both general population and protective custody. On May 17, 2014, she filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 alleging that the Warden, Deputy Warden, and Lieutenant of the prison were deliberately indifferent to her safety, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In the second case, filed {}, again, under Section 1983, she sued other prison employees based on the same allegations. The two cases were consolidated before Judge J. Randal Hall. The plaintiff is represented by private counsel. The complaint alleged that prison staff conducted a \"PREA\" intake (that is, an intake related to the Prison Rape Elimination Act), alerting them to the plaintiff's gender identity and presentation. They classified her as neither a PREA victim or threat, and housed her in the general population. Soon after, she was threatened and coerced into performing oral sex on another prisoner housed in the same unit. Due to explicit homophobia on the unit, both the plaintiff and the man who had assaulted her were moved to protective custody, and were housed together in a double occupancy room. While there, the plaintiff was sexually assaulted while being threatened with a razor blade. She asserts that she had put prison staff on notice that she was in danger, and that they had demonstrated deliberate indifference, effectively allowing her to be assaulted. On August 26th of 2016, the defendants sought summary judgment; it was granted. Judge Hall found that they had not violated any of the plaintiff's constitutional rights, and that they were covered by qualified immunity. 2017 WL 1078646. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on Jan. 6, 2020, issuing an opinion (by Judge Elizabeth Branch) finding that the there had been no constitutional violation, because prison officials were not actually aware of the plaintiff-specific risks of sexual assault, and the general risk (apart from her particular situation) was not significant enough to meet the constitutional test; the court emphasized that the 28 reported incidents of inmate-on-inmate sexual assault in five years at prison, which had population of 1,500 inmates, did not constitute substantial risk of serious harm, as required to support prisoner's deliberate indifference claim. 798 Fed.Appx. 411. The appellate mandate issued on Feb. 5, 2020. The time to seek Supreme Court review will end in mid-July.", "summary": "Plaintiff is a trans woman housed in a male prison in Georgia. She filed suit in the Souther District of Georgia alleging prison officials' deliberate indifference to her repeated sexual assault. The district court ruled in favor of the prison administration, grating their motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, similarly finding that no violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments."}
{"article": "On February 7, 2011, six Hawaii residents of Native Hawaiian ancestry held in for-profit prisons filed this state court class action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated. Each plaintiff had been transferred to one of two private prisons in Arizona pursuant to a state contract: Saguaro Correctional Center or Red Rock Correctional Center. Each plaintiff followed Native Hawaiian religious practices. Represented by the Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation and private attorneys, they brought this action against the Hawai'i state governor, the director of the Department of Public Safety, and CoreCivic (formerly Corrections Corporation of America). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant prisons prohibited them from exercising their constitutional and statutory right to practice their religion by limiting their access to sacred items, sacred spaces, spiritual advisors, daily worship practices, and observance of Makahiki ceremonies. The initial claims arose under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief under state law, as well as First and Fourteenth Amendment free exercise and equal protection rights, such that the defendants would provide a policy that would allow the plaintiffs the time and space necessary to follow the practices of their faith. Additionally, the plaintiffs requested compensatory damages and attorneys' fees and costs. On March 8, 2011, the defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii. On March 23, they moved for a change of venue to the District Court of Arizona because of the location of the two private prisons. On May 27, Judge Barry M. Kurren denied the motion, holding its removal distinguished it from <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15290\"><i>Bush v. Hawaii</i></a> and <i>Davis v. Hawaii</i>. Section 28 U.S.C. 1441 governed once the case was removed and because the venue was not inconvenient, it remained in Hawaii. 2011 WL 2118276. On November 14, 2011, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint seeking class certification and requesting damages and classwide declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint also added claims that the defendants' conduct violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. On March 22, 2012, the plaintiffs moved to compel class certification. The defendants responded by both opposing the motion and filing for a protective order against discovery that they alleged was unduly burdensome. Discovery continued to be litigated throughout the case by both parties. The defendants also moved for a class determination no later than July, citing plaintiffs' delay in filing an action. On April 26, the plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction, requesting immediate replacement of certain personal, religious items. On May 11, 2012, Judge Kurren granted in part the plaintiffs' motion to compel class certification and granted in part the defendants' protective order. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on August 22, 2012, with a supplemental complaint filed on behalf of one plaintiff who claimed additionally that he experienced unlawful retaliation in the form of segregation and removal from his job. On September 30, 2012, Judge Leslie E. Kobayashi denied two plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction because the likelihood of irreparable harm was minimal in these individual cases. 903 F.Supp.2d 975. In December 2012, the defendants moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies as prescribed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs failed to properly file grievances as to their alleged harms. Although the parties had vacated previously set settlement conferences, in March 2013, the plaintiffs requested and the court granted mandatory settlement conferences before Judge Kurren. Simultaneously, the plaintiffs moved for a protective order prohibiting retaliation against and intimidation of witnesses, which was denied at the first settlement conference without prejudice. On April 11, 2013, Judge Kobayashi granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust. The motion was granted as to: (1) the claims for regular meetings with a spiritual advisor made by certain plaintiffs; (2) the supplemental retaliation claims and claims for regular meetings with a spiritual advisor; and (3) and one plaintiff's claims for daily religious congregation and establishment of an outdoor altar. The judge denied the motion as to: (1) the state law claims; (2) claims for congregation with other practitioners on a daily basis, participation in certain Makahiki rituals and ceremonies, access to sacred items, and establishment of an outdoor altar; (3) one plaintiff's claims for participation in certain Makahiki rituals and ceremonies, regular meetings with a spiritual advisor, and access to sacred items; and (4) all of another plaintiff's religious claims. 2013 WL 1568425. Motions for partial reconsideration were denied. 2013 WL 2468356. On July 31, 2013, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The following September, the court ordered a judgement on the pleadings and dismissed all claims against the governor as a defendant, removing him as a party. It also dismissed claims under count XXI in the second amended and supplemental complaints, which had alleged that restrictions on observance of the Makahiki caused by the transfer to an Arizona prison violated Hawaiian state statutes and the state constitution. The court held that providing a remedy for these claims would create an implausible and infeasible obligation on the state beyond what the state constitution required. The court also dismissed the defendants' request for sanctions. 2013 WL 5204982. On October 31, the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the claims filed under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and on December 23, a counter-motion for summary judgment accompanied their response to the defendants' motion. The plaintiffs moved to remand state law claims, but the request was denied. Oral arguments were held on January 27, 2014 on the motions and counter-motions for summary judgment. On March 31, Judge Kobayashi granted in part and denied in part both the defendants' motion and the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the RLUIPA claims. The court also granted the counter-motion for summary judgment brought on the behalf of one plaintiff. That left (1) those claims seeking damages and retrospective equitable relief; (2) claims against Red Rock seeking prospective declaratory and injunctive relief; (3) one plaintiffs claims seeking prospective declaratory and injunctive relief regarding Saguaro; (4) another plaintiff's claims seeking prospective declaratory and injunctive relief regarding restricted custody at Saguaro; (5) the state law retaliation claim. 2014 WL 1321006. The defendants subsequently moved for reconsideration of their summary judgment motion, which Judge Kobayashi granted in part in June 2014. 2014 WL 2468348 (Amended 2014 WL 2716856). The court denied the plaintiffs leave to file a third amended complaint in May 2014. On May 13, 2014, the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment on the issue of sovereign immunity and damages. On July 31, Judge Kobayashi granted summary judgment to the defendants in part. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on: (1) all \u00a7 1983 claims against the Director of Hawaii Department of Public Safety seeking retrospective or declaratory relief; (2) claims seeking damages or retrospective relief under the Hawaii State Constitution; and (3) state law retaliation claims seeking punitive damages. (4) The plaintiffs remaining claims under \u00a7 1983 and RLUIPA were limited to compensatory and nominal damages only. 2014 WL 3809499. The plaintiffs also filed a second motion to certify the class and amended that motion in July 2014. On August 21, 2014, Judge Kobayashi granted a preliminary ruling on class certification on the record. The court certified a \"prospective relief class\" to refer to claims for prospective relief regarding daily, outdoor, group worship and access to sacred items. The court denied certification of a damages class. The court withheld a ruling on prospective relief subclasses. On September 30, 2014, Judge Kobayashi certified the prospective relief class and defined it as: a) all persons who were convicted of violating crimes under the laws of the State of Hawai'i and were residents of the state of Hawai'i; b) who are and/or will be confined to Saguaro Correctional Center (\"Saguaro\"); c) in the general population; and d) who have, according to Saguaro's established procedures, declared that the Native Hawaiian religion is their faith. The court also established a subclass of those individuals of the prospective relief class held in protective custody. A class seeking nominal damages and other retrospective relief was also established and defined as: a) all persons who were convicted of violating crimes under the laws of the State of Hawai'i and were residents of the state of Hawai'i; b) who are or were confined to Saguaro at any time within four years prior to February 7, 2011 until the resolution of this lawsuit; c) in the general population; and d) who have, according to Saguaro's established procedures, declared that the Native Hawaiian religion is their faith. From that class, the court established two classes: (1) the \"SHIP Damages Subclass,\" defined as: a) all persons who were convicted of violating crimes under the laws of the State of Hawai'i and were residents of the state of Hawai'i; b) who are or were confined to Saguaro at any time within four years prior to February 7, 2011 until the resolution of this lawsuit; c) in the Special Housing Incentive Program (SHIP); and d) who have, according to Saguaro's established procedures, declared that the Native Hawaiian religion is their faith; and (2) the \"Protective Custody\" damages subclass, defined as a) all persons who were convicted of violating crimes under the laws of the State of Hawai'i and were residents of the state of Hawai'i; b) who are or were confined to Saguaro at any time within four years prior to February 7, 2011 until the resolution of this lawsuit; c) in protective custody; and d) who have, according to Saguaros's established procedures, declared that the Native Hawaiian religion is their faith. All remaining class claims were denied and remained only to be litigated on behalf of the named plaintiffs. 2014 WL 4956454. On November 10, Judge Kobayashi entered an order addressing the remaining class claims from the court's earlier disposition on summary judgment and other claims regarding Makahiki and certain religious items. It held that those class claims still remained for plaintiffs to pursue. The plaintiffs were subsequently ordered to provide notice to members of the classes and subclasses. On November 12, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for a protective order to prohibit retaliation against class participants and intimidation of witnesses. The defendants moved to recoup attorneys' fees and costs as to this motion, but the court denied it as premature on December 3. On December 24, the plaintiffs' second motion was denied. 2014 WL 7366685. The parties prepared for an estimated 10-day trial. In May 2015, the parties requested and held a series of expedited settlement conferences before Judge Kurren that month. The parties first presented a settlement agreement on the record on June 5, 2015. Settlement talks continued through September and October between the parties. Although the case settled on October 16, 2015, negotiations continued through March 2016 when the defendants requested preliminary approval of the May 14 settlement terms (as expressed on the record on June 5) and a fairness hearing. The named plaintiffs subsequently opposed it, claiming a settlement had never been reached and the terms were part of the negotiation process. On September 7, 2016, Judge Kobayashi granted preliminary approval of the settlement and ordered that plaintiffs give notice by December 1 to object or opt out of the settlement. Though the plaintiffs claimed a settlement had never been reached and a number of members of the class filed letters of objection, the court reviewed discussions under contract law and held, under an analysis of <i>Hanlon</i> factors for fairness, that a settlement had been reached on April 11, 2017. In the settlement, registered Native Hawaiian practitioners in the general population of the prisons and protective custody were permitted to retain in-cell one each of the requested religious items in a Ziploc bag along with other in-cell property, previously authorized sea salt, and written religious materials. Other materials would be available for check-out, including communal religious items stored in the chapel curing group programming, or purchase, including coconut oil and approved amulets. Those members of the class in administrative or disciplinary segregation would be allowed one each of standard religious items, except for coconut oil or bamboo nose flutes due to safety and security reasons. Saguaro agreed to publish an in-cell retention list and publish a communal items list in its chapel and add the lists to its policy. Donations were restricted; but replacement of communal use religious items could be requested so long as Saguaro agreed to work with the inmate population to identify a source or vendor for replacement. Practitioners were permitted outdoor worship classes six times per year for 1.5 hours each and to participate in two solstice and equinox and two Makahiki celebrations each year. They were also permitted weekly group gatherings for 1.5 hours in a secure location to be determined by the facility and access to a limited number of communal items stored in the chapel. Two additional Makahiki celebrations within a few days of the Makahiki celebrations were also permitted on a limited basis, with the same food offerings provided. Upon request and subject to availability, registered practitioners could request to meet with a spiritual advisor through the cell door for 15\u201320 minutes for non-disruptive ministry, prayers, or chants. Ceremonial food offering could be administered by the advisor through the cell door food slot and an inmate could receive an in-cell meal tray provided to GP inmates participating in Makahiki, given written advance request. Other SHIP inmates would be allowed to meet with the spiritual advisor in the dayroom for similar activities upon request and subject to availability for the Makahiki. However, participation in programming would be subject to restrictions for safety and security risks based on an individualized assessment of the inmate\u2019s history and behavior. All plaintiffs, both individual and class, waived and released all claims for damages. Instead, the defendant CoreCivic agreed to pay $70,000 to the Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation for costs incurred. Except for those expressly provided in the order, the parties bore their own attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The parties agreed that implementation and religious items would be made available within 60 days of the agreement. They also agreed to forgo a consent decree and court-ordered monitoring. The court did not retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. An amended settlement order was submitted May 22, 2017 to reflect CoreCivic's name change. 2017 WL 2234175. The case was dismissed with prejudice and is now closed.", "summary": "Hawaiian residents of Native Hawaiian ancestry held in for-profit prisons in Arizona filed this class action lawsuit against the State of Hawaii and CoreCivic. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant prisons prohibited them from exercising their constitutional and statutory rights to practice their religion. The case involved extensive litigation, with class and sub-class certification granted. However, the case resolved via a settlement that the court held as valid under principles of contract law."}
{"article": "On September 22, 2003, several inmates in the Iowa State Penitentiary in Fort Madison, Iowa, filed a lawsuit pro se under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against administrative officials of the Iowa Department of Corrections in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The plaintiffs, later appointed private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages, alleging that the defendants were subjecting them to \"religious discrimination and persecution.\" Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that the defendants locked them in disciplinary segregation, retaliated against them, and falsely labeled them a gang due to their affiliation with their religion, the Church of New Song (CONS). The plaintiffs asked the Court to declare (1) that they had been subject to religious persecution, discrimination, and retaliatory treatment in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and (2) that the defendants had falsified investigative and disciplinary records to, among other things, close down CONS. The plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from further persecuting and retaliating against members of CONS and compensatory and punitive damages in excess of $1,500,000.00. On March 8, 2004, the District Court (Judge James E. Gritzner) denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, and on June 28, it denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order. On October 21, 2004, the Court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Bremer to determine whether a settlement conference should be held. On February 22, 2005, Judge Gritzner issued an order staying the case pending the outcome of another case, <i>Wycoff v. Brewer</i>, which also concerned the CONS. The Court reasoned that the proceedings in <i>Wycoff</i>, where prison officials sought court relief with respect to the CONS, would very likely affect the outcome of this case. On March 4, 2009, as a result of the ruling in </i>Wycoff</i> (which had been recaptioned <i>Smith v. Ault</i>) that the CONS would no longer have protected status, the Court lifted the stay. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgement on various grounds. Plaintiffs did not resist the motion, even after the Court extended time to reply. Holding that the record showed Plaintiffs had broken prison disciplinary rules and had failed to show that the motivating factor for the disciplinary measures was retaliation, the Court found in favor of the Defendants and dismissed the case on July 23, 2009.", "summary": "Several members of the Church of New Song (CONS) who were inmates in the Iowa State Penitentiary in Fort Madison, Iowa, filed a lawsuit pro se under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against administrative officials of the Iowa Department of Corrections. In 2009 the Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment."}
{"article": "On January 23, 2012, a deaf inmate incarcerated at the Idaho State Correctional Institution filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho. The plaintiff sued the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that IDOC's failure to provide him with a videophone meant he was denied an equal opportunity to communicate with people outside the prison. The plaintiff, represented by Disability Rights Idaho, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The case was initially assigned to Judge Candy W Dale, but later reassigned to Judge B. Lynn Winmill and then Judge Dee V. Benson. The plaintiff claimed that the text telephone (TTY) provided by the prison did not allow him to communicate in his primary language (American Sign Language). Furthermore, the technology was becoming obsolete as the number of people using a TTY outside of prison had decreased due to changing technology. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Larry M. Boyle when the parties agreed to a settlement conference to be held on October 31, 2012. The parties attempted to reach a settlement between 2012 and 2014 but ultimately could not reach an agreement. The defendant filed a motion for a jury trial, which was denied on May 27, 2014. The case was referred to Judge Dee V. Bensen for a Settlement Conference. The parties reached a settlement on January 16, 2015, in which IDOC agreed to provide the plaintiff with access to a videophone, as well as training for the plaintiff and designated IDOC staff members in the operation of the videophone technology. The agreement also required IDOC to pay $35,000 to the plaintiffs' attorneys, Disability Rights Idaho. On January 29, 2015, Chief Judge B. Lynn Winmill ordered the case be dismissed with prejudice, based on the parties\u2019 settlement. [Although the settlement agreement is not part of the docket, <a href=\"http://avidprisonproject.org/Making-Hard-Time-Harder/example-44---disability-rights-idaho.html\">Disability Rights Idaho posted it on their website</a>.]", "summary": "On January 23, 2012, a deaf inmate of the Idaho State Correctional Institution filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho against the Idaho Department of Correction. The plaintiff alleged that refusing access to a videophone violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The parties settled on January 16, 2015. The settlement required the access to a videophone to the plaintiff and payment of $35,000 for attorneys\u2019 fees. The case was dismissed with prejudice, based on the parties\u2019 settlement on January 29, 2015."}
{"article": "On June 2, 2016, a group of prisoners of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) filed this class-action lawsuit against the IDOC in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201. Represented by the Uptown People's Law Center and private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that the IDOC housed them in \u201cextreme isolation,\u201d which the plaintiffs defined as segregation from the mainstream prisoner population. During isolation, they claimed that they were involuntarily confined to their cells for upwards of 22 to 24 hours a day. This, they alleged, violated the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class-action certification. On August 22, 2016, the IDOC moved to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction. The court (Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams) denied the motion on March 10, 2017. The court explained that the plaintiffs had alleged they were deprived of human contact, food, and sanitary living conditions, and that the defendant was aware of the conditions because the plaintiffs had filed grievances. In addition, the court found that the plaintiffs adequately pled that they had not been allowed to challenge the defendant's decision to isolate them. 2017 WL 951406. The parties then engaged in discovery. The case was re-assigned to Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on January 8, 2019. The plaintiffs filed for class certification on September 6, 2019. The court issued an order on March 6, 2020 announcing that the plaintiffs' motion for class certification was fully briefed and that the court intended to set this motion for oral argument. As of April 10, 2020, the case has yet to go to oral argument and is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2016, a group of prisoners of the Illinois Department of Corrections filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs alleged that they were subjected to extreme isolation in violation of the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On June 18, 2009, a group of Muslim prisoners (including John Walker Lindh, the &quot;American Taliban&quot;) filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the warden of the Federal Correctional Institute. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Indiana, asked for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the prison's allowance of only one hour of group prayer per week violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Arguments focused on Muslim tradition, which calls for five sessions of prayer of each day with group prayer being preferable over individual sessions. The plaintiffs alleged that the prison's policy of only allowing one hour of prayer per week did not serve a compelling government purpose. Furthering their belief was the living conditions of the prisoners, which allowed them to be out of their cells most of the day. The plaintiffs moved for certification of a class consisting of all Muslim prisoners aggrieved by this policy. However, the district court (Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson) denied this motion, holding that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently define a class and, regardless, could not satisfy the numerosity requirement necessary to have class certification approved. The plaintiffs could only identify five Muslim prisoners under the warden's control whose beliefs on prayer coincided with their own. Both parties filed motion for summary judgment, and Judge Magnus-Stinson granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion, while denying the defendant's motion (2012 WL 379737). She held, as a matter of law, that &quot;recitation of the five daily Muslim group prayers is a religious exercise rooted in Mr. Lindh's sincerely held religious beliefs,&quot; thus satisfying that requirement of RFRA. However, she deemed that there were genuine issues of material fact surrounding the issue of whether the warden substantially burdened the plaintiffs' religious practices. Following a bench trial, the court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law (2013 WL 139699). The court issued a permanent injunction against the Federal Correctional Institute, holding that the prison's policy violated RFRA. As such, the prison was required to change its policy regarding prayer sessions without 60 days of the issuing of the order. Under the order, the prison was required to allow prisoners to have prayer sessions at any time that the prisoners would otherwise be allowed out of their cells. The prison changed its policy to allow religious groups to pray at three assigned times per day, with no more than 10 inmates allowed in the room at any time. Feeling that the policy violated the order of the court, the plaintiffs filed a motion to hold the defendant in contempt. After the filing of the motion, the prison again changed its policy to only allow for group prayer within individual cells, with a maximum of two prisoners allowed in any cell. The plaintiffs alleged that the warden violated the express and unambiguous command of the court, and therefore must be held in contempt. The court held that its prior ruling was not clear and unambiguous, and therefore did not hold the defendant in contempt (2013 WL 3790897). However, Judge Magnus-Stinson did further clarify her past order, declaring that &quot;the Warden is to allow group prayer during every Muslim prayer time for which the inmates are not confined to their cells. While the Warden may place a limit on the location and number of inmates who may assemble in a single place, the limitations must be reasonable and in keeping with RFRA's requirement that they are the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest be employed. Put simply, just as inmates are free to assemble, socialize, and engage in other group activities in common, recreational areas during times they are released from their cells, so too must they be allowed to engage in group prayer in common, out-of-cell areas, which the Warden may designate in his discretion.&quot;", "summary": "In 2009, a group of Muslim prisoners filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the warden of the Federal Correctional Institute, alleging that the prison's allowance of only one hour of group prayer per week violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The court ultimately issued a permanent injunction against the Federal Correctional Institute in 2013, holding that the prison's policy violated RFRA and, upon further clarification, ordered that the warden &quot;is to allow group prayer during every Muslim prayer time for which the inmates are not confined to their cell.&quot;"}
{"article": "On March 8, 2007, the Disability Law Center (\"DLC\") filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a712131, and \u00a7 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7794 against the Massachusetts Department of Correction (\"DOC\"). The DLC is the agency designated by the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a710801 et seq. to pursue legal, administrative, and other appropriate remedies to ensure that individuals with mental illnesses confined in Massachusetts prisons are protected from abuse and neglect. DLC claimed that the DOC failed to take into account mental illness when subjecting prisoners to long periods of disciplinary and other forms of isolation and segregation. The plaintiff asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that isolation of mentally ill prisoners constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that DOC's failure to address the problem violates both the Rehabilitation Act and the American with Disabilities Act. The parties began settlement negotiations in November 2007 and in 2008 sought mediation from the court. For two years the parties were unsuccessful in their negotiations, and on August 12, 2010, the court lifted a stay on discovery. 2010 WL 3199883. Extensive discovery ensued, and eventually, the parties renewed negotiations. In December 2011, the parties reached a settlement and sought court approval. On April 12, 2012, after a lengthy exploration of judicial authority to approve private settlements in which the defendant did not admit liability, Chief Judge Mark L. Wolf approved the settlement, holding that doing so would not violate the PLRA's provision that relief be limited to what is necessary to remedy the violation. The settlement agreement established detailed procedures, training, time limits, and recordkeeping to ensure that mentally ill prisoners are not placed in isolation or segregation without a full evaluation and determination that such placement will not cause further injury. The defendants also agreed to pay $1,250,000 in attorney fees and costs. 960 F. Supp. 2d 271 (D. Mass. 2012). The court retained the case on its docket (on hold but ready to be revived in the event of a claimed breach of the settlement agreement) for three years, with an additional two years possible. On May 20, 2015 the court issued a stipulation stating that since request to reopen the case had not been made in three years, the court\u2019s jurisdiction was terminated. However, on June 28, 2016, one of the prisoners who was a plaintiff in the original suit made a motion to reopen the case because the prison had been violating the agreement by placing mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement without full evaluations. On March 17, 2017, Judge Mark Wolf issued an opinion denying the plaintiff\u2019s motion to reopen the case because the previous dismissal meant the court no longer had jurisdiction. Judge Wolf said the plaintiff could open a separate action since the previous action was not a class action. 2017 WL 1042068. As such, this case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2007, the Disability Law Center filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act against the Massachusetts Department of Correction. The DLC claimed that the DOC failed to take into account mental illness when subjecting prisoners to long periods of disciplinary and other forms of isolation and segregation. The case settled in 2011, and the defendants agreed to make sure that mentally ill prisoners were not placed in isolation or segregation without a full evaluation and determination that such placement would not cause further injury; they also agreed to pay attorney fees. The case was closed in 2015 as no one had requested to reopen the case since the settlement monitoring date ended. In 2016 one of the prisoners tried to reopen the case since prison officials were violating the settlement agreement, but the judge refused to reopen the case."}
{"article": "On November 24, 2015, several inmates with hearing disabilities filed this class action in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs sued the Massachusetts Department of Correction and the Massachusetts Partnership for Correctional Healthcare under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Represented by a combination of Prisoners' Legal Services, Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights & Urban Affairs, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated persons. They claimed that the Massachusetts Department of Correction failed to provide interpreters, appropriate assistive technology, and accommodations to deaf and hard of hearing prisoners over the course of nearly a decade. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants denied them reasonable accommodation under the ADA. They alleged that they were denied technology such as teletypewriters and videophones that would make communicating with family possible. One named plaintiff alleged that because of the denial of assistive technology, she had not spoken to her family in several years. The plaintiffs also alleged that the lack of interpreters and accessible materials prevented them from engaging in programs that would allow them to earn good time. The denial of accommodations meant that the plaintiffs did not have meaningful access to healthcare, allegedly waiting nearly two years for hearing aid replacements and not being able to communicate with doctors. On March 4, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a class certification. The court denied the motion without prejudice on June 29, 2016 as premature. The defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss Counts I and II of the complaint on January 26, 2017. The court assigned the case to Magistrate Judith G. Dein for discovery. After over a year of discovery and its related disputes, as well as multiple status conferences before the Magistrate, the parties began the negotiation process. The judge granted a stay in proceedings until parties completed Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mediation. On March 30, 2018, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that it could not dismiss the plaintiffs' claims without a more developed factual record. On June 27, 2018, the plaintiffs stipulated dismissal as to the Massachusetts Partnership for Correctional Healthcare. The plaintiffs continued to engage with the defendants in mediation proceedings until May 28, 2019 when the parties filed for preliminary approval of a class settlement. The proposed settlement established intake procedures to identify and provide the appropriate reasonable accommodations for people with hearing disabilities. The settlement emphasized that the individual's request as to what accommodation would suit him or her should weigh heavily in the Department's decision on the accommodation it would provide. It also agreed to provide qualified sign language interpreters so that individuals would enjoy meaningful access to the programs inside the prisons. The settlement's provisions on telecommunication provided that each facility would provide access to at least one of each type of technological service\u2014Video Relay Services (VRI), captioned telephones, teletypewriters (TTY)\u2014as well as sound amplification devices. Moreover, individuals would not be charged for use of their accommodations and would also be given extra time, considering the delays in communication that are inherent in these services. In addition to alternative means of notification, like vibrating watches and other tactile services, the settlement provided for training for prison administrators to be able to communicate more effectively with individuals with hearing disabilities. The parties agreed to third-party monitoring during the enforcement period of the settlement, with three visits per year, and auditing. However, the monitor would only provide his or her reports to the parties. Final approval of the settlement would not enter a consent decree in the case. Instead, the plaintiffs would have to provide notice to the defendant DOC if they believed the prisons were in substantial non-compliance with the agreement, and meet and confer out-of-court if the plaintiffs are not satisfied with the defendant's justification. The court remained a last resort under the agreement to invoke its \"equitable\" authority to provide or deny relief to the plaintiffs. The parties agreed to negotiate reasonable plaintiffs attorneys' fees and the settlement will remain in effect for three years from the time of the court's final approval. In addition, the parties held final fairness hearings in late September and early October. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In November 2015, plaintiff inmates with hearing disabilities sued the Massachusetts Department of Correction and the Massachusetts Partnership for Correctional Healthcare under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Constitution of the United States. After mediation, the parties settled in 2019. Enforcement of the settlement remains in effect for a period of three years."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas action brought by a group of inmates in the the Maine Department of Corrections, seeking release of inmates due to COVID-19. The plaintiffs' claims were dismissed and the case is now closed. <hr> A group of vulnerable prisoners brought this lawsuit against the Maine Department of Corrections, alleging that the Department was not sufficiently protecting them against the threat of serious illness or death from the virus. Represented by the ACLU of Maine, they filed this petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine on May 15, 2020. The petition was assigned to Judge John A. Woodcock, Jr. The plaintiffs alleged that the Department was refusing to use medical furlough to reduce the risk of infection for inmates. One caseworker had told an inmate that \u201cthere\u2019s nobody being released because of medical conditions, so you can get that idea right out of your head.\u201d In fact, instead of releasing prisoners in an effort to de-densify, as correctional institutions across the country had done, the Department had added \u201cmany new technical requirements\u201d for medical furlough. The plaintiffs additionally alleged that the precautions the Department was taking to protect against outbreaks in its facilities were insufficient to protect prisoners, especially medically vulnerable prisoners, from contracting the virus. The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of \u201call current and future inmates who, by reason of age or medical condition, [were] particularly vulnerable to injury or death if they were to contract COVID-19.\u201d They proposed 3 subclasses:<ul><li>an Imminent Release Subclass, composed of inmates scheduled to be released within one year;<li>a Minimum Security Subclass, composed of inmates who posed a low security risk and who were housed in minimum-security or community-security settings; and<li>a Disabilities Subclass, composed of people who were medically vulnerable due to underlying medical conditions that qualified as disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.</ul> They argued that the policy of keeping vulnerable prisoners in prison, when they could otherwise qualify for medical furlough or home confinement, was a violation of the Eight Amendment\u2019s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment; that the policy was a violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act for members of the Disabilities Subclass; and that because the policy was unconstitutional and unlawful, the members of the class and subclasses qualified for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. \u00a72241. They sought a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction, an order of enlargement (an order requiring the Department to release prisoners on bail during the pendency of the habeas proceedings), and/or a writ of habeas corpus. They also sought a declaration that it was unconstitutional and unlawful for the Department to categorically deny medical furlough during the pandemic. They requested an order requiring the Department to identify all members of the class and subclasses within two days, to evaluate each class member\u2019s eligibility for medical furlough, home confinement, or other accommodation, and to release enough prisoners \u201cto ensure that all remaining persons are incarcerated...consistent with CDC guidance.\u201d On May 18, 2020, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The following day, the Department reported its first COVID diagnosis. On June 8, 2020, the court denied the motion for a temporary restraining order. The court held, among other things, that \"[g]iven the relatively low number of confirmed cases of COVID-19 in MDOC facilities and what the Court expects will be a rapid resolution of the request for a preliminary injunction, the Court does not see the need for temporary injunctive relief at this time.\" 2020 WL 3052220. The Department moved to dismiss the lawsuit on June 22, 2020. The plaintiffs later moved to convert their claim, originally brought under 28 U.S.C. \u00a72241, to an action under \u00a72254. The Court granted this motion on July 15. 2020 WL 4004795. On August 14, Judge Woodcock dismissed the plaintiffs' habeas claims without prejudice, and dismissed the motion for preliminary injunction as moot. 2020 WL 4736462. Judge Woodcock found that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their state remedies as they were statutorily required to do before seeking habeas relief. Although there may have been some common issues of fact, Judge Woodcock determined that Maine state courts could determine whether or not to permit the plaintiffs consolidate those issues. As such, because the petition was dismissed, the case is now closed.", "summary": "COVID-vulnerable inmates of the Maine Department of Corrections, seeking to represent a class of medically vulnerable and disabled inmates, brought this habeas action in an effort to force the Department to de-densify its prisons by releasing prisoners. Filed May 15, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine, the complaint alleged that the Department had refused to grant medical furlough or home confinement to inmates; they alleged that this was in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. The action was assigned to Judge John A. Woodcock, Jr. Although the Department reported its first case of COVID in May 2020, the court dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for preliminary injunctive relief in June 2020. Motions to dismiss the case and to convert the case to a different form of habeas were pending as of July 28, 2020."}
{"article": "On October 30, 2007, a state prison inmate filed a \u00a71983 lawsuit against the Chief Medical Officer of the Michigan Department of Corrections' Bureau of Health Care Services and three unnamed individual members of the Medical Services Advisory Committee (MSAC). The plaintiff, who originally filed pro se but was later represented by the University of Michigan Law School General Clinic, sought declarative, monetary, and injunctive relief, claiming that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's serious medical needs when they repeatedly denied his request for cataract surgery. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that after he received cataract surgery in his right eye in August 2004, defendants repeatedly denied his request for the same surgery in his left eye for several years, until he was finally given the surgery on April 14, 2008. Plaintiff was incarcerated in a Michigan state prison at the time of the complaint and throughout the litigation. The state of Michigan contracts with Correctional Medical Services (CMS) which provides primary-care services to state inmates. If an inmate's primary care physician writes a referral to a specialist, CMS is responsible for comparing the referral to the MDOC criteria for provision of off-site specialty care. If CMS denies the referral, the primary care provider can appeal the decision by arguing that the referral was warranted in his/her best medical judgment. The appeal would not reach an MDOC officer until after a second appeal by the primary care physician. The MDOC officer would submit that appeal to the chief medical officer, who would then take it to the MSAC for a decision. On August 30, 2004, plaintiff received surgery on his right eye. The physician who performed the surgery requested that plaintiff be returned in six weeks for surgery on the left eye. Plaintiff claimed that over the next four years, 16 separate requests for the surgery were denied and that each optometrist, doctor and ophthalmologist who examined the plaintiff said that he needed the surgery. (Appellate Brief, 2) Plaintiff finally received the surgery on his left eye on April 14, 2008. On June 10, 2008, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint dropping state agency defendants with Eleventh Amendment immunity and adding individual MSAC members. He also added CMS as well as two physicians who served as CMS's Michigan medical directors. At two points, in 2008 and 2009, various defendants filed motions for summary judgment based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. Both times, the magistrate judge [Charles Binder] filed a Report and Recommendation recommending that those motions be denied. Both times, the district court [Judge Anna Diggs Taylor] adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and denied the motions. The defendant Chief Medical Officer of MDOC filed an interlocutory appeal, on August 25, 2010, of the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. On April 10, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit [Circuit Judge Deborah L. Cook] issued an opinion reversing the district court. The court applied a two-step test to qualified immunity claims in deliberate-indifference cases, determining 1) whether, based upon the applicable law, a constitutional violation has occurred; and 2) whether that violation involved a clearly established constitutional right. The court also asked whether plaintiff could prove two elements to prevail on his claim: first, that he suffered from a \"sufficiently serious\" medical need, and second, that the defendant acted with a \"sufficiently culpable state of mind.\" The court found that the plaintiff proved the first element but not the second. The court found that defendant may not have been aware of the seriousness of plaintiff's condition based on the medical reports, and that the provision of care that plaintiff did receive was based on defendant's medical judgment, not on deliberate indifference. On May 30, 2012, the district court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Chief Medical Officer of MDOC. On September 19, 2012, the parties stipulated to the entry of an order dismissing the case with prejudice, and with no award by the Court of costs or attorneys' fees. On September 21, 2012, the court dismissed the lawsuit.", "summary": "On October 30, 2007, a state prison inmate filed a \u00a71983 lawsuit against the Chief Medical Officer of the Michigan Department of Corrections' Bureau of Health Care Services and three unnamed individual members of the Medical Services Advisory Committee (MSAC). The plaintiff, who originally filed pro se but was later represented by the University of Michigan Law School General Clinic, sought declarative, monetary, and injunctive relief, claiming that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's serious medical needs when they repeatedly denied his request for cataract surgery. On May 30, 2012, following a reversal by the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, the district court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants based on qualified immunity. As of November 18, 2014, the case is ongoing against the remaining defendants."}
{"article": "On March 26, 2013, several Muslim prisoners of the Lakeland Correctional Facility (LCF) filed this lawsuit pro se in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Deputy Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), the dietician and food service manager of the prison, and the Special Activity Coordinator of MDOC, all under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The case was assigned to District Judge Gordon J. Quist and Magistrate Judge Hugh W. Brenneman, Jr. The plaintiffs claimed that MDOC violated their First and Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide adequate nourishment to accommodate the plaintiffs\u2019 fasting period during the 2011 and 2012 Ramadan seasons. Thus, the plaintiffs claimed, MDOC burdened the plaintiffs\u2019 exercise of religion and inflicting cruel and unusual punishment. They also alleged that MDOC did not treat a Jewish inmate in the same way during his fasting period. On June 14, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, asking that the court require the defendants to provide the plaintiffs with adequate meals during the 2013 Ramadan period. On July 8, 2013, Judge Quist denied this motion because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. The court pointed to the MDOC dietitian's testimony which stated that, at most, the Ramadan meals to be provided would be 250 calories under the required amount for prisoners in a day. In a subsequent order of clarification, the court said that the reason plaintiffs did not show irreparable harm was only because of the dietitian's testimony. Despite reaffirming the denial of the plaintiffs\u2019 motion, the order of clarification required MDOC to provide a minimum of 2,350 calories per day during the 2013 Ramadan period. On July 31, 2013, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies before bringing this lawsuit. The plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and the court stayed discovery pending resolution of the motions. On July 31, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt on the ground that the actual 2013 Ramadan meals provided approximately 600 fewer calories than the defendants had represented in their answer to the complaint. On April 29, 2014, the court found the defendants in contempt of court, agreeing with the prisoners that the state had provided the plaintiffs with unduly limited calories during Ramadan, contrary to the defendants\u2019 own representations to the court and the court's order. The court ordered the defendants to pay $200 to each plaintiff. On February 25, 2014, the magistrate judge filed a report and recommendation regarding the cross-motions for summary judgment, recommending that the court grant defendants\u2019 motion, deny the plaintiffs\u2019 cross-motion, and dismiss the case. His report argued that the plaintiffs failed to properly exhaust their administrative remedies and that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. 2014 WL 1347436. <i>Eighth Amendment Claims</i> On March 31, 2014, the court granted summary judgment against the prisoners, dismissing their Eighth Amendment claims. On May 12, 2014, however, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of this decision, which Judge Quist granted on August 15, 2014, reinstating the Eighth Amendment claim. The defendants appealed this reinstatement to the Sixth Circuit. In an unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the court\u2019s order reinstating the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the plaintiffs\u2019 restricted diets during the Ramadan fasts violated a clearly established right. <i>RLUIPA Claims</i> Judge Quist partially agreed with Magistrate Judge Brenneman\u2019s recommendation when on March 31, 2014 he dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 request for preliminary injunctive relief and their Eighth Amendment claims. However, he reversed the Magistrate Judge\u2019s other recommendations and held that the plaintiffs could proceed on their First Amendment and RLUIPA claims. He said that the claims were not barred by the statute of limitations, that the defendants had not shown that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and that MDOC was not entitled to qualified immunity because it was a genuine issue of fact whether MDOC provided the plaintiffs with sufficient nutrition in Ramadan 2011 and 2012. 2014 WL 1347432. On May 13, 2014, the defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to the plaintiffs\u2019 2011 and 2012 Ramadan claims. Magistrate Judge Brenneman filed a report and recommendation regarding this motion, recommending that the court dismiss all the plaintiffs\u2019 Ramadan 2011 claims and the plaintiffs\u2019 Ramadan 2012 claim for lack of exhaustion. 2015 WL 3936315. On June 26, 2015, partially agreeing with Judge Brenneman, Judge Quist granted in part and denied in part the defendants\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing some of the plaintiffs\u2019 Ramadan 2011 claims but retaining one Ramadan 2011 claim and all Ramadan 2012 claims. 2015 WL 3936395. On July 9, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of this order. Judge Quist granted this motion and reinstated the 2011 Ramadan claims because the plaintiff showed that his exhausted grievance for Ramadan 2010 properly exhausted his Ramadan 2011 claim. <i>The Second Preliminary Injunction</i> On May 28, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs asked the court to order the defendants to provide 2,900 calories per day during the 2014 Ramadan period. Citing the defendants\u2019 failure to comply with the court\u2019s order of clarification for the 2013 Ramadan period, the plaintiffs also requested that the court appoint a monitor to ensure that the defendants comply with their legal obligation to provide the plaintiffs adequate nutrition during the 2014 Ramadan period. On June 27, 2014, the Court agreed with the defendants' position that providing prisoners participating in the Ramadan fast an average of 2,350 calories per day over a two-week period, rather than providing at least 2,350 calories every day, was consistent with sound nutritional practices and would not adversely affect prisoners\u2019 health. Judge Quist ordered the defendants to provide the court a copy of the 2014 Ramadan menu and, on a weekly basis, a sworn statement from a representative at LCF confirming that the plaintiffs were served the food items listed on the 2014 Ramadan menu. 2014 WL 2920479. On June 20, 2014, the United States filed a statement of interest. The United States expressed interest in whether Michigan prison officials were substantially burdening the exercise of religion in violation of the RLUIPA if they were found to provide inadequate nutrition to prisoners observing Ramadan. If the officials were inflicting a substantial burden, the United States was interested in what remedies were needed to ensure that Michigan officials comply with RLUIPA. On September 2, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for contempt, this time for the defendants\u2019 failure to provide the plaintiffs an average of 2,350 calories per day over a two-week cycle during the 2014 Ramadan period. In another victory for the plaintiffs, Judge Quist granted this motion on May 4, 2015. The court appointed a pro bono attorney from the Michigan State University Law School Civil Rights Clinic for the plaintiffs on July 2, 2015. Shortly thereafter, this case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Ray Kent from Magistrate Judge Brenneman on August 1, 2015. In November 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint adding claims for Ramadan 2013 and 2014. Those claims were substantially the same as the claims in the original complaint but also added a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim based on MDOC\u2019s differential treatment of a Jewish inmate during his fasting period and a civil conspiracy claim alleging that MDOC had conspired to provide the plaintiffs with fewer calories than required by MDOC guidelines and the court\u2019s previous orders because plaintiffs were Muslim. The court granted the motion on April 14, 2016, and the new claims were added to the previous ones. On July 30, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment as to the constitutional and statutory claims during the 2011 and 2012 Ramadan fasting, arguing that the plaintiffs were fed only 1600 calories per day. However, on August 11, 2016, the defendants filed a joint stipulation with the plaintiffs in which the plaintiffs agreed to voluntarily dismiss their claims for injunctive and monetary relief based on the RLUIPA. Soon after, Judge Quist granted this proposed order, but the plaintiffs\u2019 Eighth Amendment, First Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims remained. Then, the defendants filed another motion for partial summary judgment on August 17, 2016. The defendants sought summary judgment in their favor on the grounds that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established. On November 4, 2016, Judge Kent filed a report and recommendation with the court regarding the plaintiffs\u2019 July, 30, 2016 motion for summary judgment and the defendants\u2019 August 17, 2016 motion for partial summary judgment, recommending that the court deny all of these motions because factual uncertainties remained. Judge Kent also recommended that the court grant the defendants\u2019 motion as to the plaintiffs\u2019 equal protection claim and the plaintiffs\u2019 2014 Ramadan claims against the prison\u2019s dietitian based on his lack of personal involvement; and deny the defendants\u2019 motion with regard to the plaintiffs\u2019 Ramadan 2013 conspiracy claim but grant the defendants' motion with regard to the 2014 Ramadan conspiracy claim. On February 16, 2017, Judge Quist partially agreed with Judge Kent, saying that there were still triable issues of fact that precluded summary judgment on the plaintiffs' Ramadan 2011 and 2012 claims. However, he dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 claims based on Ramadan 2013 and 2014 because the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. 2017 WL 631600. The parties met for a settlement conference on June 8, 2017, but they could not reach a settlement. After some rescheduling, the court set trial for October 2, 2018. The parties went to a jury trial on October 2, 2018 and the trial lasted three days. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs\u2019 proofs, defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law and the court took the motion under advisement. The defendants again moved for judgment as a matter of law at the conclusion of trial. This time, the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the MDOC Deputy Director from the case, leaving the dietician as the sole defendant. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. The damages against the remaining defendant totaled $3,900, consisting of $150 in actual damages and $500 in punitive damages per plaintiff for each month of Ramadan included in the claims. The defendant renewed his motion for judgment as a matter of law after hearing the jury verdict, but the District Court denied it. After hearing the verdict, the plaintiffs moved for a new trial as to damages for their First Amendment claim, but the Court denied their motion on November 7, 2018. On November 27, 2018, the plaintiffs appealed the decision to deny their motion for a new trial as to damages for their First Amendment claim. The case was added to the docket of the Sixth Circuit a day later. The issue is pending on appeal. The plaintiffs filed a motion for expenses on December 12, 2018 and as of August 9, 2020, that motion was still pending in the District Court. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "This 2013 lawsuit was brought by several Muslim inmates of the Lakeland Correctional Facility in the U.S. District for the Western District of Michigan. The plaintiffs alleged that, in failing to provide adequate nutrition to prisoners observing Ramadan, the defendants, several agents of the Michigan Department of Corrections, had violated the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments as well as the RLUIPA. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On August 22, 2016, a 37-year-old transgender woman incarcerated in the Potosi Correctional Center filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiff sued the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC) and Corizon LLC, the contracted medical provider for MDOC, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by Lambda Legal, she sought injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming violations of the Eighth Amendment\u2019s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Judge Noelle Collins was assigned to this case. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants failed to provide medical care despite the plaintiff\u2019s serious medical needs. The plaintiff was diagnosed with gender dysphoria and deemed by her doctors to be in need of medical services. The defendants were aware of the plaintiff\u2019s condition but denied medical care. The defendants, in defense, cited a policy called \u201cfreeze-frame.\u201d This policy denied gender dysphoria treatment unless the individual had received gender dysphoria medical care prior to being incarcerated in MDOC. On April 4, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction asking for medical care necessary for gender dysphoria. This motion sought hormone therapy, access to permanent body hair removal, and access to gender affirming canteen items. In addition, the plaintiff asked that the court declare that the defendants\u2019 freeze-frame policy to be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment. On February 9, 2018, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff\u2019s preliminary injunction request. The court granted the plaintiff\u2019s request that she receive the medical care needed for gender dysphoria such as hormone therapy, access to permanent body hair removal, and access to gender affirming canteen items. The court, however, denied the plaintiff\u2019s request that the defendants\u2019 policy should be declared unconstitutional. The court\u2019s rationale was that there should not be a blanket rule in cases involving medical care and individuals incarcerated within a prison system. These decisions, according to the court, should be individualized. For that same reason, declaratory relief was denied. 2018 WL 806764. The plaintiff continued to challenge the defendants\u2019 policy. On February 26, 2018, the plaintiff amended her complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. This amendment clarified that the plaintiff was not only challenging the application of the policy but also the constitutionality of the policy on its face. On March 30, 2018, the plaintiff updated her request for declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction. And then, on May 22, 2018, the court granted the plaintiff\u2019s request for declaratory relief and a permanent injunction. The court declared that the defendants\u2019 failure to provide the necessary medical care was a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, the freeze-frame policy violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to account for individual medical needs of transgender prisoners who suffer from gender dysphoria, and the defendants were prohibited from implementing the freeze frame policy. The defendants were ordered to provide treatment medically necessary for the plaintiff\u2019s gender dysphoria, including hormone therapy, permanent hair removal, and access to gender-affirming canteen items as long as she remained in custody. The defendants did not oppose the plaintiff\u2019s motions and, prior to the order, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss the individual Corizon defendants. Furthermore, the defendants were ordered to pay for the plaintiff\u2019s attorney\u2019s fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988. The parties were ordered to reach an agreement on a reasonable amount for the attorney\u2019s fees and costs. After some litigation, Magistrate Judge Collins ordered that the defendants must pay $289,164.02 in fees and $65,391.58 in costs on March 27, 2019. As of May 26, 2020, there are no further entries in the docket, and the permanent injunction against the \"freeze-frame\" policy remains in force.", "summary": "In 2016, a transgender prisoner of the Missouri Department of Corrections filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The Plaintiff alleged that the \u201cfreeze-frame\u201d policy of refraining from providing transgender prisoners necessary medical care for gender dysphoria unless they previously received such services violated the Eighth Amendment. In 2018, the court declared that the policy violated the Eighth Amendment\u2019s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and issued a permanent injunction against the policy. The court also ordered the defendants to provide the medical care necessary for the plaintiff\u2019s gender dysphoria. Additionally, the court awarded the plaintiff attorney\u2019s fees and costs."}
{"article": "On June 22, 2005, attorneys for the local ACLU and the ACLU National Prison Project filed a class-action \u00a7 1983 lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi on behalf of inmates confined in Unit 32 of the Mississippi State Penitentiary in Parchman, Mississippi. The lawsuit alleged dangerous and inhumane conditions of confinement in Unit 32, a \"supermax\" facility operated by the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). The plaintiffs immediately moved for class certification. The MDOC was already operating under an injunction issued in Russell v. Johnson, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=799\">PC-MS-0003</a> in this Clearinghouse, which concerned conditions of confinement and medical and mental health treatment for the subclass of death row prisoners confined to Unit 32. Magistrate Judge Jerry A. Davis, who oversaw the Russell case, urged the parties to discuss settlement. Following protracted negotiations, the parties reached a settlement of the issues in the form of a proposed consent decree. After a fairness hearing on April 28, 2006, Judge Davis formally approved the settlement. The consent decree called for the MDOC to make many changes to the conditions of confinement for non-death row inmates of Unit 32, including compliance with the ACA Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions (4th Ed.) and with the essential National Commission on Correctional Healthcare (NCCHC) Standards for Health Services in Prison (2003). Following the entry of the consent decree, the plaintiffs began monitoring the implementation process. Experts employed by the plaintiffs, Dr. John Robertson (medical expert) and Dr. Terry Kupers (mental health expert), conducted an audit of the medical and mental health services in Unit 32. The experts identified continuing deficiencies which they believed warranted urgent correction. The plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt on November 21, 2006, seeking an order to compel defendants to immediately comply with the medical and mental health care provisions of the consent decree. On April 4, 2007, Judge Davis called the case for an evidentiary hearing on the plaintiffs' motion to compel. Before the hearing began, the State agreed to entry of a supplemental consent decree on medical care. The hearing went forward on the plaintiffs' contentions that mentally ill prisoners were still being denied basic psychiatric care and routinely subjected to excessive force and abuse. The hearing was adjourned and the parties were directed to discuss settlement of the remaining issues. The case was reset for a settlement conference and continuation of the contempt hearing on November 15, 2007. Following that conference, the parties arrived at a supplemental consent decree on mental health care, use of force, and classification, which supplemented the original consent decree entered April 28, 2006 and the supplemental consent decree on medical care entered April 16, 2007. On November 15, 2007, the parties entered into another supplemental consent decree on mental health care, use of force, and classification. On September 16, 2008, Judge Davis denied the plaintiffs' motions for discovery and attorneys' fees as moot. On August 2, 2010, Judge Davis ordered the case dismissed without prejudice by agreement of the parties. The defendants agreed to close Unit 32, transfer the entire population of Unit 32 to other facilities over the course of the next several months, move all seriously mentally ill prisoners to MDOC's mental health facility in Meridian, MS and remedy the inadequate medical and mental health care in Unit 32 so long as any prisoners remain there. As part of the agreement, the ACLU would also monitor during the next year the medical and mental health care provided at all of the facilities in the state to which Unit 32 prisoners were transferred to ensure they meet constitutional requirements. On November 12, 2010, Judge Davis denied one of the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees upon being advised by the parties that the issue of attorneys' fees had been resolved. On January 14, 2011, Judge Davis issued a stipulated order awarding the plaintiffs $295,000 fees and expenses. Disputes over attorneys' fees continued until January 13, 2012, when the parties settled but did not disclose the details of the settlement.", "summary": "In 2005, the ACLU filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of inmates confined in Unit 32 of the Mississippi State Penitentiary in Parchman, Mississippi, alleging dangerous and inhumane conditions of confinement. The parties initially settled in 2006. Then, the plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt in late 2006, seeking an order to compel defendants to immediately comply with the consent decree. After two more settlements, the defendants agreed to close Unit 32 in 2010 and the case was dismissed."}
{"article": "On May 30, 2013, prisoners in the East Mississippi Correctional Facility (EMCF) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued the Mississippi Department of Corrections commissioner, deputy commissioner, and chief medical officer in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the ACLU National Prison Project and the Southern Poverty Law Center, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary relief, claiming that conditions in the EMCF violated their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the living conditions at EMCF, designed to house and treat Mississippi's most seriously mentally ill prisoners, were so inhumane as to cause harm to the inmates through known problems with healthcare, mental healthcare, isolation, excessive force, protection from harm, nutrition, and food safety. In September 2014, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. While this motion was pending, on October 9, 2014, District Judge Tom S. Lee recused himself and the case was reassigned to District Judge William H. Barbour, Jr. On September 29, 2015, the Judge Barbour granted class certification, and the defendants attempted to appeal this order, but the Fifth Circuit denied the defendants' motion to file an appeal on November 2, 2015. After engaging in discovery, a bench trial began on March 5, 2018 and concluded on April 9, 2018. On August 24, 2018, Judge Barbour stayed the proceedings in the case pending the receipt of supplemental expert reports, which were to be filed by November 16, 2018. Judge Barbour found that during the bench trial, it had become apparent that conditions at the prison had changed, in part, due to the appointing and hiring of new administrators and implementation of new policies and procedures. Therefore, he found the stay necessary in order ensure that any award of injunctive relief in this case would not run afoul of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). After the parties submitted their supplemental expert reports, the parties attempted to settle. However, on January 24, 2019, the parties notified Magistrate Judge John C. Gargiulo, who oversaw the settlement conferences, that the parties were unable to settle and that future settlement conferences would not be productive. The case proceeded, and on 12/31/2019, the Court entered judgment for the Defendants, stating <blockquote> It is clear that many changes have been made at the subject prison that pertain to the claims alleged in this lawsuit. The changes include, but are not limited to, new administrators, new prison personnel, and new service providers. The Court concludes that the alleged constitutional violations that may have existed at the time this lawsuit was filed no longer exist and, therefore, that the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs has not been shown necessary. Accordingly, judgment will be entered in favor of Defendants on all claims.</blockquote> Plaintiffs appealed the judgment to the Fifth Circuit on 1/30/2020. Meanwhile, the District Court taxed costs of $104,380 against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs moved for a review of the taxation, arguing that the indigent plaintiffs brought a close case, and therefore should not be assessed the plaintiffs costs. The plaintiffs also objected to the defendants\u2019 billing of expenditures that included hotel stays, travel, and dining. Defendants opposed the motion, arguing that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that costs \u201cshould be allowed to the prevailing party,\u201d and therefore entitles them to compensation for costs. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2013, prisoners in the East Mississippi Correctional Facility (EMCF) filed a class-action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Mississippi Department of Corrections, claiming that EMCF violated the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the inhumane living conditions at EMCF, a prison for the mentally ill, harmed inmates. In 2015, the court granted class certification. After engaging in discovery and a bench trial, the parties attempted to settle. After the parties submitted their supplemental expert reports, the parties attempted to settle. However, on January 24, 2019, the parties notified the court that the parties were unable to settle and that future settlement conferences would not be productive. As of March 25, 2019, the case is ongoing."}
{"article": "This case is about the refusal of North Carolina's Department of Public Safety (DPS) to recognize Humanism as a faith group within the state prison system. On February 2, 2015, an inmate in a North Carolina prison and the American Humanist Association filed this lawsuit in the Eastern District of North Carolina against officers of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety that are involved in policy decisions related to recognition of faith groups in state prison under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by the American Humanist Association's own legal team as well as private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' disparate treatment of Humanists violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, a permanent injunction, and attorneys' fees. On July 28, 2017, both the plaintiffs and defendants filed for summary judgment. On March 29, 2018, Judge Terrence W. Boyle granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 303 F.Supp.3d 421. The court rejected the defendants' argument that the American Humanist Association did not have standing in this case. Judge Boyle found that the American Humanist Association had associational standing because of its representation of other Humanist inmates incarcerated by the North Carolina Department of Public Safety. Regarding the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim, the court found that the defendants violated the Establishment Clause because the defendants did not have a secular purpose for denying Humanism recognition as a religious group or for their decision to prohibit Humanist inmates from organized group meetings. In addition, the defendants failed to put forth any evidence to support space, resource, or security concerns applicable to Humanist inmates that did not apply equally to other religious groups. Regarding the plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim, the court found that a violation because the defendants' authorized other non-theistic religions but not Humanism and there was not a rational connection between the defendants' cited interests in space, resources, and security and their refusal to recognize Humanism. Judge Boyle granted the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction, ordering DPS to recognize Humanism as a faith group and to permit a Humanist study group to meet within North Carolina state prisons on the same terms as other faiths are allowed. He also granted the plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment, stating that the defendants violated the Establishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to recognize Humanism as a faith group and to allow it to be designated on an inmate's prison records. Because the plaintiffs suffered constitutional violations at the hands of defendants, the court awarded nominal damages ($1.00) to the plaintiffs. Judge Boyle also awarded the plaintiffs attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988. The court retained jurisdiction to make any further orders necessary to carry out the terms of the relief. On July 9, 2018, the court ordered defendants to pay $5,905.25 to the plaintiffs for various court costs. On July 10, 2018, the plaintiffs withdrew their motion for attorneys' fees and litigation expenses, because the parties privately settled the matter of attorneys fees and expenses. Since the entering of the permanent injunction and motions regarding attorneys fees and costs, there has been no activity in this case. The permanent injunction remains in effect.", "summary": "This case is about the refusal of North Carolina's Department of Public Safety (DPS) to recognize Humanism as a faith group within the North Carolina state prison system. On February 2, 2015, an inmate in a North Carolina prison and the American Humanist Association filed this lawsuit in the Eastern District of North Carolina against officers of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety that are involved in policy decisions related to recognition of faith groups in state prison under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. They alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and on March 29, 2018, Judge Terrence W. Boyle granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motion. He entered a permanent injunction ordering DPS to recognize Humanism as a faith group and to permit a Humanist study group to meet within North Carolina state prisons on the same terms as other faiths are allowed and entered declaratory judgment. The court also awarded nominal damages and attorneys' fees and costs. Since the entering of the permanent injunction, there has been no activity in this case. The permanent injunction remains in effect."}
{"article": "On October 16, 2002, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, private counsel representing a group of New Jersey state prisoners filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against contract medical care providers, their executives, and New Jersey corrections officials. In that complaint and a later, amended version, the prisoners alleged that they and their class had been exposed in the state's prisons to the Hepatitis C virus (HCV), or had been admitted to the prisons but not treated for the virus, or had contracted the virus in the prisons. They attributed these conditions to the deliberate indifference of the defendants, which allegedly violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' protections against cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants' conduct constituted negligence, medical malpractice, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress under state common law, and that the conduct also violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12131 et seq. The plaintiffs sought monetary and injunctive relief. The class plaintiffs sought to represent included all past or present New Jersey state prisoners from between January 1990, and the date of filing the amended complaint, whether or not they had contracted HCV. By the time the court adjudicated the class action issue, in May 2008, the New Jersey Department of Corrections had adopted major changes in how people with HCV were treated. According to papers filed with the court, its new program lined up with the federal Bureau of Prisons approach. In particular, the court (Judge Noel Hillman) found: a. The health care provider for the department, CMS, subcontracted with the Cooper Health System and its Infectious Disease Department to provide infectious disease consultations to inmates. Cooper Hospital is also in the process of reviewing every HCV inmate's medical care to assure compliance with the FBOP's HCV Guidelines. b. All inmates who meet the treatment criteria in the FBOP's HCV Guidelines are offered HCV pharmacologic treatment which they can accept or reject. Inmates who accept HCV medications are given a combination of pegylated interferon in combination with ribavirin. This pharmacologic treatment is FDA approved and recommended for use in the FBOP's HCV guidelines. c. Inmates in New Jersey, including in excess of 7,000 admitted prior to February 1, 2003, have been given a Blood Borne Pathogen Risk Assessment. Inmates identified with a positive risk factor for HCV have been encouraged to consent to a HCV test. d. Any inmate who requests an HCV test is given the test. e. All inmates are given extensive counseling and education materials, a NJDOC video on HCV and direct communications with their healthcare providers. f. The inmates' Electronic Medical Records have been updated with comprehensive HCV forms to assure more consistent and thorough HCV documentation. g. The care and treatment of all HCV inmates is closely tracked. h. CMS compiles and analyzes statistical data regarding New Jersey's HCV program to measure and analyze the effectiveness of the program. The data is shared with the NJDOC. i. The NJDOC monitors the HCV care and treatment given to inmates and CMS is subject to contractual penalties if it does not comply with its contract. Given that the injunctive relief requested by the plaintiffs was this same set of reforms, Judge Hillman denied the request for injunctive relief as moot. In addition, the court found that only prisoners who already had HCV were appropriate plaintiffs in the case--and that there was no evidence that this subset of the putative plaintiffs class was sufficiently numerous to justify class action status. It therefore denied class certification. As to two individual class members who had HCV, the court held there was sufficient evidence in the record to go to trial on their constitutional claims (though not on their Americans with Disabilities Act claims), and denied the state's motion for summary judgment. In October 2009, the case settled for money damages. It seems from some papers filed by one of the plaintiffs that he may never actually have received his money, but when he sought the assistance of the court in enforcing the settlement against his lawyer, Judge Hillman ruled that the court lacked jurisdiction, and directed him to file a collection action in state court.", "summary": "This was a prison medical care case filed in 2002 in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking damages and an injunction against contract medical care providers and New Jersey corrections officials. The plaintiffs that the New Jersey prison system was failing to treat them for Hepatitis C. By the time the court adjudicated the class action issue, in May 2008, the New Jersey Department of Corrections had adopted major changes in how prisoners with HCV were treated; it updated its procedures to match those of the federal Bureau of Prisons, and \"backscreened\" all the prisoners willing to be screened for the virus. Given that the injunctive relief requested by the plaintiffs was this same set of reforms, Judge Hillman denied the request for injunctive relief as moot. As to two individual class members who had HCV, the court held there was sufficient evidence in the record to go to trial on their constitutional claims (though not on their Americans with Disabilities Act claims), and denied the state's motion for summary judgment. In October 2009, the case settled for money damages. (However, it seems from some papers filed by one of the plaintiffs that he may never actually have received his money. But when he sought the assistance of the court in enforcing the settlement against his lawyer, Judge Hillman ruled that the court lacked jurisdiction, and directed him to file a collection action in state court. )"}
{"article": "On December 3, 2008, plaintiff, a prisoner who is an ordained Pentecostal minister, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the District of New Jersey under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000cc, et seq. (\"RLUIPA\") against the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections and the Administrator at the New Jersey State Prison (NJSP). The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU, asked the court for nominal damages and to enjoin defendants from prohibiting plaintiff from preaching and ministering to other inmates, from leading religious services, and from teaching religious classes. Specifically, plaintiff claimed that defendants violated plaintiff's First Amendment right by implementing a policy banning all prisoners from preaching in the prison. Plaintiff had preached at weekly worship services at NJSP for more than a decade when prison officials issued a blanket ban on all preaching by inmates, even when done under the direct supervision of prison staff. On February 23, 2009, the U.S. District Court (Judge Anne E. Thompson) issued an order denying plaintiff's request for preliminary injunction. The court noted that prisoners may preach to small groups of no larger than six people, but may not lead large groups for security reasons. On November 25, 2009, the parties filed a Stipulation of Dismissal, as the claims in the action had been resolved by the parties.", "summary": "On December 3, 2008, plaintiff, a prisoner who is an ordained Pentecostal minister, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the District of New Jersey under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000cc, et seq. (\"RLUIPA\") against the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections and the Administrator at the New Jersey State Prison (NJSP). Specifically, plaintiff claimed that defendants violated plaintiff's First Amendment right by implementing a policy banning all prisoners from preaching in the prison. During the litigation, the state changed its policy to allow the plaintiff to preach to groups of six or fewer prisoners, and on November 25, 2009, the parties filed a Stipulation of Dismissal, as the claims in the action had been resolved by the parties."}
{"article": "On July 31, 2015, an inmate at the Northern Nevada Correctional Center (NNCC) living with hepatitis C filed this lawsuit in the District Court of Nevada. Representing himself, the plaintiff sued numerous medical and administrative personnel at the prison under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for violation of his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. He claimed that the defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference to serious medical needs resulting from his hepatitis C. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, including nominal, punitive, and compensatory damages. Plaintiff's bloodwork had revealed he was suffering from irreparable liver damage and was at risk of death from liver failure. Plaintiff had repeatedly informed defendants of his condition since his incarceration in 2012, but received no treatment. Specifically, his requests for Harvoni, a treatment that would cure his hepatitis C, were denied for being \"too expensive.\" According to the complaint, one defendant, a doctor who sits on the hepatitis committee at the prison, told plaintiff that \"the courts look to us [NNCC doctors] for medical opinions. So whether you need treatment or not, if we say you don't, the Court will side with us.\" In January 2016, the court stayed the case to allow opportunity for the parties to settle. An Inmate Early Mediation Conference was scheduled for May 17, 2016. Plaintiff filed a motion for an Inmate Advocate, whose role is to help the inmate to understand mediation proceedings, but was denied. On May 6, 2016, the parties asked for a time extension, as they were confident they would soon settle the case through informal settlement negotiations and wanted to avoid waste of judicial resources as well as the plaintiff's $350 filing fee. Plaintiff had previously filed to proceed in forma pauperis, but would still be responsible for the $350 regardless of the court's ruling on his motion, which would only occur if mediation failed to resolve the case. Ten days later the parties filed to dismiss the case with prejudice, with each party bearing their own costs. The terms of the private settlement agreement are unknown. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In July 2015, an inmate at the Northern Nevada Correctional Center living with hepatitis C filed this lawsuit in the District Court of Nevada in Reno. Representing himself, he claimed that the defendants, medical and administration personnel at the prison, violated his Eighth Amendment rights through deliberate indifference to serious medical needs resulting from his hepatitis C. In May 2016, the parties reached a private settlement agreement, the terms of which are unknown."}
{"article": "On May 5, 1980, inmates of the Special Housing Unit in the Attica Correctional Facility in New York filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the New York Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by the Legal Aid Society and Prisoners' Legal Services of New York, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief and alleged the following constitutional violations: the use of excessive force by prison guards, inhibition of religious exercise, inadequate ventilation, inadequate exercise, inadequate health care, denial of food, lack of sanitation, deprivation of clothing, improper classification, and denial of access to courts. On January 28, 1988, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York (Judge Michael A. Telesca) granted preliminary injunctive relief to the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed. On June 13, 1988, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Judge Wilfred Feinberg) affirmed the District Court's decision to grant the preliminary injunction. Eng v. Smith, 849 F.2d 80 (2nd Cir. 1988). Previously, on October 9, 1985, the prison correctional officers' union (Council 82) asked the District Court to allow them to intervene as defendants in the case. On April 1, 1988, the District Court (Judge Telesca) denied the request for intervention. The would-be interveners appealed. On January 12, 1989, the Second Circuit (Judge Joseph Edward Lumbard) dismissed the appeal. Eng v. Coughlin, 865 F.2d 521 (2nd Cir. 1989). On November 2, 1992, the parties entered into a partial settlement agreement, which the District Court (Judge William Skretny) entered as a Consent Decree in the case. On February 10, 1995, the court approved a stipulated dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims regarding food, exercise, sanitation, and religion. On March 9, 1998, the District Court approved the voluntarily dismissal of plaintiffs' claims relating to the mental health issue. Discovery and negotiations continued on the remaining issues for several years. On April 29, 2002, the District Court approved the plaintiffs' voluntary stipulation of dismissal and dismissed without prejudice the remaining claims of inadequate access to the law library and to legal research materials for monolingual Spanish speaking inmates. No further substantive action is reflected on the PACER docket.", "summary": "This case was brought, pro se, by a prisoner housed in the Special Housing Unit of New York's Attica prison, and then litigated by NY Prisoners Legal Services. It concerned conditions of confinement in that unit, including excessive force, religion, sanitation and nutrition, access to courts, and medical and mental health care. The parties settled, piecemeal, between 1992 and 2002."}
{"article": "On September 29, 1997, prisoners at various facilities within the New York State Department of Corrections filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Department officials. The plaintiffs, represented by Prisoners Legal Services of New York, brought the suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, challenging the systemic deprivation of religious rights of Native American prisoners, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They asked the court for injunctive relief on behalf of all Native American prisoners in New York's correctional facilities who, because of the defendants' policies, were denied the opportunity to possess symbolic items necessary for religious practice; to engage in spiritual practices, including seasonal ceremonies and meetings for prayer or study; and to chant and dance, both in congregations and individually. For approximately the following year and a half, the parties engaged in discovery. On March 24, 1999, and then July 9, 1999, the court (Judge Charles J. Siragusa) held settlement conferences. On that date, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement, approved by the court the same day. The parties agreed to create a Native American chaplain position, to allow inmates to practice their religion through group meetings, to possess certain religious items, and to celebrate religious holidays with family members. The Agreement also provided for staff notification and training as to the Native Americans' rights, and for a two-year observation period to follow entry of the Agreement in order to ensure compliance. On February 16, 2000, the parties filed a Joint Supplemental Response to the Plaintiffs' Report of Comments, dated December 14, 1999, reflecting their agreed-to interpretation of certain provisions of the Settlement Agreement. These provisions included the role of the chaplain, the burning of Indian tobacco after corrections facilities become smoke-free, and the guests able to be invited to religious ceremonies. Subsequently, on September 8, 2000, the court (Judge Siragusa) entered a decision and order approving the dismissal of the action pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The case was closed the same day.", "summary": "In 1997, prisoners at various facilities within the New York State Department of Corrections filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Department officials. The plaintiffs, represented by Prisoners Legal Services of New York, brought the suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, challenging the systemic deprivation of religious rights of Native American prisoners, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In 2000, the parties reached a settlement and the court dismissed the case."}
{"article": "On September 29, 2003, a group of paraplegic prisoners, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against prison officials. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to provide adequate medical care in violation their rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, they alleged that prison officials failed to provide adequate bladder care and treatment, such as proper use of disposable catheters, properly sterilized catheters, and access to urologists. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants unlawfully discriminated against them by failing to construct wheelchair-amenable cells and failing to provide recreational activities, in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiffs sought money damages and injunctive relief. By the time the amended complaint had been filed, all plaintiffs had been transferred to facilities in the Western District of New York. Judge Deborah A. Batts considered and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the case for improper venue. In her unpublished order of August 26, 2005, however, Judge Batts granted the defendants' motion to transfer venue to the Western District of New York. Under the new case number 05-cv-6504, the case was reassigned to Judge Charles J. Siragusa. On December 14, 2005, Judge Siragusa granted a temporary restraining order directing the defendants to supply plaintiffs with six new single-use catheters per day. This was lifted on September 15, 2006, and Judge Siragusa ordered the defendants to instead supply the plaintiffs with soap and water sufficient for cleaning catheters after reuse. On May 29, 2007, the plaintiffs filed the third and final amended complaint. On May 30, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. However, the court held the plaintiffs' motion in abeyance from 2010 through 2011 while the parties engaged in settlement discussions. On May 31, 2013, Judge Siragusa approved a joint stipulation that an expert visit the correctional facilities to review the conditions raised by plaintiffs. The expert was supposed to report back by August 16, 2013. However, as of April 23, 2014, there had been no activity in the docket. Although the judge ordered that counsel provide a joint status report to the court by December 11, 2015, the parties failed to do so. On October 10, 2017, the judge ordered the parties to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. In the plaintiffs' response, they said their lack of reporting to the court was based on a misunderstanding and that the parties had resumed settlement negotiations in September 2017. The plaintiffs noted that they had submitted a settlement proposal to the defendants and that the parties were in the process of negotiating. After several months of mediation, the parties were unable to reach a settlement agreement. On October 4, 2019, the court certified the plaintiffs' class, and pre-trial preparations began. The order identified the class as \"Plaintiffs and all prisoners in the custody of the New York State Department of Correctional and Community Supervision who suffer from a mobility disability limiting one or more of the prisoners major life activities and that requires the use of a wheelchair.\" On November 15, 2019, the court ordered plaintiffs' counsel to file a status letter within 30 days, and for the parties to confer and indicate to the court whether or not the matter this action was ready for trial. After nearly ten months passed with no status letter, the court issued an order to show cause on August 6, 2020. The plaintiffs responded and the court directed them to contact Magistrate Judge Mark W. Pedersen for a scheduling conference. In early 2021, the court set a discovery schedule. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "On September 29, 2003, a group of paraplegic prisoners, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against prison officials. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to provide adequate medical care in violation their rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. After extensive settlement negotiations and mediation, the parties were unable to reach and agreement. This case is proceeding to trial."}
{"article": "On January 21, 2003, Plaintiff. a prisoner in an Oklahoma correctional center, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, alleging that his Constitutional rights under the Free Exercise Clause were being violated by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections' refusal to provide him with a Kosher diet. In June 2003, the court (Judge Wayne Alley) consolidated Plaintiff's case with two other similar complaints. All three prisoners filed their complaints pro se and were appointed counsel. The prisoners won both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief requiring the Oklahoma Department of Corrections to provide them a Kosher diet at no personal cost. On the merits, the district court (Judge Lee West) noted that in the Tenth Circuit, 'prisoners have a constitutional right to a diet conforming to their sincerely held religious beliefs, unless a state's decision to deny inmates access to such a diet 'is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest,'' citing Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2002). The court then conducted a four-part test per Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), and concluded that the balance of the factors weighed in favor of the prisoners. At the worst, the state's budgetary concerns paled in comparison to the irreparable harm of the loss of a First Amendment freedom for the plaintiffs. The court granted the prisoners' motions for summary judgment, giving plaintiffs seven days to submit a proposed judgment and permanent injunction. That permanent injunction, issued February 8, 2006, ordered the Director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections 'to immediately provide to the plaintiffs Kosher diets at no cost, [while complying with nutritional requirements currently applicable to all other ODOC prisoners].' The court held that 'the injunction is necessary to remedy a violation of these plaintiffs' rights to freely exercise their Orthodox Jewish religion as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.' See Fulbright v. Jones, 2006 WL 222807 (U.S.D.C. W.D. Okla.). The court also awarded attorneys' fees. On September 26, 2012, the Court found that the judgment entered in this case only applies to the claims pursued by the three named plaintiffs, and the permanent injunction relief does not apply to all Oklahoma Department of Corrections inmates.", "summary": "On January 21, 2003, an Oklahoma Department of Corrections prisoner filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, alleging that his Constitutional rights under the Free Exercise Clause were being violated by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections' refusal to provide him with a Kosher diet. The case was consolidated to include the complaints of two other prisoners. The prisoners won both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief requiring the Oklahoma Department of Corrections to provide them a Kosher diet at no personal cost. The permanent injunction, issued February 8, 2006, ordered the Director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections 'to immediately provide to the plaintiffs Kosher diets at no cost, [while complying with nutritional requirements currently applicable to all other ODOC prisoners].' On September 26, 2012 the Court found that the judgment entered in this case only applies to the claims pursued by the three named plaintiffs, and the permanent injunction relief does not apply to all Oklahoma Department of Corrections inmates."}
{"article": "The plaintiff was a transgender woman who filed this pro se suit in the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma on November 7, 2013. At the time of filing, she was housed in a men's prison. The prison had denied her access to transition-related care and accommodations, which she claimed amounted to a violation of her rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint named as defendants the Director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, the Chief Medical Officer of the DOC, the Warden of the prison, the Correctional Health Services Provider, and the psychologist and doctor who provided the plaintiff care while incarcerated. Each were named in both their individual and official capacity. The case was assigned to Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti in District Court and Judges Gorsuch, O'Brien, and Holmes in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The plaintiff had requested injunctive relief, including medical staff trained to prescribe transition-related care consistent with the WPATH standards, an adequate and reliable dosage of Hormone Replacement Therapy, clothing and undergarments consistent with her gender identity, and transfer to a women's facility. At the time of filing her complaint she also filed motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. Both were denied by the District Court on May 9, 2014 (2014 WL 1875102). The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction without comment on the TRO for lack of jurisdiction on Feb 3, 2015 (601 Fed.Appx. 632). On January 21, 2015, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation that recommended the court grant the defendant's motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment. On Mar 18, 2015, Judge DeGiusti adopted this recommendation in its entirety. On the same day, he dismissed the claims against all defendants in their individual capacities without prejudice, and all the claims against them in their official capacity with prejudice. The plaintiff objected to the Report and Recommendation. On March 30, 2015, she filed a Motion for Independent Action for Relief from Judgment. Two weeks later, on April 13, 2015, the court denied the motion. The court affirmed that the rulings in the March 17, 2015 order were correct, finding that the plaintiff failed to state sufficient facts challenging the findings. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On November 7, 2013, a trans woman housed in a mens prison in Oklahoma filed a pro se case against prison staff and administration in the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. She claims that she has been denied appropriate transition related care and accommodations, amounting to a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Her request for a TRO and preliminary injunction were denied at the district court level, and the circuit court affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction without comment on the TRO for lack of jurisdiction. On April 3, 2015, the district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissing the claims against all defendants in their individual capacities without prejudice, and all the claims against them in their official capacity with prejudice. Though the plaintiff objected to the dismissal, the Court denied her motion and affirmed the dismissal."}
{"article": "On December 7, 2011, plaintiff, a male prisoner, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania under Bivens against the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiff, represented by public interest lawyers, asked the court for compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of himself and an injunction preventing defendants from continuing their unconstitutional housing, recreation, and restraint patterns, practices and policies on behalf of all current and future United States Penitentiary (USP) Lewisburg prisoners. On July 27, 2012, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint against all defendants. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated plaintiff's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by forcing him to share a cell with a hostile prisoner, which caused a threat of violence, and by placing him in painful restraints that caused injury for prolonged periods on multiple occasions for refusing dangerous cell assignments with hostile prisoners; and that defendants violated his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution by depriving him of any meaningful process prior to and during their use of punitive measures against him. Plaintiff claimed that defendants engaged in a pattern, practice, or policy of placing hostile inmates together and putting those who refuse placement in brutal restraints for long periods of time. In 2008, the Bureau of Prisons created the Special Management Unit (SMU) at USP Lewisburg to serve prisoners who present unique security and management concerns including prisoners who participated in or led group/gang-related activity. Prisoners participate in intake interviews, in part to allow officials to gather information about the prisoners so as to make safe and appropriate placement decisions. On April 9, 2013, the U.S. District Court (Judge William B. Nealon) granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion to dismiss and declined to certify the class. 2013 WL 1452962. The plaintiff subsequently filed a petition to for leave to appeal the denial of class certification on April 23, 2013 to the Third Circuit, and the docket number 13-8046 was assigned. On October 3, 2014, the U.S. District Court granted an enlargement of time for discovery until after the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issues a decision on Richardson's appeal of his class certification claims, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has decided that Richardson's appeal will be held pending their decision in Shelton v. Bledsoe. On October 8, 2014, the U.S. District Court issued an order staying the case, pending further order of the court, and ordering the action administratively closed until after the Third Circuit Court of appeals issues a decision on Richardson's appeal of his class certification claims. On July 15, 2016, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded, determining that the class-wide claims for injunctive relief were not moot even though the individual plaintiff no longer had a personal stake in the class action. 829 F.3d 273. The Court of Appeals additionally ordered costs from appellees. The district court lifted the stay on November 1, 2016 following the remand. The parties filed a joint case management plan on January 20, 2017. Plaintiff moved to certify the class on January 27, 2017. On June 26, 2017, Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson recommended that the court provisionally certify the class. The court denied the motion to certify the class without prejudice on October 17, 2017 because the plaintiff had not introduced any evidence to support the motion for class certification and therefore, the plaintiff had not affirmatively shown compliance with Rule 23's requirements of sufficiently numerous parties and common questions of law or fact. The plaintiff was granted leave to refile the motion for class certification within a reasonable time after discovery was complete. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Susan Schwab on June 6, 2018 for discovery disputes. On April 12, 2019, in the midst of ongoing discovery, the court ordered the resolution of the final discovery dispute. The court ordered the plaintiff to disclose the names of prisoners who may have information relevant to the claims in this case listed on his privilege log. On July 10, 2019, the court ordered the plaintiff's motion and its supporting brief for class certification was due by September 30, 2019. The defendant's opposition to the class certification was due by November 18, 2019, and the plaintiff's reply was due by December 9, 2019. As of October 31, 2019, the case was ongoing.", "summary": "On July 27, 2012, plaintiff, a male prisoner, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania under Bivens against the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated plaintiff's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by forcing him to share a cell with a hostile prisoner, which caused a threat of violence, and by placing him in painful restraints that caused injury for prolonged periods on multiple occasions for refusing dangerous cell assignments with hostile prisoners; and that defendants violated his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution by depriving him of any meaningful process prior to and during their use of punitive measures against him. On April 9, 2013, the U.S. District Court (Judge William B. Nealon) granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion to dismiss, declining to certify the class. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's denial of class action certification on June 15, 2016, but the district court again denied certification. Litigation is ongoing."}
{"article": "On May 18, 2015, a prisoner at the Mahanoy State Correctional Institute filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The complaint arose out of the plaintiff\u2019s hospitalization for Hepatitis C. The plaintiff sued the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) and the Bureau of Health Care Services of the DOC. The initial complaint claimed violations of First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiff claimed that, while hospitalized, the plaintiff\u2019s attorneys were barred from visiting him and all communication between plaintiff and his attorney was prohibited. Represented by a local public interest firm called the Abolitionist Law Center, the plaintiff requested monetary damages and motioned for an immediate preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to allow the attorneys access to the plaintiff. District Judge Robert D. Mariani was assigned to the case. The plaintiff is a high-profile Black Panther activist from Philadelphia. In 1982, he was convicted of murdering a Philadelphia police officer in a high-profile case. However, the plaintiff did not allege specific discrimination here. On May 26, 2015, the plaintiff withdrew his motion for preliminary injunction, notifying the court that the defendants allowed the attorneys access to the plaintiff. On November 24, plaintiff filed a supplemental and amended complaint that added the medical facility as defendants and alleged new claims. That complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and alleged that defendants violated the plaintiff\u2019s Eighth Amendment rights. The complaint also alleged that the DOC was negligently liable for medical malpractice. Specifically, the complaint alleged that plaintiff was denied treatment after he was diagnosed with Hepatitis C and a severe skin condition. The plaintiff alleged that during his hospitalization, he was denied available antiviral drugs. On August 24, 2015, plaintiff filed another motion for a preliminary injunction. He requested that the court order the defendants to immediately administer the antiviral drugs and grant the plaintiff a right to in-person consultation with a doctor of his choice. The motion also requested that the court grant a permanent injunction permitting the plaintiff attorney-client and family visits once he received inpatient medical treatment. On September 18, 2015 Magistrate Judge Karoline Mehalchick recommended that plaintiff\u2019s motion for preliminary injunction be denied for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and because the plaintiff had failed to show irreparable injury. 2015 WL 12116641. Essentially, the judge found that although Hepatitis C is a serious medical need, given the number of inmates who file and want the court to intervene in their treatment, the plaintiff's condition had not progressed to the point where any court intervention was warranted. On December 7, 2015, the DOC medical staff (medical defendants) filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim, and on January 4, 2016, the DOC also filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Both parties began briefing both the motions to dismiss and the preliminary injunction. After several requests for extensions, Judge Mariani ordered both parties to submit briefs on the motions by March 11, 2016. On April 4, 2016, defendants filed a motion to strike a portion of the complaint on the grounds that it was immaterial. Judge Mariani denied that motion on June 3, 2016, finding that nothing was irrelevant or immaterial in the cited paragraphs of the amended complaint. On June 21, 2016, DOC defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. At the same time, the court denied the medical defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. Defendants had argued that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all his administrative remedies through the prison before filing the suit, specifically claiming that he had not filed a grievance specific to his Hepatitis C treatment. Judge Mariani disagreed, finding that the plaintiff had filed the appropriate grievances through the prison. On August 5, 2016, the court granted in part and denied in part the DOC defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. Judge Mariani dismissed plaintiff\u2019s request for monetary damage from the prison superintendent on the grounds that plaintiff could not recover against him in his official capacity. The state negligence claims were also dismissed -- defendant was entitled to sovereign immunity because he was not a health care employee under Pennsylvania State Law. That same day, he granted the medical facility\u2019s motion to dismiss. The plaintiff was granted time to file an amended complaint, which he filed on August 16, 2016. The following week, Judge Mariani denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction. In his opinion he concluded the plaintiff had been denied proper medical treatment, but that the named defendants were not the appropriate defendants. The named defendants were not members of the Hepatitis C Treatment Review Committee and therefore the court could not properly issue an injunction against them. Though reaching the same result, Judge Mariani refused to adopt Magistrate Judge Karoline Mehalchick's report and recommendations from 2015 because Judge Mariani found that the court had significant new evidence from the evidentiary hearing that raised new issues. On January 10, 2017, Judge Mariani dismissed the defendants\u2019 summary judgment motion as moot, and on January 17, 2017 the plaintiff filed a third amended complaint. On May 4, 2017, Judge Mariani granted a motion to consolidate this case with another, <i> Abu-Jamal v. Wetzel </i> because of the common questions concerning Pennsylvania medical care. On June 26, 2017, Judge Mariani referred the case to the Court\u2019s Prison Litigation Settlement Committee to facilitate discussions. On August 23, 2017, the plaintiff filed his fourth amended complaint, which the defendants moved to dismiss. The court-appointed mediator reported on October 27, 2017 that a settlement had not yet been reached. On May 10, 2018, Judge Mariani denied the medical defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that the medical defendants were personally involved in the failure to treat his Hepatitis C and that he received only superficial treatment by the medical defendants. Judge Mariani next reviewed the DOC defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss: he granted the DOC defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections as a defendant because the plaintiff did not oppose that dismissal, but denied the DOC defendants\u2019 motion in all other respects. On June 11, 2018, the DOC defendants appealed the decision to the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and dismissed appeal in part on July 19, 2019 (779 Fed.Appx. 893). On January 30, 2020, both the DOC defendants and the medical defendants filed for summary judgment and are awaiting the court's response as of September 15, 2020.", "summary": "In 2015, a prisoner at the Mahanoy State Correctional Institute filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants denied him necessary medical treatment, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. In May 2018, the district judge denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, which the defendants appealed to the Third Circuit. As of March 23, 2020, the case is still ongoing."}
{"article": "On June 9, 2017, three mentally ill prisoners of the U.S. Penitentiary at Lewisburg (USP Lewisburg) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The case was assigned to Judge Yvette Kane. The plaintiffs sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons, alleging that the defendants\u2019 failure to provide adequate treatment for prisoners with mental illness constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiffs alleged that they were deprived of medication, received puzzles and coloring pages in lieu of treatment, and had five-minute conversations in the public showers with mental health professionals instead of formal therapy sessions. Represented by the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project, Washington Lawyers\u2019 Committee, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On August 11, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. The class would consist of all persons who were, as of the filing date of the complaint in this case, or are now, or will be in the future, confined to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons in the United States Penitentiary Lewisburg and suffer from a Serious Mental Illness or a Mental Illness, requiring treatment under one or more of the BOP\u2019s CARE levels. On October 2, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgement. In the two weeks after filing the motion, the defendants filed a motion to stay the plaintiff\u2019s motion for class certification pending their motion to dismiss and a statement of material facts containing records of the plaintiff\u2019s interactions with mental health services. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint did not sufficiently demonstrate that the defendants failed to provide treatment; rather, it merely demonstrated that the plaintiffs disagreed with the treatments that the medical professionals prescribed for them. On December 7, 2017, the court granted the defendants\u2019 motion to stay class certification until after the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss was decided. On June 20, 2018, Magistrate Judge Schwab issued a report recommending that the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss be denied. She found that the plaintiffs had not actually raised separate Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim in their complaint, but invited the plaintiffs to do so in an amended complaint if so desired. With regard to the Eighth Amendment medical care claims, the Magistrate Judge found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged facts to state a claim of deliberate indifference, and so denied the motion to dismiss on that basis as well. The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs' complaint violated the favorable termination rule (by challenging the duration of their confinement), but the Magistrate Judge recommended that the court temporarily deny the motion to dismiss on that objection. The plaintiffs objected to the recommendation saying that they did not challenge the duration of their confinement, nor did they raise Eighth Amendment conditions claims. On October 26, 2018 Judge Yvette Kane adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation insofar as it denied the defendants motion to dismiss, motion for summary judgment, and motion to stay discovery. The case was then reassigned to Magistrate Judge Schwab. Over the following months, Magistrate Judge Schwab issued several orders. The first, on November 27, 2018, granted the plaintiffs motion for a protective order. The second, on February 22, 2019, denied class certification without prejudice. Discovery continued in the wake of these orders. On November 20, 2019, Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner issued a verbal order reassigning the case from Judge Yvette Kane to Judge Jennifer P. Wilson, and the plaintiffs again moved for class certification. On January 29, 2020, Magistrate Judge Schwab issued an order requiring that plaintiffs show cause why their claims should not be denied as moot and also issued a recommendation that the plaintiff's motion for class certification be denied due to lack of numerosity, among other grounds. On February 24, 2021, Judge Wilson declined to adopt Magistrate Judge Schwab's recommendation to deny the class certification due to lack of numerosity and recommitted the matter to Magistrate Judge Schwab with instructions to make further findings on whether the plaintiff's claims had been rendered moot by the closure of the Special Management Unit at USP Lewisburg. On March 23, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal after conferring with Defendant's counsel. Both parties agreed that the subject of the plaintiff's legal action had been mooted by the closure of SMU at USP Lewisburg and the transfer of the named plaintiffs to other prisons within the BOP. The case was terminated on March 24, 2021.", "summary": "In June 2017, three mentally ill prisoners of the U.S. Penitentiary at Lewisburg (USP Lewisburg) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued USP Lewisburg and the Federal Bureau of Prisons, alleging that the defendants\u2019 failure to provide adequate treatment for prisoners with mental illness constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiffs eventually dismissed their claims."}
{"article": "On October 8, 2008, 47 prisoners filed a complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1346, against the federal government, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of Hurricane Rita they were subject to inhumane and unsanitary conditions of confinement. Plaintiffs also alleged that the conditions under which they were employed at a UNICOR factory manufacturing Kevlar helmets for a Department of Defense contract were similarly inhumane. Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of a delay in production caused by Hurricane Rita they were forced to work grueling days in unsanitary conditions, while also being subject to confinement at the Beaumont Federal Correctional Institution which was heavily damaged by Hurricane Rita and not fit to house prisoners. In February 2009, the U.S. moved to dismiss the case, and in the alternative for summary judgment. Briefing was voluminous, but appears to have ended in October 2009. As of March 2012, the judge had not decided the motion -- and issued a notice stating his intention to decide it soon. This did not happen, however. While the motion was pending, in October 2012, the plaintiffs' lawyer died. No other lawyer appeared to take his place. A year later, in December 2013, Magistrate Judge Giblin recommended that the case be dismissed for failure to prosecute. District Court Judge Marcia Crone adopted that recommendation, and dismissed the case without prejudice should one or more of the plaintiffs decide to refile. It does not appear that any plaintiff objected.", "summary": "47 inmates at the Beaumont Federal Correctional Institution in Midland, Texas filed a complaint against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Plaintiffs alleged that the conditions at Beaumont were unsanitary and inhumane, and that as a result of damage to the building caused by Hurricane Rita, they were subjected to confinement in a building unfit for inhabitants. Plaintiffs also alleged they were entitled to damages for working conditions endured while working in a UNICOR factory manufacturing Kevlar helmets. Defendant moved for dismissal or summary judgment in the alternate. Several years later, but before the district court ruled, plaintiffs' counsel died, and the case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute."}
{"article": "On May 21, 2012, a Native American prisoner incarcerated at the McConnell Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) filed this lawsuit, pro se, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiff sued five TDCJ employees under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983: the Director of TDCJ, the Director of Chaplaincy Department, two chaplains, and the Deputy Director of Prison and Jail Operations. He claimed that TDCJ policies violated his rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment. Specifically, he alleged that the TDCJ policies burdened the exercise of his religious beliefs by preventing him from: 1) smoking a prayer pipe during Native American pipe ceremonies; 2) wearing a religiously significant medicine bag other than within his cell and to and from religious ceremonies; 3) growing long hair, or alternatively, a kouplock, which is \u201ca one inch square section of hair at the base of the skull.\u201d Furthermore, he claimed the grooming policy violated his right to equal protection, because female prisoners were permitted to wear their hair long, but males were not. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring TDCJ to: 1) hire more Native American chaplains; 2) have security personnel available to supervise ceremonies until more chaplains could be hired; 3) allow the plaintiff to grow his hair, or alternatively, a kouplock; 4) smoke a prayer pipe at pipe ceremonies; and 5) wear medicine bags at all times. In addition, the plaintiff sought damages and attorney\u2019s fees and costs. Immediately after filing the complaint, the plaintiff moved to join another Native American prisoner claiming to experience the same deprivations, to whom the Court granted leave to join in June 2012. On June 12, 2012, Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos ordered the consolidation of <i>Davis v. Thaler</i>, docket number 2:12-cv-169 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, with this case because the two were duplicates of each other. At an evidentiary hearing held in front of Magistrate Judge B. Janice Ellington on June 21, 2012, the plaintiff orally moved for and was granted permission to add three employees as defendants: the Program Analyst for Designated Units, the Director of Rehabilitative Programs, and the McConnell Unit Chaplain. The plaintiffs again moved to add an additional defendant on July 12, 2012, and Judge Ellington permitted the Regional Chaplain to be added the following September. On August 16, 2012, the initial plaintiff moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief. He alleged that he was not being allowed adequate time with his co-plaintiff in the law library to work on their lawsuit. Judge Ellington recommended denying this motion because the plaintiff had not explained what he could accomplish with more law library time and thus, did not suffer an irreparable injury. 2012 WL 4955289. Judge Ramos adopted these recommendations and denied the motion on October 16, 2012. 2012 WL 4959409. On August 30, 2012, the McConnell Unit Chaplain filed a motion to dismiss, to which the plaintiffs agreed. The claims against McConnell Unit Chaplain were dismissed with prejudice. On October 10, 2012, the Program Analyst moved to dismiss the claims against him. Judge Ellington recommended dismissing the plaintiffs\u2019 claims for monetary damages against the Program Analyst in his official capacity, dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 claims for injunctive relief against the Program Analyst in his individual capacity, and retaining the plaintiffs\u2019 First Amendment claim for monetary damages against the Program Analyst in his individual capacity. On January 7, 2013, Judge Ramos adopted this recommendation. The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint on February 11, 2013 and consented to having a Magistrate Judge conduct all further proceedings. Shortly after, on February 22, 2013, they voluntarily dismissed all of their claims except their three RLUIPA challenges against the TDCJ Director in his official capacity and their First Amendment claim seeking damages against the Program Analyst in his individual capacity. The defendants also consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge and Judge Ramos reassigned the case to Magistrate Judge Ellington for all further proceedings on April 29, 2013. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on July 8, 2013. The plaintiffs responded with a cross-motion for summary judgment on July 19, 2013. Judge Ellington granted the defendants\u2019 motion and entered a final judgment in the defendants\u2019 favor for all claims on February 27, 2014. 2012 WL 4959409. On the RLUIPA claims, Judge Ellington found that the policies were a substantial burden on the plaintiffs\u2019 exercise of their sincerely held beliefs, but that the defendants had demonstrated that they were employing the least restrictive means of furthering compelling governmental interests in security, controlling costs, and prison administration. On the First Amendment claim, Magistrate Judge Ellington found the Program Analyst defendant was entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiffs had not established their First Amendment rights to exercise their religion had been violated. The plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit on April 2, 2014 and the docket number 14-40339 was assigned. On July 6, 2016 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s judgment in part and vacated in part. (Circuit Judges Leslie H. Southwick and Gregg J. Costa, District Judge Halil Suleyman Ozerden). The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the First Amendment claim and the medicine bag RLUIPA claim because the plaintiffs failed to offer explanation as to how the district court erred in granting summary judgment in their appeal. In addition, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the pipe ceremony RLUIPA claim, agreeing with the district court that the logistical, health, and security concerns of permitting the plaintiffs to purchase their own pipes and store them in the chaplain\u2019s office outweighed the need for a religious accommodation. However, the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the grooming policy claim under RLUIPA because it was unclear if the district court considered all of the plaintiffs\u2019 summary judgment evidence. Furthermore, the legitimacy of TDJC\u2019s cost and security concerns over the wearing of a kouplock remained disputed, and the district court didn\u2019t consider the plaintiffs\u2019 claim in light of their individual circumstances as low security risk prisoners. 826 F.3d 258. On remand, the district court ordered additional briefing. The defendants filed a motion for clarification of appeal, and on August 8, 2016, the Fifth Circuit clarified there was not a need for a trial at this time. Only additional briefing and a reexamination of the motion for summary judgment on the RLUIPA grooming policy claim was necessary. The parties then filed numerous replies and responses. On March 7, 2017, Judge Ellington denied the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs\u2019 RLUIPA grooming policy claim because there remained a material dispute as to whether the grooming policy was the least restrictive means of maintaining institutional security. 2017 WL 896299. Judge Ellington recommended that the Fifth Circuit remand the case for trial. In November 2015, the initial prisoner plaintiff was released. In response, on December 21, 2017, the defendant moved to dismiss his claims. The defendant argued that the grooming policy no longer affected this plaintiff\u2019s right to practice his Native American faith and the plaintiff lacked an injury that was likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Judge Ellington agreed and granted the motion on January 25, 2018. On March 2, 2018, the Court on its own motion ordered the consolidation of cases <i>Casey v. Davis</i> (2:14-cv-13) and <i>Cobb v. Morris</i> (2:14-cv-22) with this case. The plaintiffs in these cases challenged the same policies of TDJC, alleging that these policies conflicted with their right to practice their Native American faith in violation of RLUIPA and the First Amendment. Similar to <i>Goodman v. Davis</i>, only the plaintiffs\u2019 RLUIPA grooming policy claim survived summary judgment and was set for trial. The cases were accordingly consolidated for trial in front of Judge Ramos. On March 5, 2018, the Court appointed pro-bono counsel from a private firm to represent each of the plaintiffs in the consolidated action. The plaintiffs had previously attempted to get counsel appointed four times, but each time were denied. In July 2018, trial was set for August 29, 2018. Additionally, during this time, the plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended complaint, setting forth their RLUIPA grooming policy claim against the TDCJ Director together. A bench trial was held before Judge Ramos from August 29, 2018 to August 31, 2018. Judge Ramos issued the Court\u2019s findings of fact and conclusion of law on January 24, 2019. He granted the plaintiffs\u2019 request for injunctive relief permitting them to grow their hair long, consistent with their Native American religious beliefs. The Court noted that the differences between male and female grooming policies was unrelated to any differences in violence, contraband, or hygiene. The Court highlighted how most jails, most state Department of Corrections, and the federal prison system allow male prisoners to have long hair. Furthermore, TDCJ\u2019s employees testified they had never found contraband in long, loose hair and only nuisance contraband in braided hair, casting doubt on their alleged security interests. Finally, the defendant was unable to show that searches would take longer or that the plaintiffs, whom all had little or no history of disciplinary violations, posed any particular danger or threat to prison security. Judge Ramos entered a final judgment in the plaintiffs\u2019 favor on February 26, 2019 and enjoined the defendant from enforcing its male grooming policy against the plaintiffs with respect to the rules preventing the plaintiffs from growing their hair without restriction and wearing it loose. The plaintiffs were also awarded reasonable attorney\u2019s fees and costs. Costs were later determined to be $9,803.19, and attorney's fees were $131,298.45. On March 27, 2019, the defendant appealed Judge Ramos\u2019 findings and final judgment to the Fifth Circuit, and the docket number 19-40279 was assigned. Shortly after, the defendant moved to dismiss its own appeal, and the Fifth Circuit granted the motion to dismiss the appeal on July 9, 2019. This case is now closed.", "summary": "On May 21, 2012, a Native American prisoner incarcerated at the McConnell Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) filed this pro se federal civil rights lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. He sued multiple TDCJ employees under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. He alleged that TDJC policies that prevented his smoking a prayer pipe during Native American pipe ceremonies, limited his ability to wear a religiously significant medicine bag, and prevented him from growing long hair violated his rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment. He sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief as well as attorney's fees and costs. An additional Native American prisoner plaintiff joined the suit shortly after filing. In February 2013, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, consented to proceedings before a Magistrate Judge, and voluntarily dismissed all of their claims except their three RLUIPA challenges against the TDCJ Director in his official capacity and their First Amendment claim seeking damages against the Program Analyst in his individual capacity. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. On February 27, 2014, the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment was granted and a final judgment entered in their favor. The plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit and were successful in getting judgement on the RLUIPA grooming policy claim vacated and remanded. On remand, the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment on the RLUIPA grooming claim was denied. As the RLUIPA grooming policy claim moved towards trial, the initial prisoner plaintiff in the case was released and his claims were dismissed. The Court ordered the consolidation of cases Casey v. Davis (2:14-cv-13) and Cobb v. Morris (2:14-cv-22) with this case, as the two cases also were brought by Native American prisoner incarcerated at the McConnell Unit and involved RLUIPA grooming policy claims moving towards trial. After a bench trial, Judge Ramos granted plaintiffs\u2019 request for injunctive relief permitting them to grow their hair long, consistent with their Native American religious beliefs and entered a final judgment on February 26, 2019. The defendant appealed, but moved to dismiss the appeal shortly after. The Fifth Circuit granted the motion to dismiss the appeal on July 9, 2019. This case is closed."}
{"article": "On October 17, 2005, a Sunni Muslim incarcerated at Keen Mountain Correctional Center in Virginia filed this lawsuit, pro se, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia. The plaintiff sued officers at the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) and the Keen Mountain Correctional Center under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The plaintiff alleged violations of his rights under the First Amendment. Specifically, he alleged that during his Ramadan fast the defendants deprived him of adequate nutrition and calories in 2002 \u2013 2004, when instead of providing a full 2,200 calories including two hot meals, the defendants only provided 1,000 calories of cold-bag meals. As a result, the plaintiff said he lost 13 pounds and had a diminished religious experience because he was constantly hungry. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged the defendants refused to permit him and other Muslims to conduct the Eid prayer service and Eid-al-Fitr feast to celebrate the completion of Ramadan. Lastly, the plaintiff alleged the loss of nutrition and calories violated his right to Equal Protection and Due Process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiff sought punitive damages of $545, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief requiring the defendants to revise the Ramadan menu to ensure all Ramadan fast participants received adequate nutrition and calories, the option for two hot meals, and the opportunity to participate in the Eid-al-Fitr Observance. The parties consented to proceedings before a Magistrate Judge and the case was assigned to Judge Pamela Meade Sargent. On January 12, 2006, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing the plaintiff\u2019s claims should be dismissed because the plaintiff voluntarily fasted and was permitted to partake in the Eid-al-Fitr prayer service and feast at a different time than alleged in the complaint. On February 9, 2006, the plaintiff filed a motion to supplement his pleadings with similar allegations against the defendants for Ramadan 2005, which occurred in October and November 2005. Judge Sargant granted the motion on February 22, 2006. As the 2006 Ramadan fast approached, the defendants indicated there would be no changes to their Ramadan procedures. In response, on August 30, 2006, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to provide an amount of food equivalent to that provided to non-fasting prisoners. On the same day, the plaintiff filed a motion to appoint counsel, but Judge Sargent denied the request for counsel on September 8, 2006. On September 22, 2006, the court issued two orders on the outstanding motions for summary judgement and for preliminary injunctive relief. In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the court granted it in part and denied it in part. 479 F.Supp.2d 569. In a 53 page opinion, the court found that the 2002 claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act for some of the 2003, 2004, and 2005 claims. The court denied summary judgment to the defendants on the following claims, and ordered they be set for trial: -First Amendment and RLUIPA claims that he was denied adequate nutrition and calories during Ramadan 2004 and the associated Due Process claim regarding this allegation; -First Amendment and RLUIPA claims that he was denied the Eid-al-Fitr meal following Ramadan 2003 and 2005; and - First Amendment and RLUIPA claims that he was deprived of the Eid-al-Fitr prayer service following Ramadan 2004. In ruling on the motion for a preliminary injunction, the court granted the plaintiff's request and ordered the defendants to provide daily food containing approximately 2,200 calories, between sunset and dawn during the 2006 Ramadan period, beginning the next day. The court granted the preliminary injunction because the defendants did not present evidence to contradict the plaintiff\u2019s claim that he suffered weight loss due to the reduced caloric intake during Ramadan and the same weight loss would likely happen during the 2006 Ramadan period. The court held that such weight loss was irreparable harm and the requested relief would not disrupt Keen Mountain food service. On February 16, 2007, the parties participated in a settlement conference. On March 19, 2007, the parties reached an undisclosed settlement and moved for voluntary dismissal of the claims. Judge Sargent dismissed the case and the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement between the parties. The settlement agreement provided plaintiff a $2,250 cash payment and a change in policies surrounding the provision to allow prisoners to celebrate Muslim feasts and their yearly fasts. Prison officials agreed to determine dates for Ramadan in advance by mutual agreement with plaintiff and assistant of an expert from the Islamic Center of Virginia. Further, defendants agreed to not schedule a quarterly lockdown during the Ramadan period, unless emergency necessitated one. The settlement did not proceed smoothly. On January 30, 2009, the plaintiff accused the defendants of acting in bad faith and not providing adequate food. However, the record does not indicate what, if any, actions the court or defendants took to address the new allegations. Since there has been no activity on the docket for over ten years, the case is presumably now closed.", "summary": "A Sunni Muslim incarcerated in Virginia Department of Corrections facility (VDOC) brought suit against the officers of the VDOC for failing to provide adequate food to him during his Ramadan fasts and interfering with his participation in post-Ramadan religious events. The court issued a preliminary injunction. In 2007, the parties agreed to settle and the case was dismissed."}
{"article": "On December 19, 2014, three Virginia prisoners placed in administrative segregation at Red Onion State Prison, filed this pro-se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. The plaintiffs sued the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC), various VDOC prison officials, and the External Review Team, Dual Treatment Team, and Unit Management Team of the Virginia Department of Corrections. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. The plaintiffs claimed that the VDOC Operating Procedure 830.A, a self-described Segregation Reduction Step-Down Program designed to help prisoners progress in stages toward a return to the general prison population, violated plaintiffs\u2019 rights. Specifically, they alleged that they had been assigned to the most restrictive status (\u201cIM\u201d) without adequate due process. Due to their classification, they had also been denied the opportunity to participate in the step down process. They claimed that the IM classified prisoners were treated in a discriminatory manner as compared to other prisoners in administrative segregation, and that these conditions of confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment. They sought to abolish the procedure, be reassigned to a lower classification, and to be granted monetary damages. On January 14, 2015, the plaintiffs moved to certify a class and to appoint counsel. On March 6, 2015, District Judge James P. Jones denied both these motions, finding that the circumstances were not \u201cexceptional\u201d so as to justify appointing counsel. Therefore, because the plaintiffs were still bringing the case pro-se, Judge Jones found it inappropriate to grant class certification. On April 8, 2015, Magistrate Judge Robert S. Ballou severed this action into three separate civil suits, one for each plaintiff; the immediate case is for the named plaintiff\u2019s action. Judge Ballou held that the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) required prisoners to file separate filing fees. The purpose of the act was to force \u201cprisoners to think twice\u201d before filing civil litigation. The court subsequently filed the original complaint under separate dockets for the two other plaintiffs. Both cases were referred to Magistrate Judge Ballou. He dismissed one case (Velazquez v. Virginia Department of Corrections, 7:15-cv-00157-JPJ-RSB) on September 27, 2016. The plaintiff in the other case (Rivera v. Virginia Department of Corrections, 7:15-cv-00235-JPJ-RSB) moved to voluntarily withdraw his action on May 28, 2015. On May 18, 2016, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. In it, he alleged that OP 830.A discriminated against IM inmates, who suffered a much more restrictive environment than inmates in other forms of administrative segregation; that IM status permanently prevented an inmate from working his way out of segregated confinement; that officials arbitrarily assigned him to IM status without allowing him to be present or offer argument, contradictory testimony, witnesses, or evidence; that review between the various privilege level status steps was not meaningful; that spiteful officers could falsely report poor behavior or fail to accurately record participation in programming, thus preventing progress to the next step; and that officers routinely approved their own recommendations during the step-down program reviews, in violation of VDOC policy. The plaintiff also complained that OP 830.A affected inmates\u2019 opportunities for parole and earning good conduct time. On July 28, 2016 the defendants filed a motion for summary judgement. On September 28, 2016, Judge Jones granted the defendants\u2019 motion. He held that the plaintiff had failed to show that his conditions of confinement were atypical or significantly harsh as compared to conditions expected within a prison environment. Nor, according to Judge Jones, had the plaintiff shown that the procedure violated his due process rights. Moreover, Judge Jones rejected the plaintiff\u2019s equal protection claim because he held that the plaintiff was not similarly situated to the other prisoners in less restrictive confinement. Judge Jones dismissed all claims against the Virginia Department of Corrections as legally frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915A(b)(1). He held that neither the Commonwealth of Virginia nor any governmental entity acting as an arm of the state, such as the VDOC, was a \u201cperson\u201d subject to suit under \u00a7 1983. 2016 WL 5415903. On October 6, 2016, the plaintiff appealed the district court\u2019s September 28th ruling to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. On March 30, 2017, the Circuit Court assigned counsel for the plaintiff. On October 26, 2017, oral arguments were held before Judges Paul V. Niemeyer, Robert B. King, and Henry F. Floyd. On November 22, 2017, the Circuit Court panel, in an unpublished per curiam opinion, affirmed the judgment on the reasoning of the district court. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On December 19, 2014, three Virginia prisoners placed in administrative segregation at Red Onion State Prison, filed this pro-se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. They brought claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as money damages. The plaintiffs claimed that the VDOC Operating Procedure 830.A, (a self-described Segregation Reduction Step-Down Program designed to help prisoners progress in stages toward a return to the general prison population), violated plaintiffs\u2019 rights. On September 28, 2016, Judge James P. Jones granted the defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgement. On October 6, 2016, the plaintiff appealed the district court\u2019s September 28th ruling to the Fourth Circuit. On November 22, 2017, a panel of the Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished per curiam opinion, affirmed the judgment on the reasoning of the district court. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On May 6, 2019, twelve prisoners at the Red Onion and Wallens Ridge supermax prisons, who had each been in solitary confinement for between two and twenty-three years, filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiffs sued the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) and the wardens of both Red Onion and Wallens Ridge under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiffs - represented by private counsel and the ACLU of Virginia - sought declaratory and injunctive relief in addition to damages. The plaintiffs claimed breach of an earlier settlement agreement and violations of the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiff alleged that VDOC implemented a renamed version of the \u201cPhase Program,\u201d which was supposedly shut down in an earlier settlement, that \u201cwarehoused\u201d prisoners in solitary confinement without any opportunity to re-enter general population conditions. The earlier settlement had ended the \"Phase Program\" at the Mecklenburg Correctional Center. A class action lawsuit, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=969\">Brown v. Hutto</a>, was filed in 1981, alleging inhumane conditions and constitutional violations by VDOC. A VDOC investigation revealed that Mecklenburg could not fill its solitary confinement beds with its own prisoners. Instead, the prison had solicited other prisons to refer their prisoners for solitary confinement at Mecklenburg. Unlike the Special Management Unit, which housed prisoners unlikely to be reintroduced to the general population, the \"Phase Program\" track was designed to allow solitary confinement prisoners to reenter the general population by earning \"privileges\" for good behavior. But in practice, prisoners were very rarely phased down and prison staff could revoke privileges without oversight or appeals. The parties settled the case in 1985, with VDOC agreeing to end the Phase Program and to not start a similar program in the future. In this case, the Red Onion and Wallens Ridge prisoners alleged that the Step-Down Program was used to keep prisoners in solitary confinement in order to utilize solitary confinement space and justify the high cost of keeping both supermax prisons open. This program was alleged to be a new version of the Phase Program used at the since-demolished Mecklenburg facility. The prisoners alleged that staff at each facility were not trained or knowledgeable about the specific requirements of the Step-Down Program, leading them to keep prisoners in solitary confinement despite evidence that they should be stepped down to the general population. These decisions were not subject to meaningful review, and the review process was not appealable. The prisoners alleged this program caused significant mental and physiological harm to each of them and was implemented without any scientific basis. On May 31, 2019, VDOC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. On June 14, 2019, the remaining defendants also filed a motion to dismiss. Both motions alleged that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. As of October 2, 2019, District Judge Robert E. Payne has not issued a decision on either of these motions. The case is ongoing. A documentary about the solitary confinement conditions of Red Onion can be found <a href=\"https://youtu.be/ocTl5G4AJ9A\">here</a>.", "summary": "On May 6, 2019, twelve prisoners who had been held in solitary confinement in two Virginia supermax prisons for at least two years filed this putative class action lawsuit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiffs alleged that each prison had violated their Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights by continuing to implement a program that intentionally held prisoners in solitary confinement without the possibility of re-entering the general population. They alleged that this program also violated an earlier settlement agreement, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The defendants, the Virginia Department of Corrections, its employees, and the wardens of each prison, filed two motions to dismiss. District Judge Robert E. Payne has not yet issued a decision on either motion."}
{"article": "On February 19, 2016, the plaintiff, a Muslim inmate at the Red Onion State Prison, filed this pro se lawsuit alleging a violation of right to free expression in the District Court for the Western District of Virginia. He sued the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) under 28 U.S.C. 2201, 48 U.S.C. 1983, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). He sought declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunctions, costs, damages, and a jury trial. In the complaint, the plaintiff contested three specific prison policies that he alleged hindered his ability to practice his Sufi Islamic faith. First, he alleged that the prison's policy for Jum'ah, the weekly Islamic gathering, for inmates in solitary confinement like he is, violated his rights. In the general population, Jum'ah is broadcast in common spaces, but for inmates in solitary confinement, a taped version of Jum'ah is given to inmates with televisions. The plaintiff had neither a television nor a means to get a job that would allow him to purchase a television, since he alleged that he was being kept in solitary confinement as a result of his beard length. His second allegation stemmed from the prison's beard policies, saying that he was unable to grow his beard out to the four inches mandated by his faith due to the prison's quarter-inch beard policy. Finally, he focused on prison food policies, saying that his halal dinners no longer became halal once they entered the contaminated food slot all solitary confinement inmates use, and he was not given facilities to make his food halal again. Judge James P. Jones denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction on all issues on March 23, 2016, saying that the claims presented in the complaint did not meet the bar of imminent harm. 2016 WL 1179225. The plaintiff appealed this decision on April 14, 2016. In a December 22, 2016 opinion, the Fourth Circuit upheld the District Court's decision regarding the halal food issue and beard issue, but remanded the Jum'ah decision, saying that the court did not provide specific facts to support its decision. 672 Fed.Appx. 259. The case returned to the District Court, and on May 10, 2017, Judge Jones denied the plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief on the issue of Jum'ah. 2017 WL 1929669, W.D. Va. This supported Magistrate Judge Pamela Meade Sargeant's recommendation to not grant injunctive relief on March 20, 2017 (2017 WL 9517164 W.D. Va.). This time, the Judge detailed that, since the prison gave him an option to improve his behavior to allow him to get a job that would pay for a television and the plaintiff did not take it, his religious exercise rights were not being infringed. The plaintiff appealed this decision on June 1, and the Fourth Circuit issued a short memorandum opinion declining to take the case on October 31, saying that it had enough information to uphold the District Court's decision. 699 Fed.Appx. 280. On December 15, 2017, Judge Jones issued an opinion on the defendant's motion for summary judgment, which was filed back before the preliminary injunction appeals on July 13, 2016. He denied the motion for the plaintiff's claims under the RLUIPA, saying that the defendants did not counter the plaintiff's allegations that his continued stay in solitary confinement is related to his refusal to trim his beard as his religion instructs, and that this stay is blocking him from accessing televised Jum'ah. However, he granted summary judgment on the First Amendment free exercise claims on the beard, halal food, and Jum'ah policies, saying that these policies were not an undue burden under existing precedent. The plaintiffs filed an amended motion for summary judgment addressing the RLUIPA issues on January 12, 2018, stating that the plaintiff remains in solitary confinement for disciplinary infractions unrelated to his beard length. Judge Jones granted this motion for summary judgment on September 19, 2018, saying that the defendants presented enough evidence to support this motion this time. 2018 WL 4512074, W.D. Va. The plaintiff appealed this summary judgment decision on October 23, 2018. The Fourth Circuit vacated the summary judgment motion and remanded the case on December 6, 2019, saying that the VDOC's use of access to television for religious services as an incentive program unduly burdens the plaintiff's rights to practice a bona fide religious belief. The panel stated that religious practice should be a right, not a privilege that can be taken away through an incentive program. 944 F.3d 243. The case returned to District Court, where the defendants could file another motion for summary judgment consistent with the Fourth Circuit's ruling. The case is ongoing as of May 25, 2020.", "summary": "In 2016, the plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in the District Court for the Western District of Virginia against the Virginia Department of Corrections alleging that their policies for beards, halal food, and television access for religious services for inmates in solitary confinement violated the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Judge John P. Jones denied the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief in 2017 and initially granted summary judgment in favor of VDOC in 2018, but the Fourth Circuit overturned him on appeal in late 2019, saying that VDOC's use of access to television for religious services as an incentive program unduly burdens the plaintiff's rights to practice a bona fide religious belief. The panel stated that religious practice should be a right, not a privilege that can be taken away through an incentive program. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "After a two-year investigation initiated in December 2016 under CRIPA and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a Notice on December 19, 2018 concluding that the Hampton Roads Regional Jail Authority (\u201cHRRJ\u201d) failed to provide constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care to prisoners and placed prisoners with serious mental illness in restrictive housing for prolonged periods of time. The DOJ also concluded that HRRJ\u2019s housing practices discriminate against prisoners with mental health disabilities in violation of the ADA. In the Notice, the DOJ set forth factual findings about the conditions at HRRJ that violated prisoners\u2019 constitutional rights. Principally, the DOJ found that medical and mental health care at HRRJ was constitutionally inadequate. In all stages of medical and mental health care (including patient intake, chronic care and emergency care, treatment and therapy, continuity of care, and security and care for suicidal prisoners), the quality of care and access to care was found to be severely deficient, subjecting prisoners to a serious risk of harm due to delays and lack of care. The DOJ also found a lack of oversight and accountability and a deliberate indifference by HRRJ officials in identifying and mitigating risks. Furthermore, HRRJ utilized prolonged restrictive housing which disparately affects prisoners with mental illnesses, thereby denying them access to activities and programming that they would otherwise be eligible for, and putting them at risk for serious harm. Officials at HRRJ knew of these substantial shortcomings and the associated risks and failed to take appropriate action. On August 5, 2020, the DOJ filed this lawsuit against HRRJ in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia based on the findings in the December 2018 report and HRRJ\u2019s subsequent failure to take sufficient remedial steps. The DOJ alleges that HRRJ\u2019s policies and practices violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of prisoners. As a result, the DOJ asked Judge Rebecca Beach Smith to declare that HRRJ\u2019s practices violated the constitutional rights of prisoners and violated the ADA, and to enjoin HRRJ to take immediate action to amend its policies and practices to ensure that lawful conditions of confinement are afforded to prisoners. By the time that the complaint was filed, the parties had already negotiated a settlement. On the same day as the complaint was filed, the parties filed a joint settlement motion. In the settlement agreement, HRRJ agreed to implement a comprehensive list of reforms including appropriate screening and assessment for medical and mental health needs by qualified professionals, adequate treatment planning for medical and mental health concerns, suicide prevention practices, specialized mental health housing units, oversight of restrictive housing placement, increased medical and mental health staff, increased training for staff, increased collaboration between mental health staff and jail leadership, and a Quality Assurance program to identify and correct deficiencies with the medical and mental health care system to be overseen by a Quality Assurance Committee which will provide monthly reports to the monitor and the DOJ. The settlement agreement noted that HRRJ would designate an Agreement Coordinator to coordinate compliance with the agreement. HRRJ agreed to create annual Implementation Plans to describe how it will fulfill its obligations under the agreement, including deadlines within the first year by which HRRJ must draft or revise policies and procedures, complete a staffing plan, develop and deliver training to HRRJ staff, develop and implement a Quality Improvement Committee, and develop and implement monthly quality assurance mechanisms to report on data relevant to prevent to prevent or minimize harm to prisoners. A key provision of the settlement agreement was the mandatory appointment of an independent third-party monitor, to oversee HRRJ\u2019s compliance with the agreement. The monitor was agreed to be retained for a period of three years and provide biannual status reports to the DOJ, HRRJ and the court. The monitor would also undertake compliance reviews, on-site inspections and issue monitor reports every six months to assess compliance and HRRJ\u2019s progress on the various reform efforts. The reports will also be filed with the court. In the event of noncompliance with the agreement, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia retains jurisdiction to enforce the agreement at the request of the DOJ. On August 31, 2020, the court approved the settlement agreement and subsequently, on September 10, 2020, the court approved the appointment of James Conrad Welch to be the third-party monitor. The settlement agreement is effective as of August 31, 2020. By the terms of the agreement, HRRJ will implement all provisions of the agreement within four years and the agreement will terminate in five years, so long as HRRJ has attained substantial compliance with the agreement and maintained that compliance for at least one year. HRRJ will have the burden to prove that it has achieved and maintained substantial compliance with the agreement and has been operating in accordance with the requirements of the ADA and the U.S. Constitution continuously for one year. The agreement will terminate by order of the court. As such, this case remains ongoing.", "summary": "On August 31, 2020, Judge Rebecca Beach Smith in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia approved a settlement between the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division and Hampton Roads Regional Jail Authority. The agreement resolved the DOJ\u2019s claims alleging unlawful conditions at the Hampton Roads Regional Jail (HRRJ) in violation of CRIPA and the ADA. Under the agreement, HRRJ will develop and implement policies, procedures, and training regarding adequate medical and mental health care and appropriate housing for prisoners with serious mental illness. These measures include specialized mental health housing units, increased training for medical, mental health, and security personnel, proper screening and assessment for medical and mental health concerns, adequate treatment planning and suicide prevention measures, and a quality assurance program. Per the agreement, the parties jointly appointed a monitor to assess and assist with compliance with the agreement. HRRJ must come into substantial compliance with the agreement within five years. The agreement can be terminated by court order."}
{"article": "On June 25, 2009 the plaintiff, a former female prisoner, filed suit against the State of Washington, the Washington State Department of Corrections, the Washington Corrections Center for Women, and several correctional officers in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. She alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Washington State Constitution. The suit arose from the treatment of her when she gave birth while incarcerated. She alleged that in violation of prison policy she had been shackled throughout labor and after she had given birth. She was only unshackled for an emergency cesarean section and was immediately shackled again after surgery. She sought declaratory relief, damages, and attorney's fees and costs for her great emotional and physical pain. As the suit proceeded, all individually named defendants were dismissed with the exception of two correctional officers. The plaintiff indicated she would no longer seek declaratory relief against the State of Washington and acknowledged that the Eleventh Amendment precluded her from recovering damages against the state of any state agencies. On May 3, 2010 the court (Judge Robert Jensen Bryan) issued an order concerning cross-motions for summary judgment. The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied, the officers' claim of qualified immunity was denied, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. The case came to a close on May 7, 2010 when the court (Judge Bryan) entered a stipulated order dismissing all remaining claims against all defendants after the parties reached a settlement. The details of the settlement are not known.", "summary": "On June 25, 2009 the plaintiff, a former female prisoner, filed suit against the State of Washington, the Washington State Department of Corrections, the Washington Corrections Center for Women, and several correctional officers in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. She alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Washington State Constitution based on the treatment of her while she was giving birth. On May 3, 2010 the court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The case came to a close on May 7, 2010 after the parties reached a settlement on the remaining claims. The details of the settlement are not known."}
{"article": "On November 17, 2015, four prisoners in Washington state brought a class action lawsuit against the state's Chief Medical Officer of the Department of Corrections (DOC) and the Secretary of the DOC under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for allegedly arbitrarily withholding necessary medical care from patients with serious and painful medical conditions. The prisoners, who went untreated or under-treated for serious ailments, including kidney failure, kidney stones, hernia, and chronic and substantial pain, alleged that the denial of care while incarcerated constituted cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. The Washington DOC only administered direct medical care for \"medically necessary\" conditions. All others required approval by a Department of Corrections Care Review Committee (CRC) consisting of doctors and other medical professionals across the state. Of all petitions for care, about 60% were being denied by the CRC. And complaints of chronic and substantial pain were ignored. The plaintiffs sought (1) a declaration that the Washington DOC's policies and practices governing the approval of medical care requests by DOC providers and outside specialists violate the Eighth Amendment; (2) a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining the DOC from denying, without reasonable medical justification, necessary care for class members' serious medical needs; and (3) reasonable attorney's fees. The plaintiffs also sought to certify the following class: \"All current and future prisoners, incarcerated under the jurisdiction of the Washington Department of Corrections, whose access to necessary medical care has been denied, or will be subject to denial, under the Department\u2019s policies and practices governing access to health care requiring prior approval.\" Judge Richard A. Jones denied class certification on September 18, 2017, holding that the proposed class lacked the necessary commonality for class certification. The court found that the plaintiffs had \"not adequately identified common policies and practices to show that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to inmates\u2019 needs.\" The plaintiffs sought to appeal the decision, but the Ninth Circuit denied their petition to appeal on December 21, 2017. The plaintiffs filed to amend the complaint in March 2018 to reflect a new Secretary of the DOC. Later in June 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion to stay the proceedings of the case for six months while the parties tried to resolve the case. The motion stated that the DOC revised the Offender Health Plan. Days later, the court granted an order to dismiss one of the named plaintiffs and refused to stay the case, opting instead to vacate the trial date for six months. In December 2018, the court pushed the trial date even further, settling on September 2019. On January 14, 2019, the court granted requests from two plaintiffs for dismissal, leaving only one remaining plaintiff. Three months later, in March 2019, the final plaintiff moved to terminate the case. The court granted the dismissal of the party and in turn closed the case on March 27, 2019 as no plaintiffs remained. It is unknown why the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed and the case is now closed.", "summary": "Washington state prisoners with serious medical problems sued the Washington Department of Corrections for failing to provide adequate medical care. The plaintiffs believed that the DOC applied the term \"medically necessary\" too narrowly and denied immediate care and that decisions to provide outside treatment are decided arbitrarily, without medical justification. The plaintiffs sought class action certification but Judge Richard A. Jones denied the certification on September 18, 2017 on the grounds that the proposed class lacked commonality. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied an appeal by the plaintiffs later that year. Between June 2018 and March 2019, each remaining plaintiff filed to dismiss himself as a party. As a result, the court closed the case on March 27, 2019 when no plaintiffs remained."}
{"article": "On October 20, 2017, four minor plaintiffs, represented by their parents or guardians, filed a class action lawsuit against King County and the Kent School District in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by Columbia Legal Services, alleged that King County has violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1400), by holding children in solitary confinement at King County\u2019s Maleng Regional Justice Center. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief to end King County\u2019s solitary confinement policy. The plaintiffs alleged that King County denied these children, who had not yet been convicted of any crimes, meaningful social interaction and education by holding them in isolation cells for weeks or months on end. These children were given only a few minutes of face-to-face educational instruction and denied access to reading or writing materials. The plaintiffs alleged that these deprivations could cause trauma, depression, anxiety, as well as permanent interference with a child\u2019s psychological and social development. The vast majority of children affected by King County\u2019s actions were children of color and many suffered from mental illness. The plaintiffs amended the complaint on October 23, 2017 to add additional named plaintiffs and an additional claim of discrimination. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class of all children currently incarcerated at the RJC and all such children who would be held there in the future. Besides declaratory judgment, they also sought to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the defendant from carrying out the allegedly unlawful policies and practices. In addition, the plaintiffs asked the court to issue declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a subclass of such children who have disabilities, as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, and were in need of special education and related services. The parties quickly began settlement negotiations. On August 20, 2018, the court granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion to approve a settlement agreement. Under the terms of the proposed settlement, the plaintiffs would receive $240,000 from King County and $25,000 from the Kent School District. King County agreed that the solitary confinement of juveniles was banned in all King County detention facilities, except when necessary to prevent physical harm to others, and that any use of solitary confinement would be discussed at a daily meeting. The parties also agreed to appoint a monitor to review alternatives to solitary confinement, and issue quarterly monitor's reports. The settlement was set to expire on January 31, 2022 if defendant complied with all terms.", "summary": "On October 20, 2017, four minor plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against King County and sought injunctive and declaratory relief for King County\u2019s policy and practice of holding children in solitary confinement at King County's Maleng Regional Justice Center. The Court approved the parties' settlement agreement and the plaintiffs will receive $240,000 from King County and $25,000 from the Kent School District. The settlement is set to expire on January 31, 2022 if defendant complies with all terms."}
{"article": "On April 3, 2008, two Muslim prisoners incarcerated in the Wyoming State Penitentary (WSP) sued officials of the Wyoming Department of Corrections in the United State District court of Wyoming. Plaintiffs claimed violations of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000cc et seq. (RLUIPA). Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that a prison policy requiring prisoners to consume their meals within twenty (20) minutes substantially burdens their ability to practice their religion, as they must choose between eating their meals and praying. The complaint specified that Jewish inmates experienced similar difficulties. After brief litigation, the parties entered a Consent Decree which was approved by the court (Judge Clarence A. Brimmer) on November 19, 2008. The Consent Decree permits prisoners who receive their meals in their cells or pods to take up to thirty (30) minutes to eat, and prisoners receiving religious meals may keep those meals in their cells until the next meal is served. Prisoners who eat in the dining hall are permitted to go to the front of the line and receive a 10-and 5-minute announcements before being escorted from the hall. Additional provisions in the Consent Decree substantially change the defendants' policies and practices concerning the observance by Muslims of fasting, special meals, and prayer time, and also guaranteed that a second microwave would be installed, from which pork products would be banned. The consent decree did not establish an expiration date. As of March 2018, there had been no further litigation.", "summary": "On April 3, 2008, Muslim prisoners sued the Wyoming Department of Corrections for violations of First Amendment Rights and the RLUIPA for failure to accommodate their religious practices. The case was resolved by Consent Decree on November 19, 2008."}
{"article": "On December 2, 2010, two non-profit organizations, the Colorado Criminal Defense Bar and the Colorado Criminal Justice Reform Coalition brought this lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201(a) against the Governor of Colorado, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs, represented by pro bono private counsel, sought a declaratory judgment that Colorado violated the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments by deferring the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants. This Colorado practice was due to a 1992 statute which provided that misdemeanor indigent defendants' applications for appointment of counsel \"shall be deferred until after the prosecuting attorney has spoken with the defendant.\" Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 16-7-301(4). The plaintiffs argued that the practice of deferring counsel was a violation of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rothgery v. Gillespie County where the Court held that the accused is entitled to the presence of appointed counsel during any \"critical stage\" of criminal trial proceedings. 554 U.S. 191, 212 (2008). Judge John L. Kan was assigned to the case. On January 31, 2011, the defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the matter was best resolved in the legislature, not courts. On February 25, 2011, the plaintiffs filed the first amendment complaint, adding as defendants all of the Colorado district attorneys, and the defendants again moved to dismiss. Litigation continued and Judge Kan set a date to hear oral arguments on the motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on January 20, 2012, which the defendants again moved to dismiss. The plaintiffs continued to litigate until a team of legislators took on the issue. In the 2013 regular legislative session, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees considered House Bill 13-1210 to repeal the statute. The bill was approved by both Committees, and the Appropriations Committee set aside approximately $8 million to hire additional public defenders to represent indigent clients in these matters. On January 10, 2013 the plaintiffs filed a notice to the court that <a href=\"http://www.leg.state.co.us/clics/clics2013a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont/BE89356FE46CF20787257AEE0057BFEF?Open&file=1210_enr.pdf\">legislation</a> was being considered that would moot the issues presented in the case. In May 2013, Governor Hickenlooper signed the bill removing the requirement that misdemeanor defendants confer with a prosecutor before legal counsel is appointed. The law resolved all the claims in the lawsuit and on May 30, 2013, Judge Kan dismissed the case.", "summary": "Two non-profit organizations, the Colorado Criminal Defense Bar and the Colorado Criminal Justice Reform Coalition brought this lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201(a) against Colorado on December 2, 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs, represented by pro bono private counsel, sought a declaratory judgment that a Colorado statute was unconstitutional, violating the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments by deferring the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants until after the prosecuting attorney has spoken with the defendant. This case was voluntarily dismissed after the Colorado legislature passed a new statute that removed the requirement and subsequently allocated significant new funding to provide attorneys at initial appearances."}
{"article": "On January 14, 2016, arrestees in New Orleans who were declared eligible to receive appointed counsel from the Orleans Parish Public Defender\u2019s Office (OPD) but were placed on a waiting list, sued in a class action OPD and the Louisiana State Public Defender office under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 for violating their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. OPD\u2019s refusal to represent plaintiffs meant that they remained in jail without counsel. Plaintiff class seeks attorney\u2019s fees and a declaration that OPD\u2019s placement of class members on a waiting list for an indefinite amount of time violates their constitutional rights to counsel, due process, and equal protection. OPD refused to accept plaintiffs as clients due to budgetary shortages and excessive caseloads. After hearings in which OPD discussed its budgetary crisis in late 2015, the Chief District Defender announced it would start declining certain felony cases in mid-January of 2016. The withdrawals would occur at a defendant\u2019s first appearance before the magistrate. Plaintiffs credit OPD\u2019s situation to the State of Louisiana\u2019s underfunding of its public defender system. On June 15, 2016 the parties filed a joint motion for judgment granting final declaratory and partial injunctive relief. On October 27, 2016 the court sua sponte raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, giving both parties a chance to submit briefs addressing the issue. On January 31, 2017 the court (Judge James Brady) dismissed the case, citing grounds of federalism and comity. 231 F.Supp.3d 128. On September 25, 2017 plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit. On October 4, 2018 the Fifth Circuit dismissed the case as moot because it found that since the appeal was filed, Louisiana lawmakers had reallocated funding for appointed counsel sufficient to render the waitlists for non-capital defendants nonexistent. 905 F.3d 905. This case is now closed.", "summary": "Individuals who were eligible to be assigned a public defender in New Orleans, but were placed on a waiting list due to budgetary shortages, sued the city (OPD) and Louisiana state public defender's offices for violating their Constitutional rights to counsel, due process, and equal protection. They seek attorney's fees and a declaratory judgment that their rights were violated. On June 15, 2016 the parties filed a joint motion for judgment granting final declaratory and partial injunctive relief. On October 27, 2016 the court sua sponte raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, giving both parties a chance to submit briefs addressing the issue. On January 31, 2017 the court (Judge James Brady) dismissed the case, citing grounds of federalism and comity. On September 25, 2017 plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On October 4, 2018 the Fifth Circuit dismissed the case as moot because it found that since the appeal was filed, Louisiana lawmakers had reallocated funding for appointed counsel sufficient to render the waitlists for non-capital defendants nonexistent. This case is now closed."}
{"article": "On September 12, 2013, a juvenile sex offender and his parents filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Etowah County. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and both the national and local American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief. They alleged that the Sheriff's office and particular police officers violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fourteenth Amendment's protections for substantive due process and against deprivations of liberty without due process. Specifically, the plaintiffs objected to the Sheriff's Office's program of unannounced, random, and suspicion-less compliance investigations of every individual in the county who is subject to requirements of the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act (\"the Act\"), Ala. Code \u00a7 15-20A-4(12). The primary plaintiff, James Doe, was required to register as a juvenile under the Act. As part of the Sheriff's Office's program, uniformed officers, including defendants and other unidentified officers, conducted warrantless searches of the plaintiffs' home without consent at least nine times between April 2012 and August 2013. On February 13, 2014 the Court dismissed the case after being informed that the parties reached a written agreement regarding merits of the action and litigation costs. The <a href=\"http://blog.al.com/east-alabama/2014/01/aclu_etowah_county_sheriff_rea.html\">private settlement agreement stated</a> that police would have to conduct all home visits outside of the home, and would not enter without the registrant's written consent. In addition, police would perform these visits in civilian clothes and unmarked vehicles for the registrant's privacy. The case is now closed.", "summary": "A juvenile sex offender and his parents filed a lawsuit in 2013 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama objecting to the Sheriff's Office's program of unannounced, random, and suspicion-less compliance investigations of every individual in the county who is subject to requirements of the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act, Ala. Code \u00a7 15-20A-4(12). On February 13, 2014 the Court dismissed the case because they were informed that the parties reached a written agreement on the merits of the action and litigation costs"}
{"article": "On the morning of April 7, 2003, protesters gathered at the Port of Oakland for a peaceful demonstration against the Iraq war and against specific companies that profited from the war and did business at the Port. Demonstrators formed a picket line and encouraged workers and truck drivers to refuse to enter the facilities, but did not to obstruct their access. That morning, the officers of Local 10 of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) met to decide whether its members should report to work given the demonstration and the police presence. Several members of the Union were posted at the gates to the terminals of two of the companies against which the demonstration was held, with the purpose of letting Union members know that a decision was pending and that they should not enter until it was reached. Most or all of the Union members present waited outside of the gates in a group separate from the demonstrators. Also present were several legal observers from the National Lawyers Guild. At about 7:15 AM, the Oakland Police issued a dispersal order, alleged to be inaudible to most of the demonstrators and unclear in its directive. The demonstrators cleared away from the gates and allowed traffic to pass through more easily. The police formed lines blocking access to the route to the BART station by which most of the demonstrators arrived, and also to the parking lots where others had parked. At about 7:30, allegedly without any further warning or provocation, the Oakland police officers began barraging the demonstrators with a variety of \"less-lethal weapons\" including \"sting ball\" grenades filled with rubber pellets and tear gas, and wooden dowels and lead shot-filled bean bags fired from shotguns. The officers did not distinguish between the demonstrators, legal observers, and members of the Union, subjecting them all to this barrage. The demonstrators and others attempted to retreat along the only open routes, and the Police pursued, continuing to fire \"less-lethal\" weapons into the crowd and to strike at them with battons. Some demonstrators were intentionally struck by officers' motorcycles, in accordance with the Oakland Police Department's (OPD) standard practice for crowd dispersal at the time. The officers fired these weapons at demonstrators who arrived after any notice to disperse was given, and on bystanders. The police allegedly also purposely singled out and fired their weapons at legal observers, videographers and journalists, and individuals who appeared to be leaders because they carried bullhorns. On June 26, 2003, two separate suits were filed against the City of Oakland, the OPD, and related defendants, in response to the OPD's actions on April 7. Both suits were filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Because the cases involved substantially similar questions of fact and law and arose out of the same events, on August 11, 2003, the Court ordered that the cases be officially related and heard before the same judge. The cases were not consolidated under the same docket, but most or all of the substantive orders and opinions issued by the Court thereafter bore the docket numbers and captions of both cases and applied to both cases. The cases were also officially related to a third case, Allen v. City of Oakland, a landmark case filed in 2000 that had settled in March 2003 with the City agreeing to implement comprehensive reforms to its policing practices and to submit to monitoring by court-appointed experts (Allen has a separate entry in the Clearinghouse, see related cases below.) One of the two cases addressed here, Local 10 ILWU v. City of Oakland, was filed as a class-action on behalf of all persons who attended the April 7 demonstration or who might attend future demonstrations in Oakland, and who were or would be subjected to the Defendants' alleged policy and practice of using excessive and arbitrary force to disperse or control demonstrations. In addition to the class plaintiffs, the suit also named as plaintiffs Local 10 ILWU and nine of its members, who were \"standing by\" in the vicinity of the demonstration but not active participants in it. All of the Union member plaintiffs had been hit by projectiles fired by the police. The other suit, Coles v. City of Oakland, sought relief for several individual demonstrators who were allegedly injured by the OPD. These individuals were all demonstrators who allegedly had been shot by the police with less-lethal munitions, struck with motorcycles, and/or wrongfully arrested. One plaintiff was struck in the torso by a police baton, hit by a motorcycle, and shot in the face and neck with a lead-filled bean bag. In both cases, Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants' actions were prohibited the Constitutions of both the U.S and California. They alleged violations of their guaranteed rights to freedom of speech and association, their right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, their rights to equal protection and due process, their right to be free from the use of excessive and arbitrary force, and their right to privacy. The case was brought under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, which allows private actions to be brought against States for violations under color of state law of rights guaranteed by federal constitutional and statutory law. The Union also alleged that the Defendants had violated California privacy law by conducting investigations into its political affiliations and activities prior to the scheduled demonstration. In both cases, Plaintiffs sought compensatory, exemplary, and punitive damages, as well as to recover legal costs. They also sought declaratory judgments holding the Defendants' actions to have been unlawful violations of the Plaintiffs' rights under the Constitutions of the U.S. and of California and of statutory law. They sought injunctions that among other things would prohibit the Defendants from unlawfully interfering with the constitutional and statutory rights of participants in public demonstrations and protests; from intentionally striking demonstrators with motorcycles; and from using \"less-lethal\" weapons as a method of crowd control against non-violent crowds or demonstrations. They sought an order compelling compliance with the already mandatory terms of the Settlement and Consent Decree reached in Allen v. City of Oakland. On December 24, 2004, the parties entered a court-approved partial settlement addressing the Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief to the extent that those claims related to the Defendants' crowd control policies. At the same time, class-action elements of the Local 10 ILWU case were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. In the settlement, the Defendants denied any wrongdoing. The claims for damages and costs, and for other injunctive relief, remained to be litigated. The Court retained jurisdiction over the issues resolved by the settlement for purposes of enforcement. The City of Oakland and its Police Department adopted a new official Crowd Control/Crowd Management Policy in light of the settlement. The Crowd Control Policy restricted the City's power to declare an assembly unlawful only to those circumstances where demonstrators had already acted illegally or where they posed a clear and present danger of imminent violence. It forbade the OPD from dispersing demonstrations that had not been declared unlawful. It also required the OPD to provide an opportunity for demonstrators at assemblies declared unlawful to safely disperse prior to arrest, and required that repeated and sufficiently amplified announcements of the dispersal order, specifying available routes, be made. It also forbade the indiscriminate use of less-lethal munitions directly against crowds, even when specific individuals in the group were already violent. It prohibited the use of intentional motorcycle strikes and certain less-lethal weapons, such as wooden dowels and tasers, against crowds, and required that bean-bag munitions only be used against specifically targeted violent individuals or individuals who otherwise present an imminent risk to themselves or others. In 2011-12, the City of Oakland allegedly violated this policy repeatedly when it used less-lethal munitions against non-violent demonstrators at Occupy Oakland demonstrations and other protests. See related cases below (Campbell and Spalding). On April 27, 2005, the Court (Judge Thelton E. Henderson) denied the Defendants' motions to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims in both cases for the use of excessive force in instances where plaintiffs were not arrested. The Defendants did not seek to have dismissed the Fourth Amendment excessive force claims of those plaintiffs who had been arrested. The Judge held that whether the police actions intended to physically move the plaintiffs constituted seizures (and therefore would qualify for protection under the Amendment) was a question that would need to be resolved at trial. The order also denied the Defendants motion to dismiss the Union's First Amendment claims, because the Union alleged that the police had investigated the Union prior to the protest and knew that many of its leaders supported the demonstrators and their cause. On September 27, 2005, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and legal costs, determining that the Plaintiffs were entitled to fees but declining to order the Defendants to pay the amount requested, totaling about $1,100,000, although not declaring this amount to be unreasonable. The order required the parties to negotiate further, and to return to the Court for a judicial determination of the amount to be paid only if the negotiations failed. Coles v. City of Oakland, 2005 WL 2373724 (N.D. Cal. 2005). On December 6, 2005, Judge Henderson issued an order that granted in part and denied in part the parties' various motions for partial summary judgment or adjudication, resolving all outstanding questions of law and fact except the Fourth Amendment issue described above, which he held would need to be argued orally. He granted the Local 10 Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for summary judgment on their privacy claim, and the Defendants' unopposed motions to dismiss certain claims against some of the individual police officer defendants. After this order, the Plaintiffs in the Local 10 ILWU case entered settlement negotiations with the Defendants, and on July 31, 2006 the action was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice in light of settlements reached between the parties. These settlement agreements have not been obtained by the Clearinghouse and their terms are unknown, but they did include attorneys' fees and costs. The Court retained jurisdiction over the case in order to enforce the earlier settlement that established the Crowd Control Policy. The Plaintiffs in Coles also reached settlements with the Defendants. One plaintiff received $210,000 inclusive of attorneys' fees and costs. Another received $8,000, inclusive of costs. Other plaintiffs settled for $30,000, $10,000, $31,250, and $48,000, exclusive of attorneys' fees and costs. The amount received by the remaining plaintiff is unknown. On January 4, 2007, Judge Henderson granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees in the Cole case. The Court ordered the Defendants to pay the Plaintiffs' attorneys $621,512.12. This included attorneys' fees and costs for the Coles portion of the earlier settlement for injunctive relief that lead to the Crowd Control Policy. As of the time of this writing, July 2013, there has been no activity on either docket since this last order. The settlement establishing the Crowd Control Policy does not appear to have a termination date, and so it is possible that the case could be reopened.", "summary": "On June 26, 2003, two separate suits were filed against the City of Oakland and the Oakland Police Department (OPD), and related defendants, in federal court. The suits were filed in response to the OPD's actions on April 7 at a peaceful antiwar demonstration at the Port of Oakland. The Police, without giving sufficient notice to disperse and without provocation, barraged demonstrators with a variety of \"less-lethal\" munitions, while blocking the main exit routes. Police pursued demonstrators and others present when they attempted to disperse, while continuing to fire at them and intentionally strike them with motorcycles. On August 11, 2003, the Court ordered that the cases be officially related and heard before the same judge. One of the two cases, Local 10 ILWU v. City of Oakland, was filed as a class-action on behalf of all persons who attended the April 7 demonstration. The suit also named as plaintiffs Local 10 of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union, plus nine of its members who were \"standing by\" in the vicinity of the demonstration but not active participants in it. The other suit, Coles v. City of Oakland, sought relieve for several individual demonstrators who were allegedly injured by the OPD. In both cases, Plaintiffs sought compensatory, exemplary, and punitive damages, as well as to recover legal costs. They also sought declaratory judgments holding the Defendants' actions to be unlawful violations of the Plaintiffs' rights under the Constitutions of the U.S. and of California and of statutory law. They sought injunctions that among other things would prohibit the Defendants from unlawfully interference with the constitutional and statutory rights of participants in public demonstrations and protests. On December 24, 2004, the parties entered a court-approved partial settlement addressing the Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief to the extent that those claims related to the Defendants' crowd control policies. Oakland adopted a new official Crowd Control Policy that forbade the police from dispersing crowds that had not behaved illegally or that did not pose a clear and present danger of imminent violence. It also forbade the indiscriminate use of less-lethal weapons directly against crowds, even when specific individuals in the group were violent. The remaining issues eventually settled, with awards of damages and attorneys' fees well in excess of $1,000,000."}
{"article": "The plaintiff, a demonstrator involved in the Occupy Oakland protest movement, alleged that in the early morning hours of November 3, 2011, he was wrongfully beaten and imprisoned by two Oakland police officers, in the presence and with the approval of their supervising Sergeant. He alleged that the day prior he had participated, with several thousand other individuals, in a protest against recent police brutality and for economic justice. After the protest he went for dinner, and when walking home after midnight he encountered a police line obstructing his path. The plaintiff, an Army veteran of the war in Afghanistan, alleged that he questioned and criticized the officers' actions, and that in retaliation to his criticism two of the officers brutally beat him with clubs, sprayed painful chemicals in his face, and then arrested him. The beating caused lacerations to his spleen and internal bleeding, but rather than taking the plaintiff to a hospital, the police detained him in handcuffs at various locations near Oakland City Hall and then later transferred him to the Alameda County Jail. He was not taken to a hospital until approximately 18 hours after his arrest, after a friend paid his bail. He alleges that while detained his pleas for help were mocked or ignored by jail personal, including the jail medical staff. When he was taken to the hospital, his internal bleeding was discovered. The medical staff had to permanently cut off blood flow to his spleen, leaving him with a non-functioning organ. He was kept in intensive care for five days. The plaintiff filed the lawsuit on November 29, 2012 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The suit was filed against the officers individually and in their official capacities, against other unknown individuals involved in his detention, and against the City of Oakland. The suit was filed under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and alleged that the police's actions violated his First Amendment right to free speech, his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process, and the Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as his rights to be free from excessive and arbitrary force, to personal liberty, and to freedom of movement. He also alleged analogous violations of California constitutional and statutory law, and a California statute requiring that certain misdemeanor plaintiffs be cited and released rather than jailed. Other allegations included assault and battery, false imprisonment, and negligence. The plaintiff sought compensatory, statutory, and punitive and exemplary damages, attorneys' fees and legal costs, and further relief as deemed appropriate by the court. On January 7, 2013, the plaintiff amended his complaint. The amended complaint appears to be substantially the same as his first complaint, expect with a paragraph describing the injury to his spleen in more specific terms. The parties entered into settlement negotiations. After two settlement conferences, the parties reached a settlement agreement which was ordered by the court on January 30, 2014. The Defendants paid $645,000 to the plaintiff to compensate his claims including attorney's fees. The case is closed.", "summary": "The plaintiff filed the lawsuit on November 29, 2012 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff, a demonstrator involved in the Occupy Oakland protest movement, alleged that when he was returning home from a protest, two Oakland police officers brutally beat him with clubs, sprayed painful chemicals in his face, and arrested him. The suit was filed under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, and alleged that the polices' actions violated his First Amendment right to free speech, his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process, and the Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures. After two settlement conferences, the parties reached a settlement agreement which was ordered by the court on January 30, 2014. The Defendants paid $645,000 to the plaintiff to compensate his claims including attorney's fees. The case is closed."}
{"article": "This is a case about protestors being detained and arrested in downtown Los Angeles between November 24-26, 2014. On January 12, 2016, four protestors represented by private counsel and the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) filed this \u00a7 1983 class action suit against the City of Los Angeles in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctions against the City and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), declaratory judgments that their rights had been violated, nullification of the arrests, and various damages and attorney\u2019s fees. They claimed that the LAPD had violated their First Amendment rights through unlawful detention during a protest; that they were unreasonably detained, searched, and arrested in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights; that not being permitted release on recognizance while held in custody based on a perceived affiliation with nation-wide protests and purported engagement in \u201ccivil disobedience\u201d violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process; and that their right to privacy under California state law was violated by compulsory disclosure and subsequent upload to a nationwide protestor database of personal information. The protestors were marching in response to a grand jury\u2019s refusal to indict a police officer for the shooting death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. At some point during the demonstration, protestors were kettled in by LAPD officers and prevented from leaving. The protest was deemed unlawful because it was blocking motorists, but plaintiffs contended in their complaint that the only traffic interference originated from the LAPD. The captain of the police then issued a \u201cdispersal order,\u201d informing them they would only be let go after individual questioning. Few of the protestors heard this order (the complaint states that the LAPD captain later admitted it was \u201cinadequate\u201d). The subsequent questioning involved being restrained in zip ties, patted down and searched, recorded on video, and forced to provide private identifying information. This was not the first time the City and LAPD had been sued for similar practices. In 2005, the City agreed to a settlement in a lawsuit (<i>National Lawyers Guild v. City of Los Angeles</i>) brought by NLG that provided the LAPD would no longer prevent sidewalk protests, would not kettle protestors using their motorcycles, and would attempt to arrest individuals responsible for any unlawful conduct prior to declaring an unlawful assembly. The City had to settle again in 2009, stipulating that it would facilitate protests that may temporarily block traffic and set specific requirements for declaring an unlawful assembly. For more information, see <i><a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11347\">MIWON v. City of Los Angeles</a></i>. The complaint in this case alleged that the City had repeatedly failed to train its officers to adhere to any of these provisions, all of which were violated during the protests. The plaintiffs moved for class certification on July 14, 2016. The court granted their motion in part on May 25, 2017. It certified a class entitled to seek damages defined as the \"approximately 130 persons who were detained and arrested at 6th and Hope Streets on November 26, 2014, denied release on their own recognizance but never prosecuted.\" But the court declined to certify a class of protestors at a different intersection because the putative class representative was an NLG observer rather than a protester. It also declined to certify a class for injunctive relief consisting of all past and future protestors because \"no objective criteria\" existed to determine membership. 2017 WL 10776036. On February 27, 2017, the parties began court-ordered mediation. However, after over a year of failure to agree on a settlement, the parties were ordered into private mediation on July 8, 2018. The parties agreed to a provisional settlement on January 10, 2019, which after some modification Judge John A. Kronstadt approved on May 11, 2020. The plaintiffs were awarded a total of $750,000. $215,878.51 was put in a settlement fund for distribution to class members; $20,000 was awarded to the class representatives; and $476,801.93 was granted as attorney\u2019s fees (the rest went to various court fees). Injunctive relief was not part of the settlement. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Protestors in downtown LA alleged they were unlawfully detained, searched, interrogated, and some arrested during demonstrations in November, 2014. They brought a class action lawsuit against the City alleging violations of their 1st, 4th, and 14th amendment rights, as well as California state rights. A settlement was reached on May 11, 2020, granting plaintiffs $750,000 of attorney's fees, court fees, and class damages."}
{"article": "This is a case about harm caused by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) misclassifying residents as gang members or gang associates. On August 2, 2020, five residents of Los Angeles filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. They sued the City of Los Angeles under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by attorneys from the Justice X Law Group, the plaintiffs sought damages for harms that arose from being falsely linked to gang activity, including imprisonment, excessive charging, job loss, inability to acquire housing, and loss of access to financial aid for college. Plaintiffs asserted that they were subjected to unnecessary and outrageous searches and seizures that violated the Fourth Amendment; that they were unlawfully confined in violation of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause; and that the City of Los Angeles was responsible for and complicit in these LAPD policies. Much of the alleged misconduct in this case arose from section 186.22 of the California Penal Code (CPC). That law enhances sentences for crimes committed in association with a gang. Plaintiffs alleged that, since its inception, officers have abused it by knowingly or recklessly misclassifying people as gang members or gang associates while charging them with minor crimes to support convictions. Plaintiffs alleged they were misclassified for visiting family in a neighborhood with gang-related activity or having a cousin who was an alleged gang member. The magnitude of this abuse became clear in 2016 when, according to plaintiffs' complaint, a state audit found that California\u2019s statewide gang association database (CalGangs) contained abundant \u201cquestionable entries and errors such as the inclusion of year-old children.\u201d The issues of false classifications led to the California Department of Justice suspending CalGangs in June of 2020 and revoking LAPD\u2019s access to it in July of 2020. The L.A. County District Attorney\u2019s Office filed a criminal complaint against three LAPD officers on July 9, 2020 for conspiring to falsify police reports and fabricate court documents. An LAPD memorandum confirmed that as of July 10, 2020 twenty-four LAPD officers are under investigation for similar charges. The case is ongoing as of September 13, 2020.", "summary": "In 2020, residents of Los Angeles filed a putative class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that false claims of gang association and gang identity led to unreasonable searches, seizures, and imprisonment that violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. The case is ongoing as of September 2020."}
{"article": "This class-action lawsuit was filed on July 1, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The suit came in response to police tactics used to quell protests in Denver that followed the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. Plaintiffs, seven private individuals, were represented by the civil rights law firm Loevy & Loevy and brought this suit against the city and county of Denver, as well as 10 anonymous officers of Denver Police Department (called Does 1-10). The class-action suit established two separate, putative classes: the Arrest Class, made up of those who were arrested in the protests, and the Direct Force Class, composed of protesters who suffered injuries from police using weapons. The suit alleged that on May 28, 2020 the Denver Police used weapons like tear gas, flashbang grenades, pepper spray, pepper balls, and rubber bullets on peaceful protesters. According to the complaint, these actions violated the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The First Amendment count claimed that the defendants' actions violated the U.S. Constitution's guarantee of Free Speech and Freedom to Petition. They also argued that the city's curfew itself was unlawfully executed because it only applied to protesters and not to non-protesters. The Fourth Amendment count argued that the defendants' actions in arresting and firing weapons at protesters constituted unreasonable search and seizure and excessive force. Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment count claimed that defendants violated the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, the Direct Force Class was denied Due Process when the police fired weapons at them \"indiscriminately\" and the Arrest Class was denied Due Process and Equal Protection when the police arrested them for violation of curfew, according to the complaint. Plaintiffs sought class certification, declaratory relief, injunctive relief prohibiting defendants from further violations, and general and punitive damages. They also sought attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty. A week later, plaintiffs submitted a notice of related cases, citing two cases with common facts and claims and with at least one party in common: <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17595\"><i>Abay v. Denver</i></a> and <a href=\"https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17634&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BspecialCollection%7C63%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B\"><i>Black Lives Matter 5280 v. Denver</i></a>. The plaintiffs amended the complaint on July 23, 2020. The case was reassigned to Judge Lewis T. Babcock, since not all parties consented to jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. Then on July 28, the case was reassigned to Judge R. Brooke Jackson, consistent with the reassignment in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17634\"><i>Black Lives Matter 5280 v. City and County of Denver</i></a>. On August 4, the two cases were consolidated together with <i>BLM 5280</i> designated as the lead case. Additional information on this litigation can be found under the <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17634\"><i>BLM 5280</i> entry</a>. The case is ongoing as of January 2, 2021.", "summary": "This class action lawsuit was filed in response to police actions amidst the nationwide protests that ensued following the police killing of George Floyd. The complaint, filed by seven private individuals, argues that the police use of weapons like pepper balls, pepper spray, and rubber bullets constituted violations of the protesters' First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The suit established two classes of plaintiffs, the Arrest Class and the Direct Force Class. The case is ongoing as of January 2, 2021."}
{"article": "On August 4, 2014, a 71-year old grandmother living in Washington, DC filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the District of Columbia. The plaintiff, represented by the non-profit organization Equal Justice Under Law, sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees, claiming that her constitutional rights were violated. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the police verbally and physically abused her during a search of her home that was conducted despite the fact that she was under no suspicion of any wrongdoing. The incident happened on October 27, 2012 when two officers were on patrol and passed the plaintiff's home and saw three men near her property \"outside the fence line.\" One of the men was the plaintiff's grandson. After conversing with the men, the three were arrested for possession of an open container of alcohol and possession of synthetic marijuana. A handgun was also found. One of the other men admitted that all of the illicit items belonged to him and no charges were pressed against the plaintiff's grandson. Even though no charges were pressed against the plaintiff's grandson, the police sought to search the plaintiff's home on the basis that there might have been evidence related to illegal firearms in the home. According to the plaintiff's complaint, the search warrant application was vague and did not specify any specific reason for searching the home. Furthermore, the complaint alleges that the basis given for the warrant was inadequate. Both before and after obtaining the warrant, the plaintiff alleged that she was kept from entering her home and treated abusively by the police. After the search did not turn up anything illegal, the plaintiff claims that she reentered her home to find that it had been torn apart by the police. On September 16, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. They argued that the officers' conduct was lawful, that the officers conduct was protected by qualified immunity, and that plaintiff failed to allege a <i>Monell</i> claim against the Metropolitan Police Department. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on September 25, 2015, which added several officer defendants to the action. On September 30, 2016, Judge Randolph D. Moss ruled on the defendants' motion to dismiss, granting in part and denying in part. 211 F. Supp. 3d 150 (D.D.C. 2016). Specifically, the Court found that the officers had failed to establish the following: (1) that the firearm found gave them probable cause to conduct a warrantless arrest; (2) that the protective sweep of the home was lawful; and (3) that the application for the warrant for the subsequent search was supported by probable cause. The Court did find, however, that all defendants who executed the search except for one acted lawfully. Finally, the Court found that the plaintiff's complaint adequately alleged that the purportedly unconstitutional search of the home was the result of the District's \"pattern policy, and practice\" of an affiant officer falsely claiming that his training and experience led him to believe that evidence of a crime would be present. On May 1, 2017, the parties stipulated to a dismissal of the case pursuant to a private settlement agreement. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Plaintiff brings this lawsuit under the Fourth Amendment, claiming that her rights were violated by a search of her home that was conducted without probable cause. She claims that she was prevented from entering her home while the police conducted an illegal search based on misinformation and poorly conceived police procedures. She claims that the officers during the arrest were abusive mentally and physically. On September 30, 2016, the Court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. In May 2017, the parties reached a private settlement agreement and stipulated to a dismissal of the case, which is now closed."}
{"article": "Black Lives Matter - D.C. and several individual protestors brought this lawsuit on June 4, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of D.C. in response to President Trump's use of military police to disperse peaceful protesters in Lafayette Square Park on June 1st, 2020. Protesters had gathered as part of the nationwide outcry following the police killing of George Floyd. Around 6:30 in the evening, following an order to clear the square from Attorney General Barr, military and federal police forces used tear gas, pepper spray capsules, rubber bullets, and flash bombs to disperse the protesters in order to clear the path for President Trump to walk to nearby St. John's Church for a photo-op. Plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, ACLU D.C., Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law, and private counsel. Named defendants included President Donald Trump, Attorney General William Barr, and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, as well as the heads of several military and law enforcement agencies. The plaintiffs also sued unnamed officers, members, and agents of the U.S. Park Police, the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Armed Forces, the Arlington County Police Department, and other federal and non-federal law enforcement agencies. The complaint alleged violations of the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) (conspiracy to deprive rights), and 42 U.S.C. 1986 (failure to prevent conspiracy to deprive rights). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief; compensatory and punitive damages, including damages for pain and suffering; and attorney's fees. The case was assigned to Judge Dabney L. Friedrich. On June 9, 2020, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that sought class certification, added an individual plaintiff, and added Michael Carvajal (Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons) as a defendant. The plaintiffs brought the action on behalf of themselves and two classes of an individuals: 1) an injunctive relief class and 2) a personal injury class. A second amended complaint was filed two months later. This amended complaint added two individual plaintiffs. It also removed General James McConville, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, as a defendant and added the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia and unnamed Metropolitan Police Department officers. It also added First and Fourth Amendments claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. On August 19th, 2020, Judge Friedrich ordered the parties in this case and <a href=\"https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17604\"><i>Buchanan v. Trump</i></a> to propose a consolidated briefing schedule or to explain why briefing should not be consolidated given the similar factual and legal questions in each case. The following day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. The plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on September 3rd, identifying a number of individual law enforcement officers as defendants. In the following months, the defendants filed a number of motions to dismiss. As of April 21, 2021, the court has yet to issue decisions on any of the motions to dismiss and the lawsuit remains pending.", "summary": "On June 1st, 2020, President Trump and Attorney General Barr ordered military and federal police to attack peaceful protesters using chemical weapons. Protesters were gathered in response to the May 25th killing of George Floyd. The complaint, which eventually sought class certification, claimed that the government's actions represented violations of the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and constituted conspiracy to deprive rights and failure to prevent conspiracy to deprive rights. Plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. As of April 21, 2021, the lawsuit is ongoing."}
{"article": "On November 24, 2009, patrons of Atlanta Eagle, a gay bar in Atlanta, Georgia, filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the City of Atlanta, the chief of police, and officers of the Atlanta Police Department in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private lawyer Dan Grossman, and public interest lawyers from Lambda Legal Defense and the Southern Center for Human Rights, asked the Court for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief to redress defendants' violations of plaintiffs' rights under the U.S. Constitution and Georgia Constitution to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the police action was taken without any particularized reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that any individual was involved in any criminal activity. The plaintiffs also sought redress for the numerous state law torts committed by individual defendants, including false imprisonment, assault, battery, and trespass. According to the complaint, on September 10 and 11, 2009, a paramilitary, SWAT-type force of Atlanta police officers entered the Atlanta Eagle without a warrant, claiming to be searching for public sex, drugs, and illegal weapons. The police forced dozens of bar patrons to lie face-down on the floor, which was covered with spilled beer, dirt, and broken glass. Officers allegedly made threats of violence and anti-gay slurs. Plaintiffs claim that although they were not suspected of any criminal activity, police officers emptied their pockets, confiscated their IDs, and entered every patron's name into a police computer. After the raid, not a single patron was charged with any crime, and no weapons, drugs, or evidence of sex was found. In December 2010, the parties reached a settlement that required the Atlanta Police Department to rewrite their policies regarding arrest, search, and seizure, and to make other changes to protect the public from police misconduct. The settlement required, among other provisions: <ul> <li>Changes in search and seizure policy to accord with a set of legal principles spelled out in the settlement, covering the requirements for arrests, stops, and searches. </li> <li>All Atlanta police officers in uniform must wear a conspicuously visible nametag, and any Atlanta police officer who is in uniform or has displayed a badge or other indicia of police authority must identify himself by name and badge number upon request at some point before the end of an encounter with a civilian.</li> <li>Atlanta police officers may not interfere in any way with a citizen's right to record police activity</li> <li>Payment of $1,025,000 by the City of Atlanta. </li></ul> Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. issued an order to approve the settlement agreement on December 8, 2010. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the City of Atlanta's compliance with the terms of the settlement if it failed to implement the actions set forth in the settlement agreement within 180 days of the entry of the order. On June 16, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions on the grounds that the Atlanta Police Department had not implemented the police reform policies outlined in the settlement agreement. The police department agreed to implement the policies if plaintiffs withdrew their motion for sanctions. After three years of inactivity, on March 17, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt sanctions on the grounds that the police department had still not implemented police reform policies. The plaintiffs requested post-judgment discovery. On May 19, 2015, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion. In response to a joint motion by the parties, the court ordered the appointment of a special master, Joe D. Whitley, on June 22, 2016 to monitor the Atlanta Police Department's compliance with court orders and assist the parties in addressing any obstacles with compliance or relevant discovery. On September 23, 2016, the court granted the parties' Consent Order Setting Forth Initial Special Master Monitoring, Discovery, and Dispute Resolution Procedures. The consent order laid out detailed procedures for ensuring compliance and a feedback mechanism for the creation of a civil rights training program. The consent order also provided a detailed monitoring scheme. Further, all post-judgment discovery requests were stayed without prejudice. In two 2016 status reports, Mr. Whitley found that the police department had complied or attempted in good faith to comply with the requirements of the court order. However, after six months, it became clear that there were existing areas of disagreement between the parties regarding the following elements of the court order: (1) the identification requirement for officers; (2) the requirement of no interference with audio or video recordings; (3) documentation of warrantless seizures and identification checks; and (4) timely resolution of citizen complaints. But at that point, Mr. Whitley still believed that all of the issues could be resolved, particularly through increased communication between the parties. After nine months had passed, however, Mr. Whitley determined that there were fundamental disagreements between the parties regarding the court order's requirements and how compliance should be evaluated. At Mr. Whitley's urging, on July 25, 2017, the Court issued two orders: one requiring that the police department show cause why it should not be held in contempt for violating the court order and another requiring that the department show cause as to why it is entitled to relief from any of the court order's provisions. On September 25, 2017, the police department filed a motion to disqualify the special master and reassign matters to the district court, as well as an emergency motion to stay the special master's activities. However, the court did not grant the emergency motion and the special master continued to carry out his responsibilities. And on November 28, 2017, the court denied the police department's motion to disqualify the special master and adopted his October 2017 status report. On February 12, 2018, the court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by responding to the police department's emergency petition. The court called for briefing and a special master report and recommendation on the issue of whether the attorneys' fees sought were reasonable. Throughout 2018, the parties engaged in extensive settlement discussions with the goal of reaching an agreement with respect to the show cause order on contempt issues and the police department's compliance with the original settlement agreement. They proposed a new consent order on November 28, 2018, and the court approved it the following day. The order required the police department to modify 1) training procedures; 2) standard operating procedures; 3) handing citizen complaints; 4) \"stop and think\" forms; and 5) identification procedures. It also provided the plaintiffs the right to engage in post-judgment discovery, and the right to address any failure to comply in court. Additionally, the city agreed to pay the plaintiffs attorneys' fees. The case remains open such that the parties may resume litigation if the defendants fail to comply with the consent order.", "summary": "In 2009, patrons of an Atlanta gay bar sued the Atlanta Police Department, alleging that a raid on the bar had taken place without particularized reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The parties reached a settlement requiring the police department to reform its policies. However, after the judgment, the plaintiffs filed for sanctions twice because the police department had not implemented the policies. In response to a joint motion by the parties, the Court ordered the appointment of a special master on June 22, 2016 to monitor the Atlanta Police Department's compliance with court orders and assist the parties in addressing any obstacles with compliance or relevant discovery. After some time, the special master noted several disputes between the parties. The Court ordered the police department to show cause why it should not be held in contempt for violating the court order. However, as of September 2018, the parties were close to reaching a settlement agreement."}
{"article": "On November 13, 1974, eighteen named individuals and fifteen named groups, relying on 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, brought a civil action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Chicago's mayor and police officials. The plaintiffs claimed that the police defendants engaged in a broad range of activities constituting unlawful intelligence gathering of suspected subversives in violation of the plaintiffs' rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as their rights under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2510-2520 (regarding electronic surveillance). In addition to class action status for their case, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. Private counsel and the Cook County Public Defender's Office represented the plaintiffs. District Judge William J. Lynch, on May 16, 1975, denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, rejecting their justiciability, statute of limitations and insufficient pleadings-based challenges to the complaint. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 115 (N.D. Il. 1975). In an unpublished ruling on July 31, 1975, then-District Judge Joel M. Flaum issued a protective order to limit disclosure to plaintiffs' attorneys of documents produced in discovery. In succeeding months, the defense sought to extend the protective order to certain depositions and interrogatories. Discovery proceedings proved contentious during the following year. On March 5, 1976, District Judge Alfred Y. Kirkland, Sr., denied a defense request for a protective order to shield the mayor from having to provide an oral deposition. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 428 (N.D. Il. 1976). Separately, Judge Kirkland also ruled upon plaintiffs' motion to compel a response to written interrogatories, finding (among other things) that no \"informer's privilege\" existed to resist disclosure of the identity of persons who participated in intelligence gathering on lawful activities, as opposed to those who provided information on violations of law. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D 430 (N.D. Il. 1975). Later that year, Judge Kirkland revised the protective order to protect the defendants' data gathering system from public disclosure, since it had not yet been shown to be illegal. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 431 (N.D. Il. 1976). Soon thereafter, the judge enjoined the defendants from joining or infiltrating the plaintiffs' legal team, a tactic which the plaintiffs' documentary evidence showed had been employed, earlier, by the defense. The court also enjoined the defendants from using data they or their agents obtained as a result of joining plaintiffs' legal team and by gathering information about plaintiffs' case by means other than orderly discovery procedures. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 435 (N.D. Il. 1976). In another ruling that day, to sanction the defendants for failure to answer interrogatories in a meaningful way, Judge Kirkland held that plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing of parts of their complaint, shifting to defendants the burden of showing that they had not engaged in certain activities. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 438 (N.D. Il. 1976). On October 3, 1975, a second, similar lawsuit, ACLU v. Bell, was filed in the same court by several individual and organizational plaintiffs represented by private counsel and an assistant federal public defender. Over a period beginning in 1977, the FBI, Justice Department, CIA, various officials of these agencies, and the Secretary of Defense were added as defendants. The two cases were consolidated for discovery purposed on July 2, 1976. In mid-1977, discovery battles continued, with Judge Kirkland granting in part the federal defendants' request to stay class discovery pending interlocutory appeal of class certification (he allowed discovery relating to the named plaintiffs), and rejecting defense invocations of the informer's privilege. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 441 (N.D. Il. 1977). Earlier, Judge Kirkland had certified two classes of plaintiffs subjected to the alleged illegal surveillance and intelligence gathering-one of individuals and the other of organizations-with the certification applicable to the declaratory and injunctive relief requests only, excluding the damages aspect of the complaint. The defendants' interlocutory appeals failed, Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 558 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1976) (table) and 565 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1977) (Circuit Judge Robert A. Sprecher), and the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari to review the class certification. Rochford v. Alliance to End Repression, 434 U.S. 828 (1977). Continued litigation of discovery issues, including objections based upon informer's and state secrets privilege assertions, resulted in judicial suggestions to explore settlement. American Civil Liberties Union v. Brown, 609 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1979) (District Judge James E. Noland, by designation); American Civil Liberties Union v. Brown, 619 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Circuit Judge Walter J. Cummings). Eventually, with trial slated to occur in 1981, the parties reached accord on two settlement documents, one referred to as the FBI settlement and the other as the CIA settlement. Most plaintiffs approved of the settlements. Two dissenting political organizations and a few individual plaintiffs dismissed their claims, rather than settle. On February 13, 1981, the court conducted a fairness hearing regarding the proposed settlements and, afterward, continued to receive input, objections, and clarifying information about the terminology and scope of the settlements. District Judge Susan Getzendanner accepted and approved the two settlements on August 11, 1981. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (N.D. Il. 1981). Separately, proposed settlements between most plaintiffs and the City of Chicago and the Defense Department defendants were approved by Judge Getzendanner. Her March 30, 1982, order noted that the settlement with the city provided the plaintiffs with the injunctive relief they requested, barring political spying and harassment and limiting investigative activities based on First Amendment protected conduct except in four specific types of investigations: criminal, dignitary protection, public gatherings, and regulatory investigations, all governed by a commencement standard of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The settlement's restrictions on domestic intelligence gathering activities by the Defense Department prohibited unlawful activity by the agency and its agents. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537 (N.D. Il. 1982). Appendices to that opinion contain the text of the settlement with the city and related documents. Id. Despite the settlements, decades of litigation followed. On March 7, 1983, the Department of Justice issued new Guidelines on Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations. Plaintiffs had Judge Getzendanner enjoin the FBI from implementing in Chicago the portion of the new guidelines that gave less protection from investigations based on First Amendment-protected activity than was provided for under the settlement agreement. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F.2d 575 (N.D. Il. 1983). On appeal, a panel of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit deemed the injunction unwarranted, in the absence of any indication of substantial and imminent danger of the FBI violating the decree, and changed the injunction to a declaratory judgment. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 733 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1984) (District Judge Edward Dumbauld, by designation). The court then voted to hear the case, en banc. After re-argument, the court reversed the district court, saying that the new investigative guidelines were not inconsistent with the consent decree. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner). In an October 24, 1985 unpublished order, Judge Getzendanner sanctioned the city defendants for a years-before non-disclosure of certain files to plaintiffs, ruling that several paragraphs of the plaintiffs' complaint concerning dissemination of information would be deemed true without being subject to rebuttal, and allowing one of plaintiffs' attorneys fees incurred in seeking the files and the sanctions. By the end of 1985, cross-motions for summary judgment had been filed by the remaining parties (two organizational plaintiffs, three individual plaintiffs, and the city defendant). Judge Getzendanner ruled that the actions of the city police as to lawful speech activities of a retired social worker, a civil liberties organization, and a peace organization violated these plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The court awarded the organizations $20,625 apiece, plus costs, and the individual $10,000, plus costs. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 627 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Il. 1985). Related attorneys' fee litigation occurred over the next few years, as discussed below. Meanwhile, by 1989, the Chicago Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (\"Chicago CISPES\") petitioned the district court for discovery under and enforcement of the settlement. They alleged that from March 1983 through June 1985, they were unlawfully investigated as a part of a national CISPES investigation that stemmed from unreliable and unverified informant information. On June 28, 1989, Magistrate Judge Joan Lefkow directed the FBI to provide discovery. Conceding defects in the CISPES investigation, the FBI had disciplined personnel connected with it, segregated and archived away from the FBI records gathered during the investigation, and conducted nationwide training on how to deal with activities protected by the First Amendment. These remedial actions, the FBI said, mooted CISPES' request for relief. In turn, CISPES cross-moved for summary judgment. On October 3, 1991, in an unpublished ruling, Judge Ann C. Williams granted CISPES' motion, finding the FBI had violated the settlement decree and the controversy was not moot, since the FBI had not shown that its misconduct was incapable of reoccurring. CISPES later prevailed in seeking additional discovery from the FBI concerning its interviews of Arab-Americans during the time period surrounding the Persian Gulf War in early 1991, when (in an April 9, 1992, unpublished decision) Magistrate Judge Lefkow ruled that such discovery would be relevant to whether the FBI's training was adequate as contemplated by the consent decree. In an also-unpublished order dated June 26, 1992, Judge Williams denied the FBI's objection to the discovery ruling. On October 14, 1992, Judge Williams directed expunging of data identifying Chicago CISPES members and associates from government records regarding the CISPES investigation. Later unpublished rulings awarded plaintiffs' counsel attorneys' fees for efforts in monitoring compliance with the court's decree. The award and the finding of intentional noncompliance with the court's decree were reversed by the Seventh Circuit, which ruled that negligent violation of the decree during nationwide efforts in the CISPES investigation did not merit the district court's earlier findings; in turn, the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties entitled to attorneys' fees. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 119 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1997) (Circuit Judge Terence T. Evans). Separately, three activist groups filed an enforcement petition under the consent decree. They alleged misconduct by city police in connection with the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1996. Following a hearing, Magistrate Judge Edward A. Bobrick's unpublished October 27, 1999, report recommended granting summary judgment for the city. The plaintiffs' objected. On review, District Judge Joan B. Gottschall sustained the objections, in part. Using the \"clear and convincing\" standard of proof to determine whether violations of the decree had been established, the judge found that the plaintiffs' evidence failed to meet this standard in most instances; but some testimony, if believed by a fact-finder, could provide clear and convincing evidence that, because of plaintiffs' First Amendment-protected views and activities, police engaged in conduct violating the decree. As to events shown by this testimony, Judge Gottschall's unpublished May 8, 2000, order denied the city's summary judgment motion. Later, a four day bench trial occurred regarding these events. The judge ruled, in an unpublished order on December 22, 2000, that the plaintiffs' evidence failed to meet the clear and convincing standard of proof. Earlier, the judge's unrelated, unpublished order of September 21, 2000, rejected a petitioner's claim that police had violated the decree by mistakenly retaliating against him, a police officer, for his supposed leaks to the press during an investigation into police corruption. By then, Judge Williams had denied the city's motion to modify the nearly twenty year old consent decree. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 66 F. Supp.2d 899 (N.D.Il. 1999). In a different motion, the city submitted a number of hypothetical questions to the court, in hopes of receiving guidance to help avoid violations of the decree. The court ruled in a May 2000, unpublished order that Article III limitations precluded it from providing an advisory opinion. The city appealed Judge Williams' 1999 denial of their modification request. A Seventh Circuit panel, on January 11, 2001, reversed the lower court, directing it to modify the decree as the city had requested. Judge Posner noted that the city had not asked for abrogation of the decree and would still be bound to adhere to its' core protections and enforcement provisions. He observed that changing circumstances since the decree's entry-particularly the increased threat of terrorism-warranted ensuring that the police had the ability to monitor statements, build a file, or plant an undercover agent among a group discussing the desirability of committing acts of violence in pursuit of an ideological agenda. Unless the motives of the police were improper or the methods forbidden by other provisions of federal or state law, other cities' police could perform basic investigative functions inhibited by the decree in Chicago. Because prior misconduct of police should not impair public safety in the present and because the modified decree amply protected First Amendment rights, the appellate court ruled in the city's favor. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2001). On remand, Judge Gottschall's unpublished March 2, 2001, order granted the city's motion and modified the consent decree. A police union official attempted, in December 2001, to use the decree to sanction police officials who, allegedly, investigated him because of his union-related statements. On February 26, 2003, Judge Gottschall granted the city's motion to dismiss the union official's enforcement petition. (We do not have a copy of the motion or of the order granting it.) From 1985 through 2004, many rulings addressed denials and awards of attorneys' fees. Litigation centered on the applicability of the Equal Access to Justice Act (\"EAJA\"), 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2412, passed after the lawyers reached the 1981-82 settlements but effective after the court approved the settlements. To track the course of these disputes, review (1) Judge Getzendanner's unpublished orders of October 24, 1985, and September 4, 1986; (2) Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1987) (Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook); (3) Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 899 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); (4) Judge Williams' unpublished order of August 9, 1990; and (5) Judge Gottschall's unpublished orders of May 26, 2000, September 21, 2000, and November 2, 2000. In 2000, the district court approved payment of attorneys' fees. Over $1 million in fees were awarded to plaintiffs' counsel for services performed during between 1994 and 2001. (We do not have a copy of the district court's ruling(s) granting these payments.) On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the award. The panel opinion by Judge Posner observed that the legal services provided during the 1994-2001 period involved two failed contempt proceedings; the plaintiffs' failed opposition to the modification of the decree; and efforts to monitor the city's compliance with the decree, which efforts merely led to the failed contempt proceedings and which efforts were entirely uncalled for by the decree (which made monitoring duties a responsibility of a public body rather than of plaintiffs' counsel). Thus, the court could not say the applicant attorneys had represented \"prevailing parties\" in any of the efforts, nor that they acted pursuant to some obligation imposed by the decree or other law. Even when their services responded to the city's attempt at modification of the decree, the attorneys were not entitled to fee recovery because their opposition to modification \"verged on the unreasonable.\" Judge Posner noted that the absence of a sunset provision or termination date in the decree posed a considerable defect, one not present in more modern decrees. He observed that, after the decree's modification, something of a sunset provision had been provided in that, after the completion of the independent audit in or before 2006, the district judge was to consider whether the decree had outlived its usefulness. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 356 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2004). On September 30, 2008, the Northern District of Illinois (Judge Gottschall) denied the City's motion to dissolve the modified consent decree. The court found that although the decree was \"probably ripe for dissolution,\" the City had failed to conduct an independent audit that would allow the court to review the City's compliance. The City appealed to the 7th Circuit, which dismissed the appeal on August 4, 2009. In the meantime, the district court (Judge Gotschall) dissolved the modified consent decrees in related cases (1:74-cv-3268 and 1:75-cv-3295). On April 13, 2011, Judge Gotschall granted the City's motion to dismiss the case without prejudice. According to the order, petitioners were permitted to seek reinstatement of the petition if the City failed to conduct an audit and allow the court to review the results, as required by the modified consent decree. The court (Judge Gotshchall) gave the petitioners 45 days to file a motion to reinstate the petition, after which time the case would be dismissed without prejudice. There was no further court involvement in this case.", "summary": "In November 1974, several individuals and groups filed a civil rights action against Chicago's mayor and police officials, claiming that they had engaged in unlawful intelligence gathering and electronic surveillance. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants had violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, and they sought both damages and injunctive relief. After the case was consolidated with a number of related cases, in August 1981, the parties entered into a consent decree settlement. The consent decree barred the City from political spying, harassment, and investigation of certain activities protected by the First Amendment. Despite the settlement, decades of litigation addressing enforcement of the decree followed. In April 2011, the district court granted the City's motion to dismiss the case. The court's order permitted the plaintiffs to file a motion to reinstate the consent decree within 45 days if the City did not conduct an audit showing compliance with the terms of the agreement. There was no further legal action taken by either party."}
{"article": "On October 21, 2004, a group of former Chicago Police Department (CPD) detainees filed this class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the CPD. Represented by the Chicago civil rights law firm Loevy & Loevy, the plaintiffs alleged that the CPD were engaged in a unconstitutional pattern and practice of detaining persons under its control for excessive periods of time and under poor conditions. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the Department routinely and secretly detained suspects in police station interrogation rooms for lengthy periods of time, up to 48 hours without sleep or food, in attempts to develop legal grounds for detaining them. These unlawful detentions, plaintiffs alleged, amounted to physical and psychological \"soft torture\" and produced scores of false confessions. Plaintiffs sought monetary damages and class certification. On June 13, 2005, the plaintiffs moved for certification of three separate classes: (1) those subjected to interrogation room detentions for over 16 hours; (2) those held in the department lock-up and deprived of adequate accommodations for sleep; and (3) those detained by police for over 48 hours without a probable cause hearing. Defendants objected to certification of Class I and III, but consented to certification of Class II. On October 5, 2005, U.S. District Judge Robert W. Gettleman granted plaintiffs' motion with respect to the Class II and III. Class II was defined as: \"All persons held in a CPD lock-up or detective division facility between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. at any time from October 12, 2002, to the date of this order.\" Class III was defined as: \"All persons arrested on suspicion of a felony without an arrest warrant and who were detained by the CPD in excess of 48 hours without a judicial probable cause hearing at any time from August 15, 1999, to the date of this order.\" Judge Gettleman denied certification as to first class because the claims of the only proposed representative of the first class was barred by the statute of limitations. 231 F.R.D. 367 (N.D.Ill. Oct 05, 2005). The plaintiffs later added a new representative for Class I and renewed their motion to certify this class. Judge Gettleman granted the motion on June 2, 2006. While the certification issues were being resolved by the court, the parties engaged in substantial discovery. Many disputes arose, causing the parties to appear before U.S. Magistrate Judge Sidney I. Schenkier over 20 times. The CPD was ordered to produce, among other materials, computerized arrest data and a sampling of 3,000 paper arrest records. The plaintiffs used the arrest data to create a database which would be used to identify the members of the various classes. Judge Schenkier held a series of settlement conferences beginning on September 21, 2006 and continuing over the next year. On October 6, 2010, the Court gave final approval of the negotiated class action settlement. The defendants were required to fund a settlement fund of up to $16.5 million to pay settlement class members. The agreement specified the following awards for each class: \u2022 Members of Class I (detained for longer than 16 hours) were eligible for an award of up to $2,000; \u2022 Members of Class II (detained overnight without adequate accommodations for sleep) were eligible for an award of up to $90; and \u2022 Members of Class III (detained for longer than 48 hours without a probable cause hearing) were eligible for an award of up to $3,000. The defendants were also required to pay for all costs related to the claims administration for the settlement. The agreement also allowed for an attorneys' fee award not to exceed $5 million, and attorneys' costs and expenses not to exceed $70,000. On April 19, 2013, Judge Schenkier issued an order stating that the entirety of damages had been paid and any remainder of the settlement fund would be returned to the City of Chicago.", "summary": "In a lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the plaintiffs challenged Chicago Police Department's alleged unconstitutional pattern and practice of detaining persons under its control for excessive periods of time and under conditions plaintiffs claimed reached the level of \"soft torture.\" This case settled on October 6, 2010 for $16.5 million."}
{"article": "On March 19, 2015, three men arrested in Chicago, IL filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs sued the City of Chicago and Chicago police officers under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by a private firm, asked the court for compensatory and punitive damages. They claimed that the City of Chicago and police officers violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Chicago police officers had subjected them to false arrest at the Homan Square detention facility, excessive use of force, and illegal searches; attempted to coerce them into false confessions without an attorney present; and threatened them that they would be charged with crimes if they did not provide information. The Guardian, a UK-based newspaper, profiled conditions in Homan Square through <a href=\"https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/homan-square\">a series of articles</a> starting in early 2015. Documents filed later in this case mention that the press coverage inspired the plaintiffs to come forward with this lawsuit. On May 13, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Primarily, the defendants claimed that plaintiffs' complaint was untimely and that the allegation that the police had threatened plaintiffs into not speaking about their experience was not enough to defeat the statute of limitations. On May 27, 2015, Judge Andrea R. Wood granted the defendants' motion to stay discovery pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss. On March 31, 2016, Judge Wood granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in a minute order. However, Judge Wood did not issue a Memorandum Opinion and Order on the motion to dismiss until January 31, 2018. The docket does not explain the reason for this large gap in time. Given the unusual gap without a written dismissal order, the Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(7)(A)(ii) dictates that a dismissal order is assumed to be filed 150 days after judgment is entered into the docket. In the opinion, Judge Wood held that the case should be dismissed because the complaint was filed after the statute of limitations had expired and the doctrine of equitable estoppel did not apply to the circumstances. Specifically, Judge Wood held that although the plaintiffs adequately alleged facts establishing the first two elements of equitable estoppel\u2014that the defendants acted affirmatively to prevent them from filing suit and the plaintiffs did actually and reasonably rely on the threats while they were made\u2014the plaintiffs did not file suit promptly after the obstacle to filing was removed and therefore failed to adequately allege facts establishing the third element of equitable estoppel. On February 6, 2018, the plaintiffs appealed Judge's Wood decision granting the defendants' motion to dismiss to the Seventh Circuit. On August 17, 2018, the defendants submitted a docketing statement arguing that the plaintiffs failed to file a timely notice of appeal as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). They argued that the district court entered a dispositive order on the docket on March 31, 2016, meaning that the plaintiffs' notice of appeal filed on February 6, 2018 was more than 30 days after the entry of judgment. A Seventh Circuit panel composed of Judges Daniel Anthony Manion, Diane S. Skyes, and Michael B. Brennan sided with the appellees in a September 30, 2019 opinion. 939 F.3d 882. They wrote that the appellants should have filed their motion to appeal within 30 days of the dismissal order, which came 150 days after the March 30, 2016 minute order dismissing the case. They did not agree with the plaintiff's argument that they should have been allowed to appeal when the written opinion was published. In addition, the panel briefly discussed the merits of the case, and wrote that this case was not filed within the statute of limitations and that equitable estoppel did not apply. They referred back to previous cases in the Seventh Circuit that held that police intimidation was not sufficient to invoke equitable estoppel, and added that the Guardian articles providing \"a newfound sense of security\" to come forward was not enough to overcome that precedent, either. The plaintiffs did not appeal the decision to the Supreme Court; the case is now closed.", "summary": "On March 19, 2015 three Chicago residents filed suit against the City of Chicago and several members of the Chicago Police Department for unlawful arrest and detention and excessive use of force at the Homan Square detention facility. In May 2015 defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On March 31, 2016, the Court granted the defendants motion to dismiss; the dismissal order came 150 days later, though a written opinion and order came down on January 31, 2018. The plaintiffs appealed the Court's decision to grant the motion to dismiss to the Seventh Circuit after the written order was issued. A Seventh Circuit panel agreed with the district court on September 30, 2019; they wrote that the appeal was not filed in a timely manner, and that the underlying case was filed after the statute of limitations had passed. This decision was not appealed and the case is closed."}
{"article": "On July 30, 2020, six individual plaintiffs and the Kentucky Alliance Against Racial and Political Repression (KAARPR) filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. They were represented by attorneys from the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the ACLU of Kentucky Foundation, and private counsel. They brought suit against the Louisville and Jefferson County Metro Government, the Mayor of Louisville, the Interim Chief of Louisville Police, and over a dozen Louisville Police Department officers. The complaint arose out of the protests that swept the country following the police killings of George Floyd in May of 2020 and of Breonna Taylor (by Louisville police) in March of 2020. The complaint alleged that during these protests in Louisville, protesters were met with police using tear gas, pepper balls, flash bang grenades, and, in at least one case resulting in a fatality, live ammunition. The complaint argued that these actions represented violations of the U.S. Constitution and common law tort law. Specifically, the complaint argued that the defendants' First Amendment right to free speech and assembly and their Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force. The complaint also argued that defendants' actions constituted common law battery and assault. The case was assigned to District Judge Charles R. Simpson III. By August 25, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. This motion was denied the very next day. Plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint on September 11, 2020. The amended complaint added a plaintiff but left the substance of the complaint unchanged. The case is ongoing as of October 12, 2020.", "summary": "This case arose out of the protests that took place nationally after the police killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor. Plaintiffs were six individuals and one political group called the Kentucky Alliance Against Racial and Political Repression. They filed a class-action suit against the Louisville and Jefferson County Metro Government and the Louisville police. The complaint argued that police tactics used to quell the protests constituted violations of the U.S. Constitution as well as common law battery and assault. The case is ongoing as of October 12, 2020"}
{"article": "In July 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ] initiated an investigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141 of alleged misconduct by the Canine Section of the Prince George's County Police Department [PGPD]. The investigation followed some eighteen civil rights lawsuits filed between 1993 through 1998 by individuals that alleged dog attacks by the PGPD's canine unit. In October 2000, the DOJ expanded the scope of its investigation to include broader allegations of excessive force. The DOJ and the FBI also launched a criminal investigation which resulted in the federal indictment of two PGPD officers on charges that they ordered a police dog to attack an unarmed homeless man. See U.S. v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613 (4th Cir. 2003). Following the DOJ's investigation, DOJ, PGPD and local FOP officials met and negotiated agreements to address all of the DOJ's concerns. The settlement agreements took the form of a Memorandum of Agreement [MOA] as to allegations of excessive force and a Consent Decree as to PGPD's Canine Section. On January 22, 2004, the DOJ filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court District of Maryland (Greenbelt) along with a joint motion to lodge the proposed Consent Decree. On March 11, 2004, the District Court (Judge Roger W. Titus) approved and entered the Consent Decree. The MOA and the Consent decree required widespread reform to PGPD's use of canines and force. The agreements required the PGPD to implement the following reform measures: \u2022 revisions to use of force policies and training protocol, including documentation and review of all use of force incidents \u2022 creation of a board to review all firearm discharges \u2022 changes to the department's receipt, investigation and review of citizen complaints \u2022 implemention of a guard and bark methodology for canines, thereby restricting the use of biting \u2022 monitoring and review of all canine deployments and biting incidents \u2022 appointment of an independent monitor to oversee compliance with the MOA. Eduardo Gonzalez and the Alexander Group Independent Monitor Team (AG-IMT) were selected to serve as the independent monitor. Both agreements were set to expire three years after their effective dates, provided that the PGPD had been in substantial compliance with all provisions for at least two years. On February 2, 2007, the parties filed a joint motion to terminate the consent decree. On February 12, 2007, the Court granted the motion stating that PGPD had a) complied fully with the consent decree, and b) eliminated the last vestiges of unlawful behavior and had thus satisfied the decree.", "summary": "In July 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ] initiated an investigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141 of alleged misconduct by the Canine Section of the Prince George's County Police Department [PGPD]. The investigation followed some eighteen civil rights lawsuits filed between 1993 through 1998 by individuals that alleged dog attacks by the PGPD's canine unit. Following the DOJ's investigation, DOJ, PGPD and local FOP officials met and negotiated agreements to address all of the DOJ's concerns which resulted in a Consent Decree being entered on January 22, 2004. On February 12, 2007, the Court granted the motion stating that PGPD had a) complied fully with the consent decree, and b) eliminated the last vestiges of unlawful behavior and had thus satisfied the decree."}
{"article": "On June 12, 2003, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the City of Detroit. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141, the DOJ alleged a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct by officers of the Detroit Police Department (DPD), including the excessive use of force, false arrest, improper warrantless searches and failure to protect detainees. Contemporaneously with the filing of the DOJ's complaint, the parties filed a proposed consent decree and motion to appoint an independent monitor. The filing followed a DOJ investigation of the DPD which revealed concerns about excessive force, holding cell conditions and arrest and detention policies and practices. A day after the filing of the complaint, the City of Detroit filed a motion to stay entry of the consent judgment until its City Council could formally approve it. The Detroit City Council then filed a motion to intervene in the action on June 18, 2003. On July 1, 2003, the Coalition Against Police Brutality filed a motion to intervene as of right. U.S. District Judge Julian Abele Cook Jr. denied both intervention motions on July 14, 2003. On July 18, 2003, Judge Cook granted the parties' motions to appoint a monitor and approve the consent judgment and motion to amend the consent judgment. Judge Cook entered two separate consent judgments: one relating to the \"Use of Force and Arrest and Witness Detention\" and the other relating to \"Conditions of Confinement.\" On July 23, 2003, Judge Cook appointed Sheryl L. Robinson, with the assistance of Kroll, Inc., as the independent monitor. On October 15, 2003, the Coalition Against Police Brutality filed a notice of appeal, but the appeal was subsequently dismissed for a reason that is not apparent. On December 27, 2004, Judge Cook issued an order extending the duration of the \"Conditions of Confinement\" consent decree to July 18, 2007. The other consent decree relating to \"Use of Force and Arrest and Witness Detention\" was conditionally set to expire by its terms in July 2008. On October 26, 2007, however both consent decrees were extended by Judge Cook until July 18, 2011. The independent monitor, Sheryl Robinson Wood, issued quarterly reports from the time of her appointment. Each report contains a \"report card\" as an appendix, summarizing the monitor's evaluation of DPD compliance with the various consent judgment provisions. On July 24, 2009, Judge Cook accepted the resignation of the Monitor, on the basis of documents that demonstrated that \"she had engaged in conduct which was totally inconsistent with the terms and conditions of the two Consent Judgments in this litigation.\" In particular, she had \"engaged in undisclosed communications, as well as meetings of a personal nature,\" with the former Mayor, Kwame Kilpatrick. Judge Cook suspended decree monitoring until selection of a new monitor, which occurred on October 5, 2009 when Judge Cook appointed Robert Warsaw to the position. Throughout the course of this litigation, the parties amended their consent decrees several times so that the defendants could more easily comply with the terms. However, on April 19, 2010, Judge Cook issued an order requiring the Defendants to resolve all of its backlogged citizen complaints within a period of 90 days. The defendants asked for several extensions, and ultimately achieved compliance in March of 2011. However, as of January 2012, there were over 400 backlogged complaints, which has reopened this facet of the litigation as this number was \"totally unacceptable,\" according to Judge Cook. Judge Cook then issued an order on January 30, 2012, requiring the Defendants to fix the backlog of complaints. On April 23, 2012, the parties filed another Amended Consent Decree, amending various portions of the consent judgments related to the use of force and conditions of confinement. On July 19, 2013, Judge Cook issued an order with respect to the consent judgments after becoming aware that the individual identified as responsible for the Conditions of Confinement Consent Judgment was no longer employed by the DPD. Judge Cook ordered the defendants to identify the head of the DPD's Civil Rights Integrity Bureau (CRIB), and required that the DPD notify the court and monitor before making any personnel changes within CRIB. Judge Cook also noted that with the appointment of Kevyn Orr as Emergency Manager for the City of Detroit, the line of authority might have been complicated. Thus, Judge Cook also required the City of Detroit provide an updated description of the line of authority to clarify accountability with respect to the enforcement of the consent judgements. The defendants filed their response to Judge Cook's order on July 26, 2013. On July 29, 2013, Judge Cook issued an order extending the Conditions of Confinement Consent Judgment in light of the DPD's plan to transfer custody of its detainees to the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). Once the monitor was satisfied with the decommissioning of the DPD's holding cells, Judge Cook would dismiss the Conditions of Confinement Consent Judgment. On December 11, 2013, the monitor submitted a report confirming compliance with the Conditions of Confinement Consent Judgment, and Judge Cook subsequently dismissed this consent judgment on January 27, 2014. On December 19, 2013, Judge Cook issued a new order for \"enhanced monitoring.\" Judge Cook acknowledged that substantial progress had been made with respect to enforcement of the consent judgments, as the City of Detroit was now in compliance with 93% of the consent judgment requirements. However, Judge Cook also noted that the City was still out of compliance with 12% of the Use of Force Consent Judgment requirements. As such, Judge Cook directed the monitor to increase the frequency of visits to the City in order to expedite enforcement of the Use of Force Consent Judgment. On December 22, 2013, the defendants moved to suspend monitoring of provisions of the Use of Force and Arrest and Witness Detention Consent Judgment which have been in compliance for two or more years. However, on June 16, 2014, Judge Cook denied the motion, finding that there were no changes in circumstances which warranted a revision of the consent judgment. On May 14, 2014, due to his impending transition to inactive status, Judge Cook ordered that this case be reassigned to another judge in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The case was eventually assigned to U.S. District Judge Avery Cohn on June 16, 2014. On August 8, 2014, the parties jointly moved to terminate the remaining consent judgment, arguing that the intent of the consent judgment had been substantially satisfied. The parties noted that the independent monitor found 90% overall compliance, and any remaining compliance could be achieved through a transition agreement under which the DOJ could maintain oversight of the DPD's ongoing reform efforts without the direct oversight of an independent monitor. On August 25, 2014, Judge Cohn granted the motion terminating the consent judgment, and entered the transition agreement as an order terminating on March 2, 2016. Judge Cohn also provided final comments with respect to the order, suggesting that control of the DPD be transferred away from the Emergency Manager and back to the mayor of Detroit. Judge Cohn also suggested that the Board of Police Commissioners continue as a civilian review body dealing with complaints. This case is effectively closed.", "summary": "This is a case brought by the U.S. Department of Justice to remedy an alleged pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct by the Detroit Police Department, including the excessive use of force, false arrest, improper warrantless searches and failure to protect detainees. It was filed in 2003, simultaneously with a consent decree in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The District Court adopted the decree, and monitoring has continued since. The consent judgments were terminated on August 25, 2014 after a finding of substantial compliance."}
{"article": "On August 28, 2014, six Missouri residents filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution against individual police officers of the City of Ferguson, Missouri and the County of St. Louis, Missouri, the City of Ferguson, and the County of St. Louis. The plaintiffs, represented by private and public interest counsel, sought compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that the City of Ferguson and the County of St. Louis, through their police forces, violated the plaintiffs' rights by subjecting them to unnecessary and unwarranted force and arresting them without probable cause. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged claims of false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, failure to train, supervise, and discipline, as well as assault and battery. This suit was filed in the wake of the August 2014 shooting of Michael Brown. Brown, a black male, was fatally shot on August 9, 2014, by Darren Wilson, a Caucasian police officer with the Ferguson Police Department. The circumstances surrounding the shooting are disputed, but it is undisputed that Brown was unarmed at the time. The shooting sparked protests and general civil unrest in the City of Ferguson, caused in part by racial tension between the majority-black community and the majority-white city government and police. The plaintiffs alleged that during this time of civil unrest, Ferguson police officers used wanton and excessive force under color of law. Specifically, one plaintiff alleged that she and her son were arrested on August 13 at a fast-food restaurant in Ferguson. The complaint states that they had attended a peace rally and were arrested for supposedly failing to follow police instructions to leave the establishment. Another plaintiff claimed he was shot with rubber bullets, assaulted, and sprayed with pepper-spray by police while heading to his mother's house on August 13. According to the complaint, this plaintiff was never charged with a crime. Another plaintiff claimed he was photographing protests from his vehicle when police began moving down the street where he was parked, firing tear gas and ordering people to disperse. The plaintiff was allegedly blocked in by a police vehicle and therefore unable to comply. According to the complaint, police seized his camera and pulled the memory chip from it before arresting him. The final two plaintiffs claimed they were also arrested for failing to disperse while filming the protests on August 11. On October 2, 2014, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding four more plaintiffs to the suit. The City of Ferguson and its police chief and officer (the \"Ferguson defendants\") filed a motion to dismiss on October 24, 2014, and St. Louis County and its chief of police (the \"St. Louis defendants\") filed motions to dismiss party plaintiffs on November 26, 2014. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on December 1, 2014. On March 16, 2015, the court (Judge Henry Edward Autrey) dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent supervision against the St. Louis County defendants, and dismissed one of the plaintiffs' claims for assault and battery. The court denied the Ferguson defendants' motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on May 27, 2015. This amended complaint included claims of six sets of plaintiffs. The Ferguson defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent supervision in the third amended complaint, and the court granted the motion to dismiss on June 25, 2015, using the same rationale under which those claims were dismissed as against the County defendants from the second amended complaint. The case was referred to alternative dispute resolution on August 28, 2015, and after a conference on December 1, 2015, the neutral mediator reported that the parties participated in good faith but did not reach a settlement. The parties continued discovery and began to prepare for a trial scheduled in September 2016. The Ferguson defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on April 7, 2016, and shortly after, the St. Louis defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Judge Autrey granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on September 30, 2016. The court found that the individual police defendants were entitled to official and qualified immunity from suit, and as the plaintiffs failed to establish that qualified immunity did not apply, the supervisory defendants and St. Louis County were also entitled to summary judgment. 2016 WL 8674192. A judgment in the case was entered in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Meanwhile in the district court, the parties engaged in some litigation regarding costs, which Judge Autrey awarded to the defendants on June 28, 2017. The Eighth Circuit (Judges Diana E. Murphy, James B. Loken, and Michael J. Melloy) issued its opinion on August 1, 2017. 865 F.3d 1064. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the claims of five of the six sets of plaintiffs. The Eight Circuit did reverse in part the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the excessive force claims of one plaintiff. The circuit court found that the district court erred in granting four individual police defendants qualified immunity with regard to the plaintiff's claims that officers had held his head underwater for three to five seconds, pepper sprayed him, and took turns punching and kicking him for two to three minutes. Though the district court had dismissed the excessive force claim after finding that medical evidence undermined the plaintiff's testimony as to these events, the circuit court found this a mischaracterization of the record and said it was a factual dispute to be resolved by a jury. The Eighth Circuit therefore reversed the grant of summary judgment on that plaintiff's \u00a7 1983 excessive force claim, as well as the grant of summary judgment on his \u00a7 1983 failure to train, supervise, and discipline claim against the St. Louis defendants as it relates to the remaining excessive force claim. The Eighth Circuit responded to a motion for clarification in an August 9, 2017 order, clarifying that the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Ferguson defendants on all claims. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings related to the remaining plaintiff's excessive force claims against four individual County of St. Louis police officers and the corresponding supervisory claims against the County of St. Louis. The plaintiffs filed petitions with the Eighth Circuit for rehearing en banc and rehearing by the panel; the Eighth Circuit denied the petitions for rehearing on September 11, 2017. In the district court, Judge Autrey scheduled the action for a jury trial on October 29, 2018; it was later rescheduled for February 4, 2019. Before trial started, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on September 4, 2018 alleging that there were no facts in dispute before trial. Judge Autrey disagreed with this assessment, saying that a jury would decide if the police department's actions amounted to a failure to supervise on January 31, 2019. The jury trial took place on its scheduled date. The jurors issued a verdict in favor of the defendants on February 8, 2019. The three-month period to file an appeal on the verdict has lapsed, and the case is closed.", "summary": "Several Missouri residents sued the City of Ferguson, Missouri, for acts allegedly perpetrated by Ferguson police officers in the wake of the civil unrest that followed the August 2014 shooting of Michael Brown. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the defendants on qualified immunity grounds in 2016. The plaintiffs appealed to the Eighth Circuit court of appeals, which affirmed the district court's ruling in part but reversed the grant of summary judgment on the excessive force claims of one plaintiff. A jury found in favor of the defendants at trial, and the case is closed."}
{"article": "This is one of four ongoing cases challenging the constitutionality of the New York Police Department's \"Stop and Frisk\" program. See: Floyd v. City of New York (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12021\">PN-NY-0009</a>); Daniels v. City of New York (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12023\">PN-NY-0010</a>); and Ligon v. City of New York (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12496\">PN-NY-0014</a>). On January 28, 2010, the plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York and the New York City Housing Authority. The plaintiffs included Black and Latino New York City Housing Authority tenants and their guests who were arrested while visiting. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, the Legal Aid Society, and the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory damages and attorney's fees and costs. The plaintiffs brought their claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000(d); the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 3601 et seq.; the United States Housing Act, 42, U.S.C. \u00a7 1437, et seq.; the Constitution and laws of the state of New York; and the New York City Human Rights Law. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the City of New York and the New York City Housing Authority (\"NYCHA\"), through the New York City Police Department (\"NYPD\"), maintained an unlawful patrol and trespass arrest policy that resulted in a pattern and practice of illegal stops, seizures, questioning, searches, and false arrests of residents of, and authorized visitors to, NYCHA residences. The NYPD conducted vertical patrols, which are top-to-bottom walk-through patrols or \"sweeps\" of hallways, stairwells, rooftops and landings, elevators, and other common areas of a NYCHA residence. The complaint alleged that the police stopped and questioned residents and their visitors without objective individualized suspicion of crime and unlawfully arrested them for trespass without probable cause. The plaintiffs further alleged that the trespass laws were being enforced in and around NYCHA residences on the basis of race, ethnicity, and/or national origin in an intentionally discriminatory manner, because the patrols focused on NYCHA residences, who were predominantly African American and Latino. According to the complaint, at least one resident of the building was arrested for \"trespass\" (although charges against him were never prosecuted). Numerous plaintiffs who were arrested for trespass while visiting building residents suffered negative employment effects due to their arrest and detention, including missed job interviews, suspension or limitation of employment, or full termination. Nine of the original eighteen plaintiffs accepted offers for settlement. (Four accepted on October 4, 2010 and five accepted on December 20, 2010). On May 4, 2011, the Court (Judge Shira A. Scheindlin) issued an order compelling the city to provide documents for discovery. The Court ordered the City to produce documents characterized as \"drafts of the training curriculum/training scenarios\" and as \"deliberations about substantiated CCRB complaints concerning the legality of stops and arrests on NYCHA properties,\" and to submit a more detailed privilege log with respect to other documents. On July 5, 2011, the Judge Scheindlin denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 812 F. Supp. 2d 333. On October 17, 2011, Judge Scheindlin awarded attorneys' fees and costs to those plaintiffs who had accepted settlement offers. Discovery battles ensued, and, in several opinions, Magistrate Judge Henry Pitman further compelled production of documents and Judge Scheindlin compelled the appearance of an Integrity Control Officer for deposition. On October 4, 2012, Judge Scheindlin granted in part and denied in part defendants' motions for summary judgment. This opinion adjudicated only the individual circumstances of plaintiffs' arrests and tenancies; it did not adjudicate defendants' practices and policies. The Court did not rule definitively on the Equal Protection claims against the City, the Title VI claims, the Fair Housing Act claims, the state and city law claims against NYCHA, nor the United States Housing Act claim against NYCHA because those issues required further briefing. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of NYCHA regarding the equal protection claims (because plaintiffs did not show that NYCHA was liable for the arrests), to the City on state and city human rights law violations, and to defendants on the substantive due process claims (because the Court found them duplicative). The court denied summary judgment on \u00a7 1981 claims regarding two plaintiffs and denied summary judgment on plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. On March 28, 2013, Judge Scheindlin granted in part and denied in part defendants' motions for summary judgement. This opinion granted NYCHA's motion for summary judgement on all remaining NYSC claims as well as granting summary judgement on the remaining race discrimination claims. The Court denied summary judgment on section 1981, FHA, Fourth Amendment, Equal Protection, and USHA claims. 959 F.Supp.2d 324. On August 29, 2013, Judge Scheindlin certified the \"Stopped Class\" and \"Resident Class\" under Rule 23(b)(2). 2013 WL 4712501. The parties entered into settlement talks. After two years, the parties finally reached a settlement agreement in January 2015. The NYPD agreed to revise their Patrol Guide on vertical (or interior) patrols in NYC public housing and the related NYPD training materials regarding vertical patrols and enforcement of NYCHA rules. The settlement also imposed a documentation requirement for all trespass arrests in NYC public housing, and modified certain NYCHA rules concerning residents\u2019 cooperation with police and the prohibited activity of \u201clingering.\u201d Upon final court approval, the Davis case would become part of the court monitoring process that was ordered in the lawsuit that successfully challenged the NYPD\u2019s stop-and-frisk policies (<i>Floyd v. City of New York</i>). This settlement would be overseen by the monitor as the one in <i>Floyd</i> and <i>Ligon</i>. On April 28, 2015, the court approved the settlement and retained jurisdiction of the case to enforce the settlement. On this day, the case was also transferred to Judge Torres, who was in charge of the other stop-and-frisk cases. see Floyd v. City of New York (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12021\">PN-NY-0009</a>) for the implementation and monitoring proceedings of the settlement agreements. On August 1, 2019, The parties filed a proposed stipulation and order to incorporate new terms into the settlement. According to the stipulation and order, issued by Judge Torres that same day, the new terms included, \"the duties of the Monitor and the Joint Remedial Process, for the purpose of enforcing the Stipulation of Settlement and Order as it pertains to reforms to the NYPD's practices that relate to trespass enforcement in or around NYCHA residences, including training, supervision, monitoring, and discipline of officers.\" On May 26, 2020, the Davis, Floyd, and Ligon plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for relief, alleging that the NYPD's discriminatory social-distancing enforcement practices in response to the COVID-19 outbreak in New York City violated the court's orders, the NYPD\u2019s Court-approved racial profiling policy, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. In their complaint, the plaintiffs cited a statistical analysis prepared by The Legal Aid Society showing that the police executed the the majority of arrests in predominantly Black and Latinx precincts, despite those precincts accounting for less than half of the social distancing complaints. Judge Torres denied the emergency motion on July 8. 2020 WL 3819566. She found that the COVID claims alleged by the plaintiffs did not \"fall squarely within the scope of the policies and practices adjudicated in this litigation.\" Further, Judge Torres noted that the plaintiffs' requested blanket injunction would interfere with lawful police enforcement. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "In January 2010, plaintiffs filed a class action suit against City of New York and the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) claiming claim that the city and NYCHA employed a pattern and practice of illegal stops, seizures, questioning, searches, and false arrests of residents of, and authorized visitors to, NYCHA residences. Nine plaintiffs settled, but nine remain. In 2015, the parties settled, and they are currently implementing the terms of the settlement."}
{"article": "On July 24, 2007, the fianc\u00e9e of Sean Bell, a 23-year-old black man fatally shot by the police on the night before his wedding, and two men harmed during the shooting, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988 against the City of New York and the New York City Police Department (NYPD). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for a jury trial and sought monetary damages. On November 25, 2006, Sean Bell departed a strip club in Queens with two friends at 4:00AM. The three men climbed into a car and Bell proceeded to drive. The car allegedly struck a police detective in the leg and hit a police van before five officers began to shoot at the car, firing over 50 bullets. The shooting resulted in the death of Sean Bell, as well as serious personal injuries to the two passengers. Bell's fianc\u00e9, as the adminstratrix of his estate, accused the police of wrongful death, assault, negligence and various civil rights violations. Specifically, she claimed that the police shot Bell without probable cause, that the shooting was performed negligently and recklessly, and that it was performed without reason or provocation. The NYPD's failure to adequately train these officers, combined with the officers' failure to observe existing police protocol, deprived the decedent of his Fourteenth Amendment privileges, namely: his right to due process of law, his right to liberty, his right to be free from excessive force, and most importantly, his right to life. With him in the car were two of Bell's friends, who survived the shooting and were placed under arrest. These plaintiffs sustained severe physical injuries as a result of the shooting, and alleged that the officers lacked probable cause to discharge their weapons and similarly lacked probable cause to place them under arrest. Claiming that the shooting was performed negligently and recklessly, and without reason or provocation, the plaintiffs stated that the officers deprived them of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process, liberty, and the right to be free from physical injury and unwarranted use of force. The plaintiffs also asserted that they were subjected to false arrest and imprisonment. All plaintiffs in the suit sought compensatory, exemplary, and punitive damages. After negotiations, the plaintiffs and defendants reached a settlement agreement. The parties agreed to dismiss the action against the defendants, with prejudice, but without costs, expenses, or attorneys' fees to exceed: $3.25 million to the administratrix of Bell's estate, and $3 million and $900,000 respectively to Bell's two friends that were injured in the shooting. The plaintiffs additionally agreed to release the defendants from any and all liability or claims that could have been alleged in this particular action. On October 6, 2010, Judge Roanne L. Mann entered a stipulation of the settlement and order of dismissal.", "summary": "Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C sections 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 against the City of New York and the New York City Police Department, for wrongful death, assault, and various civil rights violations. The lawsuit arose from the shooting of Sean Bell, a 23 year-old black man who departed a strip club with two friends late one evening. Upon getting into a car, a group of five police officers opened fire on the three men, killing Bell and severely injuring the other passengers. The parties reached a $7 million dollar settlement agreement and the suit was dismissed, with prejudice, upon the stipulation and order of Judge Roanne L. Mann (United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York)."}
{"article": "On behalf of the residents of New York, New York Attorney General Letitia James brought this lawsuit against the New York City Police Department on January 14, 2021 in the Southern District of New York. The complaint alleged that NYPD officers regularly used excessive force against and falsely arrested peaceful protesters exercising their First Amendment rights during the widespread racial justice protests that took place from May 28, 2020 to December 11, 2020. The plaintiff sued all defendants under 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983 alleging excessive force and unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as First Amendment violations. The Attorney General also brought claims under the New York State Constitution alleging excessive force, unlawful seizure, and violation of the freedom of the press. In addition, the complaint alleges that NYPD officers committed assault, battery, false arrest and imprisonment, and negligence under state law and that the NYPD failed to use reasonable care in the training, supervision, and retention of NYPD officers. Plaintiff alleged that the NYPD dispatched thousands of inadequately trained officers to the large-scale protests challenging police conduct and authority. It further alleged that those officers employed unconstitutional policing practices, including ramming protesters with police bicycles; striking protesters with batons and fists; indiscriminately pepper spraying protesters; shoving protesters to the ground and using chokeholds or kneeling on protesters; \u201ckettling\u201d protesters in order to deny them an opportunity to disperse and thereafter executing mass arrests; and arresting curfew-exempt essential workers, including legal observers, medics, and jail support providers. Additionally, plaintiff alleged that New York City failed to prevent or correct the NYPD\u2019s use of unconstitutional policing practices during the protests. Plaintiff sought declaratory relief as well as injunctive relief enjoining the NYPD from implementing or applying its unconstitutional policies or practices of employing excessive force, false arrests, and retaliatory tactics against New York residents who participated in the 2020 racial justice protests. Plaintiff also sought an order required the NYPD to change its policies and training procedures and monitoring to ensure its compliance. In addition, Plaintiff sought fees and any other relief the Court deemed just and proper. The case was related to <a href=\"https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=18092\"><i>Payne v. De Blasio</i></a> and assigned to Judge Colleen McMahon on January 19, 2021. Judge McMahon consolidated this case with three other police conduct cases (<i>Payne</i>, <a href=\"https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=18094\"><i>Sow v. City of New York</i></a>, and <a href=\"https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=18093\"><i>Wood v. De Blasio</i></a>) for pre-trial purposes. In early March, the Detectives Endowment Association of New York City and the Police Benevolent Association of the City of New York moved to intervene in the case. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 5, 2021, detailing additional specific incidents in support of their earlier allegations and further alleging that the NYPD interfered with the right of journalists, legal observers, and the public to observe and report upon police behavior. As of March 7, 2021, the case remains pending in the District Court with responsive pleadings due by March 26, 2021.", "summary": "New York Attorney General Letitia James filed this lawsuit against the NYPD on behalf of New York residents on January 14, 2021. The suit alleged that the NYPD regularly falsely arrested and used excessive force against peaceful protesters during the 2020 racial justice protests in violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. It also alleged violations of the New York State Constitution and state law, including instances of assault, battery, and false arrest and imprisonment by NYPD officers. The suit sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the NYPD cease unconstitutional policing practices and change its existing policies and training practices. As of March 7, 2021, the case is ongoing before the District Court."}
{"article": "In 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice opened an investigation into policing practices in Warren, Ohio. In March of 2006, the DOJ issued a findings letter advising the Warren Police Department (WPD) to revise and update its policies and procedures to be consistent and comprehensive. The DOJ found that many officers did not follow WPD's policies, and among other things suggested that WPD revise its policies governing use of force and retrain its officers on its body-cavity and strip search policies. On January 13, 2012, the Department of Justice filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against the City of Warren, Ohio, and its police department. The United States, represented by the Department of Justice, brought the action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141 and asked the court for a declaratory judgment that Warren Police Department's (\"WPD\") policing practices--especially the use of excessive force--infringed on individuals' constitutionally-protected rights. The United States also requested an order that the WPD cease such practices by implementing policies to remedy their transgressive effect. According to the complaint, the WPD's failure to implement adequate policies to guide, train, supervise, and monitor its officers resulted in a pattern of conduct involving the use of excessive force. The complaint also included allegations that the WPD's policy governing the intake and investigation of complaints was inadequate and, furthermore, that it had failed to adequately review incidents involving the use of force and discipline officers who engaged in misconduct. The parties quickly reached a settlement, which the Court (Judge Benita Y. Pearson) approved January 26, 2012. The agreement required the WPD to adopt new protocols involving the use a force, develop procedures to document and evaluate uses of force, institute systems for tracking and investigating citizens' complaints, and implement training encompassing constitutional policing. In addition, the DOJ reserved the right to monitor the WPD's compliance with the agreement, and the Court retained jurisdiction for at least two years to ensure compliance. On July 3, 2019, the U.S. filed a motion stating that WPD had \"faithfully and fully\" complied with the requirements of the settlement agreement. The parties filed a joint motion to terminate the settlement agreement. Judge Pearson granted the motion on August 12, 2019. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Following an eight-year investigation, the United States DOJ filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141 against the City of Warren, Ohio and its police department. The United States alleged that the Warren Police Department had engaged in a pattern of conduct involving the use of excessive force. The parties reached a quick, court-approved settlement that required the WPD to adopt new protocols and procedures. The court terminated the decree in August 2019 after the U.S. determined that the WPD fully complied with the settlement."}
{"article": "Thirteen demonstrators protesting George Floyd's murder sued the city of Columbus, Ohio and various other officers in their official and individual capacities for allegedly using excessive force. The lawsuit, filed on July 8, 2020, alleged that police officers used pepper spray and rubber bullets among other methods without giving warning to the protestors. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging violations of their First Amendment right to assemble and their Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, as well as state law claims of gross negligence, battery, and malicious prosecution. The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief enjoining defendants from using similar conduct in the future, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Algenon Marbley. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on September 16, 2020. They added more individual named plaintiffs and also added another state law claim. About two months later, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from using non-lethal force such as tear gas, flash-bang grenades, or batons on nonviolent protestors. On April 30, 2021, Judge Marbley granted the preliminary injunction. 2021 WL 1725554. In a lengthy opinion that began by recounting how \"formal policing took its earliest form in slave patrols,\" Judge Marbley enjoined the defendants from using non-lethal force (including tear gas, flash-bang grenades, rubber bullets, batons, etc.) to disperse non-violent protestors. Instead, defendants could only use citations or arrests. The defendants were also ordered to ensure that their body cameras were in good working order. As of May 25, the case remains ongoing.", "summary": "Individual plaintiffs sued the city of Columbus, Ohio and multiple police officers after protesting the murder of George Floyd. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force to infringe upon their freedom to assemble."}
{"article": "This class action lawsuit was filed on June 28, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The case was brought by members of the media and legal observers against the City of Portland and sixty unnamed Portland Police Bureau (PPB) officers amidst the protests that followed the police killing of George Floyd. Plaintiffs were represented by the ACLU Foundation of Oregon. The complaint alleged that PPB had a pattern of targeting and retaliating against journalists and neutral observers. The complaint alleged that defendants' actions were violations of the First and Fourth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well provisions of the Oregon state constitution that protect free speech and free assembly. They sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, including punitive damages. They also sought attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Anna J. Brown, but then reassigned to Judge Michael H. Simon shortly thereafter. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) on the last day of June, and the court granted it in part a few days later. The TRO ordered that neither PPB nor anyone operating with the PPB would be allowed to arrest a media reporter unless they had suspicion that the individual had committed a crime. It also made clear that orders to disperse were not to apply to reporters and observers, but that reporters and observers were to wear signs that signaled they were part of the protected class. Furthermore, police were not to seize equipment or press passes from reporters or legal observers. The order lasted two weeks. On July 10, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint, which asserted the same allegations, but adding several plaintiffs (including Index Newspapers). Nearly a week later, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to submit a second amended complaint, this time adding as defendants the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Marshal Services (USMS). Again, the claims for relief did not change. Additionally, the plaintiffs and defendant City of Portland stipulated to a preliminary injunction that had the same terms as the TRO, set to expire on October 30. They also filed a motion for a TRO against the DHS and USMS with more or less the same arguments and requests that were made against the PPB in their TRO. The federal defendants submitted a memo a few days later arguing against the TRO, claiming that the plaintiffs did not have standing, were unlikely to succeed on the merits, could not demonstrate irreparable harm, and that the balance of equities did not weigh in the plaintiffs' favor. To make things even more interesting, the City of Portland also filed a memo in support of the TRO against the federal officers, an indication of the City's exasperation with the federal presence. Finally, on July 22, the plaintiffs filed a rebuttal to the DHS's and USMS's memo in opposition to the TRO. The next day, Judge Simon granted the TRO against the federal defendants, with the same provisions as the TRO against the PPB. 2020 WL 4220820. Then, on July 28, the plaintiffs submitted a motion asking the court to find the DHS and U.S. Marshals in contempt of court and to issue sanctions over alleged violations of the terms of the TRO. According to the motion (and <a href=\"https://lawandcrime.com/high-profile/federal-agents-shoot-portland-reporter-hours-after-judge-issues-restraining-order-to-protect-journalists-during-protests/\">several media reports</a>), federal agents shot at journalists mere hours after the TRO was issued. Meanwhile, the federal defendants filed a motion asking the court to reconsider the TRO. On August 10, the plaintiffs submitted a motion for a preliminary injunction. The motion was partially redacted to the public, in accordance with a stipulated protective order signed earlier that week. The motion for a preliminary injunction had more or less the same arguments as the motion for the TRO, granted a few weeks prior. On August 20, Judge Simon granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 4883017. In granting the order, Judge Simon made clear that the order did not give journalists or legal observers special privileges to not comply with otherwise lawful orders. The federal defendants did not claim that they had the right to declare a riot; that right was left to the PPB. However, the plaintiffs and the city had already stipulated that the PPB would not arrest any journalist or legal observer for failing to disperse. So the question was whether the federal defendants had the authority to arrest journalists and legal observers outside of federal property. Judge Simon found that they did not, and so the federal agents were in violation of the law when they arrested journalists and legal observers in areas far from the federal property. The federal defendants appealed this decision to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals on August 21 and submitted a motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal on August 24. The motion to stay was denied by Judge Simon on August 25, but the 9th Circuit entered an administrative stay pending resolution of the emergency motion on August 28, finding that the defendant-appellants had a high likelihood of success on the merits and that not granting the stay would cause irreparable harm. Meanwhile, on September 4, the City of Portland and the plaintiffs filed an amendment to the stipulated preliminary injunction. The amendment added language saying that \"No Journalist or Legal Observer protected under this Order may impede, block, or physically prevent the lawful activities of the Police.\" The stipulation was signed that day by Judge Simon. On September 21, the federal defendants submitted a motion to dismiss, arguing that the case against them should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. They also requested that the court stay discovery requests until the motion was decided. Two days later, the plaintiffs and defendant City of Portland submitted an amended stipulated preliminary injunction, which simply extended the time in which the injunction was in effect until the Court reached a decision on the merits. On October 9, the 9th Circuit denied the defendant-appellants' emergency motion for a stay pending appeal and lifted the administrative stay entered earlier in August. 977 F.3d 817. The 9th Circuit issued a 76 page opinion finding that the federal defendants did not show a strong likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal. In addition, the federal defendants failed to show that they are likely to suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction was not stayed pending appeal. Back in the district court, the parties continued briefing on the federal defendants' motion to dismiss. In early December, the plaintiffs and defendant City of Portland entered another stipulation in lieu of contempt motion. The plaintiffs alleged that the City of Portland violated the preliminary injunction by arresting, threatening, and assaulting observers and journalists, as well as preventing observers and journalists from filming protesting activities. The City agreed to investigate the allegations and remove certain officers from public-order policing duty. The case is ongoing as of December 31, 2020.", "summary": "This class-action lawsuit was filed on June 28, 2020 in response to Portland Police Bureau's allegedly illegal tactics in quelling the protests in that city after the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. The plaintiffs, who were members of media and legal observers of the protests, argued that their First Amendment and Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the PPB's use of pepper spray and rubber bullets, among other weapons. They sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. The court granted a TRO against the city, prohibiting the police from arresting or seizing the equipment of reporters or legal observers of the protests. The court later granted a preliminary injunction against the city. By July 16, President Trump had sent in federal officers from the DHS and USMS as reinforcement. The plaintiffs added those two organizations as defendants and filed a motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction. The motion for temporary restraining order and the motion for preliminary injunction were both granted. These decisions were appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has yet to rule on them. However, on October 9, the Ninth Circut declined to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal. The federal defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which remains pending. The case is ongoing as of December 31, 2020."}
{"article": "On March 4, 2003, plaintiff, an indigent resident of Philadelphia incarcerated for failure to pay traffic fines, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and all those similarly situated in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, against the City of Philadelphia. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, alleged that defendant's practices, resulting in the incarceration of indigent residents that failed to pay traffic fines violated the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the practices violated the plaintiffs' rights, an injunction enjoining the alleged practices, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that his and others' rights were violated by the City's practice of arresting individuals for alleged Motor Vehicle Code violations and then subjecting them to incarceration following Philadelphia Traffic Court proceedings conducted without the assistance of counsel, notice of specific charges against them, opportunity to prepare a defense, cross-examine witnesses, or offer evidence on their own behalf. The plaintiff and other members of the class were allegedly not released until they paid substantial amounts of money to satisfy fines levied against them. On March 18, 2003, the District Court (Judge Timothy J. Savage) ordered that no defendant brought before The Philadelphia Traffic Court shall be ordered incarcerated for failure to post bail or security pending a trial at which the defendant shall be afforded the right to counsel and shall be advised of his or her right to appeal to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. On June 11, 2003, the parties submitted a settlement agreement. Subsequently, on July 8, 2003, the District Court (Judge Savage) issued a settlement order resolving the case. The settlement order, pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement, certified the proposed class solely as to the issues of declaratory and injunctive relief and acknowledged that the parties had engaged in serious, good faith negotiations relating to the establishment of procedures to resolve the issues related to the class action. More specific terms of the settlement agreement are not readily available.", "summary": "Class action filed on March 4, 2003 alleging that the City of Philadelphia engaged in a practice of arresting indigent alleged traffic code violators and subjecting them to incarceration until substantial fines were paid on the basis of Philadelphia Traffic Court proceedings conducted without the assistance of counsel, notice of specific charges, opportunity to prepare a defense, cross-examine witnesses, or offer evidence on their own behalf. The District Court ( Judge Timothy J. Savage) enjoined the City of Philadelphia from incarcerating alleged traffic code violators without giving them notice of their right to counsel and appeal to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. Subsequently the parties settled plaintiffs' claims, stipulating to class certification."}
{"article": "On June 29, 2020, six named plaintiffs filed this class-action lawsuit against the city of Pittsburgh and various elected and police officials in the Western District of Pennsylvania. The case was assigned to Judge Cathy Bissoon. The plaintiffs were non-violent protesters who gathered to protest police brutality in the wake of George Floyd's murder. They the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police attacked them during these protests with flash-bang grenades, rubber bullets and tear gas. The plaintiffs argued that these actions violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech and assembly and also constituted malicious prosecution in retaliation for constitutionally protected speech. Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants' actions violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force and unlawful arrest. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief stating that these practices were unlawful as well as injunctive relief to prevent the defendants from continuing the practices in the future. The plaintiffs also sought compensatory damages, attorneys' fees and costs as appropriate. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan. She recommended that the claims against the Mayor of Pittsburgh be dismissed, 2021 WL 1391761, and the court adopted this recommendation. 2021 WL 1390492. Magistrate Judge Lenihan then referred the case to mediation and appointed David B. White as the mediator. As of May 26, 2021, the case remains ongoing.", "summary": "Six named plaintiffs filed a class-action lawsuit against the city of Pittsburgh and various elected officials and police officials alleging that actions taken against non-violent protestors constituted violations of their First and Fourth Amendment rights."}
{"article": "On April 7, 2008, twelve individuals, all represented by private counsel, filed a civil rights lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Rhode Island against the town of Coventry and individual members of the town's police force (Police). Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law alleging denial of due process and equal protection, unreasonable search and seizure, invasion of privacy, racial profiling and race/national origin intimidation. Specifically, plaintiffs, Hispanic members of the Central Falls High School boys soccer team, claimed that they were treated improperly when traveling to Coventry, a predominately white neighborhood, for a high school soccer game. When the game was over, members of the home team stopped the Central Falls coach and accused his team of stealing electronic devices from the locker room. The coach searched his players' bags but found nothing. The police arrived on the scene, blocking the team's bus, and asked the coach if they could search the players. The coach consented. The police searched the boys' property as members of the Coventry community looked on and shouted racist epithets and accused the boys of theft. The search lasted approximately one hour and none of the allegedly stolen items were found. On September 9, 2009, the district court (Judge William Smith) granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court held that the plaintiffs could not overcome qualified immunity in their claims. On the Fourth Amendment claim, the court found plaintiffs' case to be insufficient to overcome qualified immunity because the police officers did not violate the plaintiffs' clearly established rights, because the coach may have been acting in loco parentis when he consented to the police officers' request to search members of the team and their belongings. The court also held that the plaintiffs' invasion of privacy claim arose out of conduct for which the police officers were immune from suit. On the Equal Protection claim, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that the officers had a racial motive, even if they exhibited poor judgment in searching the boys in front of an angry crowd; for the same reasons, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs' state racial profiling claim. Finally, the court held there was insufficient evidence for plaintiffs' claim of supervisory and municipal liability. Plaintiffs appealed to the First Circuit. On April 1, 2011, the Circuit Court (Chief Judge Lynch, Judge Selya, and Judge Thompson) upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment. The appellate court found that the officers' conduct was subject to qualified immunity. As to the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment and state privacy claims, the court found that it was not unreasonable for the officers to consider the coach's consent to search the team. The court also held that the plaintiffs could not overcome qualified immunity on their equal protection and state discrimination claims.", "summary": "Plaintiffs, individual Hispanic members of a high school soccer team, sued police officers and the City of Coventry based on police search of the team after an away soccer game. Plaintiffs alleged Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection claims in violation of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 as well as a number of analogous state law claims. On September 9, 2009, the district court granted summary judgment for defendants on all of plaintiffs' claims, and on April 1, 2011, the First Circuit affirmed."}
{"article": "On February 22, 2017, four plaintiffs filed suit against the City of Memphis, Tennessee in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee for violating their First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs all found themselves on a \u201cblack list\u201d created by the Memphis Police Department. They argued that the police department created the \u201cblack list,\u201d which consisted of 81 individuals, by recording video protests of City Hall. The black list appeared to denote the individuals who the police determined required police escorts to monitor them in City Hall. The plaintiffs also claimed that police officers bought and used software to monitor various social media sites for subversive conversations. The plaintiffs claimed the creation and maintenance of this black list violated their First Amendment rights and contradicted a prior consent decree from <i>Kendrick v. Chandler</i>. The plaintiffs sought an order to dissolve the black list and an injunction to prevent the creation of lists in the future, an order to show cause why the defendants disregarded the order, an order to find the defendant in contempt of court, monetary damages, and costs and attorneys' fees. The Kendrick Decree resulted from a previous lawsuit in 1978. Kendrick, et al. v. Chandler, et al., Civil Action No. 2:76-CV-00449 (W.D. Tenn. 1978). The plaintiffs in <i>Kendrick</i>, including the American Civil Liberties Union of West Tennessee (WTCLU), filed a class action against the Mayor of Memphis, the Chief of Police in Memphis, and other officials within the Memphis Police Department. They sought, and were granted, an order preventing defendants from violating the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs claimed that the Memphis Police Department, through a Domestic Intelligence Unit, collected unverified information about individuals they believed were engaging in subversive activities or promoting controversial political views. The plaintiffs alleged that none of the activities monitored by the Domestic Intelligence Unit were criminal, but instead the Domestic Intelligence Unit used the information to harass and intimidate the plaintiffs. The Kendrick Decree enjoined the defendants and City of Memphis from infringing on any individuals' First Amendment Rights. The defendants could not record any information from individuals engaged in lawful demonstrations or maintain files on individuals for reasons that did not serve criminal investigations. Importantly, the order defined the City of Memphis to include all present <i>and future</i> officials, employees, and agents of the city. In response to the plaintiff's 2017 complaint citing to the Kendrick Decree, the City of Memphis filed a motion to dismiss the claim, arguing the court did not have the subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce the Kendrick Decree. The following day, ACLU Tennessee moved to intervene, and the court immediately granted the motion. The ACLU-TN sought similar relief as the plaintiffs\u2014an order of contempt for violation of the Kendrick Decree, injunctive relief, and costs and attorneys' fees. On March 8, 2017, following the intervention of the ACLU-TN, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the ACLU-TN based on the same subject-matter argument it had deployed against the original four plaintiffs. On June 30, 2017, Judge Jon Phipps McCalla granted the defendant's motion to dismiss against the original four named-plaintiffs, but denied the motion to dismiss the ACLU's claim. The court found that it retained subject-matter jurisdiction over the Kendrick Decree because the injunction did not have a termination date and applied to future employees of the City of Memphis. However, the court determined that the four original plaintiffs did not have standing because prior case law in the Sixth Circuit expressed that third-party beneficiaries of a consent decree lacked standing to enforce its terms. Since the ACLU-TN is a successor to The American Civil Liberties Union of West Tennessee, Inc. (WTCLU), an original party in <i>Kendrick</i>, it had standing to raise the claim. The four original plaintiffs sought a final order to appeal their dismissal to the Sixth Circuit. But the district court did not grant the final order. The plaintiffs filed their appeal anyway, which the Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on January 17, 2018. Meanwhile, the suit between the ACLU-TN and the defendants continued. At the end of discovery, both the ACLU-TN and the City of Memphis filed motions to dismiss. On August 10, 2018, the court granted the ACLU-TN's motion in part. The court found that the City had been engaged in political intelligence as defined by the Kendrick Decree. However, it determined a genuine dispute still existed over whether the City engaged in action for the purpose of violating any person's First Amendment rights and whether the City operated in any way for the purpose of political intelligence. The court denied the City's motion to dismiss, finding that a genuine dispute still existed over the standing of the ACLU-TN. The bench trial, held from August 20 to August 23, 2018, confirmed that the ACLU-TN had standing to bring the suit because it was a party to the original decree. Additionally, the court found the City had violated the decree by collecting information for the purpose of political intelligence and dedicating an office to do so. The City also failed to review investigations that could result in the collecting of information related to the First Amendment, including recordings of protest attendees to maintain a record. And, the City failed to train its officers on the content of the Decree. In particular, units of the Memphis Police Department investigated people associated with the Black Lives Matter movement and other political groups because of their protected political speech. As a result of the trial, the court granted ACLU-TN attorneys' fees. It required training of officers to detail that political intelligence\u2014\u201cany investigation into the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights, even if the investigating officer or unit does not have a partisan political motive\u201d\u2014could never be a permissible goal of an investigation. The court ordered the City to create new guidelines and training for officers engaging in investigations that might result in political intelligence by January 14, 2019. It also compelled the City to create a manual for social media searches and submit a list of all search terms entered into social media sites every three months to the court until ordered otherwise. Judge McCalla also determined that an independent monitor should assess compliance with the Decree. Both parties offered candidates to be independent monitors for the case moving forward. On December 21, 2018, the court appointed the defendant's candidate, former U.S. Attorney Edward Stanton III, as the independent monitor of this case. As required by the order, the City submitted a new set of training policies on January 14, 2019. The ACLU-TN filed objections to those policies, and the court asked the Monitor to investigate further. On April 5, 2019 the Monitor filed his first report, in which he mostly agreed with the ACLU-TN's criticism of the City's training measures but also accepted the City's proposed solutions to many of the issues raised by the ACLU-TN. Judge McCalla held a hearing on the matter on April 23, 2019. On May 2, 2019, the Monitor filed his first quarterly report. In it, he assessed that, to date, the City was on track to become compliant with the consent decree. He also outlined plans for soliciting public opinion on the City's practices. On August 7, 2019 the Monitor filed his second quarterly report under seal with the court. The court held a hearing to address the report on August 27, 2019. In a September 5 order following the hearing, Judge McCalla noted that the Monitor's next steps were creating and implementing a compliance plan for the City, as well as creating community focus groups. Additionally, the report said that the City and the Monitor were working to create a new social media investigations policy for the Police Department. The City the filed a motion to modify the consent decree on September 25, 2019, which the ACLU-TN opposed. In its motion, the city argued that several provisions of the decree hindered its ability to conduct law enforcement functions, including by preventing it from entering into partnerships with state and federal agencies. Judge McCalla denied this motion in a November 13, 2019 opinion, finding that the modifications requested by defendants would erode the purpose of the original consent decree but allowed for the possibility of modifications after discovery and an evidentiary hearing. On November 20, 2019, the Monitor filed his third quarterly report with the court. In it, he reported that a compliance plan had been created and was being implemented. He also noted that he received many requests for community members to be included as members of the monitoring team and opined that the creation of a civilian advisory board might be useful in this case. On December 6, 2020, the parties filed a schedule for discovery and trial on the modifications to the consent decree, with June 17, 2020 chosen for the trial, which the court adopted in a January 2, 2020 hearing. The City submitted its new social media policy to the court for review on December 21, 2019, to which both the ACLU-TN and the Monitor objected. Judge McCalla also heard objections to this policy during the January 2, 2020 hearing on modifications to the consent decree and allowed the City to respond to these objections in writing. In a February 28, 2020 letter, the Monitor informed the court that he believed the City had violated one of the sanctions imposed on it by failing to maintain records of social media search terms. The court scheduled a hearing in mid March to resolve this issue, but it was delayed to May 14, 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In an August 19, 2020 order, the court found that the Memphis Police Department had failed to report searches made by officers using their personal Facebook accounts. On April 17, 2020, the City asked the court to order mediation between itself and the ACLU-TN in order to narrow the issues for the June 17, 2020 hearing. The court authorized the Monitor to mediate between the two parties in an April 28, 2020 order. The Monitor filed the first quarterly report of 2020 on May 20, 2020. In it, the Monitor reported that many of the case's outstanding issues remained unresolved, including the approval of the City's new social media policy, the City's alleged sanctions violations, and the Monitor's solicitation of feedback from the public. In advance of the June 17 hearing, both the City and the ACLU-TN filed trial briefs and, on June 8, 2020, submitted proposed changes to the consent decree. Between June 17 and 22, 2020, Judge McCalla presided over a four day evidentiary hearing over Zoom to consider the modifications to the consent decree. After the hearing, both sides provided the court with additional briefing on the proposed modifications. Judge McCalla resolved the City's motion to modify the consent decree in a September 21, 2020 hearing. He found that there was sufficient evidence to support the changes to the decree agreed to by the City and the ACLU-TN. However, he refused to make the changes the City requested unilaterally, which related to the City's ability to work with outside law enforcement agencies who were not bound by the decree. Judge McCalla found that the City's issues with the contested provisions could be resolved by better training and that the provisions did not affect the Memphis Police Department's existing relationships with other law enforcement agencies. Judge McCalla then issued an updated judgment and consent decree. The City appealed Judge McCalla's ruling to the Sixth Circuit on November 3, 2020 (No. 20-6263). As of April 6, 2021, the appeal is fully briefed, but there has been no decision. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "Four residents of Memphis and the ACLU-TN sought enforcement of the Kendrick Decree against the City of Memphis. They claimed the City and its police force collected information in violation of the First Amendment right to peacefully protest. The four original plaintiffs were dismissed for lack of standing, but the ACLU-TN ultimately received court enforcement of the Decree against the City. A federal court found that the City violated its obligations under the consent decree after a 2018 trial and later, in 2020, rejected the City's request for the decree to be modified. The decree remains in effect while the city appeals that decision."}
{"article": "In March 2004, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated an investigation of the Virgin Islands Police Department (VIPD) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141. On October 5, 2005, the DOJ issued a technical assistance letter to the department which made recommendations regarding specific changes to the department's policies in the following areas: use of force, vehicle pursuits, holding cells, misconduct investigations, discipline, supervisory oversight, and training. On December 23, 2008, the DOJ filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141 against the VIPD. The DOJ sought both injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming that the Virgin Islands government, though its actions and omissions, was engaging in a pattern or practice of subjecting individuals to the use of excessive force. Simultaneously, the parties submitted a proposed consent decree to settle the case. U.S. District Judge Curtis V. Gomez approved the consent decree on March, 24, 2009. The Decree detailed specific actions to be taken by VIPD regarding evaluation, documentation, and review of use of force incidents; citizen complaint procedures; management and supervision; and training. On June 29, 2010, Judge Gomez allowed an amendment to the Consent Decree to make slight modifications to the monitoring timetable. On December 9, 2010, the Office of the Independent Monitor, from the firm Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, LLP, began filing regular progress/compliance reports. Due to VIPD's slow progress toward achieving compliance, on November 2, 2012, Judge Gomez adopted a jointly-proposed Action Plan, which aimed to set realistic and achievable compliance deadlines, and incorporated its deadlines into the Consent Decree. Judge Gomez also eliminated the bright-line deadline in the original Consent Decree, and amended it to provide that the Consent Decree would only expire after the VIPD had maintained substantial compliance with its terms for a period of two years. The Action Plan included particular scheduling details for when VIPD officers would receive trainings for vehicle-pursuit and spike-strip policies as well as deadlines for training its internal risk assessment team related to use of excessive force. After the VIPD requested and received multiple extensions on compliance related to specific training objectives, the parties filed a joint motion to amend the Action Plan and Consent Decrees on October 1, 2013. In their proposed amendment to the Action Plan, the parties recognized that VIPD required additional time in order to build the infrastructure in training, policies, and supervisory personnel requisite to achieve compliance. However, before Judge Gomez could rule on the motion, the VIPD failed to meet the deadlines it had outlined in the proposed amendment. As such, the parties supplemented their motion to amend, and on February 25, 2014, Judge Gomez held a hearing on the proposed amendment. At the hearing, Judge Gomez noted that the VIPD leadership had continually promised to meet new deadlines and yet had failed to do so. Judge Gomez suggested that the parties instead target meaningful and achievable quarterly goals, with quarterly hearings on the compliance status of each of these goals. On March 7, 2014, the VIPD filed a notice of their proposed quarterly goals. On April 30, 2014, Judge Gomez issued an order adopting these goals, and struck the Action Plan from the Consent Decree, instead adopting a provision for quarterly goals and compliance hearings. The order was amended on May 22 to make minor adjustments to this provision. On July 10, 2015, the parties filed a joint motion to amend the Consent Decree with respect to the timing of the Independent Monitor's reports. On August 21, Judge Gomez ordered appropriate amendments to the Consent Decree to facilitate the preparation of more accurate and complete quarterly reports. On Aug. 25, the monitor submitted a status report indicating that no part of the VIPD had reached full compliance with any part of the consent decree, though the VIPD had strengthen its infrastructure for achieving compliance. A status report filed on May 20, 2016 indicated substantial compliance had been reached with regard to some of the consent decree provisions. A year later, in May 2017, the monitor filed a status report with similar findings. On Feb. 15, 2018, the monitor filed a status report indicating that hurricanes in the fall of 2017 had slowed down progress, and that full compliance had not yet been reached. Pursuant to enforcement of the consent decree, the independent monitoring team submitted quarterly reports on VIPD's compliance, and the parties each submitted monthly status reports. At a hearing on June 26, 2018, Judge Gomez advised the appointment of two independent experts to identify outstanding issues with VIPD\u2019s compliance and provide recommendations for substantial compliance. The court ordered the parties to identify potential experts. On July 6, 2018, two experts, one for police practices and one for efficient governmental administration and policy implementation, were appointed. The experts were ordered to submit a report recommending specific steps to be undertaken by the VIPD to achieve substantial compliance with the consent decree. A joint report by the parties on September 18 indicated that VIPD had already implemented many of the recommendations, with several remaining to be implemented which was addressed in a jointly proposed order. On October 5, 2018, the court ordered subsequent reports to include VIPD\u2019s efforts to implement expert recommendations on its quarterly reports, and monitoring continued. The parties submitted a notice for a joint position on proposed changes to the structure of the monitoring team due to ongoing medical issues affecting the independent monitor on May 10, 2019. The case was reassigned to Judge Robert A. Molloy on May 8, 2020. The enforcement of the Consent Decree is still in progress.", "summary": "In March 2004, the Department of Justice (DOJ) opened an investigation into the Virgin Islands Police Department's (VIPD) practices regarding use of excessive force, and on December 23, 2008, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands. On March 24, 2009, the parties signed a consent decree, detailing specific actions to be taken by VIPD. Enforcement of the consent decree is in progress."}
{"article": "On May 28, 2014, approximately 125 police officers from the Seattle Police Department (SPD) brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The case was assigned to Judge Marsha J. Pechman. The plaintiffs each individually sued the U.S. Department of Justice and the City of Seattle, including the SPD and the Seattle Police Monitor Team, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 for their roles in implementing Seattle\u2019s new use of force policy (UF policy). The new UF policy limited police officers\u2019 ability to use force against civilians without repercussions, and the plaintiffs argued that this policy violated their constitutional rights under the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, they alleged that the policy violated their constitutional right to self-defense, as well as Due Process and Equal Protection. Initially representing themselves pro se, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, damages, and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. On August 21, 2014, the City of Seattle moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. It alleged that the plaintiffs had misunderstood both what their constitutional rights were and what the new UF policy did, as the officers\u2019 claims were not supported by the U.S. Constitution or by case law. On the same day, the Seattle Police Monitor Team filed a motion to dismiss the case because the members of the monitor team had quasi-judicial immunity. The monitors were appointed by the court as part of a consent decree from an earlier settlement in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12295\"><i>United States v. City of Seattle</i></a> regarding the SPD\u2019s excessive use of force. So, the monitors argued, they could not be considered part of the city the way that the SPD could. Six days after the motions were filed, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that added new factual allegations about the policy and removed those plaintiffs that no longer wished to litigate. The amended complaint emphasized the idea of constitutional self-defense as a right embedded in several amendments rather than stated outright. In September 2014, the defendants filed two motions to dismiss offering arguments similar to those found in the motions to dismiss the original complaint. On October 9, the court held oral arguments on the issue. The plaintiffs also obtained private counsel during this month. On October 17, 2014, the court granted both motions to dismiss. Because the complaint had already been amended once and amending it further would be \u201cfutile,\u201d Judge Pechman dismissed the case with prejudice. 62 F.Supp.3d 1215. The court held that the monitor team had quasi-judicial immunity and, even without it, the plaintiffs\u2019 claims betrayed their misunderstanding regarding what their constitutional rights were, and the constitutional right to self-defense did not exist; the plaintiffs had failed to allege that any of the defendants had violated their rights. On November 14, 2014, the plaintiffs appealed the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision nearly three years later, on September 19, 2017, finding that neither the case law nor the constitution entitled the plaintiffs to self-defense. 871 F.3d 873. On December 28, 2017, the plaintiffs petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to hear this case. On April 2, 2018, their petition was denied. The plaintiffs exhausted their options for appealing this case, and it is now closed.", "summary": "In May 2014, approximately 125 police officers from the Seattle Police Department (SPD) brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs alleged that SPD's new policy that limited the amount of force they could use on civilians was a violation of their constitutional right to self-defense. The court dismissed the case in October 2017, holding that there was no constitutional right to self-defense. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the holding."}
{"article": "On May 22, 2020, a Nevada church filed this lawsuit against the Governor of Nevada, challenging the state\u2019s restrictions on congregational worship during the COVID-19 pandemic. Represented by the Alliance Defending Freedom, the church filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. The case was assigned to Judge Larry R. Hicks; when he recused himself, the case was reassigned to Chief Judge Miranda M. Du, and later, based on relatedness to <i>Calvary Chapel Lone Mountain v. Sisolak</i>, to Judge Richard F. Boulware, II. In its complaint, the church alleged that the governor\u2019s ban on gathering was unconstitutional. The governor had prohibited public gatherings of 10 or more people, including worship gatherings. However, numerous types of businesses were exempt, and allowed to operate at 50% capacity: restaurants, nail salons, barbershops, and others. When the church filed an amended complaint on May 28, 2020, the governor\u2019s order had been amended: up to 50 people could gather to worship, but the list of businesses allowed to operate at 50% capacity had grown to include gyms, bars, swimming pools, museums, casinos, malls, and bowling alleys. For many of these businesses (particularly casinos), 50% capacity meant groups of several hundred. The church questioned the logic of allowing gatherings of hundreds at casinos in Las Vegas while restricting worship, under threat of criminal and civil penalties, in remote and rural Lyon County. (The Sheriff of Lyon County, also named as a defendant in the lawsuit, supported the church\u2019s position of opposition to the governor\u2019s statewide orders.) Additionally, state officials had declined to enforce the gathering ban on large groups of police violence protestors; the governor had publicly supported and encouraged such protests. The church alleged that the facial non-neutrality of the orders, and the state\u2019s inconsistent enforcement of those orders, amounted to a violation of the church\u2019s First Amendment rights of assembly, speech, and free exercise. It sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. On May 28, 2020, after unsuccessful attempts to persuade the governor to amend his orders, the church filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order, seeking to be allowed to gather on Sunday, May 31 for Pentecost Sunday. The court (Chief Judge Miranda M. Du) denied the motion the following day, concluding that it was unreasonable for the church to submit an emergency motion one business day before its desired meeting on Pentecost. The court also denied the church\u2019s emergency motion for reconsideration. Two weeks later, on June 11, 2020, the court (now Judge Richard F. Boulware, II) denied the church\u2019s motions for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, finding that the church had not succeeded in demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits. 2020 WL 4260438. The church appealed to the Ninth Circuit on June 15, 2020, seeking an injunction pending appeal. The Ninth Circuit denied this motion on July 2. 2020 WL 4274901. The church then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, seeking an injunction while the appeal proceeded in the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court denied the request on July 24, 2020, over three dissents by four members of the court. 140 S. Ct. 2603. In one dissent, Justice Gorsuch stated that \u201cThe world we inhabit today, with a pandemic upon us, poses unusual challenges. But there is no world in which the Constitution permits Nevada to favor Caesars Palace over Calvary Chapel.\u201d The church\u2019s appeal is pending in the Ninth Circuit.", "summary": "A rural Nevada church brought this lawsuit against the Governor of Nevada on May 22, 2020, alleging that the governor\u2019s COVID-19 gathering ban was a violation of the church\u2019s First Amendment rights. The district court denied the church\u2019s motions for preliminary injunctive relief; the church appealed this denial to the Ninth Circuit. Both the Ninth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court denied motions for injunction pending the Ninth Circuit\u2019s appeal; as of August 6, 2020, the appeal is pending in the Ninth Circuit."}
{"article": "On Mar. 16, 2017, the New York Times and its reporter Charlie Savage brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiffs sought disclosure of agency records by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), a component of DOJ which reviews all Executive Orders for form and legality and reviews legal questions raised by other parts of the executive branch. Specifically, plaintiffs sought the disclosure of records related to OLC reviews of: 1. All emails, memos, and other documents related to OLC review of proposed Trump administration Executive Orders for form and legality, including during the transition period; and 2. All emails, memos, and other documents related to OLC review of other proposed Trump White House matters, including during the transition period, including but not limited to whether the appointment of Jared Kushner to a White House role would violate anti-nepotism laws and whether the president's ongoing business operations would violate the Emoluments Clause. The complaint alleged that, on Jan. 28, 2017, plaintiffs submitted the above FOIA request to the defendant federal agencies. The complaint further alleged that, to date, plaintiffs had not received a substantive response from the defendant agencies, and that plaintiffs had constructively exhausted all required administrative remedies. Plaintiffs sought a disclosure order of the information above under FOIA and legal fees. On Mar. 17, the case was assigned to Judge P. Kevin Castel and to Magistrate Judge Ronald L. Ellis. On Sept. 11, the parties filed a letter with the court noting that the government completed its initial FOIA searches by Aug. 31. On Oct. 3, the parties submitted a status report noting their agreement that the government would make its first FOIA release on Nov. 10. The Jan. 19, 2018 status report, modified by a later order, stated that DOJ would provide an index of produced documents by Mar. 12. A status report filed on May 7, 2018 indicated the government had processed some but not all of the index. On July 20, 2018, the plaintiffs filed notice of voluntary dismissal. The case is now closed. The documents released by the government are available through this case page.", "summary": "On Mar. 16, 2017, the New York Times and one of its reporters sued DOJ under FOIA seeking records on DOJ's review of the legality of Trump's proposed Executive Orders and other matters related to anti-nepotism laws and the Emoluments Clause. The plaintiffs dismissed the case after the government released documents in response to their request."}
{"article": "This case addressed First Amendment claims concerning President Donald J. Trump\u2019s blocking of Twitter users from his account. On July 11, 2017, the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, as well as various political writers and professors, filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued President Donald J. Trump, White House Press Secretary Sean M. Spicer, and other agents of the executive branch alleging First Amendment violations. The plaintiffs argued that President Trump\u2019s Twitter account was a public forum and alleged that by blocking Twitter users who had criticized President Trump or his policies, the defendants had unconstitutionally limited those users\u2019 right to free speech. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the ACLU, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald. On October 13, 2017, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs\u2019 claims, that the plaintiffs could not establish a state action, and that blocking the individual plaintiffs did not violate the public forum doctrine. On November 3, 2017, the plaintiffs responded with a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the @realDonaldTrump Twitter account was a designated public forum and that blocking the individual plaintiffs was an unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. On May 23, 2018, the Court granted in part and denied in part both motions for summary judgment. Judge Buchwald concluded that the court had jurisdiction but found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue Sarah Huckabee Sanders and Hope Hicks, two other press officials in the Trump Administration. Thus, the two were dismissed as defendants. Next, the Court found that the type of speech the plaintiffs sought to engage in was protected by the First Amendment and that the @realDonaldTrump Twitter account was susceptible to analysis under the public forum doctrine. Lastly, Judge Buchwald concluded that the viewpoint-based exclusion, or blocking, of a Twitter user from the account was proscribed by the First Amendment and could not be justified by the President\u2019s personal interests. 302 F. Supp. 3d 541. On June 4, 2018, the defendants appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. A panel consisting of Judges Barrington D. Parker, Peter W. Hall, and Christopher F. Droney upheld the district court's ruling in a July 9, 2019 decision. They found that the President's Twitter account was not a private platform and produced government speech as part of a public forum. Under this classification, discrimination based on viewpoint was not permissible, and blocking the Twitter users amounted to viewpoint discrimination. The panel added that \"workarounds\" such as logging out of Twitter to see the President's tweets without the ability to comment placed an unfair burden on expression, too. Therefore, the President was no longer allowed to block Twitter users from the @realDonaldTrump Twitter account. 928 F.3d 226. The defendants applied for a rehearing en banc after this opinion was filed, but Judge Parker denied their motion on March 23, 2020, reiterating the positions held in the previous opinion. Circuit Judges Michael Park and Richard Sullivan dissented, questioning the broadening of the scope of public forum doctrine to include Twitter accounts. They also contested the decision that a government official using Twitter amounted to government speech. 953 F.3d 216. Trump petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court in August 2020. However, after President Biden's inauguration (Jan. 2020), President Biden was substituted as petitioner. On April 5, 2021, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Second Circuit\u2019s judgment from July 9, 2019, (928 F.3d 226) was vacated and the case was remanded to the Second Circuit with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. In a concurring statement, Justice Thomas\u2019 elaborated that <i>United States v. Munsingwear</i> allowed the Court to vacate the Second Court\u2019s decision because of a change in Presidential administration. Additionally, Thomas wrote that the \u201cmore glaring concern must perforce be the dominant digital platforms themselves\u201d and their influence over speech. 141 S.Ct. 1220. On June 9, 2021, plaintiffs moved for attorney fees. Plaintiffs argued that they were entitled under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) as they had secured a ruling that \u201cmaterially altered the legal relationship of the parties and also achieved the benefit Plaintiffs sought.\u201d This was referencing the District Court\u2019s ruling on May 23, 2018. Notably, plaintiffs sought only a portion of the fees that they claimed the EAJA entitled them to. Specifically, plaintiffs declined to pursue many of the costs associated with their private counsel. Instead, plaintiffs mainly sought to be compensatedfor their \u201cdistinctive knowledge or specialized skill in the areas of the First Amendment and constitutional law,\u201d citing an apparent \u201climited availability\u201d for qualified experts in that area. The motion included a chart of costs sought which totaled approximately $717,000. As of July 6, 2021, this motion is pending. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2017, the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University sued President Donald Trump and other executive branch officials, alleging unconstitutional violations of the First Amendment right to free speech after the named individual plaintiffs were blocked from the Twitter account @realDonaldTrump for being critical of President Trump and/or his policies. After the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the opinion and directed the Second Circuit to dismiss the case as moot because there was a change in presidential administrations due to the 2020 election."}
{"article": "This case was brought by former President Donald J. Trump, his children, and other affiliates (\u201cPlaintiffs\u201d) in response to Congressional subpoenas issued to the former President\u2019s banks, Deutsche Bank AG (\u201cDeutsche Bank\u201d) and Capital One Financial Corp. (\u201cCapital One\u201d). The banks notified him they would be complying with the subpoenas absent court intervention. Trump initiated this suit against the banks in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in his capacity as a private citizen on April 29, 2019. The complaint alleged that the Congressional subpoenas, which were issued by the House Committee on Financial Services (\u201cFinancial Services Committee\u201d) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (\u201cIntelligence Committee\u201d), were initiated to harass the President, because they requested tax returns and other personal financial documents. In addition, the complaint alleged that the subpoenas lacked a legitimate legislative purpose, and therefore exceeded the Committees\u2019 authority under the Constitution. The complaint also claimed that the subpoenas violated the Right to Financial Privacy Act (\u201cRFPA\u201d), 12 U.S.C. \u00a7 3403(a) because they did not comply with RFPA certification procedures. The Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief quashing the subpoenas, a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction prohibiting the disclosure of documents, and attorneys\u2019 fees. In their motion for a preliminary injunction, the Plaintiffs argued that they would face irreparable harm if the subpoenaed documents were disclosed. Specifically, they claimed that the disclosure of confidential documents could compromise the President\u2019s reputation, thereby hindering his ability to do his job. They also claimed that disclosure would set a precedent that undercuts judicial review of the constitutionality of such subpoenas, thereby \u201cimmuniz[ing] the subpoena from challenge.\u201d In addition to arguing irreparable harm, the Plaintiffs also claimed that the House Committees lacked a legitimate legislative purpose for the subpoenaed documents, noting that the Committees \u201chave never identified a single piece of legislation within their respective jurisdictions that they are considering.\u201d On May 3, 2019, the House Committees filed a motion to intervene to oppose the President\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction. The Financial Services Committee asserted that the purpose of the request was to conduct investigations into financial policies to ensure sound lending practices and the prevention of loan fraud. The Intelligence Committee sought to conduct investigations into \u201cefforts by Russia and other foreign entities to influence the U.S. political process during and since the 2016 election.\u201d Judge Edgardo Ramos granted the House Committees\u2019 motion on May 3. Judge Ramos denied the Plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction on May 22, 2019. 2019 WL 2204898. The Plaintiffs responded by filing an interlocutory appeal the next day. On December 3, 2019, Judge Jon Newman of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part the District Court\u2019s ruling, finding that the Plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on their statutory and constitutional claims, a requirement for receiving preliminary injunctive relief. Judge Newman remanded the case to a limited extent to exclude private documents that the Judge found to be lacking in relation to a legitimate legislative purpose. 943 F.3d 627. The Plaintiffs appealed this decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 6, 2019, staying this case until the hearing on a related case, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17222\"><i>Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP</i>,</a> concluded. On July 9, 2020, in the hearing for <i>Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP</i>, the Supreme Court noted its concern about maintaining the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches. In the interest of preserving the separation of powers, the Court articulated a higher standard that Congress failed to meet when issuing a subpoena to the President. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts explained that courts needed to apply the following standards when examining Congressional subpoenas:<ol><li>Carefully assess whether the asserted legislative purpose warrants the significant step of involving the President and his papers; </li> <li>Insist on a subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to support this objective;</li> <li>Be attentive to the nature of the evidence offered by Congress to establish that a subpoena advances a legislative purpose; and</li> <li>Carefully assess the burdens imposed on the President by a subpoena.</li></ol>The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit\u2019s opinion and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its order. <i>Trump v. Mazars, LLP</i>, 140 S. Ct. 2019. As of March 18, 2021, the case is ongoing.", "summary": "This is a case about former President Donald Trump\u2019s dispute with Congressional subpoenas requesting personal tax and financial documents. The case was brought in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York by Donald Trump, his children, and other affiliates, on April 29, 2019. The complaint alleged that the Congressional subpoenas were issued to harass the President and lacked a legitimate legislative purpose. The case was eventually consolidated with <i>Trump v. Mazars, LLP</i>, which was heard by the Supreme Court in July 2020 and later remanded for further proceedings."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: A group of Orthodox Jewish synagogues brought this lawsuit against the Governor of New York on October 8, 2020, alleging that the governor's restrictions on gatherings in light of surges in COVID-19 cases violated the Free Exercise Clause. After the district court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, they appealed to the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the injunction in part to block the enforcement of the executive order's attendance caps pending the outcome of the appeal in the Second Circuit. The case is ongoing. <hr> On October 8, 2020, Agudath Israel and affiliated Orthodox Jewish synagogues in New York City filed this lawsuit challenging an executive order issued by Andrew Cuomo, the Governor of the State of New York, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys' costs and fees. Executive Order 202.68 (\"EO 202.68\") placed restrictions on gatherings at synagogues and other houses of worship in light of a surge in rates of COVID-19 infections in hotspots identified by the New York State Department of Health. Plaintiffs are an Orthodox Jewish group, Agudath Israel of America, three synagogues in Brooklyn and Queens, Agudath Israel of Kew Garden Hills, Agudath Israel of Madison, Agudath Israel of Bayswater, and their leaders. Represented by Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders LLP, the plaintiffs sued under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2201 and 2202, as well as 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1983 and 1988. On March 7, 2020, pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law \u00a7 29, Governor Cuomo issued the original Executive Order 202, implementing the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan and declaring a statewide disaster emergency as a result of the emerging COVID-19 pandemic. Over the next few months, Governor Cuomo issued multiple supplemental Executive Orders, continuing the temporary suspension and modification of certain laws relating to the state of emergency. In response to a spike in the rate of positive COVID-19 cases in five \"hotspots\" located in Brooklyn and Queens, Governor Cuomo issued Executive Order 202.68 (\"EO 202.68\") on October 6, 2020, which directed the New York State Department of Health to identify yellow, orange, and red \u201czones\u201d based on the severity of outbreaks, and impose correspondingly severe restrictions on activity within each zone. EO 202.68 established central \u201cred zones,\u201d where non-essential gatherings were cancelled and schools and nonessential businesses were prohibited from operating in-person. Red zone houses of worship were permitted to remain open with a capacity of 25% maximum occupancy or 10 people, whichever was fewer. Similarly, in orange zones, non-essential gatherings, schools, and certain nonessential businesses were subject to more severe restrictions than houses of worship. Precautionary \u201cyellow zones\u201d were subject to lesser restrictions then red and orange zones. EO 202.68 was temporary and the zones were re-evaluated based on changes in the underlying data. The executive order was issued in advance of three special holidays for the Orthodox Jewish community to be held on October 9, 10, and 11, for the purpose of \"tackl[ing] the risk posed by mass gatherings, including those taking place in houses of worship.\" When the complaint was filed, two synagogues were located in red zones and one was in an orange zone. The plaintiffs claimed that EO 202.68 violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and sought a declaratory judgment preventing its enforcement. They argued that the executive order was facially discriminatory towards religious practices compared to similar secular activities and that religious institutions were targeted for punitive reasons because of their religious nature. The same day, the plaintiffs also filed an emergency motion for an order to show cause for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The case was assigned to Judge Kiyo A. Matsumoto and Magistrate Judge Robert M. Levy. The court ordered the defendants to show cause by October 9 as to why the requested injunctive relief should not be granted. After the parties submitted briefing and held a hearing, Judge Matsumoto denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction because they failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment claim. The court held that EO 202.68 was neutral, generally applicable, and did not burden Plaintiffs\u2019 free exercise rights. Judge Matsumoto noted that the order also shut down nonessential businesses and schools in hotspots as well and found that the new rules were not motivated by an intention to discriminate against Orthodox Jews. On October 19, the plaintiffs appealed the denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and filed a motion for an injunction. The case was scheduled to be heard in tandem with a related case, The Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Docket No. 20-3590. Their request for a stay in the district court pending appeal was denied. On November 9, the Second Circuit denied the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction primarily for procedural reasons because they failed to first request an injunction pending appeal in district court before seeking relief in the Court of Appeals. 979 F.3d 177 (Nov. 9, 2020). But, the order also addressed the similar substantive claims raised in the related case, Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo, and held that the order did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The court noted that the order was not substantially underinclusive as plaintiffs had alleged because \"within each zone, the order subjects religious services to restrictions that are similar to or, indeed, less severe than those imposed on comparable secular gatherings.\" The plaintiffs then filed an emergency application for injunctive relief to the Supreme Court on November 16 to prohibit the enforcement of EO 202.68 until the Second Circuit could issue a decision on the merits. Case Number 20A90. The Supreme Court granted the injunction in part on November 25, resting on the reasoning outlined in the related case, <i>Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo</i>, 592 U. S. ____ (Nov. 25, 2020). The Court barred the enforcement of the 10- and 25-person occupancy limits because it found that the executive order was not neutral and that less restrictive rules could have been employed instead. Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented. Meanwhile, back in district court, the defendant notified the court in a letter on November 3 of the party's intent to file a motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it was moot because the holidays it was based on had already passed. The case is currently pending appeal in the Second Circuit.", "summary": "A group of Orthodox Jewish synagogues brought this lawsuit against the Governor of New York on October 8, 2020, alleging that the governor's restrictions on gatherings in light of surges in COVID-19 cases violated the Free Exercise Clause. After the district court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, they appealed to the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the injunction in part to block the enforcement of the executive order's attendance caps pending the outcome of the appeal in the Second Circuit. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On March 5, 2019, the State of Washington filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for violating Title X\u2019s \u201cNondirective Mandate,\u201d the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Title X generally, and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706). On March 4, 2019, HHS published a Final Rule, scheduled to go into effect on May 3, 2019, which would alter longstanding regulations governing Title X grants for family planning services. Washington sought declaratory and injunctive relief to invalidate the Final Rule and prohibit HHS from implementing or enforcing it, as well as costs and attorneys\u2019 fees. On March 18, 2019, this case was consolidated for pretrial proceedings with a separate case filed by the National Family Planning & Reproductive Health Association (NFPRHA; a national membership organization of Title X providers that operate or administer more than 3,500 health centers providing family planning services to more than 3.7 million patients each year), and two health care professionals, challenging the same HHS Rule on behalf of themselves and their patients. These plaintiffs were represented by the ACLU and private counsel. The original Washington case and consolidated case were assigned to Judge Stanley A. Bastian. The plaintiffs alleged that the Rule would eliminate a Title X requirement that pregnant patients receive nondirective pregnancy counseling (\u201cNondirective Mandate\u201d); deny Title X funds to entities that provide comprehensive reproductive health care services at the same clinical site (such as abortion services); and impose numerous additional requirements that would undermine the quality of medical care, interfere with provider-patience relationships, reduce access to services, and contravene Title X\u2019s purpose. Washington alleged that the Final Rule would expel providers representing 89% of Washington\u2019s Title X network, require a DOH program contrary to Washington Law, and result in a loss of Title X funds that would irreparably harm Washington and its most vulnerable residents by reducing the effectiveness of Washington\u2019s family planning program and causing financial harm to State Medicaid and related programs. Washington and the NFPRHA parties filed preliminary injunctions on March 22, 2019, seeking to prohibit HHS from implementing the Final Rule. HHS filed a motion in opposition on April 12, 2019, and a motion hearing was held on April 25, 2019. After the hearing, Judge Bastian granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the Final Rule nationwide until further order of the court. 376 F.Supp.3d 1119. The decision noted that, \u201calthough Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that all four factors [likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest] tip in their favor, the irreparable harm and balance of equities factors tip so strongly in Plaintiffs\u2019 favor that a strong showing of likelihood on the merits was not necessary.\u201d On May 3, 2019, defendants filed a notice of appeal and motion to stay the preliminary injunction, as well as a notice of interlocutory and preliminary injunction appeal regarding plaintiffs\u2019 preliminary injunction. On May 4, 2019, defendants filed a motion to expedite the hearing on their motion to stay plaintiff\u2019s preliminary injunction, which was denied three days later. On May 24, 2019, defendants filed a motion to stay proceedings pending appeal. Defendant\u2019s motion to stay plaintiff\u2019s preliminary injunction pending appeal was denied on June 3, 2019, and defendant\u2019s motion to stay proceedings pending appeal was denied on June 14, 2019. On June 20, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a three-judge panel per curiam decision granting defendant\u2019s motion to stay pending appeal. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Final Rule was challenged in federal court in California, Oregon, and Washington (this case), and district courts in each case granted plaintiffs\u2019 preliminary injunction motions on nearly identical grounds. HHS appealed in each case and sought to stay the injunctions pending a decision of the merits of its appeals. The panel found that HHS was likely to prevail on the merits of the case, and that the remaining factors also favored a stay pending appeal. On June 25, 2019, plaintiffs in the Oregon and Washington cases filed an emergency motion for reconsideration en banc regarding the stay. On July 3, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered that the three cases (California, Oregon, and Washington) be reheard en banc pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a) and Circuit Rule 35-3, and that the motions for stay pending appeal granted by the Ninth Circuit panel would not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit. On July 11, 2019, the Ninth Circuit en banc court denied the motions for administrative stay of the three-judge panel\u2019s order granting defendant\u2019s motion to stay pending appeal. The en banc court stated they would proceed expeditiously to rehear and reconsider the merits of Defendant-Appellants\u2019 motions for stay of the district courts\u2019 preliminary injunction orders pending consideration of the appeals on the merits. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "On March 5, 2019, the State of Washington filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for violating Title X\u2019s \u201cNondirective Mandate,\u201d the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Title X generally, and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706). On March 4, 2019, HHS published a Final Rule, scheduled to go into effect on May 3, 2019, which would alter longstanding regulations governing Title X grants for family planning services. Washington sought declaratory and injunctive relief to invalidate the Final Rule and prohibit HHS from implementing or enforcing it, as well as costs and attorneys\u2019 fees. On March 18, 2019, this case was consolidated for pretrial proceedings with a separate case filed by the National Family Planning & Reproductive Health Association (NFPRHA; a national membership organization of Title X providers that operate or administer more than 3,500 health centers providing family planning services to more than 3.7 million patients each year), a Washington-based NFPRHA member organization, and two health care professionals, challenging the same HHS Rule on behalf of themselves and their patients. Washington and the NFPRHA parties filed preliminary injunctions on March 22, 2019, seeking to prohibit HHS from implementing the Final Rule. Judge Bastian granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the Final Rule nationwide until further order of the court. On May 3, 2019, defendants filed a notice of appeal and motion to stay the preliminary injunction, as well as a notice of interlocutory and preliminary injunction appeal regarding plaintiffs\u2019 preliminary injunction. On June 20, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a three-judge panel per curiam decision granting defendant\u2019s motion to stay pending appeal. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Final Rule was challenged in federal court in California, Oregon, and Washington (this case), and district courts in each case granted plaintiffs\u2019 preliminary injunction motions on nearly identical grounds. HHS appealed in each case and sought to stay the injunctions pending a decision of the merits of its appeals. The panel found that HHS was likely to prevail on the merits of the case, and that the remaining factors also favored a stay pending appeal. On June 25, 2019, plaintiffs in the Oregon and Washington cases filed an emergency motion for reconsideration en banc regarding the stay. On July 3, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered that the three cases (California, Oregon, and Washington) be reheard en banc, and that the motions for stay pending appeal granted by the Ninth Circuit panel would not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit. On July 11, 2019, the Ninth Circuit en banc court denied the motions for administrative stay of the three-judge panel\u2019s order granting defendant\u2019s motion to stay pending appeal. The en banc court stated they would proceed expeditiously to rehear and reconsider the merits of Defendant-Appellants\u2019 motions for stay of the district courts\u2019 preliminary injunction orders pending consideration of the appeals on the merits. This case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On July 30, 1964, a group of African American families filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs included African American families whose children who were attending free public schools controlled by the Jefferson Parish School Board. The plaintiffs\u2014represented by private attorney Gideon T. Carter, III, who specialized in civil rights and desegregation cases\u2014sued the Jefferson Parish School Board and its agents under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. For more than ten years after <a href= \"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=5479\"<i>Brown v. Board of Education</i></a> was decided, the defendants had continued a compulsory bi-racial school system and assigned students and school personnel to schools based on race. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and sought a preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent the defendant from segregating schools. Alternatively, the plaintiffs sought a decree requiring the defendants to present and initiate a plan to desegregate its schools. <u>Establishing a Consent Decree</u> During a hearing for the preliminary injunction in August 1964, the Court (Judge Herbert W. Christenberry) found that the plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction. Because the Court found that issuing the injunction for the 1964-1965 school year would cause serious disruption to the school system, it delayed the entry of the order until January 25, 1965. On that date the Court issued a preliminary injunction effective at the start of the 1965-1966 school year and ordered the defendants to submit a desegregation plan. The defendants submitted a desegregation plan in March 1965. The plan integrated one to three grades each year, until it reached all grades in 1970. The plaintiffs objected to the plan, saying it should take at most until 1968 to achieve full integration. The court held a hearing on the plan in June 1965 and ordered the defendants to implement a plan that would achieve full integration by 1968 and allow students to assign themselves to a school (subject only to overcrowding). Immediately after African American students were enrolled in formerly all-white schools, there were numerous incidents between African American and white students. The plaintiffs filed a motion for additional relief alleging that law enforcement failed to provide adequate protection to African American students. In particular, a group of thirty-six newly enrolled students had been prevented from entering their classroom by white students. The principal had ignored their attempt to report the incident and ordered them out of his office, then suspended the group of students for departing from the school without permission. On September 30, 1965, the court issued a Temporary Restraining Order requiring the school to reinstate the students immediately. The defendants moved to dissolve the Order, but both the District Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the request. The parties continued to litigate for several years over the desegregation plan and the defendant\u2019s compliance. On multiple occasions the Court granted motions to transfer students or to close schools and transfer the entire study body. Pursuant to the 1965 order, the defendants submitted a plan that would achieve full integration. The Court approved this plan on June 26, 1969. In April 1971 the Supreme Court issued a decision in <a href= \"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11114\"><i>Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education</i></a> that upheld busing programs aimed to speed up the integration of public schools. In May 1971, the plaintiffs moved for further relief seeking a new desegregation plan pursuant to the holding in <i>Swann</i> and asking that the faculty of each school be integrated. On July 9, 1971, the defendants submitted a follow-up plan that did not conform to the holding in <i>Swann</i>. While the Court had in 1966 declined to order desegregation of the busing system, in 1971 it found that the plaintiffs were entitled to further relief in light of the Supreme Court decision and refused to accept the defendants\u2019 follow-up plan. The same day, the Court issued an order requiring that the defendants\u2019 plan conform to the holding in <i>Swann</i> and requiring the defendants to integrate the faculty of each school such that the ratio of African American to white teachers in an individual school reflected the ratio of African American to white teachers in the school system as a whole. The defendants submitted a new plan but presented evidence that instituting the new plan would be burdensome and cause some schools to be unable to begin the school year smoothly. On August 10, 1971, the Court adopted the plan submitted by the defendants, finding that the School Board\u2019s concerns did not justify continuation of a less than unitary school system. 332. F. Supp. 590. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit seeking suspension and stay of the injunction pending appeal, but the Circuit Court denied the motion. The defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court seeking a stay of proceedings. The Supreme Court (Justice Marshall) denied certiorari, reasoning that the difficulties the parish would face in complying with the order were those normally incident to the transition to a unitary school system. The Court also noted its disapproval of the defendants\u2019 efforts to drag the litigation out: \u201cThe schools involved have been mired in litigation for seven years. Whatever progress toward desegregation has been made apparently, and unfortunately, derives only from judicial action initiated by those persons situated as perpetual plaintiffs below. The rights of children to equal educational opportunities are not to be denied, even for a brief time, simply because a school board situates itself so as to make desegregation difficult.\u201d 404 U.S. 1219. On February 11, 1972, the Circuit Court affirmed the District Court\u2019s decision from August 1971. The Circuit Court found that the 19 remaining one-race schools in Jefferson Parish were vestiges of former school segregation and that requiring the School Board to bus students was justified. 456 F.2d 552. The 1971 plan was amended by consent decree in 1978 but otherwise remained in effect for many years. <u>Obtaining Unitary Status</u> In August 2006, a member of the School Board proposed a plan creating a \u201cunitary\u201d system that would end busing practices and allow children to attend schools closer to home, as well as a plan to seek federal grant money to overhaul low-performing schools. The proposal was met with strong resistance from critics who believed the plans would re-segregate schools, and the board member ultimately withdrew the proposal a few months later. However, the School Board still sought to convert four predominantly African American, low-performing schools into magnet schools in 2007 in the hopes of boosting academics and increasing school diversity. On March 8, 2007, the parties filed a joint motion to supplement the desegregation plan to authorize the School District to use a magnet school program as a voluntary desegregation method. On the same day, the Court (Judge Jay C. Zainey) granted the motion and ordered the parties to file a report that identified which aspects of the school system remained segregated and what action was needed to desegregate them. Judge Zainey then reassigned the case to Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt in February 2008. The parties proceeded to file a proposed consent order addressing the requirements from the March 2007 order. On March 14, 2008, the Court approved portions and rejected other portions of the proposed order with instructions to revise it and report back to the Court. On May 14, 2008, a fairness hearing was held regarding the revised proposed order and the order was approved. That order excluded magnet schools and decreed that a new consent order for those schools be submitted. The amended Consent Order and corresponding plan required the School Board to modify attendance zones and upgrade facilities consistent with its desegregation obligations. The order was set to terminate on June 30, 2011. The defendants submitted a plan for the magnet schools in October 2008 and requested approval of the magnet schools. The Magnet Plan sought to redraw the school attendance zones that had been approved by the Court on May 14, 2008. On January 5, 2009, the Court approved the motion for approval of new magnet schools but denied the Magnet Plan itself, finding that the defendants could not show that the proposed change in attendance zones would not lead to fewer desegregated schools. The defendants filed an amended plan and on January 29, 2009, after a fairness hearing on the amended Magnet Plan, the Court approved the plan. After the Magnet Plan was implemented, disputes arose regarding the School Board\u2019s compliance with the Consent Order. In particular, the Court found that inaccurate information may have been provided to some parents of students regarding the magnet school application procedures and ordered the School Board to eliminate the confusion. Furthermore, allegations arose in 2010 that qualified African American students had been <a href = \"https://www.nola.com/education/2010/11/jefferson_schools_goal_of_free.html\">denied admission</a> to one of the magnet schools. Issues with irregularities in admission to magnet schools <a href= \"https://www.nola.com/news/2011/01/report_describes_jefferson_par.html\">lessened</a> after the School Board adopted written guidelines for assessing applications beginning in the 2010-2011 school year. Before the Consent Order expired, the Plaintiffs moved to extend the Consent Order and moved for further remedies and specific performance. In particular, the Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had failed to undertake corrective action for the 2011-2012 school year, that the defendants\u2019 efforts to recruit African American students into magnet schools and other advanced programs was inadequate, that African American students were subject to disparate treatment under the school system\u2019s disciplinary process, and that the defendants were using the Consent Order as a pretext to conceal attempts to continue a system of racially segregated schools. The Court granted an extension, but before the Court decided on the other motions, the parties reached a final agreement. The parties conferred and worked to resolve remaining issues that prevented Jefferson Parish from achieving unitary status. According to the Final Settlement Agreement, the School Board would continue to implement several plans, including the creation of new magnet school programs and Academic Academies, school modifications, modification of attendance zones, operation of a Majority-to-Minority Transfer Program, and implementation of other special educational programs and services. The Agreement included all essential steps that the School Board would have to take to achieve and maintain unitary status. The agreement would remain in effect for three years. On August 2, 2011, the Court approved the final settlement agreement and declared Jefferson Parish School System unitary. No further activity appeared on the docket during the next three years, so the case is presumably now closed. Even after the litigation ended and the agreement terminated, the Dandridge task force overseeing the implementation of the Agreement <a href=\"https://www.nola.com/news/2011/01/report_describes_jefferson_par.html\">criticized</a> the school system\u2019s compliance. The parties entered into a voluntary agreement in 2015 in an attempt to institutionalize the practices that had been mandated by the court order. <u>Available Opinions</u> <i>Dandridge v. Jefferson Par. Sch. Bd.</i>, 332 F. Supp. 590 (E.D. La. 1971), <i>aff'd</i>, 456 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1972). <i>Dandridge v. Jefferson Par. Sch. Bd.</i>, 404 U.S. 1219 (1971). <i>Dandridge v. Jefferson Par. Sch. Bd.</i>, 456 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1972). <i>Dandridge v. Jefferson Par. Sch. Bd.</i>, 249 F.R.D. 243 (E.D. La. 2008).", "summary": "In 1964, a group of African American families filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant Jefferson Parish School Board had violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by continuing to segregate the school system. The Court granted injunctive relief, mandated desegregation of the school system, and required that the defendants use busing to speed up the integration process. The injunction remained in place for several decades. In 2007, the School Board sought to implement a magnet school program in the hopes of boosting academics and increasing school diversity. The parties jointly moved to supplement the desegregation plan to include the magnet school program, and the Court issued Consent Orders in 2008-2009 that enabled the School Board's plans. However, issues arose in the following years with the School Board's implementation of the plan. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants were using the Consent Orders as a pretext to conceal attempts to continue a system of racially segregated schools. After the Consent Orders expired, the parties reached a settlement agreement and the Court declared Jefferson Parish Schools unitary in 2011."}
{"article": "This case involved a challenge to Caddo Parish School Board's decision to merge two all-black high schools: Booker T. Washington and Fair Park. <i>Cooksey</i> marks one challenge in a long history of school desegregation litigation efforts in the Caddo Parish School District, captured in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13701\">SD-LA-0002</a> in this clearinghouse. The case was assigned to Judge Elizabeth E. Foote in the Western District of Louisiana. A 1981 consent decree required Caddo Parish School Board to provide a qualitatively equal education at Booker T. Washington and Fair Park relative to other schools in the district. This order remains ongoing to this day. In 2017, the Caddo Parish School Board decided to merge these two schools and turn Fair Park into a middle school. The decision, according to the Board, would save money and resources. On May 5, 2017, the plaintiffs, parents of students attending Fair Park and a Fair Park alumni association, brought this suit to enjoin the merger and declare the School Board's actions unconstitutional. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause, as well as violations of the 1981 Consent Order and state law. On the same day, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the defendant from merging the schools through the duration of this case. Three days later, on May 8, the School Board responded in opposition to the TRO. It argued that the claims were unrelated to the 1981 Consent Order and that the conversion of Fair Park was unrelated to race and would aid the students. But on May 16, plaintiffs reported that they no longer intended to move for preliminary relief, and they voluntarily withdrew their motion the next day. At this point, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Karen L. Hayes for a scheduling conference. A trial was set for June 18, 2018. On July 26, 2017, however, the plaintiffs moved for an extension of time to amend their complaint. The plaintiffs informed the court that they intended to amend their complaint to make their suit a class action, involve more schools of the Caddo Parish, and include additional issues related to their case. The court granted the extension, giving the plaintiffs until August 27, 2017. August 27 came and went. The plaintiffs never filed their amended complaint, and during this time, the school merger was completed. There was no action on the docket until February 13, 2018, when Magistrate Judge Hayes ordered a conference. At this conference, both sides reported that the terms of the 1981 Consent Order did \"not affect matters of public policy,\" and thus, the Consent Order was unrelated to the Board's decision to merge schools. The parties jointly stipulated to dismissal, and the court granted the dismissal on February 20, 2018. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This case involves a challenge to Caddo Parish School Board's decision to merge two all-black high schools: Booker T. Washington and Fair Park. On May 5, 2017, parents of students at Fair Park alleged that this violated the Equal Protection Clause and a 1981 consent decree, and sought to enjoin the merger. The plaintiffs ultimately stipulated that the consent decree was unrelated to the merger, and they voluntarily dismissed their claims. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On Dec. 3, 1997, an applicant to the University of Michigan Law School brought this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the University of Michigan Law School. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, claimed that, in denying her admission, the school discriminated against her on the basis of her race, and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. She claimed that the school used the race of its applicants not merely as a plus factor in determining admission, but as one of the predominant factors. Moreover, she claimed, the school had no compelling interest to justify their use of race in the admissions process, nor did they ever employ any race-neutral alternatives. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On Jan. 7, 1999, the Court (Judge Bernard A. Friedman) certified the class. In March 2001, after a bench trial, Judge Friedman ruled for Grutter and determined that the law school's admissions policy was unconstitutional. By using race to ensure the enrollment of a certain minimum percentage of underrepresented minorities, the court held, the law school had \"made the current admissions policy practically indistinguishable from a[n unconstitutional] quota system.\" 137 F. Supp. 2d 821. The district court also concluded that the achievement of racial diversity is not a compelling state interest. The law school appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, which heard the appeal en banc. On May 14, 2002, the court (Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr. wrote the majority opinion) reversed the district court. The court held (1) that the Supreme Court had established in <i> Bakke </i> that achieving a diverse student body was a compelling interest, and (2) that the school's policy was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 288 F.3d 732. Grutter petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court, which granted it in December 2002. On June 23, 2003, the Court affirmed the 6th Circuit decision, and held that the law school's desire to obtain a \"critical mass\" of underrepresented minority students counted as a narrowly tailored use of race in its admissions process. Moreover, the Court held, the school's use of race furthered its compelling interest in \"obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.\" Because the law school engaged in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant, giving serious consideration to all the ways the applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment, it ensured that all factors that could contribute to diversity were meaningfully considered alongside race. Its admissions process was not unconstitutional. The majority opinion (written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) did note that affirmative action should not be allowed to exist forever, but, rather, that at some future date (the opinion mentions 25 years hence), only colorblind policies should be allowed. Justice Thomas issued an opinion concurring only with the majority opinion's implication of a 25-year window of affirmative-action legitimacy. He dissented from the rest of the opinion, stating that the law school had no compelling interest in maintaining an elite, but racially diverse, campus. If the school wanted to achieve greater diversity, he wrote, it could relax its test score and GPA requirements. On March 17, 2004, Judge Friedman ordered the case closed.", "summary": "On Dec. 3, 1997, Barbara Grutter brought this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the University of Michigan Law School. She claimed that, in denying her admission, the school discriminated against her on the basis of her race, and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The case made its way to the Supreme Court, which held that the law school's desire to obtain a \"critical mass\" of underrepresented minority students counted as a narrowly tailored use of race in its admissions process and was not unconstitutional."}
{"article": "On Oct. 14, 1997, two applicants who had been denied admission to the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor brought this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the university. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, claimed that the university's admissions policy treated race as a predominant factor in granting admission, and that they, as white applicants, had been discriminated against in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. On Dec. 23, 1998, the court (Judge Patrick J. Duggan) certified the class comprising \"[t]hose individuals who applied for and were not granted admission to the College of Literature, Science & the Arts of the University of Michigan for all academic years from 1995 forward and who are members of those racial or ethnic groups, including Caucasian, that defendants treat less favorably on the basis of race in considering their application for admission.\" On Dec. 13, 2000, Judge Duggan granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment with respect to the university's admissions policy during the years 1995-1998---during which time a specific number of admissions were reserved for minority applicants---and declared those policies unconstitutional. But the court also granted defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to the admissions programs for the years 1999-2000---during which time applicants were graded on a 150-point scale, and underrepresented minorities automatically received 20 points based on their membership to one of the identified minority categories. Judge Duggan determined that \"the educational benefits flowing from a racially and ethnically diverse student body are a sufficiently compelling interest to survive strict scrutiny,\" and the point system in place at the time of the decision was narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose, though the policies in place from '95-'98 were not. The court denied the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief, and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. The Dec. 13, 2000, Order and Opinion limited itself to the question of whether the university's admissions policies passed constitutional muster as narrowly tailored means of achieving diversity. In a Feb. 26, 2001 opinion, Judge Duggan ruled on whether the policies passed constitutional muster as a narrowly tailored means of remedying past and current discrimination by the university. 135 F. Supp. 2d 790. The court determined that the school's policies could not be justified as measures to remedy either the current effects of past discrimination, or the discriminatory impact of the university's other admissions criteria, and so denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment . Both parties appealed the court's decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit heard the case en banc on the same day as <i> Grutter v. Bollinger </i> (see SD-MI-0002 in the Clearinghouse). The 6th Circuit later issued an opinion in <i> Grutter </i> which upheld the University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy. The petitioner in that case also sought a writ of certiorari for this case, even though the Court of Appeals had not yet rendered a judgment in it, so that the Supreme Court could address the broader context of race in university admissions policies at one time. The Court granted certiorari. On June 23, 2003, the Court (majority opinion written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist) held that the university's point system is not narrowly tailored to achieve the school's asserted interest in diversity. 539 U.S. 244. The policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The school's policy failed to provide for the individualized consideration of each applicant that <i> Bakke </i> required. Moreover, the fact that 20 points automatically accrued to underrepresented minorities turned race into a decisive factor in the admissions process. On remand, the parties settled all remaining claims, and on Jan. 31, 2007, Judge Duggan dismissed the case with prejudice.", "summary": "On Oct. 14, 1997, two applicants who had been denied admission to the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor brought this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the university. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, claimed that the university's admissions policy treated race as a predominant factor in granting admission, and that they, as white applicants, had been discriminated against in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The case went to the Supreme Court, which held that the school's admission policy that automatically awarded 20 points out of a possible 150 to underrepresented minorities was not narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest of diversity in education and so violated the Equal Protection Clause."}
{"article": "This is a case about the violent insurrection and disruption of Congress on January 6, 2021 as Congressional members approved the results of the Electoral College in order to elect the next President and Vice President of the United States. On February 16, 2021, a member of the United States House of Representatives, in his personal capacity, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Represented by private counsel and the NAACP, the plaintiff sued the President of the United States in his personal capacity, the President\u2019s personal lawyer, Proud Boys International, and Oath Keepers under the Ku Klux Klan Act 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1985(1). The representative sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from engaging in future violations of the act, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys\u2019 fees. He claimed that the defendants plotted, coordinated, and executed a common plan to prevent Congress from discharging its official duties in certifying the results of the presidential election. He also claimed that in furtherance of this plan, the defendants spread misinformation to disrupt the legally required presidential election process. These actions allegedly prevented the plaintiff from performing his official duties and deprived him of his right to be free from intimidation and threats while doing so. This case has been assigned to Judge Amit P. Mehta and is ongoing.", "summary": "On January 6, 2021, there was a violent insurrection and disruption of Congressional processes as members approved the results of the Electoral College in order to elect the next President and Vice President of the United States. On February 16, 2021, a U.S. Representative, in his personal capacity, sued the President of the United States in his personal capacity, the President\u2019s personal lawyer, Proud Boys International, and Oath Keepers under the Ku Klux Klan Act alleging that the defendants plotted, coordinated, and executed a common plan to prevent Congress from certifying the results of the 2020 presidential election. This case has been assigned to Judge Amit P. Mehta and is ongoing."}
{"article": "On June 8, 2012, two naturalized U.S. citizens and a national non-profit dedicated to increasing civic participation among Latinos filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1973c and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201 against the State of Florida in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, the ACLU of Florida, the ACLU, and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Florida's voter purge procedures violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (\"VRA\"). Specifically, the state had implemented \"voter registration list maintenance activities\" such as forwarding list of \"potential non-citizens\" to Supervisors of Elections and requiring these Supervisors to remove the names from registration. The plaintiffs claimed that these procedures required Section 5 pre-clearance from the federal government before they could be legally implemented. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. \u00a71973c, is a temporary provision that prohibits changes in election practices or procedures in states and political subdivisions with a documented history of discriminatory voting practices until the new procedures have been determined not to have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. On July 13, 2012, the defendant\u2014Florida\u2019s Secretary of State\u2014filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint. The defendant claimed that the plaintiffs did not have a claim upon which relief could be granted for several reasons: Florida was not a jurisdiction that Section 5 covered, Florida changed it\u2019s voting procedures that would be subject to Section 5 before the plaintiffs filed their suit, the plaintiffs failed to acknowledge any of Florida\u2019s voting procedure changes subject to Section 5 pre-clearance, and the statewide injunction sought by the plaintiffs was inappropriate because the alleged violation existed in only five of Florida\u2019s 67 counties. The plaintiff\u2019s filed an amended complaint on July 27, 2012 to update and expand the list of facts underlying their claims. On August 20, 2012, the defendant re-filed the motion to dismiss in accordance with the plaintiffs' amended complaint. On July 30, 2012 the Eleventh Circuit Chief Judge, Joel F. Dubina assigned Circuit Judge Charles R. Wilson and District Judge James S. Moody to hear the case alongside District Judge James D. Whittemore. In his order, Chief Judge Dubina assigned this combination of judges to allow for a simultaneous appeal to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, if the situation were to arise. Judge Whittemore denied the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint on September 18, 2012. On June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court decided <i>Shelby County v Holder,</i> holding that Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional. Section 4(b) contained the formula that determined which jurisdictions would be subject to the pre-clearance requirements listed in Section 5. Back in the District Court for the Middle District of Florida, the defendant filed notice that further litigation in this case was unnecessary. Because the Supreme Court in <i>Shelby County</i> found the process for determining which jurisdictions would be covered by the Section 5 pre-clearance requirements to be unconstitutional, the defendant argued Florida was no longer covered by the Section 5 pre-clearance requirements and therefore the plaintiffs no longer had a claim upon which relief could be granted. In light of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in <i>Shelby County,</i> both parties agreed that the plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed, but they disagreed over whether or not it should be dismissed with prejudice. On July 10, 2015, the defendant filed a notice that the claim should be denied with prejudice because the invalidation of Section 4 invalidated Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act as well, meaning there was no way that the plaintiffs would be able to reopen their case. The plaintiffs however, filed a notice on July 11, 2013 to have the case dismissed with prejudice only to the extent Section 5 of the VRA was predicated on Section 4. This would allow the plaintiffs to reopen their case should Congress pass a new bill or should a future court find Section 5 was not predicated on Section 4. The plaintiffs filed this official motion request on July 15, 2013. The District Court ultimately agreed with the defendant that the plaintiffs\u2019 proposed order \u201cwould essentially constitute an impermissible advisory opinion\u201d and dismissed the case with prejudice on July 24, 2013. This case is now closed.", "summary": "On June 8, 2012, individual and organizational plaintiffs challenged Florida's voter purge procedures in U.S. District Court in Florida's Middle District, Tampa Division. The plaintiffs, represented by the national and Florida ACLU, private counsel, and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, claimed such procedures violated their rights under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a71973c. This case was dismissed with prejudice on July 24, 2013 in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Shelby County v Holder."}
{"article": "<b>NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see <a href=\"https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/\"> their tracker</a>.</b> COVID-19 Summary: Two third-party nominees for the Georgia State House of Representatives filed this case alleging that, in light of public health risks associated with COVID-19, requiring them to collect over 20,000 signatures to get on the ballot violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On July 9, the court ordered the defendants to reduce the relevant signature requirements by 30% for the 2020 general election.<hr> The two plaintiffs in this case, the Green Party and Libertarian Party nominees for seats in the Georgia State House of Representatives, filed this case in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia on March 26, 2020. Their complaint alleged that Georgia state laws requiring extensive collection of signatures to get on the ballot as a third party candidate should be relaxed in light of the COVID-19 public health emergency. Their complaint names one defendant, the Secretary of State for the State of Georgia. This case has been assigned to Judge Eleanor Ross, and the plaintiffs are represented by private counsel. The requirements to get on the ballot as a third party candidate in Georgia require a nominee to collect signatures from 5% of the registered voters in the district where they are running. For the two plaintiffs in this case, that would require gathering over 20,000 signatures each. Their complaint argued that requiring them to do this before the deadline of August 14, 2020, would be virtually impossible given the circumstances stemming from COVID-19, making the requirements a violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They are seeking declaratory and equitable relief. Specifically, they have asked the court to prorate the signature requirement to account for days lost due to COVID-19. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on May 8, 2020. On May 29, the defendants responded to the motion, requesting a denial of the preliminary injunction or grant in part with only a 30% reduction of the petition requirements, which they argued was an appropriate balance between the burdens of COVID-19 and the State's interest in requiring a showing of voter support for ballot access. Following a hearing, on July 9, the court granted in part the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, but refused to impose the requested remedy. Instead, the court ordered the defendants to reduce the relevant signature requirements by 30% for the 2020 general election. On August 21, the plaintiffs submitted a motion for summary judgment based on the court's ruling on the preliminary injunction, as the only remaining claim is a declaratory judgment. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "Two third-party nominees for the Georgia State House of Representatives filed this case alleging that, in light of public health risks associated with COVID-19, requiring them to collect over 20,000 signatures to get on the ballot violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On July 9, the court ordered the defendants to reduce the relevant signature requirements by 30% for the 2020 general election."}
{"article": "<b>NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see <a href=\"https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/\"> their tracker</a>.</b> COVID-19 Summary: This is a class-action suit brought by a nonprofit organization and an individual against the state of Georgia to challenge the state\u2019s requirement to purchase postage stamps for mail-in ballots. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring election officials to provide prepaid returnable envelopes for absentee ballots and absentee ballot applications. On April 30, the preliminary injunction was denied for the June primaries and on August 11, the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for preliminary injunction was denied as to Count I of the amended complaint, and which was accordingly dismissed. <hr> On April 8, 2020, Black Voters Matter Fund and an individual voter filed a class-action lawsuit against the Secretary of State of Georgia and the Dekalb County Board of Registration & Elections to challenge the state\u2019s requirement to purchase postage stamps for mail-in ballots. The plaintiffs filed the suit after anticipating mail-in votes to skyrocket for the June and November 2020 elections, given that the COVID-19 pandemic posed health risks for in-person voting. The plaintiffs argued that because election officials required voters to pay postage, the state unconstitutionally forced voters to pay in order to participate in the election. They also alleged that the poll tax posed an undue burden on the right to vote in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Specifically, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief injunction requiring election officials to provide prepaid returnable envelopes for absentee ballots and absentee ballot applications. The plaintiffs also filed a preliminary injunction and sought attorney fees. They were represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and ACLU of Georgia. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and assigned to Judge Amy Totenberg. On April 20, the defendants filed an opposition to the preliminary injunction, claiming that the Secretary had already taken various steps to mitigate the risk of harm to Georgia primary voters during the COVID-19 outbreak. On April 23, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. On April 30, the plaintiff\u2019s motion for preliminary injunction was denied as to the June primaries. 2020 WL 2079240. This was, in part, because the state had already begun mailing ballots to voters and as such, the plaintiffs' proposed remedies would be difficult to implement. The court noted that the requested relief for subsequent elections remained pending and would be addressed in a separate decision. On May 11, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to add two other voter plaintiffs and the Director of Voter Registration and Elections as a defendant. The same day, the court denied the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss the original complaint as moot. The next day, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended complaint. On May 12, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction, and sought to expedite the briefing process to implement the requested relief in time for the August runoff. The request was denied on May 15, and the court noted that the emergency motion did not raise any new facts or arguments, instead \u201c\u2018incorporat[ing] by reference all prior filings and evidence submitted in connection with the Original Plaintiffs\u2019 prior motion for preliminary injunction\u2019 and seek[ing] relief for the August runoff and November general elections.\u201d On May 18, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, stating that the claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and legislative immunity. On May 31, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a defendant class of all Georgia boards of registrars, their members, their election directors, county registrars, and municipal absentee ballot clerks, as well as a plaintiff class of all registered Georgia voters. The plaintiff class was subdivided into a subclass of all registered Georgia voters who satisfy one of the COVID-19 risk factors identified by the Center for Disease Control. On August 11, the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for preliminary injunction was denied as to Count I of the amended complaint, which alleged that the state imposed an unconstitutional poll tax in violation of the Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments. 2020 WL 4597053. While the court noted that the plaintiffs \u201cpresented compelling evidence that the state\u2019s handling of the June 2020 election was plagued with difficulties, including many instances of voters not receiving their absentee ballots, and as a result being unnecessarily exposed to the virus[,]\u201d the court found that such issues were \u201cbeyond the scope of this litigation, which is focused on the postage requirement for absentee voting.\u201d The court also pointed to other courts in this district considering direct challenges regarding those issues and that variations may lead to different outcomes. Accordingly, the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the amended complaint was granted for Count I of the complaint but denied as to Count II. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "This is a class-action suit brought by a nonprofit organization and an individual against the state of Georgia to challenge the state\u2019s requirement to purchase postage stamps for mail-in ballots. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring election officials to provide prepaid returnable envelopes for absentee ballots and absentee ballot applications. On April 30, the preliminary injunction was denied for the June primaries and on August 11, the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for preliminary injunction was denied as to Count I of the amended complaint, and which was accordingly dismissed."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This suit was brought on May 19, 2020, by two non-profit organizations and three voter plaintiffs against the state of Louisiana to challenge Louisiana\u2019s Excuse Requirement, Witness Requirement, and Cure Prohibition. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the Excuse and Witness Requirement, as well as provide absentee voters with notice and opportunity to cure defects in their absentee ballots for all elections in 2020 held in Louisiana. On June 22, the court dismissed the case. <hr> On May 19, 2020, two non-profit organizations and three individual voters brought suit against the state of Louisiana to challenge its election laws. Represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and private attorneys, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2201-02 and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1983 and 52 U.S.C. \u00a7 10301, alleging that the requirement violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the Excuse and Witness Requirement, as well as provide absentee voters with notice and opportunity to cure defects in their absentee ballots for all elections in 2020 held in Louisiana. The plaintiffs also sought attorney fees. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, and was assigned to Chief Judge Shelley D. Dick. On April 15, the Secretary of State proposed an emergency election plan expanding the category of excuses needed to request an absentee ballot and waiving the Witness Requirement for the July and August elections due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The proposed plan was rejected by the Louisiana Senate and Governmental Affairs Committee. On April 20, the Secretary of State presented a revised emergency election plan, which did not waive the Witness Requirement and presented fewer categories to fulfill the Excuse Requirement, which was approved. The plaintiffs noted that there was no emergency action plan in place for the November and December elections and that even with the plan in place, the narrow category of excuses and the need for a witness forced voters to choose between exercising their right to vote and potentially endangering themselves. Therefore, the plaintiffs alleged that Louisiana\u2019s Excuse Requirement and Witness Requirement imposed undue burdens on the fundamental right to vote, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The plaintiffs also challenged the lack of notice and opportunity to cure defects with mail-in votes. The plaintiffs alleged that the \u201cCure Prohibition\u201d violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying certain populations the right to due process. The plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on May 29. Meanwhile, in a separate case, <i>Power Coalition v. Edwards</i>, its plaintiffs also filed a suit to challenge the Excuse Requirement, Witness Requirement, and the Cure Prohibition. <i>Power Coalition v. Edwards</i> and <i>Clark v. Edwards</i> were consolidated on June 3. On June 5, the State of Louisiana filed a motion to intervene as defendants, which was granted on June 8. The same day, they filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not adequately alleged state action. The defendants also claimed that because of the proximity of the election, there should not be last-minute electoral meddling. On June 15, the defendants filed a joint motion to amend, which was denied on June 17. The same day, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to remove the Parish Registrars of Voters as defendants. On June 22, the court granted the motion to dismiss and all claims against the defendants were dismissed with prejudice. 2020 WL 3415376. The court found that the plaintiffs\u2019 claims did not adequately allege an injury in fact sufficient to give rise to standing, because the demonstrated injury was not traceable to state action. The hearing scheduled for the preliminary injunction was accordingly canceled. On June 25, the plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the judgment to dismiss their claims without prejudice, which was granted on June 30.", "summary": "This suit was brought on May 19, 2020, by two non-profit organizations and three voter plaintiffs against the state of Louisiana to challenge Louisiana\u2019s Excuse Requirement, Witness Requirement, and Cure Prohibition. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from enforcing the Excuse and Witness Requirement, as well as provide absentee voters with notice and opportunity to cure defects in their absentee ballots for all elections in 2020 held in Louisiana. On June 22, the court dismissed the case."}
{"article": "<b>NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see <a href=\"https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/\"> their tracker</a>.</b> COVID-19 Summary: This is an action brought by four individuals facing a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 and the Family Unit, a non-profit organization, against the enforcement of South Carolina\u2019s witness signature requirement and the excuse requirement. On May 12, the South Carolina General Assembly passed legislation allowing all qualified South Carolina voters to vote by absentee ballot for the June primaries. On May 25, the court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 preliminary injunction motions in part, granting relief as to the witness requirement. On September 18, the Witness Requirement was enjoined for the November 2020 General Election in a separate case, and the district court stayed the case. The defendants sought reconsideration.<hr> On April 22, four individuals facing a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 and the Family Unit, a non-profit organization, filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina against the enforcement of South Carolina\u2019s witness requirement and the excuse requirement, which were required in order to vote by an absentee ballot. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (ACLU), the ACLU of South Carolina, and the NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, the plaintiffs brought this action against the South Carolina State Election Commission and the Governor of South Carolina. They sought sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983 for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 10301, 10302(b), and 10501. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that enforcement of South Carolina\u2019s witness signature requirement during the pandemic posed an unconstitutional barrier to voting and that the exclusive category of \"persons qualified to vote by absentee ballot,\" did not include voters fearful of COVID-19 transmission. The plaintiffs alleged that the two requirements threatened to disenfranchise thousands of eligible South Carolina voters and that COVID-19 would have a disproportionate impact on older populations, voters with disabilities, and African-American voters. The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the requirements during COVID-19, as well as modification of election materials to reflect the elimination of the requirements before the June 2020 primaries. The case was assigned to Judge Michelle Childs. On April 28, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the two requirements, include self-isolation as an excuse exempting the witness requirement and enter an expedited schedule requiring the defendants to respond within seven days. The motion to enter an expedite the schedule was granted in part, but the specific schedule proposed by the plaintiff was denied. The South Carolina Republican Party (SCRP) filed a motion to intervene alleging voter fraud concerns on May 1. On the same day, the Protection and Advocacy for People with Disabilities, an independent non-profit corporation, requested to file an amicus brief. The motion to file an amicus brief was granted on May 6. And, on May 8, SCRP\u2019s motion to intervene was granted. 2020 WL 2306615. On May 11, the defendants and the SCRP each submitted a motion opposing the preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, <a href=\"https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17587\"> another action</a> was filed by individuals and the South Carolina Democratic Party on May 7, challenging the absentee ballot requirement in South Carolina against the same defendants. The Middleton plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the witness requirement, election day cutoff, and the absentee ballot age restriction limiting the categorical prohibition of all voters under 65 from casting a mailed absentee ballot. On May 12, the South Carolina General Assembly passed legislation allowing all qualified South Carolina voters to vote by absentee ballot for the June 9 primary and the June 23 runoff election. Two days later, the court determined that the injunctive relief sought by both Thomas and Middleton plaintiffs would be limited to the June 2020 primaries, as the defendants did not receive proper notice to prepare arguments regarding elections following the June 2020 primaries. On May 15, there was a consolidated hearing to address the pending motions for preliminary injunctions in both the Thomas and Middleton cases, with the remaining issues limited to the June primaries. On May 25, the court granted the preliminary injunction motions pertaining to the witness signature requirement, to be applied only for the June 2020 primaries. 2020 WL 2617329. The defendants were also ordered to immediately and publicly inform South Carolina voters of the elimination of the witness requirement. On July 13, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding the South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP as plaintiff while dropping one plaintiff. In addition, the plaintiffs withdrew the claim alleging that the witness requirement violated Section 201 of the Voting Rights Act, while adding the claim that the requirement discriminates against the plaintiffs in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). On July 24, the SCRP sought to re-intervene for the amended complaint. On August 4, the court noted that they had already allowed SCRP to intervene and that intervention is still in effect. On August 10, 3 individual plaintiffs, The Family Unit, and the South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP voluntarily dismissed the case. The same day, the defendant and the SCRP both filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that none of the requirements violated the Constitution, the VRA, or the ADA. On August 11, the Attorney General of South Carolina sought to file an amicus brief for the case. On August 12, Jay Lucas, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and Harvey Peeler, the President of the Senate, sought to intervene, which was granted on August 24. 2020 WL 4934305. The intervening defendants submitted responses in support of both motions for summary judgment, arguing that determining how to conduct South Carolina's elections was a legislative function, not a judicial one, and that the challenged provisions of South Carolina law were lawful. On August 14, the parties filed a stipulated motion to dismiss without prejudice as to the defendant Governor of South Carolina. On September 15, 2020, the South Carolina General Assembly passed legislation suspending the Excuse Requirement by allowing all qualified voters to vote by absentee ballot for the November 2020 General Election due to the current state of emergency. Three days later the court enjoined the Witness Requirement for all South Carolina voters in the upcoming November 2020 General Election in the Middleton case. In light of the suspension of the challenged provisions for the November 2020 General Election, the district court stayed the case. 2020 WL 5593847. The court instructed that the plaintiffs may request to lift the stay when the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic or future statewide elections in South Carolina are sufficiently determinable. The defendants sought reconsideration of the stay, arguing that staying the case on grounds that the Middleton injunction resolved the issues to be tried in this case, would effectively grant the Thomas plaintiffs their requested relief \"without having to ever prove anything at all . . . [which is] unjust and an abuse of discretion.\" The plaintiffs sought to consolidate the current case with <i>Middleton v. Andino</i>, however, the court denied the motion on September 22, reasoning that a district court did not have jurisdiction to consolidate an action before it with an action pending before an appellate court. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On April 22, four individuals facing a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 and the Family Unit, a non-profit organization, filed an action against the enforcement of South Carolina\u2019s witness requirement applied to absentee voters, and the excuse requirement applied in order to vote by an absentee ballot. On May 12, the South Carolina General Assembly passed legislation allowing all qualified South Carolina voters to vote by absentee ballot for the June primaries. On May 25, the court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 preliminary injunction motions in part, pertaining to the witness requirement. On September 18, the Witness Requirement was enjoined for the November 2020 General Election in a separate case, and the district court stayed the case. The defendants sought reconsideration. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On December 13, 2011, registered voters in Wisconsin filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). The plaintiffs sued the State of Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, and the Division of Motor Vehicles. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest and private counsel, claimed that the voter ID requirement implemented by 2011 Wisconsin Act 23 (Act 23) placed an undue burden on their right to vote, constituted a poll tax, and has a disproportionate impact on minority voters. The plaintiffs claimed that their fundamental right to vote under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the VRA had been violated. Specifically, they alleged that the voter ID requirement placed a substantial burden on the right to vote, particularly for black and Latino voters, by requiring photo ID that many voters do not have and cannot easily obtain. The plaintiffs sought both declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was assigned to U.S. District Judge Lynn S. Adelman. A group of eleven plaintiffs immediately filed for a preliminary injunction, which was revised as a motion for all plaintiffs on April 23, 2012. The plaintiffs moved for class certification on the same day. The court did not rule on these issues. Instead, the parties engaged in extensive discovery, which culminated in a trial in early November 2013. In an April 29, 2014 decision, the district court held that the Voter ID requirement disproportionately and negatively impacted minority voters in violation of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) and was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 17 F.Supp.3d 837. Judge Adelman ordered a permanent injunction against enforcement of the voter ID law. The defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (docket number 14-2058). In a decision by Judge Frank H. Easterbrook on October 6, 2014, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court on the grounds that the voter ID law did not violate the VRA or the Equal Protection Clause. 768 F.3d 744. The plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, which was denied. 135 S.Ct. 1551. The plaintiffs then returned to district court to pursue constitutional claims that were not considered by Judge Adelman in his initial April 29, 2014 decision about this case. The plaintiffs claimed their rights were violated because certain forms of IDs were not accepted, and some voters would have to turn over out-of-state IDs to get an acceptable Wisconsin ID, which plaintiffs argue was essentially a poll tax. In an October 19, 2015 decision, the district court found that concerns about technical college IDs being unacceptable were unripe. 141 F.Supp. 3d 932. Additionally, allegations of a poll tax were found to be moot, and claims about veterans IDs being unacceptable were dismissed on the merits. The district court held that it could not address the request for relief for those voters \u201cwho lack photo ID and face systemic practical barriers to obtaining an ID\u201d by issuing an injunction allowing individuals to sign an affidavit instead because this issue was before the court in 2014 and the Seventh Circuit decision reversed without remanding for further proceedings on this claim. 141 F.Supp. 3d 932. Following this decision, the Wisconsin legislature amended Act 23 to include veterans\u2019 ID as acceptable forms of voter identification. The plaintiffs appealed on the grounds that the district court did not properly reconsider their core argument: that voters face barriers to obtaining an acceptable ID and therefore are entitled to relief. In a decision made April 12, 2016, the Seventh Circuit confirmed that the district court could consider this argument and remanded for further proceedings. 819 F.3d 384. On July 19, 2016, after further proceedings, Judge Adelman granted a preliminary injunction allowing voters without IDs to sign an affidavit in place of the ID requirement for the November 8, 2016 election. In this decision, he also certified the class of plaintiffs in this case, defining the class \u201cas all eligible Wisconsin voters who cannot with reasonable effort obtain qualifying ID.\u201d 196 F. Supp. 3d 893. Shortly after, the parties filed cross appeals to the Seventh Circuit (docket numbers 16-3003 and 16-3052) and the defendants moved to stay the preliminary injunction. On July 29, 2016, the district court denied the defendants\u2019 motion to stay the preliminary injunction. 2016 WL 4059226. However, the Seventh Circuit stayed the injunction pending the cross appeals on August 10, 2016. 2016 WL 4224616. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order staying the injunction, but the Seventh Circuit denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit found that emergency procedures in place by the state to permit anyone who enters the ID Petition Process (a process through which any applicant must receive a photo ID on request unless the state shows certain grounds disqualified them) to get a receipt that would serve as a valid ID for the November 2016 election meant that further temporary relief was unnecessary at that time. The plaintiffs also filed an emergency motion for rehearing en banc of the order staying the injunction, but the Seventh Circuit denied the petition for hearing en banc for similar reasons. 835 F.3d 649. The plaintiffs moved to add a new plaintiff to the case and for a temporary restraining order to ensure that the new plaintiff\u2019s provision ballot would be counted despite not having a valid ID. On November 10, 2016, Judge Adelman granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion to file a supplemental complaint but denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a temporary restraining order. 2016 WL 6651323. The supplemental complaint was filed the same day. On February 24, 2017, oral argument was held on the cross appeals. As of December 2019, this case was ongoing and the cross appeals remained pending in the Seventh Circuit.", "summary": "In 2011 voters in Wisconsin filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The plaintiffs alleged that their fundamental right to vote had been violated by Act 23, Wisconsin's law implementing a voter ID requirement. After much litigation, in 2016 a judge granted a preliminary injunction allowing voters without IDs to sign an affidavit in place of the ID requirement for the 2016 presidential election. The state appealed the injunction to the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit stayed the injunction pending the appeal. As of December 2019, the appeal remained pending in the Seventh Circuit."}
{"article": "On June 21, 2016, individuals who had been subject to a $50 \"extension fee\" for inability to pay their monetary penalties in full, under threat that they would otherwise go to jail for non-payment of court fines and costs, brought this putative class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued the Bogalusa City Court and the sole judge who sits on the Bogalusa City Court for violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. They claimed that the defendants: systematically jailed and threatened to jail individuals who cannot pay fines and court costs that were used to fund expenditures of the city court; and have created an illegal extension fee to generate additional revenue. Represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, as well as to certify a class and subclass for equitable relief and a separate class for damages. The class for equitable relief was to be defined as \"all individuals who will appear in the Bogalusa City Court for criminal cases or who have unpaid fines and costs assessed by and opened by the City Court. The Subclass was to be defined as \"all individuals who were or will be adjudicated guilty in the Bogalusa City Court, who have been worn will be given a future date by which to return to City Court, and who have not paid the assessed fines and costs in full prior to returning to City Court.\" The class seeking damages included those individuals who paid an extension fee between June 22, 2015 to the time of the complaint. In a June 23, 2016 order, U.S. District Court Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order, and held their request for a preliminary injunction in abeyance. Shortly thereafter, the parties agreed to explore a possible settlement. As settlement negotiations were getting under way, the parties reached an interim agreement, which they filed on June 27, 2016. Once approved by the Court, it was to govern the next 75 days. During this time period, the defendant judge agreed not to incarcerate any Bogalusa City Court defendant on the sole basis of nonpayment of fines or costs or contempt fee, nor assess or collect (i) any court cost authorized by La. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 13:1899; (ii) any \u201cextension fees\u201d or similar payments required by the City Court to allow a defendant additional time to pay court debt; or (iii) any contempt fees that are retained by the City Court and deposited into the City Court\u2019s judicial expense account. In addition, for the same interim time period, the defendant judge agreed to provide to the plaintiffs\u2019 counsel a copy of daily jail logs for the Bogalusa City Jail, and an up-to-date copy of the Bogalusa City Court\u2019s \u201cCriminal Account-Citizens Income Statement.\u201d Both parties agreed to submit a joint written status report in 45 days to report on the status of settlement discussions and the parties\u2019 respective positions on how the Court should proceed with the pending motions for preliminary injunction and class certification. This agreement was repeatedly renewed through motions to continue until the parties reached a full settlement on September 5, 2017. On June 28, 2016, Judge Lemelle granted the joint motion and further ordered that the plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class and their Motion for Preliminary Injunction to be dismissed without prejudice. On January 17, 2017, plaintiffs amended their complaint with allegations that defendants, without the authorization of state law and after agreeing to halt the $50 dollar \u201cextension fee,\u201d began assigning community service as a sanction for non-payment, instead of jail-time, and established a $25 \u201cenrollment fee\u201d for individuals to complete community service. On June 7, 2017, a partial settlement agreement was reached. The defendants agreed to issue $50 dollar refunds to all parties who paid the \u201cextension fee\u201d on and after June 21, 2015. The plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the fifth claim for relief of their first amended complaint, which sought compensatory damages for the payment of the extension fee, and agreed to dismiss defendant Bogalusa City Court from the suit. On June 21, 2017, plaintiff\u2019s motion for class certification was dismissed without prejudice. On September 5, 2017, a full settlement was reached. Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their lawsuit against the defendant. In exchange, the defendant agreed, for a period of thirty months, to stop jailing indigent individuals for failure to pay court debt solely due to their inability to pay the debt, agreed to discontinue use of any extension fees except as explicitly authorized by state law, and agreed to discontinue use of an enrollment fee for community service. The defendant also agreed to implement warrant amnesty days that would enable individuals with arrest warrants for failure to comply with an order to appear, subpoena, or summons to appear at the city court to receive a new hearing date and clear any warrants. The defendant also permanently agreed to no longer collect or assess any court costs that would be deposited into an account controlled directly by the city court. Instead, these costs or fees would be deposited into a special account maintained by the City of Bogalusa, who would have control of the account and any disbursements made therefrom. The court was also required to submit a yearly budget request to fund operations of the city court, which the mayor and city council must approve in accordance with the city charter. The City of Bogalusa would maintain discretion to allocate funds from the special account to the court to fund operations of the court. Finally, the defendant agreed to a six-month reporting period wherein the defendant would notify the plaintiff\u2019s counsel when any city court defendant was being placed in jail for nonpayment of a fine, costs, or failure to complete a form of alternative payment. The court maintained jurisdiction over the case. There has been no action on the docket since September 5, 2017.", "summary": "On June 21, 2016, individuals who had been forced to pay a $50 \"extension fee\" for inability to pay their monetary penalties in full, or go to gail for non-payment of court fines and costs, brought a putative class action lawsuit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued the Bogalusa City Court and the sole judge who sits on the Bogalusa City Court, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 alleging that the defendants (1) systematically jail and threaten to jail individuals who cannot pay fines and court costs that fund the city court; and (2) have created an illegal extension fee to generate additional revenue. Shortly after U.S. District Court Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order, and held their request for a preliminary injunction in abeyance, the parties decided to explore settlement options. They filed a stipulated agreement with the District Court, which was granted."}
{"article": "On October 31st, 2016, a group of Plaintiffs who had been jailed for their inability to pay fines owed to the City of Florissant, Missouri for traffic tickets or other minor municipal offenses, sued the City for this violation of due process in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The Plaintiffs are represented by the Advancement Project, ArchCity Defenders, Inc., and private counsel. The Plaintiffs sued the City of Florissant, MO under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 alleging violations of the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The Plaintiffs alleged that the City held individuals in jail in \u201cgrotesque, dangerous, inhumane conditions\" until all fines and fees set by the City are paid \u2013 usually by friends or relatives. Further, they alleged that the amount paid was arbitrarily and significantly reduced when the City recognizes that they are unable to profit from the plaintiffs' detention. Also, they alleged that the City issued and enforced arrest warrants for the plaintiffs' failure to appear in court or at the jail to pay their fines. They alleged that individuals were held in jail for days in inhumane conditions before they appeared before the judge. The Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment stating that the rights of Plaintiffs were violated by the City, injunctive relief permanently enjoining the City from enforcing these unconstitutional policies and practices, and compensatory relief for damages suffered as a result of the City\u2019s unconstitutional and unlawful conduct, as well as payment of reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Nannette A. Baker. Both parties consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction in November 2016. This case was first referred to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) on June 1, 2017. The court continued to attempt to force the two parties to resolve this dispute through mediation throughout the rest of 2017 and most of 2018. On November 16, 2018, the parties agreed on a neutral mediator, James W. Reeves. Mediation seemed poised to start in early December 2018, but the order referring the case to ADR was vacated on December 6, 2018. During that same time, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or alternatively to strike or for a more definite statement on January 13, 2017. The court denied this motion on December 12, 2017, with the court holding that the plaintiffs had filed a valid claim with the court. Throughout 2019, the case proceeded slowly, the defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings for failure to join an indispensable party on March 16, 2019, which the court denied on August 12, 2019. The parties also filed various requests to extend the deadlines to allow for the gathering of additional expert reports and additional data, repeatedly pushing back the end of discovery. The Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint on January 15, 2020, nearly three years after the initial deadline for amendment of pleadings. The Plaintiffs sought to \u201cshore up\u201d class definitions, clarify factual issues learned in discovery, and add a claim under a Missouri statute \u00a7 544.170 that requires those arrested without a warrant to be released within 24 hours. The Plaintiffs alleged that were trying to make sure class categories match allegations in the complaint after receiving advice from an expert who helped them to sort through the information. They further alleged that the additional claim is similar enough to their initial claims that the defendants should have been given adequate notice and no additional discovery will be needed. On May 6, 2020, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff\u2019s motion to file a second amended complaint. The court allowed plaintiffs to amend the complaint to correct demographic information on the plaintiffs and remove paragraphs no longer supported by the information revealed in discovery. However, the court denied the plaintiff's request to add an additional plaintiff as class representative, add claims under Missouri statute \u00a7 544.170, and reconfigure and add class categories, ruling that plaintiffs had failed to show \u201cgood cause\u201d for why these amendments hadn\u2019t taken place within the original window to amend. The Plaintiffs filed motion for reconsideration of the court's ruling on May 7, 2020. On May 21, plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. This case is currently ongoing with both these motions by plaintiffs pending.", "summary": "On October 31st, 2016, a group of Plaintiffs who had been jailed for their inability to pay fines owed to the City of Florissant, Missouri for traffic tickets or other minor municipal offenses, sued the City for this violation of due process. This case is still in the discovery stage and has been ongoing for four years."}
{"article": "In 1989, Children's Rights and the ACLU filed a federal class action on behalf of children placed in foster care under the supervision of the District of Columbia's Department of Human Services (DHS), and abused and neglected children who are (or should be) known to DHS by virtue of abuse or neglect. The case asserted violations of Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, due process, the District of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, and the District of Columbia Youth Residential Facilities Licensor Act of 1986. In 1991, Judge Thomas F. Hogan of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia approved a negotiated remedial order following trial and a liability judgment against the defendant. LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991). Under the consent decree DHS agreed to develop policies and procedures in the areas of protective services; family preservation and preventive services; child placement; case reviews; adoption; staffing (qualifications, training, and caseload standards); resource development (foster homes, adoptive homes, and community based services); contracts with private providers and agencies; and development of a uniform computerized information system. The decision was appealed and remanded a number of times. The District of Columbia argued that the remedy sought by the plaintiffs could not be provided under federal law; the Court of Appeals instructed the district court to modify the consent order to be based entirely on local law. LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The district court kept the entire content of the order finding that local law provided adequate support for the measures in the decree. In October 1994, the plaintiffs filed a contempt motion, and the court ordered the creation of a limited receivership to address specific problems. In 1995, the judge found defendants in contempt of court and granted plaintiffs' request for appointment of a general receiver who would run the department. LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 887 F. Supp. 297 (D.D.C. 1995). The District made another appeal, this time regarding orders of receivership. The Court of Appeals found two orders moot, but held that the district court could not direct the receiver to disregard District law even if it interfered with the receiver's discharge of her responsibilities. LaShawn A. v. Barry, 107 F.3d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In June 2001, the parties proposed and the court agreed to terminate the receivership and appoint a monitor. In addition, the District agreed to create of a new agency, the Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA), with cabinet-level control of child welfare matters and consolidated jurisdiction over neglect and abuse cases. The District also agreed to fund additional lawyers to represent the CFSA in Superior Court and a variety of child welfare reforms. In May 2003, the monitor issued a post-Receivership Implementation Plan, a comprehensive outline for reform negotiated among plaintiffs, CFSA, the District mayor, and the court monitor. The Plan envisioned that by December 2006, defendants would fully comply with the district court's 1991 remedial order. The monitor continued to assess defendants' progress in 2004 and 2005. At one point during this period, the District failed to maintain an adequate number of attorneys on staff, and this failure apparently led to a severe case backlog for children who had a permanency goal of adoption. CFSA addressed the backlog and was required to ensure that such a backlog not recur. In December 2006 (the Implementation Plan deadline), despite numerous marked improvements, CFSA had failed to comply fully with several benchmarks. Accordingly, in February 2007, the court approved a jointly-submitted Amended Implementation Plan, which established a new reform deadline of December 2008 and required CFSA to produce annual strategy plans in 2007 and 2008. Setbacks in the reform effort prompted plaintiffs to file a contempt motion against the District in July 2008. The motion cited chronic problems, including a large backlog of unresolved abuse and neglect investigations, failure to move children into permanent homes on a timely basis, and frequent moves for children in foster care. In an attempt to resolve these problems, the parties negotiated yet another stipulated order, approved by the Court in October 2008. The stipulated order set forth a number of requirements that CFSA was to meet by January 2009. However, CFSA was unable to meet these requirements, and plaintiffs renewed their contempt motion in January 2009. In April 2010, the court ruled on plaintiffs' motion, holding the District and its mayor in contempt. LaShawn A. v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.D.C. 2010). The ruling cited the District's failure to implement an annual strategy plan approved by the court-appointed monitor and specifically mentioned the Mayor's failure to consult with the monitor or with plaintiffs' counsel as stipulated in the 2008 order. In addition, the court rejected defendants' argument that under Horne v. Flores, 129 S.Ct. 2579 (2009), the consent decree should be terminated altogether. The court also ordered that more funds be allocated to assist children aging out of the foster care system. Defendants appealed the district court's decision; the Court of Appeals upheld the ruling in February 2011. LaShawn A. v. Gray, 412 F. App'x 315 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In December 2010, the Court approved another Implementation and Exit Plan, superseding the 2007 Amended Implementation Plan. This document set forth which outcomes needed to be maintained, which outcomes still needed to be achieved, and a strategy plan for exiting the consent decree. In accordance with this new plan, CFSA developed strategy plans in each year after 2012 to develop means to achieve compliance and exit. Regular six-month monitoring reports were filed. The parties submitted a joint motion for an order approving an Exit and Sustainability plan on August 29, 2019, which was approved by the court on October 31, 2019. The plan included 19 outcomes to be achieved, self-regulation and public reporting commitments, and placement array commitments. The court monitor would continue to provide monthly review. The exit plan also detailed that the defendants may independently seek to exit court supervision after they had maintained all outcomes to be achieved for two consecutive six-month reporting periods, by petitioning the court, or by other court order. As of May 20, 2020, reporting continues, and the case is ongoing.", "summary": "On June 20, 1989, foster care children of the District of Columbia filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the Department of Human Services. The plaintiffs, represented by Children's Rights and the ACLU, asked the court to order improved policies related to protective services, family preservation and preventive services, child placement, case reviews, adoptions, and staffing, among other issues, claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA), the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, the District of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, and the District of Columbia Youth Residential Facilities Licensor Act of 1986. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that caseloads were too large, leaving many children in the foster care system for far too long with unresolved cases. Additionally, the complaint alleged inappropriate placements for children and inadequate efforts to return children home. In 1993, Judge Thomas F. Hogan approved a consent decree directing DHS to develop policies and procedures to rectify the system. After many years of oversight, and periodic contempt orders, the system has gradually improved. However, there is still a monitor in place reporting on the progress of the Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA) created as a result of this case."}
{"article": "On October 25, 2017, foster parents and three states (Texas, Louisiana, and Indiana) filed this lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Indian Child Welfare Act (the \u201cICWA\u201d) and accompanying regulations, including regulations promulgated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs titled Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings (the \u201cFinal Rule\u201d). They also challenged certain provisions of the Social Security Act (\u201cSSA\u201d) that predicated federal funding for portions of state child-welfare payments on compliance with the ICWA. The plaintiffs sued the United States of America, several federal agencies, and intervening Native American tribes in the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that the ICWA, 25 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1901\u20131923, 1951\u20131952, was unconstitutional and unenforceable and an injunction prohibiting the implementation or administration of those sections of the ICWA. They also sought attorney\u2019s fees and costs. Private counsel represented the parents. The case was assigned to Judge Reed C. O\u2019Connor. <u>Background on the Indian Child Welfare Act</u> Congress passed the ICWA in the 1970s in response to concerns about the large number of Native American children being removed from families and tribes and being placed in non-Native homes. The ICWA mandated that placement preferences in foster care and adoptive homes favor placing Native children with members of the child\u2019s extended family, or if not possible, with members of the child\u2019s tribe or with other Native families. The ICWA required a showing of \u201cgood cause\u201d to override that preference. <u>Plaintiffs' Specific Claims</u> The plaintiffs argued that the ICWA and Final Rule sets up a system based on racial and ethnic preferences in violation of state and federal law. Both the state and the individual plaintiffs alleged that the ICWA violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. All plaintiffs alleged that the Final Rule violated the APA because it was not in accordance with law. They also alleged that the parts of the ICWA, Final Rule, and SSA violated the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment by intruding into state domestic relations and violating anti-commandeering principles. The individual plaintiffs further alleged that the ICWA\u2019s placement preferences violated their Fifth Amendment substantive due process right to an intimate familiar relationship with the children they foster. The state plaintiffs alleged that the ICWA and the Final rule also were an impermissible delegation of federal legislative and executive power to tribal nations in violation of Article I of the Constitution. <u>Native Tribes Permitted to Intervene as Defendants</u> On March 26, 2018, Native tribes, including Cherokee Nation, Morongo Band of Mission Indians, Oneida Nation, and Quinault Indian Nation, filed a motion to intervene as defendants, and the court granted it two days later. The four Native tribes immediately moved to dismiss the suit. The Navajo Nation, who filed a separate motion to intervene on April 26, 2018, was not permitted to join the lawsuit as a defendant. The court found that the Navajo Nation\u2019s interest would be adequately represented by the four other tribal nation defendants. <u>The Parties File Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment</u> Both the state and individual plaintiffs filed motions for summary judgment in April 2018. The federal defendants meanwhile filed both a motion to dismiss and cross-motion for summary judgment. Several parties filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the plaintiffs, federal defendants, and tribal defendant-intervenors. These included briefs from eight states, several tribal advocacy groups, including the National Indian Child Welfare Association and National Congress of American Indians, and the Goldwater Institute. In June 2018, the Native tribes also filed a motion for summary judgment. <u>District Court Denies Motion to Dismiss and Finds Plaintiffs Have Standing</u> Judge O\u2019Connor denied both the federal and tribal defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss on July 24, 2018. He found that the state and individual plaintiffs had standing to bring suit. Further, he rejected the federal defendants\u2019 argument that they failed to waive sovereign immunity, finding the APA waived sovereign immunity on plaintiffs\u2019 claims challenging the agency\u2019s Final Rule and actions and that sovereign immunity did not protect against a challenge to the constitutionality of the ICWA. He also found that <i>Younger</i> abstention was not applicable to this case and plaintiffs seeking relief to preclude application of the ICWA to state-court child custody proceedings did not require abstention in this case. <u>District Court Grants Summary Judgment to Plaintiffs</u> After a hearing on the motions for summary judgment, on October 4, 2018, Judge O\u2019Connor granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motions for summary judgment in part and denied in part. 338 F. Supp. 3d 514. The court evaluated the plaintiff\u2019s claims that the ICWA and Final Rule violated: 1) The equal protection requirements of the Fifth Amendment; (2) the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (3) the Tenth Amendment; and (4) the proper scope of the Indian Commerce Clause. The state plaintiffs also argued that: (1) the Final Rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (the \u201cAPA\u201d); and (2) the ICWA violated the non-delegation doctrine Article I of the Constitution. First, the court addressed the plaintiffs\u2019 equal protection claims and the appropriate level of review. The plaintiffs argued strict scrutiny applied because ICWA relied on racial classifications. The defendants responded that the placement preferences relied not on racial classification, but rather political classifications, and therefore, rational basis review should be applied. The court agreed with the plaintiffs and found that the ICWA classification mirrored racial classification and that strict scrutiny applied. The court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on their equal protection claim because the classifications in the ICWA were not narrowly tailored and did not serve a compelling governmental interest. Next, the court evaluated the state plaintiffs\u2019 Article I non-delegation claim and granted them summary judgment. The state plaintiffs claimed that the ICWA was unconstitutional because it delegated congressional power to Native American tribes by permitting tribes to reorder congressionally enacted adoption placement preference by tribal decree and apply these orders against the states. The court held that regardless of whether Native tribes were characterized as quasi-sovereigns or domestic dependent nations, the Constitution did not permit them to exercise federal legislative or executive power over non-tribal persons on non-tribal land. Accordingly, it held the delegation in the ICWA and Final Rule permitting tribal placement preferences to apply over those in the ICWA impermissible. The court also granted the plaintiffs\u2019 summary judgment on their Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering claim. The plaintiffs argued that the ICWA unconstitutionally required state courts and executive agencies to apply federal standards and directives to state created claims. The federal government argued that they had the power to enact the ICWA under the Indian Commerce Clause. The court determined that the ICWA violated three principles laid out in <i>Murphy v. NCAA</i> on the importance of the anti-commandeering doctrine: 1) protecting the Constitution\u2019s structural protections of liberty; 2) promoting political accountability; 3) preventing Congress from shifting the cost of regulation to the states. The court rejected the idea that the ICWA preempts state law, as the ICWA is directly regulating the states. Finally, the court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on their claim that the Final Rule violated the APA by implementing an unconstitutional law, exceeding the scope of the BIA\u2019s statutory regulatory authority, and reflecting an impermissibly ambiguous construction of the statute; and is otherwise arbitrary and capricious. The court denied summary judgment to the individuals plaintiffs on their claim that the ICWA and Final Rule violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause. The court refused to recognize a fundamental right of keeping foster families or prospective adoptive families together. Judge O\u2019Connor entered final judgment that day, October 4, 2018, and declared \u00a7\u00a7 1901\u20131923, 1951\u20131952 of the ICWA and the Final Rule unconstitutional. <u>Defendants Appeal to the Fifth Circuit & Fifth Circuit Reverses District Court</u> The defendants appealed to the Fifth Circuit on November 19, 2018, docket number 18-11479. The Navajo Nation once again sought to intervene on the appeal, and this time, the Fifth Circuit permitted them to intervene in support of appellants. On August 9, 2019, in an opinion written by Circuit Judge James L. Dennis, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs. 937 F.3d 406. Regarding the plaintiffs\u2019 equal protection claim, the Fifth Circuit court determined that the classification was a political, rather than racial classification and applied rational basis review. The court reversed the anti-commandeering claim and preemption claim, stating that the ICWA regulates private individuals rather than states. Circuit Judge Priscilla Owen wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Judge Owen believed that the ICWA violated the constitution by directing state officers and agents to administer federal law. <u>En Banc Rehearing Results in Highly Fractured, 325 Page Decision that Partially Reverses, Partially Affirms District Court</u> On November 7, 2019, the Fifth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc. On April 6, 2021, the en banc Fifth Circuit released a highly fractured opinion, totaling 325 pages. Two principal opinions were filed by Judge James L. Dennis and Judge Stuart Kyle Duncan. Neither principal opinion gained majority support on all issues. A majority of the court agreed that Congress has the authority to enact the ICWA under Article I of the Constitution. They also reversed the district court\u2019s decision that the classification in the ICWA violated the equal protection clause. A majority of the en banc court also found that several provisions of the ICWA do not illegal commandeer the states, but affirmed the district court\u2019s ruling that other parts of the ICWA did unconstitutionally commandeer state officials. The en banc court was split on other issues, including the district court\u2019s ruling the ICWA violated the equal protection by preferring other Native American families over the adoptive parents, saying that the holding was \u201caffirmed without a precedential opinion.\u201d The en banc majority reversed the district court\u2019s ruling on the preemption and nondelegation doctrine claims. Lastly, the en banc majority held that the BIA did not violate the APA by concluding the Final Rule may issue regulations binding on state courts but held that it did violate the APA by implementing unconstitutional provisions. Judge Costa wrote a particularly lively opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Judge Costa would find that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the circuit court lacked the power to bind state courts conducting adoption proceedings and therefore could not redress the injury. He wrote \u201cit will no doubt shock the reader who has slogged through today\u2019s lengthy opinions. . . this case will not have binding effect in a single adoption.\u201d He further wrote \u201cthere is a term for a judicial decision that does nothing more than opine on what the law should be: an advisory opinion. That is what the roughly 300 pages you just read amount to.\u201d He also criticized the other opinions for their narrow view on federal power when it was being used to sustain tribal life, rather than destroy it: \u201c[T]he most tragic irony of today\u2019s opinions\u201d is that \u201c[a]fter more than two centuries of courts' recognizing sweeping federal power over Indian affairs when that power was often used to destroy tribal life, our court comes within a whisker of rejecting that power when it is being used to sustain tribal life. . . . Contrary to what a near-majority of our court concludes, the same power Congress once relied on to tear Indian children from Indian homes authorizes Congress to enlist state courts in the project of returning them.\u201d The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On 2017, foster parents and three states filed a suit challenging the constitutionality of the Indian Child Welfare Act (the \"ICWA\"). Plaintiffs allege the ICWA violates the Equal Protection Clause and anti-commandeering principles. The district court held the ICWA is unconstitutional which was partially affirmed in a fractured en banc opinion by the Fifth Circuit. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On August 18, 2009, three individuals receiving adult day health care services in California filed a class action lawsuit against the California Department of Health Care Services and its Director to enjoin the Department from making cuts to the Adult Day Health Care (ADHC) services program. Represented by Disability Rights California, AARP Foundation Litigation, and the National Senior Citizens Law Center, the plaintiffs filed their suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, and alleged numerous causes of action: violation of the 14th amendment due process clause of the U.S. Constitution; violation of the American Disabilities Act; violations of the Medicaid Act; and violation of California Government Code sections 11135 and 11139. The plaintiffs alleged that cuts or significant changes to the ADHC program would place elderly persons and adults with disabilities at great risk of permanent institutionalization. The proposed cuts would reduce ADHC services from 5 days a week to only 3, leaving a gap in service provision for elderly and disabled people otherwise unable to care for themselves. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief for a class of individuals defined as \"all recipients of Medi-Cal in California who receive ADHC services, whose benefits would be limited, cut or terminated\" under the proposed legislation. Less than a week after they filed the case, under the impression that the reduction in ADHC services would take effect on August 27, 2009, plaintiffs sought an emergency Temporary Restraining Order. Once the plaintiffs learned that the reduction would not take place until the week of September 7, 2009, they substituted a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On September 10, 2009, District Court (Judge Saundra Brown Armstrong) issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the California Department of Health Care Services from reducing, terminating, or modifying the ADHC program until an appropriate alternative could be provided to prevent institutionalization of individuals in the plaintiffs' class. On February 24, 2010, the District Court issued a second preliminary injunction preventing the defendants from \"implementing new, more restrictive eligibility requirements for ADHC services.\" On August 10, 2010, the District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The court certified the class as \"All Medi-Cal beneficiaries in the State of California for whom Adult Day Health Care benefits will be reduced, suspended, denied or terminated under the provisions of ABx4 5.\" On December 14, 2011, the District Court approved the motion for preliminary approval of a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement \"which preserves ADHC-like services for people who are at risk of institutionalization, in a new program called Community-Based Adult Services (CBAS). Similar to ADHC, CBAS will offer center-based skilled health and nursing care, therapies, transportation and other services, to eligible low income seniors and people with disabilities. Under the settlement, the planned December 1, 2011 ADHC elimination date will be moved to February 29, 2012 to ensure a seamless transition for eligible ADHC participants to the CBAS program.\" On January 25, 2012, the District Court entered the stipulated judgment pursuant to the settlement agreement reached by the parties. On Sept. 15, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the judgment and for the appointment of a special master. The district court referred the motion to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley, who issued an opinion and order denying the motion on Nov. 20, 2012. In their motion, the plaintiffs alleged that the state failed to take necessary steps to prevent managed care opt-outs; that it subjected some class members to long-delayed hearing decisions; that it subjected class members to illegal Quality Assurance reviews in determining CBAS eligibility; and it had not acted to support access to CBAS and prevent loss of CBAS services due to center closures. But Judge Corley determined that the state had not violated any aspect of the settlement agreement. On March 8, 2013, Judge Armstrong accepted Magistrate Judge Corley's report and recommendation. He ordered that the plaintiffs' motion be denied.", "summary": "California recipients of Adult Day Health Care services brought this class action to enjoin California from reducing or eliminating the ADHC program, which would put the plaintiffs at risk of institutionalization. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted the plaintiff class a preliminary injunction in September 2009, forbidding California to modify it's adult Day Health Care program until an appropriate alternative could be provided to prevent institutionalization of individuals in the plaintiffs' class. The District Court approved a settlement agreement that created a new program which will help to prevent the institutionalization of ADHC beneficiaries."}
{"article": "On July 1, 1999, two individuals who use wheelchairs for mobility, filed a complaint against the City of Steamboat Springs in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado claiming the City had failed to make its bus service and other services were not accessible to persons with disabilities, in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12101, et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief. On April 20, 2000, the court granted the United States' motion to intervene on behalf of the plaintiffs. The decree essentially dealt with all of the plaintiffs' claims, requiring the defendant to make its transportation system and other services accessible. The defendant agreed to pay attorneys' fees and costs, $9500 to one plaintiff and $2750 to the other. The defendants were required to submit annual progress reports to plaintiffs' counsel. The decree was to last for 4 years. The settlement concluded without further litigation, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "Two individuals who use wheelchairs for mobility sued the City of Steamboat Springs, for having inaccessible public transportation and facilities. The parties entered into a consent decree requiring the city to make its services and facilities accessible, pay attorneys' fees and costs, and pay $12,250 to the plaintiffs."}
{"article": "On January 6, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the Colorado Rockies baseball club in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado after it removed accessible seats in Coors Field and raised prices on others. Plaintiffs, Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition, Inc., was a Denver, Colorado non-profit corporation that advocated for the disabled, a Colorado resident with spina bifida who used a wheelchair for mobility, and his father Plaintiff who accompanied him to baseball games alleged that prior to 2001, the defendant provided wheelchair accessible seats at Coors Field behind home plate, which were the only accessible seats providing a front-row or \"near-in\" viewing experience at the infield. These seats were $27 to $38. Inaccessible seats in the same location were approximately $100. In 2001, to create a luxury seating area, the defendant raised the prices on the accessible seats behind home plate to $100 and removed some of the seats, leaving no affordable equivalent viewpoint for disabled individuals. The Plaintiffs' complaint brought a single count under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12181 et seq. The plaintiffs asked for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. On June 2, 2003, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. On April 2, 2004, the court denied the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, in a published opinion. Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition v. Colorado Rockies Baseball Club, Ltd., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Col. 2004). The defendant argued that clustering accessible seating at the top of certain sections in the ballpark was permissible under the ADA. The court denied the motion, noting that \"The Rockies may not 'ghettoize' wheelchair spaces or designate a few token wheelchair spaces in the luxury seating areas as has been done.\" A trial took place from April 19 to April 22, 2004. On August 31, 2004, the court granted a joint stipulated dismissal with prejudice of all claims. It is unclear whether the parties settled and if so what the terms of that agreement are. This order is the last entry on the docket. No documents are available through PACER.", "summary": "Plaintiffs were disabled individuals who sued the Colorado Rockies baseball club after it removed accessible seats in Coors Field and raised prices on others. There was a trial held, after which the court dismissed all claims by stipulation. It is unclear, however, whether the parties settled."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: On April 29, 2020, four individuals with disabilities and Disability Rights New York sued the Governor of New York State for the absence of live televised American Sign Language (ASL) interpretation on the Governor\u2019s daily televised briefings. Given the COVID-19 pandemic, the plaintiffs alleged that lack of live ASL accommodations discriminated against populations with disabilities residing in New York. <hr> On April 29, four individuals with disabilities and Disability Rights New York filed this lawsuit against Andrew Cuomo, the Governor of New York State, as a declaratory and injunctive action. The plaintiffs alleged that the absence of live televised American Sign Language (ASL) interpretation in Governor Cuomo\u2019s daily televised briefings on COVID-19 discriminated against populations with disabilities residing in New York, violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Further, the plaintiffs added that New York residents already faced disproportionate health risks from the pandemic and that every other state in the nation has provided some form of live televised ASL. The case was filed at the U.S District Court for the Southern District of New York and assigned to Valerie E. Canroni. The plaintiffs immediately sought a Temporary Restraining Order and preliminary injunction requiring New York to immediately include live in-frame ASL interpretation for all the governor's briefings addressed to New York residents. The plaintiffs also sought attorney fees and were represented by Disability Rights New York. The state's opposition argued that they complied with the ADA and 504 by providing closed captioning and ASL interpretation through the Governor\u2019s website. The Court granted the preliminary injunction on May 11, and ordered Governor Cuomo to immediately implement live, in-frame ASL interpretation for his daily press briefings. 2020 WL 2393285. Settlement discussions are proceeding and the case is ongoing.", "summary": "On April 29, four individuals with disabilities and Disability Rights New York filed a complaint against Andrew Cuomo, the Governor of New York State. The plaintiffs alleged that the absence of live televised American Sign Language (ASL) interpretation in Governor Cuomo\u2019s daily televised briefings on COVID-19 discriminated against populations with disabilities residing in New York by failing to provide a live ASL interpreter. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, declaring the lack of ASL interpretation as a violation under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs also sought a TRO and preliminary injunction requiring the defendant to immediately include live in-frame ASL interpretation for all briefings addressed to New York residents. The preliminary injunction was granted on May 11, and the defendant was ordered to immediately implement live, in-frame ASL interpretation for his daily press briefings. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On January 6, 2014, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice sent a findings letter to the attorney general for the State of Rhode Island. The letter reported that the Division's investigation of Rhode Island's educational, vocational, and shelter services for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities (I/DD) found that Rhode Island violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, by \"unjustifiably\" isolating persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities in sheltered workshops and facility-based day programs. On April 8, 2014, the Civil Rights Division filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island against the State of Rhode Island under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12131-12134. The DOJ asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant discriminated against people with I/DD by failing to provide state services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs and by putting Rhode Island high school students with I/DD at \"serious risk of segregation\" by failing to inform them of or provide them with state services that would allow them to work in an integrated workplace. The plaintiff further claimed that Rhode Island failed to reasonably modify its delivery of its services to prevent them from causing unnecessary segregation on the basis of disability. On the same day that the complaint was filed, both parties submitted a proposed consent decree to settle the lawsuit; presumably, they had been engaged in negotiations since the issuance of the January findings letter. On April 9, 2014, the District Court (Senior Judge Ronald R. Lugueux) approved a consent decree between the parties that would last for ten years. The Decree required ten outcomes by Rhode Island regarding four target populations. The four target populations included: (1) Individuals with I/DD that received day activity services in settings where they perform sheltered workshop tasks, \u201cSheltered Workshop Target Population.\u201d (2) Individuals with I/DD that received day activity services in facility-based day program settings, \u201cDay Target Population.\u201d (3) Individuals with I/DD that were transition-age youth attending a Rhode Island secondary school, \u201cYouth Transition Target Population.\u201d (4) Individuals with I/DD that were transition age youth who exited a Rhode Island secondary school during the 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16 school years, \u201cYouth Exit Target Population.\u201d The ten outcomes stated: (1) By January 1, 2015, defendant needed to provide all individuals within the Youth Exit Target Population person-centered planning which will result in career development plans. (2) By October 1, 2014 and September 1 of every following year, defendant needed to provide all individuals within the Youth Transition Target Population with services necessary to introduce them to work in integrated setting. (3) Defendant needed to engage in an annual person-centered planning process with all individuals within the Youth Transition Target Population. (4) Defendant needed to cease placement and funding for new entrants to the facility-based day programs. (5) By January 1, 2015, defendant needed to provide career development plans for all individuals within the Youth Exit Target Population, and by January 1, 2016, defendant must provide career development plans for all individuals within the Sheltered Workshop and Day Program Target Populations. (6) Defendant needed to institute a program that provides benefits planning information and counseling to all individuals within the Youth Exit, Sheltered Workshop, and Day Program Target Populations within one year of the individuals\u2019 scheduled transition to supported employment placement and integrated day services. (7) By September 1, 2014, defendant was to issue a direction to ensure that the Supports Intensity Scale assessment process will be administered with the presumption that individuals with the most severe disabilities can work in integrated settings and receive services. Defendant will also ensure the resource allocation decisions are made in a manner consistent with individuals\u2019 support needs. (8) Annually, the defendant was to provide Support Employment Placements and Integrated Day Services to all individuals within the Rhode Island Youth Exit Target Population, pursuant to year that group left school. Following this, through January 1, 2019, the defendant will annually provide at least fifty additional individuals within the Sheltered Workshop Target Population with the above services. This figure will then increase to at least one hundred additional individuals annually through January 1, 2024. (9) Annually, the defendant was to provide Support Employment Placements and Integrated Day Services for individuals in the Day Target Population. At least twenty-five additional individuals annually by 2015 and 2016, at least fifty additional individuals annually in 2017 and 2018, at least seventy-five additional individuals in 2019, at least one hundred additional individuals in 2020, at least 200 additional individuals in 2021 and 2022, and at least 225 additional individuals in 2023. (10) The defendant was to document for continuous review by the court monitor its efforts to provide the target populations Supported Employment Placements and Individual Day Programs. Over the next year, defendant made progress and initiated programs related to Outcomes 1-10, issuing the required direction in Outcome 7 in October 2014. However, by April 10, 2015, the defendant had not met any of the deadlines or benchmarks required by the consent decree. The DOJ determined that additional action was necessary for the defendant to come into compliance with the consent decree, and moved for a proposed order on May 6, 2016, which was granted on May 18, 2016. The order required the defendant to (1) appropriate additional money in the Governor\u2019s budget for the fiscal year 2017, (2) create a live database to allow for efficient tracking of each member of the target populations, (3) provide the plaintiff and the court monitor with access to the database or list of database entries by July 29, 2016 to allow the plaintiff and court monitor to verify progress for individuals within the target populations, (4) comply with all deadlines within the Consent Decree, (5) supply additional reports regarding progress with the Consent Decree, and (6) receive a sanction, after a show-cause hearing coordinated by the court, of $5,000 per day for each provision violated, with an additional payment of $100 per day for each member of a target population whose employment or day services are delayed due to the violation, until the violation is remedied. Each ordered sanction was not to exceed $1,000,000 per year. The defendant met or conditionally met the court order provisions 1, 2, 3, and 5 by July 29, 2016. Evaluation of provision 4 was deferred. By October 31, 2016, the defendant was meeting or exceeding the supported employment placement benchmarks for the Sheltered Workshop and Day Target Populations. However, it failed to meet a number of the other benchmarks. Youth Exit Target Population supported employment placements were below consent decree requirements. Career Development Planning for all target populations also fell below required benchmarks . The state also had not met all requirements related to various other outcomes. That said, the court monitor reported that the defendant had made progress in the development of required plans and programs to assist in their compliance with the consent decree. By July 20, 2017, supported employment placement for the Youth Exit and Sheltered Workshop Target Populations fell below their benchmarks, but the Day Target Population greatly exceeded the benchmark. Career development planning and benefits planning for all target populations remained below the required benchmarks. The defendant had not yet met the integrated day services requirements with regard to target populations. Finally, the defendant had not yet reached provider capacity requirements that would enable the ability to provide the required services of the consent decree. While the defendant had not reached all required benchmarks, the court monitor reported that the defendant continued to make significant progress in the development of required plans and programs to assist in reaching compliance. Two such programs were a sheltered workshop and a facility-based day service provider, both of which were operated by Community Work Services and Birch Academy. The Court Monitor\u2019s report on October 29, 2018, showed significant improvement since 2017. Career development planning for members of the Birch Look Back Target Population and the TTP Target Population significantly improved over the past year. TTP target population met its benchmark as acceptable career development plans were increased from 42 to 94%. However, the quality of person-centered career development planning did not increase sufficiently since the previous report. The Court Monitor noted that further action was required to improve employment placements and day services to be more personalized and self-directed. The Youth Exit Population met its benchmark. On February 14, 2019, the Court Monitor also noted that the Governor\u2019s recommended budget for 2020 appeared adequate to meet funding requirements necessary to comply with the Consent Decree. Judge McConnell appointed Dr. A. Anthony Antosh to replace the Court Monitor on February 28, 2020. Monitoring continued. On March 18, 2020, in light of the COVD-19 public health emergency, the court ordered the Court Monitor to engage in conversations with the State, providers, family advocates, and the DOJ to make recommendations to the Court on orders that could (1) lessen the administrative burden on providers and the State; (2) assist class members and their families in maneuvering the system and securing essential services; (3) any other recommendations the Court Monitor deems appropriate. The case is still ongoing as monitoring for the consent decree continues.", "summary": "On April 8, 2014, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island alleging that Rhode Island violated the ADA by segregating individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities in sheltered workshops and facility-based day programs that denied them the opportunity to associate with those who did not have a disability. On April 9, 2014, the District Court approved a Consent Decree where Rhode Island agreed to, among other things, provide employment planning services to individuals with developmental and intellectual disabilities designed to encourage and assist them in working in integrated working environments, provide state support and services for those working in integrated settings and those making the transition to those settings, programs to educate relevant individuals about the programs and benefits that the Rhode Island offers to those working in integrated settings. Rhode Island must also implement policies regarding the services required by the Consent Decree, train its personnel in the new procedures and working with individuals with disabilities, and Rhode Island must help sheltered workshops change their structure to become integrated working environments."}
{"article": "This is a case challenging the legality of the Kanawha County Schools (KCS) treatment of students with disabilities. On January 24, 2020, a plaintiff who was a third-grade student in the Kanawha County School district, filed this class-action suit against the school district and its superintendent. The Arc of West Virginia, an advocacy organization that supports students with disabilities, also joined as a plaintiff. The student had autism and ADHD. The plaintiff had been denied effective behavioral support at his school and had been repeatedly removed from the classroom. The plaintiff sued under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the Americans Disabilities Act (ADA), the West Virginia Human Rights Act, and West Virginia Policy 2419. Judge Irene Berger was assigned to oversee the proceedings. The plaintiff argued that the school district was failing to comply with the requirement under the IDEA to provide students with disabilities with a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE). The FAPE standard requires \"appropriately ambitious\" special education, which KCS failed to meet. Similarly, KCS had not met its requirements under the ADA to adjust policies, practices, and procedures as necessary and to provide children with disabilities equal education opportunities. KCS did not have a current system in place to identify and provide resources for students with disabilities and instead used informal and formal removal techniques in response to behavior problems. The plaintiffs sought class certification for a class consisting of \"[a]ll Kanawha County Schools students with disabilities who (1) need but are not receiving behavior supports from KCS, and (2) have experienced disciplinary removals from any classroom.\" The plaintiffs also sought declaratory and injunctive relief, specifically asking the Court to enjoin the defendants in revising their policies in order to provide effective behavior supports to its students with disabilities, and also provide a monitor to oversee compliance with the court order. Finally, the plaintiffs sought attorneys' fees and costs. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claims on March 20, 2020. On April 10, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, switching the organizational defendant to the Board of Education of the County of Kanawha. The defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the IDEA. The defendants also sought to dismiss the Arc of West Virginia from the case, arguing that the organization lacked standing because they did not allege that one of their members required relief. On July 16, 2020, Judge Irene Berger dismissed the claims against the superintendent but denied the school district's motion to dismiss. 2020 WL 4018285. The Court found that the plaintiffs had alleged systemic violations, and therefore they did not need to exhaust their administrative remedies. The Court also determined that the Arc of West Virginia had associational standing and was permitted to remain in the litigation. As of October 22, the case remains ongoing.", "summary": "In this case, a third-grader plaintiff who had autism and ADHD filed suit against the Kanawha County Schools system under the IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the ADA, the West Virginia Human Rights Act, and West Virginia Policy 2419. The elementary school student had been subject to disciplinary removal from the classroom and his district had failed to provide the behavioral supports and programming required by law. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On October 18, 2016, families in Flint, Michigan filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The case was assigned to Judge Arthur J. Turnow. The plaintiffs sued the Michigan Department of Education (MDE), Flint Community Schools (FCS), and the Genesee Intermediate School District (GISD) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1400, \u00a7 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. They alleged that the state of Michigan and local educators violated federal law by not screening to identify students who needed special education services. They further argued that the defendants had violated the rights of students with disabilities in the imposition of school discipline, including illegal suspensions and expulsions. The Flint parents and children were represented by the ACLU of Michigan and private counsel. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that children attending these schools were at risk of developing a disability due to their prolonged exposure to lead. Despite that risk, the schools had a pattern and practice of systematically failing to provide ongoing screening and timely referrals for evaluations to identify qualifying disabilities. Also, the schools systematically failed to provide students with disabilities with safeguards and had a pattern of using unduly harsh disciplinary measures with students with disabilities, including physical restraints and seclusion techniques. (For more information on the Flint water crisis, which involved claims of widespread lead exposure from the City's drinking water, see <a href=https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16508><i>Waid v. Snyder</i></a>.) On December 8, 2016, FCS and MDE each filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On December 15, GISD moved for judgment on the pleadings, using the same reasoning. On July 7, 2017, the defendants moved to stay discovery pending these motions, and the court granted this request on August 24, 2017. 2017 WL 3642131. On September 29, 2017, the court denied GISD and MDE\u2019s motions to dismiss, in their entirety. The court granted FCS's motion in part and denied it in part, granting dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim regarding universal preschool but denying the rest of the motion. On October 16, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to comply with their child-find obligations (their obligations to identify and evaluate children with disabilities) under state and federal law. That same day, the defendants appealed the denial of the motion to dismiss to the Sixth Circuit. (Docket Number: 17-2255). On October 24, the defendants moved to stay District Court proceedings, arguing that the District Court now lacked jurisdiction because the defendants had filed an appeal. The court denied this request on November 2, 2017, because denials of motions to dismiss are generally not appealable, so the defendants\u2019 appeal would likely be dismissed. 2017 WL 5010773. On November 28, 2017, as predicted by the district court, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal. 2017 WL 6947900. The panel of judges was made up of Judge Richard Suhrheinrich, Judge Raymond Kethledge, and Judge Denise Hood. In district court, the parties moved forward with discovery and settlement discussions. On April 9, 2018, the parties reached a partial settlement agreement as to the plaintiffs\u2019 child-find claims. This mooted out the plaintiffs\u2019 October 2017 motion for a preliminary injunction. This settlement required the defendants to implement a screening and assessment program for the next five years and report its progress back to the plaintiffs every six months for at least the next two years. On April 12, 2017, at the request of the parties, the court incorporated this settlement agreement into a court order and dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 child-find claims with prejudice. As of February 7, 2020, the case is ongoing. The partial settlement only resolved the child-find issues; all of the plaintiffs\u2019 other claims are still in dispute. The final pretrial conference is set for March 16, 2020, and the court retains jurisdiction to enforce the partial settlement agreement until April 2023.", "summary": "In October 2016, a group of Flint schoolchildren (via their parents) sued the state of Michigan and the school district in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging that the state of Michigan and local educators are in violation of federal law by not screening to identify students who need special education services and violating the rights of students with disabilities in the imposition of school discipline. In April 2018, the parties reached a partial settlement as to one of the plaintiffs' claims, but the rest are still in dispute. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On Nov. 17, 2014, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the University of North Carolina (UNC). The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit the consideration of race in college admissions, claiming that UNC's current admissions policy discriminated against Asian American applicants. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that UNC's current admissions policy held Asian American students to a higher standard based on their race, that UNC was engaged in a prohibited form of racial balancing, that UNC was not limiting its consideration of an applicant's race to \"merely a plus factor,\" and that a racially neutral alternative was available to achieve the same goals of diversity. As evidence of this, the plaintiff pointed to admissions data that showed a disparity between acceptance for Asian American students at UNC and at other schools (for example, the University of California) that did not employ racial considerations in their admissions process. Additionally, the plaintiff pointed to the steady rate of acceptance of Asian American students despite the change in application rates and qualifications for those applicants. According to the plaintiff, this was evidence of a policy indistinguishable from racially based quotas for admissions. The plaintiff also pointed to a long history of admissions discrimination at UNC as evidence suggesting the current policy may have similar aims. The case was assigned to Judge Loretta C. Biggs on Jan. 12, 2015. On Mar. 20, 2015, the parties filed a joint stipulation of voluntary dismissal of a subset of the plaintiff's claims. The parties dismissed the UNC Board of Trustees and the individual trustees named as defendants, arguing that the Board did not play an active role in creating the admissions policy. The parties also dismissed all Title VI claims against the individually named defendants from the Board of Governors, the UNC president, and various other UNC Chapel Hill administrators. Finally, the parties dismissed the 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 claim against all defendants. On Jun. 30, 2015, a series of individual UNC students and parents of students intending to apply to UNC moved to intervene on behalf of the defendants. The intervenors identified themselves as African American, Black, Moorish, Indian, and Hispanic. On Jul. 6, 2015, the defendants moved to stay the proceedings in light of the Supreme Court's pending decision in <i>Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin</i>. Although the plaintiff initially opposed the motion, the parties filed a joint motion to partially stay proceedings on Sept. 30. They sought partial stay of the proceedings pending the resolution of <i>Fisher</i> in the Supreme Court, but on the condition that defendants produce \"certain agreed-upon materials.\" The court granted the partial stay motion and then stayed all proceedings on Oct. 1. The Supreme Court decided <i>Fisher</i> on Jun. 23, 2016, holding that the University of Texas' use of race in the admissions process did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 136 S. Ct. 2198. The court here lifted the stay on Aug. 1, 2016 and discovery continued. The court granted permissive intervention to the current and prospective students on Jan. 13, 2017. 319 F.R.D. 490. On Oct. 25, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the plaintiff brought suit as \"an organizational plaintiff asserting representational standing\" but did not meet its burden of showing its members had \"indicia of membership in an organization.\" The court held on Sep. 29, 2018, that the \"indicia of membership\" test did not apply to Students for Fair Admission, since it was a voluntary membership association with actual members. The court held that Students for Fair Admission had standing because four of its members were recent high school graduates who had applied to the University of North Carolina and were denied admission. 2018 WL 4688388 On Jan. 18, 2019, the defendants moved for summary judgement, arguing that the University employed a narrowly tailored admissions policy, using the type of holistic review endorsed by the Supreme Court. The plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on Mar. 4, 2019, asking the court to find as a matter of law that the University's admissions policy was not narrowly tailored. On Sep. 30, 2019, Judge Biggs denied both motions for summary judgement. She found that there was an issue of material fact regarding UNC's use of race as a \"plus\" factor. UNC presented evidence that their system, which lists \"background\" as a factor in admissions decisions but does not assign points to students based on their race or ethnicity as it does with other categories, takes the kind of holistic approach endorsed by the Supreme Court. UNC presented expert evidence based on four years of admissions decisions that their approach considers each student individually. The plaintiffs presented conflicting expert evidence, which they claimed showed that race was a predominant factor in admissions decisions. 2019 WL 4773908 Judge Biggs also found an issue of material fact regarding UNC's efforts to explore race neutral alternatives. UNC presented expert evidence that concluded that no race blind alternatives were available that would allow the university to maintain both its academic standards and racial diversity. The Plaintiffs countered that UNC had not sufficiently attempted to use race neutral alternatives such as increasing financial aid, adopting policies using geographic diversity, including percentage plans and the use of zip codes and Census tract data, reducing or eliminating preferences for legacies, or eliminating the Early Acton admissions options. A bench trial was set for May 11, 2020. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On November 17, 2014, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina under The Civil Rights Act of 1964, against the University of North Carolina. Plaintiff asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit the consideration of race in college admissions, claiming that UNC's current admissions policy discriminated against Asian American applicants. The court denied summary judgement and, as of April 9th, 2020, the suit is ongoing."}
{"article": "On May 9, 2003, four female former students and a former employee of Rhinebeck Central High School filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the High School and the former principal, alleging that the defendants had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the former principal had subjected female students of the school to sexual harassment that constituted discrimination on the basis of sex. The plaintiffs further alleged that district officials received actual notice of the discrimination, but did not act to remedy the situation. The plaintiffs claimed that the the deliberate indifference prevented the female students from enjoying the educational benefits and opportunities offered by the school. On March 18, 2004, Judge Stephen C. Robinson permitted the United States to file a complaint in intervention seeking relief to ensure that the School District would operate a school system that offered an educational environment free from discrimination. The parties field a Consent Decree with the court on February 15, 2006, in which they agreed that the District would: refrain from engaging in any activity that discriminated against any student on the basis of student's sex in the administration of educational benefits and services, respond promptly and appropriately to allegations of sexual harassment and discrimination, and refrain from retaliating against any student or employee because that student or employee participated in a complaint against the District alleging discrimination on the basis of sex. The District also agreed to hire an expert in sexual harassment training and prevention and to designate two compliance officers that would be responsible for receiving and identifying complaints of discrimination. The District would keep a written record of all allegations of discrimination on the basis of sex, and the investigation undertaken by the District. The parties agreed that the Consent Decree would be effective for three years, unless the parties chose to extend it. Additionally, the District agreed to furnish to the government six months after the date of the Consent Decree, and annually thereafter, a detailed report covering the District's compliance efforts for the preceding year. Finally, the District agreed to pay $152,500 as a settlement amount to the plaintiffs and their counsel. The consent decree ended in 2009 without any further litigation. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Former students and an employee of Rhinebeck Central High School filed suit against the School District and the former principal alleging that the District had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to rectify allegations that the principal had sexually harassed the female students. The parties reached a Consent Decree in which the District agreed to implement anti-discrimination procedures."}
{"article": "The plaintiff in this case was a 16-year-old rising senior at the George Nelson Temper High School (Temper), which is part of the Kenosha Unified School District No. 1 (KUSD), in Wisconsin. Plaintiff, who was assigned female on his birth certificate but whose gender identity is male, suffers from gender dysphoria, a <a href=\"https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-gender-dysphoria\">condition</a> recognized by the American Psychiatric Association. Over the course of several years, despite explanations from the plaintiff and despite receiving several signed letters from the plaintiff\u2019s pediatrician explaining Plaintiff\u2019s condition, KUSD officials repeatedly denied access to facilities matching Plaintiff's gender identity. Even after hearing from a pediatrician that Plaintiff\u2019s gender identity was male, KUSD told Plaintiff to use either the girls' restroom, or a gender-neutral, single-occupancy bathroom in the school\u2019s office. KUSD refused to change Plaintiff\u2019s name or gender in school records and attendance lists, and the school also initially refused to allow Plaintiff to be nominated as prom king, relenting only after petition and other protests by Plaintiff\u2019s fellow students. After learning of a lawsuit challenging a school in Virginia for denying transgender students access to bathrooms and other accommodations matching their gender identity, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14977\">G.G. v. Gloucester School Board</a>, Plaintiff began to use the boys' restrooms at school. In G.G, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) had issued a statement of interest explaining that it was the agency\u2019s position that Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972 requires that schools receiving federal funding allow transgender students to use restrooms and other single-sex, multi-occupancy facilities that match their gender identities. When confronted by KUSD officials over Plaintiff\u2019s use of the boys\u2019 restrooms, Plaintiff\u2019s mother explained to them that based on the DOJ\u2019s position, KUSD is required to allow him access to the boys\u2019 restrooms. However, KUSD officials nevertheless maintained that Plaintiff was not allowed to use the boys\u2019 restrooms after that meeting. In April of 2016, Plaintiff engaged counsel who sent KUSD a letter demanding that Plaintiff be able to use the boys' restroom. When the school refused, Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the US Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights, alleging the school policy violated Title IX. Plaintiff later withdrew this complaint to file a suit on July 19, 2016, against KUSD and its superintendent in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201, and Title IX of the Education Amendment (20 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1681 et seq.). Represented by the Transgender Law Center, along with the civil-rights law firms Relman Dane & Colfax and the Robert Pledl Law Office, Plaintiff argued that KUSD\u2019s discriminatory actions violated Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. He asked the court to declare that KUSD has violated Title IX and the Fourteenth Amendment and to issue a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring KUSD to take various steps to prevent further discrimination against Plaintiff. District Judge Rudolph T. Randa was assigned to the case on July 20, 2016, but due to his unavailability, the case was reassigned on August 3, 2016, to Magistrate Judge David E. Jones. Plaintiff did not consent to have a magistrate judge enter final judgment on the matter and so the case was reassigned to Judge Pamela Pepper. On August 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint using his and his mother's full names because they had already consented to the media using their names. The same day, Plaintiff also filed for a preliminary injunction, asking the court to enjoin KUSD from its discriminatory practices. Attached to the motion were various supporting statements from healthcare professionals along with the U.S. Department of Education's Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students. This Dear Colleague letter was issued on May 13, 2016, and told schools that compliance with Title IX entailed treating students consistent with their gender identity (this letter was later rescinded, on February 22, 2017, under the new Trump Administration). KUSD filed a motion to dismiss the case on August 16, 2016, and the court heard oral arguments on that motion and the preliminary injunction. On September 21, 2016, Judge Pepper denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, and the next day she granted in part Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge Pepper found that Plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits and enjoined the school from denying Plaintiff use of the boys' bathroom and from disciplining him in any way for using it. 2016 WL 5239829. KUSD appealed both decisions to the Seventh Circuit on September 23, 2016, arguing that the two orders were inextricably bound and that the appeals court could not review one without the other (originally the district court had certified the order denying the motion to dismiss for immediate interlocutory appeal, but soon after revoked that certification when it concluded it had erred by including certification language in the order). In the district court, KUSD also moved to stay the preliminary injunction, arguing that it would threaten the \"constitutionally privacy interest\" of students in the school district. On October 3, 2016, Judge Pepper denied Defendants' motion to stay. 2016 WL 8846573. Litigation continued into discovery throughout the school year. Defendants requested that Plaintiff submit to an independent medical examination. Judge Pepper denied the request as moot after Plaintiff submitted his own request governing an independent medical examination. On May 30, 2017, the Seventh Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction and denied to review the denial of the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the two issues were not inextricably bound. Notwithstanding the intervening change in position by the Trump Administration, the Seventh Circuit found that Plaintiff was likely to succeed on his Title IX discrimination claim. The court did not reach the question of whether transgender status triggered heightened scrutiny, but the Seventh Circuit did find that Plaintiff was likely to succeed on his Equal Protection Claim on a theory of sex stereotyping. The court also found KUSD's privacy argument was based on sheer conjecture and abstraction and that a \"transgender student's presence in the restroom provides no more a risk to other students' privacy rights than the presence of an overly curious student of the same biological sex.\" 858 F.3d 1034 (Williams, J.). The Defendant appealed this order to the Supreme Court on August 29. Both parties agreed to a settlement hearing before Magistrate Judge William E. Callahan, Jr. on November 1, 2017. Despite the efforts of the parties, mediation did not result in settlement of the Plaintiff\u2019s claims. On November 21, 2017, the case was reassigned to Judge Pamela Pepper for further pretrial proceedings, trial, and eventual entry of final judgment. On January 22, 2018, the parties filed a joint motion to approve the proposed Consent Judgment. The Consent Judgment: required the Defendants to pay $800,000 to the Plaintiff for compensatory damages, attorney\u2019s fees, and costs; permanently enjoined the Defendants from preventing the Plaintiff from using male bathrooms and from taking retaliatory actions; and required the Defendants to inform current board members, district-level administrators, and school level principals and assistant principals of the terms of the permanent injunction. The judgment was set to last for 10 years, during which the court retained jurisdiction for enforcement purposes. The Consent Judgment was signed by Judge Pepper on January 23, 2018. The Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the writ for certiorari. 138 S. Ct. 1260. The case is administratively closed, but remains ongoing due to court enforcement. As of April 15, 2020, there has been no further action in the docket.", "summary": "A 16-year old transgender male student sued Kenosha Unified School District No. 1 (Kenosha) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin on July 19, 2016, arguing that the school violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX by denying Plaintiff access to the boys\u2019 restrooms. The district court granted the plaintiff a preliminary injunction to use the boys' restroom throughout his senior year, which the Seventh Circuit upheld on May 30, 2017. The parties settled on January 22, 2018. The settlement required Defendant to pay Plaintiff $800,000, enjoined Defendant from prohibiting Plaintiff from using the boys\u2019 restroom, and required the Defendant to notify all staff about the injunction."}
{"article": "On August 11, 2005 a group of African-Americans filed a consolidated amended complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et seq.) and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 against Wal-Mart Stores Inc. in United States District Court of the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart discriminated against African-Americans in hiring and sought damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that Wal-Mart's practice of \"word of mouth\" hiring for over-the-road truck drivers discriminated against African-Americans. On May 16, 2007, the court (Judge Wilson) certified a class of African Americans who resided in the continental United States who had applied for employment as over-the-road truck drivers at Wal-Mart since September 22, 2001 and not been hired, and African Americans who resided in the continental United States who were deterred or thwarted from applying for positions as over-the-road truck drivers at Wal-Mart. The defendant an interlocutory appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals but on June 28, 2007 was denied. Discovery proceeded in preparation for trial and on January 13, 2009 the court (Judge Wilson) denied the defendant's motions for decertification and summary judgment. The parties thereafter reached a settlement that was approved by the court (Judge Wilson) on March 5, 2009. In the settlement Wal-Mart agreed to damages in the amount of $17,500,000 to be distributed to the named representatives, class members, and for attorneys fees. It also agreed to provide EEO training, actively recruit minorities, impose benchmarks for hiring minority drivers, make specific job opportunities open to minorities, and engage in recordkeeping and reporting. The case came to a close on July 10, 2010 when the last objections by class members were dismissed.", "summary": "On August 11, 2005 a group of African-Americans filed a consolidated amended complaint Wal-Mart Stores Inc. in United States District Court of the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart discriminated against African-Americans in hiring of over-the-road truck drivers. On May 16, 2007, the court certified a class of African Americans who had not been hired or had been deterred from applying for these jobs. Discovery continued in preparation for trial and on January 13, 2009 the court denied the defendant's motions for decertification and summary judgment. The parties thereafter reached a settlement that was approved by the court on March 5, 2009. In the settlement Wal-Mart agreed to damages in the amount of $17,500,000 to be distributed to the named representatives, class members, and their attorneys. It also agreed to provide EEO training, actively recruit minorities, impose benchmarks for hiring minority drivers, make specific job opportunities open to minorities, and engage in recordkeeping and reporting."}
{"article": "On March 31, 2005, a female employee of Citigroup Global Markets and its subsidiary, Smith Barney, filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et. seq., and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, against Citigroup Global Markets Inc. in the United States District Court of the Northern District of California. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief and damages, charging Citigroup and Smith Barney with discriminating against female financial advisors on the basis of gender with respect to business opportunities, compensation, professional support and other terms and conditions of employment. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that Smith Barney's policies and practices had locked in and perpetuated past discrimination, caused \"cumulative advantage\" effects, and caused branch management to discriminate against female brokers. Furthermore, Smith Barney refused to change policies or practices that it knew to be discriminatory against women. On November 29, 2006, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, better articulating their concerns and defining the putative class as all female Financial Advisors employed by Smith Barney in the United States at any time after August 30, 2003, and adding a subclass consisting of all female Financial Advisors employed by Smith Barney in California at any time after June 25, 2003. On May 1, 2008, after a series of negotiations, the parties reached a settlement. The stipulated to - and later approved - class was as follows: All women employed as Financial Advisors in (i) the United States branches of Smith Barney\u2019s retail brokerage division at any time from August 30, 2003 through March 1, 2008 or (ii) the California branches of Smith Barney\u2019s retail brokerage division at any time from June 25, 2003 through March 1, 2008. The settlement included $33 million settlement for the 2,411 members of the Settlement Class in a gender discrimination case against Smith Barney. In addition to the monetary compensation, the settlement included comprehensive injunctive relief for four years designed to increase business opportunities and promote equality in compensation for female brokers. The Northern District Court of California (Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton) approved the Settlement and Class on August 13, 2008, finding that the the terms embodied in the agreement were fair, reasonable, and adequate as required by law, and that proper notice to the class was given. Also on August 13, Court entered the final order and judgment in this matter, but retained continuing jurisdiction over the settlement. On September 31, 2011, the parties filed a stipulation and proposed order to transfer the jurisdiction of the case to the District of Columbia. This was done so that the case could be consolidated with another case, Augst-Johnson, et al v. Morgan Stanley & Co, Incorporated, Case No. 1:06-CV-01142 (RWR) (D.D.C.); so that a Consolidated Settlement Agreement could be considered. On October 3, the Court the Court approved the stipulation and proposed order, and ordered that continuing jurisdiction of this case be transferred to the District of Columbia. The case is closed.", "summary": "This case was brought by female employees of Citigroup Global Markets against Citigroup Global Markets and its subsidiary, Smith Barney, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and damages for the company's discriminatory practices against female employees. This case was solved by a class-action settlement on August 13, 2008, resulting in relief granted."}
{"article": "On September 25, 2006, the Denver Field Office and the Phoenix District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The EEOC sued Moreland Auto Group, LLP (doing business as Kids Automotive, Inc.; Kids Financial, Inc.; and Brandon Financial, Inc.) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiff, representing two former female employees of the defendant, sought injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant from discriminating against employees based on gender or from retaliating against employees who complain about discrimination. The EEOC further sought monetary relief for the two employees. Specifically, the complaint alleged Moreland Auto Group allowed employees to sexually harass the two female employees. This harassment created a hostile work environment. The EEOC also alleged that the defendant retaliated against the complaining parties when they complained about the discrimination. The complaining parties intervened in the lawsuit in November 2006. The defendant filed a counterclaim against the EEOC in December 2006, alleging failure to fully conduct an investigation of the discrimination complaint. Following discovery and a number of status conferences, the parties settled the lawsuit. On August 22, 2008 Judge Edward J. Nottingham approved the parties' settlement agreement. The agreement included a $70,000 fund to be dispersed amongst the claimants, and an injunction enjoining the defendants from gender-based discrimination or retaliation against employees who make complaints of discrimination. It further required the defendant to implement annual trainings on employment discrimination. The settlement agreement's effective period was three years, and there is nothing more in the docket. The matter was dismissed with prejudice when the settlement agreement was ordered, and appears to have ended in 2011.", "summary": "On September 25, 2006, the Denver Field Office and the Phoenix District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The EEOC sued Moreland Auto Group, LLP under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Two former female employees sought injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant from discriminating against employees based on gender or from retaliating against employees who complain about discrimination. On August 22, 2008 Judge Edward J. Nottingham approved a settlement agreement that included a $70,000 fund to be dispersed amongst the claimants, and an injunction enjoining the defendants from gender-based discrimination."}
{"article": "On May 3, 2000, ten black current and former special agents of the United States Secret Service filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et seq. (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981a (the Civil Rights Act of 1991) against the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Treasury and the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs filed the lawsuit individually and on behalf of a putative class of black special agents who were employed by the U.S. Secret Service as GS-1811's at any point from January 1, 1974 to the present. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought equitable relief including back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, a declaratory judgment, and an injunction, alleging that the Secret Service had engaged in a pattern and practice of racial discrimination in promotions as well as in transfers, assignments, testing, hiring, and disciplinary practices. On June 30, 2000, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. After a lengthy period of discovery, on October 24, 2004, Judge Richard W. Roberts issued a memorandum opinion and order granting in part and denying in part the defendant's motion to dismiss. On May 1, 2006 and August 7, 2006, the plaintiffs filed two amended complaints. On May 31, 2006 and again on September 20, 2006, the defendant filed motions for partial dismissal and/or for partial summary judgment, which the court denied without prejudice on June 26, 2008. On August 4, 2010, the Court issued a memorandum opinion and order denying plaintiffs' motion for class certification, holding (1) that the class representatives' claims were not typical of the class members' claim and (2) that there was a potential conflict of interest among the class plaintiffs and the class members. After further development, in February 2013, the Court granted class certification. 926 F.Supp.2d 8. In February of 2014, the defendants moved for a partial motion to dismiss, summary judgment, and to reopen discovery. On March 4, 2014, the Court refused to reopen discovery for the defendants on the grounds that the plaintiff's class-certification does not warrant reopening discovery. Litigation continued and in 2015, the defendants moved again for summary judgment. The court had a hearing on both motions for summary judgment on May 5, 2016. On January 17, 2017, before the court decided on the motions for summary judgment, the defendant filed a notice of settlement agreement after 16 years of litigation. On January 27, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of settlement agreement, which was approved by the court on January 31, 2017. The plaintiff also filed a motion for preliminary approval of distribution of settlement proceeds, which was granted by the court on February 16, 2017. The court, however, did not address the proposed payment attorney's fees and costs. The proposed settlement provided for both monetary and injunctive relief. The agreement required the defendant to pay $24 million as a fund, including payments to plaintiffs and class members, administrative costs and attorney's fees and expenses. The defendant also agreed to start a hotline for agents to report bias, change its hiring procedures, and maintain detailed records on promotion factors as well as complaints alleging racial discrimination. On April 10, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion for order granting final approval of settlement. The parties agreed on $8 million in attorney's fees and $859,049.26 in costs to be paid out of the settlement fund. On May 3, 2017, Judge Friedman granted the final approval of class action settlement as well as the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for an award of attorney\u2019s fees and costs. The settlement agreement will retain in effect until the date on which the Secret Services delivers to the plaintiffs the last statistical report, which is estimated to be in 2021. As of June 1, 2020, there has been no further docket activity.", "summary": "This case was brought by ten black current and former special agents of the United States Secret Service against the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Treasury and the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Plaintiffs sought equitable relief including back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, a declaratory judgment, and an injunction, alleging that the Secret Service discriminated against them on the basis of race in promotions as well as in transfers, assignments, testing, hiring, and disciplinary practices. The court approved a settlement agreement that awarded $24 million in damages, $8 million in attorney's fees, and $860,000 in costs. The agreement will remain in place until 2021."}
{"article": "On May 10, 2002, eight Hispanic Special Agents filed a class action complaint against the United States Customs Service (\"Customs Service\"), in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel asked the court for equitable relief, compensatory damages, a declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs contended that there was a pattern and practice of discrimination on the basis of national origin by the Department of Treasury's United States Customs Service. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the Customs Service's personnel policies, practices, and procedures discriminated against Hispanic Special Agents regarding selections for competitive positions and promotions, assignment to undercover work, discipline, awards and bonuses, foreign language proficiency awards, training, harassment and hostile work environment, systemic retaliation, and other terms and conditions of employment. The plaintiffs requested to act on behalf of a class consisting of all current or former Hispanic Special Agents (Criminal Investigators GS-1811) who had served with the Customs Service from January 1, 1974 or January 1, 1977 to the present. On March 20, 2003, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The defendant argued that the court should dismiss class claims due to failures by the plaintiffs to timely exhaust administrative class remedies, to assert adverse employment actions, and/or to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The defendant also argued that the individual claims should be dismissed as well because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies and/or to allege actionable adverse employment actions. Subsequently, on February 26, 2004, the court (Judge James Robertson) granted in part and denied in part the motion for summary judgment. In this judgment, the court (Judge Robertson) held that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust claims of hostile work environment and foreign language proficiency awards. Contreras v. Ridge, 305 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D.D.C. 2004). On May 5, 2006, following a denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the pattern or practice claims, the defendant renewed its motion. On March 20, 2007 the court (Judge Robertson) granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding the plaintiffs' evidence insufficient, and thus terminating the case.", "summary": "This case was brought by eight Hispanic Special Agents against the U.S. Department of Treasury's United States Customs Service. Plaintiffs sought equitable relief, compensatory damages, a declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief, alleging there was a pattern and practice of discrimination on the basis of national origin by the U.S. Customs Service. The Court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on March 20, 2007, thereby terminating the case."}
{"article": "On December 10, 2009, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against Yellow Transportation, Inc., and YRC, Inc., for discriminatory employment practices on behalf of 14 current or former black employees and the class of similarly situated black employees. The EEOC alleged that Yellow Transportation (later merged into YRC) had violated \u00a7703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-2(a) by subjecting black employees to greater scrutiny, more frequent and greater discipline, lower paying and less favorable job assignments, more difficult and time-consuming work, and a hostile work environment. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief, including economic and noneconomic harm to the employees, punitive damages, development of policies and programs to provide equal employment opportunity and eradicate the effects of its past discrimination. The EEOC also sought to recover its costs. The charging parties later intervened as plaintiffs on their own behalf, filing their complaint on October 6, 2010. The Intervenors' complaint proceeded on the same grounds as the EEOC's allegations but added claims for retaliation. Examples of the racial hostility in the Intervening Plaintiffs' work environment include repeated hanging of nooses at the workplace, racial slurs and racially motivated graffiti in bathroom stalls, displays by white employees of racially hostile symbols (such as the Confederate flag and \"KKK\") on clothing or in the form of tattoos, and supervisors' failure to address complaints adequately. Additional examples of the alleged disparate treatment include delaying full-time hiring of black employees (which gave white employees greater seniority), denial of work opportunities that would lead to advancement, giving shorter sick leaves to black injured workers than white, granting less overtime to blacks than whites, and denying blacks - but not whites - the opportunity to choose who they worked with. The parties reached a settlement, which the Court (Magistrate Judge Susan Cox) entered as a consent decree on September 25, 2012. The decree resolved this case and the related case <i>Brown v. Yellow Transportation, Inc.</i> , linked below (Clearinghouse code: EE-IL-0329). The decree awarded a total $11 million to the class of plaintiffs from the two cases to be distributed according to the specified claims process. Attorney's fees were awarded to the Intervening Plaintiffs' attorneys in the amount of $1.1 million out of the $11 million award. No significant injunction was granted because the facility at which the Plaintiffs originally worked had closed and the facility to which those who had not been fired were transferred (Chicago Heights) was already under an adequate consent decree from the cases <i>EEOC v. Roadway Express, Inc.</i>, linked below (Clearinghouse code: EE-IL-0189), and <i>William Bandy v. Roadway Express, Inc.</i>. The court simply requires a notice to be posted at the remaining facility. Final approval of the distribution of the settlement funds was granted on April 8, 2013. Because the duration of the notice provision is co-extensive with the duration of the Chicago Heights decree, the decree is technically in effect as of this writing. For all intents and purposes the case is closed.", "summary": "The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against Yellow Transportation, Inc., and YRC, Inc., for discriminatory employment practices on behalf of 14 current or former black employees and the class of similarly situated black employees. The EEOC alleged that Yellow Transportation (later merged into YRC) had violated \u00a7703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-2(a) by subjecting black employees to greater scrutiny, more frequent and greater discipline, lower paying and less favorable job assignments, more difficult and time-consuming work, and a hostile work environment. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief, including economic and noneconomic harm to the employees, punitive damages, development of policies and programs to provide equal employment opportunity and eradicate the effects of its past discrimination. The EEOC also sought to recover its costs. The charging parties later intervened as plaintiffs on their own behalf, adding claims for retaliation. The parties reached a settlement, which was entered as a consent decree. The decree resolved this case and the related case <i>Brown v. Yellow Transportation, Inc.</i> , linked below (Clearinghouse code: EE-IL-0329). The decree awarded a total of $11 million ($1.1 million in attorney's fees) and no significant injunctive relief because of a consent decree in other litigation. The case is technically open but effectively closed."}
{"article": "On Apr. 23, 2003, the plaintiff, a woman above the age of 40, filed a lawsuit alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) pursuant to 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a712203 against Sprint/United Management Company in U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought to be reinstated to her former position, back pay of $75,000, front pay, lost fringe benefits, compensation for physical injury, pain and suffering, future medical, mental anguish, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life, and other categories of actual damage, and $1 million in punitive damages. The plaintiff alleged that that defendant had engaged in a pattern and practice of age discrimination against her and others similarly situated such that it should proceed as a collective action under the ADEA. The plaintiff was terminated in a reduction in force (RIF) while working for Sprint Management Company. The plaintiff contended that Sprint, before and during the RIF process, routinely transferred younger employees (i.e., employees under the age of 40) to \"safe\" positions that would not be eliminated during the RIF. On Apr. 19, 2004, the plaintiff moved for provisional certification to proceed as an ADEA collective action. On July 2, 2004, the court granted the motion for provisional certification. At this time, 119 individuals had already opted in to the collective action. The provisional certification defined the class as employees who were all terminated as a result of Sprint\u2019s RIF occurring from Oct. 2001 through Mar. 2003; were subjected to the same \u201cdisplacement guidelines\u201d and \u201creduction guidelines\u201d utilized by Sprint management in determining which employees to select for termination during the RIF; and were subjected to the same performance rating systems. The plaintiff filed amended complaints on July 2, 2004, and again on Nov. 14, 2005. On July 19, 2004, the case was consolidated with several other similar cases for the limited purpose of coordination of discovery. The plaintiffs moved to have ten plaintiffs who had filed separate actions joined to this action; to add a disparate impact claim in light of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in <i>Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi</i>, 544 U.S. 228 (2005); and to expand the definition of the class. At this time, the class comprised employees who, among other things, were terminated on or after Oct. 1, 2001 and who were assigned to job grades 71 through 79. The plaintiffs sought to expand the class to include those whose employment was terminated beginning in late July 2001, and to include \u201cE grade\u201d (executive level) employees. Oral argument was held on July 26, 2005. On July 29, 2005, the court granted and denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion in part. The court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion with respect to the adding the disparate impact claim and denied the motion with respect to the other two claims. The motion to expand the class was denied on the grounds that it was untimely. The parties entered mediation in 2006. On May 18, 2007, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of collective action settlement. On May 30, 2007, the court granted preliminary confirmation of the proposed settlement and appointed a settlement administrator. On Sept. 11, 2007, Judge John Lungstrum approved the class settlement agreement. The settlement provided $57 million in monetary relief to the 1,697-member class previously certified under the ADEA. Specifically, the court found, based on the parties' joint filing, the court's knowledge of the record, and the hearing with the parties, that the terms of the Master Full and Final Settlement Agreement of All Claims (\"Settlement Agreement\") appeared to be \"reasonable, adequate, fair, and consistent with relevant state and federal law and warrants notice thereof being given to the individual Plaintiffs.\" On Oct. 15, 2009, Judge Lungstrum signed an order accepting the report of final termination of the settlement fund and dismissing the case with prejudice. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Plaintiffs sued Sprint, alleging ADEA violations pursuant to 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621, the ADA, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a712203. Class comprised just under 1,700 members. Eventually, parties reached $57 million settlement agreement."}
{"article": "On April 26, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a black female applicant, filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Maryland, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Advancemed Corporation. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant refused to hire the complainant because of her race. On March 23, 2005, the District Court (Judge Peter A. Messitte) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $22,000.", "summary": "On April 26, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, on behalf of a black female applicant, filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Maryland, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Advancemed Corporation. The EEOC alleged that the defendant refused to hire the complainant because of her race. The parties entered into a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $22, 000."}
{"article": "On December 6, 2004, a group of African-American police officers brought a lawsuit against their employer, the Baltimore Police Department, as well as various other municipal entities, including the City of Baltimore and the Baltimore City Council, in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been discriminated against and that the discrimination was illegal under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e, as well as 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that the Baltimore Police Department had engaged in a pattern and practice of disparate discipline with respect to African-American police officers, claiming that the excessive subjectivity in the disciplinary process has resulted in both unintentional and/or intentional discrimination against African-American officers on the basis of their race. The complaint alleged that African American and white officers would commit the same disciplinary offenses, but the African American officers' offenses were rated as more severe and thus they routinely received harsher discipline--including more frequent termination--as a result. The hostile work environment alleged in the complaint included derogatory comments such as the n-word and having dog feces wrapped in an African-American-owned newspaper left on officers' desks. Other harassment allegations included nooses in lockers, being assigned to low-level duties to prevent advancement, and superior African American officers having their authority undermined by subordinate white officers. The case settled on June 18, 2009, for $4.5 million. The settlement sets up a $2.5 million fund to pay the individual claims of the 15 plaintiffs. The remaining $2 million will go toward nonmonetary relief -- leadership classes, training on the disciplinary process, and hiring a consultant to assist with antidiscrimination efforts.", "summary": "This is a race discrimination class action brought by black police officers in Baltimore, alleging discriminatory discipline and hostile work environment. It was filed in December 2004, and settled in June 2009 for $2.5 million in damages to the 15 named plaintiffs and injunctive relief for the class."}
{"article": "On July 26, 2005, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division filed this reverse-discrimination lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the City of Pontiac and the local firefighters' union. The DOJ began investigating whether the City of Pontiac's hiring and promotion policies discriminated against white men after <a href=\"https://www.fettlaw.com/in-the-news/firefighters-suit-spurred-probe/\"> a firefighter filed a lawsuit in July 2004 challenging the policies</a>. The DOJ alleged that the City of Pontiac and the local firefighters\u2019 union pursued policies and practices that discriminated against applicants for employment and promotion based on race and sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The DOJ sought an injunction preventing the City of Pontiac and the union from engaging in discriminatory employment policies and practices on the basis of race or sex and from failing to compensate those who suffered a loss due to discriminatory policies and procedures. Additionally, the DOJ sought fees and costs. The complaint alleged that collective bargaining agreements entered into by the Pontiac Fire Department and the local firefighters' union established a dual system for hiring and promotion, which discriminated on the basis of sex and race. The hiring and promotion policies required that one out of every three individuals hired or promoted be either a female or a minority. Two lists were maintained for the purposes of hiring and promotion. The first list included all candidates, while the second list included only the female and minority candidates. Hiring and promotion decisions were made from the first list, but if one out of three individuals hired or promoted were not either a racial minority or female, then the second list was consulted. The DOJ alleged these policies discriminated against men and non-minorities. The parties engaged in negotiations to resolve the dispute without a trial. On July 20, 2006, the District Court (Judge George C. Steeh) granted the DOJ's motion for the provisional entry of a consent decree. The court signed the consent decree on September 28, 2006, despite objections from a number of individuals who felt they deserved compensation but fell outside the decree\u2019s scope. The consent decree was designed to: (1) prevent future discrimination on the basis of race and gender and (2) provide remedial relief, such as backpay, offers of employment or promotion, and retroactive seniority, for those employees and applicants affected by the allegedly discriminatory policies. The consent decree specifically enjoined the defendants from: (a) engaging in or agreeing to any act or practice that discriminated on the basis of race or sex in violation of Title VII and in relation to hiring or promotion and (b) retaliating against anyone for engaging in practices protected by Title VII, including cooperating with the investigation related to this case and seeking or receiving individual relief. The consent decree also provided for individual relief and listed individuals who were eligible for such relief. Further, the consent decree imposed record-keeping and reporting obligations on the defendant and provided that the court would retain jurisdiction for a period of two years. It does not appear that the DOJ took any action to enforce the consent decree in court over the next two years. On October 1, 2008, after the two-year period ended, Judge Steeh dissolved the consent decree and dismissed the case. This case is closed.", "summary": "In 2005, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the City of Pontiac and the local firefighters' union. The DOJ alleged that the collective bargaining agreements entered by the Pontiac Fire Department and the local firefighters' union discriminated on the basis of sex and race by explicitly creating and maintaining a dual system for hire and promotion requiring that one out of every thee hires or promotions be given to a minority. In 2006, the DOJ and the City of Pontiac reached a settlement that required the City of Pontiac to not engage in any act or practice that discriminated on the basis of race or sex in violation of Title VII in relation to hiring or promotion in the Pontiac Fire Department and to provide remedial relief to those employees and applicants denied hire or promotion as a result of the dual system for hire and promotion. The case closed in October 2008."}
{"article": "On August 29, 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico against Bell Gas, Inc. and related corporations on behalf of a female employee. The EEOC alleged that the companies had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et. seq.) by subjecting the employee to a sexually hostile work environment created by verbal and physical harassment from her immediate supervisor, including sexual assault. The EEOC further alleged that Bell Gas had unlawfully retaliated against the employee by constructively discharging her (she was supposedly offered a transfer but was given no further information). The EEOC sought its costs, and monetary and injunctive relief for the employee, including reform of policies and practices, back pay, reinstatement, front pay, job search expenses, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages. The Court (Judge William P. Johnson) approved the employee's motion to intervene in the case on December 23, 2002. Adding her former supervisor as a defendant, she brought claims for violation of Title VII, sexual assault and battery, and several other violations of New Mexico law. She sought substantially the same relief as the EEOC. The Court clerk made an entry of default against Bell Gas for its failure to respond to the EEOC's complaint, but the default was set aside upon the Court's subsequent finding that the untimely response was an honest mistake. The employee's supervisor represented himself. After a fair amount of discovery disagreement the parties reached a settlement, which the Court entered as a consent decree on April 6, 2004. Under the agreement the employee received a total of $180,000; $60,000 up front and monthly payments of $2,000 for 60 months, secured by a mortgage lien on Defendants' property. The decree required Defendants to implement policies to keep the workplace free of sex discrimination and foster complaint lodging without retaliation, to distribute the sexual harassment policies to all employees, to provide annual training on avoiding sex-discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, to conduct complaint-investigation training, and to report to the EEOC. The docket shows no further court activity, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "On August 29, 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the Albuquerque U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico against Bell Gas, Inc. and related corporations on behalf of a female employee. The EEOC alleged that the companies had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et. seq.) by subjecting the employee to a sexually hostile work environment created by verbal and physical harassment from her immediate supervisor, including sexual assault. The parties entered into a Consent Decree, which provided the employee received a total of $180,000; $60,000 up front and monthly payments of $2,000 for 60 months-and subjected Defendants to an array of injunctive provisions. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "The Los Angeles District Office of the EEOC brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada against Consolidated Resorts in September 2006. The complaint alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The defendant allegedly sexually harassed a female employment, creating a hostile working environment and resulting in a tangible employment action. The parties participated in a conference with an early neutral evaluator that did not result in a settlement. The defendant moved to dismiss and for summary judgment, both of which were denied. On October 15, 2008, the parties entered into a court enforceable consent decree for a one year period. The consent decree stipulated that the defendant would pay $55,000 to the charging parties, adopt anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation policies, provide training to employees, and submit to reporting and record keeping requirements. The consent decree ran its course without any further litigation. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2006, the EEOC sued Consolidated Reports in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada alleging violations of Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination. The complaint alleged and employee of the defendant sexually harassed the charging party and created a hostile work environment. In 2008, the case settled when the parties agreed to a 1 year consent decree requiring the defendant to pay $55,000 to the charging party, to adopt anti-discrimination policies, provide training to employees, and comply with other requirements."}
{"article": "On July 12, 2005, three U.S. orchard workers from Yakima Valley who had been denied or terminated from agricultural employment, brought this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. Represented by Columbia Legal Services and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued Global Horizons, Green Acre Farms, Platte River Insurance Company, and Valley Fruit Orchards, under the Migrants and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1801), the Farm Labor Contractors Act (42 U.S.C \u00a7 1981), and Washington anti-discrimination law. In their complaint (amended several times), the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages. They alleged that the defendants systematically and intentionally preferred H-2A laborers from Thailand to U.S. workers, in violation of federal and state law. The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants provided false and misleading information concerning the terms and conditions of employment, failed to comply with the working arrangement, failed to pay wages as promised, and failed to provide adequate written pay statements in violation of 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1801. They sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Michael W. Leavitt. On February 3, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the class, which Magistrate Judge Leavitt granted on July 28, 2006. 2006 WL 2129295. The class was defined as \"All workers who were U.S. residents and who sought employment through defendant Global Horizons to work at either Green Acre Farms or Valley Fruit Orchards in 2004, and all U.S. resident who, in the future, seek employment with or obtain employment with Global, Green Acre, or Valley Fruit.\" It also included three subclasses: 1. Denied Workers: All workers who were U.S. residents and who sought and were denied employment with the defendant and all U.S. residents who in the future would seek employment with the defendant, 2. Green Acre Workers: All workers who were U.S. residents and who were employed through the defendant Global to work at Green Acre Farms, 3. Valley Fruit Workers: All workers who were U.S. residents and who were employed through defendant Global to work at Valley fruit. The Court also granted the plaintiffs' motion to bifercate the trial, separating the liability and damages issues. Between May 2006 and February 2007, the plaintiffs filed several motions to compel discovery; each motion was granted by Judge Leavitt. (insert citations for discovery orders) On March 23, 2007, in response to yet another motion by the plaintiffs to compel discovery and for sanctions, the defendants filed their own motion for sanctions alleging that the plaintiffs' attorneys were using abusive litigation tactics to drive up costs, such as filing motions for contempt and sanctions knowing that the defendants' attorney was in the process of applying for permission to appear <i>pro hac vice</i>. The defendants eventually withdrew their motion for sanctions, and the plaintiffs' motion was denied by the Court on March 27, 2007. The Court also gave the defendants additional time to produce all the requested discovery documents. When the defendants still did not produce the requested documents, the Court, in a May 2007 order, imposed sanctions in the amount of $12,500 against the defendants for the continued refusal to comply with the Court's order regarding discovery. Payment was due no later than June 1, 2007. The Court also warned that the defendant's continued failure to comply with the Court's order would result in additional monetary sanctions in the amount of $500 a day until there was full compliance. In a July 11, 2007 order, District Court Judge Alan A. McDonald granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, finding that the defendants had violated the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (AWPA) and the Washington Farm Labor Contract Act (FLCA). He awarded statutory damages under FLCA. As to their motion to strike the defendants' jury demand with respect to the plaintiffs' Farm Labor Contractors Act and Migrants and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act claims, the Court granted the motion, the defendants' jury demand was stricken, and the plaintiffs were entitled to $1,857,000. The plaintiffs were denied summary judgment on the claim that the defendants intentionally deprived employees of wages. Judge McDonald also imposed monetary sanctions on the defendants for their continued refusal to comply with the Court's orders. The Court ordered that the defendants immediately pay $27,000, in addition to the $12,500 previously imposed, and the additional penalty of $500 for each day the defendants failed to make payment. The Court also ordered defendant Global Horizons to appear before the court on July 24, 2007 or face criminal contempt charges. 2007 WL 2041973 The defendants filed motions for reconsideration of Judge McDonald's order regarding their failure to respond to the plaintiffs' partial summary judgment motions, but Judge McDonald passed away before considering the motions for reconsideration. The case was transferred to U.S. District Court Judge Robert H. Whaley, and on August 10, 2007, he vacated the judgment with respect to the amount of damages while leaving the portion of Judge McDonald's order that found that Global committed the alleged violations of the Farm Labor Contractors Act and Migrants and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act. He also vacated the award of statutory damages in the amount of $500 per violation per person because Judge McDonald did not cite to relevant 9th Circuit case law with respect to the awarding of statutory damages. 2007 WL 2327073, E.D.Wash. In September of 2007, the plaintiffs' claims of racial discrimination, which were not resolved by Judge McDonald's order, were tried by a jury. It found that Global Horizons and Mordechai Orian violated the Farm Labor Contractors Act by failing to employ, or discharging or laying off members of the subclasses, and discriminated against the subclasses because of their race. The jury awarded $300,000 in punitive damages to the class, and awarded the following damages to the representative Plaintiffs: Ricardo Betancourt: $5099.50 for lost wages, $2500.00 for emotional distress; Jose F. Sanchez: $492.20 for lost wages, $5,000.00 for emotional distress; Jose Guadalupe Perez-Farias; $0.00 for lost wages, $4,000.00 for emotional. The Court entered judgment on October 23, 2007 consistent with the jury's findings. The claims against \"Grower Defendants\" (the named defendants other than Global Horizons) were tried separately by the Court. On March 27, 2008, the Court determined that Grower Defendants did not discriminate against the subclasses based on race and dismissed the plaintiffs' discrimination claims against the Grower Defendants. The Court upheld the jury verdict against defendant Global Horizon. With respect to the FLCA claims, the Grower Defendants were found liable for FLCA violations. 2008 WL 833055, E.D.Wash. The Court also addressed Global Horizons' post-trial motions, upholding the jury verdict with respect to the discrimination claim against Global and Mordechai Orian and the FLCA claims asserted against Global, but agreeing with the Global Horizons that, as a matter of law, Mordechai Orian could not be held individually liable for violations of the FLCA. On May 23, 2008, the judgment for damages for racial discrimination was amended, and the denied-work subclass definition was changed. 2008 WL 2180166, E.D.Wash. The judgment was again amended on June 15, 2009, specifying which defendant was liable to which plaintiff for what damages; Global and Grower Defendants were responsible, jointly and severally, for lost wages to each plaintiff while Global alone was responsible only for damages for emotional distress to each of the three named plaintiffs. The $100,000 amount for punitive damages awarded to each subclass category did not change in the amendment of the judgment. In April 2008, the Court ordered Global Horizons to pay the previously ordered monetary sanctions of $45,500 by May 30, 2008. The order stated that if Global Horizons failed to make the payment, its attorney would have to appeal and show cause why it failed to obey the Court's orders and why the sanctions should not be reduced to a judgment. The District Court Judge also referred the matter to Magistrate Judge James P. Hutton. After Global Horizons failed to make the $45,500 payment, the Court ordered that a representative appear and show cause as to why Global had failed to obey the Court's orders. At a show cause hearing on June 3, 2009, Global's local counsel, Gary Lowland, appeared and reported that he had no knowledge to answer a majority of the Court's questions regarding Global's financial status. Thus, the Court directed Mordechai Orian, the president and chief strategic officer for Global Horizons, to appear at a supplemental show cause hearing to be held on July 2, 2008. On that day, Orian testified as to Global's financial status. Based on his testimony, Magistrate Judge Hutton issued a report and recommendation on July 21, 2008 concluding that Global Horizons was financially insolvent, with debts far exceeding its assets. Judge Hutton also suggested that the if Global Horizons insisted on continuing litigation, the District Court should consider imposing case dispositive sanctions on Global. On August 6, 2008, Global Horizons filed a motion to seal, which was granted on January 4, 2011. On November 14, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum for \"Phase II\" of the class action addressing class membership, injunctive relief, statutory damages for violations of the Farm Labor Contractors Act (FLCA), and the distribution of punitive damages awarded at trial. A bench trial was held on March 3, 2009, after which Judge Whaley issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding five of the plaintiffs' motions. 2009 WL 1011180. He determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to $235,000 in statutory damages, and each individual class member was to relieve $350 or more in statutory damages. The Court also held that proof of eligibility to work would not be necessary in order to receive statutory damages. The Court ultimately rejected the plaintiffs' attempts to hold two individuals personally liable for their companies' use of an unlicensed farm labor contractor as well as the plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief against Global Horizons and Grower Defendants. The defendants filed motions to amend the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but those motions were denied in a June 15, 2009 Order addressing pending motions. That same day, the original judgment was amended for the second time, as previously mentioned, and the Court also issued a new judgment in favor of the plaintiffs reflecting what it had decided in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The defendants filed an appeal to this new judgment on June 19, 2009. Earlier, in May 2009, the plaintiffs had filed a motion for attorneys fees. The defendants filed motions to extend the time to respond to the motion, which was granted by the Court. The parties litigated over attorneys\u2019 fees for several months until the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys fees on March 24, 2010 and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in the amount of $1,452,831. Global Horizons and Mr. Orian were also ordered to pay the Court $1,424.58 for costs of interpretation fees that were provided at trial on a cost-reimbursable basis. 2010 WL 11437705. The defendants appealed this decision in April 2010, but their appeal was dismissed on December 17, 2010 because they lacked representation by a licensed attorney. On April 23, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a cross appeal to the 9th Circuit, appealing from the: - March 24, 2010 Judgment Against Global for Reasonable Attorney's Fees; - March 24, 2010 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees; - August 3, 2009 Second Amended Judgment of the Jury Verdict; - August 8, 2009 Amended Judgment of the FLCA Statutory Damages; - June 15, 2009 Order Addressing Pending Motions Re FLCA Emotional Distress Damages; - April 15, 2009 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re FLCA Statutory Damages; - March 27, 2008 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re Claims against Grower Defendants; and - August 10, 2007 Order Vacating FCLA Damages Judgment The 9th Circuit (J. Richard R. Clifton, N. Randy Smith, and Edward R. Korman) heard oral arguments on July 12, 2011. It held on August 17, that the district court had erred in not awarding the workers the full amount of mandatory statutory damages under the Farm Labor Contractors Act \u2013 their damages should equal $1,998,500. It affirmed the district court\u2019s finding on the grower defendants\u2019 liability regarding discrimination. 447 Fed.Appx. 843. The 9th Circuit then withdrew its August 17th order and granted a petition for rehearing. 669 F.3d 927. It then certified to the Washington State Supreme Court three issues of state law. These issues were: 1. Did the Fair Labor Contractors Act, specifically Washington Revised Code \u00a7 19.30.17(2) mandate that courts order a $500 damage award per plaintiff per violation, or did courts have discretion to decide the appropriate amount? 2. If the Fair Labor Contractors Act mandated a $500 per plaintiff per violation award, did that violate Washington\u2019s public policy or due process guarantees? 3. Could people who had not been \u201caggrieved\u201d by a violation nonetheless be awarded damages under the Fair Labor Contractors Act? 669 F.3d 927. On September 27, 2012, the Washington Supreme Court held that the $500 per plaintiff per violation damage award was mandated under the Fair Labor Contractors Act and due process did not require a cap on statutory damages. Moreover, nothing in the Washington State law conflicted with Congress\u2019s ability to enact statutes that created standing where legal rights had been violated without injury. 175 Wash.2d 518. On December 5, the 9th Circuit entered another order that the district court had erred in awarding less than $500 per plaintiff per violation, and should have ordered a total damages award of $1,998,500. 669 F.3d 927. In May 2014, it granted the plaintiffs attorneys\u2019 fees totaling $141,513.50 for appellate litigation. Back in District Court, the plaintiffs continued to seek payment from the defendants for owed sanctions. As this case had carried on, Global Horizons had been involved in a separate case, <i>Nasee v. Global Horizon</i>, in which it was granted a motion for costs and fees. Because Global Horizon owed a significant amount in sanction fees for this case, On November 8, 2011, Judge Whaley in the District Court directed the award of $3,293.22 deposited into the Court's registry and disbursed to the plaintiffs\u2019 counsel. On December 9, 2011, the plaintiffs moved for the district court to order Platte River Insurance pay a bond to be disbursed to the plaintiffs. Washington state law requires farm labor contractors to obtain bonds to \u201cbe conditions on payment of sums legally owing under contract to an agricultural employee.\u201d Platte River Insurance held such bonds for the parties in the case. Judge Whaley granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion on January 18, 2012, contingent on the 9th Circuit remanding the issue to the district court. 2012 WL 12830389. On March 26, 2012, Judge Whaley directed disbursements of the funds. After receiving the 9th Circuit\u2019s holding, the District Court amended its August 3, 2009 judgment. On March 27, 2013, it held that the Denied Worker Subclass was to recover $997,099.50, the Green Acre Subclass was to recover $410,492.20, and the Valley Fruit Subclass was to recover $596,500.00. Judge Whaley granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion for fees on June 28, 2013 with $979,394.25 for attorneys fees and 39,842.66 for costs. The plaintiffs then moved for attorneys\u2019 fees for post appellate work, which was granted on August 27 for a total of $41,125.55 On November 4, 2013, the plaintiffs\u2019 attorneys submitted a Satisfaction of Judgments to the court, stating: - All judgments against Green Acre Farm and Valley Fruit Orchard had been fully satisfied; - All judgments for plaintiffs against Global Horizons and Mordechai Orian had been fully satisfied; - Judgments for attorneys\u2019 fees and costs against Global Horizon and Mordechai Orian were still unsatisfied in the amount of $486,717,64 After the plaintiffs\u2019 counsel attempted to find and compensate all class members to the case, $813,542.58 remained undistributed to silent members. The plaintiffs moved to distribute the money through incentive awards (for the representative plaintiffs in compensation for their work on the case); costs (for the cost of distributing the funds to class members); and <i>cy press</i> (to help advance the objectives of the Farm Labor Contractors Act). On April 2, 2014, Judge Whaley granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion as follows - $7,500 to each representative plaintiff as an incentive award - $25,258.51 to Columbia Legal Services as compensation for costs of distribution - $495,990.01 to Columbia Legal Services as <i>cy press</i> ($95,990 of which was to remain in reserve through the end of 2014 to pay additional class members who came forward) - $95,261.33 each to Northwest Justice Project, Laurel Rubin Farmworker Justice Project, and Northwest Communities Education Center as <i>cy press</i> awards. 2014 WL 1399420. There has been no further litigation and the case now appears closed.", "summary": "On July 12, 2005, three U.S. farm works from Yakima Valley who were illegally denied or terminated from agricultural employment brought this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington against Global Horizons, Green Acre Farms, and Valley Fruit Orchards under the Migrants and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1801, the Farm Labor Contractors Act, 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1981 and the Washington Law Against Discrimination. The parties agreed to go to trial, and after years of litigation the plaintiffs received a judgment in their favor under FLCA, as well as attorneys fees, for both trial and appellate legal work. In January 2014, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for incentive payments. There has been no further movement in the case."}
{"article": "On December 3, 2013, a non-profit organization filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff, represented by the Alliance Defending Freedom, asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate, even with the accommodation for non-profit religious organizations, is unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiff asked for both a preliminary and permanent injunction keeping the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate against the organization. On January 15, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment. On February 17, 2014, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on the grounds that the accommodation to the ACA mandate does not substantially burden the plaintiffs' religious freedom under RFRA or cause the plaintiffs irreparable harm. On March 11, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction. The court granted the motion for preliminary injunction on April 23, 2014 consistent with the 10th Circuit's ruling in <i> Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius</i>, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013). On September 30, 2014, following the Supreme Court's ruling in the Hobby Lobby case, the district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss as moot, and additionally denied defendants' motion for summary judgment without prejudice. The court also ordered plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 22, 2014, and filed a motion for summary judgment on December 1, 2014. The plaintiff stipulated to the dismissal of the case with prejudice on June 11, 2015, and the court terminated the case on June 12, 2015.", "summary": "On December 3, 2013, a non-profit organization filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff, represented by the Alliance Defending Freedom, asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate, even with the accommodation for non-profit religious organizations, is unconstitutional. On March 11, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction. Following the Supreme Court's decision in <i>Hobby Lobby</i>, the plaintiff stipulated to dismissal of the case."}
{"article": "On September 5, 2013, the voting stockholders of Midwest Fasteners, a Michigan for-profit corporation, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the First Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to issue a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance. Specifically, the stockholders contended that compliance with the contraception coverage requirement violated their sincerely held religious beliefs. On October 8, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction of the HHS Mandate. They also sought a stay. On October 15, the Government filed a notice of non-opposition to the plaintiffs' motions in light of ongoing appeals in similar cases, including <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12714\">Gilardi v. HHS</a>. On October 16,2013 the District Court (Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle) granted the unopposed motion for preliminary injunction and stayed the case until 30 days after the resolution of <i>Gilardi</i>. Additionally, Judge Huvelle directed the clerk to administratively close the case until further order of the court. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court decided <i>Burwell v. Hobby Lobby</i> <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12661\"></a> in favor of Hobby Lobby due to their religious objection to complying with the contraception coverage of the ACA. Back in this case, on September 10, 2014 the parties jointly filed a motion for stay that was granted on September 16, 2014. In addition to granting the motion for stay, the court extended the preliminary injunction until October 20, 2014 and ordered the parties to file status reports on October 6, 2014. On October 24, 2014 Judge Ellen S. Huvelle ruled that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in <i>Burwell v. Hobby Lobby</i>, the defendants would be permanently enjoined from enforcing the provisions of the ACA against the plaintiffs. The parties were ordered to attempt to reach an agreement on attorneys fees within 45 days. The plaintiffs filed a motion on December 3, 2014 to extend time to file a motion for attorney's fees and a new deadline was set for January 7, 2015. There has been no further activity on the docket the case is now presumed closed.", "summary": "On September 5, 2013, the voting stockholders of a Michigan for-profit corporation filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia asking the court to issue a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. In light of the ruling in <i>Burwell v. Hobby Lobby</i> the Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on October 24, 2014 permanently enjoining the defendants from enforcing compliance with the contraception coverage under the ACA."}
{"article": "This is a case about President Trump's executive order that prohibits racial sensitivity training in federal agencies, contractors, and grant recipients. On October 29, 2020, the National Urban League and National Fair Housing Alliance, two civil rights non-profits, filed this putative class action lawsuit in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Represented by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the plaintiffs sued the President, the Secretary of Labor, and the Department of Labor under the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201) and All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1651). The plaintiffs sought an injunction, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees. They claimed that the executive order violated freedom of speech under the First Amendment by denying benefits (e.g. government contracts and grants) to private entities that express ideas the Trump Administration doesn't like (e.g. implicit bias). The plaintiffs also argued that the executive order violated Fifth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection rights because the order was too vague about what the standards were for prohibited conduct and enforcement. In addition, the events surrounding the executive order indicated an intent to discriminate on the basis of race, national origin, sex, and/or gender. The case was assigned to Judge Amit P. Mehta. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "This is a case about President Trump's executive order that prohibits racial sensitivity training in federal agencies, contractors, and grant recipients. On October 29, 2020, the National Urban League and National Fair Housing Alliance filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the District of Columbia against the President, the Secretary of Labor, and the Department of Labor, seeking an injunction, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees. They claimed that the executive order violated freedom of speech under the First Amendment by denying benefits to private entities that express ideas the Trump Administration doesn't like. The plaintiffs also argued that the executive order violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because the order was too vague and created with an intent to discriminate on the basis of race, national origin, sex, and/or gender. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On April 22, 2010, individuals who provide home care to disabled individuals enrolled in Illinois Medicaid-waiver programs filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the State of Illinois, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Healthcare of Illinois & Indiana, SIEU Local 73, and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31. The plaintiffs, represented by the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, sought an injunction against enforcement of the agency-fee provision of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (PLRA) and a declaration that the law violated the personal assistants' fundamental rights. Plaintiffs claimed that compelling them to financially support the union for purposes of speaking to and petitioning the state infringes on their right of free association, free speech, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances under the First Amendment. Specifically, plaintiffs work as part of the Illinois' Home Services Program. This program allows Medicaid recipients who would normally need institutional care to hire a \"personal assistant\" to provide homecare services. Under State law, the care recipients and the State both play some role in the employment relationship with the Personal Assistants. The Illinois Legislature codified this unique employment relationship by amending existing laws so as to acknowledge the right of the persons receiving care to hire and fire personal assistants or supervise them, but declaring personal assistants to be public employees of the state for the purposes of coverage under the Illinois PLRA. The Illinois PLRA authorizes state employees to join labor unions and to bargain collectively on the terms and conditions of employment. The PLRA also contains an agency-fee provision, which requires members of a bargaining unit who do not wish to join the union to nevertheless pay a fee to the union. Following a vote, SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana was designated as the personal assistants' exclusive representative for purposes of collective bargaining. Plaintiffs challenged the mandatory contributions under the agency-fee provision. On November 12, 2010, District Court Judge Sharon Coleman dismissed plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. <http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-IL-0012-0002.pdf\">2010 WL 4736500</a>. The district court relied on Supreme Court precedent holding that state employees can be required to contribute fair share fees to compensate unions for their representational activities. Plaintiffs appealed. On September 1, 2011, Judge Daniel Manion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision <http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-IL-0012-0003.pdf\">656 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2011)</a>. The appellate court held that the State of Illinois and the care recipients are joint employers of the personal care providers, and the court stated that it had no difficulty concluding that the State employs personal assistants within the meaning of Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. 431 U. S. 209 (1977) (upholding the maintaining of a union shop in a public workplace). Plaintiffs sought certiorari and the Supreme Court granted review. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court overturned the Seventh Circuit's decision and held that the Illinois PLRA violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights under the First Amendment. <http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-IL-0012-0004.pdf\">134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014)</a>. Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel Alito was heavily critical of the Seventh Circuit's reliance on Abood. The Court noted the questionable foundations of that decision, highlighting its lack of adequate First Amendment analysis and failure to appreciate the distinction between core union speech in the public sector and core union speech in the private sector. The Court went on to stress the distinction between the full-fledged public employees at issue in Abood and the personal assistants at issue here. The Court noted that personal assistants are almost entirely answerable to the care recipient and not to the State, do not enjoy most of the rights and benefits that inure to state employees, and are not indemnified by the State for claims against them arising from actions taken during the course of their employment. Because Abood did not apply, the Court stated that the agency-fee provision of the law must serve a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms. The Court found insufficient the interests contended by defendants and held the Illinois PLRA unconstitutional.", "summary": "On April 22, 2010, homecare providers who did not wish to support the designated labor union filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois seeking an injunction against enforcement of the agency-fee provision of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (PLRA) and a declaration that the law violated the personal assistants' fundamental rights. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court held that the clearest case on point, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. 431 U. S. 209 (1977), did not apply because the public employees at issue there were distinct from the care providers here. Accordingly, the Court stated the agency-fee provision must serve a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms. The Court found insufficient the interests contended by Defendants and held the Illinois PLRA unconstitutional."}
{"article": "On May 8, 2018, National Fair Housing Alliance, Texas Low Income Housing Information Services, and Texas Appleseed filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs were represented by the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Fair Housing Alliance, Lawyers\u2019 Committee for Civil Rights, Public Citizen Litigation Group, and private counsel. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as attorneys\u2019 fees and costs under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act. They claimed that a suspension of Fair Housing Act rules violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). This case was assigned to Judge Beryl Howell. In 2009, amid widespread expert agreement that its current system for ensuring local government Fair Housing Act (FHA) compliance had failed, HUD began planning a substantial overhaul, promulgating Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Rule (\"AFFH Rule\") in 2015. The rule required cities and counties receiving federal housing assistance to submit to HUD an Assessment of Fair Housing (AFH) every three to five years using a standardized template called the Assessment Tool. In the AFH, each participating local government was required to document any identified fair housing issues and outline its plans for addressing them; these plans were then reviewed by HUD for adequacy. The AFFH rule also committed HUD to providing participating cities and counties with guidance and technical support. Yet on January 5, 2018, without providing advance notice or opportunity for comment, HUD published a notice in the Federal Register immediately suspending the AFH requirement of the AFFH rule. Specifically, it released local governments from submitting new assessments before October 31, 2020, and announced that it would not review any submitted AFHs before that date. The official reason given by the agency was that \"program participants needed more time to adjust to the new AFFH process\" and \"additional technical assistance may result in program participants better understanding their obligations under the AFFH rule.\" According to the plaintiffs, however, HUD had yet to take any public action to provide \"additional technical assistance.\" In the complaint filed on May 8, the plaintiffs asserted that these actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act and breached the agency's obligations under the Fair Housing Act. Yet on May 23, 2018, HUD published three related notices in the Federal Register. The first of these notices withdrew the January 5 suspension of the rule. But the second and third notices, respectively, withdrew the Assessment Tool and announced that participating jurisdictions could meet their AFFH duty if they simply \"acted in accordance\" with HUD's pre-AFFH system. In response, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 29, 2018 alleging that the combined effect of these latter two notices was the same as the agency's initial suspension in January. They also sought preliminary injunction and summary judgment, seeking the reinstatement of the Assessment Tool and the resumption of the normal AFH submission schedule. On June 5, 2018, several states and cities filed amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs, with the State of New York also moving to intervene as a plaintiff. HUD filed its opposition brief on June 12, 2018, and later moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on July 9, arguing in both that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the lawsuit. On August 17, 2018, the court denied the plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction and summary judgment, and denied the State of New York's motion to intervene. It granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. However, the plaintiffs filed a motion to alter judgment on September 14, 2018 and also sought to amend their complaint to further illustrate factual disputes they allege are grounds for reopening the case. Judge Howell denied the plaintiffs' motion to alter judgment and amend the complaint on August 26, 2019. Holding that a motion to alter judgment is an \"extraordinary remedy\" and the plaintiffs seeking reconsideration must meet a very high bar, Judge Howell found that the plaintiffs failed to meet such bar. The court found that although the plaintiffs\u2019 claim that the final judgment was based on erroneous factual allegations, the \"judgment was not premised on factual conclusions but rather on a legal assessment of the existing regulatory regime after HUD\u2019s contested actions.\" 397 F.Supp.3d 1.", "summary": "On May 8, 2018, several Texas organizations filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. They alleged that HUD suspended a provision of the Fair Housing Act that would require cities to report incidents of housing discrimination and that that this suspension violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The defendants' motion to dismiss was granted, and the plaintiffs filed to reopen the case and amend their complaint. This motion was denied on August 26, 2019."}
{"article": "On March 7, 2003, a group of recovering alcoholics and drug addicts filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the City of Boca Raton in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming that an ordinance enacted by the city unlawfully prohibited drug and alcohol recovery facilites from operating within residentially zoned areas. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they were direct targets of the ordinance which was passed in response to public outcry to remove the plaintiffs from residential neighborhoods. On February 26, 2007, the court (Donald M. Middlebrooks) entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as to their Fair Housing Act claims. The plaintiffs were awarded nominal damages and the city was enjoined from enforcing section 2 of Ordinance 4649 and Section 28-2 as applied to recovering individuals. After litigation over attorney fees and a failed appeal by the city, the case was closed.", "summary": "A group of recovering alcoholics and drug addicts filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the City of Boca Raton. The plaintiffs claimed that an ordinance enacted by the city unlawfully prohibited drug and alcohol recovery facilites from operating within residentially zoned areas. The court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as to their Fair Housing Act claims. The plaintiffs were awarded nominal damages and the city was enjoined from enforcing section 2 of Ordinance 4649 and Section 28-2 as applied to recovering individuals. This case is closed."}
{"article": "On October 24, 2006, owners and prospective purchasers of condominiums in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act against Sunrise Lakes Condominium Apartments in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida. The plaintiffs, represented by private and public interest attorneys, claimed that the condo association had prevented Hispanics from purchasing units in the condo building. Following a stipulation of dismissal on October 16, 2007, the court (Marcia G. Cooke) dismissed the case on October 19, 2007. We have no further information concerning this case.", "summary": "Owners and prospective purchasers of condominiums in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act against Sunrise Lakes Condominium Apartments, claiming that the condo association had prevented Hispanics from purchasing units in the condo building. Following a stipulation of dismissal on October 16, 2007, the court (Marcia G. Cooke) dismissed the case on October 19, 2007. We have no further information concerning this case."}
{"article": "On June 24, 2010, the United States filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a73601-3619, against owners and operators of an apartment complex located in Red Wing Minnesota. DOJ alleged that the defendants discriminated against the complainant, an African-American man, on the basis of race and sex when it refused to rent him a unit because of his criminal background, but rented an apartment to a white male with a felonious criminal background. The complaint sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Judge Nelson was elevated to the Court of Appeal, and the case was reassigned to Judge Donovan Frank. On July 29, 2011, Judge Frank approved a two year Consent Decree agreed to by the parties. The Consent Decree provides: <ul> <li> It enjoins the Defendants from refusing to rent a dwelling or discriminating against a person in the terms and conditions of the rental of a dwelling on the basis of race or sex. <li> It requires antidiscrimination training of all of defendants employees involved in renting apartments <li> It requires posting of Fair Housing notices and use of Equal Housing Opportunity language in advertising. <li>It requires recordkeeping and notice to the DOJ in the event any additional complaints are filed. <li> It orders the Defendants to pay $15,000 in damages to the complainant. <li> It preserves jurisdiction in the district court for enforcement for 2 years. No further litigation has occurred in this case and it is presumably closed.", "summary": "On June 24, 2010, the United States filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, under the Fair Housing Act, against owners and operators of an apartment complex located in Red Wing Minnesota alleging discrimination on the basis of race and sex against an African-American male. On July 29, 2011, Judge Frank approved a two year Consent Decree agreed to by the parties enjoining defendants from continuing to engage in discriminatory practices and ordering defendants to pay $15,000 in damages to the complainant."}
{"article": "On March 17, 2011, the National Fair Housing Alliance and Paralyzed Veterans of America filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 3601 et seq., against Virginia-based real estate development company HHHunt Corporation, and a multitude of affiliated designers, builders, managers, and owners of nine apartment complexes throughout the Southeast. In their <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-VA-0004-0004.pdf\">complaint</a>, the plaintiffs, represented by Relman, Dane & Colfax, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages, claiming that the defendants discriminated against people with disabilities in violation of the FHA. Specifically, the FHA requires that certain apartment complexes built for first occupancy after March 13, 1991 be designed and constructed with accessible and adaptable features for people with disabilities. The plaintiffs alleged, however, that since at least 2002 the defendants engaged in a continuous pattern or practice of discrimination by designing and building multifamily dwellings without these required features, thereby denying people with disabilities the use of these facilities. On April 5, 2012, the plaintiffs filed an <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-VA-0004-0001.pdf\">amended complaint</a>, adding as defendant J. Davis Architects, which the plaintiffs alleged was the design architect on at least one of the subject properties. The amended complaint also named as defendants several property managers, and the plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin these managers from refusing to permit surveys and retrofits of the subject properties. On October 26, 2012, the District Court (Judge James C. Turk) entered a <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-VA-0004-0002.pdf\">stipulated judgment</a>, evincing the terms of a settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and all the defendants except J. Davis Architects. Under the agreement, HHHunt agreed to permit accessibility surveys by a third party inspector of the nine subject properties and to retrofit inaccessible features within one to three years. Specifically, HHHunt agreed to change entry doors with high thresholds, remove large steps that block routes to entry doors, correct hazardously steep sidewalk slopes, provide adequate accessible parking, and ensure that kitchens and bathrooms have sufficient maneuvering space for wheelchair users. HHHunt also committed to pay an undisclosed sum for the plaintiffs' costs and attorneys' fees. The District Court retained jurisdiction to designate a Magistrate Judge or another person to resolve disputes between the parties. Following the settlement, the only remaining claims in the lawsuit were those against J. Davis Architects. The plaintiffs contended that J. Davis drafted architectural plans for at least one of the subject properties that contained design elements that violated that FHA. After some disagreement, the parties ultimately stipulated that J. Davis had a connection to two of the subject properties. J. Davis next moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that one of the plaintiffs' claims was barred by the statute of limitations. The District Court (Judge Turk) <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-VA-0004-0008.pdf\">denied the motion</a> on January 29, 2013, finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that the claim was timely, because the challenged conduct was not an isolated occurrence, but rather part of a pattern or practice that amounted to a continuing violation of the FHA. <i>Nat'l Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. HHHunt Corp.</i>, 919 F. Supp. 2d 712 (W.D. Va. 2013). Nearly one year passed with little court activity. On January 14, 2014, the District Court entered an order dismissing the action with prejudice, upon motion of the plaintiffs and J. Davis. The joint motion contained no additional terms, and it is unclear if it was predicated on a private settlement agreement. The District Court retained limited jurisdiction to resolve disputes arising under the settlement agreement until October 26, 2015. Since there has been no docket activity after 2014, the case is presumed closed.", "summary": "In March 2011, the National Fair Housing Alliance and Paralyzed Veterans of America filed this federal suit the Western District of Virginia under the Fair Housing Act, alleging that real estate development company HHHunt Corporation and affiliated entities discriminated against people with disabilities by designing and building apartment complexes without the required accessible and adaptable features. In October 2012, the District Court (Judge James C. Turk) entered a stipulated order, under which the defendants agreed to make numerous improvements to the subject properties. Following the settlement agreement, claims concerning the liability of an architecture firm lingered, but were ultimately resolved by a stipulated dismissal on January 14, 2014. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the District Court retained jurisdiction to resolve disputes between the parties until October 2015. Since there has been no docket activity after 2014, the case is presumed closed."}
{"article": "On August 25, 2011, an individual with intellectual disabilities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiff, represented by a nonprofit impact litigation firm, sued the Director of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities (APD) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1983 and 1988, claiming violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff was involuntarily committed to residential services pursuant to a Florida statute but never received a periodic review of his continued need for involuntary confinement. Thus, the plaintiff asked the court for a permanent injunction that would require the defendant to adopt policies and procedures to ensure that clients who are committed to the defendant's care and custody receive state-initiated, periodic review of their involuntary commitment. On December 19, 2011, District Judge William Stafford denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the basis that the plaintiff had provided sufficient allegations to survive the motion. After the parties engaged in discovery, on May 22, 2012, Judge Stafford granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the APD successfully set up a nonadversarial scheme that allowed behavioral specialists the flexibility to perform tasks and make decisions for which they were trained, without having to spend unnecessary time in periodic court proceedings. The court reasoned that this scheme, when applied specifically to the plaintiff's case, was sufficient under the due process clause and periodic judicial review of involuntary commitment was not required. 2012 WL 1886438 (N.D. Fla. May 22, 2012). On August 10, 2012, the plaintiff filed an appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit held on August 20, 2013, that the Supreme Court of Florida had to answer three certified questions related to the case because the Supreme Court of Florida is the \"arbiter[] of Florida law.\" These questions asked whether the \"support plan\" under a Florida statue requires that APD \"consider[s] the propriety of a continued involuntary admission for residential services,\" if APD is required under law \"to petition the circuit court for the release\" of a person from involuntary admission if the circumstances surrounding the admission have changed, and if Florida law requires that involuntary admissions are periodically reviewed. 736 F.3d 959, 973 (11th Cir. 2013). On May 14, 2015, the Florida Supreme Court held that APD was not required to \"consider the propriety of continued involuntary admission\" and APD did not have \"to petition the circuit court for the release\" of a person who was involuntarily admitted but the circumstances surrounding the admission had changed. 175 So. 3d 710 (Fla. 2015). The case then returned to the Eleventh Circuit. On October 15, 2015, the Eleventh Circuit delivered an opinion reversing the Florida Supreme Court's decision and remanding the case to the district court on the basis that the APD scheme was not constitutionally adequate. The court held that Florida's system was in violation of the Due Process Clause because it did not require continued involuntary commitment to be reviewed by a decision-maker with the authority to order release. On July 25, 2016, the parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal, and resolved the costs and fees in a separate agreement. The next day, Judge Stafford dismissed the case with prejudice. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2011, the plaintiff, an individual with intellectual disabilities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiff sued then Director for the Agency for Persons with Disabilities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1938 & 1988. The plaintiff was involuntarily committed to residential services pursuant to Florida statute but never received any periodic review of his continued need for involuntary confinement to residential services. The District Court granted the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the Agency's scheme of review satisfied the Due Process Clause. On October 20, 2015, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed this decision and remanded the case to the lower court."}
{"article": "Starting in at least 2011, officials of the State of Illinois pursued plans to close up to four State Operated Developmental Centers (SODCs) within 2.5 years. SODCs are facilities for Illinois adults with severe developmental disabilities. In February 2012, Governor Quinn announced that Illinois would close Jacksonville Developmental Center and Murray Developmental Center by October 31, 2012 and 2013 respectively. The closure plans were undertaken to shift resources towards expanding community-based care and to deal with Illinois's $13 billion budget deficit. Illinois closed the Jacksonville center on December 3, 2012. When this suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, on February 19, 2013, Illinois was in the course of transferring residents of the Murray Center to community-based options in order to enable the facility's closure. The guardians of individuals residing in these institutions filed this suit individually on behalf of their charges and as a class action for all similarly situated disabled individuals. Some named plaintiffs claimed to have been told that Illinois would be closing all SODCs in the state. Thus the plaintiffs opposed the closures of the Jackson and Murray centers and the anticipated closure of the rest of the SODCs and brought the suit seeking declaratory relief, attorneys' fees, and an injunction preventing the planned closures. The plaintiffs argued that Illinois had not demonstrated that the community-based setting approach would be adequate or appropriate for individuals who are severely and profoundly developmentally disabled. The plaintiffs further argued that the closure plans discriminated against the class by targeting developmental disabilities for greater funding reductions than other disabilities, providing the class members services less effective than those provided to individuals with other disabilities, creating a substantial risk of harm, and limiting non-ambulatory individuals' access to community residential settings. The plaintiffs brought their claims under The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794), <i>Olmstead v. L.C.</i>(527 U.S. 581 (1999)), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (for state infringement of equal protection), and various federal and state Medicaid laws. In effect, Plaintiffs argued for the right to remain institutionalized. On February 27, 2013, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. On April 15, 2013, the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division filed a statement of interest opposing the injunction and the plaintiffs' interpretation of the ADA and <i>Olmstead</i>. The DOJ explained its position that the ADA is a statute for integration, not segregation. On May 30, 2013, the Court (Judge Marvin E. Aspen) granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order. The order, which was entered on June 12, 2013, was to prevent Illinois from transferring or discharging residents of the Murray Developmental Center without their legal guardians' written consent. Illinois was also restricted from sending residents on overnight transition visits. The order was to last until the court ruled on the motion for preliminary injunction. On June 20, 2013, the Court restricted the plaintiffs' claims to those dealing with the Jacksonville and Murray centers, finding the potential closing of all SODCs to be too speculative to be ripe for adjudication. 2013 WL 3168758 (N.D. Ill. 2013). The Court also rejected the plaintiffs' interpretation of <i>Olmstead</i>, stating \"[T]his is not an Olmstead case.\" On June 28, 2013, the Court clarified that the restraining order allowed the state to consent to the transfer of wards of the Office of the State Guardian. In other words, the state as legal guardian was empowered to consent to the transfer of certain residents. On October 8, 2013, Judge Aspen granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims. The court dismissed counts IV and V against DHS and dismissed all claims against Governor Quinn. The court dismissed count III (the Olmstead claim) entirely and count IV to the extent it alleged violations of state regulatory laws relating to Medicaid. This left the equal protection claim, the ADA claim, the Rehab Act claim, and violations of federal laws pertaining to Medicaid. 2013 WL 5548929 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2013). In January 2014, the court held a hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction and possible permanent injunction. On July 21, 2014, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and lifted the temporary restraining order previously entered on June 12, 2013. 60 F. Supp. 3d 856 (N.D. Ill. 2014). The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Seventh Circuit. On October 15, 2015, the Seventh Circuit (Judge Posner) affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the harm to the state if the injunction were granted would outweigh the harm caused to residents if the injunction weren't granted. 803 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2015). The district court dismissed the case on March 3, 2016, after the parties filed a proposed agreed order of dismissal. Each party bore their own attorneys' fees and costs.", "summary": "After Illinois initiated the process of closing several State Operated Developmental Centers for adults with severe developmental disabilities, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiffs opposed the closures of the Jackson and Murray centers and the anticipated closure of the rest of the SODCs and brought the suit seeking declaratory relief, attorneys' fees, and an injunction preventing the planned closures. Plaintiffs brought their claims under The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794), <i>Olmstead v. L.C.</i>(527 U.S. 581 (1999)), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (for state infringement of equal protection), and various federal and state Medicaid laws. Plaintiffs' claims brought under the Olmstead mandate were dismissed. Plaintiffs did obtain a temporary restraining order, but their motion for a preliminary injunction was denied by the district court and upon appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit."}
{"article": "On December 22, 1995, People First of Tennessee filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the State of Tennessee on behalf of residents of the Clover Bottom Developmental Center, Greene Valley Developmental Center, and Winston Developmental Center. The plaintiff sued the Clover Bottom Development Center and the Tennessee Department of Health under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The complaint alleged that a Department of Justice CRIPA investigation of the facilities in 1994 found a pattern of injury, abuse, and neglect, deficient medical care, a lack of activities, and a failure to provide educations to school-age children as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. It also alleged the use of unnecessary restraints, inadequate discharge planning, and failure to provide habilitation and training. The People First of Tennessee, represented by the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia and private counsel, sought injunctive relief to permanently enjoin the defendants from continuing the acts, practices, and omissions described above. On November 15, 1996, the United States Department of Justice also filed a lawsuit in the Middle District of Tennessee against the state, alleging similar violations. That case was styled U.S. v. Tennessee Civ. No. 96-cv-01056 (M.D.Tenn.) (\"United States case\") (See ID-TN-0004). On December 2, 1996, the district court (Judge Robert L. Echnols) granted a motion to consolidate the People First case with the United States case. People First, the Department of Justice, and the State of Tennessee entered into a settlement agreement, which was approved by Judge Echnols on November 27, 1996. In the settlement, the state agreed to, among other things: \u2022 Create person-centered evaluation of citizens in need of services \u2022 Develop community programs and resources \u2022 Increase staffing and staff training \u2022 Improve living conditions in the centers \u2022 Provide education for school-age residents On the same date, the court granted plaintiff People First of Tennessee's motion to amend their complaint. According to the PACER docket, litigation continued after the settlement regarding defendants' compliance with the settlement agreement, the Parent-Guardian Association's (PGA) intervention in the action, and attorneys' fees. Community Rehabilitation Agencies of Tennessee (CMRA), an association of agencies providing services to individuals with intellectual disabilities, moved to intervene in the consolidate suits. The court (Judge Jon McCalla) denied the motions for each case. On August 8, 2001, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (District Judge John Feikens, Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation) affirmed the denials. U.S. v. Tennessee, 260 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2001). On Mar. 18, 2002, the court ordered the case administratively closed in light of the ongoing settlement process. The court allowed the case to be reopened by either party. The case was reopened on Feb. 22, 2006 to address the state's motion for partial termination of the settlement regarding Greene Valley Developmental Center. The settlement agreement allowed the state to seek partial termination of the agreement after two years if the state showed compliance with provisions related to institutional care services and protection from harm. The court had to address if \"the State has substantially complied with\" the provisions. The court granted the motion on Mar. 16, 2006, finding that the state had achieved compliance with respect to the conditions at the Greene Valley Developmental Center. The court terminated the settlement agreement with respect to the Harold Jordan Center on Sept. 30, 2008, finding that the state showed compliance with provisions related to institutional care services and protection from harm at that particular facility. The court once again ordered the case administratively closed on Mar. 31, 2009. While the case remained closed, a series of procedural developments occurred. First, on Nov. 19, the state indicated that budgetary considerations compelled it to close the Clover Bottom Developmental Center and Harold Jordan Center. On Dec. 21, 2009, the PGA filed a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in response to the state's asserted intent to close the facilities without a comprehensive closure plan. The court denied the motion on Jan. 12, 2010, holding that the parties did not make a sufficient effort to confer with the state, as required by the settlement agreement, before bringing their motion. After many months of negotiation, the parties drafted an exit plan that established criteria that, if the state satisfied, would result in a dismissal of this case. The court approved the exit plan on Jan. 29, 2015. A year later, on Jan. 12, 2016, the court found that the state had complied with the exit plan provisions and ordered the case dismissed with prejudice. The court also vacated previously-granted injunctive relief, except as to class members residing at Greene Valley Developmental Center while they continued to reside there. The court maintained jurisdiction over the matter only as to these residents. On Sept. 8, 2017, after the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss the case as to the outstanding injunction, the court dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that the state was in full compliance with the exit plan as to Greene Valley Developmental Center. Throughout the course of this litigation, the court awarded installments of attorneys' fees and reimbursements totaling $2,778,833.84 for the plaintiffs and $753,433.86 for the PGA. The case was then closed, though the court currently retained jurisdiction solely over matters related to attorneys' fees. On November 9, 2017, People First filed a final motion for attorneys' fees. The PGA filed a similar motion the following day. On November 14, 2017, the court granted both motions, awarding People First $377,944.28 and PGA $65,750. All motions for attorneys' fees have been resolved. The case is presumably closed.", "summary": "On December 22, 1995, People First of Tennessee filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the State of Tennessee on behalf of residents of the Clover Bottom Developmental Center, Greene Valley Developmental Center, and Winston Developmental Center. The parties settled, and the case is now closed."}
{"article": "This was a class action brought in October of 2006 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California on behalf of all legal hourly-paid agricultural workers who had been employed by fruit picking companies of Reedley, California owned by defendants. Plaintiff alleged that employees of Fruit Patch, Inc. engaged in a massive scheme to hire undocumented immigrants for the express purpose of depressing employee wages. In furtherance of their scheme, defendants are alleged to have recruited over 100 undocumented immigrants to work in their plants, provided housing for them and turned a blind eye to obviously fake work papers. Plaintiff further alleged that after defendants were notified of workers using false social security numbers, the undocumented workers would then simply assume new bogus identities and continue working. Plaintiff alleges that defendants' scheme violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (\"RICO\"), 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1961 et seq., and the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1324(a), et seq. Plaintiff was represented by private counsel. Defendants moved to dismiss the case. On March 27, 2007, the District Court (Judge Oliver W. Wanger) granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiff's request for sanctions. Judge Wanger held that plaintiff's complaint sufficiently stated a claim for RICO violations by alleging predicate acts of knowingly hiring unauthorized aliens and harboring undocumented aliens. He, however, found that allegations of a conspiracy involving unnamed co-conspirators did not comply with notice pleading requirements. The Court granted plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Hernandez v. Balakian, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (E.D. Cal. 2007). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint and defendants answered it and asserted affirmative defenses, which plaintiff moved to strike. That motion was denied. Hernandez v. Balakian, No. CV-F-06-1383 OWW/DLB, 2007 WL 1649911 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2007). The parties proceeded to discovery on class issues, and, in December of 2007, the plaintiff filed his motion for class certification. Shortly thereafter, in January of 2008, the plaintiff sought leave to file an amended complaint, as he had been arrested and charged with a felony, and had been injured in an automobile accident that impaired his memory. He argued he was no longer a suitable class representative. The Court (Judge Wanger) allowed plaintiff 30 days to amend his complaint to substitute a suitable class representative. Hernandez v. Balakian, 251 F.R.D. 488 (E.D. Cal. 2008). However, the plaintiff filed to timely amend the complaint, and the case was dismissed without prejudice.", "summary": "In October of 2006, a class action lawsuit was brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California on behalf of agricultural workers alleging that defendant employers had engaged in a massive scheme to hire undocumented immigrants in an effort to depress employee wages. The case was dismissed without prejudice in May of 2008 after the plaintiff failed to timely amend his complaint to substitute in a suitable class representative."}
{"article": "This case is about the ability of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to issue new guidelines on asylum application procedures and whether DHS is allowed to issue a rule that asylum seekers must first apply for asylum in another country before applying in the U.S.. On July 16, 2019, four advocacy organizations -- the East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, Al Otro Lado, Innovation Law Lab, and the Central American Resource Center -- challenged a new asylum policy of the Trump administration narrowing eligibility qualifications for asylum seekers. The rule blocked asylum for noncitizens who transited through another country prior to reaching the southern U.S. border. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 551 et seq., and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1101 et seq. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. This lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court in the Northern District of California and assigned to Judge Jon S. Tigar. The complaint had three key arguments. First, plaintiffs argued that Congress made clear that noncitizens may apply for asylum regardless of where they enter the U.S., and that many necessarily transit through another country before reaching a U.S. port of entry. U.S.C. \u00a7 1158(a)(1). The complaint emphasized the distinction between firm resettlement barring eligibility for asylum under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1158(b)(2)(A), and temporary transit through another country. Second, plaintiffs argued that the rule jeopardized the international law principle of non-refoulment which prohibits the forcible return of asylum seekers to countries where they would be persecuted. Third, plaintiffs argued that the government failed to follow procedural steps required by the APA, including providing notice and an opportunity to comment prior to enacting the Rule. On July 24, 2019, the Court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction, preventing the government from implementing the rule due to the government\u2019s failure to comply with notice and comment procedures of the APA and the balance of public interests. 385 F.Supp.3d 922. On July 29, 2019, the government requested a stay of the injunction pending an appeal to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the nationwide scope of the injunction was unwarranted and would serve to undermine the constitutional and statutory authority of the Executive Branch. On August 16, 2019, the Ninth Circuit denied a stay for application of the injunction inside its boundaries. The Ninth Circuit granted the stay pending appeal for all locations outside the Ninth Circuit, finding that the nationwide scope of the injunction was not supported by the record in the district court. 934 F.3d 1026. The plaintiffs then moved in the district court to restore the nationwide scope of the injunction, supplementing the record the appeals court had found inadequate. On September 9, 2019, the district court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion to restore the nationwide scope of the injunction, viewing it as the only sufficient remedy to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs, as well as necessary to maintain uniform immigration policy. 391 F.Supp.3d 974. The government again appealed to the Ninth Circuit and filed an emergency motion for a stay. While the stay issue was being briefed, the Supreme Court granted a stay pending disposition of the government's appeal to the Ninth Circuit (140 S.Ct. 3). The government again appealed the injunction to the Ninth Circuit on July 6, 2020. While the injunction was on appeal, but before the change of administration, the Department of Homeland Security issued a separate \u201cfinal rule\u201d on the asylum issue that was substantially similar to the one the district court had preliminarily enjoined. On January 28, 2021, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint seeking to enjoin the government from implementing this new rule as well. The district court granted that injunction on February 16, 2021. On January 21, 2021, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and stay of the final rule's effective date. Judge Tigar granted the preliminary injunction and stay of the effective date on February 16. In in April 2021, the Ninth Circuit upheld the original injunction and found that the rule change was arbitrary and capricious because the government did not take the evidence in front of the agency into account when making the rule change, and that the balance of harms favored upholding the injunction (994 F. 3d 962). The Ninth Circuit also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying the injunction along the four states bordering Mexico. The case is ongoing, but is likely to terminate soon due to the inauguration of the Biden Administration. There has been no movement on the trial court docket since the court of appeals mandate in April.", "summary": "On July 16, 2019, the East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, Al Otro Lado, Innovation Law Lab, and the Central American Resource Center in Los Angeles brought this suit against the U.S. Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security. Plaintiffs challenged the federal immigration rule restricting eligibility for asylum for noncitizens who transited through another country prior to reaching the southern U.S. border. Plaintiffs claimed the rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Plaintiffs successfully sought a preliminary nationwide injunction. However, defendants appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit and the nationwide scope of the injunction was stayed. Then the District Court restored the nationwide scope of the injunction on September 9, 2019, but the government again appealed and the U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay pending disposition of the appeal in the 9th Circuit. The District Court issued a separate preliminary injunction against another rule issued by the Department of Homeland Security in the closing days of the Trump Administration which was substantially similar to the one already enjoined. The Ninth Circuit upheld the original injunction in April, 2021. The case is ongoing but is likely to terminate soon given the change in presidential administrations."}
{"article": "This case is one of several brought nationwide by States, counties, and nonprofit organizations challenging the Trump administration's revised, final public charge rule, which expands the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. District court judges from across the country granted preliminary injunctions enjoining the government from implementing the public charge rule but after multiple Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court issued stays of these injunctions, the public charge rule was implemented by the government on February 24, 2020. The district court in this case denied a preliminary injunction but issued a preliminary injunction covering California in a related case. This preliminary injunction was stayed pending the Supreme Court's disposition on petitions for certiorari from the Second and Seventh Circuits on similar injunctions. On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. A little over a month later on March 9, 2021, DHS officially abandoned the rule and the petitions for certiorari were voluntarily dismissed by the government. <u>Healthcare Providers and Nonprofits Sue Over the Public Charge Rule</u> On August 16, 2019, several healthcare providers and nonprofit organizations serving immigrant communities filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its acting secretary in his official capacity, and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and its acting secretary in his official capacity, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs sought relief to declare the Department of Homeland Security\u2019s <a href=\"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/08/14/2019-17142/inadmissibility-on-public-charge- grounds\">Final Rule</a> (the Rule) vacated due to violations of the APA and unconstitutional for violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs also sought to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Rule from being implemented and enforced. The case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley but was reassigned to District Judge Haywood S Gilliam, Jr after the plaintiffs declined to proceed before a magistrate judge. On August 14, 2019, the DHS published a revised, final public charge rule, which defines personal circumstances that affect the ability of individuals and their families to successfully enter the U.S. or acquire legal permanent resident status (i.e., get a green card). The Rule increases the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that if an immigration officer finds that a person seeking a visa is likely to become a public charge, that person is \u201cinadmissible.\u201d The traditional conception of public charge has meant \"someone who is primarily dependent on the government to avoid destitution.\" Under the Rule, an immigrant who uses non-cash benefits such as food stamps or Medicaid (the plaintiffs have alleged that over one-half of U.S. citizens can be expected to use one of these programs at some point in their lifetime), or is deemed likely to receive them in the future, may be found more likely to be a public charge and inadmissible for purposes of a visa or green card application. According to a New York Times <a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/11/us/immigration-public-charge-injunction.html\">article</a>, the new standards would directly affect about 1.2 million applicants annually, primarily immigrants from Africa and Latin America. The plaintiffs asserted four claims for relief against the defendants. First, the plaintiffs asserted that the Rule's definition of public charge was \"contrary to the plain and well- established meaning of that phrase, and to how it has been interpreted and applied since 1882.\" In support of this claim, the plaintiffs stated that Congress has repeatedly declined to change the longstanding definition of public charge. The plaintiffs also claimed that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious, as it departs from prior law and practice without adequate explanation of the reasons for the departure and consideration for the consequences of the change. Next, the plaintiffs asserted that in enacting the Rule, \"defendants acted with improper discriminatory intent and bias against non-white immigrants,\" in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Lastly, the plaintiffs argued that the Rule was invalid because it was issued by the acting head of the USCIS and that his designation as acting head of USCIS violated the Constitution and federal law. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the implementation and enforcement of the Rule to prevent harm to themselves and the immigrant families they represent; \"The Rule has and will continue to divert Plaintiffs\u2019 resources, both to address the harmful effects of the Rule and to educate immigrant families about those effects, preventing Plaintiffs from carrying out other aspects of their missions and ensuring that their patients, members, and clients do not forgo critical services to lead healthy, productive, and successful lives.\" The case was ordered related to <i>City and County of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services</i> (IM-CA-0156) on August 30, 2019. Accordingly, the case was reassigned to the judge presiding over that related case, Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton. <u>Plaintiffs Seek A Nationwide Preliminary Injunction</u> On September 4, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking a nationwide injunction enjoining the defendants from implementing and enforcing the Rule and an order postponing the effective date of the Rule pending judicial review. The plaintiffs argued that a preliminary injunction was appropriate because of their likely success on the merits and that absent an injunction, the Rule would cause plaintiffs to suffer irreparable harm \"by interfering with their missions, forcing them to divert resources from providing their core services to handling the effect of the Regulation, and depriving them of revenue.\" In their opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs have \"no basis for turning their abstract policy disagreement with the Executive Branch into a nationwide injunction.\" The defendants asserted that because the plaintiffs are \"municipalities rather than [noncitizens] governed by the Rule,\" they cannot meet jurisdictional requirements. Furthermore, the defendants contended that the Rule was not unlawful, as it \"reflects Congress\u2019s delegation of broad authority to the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of 'public charge'\" and was \"the product of a well-reasoned process that considered the plain text of the statute, legislative intent, statistical evidence, and the substance of hundreds of thousands of comments submitted by the public.\" <u>The Court Grants a Geographically Limited Preliminary Injunctions</u> Following a hearing on October 2, 2019, on October 11, 2019, Judge Hamilton issued an order denying the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, but granted preliminary injunctions in two related cases that would enjoin the defendants from implementing and enforcing the Rule in California, Oregon, the District of Columbia, Maine, and Pennsylvania. 408 F. Supp. 3d 1057. Judge Hamilton denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction in the current case, finding that the plaintiffs \"have not met their burden to demonstrate that there are serious questions concerning whether they are within the challenged statute\u2019s zone of interest, and certainly they have failed to demonstrate a likelihood that they are able to bring the APA actions underlying their present motion.\" Judge Hamilton concluded that a preliminary injunction was appropriate in the two related cases because the plaintiff states and counties were likely to succeed on the merits of their APA claims and would be irreparably harmed absent an injunction. However, Judge Hamilton did not grant the plaintiffs' request to enjoin the implementation of the Rule nationwide. Because the plaintiff states and counties did not establish \"the necessity of such relief,\" the scope of the injunction was limited to California, Oregon, the District of Columbia, Maine, and Pennsylvania. <u>The Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court Stay the Preliminary Injunctions</u> On December 5, 2019, a Ninth Circuit panel issued an order in a related case, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17409\"><i>City and County of San Francisco</i></a>, granting the government's emergency motion to stay the preliminary injunction in California, Oregon, the District of Columbia, Maine, and Pennsylvania. In the same order, the Ninth Circuit panel stayed a nationwide injunction that was issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17290\"><i>State of Washington v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security</i></a>. Following the stay, on December 10, plaintiffs in this case filed notice that they would appeal the district court's October 11 decision denying their preliminary injunction. However, they withdrew their appeal shortly thereafter, and it was dismissed by the Ninth Circuit on February 4, 2020. 2020 WL 1170719. On January 27, 2020, the Supreme Court, in <i>State of New York</i>, issued a stay on all nationwide injunctions enjoining the defendants from implementing the Rule. 140 S.Ct. 599. Following this decision, the defendants indicated that the Rule would be implemented and enforced starting February 24, 2020. <u>Defendants\u2019 Motion to Dismiss</u> Back in the district court, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on April 22. In response, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 20. Defendants filed a new motion to dismissed the amended complaint on June 10. On August 7, Judge Hamilton granted the motion to dismiss in part. He deferred ruling on the arbitrariness and capriciousness of the new public charge rule pending a Ninth Circuit ruling on the preliminary injunction. 477 F. Supp. 3d 951. He held that plaintiffs did not lack standing, and so denied that part of the motion to dismiss. However, he granted dismissal of plaintiffs' invalid appointment claims, holding (1) that President Trump had the authority to appoint Acting Secretary of DHS McAleenan; and (2) the Public Charge rule wasn't promulgated under Acting Secretary of USCIS Cuccinelli\u2019s authority, making his appointment irrelevant to the complaint. Judge Hamilton also granted dismissal of, but with leave to amend, the equal protection claim. He held that the disparate impact was real but not dispositive; that none of the statements pointing to racial motivation were stated by anyone directly involved in promulgating the Rule; and that fast-tracking the Rule was not indicative of discriminatory intent. Plaintiffs moved to reconsider the ruling on September 10. On November 25, Judge Hamilton granted the motion to reconsider and amended his August 7 order. 2020 WL 6940934. He reversed his dismissal of the claims against McAleenan's appointment, finding that factual investigation would be required to determine whether President Trump's tweet appointing McAleenan violated the order of succession outlined in Executive Order 13753. <u>Preliminary Injunction is Affirmed in the Ninth Circuit then Stayed</u> On December 2, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction from the related case of <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17409\"><i>City and County of San Francisco</i></a>. 981 F.3d 742. However, Judge Hamilton stayed the order on December 17, as did the Ninth Circuit on January 20, 2021, pending the Supreme Court's disposition on petitions for certiorari from the Second and Seventh Circuits. <u>President Biden Issues Executive Order to Review the Public Charge Rule</u> On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. On March 9, 2021, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the Rule had been implemented by DHS Acting Secretary Kevin McAleenan. Pointing out that this court and others throughout the country had determined Mr. McAleenan was serving invalidly, the plaintiffs argued he therefore lacked authority to implement the rule. They also argued that defendants' attempts to ratify the rule through Chad Wolf instead suffered from similar issues of lacking authority. <u>The Rule is Officially Abandoned and Vacated</u> Also on March 9, 2021, <a href=\"https://www.dhs.gov/news/2021/03/09/dhs-secretary-statement-2019-public-charge-rule\">DHS formally abandoned the rule</a>. The government voluntarily dismissed its appeal to the Seventh Circuit, lifting the stay of the Northern District of Illinois' November 2, 2020 decision vacating the Public Charge Final Rule nationwide from (<a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17408\"><i>Cook County v. Wolf</i></a>). That same day, at all parties' requests, the Supreme Court dismissed the pending petition for <i>Cook County</i>, as well as similar petitions for the Ninth (<a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17409\"><i>City and County of San Francisco v. USCIS</i></a>) and Second (<a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17287\"><i>New York v. DHS</i></a>) Circuits. On March 10, eleven state attorneys general, led by Ken Paxton of Texas, moved to intervene as defendants in the Ninth Circuit. They filed similar motions in the Seventh and Fourth Circuits, and a day later on March 11, they filed an <a href=\"https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/20/20A150/172422/20210319132528733_20A__%20Application.pdf\">emergency application</a> to the Supreme Court to intervene on behalf of the government and stay the judgment from <i>Cook County</i>. On April 9, 2021 the Ninth Circuit ruled 2-1 to deny the motion to intervene without an opinion. 2021 WL 1310846. However, Judge Vandyke wrote a lengthy dissent, arguing that the Biden administration was now colluding with the plaintiffs in the Public Charge lawsuits, making their interests at odds with the interests of the states who were seeking to intervene. He explained that this case was clearly still worth pursuing, since it had sufficient merit to warrant Supreme Court review and the government was circumventing APA requirements. Moreover, even though the Rule had been vacated, there was still a chance the Supreme Court may reverse that decision, making this lawsuit not yet moot. As of April 15, 2021, the Public Charge Final Rule has been abandoned and vacated nationwide. The parties are currently conferring on how this will impact litigation. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On August 16, 2019, several health care providers and nonprofit organizations serving immigrant communities filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security's Final Public Charge Rule (the Rule), which added non-cash benefits to the factors considered in determining whether a person applying for legal permanent residence is likely to become a public charge. The plaintiffs alleged that the Government violated the Administrative Procedure Act by exceeding its statutory authority, claimed that the Rule was \"arbitrary and capricious,\" and asserted that the Rule violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In October 2019, a district court judge denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction enjoining the government from implementing the Rule, but issued an order for preliminary injunction in a related case that would enjoin the implementation of the rule in California, Oregon, the District of Columbia, Maine, and Pennsylvania. This preliminary injunction was stayed by the Ninth Circuit in December 2019. It was affirmed a year later in December 2020, but the order was stayed pending petitions to the Supreme Court in the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. The Rule was abandoned by DHS on March 9, 2021. As of April 15, 2021, the case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On November 20, 2014, Joe Arpaio, the Sheriff of Maricopa County in Arizona, filed this lawsuit in the D.C. District Court against President Obama, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the U.S. Attorney General. Sheriff Arpaio sued under the Declaratory Judgment Act(28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201) and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff claimed that two federal programs constituted unconstitutional abuses of the President's power: 1) The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program started on June 15, 2012; and 2) Several additional programs-- referred to by the plaintiff as Executive Order Amnesty (EOA) programs-- started on November 20, 2014 DACA allowed some undocumented immigrants who were brought to the United States as children to receive a renewable two-year period of deferred action from deportation and become eligible for a work permit in the U.S. EOA extended DACA to defer action for childhood arrivals who arrived after the earliest cut-off date and for parents and other relatives of U.S. citizens or persons lawfully present. Specifically, Sheriff Arpaio claimed that the challenged programs constituted a dramatic departure from prior interpretation and application of existing law and regulations and that the President cannot effect these changes by Executive Order. Plaintiff also argued that even if the Court deemed these dramatic changes constitutional, the challenged programs should have gone through notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures under the APA. Alternatively, Plaintiff challenged these actions pursuant to the APA as unlawful and invalid as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, unreasonable, and/or otherwise not in accordance with law. On December 4, 2014, Plaintiff sought a Preliminary Injunction and filed a brief, which the court construed as a motion to dismiss. On December 23, 2014, District Judge Beryl A. Howell denied the preliminary injunction and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Howell found that the plaintiff did not suffer a legally cognizable injury, and thus held that the Plaintiff lacked standing. Sheriff Arpaio, the Court explained, did not suffer injury in fact in his personal capacity because he sought to vindicate only a general interest in proper application of Constitution and laws. Although he alleged that undocumented immigrants had targeted him for assassination as a result of his stance on illegal immigration, neither of the challenged programs threatened the sheriff's life; in fact, his stance on illegal immigration existed prior to this case and the challenged programs. In addition, Sheriff Arpaio did not suffer injury in fact in his official capacity because he was asserting generalized grievances against federal policy and alleged injuries were largely speculative. The plaintiff also failed to show causation because neither challenged program authorized the conduct of which he complained. Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F.Supp.3d 185 (D.D.C. 2014). On December 29, 2014, Plaintiff appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court. On August 14, 2015, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court in an opinion by Judge Cornelia T.L. Pillard. This ended the case.", "summary": "On 2014, Joe Arpaio, Sheriff of Maricopa County in Arizona, filed this lawsuit in the D.C. District Court under the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) against President Obama, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the U.S. Attorney General, claiming that the federal programs deferring immigration action for various categories of out-of-status aliens were unconstitutional abuses of the President's power, or should have been done via formal rulemaking. In December 2014, the D.C. District (Judge Beryl A. Howell) dismissed the case, holding that Sheriff Arpaio lacked standing. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in August 2015."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: A class of asylum seekers detained by the New Orleans ICE Field Office filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction, requesting that defendants be compelled to conduct individual parole reviews for every detainee and to consider the risk of COVID-19 to them in determining their eligibility for parole. On April 21, 2020, the court denied the motion for preliminary injunction. <hr> On May 30, 2019, asylum seekers detained under the jurisdiction of the New Orleans ICE Field Office filed this class action lawsuit under the Administrative Procedure Act and 28 U.S.C.\u00a7\u00a7 1361 and 1651 against the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); the Acting Director of ICE; the Acting Executive Associate Director ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations; and the Acting Director of the New Orleans ICE Field Office. Represented by the ACLU of Louisiana and Southern Poverty Law Center, the plaintiffs argued that DHS has ignored a 2009 Parole Directive, denying parole to more than 98% of arriving asylum seekers. The plaintiffs also argued that the New Orleans ICE Field Office conducted sham parole reviews and blanket denials of parole, violating their Due Process rights under the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief preventing the defendants from detaining the plaintiffs without individualized parole reviews that determined the risk of flight or danger to the community. The plaintiffs' proposed class was \"all arriving asylum seekers who receive positive credible fear determinations; and who are or will be detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; after having been denied parole by the New Orleans ICE Field Office.\" On May 30, 2019, the case was related to Damus v. Neilsen. <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16498\">here</a>. On June 28, 2019, the plaintiffs moved to certify class, proposing that the class be defined as: \"(1) all arriving asylum seekers (2) who are found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture and (3) who are or will be detained by U.S. Immigration and Customers Enforcement; (4) after having been denied parole under the authority of the New Orleans ICE Field Office.\" On July 18, 2019, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants from continuing to detain asylum seekers without individualized consideration of flight risk or danger to the community. On August 5, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that some of the plaintiffs were no longer in ICE custody, others had had their parole requests adjudicated, and additional plaintiffs were no longer eligible for parole. On September 5, 2019, Judge James E. Boasberg issued an order granting the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, granting the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, and granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. In granting the preliminary injunction, Judge Boasberg found that the New Orleans ICE Field Office had ceased to follow the 2009 Directive. Class certification was granted because the proposed class met the requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendants' motion to dismiss was only granted in regards to plaintiffs' due process claim. 2019 WL 4225322. On November 1, 2019, the defendants filed a notice of appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court. On November 18, 2019, the appeal was docketed as 19-5306. On January 9, 2020, Judge Boasberg issued an order directing the defendants to distribute copies of the class notice to all provisional class members. On March 31, 2020, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs sought to compel the defendants to conduct immediate case by case parole assessments for all class members to address the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs also requested that defendants be required to consider the risk of COVID-19 to individuals when conducting their individualized assessment. On April 7, 2020, the defendants filed a memorandum in opposition to the emergency motion for a preliminary injunction. They argued that the motion should be denied because plaintiffs had failed to show that ICE had violated the Parole Directive, had failed to establish irreparable harm if they were not given new parole reviews, and that the plaintiffs' request was not in the public interest. On April 8, the plaintiffs filed their reply to the defendants' memorandum. The plaintiffs pointed out that the COVID-19 pandemic continued to worsen and that the continuation of blanket parole denials put the health of plaintiffs and detention officials at the risk of irreparable harm. On April 21, 2020, Judge Boasberg denied the plaintiffs' emergency motion for a preliminary injunction, asserting that the court had already enjoined the defendants to follow their parole direct, and thus it was unnecessary to do so again. The court left open the possibility that plaintiffs could file a motion for contempt asserting that defendants had not complied with the court's original injunction. The plaintiffs did just that and filed a motion for order to show cause why the defendants should not be held in contempt for violating the 2019 preliminary injunction order, expedited discovery, and the appointment of a special master on May 12. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants continue to disregard the Parole Directive in violation of the preliminary injunction. They claimed that parole grant rates remained below 25% for redetermination applications and below 20% for first-time applicants and in some cases facilities held zero parole redeterminations in March and April. In their response filed on June 16, the defendants argued that in the recent months ICE had granted parole at rates closer to 30% and that there was not clear and convincing evidence that they were not following the preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the defendants filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeal on June 16. The D.C. Circuit granted the motion and dismissed the appeal on June 29. 2020 WL 3635095. Back in the district court, on July 22, 2020, Judge Boasberg granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion seeking discovery regarding compliance with the preliminary injunction, a finding of contempt, and appointment of a Special Master in part. He found the plaintiffs raised sufficient question of compliance and ordered limited discovery. He denied without prejudice the motion with respect to the finding of contempt and the appointment of a special master, with these requests to be renewed following discovery and a potential hearing on the defendants\u2019 violations. The parties then began engaging in limited discovery with a joint status report on the discovery due October 30, 2020. As the parties engaged in limited discovery, on August 20, 2020, The Center for Investigative Report filed a motion to intervene to unseal the defendants\u2019 monthly production of parole determinations and any future productions in order to inform the public debate over DHS\u2019s application of parole procedures to asylum seekers. Judge Boasberg granted the motion to intervene on October 10. He ordered for DHS\u2019s future monthly submissions to include a public version of the parole determinations without personally identifiable information and for DHS to file redacted versions of prior reports. The defendants continued to file monthly status reports and both parties continued joint status reports. A status hearing is scheduled for March 4, 2021. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "In May of 2019, asylum seekers detained under the jurisdiction of the New Orleans ICE Field Office filed a class action lawsuit against DHS, ICE, and the New Orleans ICE Field Office, alleging that they were giving blanket parole denials without individualized reviews. In September 2019, the court granted preliminary injunction, enjoining defendants from continuing to detain asylum seekers without individualized consideration. In March 30, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for preliminary injunction, seeking immediate reviews of class members still detained. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for order to show cause why the defendants should not be held in contempt for violating the 2019 preliminary injunction order, expedited discovery, and the appointment of a special master. The court granted limited discovery. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On June 5, 2005, attorneys with the Legal Aid Justice Center, the Southern Poverty Law Center and the Virginia Justice Center for Farm and Immigrant Workers filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of a group of over 1500 migrant workers in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against their former employer, Eller and Sons Trees, Inc. Plaintiffs, who were from Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, were admitted to the U.S. under the H-2B temporary farm worker program. The plaintiffs alleged that they planted trees and performed other forestry related work for the defendant, but that the defendant took advantage of them by grossly underpaying them in violation of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (AWPA) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The case was assigned to Judge Clarence Cooper. The District Court granted class certification on September 28, 2006. <i>Leon-Granados v. Eller and Sons Trees, Inc.</i>, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73781 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2006). That same day, Judge Cooper issued a discovery order and held that the applicable statute of limitations for the AWPA claims was six years. <i>Leon-Granados v. Eller and Sons Trees, Inc.</i>, 452 F.Supp.2d 1282 (N.D. Ga. 2006). Defendants appealed the class certification order. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the order granting class certification. <i>De Leon-Granados v. Eller and Sons Trees</i>, Inc. 2007 WL 2456206 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2007). While the case was on appeal, discovery continued, as the District Court refused defendants' request to stay the case proceedings. On November 15, 2007, plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on one of their multiple claims under FLSA--their claim for reimbursement of passport, visa and travel expenses incurred in coming to work for Defendants--as well as on their claim of non-compliance with the AWPA. On October 7, 2008, the court granted Plaintiffs' partial summary judgment motion for the FLSA claim. <i>De Leon-Granados v. Eller & Sons Trees, Inc.</i>, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1313 (N.D. Ga. 2008). The court found that Eller and Sons failed to reimburse their guest workers for travel and visa expenses incurred when they came to the United States to work for the company, failed to provide them all the hours of work they were promised in their H-2B work contracts, and failed to maintain accurate records of the hours they worked. Plaintiffs were awarded $57,001.28 in damages (after court granted plaintiffs' motion to correct summary judgment order). However, the Court was unable to rule on the AWPA claim. The defendants had moved to strike the plaintiffs' expert witness, a veteran wage and hour investigator who had reviewed the defendants' records. Without that testimony, the Court could not rule on the AWPA claim, so it would have to wait until the motion was resolved. On October 30, 2008, the defendants withdrew their motion to strike the plaintiffs' expert witness. They then moved for an interlocutory appeal on November 4, 2008. The interlocutory appeal was fought over until September 14, 2009 when the Court denied the appeal because (1) it \"would not materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation,\" and (2) final judgment would likely follow a damages hearing, and the defendants could just appeal then. 2009 WL 10696537. In the same order, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgement on the AWPA claim, holding that the defendants' payroll had failed to meet the AWPA requirements. It found that, following testimony by the plaintiffs' expert witness, there was no genuine issue of material fact that the defendants had kept inaccurate records and were sometimes intentionally underreporting workers' hours to evade wage payment obligations. The plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint on July 22, 2010, clarifying requested damages. They then moved for statutory damages on August 6, 2010. The defendant filed for bankruptcy on September 23, 2010, but the Court ordered on November 4, 2010 that litigation would proceed anyway. The parties proceeded with negotiations in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana until June 4, 2012 when that court issued an order that the parties had come to a settlement agreement. Back in the district court, on September 28, 2012, Judge Cooper granted the plaintiffs' motion for statutory damages pursuant to the AWPA claim. Finding that the defendants were clearly aware of the requirements but willfully ignored them, that these were far more than \"mere technical violations,\" and that each class member would be receiving only a small amount, he awarded statutory damages to the plaintiff class near to the maximum allowable: $499,858.74. 2012 WL 13065433. On October 29, 2012, he then issued a final judgment for the plaintiffs, granting full damages in excess of $11 million.", "summary": "A group of public interest law firms filed this class action lawsuit in June, 2005 on behalf of migrant workers against their former employer, alleging gross underpayment in violation of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (AWPA) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The Court granted, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, class certification for the plaintiffs in September, 2006. The plaintiffs won partial summary judgments in 2008 and 2009, resulting in an eventual award of $11 million in a final judgment in October, 2012."}
{"article": "On May 1, 2018, the Council on American-Islamic Relations - Chicago (CAIR-Chicago) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The case was assigned to Judge Robert Gettleman. CAIR-Chicago sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), an agency within DHS, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Represented by private counsel, CAIR-Chicago sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On August 1, 2017, CAIR-Chicago filed a FOIA request for records containing demographics and processing times of naturalization, change of status, and asylum since the 2008 institution of the Controlled Application Review & Resolution Program, a policy that imposes rules to delay or deny immigration benefits. CAIR-Chicago sought expedited processing of its FOIA request because it suspected religious discrimination against Muslim applicants, but defendants denied this request. The defendants did not respond to the FOIA request within the statutory time period and still had yet to respond. The plaintiff alleged that this conduct was a wrongful delay of release of records in violation of FOIA. A status report filed on August 21, 2018 indicated the parties were attempting to avoid litigation and that the government would conduct the necessary searches for responsive records. On June 28, 2019, CAIR-Chicago voluntarily dismissed the suit without explanation. Presumably, the parties resolved the disputes related to the records and the defendants provided the records to CAIR-Chicago. This case is closed.", "summary": "In May 2018, the Council on American-Islamic Relations - Chicago (CAIR-Chicago) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services for failing to process its FOIA request for immigration records since the 2008 institution of the Controlled Application Review & Resolution Program, alleging that this conduct was a wrongful delay of release of records in violation of FOIA. The plaintiffs dismissed their claims without explanation on June 28, 2019."}
{"article": "On March 2, 2007, a resident alien and two organizations that represent indigent aliens, the Political Asylum/Immigration Representation Project (PAIR) and the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (CLINIC), filed a class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, challenging the mandatory detention provision of Section 236(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (\"INA\"), 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226(c). The plainitff also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241, requesting his immediate release from detention. Plaintiffs' complaint asserts that Section 236(c) of the INA, in effect since October 9, 1998, requires the mandatory detention without bond of virtually all immigrants who commit a specified removable offense upon the immigrant's release from the criminal custody that resulted from the offense. Section 303(b) (\"Transitional Period Custody Rules\" or \"TPCR\") of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (\"IIRIRA\") provision, in effect until October 9, 1998, also required detention upon release for those who committed specified removable offenses, but did not preclude bond. Plaintiffs contended that the government misinterpreted both of those provisions and as a result, improperly detained individuals in contravention to the statutes. Defendants moved to dismiss the case, asserting that the PAIR and CLINIC lacked standing and because the complaint failed to state a claim. All parties then moved for summary judgment. On July 12, 2007, the District Court (Judge Richard G. Stearns) held a hearing on the limited issue of the plaintiff's writ of habeas corpus and deferred ruling on the other claims and defenses. Before the Court ruled on the habeas corpus petition, the plaintiff was released from custody, and he voluntarily dismissed his claims. Another detained alien, then moved to intervene in the case and be substituted as the named individual plaintiff. The District Court (Judge Stearns) then took up the remaining motions. He denied the the second detained alien's motion to intervene and dismissed the remainder of the case, holding that organizations lacked standing to continue to pursue the case on Parinejad's behalf once he was released from custody. The Court noted that if the second detained alien wished to litigate the lawfulness of his detention, he needed to file his own lawsuit. -- F.Supp.2d ----, 2007 WL 2372627 (D.Mass.). As of the date of this summary, plaintiffs had not filed a notice of appeal and the case remained closed.", "summary": "On March 2, 2007, a resident alien and two non-profits filed a class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, challenging the mandatory detention provision of Section 236(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The plaintiff also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241, requesting his immediate release from detention. On July 12, 2007 district court held a hearing on the writ of habeas corpus, however, before ruling on the issue the plaintiff was released from custody. The court then dismissed the remainder of the case."}
{"article": "This case addressed the termination of an immigration program granting deferred action to seriously ill individuals. The Irish International Immigrant Center (a.k.a. the Rian Immigration Center) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts on September 5, 2019. The plaintiff sued U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and President Trump under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Declaratory Judgment Act. Plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief claiming violations of the APA and the Fifth Amendment\u2019s Equal Protection Clause. For decades, USCIS allowed people battling serious illnesses to request deferred action. In August 2019, the Trump Administration prohibited USCIS field offices from granting deferred action to the individuals who could ordinarily be protected by this program. The plaintiff alleged this prohibition was illegal. Plaintiff was represented by the ACLU of Massachusetts, Lawyers for Civil Rights, and private counsel. Judge Indira Talwani was assigned. The parties jointly moved to stay the case on October 29, 2019. The parties sought a settlement or other nonjudicial resolution. The court granted the stay two days later. This followed the USCIS announcement that it would reinstate the deferred action program, but requests would only be granted \u201cbased on compelling facts and circumstances.\u201d Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on February 28, 2020. The defendants first argued that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review defendants' enforcement discretion. They also argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Fifth Amendment. The motion was denied three days later. 2020 WL 6395575. On June 15, 2021, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice regarding all claims in this case. As of July 13, 2021, no further reasoning was stated in the notice itself or on the <a href=\u201dhttps://www.aclum.org/en/cases/rian-immigrant-center-v-cuccinelli\u201d>ACLU of Massachusetts's website</a>. This case is now closed.", "summary": "In September 2019, the Irish International Immigrant Center sued U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services and President Trump. Plaintiff alleged defendants illegally terminated an immigration relief program that granted \"deferred action\" to seriously ill individuals and their families. Represented by the ACLU, the plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief for violations of Equal Protection and the Administrative Procedure Act. The court granted a joint motion to stay the case on October 31, 2019, so parties could seek a nonjudicial resolution. This followed a USCUS announcement that the deferred action program would return but requests would only be granted \u201cbased on compelling facts and circumstances.\u201d Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice on June 15, 2021."}
{"article": "This case is one of several brought nationwide by States, counties, and nonprofit organizations challenging the Trump administration's revised public charge rule, which expands the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. This case was filed in the fall of 2018, after the State Department made changes to its Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) that revised the public charge rule. The State Department officially implemented the rule in the fall of 2019, shortly after DHS announced its own implementation of the rule. Although the DHS rule was quickly enjoined, the State Department's rule wasn't enjoined until July 29, 2020 in <i><a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17353\">Make the Road New York v. Pompeo</a></i>. On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for government agencies to review actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. While <a href=\"https://www.dhs.gov/news/2021/03/09/dhs-secretary-statement-2019-public-charge-rule\">DHS formally abandoned the rule</a> on March 9, 2021, the State Department's rule is still official policy, though still enjoined. <u>The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore Sue Over Changes to the Public Charge Rule in the Foreign Affairs Manual</u> On November 28, 2018, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Maryland filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The City sued U.S. President Donald Trump, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, and the U.S. Department of State (DOS) under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Bivens for violations of Fifth Amendment equal protection. The plaintiffs, represented by the Democracy Forward Foundation and the City of Baltimore Department of Law, sought attorneys\u2019 fees and declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting defendants from enforcing January 2018 changes to the State Department\u2019s Foreign Affairs Manual. The changes were to instructions to consular officers on how to determine the likelihood a visa applicant would become a public charge if admitted to the United States. The City alleged that the increase in public benefit listed in the new definition would, in effect, decrease the number of immigrants eligible to apply for visas. The changes were made without providing the public legally required notice, explanation, and opportunity for comment. The case was assigned to Judge Ellen Hollander. The changes to the FAM increased the types of programs that the federal government would consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that if a consular officer finds that a person seeking a visa is likely to become a public charge, that person is \u201cinadmissible.\u201d Thus, an immigrant who uses non-cash benefits such as food stamps or Medicaid may be found more likely to be a public charge and inadmissible for purposes of a visa. The plaintiffs asserted that the effect of this Rule would be to force immigrant families to choose between using these benefits or risk failing to gain entry to the U.S. <u>Defendants Move to Dismiss</u> The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on February 25, 2019. They argued that the City of Baltimore lacked subject matter jurisdiction and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Moreover, even if the City overcame these hurdles, the defendants argued that it still failed to plausibly allege that the FAM changes violated either the APA or equal protection. On September 20, 2019, Judge Hollander denied the motion. She held that the City was affected by the changes and could sue on behalf of the immigrants affected. She also found that sufficient allegations had been provided to sue President Trump under the equal protection claim. Finally, she upheld the APA claim on the grounds that changes to the FAM are subject to notice and comment, and that there could be grounds for an injunction. <u>The Rule is Officially Implemented by the State Department</u> On October 11, 2019, the Department of Homeland Security's similar public charge rule (DHS Rule) began to be enjoined by courts around the country. That same day, DOS formalized the changes to the FAM by implementing the Interim Final Rule. This rule mirrored the DHS Rule, explicitly expanding the definition of \"public charge\" for the purposes of granting visas. <u>The Fight Over Discovery</u> On October 20, defendants filed their answer to the complaint, and a Scheduling Order for discovery was issued on November 5. On top of requesting documents from DOS, the City requested interrogatories of Secretary Pompeo and President Trump. In response, the defendants moved to amend the Scheduling Order on November 18, arguing that no discovery was needed beyond production of the administrative record. What followed was a \"flurry of submissions,\" and on December 19, Judge Hollander granted the motion in part. She vacated the previous Scheduling Order and denied discovery beyond the administrative record on the equal protection claim, holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to discovery because this was an immigration issue and that the administrative record would suffice. However, she denied the motion for the APA claims, finding that the plaintiffs could proceed with the administrative record and pursue extra-record discovery afterward if needed. 429 F.Supp.3d 128. On February 7, 2020, the City supplemented its complaint to include the Interim Final Rule. <u>Parties Move for Summary Judgment</u> On May 15, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. On June 12, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and also filed a cross motion for summary judgment. <u>The FAM Changes and the Interim Final Rule are Enjoined</u> On July 29, the FAM changes and the Interim Final Rule were enjoined nationwide by the District Court for the Southern District of New York in <i><a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17353\">Make the Road New York v. Pompeo</a></i>. 475 F.Supp.3d 232. The DHS Rule was similarly enjoined in <i><a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17287\">State of New York v. DHS</a></i>. 2020 WL 4347264. Subsequently, on August 6, Judge Hollander ordered the parties to explain to the court the import of these cases. <u>Changes with the Biden Administration</u> On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for government agencies to review actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. On February 19, defendants moved to stay proceedings while the new administration reevaluated the rule. The court granted the motion that same day, ordering a status report due by May 24. On March 9, <a href=\"https://www.dhs.gov/news/2021/03/09/dhs-secretary-statement-2019-public-charge-rule\">DHS formally abandoned the rule</a>. DOS, however, did not. As of March 14, 2021, the FAM revisions and Interim Final Rule are enjoined nationwide. The court has yet to rule on summary judgment, and proceedings are currently on hold until May 24, 2021.", "summary": "In 2018, the City of Baltimore filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiff alleged that certain changes to the Public Charge rule by the U.S. President, Secretary of State, and Department of State were made without following proper administrative procedure and in violation of equal protection. The rule increased the number of immigrants barred from applying for visas for having previously received public assistance. The rule was preliminarily enjoined in a different lawsuit on July 29, 2020. The lawsuit is ongoing, but proceedings are stayed until May 24, 2021."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a class-action habeas petition brought on May 4, 2020, by two individuals in ICE custody, seeking better access to phone calls. The defendants moved to dismiss the case on June 29. No outcome so far. <hr> On May 4, 2020, two individuals in the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) brought this lawsuit against ICE and its parent agency, the Department of Homeland Security. They complained about ICE's restrictions on telephone access--the high cost of phone calls and the denial of incoming calls. Both restrictions predated the COVID-19 pandemic. But they alleged that because in-person visitation had become impossible, the phone restrictions unconstitutionally violated their Fifth and First Amendment rights, preventing communication with counsel and denying their right to legal representation. One plaintiff alleged that since pandemic restrictions began, communications with his attorney have been very challenging. Another pointed to a delay of a month in his asylum hearing (prolonging his detention) because he had been unable to have a meaningful preparatory call with his counsel. The plaintiffs\u2019 proposed class includes \"all current and future adult immigration detained persons who are or will be held in ICE custody in El Paso or Otero.\" Represented by private counsel and the American Immigration Council, the plaintiffs framed the lawsuit as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241, and as an injunctive and declaratory action under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2201 and 2202. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico and assigned to Magistrate Judge Gregory B. Wormuth. The case was later reassigned to Judge James A. Parker on June 5. On June 29, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and the plaintiff's failure to state a claim. They argued that the plaintiffs could not bring claims relating to injuries they have not personally suffered and that the plaintiffs could not bring this case in district court as the Immigration and Nationality Act contains a jurisdiction-channeling provision that requires exclusive review in the federal courts of appeals. The plaintiffs responded that the jurisdictional bar does not apply where claims address systemwide detention conditions that are collateral to the removal process and are effectively unreviewable through a petition for review. They further argued that they have standing to bring the action on behalf of the proposed class and that they stated a proper Due Process claim. The plaintiffs then moved for a preliminary injunction on August 26, claiming that despite the increased reliance of telephone calls due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the ICE's acknowledgment of a need to expand telephone access, restrictive practices at Otero have rendered all communications nearly impossible. In its opposition to the preliminary injunction on September 9, the defendants argued that because the court has not certified a class, any injunctive relief must be limited to the named plaintiffs. They also argued that the named plaintiffs have not established a likelihood of success on the merits, nor imminent and irreparable harm. The plaintiffs filed a reply on September 23 and on October 6 filed an unopposed motion for a hearing on their motion to certify the class, their motion for a preliminary injunction, and the defendants' motion to dismiss. Judge Gonzales referred the plaintiffs' motions to certify the class, for a preliminary injunction, and for a hearing, and the defendants' motion to dismiss to Magistrate Judge Kevin R. Sweazea. On December 10, Magistrate Judge Swazea ordered a mandatory settlement conference to occur on January 15, 2021. The conference was eventually held on January 19, but the case did not settle. On January 19, Judge Swazea ordered a motion hearing to occur on March 10 regarding the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.", "summary": "On May 4, 2020, two individuals in ICE (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement) custody sued ICE and the Department of Homeland Security. They claimed that restrictions to telephone access by impsing costs and denying access to incoming calls during the COVID-19 pandemic when in-person visitations have been rendered impossible is unconstitutional. Specifically, they alleged that their Fifth and First Amendment rights had been violated by preventing communication with counsel, denying their right to legal representation, and other resources critical to support their cases. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: The SPLC, Innovation Law Lab, Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center, Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project, Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. and Santa Fe Dreamers Project filed for an emergency temporary restraining order challenging the continued operation of the immigration courts despite the current public health crisis. On April 1, 2020, Judge Karin J. Immergut denied the plaintiffs' motion, finding the relief requested to be too attenuated from the claims underlying the plaintiffs' initial complaint. On July 31, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss. The defendants then filed a motion for reconsideration on September 4, which was denied on September 15. <hr> On December 18, 2019, six immigration legal service providers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, alleging that the federal government had manipulated the immigration adjudication system in a way that makes it virtually impossible for asylum seekers to win their cases. The organizations (Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center, Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project, Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc., Innovation Law Lab, Santa Fe Dreamers Project, and Southern Poverty Law Center), sued President Trump, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), under the U.S. Constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Represented by Innovation Law Lab, Southern Poverty Law Center, and private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as well as provisions of the INA and the APA. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Stacie Beckerman. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had abused their authority to perpetuate \u201casylum-free zones\u201d\u2014immigration court jurisdictions where asylum is virtually impossible to win, thus nullifying the U.S. asylum statutory scheme. The plaintiffs also claimed that by burdening the immigration courts with a backlog of more than a million cases, the defendants had undermined fairness in the system and impaired the INA\u2019s case-by-case decision-making process. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that by implementing new performance metrics for immigration judges (the Metrics Policy) and a rapid-removal family docketing directive (the FAMU Directive), the defendants had impaired the impartiality of immigration judges and undermined the fairness of proceedings for recently-arrived families. As immigration legal service providers, the plaintiffs stated that the defendants\u2019 efforts had denied them a fair forum in which to vindicate their organization missions. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on March 20, 2020. On March 27, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In their request, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants\u2019 actions in response to the pandemic had turned the immigration court system into a public health hazard. Specifically, they claimed that the defendants were continuing to require attorneys, respondents, judges, and staff to appear in person at many immigration courts, refusing to extend deadlines despite the danger associated with compliance, failing to provide adequate notice of emergency court closures and procedures, and ordering immigration judges to fast-track cases to completion (i.e. deportation) in the absence of respondents and counsel. The plaintiffs sought a temporary injunction under the All Writs Act to require the defendants to take reasonable steps to the protect public health in the immigration courts, including: no longer compelling respondents to appear in person or holding hearings without the consent of the respondent or their counsel, no longer invoking in absentia procedures to order removal in cases where respondents fail to appear, tolling deadlines, waiving certain filing requirements, and allowing attorneys not to appear in person without being held in contempt. The same day, the case was reassigned to Judge Karin J. Immergut. A group of former immigration judges and members of the Board of Immigration Appeals filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs\u2019 request for a TRO on March 30, 2020. On April 1, 2020, Judge Immergut denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion. In an April 2 order, she explained that the relief sought by the plaintiffs was too attenuated from the claims alleged in their complaint to sustain their burden for a temporary injunction under the All Writs Act. Judge Immergut also noted that the defendants demonstrated that they had taken significant steps to reduce in-person contacts and modify immigration court functions in the wake of the pandemic. Consequently, she did not find it necessary to grant the sweeping relief sought by the plaintiffs. On July 31, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims that sought enjoinder of \u201casylum-free zones\u201d\u2014i.e. immigration courts with unusually high rates of denials for asylum applications\u2014 for lack of jurisdiction. 2020 WL 4431682. However, all of the remaining claims were allowed to proceed. The defendants sought reconsideration on September 4. They argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from or relating to removal proceedings. The defendants also claimed that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The defendants' motion for reconsideration was denied on September 15, as it repeated and expounded upon arguments previously made without a new basis for reconsideration. The district court also noted that it was bound by Ninth Circuit precedent, <i>East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump</i>, which recognized organizational standing for immigration services organizations when they can establish their own injury. The court also found that it had jurisdiction because the plaintiffs' asserted injuries did not arise from any removal proceeding and were not cognizable under the petition-for-review process. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "A group of immigration legal service providers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon on December 18, 2019, alleging the federal government had manipulated the immigration adjudication system in a way making it virtually impossible for asylum seekers to succeed. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as well as provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. After the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs moved for a Temporary Restraining Order due to the COVID-19 pandemic, alleging that the immigration courts had failed to take adequate public health measures to protect judges, respondents, attorneys, and staff. On April 1, 2020, the District Court denied the plaintiffs' motion. On July 31, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss. The defendants sought reconsideration, which was denied on September 10."}
{"article": "On April 15, 2009, two longtime permanent residents of the United States who had been detained in Pennsylvania prisons for periods exceeding six months while they pursued challenges to decisions to deport them filed a class action lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the prisons that held them in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1101 et seq., the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 551 et seq., and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by private and public interest counsel, asked the court for a writ of habeas corpus and injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging violations of their Fifth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that their prolonged detention pending immigration proceedings without a hearing to determine whether such detention was justified violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. On August 10, 2009, the Court (Judge John E. Jones III) declined to certify a class action or to grant habeas class relief but granted the plaintiffs' individual habeas petitions. Alli v. Decker, 644 F. Supp. 2d 535 (M.D. Pa. 2009). The court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to provide class relief, as the statute that authorized plaintiffs' detention explicitly barred class action to enjoin or restrain its application, but also interpreted that statute as authorizing mandatory detention only \"for the period of time reasonably necessary to promptly initiate and conclude removal proceedings,\" and held that \"[i]f an alien detained pursuant to [the statute] makes a showing via a habeas petition that detention is no longer reasonable, the alien must be afforded a hearing before the habeas court at which the government bears the burden of justifying continued detention based on traditional bail factors such as the alien's risk of flight and potential danger to the community.\" Id. at 11-12. The court gave the parties twenty days to indicate whether they wanted to present testimony or evidence related to the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' detentions at a bail hearing. Rather than do so, the parties came to an agreement whereby defendants would release the plaintiffs without requiring that they post bail. One plaintiff was released in late January of 2010 under minimal reporting requirements, and the other was released in late March of the same year, subject to electronic monitoring.", "summary": "On April 15, 2009, two longtime permanent residents of the United States who had been detained in Pennsylvania prisons for periods exceeding six months while they pursued challenges to decisions to deport them filed a class action lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the prisons that held them, claiming that their prolonged detention without a hearing to determine whether such detention was justified violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. On August 10, 2009, the Court (Judge John E. Jones III) declined to certify a class action or grant habeas class relief but granted the plaintiffs' individual habeas petitions. Alli v. Decker, 644 F. Supp. 2d 535 (M.D. Pa. 2009). Rather than present evidence on the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' detention at a bail hearing, the parties came to an agreement whereby defendants would release the plaintiffs without requiring that they post bail. One plaintiff was released in late January of 2010 under minimal reporting requirements, and the other was released in late March of the same year, subject to electronic monitoring. <br />"}
{"article": "On October 12, 2011, a coalition of immigrant rights groups and individual immigrants filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, Charleston Division, against the State of Carolina and Charleston County. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of South Carolina, the national ACLU's Immigrants' Rights Project, the Southern Poverty Law Center, the National Immigration Law Center, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), the South Carolina Appleseed Legal Justice Center, LatinoJustice PRLDEF, and private counsel, filed their suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201, claiming that South Carolina's comprehensive immigration law, Act 69, violated the federal Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged Sections 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Act, which require state and local law enforcement officers to investigate the immigration status of any individual they stop, detain, or arrest whenever they have a \"reasonable suspicion\" that the individual lacks immigration status, require them to determine the immigration status of all people being detained in prisons or jails, allow them to arrest individuals solely for failing to carry registration documents, make it a crime to harbor or transport an undocumented immigrant or to be harbored or transported by others if one is an undocumented immigrant, and impose civil liability on the police for failing to enforce its provisions to the maximum extent possible. They claimed that these sections are preempted by federal law and in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and further claimed that the Act as a whole is preempted. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Act violated the Constitution and a peremptory injunction barring its enforcement before it came into effect on January 1, 2012. (In passing Act 69, South Carolina joined Utah, Indiana, Georgia and Alabama in enacting immigration laws similar to Arizona's Senate Bill 1070. For the case challenging the Arizona law, see United States v. Arizona (IM-AZ-0015); for the case challenging Utah's HB 497, see Utah Coalition of La Raza v. Herbert (IM-UT-0002); for the case challenging Indiana's SEA 590, see Buquer v. City of Indianapolis (IM-IN-0002); for the case challenging Georgia's HB 87, see Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal (IM-GA-0007); and for cases challenging Alabama's HB 56, see United States v. Alabama (IM-AL-0005), Hispanic Interest Coalition v. Bentley (IM-AL-0006), and Parsley v. Bentley (IM-AL-0007).) The district court (Judge Richard M. Gergel) originally issued an order directing the parties to brief the issue whether the United States should be joined as a necessary party; the court set the issue aside when the United States filed a related action. See United States v. South Carolina (IM-SC-0002). After a joint hearing on motions for summary judgment by plaintiffs in this case and by the federal government in United States v. South Carolina (IM-SC-0002), on December 22, 2011, the Court (Judge Richard M. Gergel) issued an order in large part granting both motions. Lowcountry Immigration Coalition v. Haley, No. 2:11-cv-02779, 2011 WL 6973241, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151549 (D.S.C. Dec. 19, 2011). It enjoined Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act, but declined to enjoin Sections 1 and 7 or the Act as a whole, finding that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge them. Defendants appealed to the Fourth Circuit, but the case was stayed until the Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Arizona (IM-AZ-0015), which dealt with a very similar statute in Arizona. That occurred in June 2012, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); the Court struck down much of the Arizona statute, but declined to facially review the \"show me your papers\" provision. Shortly thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a \"limited remand\" in this matter, directing the district court to decide in the first instance if its order should be adjusted in light of the Arizona opinion. On November 27, 2012, the district court left in place most of its prior preliminary injunction, again the sections of the law that aimed to criminalize unlawful presence and giving a ride or renting an apartment to an undocumented immigrant. But the district court followed the Supreme Court's lead on the \"show me your papers\" provision. It noted: \"This litigation is only at the preliminary injunction stage, and this Court's decision to dissolve the injunction regarding these status-checking provisions does not foreclose a future as-applied challenge based upon subsequent factual and legal developments. In the course of this litigation, the parties will have the opportunity to conduct discovery regarding the actual practices and procedures associated with the implementation of Sections 6(A) and 6(C)(1), and this Court can then address these issues with the benefit of a full record.\" On December 7, 2012, the State of South Carolina filed an interlocutory appeal, challenging the district court's November 27 order. On July 13, 2013, the Fourth Circuit, per Judge Davis, upheld the preliminary injunction issued by the lower district court. The order would enjoin enforcement of Sections 4, 5, and 6(B)(2) of the law. Section 4 made it unlawful for a person who was illegally present in the United States to conceal, harbor, and transport herself from detection, and it made it illegal for a third party to assist in that endeavor. Section 5 made it illegal to fail to carry and illegal alien registration card, and 6(B)(2) made it illegal to display false identification. South Carolina tried to argue that the Plaintiffs did not have a private right of action under the Supremacy Clause. Judge Davis dismissed this argument, pointing out that there is a long history of citizens seeking, and obtaining, injunctive relief against state laws that are preempted by federal laws. South Carolina also argued for <i>Younger</i> abstention, a doctrine which provides that federal courts should not exercise their jurisdiction over a matter if significantly interferes with a state judicial proceeding or prosecution. Judge Davis pointed out that no such proceeding or prosecution was ongoing here. He further argued that injunctive relief is particularly compelling where constitutional rights are at issue as they are here. On the merits, Judge Davis affirmed the lower court's finding that all three sections were preempted. Judge Dvais noted that there was no presumption against preemption because immigration is regulated heavily by the federal government. Judge Davis then established that each section of the law at issue was preempted. Section 4 of the Act was preempted because the Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States stated that unlawful presence is not a criminal offense. Section 4 made it illegal for unlawful aliens to shelter, harbor, or conceal oneself. This essentially criminalized unlawful presence. Judge Davis noted that Congress is unwilling to do this; instead; it has established a civil proceedings system that facilitates the removal of unlawful aliens. For the subsections of Section 4 dealing with third parties aiding unlawful residents, Judge Davis agreed with the district court that this area is so heavily regulated by federal law that there is no room left for this state regulation. Judge Davis also found Section 5 to be preempted. The Supreme Court reviewed a similar statute in Arizona v. United States and there held that there was federal law governing the registration of unlawful aliens. It was thus unnecessary for there to be state law on the same issue. Judge Davis also found Section 6 to be preempted by a host of federal laws governing false and fraudulent identification. After about 6 more months of litigation, Judge Gergel issued final judgment. Judge Gergel permanently enjoined South Carolina from enforcing Sections 4, 5, and 6(B)(2) of Act 69. Section 7 and the remainder of Section 6 would be enforced according to the guidelines stipulated in a memo by South Carolina's Attorney General. The memo stipulated that, under Section 6, officers could not prolong stops based on a suspicion of a person's immigration status. It also said that, under Section 7, officers could not prolong the detention of an individual to ascertain their immigration status or hold individuals in detention because of a belief about their immigration status. Not even to transfer them to federal custody. The plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their claims against Sections 6 and 7 without prejudice. On July 7, 2014, Judge Gergel granted a motion to award $98,000 in attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs' lawyers.", "summary": "This is a class action lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of a South Carolina immigration law which requires state and local law enforcement officers to investigate the immigration status of any individual they stop, detain, or arrest whenever they have a \"reasonable suspicion\" that the individual lacks immigration status, allows law enforcement officers to arrest individuals solely for failing to carry registration documents, makes it a crime to harbor or transport an undocumented immigrant or to be harbored or transported by others if one is an undocumented immigrant, and imposes civil liability on the police for failing to enforce its provisions to the maximum extent possible. The law was patterned after Arizona's SB 1070. The District Court has issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the law, and this injunction has been appealed to the Fourth Circuit; in the meantime, the case, along with several others like it from different states, are stayed at the District Court or U.S. Appellate level pending the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Arizona. After Arizona v. United States was decided the issue was remanded to the District Court. The district court left in place most of its original preliminary injunction, enjoining the state from enforcing Sections 4, 5, and 6 (B)(2). The 4th Circuit per Judge Davis agreed and affirmed the order on July 13, 2013. In March of 2014 Judge Gergel permanently enjoined South Carolina from enforcing Sections 4, 5, and 6(B)(2). Furthermore the state agreed to more favorable interpretations of Section 7, and the remainder of Section, encouraging the Plaintiffs to dismiss their claims on those sections without prejudice."}
{"article": "This lawsuit came on the heels of immigration raids conducted by federal authorities at Swift meat packing plants throughout the country. Shortly after the raids, on December 15, 2006, a group of Swift employees filed a class action lawsuit against their employer, Swift Beef Company, Inc., and related companies, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that Swift engaged in a longstanding scheme to hire undocumented immigrants for the express purpose of depressing employee wages. In furtherance of its scheme Swift recruited undocumented immigrants to work in its plants and assisted in providing them fake immigration documents. Plaintiffs, who were represented by private counsel, alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1961 et seq.; Immigration Reform and Control Act, 8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1324 et seq.; and \u00a7 274 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as statutory damages and exemplary damages in the amount of $23 million. Defendants responded by moving to dismiss the case. For reasons that are not apparent from the PACER docket, on October 4, 2007, the parties agreed to dismiss without prejudice two of the defendants, Hicks, Muse, Tate & Furst Inc. and HM Capital Partners of Dallas, LLC. On December 20, 2007, the Court (Judge David C. Godbey) granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss. The Court found that while the plaintiffs had adequately pled a claim for harboring illegal aliens under RICO, they had not pled their claim for hiring illegal aliens with sufficient factual support to satisfy the standard detailed by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Since plaintiffs had not alleged that defendants had actual knowledge that the illegal aliens hired had been smuggled into the country, the Court found that their illegal hiring claim was inadequate and therefore dismissed it. Plaintiffs amended their complaint on March 14, 2008, but the Court (Judge Godbey) again dismissed their illegal hiring claims on May 28, finding that they remained insufficiently specific. Following some discovery disputes, plaintiffs moved for class certification on October 6, 2008. The Court (Judge Godbey) denied the motion on January 13, 2009, finding that the proposed class of all Swift employees who had the legal right to work in the United States was not clearly ascertainable, as it would not be possible to determine who belonged without \"an extensive factual inquiry into thousands of employees' work authorization.\" The next entry on the docket is on June 18, 2009, when the parties entered an unexplained stipulation for dismissal with prejudice. The case was terminated on the same day.", "summary": "On December 15, 2006, a group of employees at Swift Beef Company's meat packing plants filed a class action lawsuit against their employer and related companies, alleging that Swift had engaged in a longstanding scheme of hiring undocumented immigrants for the express purpose of depressing employee wages, and that in furtherance of its scheme, Swift had recruited undocumented immigrants to work in its plants and assisted in providing them with fake immigration documents. After the Court dismissed plaintiffs' illegal hiring claims as insufficiently specific and denied their motion for class certification, the parties stipulated for a dismissal with prejudice on June 18, 2009, and the case was terminated."}
{"article": "This action challenged the Trump Administration's third attempt to suspend the United States Refugee Admissions Program (the \"USRAP\"), a program administered by a consortium of federal agencies and nonprofit organizations working to identify and admit qualified refugees for resettlement into the United States, by issuing the Executive Order on Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions Program with Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and accompanying Memorandum (together, \"EO-3\").The executive order imposed new restrictions on refugees and delayed the cases of refugees on the cusp of resettlement for two years. The complaint was filed on November 13, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Plaintiffs were individuals unable to reunited with family members or close friends because of the EO-3, refugees in the USRAP in limbo as a result of EO-3, and organizations dedicated to assisting such refugees. Claiming that EO-3 violated the Immigration and Nationality Act, Administrative Procedure Act, Establishment Clause, and Equal Protection Clause, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the defendants from enforcing any portion of EO-3. Plaintiffs moved for such an injunction on November 16. On November 21, the court (Judge James Robart) ordered the plaintiffs to show cause as to why the current case should not be consolidated with a case filed earlier on related grounds, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15635\">Doe v. Trump</a>. Eight days later on November 29, the parties agreed that the cases could be consolidated so long as the actions retained their separate character, the parties to one action would not be designated as parties to the other, the parties could continue to file separate briefing so long as it was not duplicative, and consolidation would not affect the parties' page limits. On November 29, 2017, the court consolidated this case with Doe v. Trump. Further updates on this case may be found on the Doe page, available <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15635\">here</a>. The parties reached a settlement agreement in the consolidated cases on November 13, 2019. According to the settlement, the government was required to expedite the refugee resettlement applications of over 300 refugees affected by the ban. In addition, any refugee benefitting from the settlement who traveled to the United States would be counted among refugees settled in the year of 2018, ensuring that they would not take any slots away from the 18,000 refugees that the Administration planned to resettle in 2020. Further information about the settlement can be found <a href=\"https://www.jfsseattle.org/press-publications/settlement/\">here</a> . The judge accordingly dismissed the case, leaving the parties the opportunity to reopen the case within 60 days if the settlement was not perfected. That window passed without further activity on the docket, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "This action challenged the Trump Administration's third attempt to suspend the United States Refugee Admissions Program. On Nov. 29, 2017, this case was consolidated with Doe v. Trump. Further updates on this case, which settled in 2019, may be found on the Doe page, available <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15635\">here</a>."}
{"article": "On August 20, 2018, 23 inmates at the Pulaski County Jail (PCJ) filed a pro se civil class action against the PCJ and six officials of the PCJ in their official and personal capacities in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiffs asked the court for monetary and injunctive relief, claiming that they were being kept locked in their cells because the jail was not properly staffed. On September 12, 2018, Judge James Moody Jr. entered an initial order providing guidelines for proceeding pro se and finding that a request for class certification at this stage was premature; accordingly, he severed the case as twenty-three separate lawsuits. On November 1, 2018, Judge Moody dismissed the case without prejudice due to lack of prosecution, as the plaintiff had failed to comply with the court\u2019s order directing him to provide a current mailing address. On November 20, 2018, the plaintiff filed a notice of change of address, and on December 3, 2018, he filed a motion to reopen the case. On February 13, 2019, Magistrate Judge J. Thomas Ray granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion to reopen the case, but directed the plaintiff to file an amended complaint clarifying how he was personally harmed by the alleged constitutional violations and explaining how each defendant was personally involved in violating his constitutional rights. On March 7, 2019, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Twenty-one of the other cases were all dismissed without prejudice due to lack of prosecution by the other inmates. This instant case and one other case (docket no. 4:18-cv-00552), which was also dismissed without prejudice due to lack of prosecution and reopened, are the only two ongoing cases out of the total twenty-three cases initially filed on this matter. On June 23, 2019, the Magistrate Judge J. Thomas Ray recommended that plaintiff\u2019s complaint and amended complaint be dismissed and the dismissal of the case be counted as a \u201cstrike\u201d pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915(g) (barring inmates from bringing suit if they have previously brought three frivolous lawsuits). The court reasoned that despite its clear instruction to the contrary, the amended complaint \u201cstill contains only conclusory allegations that fail to identify any specific individuals, explain how each of them were personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations, or provide any specific facts demonstrating how these alleged constitutional violations resulted in him sustaining any physical injuries,\u201d among other things. The court dismissed the case on July 8, 2019. 2019 WL 2929016. The plaintiff sought to reopen the case, objecting to the court\u2019s order of dismissal, on July 22, 2019. On July 25, the court declined to reopen the case, as the plaintiff did not put forth any grounds justifying relief from the judgment and order of dismissal. The plaintiff sought to appeal the case, but his petition for appeal was denied by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on March 11, 2020. This case is closed.", "summary": "In August 2018, an inmate filed a civil class action lawsuit against the Pulaski County Jail (PCJ) and six PCJ officials in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiff, on behalf of himself and twenty-two other inmates, asked the court for monetary and injunctive relief, claiming that he and other inmates were being kept locked in their cells because the jail was not properly staffed. On September 12, 2018, U.S. District Judge James Moody Jr. entered an initial order providing guidelines for proceeding pro se and finding that a request for class certification at this stage was premature; accordingly, he severed the case as twenty-three separate lawsuits. Twenty-one of the other cases were eventually all dismissed without prejudice due to lack of prosecution by the other inmates. This instant case and one other case (docket no. 4:18-cv-00552), which was also dismissed without prejudice due to lack of prosecution and reopened, are the only two ongoing cases out of the total twenty-three cases initially filed on this matter."}
{"article": "On January 18, 2012, prisoners at the Los Angeles County Jail filed this class action in the United States Court for the Central District of California. The prisoners sued the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The prisoners, represented by the ACLU of Southern California, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated. Specifically, they claimed that violence by LASD deputies\u2014\"sadistic beat[ing] of inmates\" that included \"broken legs, fractured eye sockets, shattered jaws, broken teeth, severe head injuries, nerve damage, dislocated joints, collapsed lungs, and wounds requiring dozens of stitches and 22 staples\"\u2014violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs. This case's origins lie in the landmark case Rutherford v. Block (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=5500\">JC-CA-0018</a> in this Clearinghouse). That case resulted in the appointment of a special master to monitor and report reform efforts in the Los Angeles Jail system. The 30 semiannual reports submitted in that litigation highlight the illegal treatment of mentally ill detainees and the incidences of violence in the Los Angeles Jail system. The ACLU also submitted annual reports on the Los Angeles County Jail system in the Rutherford litigation. Its reports alleged the rise of a gang of deputies who were supervising the jail. The plaintiffs alleged that this gang, the \"3000 boys,\" incited and committed violence against prisoners, and competed with other jail deputy gangs for control of the jail, involving the prisoners in their struggle for control. Members of the gang were said to have a \"3000\" tattoo on the back of their necks. The plaintiffs in this case cited reports from prisoners, ACLU reports, and quotes from the Sheriff of Los Angeles that confirmed the existence of the gang, though the activities of the gang were disputed. The plaintiffs also alleged that a culture of violence had taken root in the county jail, citing multiple incidences of mentally ill prisoners being beaten and men being beaten for witnessing other beatings. The plaintiffs also alleged that several of these beatings resulted in disciplinary segregation for the victims. Other incidents were witnessed by chaplains, in-jail educators, and visitors. The plaintiffs described taunting and beatings that were were racially motivated, disproportionately affected the mentally ill, and constituted punishment for perceived slights rather than violations of jail policy. They also claimed that prisoners conferring with the ACLU were targeted in particular. There were 51 specific incidents set forth in the complaint that occurred in 2010\u20132011, however the plaintiffs alleged that the violence had been ongoing for at least 12 years. On June 7, 2012, the Court (Judge Dean Pregerson) issued an unpublished order that certified the plaintiff class and denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss. 2012 WL 2061694 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2012). Then, the parties continued with discovery and entered into settlement talks from 2012\u20132015. On January 6, 2015, both parties filed a joint motion for a settlement. The settlement was approved in April 2015. Under the settlement agreement, the Sheriff's Department agreed to adopt a detailed and far-reaching plan to reform department policies and practices on use of force. A panel of three court-appointed experts, who were assigned to write the plan, also monitored the department's compliance with all aspects of the remedial plan. The defendants agreed to pay $950,000 in attorneys' fees and to pay reasonable attorneys' fees for ongoing work to ensure compliance with the settlement up to $30,000 per year. The plaintiffs' attorneys also acted as monitors. The settlement included enhanced training in use of force for all deputies and methods for tracking and review of use of force incidents and detainees' complaints and grievances. To apply to the court for termination of the agreement consistent with the PLRA, the defendant had to maintain compliance for 18 months as monitored by the panel. On April 21, 2015, the Court (Judge Dean Pregerson) approved the settlement and dismissed the case. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement. The case was later reassigned to Judge Michael R. Wilner in 2016. Judge Wilner issued an order governing the disclosure of records following his appointment on June 17, 2016. Following the approval of the settlement until May 31, 2019, the panel of monitors filed five reports evaluating the defendant\u2019s compliance with the settlement action plan. In compiling the reports, the panel spoke with detainees and met with the Sheriff, the Department\u2019s Inmate Grievance Coordinator, and the Inmate Grievance Teams. After the second report, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement in September 2017. The parties stipulated to continuing the motion and hearings on the motion for the next year and half, until it was withdrawn by the plaintiffs in May 2018. Judge Wilner granted attorneys' fees in the amount of $60,000 for work performed in 2015 and 2016 by the class attorneys on October 19, 2017. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2012, prisoners in the Los Angeles County Jails filed this is a class action in the US District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs alleged a long-standing and widespread pattern of violence and abuse by deputies against inmates and sought an injunction requiring training, supervision, and disciplinary policies for deputies. In 2015, the parties reached a settlement that required a detailed and far-reaching remedial plan. The case is ongoing with monitoring."}
{"article": "On February 29, 2016, two detainees with disabilities filed this class-action lawsuit against San Bernardino County in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The lawsuit was filed under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. Represented by the Prison Law Office and private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that the county violated the Fourteenth Amendment and Eighth Amendment rights of the nearly 6,000 people incarcerated in its jails. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the jail\u2019s medical, mental health, and dental care were unconstitutionally deficient; that jail staff used excessive force and failed to take the basic steps to prevent violence; and that jail staff discriminated against people with disabilities by locking them in housing units without accessible toilets or in tiny cells for 22 hours a day. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that San Bernardino County\u2019s ongoing practices violated their constitutional and statutory rights, and sought injunctive relief compelling the county to address the issues alleged by providing adequate health care, protecting people from violence, providing equal access to programs, services, and activities, and ceasing the use of excessive force. On September 30, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On November 18, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. On January 27, 2017, Judge Virginia A. Phillips granted the parties\u2019 joint motion to certify two classes of plaintiffs composed of (1) all people who are currently, and in the future, who will be incarcerated in the San Bernardino County jails, and of (2) all people who are currently, or in the future will be, incarcerated in the San Bernardino County jails and who have a psychiatric and/or intellectual disability as defined by the ADA. Having reached a settlement agreement, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a proposed consent decree on March 28, 2018, that would, if approved by the court, settle all claims for injunctive relief in this suit. The settlement agreement named the plaintiffs as the prevailing party and required the defendant to adopt what the parties called the remedial plan. The remedial plan was designed to meet the minimum level of health care necessary to fulfill the defendant\u2019s obligations under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, to ensure that unlawful force is not utilized in the jails, to avoid the unlawful use of segregated or restrictive housing in the jails, and to ensure compliance with the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The plan required that the defendant develop and implement appropriate and adequate plans, policies, and practices to ensure compliance with the agreement; report on the use of these policies; provide notice to class members; and adopt a more effective dispute resolution process. The defendant also was required to pay the plaintiffs $350,000 in attorneys\u2019 fees. The duration of the settlement was four years, and the court would retain jurisdiction over the matter. The court issued a preliminary approval of the consent decree on December 12, 2018 which it finalized on December 14, 2018. The court also granted the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees. After the order approving the consent decree, there was no action in the docket until February 13, 2020, when the parties entered a joint stipulation to enforce the judgment against the defendant. On February 20, 2020, the court replied by issuing a class action order regarding mental health staffing. Specifically, the court ordered the the defendant to hire an additional 20 mental health clinicians. As of April 8, 2020, the case is ongoing", "summary": "On February 29, 2016, two detainees with disabilities filed a class action lawsuit against San Bernardino County under \u00a7 1983, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that the county violated the detainees' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In March 2018, the parties reached a settlement and proposed a consent decree. The court approved the consent decree on December 14, 2018. The case remains ongoing for enforcement."}
{"article": "On April 2, 2002, prisoners at the El Paso County Jail in Colorado Springs filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 against El Paso County and its former and current sheriffs. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the ACLU, alleged that the jail failed to protect and adequately provide for prisoners with serious mental health needs. When the lawsuit was filed, nine prisoners had died in the jail in recent years, and in the first year that the lawsuit was pending, two additional prisoners in the jail died from suicide. In almost every case, the deceased prisoner was suicidal, seriously mentally ill, or displaying symptoms of psychosis from overdose or withdrawal. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as class certification. Since the filing of the complaint, at least three separate reports by outside investigators have documented the inadequate state of mental health care in the jail: a report by a citizen's panel appointed by the Sheriff from October, 2002, a report by the National Institute of Corrections from May 26, 2003, and a report by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care from June 25, 2004. On July 29, 2003, the District Court (Judge Richard P. Matsch) denied both the defendants' motion to dismiss and the plaintiff's motion for class certification. Shook v. El Paso County, 216 F.R.D. 644 (July 29, 2003). Plaintiffs appealed the denial of the class certification, and they won a ruling in the Tenth Circuit on October 18, 2004. Shook v. El Paso County., 386 F.3d 963 (10th Cir. 2004) After the case returned to the district court, on April 1, 2005, the plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Complaint. Additional prisoners intervened as plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for class certification. On June 28, 2006, Judge Matsch denied class certification a second time. Shook v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Cnty. of El Paso, No. CIV.A. 02CV00651RPM, 2006 WL 1801379 (D. Colo. June 28, 2006). On September 22, 2006, Judge Matsch dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs appealed again to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. On August 29, 2008, Judges Timothy M. Tymkovich, Neil M. Gorsuch, and Jerome M. Holmes of the Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Matsch's decision. Shook v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners of Cnty. of El Paso, 543 F.3d 597 (10th Cir. 2008).", "summary": "On April 2, 2002, prisoners at the El Paso County Jail in Colorado Springs filed a class action lawsuit uagainst El Paso County, the Board of County Commissioners, and former and current Sheriffs. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, alleged that the jail failed to protect and adequately provide for prisoners with serious mental health needs, particularly in preventing suicides. On June 28, 2006, Judge Richard P. Matsch denied class certification and on September 22, 2006, he dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision."}
{"article": "On May 1, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice, on behalf of inmates from the Miami-Dade County Corrections and Rehabilitation Department Jail (MDRC), filed a suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against officials from Miami-Dade County for alleged violation of the inmates' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The suit alleged that the defendants failed to provide suicide protection and mental health care to the inmates, causing the inmates to suffer serious harm. On May 22, 2013, the Court (Judge William J. Zloch) entered a consent decree that revised the standard of medical care to be provided by the MDCR facilities and monitoring of the implementation of this care. The consent decree also included compliance with federal standards of mental health care and suicide prevention. The case was dismissed without prejudice. The U.S. submitted a series of eight status reports regarding compliance between November 2013 and January 2017. The parties held status conferences with the court subsequent to each report. The reports found that the County was substantially not in compliance with the consent agreement. On December 7, 2014, the parties submitted the first revised summary action plan that itemized each compliance issue with specific dates. The dates of compliance spanned from May 11, 2015 to November 30, 2016. Monitoring continued in the interim. Compliance was not reached by the deadline and parties submitted a second revised summary action plan on May 18, 2016; it was approved on May 23, 2016. The dates in the second revised summary action plan spanned July 2016 to February 2017. A full compliance tour was scheduled for September 2017 but was rescheduled for December 2017 due to Hurricane Irma. On January 11, 2017, Judge Zloch recused himself and the case was reassigned to Judge Beth Bloom. Status reports and conferences resumed in February and continued through May when Judge Bloom ordered the County to begin submitting monthly reports to the court due to its continued lack of compliance. The County continued submitting status reports monthly until February 2018. On January 19, 2018, the independent monitor found that the County was still not in compliance. On February 9, 2018 Judge Bloom ordered the parties to write a new summary action plan with a final deadline by which the County would achieve full compliance with the settlement agreement or face sanctions. The parties submitted a new summary action plan on February 14, 2018. The Court ordered this third plan and the final compliance date was set to be April 16, 2018. If the County was not in compliance by that date, sanctions would be filed against them. The County continued to file monitoring reports, but was still not in compliance by the final deadline in the third settlement agreement. The United States filed sanctions against the county on April 30, 2018; the Court ordered these sanctions on May 4, 2018. Also on May 4, the court approved a fourth revised settlement agreement that set the final compliance date to be June 21, 2018. The United States decided not to pursue sanctions following this order on May 11, 2018. Status reports continued throughout 2018 and early 2019 with the County making progress on the settlement agreement. On March 29, 2019, after the United States had moved for a stay on the compliance deadlines from the fourth summary action plan, the parties informed the court of a final action plan to achieve full compliance. They agreed to file a joint declaration when the County had achieved compliance with the final action plan and set the deadline for full compliance with the settlement agreement to be after the final monitoring tour of the County\u2019s facilities on September 27-29, 2019, with the subsequent monitoring report and conference being completed by November 7, 2019. The parties filed this information in a joint declaration on June 16, 2019. On November 7, 2019, a status conference was held but the County was still not in full compliance. The Court ordered the parties to develop a compliance timetable, which they submitted on November 12, 2019. The County continued to file monthly status reports, as per the compliance timetable, however, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the parties decided to reschedule the twelfth monitoring tour for October 12, 2020 tentatively, on April 2, 2020. Compliance efforts (monitoring reports submitted by the county and monthly conference calls between the parties) would continue in the meantime. Monthly reports have continued by the County, but no further progress has been made on the case as of April 15, 2020.", "summary": "On May 1, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice brought suit in the Southern District of Florida on behalf of jail inmates against officials from Miami-Dade County. The DOJ claimed that the defendant failed to provide adequate suicide protection and mental health care to the inmates. The parties agreed to a consent decree, which was entered on May 22, 2013. Timely compliance has been a challenge and as of April 15, 2020 the defendants were still not in compliance."}
{"article": "On February 11, 2004, two named plaintiffs filed this civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. In their complaint (as amended nine days later), the plaintiffs challenged the Cook County Sheriff's policy of strip searching all males following their return to the Cook County Jail from court after there was a judicial determination that there was no longer a basis for their detention. The plaintiffs also alleged that female detainees were not subjected to similar treatment, as they were placed in a holding cell after returning from court and processed out of the jail without being strip searched or re-entering the general housing units. The strip searches without reasonable suspicion and the differential treatment, the plaintiffs alleged, violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs sought monetary damages, injunctive relief and class certification. The defendants generally denied the allegations and contended that the strip searches were necessary, for there was no space in the jail to construct additional bullpens to house the discharged male detainees so that they would not be required to enter the housing units and undergo strip searches. On November 22, 2004, the District Court (District Judge Elaine Bucklo) certified the case as a class action, with the class defined as follows: all male inmates who, on or after February 12, 2002, have been subjected to defendants' policy, practice and custom of strip searching, without reasonable suspicion that the inmate is concealing a weapon or other contraband, at the Cook County Department of Corrections, following their return from court after there had been a judicial determination that there was no longer a basis for their detention, other than to be processed for release. Bullock v. Sheahan, 225 F.R.D. 227 (N.D. Ill. 2004). Discovery ensued and included substantial document production, depositions and experts. The defendants sought to preclude the testimony of one of plaintiffs' retained experts, Donald Henry. Mr. Henry was a registered architect specializing in the design of prisons and jails and was retained by the plaintiffs to inspect the jail and offer an opinion whether there was adequate space for the construction of additional bullpens to hold male detainees. Judge Bucklo denied the motion. Bullock v. Sheahan, 519 F.Supp.2d 760 (N.D.Ill. 2007). The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the following four claims: <ul> <li> The strip searching of all male court discharged persons and not all female court discharged persons violated the Equal Protection Clause. <li>The strip searching of all male court discharged persons in large non-private group settings, with up to fifty inmates, while the female court discharged persons who opted to return to the housing divisions were afforded privacy, violated the Equal Protection Clause. <li>The strip searching of all male court discharged persons not based upon reasonable suspicion that they were concealing contraband violated the Fourth Amendment. <li>The manner in which the strip searches were conducted, in large non-private group settings, violated the Fourth Amendment. </ul> Defendants moved to strike portions of plaintiffs' motion (as to the second and fourth claim), asserting that plaintiffs were adding new theories of liability not pleaded in their amended complaint. Judge Bucklo denied the motion to strike, but allowed defendants to conduct additional discovery as to those claims. Bullock v. Sheahan, 519 F.Supp.2d 763 (N.D.Ill. 2007). On July 30, 2008, the district court (Judge Bucklo) granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, and on February 27, 2009, Judge Bucklo partially granted that motion with respect to the portions of the earlier order that granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their Fourteenth Amendment claims and on some of their Fourth Amendment claims. On March 18, 2011, the court approved a proposed class settlement. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement. The defendants agreed to pay $1.4 million to class members and roughly $2 million in attorney's fees and costs. The defendants also agreed to pay the two class representatives $25,000 as \"incentive awards\" for serving as the representatives. However, the defendants later discovered that one of the class representatives had certified that he had no legal claims of any value during bankruptcy proceedings in 2010, so he couldn't receive this incentive award. The agreed with the defendants and issued an opinion on May 23, 2011. Over the next two years, the defendants paid claims submitted by class members. The court oversaw the payments and denied late claims and other challenges. The court terminated its jurisdiction over the case on September 1, 2012. Note: There was another (separate) strip search case against the Cook County Sheriff in the same District Court. That case, Young v. Cook County, 1:06-cv-00552, alleged an unconstitutional practice of strip searching all pretrial detainees upon their entry in the Cook County Jail for intake/booking. See <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9811\">JC-IL-0009</a>.", "summary": "In 2004, plaintiffs filed this class-action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs challenged the Cook County Sheriff's policy of strip searching all males following their return to the Cook County Jail from court after there was a judicial determination that there was no longer a basis for their detention. The parties settled in 2011 and the defendants paid $1.4 million in damages and roughly $2 million in attorney's fees and costs."}
{"article": "Plaintiff, represented by private counsel, filed a 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 action in the District of Maryland against officers, the Baltimore Police Department, and police and city officials in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff sued for damages. The plaintiff was a Registered Nurse who worked at The Johns Hopkins Hospital. On April 12, 2008, she left the hospital at approximately 7:35 p.m. and began her commute home. The police had blocked an exit ramp on I-83 North because of accident with a patrol car and road flares. The plaintiff drove over the road flares. The officer entered his patrol vehicle and followed the plaintiff 4/10ths of a mile, and with weapon drawn, ordered the plaintiff to the ground. Plaintiff was arrested for minor traffic violations. Plaintiff was later stripped searched at the Baltimore central booking facility, as was the policy for all arrestees processed at the facility. In Defendant's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, counts were dismissed as to the arresting and searching officers, but denied with respect against the supervisors of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) and the secretary of DPSCS, as well as the warden of the booking facility. A motion to dismiss was partially granted and denied on November 2, 2008 by Judge Andre Davis, and another motion to dismiss was partially granted and denied on September 1, 2009 by Judge Catharine Blake. A motion for summary judgment was partially granted and denied on March 31, 2011. As of 04/15/2012, this case is still ongoing, with the parties participating in several scheduling conferences, presumably in preparation for trial.", "summary": "This was a strip-search case in which a nurse on her way home from Johns Hopkins was pulled over for a traffic violation, taken to the police station, and strip searched in front of a crowd of people. She claimed that the strip search was illegal. This is one of many cases pending that charge the Baltimore police department with illegal strip searches. This case is still ongoing."}
{"article": "On May 27, 2011, twenty persons then confined in the Suffolk County Correctional Facility (SCCF), which consists of the Riverhead Correctional Facility, a medium/maximum security jail, and the Yaphank Correctional Facility, a minimum security jail, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. The lawsuit was filed pro se as a class action, on behalf of those individuals and all others similarly situated. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages alleging that the conditions of their confinement violated their constitutional rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged unsanitary and hazardous living conditions, including, among other things, chronic exposure to human waste and presence of fungus, mold and other hazardous matters in the shower and housing areas, which caused various ailments to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs all sought to proceed in forma pauperis. The plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on June 17, 2011, adding additional eight plaintiffs detained in the SCCF. The Court (Judge Joanna Seybert), on June 23, 2011, granted the forma pauperis status, but denied the request to proceed as a class action due to the fact that all of the class representatives were proceeding without counsel. The plaintiffs filed a motion to join four additional plaintiffs on June 30, 2011. On July 27, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Amended Complaint seeking to add seven additional plaintiffs as Supplemental Plaintiffs. The motion for joinder was granted by the order of the Court (Judge Joanna Seybert) on October 7, 2011, but the Court denied the motion to join Supplemental Plaintiffs. The Court also dismissed four plaintiffs with the same order. On November 22, 2011, the Court (Judge Joanna Seybert) determined that the appointment of pro bono counsel was appropriate and directed the Court's Pro Se Office to find willing counsel. Afterwards, the Court received a large number of substantially similar complaints from inmates at SCCF, seeking damages, amounting to fifty-nine separate complaints alleging similar violations due to unsanitary conditions. On January 23, 2012, the Court (Judge Joanna Seybert) appointed Shearman & Sterling LLP as pro bono counsel, and ordered consolidation of all existing fifty-nine actions as well as any future complaints of the living conditions at SCCF with Shearman & Sterling's appointment extended to all of the plaintiffs in the newly consolidated action. By April 5, 2012, there were 163 plaintiffs. On April 5, 2012, the pro bono counsel filed the Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, dropping all plaintiffs but for the named six plaintiffs, but seeking to represent the interests of all 163 plaintiffs, as well as other past, present or future persons imprisoned at SCCF, by proceeding as a class action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The New York Civil Liberties Union joined in the representation. The complaint was filed against Suffolk County, the Sheriff of the Suffolk County and his deputies in their personal and official capacities. The plaintiffs alleged violations of constitutional rights, negligence and ministerial negligence under New York common law. The allegations included, among other things, overcrowding, and unsanitary and hazardous conditions at the jail-- including flawed plumbing that leads to chronic exposure to human waste and contaminated food and drinking water, which caused the prisoners various health issues. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages. On May 16, 2012, the County moved to dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint. On May 17, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. On March 19, 2013, the Court (Judge Joanna Seybert) addressed both motions. The Court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss, dismissing without prejudice claims against the Sheriff and his deputies of personal liability for cruel and inhuman treatment. The Court explained that for such liability to exist, the plaintiffs must demonstrate the defendants' actual knowledge of substantial risk of serious harm, while the complaint pleaded only constructive knowledge. The claim under the theory of supervisory liability against the Sheriff and his deputies was also dismissed, because the complaint was void of any allegations that the defendants made the decisions that allegedly constituted the violations. All other claims survived. The Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, creating two classes, injunctive and damages, constituted of all persons who are at present time or will at any time in the future be detained at SCCF, with separate subclasses for those persons detained at Riverhead and Yaphank, with the named plaintiffs ordered to be the class representatives. The counsel of the named plaintiffs was ordered to be appointed class counsel. Between 2013 and 2019, the parties conducted discovery and filed respective motions for summary judgment in fall 2018. Subsequently, the court terminated these pending summary judgment motions in September 2019. In doing so, the court directed the plaintiffs to file a motion proposing those class members who had fully exhausted administrative remedies per the PLRA's requirements, or who were not subject to the exhaustion requirement, as substitute class representatives. A motion to add additional class representatives was filed in late 2019. The case remains ongoing as of November 2020.", "summary": "On May 27, 2011, inmates at the Suffolk County Correctional Facility filed, pro se, a complaint alleging that the unsanitary conditions of confinement at the two jails, located at Riverhead and Yaphank, violated their constitutional rights. The Court appointed pro bono counsel on November 22, 2011; they filed the Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint on April 5, 2012, seeking to represent interests of all inmates as a class action. The Court granted the class certification on March 19, 2013, and denied most of the defendants' motion to discuss at the same time. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On November 19, 2009, the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division began an investigation of Parish of Terrebonne Parish Juvenile Detention Center (TPJDC) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141. On January 18, 2011, the DOJ published their findings that the TPJDC violated youth's civil rights and that youth were harmed by (1) physical and sexual misconduct by staff; (2) excessive physical restraints when lesser forms of punishment would be appropriate; (3) inappropriate use of chemical agents; (4) excessive use of isolation; and (5) inadequate suicide prevention. On October 4, 2011, the United States filed suit in the Eastern District of Louisiana against Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government, who owned and operated TPJDC, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141. The complaint alleged the harms identified in the findings letter. The United States sought equitable and declaratory relief, as well as a permanent injunction against further participation in the alleged acts. The same month, negotiations began between the parties. They submitted a settlement agreement to the Court on October 19, 2011. The agreement was approved by Judge Helen G. Berrigan on October 31, 2011 and the case was dismissed. The settlement agreement included provisions to cure the alleged violations. It also included terms for monthly reports produced by monitor documenting statistics, trends, and corrective actions. The agreement would terminate once the United States certified that the Parish was in substantial compliance with all of the provisions of the settlement for twelve consecutive months. On November 19, 2014, the Court issued an order of final dismissal terminating the settlement agreement and dismissing the case with prejudice.", "summary": "On October 4, 2011, the United States filed suit against Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government alleging violations of the juvenile inmates' civil rights. On October 31, 2011, Judge Helen G. Berrigan approved a settlement agreement that included provisions to cure the alleged violations. On November 19, 2014, the Court issued an order of final dismissal terminating the settlement agreement and dismissing the case with prejudice."}
{"article": "On March 27, 2011, Disability Rights Mississippi (the Protection and Advocacy organization for Mississippi) filed suit against Forrest County in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Plaintiff, represented by counsel from the Southern Poverty Law Center in Jackson, brought action for alleged violations of three separate Protection and Advocacy acts: the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, the Individuals with Mental Illness Act, and the Individual Rights Program. The complaint alleged that the County did not allow plaintiff access to records and residents of a juvenile center, as Protection and Advocacy laws require. Plaintiff sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and attorney fees. On April 12, 2011, the parties agreed to set up a temporary plan to allow the plaintiff access to the defendant's facilities and records. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi (Hon. Keith Starrett) signed the agreement as a plan to be enforced until the parties reach a permanent plan. The temporary plan allowed plaintiff access to defendant's residents, records and facilities for investigations, as the law required, but limited access to prevent interference with defendant's programs. Later, a state youth court issued orders that were inconsistent with this temporary plan. On June 13, 2011, the Court issued an order staying all state court orders that were inconsistent with the temporary plan. Since that date, there has been no submission of a permanent plan.", "summary": "On March 27, 2011, Disability Rights Mississippi filed suit against Forrest County in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, alleging violation of Protection and Advocacy Laws in that defendant did not allow plaintiff access to investigate the county's juvenile centers. On April 12, 2011, the parties agreed to a temporary plan permitting plaintiff access consistent with Protection and Advocacy laws, but limited in a way that prevents interference with juvenile center programs. Since then, there has been no sign of a permanent plan for access."}
{"article": "On April 25, 2016, a minor pre-trial detainee in the Rutherford County Detention Facility (\u201cthe Facility\u201d) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The plaintiff sued the Tennessee Department of Children\u2019s Services (\u201cDCS\u201d) and its Commissioner, the Director of the Facility, an officer of the Facility, and Rutherford County under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. The plaintiff, through private counsel and the ACLU of Tennessee claimed violations of the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause. The plaintiff alleged the government had unlawfully held him in solitary confinement for long periods of time as a punitive measure. Specifically, the plaintiff was placed in solitary confinement at the Facility for five days prior to the filing of this lawsuit for allegedly disruptive behavior. The plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief. He requested a temporary restraining order, a preliminary and permanent injunction, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Todd J. Campbell. On April 25, 2016, the court granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent defendants from placing or keeping him in solitary confinement while awaiting adjudication. On May 4, 2016, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief and subject-matter jurisdiction. On May 5, 2016, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding he had not shown irreparable harm, as he was no longer in solitary confinement. The temporary restraining order terminated the same day. On May 18, 2016, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint to certify a class of all current and future juveniles held in detention at secure facilities in the State of Tennessee. On June 9 and 22, 2016, the defendants again moved to dismiss the amended complaint, alleging the matter was moot because the plaintiff was no longer in the custody of the Facility, and alleging failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction. On July 7, 2016, the plaintiff sought class certification of those juveniles detained in any facility licensed by DCS, and a subclass of those juveniles detained in the Facility. Judge Campbell denied the defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss on August 26, 2016, finding that the plaintiff\u2019s claim was capable of repetition and therefore was not moot. On November 30, 2016, the case was reassigned to Judge Aleta A. Trauger. On February 9, 2017, the plaintiff again sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendants from placing the plaintiff or any other class member in solitary confinement as punishment. On February 17, 2017, the court granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion to a certify class defined as \u201call juveniles detained in the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center who are or were placed in solitary confinement or isolation for punitive reasons, from April 25, 2015 to the present.\u201d 2017 WL 660681. On March 22, 2017, the plaintiff\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction was granted. 2017 WL 1091864. The court found that the plaintiff\u2019s claim that the solitary confinement of juveniles for punitive purposes constituted inhumane treatment was likely to succeed on the merits. On October 30, 2017, the case was referred to a magistrate for settlement. An order dated January 29, 2018, explained that after further discussion, the parties had one unresolved issue that they wish to continue mediating. The case was transferred to Judge Eli Richardson on November 14, 2018. The parties reached a settlement and then moved for preliminary approval of the agreement on January 24, 2019, but Judge Richardson denied the motion due to concerns about the agreement. The parties then revised the settlement and again moved for preliminary approval on March 27, 2019. Judge Richarson preliminary approved the agreement, and after a fairness hearing, approved the agreement on July 19, 2019. The agreement included a permanent injunction prohibiting Rutherford County from using seclusion as punishment for minors. The defendants also agreed to reporting requirements and that they would pay $250,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. The court dismissed the case with prejudice that same day. The case remains ongoing for compliance with the permanent injunction of the settlement agreement. As of March 24, 2021, there was no additional activity on the docket to suggest compliance issues or disputes.", "summary": "In 2016, a minor detainee at Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The plaintiff alleged that the practice of placing minors in solitary confinement as punishment violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. In 2017, the plaintiff was granted a preliminary injunction and the parties began the settlement process. The case settled in July 2019. The settlement agreement included a permanent injunction prohibiting Rutherford County from using seclusion as punishment for minors."}
{"article": "[Note: This case was previously known as Twitter v. Holder, then Twitter v. Lynch, then Twitter v. Sessions] On October 7, 2014, Twitter -- an online social networking service -- filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) under the Administrative Procedure Act. Twitter, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that nondisclosure provisions set forth in a letter from the Deputy Attorney General (\"the DAG Letter\") and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) secrecy provisions were unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Twitter also contended that the review mechanisms for seeking to modify the nondisclosure provisions violate the separation of power principles. Twitter specifically contested the FBI's practice of occasionally issuing National Security Letters (\"NSLs\") to communication providers, compelling them to disclose information deemed relevant for protecting against terrorism. The FBI also issues FISA orders that permit surveillance or disclosure of stored records. Recipients of a NSL or a FISA order are restricted from disclosing information from that order. In 2013, in response to these restrictions, five communication providers (including Google and Facebook) filed a lawsuit to relax restrictions for publishing information such as the total number of requests and user accounts encompassed by such requests. In January 2014, the DOJ and the five providers settled. Two pre-approved disclosure formats were set forth in the DAG Letter, which was dated January 27, 2014. Twitter, the plaintiff in this case, had a practice of releasing transparency reports that listed the number of requests from the government for account information and content removal, and how Twitter responded to such requests. At the time of the complaint, the reports did not contain information regarding NSL and FISA orders. On January 29, 2014, the plaintiff met with the defendants and sought confirmation that the DAG Letter (of January 27, 2014) did not apply to the plaintiff. Subsequently, the plaintiff submitted a draft report to the FBI seeking prepublication review; the draft included numeric information of NSL and FISA orders received. The FBI denied prepublication on a basis that the contained information exceeded the scope set forth in the DAG Letter. This first amendment complaint ensued. On October 17, 2014, the government declined to proceed before a magistrate judge, and the case was subsequently reassigned to District Court Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers on October 20, 2014. On January 9, 2015, the government filed a partial motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The government argued that: 1. The court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs failed to establish an injury-in-fact and therefore lacked standing, and because the DAG Letter did not constitute a final agency act under the Administrative Procedure Act; 2. FISA challenges should instead have been considered by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; and 3. The Plaintiff's separation of powers challenge to the disclosure review mechanisms failed as a matter of law because deference to the Executive was entirely appropriate in this context. In February 2015, a number of popular digital media organizations filed amici briefs on behalf of Twitter, including Buzzfeed, National Public Radio, and Reddit. A hearing was held on the government\u2019s motion to dismiss on May 5, 2015, but before Judge Rogers could rule, the defendants notified her in June 2015 of the passage of the USA Freedom Act. The USA Freedom Act reauthorized portions of the USA Patriot Act, but eliminated the Patriot Act\u2019s bulk data collection provisions. Notably for this case, the Act added options for those who had been subject to NSL or FISA orders to publicly report information about orders received, and amended the judicial review process for NSL nondisclosure requirements. Judge Rogers subsequently called for briefings on the impact of the Act on the pending partial motion for summary judgment and on the case as a whole. The plaintiff argued that the legislative changes did not affect the defendant's pending partial motion to dismiss, should not affect Twitter\u2019s APA or First Amendment claims, and changed, but did not moot, its First Amendment and separation of powers claim. The government argued that passage of the Act made the plaintiff's Administrative Procedure Act and First Amendment challenges moot, and that the Act reinforced the constitutionality of the NSL statutes. On October 14, 2015, after receiving all supplemental briefs, the Judge Rogers dismissed the government\u2019s motion to dismiss as moot and ordered Twitter to file an amended complaint in light of the changes under the USA Freedom Act. 139 F.Supp.3d 1075. Twitter filed its amended complaint on November 13, 2015. In light of the new legislation, Twitter sought declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction, arguing that the non-disclosure provisions of FISA were unconstitutional on their face, that the government\u2019s actions showed a pattern of \u201cinformal, overly expansive, delayed and conflicting\u201d actions that had a chilling effect on speech and limited Twitter\u2019s first amendment rights. It also argued that the Espionage Act was unconstitutional as applied to Twitter, and sought declaratory relief to that effect, expressing its concern that Twitter would be prosecuted under the Espionage Act should it choose to publish its Transparency Report. The government filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on January 15, 2016. It argued that the court should dismiss the FISA claims in the interest of comity, that Twitter failed to establish standing with respect to its Espionage Act claims, and that all of Twitter\u2019s claims should fail as a matter of law since the government may lawfully restrict disclosure of classified information. On May 2, 2016, Judge Rogers granted the motion in part and denied it in part. Judge Rogers denied the motion to dismiss on the grounds of comity and concluded that Twitter had standing under the Espionage Act, but had not sufficiently pleaded its First Amendment claims. 183 F.Supp.3d 1007. Three weeks later, Twitter filed a second amended complaint. In it, Twitter alleged an implied cause of action under the First Amendment and a cause of action under the Administrative Procedure Act. Twitter claimed that the information it sought to disclose was improperly classified, and that the government failed to specify which specific information in its report could not be published. On November 22, 2016, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. It was denied without prejudice on July 6, 2017. The government filed a motion to reconsider on September 5, 2017, which Judge Rogers denied on November 28, 2017. After a lengthy discovery process, the Court published an order on June 21, 2019 suggesting that they would reconsider defendants' motion for summary judgment based on new information provided in the classified declaration of Michael McGarrity, Acting Executive Assistant Director of the National Security Branch of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This evidence supported the government's assertion of a state secrets privilege, showing with specificity the imminent harm to national security that disclosure of this information would constitute. On September 27, 2019, the government filed a renewed motion for Summary Judgment. On October 25, 2019, plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for Summary Judgment, contending that the government's evidence was purely speculative and hypothetical and that they failed to meet their burden to justify classification of the information in Twitter's transparency report. In April 2020, Judge Rogers granted summary judgment to the government and denied summary judgment to the plaintiff. The Court ruled that, while strict scrutiny applied, the government sufficiently showed that the national security concerns outweighed Twitter's interest in disclosure. 2020 WL 1904597. No appeal has yet been filed.", "summary": "On October 7, 2014, Twitter filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the U.S. Dept. of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to file a report on information requests received from the government. The Court granted summary judgment for the government in April 2020."}
{"article": "On June 3, 2014, the New York Times and NYT reporter Charlie Savage filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). They sought production of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) rulings interpreting surveillance law since 9/11 after the government failed to release these documents in response to a FOIA request. Represented by in-house counsel, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the documents sought were public and must be disclosed, an order requiring the defendant to produce the documents within 20 days, and attorneys' fees and costs. As a result of Edward Snowden\u2019s release of classified documents in 2013, it became evident that FISC engaged legal analysis interpreting constitutional rights and surveillance statutes. Though the government began selectively declassifying FISC rulings, many documents remained secret. The New York Times submitted a FOIA request on March 12, 2014 to obtain FISC documents related to rulings on the sharing of raw data without private information removed between government agencies and attempts to approve of a warrantless surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Service Act but failed to receive any documents. While this litigation was pending, the DOJ produced redacted versions of the FISC documents to the plaintiffs. The parties settled the case with plaintiffs' stipulation to voluntary dismissal. On October 28, 2015, Judge Vernon S. Broderick accepted the stipulation and dismissed the case with prejudice. The documents were then posted at Savage's website <a href=\"http://www.charliesavage.com/?page_id=303#anchor5\"> here</a>, and are reposted by the Clearinghouse. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On June 3, 2014, the New York Times and its reporter filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) seeking production of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) rulings interpreting surveillance law since 9/11. The plaintiff alleged a violation of FOIA because the defendant failed to release these documents in response to a FOIA request. While this litigation was pending, the DOJ produced redacted versions of the FISC documents to the plaintiffs. The case was voluntarily dismissed on October 28, 2015. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On June 25, 2003, a lawsuit was filed on behalf of a five-year old developmentally disabled girl under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396 (Title XIX of the Social Security Act, \"The Medicaid Act\") against the Arkansas Department of Human Services (ADHS) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive relief, claiming that ADHS was not in compliance with the Medicaid Act. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that her rights were violated when ADHS refused to provide her father with an enrollment application for community-based services and instead placed her on a waitlist for an indefinite time period. Arkansas participates in Medicaid, and ADHS is the state agency charged with the administration of the Medicaid program in Arkansas. Arkansas provides services for developmentally disabled individuals in intermediate care facilities; alternatively, Arkansas also chose to provide home and community based services for developmentally disabled individuals (known as the Alternative Community Services Medicaid Waiver Program, or \"ACS\"). Plaintiff was a five-year-old girl with developmental and physical disabilities resulting from Down syndrome. Plaintiff's father wished to enroll her in the ACS program and requested an enrollment application in November of 2002; instead of providing an application, ADHS required Plaintiff to complete a client choice form. ADHS put Plaintiff on a wait list at number 2285 for an indefinite period of time even though there were almost 1,000 empty slots under the ACS program. Plaintiff alleged that ADHS had taken similar actions in response to other requests for ACS services. Defendants filed an answer on July 17, 2003. During a hearing held on August 14, 2003, Defendants agreed to provide Plaintiff with an application for ACS services. Because that was the primary relief sought by Plaintiff in her Complaint, the Court (Judge G. Thomas Eisele) dismissed the case without prejudice and stated that it considered Plaintiff to be a prevailing party. On September 22, 2003, the Court issued an order awarding attorney's fees and costs. Rejecting Plaintiff's request for more than $26,000 because it was excessive in light of the relief obtained, the Court awarded Plaintiff $16,500 in attorney's fees, and $150 in costs. There has been no further action in the case, and it has been closed.", "summary": "This case was brought on behalf of a developmentally disabled girl against Arkansas Department of Human Services (ADHS) because ADHS would not provide Plaintiff with an application to enroll in community/home-based services provided through the state's Medicaid program. The case was dismissed without prejudice on September 22, 2003, when Defendant agreed to provide Plaintiff with an application for those services."}
{"article": "On January 20, 2010, an employee of the federal judiciary married to her same-sex partner under California law filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2201-2202, and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 701-706, against the federal Office of Personnel Management (OPM). The plaintiff, represented by private counsel and Lambda Legal, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief and a review of administrative action, alleging an equal protection violation. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) violates the Fifth Amendment by refusing to recognize lawful same-sex marriages for purposes of the laws governing spousal health benefits for federal employees, thereby denying her of a benefit that would be available to her if her spouse were of the opposite sex. The plaintiff, a 19-year employee of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, had applied for health benefits for her wife and been denied, and though the Ninth Circuit (Chief Judge Alex Kozinski) then issued an order as part of the employment dispute procedure finding that she was entitled to spousal health benefits, In re Golinski, 587 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2009), the OPM had refused to comply. As such, the plaintiff's initial complaint requested a writ of mandamus to enforce the Ninth Circuit order. On March 16, 2011, however, the District Court (Judge Jeffrey S. White) dismissed this claim, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to issue mandamus relief, Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 781 F. Supp. 2d 967 (N.D. Cal. 2011), and the plaintiff was forced to amend her complaint to request injunctive relief. Meanwhile, on February 23, 2011, the Department of Justice indicated that it had come to the conclusion that DOMA was unconstitutional and that it would no longer defend the act in court. In response to this, on May 4, 2011, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives (BLAG) moved to intervene to defend the act, and their motion was granted on June 3. On the same day, the defendants-intervenors moved to dismiss the complaint. On July 1, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and the Department of Justice filed a brief supporting the plaintiff's claim. On February 22, 2012, the District Court (Judge White) granted the plaintiff's motion and denied that of the defendant-intervenors. Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012). The Court stated that classifications based on sexual orientation should be subjected to heightened scrutiny, but held that the application of DOMA to deny spousal health benefits in this case did not even have a rational basis and thus constituted a violation of the equal protection component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. It entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from interfering with the enrollment of the plaintiff's wife in her family health benefits plan. Defendants-intervenors appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On May 22, 2012, the Court of Appeals (Judge Sydney R. Thomas) denied the plaintiff's motion for an initial hearing en banc and scheduled arguments before a three-judge panel for the week of September 10-14. However, the Court vacated the September 10, 2012 oral argument date, pending the resolution of the petition for writ of certiorari submitted to the Supreme Court on July 3, 2012 by the U.S. Department of Justice. On June 27, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States entered an order denying the petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment. On July 25, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered an order dismissing all appeals of the case, as stipulated by the parties following the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Windsor (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12113\">PB-NY-0017</a> in this clearinghouse) holding \u00a7 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional.", "summary": "On January 20, 2010, an employee of the federal judiciary married to her same-sex partner under California law filed a lawsuit against the federal Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, alleging that the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) violates the Fifth Amendment by refusing to recognize lawful same-sex marriages for purposes of the laws governing spousal health benefits for federal employees, thereby denying her of a benefit that would be available to her if her spouse were of the opposite sex. On February 22, 2012, the District Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, holding that the application of DOMA to deny spousal health benefits in this case did not have a rational basis and thus constituted a Fifth Amendment violation. It entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from interfering with the enrollment of the plaintiff's wife in her family health benefits plan. On July 3, 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a petition in the Supreme Court for certiorari prior to judgment. That petition was held without decision while the Court considered the California Prop. 8 case (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11970\">PB-CA-0029</a> in this Clearinghouse) and Windsor, the DOMA case from the Second Circuit (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12113\">PB-NY-0017</a> in this Clearinghouse), in which the Court granted review on December 7. The case was dismissed following the decision in Windsor holding \u00a7 3 of DOMA unconstitutional."}
{"article": "On December 4, 2012, a 21-year-old with muscular dystrophy filed this lawsuit against the California Department of Health Care Services in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. Prior to turning 21, the plaintiff had received 615 hours of Medi-Cal funded, in-home nursing care per month. Once he turned 21 in September 2012, however, the state reduced his nursing care by 200 hours per month due to its restrictions on funded nursing hours for adults, despite the fact that his condition remained the same. The plaintiff alleged that the reduction in nursing hours put him at serious risk of unnecessary institutionalization in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. He also alleged a deprivation of the constitutional right to procedural due process under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the reduction in his in-home nursing care. On August 1, 2013, Judge William B. Shubb dismissed the case pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff was permitted to select any combination of services available under the state plan to address his health care needs. The plaintiff could also, when medically necessary, submit a request to be reassessed for additional waiver services. The defendant agreed to pay $69,500 in attorneys' fees and costs. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Plaintiff, an individual with muscular dystrophy, filed this lawsuit alleging that the state's planned reduction in his home care nursing services (due to his reaching his 21st birthday and transition into \"adult\" services) puts him at risk of unnecessary institutionalization in violation of the ADA and Section 504. The parties reached a settlement agreement and on August 1, 2013, the case was dismissed."}
{"article": "The plaintiffs, institutionalized individuals in the District of Columbia with disabilities, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on December 23, 2010. The complaint alleged that the District of Columbia has policies and procedures that force the unnecessary institutionalization of people with disabilities who could live in the community with appropriate services. The plaintiffs claimed that these policies, which erect barriers to receiving long-term care and arbitrarily restrict the availability of community-based services, violate the Americans with Disabilities Act's integration mandate (under the precedent of Olmstead v. L.C.) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiffs filed this complaint in response to the failure of D.C. to develop and implement a working Olmstead plan. On April 27, 2011, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The defendants claimed that D.C.'s policies were adequate to prevent unnecessary institutionalization and that none of the plaintiffs had demonstrated that his or her institutionalization was a result of the District's policies or that he or she could live in the community. The United States (Department of Justice) filed a brief siding with the plaintiffs on October 3, 2011. On February 14, 2010, Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle issued an opinion denying, for the most part, the defendant's summary judgment motion. Judge Huvelle agreed to dismiss the individual defendant officials from the case, noting that the claims against them were duplicative of those against the District. But, Judge Huvelle denied the defendants' motion on the substantive claims, finding that the District had no effective plan in place to prevent unnecessary institutionalization. In April 2012, the District of Columbia announced a new Olmstead community integration plan. In March of 2013, the plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint without the named parties. The defendants immediately filed a motion to dismiss. On March 28, 2013, Judge Huvelle granted the plaintiff's class certification as well as denied defendant's motion to dismiss. This prompted renewed litigation in conjunction, including a request for interlocutory appeal on the class certification. The defendants also filed a motion to stay pending the request for interlocutory appeal, and this motion was ultimately denied. In September of 2015, following months of discovery, the plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint, and the defendants filed a final motion to dismiss. This motion was again denied. After trial before Judge Huvelle, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law on October 6, 2016. On September 13, 2017, however, Judge Huvelle found that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate the existence of a concrete, systemic failure that entitled them to class-wide relief and dismissed their class-wide claims. More specifically, Judge Huvelle found that there were both systemic and individualized barriers to transitioning that were beyond the control of the defendants, so a single injunction could not remedy the plaintiffs\u2019 institutionalization. As the plaintiffs had not sought individual relief, Judge Huvelle entered judgment for the defendants and denied the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law as moot. On October 18, 2017, the plaintiffs appealed Judge Huvelle's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. On July 5, 2019, a D.C. Circuit panel composed of Judges Karen L. Henderson and Robert L. Wilkins with Senior District Judge Harry T. Edwards reversed and remanded Judge Huvelle's decision. They stated that the state has the burden of proof in showing that the access plans it has in place are sufficient under Olmstead, and that the District Court erred when it focused on the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint, not the robustness of the State's plan. 928 F.3d 1070. The case returned to the District Court for further proceedings; discovery is ongoing.", "summary": "Institutionalized individuals with disabilities filed this challenge to the District of Columbia's Medicaid policies. Plaintiffs alleged that the District does not have an effective plan to prevent unnecessary institutionalization and that the inability of individuals to access sufficient community-based supports and services under DC's policies violates the ADA. Following trial in 2016, Judge Huvelle found that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate entitlement to class-wide relief and entered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed the decision; the D.C. circuit reversed and remanded. Discovery is now ongoing."}
{"article": "On October 9, 2007, a same-sex couple residing in San Diego, California, with their adopted child who was born in Louisiana, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the State of Louisiana. The plaintiffs had asked Louisiana to issue a new original birth certificate identifying plaintiffs as the child's legal parents, but the state refused to do so. The plaintiffs, represented by Lambda Legal and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory relief finding Louisiana's actions in violation of the Constitution; for an injunction requiring Louisiana to issue the new birth certificate; and for reasonable attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs amended the complaint on June 30, 2008. Plaintiffs had adopted their child, who was born in Shreveport, Louisiana, in New York in 2006. Louisiana rejected their request for an amended birth certificate identifying both of them as the child's legal parents relying on its own law, public policy, and an advisory opinion from the Louisiana Attorney General's Office; the state concluded that it was not required to recognize an out-of-state adoption decree that violates Louisiana public policy. In particular, the state contended that it did not need to recognize out-of-state adoption decrees that name two unmarried persons as the adoptive parents because, in Louisiana, only married parents could jointly adopt a child. Plaintiffs countered that adoption orders by a New York state court are judgments that must be given full faith and credit under the Constitution by every other state. Furthermore, plaintiffs claimed that the State of Louisiana violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause because the state denied the legal benefit of an accurate birth certificate to a subset of children who are adopted by unmarried same-sex couples. On December 22, 2008, the District Court (Judge Jay C. Zainey) granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment; the court found that the Louisiana statute in question authorizes the state registrar to issue a new birth record upon receipt of a valid out-of-state adoption decree and is entitled to full faith and credit. Thus, the court ordered the state to issue an amended birth certificate identifying the plaintiffs as the child's parents. On January 15, 2009, the state sought a new trial in the district court and, six days later, also filed an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On March 18, 2009, the District Court denied the state's motion for a new trial and granted the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the judgment; Judge Zainey ordered that the Louisiana State Registrar issue a completed birth certificate reflecting the names of the adoptive parents in accordance with the Court's judgment. However, on March 27, 2009, the Fifth Circuit ordered that the judgment be stayed pending resolution of defendant's appeal in that Court. On February 18, 2010, a Fifth Circuit panel held that Louisiana law, properly understood, required defendant to reissue the birth certificate with both parents' names listed. Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2010). However, that opinion was vacated by the Court's decision to rehear the case en banc. Adar v. Smith, 622 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2010). On April 12, 2011, the en banc Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for dismissal. Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2011). The court found that Louisiana did not violate the full faith and credit clause by determining how to apply its own laws to maintain its vital statistics records, and that no right created by the New York adoption order had been denied. As to the Equal Protection claim, the court found that Louisiana's preference for stable adoptive families provides a rational basis for its decision to have its birth certificate requirements flow from its domestic adoption law (requiring that any parents wishing to jointly adopt be married). The costs on appeal were awarded to defendant as well. On May 20, 2011, on remand, the District Court Judge Zainey entered judgment in favor of defendant and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint. On October 19, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.", "summary": "Plaintiffs are a same-sex couple who asked a federal court in Louisiana to declare as unconstitutional Louisiana's refusal to issue an amended birth certificate for an adopted child listing both individuals in an unmarried same-sex couple as the legal parents, and, for injunctive relief requiring Louisiana to issue such birth certificate. After the district court held for plaintiffs, the Fifth Circuit reversed and found that Louisiana's recognition of a New York adoption order was not entitled to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and that there was no Equal Protection violation."}
{"article": "On April 9, 2014, several same-sex couples residing in North Carolina filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the state of North Carolina. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and private counsel, asked the court to declare that North Carolina's ban on same-sex is unconstitutional, declare North Carolina laws prohibiting joint adoption by same-sex couples are also unconstitutional, enjoin the state from enforcing any of its laws banning same-sex marriage, direct the state to recognize same-sex marriages entered into in other states, and award the plaintiffs costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees. The plaintiffs alleged that their rights under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause were violated by North Carolina's laws banning same-sex marriage. They also claimed that the laws interfered with the structure of their families because same-sex couples could not participate in second parent adoption. On June 2, 2014, the Court (Magistrate Judge Joi Elizabeth Peake) granted a petition that allowed one of the plaintiffs to prosecute this civil action on behalf of her minor child. That same day, the Court stayed further proceedings in this case pending a ruling by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12807\"><i>Bostic v. Schaefer</i></a>, which also challenged a state's ban on same-sex marriage. On June 24, 2014, this case was reassigned to Chief Judge William L. Osteen. The Fourth Circuit's July 28, 2014 ruling in <i>Bostic</i> held that the Virginia Marriage Laws violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that they prevent same-sex couples from marrying and prohibit Virginia from recognizing same-sex couples' lawful out-of-state marriages. 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014). On August 27, 2014, the proceedings in this case were further stayed pending the determination of the Supreme Court whether to grant a petition for writ of certiorari in <i>Bostic</i>. After the Supreme Court denied certiorari review in <i>Bostic</i>, Judge Osteen issued an order on October 6, 2014, finding that it appeared the plaintiffs were entitled to an order granting the pending motions for preliminary injunction in light of the Fourth Circuit's mandate, but that at least two issues remained for the court's resolution: (i) what further action by the court was necessary with respect to those issues arguably resolved by <i>Bostic</i>, and (ii) resolution of the adoption laws at issue in the case. On October 8, 2014, Judge Osteen lifted the stay in the case and denied all prior pending motions, except the motion for preliminary injunction, as moot. The order also dismissed the North Carolina Attorney General as a defendant and allowed the State of North Carolina to intervene. The plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings that same day. The Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate filed motions to intervene. On October 14, 2014, Judge Osteen permitted their intervention, noting that it would preserve their right to appeal, but overruled their objections to the court's jurisdiction and to the application of <i>Bostic</i>. In an October 14, 2014 order, the court declared North Carolina Const. art. XIV, \u00a7 6, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 51-1, and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 51-1.2 unconstitutional to the extent that those laws prevent same-sex couples from marrying and prohibit the State of North Carolina from recognizing same-sex couples\u2019 lawful out-of-state marriages. 14 F. Supp. 3d 695 (M.D. NC 2014). The order enjoined the State of North Carolina and its officers, agents, and employees from implementing or enforcing any of the above-mentioned provisions. The plaintiffs' claims concerning North Carolina's adoption laws, as well as the pending motion for preliminary injunction, were dismissed without prejudice as moot. Speaker of the NC House of Representatives and President Tempore of the NC Senate, intervenors in this action, appealed the order on November 6, 2014. The plaintiffs filed a notice of cross-appeal on November 14, 2014, seeking dismissal of the legislative intervenors' appeal by appealing the order granting the motion for intervention. On December 4, 2015, the cross appeals were consolidated before the Fourth Circuit. On February 10, 2015, the Fourth Circuit placed the case in abeyance pending the US Supreme Court's decision in <a href=\" http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12787\"><i>Obergefell v. Hodges</i></a>. On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court's <i>Obergefell</i> decision held that state bans on same-sex marriage violate the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court denied the intervenors' petition for a writ of certiorari, resulting in a mandate from the Fourth Circuit on August 12, 2015. This denial left intact the judgment in the plaintiffs' favor of October 8, 2014, rendering the plaintiffs the prevailing party for purposes of recovering attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988. The plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney's fees on October 13, 2015. The plaintiffs reached a settlement agreement with the legislative intervenors for $44,501.36 on October 21, 2015. Though certain administrative errors prolonged the resolution of the remaining fees, the court granted the plaintiffs' motions for attorney's fees and costs against the defendants on July 25, 2018 in the amount of $169,656.25. As of August 9, 2018, it does not appear that either party filed an objection to this order during the 10-day stay on the attorney's fees for the filing of objections, and it does not seem that there are any further matters to be resolved in this case.", "summary": "On April 9th, 2014, several same-sex couples residing in North Carolina filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the state of North Carolina. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that North Carolina's ban on same-sex is unconstitutional, declare North Carolina laws prohibiting joint adoption by same-sex couples are also unconstitutional, enjoin the state from enforcing any of its laws banning same-sex marriage, direct the state to recognize same-sex marriages entered into in other states, and award the plaintiffs costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees. The court ruled in the plaintiffs' favor on October 14, 2014, declaring the North Carolina laws in question unconstitutional to the extent they prevent marriage and recognition of same-sex couples."}
{"article": "On December 2, 2014, seven same-sex couples seeking to marry or have their out-of-state marriage recognized in Nebraska filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska. The plaintiffs, represented by lawyers from the ACLU and private counsel, sued the state of Nebraska and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs alleged that Nebraska's exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage and refusal to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples from other jurisdictions under Nebraska's \"Defense of Marriage\" Constitutional Amendment violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. On March 2, 2015, the district court (Judge Joseph E. Bataillon) granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The injunction ordered all relevant state officials to treat same-sex couples the same as different-sex couples in the context of processing a marriage license or determining the rights, protections, obligations, or benefits of marriage. Waters v. Ricketts, 48 F.Supp.3d 1271 (D. Neb. 2015). The same day, the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal regarding the preliminary injunction. On March 6, 2015, the Eighth Circuit granted defendants' Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and scheduled an oral argument. On April 29, 2015, the Eighth Circuit ordered on its own motion that oral argument and any further consideration of the cases be deferred pending the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). (Clearinghouse code <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12787\">PB-OH-0003</a>). On June 13, 2015, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. On June 30, 2015, the Eighth Circuit vacated its order staying the District Court's preliminary injunction. On August 11, 2015, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction, held Nebraska's constitutional provision to be unconstitutional, and remanded the case for entry of final judgment on the merits in favor of the plaintiffs. Waters v. Ricketts, 798 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2015). On September 24, 2015, plaintiffs filed supplemental materials alleging further injuries related to a defendant's actions under state birth certificate issuance statutes. On February 4, 2016, Judge Bataillon granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment, denied the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment and issued a permanent injunction striking down Nebraska\u2019s ban on gay marriage. Waters v. Ricketts, 159 F.Supp.3d 992 (D. Neb. 2016). The injunction ordered state officials to treat same-sex couples the same as different-sex couples in the context of processing marriage certificates or determining rights, protections, obligations or benefits of marriage. On June 14, 2016, Judge Bataillon closed this case, but retained jurisdiction to enforce its injunction for a period of at least 3 years.", "summary": "On December 2, 2014, seven same-sex couples seeking marriage or recognition of an out-of-state marriage in Nebraska filed claim against the state of Nebraska under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska. The District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, and it was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit on interlocutory appeal following the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. On February 4, 2016, Judge Bataillon issued a permanent injunction striking down Nebraska\u2019s ban on gay marriage."}
{"article": "The Plaintiffs, same-sex parents filing on behalf of their minor twins, filed this lawsuit in the District Court of South Carolina (Columbia Division) on January 7, 2016. The Plaintiffs sued the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control/State Registrar of Vital Statistics under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The Plaintiffs, represented by Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming violations of Obergefell v. Hodges (<a href=https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12787>PB-OH-0003</a>)and other binding precedent, as well as violation of their fundamental right to marry and other protected liberties. The Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant\u2019s refusal to treat same-sex spouses the same as opposite-sex spouses in the issuance of birth certificates is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Plaintiffs further alleged that the Defendant\u2019s refusal to name both Plaintiffs on their twins\u2019 birth certificates discriminates on the basis of sex and sexual orientation. The Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 31, 2016. They alleged that there was no dispute between the parties as to material fact and that the Defendants failed to contest the Plaintiffs\u2019 constitutional arguments or right to declaratory relief judgment. The Court agreed, and on February 15, 2017, District Judge Mary G. Lewis granted Plaintiff\u2019s Motion for Summary Judgment and request for declaratory judgment. 2017 WL 624803. On February 28, 2017, Judge Lewis entered a Consent Decree ordering the Defendant to (1) apply all rules, procedures, policies and practices relating to the issuance of birth certificates to same-sex spouses on the same terms as it applies them to different-sex spouses, (2) to list the birth mother on the original birth record as the \u201cMother\u201d of a child born in South Carolina, (3) to list the spouse of the birth mother on the birth record as the other parent of the child (excluding instances of surrogate births), (4) to issue two-parent birth certificates to married same-sex parents on the same terms that two-parent certificates are provided to different-sex married parents, (5) to modify its existing vital records system to allow updates to its systems and forms so that the first parent is listed as \u201cMother/parent,\u201d and the second parent as \u201cFather/parent,\u201d (6) to institute updates to allow the Mother\u2019s Worksheet for Child\u2019s Birth Certificate completed at hospitals to be recorded in a gender-neutral fashion, (7) to issue corrected birth certificates to the Plaintiff\u2019s mailing address, (8) to make available to the public a statement listing these new policies and procedures, (9) and to allow any individuals who meet the requirements listed in this public statement but were previously denied issuance of a birth certificate listing both same-sex spouses as parents to obtain a corrected birth certificate for free. Furthermore, the court maintained jurisdiction of the case for purposes of monitoring compliance with and enforcing the Consent Decree, and allowed the Plaintiff\u2019s to submit a motion for attorney\u2019s fees and costs pursuant to federal and local rules. The Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Attorney\u2019s Fees on April 14, 2017, requesting approximately $49,000, but subsequently withdrew that motion on June 15, 2017 in light of an agreed upon undisclosed settlement between the parties. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2016, a same-sex married couple filed this Civil Rights Act of 1871 complaint in the District Court of South Carolina (Columbia Division). Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming violations of their fundamental right to marry and other protected liberties related to the differential treatment of birth records for children with same-sex married parents. Summary Judgment was granted in favor of the Plaintiffs and a consent decree entered ordering South Carolina to make changes to the policies of their birth-record keeping, as well as the issuance of corrected birth certificates to the Plaintiffs and all who qualified under the new policies and requested such a correction. The parties reached an undisclosed settlement for attorney\u2019s fees and the case closed in June 2017."}
{"article": "On October 22, 2013, five parolees in custody or under supervision of the Illinois Department of Corrections filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Represented by the Uptown People's Law Center and the MacArthur Justice Center at the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, the plaintiffs sued the Chairman of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board (PRB) and the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. They alleged that the defendants violated the Due Process Clause by subjecting the plaintiffs to fundamentally unfair and procedurally flawed parole review proceedings, and requested injunctive and declaratory relief. The suit was brought on behalf of all parolees in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections facing parole revocation. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the PRB and DOC failed to: <ul><li>appoint counsel to represent indigent parolees in revocation hearings; <li>provide adequate written notice of allegations and evidence against parolees;<li>allow parolees to develop evidence in advance of their hearings;<li>allow parolees the opportunity to speak on their own behalf at hearings;<li>allow parolees to access legal materials required for meaningful participation;<li>allow parolees to present written evidence and witnesses at hearings;<li>provide a hearing before a fair and impartial decision maker;<li>allow parolees to remain silent during proceedings; and<li>allow parolees to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses at the preliminary and final hearing.</ul>The plaintiffs alleged that the process of the parole revocation proceedings amounted to essentially a rubber stamp of the recommendations of supervising parole agents. Shortly after filing, the parties began extensive settlement negotiations and the court stayed discovery. In February 2015, the parties reached an impasse in their negotiations and requested that the stay on discovery be lifted. Then the parties engaged in significant discovery. In February 2016, the parties reengaged in settlement talks, which resulted in a first proposed settlement agreement filed on October 24, 2016. Judge Amy St. Eve granted the parties joint motion for preliminary approval of the proposed settlement and then the parties proceeded to collect comments and objections from class members. On January 13, 2017, the plaintiffs informed the court that they had a final settlement agreement and submitted to the court for approval. On January 25, 2017, Judge Amy J. St. Eve granted final approval of a class action settlement agreement and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Parole Review Board agreed to appoint counsel to represent each qualified alleged parole violator. Counsel would be paid by the PRB, or the PRB would arrange to secure volunteer private counsel and supervised law students who would serve pro bono. The parties stipulated that the Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center would create a handbook of legal resources and information that the defendants would distribute to all parolees. The IDOC agreed to make its best efforts to provide those in its custody facing parole revocation hearings for offenses in its facilities with access to means of communicating with others who would be able to provide relevant eyewitness or character testimony or other evidence. The parties jointly selected a monitor to ensure that the defendant complied with the agreement and was assigned to report to the parties on the status of compliance. In this role, the monitor met with parolees, observed hearings, and examined IDOC and PRB records to determine if the defendants were in compliance with the agreement. The defendants also agreed to pay plaintiffs counsel $225,000 for compensation. The monitor was scheduled to file a report with the parties after one year and then every six months after. The settlement was set to terminate in 24 months from the date of approval, on January 25, 2019. As of March 21, 2019, there was no additional activity on this case. This case is now closed.", "summary": "On October 22, 2013, parolees in custody or under supervision of the Illinois Department of Corrections filed a class action lawsuit alleging violations of their due process rights due to procedurally unfair parole review proceedings, which functioned as essentially an automatic approval of parole board recommendations. In January of 2017, the parties reached a settlement agreement which directs Illinois to revise its parole review proceedings and inform parolees of their rights."}
{"article": "On March 8, 2018 a transgender woman serving a ten-year sentence brought this lawsuit against the Illinois Department of Corrections and a group of its officers in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. Though she had lived as a woman since the age of five, the plaintiff was incarcerated in a men\u2019s prison and had previously been transferred from another men\u2019s prison due to harassment and abuse by guards and prisoners. Following a settlement in a related case, the plaintiff continued to be harassed and subjected to physical and sexual abuse. As a result, she was placed in segregation and made multiple suicide attempts. In addition to continued abuse, the defendants allegedly failed to provide basic mental health services to the plaintiff. Officers also allegedly physically assaulted her and made clear that they would not protect her from other inmates. The complaint and an accompanying motion for preliminary injunction asked the court to order the defendants to transfer the plaintiff to a women\u2019s prison. The plaintiff also sought: 1) an injunction under the Americans with Disabilities Act, which would require adequate mental health care and placement in general population rather than segregation; 2) a declaration that the defendants\u2019 conduct and policies violated the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments and the Illinois Hate Crimes Act; 3) compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983; and 4) attorney fees. The case was assigned to Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel. On April 20, 2018, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the court to dismiss the suit because the plaintiff had yet to \u201cexhaust <i> his </i> administrative remedies\u201d (emphasis added) as required by the PLRA for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to follow procedure or provide sufficient information for the grievances that were filed, and in other cases failed to file a grievance for particular claims. On June 8, 2018, the plaintiff moved to withdraw her motion for a preliminary injunction, informing the court the she had been transferred to a new men\u2019s prison facility due to her fear for her life from ongoing abuse. There, she was placed in general population and received some mental health services, seeming to moot the request for preliminary relief. However, on July 17, 2018, barely a month later, the plaintiff filed a renewed motion for preliminary injunction, arguing that as soon as her prior injunctive motion had been withdrawn, prison staff had resumed discriminatory treatment against her, including verbal abuse and a failure to ensure her physical safety from other inmates and prison staff. On August 14, 2018, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint reflecting these developments. On November 7, 2018, Judge Rosenstengel issued an order granting portions of the preliminary injunction. 2018 WL 5830730. The order emphasized that since her childhood, the plaintiff's \"family and community treated her as a girl and referred to her by her preferred name.\u201d Judge Rosenstengel also noted that the plaintiff had begun \"hormone treatment to physically transition to female\u201d which was \u201cmost likely irreversible.\u201d The court held that the plaintiff had a likelihood of success as to her equal protection claims and her Eighth Amendment claims. It ordered the defendants to train staff on transgender issues, allow the plaintiff to attend transgender support group programs, and consider all evidence for and against transferring the plaintiff to a women\u2019s facility. The injunction gave the defendants fourteen days to comply. Magistrate Judge Reona Daly documented a report and recommendations pertaining to the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 2019 WL 3046332. The report granted the defendant's motion for some claims, finding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative options. For nine other claims, though, the Magistrate Judge recommended denying the defendant's summary judgment motion because the facts supported the plaintiff's assertion that she had exhausted her administrative options. Because neither party objected to the report, Judge Rosenstengel reviewed the report only for clear error. Finding none, she adopted the recommendations on May 15, 2019. 2019 WL 2118219. The claims dismissed were dismissed without prejudice, and the surviving claims proceeded. On July 8, 2019, the plaintiff was transferred out of Illinois Department of Corrections. Shortly thereafter, on July 25, two defendants associated with Illinois Department of Corrections moved to dismiss claims against them seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The two defendants argued that the plaintiff's transfer mooted those claims. After the plaintiffs did not respond to the motion, Judge Rosenstengel dismissed the claims on February 6, 2020. 2020 WL 584193. After this motion, the five surviving claims were: three Eighth Amendment claims, a claim arising under the Illinois Hate Crimes Act, and an IIED claim. As of April 13, 2020, the parties were engaged in discovery and the case was ongoing.", "summary": "A transgender woman incarcerated at a men's prison in Illinois brought this action against the Illinois Department of Corrections and its officers in federal court, for abuse, harassment, and equal protection violations. The plaintiff sought an injunction ordering the Department to transfer her to a women's facility. On November 7, 2018, Judge Nancy Rosenstengel of the Southern District of Illinois granted a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to provide basic mental health services to the plaintiff and consider all evidence as to whether she should be transferred to a women's prison."}
{"article": "This case addresses the Illinois Department of Corrections\u2019 treatment of a prisoner during two decades of solitary confinement. Initially, the prisoner had been sentenced to serve seven years in prison as a young adult. However, during his first years in prison, he accumulated infractions for violent behavior caused by an untreated personality disorder. As a result, his sentence was extended to almost two lifetimes in solitary confinement. Released in August 2018 as the result of a habeas petition (one of more than 3 dozen federal lawsuits he filed challenging his confinement), he filed this lawsuit against the State of Illinois and its Department of Corrections on October 28, 2018, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Represented by Loevy & Loevy, the MacArthur Justice Center, and private counsel, he brought claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. Under \u00a71983 he alleged that the Department had violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and he claimed that the Department discriminated against him by its failure to provide treatment or reasonable accommodations in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. He sought compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. Specifically, the complaint outlined the conditions he faced while in solitary confinement. The plaintiff alleged the Department did not provide him with any way to challenge his placement in solitary confinement. He spent twenty years in a cell the size of half a parking space with no sensory stimulation or human contact. Throughout the twenty years, the prison recorded dozens of instances of the plaintiff engaging in serious self-mutilation and increasingly aggressive behavior; he alleged that he was never given the acute psychiatric care he needed for his declining mental health. Initially assigned to Judge Sara L. Ellis, the case was transferred on March 27, 2019 to the Central District of Illinois, where it was assigned to Judge Colin Stirling Bruce. He disqualified and recused himself on September 18, 2019, and the case was reassigned to Judge Harold A. Baker. Two days prior to his recusal, Judge Bruce denied the Department\u2019s motion to dismiss; however, he dismissed the State of Illinois as a defendant, even though no such dismissal had been sought. He stated that because Illinois accepts federal funding, it does not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits brought under the Rehabilitation Act. However, because the Director of the Department of Corrections was sued in his official capacity (which is equivalent to a suit against the state itself), the state\u2019s participation in the lawsuit would be unnecessary. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on March 7, 2020. As of July 8, 2020, two motions to dismiss are pending.", "summary": "In 2018, a former prison inmate from Illinois sued the Illinois Department of Corrections. The plaintiff had spent 20 years in solitary confinement, where his mental health declined substantially. The plaintiff alleged that the Department had violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation act, by placing him in solitary confinement, providing no opportunity to appeal his placement, and providing him with insufficient psychiatric care. As of July 8, 2020, the litigation is ongoing."}
{"article": "On January 21, 2009, the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Indiana filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, against the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The complaint challenged the creation of housing units inside federal prisons in which prisoners lived in isolation from the outside world. Plaintiffs alleged that these cells, called Communication Management Units (CMUs) and designed to house prisoners viewed by the government as terrorists, were established in violation of federal laws requiring public notice and opportunity to comment on policy, and were disproportionately used to house Muslim prisoners. The plaintiff Sabri Benkahla was abducted at gunpoint by Saudi Arabian police and transferred to America in custody of the FBI the night before his wedding. Benkahla was charged with supplying services to the Taliban and further using a firearm in violent crime. The U.S. District Court Judge Leonie Brinkema found him not guilty, but the government forced him to testify in front of a grand jury a month later. Benkahla was convicted of perjury and sentenced to 121 months in prison in a CMU. Following this, a motion on July 27, 2009 to add parties was filed, and Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Harley G. Lappin and Joyce K. Conley were added in their official capacities. In the same motion, all pending claims against defendants B.R. Jett, Paul McNulty, Unknown Employees of Correctional Programs Divisions of the Federal Bureau of Prison, Les Smith, T.R. Henry, S Julian T. Coleman, and Agent Grass were dismissed. Further on July 27, 2009, an amended complaint was filed that declared the Defendants violated the Administrative Procedure Act by establishing the Terre Haute CMU and issuing the Terre Haute CMU Institution Supplement and Institution Supplement - Visiting Regulations without notice and comment rulemaking. Subsequently on September 14, 2009, all defendants were dismissed aside from the Federal Bureau of Prisons. On July 28, 2010, plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss. This case was dismissed on July 29, 2010 without prejudice in the Southern District of Indiana. On August 9, 2010 a Third Party Continuing Petition to Intervene was filed on behalf of similarly situated prison inmates, and this was denied on October 20, 2010 because it was untimely and the court found that their interests are not in common with plaintiff. There is no reason to conclude this case is ongoing.", "summary": "On January 21, 2009, the ACLU filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the Federal Bureau of Prisons in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The complaint challenged the creation of Communication Management Units (CMUs) in the federal prisons. On July 28, 2010, plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss. This case was dismissed on July 29, 2010 without prejudice in the Southern District of Indiana."}
{"article": "This case concerns discrimination against disabled prisoners by correctional facilities. On August 30, 2019, the plaintiffs, six individuals all currently or formerly in the custody of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (the \u201cDepartment\u201d), filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland (No. 19-004580) against the Department and various current and former Department officials. The plaintiffs sued all defendants under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the \u201cADA\u201d), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and state law. The plaintiffs also sued the individual (i.e. non-Department) defendants for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive, compensatory, and punitive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the Department\u2019s discriminatory practices denied them equal access to the Department\u2019s services, programs, and activities available to non-disabled prisoners. For example, the Department had not made all parts of their facilities wheelchair-accessible, forcing wheelchair-bound prisoners to expose themselves to dangerous conditions likely to cause physical harm, such as noncompliant bathrooms, showers, ramps, and cells. The Department had also denied the plaintiffs and other disabled prisoners equal access to the Department's vocational training and work release programs on the sole basis of their disabilities, resulting in lost opportunities to work and earn money while in prison. The plaintiffs also claimed to receive threats from prison staff when the plaintiffs spoke up against the Department's noncompliance. On October 23, 2019, the defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. On December 30, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, Section 1983, or Maryland state law. On January 14, 2020, Judge Ellen L. Hollander transferred the case to Chief Judge James K. Bredar because one of the plaintiffs was also involved in a case with overlapping factual and legal issues assigned to Judge Bredar (Jardina v. Dep\u2019t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., No. JKB-16-1255). In fact, the plaintiff in Jardina moved to consolidate his case with this one on November 26, 2019, and Judge Bredar granted that motion to consolidate on January 15, 2020. On February 5, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge J. Mark Coulson for purposes of settlement, discovery, or further proceedings. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2019, a group of current and former prisoners filed a complaint against the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services for violating their rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and Maryland State Law. A similar case was consolidated with this one in January 2020, and a motion to dismiss the complaint is pending in federal court."}
{"article": "This is a case about poor conditions at a North Carolina private prison. On June 28, 2007, a group of men held at the Rivers Correctional Institution in North Carolina brought this class action suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They sued GEO Group, Inc., the private company that owned and operated the prison, and the United States Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, the Legal Aid Justice Center, and the Washington Lawyers\u2019 Committee for Civil Rights, sought declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief, claiming statutory violations under the Rehabilitation Act, violations of the Eighth Amendment, and negligence. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the health and welfare of the class, that they had excluded prisoners with disabilities from other services and programs, and that they had deliberately deprived the plaintiffs of adequate medical, dental, and mental health care. For example, the named plaintiff suffered improper treatment of a cavity at Rivers and ultimately underwent emergency surgery, which removed the infection and saved his life but left him deformed and disabled. The plaintiffs also alleged that GEO Group had breached its contract with the U.S. Government, which required GEO Group to provide its prisoners with \u201cmedical services that are commensurate with community standards.\u201d On July 26, 2007, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, to transfer the case on the grounds that the D.C. Court lacked personal jurisdiction over GEO Group. On September 18, 2007, the United States Bureau of Prisons also filed a motion to dismiss or transfer. The plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on September 25, 2007. Both parties filed motions for time extensions to file responses to the motions, but on February 28, 2008, Judge Ricardo M. Urbina, agreeing that \u201ctransferring the case furthers the interests of justice,\u201d granted the defendants\u2019 motion to transfer the case to the Eastern District of North Carolina. 535 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2008). The case was then transferred to North Carolina, where it was assigned to Senior District Judge Malcolm J. Howard. On October 24, 2008, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, stipulating the requests for both the class and the Disability Sub-Class (which consisted of prisoners who had been allegedly denied access to programs and services they should have been provided under the Rehabilitation Act) and demanding a jury trial. The defendants moved to strike the amended complaint on January 5, 2009, and simultaneously filed motions to dismiss the suit. On February 16, 2009, GEO Group filed a notice of subsequently decided authority, citing Judge James C. Dever\u2019s February 13, 2009 decision dismissing a prisoner's claims to relief for failure to comply with North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 9(j), regarding special pleading requirements for medical malpractice. The Bureau of Prisons also filed a notice of subsequently decided authority on April 14, 2009, noting that the Fourth Circuit had affirmed a district court\u2019s finding that the Rehabilitation Act did not apply to federal prisons. The case was reassigned from Judge Howard to Judge James C. Dever on July 22, 2008, and Judge Dever issued three orders: denying the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and their motion to strike the amended complaint, and denying without prejudice the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification. On November 9, 2009, Judge Dever granted the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss because two of the named plaintiffs had been released and for failure to state a claim, granting the plaintiffs leave to re-file an amended complaint. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on December 9, 2009, which the defendants moved to dismiss on January 22, 2010. After a hearing on the motions conducted on January 31, the Federal Bureau of Prisons filed a motion to dismiss on February 2. On September 29, 2010, Judge Dever granted GEO Group\u2019s motion to dismiss and granted in part the Federal Bureau of Prisons\u2019 motion to dismiss, largely because the plaintiffs still failed to state a claim; however, the judge gave the plaintiffs leave to file a third amended complaint. 2010 WL 3835141. The plaintiffs accordingly filed a third amended complaint on October 25, 2010. The plaintiffs continued to allege that GEO Group \u201cmanifested a pervasive and deliberate indifference to the health needs of\u201d the prisoners at Rivers. The complaint described ten separate prisoners who had suffered deprivation of medical care or inadequate medical care while at Rivers and who had suffered injury, hospitalization, or disability as a result. GEO Group filed an unopposed motion to dismiss GEO Group as a defendant on November 29, 2010, noting that the Court had stated that it would dismiss the claims in the Third Amended Complaint as to GEO. The Bureau of Prisons filed a motion to dismiss on December 3, 2010. On July 18, 2011, Judge Dever granted GEO Group\u2019s motion to dismiss as a defendant, citing the November 9, 2009 motion to dismiss, in which GEO argued that GEO\u2019s actions at Rivers did not qualify as government action against which Eighth Amendment claims could be raised. However, the court rejected the Bureau of Prison\u2019s argument that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because the Bureau failed to adequately support their argument with evidence. 2011 WL 2899135. The plaintiffs again attempted to file for class certification on August 23, 2011, against which the Bureau of Prisons filed a motion to stay while they filed a motion to dismiss one of the plaintiffs. On September 26, 2011, Judge Dever granted the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss one plaintiff for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to the parties\u2019 agreement. The Bureau of Prisons also filed a motion for reconsideration of the court\u2019s July 18, 2011 order. Judge Dever denied that motion on January 9, 2012, finding that the defendants failed to persuade the court that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies or that precedent required the court to dismiss the case. 2012 WL 43586. On February 23, 2012, Judge Dever denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification, finding that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the commonality requirement for class certification. 2012 WL 600865. After that, a status conference was set for March 8, 2012, but before the conference could commence, the remaining named plaintiff was transferred, and the parties stipulated to dismissal on March 26, 2012. The case is now closed.", "summary": "A group of prisoners at a North Carolina private prison sued the prison company and the Federal Bureau of Prisons for deliberate indifference to their medical and mental health needs. After lengthy procedural maneuvering involving a change of venue from D.C. to North Carolina and failed attempts at class certification, the last remaining named plaintiff was transferred and the court dismissed the case."}
{"article": "On October 23, 2009, an individual plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Hackensack Police Department, Hackensack Municipal Court, Bergen County Jail in the City of Hackensack, Bergen County Municipal Court, and Bergen County Prosecutor. The plaintiff, representing himself pro se, sought compensatory and punitive damages plus special damages for future legal fees. The plaintiff specifically claimed that the defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by attempting to break in and enter his home, threatening to imprison him, fabricating stories to have him incarcerated, and asserting false criminal charges, which led to plaintiff spending three months and five days in county jail. Prior to these events, the plaintiff and officers had a relationship that arose out of an automobile accident. The plaintiff stated that he collected social security checks because of lasting injuries from the accident. The officers, allegedly because the plaintiff is black, claimed that the plaintiff had faked these injuries. On October 12, 2010, the U.S. District Court (Judge Jose L. Linares) issued an order granting in part and denying in part motions to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. The court granted leave to the plaintiff to allow him to amend his conspiracy to maliciously prosecute and equal protection claims. The court noted that if the plaintiff failed to do so, his Second Amended Complaint would remain the operative complaint in this matter and the case would proceed solely as to the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim as against defendant Sgt. Aiellos. 2010 WL 4025846. The plaintiff submitted an amended complaint later that month on October 27, 2010. The District Court issued an opinion dismissing the amended complaint as to all defendants except Behnke and Sgt. Aiellos on December 22, 2010. 2010 WL 5392724. The court granted Behnke's subsequent motion to dismiss on February 26, 2011. Then, on May 22, 2012, the court issued an opinion denying the plaintiff\u2019s motions for leave to submit another amended complaint and for a stay in discovery proceedings. 2012 WL 1883812. On December 20, 2013, the U.S. District Court (Judge Jose L. Linares) issued an order denying the defendant\u2019s and plaintiff\u2019s motions for summary judgment. 2013 WL 6865619. On January 16, 2014, the defendant appealed to the Third Circuit on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court issued an order on May 7, 2014 granting the defendant\u2019s motion to stay the case pending interlocutory appeal. Months later, on December 2, 2014, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s decision to deny summary judgment. The Third Circuit\u2019s decision hinged on two elements, including whether the plaintiff\u2019s criminal complaint was brought without probable cause and whether the defendant acted maliciously toward the plaintiff. The court agreed with the district court that both issues were matters of disputed fact for a jury to decide and therefore rejected the motion for summary judgment. 594 Fed. App'x 742. Following the Third Circuit\u2019s decision, litigation continued in the district court. The parties litigated discovery and pretrial orders vigorously. Trial was initially set for June 2018, but later postponed because in May 2018, the docket indicates that plaintiff sought to retain counsel (which terminated all pending pretrial motions). That fall and into early 2019, the parties continued settlement negotiations without success. In May of 2019, the case was re-assigned to Judge John Michael Vazquez. Later that year, the plaintiff filed a motion for recusal, which was denied by Judge Vazquez. On February 7, 2020, the plaintiff requested to stay the case while the Third Circuit decided a petition for a writ of mandamus. The stay request was denied and the parties prepared for trial. However, the trial has been delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the case remains pending as of April 15, 2021.", "summary": "On October 23, 2009, an individual plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the District of New Jersey under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Hackensack Police Department, Hackensack Municipal Court, Bergen County Jail in the City of Hackensack, Bergen County Municipal Court, and Bergen County Prosecutor. The plaintiff, bringing suit pro se, sought compensatory and punitive damages plus special damages for future legal fees. The plaintiff specifically claimed that the defendants violated his Second and Fourteenth Amendment rights by attempting to break in and enter his home, threatening to imprison him, fabricating stories to have him incarcerated, and asserting false criminal charges, which led to plaintiff spending three months and five days in county jail. The district court denied the defendant\u2019s and plaintiff\u2019s motions for summary judgment. In Dec. 2014, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s decision to deny summary judgment. Settlement discussions have since been unsuccessful and the case is ongoing in the district court, pending trial once public health conditions allow."}
{"article": "On June 6, 2014, a deaf prison inmate who primarily communicates in American Sign Language filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Oregon against the Oregon Department of Corrections. The plaintiff brought disability discrimination claims under the ADA and a state anti-discrimination statute, as well as an unjust enrichment claim. The plaintiff, represented by private attorneys, sought $460,000 in damages, claiming that there was a failure by the prison system to communicate with him since the beginning of his sentence in late 2000 (14 years). The lawsuit claimed that, instead of providing interpreters, the prison made him train other inmates as his interpreters and that they were not qualified to help him. These interpreters were also privy to confidential information since they were his method of communication for medical, religious, and counseling services. On June 13, 2014, the defendant filed a partial motion to dismiss the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim, as well as both disability discrimination claims on statute of limitations grounds. On October 6, 2014, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which no longer included the unjust enrichment claim. District Judge Anna J. Brown denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on October 30, 2014. With respect to the plaintiff's disability discrimination claims, the Court held that the continuing-violations doctrine (ADA claim) and the continuing-tort doctrine (state law claim) applied because the defendant\u2019s conduct constituted longstanding, continuing violations based on discriminatory policies. 2014 WL 5494895. On March 18, 2015, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on June 16, 2015 and a second motion for partial summary judgment on August 28, 2015. The plaintiff then filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment on September 18, 2015. On February 4, 2016, Judge Brown denied the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motions for summary judgment. Specifically, the Court granted the defendant's motion with respect to the plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief because he had been released from custody; limited the plaintiff's recovery under the state anti-discrimination law to instances of disability discrimination that occurred on or after September 23, 2013; limited the plaintiff's recovery under the ADA to instances of disability discrimination that occurred on or after May 5, 2012; and dismissed the plaintiff's claim under the ADA for emotional-distress damages as barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). 2016 WL 447839. On May 2, 2016, Judge Brown issued an amended opinion and order in which he entered summary judgment in the defendant's favor against the plaintiff\u2019s \u201ccontinuing tort\u201d theory of the case. The Court found that a question of fact existed regarding whether the plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies in order for his federal claim to proceed at all, pursuant to the PLRA. 2016 WL 2337892. On May 19, 2016, the case was reassigned to Judge Michael W. Mosman. In August 2016, the parties engaged in settlement discussions, but were unable to reach an agreement and the case proceeded to a jury trial. The Court bifurcated the trial and first heard arguments on whether the plaintiff complied with the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. The Court held that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and dismissed his entire remaining ADA claim with prejudice. Following trial on the remainder of the plaintiff's state law discrimination claims, the jury returned a verdict of $400,000 in noneconomic damages for the plaintiff on November 3, 2016. On December 5, 2016, the defendant filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial and an order of remittitur. On February 8, 2017, the Court denied the defendant's motion and judgment was entered for the plaintiff in the amount of $400,000. On June 9, 2017, Judge Mosman ruled on the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $911,062.21. While he did find that a fee multiplier was appropriate based on the risk involved in the case and the performance of the plaintiff's attorneys, he adopted a smaller fee multiplier than the one requested. Thus, Judge Mosman awarded the plaintiff $683,873.13 in attorneys' fees, $18,155.19 in costs, and $3,924.79 in litigation expenses. 2017 WL 2495496. Although the parties both appealed the District Court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in March 2017, the parties agreed to voluntarily dismiss the appeals on September 21, 2017 for unknown reasons. The case is now closed.", "summary": "A deaf prison inmate who primarily communicates in American Sign Language filed a lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act against the Oregon Department of Corrections, claiming they failed to communicate with him for over 14 years. The lawsuit claimed that, instead of providing interpreters, the prison made him train other inmates as his interpreters and they were not qualified to help him and were also privy to confidential information. In May 2016, the Court granted partial summary judgment for the defendant. Following a jury trial on the remaining claims, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's ADA claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA. The jury awarded the plaintiff $400,000 in noneconomic damages. The Court awarded the plaintiff $683,873.13 in attorneys' fees, $18,155.19 in costs, and $3,924.79 in litigation expenses. Although both parties appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, they agreed to voluntarily dismiss their appeals in September 2017. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On November 10, 2011, an Oregon Department of Corrections inmate filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiff, proceeding without a lawyer, alleged that the defendant, Oregon Department of Corrections (ODOC), violated his free speech and due process rights, and his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, as well as the Oregon Constitution. The case arose when ODOC rejected and returned a letter that the plaintiff sent to another inmate at Oregon State Penitentiary because of a picture the plaintiff had drawn on the front of the envelope. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary damages. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, and assigned to District Judge Marco A. Hernandez. On January 2, 2012, Judge Hernandez denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Barrett v. Williams, 2012 WL 10897 (D.Or. 2012) On August 27, 2012, the State filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff did not respond and on February 22, 2013, the District Court dismissed the case. Barrett v. Williams, 2013 WL 686966 (D.Or. 2013). On March 23, 2013, the plaintiff sought reconsideration; he explained that he had missed the prior deadline because he was being transferred from New Mexico Department of Corrections to Florida Department of Corrections on the filing date and could not access to his legal documents during the transfer. On May 27, 2013, the Court granted the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and re-opened the defendants' motion for summary judgment. On November 14, 2013, the District Court denied summary judgment in part and granted it in part. The Court held that plaintiff's due process rights were not violated because the plaintiff was provided notice and a right to appeal. The Court also held that the defendants' rejection of the plaintiff's letter was not in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights, and denied the plaintiff's claim for damages. However, the District Court allowed the rest of plaintiff's free speech claim, addressing the regulation going forward, to proceed. Barrett v. Williams, 2013 WL 6055247, (D.Or. 2013) On December 2, 2013, the plaintiff sought reconsideration from the Court's November 13, 2013, ruling, which denied him damages. On December 16, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for appointment of counsel. On February 26, 2014, the Court granted the plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel but denied his motion for reconsideration from the Court's November 13, 2013, ruling. Specifically, the Court held that the Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for money damages because the rights the plaintiff asserted were not clearly established. Barrett v. Williams, 2014 WL 795801, (D.Or. 2014) Following a February 19, 2015, one-day trial, on March 30, 2015 the District Court issued Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. The Court held that the defendants' incoming mail policy of blocking a form of expression--artwork on an envelope-- violated inmates' and their correspondents' First Amendment rights. Barrett v. Premo, 2015 WL 1477902 (D.Or. 2015). On May 14, 2015, the Court enjoined the State from enforcing a blanket ban on artwork on the front of envelopes coming into its prisons. The Court also awarded the plaintiff reasonable attorney fees. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On November 10, 2011, the plaintiff--an Oregon Department of Corrections inmate-- filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, in U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The plaintiff alleged that the Oregon Department of Corrections violated his First Amendment free speech rights, his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights, and his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, when they rejected a return a letter written to another ODOC inmate because the envelope had a drawing on it. On May 14, 2015, the District Court enjoined the challenged prison policy."}
{"article": "On March 11, 2013, the Disability Rights Network (DRN), a Pennsylvania non-profit, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-PA-0031-0001.pdf\">filed suit</a> in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (PDOC). DRN alleged that the PDOC violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment in its use of solitary confinement \"Restrictive Housing Units\" (RHUs). There are no prisoner plaintiffs, and the case is not a class action; DRN has been designated by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as an entity that can advocate for and protect the rights of Pennsylvanians with mental illness, pursuant to the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 10801-07. According to the complaint, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections violated the rights of prisoners with severe mental illness by creating a cycle of solitary confinement and mental deterioration through the use of RHUs. DRN alleged that the PDOC regularly disciplined mentally ill prisoners for behavior symptomatic of their mental illnesses, and failed to take account of the role of mental illness in their behavior and the particularly detrimental effect of solitary confinement on the mentally ill, whose conditions worsened when deprived of human contact and adequate treatment. DRN further alleged that the PDOC did not maintain adequate therapeutic alternatives to RHUs for the number of mentally ill prisoners in the system and that PDOC nevertheless underutilized the treatment facilities it had by placing mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement, even when there were significant numbers of beds available in appropriate treatment programs. On January 5, 2015, the parties executed a <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-PA-0031-0003.pdf\">Settlement Agreement</a> providing for the dismissal of the matter without prejudice and retention of limited jurisdiction by the Court to enforce the agreement. In accordance with the parties' wishes, the Court dismissed the matter on January 15, 2015. Under the terms of the agreement, the PDOC neither admitted nor conceded any liability, wrongdoing, or violation of law, but agreed to continue with the implementation of specified improvements to its policies, practices, and facilities, under the supervisions of DRN. In particular, under the settlement, the PDOC will evaluate all incoming prisoners for serious mental illness, including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and major depressive disorder, and will place prisoners with serious mental illness in the RHUs only in \"exceptional\" circumstances; even then, a prisoner with serious mental illness can be kept in solitary confinement for no longer than 30 days and must be allowed out of their cells for 20 hours per week. The settlement provided for a monitor to report on compliance. The PDOC also agreed to pay DRN $750,000, in full satisfaction of all existing claims, fees, and costs. On May 5, 2015 the parties jointly filed an addendum to the settlement agreement wherein it would remain in effect for 3 years (less if the defendant could demonstrate substantial compliance for a period of 18 months). If the plaintiffs feel during that three years that the defendant is in noncompliance, the settlement specifies a procedure to follow, which could lead to an order of specific performance if the court agrees. There has been no activity on the docket since May 2015 and the case is presumably closed since the three year time period set in the agreement has lapsed.", "summary": "The Disability Rights Network (DRN), a Pennsylvania non-profit, filed this Eighth Amendment suit against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (PDOC) for the PDOC's use of solitary confinement with severely mentally ill prisoners. On January 5, 2015, the parties executed a settlement agreement for dismissal of the matter, in which the PDOC agreed to implement certain improvements and to pay $750,000 to DRN. In particular, the PDOC will evaluate all incoming prisoners for serious mental illness, and will place prisoners with serious mental illness in solitary confinement only in \"exceptional\" circumstances; even then, a prisoner with serious mental illness can be kept in solitary confinement for no longer than 30 days and must be allowed out of their cells for 20 hours per week. The settlement also provided for a monitor to report on compliance, and will remain in effect for 3 years (less if the defendant demonstrates substantial compliance for a period of 18 months). There has been no activity on the docket since May 2015 and the case is presumably closed since the three year time period set in the agreement has lapsed."}
{"article": "On November 10, 2014, the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the Middle District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and Pennsylvania state law against the Pennsylvania Attorney General and the District Attorney of Philadelphia. The plaintiffs--incarcerated prisoners, Prison Radio, Human Rights Coalition, and an unincorporated network of educators--requested injunctive relief, a declaratory judgment, and attorney fees; they alleged that the defendants violated their free speech rights. One of the plaintiffs is Mumia Abu-Jamal; he was incarcerated for killing a police officer. Abu-Jamal was invited by the undergraduates of Goddard College to give the fall 2014 commencement speech via recording. (Prison Legal News, which soon got involved in the litigation, was going to record the speech and relay it to the college.) In response to this invitation, on October 4, 2014, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the Revictimization Relief Act, 18 P.S. \u00a7 11.1304, an amendment to Pennsylvania's Crime Victims Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. \u00a7 11.10. The act allowed, in part, for attorneys and victims of personal injury crimes to enjoin those convicted of the crime from conduct that \"perpetuates the continuing effect of the crime on the victim.\" On January 8, 2015, Prison Legal News simultaneously filed a verified complaint and a motion for preliminary injunction in an initially separate action. (Prison Legal News v. Kane, Docket 1:15-cv-45). PLN added to the First Amendment argument an argument that the Act was impermissibly vague. The District Court (Chief Judge Christopher C. Connors) consolidated these actions. The records for both are in this Clearinghouse entry. On January 23, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Revictimization Act, and that the First Amendment issue was not ripe for adjudication. In an opinion dated March 6, 2015, the District Court (Chief Judge Christopher Conner) granted the District Attorney's motion, but not the Attorney General's similar motion. The Court reasoned that the District Attorney had promised not to enforce the act pending a determination of its constitutionality, but the Attorney General's refused to disavow enforcement. 96 F. Supp. 3d 447. Next, on April 28, 2015, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for declaratory relief, declaring the Revictimization Relief Act violated the plaintiffs' free speech rights, and was impermissibly vague, and permanently enjoining its enforcement. 105 F. Supp. 3d 448. A declaratory judgment was entered on April 30, 2015. Defendants elected not to appeal the judgment. Since July 2015, there has been no activity on the docket and the case is presumably closed.", "summary": "Incarcerated prisoners, Prison Radio, Human Rights Coalition, a network of educators, and Prison Legal News, filed these two consolidated lawsuits in the Middle District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C.\u00a7 1983 and Pennsylvania state law. The plaintiffs claimed that the Penn. Revictimization Relief Act--which banned certain public speeches by those convicted of crimes--violated their free speech rights. The District Court agreed, striking down the law on April 2015. Defendants elected not to appeal the judgment. Since July 2015, there has been no activity on the docket and the case is presumably closed."}
{"article": "On May 8, 2013, a prisoner in Pennsylvania's state prisons filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff sued the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections as well as the superintendents of SCI-Greene and SCI-Mahanoy under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff asked the court for both injunctive relief and damages, alleging that the defendants violated the plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by keeping him in solitary confinement for 22 consecutive years. The parties initiated discovery. On July 3, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. After numerous extensions for replies, the parties set a date for mediation on October 30, 2013. The mediation was unsuccessful. On January 27, 2014, Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy denied defendants' motion to dismiss. Judge Eddy held that the plaintiff's complaint alleged sufficiently plausible facts on both his Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Specifically, the plaintiff plausibly asserted that the conditions of his confinement caused severe physical and mental distress and that the defendants not only knew about his suffering, but were deliberately indifferent to it. His Fourteenth Amendment claim was not barred by claim preclusion from prior litigation challenging his solitary confinement because of new circumstances and the extended duration of the confinement. Further, the administration violated his procedural due process rights by failing to give him adequate information for why he was being kept in solitary confinement. 2014 WL 294988 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2014). The parties continued discovery for the next ten months. On November 21, 2014, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On July 15, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. On August 6, 2015, the defendants filed their own motion for summary judgment. After numerous extensions for responses to the summary judgment motions, Judge Eddy issued her opinion on February 12, 2016, denying both motions. She held that there were material issues of fact on both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims to warrant a jury trial. 2016 WL 595337 (Feb. 12, 2016). On May 10, 2015, the parties engaged in successful mediation and reached a settlement-in-principle.The Department of Corrections agreed to not place the plaintiff back in solitary confinement due to his prior disciplinary record or activities, to provide a single cell (and not have to share it for the rest of his life), to provide him with full mental health evaluation, and pay a monetary settlement. On July 25, 2016, Judge Eddy approved the stipulation of voluntary dismissal and the case was dismissed with prejudice. (https://abolitionistlawcenter.org/2016/07/11/media-release-settlement-reached-in-shoatz-v-wetzel/) During the period of mediation, the Department of Justice announced that it was closing an investigation against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections for its use of solitary confinement. The PDOC stipulated that it would ensure that prisoners are not sent to solitary confinement, expand mental health classification processes and streamline mental health care delivery, provide more mental health training to staff, and offer more out-of-cell activities for prisoners in solitary confinement. The DOJ letter also indicated that PDOC would commit to ensuring that all inmates with a serious mental health condition either present or in the past would be diverted to treatment units, reduce use of restraints, improve mental health staffing and recordkeeping, expand commitment units, better identify prisoners with intellectual disabilities, and improve quality assurance processes. (DOJ letter) No further activity has appeared on the docket. Presumably the case is closed.", "summary": "In 2013, a prisoner in Pennsylvania state prison filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged that his 22 years of solitary confinement violated the Eighth Amendment as well as his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. In 2016, the parties concluded successful mediation as a result of systemic changes to Pennsylvania's policies concerning solitary confinement and the case was dismissed."}
{"article": "On February 3, 2010, eleven Virginia prisoners, represented by the Legal Aid Justice Center and private counsel, filed this class action lawsuit against the Virginia Parole Board (\"the Board\") under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Plaintiffs challenged the Board's denials of parole for prisoners convicted of violent offenses solely because of the nature and circumstances of the crimes they had been convicted of committing. Those denials, Plaintiffs said, violated their due process rights and were unconstitutional ex post facto enhancements of their sentences. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that the Board adopted and implemented practices, policies, and procedures for making parole determinations without considering all the circumstances required by Virginia law, resulting in a drastic reduction in the availability of parole for prisoners convicted of violent offenses and the de facto abolition of the provisions of Virginia law governing parole for such prisoners. Moreover, Plaintiffs claimed these practices, policies and procedures created a significant risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to their crimes at the time of sentencing. Plaintiffs brought this action on behalf of a class of persons currently incarcerated by the Virginia Department of Corrections (\"DOC\") for violent offenses committed prior to January 1, 1995, who were or would become eligible for parole, and who had been or were likely to be denied parole exclusively or primarily by reference to the serious nature or circumstances of the crimes they had been convicted of committing. On March 1, 2010, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. On October 25, 2010, the Court (Judge Robert E. Payne) denied discovery and dismissed the case with prejudice. Judge Payne held that Plaintiffs had only a limited liberty interest in parole that was satisfied by existing prison procedures, noting that \"the Board has provided each Plaintiff with a constitutionally valid reason for denying them release on discretionary parole.\" In addition, Judge Payne rejected the ex post facto claims because the complaint revealed that about 120 to 230 prisoners who had been convicted of committing violent crimes were released on parole each year. On November 22, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Alter Judgment Pursuant to Rule 59(e). In their Rule 59(e) motion, Plaintiffs requested that the Court alter or amend its order of dismissal to be \"without prejudice\" in order to provide Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their Complaint. On March 1, 2011, Judge Payne denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter Judgment. Plaintiffs appealed the case to the Fourth Circuit. On July 10, 2012, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court\u2019s ruling in an opinion delivered by Judge Henry F. Floyd. Judge Floyd largely adopted the district court's reasoning, noting that discretionary decisions about whether to grant parole did not implicate the ex post facto clause. Judge Roger L. Gregory dissented, criticizing the majority's \"rigidly formalistic view\" of due process that allowed the Board to discharge its duties by supplying Plaintiffs written reasons for parole denials without requiring individualized consideration. Plaintiffs petitioned for a rehearing, but this was denied on November 15, 2012. No further activity has occurred since that date, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "On February 3, 2010, a group of 11 individuals held in Virginia prisons filed a class action lawsuit against the Virginia Parole Board for denying parole requests because of the nature and circumstances of the crimes they had been convicted of committing. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed."}
{"article": "On October 15, 2015, a prisoner in the state of Vermont filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Vermont. The plaintiff sued the state of Vermont, the Agency of Human Services, the Department of Corrections, the Department of Mental Health, and the Department of Aging and Independent Living under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12182. The plaintiff, represented by Disability Rights Vermont, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, compensatory, and punitive relief. The plaintiff claimed that his continued incarceration violated Title II of the ADA and the \u201cIntegration Mandate\u201d of the ADA. He also claimed that placement in his conditions constituted a violation of the rehabilitation act and a violation of the Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he had served his minimum sentence as of July 13, 2013 but he continued to be held at Southern State Correctional Facility because the defendants failed to implement disability-related support in the community. Without the support in the community, the plaintiff is at risk for continued unnecessary and harmful institutionalization. Also, had the plaintiff been placed in the most integrated setting possible, he would not have experienced exacerbated mental, emotional, and physical trauma, which included a significant suicide attempt. The plaintiff endured unnecessary pain and suffering and a continuing violation of his civil rights in the form of disability-based discrimination. The parties conducted discovery and had an Early Neutral Evaluation meeting in which a full settlement was reached. On June 7, 2016, Judge William Sessions dismissed the case according to the private settlement and ordered to reopen the action if the settlement is not consummated.", "summary": "In 2015, the plaintiff filed this in the U.S. District Court of Vermont alleging disability-based discrimination while incarcerated. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, compensatory, and punitive relief and the judge dismissed the matter after the parties reached a full settlement."}
{"article": "On May 10, 2016, this class-action lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois on behalf of over 1,000 current and former residents of Alexander County Housing Authority (ACHA) to remedy allegations of rampant discrimination based on race and family status as well as rent overcharges and a failure to maintain rental units. The plaintiffs sued ACHA under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, and state law, seeking injunctive relief and damages. Represented by the Sargent Shriver National Center of Poverty Law and private counsel, the plaintiffs claimed that ACHA has persisted in racially discriminatory practices for the past 40 years, pointing to a previously settled lawsuit in which the Department of Justice found a pattern and practice of racially segregated housing. The plaintiffs also alleged that ACHA had ignored multiple requests to adequately maintain the housing units. After filing three additional amended complaints, which included adding and removing individual plaintiffs and dropping the putative class-action claims for damages, as well as engaging in some discovery, the parties started participating in settlement conferences with Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. On July 27, 2017, the majority of the plaintiffs stipulated with the defendants to dismiss the case with prejudice and without costs. Three remaining plaintiffs failed to respond to the court on whether they intended to proceed with the case. On September 12, 2017, Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan dismissed and closed the case after the three remaining plaintiffs failed to further prosecute the case.", "summary": "In 2016, current and former public housing residents filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs alleged rampant discrimination on the basis of race and family status, rent overcharges, and a failure to maintain rental units. After participating in settlement conferences, the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice and without costs in July 2017. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On March 11, 2011, the NAACP and a few other individuals filed a class-action lawsuit against the city of San Jose and public officials. The plaintiffs stated that they were peacefully protesting police brutality and institutionalized racism when San Jose police fired impact munitions and attacked them with flash-bang grenades, chemical weapons, and batons. The plaintiffs contended that the defendants have exhibited a long history of targeting Black, Brown, and Muslim communities, and that the use of force in these protests was racially motivated. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, contending that the defendants violated their First Amendment right to free speech and association, their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful arrest and excessive force, and their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection. Claims were also brought under the state constitution equivalents of these provisions. The plaintiffs also brought claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, arguing that the defendant's policing practices failed to make reasonable modifications that allow people with disabilities to participate in protests. Finally, the plaintiffs sued under a variety of state laws, including tort claims like assault and negligence. The lawsuit sought declaratory relief stating that the defendant's policing practices were unconstitutional, as well and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from engaging in the same behavior in the future. The class members also sought compensatory damages relief. The case was assigned to Judge Phyllis Jean Hamilton of the Northern District of California. As of May 25, the case remains ongoing.", "summary": "The NAACP and individual people sued the city of San Jose and political officials for policing tactics that allegedly deprived them of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs, protesting systemic racism in policing, alleged that the police used excessive force in a racially motivated manner to end the protests."}
{"article": "This complaint was filed on July 23, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The suit was filed by a number of political and legal organizations, as well as a news media organization. These groups included: Black Lives Matter Chicago; Black Abolitionist Network; Chicago Democratic Socialists of America; Good Kids/Mad City; #LetUsBreathe Collective; South Siders Organized for Unity and Liberation; National Lawyers Guild Chicago; First Defense Legal Aid; and In These Times. The defendants were numerous federal agents, including Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Chad Wolf, Deputy Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Matthew Albence, Attorney General William Barr, Director of Federal Protective Services L. Eric Patterson, and FBI Director Christopher Wray, among others. Plaintiffs were represented by private counsel and attorneys from Westside Justice Center, People's Law Office, as well as attorney-professors at Northwestern and University of Chicago. The lawsuit followed the dispersal of federal agents to quell protests that occurred in Chicago after the police killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor in the spring of 2020. President Trump first sent federal agents to Portland in July, then to several other cities including Chicago later that month. The complaint did not allege that the federal troops had done anything in particular, but that their very presence was menacing. They argued that the presence of these federal agents represented violations of the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to free speech and free protest as well as excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. They also alleged conspiracy to deprive the plaintiffs of their rights. The plaintiffs requested declaratory relief that would deem the federal agents' actions illegal and injunctive relief prohibiting the policing of the protests by federal agents, ceasing the arrest of residents of Chicago, and to stop enforcing a policy of alleged \"preemptive arrests.\" On July 31, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint which added a count of violating the Tenth Amendment. They argued that the federal agents' conducting of law enforcement was an encroachment on the policing powers left to the state and local government. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to state a claim on October 2. They argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the plaintiffs' alleged injuries that took place in other cities and statements by the President, Attorney General, and Acting Secretary of DHS, but failed to allege particular and concrete injuries their organizations in Chicago. In addition, even if the plaintiffs had standing, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Tenth Amendment because the plaintiffs did not cite that a specific federal law violated the Tenth Amendment or adequately allege the federal defendants encroached on a specific power reserved to the states. On January 21, 2021, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice. The plaintiffs' claims were based on the Trump administration's alleged animus against Black Lives Matter and other groups protesting for racial justice. When Joe Biden was elected President, the change in administration mooted the plaintiffs' claims. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This is a lawsuit brought by several black activist groups, legal organizations, and news media outlets, against the heads of various federal agencies, including the DHS, ICE, Federal Protective Services, and the DOJ. They argued that the deployment to Chicago of these federal agencies by President Trump during the protests that ensued after the police killing of George Floyd were unlawful and unconstitutional. They argued that the defendants violated the First, Fourth, and Tenth Amendments by using these agents, and that they were in conspiracy to deprive Chicago residents of their rights. When Joe Biden replaced Donald Trump as President, the change in administration mooted the case. It was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs in January 2021."}
{"article": "On May 25, 2010, the plaintiffs -- individuals who were allegedly issued summonses without probable cause by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) -- filed this putative class action complaint in the United States Court for the Southern District of New York, against the City of New York under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief, claiming violations of their First and Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that an unwritten 'summons quota' drove NYPD officers to issue summonses to and arrest individuals without probable cause, and in violation of the federal and state constitutions. The complaint explained that in 1994, the NYPD instituted the COMPSTAT system, which records the statistics of arrests by type and the amount of summonses issued. Summonses are tickets written by police officers in lieu of arrest for a crime that directs the recipient of the summons to appear in court to face charges. Marijuana violations, disorderly conduct, and obstruction of governmental administration (OGA) are crimes for which summonses are typically issued. The plaintiffs alleged that since the institution of the COMPSTAT system, the number of summonses issued had increased by 500%, and that more than half (50.5%) of these charges are dismissed later on. The plaintiffs alleged that the NYPD employed an illegal quota system for summonses, arrests, and quality-of-life violations. An officer's ability to meet quotas, plaintiffs claimed, was linked to officer promotion and demotion. This scheme was found by an arbitrator to be illegal under New York labor law. As alleged by the plaintiffs, as part of an effort to meet the quota system NYPD Precinct commanders ordered officers to issue summonses in cases in which there was no probable cause of a crime being committed. They introduced tape recordings of two precinct commanders issuing orders for officers to issue summonses and 'articulate' violations of the law after-the-fact. The plaintiffs further alleged that this policy was disproportionately enforced in minority communities in Brooklyn, the Bronx and Queens. As a result, they have been falsely arrested and denied their right to peaceably assemble in their own communities. On April 23, 2012, after hearing the parties on the matter of class certification, the court (Judge Robert W. Sweet) issued an unpublished opinion and order certifying the class as \"includ[ing] individuals who were issued summonses that were later dismissed upon a judicial finding of facial insufficiency and who were ticketed without probable cause.\" The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration on the issue of class certification, but the motion was denied on July 19, 2012. For the next several years, the parties engaged in discovery and litigated many issues regarding access to evidence during discovery. One notable discovery debate concerned removing the statutory seal on the records of individuals whose criminal court summonses were dismissed for factual insufficiency for the relevant time period. On February 24, 2016, the court (Judge Sweet) issued an opinion granting in part and denying in part defendants\u2019 second motion to remove the statutory seal, concluding that unsealing the records for the purpose of aggregating statistics and discerning patterns is permissible, but doing so to identify officers who issued disputed summonses so that they can be called at trial is not. 2016 WL 817445. On April 1, 2016, the court (Judge Sweet) issued an order detailing the summons information to be provided and that which was to be withheld. On January 23, 2017, the plaintiffs submitted an executed stipulation of settlement and a proposed preliminary approval order. On January 24, 2017, the court (Judge Sweet) issued an order granting preliminary approval of the proposed settlement and notice plan, and appointing a settlement claims administrator. The parties agreed to settlement benefits of up to seventy-five million dollars, with up to $56,500,000 to be used to fund settlement payments to individual class members, service awards to the named class representatives, and costs of notice and settlement administration, and an additional $18,500,000 to pay attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. As is detailed in the settlement, the NYPD has made changes to its policies, practices, and procedures related to criminal summonses, and will continue to make additional changes. The changes address the use of quotas, numerical measurements of performance, and other matters that have been the subject of the class\u2019 injunctive relief claims in this case, including: signing into law the Quota Bill to prohibit discrimination against an employee for the failure to meet quotas; publishing Legal Bureau Bulletin concerning the Quota Bill; revising Patrol Guide Section 205-38 to reiterate the retaliating against service members for providing information regarding misconduct and corruption will not be tolerated; developing new Patrol Guide procedures and updating training and reference materials; announcing the \u201cJustice Reboot\u201d initiative; signing the Criminal Justice Reform Act (singed by Mayor de Blasio); voluntarily posting certain summons data on the NYPD website; and agreeing to make a confidential presentation to counsel for the class regarding changes to the performance evaluation system. The NYPD agreed to present additional pilots and ongoing projects. Such pilots and projects include: making reasonable efforts to ensure that the NYPD sends a department-wide email regarding quota policy, disciplinary action, and retaliation; investigating allegations regarding quotas, numeric performance goals, and misconduct; conducting such investigations by a designated parent command Investigations Unit; making reasonable efforts to conduct targeted internal review of training materials and to ensure compliance with the Quota Bill; and making reasonable efforts to make changes to its Patrol Guide and conduct training relating to the distribution of \u201cContact Cards.\u201d On April 14, 2017, the parties jointly moved for final approval of the class action settlement, which the court granted on April 18, 2017. On June 19, 2017, the court entered final judgment in this case, approving the settlement agreement. The judgment, pursuant to the settlement agreement, required the defendants to pay settlement benefits in the amount of $75,000,000 and attorneys\u2019 fees in the amount of $18,500,000. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. As of April 20, 2020 the case is ongoing for compliance purposes but there have been no new entries in the docket since the final order and judgment.", "summary": "Individuals issued summonses by the NYPD without probable cause brought a class action suit against the City of New York. They alleged that the NYPD's 'quota' policy is linked to officer promotion and demotion, and as a result, leads to commanding officers ordering police officers to arrest and issue summonses to individuals without probable cause, in contravention of the federal and state constitutions. Judge Sweet, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, granted the case class action status in April 2012. On January 24, 2017, Judge Sweet preliminary approved the parties' settlement agreement, in which the parties agreed to settlement benefits of up to seventy-five million dollars. On April 18, 2017, the court granted final approval. The case is ongoing for compliance purposes."}
{"article": "On August 28, 1997, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint against the City of Steubenville pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a714141 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio to remedy an alleged pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct by officers of the Steubenville Police Department [\"SPD\"] including: using excessive force; making false arrests; lodging false charges; and conducting improper searches and seizures. The filing followed a year long DOJ investigation of the SDP. Contemporaneously with the filing of the government's complaint, the parties filed a joint application for the entry of the consent decree. In support of the joint application, the parties submitted the declaration of James J. Fyfe, Ph.D., a nationally recognized expert in police management, who consulted the DOJ during its investigation of SPD. District Judge George C. Smith entered the consent decree on September 3, 1997. The consent decree included the implementation of changes in the use of force, officer training, internal affairs investigations, officer detention and arrest of subjects, and collection and retention of department information and data. On October 20, 1997, the Fraternal Order of Police of Fort Steuben filed a motion for leave to intervene as a third-party, so that it could challenge the consent decree. Judge Smith denied that motion on July 23, 1998. In accordance with the consent decree, the parties selected Charles D Reynolds to serve as auditor. The auditor was charged with oversight of the implementation of the provisions of the consent decree and provided quarterly reports to the court. In 2001, a member of the police department who had not been chosen as the Chief of Police when that position was being filled sued in state court, alleging a violation of Ohio Civil Service law. The city defended the case on the grounds that it followed the procedures specified in the consent decree, and the matter was moved to federal court. On June 15, 2001, Judge Smith found that case (C2-01-322) related to the underlying civil rights case; both were assigned to Judge Edmund A. Sargus Jr., for decision. On June 15, 2001, Judge Sargus ordered the cases consolidated, denied the city's dismissal motion, and granted the U.S. permission to intervene as a party in the civil service case. 147 F.Supp.2d 872 (2001). On September 7, 2001, Judge Sargus granted the DOJ and the City's motion for summary judgment in the individual officer's lawsuit. That officer, the Court found, was not entitled to become the Chief against the procedures specified in the decree. 2001 WL 1681105. Monitoring and reporting by auditor Reynolds continued until early 2005. On March 2, 2005, the parties filed a joint motion for termination of the consent decree and dismissal of the case. Judge Sargus granted that motion and the case was dismissed on March 4, 2005.", "summary": "On August 28, 1997, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint against the City of Steubenville pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a714141 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio to remedy an alleged pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct by officers of the Steubenville Police Department. The parties entered into consent decree contemporaneously with filing the complaint. Monitoring and reporting continued into 2005, when the parties filed and the court granted a joint motion for termination."}
{"article": "On July 24, 2008, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, against the City of Tenaha. The plaintiffs were all individuals who were traveling on public roads in or near Tenaha, Texas, when, they say, they were illegally stopped and their property seized. They sued under the Fourth Amendment (unreasonable searches and seizures) and Fourteenth Amendments (equal protection), actionable under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs were represented by lawyers from Legal Aid, the American Civil Liberties Union (Racial Justice Program, Criminal Law Reform Project, Texas chapter, and national), and from private practice. They asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary relief including compensatory and punitive damages as well as legal costs. The plaintiffs claimed that law enforcement officials in and around the City of Tenaha had developed an illegal practice of targeting, stopping, detaining, searching, and often seizing property from people who appeared to be non-white or who were traveling with non-white passengers. The named plaintiffs claimed that they had been victims of such stops. The plaintiffs sought a class certification of similarly situated persons consisting of: (1) people who were, or appeared to be, members of racial or ethnic minority groups and those in their company, and (2) were or would be traveling in, through, or near Tenaha since July 27, 2006, and (3) were, or were subject to being stopped and detained and/or arrested by one or more of the defendants without an articulable suspicion of criminal activity, to find valuable property or money. The individual plaintiffs were allegedly stopped without warrants or legal justification and were then either detained or threatened with detention, and had property seized in amounts varying from $3,969 to $50,000. Plaintiffs were allegedly falsely prosecuted for crimes such as money laundering. One couple was allegedly told that their children would be put in foster care if they did not sign papers authorizing the seizure. On August 29, 2011, the Court (Judge T. John Ward) granted in part the plaintiff's motion for class certification. Morrow v. Washington, 277 F.R.D. 172 (E.D. Tex. 2011). The Court granted the class certification for Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, but did not certify the class for Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims or for monetary relief. In the opinion, the Court cited to recordings from cameras in the police vehicles at the time of the stops. The Court drew an adverse inference from the failure of Tenaha's law enforcement agencies to collect and report racial profiling evidence, as required by Texas law. The Court also drew an adverse inference from two defendants' invocation of their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, during deposition. The Court modified the class definition, because it found that there was \"articulable suspicion\" for the stops (albeit not reasonable suspicion). The modified definition of the class consisted of (1) people who were, or appeared to be, members of racial or ethnic minority groups and those in their company, and (2) were, or would be, traveling in, through, or near Tenaha at any time after November 1, 2006, and (3) were subject to being stopped by one or more defendant for an alleged traffic violation. The defendants twice sought a discretionary interlocutory appeal of the class certification, but were twice denied. On August 6, 2012, plaintiffs and defendants filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a consent decree. The Consent Decree was extensive, with key terms including the following:<ul><li>All traffic stops shall be recorded in full by both video and audio recordings. <li>Defendants shall maintain written documentation with details about traffic stops, detention, canine sniffs, searches, seizures, and/or forfeitures. <li>Defendants will not use canines for routine traffic stops. <li>Written notice shall be provided to a person before a canine sniff, before a consent search, and before the seizure of property. Before conducting a consent search, an officer must obtain written and oral video and audio recorded consent for the search. <li>Defendants will track all asset forfeiture incident to traffic stops, and all such revenue will all be donated to non-profit organizations, used for audio and video equipment, or used for the annual training required by this decree. <li>Internal review procedures will be instituted every quarter, and an impartial monitor will address compliance.</ul> Defendants also agreed to pay litigation costs (attorneys' fees and notice to the class). On February 19, 2013, the Court (Judge Gilstrap) granted preliminary approval of the consent decree. Following a fairness hearing, the court granted final approval of the consent decree on August 8, 2013. The court appointed a monitor on October 9, 2013, who proceeded to file quarterly status reports. On August 7, 2017, the plaintiffs moved to extend the duration of the Consent Decree, which was set to expire the next day. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants had a \"poor record of compliance,\" necessitating an extension of the consent decree. There was a hearing on this motion on November 1, 2018, after which the parties renegotiated the settlement agreement. They filed a joint motion to approve the amended agreement on December 13, 2018, which the court approved. The agreement was substantially similar to the originally consent decree, but extended the duration to the next two years with the opportunity for the plaintiffs to file for additional extensions. This case is ongoing with some litigation over attorneys' fees as of April 17, 2020. The amended settlement is set to expire in early 2021.", "summary": "In July 2008, the plaintiffs sued the City of Tenaha under the Fourth Amendment (unreasonable search and seizure) and the Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection). They claimed that law enforcement officials in and around the City of Tenaha have developed an illegal practice of targeting, stopping, detaining, searching, and often seizing property from people who appeared to be non-white or who were traveling with non-white passengers. The plaintiffs claimed that they had been victims of such stops and seizures of amounts up to $50,000, as well as false prosecution or detention. The parties reached a preliminary settlement in August 2012. Their proposed consent decree included: video and audio recordings of all stops; written documentation with details of the stop; no more dog searches in routine traffic stops; written and oral consent for a search; all asset forfeiture revenue must be donated to nonprofits or used for audio/video equipment or training; and use of an impartial monitor. The court approved the consent decree, which it later extended to early 2021 after the plaintiffs alleged noncompliance by the City."}
{"article": "This is a lawsuit about the constitutionality of President Trump\u2019s Executive Order authorizing sanctions against individuals who assist the International Criminal Court (ICC). The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and private counsel brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on January 15, 2021 in response to the June 11, 2020 Executive Order authorizing economic sanctions against individuals who assist the International Criminal Court (ICC) in investigating or prosecuting war crimes and other grave human rights violations. The plaintiffs argued that the Trump Administration violated the First Amendment when it prevented individuals in the ICC\u2019s justice proceedings from providing human rights expertise and representing victims. The plaintiffs were three law faculty and a human rights attorney who work with or advocate before the International Criminal Court. They sued the President in his official capacity, the U.S. Department of State, the Secretary of State, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Attorney General, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, and the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control. The plaintiffs sought to invalidate the Executive Order and block the Trump administration from implementing or enforcing it against any individual seeking to assist the ICC. They sued under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and \u00a7706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and an injunction that would prevent the defendants from implementing or enforcing the Executive Order, Regulations and Designations, and IEEPA\u2019s civil or criminal penalty provisions against the plaintiffs. Additionally, the plaintiffs requested payment for their costs and reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees incurred in this action. On January 19, 2021, the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero. The case was reassigned to District Court Judge Charles R. Breyer on January 29, 2021. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2021, the ACLU and private counsel brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in response to President Trump\u2019s June 11, 2020 Executive Order authorizing economic sanctions against individuals who assist the International Criminal Court in investigating or prosecuting war crimes. The plaintiffs sued under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and \u00a7706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. They sought declaratory relief and an injunction that would prevent the Trump Administration from implementing or enforcing the Executive Order. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "This case involved the District of Columbia\u2019s signature requirements for ballot qualification during the COVID-19 pandemic. Bill B-23-0864 lowered the signatures required for third-party presidential candidates to qualify for the D.C. ballot from 5,007 to 250. The political party Alliance Party and two third-party presidential filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on August 21, 2020. They were represented by private counsel and sued the District of Columbia Board of Elections. The case was assigned to Judge Boasberg. The plaintiffs alleged that they had not been given adequate notice of the signature decrease, resulting in them abandoning their effort to collect signatures because they thought it would be impossible to collect 5,0007 signatures while adhering to social distancing guidelines. The deadline for submitting petitions to appear on the ballot had passed the day before the bill was passed on August 6, 2020. Plaintiffs alleged that independent and third-party presidential candidates who ceased attempting to collect signatures to meet the 5,007 threshold had their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights violated because they could not take advantage of the signature reduction until it was too late. Suing under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the plaintiffs contended that their equal protection rights were violated because notice was given to other candidates, but not independent or third-party presidential candidates. The plaintiffs also alleged that their First Amendment and due process rights were violated because they had not been given timely notice to exercise their fundamental right of political speech. In addition to declaratory relief, the plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the new bill, and also sought a deadline extension that would allow presidential candidates to continue gathering signatures until September 1, 2020. For future elections the plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction requiring the defendants to provide at least two-weeks notice for any changes to the signature requirement. Finally, the plaintiffs sought attorneys\u2019 fees. A week after filing their complaint, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order on August 28, 2020. They now sought to extend the filing deadline to September 8, 2020. The plaintiffs made two primary arguments. First, the defendant\u2019s lack of notice irreparably harmed non-major party candidates by effectively denying ballot access. Second, defendant could handle the deadline extension as a single worker could certify 500 signatures within two days. The court denied this motion during a motion hearing held on September 3, 2020. The 2020 general election was held on November 3. Two days later, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the law at issue would not be in effect for future elections and, therefore, the case was moot. After the plaintiffs failed to respond to the motion, the court granted it on December 7, 2020. This case is closed.", "summary": "The Alliance Party and two third-party presidential sued the District of Columbia Board of Elections. The D.C. city government had lowered the signatures required for ballot qualification from 5,007 to 250 on August 6, 2020, the day after petitions to appear on the ballot were due. The plaintiffs contended that they had ceased collecting signatures because it was \"impossible\" to collect 5,007 signatures while adhering to social distancing guidelines, but would have continued their efforts if they knew they only had to get 250. The district court denied a motion for temporary restraining order, the 2020 election was held and this case was dismissed soon after."}
{"article": "On May 15, 2015, private citizens of Jefferson County, Florida filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiffs sued the Jefferson County Board of Commissioners, as well as the Jefferson County School Board and the official director of elections in the county, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs were represented by two public interest groups, the Florida Justice Institute and the ACLU Foundation of Florida. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asking the court to name the 2013 redistricting plan of Jefferson County unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, asking for an order enjoining the use of the 2013 redistricting plan, and, in the event that the defendants were unable to come up with a plan that was satisfactory, a court-ordered redistricting plan. The plaintiffs also sought attorney\u2019s fees. Jefferson County, Florida was divided into five districts, each of which elected one commissioner to the Board of Commissioners. Each voting district was supposed to contain a roughly equal number of residents, pursuant to the one person one vote requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. The third district contained the Jefferson Correctional Institution, a correctional facility housing 1157 inmates (according to the 2010 census). The population of the correctional facility was counted when drawing the lines of District Three, even though the vast majority of the inmates were not residents of Jefferson County, and thus were not registered to vote in Jefferson County. Because there are five districts in Jefferson County, an ideal population size for each district would be 1/5 of the population. Including the prison population, District 3 missed this goal by only 4%. Not including the prison population, District 3 missed this goal by 29.69%. The plaintiffs were concerned that the smaller voting population in District 3 gave the residents there inflated electing power. On March 9th, 2015, the plaintiffs filed their complaint, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Discovery lasted about two months, from the end of March, 2015 to September of 2015. At the end of July, the Defendants moved for summary judgment, and at the beginning of August, 2015, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment as well. On March 19, 2016, Judge Mark E. Walker granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants'. As a result, the 2013 Jefferson County redistricting plan was declared unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, and was forbidden from being used. 2016 was an election year for Jefferson County, so the court entreated the Defendant to come up with a usable, constitutional redistricting plan, or the court would be forced to order their own redistricting plan. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants then submitted redistricting plans for Jefferson County. The plaintiffs\u2019 plan was only to be accepted if the defendants\u2019 plan was unacceptable. A major point of contention in the acceptability of the plans was their adherence to a 1985 consent decree, which outlined the way elections were to be run in Jefferson County. The sticking point was that the consent decree stipulated that District 3 was to be a \u201cbalance district\u201d \u2013 that is, having roughly equal numbers of African-American and white voters. On April 18, 2016, Judge Mark E. Walker approved the defendants\u2019 plan. Though the new District 3 did not have an equal number of African-American and white voters, the court deemed it acceptable and no longer unconstitutional. On July 13, 2016, the two parties filed a notice of settlement. They resolved the plaintiffs\u2019 claim for attorney\u2019s fees; the amount settled upon was not mentioned in the notice. The parties also agreed to close the case, but asked the court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the payment of the settlement. The settlement was to be made in two payments. According to the final action in this case on July 14, 2016, this case is closed pending the second of these two settlement payments. As of October 2018, there has been no further litigation, and the case is presumed closed.", "summary": "In 2015, residents of Jefferson County, Florida filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that the county's 2013 redistricting plan was guilty of \"prison-based gerrymandering,\" and was thus guilty of violating the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought and received a declaration that the 2013 plan was unconstitutional as well as an injunction requiring the defendants to produce an acceptable redistricting plan. The defendants' plan was approved and parties then settled on the attorneys' fees."}
{"article": "On June 26, 2014, multiple residents and citizens of Arizona subject to the death penalty filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) and multiple state officials associated with the organization under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. With the representation of private counsel and the Federal Public Defenders Office, the plaintiffs claimed violations of the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, and the Supremacy Clause. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants\u2019 lethal injection protocols did not follow the FDA\u2019s regulations and that the Department was concealing information regarding protocols. The plaintiffs sought temporary, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to order defendants to stop executing plaintiffs until they complied with FDA regulations. On July 2, 2014, the lead plaintiff, Wood, filed a motion for preliminary injunction to bar defendants from his scheduled execution on July 23, 2014 without first disclosing to him the process of his execution and the drugs to be used. On July 10, 2014, Judge Neil Wake denied the motion on the grounds that Wood\u2019s motion, founded on the First Amendment claim in his complaint, was not likely to succeed on the merits and did not raise serious questions as to the merits. 2014 WL 3385115. Wood appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit. On July 19, 2014, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court\u2019s decision and ordered that Wood\u2019s execution be stayed until the ADC provided specific information as to the drugs to be used in his execution and the qualifications of the personnel intended to carry out his execution. 759 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014). ADC immediately filed a petition for a rehearing, but the Ninth Circuit denied the petition on July 21, 2014. The following day, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit\u2019s decision, holding that Judge Wake did not abuse his discretion in denying Wood\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction. 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014). Mr. Wood was executed on July 23, 2014. The remaining plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on September 18, 2014. The complaint described the defendants\u2019 \u201cimprovisational execution\u201d of Wood, stating that it placed \u201chis suffering far beyond what the Constitution permits.\u201d It alleged that he gasped for air for nearly two hours as the defendants continued to inject him with a variety of drugs. The complaint also added new plaintiffs and new claims to the original suit. It added several other citizens and residents of Arizona subject to the death penalty, as well as the First Amendment Coalition of Arizona, Inc. The complaint further alleged that the defendants had denied the press their First Amendment rights to access governmental proceedings, and that they violated the prisoners' rights against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. They also claimed that the defendants had violated the Equal Protection Clause because execution methods varied without a principled basis for such deviations. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on October 9, 2014 for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The defendants moved to dismiss most of the plaintiffs\u2019 First Amendment claims alleging violation of their right to governmental proceedings and their Fourteenth Amendment claims. On November 21, 2014, the parties entered a stipulated agreement to resolve this motion. The stipulation set forth the following terms: Arizona would publicly release a report regarding Wood\u2019s execution and, in light of this report, the ADC would review its death penalty procedure and propose a new protocol. If adopted, ADC would provide the plaintiffs with a copy to review and upload the final protocol on the website for public viewing. Regarding the litigation process, the stipulation stated that the defendants would not seek an execution warrant from the Arizona Supreme Court until after the issue was resolved and a final judgment was entered, that all litigation would be stayed until the new protocol was proposed, that the plaintiffs would be allowed to file a second amended complaint after the new protocol was released, if needed, and that the defendants would take appropriate steps to preserve all documents relied upon and used in the report. Both parties agreed to not seek attorneys' fees. Judge Wake lifted the stay on January 12, 2016, holding that the stipulation had been satisfied but that the state could not seek a warrant of execution until the matters pending in the case were resolved. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on January 29, 2016. This complaint alleged that the new protocol proposed by the defendants used a combination of drugs never used together before and still violated the same rights. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 entire second amended complaint on February 19, 2016 on the grounds that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On May 18, 2016, Judge Neil Wake granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice as to both the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims on the grounds that neither guaranteed a legal right of access to government information. This decision also dismissed the First Amendment Coalition as a plaintiff. 188 F. Supp. 3d 940. First Amendment Coalition appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit. Meanwhile in the district court, on July 29, 2016, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 claim of an Eighth Amendment violation for cruel and unusual punishment on the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants argued that they no longer had the midazolam drug plaintiffs referred to in the complaint and could not no longer obtain it. On December 19, 2016, the parties agreed to dismiss the first claim in the plaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint without prejudice. But, if the ADC used or showed an intention of using midazolam or any benzodiazepine drug as part of the lethal injection protocol in the future, any future prisoner, as a third-part beneficiary, could reinstate this claim. Neither party sought attorneys' fees but they did agree in the stipulation that plaintiffs were entitled to seek fees if the defendant breached the agreement. The final stipulated agreement of the case was entered on June 21, 2017. The agreement dismissed the last two claims in the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint but the parties did not agree to settle. So, the plaintiffs\u2019 preserved the right to appeal any claims in the case. Essentially, the agreement prohibited the defendant from ever engaging in the following conduct: using certain categories of drugs or expired drugs in the lethal injection process, forcing prisoners to pay for the chemicals to be used in their own injection, failing to provide a timely report of the drugs used upon request, changing the drugs to be used in an execution after a warrant has been sought without notifying the prisoner, and adopting any language that would allow the ADC or its directors discretion to deviate from the central issues to the established execution procedures. The agreement stated that if the defendants engaged in or showed an intent to engage in certain prohibited conduct that the claims would be reinstated and the defendants would be enjoined. First Amendment Coalition's appeal continued in the Ninth Circuit. Oral arguments occurred on September 12, 2018. On September 17, 2019, the court released its opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the district court\u2019s dismissal of the plaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint. The court held that the ADC did violate the First Amendment right to access to governmental proceedings by restricting access to hearing sounds of an execution and reversed the district court\u2019s decision on this count. However, the court held that the First Amendment right does not encompass knowledge of execution drugs or personnel and affirmed the district court opinion on these counts. Finally, the court held that the Arizona restrictions did not restrict plaintiffs\u2019 First Amendment right of access to the courts. The case was remanded on the reversed count. <i> First Amendment Coal. of Ariz., Inc. v. Ryan </i>, 938 F.3d 1069 (U.S. App. 2019) The case is ongoing.", "summary": "Several citizens and residents of Arizona subject to the death penalty brought suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 against the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) and several associated governmental employees. The plaintiffs argued that the ADC's lethal injection procedure violated their First Amendment right to access governmental proceedings, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, and the Federal Supremacy Clause. The parties came to a stipulated agreement prohibiting the defendant from using certain chemicals for execution, among other limitation. The case is ongoing after the Ninth Circuit remanded counts for retrial."}
{"article": "On March 6, 2012, a group of individuals convicted of sexual offenses prior to 2011 filed this lawsuit in the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Governor of Michigan and the director of the Michigan State Police. The plaintiffs alleged that Michigan's 2011 Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) could not be applied to them retroactively. Under SORA, one of the plaintiffs was required to register as a sex offender even though he was not originally convicted of a sex offense. Another plaintiff was required to register on a public registry even though he was promised privacy in his plea agreement. And two of the plaintiffs were required to remain on a public registry for life instead of 25 years. Represented by the ACLU of Michigan, Michigan Clinical Law Program, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief barring SORA's retroactive application. The plaintiffs claimed that SORA violated the prohibition on ex post facto laws, interfered with their fundamental rights to work, travel, speak, and raise their children without being narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest, violated the Due Process Clause, and was void for being too vague. The case was assigned to Judge Robert H. Cleland and referred to Magistrate Judge David R. Grand. On April 24, 2012, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Nearly a year later, on March 18, 2013, the defendants\u2019 motion was granted in part and denied in part. The court granted the defendants\u2019 motion on the ex post facto claim, finding that SORA was a regulatory action and not a criminal statute. The court also granted the defendants\u2019 motion on the claims that SORA interfered with the plaintiffs\u2019 rights to travel and work. The court concluded that the extra procedures imposed by SORA, such as reporting temporary residences or prohibiting loitering in a school zone, did not significantly burden the plaintiffs\u2019 ability to travel interstate or intrastate. Similarly, the court found that SORA did not bar the plaintiffs from electing a particular career. The Act\u2019s only restriction on employment regarded working in a school zone, and the court found that provision to be narrowly tailored to serve the legitimate interests of the State. The court also granted the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss for claims that applying SORA retroactively was unconstitutional for the plaintiff who were originally convicted of a non-sexual offense and the plaintiff who was offered a plea agreement that stipulated they would not have to register on a public registry. Applying SORA retroactively to these plaintiffs had a legitimate legislative purpose. However, the court denied the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss the claim that SORA interfered with the plaintiffs\u2019 rights to raise their children. The court found that the prohibition against any loitering in a school zone may have impeded on the plaintiffs\u2019 ability to raise their children and participate in their education. The court also denied the motion to dismiss the claims from plaintiffs whose registration period on a public registry was extended from twenty-five years to life. The court denied the motion since it was unclear from the complaint whether the defendants had a rational legislative purpose for requiring lifetime registration. The court denied the motion to dismiss claims as to SORA\u2019s vagueness, which had made it impossible for the plaintiffs to comply with its reporting requirements. The court found that additional information was needed to determine if SORA was specific enough for the plaintiffs to understand the requirements imposed on them. The court similarly denied the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 First Amendment claim. The court found that additional information was needed to conclude whether SORA\u2019s requirements that the plaintiffs provide all online usernames chilled the plaintiffs\u2019 right to free speech. 932 F.Supp.2d 803. Discovery continued for the next year. On February 20, 2014, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. Less than two weeks later, the defendants also moved for summary judgment. Both motions were denied on May 1, 2014. The court instead ordered the parties to cooperate and produce one stipulated factual record, to notify the court of any disputed material facts, and to each file a Motion for Judgment. On March 31, 2015, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs\u2019 June 27, 2014 Motion for Judgment and the defendants\u2019 July 9, 2014 Motion for Judgment. The court held the plaintiffs\u2019 claims that certain aspects of SORA were too vague were valid, since the plaintiffs had curtailed their conduct as a result of the statute's uncertainty. Specifically, the court held that geographic exclusion zones proscribing where registrants could stand were unconstitutional since they were too vague to inform registrants and law enforcement was constituted a violation. Similarly, requirements that registrants report their telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, instant message addresses, and vehicle registration were too vague to provide registrants or law enforcement with necessary guidelines for what acts triggered a reporting requirement. The court reserved ruling on the plaintiffs\u2019 remaining claims. 101 F.Supp.3d 672. On June 5, 2015, the defendants appealed the district court\u2019s initial ruling to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. On September 3, 2015, the district court ruled on the plaintiffs\u2019 remaining claims. The court held that SORA could not retroactively extend the plaintiffs\u2019 reporting requirements from twenty-five years to life. The court found that the defendants did not show that this extension was narrowly tailored to public safety because there was no evidence that sex offenders who had not re-offended in twenty-five years were at an increased risk of committing a different sex offense. 101 F.Supp.3d 722. On October 26, 2015 the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The defendants filed another appeal on November 20, 2015. On August 25, 2016, the Sixth Circuit ruled on the appeals. The Sixth Circuit unanimously found that SORA imposed a punishment on the plaintiffs and therefore was an Ex Post Facto law. As a result, retroactive application of SORA was unconstitutional. The case was remanded to the district court to enter judgment consistent with the Sixth Circuit\u2019s opinion. 834 F.3d 696. The defendants appealed the Sixth Circuit\u2019s holding to the U.S. Supreme Court on December 14, 2016. The parties entered into a stipulated order on April 3, 2017 granting interim injunctive relief pending resolution of the appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. The parties agreed that the plaintiffs would not be listed on a public registry, the defendants would not enforce any of SORAs\u2019 provisions that became effective since 2006 against the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs\u2019 registration periods would run for 25 years instead of life. The U.S. Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for certiorari on October 2, 2017. The parties reopened the case in the district court the following month. The defendants moved for judgment on December 4, 2017. The defendants contended that the Sixth Circuit\u2019s decision only affected the plaintiffs in this case and did not apply to SORA itself. On January 26, 2018, the district court issued a stipulated final judgment on remand. The court held that retroactive application of SORA\u2019s 2006 and 2011 amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Therefore, the defendants and any other individual were enjoined from enforcing the 2006 and 2011 SORA amendments against the plaintiffs. The court further held that the plaintiffs would not be listed on a public registry and the only requirements of SORA that applied to them were to verify their address quarterly, provide fingerprints, and pay annual fees. Further, their registration period was amended to 25 years instead of life. This case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2012, plaintiffs filed suit in the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging that the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), when applied retroactively, violated their rights to due process, was unconstitutionally vague, violated prohibitions on ex post facto laws, and violated their fundamental rights. In 2018, upon remand from the Sixth Circuit, the district court held that SORA violated the Ex Post Facto clause and could not be applied retroactively."}
{"article": "On Jan. 8, 2014, six self-described \"Juggalos\" (or fans of the Insane Clown Posse, or any other Psychopathic Records hip hop group) filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and Declaratory Judgment Act. The plaintiffs were represented by the ACLU and private counsel. Their complaint alleged that the FBI had conducted a \"threat assessment\" in 2011 that classified Juggalos as a \"loosely organized hybrid gang,\" a designation, the complaint alleged, that caused the plaintiffs various harms, including extra police attention. The plaintiffs alleged, under the APA, that the defendants had violated their constitutional rights in the following ways: (1) agency action contrary to the First Amendment's freedom of association, (2) agency action contrary to the First Amendment's freedom of expression, (3) agency action that violates due process under the Fifth Amendment, (4) arbitrary and capricious agency action, (5) agency action that fails to observe procedures required by law. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was assigned to District Judge Robert Cleland. On Apr. 9, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case. On June 30, 2014, Judge Cleland granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the alleged injuries were not sufficiently certain or precise to allow them standing to sue. Parsons v. U.S. Department of Justice, 30 F.Supp.3d 648 (E.D. Mich. 2014). The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. On Sept. 17, 2015, Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr., U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation, authored a unanimous opinion reversing the district court's June 30, 2014, dismissal. Judge Sargus found that the plaintiffs did have standing to sue, and did not rule on the merits, but rather remanded the case to the district court. Parsons v. U.S. Department of Justice, 2015 WL 5446909, 801 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2015). On Jan. 29, 2016, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, and the district court granted the motion on Sept. 29, 2016. The court found that the alleged harms were due to actions of third parties - for example, the local police and sheriff departments - and not the defendants. These harms were therefore not legal consequences, and did not qualify for judicial review under the APA. Further, the court held that the defendants' actions were the result of legally mandated agency discretion and therefore not subject to APA review. Separately, the court did not find merit in the plaintiffs' claim that their classification violated the due process requirement to avoid vagueness as the classification did not require anything of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed notice of appeal on Oct. 13, 2016. On Dec. 18, 2017, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case under the same final agency action analysis for APA claims. Echoing the lower court's analysis, it classified the DOJ report as a product of \"independent agency decision making.\" Because the report was purely \"informational,\" the court ruled that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated legal consequences flowing from it. Rather, the harms alleged stemmed from discretionary reliance on the designation by third parties. We believe that the case is effectively closed.", "summary": "Six Insane Clown Posse fans, or \"Juggalos,\" sued the DOJ and FBI in the the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under the Administrative Procedures Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act, alleging that the FBI had designated the Juggalos as a \"loosely organized hybrid gang\" in 2011, which had caused various harms to the plaintiffs, including extra police attention. The district court dismissed the case upon finding that the designation was not a final agency action, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal."}
{"article": "On June 28, 2018, Black Love Resists in the Rust and four individual plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the City of Buffalo under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for violations of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment, and under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiffs, represented by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the National Center for Law and Economic Justice, and the Western New York Law Center, Inc., sought both injunctive and monetary relief. They claimed that the City of Buffalo disproportionately used vehicle checkpoints in Black and Latino communities to generate revenue, resulting in disparate impact on Black and Latino people. Specifically, they claimed that over 85% of checkpoints occurred in predominantly Black or Latino neighborhoods; nearly 40% of checkpoints conducted since 2012 occurred in just three of Buffalo's seventy-seven census tracts, each with a Black or Latino population exceeding 86%. The plaintiffs sought an injunction to end and remediate these traffic enforcement practices, as well as monetary damages for financial harm, humiliation, and loss of liberty and property. According to the complaint, around 2012, the Buffalo Police Department initiated a crime \"Strike Force\" that implemented a vehicle checkpoint program to conduct stops and searches of drivers without any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. These checkpoints lasted as long as forty-five minutes and frequently resulted in multiple citations. For example, one class member was issued four separate tickets for having four tinted windows, costing him $720 total. That class member was also forced to choose between jail or the immediate impoundment of his car; he chose the latter, resulting in an addition $125 fee. Under state law, the City of Buffalo kept almost all the revenue collected from traffic tickets. After the checkpoints were instituted in 2015, the number of traffic tickets issued increased by 92%. On May 21, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding several additional Buffalo residents as plaintiffs. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "On June 28, 2018, Black Love Resists in the Rust and four individual plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit against the City of Buffalo in the Western District of New York. They claimed that the Buffalo Police Department disproportionately used vehicle checkpoints in Black and Latino communities to generate revenue, resulting in disparate impact on Black and Latino people. The plaintiffs sought an injunction to end and remediate these traffic enforcement practices, as well as monetary damages for the financial harm, humiliation, and loss of liberty and property. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 21, 2020; the case is ongoing."}
{"article": "This case was brought by Disability Rights California (\u201cDRC\u201d), a nonprofit corporation, to challenge the systemic institutionalization and segregation of Alameda County residents with serious mental health disabilities. On July 30, 2020, DRC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California and named the County of Alameda (\u201cthe County\u201d), Alameda Health System, and Alameda County Behavioral Health Care Services (\u201cCounty Behavioral Health\u201d) as defendants. DRC brought the suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, or 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12111 et seq. DRC sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorney\u2019s fees, alleging that the defendants had violated the ADA, as well as section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (28 U.S.C. \u00a7 794 et seq.) and sections 11135-11139 of the California Government Code, by detaining mentally disabled individuals for longer than needed and failing to provide them proper treatment and services. On October 13, 2020, Alameda Health System filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to strike the complaint. It argued that DRC lacked standing because DRC\u2019s complaint depended on the County creating community-based mental health services, a future event that may never occur. The County and County Behavioral Health filed similar motions shortly thereafter. On January 21, 2021, Judge Charles R. Breyer issued an order granting the defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss with leave to amend, finding that DRC had failed to plausibly allege disability discrimination under the relevant statutes. Specifically, Judge Breyer found that the claims against the Health System failed because they centered on the failure to provide services rather than the setting. And Judge Breyer found that the claims against the County failed because the plaintiffs had not identified specific programs being provided in institutionalized settings that could be provided elsewhere. 2021 WL 212900. Judge Breyer also found that DRC had standing with respect to all defendants because DRC adequately pleaded an injury suffered by its constituents that could be traced to the defendants\u2019 conduct. DRC has alleged that its Constituents have been unnecessarily institutionalized and continue to face a risk of unnecessary institutionalization as a result of Defendants\u2019 practices and lack of services; and, DRC showed that this injury could be redressed by a favorable decision. <i>Id.</i> DRC submitted an amended complaint on February 23, 2021.", "summary": "On July 30, 2020, Disability Rights California brought a suit against Alameda County in the Northern District Court of California. Disability Rights California alleged that Alameda County had discriminated against residents with serious mental health disabilities by institutionalizing and segregating them instead of providing adequate treatment and services. On January 21, 2021, the Court granted Alameda County\u2019s motion to dismiss with leave to amend and denied their motion to strike. Disability Rights California has filed an amended complaint as of February 23, 2021."}
{"article": "On February 9, 2015, a deaf individual filed this lawsuit against Parkview Health Systems Inc. and Parkview Medical Center Inc. in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiff sued under Title III the Americans with Disability Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. The plaintiff, represented by attorneys from the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, requested attorney fees and compensatory damages on the basis that the defendants failed to provide the plaintiff with an American Sign Language interpreter when his daughter was hospitalized, severely limiting his ability to understand her condition and the doctors' procedures. Additionally, the plaintiff asked the court for an injunction ordering the defendants to stop discriminating against deaf patients and their relatives. In October 2015, the matter settled. Prior to the initiation of the lawsuit, Parkview had installed video remote interpreting (VRI) to provide immediate access to sign language interpreters, and instituted policies that pre-scheduled and outpatient services would use in-person ASL interpreters. Under the settlement, these policies remained in place. The settlement also provided that Parkview would continue to train staff that lip-reading and note-writing are often not effective in communicating medical information to individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing and that staff should take care in ascertaining the preferred method of communication of the deaf or hard of hearing patient or companion.", "summary": "In 2015, a deaf individual filed a lawsuit against Parkview Health Systems Inc. He claimed that he was not provided an interpreter in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which severely influenced his communications with hospital staff regarding his critically injured daughter. The case settled for changes in policy and practice."}
{"article": "On January 1, 2014, deaf and hard of hearing prisoners in the Kentucky prison system filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated against the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the Kentucky Department of Corrections, several other departments of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and by the Washington Lawyers' Committee Prisoners Rights Project, alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the First Amendment, and asked the court for preliminary injunctive relief, certification as a class action, declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the defendants discriminated against them by denying or reducing the plaintiffs' access to telecommunication equipment such as Telecommunication Devices for the Deaf (TDD) and videophones that would allow them to communicate with their friends, family and attorneys outside of the prison system. Plaintiffs who use American Sign Language were denied interpretive service resulting in the denial of governmental services like educational, employment training and opportunities, and heath care programs on the basis of their disability. Plaintiffs were also denied translation services during religious ceremonies and were not provided with an effective means of receiving prison announcements. Lastly, plaintiffs claimed that defendants failed to provide them with interpreters or other aids at disciplinary hearings, thereby denying them the right to hear the charges against them and defend themselves. The parties reached a settlement and appointed a monitor and the court approved on June 24, 2015. The settlement required the Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC) to ensure a full and equal access to all services and accommodations; assign a staff member at each KDOC adult institution as an ADA coordinator; during initial intake provide effective communication, hearing assessment, and auxiliary aids and services in the form of qualified interpreters, etc.; ensure staff awareness through identification cards; provide deaf inmates with interpretation of materials; provide deaf inmates with a schedule showing when interpretation services are available; ensure deaf and hard of hearing inmates get equal access to on-site and off-site medical care, various programs, work assignments, religious services, any meetings relating to transfer and classification matters; provide interpretation for disciplinary proceedings, announcements, alarms and any other information audibly conveyed to the inmates; provide telecommunication devices and other adequate technology devices; and train KDOC employees on the implementation of new policies. The settlement was scheduled to last 5 years, and provided for appointment of a monitor, Margo Schlanger. In February 2016, the monitor filed her first semi-annual report. The report stated that the payment to plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel was made; the requirement of hiring ADA Coordinators were nearly compliant; videophone installation is apparently compliant; free access to videophone, provision of qualified interpreters for unscheduled medical emergencies, and provision of qualified interpreters for disciplinary hearings were unclear; informational materials were partially compliant; the routine and situational reporting were difficult or partially noncompliant; and training was noncompliant. In December 2016, the monitor filed her second semi-annual report. This one included in-depth discussion of needed improvements at 8 of the prisons, and proposed training for officers and staff. In May 2017, the monitor filed her third semi-annual report. It discussed ongoing compliance challenges, and included several appendices: <ul><li>I. Settlement Agreement<li>II. ADA staff computer-based-training<li>III. ADA Coordinator training<li>IV. Site visit report for Dec. 2016 and Feb. 2017 visits, with exhibits, included aggregated recommendations<li>V. Recommended forms<li>VI. April 2017 quarterly reporting request</li></ul> The fourth semi-annual status report, filed in November 2017, focused on hearing aids. The report concluded that the process for meeting inmate audiology concerns has improved but still needs further progress. The fifth semi-annual status report, filed December 2018, explained the state's new audiology policy, and focused on a self-auditing pilot. The sixth semi-annual status report, filed April 2019, summarized that while progress was being made, problems remained: <blockquote>Some institutions have implemented a timely and effective audiology process, managed interpretive services effectively, and even worked on improving communication with hard-of-hearing inmates by providing new amplification devices. That said, the most recent self-reporting cycle reveals the widespread continuation of two different kinds of problems. Procedurally, some institutions continue to struggle with keeping and sharing the records needed to comply with the agreement and to check on that compliance, including when I make requests for follow-up. And substantively, self-reporting and follow-ups reveal crucial areas of compliance weakness\u2014areas that I have seen and described consistently in several prior reports, as many as three years ago. These include: \u2022 Identification, tracking, and reporting of inmates who are deaf/hard-of-hearing \u2022 Ensuring prompt and accurate provision of audiology services \u2022 Providing interpretation, both in-person and remote \u2022 Providing videophone services.</blockquote> The seventh semi-annual report, filed December 2019, made numerous recommendations to KDOC about continuing issues, and included the department's responses as an exhibit. The eighth semi-annual report, filed May 2020, tracked (and included) responses to those recommendations. The settlement term was set to expire in July 2020, but the parties agreed in a joint filing dated August 3, 2020, to extend it for six months. Monitoring therefore continues through the end of 2020. On December 16, 2020, the monitor filed the 9th semi-annual report, which found significant improvement. It included training presentations that had been provided by the monitor in October 2020, and stated:<blockquote>In this current filing, although the COVID pandemic has created real obstacles, I am pleased to report yet more progress. I cannot say that each KDOC prison is complying with each and every settlement agreement provision. However, compliance with many of the ADA/Settlement Agreement requirements has been accomplished. And I believe there is now a system in place that can\u2014if the prison authorities so choose\u2014succeed in maintaining that compliance and in solving remaining problems. In order to assist in that process, I continue to offer recommendations for the period after the settlement term closes. </blockquote>", "summary": "On January 1, 2014, deaf and hard of hearing inmates in the Kentucky prison system filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky against the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the Kentucky Department of Corrections, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the First Amendment. Plaintiffs claimed that they were denied access to telecommunications and denied interpretative services for religious services, job training, disciplinary hearings, public announcements, educational and vocational training effectively excluding them from many governmental services. The parties reached settlement which was entered by the court in a consent decree in June, 2015. A monitor was appointed, who will submit a semi-annual report during the five-year term of the settlement. The settlement includes provision of services and accommodations through a qualified interpreter and communication technologies, staffing, and training."}
{"article": "On January 2, 2015, a prisoner in Pennsylvania sued the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (\"PDOC\"), several of its employees and administrators in their official and individual capacities, as well as Wexford Health Sources (the provider of medical care in state prisons), in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The lawsuit was brought under the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, for the alleged deprivation of the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. The plaintiff alleged that the PDOC systematically denied medical care to persons with severe eye conditions, including severe cataracts. The plaintiff was represented by both private counsel and attorneys from the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project and sought declaratory and injunctive relief; compensatory and punitive damages; and attorneys' fees and costs. Along with his complaint, he filed a motion for class certification. Since 1999, the plaintiff had suffered from various eye and vision conditions and had received cataract surgery on his right eye in 2001. Prior to 2008, an optometrist determined that the plaintiff's left eye required cataract surgery, to which the plaintiff consented. However, the defendants denied the recommended surgery, and the plaintiff appealed the denial to no avail. The DOC allegedly had an administrative policy colloquially known as the \"One Good Eye\" policy, which denies cataract surgery to those who retain a threshold modicum of visual acuity in one eye, notwithstanding physician recommendations to the contrary. In 2012, the plaintiff was diagnosed with a cataract in his left eye, and his treating ophthalmologist requested surgery, which was scheduled for September 2012, but then postponed the procedure. The plaintiff filed an administrative grievance seeking surgery, but in January 2013, the defendant upheld the decision to postpone. In May 2013, the plaintiff received an additional eye examination, his left eye was diagnosed with a \"very dense cataract,\" and he was referred for surgery. One of the defendant's staff instead scheduled the plaintiff for a follow-up consultation three months later and explained that the plaintiff was ineligible for cataract surgery on his left eye because the visual acuity in his right eye measured 20/60. Over the next two years, the plaintiff repeatedly requested further information regarding his ineligibility and filed another administrative grievance, while the cataract in his left eye caused virtual blindness in that eye and allegedly caused the vision in his right eye to deteriorate. He ultimately received cataract surgery on his left eye in Febuary 2015. Wexford filed a motion to dismiss on March 24, 2015. The other defendants filed their own motions to dismiss on April 16, 2015 and June 3, 2015, and the PDOC filed a motion for judgment and to stay discovery on July 17, 2015. Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner granted the motion to stay discovery. After a teleconference with the plaintiffs and defendants on August 24, 2015, however, the Court ordered that the defendants had failed to show good cause for keeping their cataract surgery policy confidential, although such policy has not appeared in the Court record yet. On July 17, 2015, the PDOC and its administrators filed a motion to stay discovery pending disposition of the plaintiff's motion for class certification, the defendants' motion to dismiss, and the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. On July 21, 2015, the Court granted the motion. On September 18, 2015, the Court denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification without prejudice. The Court stated that it would allow limited discovery related to the eligibility of this case for class action certification. On January 20, 2016, the Court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions to dismiss. The motions were denied as to the allegations that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of disability in violation of the ADA or \u00a7 504, and that some of the staff member defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in their individual capacities. The motions were granted as to the allegations that Wexford and some of the staff member defendants, acting in their official capacities, violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and that the same staff member defendants, acting in their official capacities, violated Pennsylvania's constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court noted that the plaintiff had sought only injunctive relief against some of the defendants and, because he had received the cataract surgery, those claims were moot. 159 F. Supp. 3d 502. On February 4, 2016, the parties jointly moved to stay pretrial deadlines pending the conclusion of settlement negotiations. On February 8, the Court granted the parties' motion and ordered that counsel submit status reports every 60 days. On April 8, 2016, the plaintiff wrote a letter notifying the Court that settlement negotiations with the PDOC and two of its administrators were proceeding but that negotiations with Wexford and its physicians had stalled. On April 19, 2016, the plaintiff moved to partially lift the stay with respect to the Wexford defendants, which the Court denied on April 20, 2016. Negotiations continued throughout the remainder of the year. On January 17, 2017, Chief Judge Conner signed an order referring the case for purposes of settlement only to Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson. A mediation took place on February 7, 2017. On February 8, 2017, Chief Judge Conner ordered the case dismissed without costs and without prejudice under the terms of a settlement agreement to which the parties had agreed. Thirty days after February 8, 2017, PDOC agreed to adopt a new cataract policy to replace the old \"One Good Eye\" policy. An individual would be eligible for cataract surgery even if the individual has one eye that does not need to be operated on. Additionally, individuals who were denied surgery under the old policy would be evaluated on a rolling basis according to the new cataract policy. The PDOC would also let individuals know about the policy change, and provide surgical evaluations for individuals with cataracts and post-operative care after the cataract surgery. For 3 years after February 8, 2017, the PDOC would provide plaintiff's counsel with an accounting of individuals who have cataracts and how they were evaluated under the new cataract policy. They must also provide plaintiff's counsel with a copy of proposed changes or revisions to the new cataract policy, if any. The PDOC also agreed to pay the plaintiff $16,500 but did not agree to pay attorneys' fees. The parties agreed that the Court would retain jurisdiction over the implementation and enforcement of this agreement for 3 years, after which the case would be dismissed with prejudice. On March 21, 2017, the parties signed a formal settlement agreement. Litigation continued over attorneys' fees and costs. On February 23, 2018, Magistrate Judge Carlson conducted a settlement conference for the parties. The parties reached an agreement, and on February 26, 2018, Chief Judge Connor ordered that a motion by the plaintiff for attorneys' fees be dismissed as moot because of this resolution. On March 30, 2018, an individual sent a handwritten letter to the Court explaining that he had not received surgery for his cataracts and that his vision was deteriorating. Judge Carlson forwarded this letter to counsel for both parties. The settlement agreement expired without any further docket activity, so the case is now closed.", "summary": "In January 2015, the plaintiff, a prisoner, filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections systematically denied medical care to individuals with severe eye conditions, including severe cataracts, in violation of the ADA, \u00a7 504, and his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The parties settled, and the Department of Corrections changed their cataract policy, no longer denying surgery to individuals who had \"One Good Eye.\""}
{"article": "On May 21, 2011, multiple students of the Mobile County Public School System (MCPSS) filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court of the Southern District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, against the Mobile County School District. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Southern Poverty Law Center, sought a court order mandating due process hearings before the school district issues long-term suspensions or expulsions. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the school district violated the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by denying students a hearing before issuing long-term suspensions or expulsions. The plaintiffs also alleged that the school district also failed to notify parents before a suspension or expulsion was issued and denied students the right to defend themselves against accusations and to have an advocate or legal counsel present at a hearing. The plaintiffs alleged the Mobile County Public School System frequently used long-term suspensions and expulsions as disciplinary measures for minor infractions. These disciplinary measures have severe detrimental impacts on students, and plaintiffs claimed that to employ these measures without a hearing is a violation of due process. School administrators often used these measures not only without a hearing, but also without informing students' parents before the suspension was issued, a violation of the School Code of Conduct Handbook. To the extent that administrators acted against the disciplinary code, the plaintiffs claimed the Board of Commissioners turned a blind eye to these actions and failed in their duties to train and supervisor administrators. On March 1, 2013, the parties entered mediation and on June 10, 2013, the District Court (Judge William H. Steele) dismissed the case with prejudice contingent on the parties agreeing to terms of the settlement agreement. On June 28, 2013, a settlement was reached. The settlement agreement stated terms for amending the Mobile County Public School System's Conduct Code. These changes included: requiring notification of parents when the principal recommended a long-term suspension; requiring a due process hearing for any long-term suspension recommendation; changing the definition of long-term suspension from eleven or more school days to five or more school days; reducing the number of infractions that suspension may be applied to; providing information sessions for parents and students to explain discipline policies; developing alternative punishments to suspension; and training administrators and establishing goals in order to reduce suspensions, among other measures. The settlement also included individual remedies for the individually named plaintiffs. This settlement remained in effect until August 2016. There has been no action on the docket since June 28, 2013.", "summary": "Students in Mobile County schools sued the county for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process by denying the students a hearing before issuing long-term suspensions and expulsions. The case entered mediation and was settled on the terms of the agreement that amended the school district's disciplinary procedures and practices."}
{"article": "In 1870, Congress passed Mississippi\u2019s Readmission Act returning Mississippi to full statehood following the Civil War on certain conditions including that \u201cthe constitution of Mississippi shall never be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States of the school rights and privileges secured by the constitution of said State.\u201d 16 Stat. 67 (1870). On May 23, 2017, four low-income African American women filed this lawsuit on behalf of their children, students of Mississippi schools, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against various officials in Mississippi's government, including the Governor, Speaker of the House, Lieutenant Governor and presider over the Senate, Secretary of State, and the entire Board of Education. Represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and co-counsel, the plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and <i>Ex parte Young</i> claiming that Mississippi failed to meet its obligations related to \"school rights and privileges\" under the Mississippi Readmission Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment that the educational requirements under the 1869 Mississippi Constitution and the Readmission Act remain in effect and that the current Mississippi Constitution conflicts with the Readmission Act. In addition, they sought attorneys' fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge William H. Barbour. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Mississippi was not upholding the Readmission Act because there was a significant disparity in the conditions and education at plaintiffs' schools where students were primarily African American and schools where students were predominantly white and wealthy. The state\u2019s top five highest-performing school districts were predominantly white whereas thirteen of the state\u2019s nineteen school districts with an \u201cF\u201d rating were more than 95 percent African American. The plaintiffs\u2019 children attended elementary schools in the Jackson Public School District and the Yazoo City Municipal School District, both with an \u201cF\u201d letter grade from the Mississippi Department of Education. The plaintiffs claimed the schools lacked textbooks, supplies, and experienced teachers and were in poor condition. For example, the complaint noted that at some schools paint was peeling off the walls and the ceilings had visible water spots. On March 28, 2018, Judge Barbour dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that it was barred under Eleventh Amendment Immunity. The Court found that while the plaintiffs were only suing state officials, not the state, they were suing state officials in their official capacities, and therefore, the state was the real substantial party in interest and enjoyed sovereign immunity. Further, the Court held that the <i>Ex parte Young</i> doctrine that creates an exception to state sovereign immunity, was not applicable in this case because the plaintiffs were not seeking injunctive relief. The plaintiffs then moved to have the judgment altered and for leave to file an amended complaint. On January 4, 2019, Judge Barbour found the Court did not err in finding the claims barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, but altered the judgment so that the case was dismissed without prejudice. 2019 WL 3757948. He denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint and entered a final judgment dismissing the case without prejudice. The plaintiffs promptly appealed the judgment to the Fifth Circuit on January 25, 2019. The appeal was docketed as 19-60069. The Fifth Circuit (Circuit Judges Stephen A. Higginson, E. Grady Jolly, and James E. Graves Jr.) affirmed in part and vacated in part. 954 F.3d 729. It found the plaintiffs' claim seeking a declaration that the current version of Mississippi's Constitution violated the Readmissions Act could be pursued under the <i>Ex parte Young</i> exception to state sovereign immunity because the defendants were state officers sued in their official capacities and the plaintiffs alleged a continuing violation of federal law--the Readmission Act. However, the Fifth Circuit affirmed that the claim seeking a declaration that the 1868 Mississippi Constitution remained in effect was barred by state sovereign immunity and <i>Ex parte Young</i> did not apply because this would require a federal court to tell state officials how to conform to state law. The Fifth Circuit denied the defendants' request for rehearing en banc (9-8). 981 F.3d 437 Circuit Judge Edith H. Jones, joined by the seven other Circuit Judges voting for rehearing, dissented, arguing that the request for a declaration the current Mississippi Constitution violated the federal Readmission Act would necessarily require the impermissible adjudication of a question of state law. On January 13, 2021, the defendants filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court (Case No. 20A126). They also filled an application with the Supreme Court to stay the mandate of the Fifth Circuit pending the Supreme Court's decision on whether to grant review. Back in the district court, the case was reassigned to District Judge Kristi H. Jonhson and then District Judge Henry T. Wingate in January 2021. As of February 5, 2021, the petition for review remained pending, and the case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2017, four low-income African American mothers filed suit against the numerous officials of the State of Mississippi claiming the state failed to live up to the educational requirements set by the Mississippi Readmission Act of 1870. They sought declaratory relief that the requirements are still intact. The case was dismissed in 2018 due to the state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit which affirmed in part and reversed in part. The defendants requested rehearing en banc, but the Fifth Circuit denied the request. The defendants then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court and a request to stay the Fifth Circuit's mandate in January 2021. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On April 8, 2009, the plaintiffs, a student discriminated against and harassed based on his sex and sexual orientation and his sister who tried to form a gay-straight student alliance at their high school, brought a suit against Indian River Central School District, the District Board of Education, and a number of individual administrative officials, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York (Judge Glenn T. Suddaby). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and Lambda Legal, sought a declaratory judgment, permanent injunctive relief, a jury trial, and nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages due to the defendants' viewpoint and content-based discrimination under the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 4071, et seq. and freedom of speech and association under the First Amendment, denial of equal protection due to sex and sexual orientation under the Fourteenth Amendment, sex discrimination under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, U.S.C. \u00a7 1681, et seq., and violation of New York law. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that from September 1993 until January 2004, the defendants were deliberately indifferent and contributed to one of the plaintiff's severe, pervasive harassment based on his sex and sexual orientation, depriving him of equal access to educational programs and causing him to drop out of high school due to the emotional and physical harms he suffered. The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendant repeatedly denied students, including the plaintiffs themselves, permission to form a gay-straight student alliance in violation of their rights under the Equal Access Act and the First Amendment. On August 13, 2010, the United States moved to participate as amicus curiae, as the suit involved Title IX and Equal Protection claims based on sex. The motion was approved on December 6, 2010. On March 29, 2011, the Court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss. See Pratt v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d 135, 154 (N.D. N.Y. 2011). The Court dismissed two of the plaintiffs' New York law claims and the plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages against the School District, but left the rest of the claims standing against the defendants. See id. The parties reached a private settlement agreement, which the Court recognized on June 21, 2013, and dismissed the action with prejudice on August 8, 2013. The settlement agreement required the District to: retain a consultant to advise them on how to better handle student harassment, share information about student bullying across the schools in the District, and follow certain guidelines set out in the agreement. See Lambda Legal, Lambda Legal Clients and Indian River Central School District Settle Antigay Harassment Lawsuit, Lambda Legal (August 8, 2013), http://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/pratt-v-indian-river-central-school-district-settlement.", "summary": "This federal lawsuit was filed in 2000 in the Eastern District of California; in it, a former high school student and the Gay-Straight Alliance Network sued his school district for failure to take effective measures to remedy continuing harassment that he faced based on his sexual orientation. The case settled for a consent decree entered August 15, 2002, which required the defendants to implement a mandatory staff training program, revise its policies, select compliance coordinators, develop systems for reporting harassment and discrimination, allow students to form a gay-straight alliance, and create a community advisory group. The decree implementation period was 6 months."}
{"article": "On February 18, 2007, an African-American individual filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sued the defendant Cook's Pest Control under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981. The plaintiff alleged that defendant maintained a pattern and practice of discrimination in employment on the basis of race. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that defendant discouraged African-Americans from applying for jobs with defendant by, among other things, telling them there was no job and requiring that they file applications personally at every office at which they sought employment. The plaintiff sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and damages. On August 8, 2007, the defendant filed motions to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for lack of service and the Title VII claims. On January 28, 2008, the district court (Judge L. Scott Coogler) denied the motions. On June 5, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the named plaintiff failed to failed to make a prima facie case for disparate impact or disparate treatment and failed to show any injury to himself. On December 9, 2008, Judge Coogler denied defendant's motion for summary judgment without prejudice pending further discovery. Over the next several years, extensive discovery was conducted. In December of 2010, the court stayed the case temporarily as the parties sought mediation. In October of 2011 the parties reached a settlement. Under the terms of the proposed settlement agreement, the defendant agreed to set up a settlement fund of $2,500,000 and to bear the costs of administering the payment of the class members' claims. It also agreed to establish and implement a race-neutral, anti-discrimination hiring policy with the help of a monitor, to train employees in the policy, and to keep records of the race of applicants and hires and the reason hiring decisions were made. The settlement was to last three years, with a possible extension of up to one additional year if necessary to resolve challenges still pending with the monitor. On January 27, 2012, Judge Coogler preliminarily approved the settlement and certified the class for the purposes of the settlement. The class is defined as: All African-Americans who applied for employment at any Cook\u2019s location from March 1, 2005, through the date of preliminary approval of the settlement, and who were denied employment, excluding all judicial officers or employees of the Federal courts within the second degree of affinity; employees of Plaintiffs\u2019 counsel; and any other person whose presence in the class would cause mandatory recusal of any judge assigned to the case. On July 17, 2012, the Court approved the parties' settlement agreement and dismissed the case with prejudice, while retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. 2012 WL 2923542. The named plaintiff was allotted to receive $48,000 for the service to the class. The court ordered the defendant to pay attorney's fees, costs and expenses in the amount of $928,831.55, which is $875,000.00 in attorney's fees and $53,831.55 of expenses. This case is now closed.", "summary": "This case was brought by an African-American job applicant against Cook's Pest Control, Inc., alleging that Cooks had maintained a pattern and practice of discrimination in employment on the basis of race. The parties reached a settlement in October of 2011 and the court has granted preliminary approval and certified a settlement class. The court approved the parties' settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice in July 2012."}
{"article": "This class action involving store managers at Samsonite Company Stores, Inc. was filed on March 24, 2009, in the U.S. District Court, California Northern District. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought class certification (collective class and state classes for New York and California plaintiffs) as well as compensatory, declaratory, and injunctive relief, claiming that defendants consistently failed to pay appropriate overtime compensation as required by federal and state law. The complaint alleged that defendants misclassified plaintiffs as \"exempt\" from state and federal overtime laws; that defendants failed to pay all wages due and appropriate overtime compensation; that defendants failed to provide or authorize meal and rest periods; that defendants failed to maintain accurate time records; that defendants breached their contracts by promising plaintiffs vacation time based on hours worked, but did not pay for their vacation time based on their overtime hours; and that after filing this suit, certain plaintiffs were retaliated against and received pay cuts. The requested relief included damages in the amount of their respective unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages from 3 years immediately preceding the filing of this action, attorneys fees and costs, restitution of vacation time and other unpaid wages and premiums, and injunctive relief requiring defendants to provide timely, accurate, itemized wage statements as well as payment of meal and rest periods. Plaintiffs that alleged retaliation requested relief for backpay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. Pursuant to court order, the parties participated in mediation. During the second mediation session, the mediator made a proposal that both sides accepted on November 5, 2009. A few weeks later, the parties agreed upon a Joint Stipulation of Settlement and Release. The settlement notes that defendants have reclassified all of its store managers nationwide to be non-exempt employees. Defendants, which filed for bankruptcy in September 2009, proposed to pay a lump sum of $850,000 to all 89 of the class members to resolve all outstanding wage and hour claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and state laws. This is in addition to the amount of $116,251.08 that defendants already voluntarily paid to 30 of the 89 class members since the lawsuit was filed. Specifically, the settlement provides that all class members be paid 10% simple interest on their back overtime wage; that each class member be paid liquidated damages for the full 3 years of his/her FLSA claim; that California class members are paid additional amounts for the state claims raised in the suit, which defendants disputed, and which plaintiffs are waiving in the settlement; that California and New York class members will recover alleged vacation time underpayments; and that plaintiffs will recover for each claim they have for every week in which they were eligible for any recovery, for an average of nearly $6,300 per class member. In December 2009, the court certified plaintiff's class for settlement purposes and granted preliminary approval of the Joint Stipulation of Settlement and Release. In April 2010, the court granted final approval of the Joint Stipulation of Settlement and Release. The court also granted attorneys' fees of $241,562.77 and costs of $35,000, which comply with the 9th Circuit's benchmark for attorneys' fees in a class action (attorneys' fees equal 25% of the common fund). Also, based on the standards of Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 901 F.Supp. 294, 299 (N.D.Cal.1995), the court granted enhancements of $5,000 each sought by the representative plaintiffs.", "summary": "Plaintiffs, all current or former store managers of Samsonite Company Stores, Inc., sought compensatory, declaratory, and injunctive relief, claiming that defendants consistently failed to pay appropriate overtime compensation as required by federal and state law. In November 2009, the parties attended courted ordered mediation and reached a settlement agreement shortly thereafter. The court granted final approval of the settlement agreement in April 2010, which awarded plaintiffs a lump sum of $850,000."}
{"article": "This is a case about the Women\u2019s National Soccer Team (WNT) suing the United States Soccer Federation (USSF) for gender discrimination. On March 8, 2019, members of the WNT filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued the USSF under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d) et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et seq. Represented by Winston & Strawn LLP, the plaintiffs sought damages & fees (including back pay), an injunction against the USSF engaging in its gender discrimination practices, a declaratory judgment that such practices were unlawful, and an adjustment to their wages and benefits. They claimed that the USSF had been paying them less than similarly situated male employees despite better performance in violation of the EPA. Their complaint also stated that the USSF has been treating them less favorably than their male colleagues in violation of Title VII, specifically with respect to \u201cpay; playing, training and travel conditions; promotion of games; and support and development for games.\u201d The WNT has had world-wide success. It has been ranked first in the world according to FIFA\u2019s Women\u2019s World Rankings for ten of the past eleven years; it has won three World Cup titles and four Olympic Gold Medals; and has won numerous other awards and accolades. Plaintiffs alleged that because of this success, they spend more time training, competing, and participating in media sessions than their male counterparts. They furthermore contended that they earned more profit and/or revenue for the USSF than the Men\u2019s National Soccer Team (MNT) during the period relevant to this case. Despite this, the plaintiffs claimed that USSF has continued to treat its female employees worse than its similarly situated male employees. For non-tournament games called \u201cfriendlies\u201d, the complaint calculated that if all games were won, the WNT would earn on average 38% that of the MNT. For the 2014 World Cup, the MNT earned $5,375,000 in \u201cperformance bonuses\u201d after being knocked out in Round 16. In contrast, in 2015, the WNT earned only $1,725,000 after winning the entire World Cup. But the plaintiffs said that the disparate treatment extended to policies and practices as well. The WNT was much more often forced to play on inferior surfaces such as artificial turf, which affect the game and are more likely to lead to injury; the MNT has consistently received charter flights while the WNT has had to fly commercial; the USSF has allocated fewer resources for promoting WNT games than for promoting MNT games, and waited longer before announcing their games leading to reduced attendance; and the USSF charged less for tickets to WNT games than to MNT games, reducing the potential revenue from their games. The WNT began collective bargaining for equal pay through their union in 2012, but the USSF has continually rejected their demands. In fact, in response to their 2012 demands, the USSF countered that they would only compensate the WNT for winning games against FIFA top-ranked teams (the MNT, by comparison, were always paid no matter the outcome of the game or the rank of the opposing team). According to the complaint, in 2016, a representative of the USSF claimed that \u201cmarket realities are such that the women do not deserve to be paid equally to the men,\u201d after openly admitting that the WNT outperformed the MNT in both revenue and profit the prior year. In 2017, the WNT proposed a revenue-sharing model to test these \u201cmarket realities\u201d wherein their pay would increase or decrease based on whether the USSF derived more or less revenue from WNT\u2019s activities. The USSF rejected this proposal. Upon filing the suit on March 8, 2019, plaintiffs filed a motion to transfer the case to Multidistrict Litigation, but this was denied on June 10, 2019. Defendant filed to transfer to the Northern District of California on May 23, 2019, but this was denied on July 1, 2019. On August 20, 2019 the case was referred to mediation. On September 11, 2019, plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, which was granted on November 8, 2019. The order granted: (1) Certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class, defined as: \"All WNT players on the team at the date of final judgment, or the date of the resolution of any appeals therefrom, whichever is later;\" (2) Certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class, defined as: \"All WNT players who were members of the WNT at any time from February 4, 2015 through the date of class certification;\" and (3) Conditional certification of a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 216(b), defined as: \"All WNT players who were members of the WNT at any time from March 8, 2016 through the present.\" On February 20, 2020, both parties motioned for summary judgment. On May 1, 2020, Judge R. Gary Klausner denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion and granted the defendant\u2019s motion in part. The EPA claim was denied because (1) the WNT was paid more both on a cumulative and average per-game basis than the MNT, and (2) the WNT failed to offer sufficient evidence that despite this, they were being undercompensated compared to the MNT. The Title VII claim, however, survived \u201cinsofar as it is based on (1) travel conditions (specifically, charter flights and hotel accommodations), and (2) personnel and support services (specifically, medical and training support).\u201d On May 8, 2020, the plaintiffs appealed the court's summary judgment decision. The court denied their motion on June 23, 2020, reasoning that if the plaintiff loses at trial, an appeal of all claims is likely anyway, so it would not make administrative sense to do so before the trial. On July 29, 2020, the court scheduled a jury trial for January 26, 2021. As of October 3, 2020, the case is ongoing.", "summary": "The Women's National Soccer Team alleged that the United States Soccer Federation discriminated against them in terms of pay and working conditions in violation of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The court denied the Equal Pay Act claim because the team failed to provide sufficient evidence for gender-based unequal pay. The Title VII claim is moving forward however on the premise of unequal working conditions and is scheduled for a jury trial on January 26, 2021. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On April 22, 1999, a black employee of an automotive plant sued the owner and its manager in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, Judge Edward W. Nottingham, for failing to prevent racial discrimination by other workers, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981, and state law. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed he was the only black employee among 65 employees at the factory. Other employees shunned him, referred to him with the n-word and intimidated him in various ways. When the plaintiff found a black doll with a noose around it in his locker, he quit his position out of fear. He claimed that supervisors, were aware of discrimination and in fact witnessed it yet did not discipline the other employees. He claimed discrimination, ethnic intimidation, and constructive discharge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e, et seq. (against the company only); 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981; Colorado Revised Statutes \u00a7\u00a7 18-2-121(2) and 13-21-106.5; and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against 10 \"Doe\" defendants. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment, back pay, front pay, benefits, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. On December 1, 1999, the court granted a stipulated motion to dismiss with prejudice the supervisor defendant from the case. On June 29, 2000, the court dispensed with both parties' motions for summary judgment. <i>Goodman v. Timpte,</I> 2000 WL 34507333, No. 99-795 (D. Colo. Jun. 29, 2000). The Court granted the defendants' motion in part as to the plaintiff's third claim for ethnic intimidation. It denied the motion in all other respects. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed his claims against the unidentified plaintiffs and the fourth claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. On October 30, 2000, the court dismissed the case with prejudice, after a stipulated motion. It appears the parties reached a settlement, although an agreement is not publicly available. This is the last entry on the docket.", "summary": "A black employee of an automotive plant sued the owner and its manager for failing to prevent racial discrimination by other workers, under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981, and state law. It appears the parties settled, although an agreement is not publicly available."}
{"article": "On March 16, 2001, an African-American employee of the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority (\"WASA\") filed this class action lawsuit against WASA on behalf of himself as well as current and former black employees under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory damages, claiming that the defendant engaged in race discrimination through its hiring and promotion practices. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that in 1996 the defendant adopted an at-will employment system that allowed managers to hire or promote their chosen candidates or to inflate those candidates' scores. With this new system in place, the plaintiff claimed that African-American employees encountered a \"glass ceiling\" that prevented them from obtaining the same positions as similarly situated white employees and from advancing as rapidly as those employees. The plaintiff alleged in particular that black employees were hired at the lowest levels of the agency, were forced to wait longer than white employees for promotions, and were often skipped over for promotions in favor of equally experienced white employees. The plaintiff sought to certify a class consisting of all African-American employees who applied for and were denied positions or promotions at WASA from October 1996 through December 2000. The defendant moved to dismiss the case on May 21, 2001, claiming that because the plaintiffs requested compensatory damages and a jury trial in addition to injunctive relief, they could not, as a matter of law, satisfy the requirements for class certification under FRCP 23(b). The District Court (Judge Henry H. Kennedy) denied the motion, explaining that the D.C. Circuit had adopted an \"ad-hoc approach\" to the issue and that the case law did not regard compensatory damages claims or a request for a jury trial as per se incompatible with class certification under 23(b). <i>Taylor v. Dist. of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth.</i>, 205 F.R.D. 43, 2002 WL 5513 (D.D.C. 2002). The parties then engaged in a lengthy discovery battle. On March 13, 2007, the District Court (Judge Kennedy) certified the class as to liability under FRCP 23(b) for injunctive and declaratory relief, but it postponed any certification as to damages. <i>Taylor v. Dist. of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth.,</i> 241 F.R.D. 33, 2007 WL 766229 (D.D.C. 2007). The defendant appealed this ruling, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Judge Karen L. Henderson) denied the petition as untimely on April 3, 2009. <i>In re D.C. Water & Sewer Auth.</i>, 561 F.3d 494 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The plaintiffs moved to enlarge the class period on November 14, 2007, and the District Court (Judge Kennedy) denied this motion in an unpublished order on February 7, 2008. The parties then continued disputing the class composition and notice procedures until August 25, 2009, when the District Court (Judge Kennedy) acceded to the parties' request and issued a stipulation and order approving the class notice and directing issuance of the notice to class members. On November 30, 2010, at the parties' request, the District Court (Judge Kennedy) issued an order referring the case for alternative dispute resolution. The parties eventually reached an agreement and submitted a proposed settlement for approval on March 23, 2013. The District Court (Judge Barbara J. Rothstein) issued an order, on March 28, 2013, approving the class settlement. The Court announced that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in <i>Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes</i>, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), it was vacating the class certification under FRCP 23(b)(2) and recertifying the class under 23(b)(3). The approved class had 1,037 members, consisting of all African-American employees who worked for the defendant between October 1, 1996, and December 31, 2000. Under the terms of the agreement, WASA transmitted $2,885,000 to a claims administrator, with $1.9 million set aside for the payment of claims and the remaining funds to be used for attorneys' fees, litigation costs, and a service award to the lead plaintiff. The settlement also included substantial non-monetary relief. Under the agreement, WASA was forbidden from retaliating against any class members for their involvement in the litigation, and was required to provide employees with a written statement of its commitment to equal employment opportunity and post a copy of this policy in common areas of the workplace. WASA also agreed to conduct a mandatory diversity and equal employment opportunity training for all employees and take measures to ensure that employees understand their obligations to identify and report violations of the policies. WASA further agreed to develop and implement complaint procedures and a complaint tracking system, as well as a voluntary affirmative action program. A settlement compliance monitor was assigned to oversee and report on WASA's implementation of the agreement, and WASA agreed to submit reports for the monitor's review. Finally, WASA agreed to create an internal implementation team as well as institute an annual review of pay and data practices to ensure that any racial disparities in pay are due to legitimate and non-discriminatory factors. On March 16, 2015, the District Court (Judge Rothstein), after receiving a letter from class members who claimed that they had not yet been paid their monetary award, issued an order requiring the parties to provide a status report. Plaintiffs' counsel responded on March 18 and explained that there had been a delay because WASA inadvertently omitted several people from the list of eligible class members it prepared for the claims administrator. Further compounding this delay, plaintiffs' counsel stated that his co-counsel has been preparing a motion to advise the court on how the administrator calculated the payouts to individual class members. The money would not be disbursed until this motion was filed. The matter resolved in June 2015 when the court ordered counsel to furnish the five individuals with proper documents to file for disbursement. The balance of $14,025.38 in settlement funds were distributed to the District of Columbia Legal Aid Society upon a motion by the parties on October 4, 2017. The case is closed.", "summary": "On March 16, 2001, an African-American employee of the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority (\"WASA\") filed this class action lawsuit against WASA on behalf of himself as well as current and former black employees under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant engaged in race discrimination through its hiring and promotion practices. On March 28, 2013, the District Court approved a settlement agreement under which WASA paid $2.8 million and agreed to undertake extensive measures to address the discriminatory workplace practices."}
{"article": "A senior who applied to work at a Cracker Barrel store alleged he was not hired because of corporation-wide age discrimination in hiring. It appears the parties settled, though no agreement is publicly available. The plaintiff, a man over sixty years of age, sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 621 et seq. The plaintiff contended that Cracker Barrel had a nationwide pattern or practice of asking for and illegally considering the age of all applicants for employment He demanded compensation for lost wages liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees and costs, as well as a permanent injunction against age discrimination in hiring. The complaint sought class certification for similarly situated individuals. On January 24, 2008, the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division (Judge Mary Scriven) dismissed the case with prejudice. It appears the parties reached a settlement, although the details are not publicly available at this time.", "summary": "A senior who applied to work at a Cracker Barrel store alleged he was not hired because of corporation-wide age discrimination in hiring. It appears the parties settled, though no agreement is publicly available."}
{"article": "On May 13, 2004, a deaf woman filed this lawsuit in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho. She sued Hollywood Entertainment Corporation (doing business as Hollywood Video) under the Idaho Human Rights Act, claiming the company discriminated against her on the basis of her disability. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, requested monetary relief, attorney fees and costs, and a jury trial. The complaint alleged that the defendant employer assigned fewer work hours, assigned her only menial jobs, withheld promotion, and ignored the harassment other employees inflicted upon her. On December 9, 2004, after the initial complaint and a special interrogatory to determine specific damage amounts sought by the plaintiff, the defendant filed a notice to remove the case to federal court. The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho on December 9, 2004 and ultimately assigned to Judge B. Lynn Winmill. The defendant moved to consolidate this case with a similar action brought under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA). The case was consolidated on May 26, 2005 with <i>EEOC v. Hollywood Ent Corp</i>, which can be found at <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=5664\">EE-ID-0012</a>. On July 26, 2006, the plaintiff filed a stipulation to dismiss after the consolidated EEOC case ended in a settlement. The court ordered the case dismissed with prejudice on the same day. In March 2006, <i>EEOC v. Hollywood Ent Corp</i> settled by entry of a consent decree valid for two years that required Hollywood Video to provide injunctive relief within their business environment and monetary relief to the plaintiff. The case closed in 2008 after the two-year order expired.", "summary": "A deaf woman filed this lawsuit in the state court of Idaho, alleging that her former employer Hollywood Video discriminated against her on the basis of her disability. The case was removed to federal court and ultimately consolidated with an EEOC case in federal court."}
{"article": "AT&T changed its pension plan in November 1997, which allegedly resulted in younger employees receiving more benefits than older employees previously had, while the pension benefits for older employees were reduced. On August 5, 1998, the plaintiff filed this class-action lawsuit in the District Court of New Jersey bringing 17 claims for relief alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), ERISA, and state law. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the previous pension plan to be used. The plaintiffs also sought money damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. The putative class-action suit proposed a class of \"management employees of AT&T who were participants in the AT&T Management Pension Plan as of 12/31/1996.\" The case was assigned to Judge Nicholas Politan, and the plaintiffs were represented by private counsel. The defendants moved to dismiss some of the claims. In an opinion issued on April 23, 1999, Judge Politan dismissed some of the plaintiffs claims. The ERISA claims were dismissed because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the statute. Other state-law claims were dismissed because they were preempted by ERISA's framework. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 7, 1999, alleging nine claims involving the ADEA, ERISA, and other fiduciary duty claims. The defendants again moved for partial dismissal of claims on October 1. On June 19, 2000, Judge Politan granted the motion for the ADEA claims, but denied it for the other claims. After the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, Judge Politan certified the class for the ERISA claims only on June 7, 2001. The plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on November 29, 2001. After the case was reassigned to Judge William G. Bassler, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss. In an order issued on October 17, 2002, Judge Bassler dismissed multiple ERISA claims included in the third amended complaint. 2002 WL 32159586. Based on the statutory text of ERISA, Judge Bassler determined that AT&T's revised pension plan complied with the law. After this order, the plaintiffs had five remaining claims: three based on ERISA violations, a breach of fiduciary duty claim, and a claim alleging a misleading description of the pension plan. The case was then reassigned to Judge Jose Linares. After both the plaintiffs and the defendants moved for summary judgment in October 2004, the plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint on November 23, 2004. The defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the fourth amended complaint, which the court granted on March 31, 2006 with regards to two more ERISA claims. 428 F. Supp. 2d 213. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of this opinion, but Judge Linares denied the motion. 2006 WL 3359722. The parties engaged in numerous discovery battles while the plaintiffs fought to keep their claims alive. In July 2006, the case was reassigned to Judge Stanley Chesler. Judge Chesler granted the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, reinstating two ADEA claims. 2006 WL 3626945. Subsequently, Judge Chesler's denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and also denied the defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings. 2007 WL 14585. With their ADEA claims back in play, the plaintiffs moved to certify an ADEA class. The plaintiffs proposed a class of former or current AT&T management employees who were age 40 or over on November 19, 2001 when their employment with AT&T ended and participated in the Management Pension Plan after the change occurred. The court stayed the class certification question while it decided the defendants motion to dismiss the two reinstated ADEA claims. On March 29, 2007, Judge Chesler denied the defendants' motion. 2007 WL 958472. Two months later, the plaintiffs' proposed class was approved. 2007 WL 1557163. The plaintiffs supplemented their fourth amended complaint by seeking to reinstate two ERISA claims that had been dismissed earlier in the litigation. Subsequently, the defendants moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims. On June 7, 2010, Judge Chesler granted the motion. 2010 WL 2326211. This order resulted in a final judgment on all remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed the judgment to the Third Circuit. On June 22, 2011, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 2011 WL 2507089. This opinion ended the case after more than ten years of litigation. The case is now closed.", "summary": "AT&T management employees filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that changes to the company's pension plan violated the ADEA and ERISA. After more than ten years of litigation, the defendants were granted summary judgment on all claims."}
{"article": "On May 21, 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice (\"DOJ\") filed a lawsuit on behalf of United States of America against the City of New York under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn Division. On July 17, 2007, the Vulcan Society--an organization of Black firefighters, and three individuals, filed an Intervenor's Complaint. Plaintiffs sued to enforce the right of Black and Hispanic candidates to be treated fairly in the application process for positions in the New York City Fire Department (\"FDNY\"). Specifically, Plaintiffs challenged the City's reliance on two written examinations that were used to appoint entry-level firefighters to classes at the New York City Fire Academy (\"Academy\"). These examinations--Written Examination 7029 and Written Examination 2043--were administered from 1999 to 2007, and the City had appointed more than 5,300 entry-level firefighters based on the test's results. Although Plaintiffs identified approximately 3,100 of the examination candidates as Black and approximately 4,200 of the examination candidates as Hispanic, the City had appointed just 184 Black firefighters and 461 Hispanic firefighters from the challenged examinations. Plaintiffs asserted that the City's reliance on Exams 7029 and 2043 in selecting entry-level firefighters had had a disparate impact on Black and Hispanic candidates in violation of Title VII. The Intervenors also claimed, under a disparate treatment theory, that the City, two city agencies, the Mayor and the Fire Commissioner had long been aware of the discriminatory impact on Blacks of their examination process, and that their continued reliance on and perpetuation of these racially discriminatory hiring processes constituted intentional race discrimination. To remedy these claimed violations, Plaintiffs sought various forms of injunctive and monetary relief. The United States sought to enjoin the City from engaging in discriminatory practices against Black individuals on the basis of race and against Hispanics on the basis of national origin, and sought a specific injunction against the practices challenged in this case. It also asked the court to order the City to take appropriate action to correct the present effects of its discriminatory policies and practices and to enjoin it from failing to \"make whole\" those harmed by the City's policies and practices. The Intervening Plaintiffs sought similar, but broader relief, including an injunction requiring the City to appoint entry-level firefighters from among qualified Black applicants in sufficient numbers to offset the historic pattern and practice of discrimination against Blacks in testing and appointment to that position. The Intervenors sought to require the City to recruit Black candidates and implement and improve long-range recruitment programs and to provide future test scores, appointment criteria, eligibility lists, appointment data, and all other information necessary to conduct an adverse impact and job-relatedness analysis of the examination and selection process. The Intervenors also sought damages and other fees. On September 5, 2007, the Court (Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis) issued an order to bifurcate the liability and relief phases, and permitted intervention by the Intervenors. On July 25, 2008, the Court denied the Intervenors' motion to amend their Complaint, but on January 28, 2009, declined to dismiss the Intervenors' Complaint on timeliness grounds. On May 11, 2009, in a published opinion, the Court certified a class consisting of Black applicants for the position of entry-level firefighter. United States v. City of New York, 258 F.R.D. 47. On July 22, 2009, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs had established a prima facie case that the City's use of the two written examinations had resulted in a disparate impact upon Black and Hispanic applicants for the position of entry-level firefighter. The Court also concluded that the City had failed to present sufficient evidence that business needs justified its employment practices. Therefore, the Court granted Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment in their entirety. This ruling established that the City was liable for disparate-impact discrimination under Title VII. 637 F.Supp.2d 77. On January 13, 2010, in a published order, the Court held that the City's use of these two examinations constituted a pattern and practice of intentional discrimination against Blacks, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and State and City Human Rights Laws. 683 F. Supp. 2d 225. On January 21, 2010, in another published order, the Court expressly did not order any particular form of relief. Instead, the Court \"outlined the broad contours of relief and resolves several basic disputes regarding the implementation of a remedy.\" In essence, the Court concluded that two broad forms of relief were needed to remedy the City's discrimination: (1) compensation for the identified victims of the City's discriminatory testing practices, and (2) compliance measures to ensure that the City implements and administers a fair and job-related test for entry-level firefighters. The Court noted that these forms of relief were simple in concept, but would be complex in execution. Achieving these basic aims would require ongoing oversight, attention to myriad details, and resolution of disputes among the parties. 681 F. Supp. 2d 274. Following these decisions, the Court issued a preliminary relief order directing the parties to take certain actions to begin remedying the City's violations. Among other things, the Court directed the parties to prepare for a hearing (the \"6019 Hearing\") regarding the validity of Exam 6019, which in turn would determine whether and how the City could hire from the Exam 6019 eligibility list on an interim basis while a new, valid selection procedure was being developed. On August 4, 2010, in a published opinion, the Court held that the City failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that its use of Exam 6019 as a pass/fail and rank-ordering device was job-related and justified by business necessity. Therefore, the Court concluded that the City's use of Exam 6019 did not comply with Title VII. Accordingly, the Court restrained and enjoined the City from taking any further steps to initiate or finalize a fire academy class using the Exam 6019 eligibility list until October 1, 2010. 731 F. Supp. 2d 291. On October 19, 2010, the Court permanently enjoined the City from hiring firefighters based on the results of Exam 6019, except under one of the interim approaches already endorsed by the Court. 2010 WL 4137536. On June 6, 2011, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff-Intervenors' motion for continued remedial-phase certification of the class of Black victims of the City's discrimination that the Court had conditionally certified at the beginning of the remedial phase of the litigation. In that Order, the Court certified noneconomic loss and injunctive relief subclasses, each comprised of Black non-hire and delayed-hire victims of the City's discrimination. The Court appointed the three individual Intervenors as representatives of the noneconomic loss subclass, and the Vulcan Society as representative of the injunctive relief subclass. 2011 WL 2259640. With respect to issues of \"make-whole\" relief, including backpay and benefits, priority hiring, and retroactive seniority, the court denied Plaintiff-Intervenors' motion for certification of a single class represented by the Vulcan Society, but permitted Plaintiff-Intervenors to move for certification of non-hire victim and delayed-hire victim subclasses as to issues of make-whole relief as long as they were represented by individual subclass members. Before the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011) (\"the Wal-Mart decision\"), Plaintiff-Intervenors contended that the two subclasses should be certified as mandatory subclasses under Rule 23(b)(2). In the alternative, they argued that they also qualified for certification under Rule 23(b)(3). After Plaintiff-Intervenors filed their motion for certification of the two subclasses, the Wal-Mart decision was issued on June 20, 2011. The Court ordered the parties to submit additional briefing addressing the effect of the Wal-Mart decision on the pending motions for certification of the two subclasses. The parties filed letters stating their views on the Wal-Mart decision on June 21, 2011. On July 8, 2011, in a published order, the Court addressed the effect of the Wal-Mart decision. Applying Wal-Mart, the Court denied the City's motion to decertify the liability-phase class; denied Plaintiff-Intervenors' motion for summary judgment as to compensatory damages for noneconomic losses; and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), certified the non-hire and delayed-hire victim subclasses as to common remedial-phase issues. 276 F.R.D. 22. On July 11, 2011, the court granted Plaintiff-Intervenors' Motion to compel the City to reduce the application fee for Exam No. 2000 from $54.00 to $30.00. On July 13, 2011, the court issued an order approving changes made to the next entry-level examinations, including inclusion of questions on race and gender. 2011 WL 2745940. On September 30, 2011, following a bench trial on injunctive relief, the Court issued a memorandum on findings of fact. 2011 WL 7661518. On October 5, 2011, the court issued an order containing a draft remedial order and informing parties of its intention to enter a permanent injunction, after reasoning that the court's involvement in remedying discrimination is required due to the City's historic lack of response to it. It aimed at compelling the City to undertake a court-guided institutional reform with several general injunctions and only few specific instructions. The draft remedial order also contemplated retention of jurisdiction by the Court for at least ten years and appointment of a Court Monitor to assess implementation of orders. 2011 WL 4639832. The court issued an order granting partial judgment and a permanent injunction on December 8, 2011. The order contained several permanent injunctions: 1) the City was enjoined from using policies previously found unlawful by the Court, or any other policies that have a disparate impact on Black or Hispanic applicants; 2) prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race or national origin in the City's recruitment and selection processes; 3) prohibition on retaliation. The order also contained more specific remedies, including, among others: 1) development of an optional survey to assess effectiveness of its selection procedures with an independent recruitment consultant; 2) mitigating effects of voluntary attrition plans on Hispanics and Blacks; 3) more comprehensive screening procedure; 4) assessment of its compliance with employment laws. The Court retained jurisdiction over the matter until the City's examinations, recruitment, selection and other procedures no longer had a disparate impact on Blacks and Hispanics, and, in any event, the court's jurisdiction to modify or enforce the order would not lapse until the later of January 1, 2022, or expiration of the City's next two civil hiring lists for entry-level firefighters. 2011 WL 6131136. On December 9, 2011, the defendants filed a notice of appeal of the order to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. On February 1, 2012, the District Court denied a motion to intervene by a firefighters' union without prejudice regarding priority hiring eligibility, granted the motion with respect to the City's motion for a change in examination objection policy. 2012 WL 3134353. It also denied an individual's motion to intervene, and granted the plaintiff-intervenor's motion for partial final judgment on the issue of individual liability of the Mayor and other officials. On February 2, 2012, the plaintiff-intervenors appealed the Court's partial final judgment. On March 8, 2012, the Court issued an order denying summary judgment for the plaintiffs as to backpay liability because certain issues had to be resolved on an individual basis, but found there was no question that backpay was due. The pre-mitigation backpay was estimated to be $126,696,803.00 by statistical analysis. The court also permitted the City to amend its response to claim of failure to mitigate damages by the plaintiffs. The court also decided the issue of eligibility for backpay, settling on the definition of non-hire claimant and delayed-hire claimant. The former included any Black or Hispanic applicant who failed written exams 7029 or 2043 and did not gain position of entry-level firefighter, or passed exam 2043 and failed to gain the same position. The latter included any Black or Hispanic applicant who failed or passed written exams 7029 or 2043, but did not gain position of entry-level firefighter after a certain date. The definitions also included other qualifications, such as speaking English, not having a criminal record of a felony, and being of a certain age. The Court also denied the City's motion to delay individual relief determinations pending its appeal of the earlier summary judgment. 847 F. Supp. 2d 395. The proceedings continued with the matters concerning the fairness hearing on the relief granted to two classes of complainants. On September 28, 2012, the Court granted the City's motion to use Exam 2000 to create a list of eligible applicants. 2012 WL 4503253. Following a fairness hearing, the Court determined that none of the objections merited a change in the proposed relief order, and issued a final relief order on October 26, 2012. The final relief incorporate the proposed relief order and all the orders made by the Court in the interim (such as calculating backpay). 905 F. Supp. 2d 438. On May 14, 2013, the Second Circuit issued its decision on the City's appeal of the injunction against hiring entry-level firefighters, summary judgment against it on disparate treatment of January 13, 2010, and the plaintiff-intervenors' cross-appeal on individual liability of the Mayor and other officials. The Second Circuit vacated summary judgment against the City on disparate treatment, reasoning that the City met its burden of production to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination. It also found that there was sufficient evidence for an individual claim against the Commissioner based on federal law. In light of vacating the summary judgment, the Second Circuit ruled that certain provisions of the injunction had to be modified, wherever it referenced disparate treatment by the defendants. In all other respects, the injunction was affirmed. The disparate treatment issue was remanded for a trial with an order that a different judge preside over the proceedings. 717 F.3d 72. On August 30, 2013, the District Court granted the plaintiff-intervenors attorney's fees in the amount of $3,707,313.29. The expert's fees were denied without prejudice. 2013 WL 5542459. On June 3, 2013, the District Court issued an order allowing the plaintiffs to seek noneconomic compensatory damages under New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law, based on the disparate impact claims. Afterwards, the Court continued to review the Special Masters' reports and approving lists of priority hires, and denying some claimants (for example, see Docket Entry No. 1182). 2013 WL 12318105. On January 30, 2014, the District Court granted in part the plaintiff-intervenors' expert fees in the amounts of $198,751.11, $5,856.00 and $33,642.00. 2014 WL 347605. On March 18, 2014, the District Court received a letter that the plaintiffs and the City settled as to the disparate treatment dispute. On April 22, 2014, both parties filed a joint motion for provisional approval of the settlement, which was granted on April 28, 2014. The stipulation contained promises by the City to better recruit minority firefighters and creation of a position at FDNY for that purpose. According to <a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/nyregion/new-york-settles-bias-lawsuit-against-fire-department.html\">the New York Times</a>, the new Mayor of New York, Bill de Blasio, decided to settle the case and agreed to pay nearly $100 million in backpay to minorities. About six months later, the United States proposed a schedule of individual monetary awards for victims of discrimination. On March 11, 2015, Judge Garaufis accepted a modified form of the United States' proposal to resolve outstanding claims for backpay and fringe benefits. The order awarded a total of $99,098,358.29 to plaintiffs and included detailed procedures for allocating the award across plaintiffs based on the plaintiffs' individual circumstances. In addition, the City reimbursed $150,000 in costs to the United States but was not required to pay attorneys' fees. The Intervenors and the agreed to negotiate in good faith to arrive at reasonable attorneys' fees. The court decided that the total settlement was fair, placing particular stress on the fact that some plaintiffs had been injured 15 years ago. It also noted that individual plaintiffs were generally favorable towards the settlement. Turning to the allocation scheme, the court recognized a paucity of precedent but decided that the formula was \"lawful, consistent with the public interest, fair, reasonable, and adequate.\" In addition, Judge Garaufis rejected objections by individual plaintiffs that had surfaced during the preceding year. Judge Garaufis also noted that the City made a series of offers of judgment starting in April 2014 to Black claimants who suffered non-economic harm. 2015 WL 1063403. On April 16, 2015, Judge Garaufis ordered the City to pay back interest on claimant's employee pension contributions. Balancing the City's interests with those of the plaintiffs, Judge Garaufis found that Title VII's \"make whole\" imperative outweighs the City's potential savings. 2015 WL 1800245. In a June 5, 2015 order, Judge Garaufis adopted the parties' joint stipulation on the Intervenors' intentional discrimination claims. The City agreed to:<ol type=\"a\"> <li>Recruit Black test-takers in proportion to the total population, plus 3% to correct past discrimination;</li> <li>Appoint a Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer to promote diversity;</li> <li>Disclose medical standards to candidates;</li> <li>Place firefighters in companies close to where they live, as practical; and</li> <li>Engage in outreach activities at local schools and colleges. 308 F.R.D. 53.</li></ol>Over the next year, the court continued to enforce the settlement agreements. In particular, the court awarded several money judgments to individual claimants found eligible by Special Masters. In addition, the City awarded $30,950 to a firefighter who alleged retaliation by the Fire Department as part of a December 31, 2015 settlement agreement. On February 18, 2016, Judge Garaufis preliminary approved a settlement awarding $9.5 million in attorneys' fees to the Intervenors. Few class members objected to the fee award. Noting that fee awards are permissible in class actions and that $9.5 million was reasonable in light of the time spent and success obtained by the Intervenors, Judge Garaufis issued final approval of the award on June 16, 2016. 2016 WL 3417218. The parties adopted the Second Amended Protective Order on November 20, 2017, to help ensure the privacy of the class members. The Order define \"confidential material\" to include anything that contained identifying information of current or former firefighters or applicants and restricted use of such material to the litigation. In addition, the Order restricted how the parties could disseminate confidential information to third parties. As of April 12, 2021, the monitor continues to submit quarterly reports detailing the city's advances in diversity hiring. Its most recent report was filed on February 1, 2021. As of April 12, 2021, the case remains ongoing.", "summary": "On May 21, 2007, the United States and African American and Hispanic applicants for positions in the New York City Fire Department filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District Court of New York, claiming that the test used by the NYFD resulted in disparate impact discrimination against the two groups. The Court bifurcated the case and ordered broad remedial relief, and even after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011), disallowed decertification of the class. On March 18, 2014, the District Court received a letter that the plaintiffs and the City settled as to the disparate treatment dispute. Later, the parties settled the intentional discrimination claims. The settlements awarded $100 million in backpay and required institutional reform. The case is still ongoing as the court monitors the settlement's implementation."}
{"article": "On March 12, 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit under Title VII in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York. The DOJ sought injunctive and monetary relief, alleging that the defendant had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of sex in its hiring practices. The complaint alleges that the City of New York, specifically the New York City Department of Transportation (\"DOT\"), implemented discriminatory recruitment and hiring procedures on the basis of sex by: (1) failing or refusing to hire women for the position of Bridge Painter on the same basis as men; and (2) by failing or refusing to take appropriate action to correct the present effects of their discriminatory policies and practices. On June 27, 2007, intervenor plaintiffs, a labor union and several females previously not hired by the DOT, were added to the action. On October 31, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied in part and granted in part on July 2, 2009. The motion was denied with respect to the allegations of pattern or practice of discrimination by the United States, but granted with respect to the same allegation by intervenor-plaintiffs. The Court reasoned that individuals cannot bring pattern or practice claims and each individual alleged wrongdoing was time barred. After more discovery and pre-trial motions, the case went into a bench trial. On May 13, 2010, the Court (Judge William H. Pauley III) issued an opinion and order, finding for the plaintiff United States. The court found that the defendant was engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination, by not having objective hiring criteria, giving preference to less qualified male applicants, and maintaining a hostile work environment. It did not find the City's justifications to be compelling. The Court ordered to implement the United States proposed orders of remedial relief to establish objective hiring procedures at the DOT. Judgment on individual compensation and relief was reserved for later. On May 28, 2010, the Court issued a judgment approving the compliance injunction by the United States. Under the proposed orders, the defendant had to establish objective hiring criteria and advertise those criteria, as well as have established interviewing procedures. The proposed orders also included general injunctions: 1) prohibition against gender discrimination in recruitment and hiring of bridge painters; 2) prohibition on retaliation. It was also ordered that the City submitted three annual reports describing its compliance, kept all records pertaining to the orders, and that United States had a right to monitor compliance. On June 25, 2010, the defendants appealed against the May 28 judgment. However, the parties then settled and the appeal was withdrawn. On September 30, 2010, the Court entered stipulation and order of settlement. The agreement did not in any way modify the compliance injunction. The defendant agreed to pay $250,000.00 to four intervenor plaintiffs each ($1,000,000.00 total). The defendant had a right to apply to the court for modification of the compliance injunction. After a fairness hearing on December 7, 2010, the Court ordered the agreement to be fair and lawful, and adopted the compliance injunction as its final order.", "summary": "On March 12, 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit under Title VII in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York. The DOJ sought injunctive and monetary relief, alleging that gender discrimination in hiring and hiring procedures for the position of Bridge Painter. On May 13, 2010, the Court issue a judgment for the plaintiff, finding pattern or practice of discrimination. The defendant was ordered to implement objective hiring criteria and procedures. On September 30, 2010, the Court entered a settlement agreement deciding individual relief, whereas the defendant agreed to pay $1,000,000.00 total to four female individuals."}
{"article": "On April 15, 2005, a fraternal organization of police officers of Asian or Pacific Islander descent and all officers filed this federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on the grounds that they were passed over for promotion because of their race. The suit alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as 42 U.S.C. \u00a71981 and 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for compensatory damages, declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. The eleven individual plaintiffs in this action are Asian American police officers employed by the defendant (Port Authority of New York and New Jersey) who claimed they were denied promotion because of their race. All eleven of the plaintiffs are members of the Port Authority Police Asian Jade Society of New York and New Jersey Inc. (\"Asian Jade Society\"), a nonprofit organization whose purpose is to promote good relations among the members of the Port Authority police department. During the relevant period, the Port Authority utilized a promotion process where entry-level police officers could be promoted to the rank of Sergeant, the first level in the hierarchy of supervisory positions. Periodically, each facility's commanding officer would make a recommendation for officers for promotion, at their discretion, and after the applicant had passed an exam. Recommended officers would then be evaluated by the Chiefs' Board, each board member would vote for or against each officer and those who received a majority would be recommended to the superintendent; the board did not use any written guidelines. The ultimate decision to promote an officer belonged solely to the Superintendent and promotions occurred outside of this hiring process. As of January 31, 2001, no Asian American had been promoted to Sergeant. The Asian Jade Society filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\") on behalf of the eleven members on January 31, 2001. The EEOC determined there was reasonable cause to believe race discrimination had occurred under Title VII. The plaintiffs filed suit on April 15, 2005, alleging that the Port Authority had discriminated against Asian Americans in making promotions to Sergeant. On March 11, 2009, a nine-day trial commenced in the Southern District of New York, before Judge Miriam Cedarbaum. The jury found that the Port Authority's promotion practice had a disparate impact on Asian-American police officers and that the defendant had utilized a pattern or practice of intentional discrimination with respect to seven of the eleven plaintiffs. On April 14, 2010, Port Authority was ordered to pay the seven plaintiffs $1,637,622 in back pay and compensatory damages. Additionally, Port Authority was ordered to pay $2,357,659 in attorneys' fees and costs. The Port Authority appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support each plaintiffs' theories, that evidence barred by the statute of limitations was admitted, and that damages were awarded on time-barred claims. The four plaintiffs who did not prevail at trial cross-appealed and argued that the district court erred by excluding expert testimony. On July 10, 2012, the Court of Appeals (Judge Dennis Jacobs) found the district court erred in impliedly instructing the jury that a common pattern of discrimination is an element of liability. The circuit court declined to extend the pattern-or-practice method of proof outside of the class action context (federal Courts of Appeals have consistently held that the pattern-or-practice method of proof is not available to private non class plaintiffs). The court affirmed the lower court's judgment with respect to the disparate impact and the individual disparate treatment claims. Where the plaintiffs relied on the continuing violations doctrine to prove disparate impact, the back pay and compensatory damages were reversed since the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to disparate impact proof. Failures to promote are considered discrete acts and the continuing violations doctrine requires conduct to be a part of an ongoing discriminatory policy. The Second Circuit court easily affirmed the district court's judgment regarding the four plaintiffs who did not prevail at trial, finding no abuse of discretion. Ultimately, the court remanded for new trial all compensatory damages and equitable relief remedies and affirmed the back pay only for conduct that occurred within the requisite time period. On remand, there is a notice that the parties were required to submit proposed verdict forms to the District Court by the end of June 2013. The parties entered mediation with Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman. A settlement agreement was reached on February 19, 2015 and the case was dismissed with prejudice. The settlement agreement is not publicly available, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "On April 15, 2005, a fraternal organization of police officers of Asian or Pacific Islander descent filed a federal lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on the grounds that they were passed over for promotion because of their race. After a jury verdict for the plaintiffs, the Second Circuit on July 10, 2012 remanded for new trial all compensatory damages and equitable relief remedies awarded by the lower court and affirmed the back pay only for conduct that occurred within the requisite time period. The parties reached a settlement agreement in February of 2015."}
{"article": "On June 22, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this lawsuit against Schott North America, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The complaint alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The defendant, a glass manufacturer, allegedly classified quality assurance workers in its Duryea facility according to gender. When it created a new quality assurance classification combining men and women, it allegedly gave preference to men in a variety of ways, including hiring more men than women, giving men an unfair advantage in its application system, and dismissing women instead of men. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief as well as punitive damages against the defendant. The female complainants intervened in the EEOC's suit and alleged that the employers' policies resulted in disparate impact and disparate treatment of female employees. Judge James Munley was assigned to this case. On November 5, 2007, the defendant moved for summary judgment. The defendant claimed that the plaintiffs offered no evidence of sex discrimination that would offer relief. The court, however, disagreed and denied this request on September 29, 2008. The parties underwent pre-trial proceedings on February 6, 2009, and jury trial was set for June 2, 2009. Before a trial could be held, on May 6, 2009, the parties informed the court that they had reached a settlement agreement. About a month later, the court approved the parties\u2019 consent decree. The court retained jurisdiction for three years to ensure compliance. This consent decree required that: 1. The defendant pay $1,450,000.00 to eleven individuals the plaintiffs identified as claimants. 2. The defendant would be prohibited from engaging in employment discrimination and retaliation. 3. The defendant was obligated to post notices on all bulletin boards to be visible to its employees. 4. The defendant was obligated to revise anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies and complaint procedures 5. The defendant had to promote supervisor accountability in anti-employment discrimination efforts. This required the managers and supervisors to receive training, to report any incidents of employment discrimination, and to ensure compliance with the defendant\u2019s policy. 6. The defendant had to provide anti-employment discrimination training to all its employees. 7. The defendant had to retain records of any and all employment discrimination complaints. 8. The defendant had to report regularly to EEOC to ensure compliance anti-employment discrimination efforts. The court docket shows no further activity, and the consent decree duration has lapsed. Therefore, this case is closed.", "summary": "In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and complainants, that intervened as plaintiffs, filed this suit against Schott North America, Inc, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The complaint alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In 2009, the court approved the parties\u2019 consent decree. The court retained jurisdiction for three years to ensure compliance. This decree required that the defendants provide monetary relief for the claimants, comply with Title VII, provide anti-discrimination training to all its employees, retain records of employment discrimination, and regularly report to the EEOC. In 2012, this case closed."}
{"article": "The Memphis District Office and Nashville Area Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this lawsuit against Whirlpool Corporation on June 9, 2006, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Judge John T. Nixon was assigned to this case. The complaint alleged sexual and racial harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief for the individual complainant and attorneys fees for the EEOC. Specifically, the complaint was brought after an African-American employee of Whirlpool complained that a fellow employee had racially and sexually harassed her. The harassment eventually led to the harasser physically attacking the complainant. Prior to the attack, the complainant complained to her supervisors about the harasser\u2019s racialized and sexualized comments toward her, but her supervisors did very little to address her concerns. At one point, she complained to the supervisor and he responded by saying: \u201cwhy don\u2019t you just go ahead and f#@k him and get it over with?\u201d After constantly rejecting the harasser\u2019s sexual advances, the harasser physically attacked the complainant. The complainant eventually quit her job with Whirlpool Corporation because her therapist and psychologist advised her to do so. The complainant intervened in the case on July 24, 2006. For the next two years, the parties engaged in discovery. On December 21, 2009, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The court awarded monetary relief in back pay, front pay, and compensatory damages in the amount of $1,073,261. The court did not award any punitive damages. The court also did not grant any injunctive relief, stating that \"because the workplace at issue, Defendant\u2019s LaVergne Division, closed as of August 15, 2008 and Plaintiffs did not renew their request for this relief in their post-trial papers, the Court will not now grant injunctive or declaratory relief.\" On February 20, 2010, the plaintiffs moved for attorney fees and costs. The court granted the plaintiff $215,015 in attorneys fees and costs on August 2, 2011. Meanwhile, on April 26, 2011, the defendant appealed the district court's December ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Without stating a reason, the parties then jointly moved to dismiss the appeal. The Sixth Circuit granted this joint motion on June 12, 2012, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "In June 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. A month later, the complainant intervened into the case as a plaintiff. Judge T. NIxon was assigned to the case. Plaintiffs alleged sexual and racial harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complainant, an African American woman, experienced sexual and racial harassment by a fellow co-worker, a white man, at the Whirlpool Corporation. The complainant\u2019s supervisors failed to take action, and the events escalated until the co-worker physically attacked the complainant. In 2009, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs that granted $1,073,261 in monetary relief. And in 2011, the court awarded $210,039 in attorney fees and costs to the plaintiff."}
{"article": "On December 19, 2018 two US Airmen under pseudonym and OutServe-SLDN, a network of LGBTQ military service-people, filed suit against the U.S. Department of Defense, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The Plaintiffs argued that the Department of Defense had violated equal protection under the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs, represented by Winston and Strawn LLP, LAMBDA Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Outserve-SLDN, sought declaratory and injunctive relief allowing HIV-positive service members to continue to serve, as well as money damages. The plaintiffs alleged that they were discharged from their duties in the Air Force due to their HIV status. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the plaintiffs were discharged based on their HIV status. The complaint explains that what it means to be living with HIV has changed significantly since its origin, \u201cfor most people living with HIV, medication renders their HIV inconsequential to their daily lives.\u201d Both plaintiffs Roe and Voe were service members in good standing. Both had been successfully deployed to foreign countries twice and were excelling in their positions when they were diagnosed with and began treatment for HIV. Both of the plaintiffs were able to get their viral loads to an undetectable status quickly, however they were both dismissed from the Air Force solely on the basis of the HIV status. When the Air Force discharged Roe and Voe, the Air Force described HIV as rendering the service members ineligible for deployment to the Central Command area of responsibility. The Air Force also noted the service members were precluded from being able to deploy world-wide without a waiver. The case was assigned to Judge Leonie M. Brinkema. On January 11, 2019 the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo until there was a judgment on the merits of the plaintiffs claims. The plaintiffs requested that the injunction prevent the defendants from restricting Roe and Voe and others similarly situated from being promoted, changing duty station, or re-training on the same terms as other service members living with HIV who were not being separated. On January 25, 2019, the Department of Defense opposed the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and also filed a motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. A hearing was held before Judge Brinkema on February 15, 2019. The same day, Judge Brinkema issued an opinion granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The order enjoined the defendants from separating or discharging from military service Richard Roe, Victor Voe, and any other similarly situated active-duty member of the Air Force because of their classification as ineligible for worldwide deployment or deployment to the United States Central Command area due to their HIV-positive status. Judge Brinkema also denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. 359 F.Supp.3d 382. The same day the order was issued, the plaintiffs OutServe-SLDN filed a motion to amend the preliminary injunction. In the motion, the plaintiffs asked the court to remove the phrase \"active-duty.\" There was a member of the Air National Guard who faced separation from service on the basis of HIV-positive status. Four days after the motion was filed, the court denied to amend the preliminary injunction, and Judge Brinkema said that this airman was not similarly situated to the named plaintiffs because he is not on active-duty and he is part of the National Guard, which is a separate institution from the Air Force. Judge Brinkeman dismissed this motion without prejudice. On March 22, 2019 plaintiffs OutServe-SLDN filed a motion to compel documents and information withheld on the basis of deliberative process privilege. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were withholding 161 documents because they allegedly involved Defendants\u2019 decision-making regarding policies affecting service members living with HIV. The documents at issue were related to the determinations that Plaintiffs Roe and Voe were limited in their ability to deploy, documents that defendants relied upon in writing or amending Air Force policies relating to individuals living with HIV, and documents related to the deployability of other Airmen living with HIV, and the decisions to separate or retain those Airmen. The defendants opposed this motion, and a hearing was held before Magistrate Judge Ivan D. Davis on March 29, 2019. The motion to compel production was held in abeyance by Judge Davis pending review of a similar issue in the companion case, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17748\">Harrison v. Spencer</a>. On April 5, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to modify the preliminary injunction to include the following language: <blockquote>If an Airman wishes to be excepted from this Order and be separated or discharged, the Air Force shall provide them a written notice that their consent to separation is not required and that a federal lawsuit may result in his or her retention. After receiving such a notice, the Airman may make a written request to proceed with his or her separation or discharge, and then the Air Force may proceed with the separation or discharge.</blockquote> The plaintiffs did not oppose this motion, and three days later, Judge Brinkema granted the motion and amended the February 15 Order as proposed. The defendants filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on April 16, 2019. They appealed the February 15, 2019 decision denying the defendants motion to dismiss that granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. (Appellate Docket No. 19-01410). Amicus briefs were filed by the HIV Medicine Association (with the American Academy of HIV Medicine, GLMA: Health Professionals Advancing LGBTQ Equality, and Infectious Diseases Society of America), former military officials, and the American Public Health Association (with Duke Law Health Justice Clinic, Southern AIDS Coalition, The National Alliance of State and Territorial AIDS Directors, and NMAC). All three amicus briefs were in support of the appellees. Oral argument was held on September 18, 2019 before a panel of Fourth Circuit Judges comprised of Judges James A. Wynn Jr, Albert Diaz, and Henry F. Floyd. Back in the district court, on May 3, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in part. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue since Outserve was not injured by the military's policies nor was it the type of institutional plaintiff that can sue based on injury to its members. The plaintiffs rejected both of these contentions. On May 31, 2019 oral argument was held before Judge Brinkema, and on the same day, Judge Brinkema ordered that the motion to dismiss be held in abeyance so that the parties could engage in additional discovery. On June 18, 2019, following a decision in the companion case <i>Harrison v. Shanahan</i>, regarding the production of documents where the defendants similarly opposed the motion on the basis of deliberative process privilege, Magistrate Judge Davis issued an order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion to compel documents and information. Judge Davis denied the motion to compel with regard to one document because it was not relevant to plaintiffs' claims because it was an appeal of a physical evaluation board hearing for someone who was not a party to this case. Based on the decision in <i>Harrison v. Shanahan</i>, Judge Davis ordered the defendants to produce the other requested documents because they were relevant to the plaintiffs' case, there is no other source of information, and the possible negative effect on the government is outweighed by the plaintiffs need for the information. In July 2019, the plaintiffs filed another motion to compel documents and information withheld on the basis of deliberative process privilege. After the June 2019 order by Magistrate Judge Davis, the defendants produced many documents, however, the defendants refused to produce complete versions of eight emails to and from senior officials regarding the Air Force\u2019s decision to refer asymptomatic HIV-positive Airmen into the Disability Evaluation System and to separate them from service. The plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on July 23, 2019 with respect to their claim that the determinations of Roe and Voe's deployability and separability violated the APA, and their claim that the determinations of Roe and Voe's deployability and separability are arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. On July 19, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to stay the summary judgment briefings and the bench trial set to begin on September 9, 2019 because of the Fourth Circuit appeal in this case. Oral argument before a panel of Fourth Circuit judges was set for September 18, 2019. On August 1, 2019, Judge Brinkema cancelled the district court trial scheduled for September 9 and stayed all proceedings until further order of the court. On appeal, on January 10, 2020 the Fourth Circuit published an opinion affirming the decision of the district court. Four days later the Fourth Circuit published an amended superseding opinion written by Judge Wynn and joined by Judges Diaz and Floyd, once again affirming the decision of the district court. The district court previously concluded that Roe and Voe were likely to succeed on their claims that their discharges were arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, and irrational, in violation of Roe and Voe\u2019s Equal Protection rights. On the motion to dismiss, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on at least one claim (either that discharging Roe and Voe violated the APA or that the deployment policies violate the APA), and that absent judicial review the plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm. 947 F.3d 207. On the preliminary injunction, the Fourth Circuit said the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that their deployment policies at issue violate the APA because the government has not and cannot reconcile the policies with current medical evidence. Judge Wynn wrote that the district court rightly found that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the Air Force\u2019s discharge decisions were arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the APA. Department of Defense regulations require individualized determinations based on objective evidence to determine a service member\u2019s fitness for duty or separation under the Disability Evaluation System. The Fourth Circuit said that the government's explanation for why is has effectively imposed a ban on deploying HIV-positive service members to the Central Command area of responsibility is \"at odds with modern science.\" Because the Air Force ignored developments in knowledge and treatment that allow HIV-positive service members to carry out their duties without posing any substantial risk of transmission, the Air Force denied these service members an individualized determination of their fitness for military service. 947 F.3d 207 OutServe-SLDN and the American Military Partner Association merged in August 2019 and formed the Modern Military Association of America (MMAA). Due to this merger, On March 10, 2020, plaintiffs Voe and Roe filed a consent motion to substitute parties. The plaintiffs requested that the court substitute the Modern Military Association of America for OutServe-SLDN in this case, which the court did the next day. On March 27, 2020, Judge Brinkema denied the defendants' renewed motion to dismiss and in a separate order also denied the plaintiffs' motion to compel documents and information. Judge Brinkema found that MMAA (formerly Outserve) had direct standing as the organization personally suffered an injury due to the increased staffing required by the greater number of HIV-related calls. 2020 WL 1493557. On May 4, 2020 plaintiff Roe filed a motion for summary judgment. One month later, the defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment. A hearing before Judge Brinkema is scheduled for August 4, 2020. The case remains open.", "summary": "On December 19, 2018 two US Airmen under pseudonym and OutServe-SLDN, a network of LGBTQ military service-people, filed suit against the U.S. Department of Defense, James Mattis, and Heather Wilson in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The Plaintiffs argued that the U.S had violated equal protection under the fifth amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs represented by Winston and Strawn LLP, LAMBDA Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Outserve-SLDN (now known as the Modern Military Association of America) sought declaratory and injunctive relief allowing HIV positive service members to continue to serve and damages. The Plaintiffs allege that they were discharged from their duties in the Air Force due to their HIV status. The case was assigned to Judge Leonie M. Brinkema. On January 11, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants from restricting Roe and Voe and others similarly situated from being promoted, changing duty station, or re-training on the same terms as other service members living with HIV who are not being separated. A hearing was held before Judge Brinkema on February 15, 2019. The same day, Judge Brinkema issued an opinion granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The order enjoined the defendants from separating or dicharging from military service Richard Roe, Victor Voe, and any other similarly situated active-duty member of the Air Force because they are classified as ineligible for worldwide deployment or deployment to the United States Central Command area due to their HIV-positive status. The defendants appealed to the decision on the preliminary injunction to the Fourth Circuit. Oral argument was held on September 18, 2019 before a panel of Fourth Circuit Judges comprised of Judges James A. Wynn Jr, Albert Diaz, and Henry F. Floyd. In January 2020, the Fourth Circuit issued an opinion affirming the district court's decision. In the district court, both parties have filed motions for summary judgment, and oral argument is set for August 4, 2020. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On September 28, 2006, the San Francisco district office of the EEOC brought this lawsuit against United Airlines in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The EEOC alleged that United Airlines had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Civil Rights Act. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendant had refused reasonable accommodation to individuals with disabilities by disallowing them to work fewer than thirty hours per week. The EEOC claimed that these actions adversely affected their status as employees due to their disabilities and sought injunctive and monetary relief as well as attorney\u2019s fees. On February 14, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied on March 21 by Judge Thomas S. Zilly. The court held that there are material issues of fact as to the fundamental job duties of the employment position at issue and what constitutes a reasonable accommodation. In addition, the court held that the defendant\u2019s offer of a three-year unpaid leave is not a \u201creasonable accommodation\u201d for a disabled claimant who did not have a temporary medical condition. On May 29, three other employees of United Airlines filed a motion to intervene as putative class representatives, but the court denied their intervention as class representatives and granted them leave to intervene as individual plaintiffs-intervenors on July 16. Both the EEOC and proposed intervenors\u2019 motions for reconsideration of this decision was denied on August 7, 2008. On August 18, the proposed intervenors appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on November 6, 2008 and remanded to the district court. Back in the district court, on June 5, 2009, the intervenors filed a complaint and motion to certify class. On July 6, 2009, the motion for class certification was stricken with prejudice as inappropriately. On February 4, 2010, more employees of United Airlines filed a second motion to intervene. On March 6, the first three intervenor plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case and the second motion to intervene was withdrawn. On August 26, 2010, the defendant filed a sealed motion for summary judgment. On December 17, 2010, the parties filed notice of a settlement agreement with an attached consent decree. That same day, the court approved the consent decree. The decree stipulated the following injunctive relief: 1) non-discrimination policies: United Airlines will permit reduced-hours schedules as reasonable accommodations for qualified individuals with disabilities in good faith and on a case-by-case basis. The parties also agreed that working fewer than 16 hours per week (the minimum schedule for United Airline's part-time workers) would be an unreasonable accommodation and would not be allowed. 2) training: United Airlines will train all supervisors involved in administering the reasonable accommodation process with respect to the interactive accommodation process, the requirements of the consent decree, among others. The trainer would be a qualified outside consultant, approved by the EEOC and knowledgeable in the ADA. 3) record keeping and reports: United Airline will mail to counsel a report of training provided and requests for reduced hours accommodations. In addition, United Airlines will pay $600,000 as damages to the plaintiff and each party will bear its own costs and attorneys\u2019 fees. The consent decree was set to terminate three years from date of entry unless the EEOC asked for a continuation. The case is closed, as there are no further activity on this case's docket as of March 2019.", "summary": "The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought an anti-discrimination lawsuit against United Airlines. The claim was that United Airlines discriminated against its employees when it denied employees with disabilities a reduced hours schedule as an accommodation. On December 17, 2010, the court approved a consent decree which required United Airlines to consider a reduced-hours schedule as a reasonable accommodation for employees with disabilities and awarded the plaintiff $600,000 in damages. The consent decree was set to terminate three years from date of entry unless the EEOC asked for a continuation. The case is closed, as there are no further activity on this case's docket as of March 2019."}
{"article": "On August 14, 2013, private citizens filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Missouri against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the First Amendment. The plaintiff, represented by the public interest firm Thomas More Society, asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Due to the ACA mandate, the plaintiffs' employer, the State of Missouri, only offered a health insurance plan that includes contraception coverage. The plaintiffs claimed paying for this health insurance plan violated their Catholic religious beliefs and their right to family integrity. On September 10, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs do not have claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendants' motion argued that the ACA contraception mandate applies only to employers, not private individuals. Furthermore, defendants argued that if the government began allowing individual exceptions to certain aspects of insurance policies the group insurance model would fall apart. On October 16, 2013, the court (Judge Jean C. Hamilton) granted defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The court found that because plaintiffs' alleged injuries were linked with the independent discretionary actions of the State and his health insurance provider, neither of which were parties to the action, plaintiffs alleged only indirect causation between the contraception mandate and their alleged injuries. Moreover, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that an injunction of the government's' policy would alter the behavior of these third parties. These third parties would retain discretion not to offer plaintiff a health plan that excludes contraception and abortion. 978 F. Supp. 2d 1008. Plaintiffs appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and the case was heard before a panel of three judges: Judge Roger Wollman, Judge James Loken, and Judge Diana Murphy. On July 20, 2015, the Court of Appeals reversed. In an opinion by Judge Wollman, the court pointed out that, prior to the enactment of the contraception mandate, the insurance provider and the state had been willing to offer the plaintiffs a contraceptive-free healthcare plan. It concluded that this was persuasive evidence that the insurance provider might well alter its policy if the plaintiffs succeeded on the merits of their claim, and therefore that the injury was not too speculative for adjudication. The case was remanded to the district court for decision on the merits. 793 F. 3d 949. The defendants filed another motion to dismiss. On January 8, 2016, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part: the plaintiffs\u2019 constitutional and APA claims were dismissed with prejudice, but the RFRA claim remained at issue because the plaintiffs alleged that the mandate imposed a substantial burden on their exercise of religion. 2016 WL 98170. On May 24, 2016, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Three weeks later, the plaintiffs did so as well. On July 21, 2016, the court granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants\u2019. Judge Hamilton entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, enjoining the defendants from requiring the plaintiffs\u2019 health insurance issuer to provide them with health insurance that includes contraceptive coverage. The order applied only to health plans provided to the plaintiffs.196 F. Supp. 3d 1010. On August 18, 2016, the plaintiffs moved to recover attorneys\u2019 fees, but agreed to stay briefing on this motion on September 1 after the government indicated that it would likely appeal the district court's decision. The government duly filed its notice of appeal with the Eighth Circuit on September 16. On November 2, 2016, however, the government moved to hold the appeal in abeyance pending the Eighth Circuit's decision in a closely related case, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12671&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Csharpe%20holdings%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B\"><i>Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs.</i></a>. <i>Sharpe</i> was one of several RFRA-based challenges to the contraceptive-coverage mandate consolidated and remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court in order to allow the parties to reach an acceptable compromise. <i>Zubik v. Burwell</i>, 136 S.Ct. 1557 (2016). In the wake of that decision, on July 21, 2016, HHS sent out a Request for Information (RFI) to determine \"whether modifications to the existing accommodation procedure could resolve the objections asserted by the plaintiffs in the pending RFRA cases while still ensuring that the affected women seamlessly receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.\" Since the Eighth Circuit had already decided to withhold further action in <i>Sharpe</i> until after the government filed a status report on the RFI on November 30, it likewise agreed on November 23 to abey proceedings in this case. On February 13, 2017, the date when the abeyance was set to expire, the government wrote to the Eighth Circuit indicating that both parties agreed to extend the abeyance by an additional sixty days. The government explained that the change in presidential administrations that year would likely bear significantly on the issues of this case, with the possibility of the dispute being mooted entirely. Following President Trump's May 4 executive order directing a change in regulations to allow for conscience-based exceptions to the ACA's contraceptive-care mandate, the parties agreed to have the case dismissed on November 13, 2017. The Eighth Circuit obliged three days later, and on December 13, the plaintiffs withdrew their district court motion for attorney's fees. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Private citizens sought an exception to the Affordable Care Act mandate requiring employers to provide contraception coverage on that basis that paying for this insurance plan violated their Catholic religious beliefs. On October 16, 2013, the Eastern District of Missouri (Judge Jean C. Hamilton) dismissed the claim for want of standing, but on July 20, 2015, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for merits decision. Judge Hamilton dismissed all but one of the plaintiff's claims but granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on that claim, enjoining the defendants from requiring the plaintiffs to pay for contraception through their insurance. The government appealed this determination, but following President Trump's May 4, 2017 executive order directing a change in regulations to allow for conscience-based exceptions to the contraceptive-care mandate, the parties agreed to have the case dismissed. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On May 17, 2018, a Catholic foster care and social services agency and {} filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, against the City of Philadelphia. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and by conservative public interest organization the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, alleged that city of Philadelphia revoked new referrals of foster children to their organization because of their faith-based opposition to same-sex marriage. The complaint sought monetary and injunctive relief for violations of under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, breach of contract, the First Amendment, Pennsylvania Constitution, and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case was assigned to Judge Petrese B. Tucker. Plaintiffs asserted that Philadelphia's decision to revoke new foster care referrals breached their contract with the city and targeted them on religious grounds. According to the plaintiffs, the city had previously excepted them from providing foster care services to same-sex couples, and therefore the city's contract was ambiguous on whether they were required to provide these services to same-sex couples. They also alleged that the public statements made by the Mayor of Philadelphia and other public officials criticizing their refusal to serve same-sex couples indicated the city's decision to suspend the contract constituted religious discrimination. On June 7, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction requesting that the Court reinstate referrals of foster children to the plaintiff. The defendants' opposition argued that the plaintiffs violated the City's Fair Practice Ordinance, which forbids discrimination against individuals in public accommodations, and was clearly included in the contract. Since the defendants were acting on behalf of the city, and the city was previously unaware of the plaintiffs' refusal to serve otherwise qualified same-sex couples, the defendants argued that they were within their right to suspend the contract. On July 13, 2018, Judge Petrese B. Tucker denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and TRO. Judge Tucker held that the parties' intent was clear: the Fair Practices ordinance applied to the contract and that plaintiffs' services fell within \"public accommodations\"; therefore, the plaintiffs were required to serve anyone who sought their services. 320 F.Supp.3d 661. The Court rejected the defendants' claims that this violated the Free Exercise clause; it held that the city's policy was neutral and also found that there was insufficient discriminatory intent to trigger strict scrutiny review. The plaintiffs appealed on the same day of this decision. On April 22, 2019, the United State Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, in an opinion by Judge Thomas L. Ambro. The Court of Appeals held that the City's nondiscrimination policy was neutral and the religious views of the plaintiff did not entitle it to an exception from the policy. Additionally, the Third Circuit found that the City had not targeted the plaintiffs \"for its religious beliefs\" nor was its decision \"motivated by ill will against [the plaintiff's] religion, rather than sincere opposition to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.\" 922 F.3d 140. The plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on July 22, 2019. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on February 24, 2020. 140 S.Ct. 1104. Numerous parties filed amici curiae briefs for both the plaintiff and the defendant. A group of United States Senators advocated for granting the injunction on religious liberty grounds, while others argued for preserving the lower court's decision and reasoning. The case is ongoing with oral arguments scheduled for the upcoming 2020 Supreme Court term.", "summary": "On May 17, 2018, the plaintiff, a catholic foster care and social services agency, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the City of Philadelphia. The plaintiffs alleged that the City's decision to stop referring foster care discriminated against them for their religious beliefs and violated their contract, constitutional rights, and state law. On June 13, 2018, Judge Petrese B. Tucker denied the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction holding that the City of Philadelphia was entitled to suspend the contract for violations of the City Fair Ordinance which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The plaintiffs appealed on the same day, and the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on April 22, 2020. The case is ongoing, and the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari on February 24, 2020."}
{"article": "On January 5, 2017, two residents of the City of McCrory that were living in a trailer worth approximately $1500, filed a putative class action complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Plaintiffs, represented by Equal Justice Under Law and private counsel, sued the City of McCrory and its Police Chief under 42 U.S.C \u00a71983. The plaintiffs alleged that the City\u2019s Trailer-Banishment Ordinance\u2014which forbid anyone from residing in a home or trailer worth less than $7500\u2014violated both the Eight and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs sought both monetary and injunctive relief. That same day, the plaintiffs also moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to stop the City from enforcing the ordinance. The next day, the Court (Judge D. P. Marshall Jr.) scheduled a hearing on the temporary restraining order, but in an answer filed that same week, the City promised not to enforce the ordinance against anyone and to immediately submit a replacement ordinance to the City Council. In response, the Court found the claim for preliminary injunctive relief moot, and it stayed the case to allow the City to alter the ordinance at issue. On January 10th, the City Council passed a new ordinance, removing the challenged provision and establishing a new one that contained no reference to the value of one\u2019s home or trailer. The defendants then moved to dismiss the case, but on May 23, the Court found that the plaintiffs still had a viable claim for compensatory damages based on any harm suffered during the months the ordinance was in effect. The defendants again moved to dismiss the claim but the Court found the plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim based on lost wages and transportation expenses totaling $800. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 16, 2017, seeking monetary relief and permanent injunctive relief to stop the City from passing a similar ordinance in the future. The defendants filed a counterclaim alleging that the plaintiffs' trailer was a public nuisance. The parties reached a private settlement, and the Court granted a voluntary motion to dismiss both parties claims on November 30, 2017. According to Stephanie Storey, spokeswoman for Equal Justice, the settlement totaled just over $20,000. We have no further information on the litigation, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "Plaintiffs challenged a city ordinance prohibiting residents from living in trailers or homes worth less than $7500. Less than a week after plaintiffs filed their complaint suit, the City changed the ordinance and eliminated the provision at issue. Ultimately the parties settled outside of court for roughly $20,000."}
{"article": "The background to this case concerns a policy known as the Small Area Fair Market Rent (\u201cFMR\u201d) rule that was set to go into effect on January 1, 2018, after years of advocacy, research, and public debate. The rule required the public housing agencies (PHAs) that administered the Housing Choice Voucher program (formerly Section 8) to set voucher values in 24 metropolitan areas based on the prevailing private market rents for each distinct zip code within those regions. The revised methodology recognized the existence of very different local rental markets within each metropolitan area and calibrated the vouchers more closely to the amount needed to live in various neighborhoods. It thus enabled voucher holders to access a wider range of housing, outside of voucher-concentrated, racially-segregated areas. However, in August 2017, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (\u201cHUD\u201d) abruptly announced it would be delaying the rule\u2019s implementation for two years, claiming that further study was needed. HUD stated the agency was waiting for a final review of the Small Area FMR report and a further review of public comments. Additionally, HUD determined that the Public Housing Authorities had not been given enough guidance and technical assistance to implement the use of Small Area FMRs. On October 23, 2017, Open Communities Alliance and two individual plaintiffs, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against HUD and its Secretary. The complaint challenged HUD\u2019s decision to suspend a rule that would have assisted low-income families in securing affordable housing. The Plaintiffs claimed that the delay would only further racial and economic segregation, and argued that HUD\u2019s failure to implement the Small Area FMR rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (\u201cAPA\u201d), the statute that governs how federal agencies propose and implement regulations. The Plaintiffs, represented by the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, the Public Citizen Litigation Group, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and private counsel, sought to temporarily and permanently enjoin the suspension of the rule. On December 23, 2017, Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell granted the Plaintiff\u2019s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, requiring HUD to reinstate the Small Area Fair Market Rent regulation, criticizing HUD's decision to suspend final rules for two years without notice or comment or evidentiary findings. 2017 WL 6558502. The Defendants requested an extension to contemplate how to proceed with the litigation. The extension was granted, and the Defendants' response was due February 15, 2018. On February 15, 2018, the parties stipulated that the HUD would no longer delay implementing the FMR rules and allowed the court to enter judgment for the Plaintiffs. HUD acknowledged that it was in the process of implementing the FMR rules. The Plaintiffs then moved for attorney's fees. On February 15, 2018, the Court entered final judgment for the Plaintiffs. Attorney's fees of $154,272.11 were awarded on June 15, 2018. 2018 WL 8622230. HUD paid the fees, and the court closed the case on August 15, 2018.", "summary": "In August 2017, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (\u201cHUD\u201d) abruptly announced it would delay, by two years, a rule designed to allow low-income families greater choice in their housing options. The Plaintiffs argued that HUD\u2019s failure to implement the rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and they sought a preliminary injunction, which was granted. HUD then agreed to implement the rule and paid the Plaintiffs' attorney's fees."}
{"article": "On January 18, 2001, the United States filed a complaint under the Fair Housing Act and the American with Disabilities Act against the Edward Rose Construction, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The plaintiff sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. On September 3, 2002, the United States initiated a <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11863\">related lawsuit</a> against the same defendants in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The defendants were developers, builders, and operators of rental apartment complexes in the Northern District of Indiana and numerous additional locations. These complexes contained multi-family dwellings, built after the effective date of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 3604(f)(3)(C). Plaintiff claimed that defendants' pattern and practice of failing to design these dwellings so that that were readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities violated rights granted by the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 3601-3619; Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a712181-12189; and qualified as discrimination against a person or group of persons under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a712181-12189. On September 3, 2002, the parties agreed to resolve both the Indiana and Michigan cases without an evidentiary hearing or findings of fact. On September 30, 2005, the plaintiffs presented a consent order to the court, which Judge Allen Sharp signed on October 3rd. Under the Consent Order, the defendants agreed to retrofit 49 apartment complexes in Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Wisconsin, Virginia, and Nebraska to enhance their accessibility to individuals with physical disabilities. The agreement affected more than 5,400 ground floor apartments. The consent decree also required the defendants to pay $1,060,000 to a fund for those who may have been harmed by the lack of accessibility features at the complexes. The consent order terminated in 2010, and the case is now closed. Contemporaneous with the submission of the Consent Order, the parties stipulated to the transfer of the Untied States' claim against the defendants in the Indiana Action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The Michigan Consent Order is separate and resolves the claims raised by both the Michigan and Indiana actions against all Defendants.", "summary": "This case was brought in Indiana federal court and in Michigan federal court by the United States against the developers, builders, and operators of rental apartment complexes in Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Virginia. The plantiff claimed the defendants had designed and built apartments that are not accessible to persons with disabilities. The consent decree that resulted calls for millions of dollars in retrofits to apartments in six different states, and compensatory damages in the amount of $1,060,000."}
{"article": "On September 28, 2020, the Massachusetts Fair Housing Center (\u201cMFHC\u201d) and Housing Works, Inc. (\u201cHousing Works\u201d) filed a complaint against the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (\u201cHUD\u201d) and the Secretary of HUD (\u201cSecretary\u201d) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs sued the defendants under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 702-703, alleging that a new HUD rule (\u201cthe 2020 Rule\u201d) limiting disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act (\u201cFHA\u201d) was contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. The plaintiffs argued that the 2020 Rule contravened the language and intent of the FHA, as well as longstanding practice, by introducing new pleading and proof requirements and new defenses that would make it harder for victims to bring disparate impact claims and easier for violators to evade liability. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from implementing the 2020 Rule until after this case was resolved. The case was assigned to Judge Mark G. Mastroianni. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on October 6, 2020. The court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion on October 25, 2020, finding that the defendant's purported justifications for the new rule appeared \"inadequately justified.\" 2020 WL 6390143. Accordingly, the court enjoined the defendants from implementing the 2020 Rule until this case was resolved. As of December 21, the case remains ongoing.", "summary": "On September 28, 2020, the Massachusetts Fair Housing Center and Housing Works, Inc. filed a complaint against the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Secretary of HUD in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs sued the defendants under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 702-703, alleging that a new HUD rule (\u201cthe 2020 Rule\u201d) limiting disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act was contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from implementing the 2020 Rule until after this case was resolved and filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on October 6, 2020. The court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion on October 25, 2020, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the 2020 Rule was arbitrary and capricious. This case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On November 7, 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division (\"DOJ\") sent its \"findings letter\" to Kentucky's governor, advising him of the results of the November 2001, DOJ investigation of conditions and practices at the Oakwood Developmental Center (\"Oakwood\"), a state-operated center in Somerset, Kentucky, for developmentally and mentally disabled persons. (Although legally a \"commonwealth,\" Kentucky will be referred to in this summary as a state, as it is more commonly known.) The investigations occurred under the authority of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (\"CRIPA\"), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997. DOJ and expert consultants visited the facility, reviewed a wide array of documents there, and conducted interviews with personnel and residents. The letter commended Oakwood and state government staff for providing a high level of cooperation during the investigation. The investigation found multiple deficiencies in resident care at Oakwood, in that numerous conditions and services there substantially departed from generally accepted standards of care. Constitutional and federal statutory rights of residents at the facility were violated in several respects, according to the DOJ. DOJ concluded that deficiencies existed in conditions of resident care and treatment due to Oakwood's failure to provide adequate: (1) protection of its residents from harm due to abuse, mistreatment, neglect, improper use of restraints, pica behavior (ingestion of non-food items), and an overall lack of environmental safety; (2) behavioral and psychology services, including adequate treatment team meetings, individual and behavioral support plans, and training programs; (3) psychiatric services; (4) medical care, including neurological care; (5) nursing care; (6) staffing and staff training; (7) nutritional management; (8) physical therapy, and (9) quality assurance mechanisms designed to self-correct institutional problems. The letter provided details of deficiencies for all of these categories. This summary provides examples of these details, using the numeric indicator from the prior paragraph, as follows: (1) numerous and recurring incidents of abuse and neglect by staff; continued employment of documented abusers; inadequate investigations of incidents; unacceptably high volume of abuse and neglect incidents; inadequate supervision and communication regarding residents known for pica or self-injurious behaviors; (2) inadequate interdisciplinary care team meetings and individual/behavior support plans; overuse of chemical and physical restraints; inadequate resident training programs; insufficient psychological staff resources; (3) incorrect psychiatric diagnoses and use of psychotropic medications without psychiatric diagnoses; no peer review of psychiatric care nor any functional system for treatment of movement disorders; untrained staff; (4) poor preventative care, medical monitoring, communication among medical professionals, record keeping, and mortality review; inadequate evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment for seizure disorders leading to improper medication usage; (5) fragmented, incomplete, and inconsistent nursing assessments and documentations; high level of medication errors; vague medical emergency protocols and inadequate documentation of emergencies by poorly trained staff; outdated and ineffective infection control practices; haphazard staffing; (6 and 7) inadequate individual meal management plans; unmonitored, unaided meals for residents with swallowing difficulties; under-staffing at mealtimes resulting in cold food; (7 and 8) absence of a positioning program; overuse of wheelchairs; inadequately trained direct care staff; understaffed physical therapy department; and (9) no quality improvement program capable of addressing systemic crises in clinical services; absence of formal feedback system; nursing performance goals not objective and measurable, precluding reliable assessment and monitoring; and a total lack of a management information system. In addition to the remarkable list of deficiencies at Oakwood, the letter also noted that the state regularly deprived Oakwood residents who desired to live in the community and who reasonably can be accommodated an adequate opportunity to do so, in violation of the state's obligations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (\"ADA\"), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12132 et seq., and ADA-related regulations. Ten pages of minimally-acceptable remedial measures for each of these categories were outlined in the letter, which concluded by inviting continued further collaboration in implementing the remediation. The letter provided notice that, absent a resolution of the federal concerns, the DOJ would file a CRIPA lawsuit to compel correction of the identified deficiencies at Oakwood. Subsequently, on September 21, 2004, the state and DOJ entered into a memorandum of understanding, setting out a \"Strategic Action Plan\" that aimed to resolve the many deficiencies in care and conditions at Oakwood (which, by this time, had been re-named and re-organized as the Communities at Oakwood). It included the appointment of a jointly-selected monitor, Dr. Nirbhay N. Singh, Ph. D., to oversee, at state expense, Kentucky's implementation of the memorandum and its plan. The plan, an attachment to the memorandum, set specific goals and target dates for achieving them. On August 31, 2006, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, DOJ simultaneously filed a CRIPA complaint against the state and a settlement agreement between the parties, the latter referencing and attaching the strategic action plan obligating the state to implement remedial measures. The settlement named the same monitor, who would also now report compliance progress to the court. The lawsuit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, described practices at Oakwood that violated the residents' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and their rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (\"ADA\"), 42 U.S.C \u00a7\u00a7 12101 et seq., and the ADA's implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35. The settlement obligated the state to ensure, and to periodically document its progress in ensuring, improvements that would bring the facility up to generally accepted professional standards of care. The state also obliged itself to educate Oakwood employees about the requirements imposed by the settlement agreement. The settlement provided for the United States to conduct regular compliance reviews, with facility inspections and interviews of staff and residents, and to fully access and review relevant documents. District Judge Karen K. Caldwell approved the settlement on September 13, 2006, retaining jurisdiction to enforce the strategic action plan. Following several years of the parties providing periodic updates to the court, the parties filed a Joint Notice of Dismissal and the court signed an order closing the case on September 29, 2011.", "summary": "On August 31, 2006, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, DOJ simultaneously filed a CRIPA complaint against the state and a settlement agreement between the parties, the latter referencing and attaching the strategic action plan obligating the state to implement remedial measures at the Oakwood Developmental Center. The court monitored implementation of the agreement until 2011, when the case was closed."}
{"article": "On June 7, 2007, attorneys with the Southern Poverty Law Center filed a class action lawsuit in the U. S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas on behalf of about 2,700 Mexican migrant workers who entered the United States with H-2A visas and harvested and packed tomatoes and performed other agricultural work in Bradley County, Ark., from 2002 to 2007. Plaintiffs alleged that the employers violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (\"FLSA\"), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 201 et seq. by failing to pay the prevailing wage and overtime wages, and not reimbursing workers for travel, visa and hiring fees. Plaintiffs sought money damages, injunctive relief and class certification. Defendants included former employers Candy Brand, LLC, and Arkansas Tomato Shippers, LLC, and several individual supervisors. Defendants initially responded by filing a motion for more definite statement. The trial court denied that motion. Perez-Bemotes v. Candy Brand, LLC, 2007 WL 4189499 (W.D.Ark. Nov 21, 2007). On December 9, 2007, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to include a statement about the grounds of jurisdiction over a class action claim. On October 13, 2008, the Court (Judge Harry F. Barnes) granted plaintiffs' conditional motion to certify a class and motion requesting information of potential class members from defendants. 2008 WL 4809105. After discovery, on March 23, 2010, the Court granted class certification for the plaintiffs, designating two classes. The first class included \"all nonsupervisory workers employed by Defendants any time between 2003 and the date of judgment in this matter who were employed pursuant to H-2A temporary work visas;\" and the second included \"all nonsupervisory workers employed in the Defendants' packing shed operations at any time between 2003 and the date of the judgment in this matter--irrespective of visa status--who did not receive overtime pay during workweeks when they worked more than forty (40) hours.\" 267 F.R.D. 242. The defendants tried to appeal this decision, though permission for interlocutory appeal was denied by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Following class certification, the Court approved a stipulated dismissal as to defendant Dale McGinnis, though none of the other business defendants were dismissed. On August 30, 2010, the Court dismissed individual and joint motions for summary judgment by the defendants, allowing plaintiffs more time for discovery. The Court found that defendants were legally deemed employers for the H-2A guestworkers, and did not qualify for an exemption from paying overtime. The Court also held that defendants, in accordance with the FLSA, were required to reimburse plaintiffs for travel expenses if they brought plaintiffs' income below minimum wage, during the first work week. According to the employment contract, defendants were also required to reimburse plaintiffs for daily travel expenses and to pay plaintiffs overtime. Accordingly, on May 20, 2011, the Court denied defendants' numerous motions for summary judgment, and granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment related to violations of the FLSA and H-2A employment contracts, as well as their motion for summary judgment on the issue of employer status and liability of defendants. 2011 WL 1978414. The Court denied defendants' motion for reconsideration of the matter the next month. Following the grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs, the Court instructed the parties to submit briefs regarding whether defendants mitigated damages by providing housing, whether defendants were liable for other expenses not presented in the motions for summary judgment, and whether plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees pursuant to the FLSA. A jury trial was set for January 23, 2012. Before this date, however, the parties reached a settlement agreement and the Court granted a motion for preliminary approval of a proposed class action settlement. The settlement agreement required the defendants to pay plaintiffs $1,212,500 in damages and attorney fees; it also provided terms for how to handle breach of payment and administration of the settlement agreement. Later that year, defendants breached the settlement agreement, and on September 4, 2013, the Court entered judgment against the defendants, requiring payment in the amount of $790,625 with an interest rate of 5%, with interest building from January 1, 2012 until paid. Additional attorney fees were to be calculated at the time of collection.", "summary": "On June 7, 2007, attorneys with the Southern Poverty Law Center filed a class action lawsuit in the U. S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas on behalf of about 2,700 Mexican migrant workers who entered the United States with H-2A visas and harvested and packed tomatoes and performed other agricultural work in Bradley County, Ark., from 2002 to 2007. Plaintiffs alleged that the employers violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (\"FLSA\"), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 201 et seq. by failing to pay the prevailing wage and overtime wages, and not reimbursing workers for travel, visa and hiring fees. On May 20, 2011, the Court (Judge Harry F. Barnes) granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. Later, the parties reached a settlement agreement, and a final version of the agreement was approved by the Court on April 9, 2012, requiring the defendants to pay $1,212,500 in damages and attorney fees to plaintiffs. Defendants breached this agreement and the Court entered judgment against them on September 4, 2013."}
{"article": "On August 31, 2010, hourly employees filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against their employer and its owner/president for violating various federal and state employment and non-discrimination statutes including the Fair Labor Standards Act (\"FLSA\"). Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that defendants failed to pay required minimum and overtime wages, to pay in a timely manner, and to provide accurate wage statements. Plaintiffs also alleged that their employer discriminated against them on the basis of their race and/or alienage by paying them less, failing to pay them overtime, and depriving them of other employment benefits. In addition, plaintiffs accused defendant of committing unfair business practices and fraud. An amended complaint was filed on March 30, 2011, and only maintained the claims under the FLSA and the California Labor Code. The amended complaint did not mention discrimination or plaintiffs' immigration status. Plaintiffs, represented by attorneys at the ACLU of Southern California and private counsel, sought class certification, damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief. According to plaintiffs, defendants required them to work as many as fourteen hours a day without compensating them with mandatory overtime pay. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants created two fraudulent schemes to evade paying plaintiffs the required overtime. On January 28, 2011, the District Court (Judge Percy Anderson) ordered the parties to a settlement conference, but no settlement was reached. On April 18, 2011, the court dismissed the FLSA claims without prejudice per the plaintiffs' submitted stipulation. The parties dismissed the claims to enable plaintiffs to participate in a civil action filed by the U.S. Secretary of the Department of Labor against defendants for FLSA violations. On April 22, 2011, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims because all claims over which the court had original jurisdiction had been dismissed.", "summary": "On August 31, 2010, hourly employees sued their employer under federal and state employment and non-discrimination statutes for requiring plaintiffs to work as many as fourteen hours a day without compensating them with mandatory overtime pay. The plaintiffs dismissed their federal claims in order to participate in a civil action filed by the U.S. Department of Labor against defendants and the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims."}
{"article": "On December 19, 2013, four immigration detainees of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201 against ICE and the Department of Homeland Security. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that ICE violated the plaintiffs\u2019 rights under the First and Fifth Amendments and the Immigration and Nationality Act. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that ICE restricted their access to telephones, contrary to the agency\u2019s National Detention Standards, thereby denying or severely limiting the plaintiffs\u2019 statutory and constitutional rights to retain counsel, to communicate with retained counsel, to gather and present evidence, to obtain a fair hearing, to apply for immigration benefits, and to petition for documents that might help them avoid deportation. The plaintiffs were in ICE custody pending deportation proceedings. Most detainees were geographically isolated from family, courts, and attorneys. As a result, telephone access was critical. Many detainees would qualify for one or more of the several forms of \u201crelief from removal,\u201d but because of ICE policies restricting telephone access many plaintiffs were unnecessarily detained for months. Many were forced to seek multiple continuances while they attempted to gather information and documents to contest their deportation. Others would accept deportation much earlier if they were able to obtain legal consultation over the telephone. The following are examples of the practices restricting telephone access, some of which violated ICE\u2019s own detention standards: Detainees are confined for up to 22 hours a day and are permitted to make calls only during inconsistently scheduled \u201cfree time,\u201d which is often early in the morning or at night. Detainees have no privacy when using telephones. Phone calls from the facilities are prohibitively expensive, especially for indigent detainees. Detainees are completely unable to receive incoming calls. Telephone systems in the facilities disconnect after 15 minutes, or if a recorded greeting begins to play (including voicemail or automated systems requiring the selection of options to reach a live person). Although ICE policy requires that detainees have access to a free-call platform for contacting nonprofit legal services, that platform is often unavailable and usually ineffectual. On April 16, 2014, the district court (Judge Edward M. Chen) granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification. 300 F.R.D. 628. Then, on April 28, 2014, the court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu for settlement negotiations. Settlement discussions went on for over two years. During that time, the court approved an expansion of the plaintiff class on July 27, 2015. 308 F.R.D. 203. That expansion included detainees at newly-constructed detention facilities in California. The plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint on August 27, 2015, which included allegations against telephone policies in the new facilities. On March 18, 2016, the court ruled that the detainees had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and that the telephone policies did not violate the plaintiffs\u2019 statutory rights to counsel. 171 F. Supp. 3d 961. However, the court allowed the due process and First Amendment claims to proceed. On July 1, 2016, the court granted preliminary approval of the parties\u2019 settlement agreement; on November 18, 2016, the court approved the settlement agreement and awarded attorneys\u2019 fees in the amount of $405,000. With this class-action settlement, restrictions on the detainees\u2019 use of telephones were lifted such that they could make outgoing calls and ultimately obtain legal assistance. The terms of the preliminary settlement agreement included the following: <ol><li>Adding free and private numbers to housing unit telephones, eliminating automatic telephone cutoffs of 20 minutes, and extending cutoff times to 40 or 60 minutes,<li>Adding 40 phone booths and additional phone rooms in housing units to facilitate privacy,<li>Provisions ensuring timely access to phones and messages such as providing facilitators to process phone requests, and<li>Provisions for implementation of and compliance with the agreement.</ol>On April 23, 2019, the parties filed a proposed order to extend certain terms of the settlement agreement. The court granted this order on the same day. The parties filed another proposed order to amend the settlement agreement on December 13, 2019, which the court again granted the same day. The proposed orders can be found in the Documents for this case on the Clearinghouse website. The parties held a mediation conference with Magistrate Judge Ryu on March 24, 2020. Subsequently, they filed another proposed order on April 1, 2020, which was granted on the same day by the magistrate judge. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "A class-action lawsuit on behalf of people facing deportation proceedings, who are detainees at facilities contracted by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, resulted in a settlement agreement. The plaintiff-detainees alleged that ICE restricted their telephone access, violating their rights under the First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The terms of the settlement agreement included provisions for longer access to free and private phone calls in a timely manner, as well as attorneys\u2019 fees."}
{"article": "On June 4, 2013, plaintiffs, natives of Mexico who had agreed to voluntary departure from the United States, filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Central District of California under the Immigration and Nationality Act (\"INA\"), 8 U.S.C. \u00a71101 and state law against the acting director of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (\"CBP\") and Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (\"ICE\"). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's agencies in southern California violated INA and their Fifth Amendment due process rights by coercing plaintiffs into accepting voluntary departure through misstatements, omissions, threats, and/or pressure, in violation of defendants' own regulations. On June 14, 2013, the defendants filed their response and over the next few months, filed a motion to change venue and a motion to dismissed. On November 5, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction. On December 4, 2013, the parties began settlement negotiations. On December 9, 2013, the Court (Judge John A. Kronstadt) referred the case to Magistrate Judge Paul L. Abrams to provide oversight over settlement conferences. On January 1, 2015, the parties moved for final settlement approval, and on March 11, 2015, Judge John A. Kronstadt certified the class settlement. The final certification of the class was defined as: <blockquote>All Individuals who returned to Mexico pursuant to a Qualifying Voluntary Return between June 1, 2009 and August 28, 2014, and who are described in both paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section: (a) Based on the facts as they existed at the time of his or her Qualifying Voluntary Return, the Individual: (i) Last entered the United States with inspection prior to his or her Qualifying Voluntary Return and satisfied the non-discretionary criteria for submitting an approvable application to adjust status under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1255(a), based on a bona fide immediate relative relationship defined in 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1151(b)(2)(A)(i); (ii) Was the beneficiary of a properly filed Form I-130 Petition for Alien Relative based on a bona fide family relationship, which was pending or approved at the time of the Qualifying Voluntary Return; (iii) Satisfied the non-discretionary criteria to apply for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1229b; or (iv) His or her Qualifying Voluntary Return occurred on or after June 15, 2012, and he or she satisfied the non-discretionary criteria for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (\"DACA\") listed on page one of the June 15, 2012 memorandum from former Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano; and (b) At the time of application for class membership, the Individual: (i) Is physically present within Mexico; and (ii) Is inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1182(a)(9)(B), due to his or her Qualifying Voluntary Return**, except that this requirement does not apply to an Individual seeking recognition as Class Member under Paragraph (a)(i) above. </blockquote> **\"Qualifying Voluntary Return\" was defined as \"any Voluntary Return that occurred within the Relevant Area during the period starting June 1, 2009, and ending on the date of the District Court's Preliminary Approval of the Classwide Settlement.\" In exchange for the release of all claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against defendants, the defendants agreed that for a period of 180 days, they would accept applications from class members who wanted to return to the United States. If the application was granted, the class member could physically return to the United States and would be placed in the same position with regard to immigration law and regulation as they were prior to their Qualifying Voluntary Return. The defendants were responsible for class member notification costs up to the lower of 50% of total costs or $150,000, with the class counsel responsible for the remaining amount. Class counsel was awarded $700,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. There has been no action on the docket since April 22, 2016 and the case is likely closed.", "summary": "On June 4, 2013, plaintiffs, natives of Mexico who had agreed to voluntary departure from the United States, filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Central District of California under the Immigration and Nationality Act (\"INA\"), 8 U.S.C. \u00a71101, and state law against the acting director of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (\"CBP\") and Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (\"ICE\"). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's agencies in southern California violated INA by coercing plaintiffs into accepting voluntary departure through misstatements, omissions, threats, and/or pressure in violation of defendants' own regulations. The parties settled on March 11, 2015, where defendants agreed to allow applications from the class members that would enable their return to the United States and their legal position prior to acceptance of voluntary departure."}
{"article": "In December 2017, the ACLU of Northern California submitted a request to the Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs Enforcement seeking documents related to the agency's use of a private contractor known as G4S Secure Solutions to restrain, process, and transport immigration detainees. G4S had reportedly been involved in instances of assault and neglect against detainees in their custody, including a 2014 incident during which a detainee died. The ACLU specifically sought records regarding the policies and procedures used by G4S and the manner in which the company was awarded its contracts with the government, totaling in excess of $200 million. The agency did not provide the records to the ACLU. On July 10, 2018, the ACLU filed this suit against Immigrations and Customs Enforcement under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The ACLU, represented by private counsel and in-house attorneys, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, they sought an order directing the defendant to release the requested records; a declaration that the defendant's refusal to provide the records was illegal; and attorneys' fees. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Laura Beeler. The parties began filing case management updates shortly after filing the suit. Magistrate Judge Beeler put a minute entry into the record on March 8, 2019 asking the plaintiffs to provide a narrowed version of their FOIA request within a week. Subsequent case management statements showed that the plaintiffs submitted a narrower request within the deadline, though a June 13, 2019 case management statement from the ACLU indicated that the plaintiffs were concerned that the defendants would not process the revised requests in a timely manner. On June 26, 2019, the court received notice of a possibly related case from G4S, <i>Liborio Ramos v. G4S Secure Solutions</i>, 19-cv-02757 in N.D. Cal. This new case was filed by a private citizen represented by the ACLU alleging assault, battery, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress in ICE custody via G4S. The defendants resisted relating the two cases, but Magistrate Judge Beeler filed an order relating the two cases on July 8, 2019. Document production continued after the cases were combined. In a September 26, 2019 case management conference, Magistrate Judge Beeler ordered the defendant to increase production of documents from 500 a month to 750 a month. COVID-19 moved document production and further case management conferences online in late March. A May 7, 2020 case management report shows difficulty in getting monthly document productions over to the plaintiffs in March and April, but the defendants promised to work with the plaintiffs to figure out the cause of the issue. Production is ongoing.", "summary": "On July 10, 2018, the ACLU of Northern California filed this FOIA suit against U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement. The plaintiff sought records pursuant to a FOIA request about the defendant's use of a contractor to process and transport immigration detainees, some of whom had allegedly suffered injury and death due to the contractor's malfeasance. The plaintiff sought an order from the court that the defendant provide the records. This case was combined with a suit from a private plaintiff alleging mistreatment in ICE and G4S custody in July 2019. Document production appears to be continuing smoothly at a rate of 750 pages per month, but shifting production online due to COVID-19 has yielded some issues in getting documents over to the plaintiff. Document production is ongoing."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a lawsuit brought by the State of California regarding the July 2020 release of ICE regulations which, in effect, meant that students on F-1 visas would risk deportation if their school shifted to online learning. In a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same July directive, plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the regulations rescinded. In order to effectuate the rescission, ICE removed the guidance from its website and replaced it with the previous guidance and as a result, plaintiffs withdrew their motion for a preliminary injunction. California continued to monitor the alterations ICE made to its website between July and September and filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on October 19, 2020. <hr> <b>Background</b> Generally speaking, F-1 visas (colloquially \"student visas\") can be granted to international students who attend American universities. However, regulations on the granting of these visas limit the amount of online or distance learning the student can engage in. According to these regulations, an international student can engage in only one such class or three credits of that class per semester. 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 214.2(f)(6)(i)(G). The COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020 made this regulation untenable, as schools and universities had to shift to online learning systems. In response, defendant ICE issued an exemption on March 13, 2020, affirming that international students would be permitted to continue distance learning in the United States under their F-1 visas. The exemption would apply until the end of the emergency. However, on July 6, 2020, ICE issued a new directive stating that it would rescind that exemption. This directive would then mean that international students at schools that would still be fully online would have to either transfer to other schools that were at least partially in-person, go back to their countries voluntarily, or risk deportation. The directive also ordered schools that had gone fully online or had simply decided not to have classes to submit an \"operational change plan\" within nine days, and ordered schools that would have a hybrid system to certify each F-1 student to make sure that they were not taking entirely online courses. <b>The Lawsuit</b> On July 9, three days after the directive was issued, the State of California filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The complaint alleged two violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). First, it argued that the directive was arbitrary and capricious because: 1) the defendants gave no explanation for the sudden shift in policy; 2) defendants relied on factors Congress did not intend for them to rely on in making the shift; 3) defendants failed to consider the reliance interests of students and universities after they had issued the original exemption; and 4) defendants failed to provide any cogent explanation for the shift in policy. Second, the state alleged that defendants did not go through proper notice-and-comment rulemaking processes when they issued the new directive. The State of California sought declaratory relief that would call the new directive illegal, an order setting aside the July directive, and injunctive relief that would force defendants to reinforce the original March 13 exemption. California declined to have a magistrate judge conduct the proceedings. The next day, July 10, the case was assigned to Judge Jon S. Tigar. On July 13, California submitted a motion requesting a preliminary injunction. The proposed injunction would prohibit the government from acting on the new directive. Also on July 13, Regents of the University of California filed a motion to relate the case to <a href= \"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17680&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7CRegents%20of%20the%20University%20of%20California%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B\">the case they had filed</a> in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California three days prior. Judge Tigar found that the cases are related and reassigned the suit by University of California (which was filed after this suit by the state of California) to himself on July 14. Meanwhile, in a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same directive, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17677&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7CHarvard%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B\"><i>President and Fellows of Harvard College</i></a>, the parties conferred and the defendants agreed to rescind their implementation of the directive and to return to the March policy. On July 14, the parties filed a joint stipulation that stated that because the government agreed to rescind the July directive by removing it from its website and replacing it with the March guidance, California's claims were therefore mooted, and the state agreed to withdraw its motion for a preliminary injunction. Over the next two months, the plaintiffs continued to monitor the changes ICE made to its website in order to fully effectuate the rescission and submitted status reports to the court. On October 13, 2020 the government filed a motion to dismiss and on October 19, California filed a notice of voluntary dismissal.", "summary": "This case was filed in response to the July 6, 2020 directive by ICE that would effectively force international students studying under F-1 and M-1 visas to attend in-person classes or risk deportation. The state of California filed this suit against ICE and DHS on July 9, arguing that the directive was in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in two ways. First, the directive was arbitrary and capricious in that it failed to take into account students' and universities' reliance interests and the defendants gave no reasoned basis for the new order. Second, the defendants were in violation of procedural elements of the APA, because they failed to use proper notice-and-comment rule-making when issuing the new order. On July 15, in a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same July directive, plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the regulations rescinded. In order to effectuate the rescission, ICE removed the guidance from its website and replaced it with the previous guidance and as a result, plaintiffs withdrew their motion for a preliminary injunction. California continued to monitor the alterations ICE made to its website between July and September and filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on October 19, 2020."}
{"article": "The American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) filed suit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on July 20, 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. AILA claimed that DHS had violated the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7552) and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7701-06) by failing to properly respond to a FOIA request. On February 6, 2009, AILA had submitted a FOIA request to DHS seeking the disclosure of the guidance it gives to agencies when investigating fraud in H-1B visa applications. DHS denied the request, citing various administrative exemptions. After an AILA administrative appeal and second request on April 12, 2009, DHS released a limited number of redacted documents along with \"<i>Vaughn</i> submissions,\" providing a description of the exempted information. After an unsuccessful appeal, AILA brought suit, seeking an order for DHS to conduct a reasonable search for relevant documents, an order to refrain from withholding information relevant to the FOIA request, and a declaration that the information is not exempted from FOIA. On December 10, 2010, DHS moved for summary judgment, arguing that all segregable information had been released, along with adequate <i>Vaughn</i> submissions. On January 14, 2011, AILA filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the <i>Vaughn</i> submissions were inadequate, and seeking full disclosure of documents. However, on February 24, 2011, DHS withdrew its motion for summary judgment, offering to conduct a further search for segregable documents. On May 31, 2011, AILA moved again for summary judgment, arguing that DHS still had failed to adequately respond to their FOIA request. On June 27, 2011, DHS filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, again arguing that they had submitted all segregable information, along with proper <i>Vaughn</i> submissions. On March 30, 2012, the District Court (Judge Emmit G. Sullivan) granted AILA's motion for summary judgment in part, and denied DHS's cross-motion for summary judgment. Judge Sullivan ordered DHS to provide <i>Vaugh</i> submissions that sufficiently describe the information to AILA, so that AILA can make a proper segregability determination. This was the last action in the case.", "summary": "On July 20, 2010, the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) filed suit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for failing to adequately respond to FOIA requests regarding USCIS procedures for inspecting potential H-1B visa fraud. On March 30, 2012, the District Court ordered DHS to provide adequate description of the exempted information in response to the FOIA request so that AILA could make a proper segregability determination. This was the last action in this case."}
{"article": "On August 22, 2014, mothers and children from El Salvador and Honduras, who were held in a detention center in Artesia, New Mexico, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The plaintiffs brought their suit under the Immigration and Nationality Act and the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), implemented in the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA). The Plaintiffs allege that their rights to seek asylum and related relief, and to a fair hearing to present their claims, have been violated. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that they have been subjected to a process in which they are provided virtually no notice of when critical proceedings are scheduled to occur; asylum officers and immigration judges rush them to answer questions regarding the violence, death threats, and sexual abuse they fear - all while their children are listening; their children are ordered removed without being individually screened to determine whether they have a separate basis for fearing persecution; and their claims are denied for failing to properly respond to questions about their asylum claims phrased in complicated legal terminology. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), National Immigration Project and National Immigration Law Center, asked the court for: a declaratory judgment; a corrective action plan to be approved by the court; attorneys' fees; the return of deportees; and an injunctive order for the opportunity for plaintiffs to be given the opportunity to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief before any removal order is executed, including a new credible fear interview. They also requested, if relevant, a new immigration judge credible fear review hearing, with a reasonable amount of advance time to obtain and meet with counsel and prepare for each, as well as notice to Plaintiffs and their retained counsel as to the time of each such interview and/or hearing. On January 30, 2015, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all of their claims without prejudice. In their notice, Plaintiffs indicated that, as a result of the filing of the lawsuit, DHS had taken steps to remedy the failures at the Artesia facility. Furthermore, the individual Plaintiffs were able to secure representation from volunteer attorneys. In each Plaintiff's immigration case, the federal government revisited the negative decisions, vacated the expedited removal orders, and placed each Plaintiff in regular immigration proceedings. One Plaintiff had already secured asylum for herself and her children. The notice also stated that, on December 18, 2014, the federal government closed the Artesia detention facility.", "summary": "Central American mothers and children detainees brought suit against the Department of Homeland Security and its various agencies for the government's unlawful expedited removal policies at the Artesia Family Residential Center. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case in January 2015 after DHS remedied the violations of Plaintiffs' rights in their immigration proceedings and closed the Artesia facility."}
{"article": "This case arose in response to President Trump's 2018 family separation policy. On April 6, 2018, the U.S. Attorney General announced a \u201czero-tolerance\u201d immigration policy, which criminally prosecuted all adult entrants crossing the border without documentation, including asylum seekers accompanied by minor children. The Trump administration stated that its zero-tolerance policy was intended to reduce illegal border crossing, migration, and the burdens resulting from fraudulent asylum requests. However, enforcement of the zero-tolerance policy resulted in widely-publicized separation of children from their parents. Although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) held authority over detainment of adult non-citizens, minor children were not permitted to be held in federal criminal detention facilities. Therefore, accompanying children were held separately under the guidelines of the <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-CA-0002-0005.pdf\">Flores Settlement Agreement (FSA)</a>, which required the government to limit the time accompanied minors spent in detention to 20 days. In cases where the parents were not released in 20 days, minors were considered unaccompanied non-citizen children, under the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services\u2019 Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). Public pressure prompted an <a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/us/politics/trump-immigration-children-executive-order.html\">executive order</a> from President Trump, which mandated the DHS to maintain custody of immigrant families on June 20, 2018. This allowed immigrant parents and children apprehended at the border to remain together during the pendency of their criminal or immigration proceedings. On June 20, 2018, three immigrant parents forcibly separated from their children filed a lawsuit against various immigration federal agencies and officials in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking immediate reunification with their children. Represented by Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, the plaintiffs alleged that family separation was a punishment in violation of Due Process and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions to immediately reunite with their children as well as declaratory relief. They also sought attorney fees. The case was initially assigned to Judge Tanya S. Chutkan, then re-assigned to Judge Paul L. Friedman as he had an earlier related case. Specifically, the plaintiffs, all of whom entered the U.S. with accompanying children, crossed the US-Mexico border from Central America after the announcement of the zero-tolerance policy, prior to the issuance of the June 20 executive order. Plaintiff M.G.U. crossed the U.S.-Mexico border with her children, then presented herself with her children at the San Ysidro, California port of entry on May 4, 2018. Initially detained together with her children at the South Texas Family Residential Center (STFRC), Plaintiff M.G.U was moved to an adult detention facility from the STFRC due to a past criminal conviction. Her children were determined as non-citizen children without a suitable legal guardian, separated to be transported to New York in custody of the ORR. Plaintiff E.F. and Plaintiff A.P.F. were prosecuted for entering the U.S. without inspection after crossing the US-Mexico border with their children. In accordance with the Trafficking Victim Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), their children were similarly transferred to the custody of the ORR. On June 22, 2018, the plaintiffs filed for a temporary restraining order (TRO), allowing them access to daily information on the children\u2019s well-being as well as consistent communication with the children during the period of the separation. At the hearing held on June 27, 2018, the defendants claimed that most of the information requested by the plaintiffs was already available, or available upon request. Judge Friedman withheld the TRO application and suggested a joint status report between the plaintiffs and defendants. The parties submitted the joint status report on July 5, 2018, which resolved several issues. However, the parties could not reach an agreement on matters regarding communication between the plaintiffs and children, or the release of specific information on the location of Plaintiff E.F.\u2019s child. On July 16, 2018, the Court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 TRO for the matters above. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction for immediate reunification with their children. A hearing was held on July 12, 2018, during which Plaintiff E.F. informed the Court that she was awaiting a review decision on a negative credible fear determination. A credible fear determination by an asylum officer determines whether an individual has reasonable fear of returning to their home country. If negative, the plaintiff would be removed, which risked Plaintiff E.F. being removed from the U.S. without her son. On July 13, 2018, an immigration judge had affirmed Plaintiff E.F.\u2019s negative fear determination. For that reason, the Court prohibited defendants from removing Plaintiff E.F. from the U.S. prior to the preliminary injunction decision. Meanwhile, in another case, on June 26, 2018, Judge Dana M. Sabraw of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California issued a class-wide preliminary injunction requiring reunification of children under the age of five with their parents by July 10, 2018, and children over the age of five by July 26, 2018. For more information, see <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16620\">Ms. L v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement</a>. On July 18, 2018, Judge Friedman granted Plaintiff E.F.\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction, ordering the defendants to reunite her with her 9-year-old son by July 20, 2018. Plaintiff M.G.U. and Plaintiff A.P.F. had been reunited with their children prior to the court order on July 11, 2018, and July 17, 2018, respectively. On November 9, 2018, the defendants moved to dismiss the case because the plaintiffs' claims were based on the separation from their children, who were now united. Additionally, they asserted that there was no fundamental right of parents to be detained with their children while they were detained pursuant to a criminal charge. On December 23, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to add two additional plaintiffs, plaintiffs P.M.B. and C.O.M., a mother subject to a final order of deportation, and daughter, whose asylum was pending. The mother and daughter were initially detained together near Dilley, Texas, but faced imminent separation, as the defendants argued that the proposed plaintiff was not a class member because the family had not been forcibly separated previously. The plaintiffs filed for an emergency TRO to preserve the status quo detention of P.M.B. and C.O.M., preventing their separation, which was granted on December 24, 2018. On January 26, 2019, the defendants released the proposed plaintiffs from detention to lawfully pursue immigration relief in the U.S., subject to an ankle monitor. Since releasing C.O.M. and P.M.B., the defendants indicated they no longer had intent to separate the plaintiffs while they pursued immigration relief. Consequently, Plaintiffs sought dissolution of the TRO and withdrew their motions without prejudice. On February 19, 2019, the court granted the plaintiff's motion. On July 19, 2019, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On June 20, 2018, three immigrant parents separated from their children filed a civil action against various federal agencies and officials in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for immediate reunification with their children.The plaintiffs were detained after crossing the United States-Mexico border without inspection with young accompanying children, seeking asylum. After plaintiffs were apprehended at the border, the children were separated under the \u201czero-tolerance\u201d immigration policy announced April 6, 2018, which criminally prosecuted adult entrants crossing the border illegally and placed accompanying minors in custody of the government. All three plaintiffs crossed the border prior to the Executive Order issued on June 20, 2018, which allowed immigrant parents and children apprehended at the border to remain together during the pendency of their proceedings. The plaintiffs alleged interference of family integrity in violation of Due Process, and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions to immediately reunite plaintiffs with their children. The plaintiffs obtained preliminary relief and were (along with another parent who joined the case later to prevent separation from her daughter) ultimately re-united with their children. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "This action, filed Jan. 31, 2017, challenges President Trump\u2019s Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order ban on admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The complaint alleges that in preventing the plaintiff, a Syrian national with a valid U.S. visa, from returning to the U.S. pursuant to the EO, the defendants violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause, Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection rights, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and international law. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel and Prof. Bernard Harcourt of Columbia Law School, was a physician resident in the University of Illinois Chicago/Advocate Christ Hospital. He returned to the United Arab Emirates to get married on Jan. 23, and upon returning to the U.S. to continue his residency, he was detained at Abu Dhabi International Airport on Jan 29. Despite his valid visa, he was detained pursuant to the EO. If the plaintiff could not return to the U.S., he faced the risk of being deported to Syria, where he is a citizen but has never been a resident. That same day, the plaintiff also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The case was assigned to Judge Elaine Bucklo. At a status hearing on February 1, the parties told the judge they had reached a \"settlement in principle.\" Judge Bucklo set a status hearing for February 9 at which they could update her on the progress towards settlement or otherwise. On February 2, according to news reports, the plaintiff successfully entered the United States at Chicago O'Hare International Airport. On February 8, the plaintiff filed a motion for voluntary dismissal, with leave to reinstate on or before August 1. Judge Bucklo on February 9 granted the plaintiff's motion and terminated all pending dates and motions as moot, but noting that the plaintiff still had leave to reinstate on or before August 1, 2017. Only the complaint is publicly available for this case. This case is now closed.", "summary": "This action, filed Jan. 31, 2017, challenges President Trump\u2019s Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order ban on admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The complaint alleges that in preventing a Syrian national with a valid U.S. visa from returning to the U.S. pursuant to the EO, the defendants violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause, Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection rights, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and international law. The case was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel and Bernard Harcourt of Columbia Law School, is a resident in the University of Illinois Chicago/Advocate Christ Hospital. He returned to the United Arab Emirates to get married on Jan. 23, and upon returning to the U.S. to continue his residency, he was detained at Abu Dhabi International Airport on Jan 29. Despite his valid visa, he was detained pursuant to the EO. If the plaintiff cannot return to the U.S., he faces the risk of being deported to Syria, where he is a citizen but has never been a resident. That same day, the plaintiff also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The case was assigned to Judge Elaine Bucklo. At a status hearing on February 1, the parties told the judge they had reached a \"settlement in principle.\" On February 2, the plaintiff successfully entered the United States at Chicago O'Hare International Airport. On February 8, the plaintiff filed a motion for voluntary dismissal and leave to reinstate on or before August 1, 2017. Judge Bucklo granted this motion and terminated the case. This case is now closed."}
{"article": "This case is part of the series of <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=33\">Signal International cases</a>. It was consolidated with <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14380\"><i>Achari v. Signal International</i></a> and continues on that page. On Aug. 14, 2013, 13 Indian guestworkers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. The plaintiffs filed this suit after District Judge Jay Zainey <a href=\"http://clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-LA-0010-0016.pdf\">denied class certification</a> on January 3, 2012 in a related case, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14377\"><i>David v. Signal International</i></a>. The complaint alleged violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. \u00a71589 (forced labor) and 18 U.S.C. \u00a71590 (trafficking)) and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. \u00a71981), as well as claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. The plaintiffs were represented by private law firms. Plaintiffs were allegedly brought into the United States to provide labor and services to the defendant, Signal International, a company based in Pascagoula, Mississippi with operations in the Gulf Coast region, in the business of providing repairs to offshore oil rigs. The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs paid Signal's recruiters as much as $25,000 for travel, visa, and recruitment fees, but upon arrival in the United States found out they would not receive the green cards promised to them. Instead, plaintiffs were forced to pay additional fees ($1050 per month) to live in racially segregated labor camps, and were subject to squalid living conditions and threats of both legal and physical harm if they complained about the conditions or decided not to provide labor. On Oct. 17, 2013, the District Court (Judge Robert H. Walker) entered an order consolidating this matter with the <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14380\"><i>Achari</i></a> case. The Court (Chief U.S. District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr.) then transferred this case and <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14380\"><i>Achari</i></a>, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14381\"><i>Chakkiyattil v. Signal International</i></a>, and <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14383\"><i>Krishnakutty v. Signal International LLC</i></a> to the Eastern District of Louisiana. On October 24, 2013, the case was assigned to Judge Susie Morgan and consolidated with the <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14380\"><i>Achari</i></a> case. The Court closed the Achari case on May 26, 2017 without prejudice due to settlement agreement. The settlement established a claims process and ensures that all aggrieved individuals included in the litigation may receive relief in spite of the bankruptcy proceedings. In addition to monetary relief, Signal International's CEO issued a statement acknowledging the company's wrongdoing and apologizing for its treatment of the guest workers. The Court retained jurisdiction such that any party may reopen the case if any of the unlocated plaintiffs are located so that they may be paid pursuant to the settlement agreement.", "summary": "On Aug. 14, 2013, 13 Indian guestworkers filed suit in S.D. Miss. for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. In Oct. 2013, the court transferred this case to E.D.La where it was consolidated with the Achari lead case. The Achari case was dismissed due to settlement agreement but the court retained jurisdiction."}
{"article": "In early 2015, six refugees filed this class action lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York (Judge David Hurd). The plaintiffs sued the Utica School District under the Declaratory Relief Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2201 and 2202, claiming violations of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C \u00a7 1703; Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000d et seq.; New York Education Law \u00a7 3202(1); the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause; the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause; and the New York State Constitution\u2019s Due Process Clause. The plaintiffs, represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union, alleged that the defendants consistently denied Utica residents between the ages of 17 and 20 who were limited English proficient (LEP) and immigrants access to educational opportunity. Defendants diverted this largely refugee population to alternative education programs rather than allowing them to enroll at the only public high school in Utica. The alternative education programs provided either only English as a Second Language (ESL) classes or a combination of ESL and GED classes, both of which provided a substantially inferior education to normal high school courses. When students inquired as to the reason for the diversion, defendants indicated that the students were too old to enroll in the high school. In fact, under New York law, individuals have a right to attend high school until they reach age 21. The plaintiffs sued for declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was litigated for several months, and after mandatory mediation did not result in a settlement, litigation continued until early 2016 when the parties commenced settlement negotiations. On June 3, 2016, Judge Hurd ordered a consent decree stipulating the terms of the settlement between the parties. The terms included that the defendants were to provide any student between ages 17 and 20 with the opportunity to attend the public high school, while taking steps to overcome language barriers students may face. Defendants were to also train all Utica City School District employees on the enrollment process for LEP students, and take efforts to inform the community that all students between ages 17 and 20 can enroll at the public high school. The consent decree is set to expire on June 3, 2020. While the case is still open in order to ensure enforcement of the consent decree, as of May 20, 2020 nothing further has happened.", "summary": "In 2015, six refugees living in Utica, NY filed this class action in the Northern District of New York against the Utica School District Board of Education and the Utica City School District. The plaintiffs alleged that that the defendants consistently denied Utica residents between the ages of 17 and 20 who were limited English proficient (LEP) and immigrants access to educational opportunity. In 2016, the parties reached a settlement requiring the defendants to end their discriminatory practices and enact a detailed remedial plan. Enforcement of the consent decree is ongoing as of November 2018."}
{"article": "This is a class action suit about bond hearings for detainees under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The issue is whether due process under the Fifth Amendment allows the government to place the burden of proof for whether the person being detained poses a flight risk (and therefore shouldn't be released) on the detainee themselves. Another issue is whether Immigration Judges are required by the INA or Department of Justice regulations to consider the detainee's ability to pay bond and possible alternatives to bond at bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226(a). The case was brought on behalf of people detained under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226(a)) at the Batavia Federal Detention Facility in upstate New York, as well as a subclass of people who are detained in Richwood, LA but have their hearings in front of judges at the Buffalo/Batavia immigration court. On March 10, 2020, the case was filed by two civil immigration detainees held under \u00a7 1226(a) pending their removal proceedings; they were represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union (an ACLU affiliate). The presiding judge is Elizabeth A Wolford, in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. Plaintiffs filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a72241, alleging violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Fifth Amendment. Claims were also asserted on behalf of class members who had been denied bond before particular Immigration Judges who allegedly had a policy of not granting bond hearings or alternatives to detention in most cases. In a September 2020 order, Judge Wolford denied class certification for the post-hearing class , but granted Plaintiffs\u2019 preliminary injunction motion as to the main pre-bond hearing class in September and found that plaintiffs had stated a Due Process Claim that the government is required to bear the burden of proof at bond hearings for individuals detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a71226(a). The court partially denied Plaintiffs\u2019 sub-class claims and partially granted Defendents' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the claims regarding the no-bond policy on the ground that Plaintiffs had not named the warden of the Richwood detention center as a defendant. Finally, Judge Wolford rejected Plaintiffs\u2019 claim that the INA required Immigration Judges consider non-bond alternatives to detention or the ability of detainees to pay, but found that Plaintiffs had stated a claim for violation of the INA on different grounds \u2013 namely, that the Immigration Judge at one plaintiff\u2019s bond hearing had stated she was unable to consider alternatives to money bond. In late September 2020, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration relating to the issues they had lost,. Before this was acted upon, defendants filed a notice of appeal for the portion of the September decision and order that granted, in part, the preliminary injunction. (483 F. Supp. 3d 159). In a decision and order dated March 29, 2021, Judge Wolford rejected Plaintiffs\u2019 motion for reconsideration. Later in April, Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal regarding the September order and partial denial of the preliminary injunction. The appeal remains pending and the case remains ongoing.", "summary": "In 2020, two immigration detainees in the Batavia Federal Detention Facility in Batavia, NY, filed this class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. Plaintiffs claimed that they and others similarly situated had been improperly denied bond, that non-bond alternatives to detention had not been properly considered by their immigration judges, that such considerations were required by the Immigration and Nationality Act, and that the policy of placing the burden of proof on the Plaintiffs to show they posed no flight risk violated their Fifth Amendment Rights. The court granted relief for pre-hearing detainees, agreeing that they pled sufficient facts to state a Due Process Claim that the government is required to bear the burden of proof at bond hearings for individuals detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a71226(a). It denied Plaintiffs' request to certify the putative post-hearing class. Both parties appealed; the case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On May 26, 2015, a group of parents and guardians of children born in Texas, and a nonprofit advocacy organization, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Represented by Texas RioGrande Legal Aid and the Texas Civil Rights Project, the plaintiffs sued the Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs, all Mexican citizens, asked for the release of certified copies of their U.S.-citizen children's birth certificates. The defendant had, according to the plaintiffs, recently changed longstanding regulations and was now refusing to accept official Mexican-issued identification (<i>matricula consular</i>) as proof of parents' identity and relationship with their children. Consequently, lacking birth certificates for their children, the plaintiffs could not prove their children's U.S. citizenship nor their parent-child relationships. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant was discriminating on the basis of national origin and only withholding the birth certificates because of the parents' immigration status and national origin. Further, the plaintiffs maintained, the defendants were interfering with exclusive federal authority over matters involving immigrants' documentation and diplomatic affairs with consulates issuing identity documents. Thus, the plaintiffs alleged, the defendant's actions violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Further, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the Texas State Administrative Procedures Act. On July 22, DSHS moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of state sovereign immunity, and failure to state a claim under the requirements of \u00a7 1983, preemption doctrine, and the Supremacy Clause. The plaintiffs responded on August 5, arguing that this case properly stated jurisdiction and a valid claim; the defendant replied on August 13. On August 21, the plaintiffs moved for an emergency preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs argued that, without the birth certificates, the parents and children would suffer irreparable harm by being unable to access rights such as education, housing, and healthcare, to protect the children from deportation, to maintain family unity, and to ensure the children's ability to freely travel between other countries and the United States. However, on October 16, 2015, Judge Pitman denied the plaintiffs' request for emergency application for a temporary injunction. Judge Pitman found that, although the plaintiffs had met the burden of showing irreparable harm to the children (\"it simply begs credulity for Defendants to argue a birth certificate is not a vitally important document\"), the plaintiffs had not demonstrated they would likely succeed on the merits. Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the state interest in preventing fraud in birth certificates might be found to justify disfavor of Mexican-consular identity documents. The plaintiffs had not shown they were likely to prevail on the preemption claim, because the state policy did not facially preempt federal immigration policy, and the state had a compelling interest in regulating birth certificates. 2015 WL 6118623 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2015). The plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint on Mar. 29, 2016, adding additional plaintiffs from Mexico and Central America. Some parents possessed no acceptable documents, while some had presented one acceptable document but had been denied a birth certificate anyway. The parties soon entered mediation and reached a private settlement agreement on July 22, 2016. According to <a href=\"https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/25/us/lawsuit-texas-immigrants-birth-certificates.html?_r=0\">news reports</a>, Texas agreed to accept some identity documents that it had been rejecting, including Mexican voter identification cards presented with secondary identification. Parents from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras could also present consulate-issued documents. Texas also established a review process for rejected birth certificate applications and training for registrar officials issuing the certificates. The Court set a compliance monitoring period of nine months. The Court dismissed the case with prejudice on May 9, 2017. This case is now closed.", "summary": "In May 2015, parents of children born in Texas sued the Texas Department of State Health Services. Plaintiffs, all Mexican or Central American citizens, asked for the release of their U.S.-citizen children's birth certificates, which defendant would not issue after refusing to accept the parents' consular identity documents. The parties privately settled in July 2016."}
{"article": "This suit seeks to support Texas's law Senate Bill 4 (SB4), which requires local Texas law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration officials and punishes them if they do not. Unlike the <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=46\">suits that seek to challenge President Trump's \"Sanctuary City\" Executive Order</a>, this suit aims to support the work of federal immigration officials. <b>The Four Texas Cases</b> There are, so far, four cases addressing SB4--this one was the first filed. The four cases are this one, which is before Judge Sam Sparks, and three that are in front of Judge Orlando Garcia: City of El Cenizo v. Texas, No. 1:17-cv-00404 (W.D. Tex.) <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15825>IM-TX-0045</a> in this Clearinghouse. El Paso County v. Texas, No. 5:17-cv-00459 (W.D. Tex.), <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=1583\">IM-TX-0046</a> City of San Antonio, Texas v. State of Texas, No. 5:17-cv-00489 (W.D. Tex.), <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15852\">IM-TX-0047</a> This case was brought by Texas against pro-immigration cities and counties; the other three were brought by pro-immigration cities and counties seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction barring implementation of SB4. On June 6, Judge Garcia, consolidated the three other cases, with El Cenizo becoming the lead case in the consolidation. This case, however, remains separate. <b>Summary of this litigation</b> On May 7, 2017, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton filed this suit seeking a declaratory judgment approving SB4. Defendants are Travis County, City of Austin, and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF). In their complaint, the plaintiffs accused defendants of being \"openly hostile\" to cooperation with federal immigration officials both in policy and in practice. Judge Sam Sparks was assigned to the case. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on May 24, 2017. They argued that the state filed the suit prior to SB4 going into effect and that it had suffered no direct injury. That same day, the state filed a motion to consolidate this case with the City of El Cenizo case. On May 31, 2017, Texas filed an amended complaint, adding its Attorney General as a new plaintiff, and many of the City of El Cenizo plaintiffs as defendants in this case, including the League of Latin American Citizens (LULAC), El Paso County, and the Texas Organizing Project Education Fund. 2017 WL 9362209 (W.D.Tex.). In response, the defendants filed amended motions to dismiss on June 2, 2017. The state voluntarily dismissed MALDEF from the case on June 16, 2017. On June 28, 2017, defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that Texas lacked standing. The next day, the city of El Paso filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court dismissed the case without prejudice on August 9, 2017, finding that Texas lacked actual or imminent injury, which was required for Article III standing to seek declaratory judgment. 272 F.Supp.3d 973 (W.D. Tex. 2017). The court wrote that \"[t]he State's alleged injury turns on the legal consequences of some act that may or may not occur - that is, Defendants' decision to violate the law. The State has produced no evidence that at the time of filing suit, it was clear Defendants planned to violate the law once it takes effect. Expressing public disagreement with a law does not constitute a violation of the law, nor does articulating the desire to challenge the constitutionality of the law equate to a violation of it.\" Id. at 980. The court noted that its holding was in line with a well-established ban on advisory opinions, and that do otherwise would be to \u201c'open a Pandora's box and invite every local government to seek a court's judicial blessing' on a law prior to it taking effect.\" Id. Texas appealed the dismissal to the Fifth Circuit on Aug. 31, 2017. On May 25, 2018, the Fifth Circuit granted MALDEF's motion to dismiss itself as a party in the case. On December 12, 2018, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claim after full briefing and oral argument. 910 F.3d 809 (5th Cir. 2018). Judge Stephen A. Higginson, writing for a three-judge panel, affirmed this case's dismissal. It found that the district court lacked federal-question jurisdiction over this case, because section 1331 does not encompass \u201csuits by the States to declare the validity of their regulations despite possibly conflicting federal law.\" This relied on a 1983 Supreme Court decision in <i>Franchise Tax Board of the State of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California</i>. Judge Higginson did not discuss the district court's Article III standing analysis, finding that it was not necessary to reach that issue because of Texas's failure to articulate a federal question in this suit. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This suit seeks to support Texas's law Senate Bill 4 (SB4), which requires local Texas law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration officials and punishes them if they do not. Unlike the <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=46\">suits that seek to challenge President Trump's \"Sanctuary City\" Executive Order</a>, this suit aims to support the work of federal immigration officials. There are, so far, four cases addressing SB4. On May 7, 2017, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton filed this suit seeking a declaratory judgment approving SB4. Defendants are Travis County, City of Austin, and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF). The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on May 24, 2017. The court dismissed the case without prejudice to refiling on August 9, 2017, finding that Texas lacked actual or imminent injury, which was required for Article III standing to seek declaratory judgment. Texas appealed to the Fifth Circuit, who affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claim on December 12, 2018. The case is closed."}
{"article": "On May 3, 1993, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) notified Harrison County, Mississippi of its intention to investigate conditions of the county jail under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. 1997 et seq. Following the investigation, the DOJ sent a letter notifying the president of the Harrison County Board of Supervisors of its findings. The DOJ found there were too few staffed officers per inmates and significant deficiencies in the officers' training. These underlying problems lead to excessive discipline of inmates, lack of access to legal materials, and unsecured dangerous objects, including kitchen knives and prescription medication. The DOJ also found the suicide prevention program, as well as general medical and mental health care of the inmates, to be inadequate. The DOJ findings letter then made recommendations as to the minimum remedial measure needed to meet constitutional standards. Negotiations led to settlement; the Attorney General filed a CRIPA action against the jail on January 6, 1995. Although it is not mentioned in the docket sheet, presumably the parties provided the court with their proposed consent decree. Six days later, Judge Walter J. Gex III approved a consent decree, which laid out steps the county must take to improve issues discussed in the DOJ's letter of findings and recommendations. The consent decree mandated that the county double the number of officers per shift, have a female officer on duty at all times. The officers were to have 80 hours of training before starting their employment, with 40 hours of training per year thereafter. The decree prohibited using the 'strip cells', or cells without amenities, to house inmates. The county was also required to implement procedures that identified and properly stored dangerous materials and open a law library that was accessible at least eight hours a day, five days a week. For medical care, the county agreed to hire a medical professional and to both screen and monitor the inmates health. The county also agreed to hire a psychologist on at least a half-time basis and develop a suicide prevention program. The county was given one year to be in compliance with this decree. On November 4, 1996, the county sheriff submitted a report, claiming substantial compliance with the consent decree. On April 15, 1999, the case was placed on the inactive docket of the court. In 2000 two inmates from the county jail sent the court letters claiming the constitutional rights were continuing to be violated. The court dismissed these petitions, but the county jail restarted submitting status reports regarding the conditions of the jail. On May 28, 2003, the DOJ filed a motion for an order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt for failure to comply with the 1995 consent decree. On March 23, 2004, Judge Walter J. Gex III held a hearing regarding the motion. Judge Gex ultimately determined to stay the issue of contempt, predicated on the defendants' agreement to allocate funds towards the jail and hire certain numbers of additional staff to address the concerns raised in the DOJ's motion. This defendants were also required to continue to file status reports regarding the facility quarterly. Throughout the next ten years, Judge Walter J. Gex III issued several minute orders requiring the defendants to be more thorough in their status reports. On May 9, 2014, the case was reassigned to Chief District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. On August 11, 2015, the parties filed a joint motion for dismissal, citing increased physician, psychiatrist, and mental health staffing; the creation of a chronic care program; and implementation of new auditing and quality assurance mechanisms. In the motion, the defendants stated that they would continue to use their best efforts to make progress in their auditing, their peer review of medical services, policies and practices, and to appoint a specific representative for persons with mental illnesses whose job would be to advocate for alternatives to institutionalization and seek funding for mental health services. Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. terminated the 1995 consent decree and dismissed the case with prejudice the next day.", "summary": "On May 3, 1993, the U.S. Department of Justice investigated the Harrison County, MI jail. The DOJ found violations of inadequate staffing and medical care. Apparently after negotiation, the Attorney General filed an action under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. 1997 et seq., against the jail in 1995. Six days later, Judge Walter J. Gex III approved a consent decree. The consent decree mandated doubling the number of officers, increased training, and hiring of medical professionals for the physical and mental health of the patients. The decree was enforced sporadically throughout the next ten years. On August 11, 2015, the parties filed a joint motion for dismissal, with the county agreeing to continue to use its best efforts to improve its mental health and medical care. The case was dismissed on August 12, 1995."}
{"article": "On October 31, 2003, three plaintiffs represented by private attorneys with law firms in New York and Washington, D.C., filed this class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. They alleged that the Erie County Sheriff's Department had an unconstitutional blanket policy and/or practice of strip searching all individuals who entered either the Erie County Holding Center or the Erie County Correctional Facility, regardless of the crime charged and without reasonable suspicion that the individuals were concealing weapons or contraband. The plaintiffs alleged that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and class certification. The parties engaged in contentious discovery, resulting in numerous discovery motions and request for sanctions. District Judge John T. Curtin and Magistrate Judge Hugh B. Scott made numerous unpublished rulings on these issues. See, e.g., Pritchard v. County of Erie, 2006 WL 1455484 (W.D. N.Y. May 22, 2006) and Pritchard v. County of Erie, 2006 WL 2927852 (W.D. N.Y. Oct 12, 2006) (order relating to the deposition of an Assistant County Attorney). Additionally, the judges issued opinions regarding discovery of e-mails sent by a former Assistant County Attorney to individual defendants and other Sheriff's Department officials regarding the Sheriff's Department's evolving policies regarding inmate strip searches. See Pritchard v. County of Erie, 2006 WL 3858475 (W.D. N.Y. Jan. 04, 2006); objections overruled by Pritchard v. County of Erie, 2006 WL 3872844 (W.D. N.Y. Apr. 17, 2006); vacated and remanded by In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413 (2nd Cir. 2007) (Circuit Judge Dennis Jacobs); on remand, the Court found that dissemination of attorney's advice did not waive attorney-client privilege. Pritchard v. County of Erie, 2007 WL 1703832 (W.D. N.Y. June 12, 2007). On reconsideration, the Court found that the defendants waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to the disputed e-mails by placing the information in those communications \"at issue\" in the litigation. Pritchard v. County of Erie, 2007 WL 3232096 (W.D. N.Y. Oct 31, 2007). On September, 2009, the plaintiffs sought class certification of the class of all persons who have been placed into the custody of the Erie County Correctional Facility and/or the Erie County Holding Center after being charged with misdemeanors, violations, violations of probation or parole, traffic infractions, civil commitments or other minor crimes and were strip searched upon their entry into the Erie County Correctional Facility and/or the Erie County Holding Center pursuant to the policy, custom and practice of the Erie County Sheriff's Department and the County of Erie. The plaintiffs requested that the Court certify this action as a money damages class action under Rule 23(b)(3). In the alternative, the plaintiffs sought partial certification under Rule 23(c)(4). The court held in favor plaintiff and found that all the requirements for class certification had been met. 269 F.R.D. 213, 219. But, the court defined two separate classes for the Erie County Holding Center and Erie County Correctional Facility, respectively, based on its finding that the two facilities did not share enough commonality due to the different procedures each had in place. 269 F.R.D. 213. However, in 2010, the Supreme Court courted decided <i>Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders</i>, 132 S.Ct. 1510 (2012), and held that searches in a New Jersey jail did not violate the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments. In response, the plaintiffs in this case submitted a brief distinguishing this case from <i>Florence</i>. The plaintiffs argued that the strip searches in <i>Florence</i> were private, individual searches, while the searches in this case were in groups. (In ECHC, class members were searched in groups of three in a shower area, and in ECCF, class members were searched in larger groups in a large common room). The plaintiffs further argued that the <i>Florence </i> decision was limited to the facts addressed in that case. The Court instructed the parties to provide a joint submission regarding the procedural posture of this action based on the <i>Florence</i> decision, but the parties did not reach an agreement. Instead, on May 23, 2012, the plaintiffs requested that the Court allow the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint. As of March 22, 2016, the court had not ruled on the request for leave to file an amended complaint and no other action has occurred in the case.", "summary": "In 2003, prisoners filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that the Erie County Sheriff's Department had an unconstitutional policy and practice of strip-searching prisoners when they entered the county facilities. In 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that a similar strip search policy was constitutional in <i>Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders</i>. The plaintiffs in this case argued that their case was distinguishable from <i>Florence</i>. However, no further action occurred in the case after 2012."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas action filed by individuals in the Shelby County Jail who alleged that their underlying medical conditions made them especially vulnerable to COVID-19. They alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act and requested release. The court denied both preliminary relief and motions to dismiss. The parties moved for preliminary approval of class action settlement, which was granted on January 28, 2021. A final approval hearing is scheduled for March 5, 2021.<hr> Two individuals with medical conditions that rendered them especially vulnerable to COVID-19 filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus on May 20, 2020 against the Shelby County Sheriff's Office in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241. They sought to represent a class of Shelby County Jail detainees with disabilities or who were medically vulnerable to COVID-19. Represented by lawyers from the ACLU as well as private counsel, they alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12111 et seq.), and the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 701). Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that conditions in the jail, like housing detainees in close proximity to one another, constituted a failure to provide reasonable safety as well as unlawful punishment of pretrial detainees. They also claimed that defendants were violating the ADA and Rehabilitation Act because they had not made reasonable modifications to their policies to avoid discriminating against detainees with disabilities, who were particularly likely to be affected by COVID. Judge Sheryl H. Lipman was assigned the case. Simultaneously with the initial petition, plaintiffs sought class certification, a temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of habeas corpus that would immediately release the named plaintiffs, and a TRO, preliminary injunction, permanent injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus that would create a process by which class members could be released. Plaintiffs filed a motion to expedite consideration of the TRO and preliminary injunction. The following day, Judge Lipman granted the motion to expedite consideration of the TRO and preliminary injunction, instructing defendants to file a response by May 26. Defendants did so, filing a motion to dismiss, a response in opposition to the motion for class certification, and a response in opposition to the motion for a temporary restraining order. Defendants' responses indicated that they had a thorough process for dealing with COVID-19 and were trying to decrease the population of the jail. By June 10, Judge Lipman issued an order denying defendant's motion for dismissal. She explained that habeas relief was properly sought because plaintiffs challenged the \"fact,\" not conditions, of confinement. Judge Lipman also denied in part and granted in part plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification. The court granted class certification but narrowed its scope. The certified class consisted of detainees (1) age 65 or older; or with (2) chronic lung disease or moderate to severe asthma; (3) serious heart conditions; (4) immunodeficiencies; (5) severe obesity; (6) diabetes; (7) chronic kidney disease undergoing dialysis; (8) chronic liver disease; or (9) hemoglobin disorders. The court also certified a subclass defined as \"All persons currently or in the future held at the Jail in pretrial custody during the COVID19 pandemic who are at increased risk of COVID-19 complications or death because of disabilities as defined in the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.\" 2020 WL 3108713. Two days later, Judge Lipman addressed the motion for a temporary restraining order. She found that the factual record was not developed enough to rule and ordered the parties to agree on an \"Independent Inspector\" who would visit the jail and report back to the court. A few days later, plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint which added two more named plaintiffs. Meanwhile, by June 18 the parties had settled on Michael K. Brady as Independent Inspector. The Inspector filed his report on June 30, 2020. He found that the jail was run by \"consummate professionals\" but still needed to make several adjustments to ensure the safety of its detainees, including issuing additional masks, improving sanitation, and sequestering new arrivals and high-risk detainees. On June 30, defendants submitted another motion to dismiss, this time targeting plaintiffs\u2019 amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court denied the motion on July 24, 2020. Judge Lipman criticized defendants' \"needless filing\" of a second motion to dismiss. She noted that defendants' arguments either had been raised and rejected in the first motion to dismiss or should have been raised in the earlier motion. Judge Lipman then rejected the new arguments on the merits because (1) pretrial detainees can bring unconstitutional punishment claims; (2) neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act required proof of discriminatory intent; and (3) habeas relief was available for detainees alleging that their continued detention violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. 2020 WL 4668756. On August 7, the court rejected plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief and habeas relief. Judge Lipman noted that habeas relief was only available if plaintiffs showed that it was impossible for the jail to detain them in compliance with the Constitution, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act. But she found that \"any shortcomings are remediable,\" while acknowledging continuing concerns about the lack of social distancing, testing, and quarantine at the jail. 2020 WL 4668757. On September 15, 2020, plaintiffs moved to modify class certification and file a second amended petition for habeas corpus, alleging that defendants had \"temporarily made improvements to certain conditions, apparently in preparation for the inspections by court-appointed inspector,\" but those improvements \"lapsed shortly after the inspections occurred,\" as well as adding additional named plaintiffs, and including a more detailed request for injunctive relief. After attending mediation, on December 28, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a notice of settlement, and on January 22, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement. On January 28, the court preliminarily granted the motion, which are to be approved by the class and subclass. The consent decree stated that the defendants must provide the Inspector and plaintiffs with a monthly report that details the population of the jail, number of COVID-19 tests conducts for detainees and staff, number of staff on leave in the past 30 days due to COVID-19 symptoms, number of detainees who died and exhibited symptoms of or tested positive for COVID-19 prior to death, and type of housing for class and subclass members. The decree also mandated unannounced inspections and reports by the Inspector at least every 90 days and unrestricted communications with the jail's Expeditor. A final approval hearing is scheduled for March 5, 2021.", "summary": "Two detainees in Shelby County Jail in Tennessee filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus. They claimed that failure to take sufficient COVID-19 precautions violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and they sought release. The court appointed an \"Independent Inspector\" to assess conditions at the jail and, based on his report, denied preliminary relief. The court also denied defendants' motion to dismiss, and a trial is scheduled for May 2021. An Independent Inspector was tasked with inspecting the jail to evaluate the conditions. While praising defendants' professionalism, he wrote that several adjustments needed to be made in order for the jail to be a safe place for detainees. After attending mediation and filing a joint motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement, the court preliminarily granted the consent decree requiring monthly reports on the status of COVID-19 in the Jail and unannounced, periodic inspections by the Inspector. A final approval hearing is scheduled for March 5, 2021."}
{"article": "On August 2, 2014, detainees at the Franklin County Jail filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Franklin County. The plaintiffs, represented by Columbia Legal Services, claimed that jail officials\u2019 excessive use of force and the jail\u2019s squalid living conditions violated the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. They asked the Court to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the County from permitting such abuses. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that jail staff regularly utilized restraint chairs and chained detainees to fixed objects for long periods of time, pepper sprayed detainees without cause or proper supervision, and locked detainees in segregation or isolation without cause and in inhumane conditions for up to 23 hours per day. The plaintiffs also claimed that jail officials seized detainees\u2019 property without notice or cause, denied detainees outdoor exercise, and prohibited detainees from visiting with friends and family. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that the County did not provide any educational services, programming, or religious services for detainees. As a result, the plaintiffs suffered emotional, physical and psychological injuries. On August 5, 2014, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order barring the County from chaining detainees to fixed objects. Judge Stanley A. Bastian denied the motion, finding that the plaintiffs failed to make an adequate showing of immediate irreparable harm and because they sought to alter, rather than preserve, the status quo. On January 12, 2015, Judge Bastian referred the case to Magistrate Judge James P. Hutton for a settlement conference. Then, on December 16, 2015, Judge Bastian referred the case to Magistrate Judge John T. Rodgers for a settlement conference. On February 12, 2016, both parties filed a joint motion to stay further proceedings in the litigation. The parties had come to a settlement agreement on February 5, 2016, that was confirmed by Magistrate Judge Rogers. On March 16, 2016, Judge Bastian granted the joint motion. On March 28, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class for the purposes of settlement and for preliminary approval of settlement. They requested that the court certify a settlement class defined as \u201cAll individuals who are now, or in the future will be, detained in the Franklin County Correctional Center during the term of the parties\u2019 Settlement Agreement.\u201d The settlement agreement required a three year term during which the defendant would be monitored by an independent third party to ensure compliance. The agreement required the defendant to hire additional staff, enter into a new contract for medical services, renovate and repair parts of the jail, adopt new policies, end a 23-hour lockdown policy and other practices, and train jail staff on these new policies and procedures. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. Plaintiffs would be awarded reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees and costs as well. On April 28, 2016, Judge Bastian granted the joint motion to certify the class. On July 8, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion for settlement requesting final approval, which the court granted on July 21, 2016. A few months later, Judge Bastian appointed Phillip Stanley as the monitor for the settlement agreement. On December 13, 2016, the court granted a joint motion to award plaintiffs\u2019 attorneys\u2019 fees and costs, accepting the $400,557.66 as reasonable. After three years of monitored compliance with the settlement, the agreement expired, and the court dismissed the case with prejudice on December 13, 2019. This case is now closed.", "summary": "In August 2014, detainees at the Franklin County Jail filed a lawsuit alleging that jail officials used excessive force against them and that the jail provided inhumane living conditions, in violation of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In March 28, 2016, the parties settled. The defendant paid $400,557.66 in attorneys\u2019 fees and was required to hire additional staff, renovate the prison, and adopt new mental health services policies."}
{"article": "For the complete Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse collection of FISA Matters, see our <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=20\">special collection</a>.<hr>This case involves a dispute over administrative subpoenas known as National Security Letters (NSLs). In 1986, Congress empowered the FBI to issue NSLs as part of authorized investigations to protect against international terrorism and clandestine intelligence activities. NSLs are directed to electronic communications service providers in order to obtain specified limited information; they are not used to obtain the content of communications. Because of national security interests, the NSL statute imposes a nondisclosure obligation on the NSL recipient. In 2006, Congress revised the nondisclosure provisions in order to avoid unnecessary disclosure restrictions: the nondisclosure requirement no longer applied automatically, and Congress provided a specific statutory mechanism for judicial review of a nondisclosure requirement itself, separate from review of the NSL. In 2011, the FBI issued a National Security Letter (NSL) to an unnamed electronic communication service provider, seeking certain subscriber information. By certifying that the disclosure of the existence of the NSL may result in \"a danger to the national security of the United States,\" the federal government could prohibit the provider from disclosing the existence of the NSL. This entry describes the lawsuits between the recipient and government that arose from this NSL and subsequent NSLs issued to the same recipient. In early 2011, the NSL recipient filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California to set aside the NSL under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3511. The recipient, represented by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the nondisclosure provision in the NSL Statute (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2709) violated the First Amendment. More specifically, the recipient argued that the nondisclosure provision of the statute was an unconstitutional prior restraint and content-based restriction on speech, both on its face and as applied. The federal government opposed the petition and filed a motion to compel the recipient to comply with the NSL. The government also filed a separate lawsuit seeking a declaration that the recipient was required to comply with the NSL on June 3, 2011 (No. 11-2667). We have an incomplete docket for the government's declaratory judgment action and no docket for the original case\u2014it's entirely under seal. On March 14, 2013, U.S. District Judge Susan Illston granted the petition to set aside the NSL, declaring that 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2709 on its face violated the First Amendment. She noted that \u00a7 2709 allowed the government to suppress speech without initiating prompt judicial proceedings and determined that the law was not narrowly tailored because it prevented NSL recipients from disclosing not just the content of NSLs but also their very existence. So, she enjoined the government from issuing additional NSLs or enforcing \u00a7 2709's nondisclosure provision in any case. 930 F. Supp. 2d 1064. The government appealed, and the district court stayed proceedings during the appeal on August 7, 2013. Despite the court's March 14 order, the government issued two new NSLs to the recipient of the original NSL. The recipient filed another lawsuit to challenge the new NSLs (No. 13-80089). On August 12, 2013, Judge Illston refused to set aside the new NSLs pending the appeal because they included procedural safeguards. For example, the FBI notified the recipient that judicial review was available and agreed to produce upon challenge evidence of a \"good reason\" that nondisclosure was required to protect against terrorism. Around the same time, other electronic communication service providers began to challenge NSLs. For more information on these cases, see <a href=https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14108>here</a>. Before the Ninth Circuit could decide the appeal in this case, Congress amended both 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2709 and 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3511 as part of the USA FREEDOM Act on June 2, 2015. In light of the significant changes to the statutes, the Ninth Circuit vacated Judge Illston's order and remanded the case on August 24, 2015. On March 19, 2016, Judge Illston found that Congress's revisions cured the NSL process's constitutional defects. The revised \u00a7 2709 allowed NSL recipients to require the government to seek judicial review of nondisclosure requirements, and the revised \u00a7 3511 required courts to \"rule expeditiously\" when reviewing NSL nondisclosure requirements. Moreover, the government would bear the burden of proof in the subsequent proceedings and had to provide specific facts to support a claim that disclosure could cause harm. Finally, the new \u00a7 3511 allowed the FBI and courts to authorize limited disclosures, which showed that the statute was narrowly tailored. The court then analyzed whether nondisclosure was appropriate for the challenged NSLs. It found that the government adequately supported nondisclosure in case 11-2173 but not 13-80089, and it stayed its ruling pending appeal. The government then voluntarily lifted the nondisclosure requirement in case 11-2173. As a result, the recipient was able to reveal itself as CREDO Mobile. (Information about specific customer accounts remained undisclosed in all cases.) The Ninth Circuit (Judges Sandra S. Ikuta, N. Randy Smith, and Mary H. Murguia) affirmed the district court's decision on July 17, 2017. The court found that \u00a7 2709's nondisclosure requirement was content based, applied strict scrutiny, and upheld the restrictions because \u00a7 2709 required the government to establish a reasonable likelihood that harm would result from disclosure on a case-by-case basis. The court then questioned whether \u00a7 2709 was a prior restraint but concluded, assuming it was, that the law passed muster because it provided quick judicial review. 863 F.3d 1110. The Clearinghouse does not know if CREDO Mobile continues to seek disclosure of those parts of the NSLs that have not already been made public.", "summary": "In early 2011, an electronic communication service provider that had received a National Security Letter (NSL) from the federal government filed a petition to set aside the NSL in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The recipient asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that a nondisclosure provision of the NSL Statute, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2709, violated the First Amendment. On March 14, 2013, U.S. District Judge Susan Illston granted the petition to set aside the NSL, declaring that \u00a7 2709 violated the First Amendment. The government was therefore enjoined from issuing NSLs under \u00a7 2709 or from enforcing the nondisclosure provision in this or any other case. The government appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, but while the appeal was pending, Congress amended \u00a7 2709 and 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3511 as part of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. The district court and Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the revised \u00a7 2709 and \u00a7 3511. But the district court held that the government failed to justify nondisclosure in one case involving the recipient, and the government found that nondisclosure was no longer required in another case involving the recipient. As a result, the recipient could reveal itself as CREDO Mobile."}
{"article": "On May 14, 2014, the plaintiff, a freelance investigative reporter, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the National Security Agency (NSA) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, alleged that the defendants violated the Freedom of Information Act by improperly withholding records concerning the NSA's collection of metadata of judges within the federal judiciary, failing to conduct an adequate search for such records, and failing to grant his requests for a fee waiver. The plaintiff sought both injunctive relief and damages. On September 26, 2014, the DOJ and NSA moved for summary judgment. On July 31, 2015, U.S. District Judge Tanya S. Chutkan granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion for summary judgment. She held that while the defendants made a good faith effort search both their facilities and records systems for the requested information, they \"failed to conduct an adequate search and adequately explain the basis of their search in certain limited respects.\" Judge Chutkan ordered them to search again through NSA directives and the DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel's draft legal memoranda. Thus, there were still material issues of fact. 118 F. Supp. 3d 302. The defendants completed the new searches and subsequently moved again for summary judgment on October 14, 2015. On July 11, 2016, Judge Chutkan denied the defendants' motion, holding that simply asking two senior attorneys in the Office of Legal Counsel whether they were \"aware of any projects OLC projects concerning the propriety of surveilling federal or state judges\" did not provide a reasonable basis for concluding that OLC was unlikely to possess responsive records. Judge Chutkan further held that the defendants did not establish that it would be unduly burdensome for them to search the emails of departing OLC attorneys for any draft memoranda or opinions concerning such surveillance program. 196 F.Supp.3d 67. Judge Chutkan directed the parties to submit another status report and scheduling order by October 11, 2016. In August 2016, the parties reported to the Court that they had agreed to new terms under which defendant would search. On October 11, 2016, the parties reported that the search was complete and no documents were gathered. The parties then reported that the only remaining issue to be resolved was payment of plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs. On January 26, 2017, the parties reported that a tentative settlement agreement was reached regarding plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs\u2013 that we know of, there is no public information as to the amount of attorney's fees. The settlement agreement was approved on February 27, 2017 and the Court dismissed the case with prejudice.", "summary": "In 2014, an investigative reporter filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act against the National Security Agency and U.S. Department of Justice in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were improperly withholding records concerning the NSA's surveillance of federal and state judges. The Court ordered the defendant conduct an email search for draft memoranda or opinions concerning such surveillance program. The search wielded no results. A settlement agreement was reached paying plaintiff's attorney's fees on February 27, 2017."}
{"article": "On September 16, 2016, The Associated Press, Gannett Satellite Information Network LLC, and Vice Media, LLC filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 552, et seq. The plaintiffs sought to compel the FBI to provide records about the publicly acknowledged purchase of a tool allowing the government access to the phone of one of the perpetrators of the mass killings in San Bernardino, California on December 2, 2015. ' The defendant completed document review through January, 2017 to determine whether FOIA exemptions would apply to the documents. On January 30, 2017, the defendant moved for summary judgment citing to various exemptions to have the claim dismissed. The plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment on February 20, 2017. The Court (Judge Tanya S. Chutkan) granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on September 30, 2017. Plaintiff sought the identity of the vendor who unlocked the phone and the purchase price of the vendor. The Court found the defendant properly invoked exemption 1 (information specifically authorized to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy by an Executive Order), exemption 3 (information exempted by statute), and exemption 7 (information compiled for law enforcement purposes). However, the Court found Exemption 4 (trade secret and commercial or financial information) did not apply. 265 F. Supp. 3d 82. The docket was last updated on September 30, 2017.", "summary": "On September 16, 2016, The Associated Press, Gannett Satellite Information Network LLC, and Vice Media, LLC, filed a lawsuit seeking information about the recently purchased tool allowing government access to the phone of one of the perpetrators of the mass killings in San Bernardino, California on December 2, 2015. The Court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion on September 30, 2017, finding information at issue was protected under FOIA exemptions 1, 3, and 7."}
{"article": "On January 17, 2006, a group of organizations including the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and a number of individuals, filed a law suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the National Security Agency (NSA), under Bivens and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs challenged the legality of NSA's Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) as violating their free speech and privacy rights as well as the Separation of Powers doctrine. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, asked the court for declaratory judgment and permanent injunction. The plaintiffs alleged that their regular conduct (e.g., journalism, the practice of law, and scholarship) have been impaired by the TSP, which violated various portions of the U.S. Constitution. The NSA countered that the plaintiffs: (1) lacked standing; and (2) could not establish a prima facie case without the use of state secrets, so that the state secret privilege barred plaintiffs' claims. On August 17, 2006, the District Court (Judge Anna Diggs Taylor) disagreed with most of the NSA's arguments, and issued a judgment and permanent injunction order: (1) the TSP violated the Separation of Powers doctrine, the Administrative Procedures Act, the First and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; and (2) the NSA was enjoined from utilizing the TSP including conducting wireless wiretaps of telephone and internet communication, as violating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Title III. The plaintiffs' data-mining claims were denied. The same day, the NSA filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit. The 6th Circuit stayed the operation of the the district court's injunction, 467 F.3d 590 (6th Cir., Oct. 4, 2006) and then on July 6, 2007, vacated the District Court's order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals found that the plaintiffs lacked standing. 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007). On March 3, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari review. 552 U.S. 1179.", "summary": "On January 17, 2006, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the National Security Agency alleging that the Terrorist Surveillance Program was unconstitutional. On August 17, 2006, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Judge Taylor) agreed and enjoined the program. On July 6, 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit vacated the order and instructed to dismiss the case based on lack of standing."}
{"article": "The plaintiff in this federal lawsuit was a naturalized U.S. Citizen. He was denied boarding to a flight from the United Arab Emirates (\"UAE\") to the United States because of his alleged inclusion on the No Fly List. He filed the lawsuit on May 30, 2013, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (\"FBI\"), the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Terrorist Screening Center (\"TSC\"), which created and maintained the No Fly List. Represented by the Council on American Islamic Relations as well as private counsel, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants placed him on the No Fly List to coerce him into becoming an informant for the FBI. The plaintiff further alleged that during an interview in Sudan he was denied counsel by defendants and urged to become an FBI informant in order to have his name removed from the No Fly List. Because the plaintiff refused to become an informant, he further alleged that the defendants retaliated by instigating and facilitating his torture in the UAE. Based upon the foregoing allegations, the plaintiff alleged six claims for relief: (1) violation of the right to citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) an unidentified cause of action pertaining to torture; (3) denial of his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment; (4) violation of his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment; (5) violation of his Fifth Amendment substantive due process right to return to his homeland once abroad; and (6) denial of procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment because the defendants failed to inform him on the basis for his inclusion on, or the means of removing his name therefrom the No Fly List. The plaintiff sought a declaration that his right to counsel was violated; redress for the defendants' instigating and facilitating his torture in the UAE; an injunction preventing the defendants from violating the above-mentioned rights; and monetary damages in the amount of $30,000,000. The case was assigned to Judge Anna Brown. On June 17, 2013, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint to add an additional defendant. On November 4, 2013, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court heard oral argument on the defendants' motion on March 14, 2014 and took the motion under advisement. On May 29, 2014, Judge Brown granted the official-capacity defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissing all counts except three (denial of his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment) and four (violation of his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment). The plaintiff had leave to file a second amended complaint consistent with the opinion and order no later than June 27, 2014. 23 F.Supp.3d 1268 (D. Or. May 29, 2014), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73174. The plaintiff eventually filed a series of amended complaints. In 2015, the government revised the redress procedures available through administrative procedures as a result of the decision in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12886\">Latif v. Holder</a>, 28 F.Supp.3d 1134 (D.Or. 2014), which held various aspects of the process inadequate under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the APA. As a result, the official-capacity defendants moved for a stay or, in the alternative, an extension of time to allow the defendants to reconsider the plaintiff's application under the new procedure. However, after completing the re-evaluation, the defendants determined that the plaintiff should remain on the No-Fly List. On January 14, 2015, Judge Brown granted in part and denied in part the official-capacity defendants' unopposed motion. The court agreed that it was appropriate for the official-capacity defendants to reconsider the plaintiff's DHS TRIP inquiry under the new procedures, but the court found that a stay was unnecessary to permit the defendants to do so. In addition, the court noted that this case was now over 18 months old and had not yet proceeded beyond the pleading stage. Accordingly, the court ordered the defendants to complete a substantive reconsideration of the plaintiff's DHS TRIP inquiry no later than March 9, 2015, to move the case along. The plaintiff filed their corrected fourth amended complaint on April 6, 2015. The defendants again filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction. On November 4, 2015, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient (1) to state a substantive due process claim based on right to international travel; (2) to state procedural due process claim based on right to international travel and to be free from false government stigmatization; (3) to state a claim for injunctive relief under the Fourth Amendment because the plaintiff was subject to surveillance without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion; and (4) to state a claim under the Wiretap Act. However, the court also held that the plaintiff's allegations were not sufficient to state a claim under the Stored Communications Act and that he had failed to plead a valid waiver of sovereign immunity for his claim that the FBI failed to comply with FISA. And the court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek prospective injunctive relief on the claim that the FBI placed him on the No Fly List while he was abroad in order to subject him to custodial interrogation without the assistance of counsel, because that issue no longer affected him, personally. 142 F.Supp.3d 1152, 2015 WL 6756121, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151522. The court again gave the plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to correct the deficiencies, and on November 29, 2015, the plaintiff filed his fifth amended complaint. On March 16, 2016, Judge Brown found that plaintiff lacked standing to seek declaratory relief on their claim that was brought under the Fourth Amendment. On May 9, 2016, the defendants notified the court that the plaintiff was removed from the No Fly List. On September 28, 2016, the courted issued an opinion and order, in which it granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissed with prejudice plaintiff\u2019s fifth amended complaint, and denied as moot the defendants\u2019 motion to stay the plaintiff\u2019s due process claims. 2016 WL 5539591, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133307. On October 6, 2016, the plaintiff filed a notice in which he stated his non-objection to the court dismissing this action as to the individual capacity defendants, the actions of which were subsequently dismissed without prejudice by the court on October 24, 2016. On December 23, 2016, the plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. On August 2, 2017, the appellant submitted their opening brief, arguing that (1) the court must reject defendants\u2019 attempt to moot plaintiff\u2019s claims by removing him from the No Fly List years after the start of the litigation; (2) the complaint states a Fourth Amendment Claim for Unlawful Surveillance, Search, and Seizure; and (3) the district court improperly concluded that declaratory relief was not available for the fourth amendment claim. In response, the government argued that (1) the plaintiff\u2019s No Fly List claims are moot because he is no longer on the No Fly List; (2) the government had demonstrated that the alleged wrongful conduct is not likely to occur; (3) the plaintiff\u2019s requests for injunctive relief for speculative future claims do not save his current claim from mootness; (4) the plaintiff\u2019s No Fly List claims are not capable of repetition yet evading review; and (5) the district court correctly dismissed the plaintiff\u2019s surveillance claims. Oral argument was scheduled for May 9, 2018 before Judge Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Judge Morgan B. Christen, and Judge Marvin J. Garbis. On June 28, 2018, Judge Marvin J. Garbis retired and was replaced by Judge Milan D. Smith. On September 20, 2018, the Ninth Circuit found that the allegations in the plaintiff\u2019s fifth amended complaint were vague and conclusory, and did not give rise to a plausible claim for relief. Moreover, since the plaintiff had several opportunities to amend his complaint, and repeatedly failed to do so, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing his Fourth Amendment claim with prejudice. 738 Fed.Appx. 545 (Mem), 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 26939, 2018 WL 4537720. In a separately filed opinion by Judge Christen, the panel reversed the district court\u2019s dismissal of the plaintiff\u2019s action as moot, that alleged the FBI violated his substantive and procedural due process rights by placing and maintaining him on the No Fly List. The panel held that plaintiff\u2019s removal from the No Fly List was more likely an exercise of discretion than a decision arising from a broad change in agency policy or procedure, and further held that the government had not assured plaintiff that he would not be banned from flying for the same reasons that prompted the government to add him to the list in the first place, nor had it verified the implementation of procedural safeguards conditioning its ability to revise plaintiff\u2019s status on the receipt of new information. The panel subsequently reversed the district court\u2019s dismissal of the plaintiff\u2019s due process claims and remanded for further proceedings. 904 F.3d 1033, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 26880. Costs were taxed against the appellees. On October 25, 2018, the Ninth Circuit granted the defendants/appellees\u2019 unopposed motion for an extension to file petition for panel rehearing on or before December 5, 2018. The plaintiff filed a petition on that date, but the Ninth Circuit unanimously denied the petition on January 2, 2019. On May 19, 2019 the plaintiff filed another amended complaint. This one removed previously unresolved claims, added additional factual allegations for the due process claims, and added the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Administrator as defendant. The plaintiffs wanted to add the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) head as a defendant as well, but Judge Brown did not allow this in her order partially granting and denying the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint on May 8. 2019 WL 2030724. The case was reassigned to Judge Michael W. Mosman on July 15, 2019. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on July 20, 2019. Oral argument before Judge Mosman on the motion was held on November 14; after argument, the Judge granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice. He stated that arguments based on travel limitations were moot, but granted the plaintiff the opportunity to amend the complaint to further discuss stigma and reputational damage surrounding previous placement on the No Fly List, which is disseminated nationally and internationally. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint expanding on the reputational harm of being on the No Fly List on December 18, 2019. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on January 22, 2020; a hearing on that motion is set for June 15, 2020. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "The plaintiff, an individual citizen and lawful resident of the United States that was denied boarding a flight from the United Arab Emirates to the United States because of his alleged inclusion on the No Fly List of the federal government, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The plaintiff specifically alleged that his inclusion on the No Fly List was to coerce him to be an FBI informant. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief for the federal government's various alleged constitutional violations and torture. To date, the case remains pending."}
{"article": "On May 8, 2009, the American Civil Liberties Union (\"ACLU\") of Washington filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the Western District of Washington. The ACLU sued the United States Department of Justice (\"DOJ\") under the Freedom of Information Act (\"FOIA\"), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the DOJ to disclose and release records describing the operation and maintenance of the the National Crime Information Center Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File, which was maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (\"FBI\"), a component of the DOJ. The National Crime Information Center (\"NCIC\"), a nationwide clearinghouse of reports operated by the FBI, provides direct online access to its computerized index of criminal justice information for local, state, federal, and tribal law enforcement officers, government agencies, financial institutions, prospective employers, etc. This database includes a Violent Gang and Terrorist Organizations File (\"VGTOF\"), which contains entries on suspected terrorist organizations and individuals. In 2003, there were over 7,000 individuals listed on the VGTOF as terrorists, though many of them had no criminal records. The ACLU was concerned that this could lead to grave ramifications, for instance, during a traffic stop where after running someone's credentials, the officer is alerted to the individual's status on the VGTOF and warned to approach that person with extreme caution. The VGTOF warning also instructs the officer to call the Terrorist Screening Center immediately and a number is provided on the officer's screen. The Terrorist Screening Center sends back one of four responses to the officer: \"arrest, detain, investigate, or query.\" There is no option for letting the individual go among these responses. In a 2005 test conducted by the Terrorist Screening Center, the VGTOF was found to contain a 40% error rate, most of which were in the portion of the database that instructs officers how to approach and interact with individuals who have entries in the VGTOF. On December 19, 2008, the ACLU sent a letter to the FBI submitting a Freedom of Information Act (\"FOIA\") request for \"any record held by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation describing the operation and maintenance of the National Crime Information Center Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File.\" Though the ACLU received a letter dated January 5, 2006 indicating that the FBI received it's request, the FBI never followed up or provided any records requested by the ACLU. As a result, the ACLU filed this 2009 lawsuit claiming that the FBI violated it's rights under the Freedom of Information Act by failing to disclose and release the requested records. On June 18, 2010, the DOJ filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that it had conducted an adequate search for the requested documents, and properly withheld records and portions of records under applicable exemption under the Freedom of Information Act in order to protect classified information. On March 10, 2011, U.S. District Court Judge Robert S. Lasnik granted the DOJ summary judgment in part, but ordered the DOJ to edit any inappropriate redactions and provide more facts that would justify redacting or not providing a certain document. On March 24, 2011, the DOJ filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to stay the Court's order on their motion for summary judgment. On May 19, 2011, the Court granted the DOJ's motion for reconsideration in part, requiring that after the DOJ supplemented the Vaughn index regarding the documents discussed in sections 1, 4, and 5, the parties would attempt to resolve their differences regarding production of these documents. If the parties were unable to reach agreement, plaintiff could, within thirty days of production of the revised Vaughn index, file a supplemental memorandum to assist the Court during in camera review of the contested documents. On May 24, 2011, the DOJ filed a second motion for reconsideration questioning the Court's jurisdiction to review a designation by TSA, which was granted on June 20, 2011. On June 22, 2011, the DOJ filed the supplemental Vaughn Declarations, and on July 6, 2011, submitted documents for in camera review. On September 21, 2012, Judge Lasnik issued an order following in camera review, which required the DOJ to make certain disclosures. On October 1, 2012, the DOJ filed a third motion for reconsideration, claiming that it had further evidence to present the Court as to why exemption 1 applies to document numbers 79, 80, and 84. The Court granted the DOJ's motion for reconsideration to allow the DOJ to deliver to chambers an <i>ex parte</i> declaration addressing applicability of the exemption to these documents. Shortly thereafter, the parties began negotiations for settlement. On March 7, 2013, they agreed upon a Stipulation and Proposed Order for Compromise Settlement and Release of Claims. On March 11, 2013, Judge Lasnik officially ordered the Stipulation for Compromise Settlement and Release of Claims, whereby the United States was to pay the ACLU $50,000 within 60 days via wire transfer, as full settlement for attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the ACLU in this lawsuit. This case is closed. As a result of this lawsuit, the ACLU got many thousands of pages of materials. As far as we know, they are not publicly available--but they were used as the information base for a 2016 report titled <a href=\"https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/wirac_9-11_clinic_trapped_in_a_black_box.pdf\">\"Trapped in a Black Box: Growing Terrorism Watchlisting in Everyday Policing.\"</a>", "summary": "On May 8, 2009, the American Civil Liberties Union (\"ACLU\") of Washington filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the Western District of Washington. The ACLU sued the United States Department of Justice (\"DOJ\") under the Freedom of Information Act (\"FOIA\"). The ACLU asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the DOJ to disclose and release records it was improperly withholding from the ACLU regarding the National Crime Information Center Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (\"CVGTOF\"), which contains entries on suspected terrorist organizations and individuals. Though the DOJ moved to dismiss the case, on March 10, 2011, U.S. District Court Judge Robert S. Lasnik only granted the motion to dismiss in part, and ordered the DOJ to edit any inappropriate redactions and provide the Court with more facts that would justify a claimed exemption. After some back and forth regarding the confidentiality of the requested documents, the DOJ was required to release certain documents and on March 7, 2013 the parties came to an agreement whereby the United States was to pay the ACLU $50,000 within 60 days via wire transfer, as full settlement for attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the ACLU in this lawsuit. This case is closed."}
{"article": "On October 5, 2017, the NAACP together with its Boston and Connecticut branches filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut against the U.S. Department of Commerce (the parent agency of the U.S. Census Bureau) to compel prompt compliance with its request for documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552. Plaintiffs sought expeditious disclosure of the Bureau\u2019s plans for digitization, reaching \u201chard-to-count\u201d populations, hiring practices, and other preparations for the 2020 census, as well as a declaration that plaintiffs were entitled to a full fee waiver and an award of any costs and reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had violated 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552(a)(6)(A)(i) for failing to respond to the initial complaint within 20 days, 15 C.F.R. \u00a7 4.6(f)(4) for failure to respond to their request for expedited processing, and \u00a7 552(a)(4)(iii) for erroneously denying plaintiffs\u2019 public interest fee waiver. Back on June 29, 2017, plaintiffs had first submitted a FOIA request to the Census Bureau relating to the 2020 census. They were concerned about the digitalization, understaffing, and underfunding of the Bureau that could lead to undercounting of minority populations and security vulnerabilities. In this lawsuit, plaintiffs alleged that the Bureau failed to respond to that request within 20 days after it received the request as required by law. However, the Bureau claimed that it did not receive the request until July 6. Then, on August 7, the Bureau gave itself a month-long extension. The plaintiffs claimed the extension cited the wrong statute, failed to comply with the correct statute\u2019s procedural requirements, and violated a 10-day limit for extensions. The Bureau then delayed an additional month due to purported lack of clarification on two of the requested items. On October 3, the Bureau sent \u201cseveral internet links and four documents,\u201d saying it would provide additional records on a rolling basis but failing at the time to disclose most of the requested documents. Additionally, the Bureau denied plaintiffs\u2019 fee waiver request on the basis that plaintiffs were not an academic institution. On March 7, 2018, plaintiffs submitted a second FOIA request that became included in the dispute. The parties jointly filed a motion to meet and confer on March 19, 2018, which Judge Warren Eginton granted on March 21. However, according to a joint status report filed on June 14, the parties could not reach an agreement. Defendants then moved for summary judgment on July 26, 2018. The plaintiffs responded with a memo in opposition and a cross motion for discovery on September 17, 2018. On November 5, 2018, defendants agreed to disclose some documents but maintained their motion for summary judgment. Following several extensions for time, plaintiffs agreed to settled on February 4, 2019. The stipulation was granted by Judge Eginton on February 5. The agreement required defendants to provide most of the documents for both FOIA requests no later than February 14, and all other documents by the end of February or mid-March. On September 23, 2019, the judge approved an agreement between the parties that the defendants would pay plaintiffs $18,400 for attorneys' fees and costs within 60 days. There has been no further docket activity that would indicate any disputes over enforcement occurred. So, the case is likely closed.", "summary": "In 2017, the NAACP filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Dept. of Commerce for failure to provide it with records under the FOIA concerning its preparations for the 2020 census. The plaintiffs alleged the Census Bureau was failing to adhere to deadlines, failing to confirm certain requests, and refusing to disclose documents in a timely manner in violation of 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552 and 15 C.F.R \u00a7 4.6. In 2019, the parties reached a settlement that required disclosure of the documents within several weeks and awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs. The case likely closed in September 2019."}
{"article": "The plaintiff in this case, Jacqueline Jones, has quadriplegia as a result of a spinal cord injury and requires assistance in carrying out daily life activities due to her mobility impairment. For many years, her parents were able to care for her, but as they approach old age they no longer have the physical capacity to do so. Ms. Jones was on the waitlist for Traumatic Brain Injury/Spinal Cord Injury (TBI/SCI) Medicaid waiver for several years. In 2009, the state conducted an assessment interview of Ms. Jones in which they determined that she was at risk for imminent placement in a nursing facility, it could not provide her with services. On December 2, 2009, Ms. Jones filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida alleging that the failure to provide services to allow her to remain in the community violates the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. She filed an accompanying motion for preliminary injunction. A few weeks later, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action as moot, as they began the process of providing Ms. Jones with waiver services. The court then postponed hearing Ms. Jones' motion for preliminary injunction, but did not dismiss the case immediately. In early January 2013, Jones filed a motion for class certification, as she sought to represent all individuals on the TBI/SCI waitlist. Before the court resolved the class certification motion, similarly situated plaintiff (and potential class representative) Michele Haddad filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Discovery continued as the timeline on these motions was extended and multiple briefs were filed. The Court (Judge Marcia Morales Howard) denied Haddad's motion on May 7, 2010, because no class had been certified and Haddad therefore could not represent herself or others in Jones' case. (Haddad later filed a separate action. See <a href=\"http://http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12503\">Haddad v. Arnold</a>). The United States (DOJ) filed a motion to intervene in the case, seeking to represent the interests of individuals in Florida who are on the waitlist for services under the TBI/SCI Medicaid waiver. But because Ms. Jones had began receiving services, she stipulated to a voluntary dismissal and the case was closed in January 2011. The DOJ motion to intervene was not considered.", "summary": "Jacqueline Jones filed this lawsuit challenging Florida's failure to provide her with sufficient home care services via the Traumatic Brain Injury/Spinal Cord Injury Medicaid waiver. Although she sought to expand her case to represent a class of plaintiffs, the state began providing her with appropriate services after her lawsuit was filed and she agreed to a voluntary dismissal."}
{"article": "On November 28, 2005, the Florida Pediatric Society, the Florida Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Florida Academy of Pediatric Dentistry, Inc., and certain named individual children who were eligible to receive medical and dental care through Medicaid filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from private practice and from the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (\"AHCA\"); the Florida Department of Children and Families (\"DCF\"); the Surgeon General; and the Florida Department of Health (\"DOH\"). The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the defendants systematically failed to administer the state's Medicaid program in compliance with federal law. Specifically, they alleged that the defendants violated Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396 et seq. (also known as the Medicaid Act), by failing to provide essential medical and dental services to eligible children in Florida. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class consisting of all children who now, or in the future will, reside in Florida and who are, or will be, eligible under Title XIX of the Act for Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment Services. The complaint included four counts. In Count I, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1396a(a)(8) and (a)(10) by failing to provide \"medical assistance . . . with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.\" Count II claimed that the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396a(a)(30)(A) by failing to afford equal access to medical care through a Medicaid program that ensured that reimbursement rates for providers were high enough to guarantee children access to care that equaled the access of their peers in other geographical areas. Count III charged that the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. \u00a71396u-2(b)(5), which requires that states obtain assurances that the HMO contractors offer a suitable range of services and access to preventive and primary care services for the population expected to be enrolled and maintain a sufficient number, mix, and geographic distribution of providers. Finally, Count IV alleged that the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396a(a)(43) by failing to effectively inform the plaintiffs and their caretakers of the availability of child health care services. On January 12, 2007, Judge Adalberto Jordan issued an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. The Court refused to dismiss the case on the theory that the organizational plaintiffs lacked standing, holding that it did not need to answer this question given that the individual plaintiffs clearly had standing. The District Court proceeded to reject in large part the argument that the statutes under which the plaintiffs sued do not confer individually enforceable rights. Adopting the Supreme Court's test in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), the District Court held that the statutes from Counts I, II, and IV evinced an \"unmistakable focus on the benefitted class\" and therefore created private rights of action. The statute in Count III, by contrast, was held not to create a privately enforceable right because it is \"aggregate and systemwide in nature\" rather than focused on the needs of a particular class of people. The defendants filed a motion asking the Court to reconsider this decision and certify certain issues as immediately appealable to the Eleventh Circuit, but Judge Jordan rejected that request on April 24, 2007. The parties then engaged in extensive discovery. On March 20, 2009, Judge Jordan granted in part and denied in part two partial motions for summary judgment filed by DCF and the Surgeon General. For its part, DCF challenged the plaintiffs' standing, and the Court determined that at least one plaintiff had suffered an injury in fact because the child experienced an eighteen-month delay for an appointment in violation of Count I and because he failed to receive information about his rights to medical care in violation of Count IV. The Court further held that each of these violations could be traced to DCF. The plaintiffs did, however, fail to satisfy the causation element for Count II because DCF lacked authority to set or modify reimbursement rates, an authority that state law reposes in AHCA. Having concluded that at least one plaintiff had standing, the District Court turned to the merits of the summary judgment motion. It denied the motion with respect to the first prong of Count I (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396a(a)(8)) and Count IV, holding that issues of material fact existed about whether DCF unlawfully prevented children from obtaining health care services and whether the agency failed to inform the plaintiffs about their rights to medical care. But the Court did rule for the defendants and grant summary judgment on the second prong of Count I (\u00a7 1396a(a)(8)). It held that the plaintiffs had failed to produce any evidence showing that DCF afforded them unequal treatment compared to other Medicaid recipients or people not on Medicaid. As a result, summary judgment was proper on this part of Count I. The District Court then evaluated the Surgeon General's motion for summary judgment, which raised substantially the same issues as DCF's motion. The Court held that at least one plaintiff had standing on Counts I and II. Because this plaintiff's surgery was delayed by a year, he was denied medical care with reasonable promptness in violation of the first prong of Count I. The Surgeon General also violated prong two of Count I because the plaintiffs received deficient medical assistance compared to the assistance afforded other individuals. As for Count II, the District Court determined that medical care and services were not available to the plaintiffs to the same extent they were available to the rest of the population in the geographic area. The Court then held that the causation requirement was satisfied, explaining that DOH has at least some control over the Medicaid reimbursement rates paid to providers. On Count IV, however, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to allege facts showing that DOH was responsible for any lack of information concerning available medical services. The Court then denied the Surgeon General's summary judgment motion on Counts I and II because of the plaintiffs' factual showings on DOH's failure to provide medical services with reasonable promptness and to ensure that payments to providers were sufficiently high to guarantee quality care as compared with that received by other children. The parties tried mediation for the next few months, but on June 9, 2009, they reached an impasse. On June 25, Magistrate Judge Chris McAliley issued a recommendation that the District Court grant the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Judge Jordan then issued an order on September 30 adopting the magistrate's report and granting in part the motion for certification. After concluding that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue Counts I, II, and IV against AHCA, the Court certified a class consisting of all children under the age of 21 who now, or in the future will, reside in Florida and who are, or will be, eligible under Title XIX of the Social Security Act for Early Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment Services. Also on September 30, 2009, Judge Jordan issued an order denying the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Court again rejected the argument that the statutes at issue do not confer individually enforceable rights. It also rejected the defendants' contention that the term \"medical assistance\" in \u00a7\u00a7 1396a(a)(8) and 1396a(a)(10) is narrowly defined and precludes relief for failure to provide medical services. After more discovery, a bench trial began on December 9, 2009. The trial consisted of 94 sessions and ended in January 2012. On November 21, 2012, the District Court (Judge Jordan) issued an order requiring the parties to submit memoranda of law explaining whether the new Affordable Care Act provisions moot or otherwise affect the issues in this case. These provisions, which took effect on January 1, 2013, require Medicaid to match Medicare's rate of payment for primary care treatment for any services performed over the next two years. On March 18, 2013, Judge Jordan denied the defendants' request to dismiss certain claims as moot because of Florida's state plan amendment, which gave to Medicaid providers Medicare's higher reimbursement rates. The Court explained that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services had yet to approve the amendment, which means that medical providers in the state still have not been paid the higher rates that the plaintiffs demanded. As a result, the claims in the case remain viable. Judge Jordan again rejected the defendants' mootness arguments in an order issued on July 10, 2014. The Court held that a temporary two-year increase of Medicaid reimbursement rates to Medicare levels did not moot the case given the uncertainty about whether the state legislature would keep funding the rate increases past their expiration date on December 31, 2014. Moreover, Florida's decision to place 98 to 99 percent of children eligible for Medicaid in managed care similarly did not render the case moot because of the 1 to 2 percent of excluded children and because the managed care system would not be live until October 1, 2014. On November 25, 2014, Judge Jordan denied the defendants' request to reopen the record for trial on liability and their suggestion of mootness. In declining to reopen the record, the Court explained that allowing more discovery and trial sessions would cause substantial prejudice and would improperly prolong the process of determining liability. The Court then rejected the defendants' mootness arguments. Even though DCF made significant changes in its system for determining Medicaid eligibility, including implementing a new computer system with new income eligibility standards and a new streamlined Medicaid application, the Court held that because these changes were relatively recent it remained unclear whether they would fully resolve all of the plaintiffs' complaints. About a month later, on December 30, 2014, Judge Jordan issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law in an opinion that spanned more than 150 pages. The Court began by reaffirming its pretrial determination that the individual plaintiffs have standing to bring this case. (It declined to reach the organizational plaintiffs' standing but reserved the right to do so in a future revised order.) The Court also reaffirmed its pretrial class-certification ruling and its determination that the statutes underlying Counts I, II, and IV confer individually enforceable rights under which the plaintiffs can bring this action. After making extensive factual findings, the District Court held that Florida's Medicaid program violated federal law in several respects. The program has failed to compensate physicians and specialists at rates that are competitive with those of Medicare or private insurers. Specifically, the state's system for reimbursing physicians prioritizes budget neutrality and fails to consider statutory mandates like ensuring that reimbursement rates are sufficiently high to incentivize physicians to treat Medicaid patients. As a result, about one-third of Florida children on Medicaid do not receive the preventative care to which they are entitled, a violation of the Early Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment requirements for preventative medical care under \u00a7\u00a7 1396a(a)(8) and (a)(10). The District Court held that the defendants violated these requirements for specialty care as well. On the issue of dental care, the Court reached similar conclusions, holding that children in Florida are not receiving such care with reasonable promptness and that dental reimbursement rates are too low. The Court then identified the defendants' additional violations of federal law, including those relating to outreach efforts. On March 31, 2015, Judge Jordan issued amended findings of fact and conclusions of law in response to a motion filed by the defendants. The Court's changes related primarily to the expiration of a state statute that had delegated to DCF certain outreach responsibilities. Given the statute's expiration, the Court held that DCF could no longer be sued under Count IV for failing to perform these duties, although AHCA and DOH remained subject to liability. The Court's other changes involved the standing of some of the individual plaintiffs. After a scheduling conference, the district court informed the parties that the next phase of the case would focus on whether there remains an ongoing controversy to justify awarding any declaratory or injunctive relief. The court directed the parties to file their respective offers of proof in preparation for a hearing to be held on April 24, 2015. The defendants argued that a recent case, Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Care Center, required that the court dismiss all of the plaintiffs' claims. However, on May 1, 2015, the Court dismissed only Count II based on the new case law. After several months of settlement discussions, the court approved a final settlement agreement on June 28, 2016. The state agreed to implement an incentive program providing rate increases to eligible medical services providers upon achievement of certain objectively measurable patient access and outcome measures. The state also agreed to increase access to and utilization of pediatric dental services. The agreement calls for at least quarterly meetings between state agencies and the plaintiffs to address plan changes, changes in primary care provider assignments, and timely activation and enrollment of newborn babies with Medicaid coverage from birth. The state also agreed to ensure that communications are made through various media and non-media channels to inform parents and guardians of enrolled Medicaid children of available EPSDT services and to inform parents and guardians of unenrolled children of the availability of the Medicaid program. Finally, the state agreed to improve the Medicaid eligibility process for children by making all reasonable efforts to minimize wrongful terminations of Medicaid eligibility, monitor files on eligible unborn babies, evaluate the application process. The parties agreed to quarterly meetings to monitor the Medicaid eligibility process. The Court has jurisdiction over the litigation until September 30, 2022. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs $12,000,000 to cover attorneys' fees and costs. As of June 17, 2020, the docket reflects no further activity, but the term of the Court's jurisdiction is still ongoing.", "summary": "On November 28, 2005, the Florida Pediatric Society, the Florida Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Florida Academy of Pediatric Dentistry, Inc., and certain named individual children who are eligible to receive medical and dental care through Medicaid filed this class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The plaintiffs sued several state defendants in their official capacities, claiming that these defendants violated Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396 et seq. (also known as the Medicaid Act), by failing to provide essential medical and dental services to eligible children in Florida. After extensive discovery and a lengthy trial, the District Court (Judge Adalberto Jordan) held that the defendants were liable in several respects. After several months of settlement discussions, the court approved a final settlement agreement on June 28, 2016. The Court has jurisdiction over the litigation until September 30, 2022. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs $12,000,000 to cover attorneys' fees and costs."}
{"article": "On December 28, 2011, two Hawaii-based religious organizations filed a lawsuit in United States District Court against the State of Hawaii. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, claimed that a law prohibiting discrimination against gay couples seeking space for their civil unions or marriages violated their First Amendment religious freedoms. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Act 1, the Civil Union Act contained no exceptions for churches and other places of worship, and therefore violated the First Amendment rights of religious organizations whose doctrines made allowing gay marriages in their churches or houses of worship unacceptable. On January 19, 2012, the case was stayed by agreement of the parties while the Hawaii legislature worked towards amendments to Act 1. On July 6, 2012, Governor Abercombie signed a law that amended Act 1 to exempt religious organizations for the requirement of non-discrimination in the use of space for civil unions. On October 3, 2012, the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The judge held that the issue was not ripe for adjudication because the plaintiff had failed to show that they had standing to bring the suit and because they had failed to update the complaint to reflect the amendments to Act 1, which effectively resolved the primary dispute.", "summary": "On December 28, 2011, two Hawaii-based religious organizations filed a lawsuit in United States District Court against the State of Hawaii. The lawsuit alleged that a California law set to take effect in 2012 was chilling plaintiffs' religious freedom and unconstitutional under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The case was stayed, and the law changed in July of 2012. On October 3, 2012, the case was dismissed for lack of standing."}
{"article": "This class action was filed on behalf of impoverished parents and legal guardians who have lost, are at risk of losing, or cannot regain custody of their children from the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) because they are homeless or unable to provide food or shelter for their children. Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit against the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services in 1989 in the U.C. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants' policies violated provisions of Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, as well as the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the policies and practices of taking and retaining children of impoverished parents; failing to assist parents to secure food, cash, shelter, and other subsistence through coordination of services; failing to make reasonable efforts at reunification; and abridging the liberty and property interests of parents in retaining custody of their children while requiring them to maintain the means to support themselves and their families. Two class members secured a preliminary injunction, requiring defendants to issue sufficient funds to secure housing and utilities, restore Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits, and identify all other sources of financial assistance. On March 28, 1992, the court approved a consent decree, providing for detailed policies and development of new programs for cash and housing assistance, and for extensive monitoring. After defendants failed to meet several deadlines, the parties negotiated the scope of the decree, its implementation, and mandated compliance reports. On March 10, 1995, the parties entered an agreed order to extend the monitor's term for two years, to have DCFS hire a housing specialist to create a system for ensuring that families are reunified speedily, to investigate a new pre-court \"screening\" to prevent unnecessary removal of children, and to provide for an ombudsperson to resolve individual class member problems. The court reduced the monitoring period to one year. When DCFS refused an extension at the expiration of the monitor's term, plaintiffs filed a motion for continued monitoring and/or declaratory and injunctive relief for noncompliance. Defendants argued that the decree was unenforceable after Suter v. Artist M. absent a finding of contempt. Defendants also argued that DCFS had \"substantially complied\" with the decree, and, therefore, the court could neither make a finding of contempt nor grant relief. On April 11, 1996, the court ruled against defendants, ordering continued monitoring on limited issues. Monitoring continued for one year, and the parties entered into a limited out-of-court agreement for continued monitoring. Counsel for plaintiffs continue to work with impoverished parents to ensure that they are able to access Norman services.", "summary": "Plaintiffs filed this class action against the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services in 1989 in the U.C. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois claiming that the agency failed to provide services to assure family unification and instead removed children from parents and guardians who were unable to provide food or shelter. The case resulted in a Consent Decree whereby the agency agreed to assist families in obtaining housing and food assistance."}
{"article": "On September 8, 2014, a same-sex couple filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against a county clerk and the Indiana Department of Health. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the state's ban on same-sex marriages violated their 14th Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. The plaintiffs were legally married in Illinois, but Indiana refused to recognize their marriage as part of its same-sex marriage ban. The couple claimed that the state's ban injured them by denying them \"access to all protections, benefits, rights, and responsibilities afforded to married persons and their children under state law.\" After the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals struck down Indiana's same-sex marriage ban in <i>Baskin v. Bogan </i>, 2014 WL 4359059, the plaintiffs in this case moved for a temporary restraining order to force Indiana to recognize their out-of-state marriage. But before the Court (Judge Joseph Van Bokkelen) ruled on the motion, the parties jointly stipulated that Indiana would recognize the plaintiffs' marriage while <i>Bogan</i> was pending appeal before the Supreme Court. On September 11, 2014, the Court denied as moot Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and stayed the case pending final resolution in <i>Bogan</i>. The court stated that once the Bogan appeal was resolved, Plaintiff should move to lift the stay. On October 6, 2014, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the <i>Bogan</i> case, 135 S. Ct. 316. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit's ruling in favor of the plaintiff couple in <i>Borgan</i> was upheld. The plaintiffs filed voluntary notice of dismissal on December 19, 2014. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On Sept. 8, 2014, a same-sex couple filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against a county clerk and the Indiana Department of Health. The plaintiffs claimed that the state's ban on same-sex marriages violated the their 14th Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. After the 7th Circuit struck down Indiana's marriage ban, the state agreed to recognize the plaintiffs' out-of-state marriage pending a final resolution to the case."}
{"article": "On July 26, 2013, a same-sex couple married under the laws of Ontario filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the governor, attorney general, secretary of state of Kentucky and two county clerks. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Kentucky's laws prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying and voiding within Kentucky marriages of same-sex couples validly entered into under the laws of other states or countries. On August 16, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding two more same-sex couples married under the laws of other states as plaintiffs in the suit. The plaintiffs asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked the court to declare that Amendment 223A of the Kentucky Constitution violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and that the Kentucky statutes KRS 402.045(2) and KRS 402.045(1) violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, the plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin the State from denying same-sex couples the right to marry in Kentucky and denying recognition of marriages validly entered into under the laws of other states and countries. The plaintiffs sought summary judgment on December 16, 2013, and on February 12, 2014, U.S. District Judge John Heyburn, II, found for the plaintiffs, concluding that Kentucky's refusal to recognize valid same-sex marriages from other states violated the United States Constitution's guarantee of equal protection under the law, even under the most deferential standard of review. Two weeks later, on February 27, 2014, the Court held that the order would go immediately into effect. That same day, the defendants filed a motion to stay, which was granted, and appealed to the Sixth Circuit on March 18, 2014. Despite the stay, Judge Heyburn II held on July 1, 2014 that Kentucky laws banning same-sex marriage violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights and did not further any conceivable legitimate government purpose. Love v. Beshear, 2014 WL 2957671 (W.D. Kentucky 2014). The order declared all Kentucky laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were void and unenforceable. In the same order, the Court stayed the decision pending further order in the Sixth Circuit. On November 6, 2014, the Sixth Circuit ruled on this and other cases from four states. DeBoer v. Snyder (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12811\">PB-MI-0004</a> in this Clearinghouse). Obergefell v. Hodges (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12787\">PB-OH-0003</a> in this Clearinghouse). Henry v. Hodges (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13549\">PB-OH-0004</a> in this Clearinghouse). Tanco v. Haslam (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12995\">PB-TN-0005</a> in this Clearinghouse). It was unwilling to find a Constitutional basis to deny states' authority to define marriage. On the Due Process and Equal Protection claims raised in this case, the court found that the bans were plausibly rational, and neither in violation of the Constitution nor due to illegal animus or discrimination. It also held that \"[i]f it is constitutional for a State to define marriage as a relationship between a man and a woman, it is also constitutional for the State to stand by that definition with respect to couples married in other States or countries.\" (DeBoer v. Snyder Page p. 38). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit upheld the same-sex marriage bans in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee. 772 F.3d 388. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 16, 2015 to review these cases in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12787\">Obergefell v. Hodges</a>. The Court rephrased the questions presented as: 1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license marriage between two people of the same sex? 2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state? On June 26, 2015, the Court reversed, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy. The Court held that the right to marry was fundamental, and it demeaned gay and lesbian couples to deprive them of access to marriage. The 14th Amendment therefore did not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. Justice Kennedy was joined without further writing by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor. Each of the four dissenters--Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito--wrote a dissent. The case was remanded and reassigned to Judge Charles R. Simpson III. On January 13, 2016, Judge Simpson III granted the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys fees totaling $1,115,632.96. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2013, three same-sex couples married under the laws of other states filed a lawsuit, individually and on behalf of their children, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky against the Commonwealth of Kentucky, challenging the constitutionality of Kentucky's laws prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying and voiding within Kentucky marriages of same-sex couples validly entered into under the laws of other states and countries. Judge John Heyburn found for the plaintiffs on July 1st, 2014, and issued the final order declaring Kentucky laws banning same-sex marriages to be unconstitutional. This order was stayed and then reversed by the Sixth Circuit. The case is pending before the U.S. Supreme Court."}
{"article": "New York City implemented an overhaul to its welfare system in order to meet federal and state welfare requirements, which were revised in the mid-1990s. Under the city\u2019s program, \u201cincome support centers\u201d (locations where public assistance benefits were applied for and distributed, sometimes during the initial visit by an applicant) were to be converted to \u201cjob centers.\u201d These job centers put greater emphasis on making sure those receiving public assistance obtained employment from the private sector while doing so and added bureaucratic layers to the application process for public assistance compared to income support centers. Over half of the city\u2019s income support centers had been converted to job centers at the time the suit was filed. The plaintiffs each claimed to be qualified welfare beneficiaries who had been improperly denied assistance by one of the job centers in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause, the city\u2019s obligations under 7 U.S.C. \u00a72020 (the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program\u2014then referred to as Food Stamps), and 42 U.S.C. \u00a71396 (Medicaid). The plaintiffs also alleged state law violations. They sought class certification for all similarly situated New York City residents, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on December 16, 1998, with Judge William H. Pauley presiding. The plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order (1) enjoining the city from converting further income support centers into job centers; and (2) directing the city to expeditiously process the applications of the named plaintiffs. The court entered a temporary restraining order on the same day directing the city to provide emergency food stamps and cash assistance to the named plaintiffs. The court granted a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs on January 21, 1999. Finding the plaintiffs and others like them would suffer irreparable harm without intervention and that the evidence showed the conversion of income support centers to job centers was done with insufficient self-study and a statistical drop in the number of successful applicants for emergency assistance despite legal obligations, the court ordered the city to (1) allow applicants for public assistance to apply for benefits the first day they visit a job center, (2) cease conversion of income support centers to job centers without a formal hearing, (3) make eligibility requirements for food stamps and Medicaid separate from the eligibility determination from cash assistance, (4) send applicants timely notice of the city\u2019s decision on whether they qualify for benefits, and (5) form a corrective plan for achieving its policy goals while also meeting the needs of public assistance applicants. The city submitted a corrective action plan and requested modification to the preliminary injunction in March of 1999. On May 24, 1999, the preliminary injunction was modified to allow the closure of up to three more income support centers after an individualized hearing on the adequacy of city audit procedures. The court also approved of the city\u2019s corrective action plan in the same order. The city moved to vacate the preliminary injunction on December 10, 1999, after procuring more evidence surrounding the efficacy of the job centers in achieving their welfare obligations. Meanwhile, the State of New York moved to dismiss the complaint against them for failure to state a claim. Judge Pauley denied both motions and granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion for class certification on July 21, 2000. The certified class consisted of \"all New York City residents who have sought, are seeking, or will seek to apply for food stamps, Medicaid, and/or cash assistance at a Job Center.\" Following a September 2000 audit of the city\u2019s welfare distribution schematic, the court entered a permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiffs on December 30, 2004. The permanent injunction directed both the city and state to: (i) provide expedited food stamp service to eligible applications within 7 days; (ii) separately process applications for food stamps when the applications for cash assistance are denied or withdrawn; (iii) send notices to applicants confirming voluntary withdrawals for Medicaid in accord with 42 C.F.R. 435.913 and document such withdrawals pursuant to 7 C.F.R. 273.2(c)(6); and (iv) provide adequate and timely notice by correctly completing certain documentation. The injunction also required the state to supervise the city and make sure it met the obligations of the injunction. On January 13, 2005, the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the part of the December order in which the court concluded that 8 N.Y.C.R.R. \u00a7 387.8(a)(2)(i)(a) did not confer a privately enforceable right of action and that plaintiffs\u2019 claim under New York Social Services Law \u00a7 133 was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The court granted the motion and reversed its earlier decisions on these points on February 14, 2005. Final judgement was entered on December 14, 2005; at this time, the court also granted the plaintiffs a declaratory judgment that city officials had failed to provide the class with the obligations required of them by the relevant federal programs and further specified the parameters of the permanent injunction. A stipulation and order resolving the issue of attorney fees was reached on January 31, 2007. The city agreed to pay the plaintiff class a total of $2,559,675.94 for the attorneys' fees incurred up through December 14, 2005. The state agreed to pay $639,918.98 for the plaintiffs' fees for the same period. Both the state and the city appealed the permanent injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on January 12, 2006, but the city dropped its appeal shortly afterward. On October 31, 2007, the Second Circuit reversed the district court, ruling that the state did not have a non-delegable duty to administer the decentralized Medicaid and Food Stamp programs, the state\u2019s efforts in supervising the city since the permanent injunction was issued were adequate, and the district court exceeded its authority by issuing a permanent injunction despite New York State\u2019s affirmative supervisory steps it had taken to assure compliance. The Second Circuit ruling dismissed the claims against the state defendants, reversed the permanent injunction, and altered those parts of the December 14, 2005 judgement addressing the state government. In a second stipulation and order from April 23, 2010, the City of New York agreed to pay a further $275,000.00 to the plaintiffs for attorney fees and costs from December 15, 2005 through December 14, 2008. A third stipulation and order from December 22, 2010, had the New York City Human Resources Administration (HRA), the agency in charge of implementing the changes at issue in this case, identify households which required but did not receive a separate food stamp determination between December 15, 2005 and November 30, 2006, as a result of an application at a job center in which a request for public assistance was denied, and restore those benefits. A final stipulation and order was issued on July 22, 2011, in which the city agreed to pay $86,000.00 in attorneys' fees and costs sought to the plaintiffs for the period between December 15, 2008 and June 14, 2010. This was the most recent item on the docket; the case is now closed.", "summary": "This class action was about whether the City of New York improperly denied federally sponsored cash assistance to qualified New York City residents under a program implemented by the city in the late 1990s. The plaintiffs each claimed to be qualified welfare beneficiaries who had been improperly denied assistance by one of New York City\u2019s new job centers in violation of the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process, the city\u2019s obligations under 7 U.S.C. \u00a72020 (the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program\u2014then referred to as Food Stamps) and 42 U.S.C. \u00a71396 (Medicaid), in addition to violating state law; the plaintiffs sought class certification for all similarly situated New York City residents, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on December 16, 1998, with Judge William H. Pauley presiding. The court entered a temporary restraining order on the same day directing the city to provide emergency food stamps and cash assistance to the named plaintiffs. The court granted a preliminary injunction in-part to the plaintiffs on January 21, 1999. The court ordered the city to (1) allow applicants for public assistance to apply for benefits the first day they visit a job center, (2) cease conversion of income support centers to job centers without a formal hearing, (3) make eligibility requirements for food stamps and Medicaid separately from the eligibility determination from cash assistance, (4) send applicants timely notice of the city\u2019s decision on whether they qualify for benefits, and (5) form a corrective plan for achieving its policy goals while also meeting the needs of public assistance applicants. The city moved to vacate the preliminary injunction on December 10, 1999, after procuring more evidence surrounding the efficacy of the job centers in achieving their welfare obligations. Meanwhile, the State of New York moved to dismiss the complaint against them for failure to state a claim. Judge Pauley denied both motions and granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion for class certification on July 21, 2000. The court entered a permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiffs on December 30, 2004. The permanent injunction directed both the city and state to: (i) provide expedited food stamp service to eligible applications within 7 days; (ii) separately process applications for food stamps when the applications for cash assistance are denied or withdrawn; (iii) send notices to applicants confirming voluntary withdrawals for Medicaid in accord with 42 C.F.R. 435.913 and document such withdrawals pursuant to 7 C.F.R. 273.2(c)(6); and (iv) provide adequate and timely notice by correctly completing certain documentation. The injunction also required the state to supervise the city and make sure it met the obligations of the injunction. On January 13, 2005, the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the part of the December order in which the court concluded that 8 N.Y.C.R.R. \u00a7 387.8(a)(2)(i)(a) did not confer a privately enforceable right of action and that plaintiffs\u2019 claim under New York Social Services Law \u00a7 133 was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The court granted the motion on February 14, 2005. Final judgement was entered on December 14, 2005; the court also granted the plaintiffs declaratory judgment. Both the state and the city appealed the permanent injunction to the Second Circuit on January 12, 2006, but the city dropped its appeal. On October 31, 2007, the Second Circuit reversed the district court, ruling that the state did not have a non-delegable duty to administer the decentralized Medicaid and Food Stamp programs, the state\u2019s efforts in supervising the city since the permanent injunction was issued were adequate, and the district court exceeded its authority by issuing a permanent injunction in light of New York State\u2019s affirmative supervisory steps it had taken to assure compliance. In a series of stipulations and orders from January 31, 2007 to July 22, 2011, the City of New York agreed to pay a total of $2,920,675.94 to plaintiffs for attorney fees and costs sought; the state agreed to pay a further $639,918.98. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "This Clearinghouse entry describes two closely entwined lawsuits: O'Toole v. Cuomo, U.S. v. New York, and Disability Advocates Inc. v. Pataki. <hr> On June 30, 2003, Disability Advocates, Inc. (DAI) filed a lawsuit on behalf of New York residents in large \"adult homes,\" privately owned but state-funded facilities for individuals with mental illness or other disabilities, and on behalf of all individuals at risk of being institutionalized in adult homes. Plaintiffs filed their case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, against the Governor of New York, the State Departments of Health and Mental Health, and several other state officials. The complaint focused specifically on 26 of the adult homes in New York City, each of which housed more than 120 people and where at least 25%, and often more than 75%, of the residents had mental illnesses. The complaint compared the treatment received by mentally ill individuals who had been discharged and placed in community-based supported housing or other integrated living settings with those individuals placed in the adult homes, where personal freedom, choice, and privacy were limited, as were opportunities to interact with family and non-mentally ill persons. Recreational programming and personal rights were often non-existent. The adult homes were alleged to present frequent health, safety, and sanitation violations. The complaint also alleged instances of home operators and other staff taking financial or other improper advantage of mentally ill residents, as well participating in schemes to excessively bill the State. In addition to Plaintiff organization's own attorneys, Plaintiffs were represented by lawyers from a large private firm and from the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, the New York Lawyers for the Public Interest, MFY Legal Services, Inc., and the Urban Justice Center. The DAI complaint alleged that the decision to discharge mentally ill patients from hospitals to adult homes resulted from the state's unlawfully insufficient provisioning for supported housing. Plaintiffs also contended that increasing the capacity of supported housing settings would be of equal or lower cost to the State than maintaining the adult homes. The complaint cited state and city evaluative reports and prominent newspaper articles that indicated the State had known for at least 25 years that the living conditions and quality of care and life in the adult homes were inadequate. The Plaintiffs estimated that at least half of adult home residents with mental illness could live community-integrated settings successfully. The DAI case alleged that the State violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (\"ADA\") and the Rehabilitation Act by discriminating against persons with disabilities by failing to administer medically necessary services and programs in the most integrated setting, and by failing to make reasonable and appropriate accommodations for these persons, in violation of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12131 and 28 C.F.R. \u00a7 35.130 (Title II of the ADA and its implementing regulations) and of 29 U.S.C \u00a7 794 (Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act). The ADA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the landmark decision Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), mandates that disabled persons, including those individuals with serious mental illnesses, not be subjected to \"unjustified isolation\" and that government services providing medically necessary care be provided \"in the most integrated setting appropriate to [the patients'] needs.\" Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as an award of attorneys' fees and costs. On April 29, 2004, the first judge assigned, Robert M. Levy, granted Defendants' motion for recusal in light of his prior service on the Plaintiff organization's board of directors and past employment with New York Lawyers for the Public Interest. The case was reassigned. On February 19, 2009, the Court (Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis) denied the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. The Court found that DAI had standing to bring the suit, that Title II applied to DAI's claims, and that the Governor was a proper party. On May 8, 2009, the Court ruled on various motions in limine. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 2009 WL 1312112 (E.D.N.Y. May 8, 2009). Following a five week bench trial, the Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on September 9, 2009. The Court found that DAI had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that its constituents were not receiving services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs and had thus established a violation of the integration mandate of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. As a result, the Court held that DAI was entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). In response, three parties moved to intervene in the action: the United States, represented by attorneys from the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division; the Empire State Association of Assisted Living; and the New York Coalition for Quality Assisted Living. On November 23, 2009, the Court granted the United States' motion to intervene. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 2009 WL 450631 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2009). The Court denied the other two parties' motions on December 23, 2009. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 2009 WL 5185807 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2009). The Court issued a remedial order and judgment on March 1, 2010. The Order detailed Defendants' future obligations and ordered Defendants to pay Plaintiffs' attorneys fees and costs. The Court denied Defendants' motion for a stay pending appeal on March 11, 2010. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 2010 WL 933750 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010). Defendants appealed, and on May 31, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the judgment of the District Court and dismissed the action. The Second Circuit found that the primary plaintiff in the case, Disability Advocates, Inc., did not have standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Among other standing requirements, the Supreme Court has held that organizations seeking to assert the injuries of their members or constituents must show that they sufficiently represent the interests of those constituents and that the constituents have some control over the actions of the representative body. In New York, DAI was a contractor of the state's federally mandated Protection and Advocacy (P&A) System. Although other circuits are split on the issue of whether the state P&A can stand in for individuals with disabilities for the purpose of Article III standing, the Second Circuit found that DAI's status as a contractor of the P&A system makes it an inadequate stand-in for the people it seeks to represent. The Court also found that although the United States could sue to enforce its statutes, the federal government's late intervention in the case (nearly 7 years after it was filed) did not cure the standing problem. The Second Circuit Court decision formally ended the DAI case. However, after that decision was announced, the plaintiffs--both DAI and the United States--decided to refile the litigation to solve the standing problem. Private plaintiffs were recruited, and DAI switched its role to be among the plaintiffs' counsel, along with Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Mobilization for Justice, Urban Justice Center, New York Lawyers for Public Interest, and Disability Rights New York. Both the private plaintiffs and the United States then filed nominally new litigation on July 23, 2013: O'Toole v. Cuomo, 13-cv-04166 and United States v. New York, 13-cv-04165, simultaneously with a negotiated settlement. In addition, they filed a request that the case be assigned to Judge Garaufis, saying that the case presented nearly identical facts to that in <i>DAI</i>, thereby saving judicial resources. On August 8, 2013, a group representing 19 of the impacted homes asked the court to delay its decision regarding the proposed settlement until it had time to confer with the parties. The group argued that they disagreed with the underlying premise of the proposed agreement; namely with the contention that the presence of mentally ill persons in adult homes violated the ADA and the Olmstead mandate. The potential intervenors also alleged that they were wrongfully denied the opportunity to participate in negotiation proceedings before the proposed settlement was filed. Finally, they listed several disagreements with the substantive components of the proposed settlement, claiming that it would pressure and coerce residents into leaving adult homes and would ignore the rights of adult home operators. Judge Garaufis did not respond to the adult home operators\u2019 objections at this time. On October 10, 2013, the court issued an order finding that the parties\u2019 proposed agreement did not include sufficient mechanisms for the court to monitor and supervise its implementation. In accordance with the order, the parties submitted a proposed modification to the agreement on December 10, 2013. On January 14, 2014, counsel for the group of adult homes submitted a letter to the court asking it to modify the proposed consent judgment because of continued disagreement with its terms. Nonetheless, on January 30, 2014, the parties submitted an amended stipulated settlement agreement. The terms were similar to those in the original agreement, but included additional mechanisms for court monitoring. In the meantime, on November 20, 2013, Judge Garaufis certified the plaintiff class, defined as persons with serious mental illness residing in NYC Adult Homes. After fairness hearings, on March 17, 2014, the court issued final approval of the modified settlement agreement, finding it to be fair and reasonable. Regarding the objections of the adult home operators, the court found that, as non-parties to the case who had not formally intervened, the operators did not have standing to object to the settlement. Nonetheless, Judge Garaufis addressed each of their concerns in the March 17 Order, and concluded that the Agreement adequately addressed each of them. The terms of the court-enforced settlement provided individuals with mental illness residing in twenty-three New York City adult homes the option of transferring to community-based supported housing in the most integrated setting possible. It required that those opting for the transfers have access to flexible support services and community-based mental health care suited to their individual needs. At the time of the settlement, approximately 4000 individuals were eligible for these transfers. The State agreed to provide funding for 950 such housing units scattered throughout the Bronx and Staten Island, with 1050 more units in Queens and Kings Counties. Individuals with mental illness that rendered them a danger to themselves or others were not eligible for supported housing. The Agreement also required that all adult home residents be assessed for eligibility in the supported housing program within five years of the effective date of the settlement, with housing providers conducting \u201cin-reach\u201d to explain housing options to residents. It mandated that State compliance be monitored by an Independent Reviewer, who would make annual reports on the implementation of the settlement terms and who would otherwise observe, review, report findings, and make recommendations to the parties. The Court's retention of jurisdiction was set to expire after the fifth and final report of the Reviewer, unless the Plaintiffs alleged non-compliance or the parties agreed to extend the agreement. In addition, the parties were required to submit quarterly reports. Finally, the settlement provided $200,000 in attorneys' fees and costs for the DIA v. Pataki plaintiffs' legal expenses. From the time the order was approved until April 2015, the State filed quarterly status reports on its implementation of the agreement without apparent incident. However, in May 2015, the Independent Reviewer filed a notice stating that the team had experienced difficulty obtaining access to various records it needed to accurately review the State\u2019s progress. Accordingly, the Independent Reviewer filed a Proposed Order regarding its access to records to ensure that his team would have the records access it needed. The court issued the Order, mandating that the involved entities provide any records requested by the Independent Reviewer for monitoring and compliance purposes. The first status report of the Independent Reviewer generally indicated that progress was slow. However, in February 2016, representatives for several of the adult homes again submitted a letter to the court claiming that various pieces of information had been withheld during status reports and status conferences. Specifically, the letter claimed that, because of pressure to move residents out of adult homes at a faster pace, some residents who were inappropriate candidates for supported living had been moved out of their group homes and suffered adverse consequences. After receiving the letter, the court ordered the parties to discuss the allegations at their next status conference. The next annual report filed by the Independent Reviewer indicated that the State had made significant strides and that, contrary to the adult home operators\u2019 contentions, those who had transitioned into the community were generally doing well and were happy with their decisions. As far as areas for improvement, the report indicated that the pace of transition was still lagging and that additional support for transitions and in-reach was needed. On February 28, 2017, the New York State Office of the Attorney General (OAG) moved to withdraw as counsel for the defendants in this case and related cases, citing fundamental disagreements between counsel and Defendants and stating that Defendants had made it unreasonably difficult to represent them. The problems cited by OAG arose out of a separate but related New York case, Doe v. Zucker, litigated in Albany, in which a former resident of an adult home moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the enforcement of certain regulations that arose in conjunction with the Settlement Agreement in this case, because those regulations had prevented Doe's plaintiff from returning to an adult home, even though that's what he wanted. Specifically, the challenged regulations restricted adult homes\u2019 ability to accept new residents. OAG represented State defendants in that case. OAG claimed that the State defendants informed counsel of their intention to support the injunction against their own regulations the morning of the TRO hearing, and that the State had apparently been communicating with the adult home operators without notifying OAG. At the hearing in Doe v. Zucker, OAG counsel neither supported nor opposed the issuance of the TRO, but deferred to their clients. A week later, OAG appeared at a status conference for the present case. Judge Garaufis asked the Attorney General to explain why the office had apparently supported the TRO in the Albany case but was simultaneously defending the regulations in this case. OAG contended that it did not in fact support the implementation of the TRO in Albany, but that it had been blindsided by its clients\u2019 actions. As such, OAG maintained that it was necessary to withdraw as counsel in the federal case. At a hearing on March 22, 2017, Judge Garaufis expressed serious concern that matters so closely related to the settlement were being litigated at the state level without his knowledge--the State never informed him of the proceedings. He explained that it seemed that the State had conspired with the adult home operators to attempt to thwart the regulations limiting admittance to adult homes. He ordered the parties to engage in discovery regarding the OAG\u2019s and the State\u2019s actions leading up to the issuance of the TRO in Doe and scheduled a hearing on OAG\u2019s motion to withdraw for May 17, 2017. He also ordered OAG to inform the state court in Doe v. Zucker about the existence of the settlement and that, because the case was moot, the TRO should be rescinded. Further complicating matters, the TRO issued by the state court in Doe v. Zucker triggered an obligation in the Settlement Agreement for the parties to meet and confer if enforcement of any of the regulations pertinent to the Agreement was stayed. The Agreement required that, in such a case, if the parties were unable to agree on modifications within 120 days, the entire Agreement would be null and void. For reasons that are unclear, OAG withdrew its motion to withdraw as counsel for Defendants on May 4, 2017. The same day, the parties filed a stipulated order to modify the Agreement. The stipulation indicated that the parties agreed to delete the section of the Settlement Agreement that required the parties to meet and modify the agreement in the event of a stay of enforcement of any pertinent regulations. It also indicated that the parties could continue to negotiate possible additional revisions. Judge Garaufis granted the order on May 18 in lieu of having a hearing on May 17. As a separate matter, because Doe v. Zucker was just one of several cases brought by former residents of adult homes and adult home operators to enjoin enforcement of the regulations that arose out of the actions in NY v. U.S., Judge Garaufis became concerned that the class members in such cases were being manipulated into bringing suits against the State without fully understanding the situation or, in some cases, without consent. As a result, on June 15, 2017, he appointed guardians ad litem for the class members who were named as plaintiffs in this group of lawsuits. In early December 2017, the parties were ordered to reenter mediation under the supervision of Magistrate Judge Steven Tiscione. While the United States and class counsel were against it, defendants wanted a short time to negotiate for a revised settlement agreement. They were directed to submit a report to Judge Garaufis no later than February 7, 2018 detailing the outcome of the negotiations. By that time, parties submitted a joint motion for extension of time to negotiate, but Judge Garaufis denied that motion. On March 12, the United States submitted a motion to approve the settlement agreement. Four days later the U.S. submitted a supplement to the Second Amended Stipulation and Order of Settlement (from May 4, 2017). A month later, Judge Garaufis preliminarily approved the agreement, final approval pending a fairness hearing that took place in June. On September 6, 2018, the court granted final approval and the supplementary was also granted. The agreements provided for a quality assurance program, more specific timelines and thresholds for measuring task compliance, and a shift in lodging responsibilities, among many other provisions. Relatively little has occurred in the way of litigation since the September 2018 approval. The state continues to submit monthly status reports and the Independent Review team submits yearly reports. The most recent report, the 6th Annual Report, was filed on April 1, 2020. The report states that, while some reforms have been made, \"structural and process problems still exist,\" especially in that many members of the class do not wish to move to community services. The report claims that this is likely due to family members discouraging them from that choice. The case is ongoing as of June 29, 2020.", "summary": "This case was brought by Disability Advocates, Inc. against the Governor of the State of New York seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel Defendant to provide services in the most integrated setting appropriate. The District Court issued judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. After the Defendants appealed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the judgment of the District Court and dismissed the action due to lack of standing. The DOJ continued to pursue a settlement. On July 23, 2013, the State and the DOJ filed a settlement to provide approximately 4000 qualifying adult home residents the option of living in community-supported private homes scattered throughout New York City. The settlement was approved in March 2014. The settlement was amended and changed several times from 2014 to 2018. The case is ongoing and the court maintains jurisdiction."}
{"article": "On November 3, 2004, plaintiffs, two lesbian couples, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma against the United States and the State of Oklahoma. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief that the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and Article 2 \u00a7 35 of the Oklahoma Constitution (the \"Oklahoma Amendment,\" which banned same-sex marriage licenses from being issued in Oklahoma and acknowledging same-sex marriages issued in other states) violated the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs alleged that DOMA and the Oklahoma Amendment violated the Due Process, Equal Protection, Full Faith and Credit, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. In August 2006, the Court denied a motion to dismiss filed by the Oklahoma Attorney General and Oklahoma Governor, rejecting their sovereign immunity argument. The state officials appealed and the Court stayed the proceedings pending appeal. On June 5, 2009, the Tenth Circuit issued an unpublished decision reversing the Court's failure to dismiss the claims against the Oklahoma officials and remanding the case for entry of an order dismissing the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit's reversal was based on the plaintiffs' lack of standing to pursue their claims against the named state officials. On November 24, 2009, the Court dismissed Oklahoma from the case. The remaining defendants, the United States and the Tulsa County Clerk, filed a motion to dismiss on October 13, 2009. On February 25, 2011, prior to the Court's issuing a decision on the pending motions to dismiss, the United States notified the Court that it would cease defending the constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA, thereby abandoning other portions of its previously filed motion to dismiss. On July 21, 2011, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives filed a motion to intervene \"as a defendant for the limited purpose of defending Section 3.\" On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12113\">PB-NY-0017</a> in this Clearinghouse), which held that Section 3 of DOMA violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government, and Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11970\">PB-CA-0029</a> in this Clearinghouse), which held that the official proponents of Proposition 8 lacked standing. On January 14, 2014, the Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the Oklahoma ban on same-sex marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court entered an order permanently enjoining enforcement of the ban against same-sex couples seeking a marriage license. But, it wrote \"in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court's issuance of a stay in a nearly identical case on appeal from the District Court of Utah to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, see Herbert v. Kitchen (Jan. 6, 2014), the Court stays execution of this injunction pending the final disposition of any appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.\" The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the Section 3 of DOMA. On January 16, 2014, the Tulsa County Clerk appealed the Court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit, and on January 24, 2014, the plaintiffs appealed the Court's decision as to DOMA. The appeals court issued its decision on the first of these appeals on July 18, 2014, affirming the District Court's decision that same-sex marriage violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The main opinion was by Judge Carlos Lucero; Judge Jerome Holmes joined, and Judge Paul Kelly dissented. The Court stayed its decision pending resolution of a petition for review in the Supreme Court. Bishop v. Smith, 2014 WL 3537847 (N.D. Oklahoma 2014). On October 6, 2014, the Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. Smith v. Bishop, 135 S. Ct. 271, 190 L. Ed. 2d 139 (2014). On October 6, 2014, the Court issued an order lifting the stay on its original mandate and permanently enjoined the defendant from enforcing the Oklahoma Amendment to deny any same-sex couples marriage licenses based solely on their status as a same-sex couple. On May 1, 2015, the Court awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiffs in the amount of $298,742.77. And on June 15, 2015, the Court awarded supplemental attorney's fees, bringing the total fee award to $309,485.27. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Plaintiffs are lesbian couples who filed suit on November 3, 2004 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, against the United States and the State of Oklahoma, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and Article 2 \u00a7 35 of the Oklahoma Constitution (the \"Oklahoma Amendment\") violate the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs alleged that DOMA and the Oklahoma Amendment violates the Due Process, Equal Protection, Full Faith and Credit, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The court found for the plaintiffs, holding on Jan. 14, 2014 that the ban on same-sex marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Tenth Circuit found for the plaintiffs on July 18, 2014, and after the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari (on October 6, 2014), the Court lifted the stay on its original mandate and enjoined the Defendant from enforcing the Oklahoma Amendment and denying same-sex couples marriage licenses. The Court awarded $309,485.27 in attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On October 26, 2004, the Asociacion de Trabajadores Fronterizos and five of its individual members filed a lawsuit under the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a72296 & 2320, against the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, El Paso Division. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from Texas RioGrande Legal Aid and Public Citizen Litigation Group asked the court for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and litigation costs, claiming that the Department of Labor violated the Trade Act in its administration of job benefits by providing remedial education instead of bilingual vocational training sufficient to make participants job-ready upon completion. Plaintiiff Asociacion de Trabajadores Fronterizos (ATF) is a membership organization comprised of workers whose jobs were lost or threatened by foreign competition resulting from NAFTA. Its name translates to \"Association of Border Workers.\" The members of ATF are primarily garment workers of Mexican national origin who communicate in Spanish and have limited English-communication abilities. The named plaintiffs Plaintiffs are members of ATF whose primary residences are in El Paso County, Texas. Defendant Department of Labor (DOL) is the federal agency responsible for administering the Trade Adjustment Assistance job training benefits to displaced workers provided for under the Trade Act of 1974. On April 3, 2002, Plaintiffs, along with another party, first filed a lawsuit against the DOL that also named the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC), the Upper Rio Grande Workforce Development Board, and the commissioners and directors of these organizations as defendants. This lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas El Paso Division, included the Trade Act violations in its causes of action. This case is not in our database, but its docket number is 3:02-CV-00131. Judge Frank Montalvo severed the claims against the DOL on October 20, 2004 according to a motion by the plaintiffs. Prior to the severance, ATF filed a lawsuit on June 17, 2004, as the sole plaintiff, against the DOL under the Trade Act in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. On October 20, 2004, the order to transfer the case to the Western District of Texas was granted, with the transfer occurring on December 1, 2004. This case is also not in our database, but its docket number is 1:04-CV-00993. These events resulted in the two concurrent cases in the Western District of Texas under Judge Montalvo. Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this case on October 26, 2004 and filed a motion for summary judgment on November 5, 2004. Following a hearing on the summary judgment motion on May 24, 2005, the case was referred to Judge Edward Leavy for mediation on June 03, 2005. On December 29, 2005, upon completion of mediation, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to dismiss that included an executed copy of the settlement agreement reached by the parties. On December 30, 2005, Judge Frank Montalvo granted Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the case with prejudice and entered a final judgment. In the final judgment, the Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms the settlement agreement. The motion to dismiss, corresponding order and the final judgment were filed under this case and the original Texas case. Therefore, the other Texas case concluded with the same settlement agreement and closed on December 30, 2005. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the DOL and other defendants must dedicate $6 million in funding to establish a project for Limited English-Proficient (LEP) displaced workers in the El Paso Area. This program will make vocational training, customized training, on-the-job training and remedial education available to eligible participants. Policy changes included recognition of the effectiveness of, and a focus on, dual-language training and a required 80% wage replacement goal. The DOL was also required to issue the Training and Employment Guidance letter within 30 days of the agreement. In addition, counsel for the Plaintiffs, Texas RioGrande Legal Aide, was awarded $30,000 for litigation costs.", "summary": "This case was brought by workers with limited English proficiency, whose jobs were lost or threatened by foreign competition against the U.S. Department of Labor, seeking injunctive relief, a declaratory judgment and costs for the DOL's failure to provide adequate training under the Trade Act of 1974. The case was settled on December 30, 2005 and resulted in the establishment of a program for Limited English-Proficient workers in the El Paso area by the DOL as well as widespread policy changes as to the administration of the job training benefits."}
{"article": "On September 13, 2013, an African American prisoner in the Arizona State Prison Complex in Tucson filed this lawsuit, pro se, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiff filed under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the State of Arizona and the Arizona Department of Corrections. He alleged that the prison assigned him to a particular cell on the basis of his race, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The plaintiff alleged that the State of Arizona persisted in continuous and systematic racial segregation in the areas of housing and personal care of the prisoners. On October 30, 2013, the judge assigned to this case, Judge Cindy A. Jorgenson, granted a motion by attorneys from the law firm Kendall, Brill, and Kelly to represent the plaintiff. Among those attorneys was Bert Deixler, who had litigated Johnson v. California, in which the Supreme Court held that racial housing assignments in prison were usually unconstitutional. Johnson is <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=10562\">PC-CA-0041</a> in this Clearinghouse. On February 4, 2014, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint against all the defendants adding the governor of Arizona as a defendant. The governor and the director of the Department of Corrections moved to dismiss the case on March 13, 2014. They argued that the plaintiff improperly sued them based on a letter mailed to him and denial of a grievance appeal, despite admitting that the defendants had no involvement in housing, work, or other assignments in the Tucson prison. On March 17, 2014, the Warden of the Arizona State Prison Complex-Tucson also filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the plaintiff improperly sued based on a letter mailed to him. The plaintiff withdrew the claims against the Division Director of Offender Operation for the Arizona State Department of Corrections, and the Governor. He also filed to substitute the public officer with the Division Director of Operations. On May 8, 2014, Judge Jorgenson granted the voluntary dismissal of the claims against the governor, and then denied the governor's motion to dismiss as moot. Judge Jorgenson also granted the substitution of the public officer (the Division Director of Offender Operations). On June 9, 2014, the Division Director of Offender Operations filed a motion to dismiss. This defendant claimed that he was superfluous to this lawsuit and should be dismissed. But, on July 23, 2014, Judge Jorgenson denied the motion. As discussed in a joint settlement status report filed November 14, 2014, all parties requested a Magistrate Judge to be appointed to the case in order to act as settlement judge in this matter. On November 24, 2014, their request was granted, and Magistrate Judge Charles R. Pyle was chosen to oversee settlement negotiations. On December 22, 2015, the parties notified the court that they had reached a settlement. Under the settlement, the defendants agreed to stop segregating prisoners by race in housing, except for in individual cases where a prisoner had a documented history of racial animosity. The defendants also agreed to curtail racially discriminatory practices in prison employment opportunities. They agreed to narrowly tailor any consideration of race in connection to employment assignments to address a compelling state interest, and to only ever consider race as one factor in a comprehensive and objective assessment of employment assignment or service. The change in policy would apply to Arizona Department of Corrections prison complexes in Douglas, Eyman, Florence, Lewis, Perryville, Phoenix, Safford, Tucson, Winslow, and Yuma. The defendants also agreed to pay $5,000 in monetary damages to the named plaintiff, and to pay $195,000 to the plaintiff's counsel in attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The agreement was intended to last until at least 2023, and contained a clause prohibiting either party from moving to terminate the agreement during that period. The plaintiff\u2019s counsel were designated as monitors over the defendants\u2019 compliance with the terms of the agreement, and the defendants agreed to provide plaintiff\u2019s counsel with documents, reports, and access to its facilities for monitoring purposes. In the event of a breach of the agreement, a process is in place to resolve the issue out of court first, after which the plaintiff\u2019s counsel may seek court enforcement. The agreement bars the court from ordering the defendants to construct new prisons or to hire a specific number or type of staff unless the defendants propose to do so as part of a plan to remedy a failure to comply. On February 8, 2016, Judge Jorgenson issued an order approving the settlement agreement, and agreeing to enforce its terms. There have been no further substantive developments in the case as of May 26, 2020.", "summary": "On September 13, 2013, an African American inmate in the Arizona State Prison Complex in Tucson filed this lawsuit against the State of Arizona and the Arizona Department of Correction in the District of Arizona. He sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The inmate alleged that the prison segregated him by race, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The parties reached a settlement on December 22, 2015, under which the defendants would narrowly limit racial consideration in prison housing and employment opportunities, and pay $5,000 in monetary damages to plaintiff as well as $195,000 to plaintiff\u2019s counsel in attorneys\u2019 fees and costs."}
{"article": "On December 1, 2005, a group of California prisoners with mental illness filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The prisoners filed against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The prisoners, represented by the Legal Aid Society, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and private counsel, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the prison system's policies regarding prisoners with mental disabilities violated the ADA. Specifically, the prisoners challenged the prison system's policies of 1) adding four classification points to any prisoner with mental illness; 2) preventing prisoners with mental illness from attending programming; 3) requiring that any prisoners taking specific medications be kept inside during yard when the temperature increased over 90 degrees; and 4) preventing prisoners with mental illness from taking jobs inside prison, among other allegations. The case was assigned to Judge Lawrence Karlton. (The procedural history comes from Docket 124-3.) Following the defendants' motion to dismiss, the relationship between this case and Coleman v. Brown came into issue. Coleman, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=573\">PC-CA-0002</a> in this Clearinghouse, was a class-action lawsuit filed by mentally ill California inmates under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against CDC alleging that mental health care provided at most California penal institutions violated their constitutional rights. Coleman was also in front of Judge Karlton. In this case, instead of ruling on the motion to dismiss (and before the prisoners were able to file a motion to certify the class,) on March 15, 2007, Judge Karlton referred the case to the special master of the Coleman case to make \"a report and recommendation as to whether the claims raised [in Hecker] can be resolved within the remedial phase of [Coleman].\" The case was stayed pending that report. 2007 WL 836806. On June 12, 2007, the Coleman special master and the deputy special master gave their report and recommendation. The report concluded that the parties' were not able to \"negotiate[e] an agreement to consolidation or merger of the Hecker claims into the Coleman case at this time.\" On December 14, 2007, the prisoners filed a motion to lift the stay. The Court did not rule on the motion. In the meantime, intense litigation proceeded in Coleman. The prisoners filed a renewed motion to lift the stay on September 19, 2012. On October 19, 2012, the Court denied the prisoners' motion without prejudice to its renewal, as appropriate, not later than March 1, 2013, and the parties were directed to meet and confer with the Coleman Special Master to determine whether any Hecker issues could be resolved in the Coleman remedial process. In the midst of that meet and confer process in January 2013 the state moved to terminate the Coleman case. Therefore, the parties were not able to agree to resolve Hecker issues within the Coleman remedial process. (In the end, the Coleman termination motion was not granted.) On March 1, 2013, the Hecker plaintiffs filed a renewed motion to lift the stay. On April 12, 2013, Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd denied the prisoners' motion \"without prejudice to its renewal, as appropriate, not later than September 5, 2013.\" He ordered the parties to continue to meet and confer with the Coleman Special Master, and directed that any renewed prisoners' motion to lift the stay be \"accompanied by a joint report by the parties and approved by the Coleman special master.\" In July 2014, the parties reached a settlement. Judge Karlton granted preliminary approval of the settlement on August 7, 2014, before retiring later that month. The case was assigned to Judge Kimberly Mueller, who approved the settlement agreement on March 2, 2015. The CDC agreed to implement revised policies to ensure that prisoners with psychiatric disabilities would not be unlawfully excluded from prison programs and services or be discriminated against because of their disabilities. The Settlement Agreement also provided that the implementation of these revised policies would be monitored by the Special Master appointed by the Court in Coleman. The Court in Coleman would also retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. The parties also agreed that the CDC would pay attorneys' fees and costs through the periodic fees process in Coleman. The settlement agreement stated that termination of the Coleman litigation would terminate the issues that had been or were being resolved under the agreement. As of March 23, 2020 monitoring and implementation of the settlement agreements in both cases is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2005, a group of California prisoners with mental illness filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation alleging that the prison system's policies regarding prisoners with mental disabilities violated the ADA. The parties settled in 2015 and the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement."}
{"article": "On September 9, 2014, Disability Rights Florida filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. This suit was brought against the Florida Department of Corrections (FDC) and Wexford Health Sources, an FDC contractor, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (PAIMI), and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiff, represented by private and in-house counsel as well as Florida Legal Services, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief. The plaintiff alleged that abuse and discrimination against inmates with mental illnesses as well as inadequate care for such inmates violated their Eighth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that officials at Dade Correctional Institution (Dade CI) subjected inmates with serious mental illness in their inpatient mental health units to physical beatings, verbal harassment, deprivation of food, and torture. The plaintiff claimed that FDC was on notice of these conditions and failed to investigate the allegations of abuse and adequately punish those responsible. Disability Rights Florida, the plaintiff, is a federally-funded protection and advocacy system responsible for protecting the rights of individuals with mental illness in the state. In this lawsuit, the organization sought several forms of relief to protect prisoners with mental illnesses. First, the plaintiff requested that the court declare the defendants\u2019 conduct unlawful and unconstitutional. Second, the plaintiff requested an injunction requiring FDC to cease all actions that violated the constitutional and statutory rights of mentally ill inmates at the Dade CI inpatient unit, to take immediate action to investigate and stop the ongoing abuse of such inmates, to train and supervise officers assigned to the unit, to develop a system of periodic independent oversight of the unit, and to take immediate steps to ensure timely investigations of abuse upon these inmates. Third, the plaintiff requested an injunction requiring Wexford to mandate that its employees report allegations of abuse and ensure that inmates with mental illness receive adequate care. Fourth and finally, the plaintiff requested an injunction requiring FDC to stop discriminating against inmates in the Dade CI inpatient unit on the basis of disability. At around the same time, the estate and survivors of a mentally ill prisoner who died after being forced to shower in scalding water for hours sued FDC and several FDC guards and prison officials (<i>Chapman v. Florida Department of Corrections</i>, docket number 1:14-cv-24140-RNS). The representative alleged that the defendants violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Eighth Amendment, and sought damages. On November 14, 2014, the court issued an order consolidating <i>Chapman</i> with this case. On April 10, 2015, Disability Rights Florida and the defendants submitted a private settlement agreement that Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr. approved on April 14, 2015. Among other things, the state agreed to:<ul><LI>Provide Crisis Intervention Training to all staff at Dade CI. <li> Provide specialized training for correctional officers who work directly with inmates with mental illnesses. <li>Upgrade its video monitoring system and begin a pilot program for an audio monitoring system.<li>Try to provide full staffing at Dade CI.<li>Create an additional Assistant Warden position at Dade CI and a Mental Health Ombudsman position at FDC's central office and Region III office. These officials will lead and supervise mental health care efforts.<li>Install televisions in the common areas of the inpatient units at Dade CI for both therapeutic and recreational activities. <li>Allow a team of psychiatrists and security experts to visit Dade CI to review records, observe therapeutic and non-therapeutic activities, evaluate safeguards against abuse and neglect at the facility, and make recommendations for any needed changes and improvements. </UL> In addition, Wexford Health Sources agreed to implement all of these provisions as well as provide training, hire additional behavioral health staff, and conduct internal and external audits of its program. The parties agreed to monitor compliance with the agreement through May of 2017. The court was to retain jurisdiction over the matter for 6 months, and during that time, the plaintiff could seek to reopen the case and resume the litigation if the state\u2019s implementation of the agreement was systematically deficient. Meanwhile, on February 1, 2016, the plaintiff in <i>Chapman</i> moved to reopen the case, lift the stay on litigation entered with the settlement agreement, and start discovery because the settlement had no bearing on the issues addressed in its complaint. The court, finding that <i>Chapman</i> should have automatically reopened on March 16, 2015 when the last stay expired, reopened the matter and ordered the defendants to respond to the complaint by April 4, 2016. On April 12, 2016, the defendant answered the plaintiff\u2019s complaint, raising several affirmative defenses, including failure to state a cause of action, failure to state a claim, and that the FDC was entitled to sovereign immunity. On May 16, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The FDC and Dade CI\u2019s warden subsequently filed motions to dismiss on July 1, 2016. Meanwhile, discovery commenced. On October 28, 2016, the court granted the FDC\u2019s motion to dismiss while denying that of Dade CI\u2019s warden. As to the warden, the court found that the plaintiffs had stated a plausible claim of supervisory liability based on the warden\u2019s alleged knowledge of widespread abuse of mentally ill inmates at Dade CI. As to the FDC, the court dismissed the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought on behalf of the decedent\u2019s surviving family members for lack of standing, but upheld the same claims as brought by his estate. Discovery continued and, after fruitless mediation, a trial was scheduled for March 2018. Meanwhile, Disability Rights Florida identified deficiencies in the defendants\u2019 compliance with the settlement agreement. On May 19, 2017, it and FDC moved to extend the deadline by six months so that FDC could implement reforms, including hiring a different mental healthcare provider. At the end of the six-month extension, both parties asked the court to dismiss that portion of the consolidated case with prejudice. The court did so on November 8, 2017, but clarified that the dismissal did not affect the ongoing litigation between the estate and the FDC defendants. The court also retained jurisdiction to resolve any disputes over attorneys\u2019 fees that might emerge. There is no evidence in the docket that any attorneys\u2019 fees disputes with respect to the Disability Rights Florida litigation reached the court. However, on January 17, 2018, the remaining parties notified the court that they had settled the case privately and in full. The court ordered the case administratively closed that day. While the Clearinghouse is not aware of the terms of the new settlement agreement, subsequent litigation revealed that it included $4.5 million in monetary damages. On May 24, 2018, the court entered an order requiring the plaintiffs to file a stipulation of dismissal by July 23, 2018. However, one of the plaintiffs\u2019 lawyers tried to put a charging lien on the pool of settlement funds, and the estate of one of the decedent\u2019s relatives attempted to intervene to claim some of the proceeds. The court declined to address these new disputes, and after the lawyer voluntarily withdrew an Eleventh Circuit appeal on the lien issue, the court approved the settlement on October 26, 2018. On November 21, 2018, the parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal of the action. The same day, the court ordered the dismissal of the case and stated that the court reserves jurisdiction to enforce the parties\u2019 settlement agreement. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2014, Disability Rights Florida filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The plaintiff alleged that certain inmates with mental illness at Dade Correctional Institution had been subject to torture, beatings, verbal harassment and food deprivation in violation of their Eighth Amendment Rights. They also alleged that these inmates had received insufficient care in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Federal Rehabilitation Act. Disability Rights Florida requested declaratory and injunctive relief to deem these practices unlawful and unconstitutional, and assurance that such practices would not continue. The parties reached a settlement agreement which required improved conditions for prisoners and ran through November 2017. Subsequent litigation in this case resulted from its consolidation with a related civil rights case seeking monetary damages. That portion of the litigation settled for $4.5 million in 2018. As of July 2020, the court retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement."}
{"article": "On August 3, 2016, a prisoner with a hearing disability incarcerated at Central State Prison in Georgia filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The plaintiff sued the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC) Commissioner, wardens, and counselors at his prison under 42 USC \u00a7 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, \u00a7 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The complaint alleged that the current TTY system at the GDOC was inaccessible, inoperable, outmoded, and obsolete. The plaintiff had been in prison for nine years, and during that time was unable to communicate with family, friends, and lawyers. Further, he alleged that he had no access to religion or education in his native language (American Sign Language). He claimed that he had exhausted all administrative avenues for relief, and that prison administrators had ignored or denied all of his requests. The plaintiff initiated the lawsuit pro se, but was later represented by the ACLU, the National Association of the Deaf, and private counsel. He sought injunctive relief in the form of inmate calling services, TTY, and/or VRS services. He also asked for $15 million in damages for pain and suffering as well as violation of his constitutional rights. The case was assigned to Judge Marc Thomas Treadwell and then referred to Magistrate Judge Stephen Hyles. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on January 26, 2017, adding several defendants but no new claims. On February 15, 2017 Magistrate Judge Hyles ordered that the plaintiff\u2019s action could go forward against all named defendants. 2017 WL 1380511. The plaintiff was released from prison on February 18, 2017. The plaintiff spent the next several months serving all of the defendants. On September 8, 2017, multiple defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and stay discovery. Several months of relative inaction followed, until the plaintiff, now represented by the ACLU, the National Association of the Deaf, and private counsel, moved to file a second amended complaint on June 20, 2018. In the eighty-two paged proposed second amended complaint, the plaintiff sought to withdraw his RLUIPA claim and clarify other claims. In his new claims, he highlighted how the prison, probation, and parole systems fail deaf prisoners by not providing sign language interpretation to explain rules and conditions of their release and then punishing the deaf individuals for violating the rules. He sought to add claims related to his post-incarceration probation or parole. He also asked to add thirteen additional plaintiffs, seeking to represent a class of deaf or hard of hearing people currently or formerly incarcerated by GDOC. Finally, the plaintiff sought to eliminate all defendants who did not need to be parties to the case, while adding other defendants, including GDOC, the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles (GBOP) and Georgia Department of Community Supervision (GDCS), On September 13, 2018, Judge Treadwell issued an order denying the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss the complaint as moot and granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion to file a second amended complaint in part. 2018 WL 4365503. He granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion to clarify his ADA and \u00a7 504 of the Rehabilitation Act claims, to withdraw his RLUIPA claim, to add one of the thirteen proposed additional plaintiffs, to eliminate unnecessary defendants, and to add GDOC and GBOP as defendants. The plaintiff\u2019s request to add claims relating to his post-incarceration probation or parole was denied because these claims did not arise out of the alleged failure to provide effective communication inside Georgia\u2019s prisons. The court denied the plaintiff\u2019s request to join all but one additional plaintiff because the other proposed plaintiffs remained incarcerated, and thus, had different interests\u2014the incarcerated individuals had an interest in enjoining GDOC\u2019s future behavior whereas the plaintiff\u2019s request for injunctive relief was moot because he had been released. On the same day, Judge Treadway also issued a show cause order for why the case should not be consolidated with another, similar case, Woody v. Bryson. Civil Action No. 5:16-CV-467-MTT. Neither party replied to the order to show cause. The plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss his claims, and on September 28, 2018, the court dismissed the case without prejudice. From the docket and reported activity online, it was unknown what prompted the plaintiff to dismiss the case. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Deaf inmate at the Georgia Department of Corrections filed lawsuit for injunctive relief in the form of communication aids and damages for pain and suffering. The case was dismissed following a show cause order from the judge suggesting that case should be consolidated with a nearly identical case."}
{"article": "Individuals with Hepatitis C in the Missouri Medicaid program filed this lawsuit in response to the denial of authorization from MO HealthNet for medications prescribed to cure their infections. MO HealthNet denied authorization of medication to plaintiffs based on their fibrosis scores (a measure for severity of Hepatitis C). After being prescribed medication for their Hepatitis C but denied prior authorization for the medication from Missouri\u2019s Medicaid program, two Medicaid recipients initiated this lawsuit on October 18, 2016 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The plaintiffs alleged that MO HealthNet\u2019s policies resulted in the denial of medically necessary treatment to Medicaid beneficiaries infected with Hepatitis C, discriminated against similarly situated Medicaid beneficiaries on the basis of their fibrosis score even though Hepatitis C guidelines recommend treatment regardless of their score, and violated the \u201creasonable promptness\u201d requirement of the Social Security Act by requiring individuals to wait until they had developed more severe liver damage before getting treatment. The plaintiffs brought their claims against the Director of the Missouri Department of Social Services and the Director the of MO HealthNet under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, \u00a7 1983, and the Medicaid Act. Represented by legal services, a law school clinic, and the National Health Law Program, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, attorneys\u2019 fees and costs, and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to prohibit the defendants from implementing and following their current Hepatitis C treatment policy, as well as enjoin the defendants from refusing to provide Medicaid coverage of medically necessary Hepatitis C drug and require notice to all Medicaid beneficiaries denied coverage under the current policy. The case was automatically referred to mediation on October 18, 2016 and assigned to Judge William A. Knox. On January 30, 2017, the case was reassigned to an outside mediator. On February 2, 2017, Judge Stephen R. Bough granted the plaintiffs\u2019 request for a preliminary injunction in part to prohibit the defendants from requiring three months of negative drug and alcohol screens prior to submitting requests for approval of their Hepatitis C medications. The defendants had also agreed that the plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction to prohibit the drug and alcohol screens. The Court declined to rule on the request to prohibit defendants from applying policies based on fibrosis score until an evidentiary hearing had occurred because at least two factual disputes remained. The Court found that there was enough controversy surrounding the medical necessity of treatment regardless of fibrosis score and conflicting information on whether or not the defendants\u2019 would deny authorization to patients with low fibrosis scores. On the same day, Judge Bough also denied the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Judge Bough rejected the defendants' argument that there was no individualized federal right to reasonable Medicaid standards enforceable under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 because this mischaracterized the plaintiffs\u2019 allegations. The plaintiffs\u2019 alleged that the standards denied medically necessary treatment and Judge Bough noted that this was a valid claim because the Eighth Circuit previously held that the limiting of Medicaid coverage to those recipients meeting certain conditions or criteria violated Medicaid law and 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. After the evidentiary hearing, Judge Bough denied the plaintiffs\u2019 remaining request for a preliminary injunction on April 24, 2017, which would have prohibited the defendants from applying policies based on fibrosis scores. The plaintiffs did not show they were likely to succeed on the merits to the degree necessary to merit an injunction or any likelihood of immediate irreparable harm. The plaintiffs amended the complaint June 6, 2017 to add another Medicaid recipient to the claim who was similarly denied authorization for prescribed Hepatitis C medication. Additionally, plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint alleged the defendants violated due process for failing to use reasonable, ascertainable, non-arbitrary standards and procedures for determining eligibility for medical assistance, procedural due process for failing to provide notice of the reasons for the denial of coverage, and the American with Disabilities Act for discrimination on the basis of their disability (Hepatitis C). After MO HealthNet modified its preferred drug list and prior authorization criteria for certain medications, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment claiming the case was moot. On November 20, 2017, the plaintiffs\u2019 filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice because the claims were mooted by the new policy that no longer included restrictions based on fibrosis scores or abstinence. All three plaintiffs began to receive treatment for their Hepatitis C. Judge Bough granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion and denied the motion for summary judgement. The case was dismissed without prejudice with each party to bear its own fees and costs on November 20, 2017. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2016, two Missouri Medicaid recipients filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri after being denied medication to treat their Hepatitis C. The plaintiffs alleged that Missouri Department of Social Services and MO HealthNet denied medically necessary treatment to Medicaid beneficiaries with Hepatitis C, discriminated against similarly situated Medicaid beneficiaries, failed to provide \"reasonably prompt\" treatment, violated due process, and violated the American with Disabilities Act. In November 2017, MO HealthNet modified its policies and the case was dismissed as moot without prejudice. The case closed in November 2017."}
{"article": "After three plaintiffs sought to intervene in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15392\"><i>Texas v. United States</i></a>, Judge Reed O'Connor of the Northern District of Texas ordered the claims to be severed and removed to a new civil action. Thus, this case was brought on 02/03/2017. The plaintiffs were cisgender women incarcerated in Texas federal prisons. They alleged that their First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when transgender female prisoners were housed in the same single-sex facilities as the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also alleged that being housed with transgender prisoners violated their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000bb-4 <i>et seq.</i>). The plaintiffs were represented by the Alliance Defending Freedom. They sought a declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. The named defendants were the United States of America, the Attorney General of the United States, the Acting Director of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons, and both of the Wardens of the prisons where the plaintiffs were held. The plaintiffs filed second and third amended complaints on March 2, 2017 and May 12, 2017, respectively. The third amended complaint included four plaintiffs alleging the same constitutional violations and seeking the same relief. On June 26, 2017, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs asked the Court to enjoin the defendants from housing transgender women in the same facilities as the plaintiffs. The parties began to engage in settlement negotiations in September 2017, but failed to reach an agreement. Around the same time, a transgender woman incarcerated at the same facility in question moved to intervene in the action. She alleged that the plaintiffs' complaints were false and driven by anti-transgender biases and prejudices. On May 11, 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice promulgated revisions to the Transgender Offender Manual for the Bureau of Prisons. In light of the revisions, the plaintiffs withdrew their motion for a preliminary injunction. The court also ordered the plaintiffs to file a new complaint to specify the claims that would proceed after the revisions. On July 11, 2018, three female plaintiffs alleged similar claims as had been alleged in prior complaints; namely, that the housing of transgender female prisoners violated the plaintiffs' right to bodily privacy and endangered their physical and mental health. The plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims on September 10, 2018. The remaining plaintiff and two intervenors initially opposed the motion and tried to proceed with their claims, filing a motion to certify a proposed class of \"all female inmates who have been housed or otherwise situated with genetically-males inmates identifying as female.\" The plaintiff was eventually released and, as such, did not oppose the motion to dismiss. On April 12, 2019, Judge O'Connor dismissed the case with prejudice.", "summary": "Four incarcerated women alleged that their First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by being housed in the same facilities as transgender women. After years of litigation, the claims were eventually dismissed."}
{"article": "The plaintiff was a trans woman housed in a men's prison in Washington State. She filed this suit pro se on September 5, 2017, but later became represented by the ACLU. In the most recent complaint, the named defendants were the Secretary of Washington Department of Correction, the Chief Medical Officer for DOC, the Chief of Psychiatry for DOC, and the Director of Mental Health for DOC in their official capacities. The case was assigned to Judge Benjamin H. Settle in the District Court for the Western District of Washington. She sued them under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The plaintiff alleged that the failure of prison administration to provide her with medically necessary gender affirming treatment amounts to a violation of her rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. She requested injunctive relief requiring the defendants to provide her with adequate transition related care, to give her access to clothing and hygiene products consistent with her gender identity, and to transfer her to a women's facility. While incarcerated, prison staff and administration denied the plaintiff access to transition-related care consistent with the WPATH standards. Due to a blanket DOC policy, the plaintiff had no access to surgical intervention despite medical necessity and her repeated requests. The prison employed a gender dysphoria consultant who supported the blanket ban on gender affirming surgery, however his guidance had been dismissed by courts in several lawsuits for being inconsistent with norms in the field and the WPATH standards. The plaintiff had also faced harassment from staff for her gender presentation, including verbal abuse and extensive time in solitary confinement. Over the course of discovery, the plaintiff withdrew her request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to make room for a motion on partial summary judgment that she filed on May 18, 2018. The plaintiff also sought sanctions against the defendants for allowing a doctor to ask questions of the plaintiff during a psychological evaluation, but this motion was denied on September 26, 2018. Judge Settle stated that, while the questions were inappropriate, the defendants did not direct the doctor to ask the questions, and there would be no further need for sanctions, since the psychological evaluation is complete. On January 4, 2019, Judge Settle issued an opinion denying the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the DOC policy regarding medical treatment for trans inmates was not unconstitutional on its face. On that date, he referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Richard Creatura. On April 15. 2019, in response, the ACLU amended the complaint. During discovery under the amended complaint, the parties came to an agreement. This settlement agreement would allow the plaintiff to receive gender reassignment surgery if a medical examiner deemed it medically necessary. The plaintiff presented this settlement on March 20, 2020 through a motion to stay proceedings for 180 days in order to allow the settlement agreement to take place. Magistrate Judge Creatura approved the stay, and will check back in with the parties on September 9, 2020.", "summary": "This case was filed by a trans woman incarcerated in a men's prison in Washington State on September 5, 2017 in the District Court for the Western District of Washington. She alleges that the blanket policy in the Washington Department of Correction denying prisoners access to gender affirming surgery amounts to a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. She is represented by the ACLU, and is seeking injunctive relief. The parties came to a preliminary settlement agreement on March 20, 2020, and proceedings were stayed for 180 days in an attempt to implement the agreement."}
{"article": "On June 10, 2011, three indigent persons charged with crimes filed this class action, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law, in Skagit County Superior Court, against the City of Mount Vernon and the City of Burlington. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the ACLU, asked the court to enjoin the cities from violating the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, claiming that the cities failed to provide adequate assistance of counsel. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the cities had failed to impose reasonable caseload limits on public defenders, failed to monitor and oversee the public defense system, failed to provide adequate funds for public defense, and failed to provide representation at all critical stages of prosecution. The Cities had jointly contracted with two attorneys to handle all public defense assistance cases, and each attorney handled over 1,000 cases per year even though such a caseload was three times the maximum allowable amount for a full-time public defender pursuant to standards established by the Washington State Bar Association. The cities had not established any system for ensuring that the attorneys investigate cases, prepare for trial, or communicate timely and adequately with clients. On July 5, 2011, the defendant municipalities removed the case to federal court, where it was assigned to Judge Robert S. Lasnik of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. In response to motions from both the plaintiff and the defendants, on February 23, 2012, Judge Lasnik denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction because the balance of hardships did not tip in their favor, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiffs provided evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants knew indigent criminal defendants were not receiving adequate representation and were indifferent to this inadequacy. The same day, Judge Lasnik granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification. The class certified was \"all indigent persons who have been or will be charged with one or more crimes in the municipal courts of either Mount Vernon or Burlington, who have been or will be appointed a public defender, and who continue to have or will have a public defender appearing in their cases.\" Between June 3 and June 18, 2012, the parties went to a bench trial. However, on June 28 the judge issued an order for further briefing. Specifically, Judge Lasnik sought information on the following questions <ol> <li>Have any federal courts taken over supervision of a public defense agency, either directly or through appointment of a supervisor/monitor, anywhere in the United States?</li> <li>Have any state or federal courts held a municipality liable under Monell for constitutional defects in its public defense system?</li> <li>Has any state or municipality adopted \u201chard\u201d caseload standards like those that Washington is contemplating?</li> <li>Is the issue of the constitutionality of the representation afforded by Messrs. Sybrandy and Witt moot? If so, what impact does that have on the available remedy, including an award of attorney fees? The responses were due for August 14th and submitted that day.</li></ol> On December 4, 2013, Judge Lasnik found that the plaintiffs established a systematic deprivation of their right to counsel and the Cities' responsibility for the deprivation. The Court granted injunctive relief (1) requiring that the cities re-evaluate their contract for the provision of public defense services to insure that indigent criminal defendants were provided the actual assistance of counsel; and (2) requiring the cities to hire one part-time public defense supervisor to supervise and evaluate the provision of legal services. The Court also granted attorney's fees. 989 F.Supp.2d 1122 (2013). On April 15, 2014, the Court issued an order awarding attorneys' fees and costs. 2014 WL 11961980. Shortly after, on April 22, 2014, the Court issued an order appointing Eileen Farley as a public defense supervisor. The agreement was to last until March 30th, 2017. During that time she sent several reports detailing the improvements the defendants had made to their public defense system. In March 2017, the public defense supervisor proposed that the court extend her term and transition to a public defense auditor during the year. The Cities of Mount Vernon and Burlington responded in agreement, stating they had made the public defense supervisor's suggestions permanent and no longer needed to be supervised. In April, the court granted this extension in of supervision until July 2017, when the auditor took her place. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Three indigent persons charged with crimes filed a class action lawsuit in Skagit County Superior Court against the City of Mount Vernon and the City of Burlington alleging defendants failed to provide adequate assistance of counsel. The Cities jointly contracted with two attorneys to handle all public defense assistance cases, and each attorney handled over 1,000 cases per year. The Court found the plaintiffs established their rights were systematically deprived and the Cities were responsible for the deprivation. The Court granted injunctive relief requiring the City of Mount Vernon and City of Burlington re-evaluate their contract for the provision of public defense services and hire one part-time public defense supervisor."}
{"article": "On November 13, 2018, Cable News Network, Inc. (\u201cCNN\u201d) and CNN\u2019s chief White House correspondent, Abilio James \u201cJim\u201d Acosta, filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The case was assigned to District Judge Timothy J. Kelly. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sued President Donald J. Trump, Chief of Staff John F. Kelly, Deputy Chief of Staff William Shine, Press Secretary to the President Sarah Huckabee Sanders, the United States Secret Service, Director of the Secret Service Randolph Alles, and Secret Service member John Doe, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Declaratory Judgments Act. The plaintiffs argued that defendants violated the Constitution and APA when they revoked Acosta\u2019s White House press credentials. 2018 WL 5920424. Specifically, they alleged that the defendants\u2019 decision to revoke Acosta\u2019s press credentials violated the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. By revoking Acosta\u2019s White House press credentials solely based on CNN and Acosta\u2019s viewpoint, the content of their speech, their protected First Amendment activity, and by affording Acosta no process to contest this decision, the defendants infringed Plaintiffs\u2019 First and Fifth Amendment rights, the plaintiffs argued. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. CNN and Acosta requested that the Court compel defendants to immediately restore Acosta\u2019s press credentials, or immediately restore Acosta\u2019s press credentials pending a formal written explanation as to why the pass was being revoked and an opportunity for plaintiffs to respond to the allegations. Plaintiffs also sought attorneys\u2019 fees, and a declaration from the Court stating that the revocation of Acosta\u2019s press credentials was unconstitutional and in violation of the APA. On November 13, 2018, plaintiffs also filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, requesting that the Court require defendants to restore Acosta\u2019s White House press credentials. On November 16, in an oral order, the Court granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion, and required defendants to immediately restore Acosta\u2019s press credentials. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case on November 19 after Press Secretary Sanders and Deputy Chief of Staff Shine returned Acosta'a White House press credentials to him. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On November 13, 2018, CNN and CNN\u2019s chief White House correspondent Jim Acosta sued President Trump and several senior members of his administration for violating his First and Fifth Amendment rights by revoking his White House press credentials. under The plaintiffs sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Declaratory Judgments Act, arguing that defendants violated the Constitution and APA when they revoked Acosta\u2019s White House press credentials. On November 13, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, requesting that the court require the defendants to restore Acosta\u2019s White House press credentials. On November 16, the court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case on November 19, 2018 after the Trump administration returned Acosta's White House press credentials to him. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "COVID-19 summary: On June 10, two Catholic priests and three Orthodox Jews filed this lawsuit against the city and state of New York, alleging that by allowing protests while prohibiting worship, they discriminated against people of faith and violating their constitutional rights. They sought declaratory relief, a temporary restraining order (TRO), a preliminary injunction, and a final injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing limitations on worship services. The court denied the TRO on June 11 but granted the preliminary injunction on June 26. <hr> As part of New York\u2019s ban on gatherings during the COVID-19 pandemic, attendance at houses of worship and outdoor religious gatherings was strictly limited. In June, state and city officials allowed mass gatherings protesting the death of George Floyd, but continued to actively enforce prohibitions against congregational worship. Two Catholic priests and three Orthodox Jews filed this lawsuit on June 10, 2020, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging that Governor Cuomo and Mayor de Blasio, by allowing protests while prohibiting worship, were discriminating against people of faith and violating their constitutional rights. Represented by the Thomas More Society, they alleged violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments (under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983), the New York Constitution, and the New York Executive Law. They sought a declaration that the restrictions on indoor and outdoor worship were unconstitutional and were illegal under New York law; a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a final injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing limitations on worship services; and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The case was assigned to Senior Judge Gary L. Sharpe. The plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a temporary restraining order was denied on June 11 for services occurring on June 12 or 14 because there was insufficient time to make a reasoned determination given that the complaint had been filed the prior day. On June 26, 2020, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 3488742. The injunction prohibited the defendants from limiting the plaintiffs\u2019 indoor worship beyond the limitations imposed on businesses listed in Phase 2 of New York\u2019s reopening plan. It also prohibited any numerical limitation on attendance at the plaintiffs\u2019 outdoor worship services. The defendants appealed the order on July 27. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 9, 2020. The amended complaint added additional plaintiffs, and also added additional defendants including the Superintendent of the New York State Police, the New York State Commissioner of Health, and various officials in the New York City Department of Education. The amended complaint kept the claims pertaining to houses of worship and added claims seeking to enjoin the defendants from closing religious schools. The plaintiffs concurrently filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to the same effect, but it was denied due to failure to properly serve the defendants. On October 15, the plaintiffs filed another motion for a temporary restraining order. As of October 17, 2020, the case remains ongoing. The Court is awaiting the Defendants' answer to the plaintiffs' motion for TRO before ruling on the issue.", "summary": "When mass protests against police violence were exempted from New York\u2019s COVID-19 gathering restrictions, but congregational worship continued to be prohibited, two Catholic priests and three Orthodox Jews brought this lawsuit, alleging that New York officials were discriminating against people of faith. The court granted a preliminary injunction on June 26, 2020."}
{"article": "This landmark case is about racial segregation in the Detroit metropolitan area schools, and has been described as the most significant school desegregation case since <i>Brown v. Board of Education</i>, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=5479\">(also in this Clearinghouse)</a>. The first Supreme Court ruling is often denoted as <i>Milliken I</i>, and was considered crucial for clarifying the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. It confirmed that a school district would not be held responsible for segregation across district lines unless it could be shown that the district had engaged in a policy of deliberate segregation. This summary focuses on the history of the case in the Detroit community, rather than the Supreme Court jurisprudence. We only have the docket starting in 1989, so this summary is based on opinions and <i>The Detroit School Busing Case</i> by Joyce Baugh (University of Kansas Press, 1st ed. 2011). <b>Background</b> On Apr. 7, 1970, to counter racial segregation in Detroit\u2019s schools, the Detroit school board voted 4-2 to adopt a controversial integration and decentralization plan, which became known as the \u201cApril 7 plan.\u201d The next day, the state legislature passed Act 48 in response, which repealed the April 7 plan, required there to be neighborhood schools, and reorganized the Detroit school system into eight regions along racial lines. All four of the school board members who had voted for the April 7 plan were recalled from the board in an election on Aug. 4, 1970. On Aug. 18, 1970, NAACP attorneys filed a suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the Detroit Board of Education and other state defendants. The suit was filed on behalf of specific students (one of whom was Ronald Bradley) and these students' parents. The Detroit branch of the NAACP was also listed as a plaintiff. Later, the district court would define the class as \"all school children in the City of Detroit, Michigan, and all Detroit resident parents who have children of school age.\u201d 418 U.S. 717 (1974). The plaintiffs\u2019 original plan before the school board recall vote had been to challenge Section 12 of Act 48, the specific provision that struck down the April 7 plan. However, the recall necessitated a change in strategy, because all the school board members that had supported the plan were recalled and no pro-integration candidates were elected to replace them, so even if a challenge were successful, there would be no one on the board to support integration. Thus, the NAACP decided to challenge school segregation citywide, not just in the areas covered by the April 7 plan. <b>Early Days of the Lawsuit</b> The complaint, filed on 08/18/1970, alleged that racially discriminatory policies and practices had created segregation in Detroit\u2019s public schools and challenged the repeal of the April 7 plan along with the provisions requiring segregated student assignments and racially identifiable regions. It also requested an injunction to (1) require implementation of the April 7 plan, (2) temporarily stop all school construction, and (3) halt implementation of Act 48. The case was assigned to Judge Stephen Roth. Judge Roth denied the plaintiffs\u2019 request for immediate implementation of the April 7 plan and suspension of all school construction; he scheduled a hearing to begin on Aug. 27, 1970. On Sept. 3, 1970, Judge Roth denied another motion by the plaintiffs to implement the April 7 plan, dismissed the governor and attorney general as defendants, and scheduled the trial to begin on Nov. 12, 1970. Joyce Baugh, <i>The Detroit School Busing Case</i> 88 (1st ed. 2011). The plaintiffs then filed an emergency petition to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which was heard by Chief Judge Harry Phillips. Judge Phillips expedited the appeals procedure, and oral argument before a three-judge panel took place on Oct. 2, 1970, and the panel issued its decision on Oct. 13, 1970, finding that Act 48 violated the Fourteenth Amendment. It also reinstated the governor and attorney general as defendants and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, but did not overturn the denial of the preliminary injunction that would have required the implementation of the April 7 plan. Back in district court on remand, the plaintiffs again requested implementation of the April 7 plan, this time to start at the beginning of the second semester. They also requested a delay of the trial date. Judge Roth scheduled a hearing for Nov. 4, 1970, postponed the trial by a month, and permitted the Detroit Federation of Teachers (DFT) to intervene as an additional defendant. Two days after the hearing, Judge Roth ordered the school board to submit an integration plan to be implemented at the beginning of the second semester, by Nov. 16, 1970\u2014either the April 7 plan or an alternative that would achieve \u201cno less pupil integration.\u201d <i>Id.</i> at 89. Judge Roth then permitted another group of defendants to intervene\u2014a group of white parents in Detroit, who wanted to defend the school system against allegations of segregation. Many of these parents in this group were associated with the Concerned Citizens for Better Education (CCBE), the group behind the petition for the school board recall election. On Nov. 9, 1970, the school board submitted three options: (1) the April 7 plan, (2) a plan to create magnet schools at the junior and senior high levels that black and white students could choose to attend, to be implemented in Sept. 1971, at the start of the next school year, and (3) a part-time desegregation plan, in which high school students would take some classes at a second school, so black and white students would be in classes together for part of the day. On Dec. 3, 1970, Judge Roth issued a decision ordering the board to implement the magnet school plan the following school year. He also postponed the trial indefinitely, expressing doubt that the plaintiffs could prove their case of unconstitutional, systemwide school segregation. The plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit. On Feb. 22, 1971, a three-judge panel refused to reconsider the plaintiffs\u2019 request to implement the April 7 plan and upheld the district court\u2019s acceptance of the magnet school plan. However, the panel rejected the indefinite postponement of the trial, and Judge Roth scheduled trial to begin on April 6, 1971. <b>The Trial</b> The trial lasted for 41 days. The plaintiffs had a two-part strategy, focusing (1) on housing discrimination and its effect on school segregation, and (2) on the defendants\u2019 actions and decisions which, the plaintiffs alleged, intentionally created and perpetuated the segregated system. As the housing phase of the case concluded, on April 20, 1971, the Supreme Court decided <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11114\"><i>Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education</i>, 402 U.S. 1 (1971)</a>, unanimously holding that busing was an appropriate remedy to integrate a city and surrounding suburban schools, which were all in the same district. In the second phase of their case, the plaintiffs presented evidence that the Detroit school board\u2019s policies created and maintained segregated schools. The plaintiffs characterized the constitutional violation as the containment of blacks in a set of separate, de jure black schools, that gradually expanded over a twenty-year period, but always within a state-created racial line of containment. On Sept. 27, 1971, Judge Roth issued his first ruling, finding that the Detroit schools were illegally segregated because of both housing segregation and de jure segregation by the local and state defendants. The court found that the school board had made decisions to create and maintain segregation in the schools through optional attendance zones; transportation policies for relieving overcrowding in schools; the alteration of attendance zones, grade structures, and feeder patterns; and new school construction location decisions. The opinion noted that the school board had admitted to busing black students past closer white schools with available space to farther-away black schools, despite the board\u2019s stated policy of using transportation to increase integration. Judge Roth also found that the state defendants had acted to control and maintain the segregation pattern in Detroit schools, based on (1) funding decisions that had favored white suburban districts, (2) state approval of school construction that furthered racial segregation, and (3) passage of Act 48. A few days before the trial ended, the CCBE moved to add the other 85 school districts, which were suburban and largely white, in the tri-county area (Wayne, Macomb, and Oakland counties) as defendants. The plaintiffs and all of the other defendants were opposed to this, and Judge Roth decided to wait to rule on the motion until after the parties had submitted their desegregation plans. The state and local defendants appealed to the Sixth Circuit, before the district court had ordered a specific remedy. <b>Finding a Remedy</b> On Oct. 4, 1971, Judge Roth held a meeting with both parties to determine how to proceed and expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of a Detroit-only remedy. He ordered the Detroit school board to submit a progress report on the magnet school plan within 30 days and a desegregation plan within 60 days, and the state defendants were given 120 days to submit a metropolitan-wide plan for desegregation. A few days later, Michigan\u2019s Republican junior senator Robert Griffin introduced an amendment to the U.S. Constitution to prohibit busing as a remedy for school desegregation. Philip Hart, Michigan\u2019s Democratic senior senator, led a successful filibuster against the amendment. In Nov. 1971, the Detroit school board submitted its evaluation of the magnet plan. The report acknowledged that the non-magnet schools remained heavily segregated, and that the plan \u201caccelerated the movement of white students out of majority black schools.\u201d The authors concluded that to be more effective, the magnet plan would \u201chave to cross district boundaries.\u201d In Feb. 1972, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the state and local defendants\u2019 appeals of the district court ruling, holding that since no remedy had been granted or denied, there was nothing to review. On Mar. 15, 1972, Judge Roth accepted petitions to intervene from a white citizens\u2019 group, the CCBE, and suburban school districts, on the condition that the intervenors would not focus on issues already decided. William Saxton represented forty of the suburban school districts, and only a few of the other suburban districts chose to retain separate counsel. Hearings on the Detroit-only plans were held Mar. 14-21, 1972. On Mar. 24, 1972, before ruling on the plans, Judge Roth issued a ruling declaring that it would be appropriate to consider metropolitan plans if it were deemed necessary to remedy the constitutional violation, citing <i>Green v. County School Board of New Kent County</i>, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) and <i>Brown II</i>, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). On Mar. 28, 1972, Judge Roth rejected the Detroit-only desegregation plans, and criticized both the proposals submitted by the Detroit school board (the voluntary transfer and part-time desegregation programs) and by the NAACP plaintiffs (redrawing attendance boundaries, with some pairing and clustering of schools). The Detroit school board continued to deny any acts of segregation, but argued that if desegregation were going to take place, a metropolitan plan was preferable to a Detroit-only remedy. At this point, 70% of the Detroit school district\u2019s student population was black, and the school board argued that white flight from Detroit schools would only increase in response to a Detroit-only remedy, creating an all-black district surrounded by all-white suburban districts. Judge Roth agreed. Between Mar. 28 and Apr. 14, 1972, another set of hearings was held on the various metropolitan plans that were submitted by the NAACP plaintiffs, the state defendants, the Detroit school board, and the CCBE. The state board submitted six proposals, all of which the Judge rejected as ineffective. The Detroit school board\u2019s plan was to include reassignment of students at all grade levels in 69 of the 86 districts in the tri-county area, while the CCBE recommended a 62-district plan, with desegregation to begin after fourth grade. The NAACP plaintiffs suggested a plan that was similar but covered 54 districts. Saxton argued that under <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11114\"><i>Swann</i></a>), \u201cthe nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy,\u201d and thus the desegregation should be limited to Detroit, where the segregation was found. The plaintiffs then introduced additional evidence demonstrating that the pattern of one-race school construction and faculty assignments extended throughout the metropolitan area. Meanwhile, President Nixon instructed his attorney general to intervene in the Detroit case to oppose any metropolitan busing plan. Judge Roth denied the local U.S. Attorney\u2019s request to intervene, but invited him to participate as an amicus curiae. On June 14, 1972, Judge Roth ruled that the intra-district plans were inadequate. He reasoned that the court \u201cmust look beyond the limits of the Detroit school district for a solution to the problem,\u201d designated 53 of the 85 suburban school districts plus Detroit as the \u201cdesegregation area,\u201d and appointed and charged a special panel to prepare a specific student assignment and transportation plan within 45 days. The Detroit school board, state defendants, and suburban district-defendants all appealed the ruling to the Sixth Circuit. On July 5, 1972, the special panel reported that additional buses would be required to implement the plan. The district court added the state treasurer as a defendant and, on July 11, 1972, ordered that funds be issued to purchase the requested buses. Two weeks later, the Sixth Circuit granted the state defendants\u2019 motion to stay the order. On July 20, 1972, the district court certified the major issues for appeal to the Sixth Circuit. On Aug. 24, 1972, a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit heard oral argument. On Dec. 8, 1972, the panel unanimously affirmed the district court\u2019s findings of de jure segregation of Detroit public schools by the Detroit school board and the state of Michigan and the inadequacy of a Detroit-only remedy. The panel vacated portions of the ruling, including the designation of the geographic \u201cdesegregation area,\u201d and the remedy was put on hold to allow the state legislature to voluntarily craft a remedy. The defendants sought en banc review, which was granted. On Feb. 8, 1973, all nine of the Sixth Circuit judges heard oral argument. On June 12, 1973, the Sixth Circuit voted 6-3 to affirm Judge Roth\u2019s ruling on the issue for segregation and the need for a metropolitan remedy. In the majority opinion, Chief Judge Harry Phillips concluded that the record \u201camply\u201d supported the district\u2019s findings of \u201cunconstitutional actions by public officials at both the local and State level.\u201d 484 F.2d 215, 242 (6th Cir. 1973). However, the opinion noted that their affirmance did not rely on the evidence about segregated housing with the exception of how school construction programs helped to cause or maintain such segregation. The opinion explained that this case was different from the \u201cclassical\u201d school segregation case in that failing to adopt a metropolitan-wide plan \u201cwould result in an all black school system immediately surrounded by practically all white suburban school systems.\u201d 484 F.2d 215, 245 (6th Cir. 1973). Finally, the opinion expressed concern that to hold that school district boundaries could not be crossed \u201cwould be opening a way to nullify <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=5479\"><i>Brown</i></a>\u201d. 484 F.2d 215, 249 (6th Cir. 1973). The panel agreed that a metropolitan plan was both necessary and within the power of the federal courts, vacated the remedy portion of the district court\u2019s ruling, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings so that the suburban districts affected by the orders could be heard. The panel also vacated the July 11, 1972 order directing the purchase of school buses. On Sept. 6, 1973, the state defendants and suburban districts filed writs of certiorari, requesting Supreme Court review of the case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. At that point, two other cases, <i>Allen Park Public Schools v. Bradley</i> (filed by Saxton on behalf of 40 districts), and <i>Grosse Pointe Public School System v. Bradley</i> (filed by a single district), had been consolidated with the original suit. <b>The Supreme Court - <i>Milliken I</i></b> On July 25, 1974, in a 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Supreme Court upheld the finding of de jure segregation of the Detroit school district but rejected an interdistrict remedy. The opinion held that with \u201cno showing of significant violation by the 53 outlying school districts and no evidence of any interdistrict violation or effect,\u201d the metropolitan remedy was \u201cwholly impermissible\u201d and not justified by <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=5479\"><i>Brown</i></a>. 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974). The case was remanded to the district court to develop a Detroit-only remedy. Judge Roth died on July 11, 1974, and the case was reassigned to Judge Robert DeMascio. Judge DeMascio ordered that the plaintiffs and the Detroit school board submit each submit desegregation plans by Apr. 1, 1975. The plaintiffs\u2019 proposal covered almost all of Detroit\u2019s 290 schools, and aimed for the schools to more closely mirror the district\u2019s racial composition: a range from 41% to 90% black students. The board\u2019s plan focused on the city\u2019s 84 majority-white schools and only some of the majority-black schools, and involved attendance zone changes, new feeder patterns, noncontiguous zoning, pairing and clustering schools, and revised grade structures. <b>The Remedy - A Detroit-Only Busing Plan</b> Judge DeMascio tried, unsuccessfully, to get the parties to agree to a single plan. In a written opinion dated Aug. 15, he issued a partial judgment, rejecting the NAACP\u2019s proposal and ordering the school board to revise its plan. The ruling provided for a very limited Detroit-only busing plan. It excluded three regions from the central city area and involved only 27,524 of the district\u2019s 247,774 students, which meant that 80% of the city\u2019s black students were excluded from the plan. The judgment also ordered that several educational components be implemented in all of Detroit\u2019s schools as ancillary relief: (1) a remedial reading program, (2) in-service training for faculty and staff, (3) vocational education, (4) a testing program, (5) a new code of student conduct, (6) a school community relations program, (7) a counseling and career guidance program, (8) co-curricular activities, and (9) bilingual and multicultural studies. The busing plan was successfully implemented in Jan. 1976, though the plaintiffs, state, and school board continued to disagree about various aspects of the district court\u2019s orders. In May 1976, Judge DeMascio ordered the state to pay for half of the cost of four of the educational components: the remedial reading program, in-service training, testing, and the counseling and career guidance program. The school board was to pay for the other half of the costs through its regular budget and federal grants. The state argued that there was no constitutional violation justifying these costs, and that it should not have to pay for any of them, while the school board argued that all of the components were necessary to remedy segregation, and that the state should pay 75% of the costs. The case returned to the Sixth Circuit. A three-judge panel heard arguments on June 15, 1976. The Sixth Circuit issued a decision on Aug. 4, 1976, affirming the district court order and finding that the challenged programs were \u201cessential to the effort to combat the effects of segregation\u201d and that requiring the state to pay half of the costs was within the district court\u2019s power. 540 F.2d 229, 241, 244 (6th Cir. 1976). The panel also affirmed the district court\u2019s student assignment plan, except for its exclusion of schools in the three central city regions: \u201cWe cannot hold that where unconstitutional segregation has been found, a plan can be permitted to stand which fails to deal with the three regions where the majority of the most identifiably black schools are located.\u201d 540 F.2d 229, 239 (6th Cir. 1976). The panel noted that it could not provide any guidelines to the district court to resolve this issue on remand, however, because it believed that \u201cgenuine constitutional desegregation cannot be accomplished within the school district boundaries.\u201d 540 F.2d 229, 239 (6th Cir. 1976). <b>The Supreme Court - <i>Milliken II</i></b> The state appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in Nov. 1976 and heard oral arguments on Mar. 22, 1977. It issued its decision (<i>Milliken II</i>) on June 27, 1977. The Court unanimously affirmed the Sixth Circuit, noting that the district court\u2019s remedial plan which extended beyond \u201cmere pupil assignments\u201d was \u201cexpressly approved\u201d by <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11114\"><i>Swann</i></a> and <i>United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education</i>, 395 U.S. 225 (1969). 433 U.S. 267, 286 (1977). The court also held that the state could bear some of the costs of the remedial programs without violating Michigan's immunity from suit established by the Eleventh Amendment. <b>District Judge DeMascio's Recusal</b> Meanwhile, at the district court level, in 1976, the plaintiffs moved for Judge DeMascio to recuse himself from the case, claiming a lack of impartiality and that they had been improperly excluded from meetings the judge had held with the school board and DFT. In Jan. 1977, Judge DeMascio denied the motion and this decision was upheld by another district judge; but, in 1978, the Sixth Circuit suggested that Judge DeMascio recuse himself, which he did on Aug. 8, 1980. 495 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mich. 1980). He was replaced by a panel of three district judges: Chief Judge John Feikens, and Judges Avern Cohn and Patricia Boyle. <b>The 1980s</b> Over the next several years, the plaintiffs, school board, and state continued to dispute the programs\u2019 costs. In 1984, the panel disbanded the Monitoring Commission, which had been created to oversee the plan, and ended its oversight of the educational components. However, the Sixth Circuit ordered that the panel reinstate the Monitoring Commission and two of the educational components, the school community relations program and the student code of conduct. In 1985, Judge Cohn assumed sole responsibility for the case. He continued his supervisory role until Sept. 1988, when he terminated jurisdiction over the educational components. On Jan. 11, 1989, Judge Cohn declared that Detroit schools had achieved unitary status and vacated all existing orders and injunctions except for a vocational education order. On Feb. 24, 1989, nineteen years after the suit was filed, Judge Cohn held that court supervision and jurisdiction over the desegregation plan had terminated, though litigation about attorneys\u2019 fees continued through Jan. 1995. <b>Available Opinions</b> <i>Bradley v. Milliken</i>, 433 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1970). <i>Bradley v. Milliken</i>, 438 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1971). <i>Bradley v. Milliken</i>, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971). <i>Bradley v. Milliken</i>, 468 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1972). <i>Bradley v. Milliken</i>, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972). <i>Bradley v. Milliken</i>, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973). <i>Milliken v. Bradley</i>, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). <i>Bradley v. Milliken</i>, 402 F. Supp. 1096 (E.D. Mich. 1975). <i>Bradley v. Milliken</i>, 411 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Mich. 1975). <i>Bradley v. Milliken</i>, 411 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Mich. 1975). <i>Bradley v. Milliken</i>, 540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976). <i>Milliken v. Bradley</i>, 429 U.S. 958 (1976). <i>Milliken v. Bradley</i>, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). <i>Bradley v. Milliken</i>, 460 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Mich. 1978). <i>Bradley v. Milliken</i>, 460 F.Supp. 325 (E.D. Mich. 1978). <i>Bradley v. Milliken</i>, 620 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1980). <i>Bradley v. Milliken</i>, 495 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mich. 1980). <i>Bradley v. Milliken</i>, 585 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Mich. 1984). <i>Bradley v. Milliken</i>, 772 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1985). <i>Bradley v. Milliken</i>, 828 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1987). <i>Bradley v. Milliken</i>, No. 89-1986, 1990 WL 177183 (6th Cir. Nov. 14, 1990).", "summary": "The NAACP and Detroit students and parents sued the Detroit school board and other state defendants in federal court, alleging unconstitutional segregation in Detroit's schools. The district court found that Detroit's schools were illegally segregated, in part because of decisions made by the school board to create and maintain and segregated system. The district court found that a Detroit-only remedy would be insufficient, and ordered a busing plan that would have affected students in city schools and 53 largely white suburban school districts, but the Supreme Court rejected this plan and a Detroit-only remedy was implemented."}