\"This Court concludes that to enforce the Congressional mandate that district courts lack jurisdiction \u2014 despite the compelling context of this case \u2014 would expose Petitioners to the substantiated risk of death, torture, or other grave persecution before their legal claims can be tested in a court. That would effectively suspend the writ of habeas corpus, which the Constitution prohibits.\"At a subsequent status conference, the Court set a briefing schedule; the petitioners' preliminary relief brief was due July 17, the government's response July 20, and any reply by July 21 in the morning. The court undertook to rule on that motion by July 24. On July 24, 2017, the District Court granted the petitioners' requested preliminary relief, staying the enforcement of final orders of removal directed to any and all Iraqi nationals in the United States who had final orders of removal on June 24, 2017, and who have been, or will be, detained for removal by ICE. 261 F.Supp.3d 820 (E.D. Mich. 2017). The court explained that the stay of removal would last for each particular class member until he or she completed adjudication of a motion to reopen through the immigration court and the Board of Immigration Appeals, and (if he or she lost in the immigration courts) until the U.S. Court of Appeals denied an individual stay of removal. The motions to reopen are due, the court said, within 90 days of when the government provides each class member with his or her immigration file. (If a class member fails to file a motion to reopen, or fails to appeal, the stay of removal will expire, as well.) On September 22, 2017, the government appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. While the appeal on the July preliminary injunction was proceeding, various administrative matters moved forward: immigration files were delivered, etc. More substantively, the plaintiffs amended the complaint on October 13, 2017, raising claims that the class's prolonged detention violated the Due Process Clause and the Immigration and Nationality Act. On November 1, the government moved to dismiss. On November 7, plaintiffs sought a second preliminary injunction on the new detention claims (and also filed an amended motion for class certification). After a hearing on December 22, Judge Goldsmith ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on January 2, 2018; he held that any detainee who had spent more than 6 months in detention -- nearly all of them -- was entitled to release 30 days later unless an Immigration Judge found by clear and convincing evidence at a bond hearing that that detainee poses a flight risk or public safety risk. 285 F.Supp.3d 997 (E.D. Mich. 2018). The government appealed, and the Sixth Circuit consolidated that second appeal with the prior one, which had not yet been argued. Consolidated argument was held April 25, 2018. The matter continued in the district court, with many small issues contested and decided. Among those decisions: The court decided that the regulatory process for governmental immigration bond appeals was unlawful, because it allowed the government to unilaterally extend prolonged detention, and because the process by which the government could obtain a stay of bond release was standardless and deprived the detainee of the opportunity to be heard timely. On June 13, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion, seeking to remedy alleged coercion by the government, which was trying to obtain detainees \"voluntary\" agreement to be deported. On June 20, 2018, the court issued an order requiring, among other things, seven day notice to class counsel of any consular interviews, that the government permit and facilitate communication between the class and class counsel, and that the government cease any threatening or coercive communications with class members. However, class counsel argued that the government was failing to comply, in part by failing to provide detainees with notice of their right to communicate with class counsel at a specific staging facility. The petitioners also argued that class members were suffering mistreatment at the Calhoun County Jail as a result of their involvement in this case. On August 22, 2018, Judge Goldsmith agreed that the government was not obligated to provide this notice at temporary staging facilities under his previous order, but found the petitioners claims of mistreatment substantiated. He ordered the government to provide class counsel with the names of detainees at the Calhoun County Jail who had faced administrative or disciplinary sanction. Judge Goldsmith denied the government\u2019s motion to dismiss on September 24, 2018, at the same time granting the petitioners\u2019 motion to certify the primary class. 342 F.Supp.3d 751 (E.D. Mich. 2018). The petitioners moved for a third preliminary injunction on November 1, 2018, arguing that the subclass of detainees who had been held longer than six months were entitled to immediate release from detention because there was not a significant likelihood of their removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Petitioners argued that under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), in the absence of such a likelihood, prolonged detention was unlawful. On November 20, 2018, Judge Goldsmith granted that injunction, ruling to release all detainees who had been held longer than six months under orders of supervision. 349 F.Supp.3d 665 (E.D. Mich 2018). The releases were to take place no later than December 20, 2018. All but a handful of the detainees were released by that date. On January 18, 2019, the government appealed. Also on December 20, 2018, the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in the consolidated appeals from the first two preliminary injunctions. 912 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2018). Writing for the court, Judge Alice Batchelder vacated the District Court\u2019s preliminary injunctions halting removal and ordering bond hearings. The case was ordered remanded with instructions to dismiss the removal-based claims for lack of jurisdiction. On February 4, 2019, the petitioners filed for en banc rehearing of the decision, arguing that the INA did not strip the court of jurisdiction, and that such a broad reading would create a circuit split as well as intra-circuit conflict. The petition for rehearing delayed the effective date of the Court of Appeals order until it was denied; the order then became effective on April 9, 2019. That meant that as of April 9, 2019, the stay of removal was lifted. However, the vacatur of the bond order did not mean that anyone got redetained, because those released on bond were protected by the third preliminary injunction, the release order. The third appeal was still pending, and back in District Court, Judge Goldsmith issued an order on March 12, 2019, staying the case pending resolution of that third appeal. Although Judge Goldsmith stayed future substantive proceedings at the district level, he ruled that the court would continue to supervise compliance with non-reversed court orders. So the release order remained in effect. However, Judge Goldsmith set up a process by which the government could seek to redetain individuals whom ICE believed were close to removal; for several of these individuals, the Court granted redetention. It seemed that Iraq had begun to allow a few removals of class members. In fact, one such class member died in Iraq shortly after his repatriation there. On August 30, 2019, the plaintiffs/petitioners sought certiorari review of the Sixth Circuit's stay ruling. On January 3, 2020, the Sixth Circuit issued its decision with regard to the third preliminary injunction, which required the government to release all primary subclass members once the government has detained them for six months. Judge Jeffery Sutton delivered the opinion, in which the court vacated the injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The appeals court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter this class-wide injunction and that it was inappropriate to extend Zadvyas to this setting. Similar to the reasoning in the appeals court's last opinion, the district court lacked jurisdiction because the INA stripped all courts, save for the Supreme Court, of \"jurisdiction to enjoin or restrain the operation of 8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1221\u20131232.\" The appeals court reasoned that Zadvyas should not be extended because in that case aliens were detained under one provision while in this case, the government has detained class members under four provisions. Because the provisions in each case differed, the appeals court reasoned that the district court should not have extended the Zadvyas standard onto the different provisions. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on February 16, 2020. On February 16, 2020, Judge Goldsmith issued an order administratively closing the case pending resolution of appellate matters. Judge Goldsmith concluded that administratively closing the case was appropriate because the Sixth Circuit had yet to issue an operative ruling and that such a ruling would eventually impact further proceedings. While the case was administratively closed for the time being, the district court would continue to supervise and maintain the status quo of the third preliminary injunction until the Sixth Circuit issued a mandate. As of March 16, 2020, the first preliminary injunction (the stay of removal) was vacated, but the matter remained pending on a petition for Supreme Court review. Both the second and third preliminary injunctions were vacated and remanded for further proceedings. On July 2, 2020, the Supreme Court denied the the petition for writ of certiorari. On November 25, 2020, one of the plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the district court, which was denied on December 23. The plaintiff filed a letter on December 24, 2020, which the court treated this letter as a motion for reconsideration of the denial. On January 25, 2021, the court denied to reconsider it because they did not find that there was a palpable defect in the original denial. On March 3, the parties filed a joint memorandum requesting an adjournment of a status conference in light of the Department of Homeland Security's plans to publish new enforcement guidelines by May 19, 2021. On March 4, the court granted the request. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "Petitioners in this class action/habeas petition are Iraqi nationals\u2014many, perhaps most, Chaldean Christian\u2014who have resided in the United States for many years. They have been subject to final orders of removal for years, but the U.S. government permitted them to reside in the community under orders of supervision. In early 2017, political negotiation by the Trump administration with Iraq (related to Iraq's desire to be taken off the Trump Executive Order travel-ban list) led to Iraq\u2019s agreement to accept at least some repatriations, and so the government arrested about two hundred individuals starting June 11, 2017. On June 15, 2017, the petitioners brought this class action habeas petition in response. petitioners sought a temporary restraining order or stay of removal, ensuring that they would not be deported before the court had a chance to adjudicate the case. The district court stayed petitioners' removal, but that injunction was vacated by the Sixth Circuit. Petitioners petitioned for Supreme Court review, which was denied on July 2, 2020. The case is ongoing and the Department of Homeland Security plans to publish new enforcement guidelines by May 19, 2021."} {"article": "On April 23, 2015, a group of inmates in the Pennsylvania correctional facilities filed this class action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued Global Tel*Link Corporation (\"GTL\") under the Federal Communications Act (the \"FCA\"), 47 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7201,206,207 and 276, and Pennsylvania law. They alleged that GTL participated in unjust, unreasonable, unfair and deceptive conduct from January 1, 2000 through the present (the \"Class Period\") by charging exorbitant rates and fees - up to 100 times normal market rates for intrastate telephone calls to and from inmates pursuant to exclusive contracts with correctional facilities throughout the United States. GTL and its subsidiaries serve over 2,200 correctional facilities and 1.1 million inmates in forty-eight states. The plaintiffs sought certification of this action as a class action and declaratory and monetary relief. The plaintiffs alleged that GTL created a monopoly through exclusive contracts with thousands of correctional facilities, and therefore faces little or no market competition to challenge its intrastate telephone rates. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that in return for this monopoly power, GTL provided kickbacks to the contracting facilities. Reports have estimated that the kickbacks paid to correctional facilities exceed $124 million per year. During rule-making proceedings, the Federal Communications Commission (the \"FCC\") looked at whether intrastate charges were unreasonably high, unfair, and far in excess of the cost of providing service. The FCC concluded that they were, and that GTL had exploited their economic position by charging rates for intrastate calls greatly exceeding the cost of providing service, in direct violation of Sections 201 and 276 of the FCA that those rates be just, reasonable, and fair. On October 23, 2015, Plaintiffs' filed a motion to transfer the proceedings to the Western District of Arkansas to join a related pending cases against GTL. That motion was granted on May 31, 2016. Once transferred, the case was consolidated with Chruby et al. v. Global Tel*Link Corporation by Judge Timothy L. Brooks. Once consolidated, the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification was considered and denied by Judge Brooks, citing aspects of the cases brought that required overwhelmingly claimant-specific factual analysis. Plaintiffs' filed an appeal on this question to the US Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on October 12, 2017, and the petition was denied and October 27, 2018. The case was dismissed with prejudice on August 27, 2018.", "summary": "In 2015, inmates in the Pennsylvania correctional facilities filed this class action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued Global Tel*Link Corporation (\"GTL\") under the Federal Communications Act. They alleged that GTL charged exorbitant rates and fees for intrastate telephone calls to and from inmates pursuant to exclusive contracts with correctional facilities. Following consolidation with related cases in the Western District of Arkansas, Plaintiffs' motion for class certification was denied, as was their petition to appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The case was dismissed with prejudice in 2018."} {"article": "On March 18, 1997, a federal inmate in state custody in Texas filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12111 et seq in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory relief, injunctive relief and monetary damages, claiming that the defendants had exhibited a deliberative indifference to his medical condition and as such had violated his constitutional and statutory rights. Specifically, the Plaintiff claimed that when he entered the custody of the Defendants his initial medical screening health questionnaire was incorrectly completed in violation of policy. The Plaintiff asserted that as a result of the indifferent administration of the initial medical screening health questionnaire, he was incorrectly classified as not disabled which prevented him from receiving the accommodations he required. Plaintiff in fact has epilepsy, major depression, and a number of other disabling disorders. The Plaintiff was subsequently housed in the administrative segregation section, rather than in the hospital ward as he claimed was required by his medical condition. The Plaintiff contends that this initial misclassification upon entry into custody lead to 17 months of being housed in an incorrect unit without access to the proper accommodations he was entitled to as a disabled person. The Plaintiff claimed that the lack of proper accommodations led to excessive seizures and mental anguish. Furthermore, the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendants had been deliberately indifferent to his medical condition and failed to adequately treat the Plaintiff's chronic kidney disorder for 17 months, which had serious implications for his health in violation of the equal protection clause and the due process clause. Additionally, the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendants had breached their duty owed to the Plaintiff as a disabled person by compelling him to wear leg irons, despite their use having been restricted because of his orthopedic disability. Furthermore, the Plaintiff claimed that the defendants had failed to provide him with appropriate medical care to control his diabetes, which led to a partial loss of his vision. The Plaintiff further contended that as a result of his inadequate medical care and incorrect classification, he stood trial for a federal crime in a diminished mental and debilitative state in violation of his 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th Amendment rights. On motion for summary judgment, the District Court first found that Congress did not intend for the Americans with Disabilities Act to apply to the treatment of prisoners within state prisons. Furthermore, the District Court found that the Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to the Plaintiff's ADA claim. Pursuant to the 11th Amendment, the District Court dismissed all of the Plaintiff's claims for damages against Defendants in their official capacities. On the Plaintiff's deprivation of medical care claims, the court held that o amount a constitutional deprivation of medical care, the acts or omissions must be \"sufficiently serious to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.\" Negligent failure to supply medical care does not amount to a constitutional deprivation. Consequently, as to the Plaintiff's \u00a71983 claims, the District Court held that Hall was not denied medical care and consistently received medical care throughout his incarceration, therefore even taken as true, the Defendant's acts and omissions did not amount to a constitutional deprivation of medical care. Therefore, the Plaintiff's \u00a71983 claims were dismissed by the District Court. In the end, the District Court granted all of the summary judgment motions before it, and dismissed a number of claims for failure to state a claim. On appeal to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, the Plaintiff argued that the District Court incorrectly granted the motions for summary judgment and the dismissals for failure to state a claim. On October 26, 1999, the 5th Circuit affirmed the District Court's orders but also held that the District Court had erred in holding that the ADA does not apply to prisoners incarcerated in state prisons. Nevertheless, though it held that the ADA applies to the Plaintiff while incarcerated in the County Jail, the 5th Circuit upheld the District Court's decision on grounds of qualified immunity because the Plaintiff failed to show that the Defendants had shown a deliberate indifference to his serious medical need.", "summary": "In this prison conditions case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Americans with Disabilities Act applies to prisons. The Court upheld the District Court's denial of plaintiff's claim on qualified immunity grounds."} {"article": "On November 15, 2015, the plaintiff, a prisoner and former prisoner observation aid (POA) at the Women\u2019s Huron Valley Correctional Facility (Huron Valley), filed a claim against the warden of Huron Valley, as well as a corrections officer and another staff member at Huron Valley in the U.S. District Court of Eastern Michigan. The claim was filed under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Michigan Whistleblowers\u2019 Protection Act. The case was presided over by Judge Sean F. Cox. The plaintiff, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan and private counsel, sought injunctive relief, attorney\u2019s fees, monetary damages, and for the plaintiff to be reinstated as a POA at Huron Valley. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants fired her from her position as a POA in retaliation for reporting misconduct against two mentally ill prisoners to external professional advocates and organizations when her internal reports went unanswered and unresolved. Specifically, the plaintiff witnessed and reported the following: a mentally ill prisoner being \u201chog-tied\u201d naked and left for an extended period of time screaming in pain, as well as another mentally ill prisoner whose water was intentionally cut off from her cell for multiple days and who later went into cardiac arrest after foaming at the mouth and vomiting from severe dehydration. In both instances, the plaintiff made repeated reports to appropriate officers and staff at Huron Valley, but these reports were ignored. On June 1, 2018, the defendant's motioned for summary judgement. The motion was granted in part and denied in part on March 27, 2019. The court granted the summary judgement in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff's Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) claims, as well as her First Amendment retaliation claim as it pertained to monetary damages. The summary judgement was also denied in part in favor of the plaintiff with regard to the plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims against the defendants in their official capacity. The case was dismissed on July 26, 2019 after a settlement agreement was reached between the two parties. Through the settlement agreement, the plaintiff was awarded $6,000 in damages, the option to resume her position as a POA at Huron Valley, and the removal of any records of notations regarding the plaintiff\u2019s initial termination. In addition to the relief awarded directly to the plaintiff, the defendants agreed to instate a new policy allowing POA\u2019s to report misconduct to outside organizations if internal reports are ignored, a training for POA\u2019s on this new policy, and a mandatory annual training given to prison officers and staff regarding prisoners with mental illness. Lastly, defendants agreed to pay $60,000 in attorney's fees.", "summary": "A former prison observation aid witnessed and reported two instances of gross misconduct by prison staff against mentally ill inmates to appropriate supervisors but plaintiff's reports went unanswered. After reporting the misconduct to external organizations and advocates, the plaintiff was fired in retaliation. The case was dismissed after a settlement agreement between the parties; plaintiff was awarded relief and reform was made to the prison's policies."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: In this preexisting class action addressing medical care in Arizona's prisons, the district court denied COVID-19 emergency relief on March 23, 2020. Notwithstanding the grave threats posed by congregate imprisonment during the pandemic, the court held that the emergency measures sought by the plaintiffs were outside of its authority under the settlement agreement in this case. However, the Court did (subsequently) order Arizona to disclose to class counsel who had been tested and the results.
- pre-selects and \"grooms\" male employees for promotions, favorable assignments and training - fails to provide all employees with a consistent and timely notice of job openings and promotional opportunities - requires managers to give permission to an employee to apply for any promotion - fails to prevent sexual harassment targeted at female employees by male managers; and - selectively and disproportionally disciplines and punishes women for minor infractions - retaliates against females who seek relief through human resourcesOn February 29, 2008, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, but the Court rejected this motion. Between February 2008 and November 2009, the parties engaged in discovery. On November 16, 2009, the parties submitted a stipulation informing the court that the action was settled and the parties were in the process of preparing class action settlement agreement. On August 5, 2010, the Court approved the settlement agreement. Plaintiffs received over $15 million in damages and their counsel was awarded over $4.5 million for the settlement. The settlement also included injunctive terms for the defendant to develop non-discrimination, anti-harassment, and anti-retaliation policies that ensure its female employees enjoy equal terms and conditions of employment comparable to their male counterparts. These policies were to include:
- prohibiting discrimination based on gender or marital status; - prohibiting harassment and retaliation that result from employees' reporting of gender discrimination; and - improving policies on pay and promotionsThe settlement was to last three years, or until 2013. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In March 2007, a group of female current and former employees of a pharmaceutical company filed this class action complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant discriminated against female employees, and therefore violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000(e) et seq. and New York Executive Law \u00a7 296. In 2009, the parties reached a settlement that awarded the plaintiffs over $15 million in damages and injunctive relief. The case is closed."} {"article": "On September 21, 2011, the Teamsters Local Union, No. 117 (\"Local 117\") filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the Western District of Washington on behalf of the union members who worked for the Washington Department of Corrections. The plaintiff sued the Washington State Department of Corrections (\"DOC\") for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e, et seq. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, the plaintiff filed charges of unlawful discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), alleging that defendant violated Title VII. Local 117 is the exclusive certified bargaining representative of approximately 6,000 State employees employed by the DOC. In July 2007, prior to the filing of this case, a lawsuit was filed on behalf of females inmates against DOC, alleging that certain staff had engaged in sexual misconduct (\"the Jane Doe lawsuit\"). The DOC responded to the Jane Doe lawsuit by conducting an investigation and hiring consultants to look at the issue. As a result of this investigation, the consultants hired by the DOC recommended increasing the number of female correctional officers in the women's correctional facilities. The consultants did not recommend decreasing the number of male correctional officers. The plaintiffs' experts in the Jane Doe case suggested that increasing the number of female correctional officers would limit the potential for sexual misconduct. Both the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, the Department of Justice, and the National Institute of Corrections Information Center recommended increasing overall staffing levels at women's correctional facilities in order to improve safety. In May 2008, the DOC submitted a request to the Washington State Human Rights Commission (\"WSHRC\") to designate numerous existing correctional officer positions at several women's correctional facilities as female-only, asserting that gender is a bona fide occupational qualification (\"BFOQ\") for those positions. In February 2009, the WSHRC approved DOC's request to designate the requested positions as female-only, and upon receipt of those approvals, the DOC indicated to Locall 117 its intent to designate the positions as female-only and began recruiting and reassigning employees accordingly. In this lawsuit, Local 117 alleged that DOC failed to undertake any individualized analysis of each position before designating approximately 110 positions as female-only, and they further alleged that many of these positions were improperly designated as female-only. Local 117 alleged that, as a result, male correctional officers were discriminated against, such as being forced to transfer to less desirable positions and being skipped-over on overtime opportunities. In addition, the female staff were required to work more overtime hours. Further, following the designation of additional female-only positions, DOC employees reported that violence against staff by inmates had increased, as had violence between inmates. DOC employees believed that a lack of male staff presence in the female living units has emboldened violent offenders to act out. Both sides moved for summary judgment. On April 8, 2013, Judge Settle granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and found the plaintiff's motion moot. 2013 WL 1412335 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 8, 2013). On April 19, 2013, plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On June 12, 2015, the Ninth Circuit filed an opinion affirming the trial court's decision. 789 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2015). The plaintiff filed petitions for rehearing en banc and panel rehearing, but the Ninth Circuit denied these petitions on August 5, 2015.", "summary": "In 2011, the Teamsters Local Union, No. 117 (\"Local 117\") filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the Western District of Washington on behalf of its union members who worked for the Washington Department of Corrections. The plaintiff sued DOC for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by designating certain existing correctional officer positions at women's correctional facilities as female-only. In 2013, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and in 2015 the Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision."} {"article": "On May 1, 2012, the family of a deceased prisoner formerly held at the United States Penitentiary Administrative Maximum in Florence, Colorado (\"ADX\") filed a Bivens action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against agents of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that the defendants' failure to treat the prisoner's serious mental illness violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant \"exhibited persistent and deliberate indifference\" to the prisoner's mental illness, which lead to the death of the prisoner in an incident determined to be a suicide. A related class action case was filed on June 18, 2012. See PC-CO-0019. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on August 31, 2012, adding a second cause of action for deprivation of the plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant disregarded the family's right to the prompt return of the prisoner's body and his personal possessions following his death. On April 23, 2013, the district court (Judge Richard P. Matsch) granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the First Amendment claim and denied the motion to dismiss on all other claims. On June 21, 2012, the defendant filed an appeal of the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss. On July 22, 2014, the U.S. Circuit Court for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, finding a lack of factual support for the allegation that the named defendant could be held personally liable for any shortcomings in the treatment of the prisoner. The court (Chief Judge Mary Beck Briscoe) remanded the case with direction to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss. 572 Fed. App'x 611 (10th Cir. 2014). On remand, the district court (Judge Matsch) entered an order dismissing the case on November 13, 2014. No. 12-cv-1144-RPM, 2015 WL 9583378 (Col. 2015). On December 11, 2014, the plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Seek Relief from Judgment and Leave to Amend the Complaint. The plaintiff claimed that he could prove that Warden Davis knew Vega and knew of his mental condition through new evidence obtained in discovery in Cunningham, et al v. Federal Bureau of Prisons (PC-CO-0019). Judge Matsch granted the motion on April 23, 2015. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on July 15, 2015, alleging that, had Warden Davis performed his job duties and read Vega\u2019s records, he would have been aware of the suicide risk. Instead, he failed to take any preventative action. The amended complaint included a count of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, and a count of deprivation of right of familial association. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the claim of deprivation of the right of familial association on the grounds that the claim was already adjudicated by the 10th Circuit, and also filed a motion to dismiss the deliberate indifference claim on the basis that the complaint still failed to state an individual-capacity claim against the defendant. On December 31, 2015, the judge granted the motion to dismiss, determining that the defendant was not accountable for the death under the doctrine of qualified immunity without direct knowledge or notice. The plaintiff appealed the decision to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals on January 21, 2016. The appellate court determined that, although the deliberate indifference claim was nudged closer to the line of plausibility than in his initial complaint, the plaintiff still failed the facial plausibility standard. As such, the 10th Circuit Court affirmed the district court\u2019s grant of the motion to dismiss. 673 Fed App'x 885 (10th Cir. 2016). The case is now closed.", "summary": "The family of a deceased prisoner formerly held at the United States Penitentiary Administrative Maximum in Florence, Colorado (\"ADX\") filed a Bivens action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against agents of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant disregarded the family's right to the prompt return of the prisoner's body and his personal possessions following his death, in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The case twice failed on qualified immunity grounds. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On May 18, 2016, thirteen lawful permanent residents (LPRs) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Plaintiffs sued U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The plaintiffs, represented by a private immigration law firm, claimed that USCIS had unlawfully delayed adjudicating their naturalization applications by classifying them under its CARRP (Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program) policy. The plaintiffs sought an injunction compelling USCIS to dismantle CARRP policies and to adjudicate the plaintiffs' applications, and a declaratory judgment that CARRP violated the INA, APA, the Naturalization Clause of the Constitution, and the Due Process Clause under the Fifth Amendment. Subsequently, on June 21, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, increasing the number of plaintiffs to twenty. The plaintiffs were all from countries with significant Muslim populations \u2014 Albania, Pakistan, Iraq, Palestine, Egypt, Nigeria, Bosnia, India, Iran, Afghanistan, Yemen, Mali, and Sudan. USCIS's CARRP policy directed adjudicating officers to identify any immigration benefits application by any applicant that might implicate a \"national security concern.\" When so classified, the officers were required to delay or deny the application. Although the total number of people subject to CARRP is not known, USCIS data revealed that between 2008 and 2012, more than 19,000 people from twenty-one Muslim-majority countries or regions were subjected to CARRP. CAARP's definition of a \"national security concern\" was broader than the INA's, drawing on the FBI's Terrorist Screening Database, which the plaintiffs alleged was based on vague, overbroad, and uncorroborated information. All the plaintiffs in this case submitted naturalization applications that were subject to CAARP. Some of the plaintiffs had already also had naturalization interviews and examinations, part of the statutorily defined naturalization process under the INA. That statute specified that USCIS must process a naturalization application within 180 days from the filing date and within 120 days of the interview and examination date. All the plaintiffs had been waiting for a decision for longer than the 180-day period -- in one case, for more than two years. Further, USCIS did not notify plaintiffs that they had been classified under CARRP, nor did the plaintiffs have an opportunity to respond to this action. In addition to the INA claim, the plaintiffs challenged CARRP as a violation of the APA due to USCIS's arbitrary and capricious action and action contrary to law. CARRP never passed through the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking process, nor did Congress approve it. The plaintiffs alleged that the INA, rather than USCIS's additional non-statutory criteria, must govern naturalization entitlements because the Naturalization Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress to set naturalization law through statutes. After the plaintiffs filed their complaints, during the rest of 2016, the individual plaintiffs filed three voluntary dismissal motions, after either USCIS had adjudicated their applications or the particular plaintiffs themselves had withdrawn them. By the end of 2016, only one plaintiff remained. On December 19, 2016, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that USCIS had already denied this plaintiff's application in October 2016, and so the Court lacked jurisdiction. In response, on January 3, 2017, the remaining plaintiff opposed the defendants' motion to dismiss, arguing that the Court retained jurisdiction because the litigation had started before the USCIS adjudication. The defendants replied on January 10. On June 1, the defendants notified the Court that a federal grand jury had indicted the plaintiff for selling contraband cigarettes. On August 24, the Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case. The Court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court stated that the plaintiff had failed to challenge USCIS's adjudication jurisdiction while the amended complaint was pending; that USCIS had already adjudicated and denied her naturalization application, thereby making the case moot; and that an appeal to the denial was pending in the agency, preventing ripeness. Further, the plaintiff lacked standing to procure a declaratory judgment as to CAARP's validity, due to unlikelihood of future injury. The Court thus dismissed the case without prejudice. 2017 WL 3658916. This case is now closed.", "summary": "LPRs sued USCIS alleging unlawful delays in adjudicating their naturalization applications due to USCIS' classification of their applications as posing \"national security concerns.\" Most plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew during 2016. One plaintiff remained, and the Court dismissed the case in Aug. 2017 for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction."} {"article": "On April 23, 2012, the United States on behalf of black firefighters filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and against the Consolidated City of Jacksonville, FL and the union representing its firefighters. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary compensation, alleging that the Jacksonville Fire and Rescue Department's practice of testing to screen and select candidates for promotion had a disparate impact on black firefighters. On April 30, 2013, the NAACP and Jacksonville Brotherhood of Firefighters filed a complaint in intervention, echoing the claims and allegations of the United States while adding to the action several named plaintiffs and a class of Black Firefighters who tested for and were denied promotion while the testing practice was in place. The District Court (Judge Timothy J. Corrigan) denied the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction on December 27, 2013. In their motion, the U.S. asked that the Jacksonville Fire Department be required to set aside five slots from the next round of promotions following the November 2013 test for those fire suppression captain candidates allegedly discriminated against on the 2004 and 2008 test administrations. The court denied the motion because the remedy offered did not correlate to the severity of the alleged injury, it would be difficult for the city to administer, and the plaintiffs had not established that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their case. On June 9, 2015, the court granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiff finding the plaintiff successfully established a prima facie case of disparate impact, which enabled the parties to engage in additional phases of discovery. 2015 WL 3618367. Over the next eighteen months, the parties participated in discovery. The plaintiff amended the complaint three times, the latest of which was filed on November 28, 2016. On January 13, 2017, the parties notified the court that they had reached a tentative settlement and requested the case be removed from the trial calendar. After months of completing prerequisites for a settlement agreement, a fairness hearing took place on December 19, 2018. Judge Corrigan approved the agreement in a consent decree on February 5, 2019. The settlement included total payments of $4.9M in individual relief to classmembers and creation of new promotion examinations. The agreement also awarded attorneys' fees to counsel for the NAACP in the event it took over monitoring and enforcement of the decree from the U.S. The decree was set to remain in effect for the duration of settlement payments; fulfillment of the defendant's obligation to create the promotion positions; and completion of the second regular test administration of the new promotion procedure. The consent decree included details on this procedure and the promotion positions. The court held a second fairness hearing in May 23, 2019 and in June the court directed the parties to proceed with administration of individual relief. The case is ongoing as the consent decree is under enforcement.", "summary": "On April 23, 2012, the United States, on behalf of black firefighters, filed a complaint against the City of Jacksonville, FL and the union representing its firefighters. The plaintiffs alleged that the Jacksonville Fire and Rescue Department's practice of testing to screen and select candidates for promotion has a disparate impact on black firefighters, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On January 13, 2017, the parties notified the court that they had reached a tentative settlement and requested the case be removed from the trial calendar. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "This case involved claims arising from a juvenile detention center being used for a television show. Two children previously detained in the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center (JTDC) filed this class action lawsuit on August 24, 2016. Defendants included numerous Fox entertainment companies (collectively \u201cFox\u201d); Cook County, Illinois; the Chief Judge of the District Court of Cook County; and various officials connected to JTDC. The complaint was brought under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and filed with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (in Chicago). Allegedly, plaintiffs\u2019 rights were violated due to the filming of the hit Fox television show, Empire, at JTDC. They sought disgorgement and monetary damages. Judge Amy St. Eve. was assigned. The complaint was brought following the summer of 2015. Plaintiffs claimed JTDC locked down for approximately two weeks to be used as a set to shoot scenes for Empire. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants knew the children housed at the JTDC would be confined to their cells and pods at the facility to make room for the shooting. Throughout the two weeks, numerous areas, including JTDC's school, its facilities for family visits, and the outdoor recreation yard, were placed off-limits to the children living there. The lockdown allegedly harmed the children of JTDC. It had \u201cinterrupted and degraded the rehabilitation and structured programming that is designed to address the problems that brought the children to the JTDC,\u201d including the children\u2019s access to education. Psychological damage was also alleged as children were forced to sit still in their pods, unable to get up from their chairs without permission, for days at a time. The following claims were brought under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983:
All detainees at Leavenworth Detention Center who, during the period of June 1, 2014 through June 19, 2017, had their attorney-client telephone calls recorded by Defendants: (a) after the detainee requested privatization of his or her attorney\u2019s phone number (subclass A); (b) after his or her attorney requested privatization of the attorney\u2019s phone number (subclass B); (c) after Judge Robinson\u2019s cease and desist order on August 10, 2016, in the case styled U.S. v. Black, Case No. 2:16-CR-20032 (subclass C); or (d) after the detainee or his or her attorney otherwise notified one or more Defendants in writing of their attorney-client relationship and provided written notification of the attorney\u2019s phone number at issue (subclass D).The settlement agreement created a Settlement Fund of $1,450,000.00, of which CoreCivic agreed to fund $1,100,000.00 and Securua agreed to fund $350,000.00. The plaintiffs' attorneys received about $500,000 of the settlement funds. The settlement did not provide for relief besides damages. As of April 5, 2020, the court has retained jurisdiction for the administration of ongoing settlement payments.", "summary": "Former detainees at a private detention facility filed this class action lawsuit alleging that the company that operated the detention facility and the company that provided phone and video conference services had violated Kansas, Missouri, and Federal wiretapping statutes. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had recorded confidential phone calls and meetings between detainees and their attorneys. The defendant companies agreed to pay a total of $1.45 million to the class members and their attorneys in a settlement."} {"article": "Plaintiffs--young undocumented immigrants residing in Arizona--filed suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act against the State of Arizona and the Arizona Motor Vehicle Division in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona on Nov. 29, 2012. Represented by the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, plaintiffs claimed that the state was invalidly denying them drivers' licenses, despite their eligibility under the federal Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. Plaintiffs claimed that the Arizona Executive Order that denied them drivers' licenses violated both the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Protection Clause; they sought a declaration that the state action was invalid, and an injunction providing them drivers' licenses. Plaintiffs also petitioned for certification of a class in their complaint, including all young immigrants residing in Arizona who had been granted deferred action, or would be, pursuant to the DACA program and had (or would have) employment authorization documents (EADs) and Social Security Numbers, who were being denied drivers' licenses by the Arizona Motor Vehicles Division. On Dec. 14, 2012, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. On Jan. 9, 2013, defendants moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. The District Court (Judge David Campbell) heard oral arguments for both motions on Mar. 22, 2013, and issued an order on May 16, 2013. Judge Campbell denied plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction on the grounds that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their Supremacy Clause claim, and that, although plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their Equal Protection claim, they did not show the likelihood of irreparable injury for the claim. Judge Campbell accordingly granted defendants' motion to dismiss in part as to the Supremacy Clause claim and denied in part as to the Equal Protection claim. 945 F.Supp.2d 1049 (D. Ariz. May 16, 2013). Plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on June 17, 2013. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on Sept. 17, 2013, adding two individual plaintiffs and removing the class action claims. In all other respects, the amended complaint essentially reiterated the original complaint, alleging violations of the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. On Mar. 26, 2013, Judge Campbell issued an order dismissing one of the individual plaintiffs without prejudice. The case then spent a long time in discovery. On Apr. 30, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on the Equal Protection claim and for a permanent injunction. On July 7, 2014, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Harry Pregerson) issued an opinion as to the interlocutory appeal, granting plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The Court reversed the District Court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction, prohibiting defendants from enforcing any policy by which the Arizona Department of Transportation refused to accept plaintiffs' EADs, issued under DACA, as proof that plaintiffs were authorized under federal law to be present in the United States. 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014). On Nov. 24, 2014, the Ninth Circuit denied the state's petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc, and on Dec. 9, 2014 denied a stay pending the state's petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari review. On Dec. 11, 2014, the state sought a stay from the Supreme Court, pending its cert. petition; the Court rejected that stay on Dec. 17, in an order issued without opinion. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito noted that they would grant the stay. Following this, District Judge Campbell issued a preliminary injunction on Dec. 18, 2014. He then held a Jan. 7, 2015 hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction and summary judgment and on defendants' motion for summary judgment. On Jan. 22, 2015, Judge Campbell granted plaintiffs' motion and denied defendants'. The final judgment permanently enjoined defendants from refusing to issue drivers' licenses to DACA recipients by rejecting their EADs as proof of their authorization under federal law to be present in the United States. In his order, Judge Campbell held that for purposes of Equal Protection, defendants had classified DACA recipients differently from other holders of EADs who could obtain drivers' licenses and that such differential treatment of similarly situated persons did not survive rational-basis review. Plaintiffs had suffered irreparable harm by losing job opportunities because they lacked drivers' licenses. 81 F.Supp.3d 795 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2015). Defendants then appealed to the Ninth Circuit. After oral argument on July 16, 2015, the panel (Circuit Judges Pregerson, Berzon, and Christen) asked the parties for further briefing on issues of preemption, the separation of powers doctrine, and the Take Care Clause. The United States, at the Court's invitation, submitted an amicus brief in support of plaintiffs on Aug. 28, 2015. The Ninth Circuit then issued an opinion on Apr. 5, 2016, affirming the District Court's order. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court's Equal Protection holding. But the Ninth Circuit chose to use the constitutional avoidance principle to reach the same result without finding a constitutional violation. The court thus held that defendants' classification policy for issuing drivers' licenses violated the INA by using an independent definition of \"authorized presence,\" and it was thus preempted by exclusive federal authority to classify noncitizens. 818 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2016). Defendants requested an en banc rehearing, but the Court denied this request in a Feb. 2, 2017 order (Circuit Judges Kozinski and others dissenting). 855 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2017). Defendants then requested a stay while they petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for cert. The Ninth Circuit granted a stay on Feb. 13, 2017, and defendants filed the petition on Mar. 29, 2017. In the interim, on Sept. 5, 2017, the Trump administration announced plans to rescind DACA. But a district court in Regents of the University of California enjoined this move on Jan. 9, 2018, and the government sought cert from the U.S. Supreme Court. On Jan. 22, 2018, in this case, defendants notified the U.S. Supreme Court of the relation between the two cert. petitions. On Feb. 14, 2018, in the Supreme Court, the U.S. filed an amicus brief. On Mar. 19, the Supreme Court denied cert. in this case. On Apr. 6, the Ninth Circuit issued an order lifting the stay and causing its April 2016 judgment to take effect. The case is closed.", "summary": "On Nov. 29, 2012, DACA-eligible plaintiffs sued Arizona for denying them drivers' licenses. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction on Dec. 18, 2014 and a permanent injunction on Jan. 22, 2015. The 9th Cir. upheld the injunction on Apr. 5, 2016, and denied an en banc rehearing. SCOTUS has denied cert."} {"article": "On March 13, 2006, a group of former and current female employees filed their fourth amended complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000(e)-5(f), et seq., against the Novartis Corporation in the United States District Court in the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for injunctive relief, back pay and front pay, and compensatory and punitive damages, alleging sex discrimination, including pregnancy discrimination. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the defendant discriminated in compensation, promotion, personnel evaluations and treatment of women taking pregnancy leave. 244 F.R.D. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). This action began on November 19th 2004, when a smaller group of plaintiffs filed their original complaint. The parties engaged in extensive discovery, specifically on the relationship between the parent company and its subordinate. There was also an early question about whether the Chairman of Novartis was being properly served notice on the case (see Order confirming proper service). On August 16, 2007, the Court (Judge Lynch) granted class certification and defendant's motion for summary judgment. This order granted a class of all women who are currently holding, or have held, a sales-related job position with [NPC] during the time period July 15, 2002 through the present, including those who have held positions as Sales Representatives, Sales Consultants, Senior Sales Consultants, Executive Sales Consultants, Sales Associates, Sales Specialists, Senior Sales Specialists, and District Managers I. 244 F.R.D. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Furthermore, included in this class were any women discriminated against on the basis if pregnancy with respect to the issue of incentive-based compensation. 244 F.R.D. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). While the Court (Judge Lynch) certified the class, he also granted a motion of summary judgment for the defense, holding that the corporation could not be liable for any Title VII violation by NPC. This judgment was based on lack of evidence from the plaintiff that the Corporation and NPC functioned as a single enterprise. 244 F.R.D. 254-255 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A jury trial commenced on April 7, 2010. The jury delivered a verdict on behalf of the plaintiffs and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The trial concluded on May 19, 2010, with equitable relief to be order by the Court at a later date. In light of this, the parties engaged in vigorous negotiations and entered into a Settlement Agreement in July 2010, according to which the defendant Novartis would pay $175 million in total and adopt other measures to reduce or eliminate discrimination against female workers. On July 14, 2010, the court (Judge Castel) preliminarily approved the settlement agreement. On November 30th, 2010, the court (Judge Colleen McMahon) finalized the judgment, certifying the class, approving the settlement agreement, and dismissing the case with prejudice. The defendant was required to pay $152,500,000 in backpay, damages to the class, and other charges related to the litigation. On April 8th, 2011, the court (Judge McMahon) approved of modifications to the list of class members and the claims administration process as laid out in the settlement agreement, in order to ensure that all class members receive accurate settlement awards. On September 23rd, 2013, the court (Judge McMahon) addressed a letter to all counsel to encourage continued compliance with the settlement agreement. The parties agreed to a 3-year compliance period, however the appointed overseer to the compliance was unable to reach either party to ensure continued cooperation. On April 29, 2014, the court (Judge McMahon) ordered the monitoring period concluded and declared the settlement to have been carried out, thereby terminating Defendant's obligations to the class and concluding the case.", "summary": "This case was brought by several female employees against defendant Novartis seeking monetary and equitable relief. On July 14, 2010, the Court preliminarily approved the settlement agreement, according to which defendant would pay $175 million and adopt other measures to reduce discrimination against female employees. The court found for the Plaintiff class and awarded about $150 million in damages."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas petition and a complaint for injunctive relief brought on behalf of three immigration detainees confined in detention centers in Texas. The petitioners alleged that as people who were particularly vulnerable to the virus due to their age and serious medical conditions, they were exposed to a heightened risk of COVID-19. Plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal on December 24, 2020. We presume the case to be closed.
\"Ferguson's law enforcement practices are shaped by the City's focus on revenue rather than by public safety needs. This emphasis on revenue has compromised the institutional character of Ferguson's police department, contributing to a pattern of unconstitutional policing, and has also shaped its municipal court, leading to procedures that raise due process concerns and inflict unnecessary harm on members of the Ferguson community. Further, Ferguson's police and municipal court practices both reflect and exacerbate existing racial bias, including racial stereotypes. Ferguson's own data establish clear racial disparities that adversely impact African Americans. The evidence shows that discriminatory intent is part of the reason for these disparities.\"The report explained that Ferguson's municipal court \"operates as part of the police department. The court is supervised by the Ferguson Chief of Police, is considered part of the police department for City organizational purposes, and is physically located within the police station. Court staff report directly to the Chief of Police. Thus, if the City Manager or other City officials issue a court-related directive, it is typically sent to the Police Chief's attention.\" While the court Judge does not report to the police chief, the court clerk does, and the report explains that \"the Court Clerk and assistant clerks routinely perform duties that are, for all practical purposes, judicial. For example, documents indicate that court clerks have disposed of charges without the Municipal Judge's involvement.\" The report devotes 80 pages to its investigative findings, which allege systemic constitutional violations of numerous types:
Racial bias and stereotyping is evident from the facts, taken together. This evidence includes: the consistency and magnitude of the racial disparities throughout Ferguson's police and court enforcement actions; the selection and execution of police and court practices that disproportionately harm African Americans and do little to promote public safety; the persistent exercise of discretion to the detriment of African Americans; the apparent consideration of race in assessing threat; and the historical opposition to having African Americans live in Ferguson, which lingers among some today. We have also found explicit racial bias in the communications of police and court supervisors and that some officials apply racial stereotypes, rather than facts, to explain the harm African Americans experience due to Ferguson's approach to law enforcement. \"Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.\" Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). Based on this evidence as a whole, we have found that Ferguson's law enforcement activities stem in part from a discriminatory purpose and thus deny African Americans equal protection of the laws in violation of the Constitution.\"The DOJ concluded its report with 12 single space pages of recommendations for reform, covering essentially all the activities of the Ferguson police and municipal court. DOJ commented, as well, that \"These recommendations should be closely evaluated and, as appropriate, implemented by other municipalities. We also recommend that the City and other municipalities work collaboratively with the state of Missouri on issues requiring statewide action, and further recommend: a. Reform of Mo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 302.341.1, which requires the suspension of individuals' driving licenses in certain cases where they do not appear or timely pay traffic charges involving moving violations; b. Increased oversight of municipal courts in St. Louis County and throughout the state of Missouri to ensure that courts operate in a manner consistent with due process, equal protection, and other requirements of the Constitution and other laws.\" Negotiations towards a consent decree ensued, and the negotiating teams reached an agreement, which was made public on January 27, 2016. However, after several public hearings, the Ferguson City Council voted to accept the agreement only if it were changed in seven specified ways--(i) eliminate any requirement of salary increases for police officers; (ii) eliminate any requirements for staffing in the Ferguson Jail; (iii) extending agreement deadlines; (iv) eliminating the requirement that the terms of the agreement apply to any other governmental agency who, in the future, might take over Ferguson policing; (v) adding local preference for contracting with consultants, contractors and third parties providing services under the agreement; (vi) adding project goals for minority and women participation in consulting, oversight and third party services; and (vii) capping monitoring fees at $1 million over the first five years with no more than $250,000 in any single year. The DOJ rejected these attempts to reopen the negotiations, and promptly sued, filing this case on February 10, 2016. Acting AAG Vanita Gupta then wrote a letter to Ferguson, suggesting that the city\u2019s projected costs of the agreement were overstated. On that assurance, Ferguson's City Council approved the settlement March 15, 2016; it was filed with the Court the next day. Judge Perry approved and entered the parties' jointly-filed the consent decree on April 19, 2016, after a public hearing to consider the community's input on the proposed consent decree. The consent decree created guidelines for training police officers and reorienting Ferguson's use-of-force policies toward de-escalation and avoiding force. It provided for community policing and engagement measures, reform of the Ferguson municipal code and municipal court system, bias-free police and court practices, and accountability measures, among other provisions. The agreement was set to remain in effect until Ferguson was in full and effective compliance for two years. On July 22, 2016, the court appointed the Squire Patton Boggs team, led by Clark Ervin, as the monitor of the consent decree, and the court has held quarterly status hearings since September 2016. After agreement by the parties and in consultation with the Court, Natashia Tidwell was appointed as the new Lead Monitor on December 12, 2017. The monitor submitted a status report on March 30, 2018. The status report noted that the defendants had made the most progress on the municipal court reform sections of the consent decree, while most other subject areas were still in the early phases of implementation. The report expressed the monitoring team's concerns about the defendants' ability to implement the provisions of the consent decree under the status quo:
Significant work remains to be done before the City will be able to claim full implementation of the Consent Decree. In particular, the Monitor is concerned that implementation may stall unless the City hires additional personnel to assist with compliance. Specifically, the Monitor recommends that the City hire the following individuals: (1) an outreach coordinator tasked with community engagement and implementation of the numerous Consent Decree provisions that require public education and collaboration with the Ferguson community; (2) an individual within the Municipal Court to assist with policy development and training; and (3) an FPD employee to support policy development, facilitate the conversion of policies into structured and organized trainings, and evaluate whether state and other external training programs comply with FPD\u2019s implemented policies. These roles are critical to achieving compliance with the Consent Decree, and during the remaining quarter of Year Two, the City should prioritize identifying talented individuals to serve in these positions.On June 18, 2018, the parties filed a joint motion to modify four provisions of the consent decree, claiming the proposed modifications were consistent with the intent and purpose of the original provisions and would allow for more effective and practical application of the provisions, particularly in providing greater clarity to FPD officers in the course of their duties. The court approved the minor modifications on June 21, 2018. The plaintiffs made minor amendments to the consent decree on November 15, 2018 in an uncontested motion. Monitoring and regular status conferences have continued, and are ongoing as of June 9th, 2020. Status conferences are made open to the public and have established procedures for public comment on compliance. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "On August 9, 2014, 18-year-old black male, Michael Brown was shot by a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri. The Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice opened up an investigation into the Ferguson Police Department. The Justice Department did not find enough evidence to prosecute the officer in question but did find that the police department was violating the Constitution through various practices that invidiously discriminated against African Americans. The Justice Department and the City of Ferguson worked toward a consent decree that was eventually passed by the Ferguson City Council on March 15, 2016. The agreement will last until the Justice Department finds the city compliant for two years."} {"article": "On September 16, 2015, the Florida Justice Institute filed this class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 on behalf of 2,000 inmates in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The complaint alleged that the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC), and their medical services contractor Corizon LLC, had denied hernia surgeries to prisoners to save money, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought both a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring the defendants to immediately provide hernia surgery to all FDOC prisoners recommended for surgery. For prisoners who have not seen a surgeon, the plaintiffs requested that they be seen by a surgeon. The plaintiffs also requested monetary damages and attorneys' fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Robert L. Hinkle. On December 24, 2015, the plaintiffs moved to certify a class defined as \"all current and future prisoners in the custody of FDOC who have presented, or will present, with a symptomatic hernia to prison staff.\" The plaintiffs also moved for certification of two subclasses. These were a surgery recommendation subclass, defined as \"all class members who have received, or will in the future receive, a recommendation from a surgeon that they receive surgery\" and a no consult subclass, consisting of \"all class members who have not seen a surgeon, or will be denied a visit to a surgeon in the future, for a surgical consultation.\" On January 6, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for preliminary injunction, asking the court to order the defendants to perform those hernia surgeries for those prisoners who have already received a recommendation. The plaintiffs also sought an order requiring the defendants to send class members to an independent surgeon for a surgical consultation, and then to abide by the surgeon's recommendation. On May 2, 2016, the plaintiffs and the defendants participated in settlement mediation and reached a settlement. On September 19, 2016, the plaintiffs and defendants filed a joint motion asking the court to conditionally certify two classes and to preliminarily approve the class settlement. On September 23, 2016, Judge Hinkle preliminarily approved the consent order and certified two classes. The injunctive class was defined as \"[a]ll current and future prisoners in FDOC custody who, after September 16, 2011, have been diagnosed, or will be diagnosed, with a hernia by a qualified medical provider.\" The damages class was defined as \"[a]ll past and current prisoners in FDOC custody who were diagnosed with and/or treated for a hernia between September 8, 2013, and May 31, 2016, at an FDOC facility while Corizon was the medical provider for that FDOC facility.\" As part of the agreement, the defendants agreed to pay about $2.1 million to settle this lawsuit: FDOC would pay $150,000 and Corizon would pay $1,950,000. The consent order also required FDOC to amend its health care policy on hernias to ensure that prisoners are referred to doctors for consultations and receive the recommended care. The FDOC would adopt a new Health Service Bulletin dealing with hernias, provide notice to medical staff and comply with the new policy. On March 27, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for final approval of the class action settlement. In response, the court required that certain state and federal governmental officials be given notice and 100 days to file any objection prior to final approval in compliance with the Class Action Fairness Act. After all objections had been fully considered, Judge Hinkle ruled that none provided the basis to disapprove or alter the agreement. The court granted final approval of the class action settlement on September 11, 2017. 2017 WL 8780863. On November 16, 2017, the parties jointly moved to dismiss with prejudice the defendant Corizon. The court granted it and removed Corizon from the action. On December 19, 2017, a class member filed a notice of a breach of the agreement, claiming that the defendants were not providing inmates hernia exams. Judge Hinkle treated this notice as a motion for relief and denied it without prejudice on December 31, 2017. On January 2, 2018, another class member filed a notice of their appeal of the order granting final approval to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Later, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed his appeal. On April 25, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the consent order (from September 23, 2016), and the defendants answered on May 16, 2019. Oral argument on the motion was held on June 13, 2019. On August 15, 2019, the parties reached a joint agreement, and the court issued an order for the parties to comply. FDOC agreed to provide more complete and frequent reports. The parties also agreed that a delay of more than four months between diagnosis and surgical consult or between surgical consult and surgery would be considered an \"undue delay.\" The motion to enforce was dismissed without prejudice as moot. There have been repeated efforts to reopen the case by prisoners who were not included within the class definition, but the court has denied these. As of October 11, 2020, this case is ongoing for monitoring and enforcement purposes.", "summary": "In 2015, prisoners filed this class action in the U.S. District for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that they were denied medical treatment for hernia and sought an injunction requiring a new health policy to provide surgery for hernia. In 2016, parties reached a settlement that required such policy as well as monetary damages to the plaintiffs. In 2019, the parties reached an agreement that in addition to the settlement, more complete and frequent reports would be provided and a delay of more than four months would be considered an \"undue delay.\" As of October 11, 2020, this case is ongoing for monitoring and enforcement purposes."} {"article": "This case is part of the series of Signal International cases. It was consolidated with Achari v. Signal International and continues on that page. On Aug. 7, 2013, two Indian guestworkers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. Plaintiffs filed this suit after District Judge Jay Zainey denied class certification on Jan. 3, 2012 in a related case, David v. Signal International. Plaintiffs were allegedly brought into the United States to provide labor and services to defendant Signal International, a company based in Pascagoula, Mississippi with operations in the Gulf Coast region, in the business of providing repairs to offshore oil rigs. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs paid Signal's recruiters approximately $15,000 for recruitment fees, as well as additional fees for skills and medical tests. The plaintiffs also named Malvern C. Burnett and Sachin Dewan, a New Orleans lawyer and India-based recruiter, respectively, as co-defendants for their involvement in the scheme. Upon arrival in the United States, plaintiffs discovered that they would not receive the green cards promised to them. Instead, they were forced to pay additional fees ($1050 per month) to live in racially segregated labor camps under constant supervision of private security guards, and were subject to threats of both legal and physical harm if they complained about the conditions or decided not to provide labor. The complaint alleged violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. \u00a71589 (forced labor) and 18 U.S.C. \u00a71590 (trafficking)), Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. \u00a71962(c) and (d)), Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. \u00a71981), Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. \u00a71985), the Thirteenth Amendment, as well as claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of confidential relationship. Plaintiffs were represented by private law firms. In Oct. 2013, the Court (Chief U.S. District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr.) transferred this case and Achari, Chakkiyattil v. Signal International, and Devassy v. Signal International to the Eastern District of Louisiana. On Oct. 24, 2013, the case was assigned to Judge Susie Morgan and consolidated with the Achari case. This case continues at the case page for Achari.", "summary": "On Aug. 7, 2013, two Indian guestworkers filed suit in S.D. Miss. for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. In Oct. 2013, the court transferred this case to E.D.La where it was consolidated with the Achari lead case."} {"article": "In September 2000, the New Orleans District Office and Houston Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commision (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against drug store Rite Aid Corp. and K & B Louisiana Corp, doing business as Rite Aid Corp., in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana alleging discrimination on the basis of gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the fourth amended complaint alleged that the defendant did not consider rehiring the complaining party when a new store opened since it believed a male would be better able to meet the physical demands of a Liquor Department Clerk. Following four amendments of the complaint by the EEOC, one motion for summary judgment that was granted in part and another that was denied, and a $1,820 fine against the EEOC for excessive discovery that was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the case was heard before the judge in July 2002. The judge held that the EEOC prevailed against the defendant for engaging in an unlawful employment practice but ordered that no relief be awarded since the EEOC failed to prove cognizable danger existed that Rite Aid would in the future take sex into account in making an employment decision. Both parties appealed the judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in September 2002, which affirmed the District Court's decision in October 2002.", "summary": "The EEOC filed this lawsuit against drug store Rite Aid Corp. and K & B Louisiana Corp, (doing business as Rite Aid Corp.), alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the fourth amended complaint alleged that the defendant did not consider rehiring the complaining party when a new store opened since it believed a male would be better able to meet the physical demands of a Liquor Department Clerk. The Court found that the EEOC had proven Defendant had engaged in an unlawful employment practice but provided no relief, finding no cognizable danger that future wrongdoing would occur."} {"article": "On March 25, 2013, three same-sex couples residing in Utah, one of which was legally married in Iowa, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the state of Utah. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for a declaration that Amendment 3 to the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 30-1-2(5) violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and equal protection clause by denying same-sex couples the opportunity to marry or have Utah recognize marriages entered into in other states. The plaintiffs asked for a permanent injunction preventing the defendants from enforcing both the amendment and the law and compelling the defendants to recognize the Iowa marriage as legal in Utah. The plaintiffs also sought attorney's fees. Section 31-1-2 of the Utah Code was amended in 1977, to state that marriages \"between persons of the same sex\" were \"prohibited and declared void.\" In 2004, the legislature passed section 30-1-4.1 of the Utah Code, which provides: (a) It is the policy of this state to recognize as marriage only the legal union of a man and a woman as provided in this chapter. (b) Except for the relationship of marriage between a man and a woman recognized pursuant to this chapter, this state will not recognize, enforce, or give legal effect to any law creating any legal status, rights, benefits, or duties that are substantially equivalent to those provided under Utah law to a man and woman because they are married. In addition, the Utah Constitution was amended by referendum on Nov. 2, 2004 (with 66% of the voters approving the amendment) to include the following text: (1) Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a woman. (2) No other domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect. In this case, District Judge Robert Shelby, held on December 20, 2013, decided the case for the plaintiffs, declaring the same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional and enjoining the state from enforcing the relevant sections of the Utah Code and Constitution. Given the Supreme Court's opinion in Windsor v. United States, the court held, \"the important federalism concerns at issue here are nevertheless insufficient to save a state-law prohibition that denies the Plaintiffs their rights to due process and equal protection under the law.\" The plaintiffs had, Judge Shelby found, a fundamental right to marry, and an inability to \"develop the type of intimate bond necessary to sustain a marriage with a person of the opposite sex.\" Moreover, neither Utah's law nor the constitutional amendment served a rational basis: two of the asserted justifications (promoting responsible procreation within marriage; promoting the ideal arrangement that children be raised by both a father and a mother in a stable family unit) were not served by the ban on same-sex marriage, and the justification of preserving the traditional definition of marriage was insufficiently weighty. The court observed that \"The State's position appears to be based on an assumption that the availability of same-sex marriage will somehow cause opposite-sex couples to forego marriage,\" but found that view unsupported by evidence, whereas the harm experienced by same-sex couples was \"undisputed.\" The court compared Utah's arguments to those made by Virginia in 1966, before the Supreme Court, defending the ban on interracial marriage. The state sought a stay and filed an appeal, but Judge Shelby denied the application, as did the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. While the stay applications (there were several, on different grounds) were pending, about 1300 Utah couples got married. The state applied to the Supreme Court for a stay, and on January 6, 2014, that was granted, \"pending final disposition of the appeal\" before the 10th Circuit. This raised the issue of the status of the 1300 marriages celebrated in the prior two weeks. On January 8, the Utah Attorney General, Sean Reyes, declined to state whether the marriages remained effective, but Governor Gary Herbert's child of staff that same day directed all state agencies that recognition of the marriages was \"ON HOLD until further notice.\" That is, \"For example, if a same-sex married couple previously changed their names on new drivers licenses, those licenses should not be revoked. If a same-sex couple seeks to change their names on drivers licenses now, the law does not allow the state agency to recognize the marriage therefore the new drivers licenses cannot be issued.\" U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder took a different position, however: he announced on January 10 that \"for purposes of federal law, these marriages will be recognized as lawful and considered eligible for all relevant federal benefits on the same terms as other same-sex marriages.\" Several states have followed the same approach. On June 25, 2014, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Utah's ban on same-sex marriage, the court held in an opinion by Judge Lucero, violated the fundamental right to marry, establish a family, raise children, and enjoy the full protection of a state's marital laws, protected by the 14th Amendment under the doctrine of substantive due process. Kitchen v. Herbert, 2014 WL 2868044 (10th Circuit 2014). Judge Kelly dissented. The Court of Appeals stayed operation of its decision pending filing/disposition of a petition seeking Supreme Court review. On October 6, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari. Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014). As a result, the 10th Circuit lifted its stay and Utah clerks county began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.", "summary": "On December 20, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah found for the plaintiffs in this challenge (filed March 25, 2013) to Utah's same-sex marriage ban, and enjoined enforcement of that ban. Over a thousand marriages occurred in the next two weeks, at which time the Supreme Court stayed operation of the district court injunction pending disposition of the appeal in the 10th Circuit. On June 25, 2014, the 10th Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the District Court that Utah's ban on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals stayed operation of its decision pending filing/disposition of a petition seeking Supreme Court review. On October 6, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari. As a result, the 10th Circuit lifted its stay and Utah county clerks began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples."} {"article": "This case is a companion suit to the state court case, Gooden v. Hunter [CJ-AL-0004]. In this action, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, the NAACP challenged the practice of the Alabama Secretary of State and state voter registrars refusing to register to vote those people with felony convictions not involving moral turpitude, unless they received a \"Certificate of Eligibility\" pursuant to Ala. Code \u00a7 15-22-36.1. Plaintiff alleged the practice and law violated Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1973c. Plaintiff requested that their claims be heard by a three-judge panel and be declared unconstitutional. On May 26, 2006, the three judge panel of the District Court (Judge Charles R. Wilson, Judge William M. Acker Jr. and Judge C. Lynwood Smith) denied plaintiff's request for declaratory relief and granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. Costs were taxed against the plaintiff and the case was dismissed.", "summary": "his case is a companion suit to the state court case, Gooden v. Hunter [CJ-AL-0004]. In this action, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, the NAACP challenged the practice of the Alabama Secretary of State and state voter registrars refusing to register to vote those people with felony convictions not involving moral turpitude, unless they received a \"Certificate of Eligibility\" pursuant to Ala. Code \u00a7 15-22-36.1. On May 26, 2006, the three judge panel of the District Court (Judge Charles R. Wilson, Judge William M. Acker Jr. and Judge C. Lynwood Smith) denied plaintiff's request for declaratory relief and granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. Costs were taxed against the plaintiff and the case was dismissed."} {"article": "On September 12, 2008, two convicted felons filed a civil rights action under federal and state laws in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson Division. Plaintiffs named the Secretary of the State of Mississippi, and various county election officials as Defendants. Plaintiffs allege that \u00a7241 of the Mississippi Constitution explicitly allows for individuals who have been convicted of a crime to vote for the U.S. President and Vice President. Plaintiffs assert that they meet all the requirements for an elector in the State of Mississippi and, despite their felony convictions, retain the right to vote for President and Vice President. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants' disfranchisement of Plaintiffs violates \u00a7 241 of the Mississippi Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the National Voter Registration Act. Represented by attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union, Plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs simultaneously filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. On September 25, 2008, the District Court (Judge Tom S. Lee) denied the motion for a preliminary injunction from the bench, stating that their interpretation of \u00a7 241 was not \"fair or reasonable.\" The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit subsequently denied Plaintiffs' motion for emergency injunctive relief pending appeal. On October 02, 2008, the state officials filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6). On March 9, 2009, the District Court (Judge Tom S. Lee) granted Defendants' motion as to 12(b)(6), concluding that, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs' complaint was \"without merit and should be dismissed with prejudice\" because their interpretation of \u00a7 241 was \"legally incorrect.\" The Court also concluded that \"defendants have correctly construed this provision.\" Plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit. On February 25, 2010, in a published opinion by Chief Judge Edith H. Jones, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision. Young v. Hoseman, 598 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 2010)", "summary": "This 2008 voting rights case was brought by convicted felons who claimed that Massachessetts Constitution permitted them to vote in presidential elections. The District Court disagreed, and the 5th Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision."} {"article": "On May 17, 2006, American citizens who use the telephone and internet filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the President of the United States of America, the National Security Agency and the Attorney General under the Declaratory Judgment Act and bivens. Represented by private counsel, they sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming that the defendant's electronic surveillance program violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (\"FISA\"), the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged the government had engaged in a massive, indiscriminate, illegal dragnet of the phone calls and email of tens of millions of ordinary Americans since the September 11 terrorist attacks. Allegedly, the core component of the defendant's surveillance program was a nationwide network of sophisticated communication surveillance devices attached to the key facilities of various telecommunication companies carrying Americans' Internet and telephone communications. On February 2, 2007, this case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The Multi District Litigation (MDL) Panel then consolidated the case as part of a multi-district litigation, In Re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, NS-CA-11, in this Clearinghouse. For information about what happened while the case was a part of the consolidation see NS-CA-0004. After dismissals of almost all of the cases in the MDL, this case was one of only two cases remaining. The other case was Jewel v. NSA, see NS-CA-0002, in this Clearinghouse. On January 21, 2010, Judge Walker dismissed this case and Jewel v. NSA, holding the plaintiffs lacked standing. Jewel v. National Sec Agency, 2010 WL 235075 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21 2010). The plaintiffs appealed. On December 29, 2011, the Ninth Circuit vacated that judgment. Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge McKeown held that the plaintiffs did have standing and remanded the case back to district court \"with instructions to consider, among other claims and defenses, whether the government's assertion that the state secrets privilege bars this litigation.\" Jewel v. NSA, 673 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2011). Upon remand, the plaintiffs moved for partial summary adjudication, requesting that the district court dismiss the defendants' state secret defense. The defendants cross-moved to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity for the statutory claims and for summary judgment on the assertion of the state secrets privilege. On May 8, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a second amended class action complaint and demand for a jury trial against government defendants. Earlier in 2012, Judge Walker had retired, so the matter was reassigned to District Judge Jeffrey S. White on September 17, 2012. On July 23, 2013, Judge White granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary adjudication, rejecting the defendants' state secrets defense. However, the Judge White also granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for damages under FISA and all statutory claims for injunctive relief on the basis of sovereign immunity. Judge White reserved ruling on the Defendants' motions for summary judgment on remaining non-statutory claims (counts 1\u20144 of the Jewel Complaint and the fourth cause of action in the Shubert Complaint). Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2013). On March 10, 2014, Judge White entered a temporary restraining order requiring the preservation of relevant evidence pending the parties' further briefing and the Court's final determination of the preservation issues. In its restraining order, the Court required that the government refrain from \"destroying any potential evidence relevant to the claims at issue in this action, including but not limited to prohibiting the destruction of any telephone metadata or 'call detail' records, pending further order of the Court.\" This order applied to this case, as well as Jewel v. NSA and First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. NSA, NS-CA-0003, in this Clearinghouse. This temporary restraining order directly conflicted with an order to destroy all metadata within five years of collection issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], BR 14-01, NS-DC-0051, in this Clearinghouse. As a result, the FISC granted temporary relief from the five-year destruction requirement but required that telephony metadata being preserved beyond the five-year limitation not be used by the NSA for any purpose. On February 10, 2015, the Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment with regard to Plaintiffs' claim that interception of their internet communications was a violation of their rights under the Fourth Amendment. The Court found that the plaintiffs did not establish a sufficient factual basis to sue under the Fourth Amendment, and even if plaintiffs did establish sufficient facts, the claim would be dismissed because any defense would impermissibly disclose state secret information. 2015 WL 545925. On May 20, 2015, the Court ordered final judgment in favor on the defendants based on the February 10, 2015 order. The docket was last updated on March 5, 2018. The Court granted a Stipulated Protective Order with regard to Plaintiffs' personal information. Within 60 days of the final disposition of the action, the Defendants were required to return or destroy all protected material.", "summary": "On May 17, 2006, plaintiffs sued the United States government in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, claiming that the defendant's electronic surveillance program violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (\"FISA\"), the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the Fourth Amendment. The court dismissed each of plaintiffs' claims except the claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment and later dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim for lack of factual basis and alternatively because any defense would disclose state secret information."} {"article": "This Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) complaint was filed on Dec. 15, 2017. The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) sued Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for records pertaining to the data collection systems FALCON and Investigative Case Management (ICM). EPIC argued that ICE's use of these systems risked violating the Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Government Act. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and assigned to Judge Randolph D. Moss. EPIC is a nonprofit organization that aims to expose new issues related to privacy and civil liberties. The complaint stated that ICE had a contract with Palantir Technologies, a data mining firm, to create and maintain information systems \"designed to make determinations about specific, identifiable individuals.\" FALCON and ICM are two such information systems that ICE used. EPIC argued that Palantir's products provide \"the basis for deportation determinations\" by collecting \"massive amounts of data on individuals and applying, secretive, proprietary techniques [to make] determinations about their fitness for employment, travel, and whether they should be targeted for further investigations.\" FALCON and ICM specifically enabled ICE to secretly collect personal data from numerous federal databases with information on individuals not suspected of any crimes. The complaint further asserted that ICE sought to make FALCON exempt from several Privacy Act safeguards, while ICM is already exempt from those safeguards. At an initial scheduling conference held on March 14, 2018, Judge Randal D. Moss directed the parties to file a joint status report every 60 days. Status reports filed in May through September 2018 indicated that the government was in the process of producing responsive records on a rolling basis. A November 2018 status report indicated the production was complete and that EPIC was reviewing the produced records. The August 2019 joint status update stated that EPIC had reviewed the document production and identified several issues in dispute, including the agency's withholdings under FOIA exemptions. On July 25, 2019, EPIC raised challenges to these specific withholdings of documents, and ICE released the withheld documents the same day. EPIC reviewed the released documents and, on September 19, 2019, stated that there are no further issues concerning document production. The only issue left to be determined was attorneys' fees. On January 30, 2020, the parties stipulated to dismiss the case with prejudice, pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement, with EPIC receiving attorneys' fees. On January 31, the court ordered the dismissal. There have been no subsequent docket entries and the case has closed.", "summary": "This Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) complaint was filed on Dec. 15, 2017. The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) sued Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for records pertaining to the data collection systems FALCON and Investigative Case Management (ICM). EPIC argued that ICE's use of these systems risked violating the Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Government Act. ICE finished document production by November 2018. On July 25, 2019, EPIC raised challenges to specific withholdings of documents, and ICE released the withheld documents. On January 31, 2020, the parties settled, with EPIC receiving attorneys' fees. This case has finished."} {"article": "In April 2019, the plaintiff applied to work for Whole Foods' Manhattan-area delivery service. As part of their hiring procedure, Whole Foods, which is owned by Amazon, conducted a background check. Upon learning about plaintiff's criminal history, Whole Foods denied plaintiff a job, despite there being no other issues with plaintiff's application. On June 6, 2020, the plaintiff brought a class action suit against Whole Foods and Amazon. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff brought suit under three state human rights laws that restrict employers' ability to deny employment on the basis of applicants' criminal histories. The plaintiff sought statutory damages, exemplary and punitive damages, injunctive and/or declaratory relief, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, and reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees, costs, and expenses. In response to defendant Whole Food's September 4 motion to dismiss, the plaintiff has until September 25, 2020 to file an amended complaint. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "The plaintiff was denied employment by Whole Foods due to prior criminal history, despite three New York/New York City statues that protect applicants with criminal histories. The plaintiff brought a class action suit and has until September 25, 2020 to file an amended complaint in response to Whole Food's motion to dismiss."} {"article": "On June 14, 2006, the San Francisco District Office and Seattle Field Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit against Providence Health System, doing business as Providence Alaska Medical Center, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska alleging discrimination on the basis of age in violation of Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (\"ADEA\"). Specifically, the complaint alleged the defendant failed to rehire the complaining parties after a layoff based upon their age. On June 3, 2009, the parties entered into a three year Consent Decree in which the Defendants promised to be fully compliant with the ADEA (a zero-tolerance policy), and to pay the Plaintiffs a lump sum of $220,000 to be divided as the Plaintiffs see fit. The Consent Decree also required the Defendants to implement a non-discrimination policy, which would specifically say that age-based discrimination may result in disciplinary action, and would define age-based discrimination clearly. The goal of this policy was to make it easier for workers to come forward with complaints of age-based discrimination, and to offer quicker solutions to these complaints. The Defendants also agreed to educate their employees on the requirements of ADEA, and to report their progress to the Plaintiffs. According to the terms of the Consent Decree, this case was closed and the agreement terminated on June 3, 2012.", "summary": "On June 14, 2006, the EEOC filed this ADEA case against Providence Health System in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska on behalf of employees who claimed to have been denied re-hire after lay-off due to their age. On June 3, 2009, the parties entered into a three year Consent Decree in which the Defendants promised to be fully compliant with ADEA, to implement a non-discrimination policy, and to pay the Plaintiffs $220,000. According to the terms of the Consent Decree, this case was closed and the agreement terminated on June 3, 2012."} {"article": "On June 30, 2016 a deaf resident of California, together with the Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness (\u201cGLAD\u201d), filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Plaintiffs sued the City of Santa Ana under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (\u201cACA\u201d) Title II, the California Disabled Persons Act, and Cal. Govt. Code \u00a7 11135, which at relevant parts provides that no person shall be unlawfully denied full and equal access to benefits on the basis of disability. Plaintiffs also sued the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (\u201cICE\u201d) under Section 504, alleging discrimination based on disability in the Santa Ana City Jail against immigration detainees housed by ICE in the jail. Represented by private counsel, Plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Citing a total lack of communication services for inmates who are deaf and hard of hearing, such as ASL interpreters or auxiliary aids, Plaintiffs alleged that detainees with hearing disabilities were effectively denied access to the programming and services made available by the jail to the general public. Plaintiff resident alleged that, while ICE officials and the Santa Ana Jail knew she was not fluent in English and was deaf, they never provided her with auxiliary aids or language assistance during her five months of immigration detention at the jail. Because of this failure, she was unable to understand the jail\u2019s procedures, had no means to communicate with people outside of the jail, received improper medical care, and was denied all access to the jail\u2019s educational programming. Furthermore, because officials failed to communicate to her that she was eligible for bond in June 2015, she stayed an extra five months at the jail. Later, on December 5, 2016 Defendant City of Santa Ana submitted a request for stay of proceedings and early mediation through the court\u2019s alternative dispute resolution (\u201cADR\u201d) program. Judge Manuel Real referred the case to the ADR program, and the Parties went before a Mediator on February 17, 2017. The case settled fully on the same date. While the terms of the settlement were not made public, an attorney for Plaintiffs made a statement shortly after mediation that Plaintiffs would receive damages in the amount of $140,000. He also referenced injunctive relief that would \u201cprevent what happened to the plaintiffs in this case from happening to another deaf, hard-of-hearing person housed in the Santa Ana city jail.\u201d After the terms of the settlement were carried out, the parties filed a joint stipulation to dismiss the action with prejudice on May 19, 2017, with each Party to pay their own attorneys\u2019 fees and costs.", "summary": "In June 2016, a deaf resident of California, together with the Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Plaintiffs alleged that the City of Santa Ana's failure to provide ASL interpreters or auxiliary aids to deaf and hard of hearing immigration detainees at the city's jail violated Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and state law. In February 2017, the parties reached a settlement requiring Defendants to pay $140,000 in damages to Plaintiffs and to develop measures to ensure that deaf and hard of hearing jail detainees would receive appropriate accommodations and services. The case closed in May 2017."} {"article": "In 1992 and 1993, a deaf inmate incarcerated at the Washington State Reformatory at Monroe, Washington, filed two pro se suits in the U.S. District Court for the Western District Of Washington contending that prison officials failed to provide him with a qualified interpreter at prison proceedings in violation of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12101 (\"ADA\"); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794 (\"RA\"); 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (\" \u00a7 1983\"); and Revised Code of Washington Chapters 2.42.120(1), (2), and (4) (\"RCW\"). In the first suit filed on October 26, 1992, styled Duffy v. Riveland (92-01596), Duffy challenged the defendants' failure to provide him with a qualified interpreter at a July 30, 1992, prison disciplinary hearing. By order dated January 28, 1994, the District Court (Judge Barbara J. Rothstein) granted summary judgment to the defendants. Duffy appealed. In the second suit, styled Duffy v. Yost (93-637), Duffy challenged the defendants' failure to provide him with a qualified interpreter at two separate classification hearings. The District Court (Judge Coughenour) granted summary judgment to the defendants on April 19, 1994. Duffy appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases on appeal and reversed the summary judgments in part (dismissal of ADA, RA, state law claims and \u00a7 1983 claims stemming from disciplinary hearing) and affirmed in part (dismissal of \u00a7 1983 claims stemming from classification hearings) and remanded the cases for further proceedings. Duffy v. Riveland. 98 F.3d 447 (1996). On remand, both cases were assigned to District Judge Rothstein. Duffy amended his complaint and then filed a motion for partial summary judgment on his state law claim. On January 14, 1998, the District Court (Judge Barbara Rothstein) granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and held that state law (RCW 2.42.120) required the defendants to provide hearing-impaired inmates with a qualified interpreter at quasi-judicial proceedings. The Court ordered that injunctive relief should be extended to all future disciplinary hearings. On February 10, 1998, a consolidated class action complaint was filed in the Duffy cases and the case Atkins v. Lehman, also pending in the District. A settlement of all claims followed. The settlement provided for the creation of a new Washington Department of Corrections policy governing treatment of disabled inmates, including provisions relating to providing certified interpreters and TTY access to hearing impaired inmates. In addition to the new policy, the DOC agreed to pay plaintiffs' attorneys fees of $150,000. The District Court approved the class action settlement by order dated September 3, 1998. The settlement class included \"All inmates incarcerated in Washington State Department of Corrections (DOC) facilities now or in the future who are deaf or whose hearing impairment substantially limits a major life activity.\" We have no further information on this matter.", "summary": "In 1992 and 1993, Sean Duffy a deaf inmate incarcerated at the Washington State Reformatory at Monroe, Washington, filed two pro se suits in the U.S. District Court for the Western District Of Washington contending that prison officials failed to provide him with a qualified interpreter at prison proceedings in violation of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12101 (\"ADA\"); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794 (\"RA\"); 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (\" \u00a7 1983\"); and Revised Code of Washington Chapters 2.42.120(1), (2), and (4) (\"RCW\"). The parties eventually settled, and the settlement provided for the creation of a new Washington Department of Corrections policy governing treatment of disabled inmates, including provisions relating to providing certified interpreters to hearing impaired inmates."} {"article": "On April 13, 2015, a same-sex married couple filed this lawsuit against Utah in the District Court of the District of Utah. Suing under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the plaintiffs asked for a preliminary injunction requiring the defendant to apply the relevant sections of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act to female spouses of women who give birth through assisted reproduction using donor sperm in the same way they apply the assisted-reproduction statutes to male spouses in the same situation. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought an order requiring the defendant to recognize both of them as legal parents of their child and to issue a birth certificate for the child that identifies them both as legal parents. On July 22, 2015, the District Court (Judge Dee Benson) issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendant from enforcing the sections of its Uniform Parentage Act at issue in a way that differentiates between male spouses of women who give birth through assisted reproduction with donor sperm and similarly situated female spouses of women. Roe v. Patton, No. 2:15-cv-00253-DB, 2015 WL 4476734, at *1 (D. Utah. July 22, 2015). The defendants complied with the injunction, including issuing a birth certificate for the plaintiffs' child listing them both as parents. On October 16, 2015, the plaintiffs and defendants submitted a joint stipulated proposed order granting a permanent injunction. On October 20, 2015, the District Court (Judge Dee Benson) converted the preliminary injunction to a permanent injunction and awarded $24,302 in attorney's fees and costs to the plaintiffs.", "summary": "In 2015, a same-sex married couple filed this lawsuit against Utah in the District Court of the District of Utah. Suing under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the plaintiffs challenged Utah's application of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act. Utah did not treat female spouses of women who give birth through assisted reproduction using donor sperm in the same way they treated the assisted-reproduction statutes to male spouses in the same situation. The Court issued a preliminary injunction ordering Utah to apply the Act uniformly. Then, the parties settled and the preliminary injunction was made permanent."} {"article": "On April 25, 2017, a group of New York City disability rights organizations and three New York City residents who use wheelchairs filed this class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the interim executive director of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the New York City Transit Authority, the acting president of the New York City Transit Authority, and the City of New York, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (\u201cADA\u201d), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the New York City Human Rights Law (\u201cNYCHRL\u201d). The plaintiffs sought class-action certification; an order and judgment enjoining defendants from violating Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the NYCHRL; declaratory relief; an order requiring defendants to institute system-wide policies and practices necessary to ensure the subway system elevators regularly operate in a useable and sanitary condition and provision of adequate notice and alternative accommodations when outages occur; and attorneys\u2019 fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants\u2019 failure to maintain the limited number of elevators in the subway caused the systematic discriminatory exclusion of hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers with mobility disabilities from New York City\u2019s subway system in violation of state and federal law. Specifically, they claimed that the defendants\u2019 failure to maintain the subway elevators caused riders with mobility disabilities to routinely face frequent elevator outages occurring without notice and lasting as long as several months; that the defendants gave no warning of outages and did not provide alternate accommodations when they occur; and that as a result of defendants\u2019 failure to provide proper maintenance, they have denied New Yorkers with mobile disabilities access to public transportation. The plaintiffs argued that the transit agency\u2019s failure to provide an adequate number of elevators in the subway system violates the city\u2019s human rights law, whose aim is to \u201celiminate and prevent discrimination from playing any role in actions relating to employment, public accommodations and housing and other real estate, and to take other actions against prejudice, intolerance, bigotry, discrimination and bias-related violence or harassment.\u201d The plaintiffs' federal claims alleged that the transit agency\u2019s failure to maintain operable elevators violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits discriminating against people with disabilities in public facilities. On September 6, 2017, the Court dismissed the action without prejudice as against the City of New York on the ground that the lease between the City and the Transit Authority gives the Transit Authority full jurisdiction, control, possession, and supervision of New York transit facilities and limits the City\u2019s right of reentry to the leased facilities to repair service facilities that are not used for transit purposes. On November 3, 2017, Judge Katherine B. Forrest issued an order certifying the action to proceed as a class action on behalf of all persons who use or seek to use the New York City subway system and have a disability that requires them to use an elevator to access the subway system. The parties proceeded to discovery and deposition in 2018 and the case was reassigned to Judge Robert W. Sweet on September 20, 2018. Discovery continued under Judge Sweet, until he passed away on March 24, 2019. The case was reassigned to Judge George B. Daniels on April 8, 2019. On May 28, 2019, Judge Daniels terminated a motion for extension of time to complete discovery, a motion to compel, and a motion for discovery pursuant to the May 2, 2019, status conference. Two more motions were resolved on June 4, 2019. On August 9, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment. They moved the court to find that the defendant discriminated against individuals with mobility disabilities by systemically failing to implement adequate, programmatic subway system elevator maintenance in violation of Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the New York City Human Rights Law. Plaintiffs' experts also filed supporting statements. On the same day, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. They moved the court to find in favor of the defendant on all claims in the complaint and dismiss the complaint in its entirety. An oral argument was held on October 24, 2019. At the conclusion of oral argument, the court reserved decision on the motions and declined to set a trial date. On November 14, 2019, the plaintiffs filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. On November 18, the defendants briefly responded in a letter to the judge and asked that the plaintiffs\u2019 filing be stricken from the docket because the filing was not solicited by the court. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On April 25th, 2017, a group of New York City disability rights organizations and three individual disabled New York City residents who use wheelchairs and have frequently encountered subway outages filed this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the interim executive director of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the New York City Transit Authority, the acting president of the New York City Transit Authority, and the City of New York, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (\u201cADA\u201d), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the New York City Human Rights Law (\u201cNYCHRL\u201d). The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants\u2019 failure to maintain the limited number of elevators in the subway caused the systematic discriminatory exclusion of hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers with mobility disabilities from New York City\u2019s subway system in violation of state and federal law. After extensive discovery, both parties filed motions for summary judgment on August 9, 2019. An oral argument was held on October 24 but Judge George B. Daniels reserved a decision on the motions. The case is still ongoing."} {"article": "On December 29, 2008, two men married in the state of California, filed suit against the United States, the State of California, and 'Does 1 through 1,000' alleging violations by the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (\"DOMA\", 1 U.S.C. \u00a77) of the Full Faith and Credit, Equal Protection, and Due Process clauses to the Constitution, as well as the rights to Privacy, Speech, Travel, and the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution. The case was originally filed in Superior Court of California for the County of Orange and removed to the US District Court for the Central District of California, Southern Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged that DOMA discriminated along lines of gender and sexual orientation by prohibiting any requirement that any state recognize same sex marriages conducted in another state, and in turn permitting the limitation of federal benefits tied to marital status that are due those couples on such grounds. Plaintiffs also complained that the California state constitutional prohibition of same-sex marriage (\"Proposition 8\") violated the same set of rights as DOMA. These allegations had been brought twice before by the couple, but were dismissed or withdrawn for jurisdictional and technical reasons. The portion of the case pursuing California law was dismissed as moot on July 25, 2009, since plaintiffs were already and continued to be legally married in the state of California. The Court, Judge David O. Carter, ultimately dismissed the portion of the case concerning DOMA on technical grounds on August 24, 2009, citing improper initial filing in state court (despite removal to proper federal court). The case is notable for the two different stances taken by the Department of Justice (\"DOJ\") during briefing. The DOJ initially defended the law substantively in briefing filed June 11, 2009, citing public policy considerations to validate DOMA's diminishment of the legal status of same-sex marriages in states where they are prohibited by law, and consequent limitation on the federal benefit rights afforded such couples whose marriages are not legal in all states. In later briefing filed on August 17, 2009, the DOJ withdrew support for the law, stating that it should be \"repealed as a matter of policy\" due to its \"discriminatory\" nature, but continued to defend it on the presumption of constitutionality afforded acts of Congress and its practice of defending federal statutes as long as reasonable arguments can be made in support of their constitutionality. This was an intermediate step towards the DOJ's later position that DOMA is unconstitutional.", "summary": "Two married men in California brought suit alleging that DOMA and Proposition 8 violated their Equal Protection and Due Process Rights. The case, dismissed for jurisdictional reasons and withdrawn previously, was dismissed again because of improper filing. Smelt is significant because the DOJ began briefing by defending DOMA on substantive grounds, but changed its argument during defense of its dispositive summary judgment motion, stating that the law was \"discriminatory\" in nature and should be \"repealed as a matter of policy.\""} {"article": "On November 14, 2013, the Archdiocese of St. Louis and its affiliated nonprofit charities revived their dismissed claim (Roman Catholic Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Sebelius), in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the federal government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the First Amendment. Th plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged the religious employer exemption and the accommodations put forth in the government's final rule as amended on June 28, 2013, arguing that the definition of religious employer was too narrow and the rule continued to burden their free exercise. They argued that the accommodations required nonexempt plaintiffs to provide self-certification to their insurance provider setting forth their religious objections, which in turn triggered an obligation on the part of the insurance provider to procure the services plaintiffs found objectionable. The plaintiffs argued that they were thus the but-for cause of providing contraception coverage and asked the court to grant a permanent injunction against enforcement of the relevant provisions of the ACA. On May 8, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent the government from enforcing the contraception mandate against them. On June 30, 2014, Judge John Ross granted the preliminary injunction. 28 F.Supp.3d 944. The government appealed the order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on August 28, 2014. On November 12, 2015, the Eighth Circuit decided that it would hold the appeal in abeyance in light of the pending Supreme Court decision in Zubik v. Burwell (See FA-PA-0016 in this Clearinghouse). In Zubik, the Supreme Court declined to rule on the merits of the case and instead held that the parties \"should be afforded an opportunity to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates [plaintiffs'] religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by [plaintiffs'] health plans \u2018receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.\" The government requested that the Eighth Circuit issue an order like the one issued by the Supreme Court in Zubik, acknowledging that the plaintiffs believed they should be exempt from the government's final rule and staying the appeal to provide the government with an opportunity to resolve the plaintiffs' request for an exemption. On September 19, 2016, the Eighth Circuit issued this order. Afterwards, the parties continued to provide status updates regarding a resolution to the plaintiffs' challenge to the Eighth Circuit. In light of the continuing stay in the appeal of this matter, the district court dismissed without prejudice the government\u2019s motion to dismiss on August 5, 2016. Since September 19, 2016, the parties have submitted multiple status reports to the Eight Circuit. On May 1, 2017, the plaintiffs submitted a status report asking the court not to take any action on the case as the parties continued discussions pursuant to the Supreme Court's Directive in Zubik. The report noted that the Trump administration had not yet determined its position on the issue. On July 14, 2017, the plaintiffs submitted a status report stating discussions between parties were still ongoing. The report again noted the Trump administration had not determined its position, and as a result, the plaintiffs requested the case remain in abeyance. On September 15, 2017, the plaintiffs filed another status report containing the same information. On October 6, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss the case with the plaintiffs' consent. The court granted the dismissal of the appeal on October 10, 2017. Also on October 6, 2017, the Trump Administration issued an order that would no longer require employers to provide contraception if they had religious objections. See New York Time article for more information On October 23, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a joint stipulation of dismissal. The court granted the motion the same day. This case is closed.", "summary": "On November 14, 2013, the Archdiocese of St. Louis and its affiliated non-profit charities revived their dismissed claim in the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Missouri against the Federal Government challenging provisions of the Affordable Care Act, as amended on June 28, 2013, extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On June 30, 2014, plaintiffs were granted a preliminary injunction that prevents the government from enforcing the contraception mandate against them. The government appealed the injunction and as of March 2017. In October of 2017 when the Trump Administration removed the contraception required for employers with a religious objection, the parties moved to have the case dismissed."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas petition brought on behalf of medically vulnerable immigration detainees confined in two detention centers in California. The plaintiffs were granted a temporary restraining order and released from detention on April 30, 2020. The motion for preliminary injunctions for both subclasses were denied on May 26 and July 22. The case remains ongoing.
a) all present and future juveniles (i.e. individuals under the age of 18 and charged as adults) with disabilities, as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, who are now or will be incarcerated in segregated housing while in the custody of the Sheriff\u2019s Office and are in need of special education evaluation, instruction, accommodations, and related services (\u201cIDEA subclass\u201d); and b) all present and future juveniles (i.e. individuals under the age of 18 and charged as adults) with disabilities, as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, who are now or will be incarcerated in segregated housing while in the custody of the Sheriff\u2019s Office (\u201cADA and 504 Subclass\u201d).The proposed settlement required, among other things:
- Recreation and showers seven days a week, and no unreasonable withholding of phone or visitation privileges; - any juvenile classified into segregated housing for any reason, other than protective custody, shall be allowed out of their cells throughout the regular school day with other juveniles in general population so long as there are no co-defendants or keep-separates in the same housing pod; - On weekends and holidays the Sheriff\u2019s Office shall utilize an expanded rotation schedule for co-defendants that allows for greater time in facility accommodations to minimize the duration of time spent in segregated housing; - the Sheriff\u2019s Office and the School Board shall confer to determine how best to allow equal access, including any accommodations, to juvenile educational services and programming outside of the segregation cell; maintain notes and documentation of these conferences; and refer the juvenile to a mental health professional for an evaluation and to determine a need for any accommodations; - juveniles who refused educational services and programming shall be given another opportunity to participate prior to each period.The agreement was set to last at least five years. The agreement also provided that experts would monitor compliance, and the defendants would provide documents and access to facilitate monitoring. For reasons that are unclear to the Clearinghouse, the monitoring was set to last for only two years despite the agreement's five-year term. On February 28, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion for approval of the Settlement Agreement and certification of the class. Judge Matthewman approved the settlement after holding a Fairness Hearing and dismissed the case on March 6, 2019, but the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. 2019 WL 1051146. On April 19, 2019, the plaintiff moved for $606,526.00 in attorney\u2019s fees and $39,296.78 in costs. The defendants responded that only $260,690.50 in fees and $131.33 in costs were appropriate. On October 10, 2019, Judge Matthewman issued an order granting $390,959.00 in fees and $29,724.53 in costs, for a total award of $420,683.53. 426 F. Supp. 3d. 1266. Judge Matthewman rejected the plaintiff\u2019s use of a blended rate of $525 per hour for all attorneys on the case, and instead arrived at the $390,959.00 figure based on individualized calculations for each attorney and paralegal involved using rates ranging from $150 per hour to $400 per hour. On December 3, 2019 the court entered a satisfaction of judgment as to the attorneys' fees. Although monitoring concluded in December 2020, the settlement agreement remains in force as of April 15, 2021.", "summary": "Plaintiffs, incarcerated children who are experiencing or have experienced solitary confinement in Palm Beach County Jail filed this putative class action lawsuit against the County School District, School Board, and Sheriff's Office, as well as related officials in their individual capacities, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida (West Palm Beach) on June 21, 2018. The claim was filed under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (\"IDEA\"), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (\"ADA\"). Plaintiffs alleged violations of the 8th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution, and are seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. In their complaint, the plaintiffs challenged Palm Beach County's use of solitary confinement against minors, the conditions of the solitary confinement, and the lack of educational opportunities available to children in solitary confinement. The case has settled and the settlement agreement continues to be enforced."} {"article": "On May 6, 2010, the United States Department of Justice (\"DOJ\") filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas under Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (\"ADA\") against the State of Arkansas. The Department of Justice asked the court to issue an injunction, claiming that the State discriminates against people with developmental disabilities by not providing programs that are the most appropriate for their needs. Specifically, the DOJ claimed that in administering developmental disability services, the State of Arkansas unnecessarily segregates and isolates persons with disabilities from the community. Previously, the DOJ had filed suit against the State of Arkansas (ID-AR-002) and the Conway Human Development Center (\"CHDC\") alleging that the manner in which the State provides services to persons with disabilities residing in the CHDC violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the ADA, and the Disabilities Education Act. The DOJ moved to dismiss Count II of the CHDC complaint in order to pursue the statewide action. The State moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the DOJ did not fulfill the procedural requirements to bring suit under Title II of the ADA, as stated in the Code of Federal Regulations. The regulations set forth an administrative process, that prior to filing a lawsuit, that requires a complaint by an individual of discrimination to an agency with jurisdiction over the subject matter, an attempt at an informal resolution, issuance of a formal letter of compliance or noncompliance, and a referral by the federal agency to the Attorney General for enforcement. On January 24, 2011, the District Court (Judge J. Leon Holmes) dismissed the case without prejudice because the court found that the DOJ had not followed the administrative process set forth in the regulations.", "summary": "The Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a claim against the State of Arkansas alleging that the State discriminates against people with developmental disabilities by not providing programs that are appropriate for their needs and segregates persons with disabilities from the community. The court found that the DOJ did not fulfill the procedural requirements necessary to bring a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act and dismissed the case without prejudice."} {"article": "On Apr. 12, 2017, the ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties filed this lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented President Trump's Jan. 27 and Mar. 6 Executive Orders that banned admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, plaintiffs sought information \"concerning CBP\u2019s local implementation of President Trump's January 27, 2017 Executive Order...as well as any other judicial order or executive directive issued regarding Executive Order No. 1, including President Trump's March 6, 2017 Executive Order.\" Attorney from Davis Wright Tremaine LLP worked with the ACLU on the case. The request concerned implementation at international airports within the purview of CBP's San Diego Field Office, including San Diego International Airport and the San Diego port of entry. The request also concerned the number of individuals who were detained or subjected to secondary screening, extended questioning, enforcement examination, or consideration for a waiver at the aforementioned airports pursuant to the Executive Orders. In the complaint, plaintiffs argued that the requested records \"would facilitate the public's understanding of how Defendants implemented and enforced the Executive Orders here in the San Francisco Field Office\" and that \"[s]uch information is critical to the public's ability to hold the government accountable.\" On May 8, the government filed a motion to treat all of these FOIA cases as \"multi-district litigation,\" effectively seeking to consolidate them before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. For the transfer motion, see this case. On Aug. 2, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied defendants' transfer motion (notice of the denial was filed on Aug. 15). On Aug. 3, Judge M. James Lorenz denied defendants' May 10 motion to stay. The parties met for a series of case management conferences in the fall of 2017. The case did not settle, so the parties continued with discovery. On October 15, 2018, the parties filed notice of settlement and subsequently jointly moved to dismiss the case. The documents released by the government in all the ACLU cases are available through this case page. Litigation about attorneys' fees dragged on for several years. The parties ultimately agreed on a fee award and notified the court the case was closed on July 11, 2019. The Clearinghouse does not know the amount of the fee award.", "summary": "On April 12, 2017, the ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties sued DHS under FOIA for information on the implementation of President Trump's travel ban at San Diego airports. Defendants were unable to consolidate all nationwide ACLU cases in multidistrict litigation and ultimately agreed to release documents to the ACLU."} {"article": "The plaintiff in this case is a trans woman who was housed in a men's prison in Massachusetts for a nonviolent drug possession charge. Because of her gender presentation and identity, she faced degrading sexual harassment from both staff and other prisoners. She was forced to use communal showers and bathrooms without locks, and was subject to strip searches conducted by male staff in front of other prisoners. The living conditions and repeated sexual harassment during her time there prompted her to file suit in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts on November 15, 2017. She alleged that the conditions she faced in the prison amount to a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as several state constitution claims. The named defendants are the Massachusetts Department of Correction, Commissioner of the DOC, superintendent of the prison, ADA coordinator responsible for the facility, and Assistant Deputy Commissioner of Clinical Services responsible for the provision of health services to all DOC prisoners. GLAD is representing the plaintiff and the case has been assigned to Judge Richard G. Stearns. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief. Specifically, she asked that the DOC be required to transfer her to a women's facility, require and train all staff to use the correct name and pronouns for her, treat her as they would any cisgender woman in custody, make accommodations to assure she will not be harassed by male staff or other prisoners, and provide her access to gender-appropriate medical care. She also requested attorneys fees. On March 5, 2018, Judge Stearns issued a partial preliminary injunction instructing the defendants to do the following: require that female rather than male staff conduct strip searches of the plaintiff whenever feasible, continue to house the plaintiff in a single cell and allow her separate time to shower, and to the extent that it is reasonable, provide a staff member to ensure that other inmates do not enter the shower area while the plaintiff is showering. In September 2018, the DOC voluntarily transferred the plaintiff to a women's facility and in April 2019 she was released. Soon after, Judge Stearns dismissed the case as moot. Finally, on July 8, 2019, the court awarded the plaintiff $46,297.50 in attorneys fees and $11,740.94 in litigation expenses.", "summary": "The plaintiff, a trans woman housed in a men's prison in Massachusetts, sued the Department of Correction (DOC) and several administrators in the department for mistreatment while in custody on account of her gender identity and presentation. She was represented by GLAD and brought the suit in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The complaint requested injunctive relief and attorney's fees. The judge granted a preliminary injunction regarding how prison staff were required to treat and accommodate the plaintiff while housed in the men's facility. After the plaintiff's transfer to a women's facility in 2018 and release in 2019, the judge dismissed the case as moot and awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiff."} {"article": "On September 21, 2015, the City of Oakland filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff sued Wells Fargo & Co and Wells Fargo Bank NA under the Fair Housing Act, California Fair Employment and Housing Act, and California Government Code. The plaintiffs, represented by the Oakland City Attorney\u2019s office, the Center for Constitutional Litigation, and private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief as well as punitive damages and attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had engaged in predatory mortgage strategies that disproportionately targeted minority communities. Specifically they claimed that the defendants had engaged in redlining and reverse redlining. This caused a disproportionate amount of foreclosures in minority communities and, as a result, reduced tax revenue for the City of Oakland, increased municipal expenditures, and neutralized the effectiveness of city fair-housing programs. On November 13, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the predatory sub-prime loans that the plaintiffs referred to had ceased in 2008, placing their conduct outside the two year limitation period in the Fair Housing Act. The Court directed Oakland \u201cto amend its complaint in view of the language now in Miami and give it your best shot with as much specificity as possible in terms of the kinds of damages that you are asserting that you contend are proximately caused by the [] alleged FHA violation.\u201d On August 15, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint claiming that Wells Fargo\u2019s predatory activity had continued through the time of filing and therefore was within the limitations of the Fair Housing Act. On October 6, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint, stating the plaintiffs had failed to properly show that the defendants had been the proximate cause of the injuries they alleged. On June 15, 2018, the Judge entered an order partially denying the defendants' motion to dismiss. Of the three injuries the plaintiffs alleged, the motion to dismiss was denied for injuries related to reduced tax revenue and increased municipal expenditures for the City of Oakland. However, for the second injury, the court held that only declaratory and injunctive relief could be pursued. The third injury\u2014neutralization of the city\u2019s fair-housing program\u2014was dismissed without prejudice. On February 28, 2019 the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal. This case is ongoing pending appeal (USCA No. 19\u221215169).", "summary": "The City of Oakland filed suit against Wells Fargo & Co and Wells Fargo Bank NA in the Northern District of California alleging predatory mortgage lending practices that disproportionately affected minority communities. These mortgages are alleged to have caused a loss of property tax revenue, increased municipal spending, and the neutralization of city fair-housing programs. The motion to dismiss was partially denied by the court and is currently on interlocutory appeal with the 9th Circuit."} {"article": "On July 28, 2017, an asylum-seeker who had been held in federal detention for nine months sought habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. Three weeks later, represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union and the International Refugee Assistance Project, he and a fellow asylum-seeker filed an amended petition and class action complaint against the Department of Homeland Security. They challenged the federal government\u2019s authority to indefinitely detain arriving asylum-seekers who had been determined likely to win the right to remain in the United States. They asserted that such detention, without parole or bond hearing, was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Immigration and Naturalization Act, and 8 C.F.R. \u00a7212.5. The case was assigned to Judge Elizabeth A. Wolford. The complaint sought to certify a class of \u201call arriving asylum-seekers who have passed a credible fear interview and who are or will be detained at the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility and who have not been granted parole,\u201d as well as a sub-class who \u201chave been or will be detained for more than six months without a bond hearing before an immigration judge.\u201d An overbroad plaintiffs\u2019 discovery motion was denied in November 2017. 292 F.Supp.3d 592. On November 17, 2017, the court denied the government\u2019s motion to dismiss the suit, simultaneously granting the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction. 280 F.Supp.3d 373. The injunction required the government to give detainees access to parole procedures as described in Immigrations and Customs Enforcement Directive 11002.1. Additionally, relying on the Ninth Circuit\u2019s reasoning in Jennings v. Rodriguez, reasoning which was subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court, the court found that 8 U.S.C. 1225(b) implicitly prohibits indefinite detention, and ordered the government to offer bond hearings to asylum-seekers within six months of their detention. For continued detention, the government must prove at the bond hearing that the asylum-seeker is a flight risk or a danger to the community. In February 2018, the court clarified the injunction, requiring that once \u201can [Immigration Judge] has determined that a detainee should be released on bond, he or she must consider the financial circumstances of each [detainee] and alternative conditions of release in setting the amount of bond.\u201d 287 F.Supp.3d 327 at 345. Class certification was granted on December 19, 2017, and the preliminary injunction of November 17 was applied to the newly-certified class. 323 F.R.D. 131. In January 2018, the government appealed the November 17 orders (Second Circuit Docket No. 18-00094, Jan 12, 2018). In late February, the Supreme Court ruled in Jennings v. Rodriguez, effectively overturning the district court\u2019s November order regarding the subclass (detainees held more than six months without a bond hearing). By consent of the parties, the Second Circuit remanded this issue to the district court on September 5, 2019. On September 24, 2019 the district court granted the government\u2019s motion to decertify the subclass. 405 F.Supp.3d 467. There was no activity in the case for nearly a year, until on July 10, 2020, the court directed the parties to submit a joint status report indicating whether the case should be closed. The parties responded that they were in the process of meeting and conferring regarding a settlement that would resolve the case entirely. But then, on September 24, 2020, the parties informed the court that they were no longer intending to reach a settlement. The parties negotiated a discovery schedule and the court set a schedule for summary judgment motions. The petitioners' motion for summary judgment is due January 28, 2021, and the respondents' opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment is due February 25, 2021. As of December 23, 2020, this case is ongoing.", "summary": "This suit was filed on July 28, 2017 as a habeas petition. According to the amended petition, which was a class action, plaintiffs sought to challenge the federal government\u2019s ability to deny arriving asylum seekers parole and then incarcerate them. The Court granted a preliminary injunction on Nov. 17, 2017, and certified a class and a subclass in December 2017. In February 2018, the Supreme Court's ruling in a similar case effectively overturned the district court's certification of the subclass. The district court officially decertified the subclass on September 24, 2019, but the preliminary injunction pertaining to the broader class remained in effect. As of July 2020, the litigation is ongoing."} {"article": "This is one of many lawsuits brought challenging the Obama administration's 2012 Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate requiring employers to pay for employees' contraception and abortifacients via medical insurance coverage. Many religious hospitals, charities, universities, and other enterprises owned or controlled by religious organizations or individuals who opposed contraception on doctrinal grounds, argued the mandate violated their religious beliefs. For a full list of these cases please see our collection of the Contraception Insurance Mandate cases here. On August 23, 2012, Grace College and Seminary, and Biola University, Inc.\u2014both religious non-profits\u2014filed this lawsuit in the Northern District of Indiana. They raised their claims against the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Labor, and the Department of the Treasury under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2)), and the First and Fifth Amendments. Represented by private counsel and the Alliance Defending Freedom, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violated their sincerely held religious beliefs. On September 6, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint incorporating the government's newly announced accommodations for non-profit, religious organizations. The plaintiffs argued that even with an accommodation, the mandate violated its religious freedoms. The plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction along with the amended complaint. On September 27, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. On October 11, 2013, the plaintiff filed a separate motion for summary judgment. On December 27, 2013, the District Court (Judge Jon E. DeGuilio) granted the plaintiff's preliminary injunction on the grounds that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm without it and their claims had merit under RFRA. On February 24, 2014, the defendant appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (No. 14-1430). This case was consolidated on appeal with Roman Catholic Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend v. Sebelius. On September 4, 2015, the Seventh Circuit (Judge Ilana Diamond Rovener) reversed the District Court's preliminary injunction and remanded the case, noting that since the suit was filed, the contraception mandate accommodation had been expanded to allow qualifying religious employers to notify HHS directly about their objections. On November 5, 2015, the Seventh Circuit denied the plaintiffs' petition for a rehearing en banc. On November 12, 2015, the Seventh Circuit granted the plaintiffs' motion to stay the suit pending petition for writ of certiorari. On February 3, 2016, the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari on May 16, 2016. The Supreme Court vacated the judgement and remanded the case, citing Zubik, which held that it was appropriate to vacate and remand so that the courts of appeals could address the arguments in response to the order for supplemental briefs. The supplement briefing request asked parties to address how contraceptive coverage could be obtained by employees through insurance companies that did not require any involvement by plaintiffs beyond their decision to provide health insurance without contraceptive coverage. The Supreme Court's order also resulted in dismissal of the defendants' consolidated interlocutory appeals. On remand, the Northern District of Indiana granted the plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction and declaratory relief on June 1, 2018. The injunction required that defendants be barred from any effort to enforce any requirements of the Affordable Care Act's contraceptive mandate that violated the plaintiffs' religious consciences. The declaratory relief stated that the requirements of the contraceptive mandate violated the plaintiffs' rights protected by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. This order was issued in part due to defendant\u2019s concession that they were no longer raising a substantive defense. The parties reached a settlement for attorneys' fees on September 18, 2018. The case is closed.", "summary": "On August 23, 2012, Grace College and Seminary, and Biola University, Inc., filed this lawsuit in the Northern District of Indiana against HHS, DOL, and Treasury. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. The District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The government appealed to the 7th Circuit. In February of 2016, plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, who vacated the judgement and remanded the case. On remand, the Northern District of Indiana granted plaintiff's motion for permanent injunction and declaratory relief in June of 2018. The case is now closed."} {"article": "American Freedom Defense Initiative (AFDI) is a pro-Israeli advocacy organization, known for its provocative writing on Middle East affairs. AFDI submitted a pro-Israeli political ad to the local Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) for display on the exterior of MTA's vehicles. MTA later rejected the submission under its No-Demeaning Standard. The Standard allowed MTA to reject some but not all ads depending whether they demeaned certain disfavored individuals or groups. However, MTA permitted display of anti-Israeli ads, which allegedly contained demeaning content. In light of that, AFDI sued MTA in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The complaint was filed on September 27, 2011. AFDI, represented by public interest lawyers, claimed that MTA's censorship was unconstitutional, in violation of the Free Speech Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. On July 20, 2012, the District Court (Judge Paul A. Engelmayer) held that MTA's No-Demeaning Standard was unconstitutional. Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 880 F. Supp. 2d 456, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), appeal dismissed (Sept. 25, 2012). The Court further granted AFDI a preliminary injunction preventing MTA from enforcing its No-Demeaning Standard. The Court found that the exterior of the mass transit vehicles a public forum, and that the Standard overly differentiated speech based on its content and target, inconsistent with the First Amendment. MTA appealed this decision to the Second Circuit. On August 29, 2012, the Court (Judge Engelmayer) converted the existing preliminary injunction to a permanent injunction. Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 889 F. Supp. 2d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). In addition, the Court granted a declaratory judgment that MTA's No-Demeaning Standard violated the First Amendment and nominal damages in sum of $1 to AFDI, unopposed by MTA. Subsequently, MTA voluntarily withdrew its appeal and reached an agreement with AFDI on attorneys' fees and litigation costs. The parties jointly informed the Court of their settlement on October 16, 2012. This ended the case.", "summary": "Although it had permitted certain anti-Israeli ads for display on the outside of its vehicles, the MTA rejected AFDI's pro-Israeli ads under its No-Demeaning Standard. On September 27, 2011, AFDI sued MTA for unconstitutional censorship in the federal court in New York, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. On July 20, 2012, the District Court (Judge Paul A. Engelmayer) held that MTA's No-Demeaning Standard was unconstitutional and granted a preliminary injunction to AFDI prohibiting MTA' further enforcement of the Standard. On August 29, 2012, the Court converted the existing preliminary injunction to a permanent injunction. The Court also granted a declaratory judgment and nominal damages to AFDI. Then the parties settled the attorneys' fees and litigation costs and informed the Court of their agreement on October 16, 2012. This ended the case."} {"article": "On May 31, 2006, two women brought suit against their former employer, Les Schwab Tire Centers of Washington, and other related corporations, alleging discrimination on the basis of their sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Washington Law Against Discrimination. The plaintiff's\u2019 complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Western Washington (Judge Ricardo Martinez), alleged that the plaintiffs and a class of similarly situated individuals employed by the defendant were denied promotions, training, and other employment opportunities because of their sex. The plaintiffs sought relief in the form of monetary damages. On July 7, 2006, this matter was consolidated with a lawsuit by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which received a filed discrimination charge by the named plaintiffs, alleging similar claims of a pattern and practice of sex-based employment discrimination. On July 18, 2006, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that provided additional factual detail and further clarified the plaintiffs\u2019 allegations of discrimination on the basis of gender with respect to the defendants\u2019 policies and practices that emphasized subjective gender based and/or arbitrary criteria in employment decisions, excluding women from management positions through the use of relocation requirements, and retaliating against female employees who complained of unequal treatment. The complaint alleged both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories. On August 1, 2006, the EEOC filed a complaint against the defendants also alleging the defendants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by failing to train and promote the plaintiff and a class of women similarly situated for management positions and for discriminatory hiring practices based on the plaintiff\u2019s charge filed with the EEOC. Around that time, the parties engaged in discovery and a protective order was ordered on December 11, 2006. The court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion to certify a class on August 8, 2008 because the court found the plaintiffs failed to show that there were common questions of fact. On November 10, 2008, the court granted the EEOC\u2019s motion to bifurcate the trial and discovery and severed the individual plaintiff\u2019s claims from the EEOC\u2019s claims. One of the defendants, Les Schwab Warehouse Center, moved for partial summary judgment because it was not included as an employer that could be liable under Title VII. On January 21, 2009, the court granted the motion in part, agreeing that it is not liable under Title VII, but denied it in part, finding that the entity could still be liable under the Washington Law Against Discrimination. Between May and June 2009, the defendants filed five motions for summary judgment on various claims brought by the plaintiff. On September 3, 2009, the court granted the defendants\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment on the promotion claim, finding that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden in providing direct evidence to support the claim. On September 8, the court denied the remaining two motions for summary judgment, finding that there remained disputed issues of fact for a jury to determine on the plaintiffs\u2019 remaining claims. Trial was held from November 3 to November 6, 2009 for the named individuals\u2019 claims. On November 9, the jury returned a special verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded them $85,200 ($42,600 each) for past and future emotional distress and punitive damages totaling $200,000 ($100,000 each). The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs on November 13, 2009. On January 8, 2010, the court denied the defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial. On June 1, 2010, the court ordered the defendant to pay the individual plaintiffs $583,930 in attorney\u2019s fees and $47,218 in expenses. Regarding the EEOC\u2019s remaining claims, the court denied defendant\u2019s motions for summary judgement on January 11 and 12, 2010 and set a date for trial in March 2010 following mediation. On the eve of trial, the EEOC and the defendants filed a notice of a proposed settlement and consent decree. The court approved the consent decree on March 10, 2010. The consent decree required the defendants to provide $2,000,000 to establish a settlement class fund, as well as injunctive relief in the form of a training program and policy changes regarding the defendant\u2019s recruitment efforts and hiring, and annual reporting requirements for a four-year period.", "summary": "In 2006, this lawsuit was filed against Les Schwab Centers of Washington by 2 former employees in the U.S. District Court for the District of Western Washington. The plaintiffs, two former employees of the defendant, alleged the defendant discriminated against them and others on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. This suit was later consolidated with a lawsuit filed by the EEOC alleging similar claims of a pattern and practice of sex discrimination. In 2008, the court denied class certification finding that there was insufficient commonality between members of the potential class. The court allowed the EEOC and private claims to be severed into two separate trials. In November 2009, a 5 day trial was held for the private plaintiffs' claims and the jury awarded the plaintiff's $285,200 in damages and $631,148 in attorney's fees and expenses. Regarding the EEOC's claims, the parties entered into a consent decree in 2010, which requires the defendant to provide $2,000,000 in damages and implement policy changes, training for employees, and reporting requirements for a four-year period."} {"article": "On May 11, 2017, three Florida Department of Corrections prisoners who had chronic hepatitis C filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. Judge Mark E. Walker was assigned to the case. The plaintiffs sued the Florida Department of Corrections (FDC) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act for failing to provide prisoners in its custody who had chronic hepatitis C with adequate medical treatment, even though the standard treatment for the deadly disease (direct-acting antivirals) cured 95% of hepatitis C patients. The plaintiffs alleged that the FDC\u2019s deliberate indifference to prisoners\u2019 serious medical needs violated the Eighth Amendment and that the FDC discriminated on the basis of disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The plaintiffs, represented by the Florida Justice Institute, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On May 23, 2017, the plaintiffs sought class certification and a preliminary injunction, arguing that many sick prisoners would become sicker and die if they had to wait until the end of the litigation to get relief. A few months later, on November 17, the court granted both of the plaintiffs\u2019 requests. (The FDC had also sought to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, but the court dismissed that motion without hearing it.) The class included all current and future prisoners in FDC custody who have been diagnosed, or will be diagnosed, with chronic hepatitis C. 323 F.R.D. 694. The preliminary injunction required the FDC to come up with a plan to provide medical treatment to prisoners with hepatitis C and to put that plan into effect immediately after it was approved. On December 13, 2017, the court approved a plan that required the FDC to treat all prisoners with hepatitis C, giving priority to those whose conditions were most serious. The plan contained a timetable for the FDC\u2019s goals; all would be fully implemented over the next year. On January 31, 2018, the court allowed the FDC to modify the preliminary injunction: the FDC began using different tests to determine which patients had the most serious conditions, and its timeline for treating patients with lower fibrosis scores was extended by twelve months. Nine days later, the court allowed the plaintiffs to modify the preliminary injunction as well: the FDC was required to initiate treatment for prisoners who were co-infected with hepatitis C and HIV by the end of the year, even if they had low fibrosis scores. On February 21, 2018, the court issued a second preliminary injunction because the first was about to expire. By the time the FDC\u2019s preliminary injunction took effect, more than seven months had passed since the plaintiffs had filed their initial complaint. One plaintiff\u2019s decompensated cirrhosis (liver scarring as a result of hepatitis C) had worsened considerably, and the plaintiffs sought an evaluation for a liver transplant for him on January 5, 2018. They alleged that the FDC had known about the severity of his condition for many months and should have referred him to the transplant center already. The court denied this motion for mootness, likely because the FDC\u2019s timetable put January 31 as the date that the FDC needed to have evaluated all prisoners with decompensated cirrhosis. Less than three months later, the plaintiff died. On April 26, 2018, a prisoner in FDC custody (and, thus, a class member to this suit) filed a motion to intervene, citing his dissatisfaction with class counsel. The inmate alleged that class counsel had an ethical conflict in suing FDC and moved the court (a) to require counsel to amend the case and seek monetary damages or (b) to terminate and replace class counsel. On April 28, 2018, the court denied this motion on the basis that it failed to articulate a conflict that would warrant disqualifying class counsel. Additionally, the court noted this suit did not preclude the prisoner from separately seeking monetary damages from defendant. On May 7, 2018, the inmate filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to supplement his original motion to intervene. Both motions were denied. On June 1, 2018, plaintiff appealed the court\u2019s denial of his motion to intervene and later motion to supplement his motion to intervene (18-12292). On September 7, 2018, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that plaintiff\u2019s appeal was frivolous and denied all pending motions as moot. The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on December 11, 2018. Before the motion for reconsideration was denied, on September 12, 2018, this same prisoner filed a second motion to intervene in the trial court, alleging insufficient medical care. The court dismissed this motion after the defendant presented evidence that the prisoner received adequate medical care. On November 1, 2018 the same individual plaintiff filed another interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to intervene. One month later, this appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution because the plaintiff did not pay the filing and docketing fees (18-14652). On April 3, 2019, the plaintiff filed a third motion to intervene. The court found that the plaintiff had failed to state a basis on which to intervene and that the plaintiff had failed to state a violation of the preliminary injunction. On June 12, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis (to proceed without payment of fees). The next day, the court denied his motion, and held that his appeal was not taken in good faith. Meanwhile, on May 10, 2018, another individual plaintiff filed a motion alleging that his interest for economic and punitive damages was not being considered. The court denied this motion on the grounds that this suit is based on treatment, not damages. On May 23, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend his May 10th motion. The court again denied his motion, warning the plaintiff not to file another motion complaining about damages in this suit. On June 19, 2018, plaintiff appealed the court\u2019s denial of his motion to amend (18-12571). On July 23, 2018 the appeal was dismissed because appellant did not pay the requisite filing fees. On May 24, 2018, the court granted the original plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a third preliminary injunction with the same terms as the first two. On September 5, 2018, plaintiffs filed a motion for a fourth preliminary injunction, proposing a permanent injunction as an alternative remedy. That same day the court only granted the fourth preliminary injunction with the same terms as the previous iterations. On June 22, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment seeking both a permanent injunction as well as other forms of relief not currently required by the preliminary injunction. Though the proposed permanent injunction looked largely similar to the past preliminary injunctions, the plaintiffs sought to change some of the mechanisms by which the defendants tested for and treated hepatitis C in prisoners. On November 26, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed fifth motion for a preliminary injunction, or in the alternative, a permanent injunction. The next day, the court granted the motion for the preliminary injunction and it was was renewed. Another prisoner filed a motion to intervene on February 8, 2019. On the same day, this inmate filed a motion for joinder of the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) as a defendant because he was transferred from the FDC to the VDOC under an Interstate Corrections Compact. This individual also filed a motion for relief from judgment on the same day. Four days later, the court denied the petitioner's motion to intervene. Because the petitioner was originally incarcerated in the FDC and was then transferred to the VDOC, the court held that it was unclear if the petitioner was a member of the certified class. The court ordered the defendants to respond the petitioner's motion to clear up the confusion. Judge Walker also denied the petitioner's motion for joinder of the VDOC as a defendant. Judge Walker construed the petitioner's motion for relief from judgment as a motion to enforce the court's preliminary injunction. Additionally, the court ordered the defendants to respond to this motion and address whether the petitioner was wrongfully denied treatment in violation of the court's preliminary injunction. On March 5, 2019, the court denied the petitioner's motion for enforcement of the preliminary injunction. Judge Walker held that the injunction required the defendants to provide treatment for the petitioner by the end of December 2019, and so the deadline had not yet passed. Since the onset of the first preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs have filed motions both to enforce the preliminary injunctions and to compel defendant to treat other prisoners in compliance with the preliminary injunctions' terms. The court denied these motions without prejudice on the basis that the defendant was either complying with, or at least not in actionable violation of, the injunctions at the time the motions were considered. Individuals in FCD custody have also filed motions for civil contempt that alleged violations of the preliminary injunction, and the court denied them all on the basis that the defendants had not violated the injunction. Since the first preliminary injunction was issued, the FDC screened 55,348 prisoners for chronic hepatitis C, diagnosed 7,185 prisoners with hepatitis C, and began treatment for 4,901 prisoners using direct-acting antivirals (DAAs). On February 25, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for issuance of a sixth preliminary injunction, or in the alternative, a permanent injunction. Judge Walker renewed the preliminary injunction the next day. Judge Walker issued a permanent injunction on April 18, 2019 and as such dissolved the preliminary injunction. The permanent injunction required defendants to modify the FDC's policy on managing prisoners with hepatitis C by May 20, 2019. The FDC had to provide medical staff with the option of elastography, which is a more accurate method of identifying hepatitis C and evaluating the severity. The injunction required the FDC to adopt either opt-out testing with an aggressive notice campaign or opt-in testing with peer education for all prisoners. The FDC was required to begin treating all prisoners with hepatitis C. Prisoners with the most severe hepatitis C infections (Priority Level 1) had to start receiving treatment within six months of diagnosis, those with Priority Level 2 hepatitis C must begin receiving treatment within twelve months of diagnosis, and those with less severe hepatitis C infections must begin receiving treatment within two years of diagnosis. Judge Walker made it clear that these treatment deadlines are absolutely mandatory. The court ordered that the FDC\u2019s new policy must ensure that prisoners receive routine FibroSure and ultrasound testing every twelve months once diagnosed with hepatitis C of any severity. The agreement required that FDC\u2019s new policy must make clear that \"chronic disciplinary issues\" were not a sufficient reason for an inmate to be ineligible for treatment. Starting in June 2019, the FDC had to file monthly status reports with the court to show its progress complying with the injunction. 382 F. Supp. 3d. 1288 (N.D. Fla. 2019). Twelve days after the court issued the permanent injunction, the plaintiffs filed a motion for modification of the injunction to ask that the defendants provide class counsel with spreadsheets containing the names of all prisoners diagnosed with HCV. Two weeks later, the court denied the motion because the spreadsheets at issue contained inaccurate information. The defendants filed an appeal of the order and final judgment (as well as all preliminary injunctions and the order granting class certification) in the Eleventh Circuit on May 17, 2019. On August 31, 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's injunction and remanded back to the district court to make adequate findings on the record that its permanent injunction complied with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 973 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2020). The Eleventh Circuit also reversed the part of the district court's order that mandated direct acting antiviral (DAA) treatment for low-fibrosis-scored HCV-positive inmates, and instructed the district court to grant defendants summary judgment on that issue. The Eleventh Circuit held that failure to provide DAA treatment does not violate the Eighth Amendment because, it found, such treatment was not medically necessary for HCV-positive inmates with low fibrosis scores. Thus, plaintiffs failed to prove that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The Eleventh Circuit issued its mandate on November 2, 2020. As of April 2021, the case remains open.", "summary": "In May 2018, three prisoners brought this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida on behalf of all current and future prisoners in Florida Department of Corrections (FDC) custody who have been diagnosed, or will be diagnosed, with chronic hepatitis C. The plaintiffs alleged that the FDC's failure to provide treatment to inmates with hepatitis C violated their rights under the Eighth Amendment and the American with Disabilities Act. In 2019, the court issued a permanent injunction requiring the FDC to improve testing and treatment for chronic hepatitis C. The injunction also required the FDC to submit monthly reports to the court showing that it was complying with the terms of the injunction. The defendants appealed, and oral argument in the Eleventh Circuit is scheduled for June 10, 2020."} {"article": "On September 28, 2018, the HuffingtonPost.com brought this lawsuit against the U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that ICE had violated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) act when it failed to adequately respond to an information request by Huffington Post. Represented by attorneys from American Oversight, the plaintiff filed the lawsuit under FOIA, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief to compel compliance.The case was assigned to Judge Trevor N. McFadden. Specifically, HuffingtonPost filed this complaint after it had previously submitted a an expedited FOIA request to ICE for the arrest records of immigrants. ICE acknowledged receipt of the request, but failed to respond. Huffington Post therefore alleged that ICE had:
(1) wrongfully denied expedited processing for information for which there was an urgent need to inform the public, (2) failed to conduct an adequate search for records, and (3) failed to provide records required to be disclosed under FOIA.On February 5, 2019, the parties filed a joint notice and stipulation of dismissal, stating that the issues of the case have been resolved. HuffingtonPost then voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On September 28, 2018, HuffingtonPost.com, brought this lawsuit against the U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement for alleged violation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Specifically, HuffingtonPost alleged wrongful denial of expedited processing for information for which there is an urgent need to inform the public, failure to conduct an adequate search for records, and wrongful withholding of Non-Exempt Records. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief to compel compliance with the requirements of FOIA. On February 5, 2019, HuffingtonPost voluntarily dismissed the action, stating that the issues of the case have been resolved."} {"article": "On October 15th, 2013, two same-sex couples filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the state of Oregon. The plaintiffs, represented by both private and public counsel, sought a declaration that Oregon laws banning same-sex marriages violate the United States Constitution, a permanent injunction against the enforcement of laws banning same-sex marriage, and an award to the plaintiffs of the costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that their rights under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause had been violated by being denied the same access to marriage as different-sex couples. They further claim that the ban discriminated against gay and lesbian citizens of Oregon who wished to be married in their state of residence. On January 22nd, 2014, this case was consolidated with Rummel v. Kitzhaber because of its similar circumstances. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on February 18th, 2014. On February 20, Oregon's Attorney General, Ellen Rosenblum, announced that the state would not defend its ban on same-sex marriage. The State filed an answer in the case telling the court that it agreed with the plaintiffs that \"the ban cannot withstand a federal constitutional challenge under any standard of review.\" The state stated, however, that \"In the meantime, as the State Defendants are legally obligated to enforce the Oregon Constitution's ban on same-sex marriage, they will continue to do so unless and until this Court grants the relief sought by the plaintiffs.\" An anti-same-sex-marriage group, the National Organization for Marriage, then moved to intervene to defend the ban. The Court denied intervention and struck down the same-sex marriage ban on May 19th, 2014. The court's opinion declared that Oregon's ban of same-sex marriage violates the Equal Protection Clause and the court permanently enjoined the enforcement of the ban. Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 2014 WL 2054264 (D. Oregon 2014). The defendants declined to appeal and did not seek a stay of the injunction. However, the National Organization for Marriage appealed the denial of their intervention motion, and sought a stay of the injunction pending disposition of that appeal. That stay was denied, first by the District Court on May 19, 2014, then by the Court of Appeals that same day, and then by the Supreme Court on June 4, 2014. On August 27, 2014, the Ninth Circuit held in an unpublished opinion that the National Organization for Marriage lacked Article III standing to appeal the District Court's final judgment. The Ninth Circuit also denied the National Organization for Marriage's petition for rehearing en banc on November 24, 2014. The Supreme Court denied the National Organization for Marriage's petition for certiorari on April 20, 2015. On August 19, 2014, the Court approved the parties' agreement over attorney's fees, by which the defendants agreed to pay $132,690 in total. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On October 15th, 2013, two same-sex couples filed a lawsuit in the District of Oregon U.S. District Court against the state of Oregon. The plaintiff asked the court to declare that Oregon laws banning same-sex marriages violate the United States Constitution, issue a permanent injunction against the enforcement of laws banning same-sex marriage, and award the plaintiffs costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees. Summary judgment was decided in the plaintiffs' favor, and Oregon's same-sex marriage ban was declared unconstitutional and the state was enjoined from enforcing the ban. The National Organization for Marriage's attempts to intervene were denied. The Court awarded the plaintiffs $132,690 in attorney's fees. The case is now closed."} {"article": "NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see their tracker. COVID-19 Summary: This suit was filed on May 22, 2020, by two non-profit organizations and six individual plaintiffs against the state of North Carolina to challenge various election laws in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. No outcome yet.
- A dispute over eligibility policies concerns that the Plaintiff raised--such as the Defendant's alleged failure to identify and evaluate individual disabled children--are in essence, disputes for which the Plaintiffs should have exhausted administrative remedies and utilized the formal administrative process. - The class should not have been certified in the first place. The reason is that while none of the Plaintiffs exhausted their administrative remedies, and the exception for systemic violations is essentially a \"class action exception,\" the exception does not apply here because Wisconsin's procedures are capable of resolving child find disputes on a case-by-case, individual basis. In summary, administrative process can resolve individual child find disputes. - Plaintiffs' argument that exhaustion should be excused because their claims are \"systemic\" in nature is without merit because the Defendants cannot find safe harbor in the exception for systemic violations--each Plaintiff must offer an individual excuse for failing to exhaust the administrative process.In conclusion, none of the individual Plaintiffs had followed the formal process, and therefore, the court dismissed the case in favor of the Defendant. The plaintiffs appealed, but later withdrew the appeal. The case is closed.", "summary": "This Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (\"IDEA\") class action lawsuit was filed on September 13, 2001 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Plaintiffs claimed that the Milwaukee Public School system improperly denied them special education services and Individualized Education Programs (\"IEP\") designed to fit their needs. Plaintiffs won at trial, but that victory was vacated by the 7th Circuit and the case was soon dismissed."} {"article": "On October 27, 2014, twenty-five former prisoners forced to enroll in Kansas's Sexual Predator Treatment Program after their release from prison filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas. The plaintiffs sued directors of the Sexual Predator Treatment Program (SPTP), Larned State Hospital, the Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services, and the State of Kansas under 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Kansas state law. Representing themselves, the plaintiffs asked for declaratory and injunctive relief along with monetary damages. In their claim for relief, they cited violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, along with the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and Kansas state law (K.S.A. \u00a7 59-29a22(b)(3)). More specifically, the plaintiffs argued in a 314-page complaint that the SPTP is, in both design and in application, a source of punishment rather than therapy, and that it violated laws designed to protect recipients of therapy and constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto punishment and double jeopardy. They alleged that the program was in many ways equivalent to or in some instances worse than prison in the restrictions that it imposed and in the conditions to which it subjected enrollees. The case was initially assigned to District Judge Sam A. Crow. On January 27, 2015, the case was reassigned to District Judge Eric F. Melgren. The next day, it was again reassigned, this time to Chief Judge J. Thomas Marten. The plaintiffs sought appointment of counsel. Magistrate Judge Karen Humphreys granted the motion on February 9, 2015 but deferred selection of counsel until the court could learn more about what sorts of experience appointed counsel would need. In particular, Judge Humphreys noted that similar litigation was underway in Illinois (Hargett v. Adams), Minnesota (Karsjens v. Jesson), Missouri (Van Orden v. Healthlink), New Jersey (Alves v. Main), and Washington (Turay v. Seling) and consulted lawyers involved in the Missouri case for advice. Judge Humphreys retired in June 2015 while the stay was still in place and the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Kenneth G. Gale on June 11, 2015. On November 12, 2015, one of the plaintiffs wrote a letter to Judge Marten and Judge Gale. The letter noted that trials in both the Minnesota and Missouri cases had ended, and their respective SVP programs had been found unconstitutional. Because the trials had ended and Judge Humphreys had retired, the plaintiff argued, the stay should be lifted and the case allowed to proceed. On January 7, 2016, another plaintiff sent the court clerk a handwritten note and attached the Missouri court decision to encourage the court to lift the stay. On March 31, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for stay to be lifted, but Judge Gale denied the motion on April 4, 2016. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45574. Judge Gale emphasized that he was actively working to find counsel but had not been successful because of the large amount of uncompensated work that would be required of any appointed counsel. Judge Gale reiterated that the Plaintiffs could not adequately represent themselves and asked for their patience while the search continued. On August 2, 2016, the Court appointed seven pro bono lawyers to represent the plaintiffs and lifted the stay. Judge Gale ordered the plaintiffs to stop communicating with the Court or the defendants unless done through counsel. The original complaint and summons had not been served on defendants at the time counsel was appointed. On December 5, 2016, the plaintiffs (now through counsel) filed an amended complaint with substantial changes. The plaintiffs re-alleged that the Kansas SPTP was an unconstitutional punishment system, rather than a therapy program. Specifically, they alleged that there was no realistic possibility of ever completing the program and being released from its requirements - of the hundreds committed under SPTP, only three had successfully completed the program. The program was alleged to be inadequate because it failed to tailor treatment to the needs of the detainees. The plaintiffs also alleged that treatment hours had been cut, the facilities were overcrowded, and the employee turnover was so high as to compromise the treatment of detainees. The move from one phase of the program to another was often based on arbitrary or non-therapeutic considerations, like bed availability. The facilities were also managed like a prison, using Kansas Department of Corrections protocols. All of these factors, when combined, made SPTP an essentially lifelong commitment in a secure facility. The plaintiffs alleged that these conditions meant SPTP violated the 14th Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause. On December 29, 2016, one plaintiff moved to separate from the class. Judge Gale granted his motion and declared the case would be treated as a consolidated case, with the original complaint applying to this plaintiff and the amended complaint applying to the class action. The separate plaintiff then moved to certify the class under the original complaint and asked for separate counsel to be appointed for his case on February 23, 2017. He expressed that appointed counsel for the amended complaint did not have the \u201cbest interests\u201d of the class in mind. On March 2, 2017, Judge Gale denied the motion to appoint replacement counsel, citing the fact that able and competent counsel had already been appointed. On February 24, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendants argued that the state has discretion to design treatment programs for sexually violent predators and had not abused that discretion in creating the SPTP. The plaintiffs disagreed with the treatment they had received, the defendants argued, but that treatment was within the bounds of professional judgment and not enough to make out a constitutional violation. On July 17, 2017, the Court granted the motion to dismiss. Specifically, Judge Marten found that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately allege how the SPTP program deviated from accepted standards of treatment in a way that violated the plaintiffs\u2019 due process rights. Judge Marten also ruled that the conditions of the SPTP facilities were related to the reasons for detaining the plaintiffs and, thus, did not violate the plaintiffs\u2019 due process rights. Because of this dismissal, the separate plaintiff\u2019s motion to certify the original complaint class was denied as moot. On August 14, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal, arguing that the court had committed legal error by failing to take judicial notice of a 2015 Kansas report on SPTP. In the alternative, the plaintiffs asked for leave to file an amended complaint that did state a claim. Two months later, on November 14, 2017, Judge Marten denied this motion. Judge Marten found that consideration of the 2015 Report would not have changed his ruling that the complaint did not state a claim. The plaintiffs attached a proposed second amended complaint to their motion for reconsideration, which Judge Marten reviewed and found similarly deficient. Judge Marten decided that amending the complaint would be futile and dismissed the case with prejudice. For a discussion of SPTP, written after the complaint in this case was filed, see this Kansas City Star article.", "summary": "In 2014, various former prisoners who were forced to enroll in Kansas\u2019s Sexual Predator Treatment Program (SPTP) after their release filed this Lawsuit in the U.S District Court for the District of Kansas. The Plaintiffs alleged that the program is punitive rather than therapeutic, and that it thus violates constitutional rights against ex post facto punishment and double jeopardy in addition to rights guaranteed under the American's Disability Act (ADA), the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act (PAIR), Section 504 (Rehabilitation Act), and Kansas state law. After counsel was appointed for the plaintiffs, an amended complaint was filed that alleged due process violations under SPTP. On July 17, 2017, Judge Thomas Marten dismissed the case for failure to state a claim and denied a motion to certify the class as moot. On November 14, 2017, Judge Marten denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case with prejudice."} {"article": "On September 21, 2006, the Chicago office of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\") filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois following a complaint by a former employee of Integrity Financial Services (\"Integrity\"). The plaintiff sued Integrity under 42 USC \u00a72000 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and 42 USC \u00a71981a (Title I of the Civil Right Act of 1991). The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction enjoining the defendant from engaging in any employment practice that discriminated on the basis of race; requiring the defendant to institute and carry out equal employment opportunities for its employees; ordering the defendant to reinstate the individual employee. The plaintiff further sought back pay, non- and pecuniary losses, and punitive damages. The complaint was based on an allegation that Integrity intentionally discriminated against a black female employee on the basis of her race by terminating her employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After many status conferences, the case was settled when the District Court Judge Mark Filip entered a consent decree on May 29, 2007. The two-year consent decree included non-discrimination and non-retaliation clauses. It required Integrity to post notice of the decree, maintain and make available to the EEOC records of complaints made about race discrimination, submit written reports to the EEOC every six months, and conduct annual training sessions for all employees. The decree also included a dispute resolution clause requiring each party to notify the other party of alleged non-compliance and a chance to remedy. Integrity agreed to pay a total of $9,000, all of which was awarded to the charging party. On August 7, 2007, the EEOC made a motion to reopen the case and a motion for order to show cause why Integrity should not be held in contempt of the consent decree as the defendant did not pay $9,000. The defendants alleged an inability to pay. Both motions were stricken without prejudice. On May 20, 2008, the case was re-assigned to Judge John W. Darrah. On June 5, 2008, the plaintiff filed a renewed motion to show cause why defendant should not be held in contempt. This was withdrawn on June 9, 2008 because the defendant was no longer in business and the owner of the defendant was deceased. The case is closed.", "summary": "In 2006, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\") filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois following a complaint by a former employee of Integrity Financial Services (\"Integrity\"). The complaint was based on an allegation that Integrity intentionally discriminated against a black female employee on the basis of her race by terminating her employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The case was settled on May 29, 2007. However, the defendant did not pay follow the decree. In 2008 the defendant was no longer in business and the owner of the defendant was deceased. The case is closed."} {"article": "On April 12, 2017, the ACLUs of Washington, Montana, and North Dakota filed this suit against the United States under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump's Jan. 27 and Mar. 6 Executive Orders that ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, plaintiffs sought information \"concerning CBP\u2019s local implementation of President Trump\u2019s January 27, 2017 Executive Order...as well as any other judicial order or executive directive issued regarding Executive Order No. 1, including President Trump\u2019s March 6, 2017 Executive Order.\" The request concerned implementation at international airports within the purview of CBP's Seattle Field Office, including Seattle-Tacoma International Airport and Fargo-Hector International Airport. The request also concerned the number of individuals who were detained or subjected to secondary screening, extended questioning, enforcement examination, or consideration for a waiver at the aforementioned airports pursuant to the EO. In the complaint, the plaintiffs argued that the requested records \"would facilitate the public\u2019s understanding of how Defendants implemented and enforced the Executive Orders\" and that \"[s]uch information is critical to the public\u2019s ability to hold the government accountable.\" The case was assigned to Judge Robert S. Lasnik. On May 8, the government filed a motion to treat all of these FOIA cases as \"multidistrict litigation\" effectively consolidating them before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. For the transfer motion see this case. The ACLU filed an opposition to the motion to transfer on May 30, arguing that \"[g]ranting consolidation and transfer would promote forum-shopping and delay, not justice.\" On Aug. 3, the U.S. District Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied the government's consolidation motion. In its order, the Panel found that although the thirteen FOIA cases share \"a limited number of factual issues,\" these issues \"appear relatively straightforward and unlikely to entail extensive pretrial proceedings.\" The case was reassigned to Judge Marsha J. Pechman on Aug. 31. Litigation continued over a possible production schedule and appropriate search parameters for the government to use in responding to the FOIA request. In proceedings held on Oct. 17, 2017, and in an order issued on Jan. 12, 2018, the court directed the government to turn over documents responsive to the ACLU's FOIA requests. As of a status report filed on Mar. 2, 2018, the government finished processing and producing all records responsive to the FOIA request. The May 1, 2018, status report indicated the parties were in discussions to streamline final resolution of the case. The parties requested a discovery deadline of Nov. 1, 2018, and for dispositive motions to be filed by Jan. 31, 2019. On February 25, 2019, the parties filed a stipulation and proposed order for dismissal, which Judge Pechman signed on February 26, 2019, dismissing all claims with prejudice. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On April 12, 2017, the ACLUs of Washington, Montana, and North Dakota filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump's January 27 and March 6 Executive Orders that ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The case was dismissed voluntarily by the parties on Feb. 26, 2019."} {"article": "On October 2, 2007, a detained alien who obtained entry into the U.S. through an illegal smuggling operation brought a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, challenging Department of Homeland Security regulations which governed issuance of U-visas. The \"U-visa\" was a new non-immigrant visa classification created by the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act. U-visas granted temporary immigration benefits to certain alien victims of crimes who assisted government officials in investigating or prosecuting the criminal activity. To be processed, the application for a U-Visa had to be accompanied a law enforcement certification (LEC). Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 214.14(a)(14)(iii), a Homeland Security regulation that set out the parameters for the issuance of a LEC. Plaintiff claimed that plaintiff and his brother left Guatemala in March 2007 with the assistance of an alien smuggling operation that brought them from Guatemala to Mexico and then to the U.S. border near Falfurrias, Texas. Once near the border, the smugglers deserted plaintiff and his brother, leaving them without food, water, shelter or navigational devices. The two men wandered in the desert area for days until plaintiff's brother died. Plaintiff then contacted U.S. border agents, where he cooperated with authorities, gave them information about the smugglers and was taken into custody. Plaintiff then sought to apply for a U-visa, but was not issued a LEC by the investigating authorities. He claimed that his denial of a LEC, which was apparently done per new Homeland Security regulations, violated due process and equal protection. He asserted claims under Habeas Corpus, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241; the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 702 et seq.; and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification on behalf of all aliens who were crime victims and denied LECs for use in U-visa applications. On February 25, 2008, defendant moved to dismiss, and on December 8 the District Court (Judge Andrew S. Hanen) granted defendant's motion. Ordo\u00f1ez Orozco v. Chertoff, No. 1:07-cv-00153, 2008 WL 5155728, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98800 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2008). The court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the issuance of LECs, which it determined was the type of discretionary action withdrawn from its purview by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). It further found that the discretionary nature of the issuance of LECs defeated plaintiff's constitutional claims, his claims under the APA and his petition for mandamus. The Fifth Circuit (Judge William L. Garwood) affirmed on March 2, 2010, Ordo\u00f1ez Orosco v. Napolitano, 598 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2010), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 4, 2010.", "summary": "On October 2, 2007, a detained alien who obtained entry into the U.S. through an illegal smuggling operation brought a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, challenging Department of Homeland Security regulations which governed the issuance of law enforcement certifications (LECs), which applicants must submit in order to obtain a U-visa. On December 8, 2008, the District Court dismissed plaintiff's claims, finding that the discretionary nature of the issuance of LECs defeated them. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari."} {"article": "On August 30, 2010, a Tennessee resident who had been detained several months brought a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Rutherford County Sheriff's Office, the Rutherford County Sheriff, and the Sheriff's Chief Deputy. The plaintiff claimed he was unlawfully detained pursuant to an ICE detainer for four months after he was otherwise eligible for release. He alleged that his prolonged detention violated his constitutional rights (4th, 5th, 8th and 14th Amendments) as well as state law against negligence, false imprisonment, and failure to train. The plaintiff also brought a 1983 claim alleging that the Sheriff's Office had failed to adequately train its employees. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought to represent a class that included prisoners of Rutherford County Jail who were detained unlawfully pursuant to detainers. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and attorneys' fees. Plaintiff's claims arose out of his detention following his arrest for driving on a suspended license. He was sentenced to five days in jail. ICE then issued an immigration detainer, which would allow the Sheriff to hold the plaintiff for 48 additional hours. The plaintiff, however, was held for an additional four months. On March 2, 2011, the District Court (Judge William J. Hayes, Jr.) dismissed plaintiff's federal and state law claims against the sheriff and his chief deputy and denied class certification. Ramos-Macario v. Jones, No. 3:10-00813, 2011 WL 831678 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 2, 2011). The Court also denied defendants' motions to dismiss or in the alternative, for summary judgment as to the federal claims against Rutherford County and allowed the false imprisonment claim to go forward against the county. In March 2012, the court set a status conference for the parties to present their provisional settlement agreement. The docket does not reflect that the conference ever took place, but on April 20, 2012, the parties moved to voluntarily dismiss the suit with prejudice. It is therefore unclear whether the parties reached a settlement agreement.", "summary": "In 2010, a Tennessee resident who had been detained in jail for several months brought a lawsuit in the Middle District of Tennessee against the Rutherford County Sheriff's Office. Plaintiff was detained for four months pursuant to an ICE detainer after his five-day sentence expired. Plaintiff alleged that his prolonged detention had violated the Constitution and state law. The court dismissed plaintiff's state and federal law claims against the sheriff and his deputy, but denied defendants' motion to dismiss as to the federal claims against the county. The parties had requested to present a provisional settlement in March 2012 and in April 2012, the parties moved to voluntarily dismiss the suit."} {"article": "On August 4, 2014, a mother of three minor daughters, those minor daughters (ages 7, 11, and 13 at the time of the incident), and her brother filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs, represented by a public interest attorney, sought compensatory relief, claiming that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated during a \"violent nighttime home invasion\" by the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD). Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that, in response to a traffic stop of an individual not living in their home that occurred thirteen days prior, twenty heavily armed MPD officers stormed their home brandishing shields, machine guns, handguns, and body armor in a military-style raid. This incident happened on April 5, 2013 when MPD officers conducted a traffic stop and found contraband on the biological father of one of the daughters whose license stated that he lived at the plaintiffs' address. The complaint alleges that despite the MPD being told that the suspect did not live at the address and that there was no evidence of the suspect being a drug dealer, the police obtained a search warrant based on those causes. There were no facts connecting the home to the drug activity that was claimed to be occurring there. The complaint claims that obtaining a warrant in this case is reflective of systematic problems with the police procedures for obtaining search warrants that allow police to obtain warrants based on vague statements of their \"training\" and \"expertise,\" even in the absence of facts. On April 18, 2013, shortly after 10:00 p.m., the police conducted the raid of the plaintiffs' home. The plaintiffs claim that the police burst into the home with shields and weapons and that the mother and two daughters were kept on a couch downstairs. The police handcuffed the younger brother of the mother and pointed guns at his head even though nothing illegal was found on his person or in his room. The police also threw open the shower curtain while the third daughter, an 11-year-old, was showering and pointed a gun at her. Nothing illegal was found in the home. On September 15, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety, in which they asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on September 25, 2014, in which they added several named officers and a lieutenant as defendants. On September 16, 2017, District Judge Randolph D. Moss issued a memorandum opinion and order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. 270 F. Supp. 3d 260 (D.D.C. 2017). Although the defendants asked the court to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety, they only addressed the following issues in their brief: issues relating to the warrant; execution of the search; negligence per se; and municipal liability. Thus, the court only focused on these issues. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to count two (alleging that an officer secured the warrant only by knowingly and recklessly misleading the Superior Court judge who issued it); count three (alleging that the warrant was clearly overbroad such that no reasonable officer could have executed it in good faith); count six (alleging excessive use of force and unreasonable seizures in the execution of the warrant); and counts five and eight (alleging municipal liability). The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss count seven (alleging negligence per se) to the extent that it relied on D.C. Code \u00a7\u00a7 23-522 and 523, but denied the motion to dismiss count seven to the extent that it relied on the Fourth Amendment. Finally, the court dismissed count four (alleging that the warrant application was obtained in an unconstitutional manner) and dismissed count one except as against Officer Volpe. On April 4, 2018, Judge Moss approved the parties' settlement agreement, under which the parties agreed to settle the plaintiffs' remaining claims for $75,000. Under the agreement, $10,500 went to the brother and $42,000 went to the mother. Attorneys' fees were deducted from the settlement in the amount of $22,500. The case is now closed.", "summary": "The plaintiffs alleged that the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) conducted a nighttime raid of plaintiffs' home based on minimal connections to a traffic stop where contraband was discovered. The plaintiffs claimed that the search violated their rights and privacy and ask for compensatory damages as a result. After dismissing several of the plaintiffs' claims in September 2017 in response to the defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court approved the parties' settlement agreement in April 2018. The parties agreed to settle the remaining claims for $75,000."} {"article": "On October 9, 2012, a family of Catholic business owners filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (\"RFRA\"), and the Administrative Procedures Act (\"APA\"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. They alleged that rules under the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (\"ACA\") violated their religious freedom by requiring them to provide coverage for contraception through their companies' group health insurance plans. Providing contraceptive coverage would contravene their Catholic faith, so the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other business owners with similar religious objections. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Center for Law & Justice, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief. On October 10, the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment and filed for a preliminary injunction. On December 14, 2012, District Court Judge Michael J. Reagan denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that indirect financial support of subjectively objectionable conduct was not a substantial burden on the plaintiffs' religious freedom. 2012 WL 6553996. The plaintiffs appealed this denial to the Seventh Circuit (Docket No. 12-03841). On December 28, 2012, a three-judge panel granted the plaintiffs' emergency motion for an injunction pending appeal, finding that the coerced coverage of contraception imposed a substantial burden on the plaintiffs' religious freedom. Korte v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 6757353 (Judges Joel M. Flaum, Ilana Diamond Rovner, and Diane S. Sykes). On January 30, 2013, the Seventh Circuit consolidated the case with Grote v. Sebelius (FA-IN-0004) The same three-judge panel heard arguments in the case on May 22, 2013. On November 8, 2013, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs and their companies could challenge the mandate and state a valid claim under RFRA. The Court remanded the case with instructions to the District Court to enter preliminary injunctions barring enforcement of the contraception mandate against the plaintiffs. Grote v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654. The defendant agencies sought review in the Supreme Court, and on November 27, 2013, the case was stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby LobbyBurwell v. Hobby Lobby (also known as Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius) and Conestoga Wood Specialities Corps. The Hobby Lobby decision was issued on June 30, 2014. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. The Court emphasized that alternative methods for meeting the government's asserted interest were available. 134 S.Ct. 2751. The next day, the Supreme Court denied the government's certiorari petition for review in this case. 134 S.Ct. 2902. On July 28, 2014, the district court lifted the stay. On August 12, 2014, the Seventh Circuit awarded the plaintiffs $578.80 in costs. On November 7, 2014, the Court granted the joint motion for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their RFRA claim, entered a permanent injunction against enforcement of the contraception services mandate, and dismissed all other claims against the defendants. Finally, on February 26, 2015, the district court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and noted that the parties had reached an independent settlement on attorneys' fees and costs. The case is closed.", "summary": "In 2012, Catholic business owners filed this RFRA challenge to rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The plaintiffs argued that the rules infringed on their religious freedom by requiring them to provide coverage for contraception through their business's group health insurance plan. In December 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the contraception mandate did not impose a substantial burden on the plaintiffs' religious freedom. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit granted the plaintiffs' motion for an emergency injunction pending appeal and consolidated the case with Grote v. Sebelius. On November 8, 2013, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to enter preliminary injunctions barring enforcement of the mandate. The government sought review in the Supreme Court, but its petition was denied on July 1, 2014, the day after the Supreme Court issued its Hobby Lobby decision on a similar question. On November 7, 2014, the Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and entered a permanent injunction preventing the defendants from enforcing the contraceptive services mandate against the plaintiffs."} {"article": "On May 21, 2014, four same-sex couples -- three female couples and one male couple -- filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana, under Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, against the Attorney General of Montana, the Director of the Montana Department of Revenue, and the Clerk of Court of Cascade County. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private attorneys, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Their complaint challenged the validity of Art. XIII, Section 7 of the Montana Constitution and related statutory provisions that bar marriage between same-sex couples or preclude recognition of same-sex marriages validly entered into in another state. Art. XIII, Section 7 provides that \"[o]nly a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in this state.\" The plaintiffs also challenged all Montana statutes that refer to marriage as a relationship between the opposite sexes, to the extent that those provisions operate as a ban on same-sex marriage. On November 19, 2014, District Judge Brian Morris granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 23 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Mont. 2014). The order also declared that Montana's ban on same-sex marriage violated plaintiffs' rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Judge Morris permanently enjoined the state from enforcing Article XIII, Section 7 of the Montana Constitution and related statutory provisions, to the extent that they prohibit same-sex marriage and do not recognize same-sex marriages validly contracted outside of Montana. The injunction took effect immediately. On November 20, 2014, the defendants filed for appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Following the Supreme Court's 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015), (PB-OH-0003 in this Clearinghouse), which held that the 14th Amendment requires all states to grant same-sex marriages and recognize same-sex marriages granted in other states, the Ninth Circuit granted the defendants' motion for voluntary dismissal. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In May 2014, four same-sex couples -- three female couples and one male couple -- filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana, under Section 1983 and the 14th Amendment, against the Attorney General of Montana, the Director of the Montana Department of Revenue, and the Clerk of Court of Cascade County. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private attorneys, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Their complaint challenged the validity of Art. XIII, Section 7 of the Montana Constitution and related statutory provisions that bar marriage between same-sex couples or preclude recognition of same-sex marriages validly entered into in another state. In November 2014, the court (Judge Brian Morris) granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, declared that Montana's ban on same-sex marriage violated plaintiffs' rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and permanently enjoined the state from enforcing Article XIII, Section 7 of the Montana Constitution and related statutory provisions. The injunction took effect immediately. The defendants immediately filed for appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. However, following the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Ninth Circuit granted the defendants' motion for voluntary dismissal. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On June 16, 2011, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a73601-3619, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a71691-1691f, against the Midwest Bankcentre. The DOJ alleged that the defendant engaged in lending discrimination on the basis of race in the St. Louis metropolitan area. The case had been referred to the Department of Justice by the Federal Reserve Bank, in St. Louis, which had found statistical signs of discrimination. More specifically, the DOJ alleged that the defendant's choice of locations for branch offices was designed to serve the banking and credit needs of residents of majority-white census tracts, but not those of residents of majority-black census tracts. Similarly, the DOJ alleged that the defendant made loans for residential real estate in predominantly white residential census tracts but avoided serving the similar credit needs of majority-black census tracts. In total, the complaint asserted, the result was illegal redlining: \"defendant's policies and practices are intended to deny and discourage, or have the effect of denying or discouraging, an equal opportunity to the residents of the majority-black neighborhoods of the St. Louis MSA, on account of the racial composition of those neighborhoods, to obtain residential real estate-related loans.\" In 2000, 76% of the Missouri portion of the St. Louis metro area was non-Hispanic white, and 19% was African-American; the African-American population was mostly concentrated in the northern part of the City of St. Louis and the neighboring northeastern portion of St. Louis County. But the defendant's had drawn an assessment area (as required by the Community Reinvestment Act) that excluded both majority-black areas: the northern part of St. Louis city and the northeast corner of St. Louis County. In fact, the Midwest's CRA assessment area excluded 47 of the 60 majority-black census tracts in the City of St. Louis, and drew a virtual horseshoe around the majority-black census tracts. Settlement negotiations preceded filing in this case, and on June 28, 2011, Magistrate Judge Frederick R. Buckles approved a detailed consent decree that had been submitted simultaneously with the complaint. The consent decree included both injunctive and monetary relief, described as \"designed to expand opportunities to meet the credit needs of residents located in majority-black census tracts in the Missouri portion of the St. Louis MSA [Metropolitan Statistical Area]. Midwest will ensure that its lending products and services are made available and marketed in majority-black census tracts on no less favorable a basis than in majority-white tracts. Midwest commits itself to take all reasonable, practicable actions, consistent with safety and soundness, to increase the level of its residential lending in majority-black census tracts. with the ultimate objective that Midwest offers mortgage lending services on an equal basis as it offers such services in majority-white census tracts.\" Among the injunctive measures in the decree were:
Copies of any and all records, which includes but is not limited to FBI 302s, emails, memos, letters, charts, used by the Office of Special Counsel Robert Mueller during the drafting and preparation of its FINAL REPORT [emphasis in original] relating to the Office\u2019s investigation into: any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump; and (ii) any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation; and (iii) any other matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. \u00a7 600.4(a).The plaintiffs alleged that the DOJ refused to comply with this request or provide any responsive records. The plaintiffs filed subsequent FOIA requests for component documents of the initial request, and alleged that none of these were fulfilled:
1. Subclass A-1 members: \u201call class members who were surrounded by Defendants in the bounded area for one and a half to three hours before they were allowed to leave the area.\" 2. Subclass A-2 members: \"all class members who were surrounded by Defendants in the bounded area, arrested and detained at a police station. These individuals were released without being charged with any crime or ordinance violation.\" 3. Subclass A-3 members: \u201call class members who were surrounded by Defendants in the bounded area, arrested and detained at the police station. These were charged with criminal offenses, released only upon conditions of bond, required to appear in court on criminal charges and later the charges against them were dismissed in their favor.\"Two days later, the Court denied various motions by the defendants to dismiss claims and denied the defendants' motion seeking to relieve the City of Chicago from liability for the acts charged. In April 2004, the City of Chicago filed a counterclaim against the plaintiffs and the class they represented and filed an amended complaint in May 2006. The City alleged that the plaintiffs had violated the Municipal Code of the City of Chicago during the protest by failing to obtain a permit and obstructing public streets and were liable to the City for cost incurred by the police. The plaintiffs moved to dismiss the counterclaim but the Court denied the motion in August 2006. On March 10, 2008, the court denied the City\u2019s motion for class certification of its counterclaim against the plaintiffs because the class members\u2019 individual issues would predominate and counter-defendants would likely have different defenses. Ultimately the court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim in its opinion on February 27, 2009, holding that the defendants had failed to identify specific behavior leading to specific damage and that the plaintiffs could not be held liable for the defendants\u2019 costs solely because of their association with the protest. 624 F. Supp. 2d 933. On January 5, 2009, the court consolidated this case for trial with another case, Beal v. City of Chicago, involving individuals also arrested on Chicago Avenue during the protest (some of whom claimed they were not protesters but merely people trying to travel on that street). The class action plaintiffs and the City defendants cross-moved for summary judgment. On February 27, 2009, the Court ruled in favor of the defendants, finding that the officers had probable cause, that there was insufficient evidence of civil conspiracy, and that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. 624 F. Supp. 2d 933. The plaintiffs appealed, and on March 17, 2011, the Court of Appeals (Judges Richard A. Posner, Diane P. Wood, and Lynn Adelman) reversed and remanded the District Court judgment, finding that there were issues of fact that precluded summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claims of the plaintiffs. Specifically, there was an ongoing dispute as to whether the defendant police had effectively communicated the order to disperse to the protesters before arresting them, whether the protester crowd was peaceable, and whether the police superintendent could be held liable under \u00a71983. 639 F.3d 738. After several more months of discovery disputes, on June 28, 2012, the District Court approved a class settlement, and on November 7, 2012, the court issued a final judgment outlining the terms of the settlement as well as payments to be made by the defendants. In exchange for all class members being barred from bringing suit in the future, A-1 Subclass Members were to receive $500 per person, A-2 Subclass Members were to receive $8,750 per person, and A-3 Subclass members were to receive $15,000 per person. The 11 named plaintiffs were to receive $7,750 per person, 39 deposed class members were to receive $948.71 per person, and the class counsel's expert witness was to receive $14,000. The City was also to pay attorneys' fees and costs of $4,800,000. The sum total of payments equaled approximately $10,267,250. The City also agreed to provide criminal history record information to any Subclass A-2 or A-3 member and to seal or expunge their records of arrest related to the 2003 protest at no cost. There was no further significant litigation after this settlement and the case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2003, demonstrators arrested during a war protest filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the City of Chicago and its Police Department for violations of their rights to free speech and assembly and to be free from unlawful detainment and arrest. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgement, but the Seventh Circuit reversed on appeal. On June 28, 2012, the court approved a class action settlement awarding payments to all class members."} {"article": "On March 8, 2002, an employee of Combined Insurance Company of America (\"Combined\") filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et seq., against her employer in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff alleged sex discrimination and asked the court for damages and an injunction against future violations Specifically, the plaintiff contended that Combined had discriminated with regard to hiring and had created an atmosphere of male sexual aggression and constant sex-stereotyping. On August 25, 2003, the court (Judge James B. Zagel) granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification. Palmer v. Combined Ins., 217 F.R.D. 430 (N.D. Ill. 2003). According to the PACER docket, the court (Judge Zagel) approved a settlement agreement on August 10, 2004, and a final settlement hearing was held on October 22, 2004. On January 12, 2005, the parties made some corrections on the Settlement and Consent Decree. According to the corrected Consent Decree, defendant would pay a total of 8.5 million dollars in addition to other injunctive remedies. On the same day, the court (Judge Zagel) dismissed the case.", "summary": "This case was brought by an employee of defendant seeking monetary and injunctive relief. On January 12, 2005, the case was dismissed because of the settlement reached by the parties."} {"article": "On September 20, 2002, four New York residents who had attended New York City public schools filed this putative class action complaint against the New York City Board of Education, the New York City Department of Education, and the New York City School District. A third and final amended complaint with six additional plaintiffs was filed on July 15, 2003. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1400, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 (\"ADA\") U.S.C. \u00a7 12132, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs alleged that children with disabilities were being excluded from New York public schools and denied educational services to which they were entitled without due process. The case was assigned to Judge Charles P. Sifton. The plaintiffs sought injunctive, declaratory, and other relief, alleging numerous incidents of students with disabilities being removed from schools and deprived of educational opportunities. The complaint further alleged a general lack of oversight in the New York City school system and argued that, because the problems in the school system were systemic, it was not necessary that they show exhaustion of administrative remedies in each individual case in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim as would normally be required. On July 25, 2003, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion argued that plaintiffs either had not exhausted administrative remedies, as required by the IDEA, or that the claims of those plaintiffs who had properly sought relief through the administrative process had been rendered moot. Defendants further argued that because of the varying factual backgrounds of individual cases, solutions to problems must be sought on a case-by-case basis. In support of this, defendants argued that plaintiffs\u2019 claims were exactly the sort that should be addressed through the administrative process, and further noted that, at the time the motion was filed, six of the ten named plaintiffs had resolved their claims by way of the administrative process. On January 29, 2004, the court denied the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. Citing precedent from the Second Circuit, the judge noted that the requirement in IDEA that parties exhaust administrative options prior to litigation had exceptions. Several plaintiffs claimed lack of appropriate notice in their being denied services. In keeping with precedent that held that lack of notice of procedural rights waived the exhaustion requirement, the judge exempted plaintiffs from the requirement. On August 18, 2004 the judge granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion to certify a class of \u201cdisabled New York City children age three through twenty-one who have been, will be, or are at risk of being excluded from school without adequate notice and deprived of a free and appropriate education through suspensions, expulsions, transfers, discharges, removals and denials of access.\u201d On July 24, 2015 the judge issued a stipulation approving a settlement agreement between the parties. 2015 WL 13707092. The settlement stipulation primarily covered suspensions and removals, transfers, and discharges. It also allowed for the plaintiffs to monitor compliance. In the case of suspensions, the settlement required that suspensions of more than six days be given only upon approval from Department of Education\u2019s Office of Safety and Youth Development or the Superintendent for the district. The settlement further allowed students to remain in school pending suspension hearings in some cases and required that plaintiffs' counsel be provided with data on suspensions every semester over the course of the stipulation period. The settlement also called for \u201cManifestation Determination Reviews\u201d for students receiving a high volume of suspensions in order to monitor whether students were receiving suspensions for conduct that was \u201ccaused by, or had a direct relationship to\u201d the student\u2019s disability. If it was determined that the student was suspended for conduct directly related to a disability, the school would not be allowed to suspend the student. The Department of Education was also required to institute special reviews and programs for tracking and helping students who received a certain number of suspensions. Students who received suspensions for a full year were provided with alternative instruction. Additional provisions of the settlement placed substantial restrictions on when students could be moved between schools and transferred to GED programs. The settlement covered the first six full academic semesters beginning with the Fall Semester of the 2015-16 academic year. Plaintiffs also obtained counsel fees \u201cas though they are prevailing parties\u201d and the rights to monitor defendants to ensure their compliance with the terms of the settlement. The trial court retained exclusive jurisdiction to consider all further matters arising out of or connected with the settlement. The settlement expired in October 2018.", "summary": "This is a class-action lawsuit on behalf of disabled students in the New York City school district seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs alleged that disabled students were being denied access to the educational opportunities to which they have a right by law without due process. In 2015, the parties reached a settlement that limited how and when students could be suspended and increased oversight."} {"article": "On Dec. 10, 2003, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), the American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression (ABFFE), and the Freedom to Read Foundation (FTRF) filed this lawsuit against the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiffs sought disclosure of DOJ and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) records related to the DOJ's implementation of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. This case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and assigned to Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. In Aug. 2002, the plaintiffs filed a FOIA request to obtain records related to the FBI's implementation of the Patriot Act's surveillance provisions. Enacted in 2001, the Patriot Act substantially expanded the government's power to collect information about people living in the United States. In particular, Section 215 of the Act allowed the FBI to require disclosure from any person or organization of any tangible thing without probable cause or individualized suspicion, as long as there was an ongoing foreign intelligence or terrorism investigation. In their FOIA request, the plaintiffs sought expedited processing, but the government did not comply. In an earlier case, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit on Oct. 24, 2002 and moved for a preliminary injunction on Nov. 13, 2002. After a hearing, the court ordered the government to process the FOIA request. Although the government released 391 pages of responsive material, the government relied on an exemption to FOIA and issued the documents in heavily redacted form. One of the redacted documents was a list of times when the FBI had invoked Section 215 of the Patriot Act between Oct. 26, 2001, and Feb. 7, 2003. Both the list itself and the line indicating the total number of times that the FBI used Section 215 were redacted. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the government's motion for summary judgment, upholding the government's withholding under Exemption 1 of FOIA. This case is available in this Clearinghouse. In the following months, there was increased public concern about the Patriot Act and Section 215. The Attorney General issued a memo stating that Section 215 had never been used before and in doing so, declassified the information. The memo did not explain why the government was previously insistent that national security would be compromised if it released the number of times it had invoked Section 215. The plaintiffs then contacted former government counsel in the prior litigation and he agreed to request an unredacted copy of the Section 215 List from the FBI. However, the FBI did not respond to the attorney's request. As a result, on Oct. 23, 2003, the plaintiffs submitted a FOIA request to the FBI seeking the following: 1. An unredacted copy of the Section 215 List, containing the total number of Section 215 requests received by the FBI; and 2. Any and all records relating to Section 215 of the Patriot Act, including any and all records indicating the number of times Section 215 has been used. The plaintiffs again sought expedited processing of the FOIA request on two grounds: (1) that the records related to a matter of widespread media interest implicating possible questions about the government's integrity which affect public confidence; and (2) that the plaintiffs were primarily engaged in the dissemination of information and there is an urgency to inform the public about an actual or alleged government activity. However, on Oct. 30, 2003, the FBI told the plaintiffs that their request for expedited processing had been denied. The plaintiffs then engaged in a protracted back-and-forth with the FBI's Office of the General Counsel, during which the plaintiffs attempted to obtain an unredacted copy of the Section 215 List. However, they were ultimately unable to obtain the List. In its answer to the plaintiffs' complaint, the government raised grounds for dismissal, but did not file a dispositive motion. As a result, Judge Huvelle issued an order directing the government to file either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. On Feb. 17, 2004, the government moved for partial summary judgment on the plaintiffs' FOIA request for the Section 215 List and the request for expedited processing. The government argued that the doctrine of claim preclusion barred the plaintiffs from re-litigating the release of an unredacted copy of the Section 215 List, as the court previously ruled the document was properly withheld. Additionally, the government argued that the court should deny plaintiffs' request for expedited processing because the plaintiffs failed to show that their FOIA request deserved expedited treatment at the expense of earlier submitted requests. On Mar. 1, 2004, the plaintiffs also filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to the government's non-compliance with the FOIA. On May 10, 2004, Judge Huvelle ordered that the plaintiffs were entitled to expedited processing of their request and that the government was required to process the request for all records relating to Section 215 \"as soon as practicable.\" ACLU v. DOJ, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2004). Judge Huvelle also ordered that the government had properly withheld the information contained in the Section 215 List. Regarding the court's holding on expedited processing, Judge Huvelle weighed three factors in determining that the plaintiffs had demonstrated an \"urgency to inform\" and hence a \"compelling need\" for the requested documents. Regarding the first two factors \u2014whether the request concerned a matter of current exigency to the American public and whether the consequences of delaying a response would compromise a significant recognized interest\u2014the court noted the records' relation to current government surveillance efforts and held that the potential invasion of the public's privacy interests was of immediate concern. Regarding the third factor, the government conceded that the plaintiffs' request concerned federal government activity. Thus, the court found that the government had erroneously denied the plaintiffs' request for expedited processing. The court found that the plaintiffs also met the media-related standard for expedited processing. The plaintiffs had cited numerous newspaper articles about the Patriot Act, which the court held was sufficient to demonstrate that the subject matter of their request involved a matter of widespread media interest concerning the government's integrity. Regarding the court's holding on the government's argued FOIA exemption, the court held that the doctrine of res judicata did not preclude the plaintiffs' request for the redacted Section 215 List. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs were attempting litigate a new question: whether the statistic they sought was properly withheld in light of the Attorney General's declassification decision with respect to that statistic. However, the court nonetheless held that the government had provided a sufficiently detailed and persuasive explanation to justify the continued withholding of the redacted Section 215 List under Exemption 1, FOIA's national security exemption. In Aug. 2004, the parties agreed to a settlement. In exchange for the government's disclosure of the requested documents, the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice on Aug. 24, 2004. Though not all of the documents released by the government are available online, this page references some of their contents. Following litigation about attorneys' fees, the docket ends in 2004. It is unclear what resulted with respect to attorneys' fees.", "summary": "In 2003, the ACLU and several other nonprofits that advocate for privacy and free speech filed this FOIA lawsuit against the DOJ in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs sought disclosure of DOJ and FBI records related to the DOJ's implementation of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. In 2014, the court held that the government had properly withheld the Section 215 List, but found that plaintiffs were entitled to expedited processing of the remaining documents related to Section 215. Following the opinion, the parties reached a settlement, under which the government disclosed the requested documents and the plaintiffs agreed to drop the lawsuit."} {"article": "On November 4, 2010, eight African-American male residents of Philadelphia filled this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia division (\"PPD\"). The plaintiffs sued the City of Philadelphia and individual police officers under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Pennsylvania state law. The putative class, represented by the ACLU of Pennsylvania and private attorneys, sought injunctive and compensatory relief. They claimed that the defendants had illegally stopped and searched thousands of African-American and Latino males solely because of their race in violation of the 4th and 5th Amendments to the United States Constitution. On June 21, 2011, U.S. District Court Judge Stewart Dalzell entered an order accepting a binding settlement agreement, class certification, and consent decree between the parties and appointed a monitor. The City agreed to train its police officers to use the proper electronic database to record relevant information after each time a subject is stopped and frisked within Philadelphia. The plaintiffs and the defendants also agreed to jointly review current police department training, supervision, and discipline procedures to determine if changes are needed to ensure that stops and frisks only occur where there is probable cause to believe the subject could lawfully be detained. The plaintiffs were to report to the Court the results of periodic reviews of stop data. The Decree left open the individual damage claim by a named plaintiff, who did not settle. In a November 3, 2011 order, the Court set a jury trial on this issue and on December 20, 2011, judgment was granted in favor of the named plaintiff, who was awarded $50,000. The Decree was to stay in place until the Court, upon motion of a party, determined that the provisions regarding data foreclosure and analysis, document production, Monitor Reports and Recommendations, and Court review are no longer necessary to ensure that the PPD stop and frisk policies and practices are consistent with constitutional standards. In the time since the agreement, the plaintiffs and defendants have filed 6 reports each. The plaintiffs' reports address ongoing issues of police misconduct, such as the racial disparities of arrests and the disproportionate number of arrests in certain districts of certain racial makeups. The defendants, in their reports, provide updates on progress and address the concerns raised by the plaintiffs. The most recent report was filed by the plaintiffs on March 22, 2016, concluding that data still showed significant racial disparities in stop-and-frisk that in almost all respects could not be explained by non-racial factors. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On November 4, 2010, eight African American male residents of Philadelphia filled a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Pennsylvania state law in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia division. The Plaintiffs sued the City of Philadelphia and individual police officers claiming that as a result of the defendants' policies, customs, and procedures, members of the Plaintiff class had been subject to unconstitutional searches, seizures, frisks and detentions by the defendants, and at times those stops were accompanied by unreasonable levels of force. On June 21, 2011, U.S. District Court Judge Stewart Galzell entered an order accepting a binding settlement agreement, class certification, and consent decree between the parties and appointing a monitor. The agreement was to stay in place until the Court, upon motion of a party, determined it was no longer needed to ensure that the PPD stop and frisk policies and practices are consistent with constitutional standards. As of March 22, 2016, the plaintiffs were still submitting status reports to the Court, and there was also a status conference held on that day which leads us to believe the case is still active."} {"article": "On September 12, 2017, the Sierra Club sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. In its complaint, the plaintiff described itself as \"the nation's oldest grassroots environmental organization, [which] . . . has long advocated to protect and preserve the cultures of the borderland communities, as well as the region's land, wildlife, and environment.\" The plaintiff stated that it feared potential environmental damage that could result from President Trump's Executive Order (EO) No. 13767, authorizing expansion or replacement of portions of the U.S.-Mexico border wall. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff had submitted several unfulfilled FOIA requests to defendant agencies, seeking information about the environmental impacts of border wall proposals. First, in 2013, the plaintiff had asked for records since 2010 about border wall construction in a wildlife refuge and flood plains in parts of Texas. Although DHS released a few highly-redacted documents and promised to follow with more information, as of 2017 DHS had not yet completed its search for responsive records and had made no further determination. Next, on March 17, 2017, the plaintiff requested records since 2006 relating to a government consultant's work on the border wall, but the plaintiff had received no further communication from DHS. Finally, on May 4, 2017, the plaintiff requested records related to the EO, specifically:
1. All records related to the border wall referred to in the Presidential Administration's FY 2017 supplemental appropriations request; 2. All maps and related documents identifying all locations considered or planned for border fencing/tactical infrastructure described in the FY 2017 appropriations legislation; 3. All bids by vendors related to border wall proposals and submitted to DHS and/or CBP; 4. All communications related to border wall proposals between DHS and/or CBP; 5. All communications between DHS and CBP related to border wall proposals, including, but not limited to: funding, timetables, and vendor selection; 6. All existing and/or proposed timetables for the execution and construction of border wall proposals; 7. All communications between DHS and/or CBP with the White House that relate to border wall proposals; 8. All communication between DHS and/or CBP and any other federal agencies that relate to the border wall proposals.DHS then responded to the plaintiff on August 29, 2017, asking it to narrow the scope of its request, and asserting that this request did not constitute a denial. The complaint alleged that, in all three of the requests above, DHS violated FOIA by failing to issue a determination within the statutory 20-day deadline and by failing to conduct an adequate records search. Further, regarding the 2013 request, the plaintiff alleged that DHS had violated FOIA by wrongfully withholding non-exempt records. The plaintiff sought a disclosure order under FOIA and attorneys' fees. This case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore on September 12. A case management statement was filed on December 5, an ADR conference was held on December 7, and a case management conference on December 12. Plaintiff also filed an amended complaint on December 12. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James for settlement, but the parties on March 26 agreed to a new production schedule. The defendants were set to produce 1000 pages monthly for six months, followed by 750 monthly until completion. On September 6, 2018, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Thomas S. Hixson for settlement. The parties engaged in settlement negotiations for several months. Then, on February 1, 2019, the plaintiff requested that the court set a case management schedule to establish a production schedule for documents that the defendants had yet to produce and a briefing schedule to address the defendants' withholdings or redactions. The plaintiff stated that the defendants had not produced any documents since November 18, and the documents that had been produced were heavily redacted. On April 18, 2019, the parties filed a joint stipulation requesting that the scheduled settlement conference be continued until June. The parties explained that they had informally agreed to a new production schedule whereby the defendants would increase their production from the previously-agreed 750-1,000 pages per month to 1,200 pages per month. The defendants also agreed to re-evaluate certain redactions that they had claimed under FOIA exemptions and conduct new searches for documents responsive to the plaintiff's FOIA requests. The parties requested an additional continuance in June 2019. In October 2019 the parties requested a continuance until April 2020. In their update to the court, the parties stated that the defendants had completed productions for the 2013 and 2017 FOIA requests and had begun productions on the 2016 request. The plaintiff again stated that it believed the productions had been heavily redacted and that the parties continued to disagree about the scope and nature of the redactions; however, the parties wished to continue working together informally toward a resolution. The documents released by the government are available here. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "On Sept. 12, 2017, the Sierra Club sued DHS and CBP under FOIA, seeking disclosure of agency records regarding the environmental impacts of DHS's plans to implement the border wall Executive Order 13767. The parties agreed to a production schedule of 1000 pages monthly for six months, and following that, 750 pages monthly until completion. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "On October 20, 2004, a woman who had been subjected to a strip search after being charged with resisting arrest filed a class action civil rights lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging the Contra Costa County Sheriff's policies, practices, and customs concerning the use of strip searches and visual body cavity searches in the Contra Costa County Jail. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, alleged that she was arrested on March 1, 2004 for resisting arrest (misdemeanor) and was taken to Contra Costa County Jail in Martinez, California, where she subjected to a strip search and body cavity search. Plaintiff also alleged that she was compelled to produce a urine sample while being directly observed by male deputies. Plaintiff alleged that her search was conducted pursuant to the Contra Costa County Sheriff's blanket policy of subjecting all detainees in their custody to strip and visual body cavity searches before they were arraigned, regardless of whether any reasonable suspicion existed that the detainees possessed contraband or weapons. This policy, plaintiff alleged, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and California state law. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages and class certification. Plaintiff moved to certify a class consisting of \"[a]ll persons, since October 20, 2002, and continuing until Defendants' prior custom and policy was brought into compliance with the law on June 1, 2003, or such other more recent date when the policy was implemented, who were arrested on any charge (including felonies) not involving weapons, controlled substances, or felony violence, and who were subjected to a uniform and indiscriminate (blanket) strip/visual body cavity search(es) by defendants before arraignment at the Contra Costa County Jails without any individualized reasonable suspicion that they were concealing contraband. This class may include arrestees who were subjected to subsequent blanket strip searches before arraignment after the initial strip search, without any reasonable individualized suspicion that they had subsequently acquired and hidden contraband on their persons.\" Plaintiffs' amended complaint was filed on August 11, 2005, adding an additional representative plaintiff who was arrested on December 3, 2002 (prior to the June 1, 2003 policy change) for a felony DUI charge and then strip searched. Defendants moved to dismiss his claims as time barred. The District Court (District Judge Thelton E. Henderson) granted defendants' motion to dismiss, with respect to the individual's state law claim for monetary relief, but denied the motion as to his \u00a7 1983 claim for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief. Barnett v. County of Contra Costa, 2005 WL 5095264 (N.D. Cal. Oct 31, 2005). On April 10, 2007, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, denied plaintiffs' request for an interlocutory appeal of the District Court's order. In June 2007, the district court held joint case management discussions concerning both individuals' cases. On November 27, 2007, the plaintiffs were granted leave to file a second amended complaint, adding an additional individual as a representative plaintiff. On September 11, 2009, the Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's state law claims, but denied summary judgment on the \u00a71983 claim. On November 3, 2009, the Court granted plaintiff's motion for class certification. On June 21, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Class Action Complaint. Three days later, the parties stipulated to dismissing the case with prejudice. The dismissal was agreed to pursuant to the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Bull v. City and County of San Francisco, 565 F.3d 964. The parties eventually reached a settlement agreement that was approved by the Court on March 18, 2011. In this agreement, defendants agreed to pay $19,999 to one individual in return for her agreement to dismiss her claim with prejudice.", "summary": "On October 20, 2004, a woman who was strip searched at the Contra Costa County Jail after being charged with resisting arrest filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging the Contra Costa County Sheriff's policies and practices concerning strip searches in the Contra Costa County Jail. The parties eventually reached a settlement agreement that was approved by the Court in March 2011; defendants agreed to pay $19,999 in damages."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a preexisting putative class action case about conditions of confinement in the Mississippi State Penitentiary in Parchman, MS. On March 16, 2020, plaintiffs sought emergency relief--various precautions to slow the spread of the coronavirus, which was denied on April 24. On June 9, the plaintiffs filed a supplemental motion for TRO and preliminary injunction, alleging unconstitutional living conditions, which was denied on March 19, 2021. On November 12, the case was consolidated with another case initiated by current and former residents of the same prison for prison conditions that they alleged violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Parties acknowledge and agree that the media and members of the public have a right to record public events without abridgement unless it obstructs the activity or threatens the safety of others, or physically interferes with the ability of law enforcement officers to perform their duties.Agreement 1. This agreement substituted for a Temporary Restraining Order. The ACLU filed a First Amended Complaint on November 12, 2014. This added a Due Process claim, alleging that defendants' interference with individuals who are photographing or recording at public places, but who are not interfering with law enforcement, fails to provide them with a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct is prohibited, and \"authorizes and encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.\" First Am. Compl. 6. On November 14, the ACLU also filed for a Preliminary Injunction. On November 20 and 21, the plaintiff asked the court to approve consent judgments between the plaintiff and each of the three named defendants--the Missouri State Highway Patrol, the County of St. Louis, Missouri, and the City of Ferguson. On November 21, the District Court (Judge John A. Ross) granted all three orders. The orders for the Missouri State Highway Patrol and the County of St. Louis permanently enjoin those institutions from \"interfering with individuals who are photographing or recording at public places but who are not threatening the safety of others or physically interfering with the ability of law enforcement to perform their duties.\" See Order Granting Joint Mot. to Relief (as to Missouri State Highway Patrol); Order Granting Joint Mot. to Relief (as to County of St. Louis). This differs from the language in the order directed at the City of Ferguson. That order provides that the City and its employees or agents
shall not enforce or threaten to enforce any rule, policy, or practice that grants law enforcement officers the authority or discretion to arrest, threaten to arrest, or interfere with any individual, including any member of the media or member of the public photographing or recording in public places unless that person is threatening the safety of others or physically interfering with the ability of law enforcement to perform their duties.Order Granting Joint Mot. to Relief (as to City of Ferguson). Although these orders resolved the case, the court specifically retained jurisdiction to enforce all three orders.", "summary": "The ACLU filed this federal lawsuit in the Eastern District of Missouri on August 14, 2014, a few days after the police shooting of Michael Brown, in Ferguson Missouri, and during the days of protests that followed. The lawsuit claimed that people photographing and recording police actions in \u202aFerguson\u202c have a First Amendment right to do so. On November 21, 2014, the court approved consent orders between the plaintiff and all three named defendants. These orders enjoined all defendants from interfering with individuals who are photographing or recording in public places, and resolved the case."} {"article": "On October 31, 2017, the Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The HRDC sued Greene County under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. HRDC sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary damages and attorneys\u2019 fees. They claimed that the defendant violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it censored mail that HRDC sent to inmates at the Greene County Jail (GCJ). This case was referred to Judge Thomas M. Rose. On the same day, HRDC filed a motion for preliminary injunction, requesting that Judge Rose prohibit the defendants from arbitrarily censoring plaintiff\u2019s materials sent to prisoners housed in the GCJ. The plaintiff also requested that the court require the defendants to provide HRDC notice stating the reasons for any rejection of HRDC\u2019s publications and an opportunity to be heard on the matter before finally rejecting any mail sent by HRDC. The plaintiff argued that their publications posed no threat to the safety and security of the facility and that the defendant\u2019s policies and practices did not advance a legitimate penological objective. On November 29, 2017, the HRDC and the defendants filed a settlement agreement resolving all injunctive claims raised in the complaint. In the settlement agreement, the defendants agreed that they would not censor nor refuse to deliver items mailed to prisoners at the GCJ since July 2017. It was also agreed that the defendant would deliver all mail sent after the settlement agreement if it was consistent with the defendants\u2019 legitimate penological interests and express policy terms on publications and other materials sent to prisoners from publishers, book clubs, bookstores, or established vendors or distributors. The court was to retain jurisdiction over the enforcement of the settlement agreement, but the agreement did not state how long it would last. It was presumably permanent. On March 7, 2018, Judge Rose ordered the parties to take part in a court conducted mediation supervised by Magistrate Judge Sharon L. Ovington to address the remaining monetary issues. On July 13, 2018, the plaintiff moved to enforce the settlement agreement. According to the plaintiff's motion, the initial settlement agreement explicitly stated that the agreement addressed only the injunctive relief, and not monetary damages. The motion stated, \"Defendants now disavow the enforceability of the executed Settlement Agreement because they profess that they were unaware that the agreement dealt solely with injunctive relief, despite the plain and explicit terms of the agreement, and that regardless of its clear and express intent, they are not bound by the terms.\" The plaintiffs asked the court to retain jurisdiction over the earlier agreement and require the defendant's compliance. Without ruling on the motion, Judge Rose reassigned the case to Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman on August 28. On October 11 2018, the parties filed a second settlement agreement. The parties agreed that the defendants denied any liability in this case. However, in order to avoid the burden of litigation, the parties agreed to a settlement as to the constitutional violations. Greene County agreed to pay HRDC a total of $45,000 in full and final settlement of all claims for damages, attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. HRDC agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice, but the court retained jurisdiction for enforcement of the first and second settlements. One day later, Judge Ovington dismissed the case with prejudice, with the exception of the two settlement agreements. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This 2017 lawsuit was brought by the Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) in the U.S. District for the Southern District of Ohio. HRDC alleged that the defendant violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of prisoners by prohibiting delivery of mail sent from HRDC to prisoners. In November 2017, the parties reached a settlement agreement on injunctive relief, and in October 2018, the defendant agreed to pay HRDC a total of $45,000 for all claims of damages, attorneys\u2019 fees and costs."} {"article": "This is one of many legal challenges to the series of Trump's executive orders (EOs) known collectively as the \"Travel Ban\" or \"Muslim Ban.\" This suit in particular challenged the waiver system that accompanied the ban, which was purportedly instated to prevent the EOs from arbitrarily denying people entry into the country. Twenty six individuals who had been denied a travel visa, or whose relatives had been denied a travel visa as a result of the EOs, filed this putative class action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Northern District of California (in San Francisco) on March 13, 2018. District Judge James Donato was assigned to the case. The plaintiffs sued the President of the United States; the U.S. Attorney General; the Department of Justice; the Secretary and Department of Homeland Security; the Secretary of State and the State Department; and the Director of National Intelligence along with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Plaintiffs brought this case against defendants under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), alleging defendants violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The plaintiffs, represented by the Immigrant Advocacy and Litigation Center, Public Counsel, and private counsel, sought injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiffs alleged that the Trump Administration's failure to grant visas to individuals because of their nationality was unconstitutional. They argued the resulting separation of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents from their families was in contravention of Congress' purpose in the INA\u2014promoting family reunification. Therefore, the government's actions amounted to an arbitrary and capricious act in violation of the APA. Plaintiffs also argued that the government's refusal to consider applicants' eligibility for waivers on a case-by-case basis or develop meaningful guidance was, as a matter of law, arbitrary and capricious and therefore a violation of the APA. The plaintiffs further alleged that the government targeted individuals with discriminatory intent based on national origin without any lawful justification in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. First, plaintiffs cited the lack of a provision for waivers coupled with the government\u2019s blanket denials of visas to applicants targeted by EOs. Second, plaintiffs cited statements made by government officials concerning their intent and the application of the travel ban. As a result, plaintiffs asked the court to order the government to consider plaintiffs' eligibility for waivers. Plaintiffs requested the certification of two classes: \"Family Member Class\" and \"Visa Applicant Class.\" The Family Member Class was defined as US citizens and permanent residents \"with approved family-based visa petitions or whose family members have applied for visa categories covered by the ban, and whose family members have been or will be refused pursuant to the Proclamation without an opportunity to apply for and be meaningfully considered for a waiver or are awaiting adjudication of a waiver.\" The Visa Applicant Class is defined as \"Iranian, Libyan, Somali, Syrian, and Yemeni nationals who have applied for immigrant or nonimmigrant visas that have been or will be refused pursuant to the Proclamation without an opportunity to apply for and be meaningfully considered for a waiver or are awaiting adjudication of a waiver.\" Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on July 29, 2018, and the government moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on September 12, 2018. On February 4, 2019, the court denied the motion to dismiss for the APA claim and granted the motion for the Fifth Amendment and mandamus claims. For the Fifth Amendment due process claim, the court held that plaintiffs failed to allege any constitutionally protected right for either plaintiff class. The court found that the equal protection claim assumed the EOs unconstitutionally excluded Muslims or illegally discriminated on the basis of nationality, but that the Supreme Court had already decided that these travel orders passed rational basis review in Trump v. Hawaii. Based on this precedent, the district court held that the government\u2019s national security justification for the EOs was sufficient to stand against an equal protection challenge. Lastly, the court dismissed the mandamus claim because the APA claim would go forward and therefore plaintiffs would not have exhausted all other avenues for relief to make a writ of mandamus appropriate. 365 F. Supp. 3d 1009. Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint on February 23, 2019. On February 26, 2019, the government moved to consolidate this case with Pars Equality Center, et al. v. Pompeo, . After oral argument on April 11, 2019, the court denied the motion and decided to allow both cases to proceed, ordering the parties to work together to minimize duplication between the two cases. In response to the second amended complaint, the government filed a motion to dismiss or obtain summary judgment on June 13, 2019. The motion argued the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state an actionable claim and that the existing waiver process was \u201cnot a sham\u201d but rather an adequate procedure for the handling of thousands of visa applications. A contentious period of discovery ensued throughout the rest of 2019 and into 2020. During this time, two plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims on October 30, 2019. On June 5, 2020, the court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss following the same reasoning and outcome from the February 4, 2019, order that addressed the first amended complaint. The motion to dismiss was denied for the APA claim and granted for the Fifth Amendment and mandamus claims. In addition, the court denied summary judgment and denied the opportunity for another round of pleading amendments. 365 F. Supp. 3d. 1009. Discovery continued through 2020. But the EOs at issue were revoked by Joe Biden on his first day in office, January 20, 2021. This revocation was announced by way of Proclamation 10141 which also ordered the State Department to resume processing visa applications from people affected by the EOs. The Proclamation instructed the Secretary of State to provide a report including the number of visa applicants being considered for a waiver of the Travel Ban EOs\u2019 restrictions, a plan for \u201cexpeditiously adjudicating\u201d these applications, a proposal to ensure the reconsideration of denied applications under the revoked EOs, and a plan to ensure that the cases of re-applicants were not to be prejudiced as a result of a previous visa denial resulting from the revoked EOs. This change in executive policy prompted mootness rulings and withdrawals of claims in other actions arising out of the implementation of the EOs. On February 11, 2021, the government filed a notice to the district court informing it of two mootness rulings issued by the Ninth and Sixth Circuits on appeals from travel ban litigation following Biden\u2019s inauguration day proclamation. (One of the cases they cited in this notice, Arab American Civil Rights League v. Trump, can be found here in the Clearinghouse. In addition to notifying the court of these appellate decisions, the government asked the district court to dismiss the case. Instead of dismissing the lawsuit on March 23, 2020, the court stayed proceedings pending DHS\u2019 execution of President Biden\u2019s January 20 Proclamation. The court also directed the parties to file a joint status update by June 7, 2021. The parties filed their joint update on June 7, 2021. In the update, the parties explained why they have not reached a settlement. The plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that following the January 20 proclamation, the government invited them to reapply for visas, denying them the benefit of their earlier application date. On the other side, the government claimed that because the Proclamation undid the EOs that were the source of the harm experienced by plaintiffs, that there was no live case or controversy for the district court to adjudicate. On June 16, 2021, District Judge Donato set a status conference for September 2, 2021. Plaintiffs moved to lift the stay of proceedings on July 13, 2021, and the government filed an opposition to his motion on July 27, 2021. As of this writing, no orders have been made by the district court on when proceedings will continue. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On March 13, 2018, 26 individuals who had been denied travel visas, or had relatives denied a travel visa under Donald Trump's \"Travel Ban\" sued the federal government. They claimed that denying individuals' travel visas because of their national origin was unconstitutional and violated federal law. President Biden revoked the \u201cTravel Ban\u201d and ordered that visa applications resume processing on January 20, 2021. In a joint status update filed on June 7, 2021, the parties explained why they had not reached a settlement. The plaintiffs claimed that following the January 20 proclamation from President Biden, the government invited them to reapply for visas, denying them the benefit of their earlier application date. On the other side, the government claimed that because the Proclamation undid the EOs that were the source of the harm experienced by plaintiffs, that there is no live case or controversy for the district court to adjudicate. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "On October 24, 2008, an association of home health care providers brought this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against the Director of the Department of Health Care Services of the State of California. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the Director from implementing state legislation reducing payments to home medical service providers under California's Medi-Cal program by ten percent. Plaintiff argued that the ten percent rate reduction violated Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act (the Medicaid Act), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396 et seq., and was therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause. The plaintiff sought declaratory judgment under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201. The Director moved to stay the action or continue the hearing on the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction and extending time to respond to the two new related cases. On November 3, 2008, Judge Christina A. Snyder ordered this case and two related cases stayed in their entirety until further notice. On June 1, 2011, this case was ordered removed from the list of active cases of the Central District of California. It was further ordered that counsel file a joint report detailing the status of the case every quarter until the action was reactivated or a stipulation for dismissal was filed. On November 28, 2011, the Director filed notice that the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) approved the State Plan Amendment (SPA) that the plaintiffs opposed. CMS approved the proposed reimbursement rate reduction. While the docket contains almost no further activity, it appears that the plaintiffs appealed this decision. On April 23, 2015, the plaintiffs sought to dismiss the case, which the court approved on May 4. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Home health care providers brought suit to prevent implementation of a ten percent reduction in payments. The case was ultimately dismissed."} {"article": "On November 10, 2004, Voices for Independence, a non-profit disability advocacy group, and a class of disabled individuals, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, against the City of Meadville, PA. The plaintiffs alleged that Meadville had used federal funds to repave roads and had failed to install mandatory curb cuts and to otherwise comply with the accessibility mandates of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12111 et seq. Class certification was sought but the parties entered a court-approved Consent Decree before a decision on class certification was issued. The Court granted approval of the parties' Consent Decree on May 17, 2005, wherein the City of Meadville committed to ensure, to the maximum extent feasible, that all roads resurfaced in 2005 would be accessible to individuals with disabilities. This included a commitment to ensure that all resurfaced intersections had curb cuts. They also agreed to require all bids and contracts for the work specify ADA compliance. The City of Meadville also agreed to issue an Annual Report of Compliance on or before January 31, 2006, the report would list each intersection resurfaced in 2005 and state where new curb cuts had been installed. The City agreed to retrofit roads that had been resurfaced in 2003 in order to bring them into compliance with the ADA. A Second Consent Decree was entered on August 9, 2005. In the Second Consent Decree, the City of Meadville agreed that all resurfacing in 2006 and thereafter would comply with the ADA. The City agreed to prepare a list of all roads resurfaced since January 26, 2002 and provide the ADA compliance status of all relevant intersections and sidewalks. The parties also agreed to enter good faith negotiations to identify areas in need of retrofitting. In the Consent Decree, the plaintiffs acknowledged that certain highways in the City of Meadville had been resurfaced by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), and that the City would not be responsible for retrofitting these areas. The City of Meadville agreed to prepare a list of streets resurfaced by PennDOT and submit them to the Court within ninety days of the effective date of the decree. The Second Consent Decree granted the plaintiffs $82,762 in attorneys' fee and costs. The Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the consent decrees. In 2006, a related case was filed against PennDOT (see related cases). On March 11, 2009, the plaintiffs, the City of Meadville, and PennDOT entered another Consent Decree, wherein the City of Meadville and PennDOT divided responsibility for the resurfaced roads, sidewalks, and intersections in Meadville still in need retrofitting in order to be ADA-compliant. The City of Meadville agreed to retrofit the roads for which it was responsible by no later than December 31, 2013. The parties also agreed to pay the plaintiff\u2019s attorneys\u2019 fees. After several years of providing status reports to the Court and fulfilling all of its obligations under the various Consent Decrees, the Court granted a joint motion to dismiss all claims against the City of Meadville on August 8, 2017. There has been no action on the docket since this date.", "summary": "On November 10, 2004, Voices for Independence, a non-profit disability advocacy group filed a lawsuit in federal court against the City of Meadville, PA. The Plaintiffs alleged that Meadville had used federal funds to repave roads and had failed to install curb cuts and other accommodations mandated by the Americans with Disabilities Act. The parties entered a series of consent decrees, wherein Meadville committed to retrofit the roads and intersections, and to comply with ADA requirements on all future resurfacing projects. After several years of providing status reports to the Court and fulfilling all of its obligations of the various Consent Decrees, the Court granted a joint motion to dismiss all claims against the City of Meadville on August 8, 2017."} {"article": "On March 7, 2000, prisoners in Illinois' supermax prison, Tamms Correctional Center, brought this action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The prisoners sued the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law, alleging that their selection by prison officials for transfer to and continued confinement at Tamms violated their rights to petition the government, to due process, and to freedom of association, as well as the ex-post facto clause. They also alleged that defendants engaged in illegal retaliation. Represented by the Uptown People's Law Center, the prisoners sought injunctive relief to prevent retaliation and violation of their constitutional rights, and asked, as well, for transfer into more appropriate prison facilities. The plaintiffs also sought both compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorneys' fees. The case was assigned to Judge Patrick Murphy. Specifically, the prisoners alleged that IDOC severely restricted their movement and isolated inmates through the usage of self-contained individual cells, leaving inmates solitary for 23-24 hours a day. Plaintiffs claimed the punishment was imposed in retaliation for filing grievances and complaints and against the prison system and that the plaintiffs were not given a meaningful opportunity for a hearing before their transfer. Some of the plaintiffs also alleged violations of their First Amendment rights because they had been transferred to Tamms based on their membership in groups or gangs. On July 18, 2003, the judge granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because their initial grievance had not notified defendants that plaintiffs were put into supermax in response to litigation activities. Plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Seventh Circuit on August 27, 2003. The Seventh Circuit decided the appeal on September 9, 2005, and reversed and remanded the case for all but one plaintiff on due process and retaliation claims. 422 F.3d 570. The Seventh Circuit upheld summary judgment for the defendants on the First Amendment claims. Back in the district court, on February 7, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class. On June 14, 2006, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint which incorporated their class action allegations. Plaintiffs sought a class of all inmates who have been transferred to Tamms Correctional Center since January 1, 1998, and all prisoners who will be transferred to Tamms in the future. On September 12, 2006, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion, adopting their proposed class definition and appointing the Uptown People's Law Center as class counsel. 2006 WL 2639972. On December 6, 2006, the court affirmed the findings of a magistrate judge and denied plaintiffs' discovery motion to compel inspection of confidential prison information. 472 F.Supp.2d 1034. On January 8, 2008, the court denied a plaintiff's motion for appointment of separate counsel. One plaintiff had withdrawn from class representation, and the court ruled that under these circumstances he should proceed pro se, and was not entitled to the appointment of his own attorney. 2008 WL 131166 On September 4, 2009, the court denied the class plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted in part defendants' motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the court granted defendants' motion on qualified immunity to damages for the due process claim and on the retaliation claims by the plaintiffs who were assigned to Tamms before the current director of the IDOC took his position. 2009 WL 2905548. On January 15, 2010, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the claim of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 2010 WL 235003. Specifically, the court found that no administrative remedy had ever existed to challenge placement in supermax. On July 20, 2010, after a bench trial, the court awarded injunctive relief. 725 F. Supp. 2d 735. The injunctive relief required review of all transfers into Tamm and notice of reason for transfer to all inmates and hearings as a part of the review procedure. The hearings were to receive internal review and were appealable within the IDOC. The relief was granted for two years unless further relief was found to be necessary. On August 19, 2010, defendants appealed the injunction to the Seventh Circuit. On October 12, 2010, the district court denied a stay of the injunction and also denied the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, the court found defendants did not have a high chance of succeeding on the merits and that harm to defendants by transferring prisoners out of supermax was small. 2010 WL 4000599. But on June 6, 2012, the Seventh Circuit vacated the injunction and required a new injunction more narrowly tailored to the scope of the constitutional right. 682 F.3d 679. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit found the requirements on reporting guidelines and timing of reports were broader than constitutionally required. The PLRA required that relief be more narrowly drawn. On June 20, 2012, the district court required the defendant to submit a new proposed injunction. Defendants appealed this to the Seventh Circuit. However, in the interim, Illinois governor Pat Quinn vetoed all state budget appropriations for Tamms, effectively shutting the facility down. On March 27, 2013, the district court proposed a grant of defendant's motion to vacate the injunctive relief on the grounds there were no longer any prisoners in the facility. 2013 WL 1286971. On April 3, 2013, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to vacate the injunction due to the lack of prisoners at the facility. However, on remand the district court upheld its award of $297,848.60 in attorney's fees for the plaintiff. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On March 7, 2000, inmates in Illinois's supermax prison, Tamms Correctional Center, brought this action pro se against the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law. The inmates alleged that their selection by prison officials for transfer to and continued confinement at Tamms violated their right to petition the government, their due process rights, their freedom of association, and a violation of the ex-post facto clause. The trial court originally found for defendants on summary judgment but the Seventh Circuit reversed on the issues of due process and retaliation. During the pendency of the case, the Governor of Illinois closed the prison by vetoing appropriations for its budget."} {"article": "During the period from at least 1988 until January 1, 1994, five female janitors who worked in the School City of East Chicago, a school district in Northern Indiana, were assigned to and allowed by the school district to work only seven hour shifts, while their male counterparts were assigned and allowed to work eight hour shifts. The female janitors lost hourly earnings due to the school district's practice of limiting their hours. The five female janitors then filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e, et seq. The EEOC investigated the charges and found reasonable cause to believe the Title VII allegations were true. After unsuccessful attempts to conciliate the matter, the EEOC referred the charges to the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ). On September 15, 1998, the DOJ reached an agreement with the school district and filed a complaint against it in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana under Title VII on the same day. In the complaint, the DOJ sought an injunction prohibiting the school district from engaging in its discriminatory practice as well as compensatory backpay for female janitors who were adversely affected by such practice. This was the sixth case filed by the DOJ since 1993, alleging that women had not been given equal access to higher paying custodial jobs in public schools. According to a DOJ press release, under the agreement, the school district would create a fund of $250,000 to compensate all female janitors who lost money as a result of its sex discrimination regarding working hours. Furthermore, the school district agreed to pay the attorneys' fees for the five female janitors. Even though we had little information about any injunctive relief, it is highly likely that the agreement contained the relief sought in the complaint, requiring an end to the school district's discriminatory practice in question. On September 24, 1998, the District Court (Judge James T. Moody) issued a consent decree, and approved the DOJ's proposed monetary relief determinations on August 16, 1999. This ended the case.", "summary": "During the period from at least 1988 until January 1, 1994, five female janitors who worked in the School City of East Chicago, a school district in Northern Indiana (the Employer), were assigned to and allowed by the Employer to work only seven hour shifts, while their male counterparts were assigned and allowed to work eight hour shifts. The female janitors lost hourly earnings due to the Employer's practice of limiting their hours. The five female janitors then filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e, et seq. The EEOC investigated the charges and found reasonable cause to believe the Title VII allegations were true. After unsuccessful attempts to conciliate the matter, the EEOC referred the charges to the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ). On September 15, 1998, the DOJ reached an agreement with the Employer and filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against it under Title VII. In the agreement, the Employer agreed to create a fund of $250,000 to compensate female janitors who lost money as a result of its practice of limiting their working hours. Furthermore, the Employer agreed to pay the attorneys' fees for the five female janitors. An injunction that prohibited the sex discrimination in question was likely issued as well. The District Court issued a consent decree on September 24, 1998, and approved the DOJ's proposed monetary relief determinations on August 16, 1999. This ended the case."} {"article": "NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see their tracker. COVID-19 Summary: This putative class-action lawsuit was filed on April 29 by twelve individual voter plaintiffs and a non-profit corporation against the Indiana Secretary of State and members of the Indiana Election Commission to challenge Indiana\u2019s absentee voting laws. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On August 21, the plaintiffs\u2019 preliminary injunction was denied. The plaintiffs appealed the court\u2019s decision to the Seventh Circuit shortly after. The case is ongoing.
All persons seeking employment with the government of the State or in the service of any county shall be citizens, nationals, or permanent resident aliens of the United States, or eligible under federal law for unrestricted employment in the United States, and residents of the State at the time of their application for employment and as a condition of eligibility for continued employment. \"Resident\" means a person who is physically present in the State at the time the person claims to have established the person's domicile in the State and shows the person's intent is to make Hawaii the person's permanent residence. In determining this intent, the following factors shall be considered: (1) Maintenance of a domicile or permanent place of residence in the State; (2) Absence of residency in another state; and (3) Former residency in the State.Plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Hawaii, argued that to be unconstitutional because it had the impermissible purpose of deterring migration into the State. They sought an injunction to bar enforcement of the law. The District Court (Judge David Alan Ezra) granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Walsh v. City and County of Honolulu, 423 F.Supp.2d 1094 (D.Hawaii 2006). Plaintiffs then filed motions for summary judgment and for permanent injunction to enjoin enforcement of the law. Judge Ezra found the law to be unconstitutional and granted plaintiffs' motions. Defendants' counter motion for summary judgment was denied. Walsh v. City and County of Honolulu, 460 F.Supp.2d 1207 (D.Hawai'i 2006). Defendants appealed. While the appeal was pending, the challenged provisions of the law were repealed by 2007 Hawaii Laws Act 52 (H.B. 1750). The state then filed an unopposed motion to vacate the district court judgment, due to mootness, which was granted by the Ninth Circuit. The case was remanded to the District Court for closing. Plaintiffs were awarded $135,801.24 in attorney's fees and costs.", "summary": "On June 9, 2005, a group of individuals whose applications for employment with the City and County of Honolulu had been rejected brought a class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court District of Hawaii to challenge constitutionality of Hawaii's statutory pre-employment residency requirement for public employment. The law in question provided that any state employment seeker be a citizen, national, or LPR. Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and permanent injunction. Both were granted. While on appeal, the unlawful provisions were repealed, Defendants filed an unopposed motion to vacate the judgment due to mootness, which was granted by the Ninth Circuit. Plaintiffs were awarded $135,801.24 in attorney's fees and costs."} {"article": "On July 12, 2018, three mothers seeking asylum in the United States filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on behalf of all those similarly situated nationwide. The plaintiffs sued the Attorney General of the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), along with their respective agency heads, for allegedly violating the plaintiffs\u2019 Fifth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. Each of the three named plaintiffs had been separated from their minor children upon being detained in the United States. The plaintiffs, represented by the Immigrant Advocacy and Litigation Center, the University of Southern California, and public counsel, sought an injunction requiring the defendants to provide mental-health screenings and appropriate trauma-informed remedial medical and mental-health services to those parents and children who were separated as a result of the government\u2019s immigrant family separation policy. See \u201cHow Trump Came to Enforce a Practice of Separating Migrant Families.\u201d The plaintiffs also sought attorney's fees. The case was assigned to Judge John A. Kronstadt. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged the following: Plaintiff Ms. P, along with her daughter, arrived in the United States on or around May 17, 2018 after fleeing a physically and sexually abusive relationship in her native Guatemala. Ms. P and her daughter were detained near the border and placed in a windowless room that lacked basic amenities alongside 150 other detainees. Here, Ms. P witnessed other children being forcibly taken from their parents, whose distress was mocked by the detention officers. On May 20, after several days in these conditions, Ms. P\u2019s daughter was taken away, with no indication given as to when, or if, Ms. P would see her again. About two weeks later, Ms. P received notice of her daughter\u2019s location. They were not permitted contact with one another until June 22, when they were able to speak via telephone. According to licensed clinical social workers familiar with Ms. P and her daughter, they are both showing signs of trauma, anxiety, and depression as a result of the ongoing separation. Ms. P has not received any mental health or counseling services from the government to address these concerns. Plaintiff Ms. O, along with her daughter, arrived in the United States on or around May 17, 2018 after fleeing gang violence in her native Honduras. Upon crossing the border, Ms. O and her daughter flagged down a patrol car. They were then processed and detained separately at a nearby facility. Ms. O was placed in a holding cell that resembled a chain-link dog kennel with 50 other women and no basic amenities. Here, Ms. O witnessed other children being forcibly taken from their parents, who were taunted by the detention officers. On May 21, Ms. O, along with 50 other detainees, was taken to court where she plead guilty to criminal illegal entry though she did not understand the consequences. After the proceeding, Ms. O was transferred to another facility without her daughter. Ms. O did not learn of her daughter\u2019s whereabouts until May 30. She and her daughter have spoken over the phone only three times for less than five minutes since being separated. Ms. O has not received any mental health or counseling services from the government to address her trauma. Plaintiff Ms. M, along with her daughter, arrived in the United States on or around May 18, 2018 after fleeing domestic and gang violence in her native El Salvador. Upon crossing the border, Ms. M and her daughter flagged down a patrol car and were immediately taken to facility and separated for questioning. Ms. M was mocked by detention officers during this questioning. Ms. M was kept in a \u201ccage\u201d that lacked basic amenities with 40-50 other women. Food was scarce, and the guards would sometimes throw crackers on the floor of the cell and laugh as the hungry women scrambled to pick them up. From her cage, Ms. M could see her daughter crying in a separate cell. On May 21, Ms. M was taken to criminal proceedings with 50 other detainees where she believed she had to, and did, plead guilty though she did not understand the consequences. After these proceedings, Ms. M was transferred to another facility. She did not learn of her daughter\u2019s location or condition until her mother, who is a permanent legal resident of the United States, provided her with this information on May 25. On June 22, Ms. M was able to speak with her daughter, who was crying uncontrollably, on the phone for about one minute. Ms. M was released on bond on July 12. On July 12, the plaintiffs sought to have their lawsuit declared \u201crelated\u201d to the 1985 Flores case, which had resulted in an important and long-lasting immigration settlement agreement. Judge Dolly M. Gee declined to transfer the case to Flores because this action sought affirmative relief separate and apart from the Flores Settlement Agreement and did not call for a determination of the same questions of law or fact. On July 18, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to provide meaningful access to mental health care screening and treatment to the plaintiffs and other proposed class members. On July 27, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for class certification, proposing to define the class as all adult parents nationwide who (1) were, are, or will be detained in immigration custody by the Department of Homeland Security (\u201cDHS\u201d), and (2) have a minor child who has been, is, or will be separated from them by DHS and detained in DHS or Office of Refugee Resettlement (\u201cORR\u201d) custody or foster care, absent a demonstration in a hearing that the parent is unfit or presents a danger to the child. On September 18, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. In January 2019 the parties entered settlement discussions and the court selected Senior District Judge James S. Otero to preside over settlement proceedings between the parties. Several settlement conferences were held but the case was eventually sent back to Judge Kronstadt in October 2019 after the parties failed to come to an agreement. On November 5, 2019, Judge Kronstadt granted the plaintiffs' motions for class certification and a preliminary injunction, and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. He certified the following class:
\"All adult parents nationwide who entered the U.S. at or between designated ports of entry, who (1) on or after July 1, 2017, were, are, or will be detained in immigration custody by DHS; and (2) have a minor child who has been, is, or will be separated from them by DHS and detained in DHS or ORR custody or foster care, absent a demonstration in a hearing that the parent is unfit or presents a danger to the child.\"He also certified the following subclasses:
\"(i) the Custody Subclass, which is defined as all members of the class who are currently or will be detained in immigration custody by DHS; and (ii) the Released Subclass, which is defined as all members of the class who were previously detained in immigration custody by DHS, but who have since been release.\"Next, Judge Kronstadt found that the plaintiffs had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their due process claim with respect to both subclasses. 2019 WL 6723686. The court ordered that the defendants make available, to all members of the subclasses who elect to have them, medically appropriate initial mental health screenings, diagnoses, and treatment (if requested) by qualified professionals. On November 27, the defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit (docket no. 19-56400). They also requested that the district court stay the case pending resolution of the appeal. On February 21, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss their appeal. On March 24, 2020, the parties filed a joint stipulation to stay the case, including pending discovery, through January 10, 2021. The parties reported that on March 11, 2020, defendant DHHS had finalized a contract with a non-profit organization to implement the preliminary injunction as to the Released Subclass. As to the Custody Subclass, defendant DHS would provide notice to class members of available services and the ICE Health Service Corps Behavioral Health Unit would provide screenings and any necessary treatment. Consequently, the parties requested a stay while this relief is provided. The district court granted the stay the same day, ordering the defendants to file status reports every sixty days, with the first report due on May 22, 2020. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On July 12, 2018, three mothers who came to the United States seeking asylum and who, upon being detained, were separated from their minor children, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring the government to provide mental-health screenings and appropriate trauma-informed remedial medical and mental-health services to those parents and children who were separated as a result of the government\u2019s immigrant family separation policy. On November 5, 2019, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motions for class certification and a preliminary injunction, and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court ordered the defendants to begin providing class members with mental health screenings and any necessary treatment. The defendants initially appealed the order to the Ninth Circuit, but later voluntarily dismissed the appeal. The parties negotiated plans to implement the relief ordered by the district court and on March 24, they filed a joint stipulation to stay the case through January 10, 2021, while the relief is provided. The court granted the stay and ordered the defendants to file status reports every sixty days."} {"article": "On December 9, 2009, the Native American Council of Tribes and current and former Native American inmates in the South Dakota State Penitentiary filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota. Native American inmates in the South Dakota State Penitentiary were forbidden from using tobacco in their Native American rituals and ceremonies. Therefore, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a71996, international law, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging a violation of due process and their First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Plaintiffs alleged that there were other, less restrictive means that the South Dakota State Penitentiary could accomplish their goals. The United States filed a Statement of the Interest with the Court on July 16, 2012, stating that the defendant\u2019s arguments were a request for the court to determine the importance and centrality of tobacco to Plaintiff\u2019s religious practices. This was a problem because under common law and the RLUIPA, courts are forbidden from inquiring into the centrality of beliefs to religions. In response to a motion for summary judgment brought by the defendants on February 22, 2011, the Court (Judge Karen E. Schreier) decided that Plaintiffs did not have a cause of action under the American Indian Religious Freedom Act. Furthermore, the court stated that Plaintiffs did not have claims under international law, as they did not create an independent cause of action for Plaintiffs. This left the First, Fourteenth, and RLUIPA claims for the jury to decide at trial. The trial began on March 27, 2012. The Court concluded that the use of tobacco in Plaintiffs\u2019 Native American ceremonies was protected by RLUIPA because Plaintiffs\u2019 beliefs were sincerely held and because the practice of using tobacco was part of their religious tradition. Furthermore, the Court held that the ban on tobacco was a substantial burden to Plaintiffs because tobacco was an \u201cessential and fundamental part of Plaintiffs\u2019 religious exercise.\u201d The Court also held that there was not a compelling government interest in the ban of tobacco and, even if there was, a total ban was not the least restrictive means as required by RLUIPA. 897 F. Supp. 2d 828. On January 25, 2013, the District Court ordered a remedial order that limited the amount of tobacco to be 1% of the total mixture used for religious ceremonies. This was in accordance with the statements of one of the plaintiffs who argued that it did not matter how much tobacco was in the mixture, but rather that tobacco was present in the mixture. 2013 WL 310633. The Plaintiffs were then granted attorneys\u2019 fees in the amount of $75,350.87. The Defendants appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on February 25, 2013. On April 24, 2014 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the District Court\u2019s decision for the same reasons asserted by the District Court. 750 F.3d 742. On January 7, 2016 the Eight Circuit denied the defendants\u2019 petition for rehearing en banc. On July 5, 2016, the Court determined that Plaintiffs\u2019 motion to amend the remedial order was an attempt to add claims to the case rather than amend. Therefore, the plaintiffs\u2019 motions were denied. On August 9, 2017, the Court denied Plaintiffs\u2019 motion to modify the remedial order because there was not a significant change in the facts or law. The Court also denied Plaintiff's motion for TRO to prohibit defendants from banning tobacco in religious ceremonies, finding that the claim is moot because that relief was already included in the Court's original order. Finally, the Court denied the Plaintiff's motion to amend their complaint because the case was already decided on its merits. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On December 9, 2009, Native American inmates sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a71996, international law, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, alleging a violation of due process and their first amendment right to free exercise of religion. On March 27, 2012, the Court concluded that the use of tobacco in Plaintiffs\u2019 Native American ceremonies was protected by RLUIPA because Plaintiffs\u2019 beliefs were sincerely held and because the practice of using tobacco is part of their religious tradition. Furthermore, the Court held that the ban on tobacco was a substantial burden to Plaintiffs because tobacco was an \u201cessential and fundamental part of Plaintiffs\u2019 religious exercise.\u201d"} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of 6,000 incarcerated individuals to challenge the inadequate response to the COVID-19 outbreak at Mississippi's two largest prisons, alleging that the Mississippi Department of Corrections' response to the pandemic violates the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act and the Constitution. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including an order requiring defendants to implement remedial measures to prevent the transmission of COVID-19. The parties jointly stayed all proceedings on September 15 and entered settlement talks on October 22.
(1) that by impeding asylum seekers\u2019 ability to consult with persons of their choosing and preventing them from fully and effectively participating in the credible fear interview process, the Directives violate IIRIRA; (2) the Directives are arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion under the APA as they were motivated by racial animus and the defendants failed to provide an adequate justification for changing policy; (3) the Directives violate the APA because they were issued absent notice and comment; (4) the Directives violate the Rehabilitation Act, because they unlawfully discriminate against the individual plaintiffs (who have disabilities under the Act) by failing to provide them with a reasonable accommodation and/or excluding them from the asylum process altogether; (5) the Directives violate the First Amendment because they unduly impede communication and association between the individual plaintiffs and their counsel, as well as between RAICES and its clients; and (6) the Directives were issued in violation of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act and the Appointments Clause, because Mr. Cuccinelli\u2019s service as Acting Director of USCIS is not in accordance with the Act, nor was he nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.On September 27, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendants filed the administrative record on October 21, and on January 9 the parties agreed to treat the plaintiffs\u2019 motion as a motion for partial summary judgment. The defendants also filed a motion for partial summary judgment. On March 1, 2020, the district court granted in part and denied in part the summary judgment motions of both the plaintiffs and defendants. 2020 WL 985376. First, Judge Moss concluded that the court only had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs\u2019 challenges to the directives reducing consultation time and prohibiting extensions. Next, he found that Mr. Cuccinelli was not lawfully appointed to serve as Acting Director of USCIS, thereby requiring that those two directives be set aside. He also set aside the individual plaintiffs\u2019 negative credible-fear determinations and removal orders and remanded to USCIS for further proceedings. Judge Moss did not reach the plaintiffs\u2019 other legal challenges. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "A legal services provider and seven detained asylum seekers filed this lawsuit in the D.C. District Court on September 6, 2019, challenging the Trump Administration's new asylum directives, which gave asylum seekers only 24 hours to prepare for their credible fear interviews. The plaintiffs alleged that the directives violated IIRIRA, the APA, the First Amendment, the Appointments Clause, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Federal Vacancies Reform Act. In March 2020, the district court granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that Acting USCIS Director Ken Cuccinelli was unlawfully appointed and setting aside two of the challenged directives. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "This case is one of a pair of lawsuits filed against the Arizona Attorney General to challenge his practice of seizing money wire transferred to Mexico through Western Union. In an attempt to curtail the smuggling of undocumented immigrants by trafficking organizations (known as \"coyotes\") from Mexico to Arizona, the Arizona Attorney General had obtained warrants and seized millions of dollars of money that was wire transferred to Mexico. The Attorney General focused on amounts over $500 which were believed to have been sent as payments to Mexican smugglers who have transported people or drugs into Arizona. Western Union filed this lawsuit on September 19, 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona in an attempt to block threatened seizures by the Arizona Attorney General of Western Union wire transfers from 28 states to Mexico, even if such transfers were not sent from or received in Arizona. The seizures were to occur pursuant to a seizure warrant sought by the Arizona Attorney General in the Arizona Superior Court, Maricopa County. Western Union alleged that the seizures violated violate the Commerce Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. They sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to halt the seizures. The District Court (Judge Stephen M. McNamee) ordered that the Western Union case be consolidated with the related class action case, Torres v. Goddard [IM-AZ-6]. On September 20, 2006, the Court (Judge McNamee) denied the motion for temporary injunctive relief, in part, due to parallel proceedings in Arizona state court raising the same or similar issues. On September 25, 2007, the court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. For several years, the court granted extensions of time. On March 10, 2010, the court dismissed the case with prejudice per the parties' agreement to settle and stipulation to dismiss the case. The settlement was approved on February 24, 2010 in a separate case, Arizona v. Western Union Financial Services, Inc. [CV2010-005807.] In that case, the parties agreed to a $94 million settlement where as much as $50 million will go to support law enforcement agencies working to crack down on drug and human smuggling. Under the agreement, the state will receive $21 million and Western Union will devote $19 million to improve its own efforts to stop money laundering and $4 million to an independent monitor. Western Union also agreed to provide border state prosecutors access to wire transfer records.", "summary": "On September 19, 2006, Western Union filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the Arizona Attorney General in an attempt to block threatened seizures by the state of Western Union wire transfers from 28 states to Mexico. The Arizona Attorney General believed that millions of dollars were being sent as payment to Mexican smugglers who had transported people or drugs into Arizona. The parties ultimately stipulated to dismiss the case in 2010 after entering into a settlement agreement in a separate case, Arizona v. Western Union Financial Services [CV2010-005807]."} {"article": "This suit, filed on Dec. 11, 2017, challenged the legality of a series of immigration raids in the Atlanta area. The complaint stated that, in response to a 2015 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) directive titled \"Operation Border Resolve,\" U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) targeted families from El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala living in nine major U.S. cities, including Atlanta. As part of the directive, the complaint alleged, ICE agents were to be trained on the Fourth Amendment: \"[I]f they claim to be a member of local law enforcement during a ruse, the agents must notify the local law enforcement agency beforehand.\" The complaint argued that, in Jan. 2016, ICE officers used ruses to gain entry into the homes of noncitizens, then arrested and detained them without probable cause or search warrants. The plaintiffs argued that ICE violated the Fourth Amendment and committed false imprisonment, trespass, negligence, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, under Georgia state law and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). They sought damages and declaratory relief. This case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. After Judge Clarence Cooper was recused, the case was reassigned to Judge Steve C. Jones on Dec. 13. The plaintiffs, first represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and later by private counsel, were three families with members who were citizens of various Central American countries. In one instance, ICE officers pulled over one named plaintiff while he was driving, without citing any traffic violation. The officers indicated that the plaintiff had to let them search his home, as they believed a criminal suspect was located there, or else the plaintiff risked obstructing a criminal investigation. The officers claimed to have a warrant but did not show it, and repeatedly threatened the plaintiff. Fearing arrest, but denying any such criminal suspect was in his home, the plaintiff went back to his home with them but agreed they would wait outside while he obtained identification cards of the people residing inside. The ICE officers then forcefully entered the home and eventually arrested the plaintiff's wife for missing an immigration court date, which the family claimed had not happened. ICE detained her and some of her children for a month. In the case of another family, ICE officers once again attempted to enter into the home by claiming there was a criminal suspect there. The agents did not have a warrant, nor did they make clear they were ICE officers. Upon entering the house, they arrested and detained members of the family. Additionally, in the case of the third family, ICE officers once again gained entry into the home with no search warrant by claiming there was a criminal suspect. In each case, the plaintiffs suffered significant emotional distress after they were released from custody. On Feb. 16, the defendants moved to dismiss. The defendants argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) because the alleged conduct arose from removal proceedings and lay within the Immigration Courts' jurisdiction. The defendants also disputed that the FTCA applied because the removal orders, arrests, and detentions were lawful. On Aug. 6, 2018, the court (Judge Steve C. Jones) granted the motion to dismiss as to the alien plaintiffs and denied it without prejudice as to the citizen plaintiffs (three minor children). The court held that 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(g) and the INA barred it from adjudicating the merits of alien removal orders, but not from adjudicating citizen removal orders. The court found that the alien plaintiffs' claims that they were detained through misrepresentations and disregard for policy ultimately challenged detention methods in the execution of removal orders, and so \u00a7 1252(g)'s jurisdictional limits applied. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on Sept. 4, 2018. On Sept. 18, the defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief and that punitive damages, attorneys\u2019 fees, and declaratory relief are not available under the FTCA. On Aug. 28, 2019, Judge Steve Jones granted the motion to dismiss with regard to plaintiffs' claims for trespass, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress along with the claims for punitive damages, attorney's fees, and declaratory relief. Unable to conclude that removal orders are essentially equivalent to arrest warrants, however, Judge Jones denied the motion to dismiss as to plaintiffs' claim for false imprisonment. In March 2020, the parties had a dispute about an offer of judgment. Defendants claimed that they made an offer for judgment of $15,000 total while plaintiffs believed they had accepted an offer of judgment for $15,000 for each of nine plaintiffs. On March 23, Judge Jones directed the clerk to strike plaintiffs' acceptance and the case is now in discovery. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "This suit, filed on Dec. 11, 2017, challenged the legality of a series of immigration raids on Central American families in the Atlanta area. The complaint argued that ICE officers used ruses to gain entry into the homes of immigrant families, then arresting and detaining them without probable cause or search warrants. Only the minor plaintiffs' claims for false imprisonment survived the motion to dismiss. The case is now in discovery."} {"article": "On July 14, 2006, Western Watersheds Project, an Idaho environmental non-profit organization, filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho. The plaintiff sought reversal of a January 2005 agency determination that a bird species known as the Greater Sage Grouse did not warrant inclusion as an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The plaintiff also brought the claim under the Administrative Procedure and Declaratory Judgment Acts, arguing that the organization's continued interest in studying the bird in its wild habitat was threatened by the bird\u2019s substantially declining population and the defendant\u2019s decision to deny the species protection was arbitrary and politically motivated. The plaintiff sought an order to remand the matter to the defendant agency for reconsideration. The case was assigned to Chief District U.S. Judge B. Lynn Winmill. According to the complaint, the plaintiff petitioned the defendant in 2003 to list the Sage Grouse as a threatened or endangered species, citing \u201cover one hundred peer-review scientific publications\u201d detailing the destruction of the Sage Grouse\u2019s habitat due to livestock grazing and oil and gas development. In 2005, the defendant responded to the petition with a finding that Sage Grouse would be listed as an endangered species. The complaint alleged that this finding violated the ESA's requirement that such determinations be based on the best available scientific information. The plaintiff asked the court to order that the defendant conduct a new review of Sage Grouse\u2019s status. Beginning on September 19, 2006, fourteen corporate and government entities began efforts to intervene in the suit on the defendant\u2019s behalf, including the State of Wyoming, the Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, and the Petroleum Association of Wyoming. The intervenors argued that new federal regulations protecting the Sage Grouse would burden them with costs of compliance. On March 9, 2007, Judge Winmill denied the motions to intervene in part, ruling that the would-be intervenors could not claim any interest in the litigation given that the plaintiff sought only an administrative re-assessment of the Greater Sage Grouse\u2019s status. However, Judge Winmill granted the motion in part in the event that the plaintiff might pursue a remedy beyond a remand of the administrative decision. Because that could adversely effect the intervenors, they were granted the right to intervene to the extent of challenging a possible proposed remedy. This decision was unsuccessfully appealed to the Ninth Circuit by the intervenors. On April 9, 2007 and May 21, 2007, the plaintiff and defendant respectively filed cross motions for summary judgment. On December 4, 2007, following a hearing on motions, the court granted summary judgement for the plaintiff, reversing the defendant\u2019s decision to not list the Sage Grouse, and directing defendant agency to further consider whether to list the Sage Grouse pursuant the ESA. In his opinion, Judge Winmill found that the defendant's review of the Sage Grouse's status had failed to consider the findings of its own scientific experts. Furthermore, a Deputy Assistant Director at the defendant agency had used \u201cintimidation tactics\u201d to influence the results of the agency's scientific inquiries. Judge Winmill therefore found that the agency\u2019s decision had not been based on sound scientific analysis as required by the ESA. 535 F.Supp.2d 1173. The opinion also noted that the same Director had already been found in a separate case to have improperly interfered in an ESA listing determination in Center for Biological Diversity v. FWS, 2005 WL 2000928 (N.D.Cal. 2005). The court declared the defendant's prior determination invalid and remanded the issue to the agency for further consideration in compliance with the ESA. On January 30, 2008, the parties stipulated to a 90-day deadline (from the date of the court's order) for the defendant's completion of the new review of the Sage Grouse's status. However, the defendant subsequently asked the court for additional time to comply with the court's order, and ultimately obtained several extensions from court. On December 12, 2008, the parties agreed to a settlement covering plaintiff\u2019s attorney fees and costs, amounting to $135,000, which the court approved. On March 8, 2010, after receiving several extensions, the defendant reported to the court that it had determined that listing the Sage Grouse under the ESA was warranted. However, despite this finding, the defendant placed the Sage Grouse on its list of \"precluded\" species, meaning that a bureaucratic backlog and a lack of resources prevented the agency from protecting the species regardless of the threats it faced. Thus the defendant avoided needing to protect the Sage Grouse while conceding the plaintiff\u2019s scientific arguments. The plaintiff asked for leave to file a supplemental complaint to explain that the defendant\u2019s new determination had been arbitrary and politicized, saying that it placed the Sage Grouse in a \u201cblack hole from which few species ever emerge, and under which they receive no ESA protection.\u201d The plaintiff asked the court to order the defendant to review the Sage Grouse's status yet again and requested leave to file an amended supplemental complaint. But on April 27, 2010, Judge Winmill denied the motion. The plaintiff had not alleged that the defendant violated the earlier order or that their second determination was not in compliance with the ESA. The plaintiff would be required to file a new action if they wanted to bring this new claim and the case closed.", "summary": "In 2006, an environmental non-profit filed this action seeking reversal of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's determination not to list the Greater Sage Grouse under the Endangered Species Act. The court found that the defendant's decision not to list the species had been tainted by political considerations and inattention to scientific analysis. The defendant was ordered to conduct a new review of the Sage Grouse's status, the result of which was a new determination in 2010 that listing the Sage Grouse under the ESA was warranted. However, the defendant claimed it could not actually add the species to the endangered species list, due to a bureaucratic backlog and lack of resources. The plaintiff's request to file a supplemental brief was denied by the court, and the case closed."} {"article": "On December 23, 2002, a Mexican woman who worked in the U.S. as a non-immigrant guest worker filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging that various labor recruiters engaged in sex discrimination against women who they were placing as non-immigrant guest workers at various U.S. farms. Specifically, plaintiff alleged a systematic practice by recruiters of denying women the opportunity to obtain seasonal work (agricultural work, such as harvesting crops) under the H-2A visa guest worker program and instead deliberately steering them to less lucrative jobs in the H-2B visa guest worker program (work classified as nonagricultural, such as packing produce), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state law. Attorneys with Legal Momentum, Farmworkers Legal Services of New York (FLSNY), and other social justice organizations and private firms represented the plaintiff. Plaintiff sought declaratory relief and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants moved to dismiss, and/or for summary judgment on various grounds, including a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and argued that Title VII did not protect workers recruited outside of the U.S. In June 2004, the District Court (Chief Judge Norman A. Mordue) denied defendants' motions. Olvera-Morales v. Sterling Onions, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 211 (N.D.N.Y. 2004). On June 15, 2005, following the dismissal of the New York defendants, the case was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. The Court reconsidered the transfer order but reaffirmed its decision. Olvera-Morales v. Int'l Labor Mgmt. Corp., No. 5:02-CV-1589, 2006 WL 931752, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17923 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2006). Plaintiff moved for class certification on February 15, 2007, proposing a class consisting of \"[a]ll female H-2B workers recruited, procured or referred for employment by the Defendants or their agents, or whose H-2B employment opportunity was procured by Defendants or their agents, from 1999 to the present.\" On November 7, 2007, the District Court (Judge N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.) granted class certification. Olvera-Morales v. Int'l Labor Mgmt. Corp., 246 F.R.D. 250 (M.D.N.C. 2007). On December 18, 2007, the Court (Judge Tilley) granted Defendants International Labor Management Corporation (ILMC) and Del-Al Associates summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Title VII claims. However, the Court denied summary judgment to the North Carolina Grower's Association (NCGA) on the Title VII claims. The Court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims Plaintiffs asserted under New York Human Rights Law, dismissing them without prejudice. The Court issued its memorandum opinion on January 1, 2008. Olvera-Morales v. Int'l Labor Mgmt. Corp., No. 1:05CV00559, 2008 WL 53293 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 1, 2008). Both Plaintiffs and Defendant NGCA moved for reconsideration. On February 20, 2008, the Court (Judge Tilley) granted Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and reinstated the Title VII claim against ILMC. The Court stated that it had dismissed ILMC as an \"employment agency,\" when ILMC had only contested that it was not an \"employer.\" The Court thus held that, as the issue of whether ILMC was not an \"employment agency\" was not before the Court at the summary judgment stage, it had erred in dismissing the claim. Olvera-Morales v. Int'l Labor Mgmt. Corp., No. 1:05CV00559, 2008 WL 506090 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 20, 2008). On April 4, 2008, the Court (Judge Tilley) also granted Defendant NGCA's motion for reconsideration and dismissed the Title VII claim against it. The Court held that, since Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the time of her initial EEOC complaint, the \"identity of interest\" exception--which the Court had applied to Plaintiff--should actually not apply to her on summary judgment. Morales v. Int'l Labor Mgmt. Corp., No. 1:05CV00559, 2008 WL 939180 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 4, 2008). On April 16, 2008, less than a week before trial was scheduled to begin, the parties notified the Court that they had reached a settlement. The settlement called for Defendants to provide data to Plaintiffs' counsel for three years on the H-2A and H-2B workers hired by Defendants, for Defendants to adopt anti-sex discrimination policies and implement training to that effect, and for $100,000 in settlement funds. On August 4, 2009, the Court granted the parties' motion for final approval of the class settlement.", "summary": "On December 23, 2002, a Mexican woman who worked in the U.S. as a non-immigrant guest worker filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging that various labor recruiters engaged in sex discrimination against women who they were placing as non-immigrant guest workers at various U.S. farms. Specifically, plaintiff alleged a systematic practice by recruiters of denying women the opportunity to obtain seasonal work (agricultural work, such as harvesting crops) under the H-2A visa guest worker program and instead deliberately steering them to less lucrative jobs in the H-2B visa guest worker program (work classified as nonagricultural, such as packing produce), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state law. The case eventually settled just prior to trial. The settlement called for Defendants to provide data to Plaintiffs' counsel for three years on the H-2A and H-2B workers hired by Defendants, for Defendants to adopt anti-sex discrimination policies and implement training to that effect, and for $100,000 in settlement funds."} {"article": "In 1955, the Supreme Court ordered school districts to desegregate \u201cwith all deliberate speed.\u201d 349 U.S. 294. But the city of Columbus, MS did not allow black students to attend schools previously reserved for whites until 1965, a decade later. Even by 1970, no white students attended a historically black school, and less than 5% of black students attended historically white schools. The United States brought this action on July 13, 1970 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. It sued both of the public school systems in Lowndes County: the Columbus Municipal Separate School District and the Lowndes County School District. The Department of Justice brought the lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000c-6 and sought immediate desegregation of both districts. District Judge Orma R. Smith entered a consent decree on August 10, followed by a permanent injunction on September 5. The injunction ordered the districts to operate unitary, non-racial school systems that did not discriminate on the basis of race. It also established a biracial advisory committee and governed how the districts assigned students to schools, hired faculty and staff, transported students, built new facilities, and decided which extracurricular activities to offer. The Columbus Municipal Separate School District\u2019s original remedial measures focused on its middle and high schools. In July 1975, the United States sought additional relief to desegregate the District\u2019s elementary schools. Originally, the District claimed that its existing policies were constitutional despite the fact that half its elementary schools were either over 90% black or 90% white. It later proposed minor attendance zone changes based on a neighborhood schools concept. In contrast, the United States proposed an ambitious pairing system. When two schools were paired, their attendance zones would be merged. Then, all students would attend one school for certain grades (e.g., 1st to 3rd grade) and the other school for the others (e.g., 4th to 6th grade). By pairing historically black schools with historically white schools, the United States\u2019 plan promised quick desegregation. The district court adopted the United States\u2019 pairing plan. The District appealed, arguing that its more limited plan should have been adopted instead. In an August 9, 1977 opinion, Fifth Circuit Judge Irving L. Goldberg upheld the district court\u2019s determination. Judge Goldberg observed that the District\u2019s plan would leave several schools entirely segregated and that the pairing plan would produce \u201cmuch greater desegregation.\u201d Therefore, Judge Goldberg held that the pairing plan was appropriate despite a small increase in the District\u2019s transportation costs. 558 F.2d 228. Over the next decades, the districts filed reports with the court. The court also implemented adjustments to the student assignment plan, authorized the construction and sale of schools, and supervised the appointment of new members to the biracial advisory committee. In 2007, the Columbus Municipal Separate School District and the United States filed a joint motion for a declaration of unitary status. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case as to Columbus on August 9. In contrast, Lowndes County parents\u2019 groups concluded that the Lowndes County School District was not adhering to its obligations under the consent decree. They filed cases in 2002 and 2003 to enforce the districts\u2019 desegregation obligations. The Court merged these two lawsuits with this case in 2004. The parents\u2019 groups, Lowndes County, and the United States agreed to a new consent decree in 2006, which declared the District unitary with respect to student assignment, faculty and staff assignment, and transportation only. It also provided a pathway towards a declaration of full unitary status. On August 21, 2008, the District moved for unitary status. The United States opposed the motion because of inadequate facilities and a lack of advanced courses in one of the District\u2019s high schools together with complaints of harassment of and discrimination against black students in majority white schools. The parties then agreed to a modified consent order under which the District would remedy these problems. The District again moved for unitary status on May 15, 2012. This time, the United States did not oppose the motion, but the parents\u2019 groups did. At a fairness hearing, few residents opposed the plan. The court found that the District had made the required facilities improvements and implemented an AP program. It also found that the District had formulated and implemented an anti-discrimination policy. District Judge Michael P. Mills wrote that the court had \u201cseriously considered\u201d denying unitary status because Caledonia High School continued to use \u201cConfederates\u201d as its nickname and play \u201cDixie\u201d at sporting events. But the court ultimately concluded that the lack of complaints from the community suggested that these \u201ctroubling\u201d activities were \u201cnot vestiges of segregation\u201d of sufficient magnitude to justify a denial of unitary status. The Lowndes County School District was declared unitary on October 24, 2012. 900 F. Supp. 2d 703. The case is now closed. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 558 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1977). 900 F. Supp. 2d 703 (N.D. Miss. 2012).", "summary": "In the 1970s, the United States sued two Mississippi school districts to dismantle de jure racial segregation. Both districts operated under permanent injunctions for about forty years and obtained declarations of unitary status early in the 21st Century. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On July 9, 2017, thirteen protesters and two reporters who were arrested during a protest in Baton Rouge filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued the City of Baton Rouge, as well as numerous agents of the Sheriff\u2019s Department and of the state, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and Article 306 of the State of Louisiana Children's code. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well and monetary relief and attorneys\u2019 fees. After a Baton Rouge police officer shot and killed Alton Sterling, people gathered in Baton Rouge to speak out against the pattern of police misconduct in the area and, more generally, in the United States. In July 2016, a peaceful, youth-led protest gathered at the State Capitol building where participants spoke, sang, and prayed. Participants then marched around the area in the same fashion. Eventually, law enforcement officers gathered. The officers ordered the protesters out of the streets. Most complied with the dispersal order. The officers ordered the protesters to disperse \u2013 an impossible order to comply with, since the police blocked off most of the surrounding streets, had already ordered the protesters to stay off the sidewalks, and were arresting people who stepped into the streets to leave. Shortly thereafter, the officers swept through the crowd, violently grabbing people and binding their wrists with plastic zipties. The officers arrested a mix of protesters, reporters, and legal observers. One of the plaintiffs was a 17-year-old girl put in an adult prison with male inmates in violation of the Children\u2019s Code. Another plaintiff was separated from her children, including a five-year-old who was taken from her and put into child protective services. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had, in ordering the dispersal of a peaceful protest and unlawfully arresting participants, violated participants\u2019 First Amendment rights to speech, assembly, and free press. The plaintiffs also claimed excessive force, unreasonable search and seizure, and civil conspiracy. The original complaint and some of the exhibits contained many photographic images depicting the actions of both protesters and law enforcement officers. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in the form of a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to end their practices and policies as described above. The plaintiffs also sought a preliminary injunction to require the defendants to expunge the plaintiffs\u2019 arrests at the defendants\u2019 cost and bar the defendants from reporting the plaintiffs\u2019 arrests to any law enforcement agency, database, employer, or credit agency. They further asked that a permanent injunction be granted for the above. On July 12, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a notice of related cases. The plaintiffs listed six cases that all involved damages lawsuits on behalf of people who were wrongfully arrested during the July 2016 Alton Sterling protests in Baton Rouge. One of these cases was McKesson v. City of Baton Rouge, one with common questions of law and fact with the present case. The case was originally assigned to Judge Shelly D. Dick. On July 12, 2017, the case was reassigned to Judge James J. Brady. Then, in light of the plaintiff\u2019s notice of related cases, the court reassigned the case to Judge John W. deGravelles and Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder-Doomes, the judges who presided over the McKesson case mentioned above. On July 21, 2017, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, adding an exhibit to the complaint listing the names and charges of all persons arrested during the protest. On September 11, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to strike the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint and first amended complaint. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs\u2019 failed to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) in their use of illustrative pictures in a petition and a \u201cPhotographic Timeline\u201d as one of the exhibits. The defendants considered these to be unconventional and unprofessional. Then, on September 28, 2017, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, a motion to strike the first amended complaint. The defendants made similar arguments to the motion above. On October 12, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of voluntary dismissal of some of the defendants, namely, the defendants associated with the Louisiana Sheriff\u2019s Association. Judge deGravelles approved this the next day. On January 2, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, removing some of the unconventional exhibits complained about in prior motions to dismiss. The amended complaint retained, however, much of the photographic imagery in the complaint itself. On January 11, 2018, the defendants, in response to the plaintiffs\u2019 filing a second amended complaint, withdrew their September 11, 2017 and September 28, 2017 motions to dismiss. In the following weeks, the defendants filed two motions to strike and four motions to dismiss the second amended complaint. In support of the motions to strike, the defendants argued again that the second amended complaint violated FRCP Rule 8. Additionally, the defendants claimed that the complaint contained redundant, immaterial, impertinent, and scandalous allegations. In support of the motions to dismiss, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Moreover, the defendants claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction over some of the defendants because Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to them. Lastly, the defendants argued that this case was ripe for dismissal on the grounds that the outcome of the case might influence the claims that had already been or had yet been filed. On February 20, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to stay discovery. Then, on February 26, 2018, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, a motion to strike the second amended complaint. The defendants argued that the complaint should be dismissed and/or stricken because the 82d page, 333 paragraph complaint, with its attached 64 pages of exhibits, violated the provision of FRCP Rule 8 that requires that a properly pled complaint contain \u201ca short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.\u201d On May, 14, 2018, Judge deGravelles granted in part the defendants\u2019 motion to stay discovery. With the exception of written discovery, discovery was stayed pending resolution of the issues raised in the motions to dismiss. On September 7, 2018, pending motions to dismiss and motions to strike were decided. All motions were granted in part and denied in part; after the motions, the claims against an officer in question in his personal capacity, failure to intervene, and state law claims remained, while claims against the officer in his official capacity and certain claims against other officers were dismissed. In response to these rulings and further discovery, on November 6, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss so that the plaintiffs could file a new complaint that includes only the officers against whom the plaintiffs had valid claims. The new complaint was filed a week later; it changed the list of defendants, removing the ones already mentioned and adding new defendants identified during discovery. Different sets of defendants filed for summary judgment and motions to dismiss in early 2020, though no ruling on either has been made as of June 2020. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "This 2017 lawsuit was brought by thirteen protesters ad two reporters who were arrested for their participation in the July 2016 Alton Sterling protests in Baton Rouge. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Children's Code Article 306, and state law. They alleged that the defendants had, in ordering the dispersal of a peaceful protest and unlawfully arresting participants, violated participants\u2019 First Amendment rights to speech, assembly, and free press. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "On August 9, 2018, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) changed its longstanding policy for determining unlawful presence of students and exchange visitors. Under the old policy, students and exchange visitors were deemed unlawfully present only after an official determination. However, the new policy deemed students as unlawfully present immediately after any unauthorized activity. The unauthorized activity could be as minor as a failure to report a change of address. On October 23, 2018, Guilford College and other universities filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina against USCIS and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Plaintiffs were represented by private counsel including Mayer Brown. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to provide notice and comment and comply with other requirements of the APA. Further, the new policy allegedly imposed three- and ten-year bars on individuals without notice or opportunity to cure and thus violated the protections guaranteed by the due process clause. Finally, plaintiffs alleged the new policy violated provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). On December 14, 2018, plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint. The plaintiffs also filed motions for a preliminary injunction and partial summary judgement on some of their claims involving the APA and the INA. On January 10, 2019, the government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. On May 3, 2019, the court agreed with plaintiffs and issued a nationwide preliminary injunction against the new policy, noting the APA directed courts to \"set aside agency action\" found unlawful. However, it denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment without prejudice because the parties failed to file the relevant administrative record. The plaintiffs again filed a motion for partial summary judgment in late May, 2019. At the same time, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the new policy was exempt from notice and comment requirements of the APA. On July 3, 2019, the judge denied both motions for summary judgement without prejudice, again stating that the parties failed to provide a sufficient administrative record. The parties subsequently renewed their summary judgment motions. On February 6, 2020, the Court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment on two grounds. First, Judge Biggs found that the new rule was subject to notice and comment rulemaking under the APA that had not taken place. Second, Judge Biggs found that the rule conflicted with the INA's plain text because the INA defined \"unlawful presence\" to mean more than mere participation in unauthorized activity. The Court remedied this violation by entering a nationwide injunction against the policy. 389 F. Supp. 3d 377. The government appealed the decision and injunction to the Fourth Circuit on April 3, 2020. However, on August 3, 2020, the government voluntarily dismissed that appeal, leaving the underlying injunction in place. It is unclear why the government chose to drop the appeal.", "summary": "On August 9, 2018, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) issued a new policy that made it easier to declare the presence of students and visitors to the United States unlawful. On October 23, 2018, Guilford College and other universities challenged that policy under the Administrative Procedure Act. They alleged that the new policy violated statutory and due process rights. The District Court entered a nationwide preliminary injunction against the policy but denied summary judgment because the parties had not submitted a complete administrative record. The case was appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals but then the government dropped that appeal, leaving the injunction in place. It is unclear why the government chose to drop the appeal."} {"article": "On June 30, 2016, asylum seekers in this case, represented by the American Immigration Council and partners, filed this lawsuit against the Attorney General of the United States as well as the directors of the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review. The plaintiffs argued that DHS had failed to notify them of its one-year asylum application deadline and failed to implement mechanisms that guaranteed members the opportunity to timely submit these applications. The plaintiffs argued that these actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, governing regulations, and their due process rights. They sought class certification, injunctive and declaratory relief, mandamus, and attorneys' fees. On July 21, 2016, the plaintiffs moved to certify their class. However, the court granted a stipulated motion to stay the case until after the 2016 presidential election. The case was restored to active docket on November 7, 2016. In January 2017, the court issued an order certifying the class. 2017 WL 1397749. The court certified the following classes and subclasses: \u2022 CLASS A (\u201cCredible Fear Class\u201d): All individuals who have been released or will be released from DHS custody after they have been found to have a credible fear of persecution within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) and did not receive notice from DHS of the one-year deadline to file an asylum application as set forth in 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1158(a)(2)(B). \u2022 A.I.: All individuals in Class A who are not in removal proceedings and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one year of their last arrival. \u2022 A.II.: All individuals in Class A who are in removal proceedings and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one year of their last arrival. \u2022 CLASS B (\u201cOther Entrants Class\u201d): All individuals who have been or will be detained upon entry; express a fear of return to their country of origin; are released or will be released from DHS custody without a credible fear determination; are issued a Notice to Appear (NTA); and did not receive notice from DHS of the one-year deadline to file an asylum application set forth in 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1158(a)(2)(B). \u2022 B.I.: All individuals in Class B who are not in removal proceedings and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one year of their last arrival. \u2022 B.II.: All individuals in Class B who are in removal proceedings and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one year of their last arrival. The day after class certification, the defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied the motion in March 2017. 2017 WL 1153856. On October 30, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The defendants opposed the motion, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction and that neither Congress nor the Constitution required the notice that the plaintiffs were seeking. The court disagreed, and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. On March 29, 2018, the court found that Congress, in adopting the one-year application deadline, expressed concern about foreclosing legitimate claims and intended to monitor administration of the deadline to make sure it was implemented fairly. Failure to provide notice to class members, then, violated Congressional intent. The court also found that the defendants had not taken steps that were \u201creasonably calculated\u201d to provide notice to class members and that consequently, it had not met its procedural due process obligations. The defendants appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit on May 25, 2018. According to the American Immigration Council, the parties agreed to a joint interim stay agreement that requires the Executive Office for Immigration Review and USCIS to treat as timely all pending and newly filed asylum applications adjudicated during the stay that are filed by class members without final orders of removal. See the Council's website for additional information. Since the defendants filed the appeal, the parties have been participating the Ninth Circuit's mediation program which facilitates settlement. As of this writing, this process is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2016, asylum seekers filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs alleged that DHS had failed to notify them of its one-year asylum application deadline and failed to implement mechanisms that guaranteed them the opportunity to timely submit asylum applications. In March 2018, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The defendants appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit in May 2018, and the parties have since been participating in the Ninth Circuit's mediation program which facilitates settlement. This process is ongoing."} {"article": "On October 4, 2004, a practicing lawyer and his family members filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon against the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), under Bivens and 50 U.S.C \u00a7\u00a7 1804 and 1823 (electronic surveillance and physical searches under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the defendants conducted unlawful arrest, imprisonment, searches and seizures. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants violated the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552a by illegally leaking information and that portions of the Patriot Act are unconstitutional. The plaintiffs sought return of improperly seized property. This case is based on the following background. On March 11, 2004, terrorists' bombs exploded on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain. The FBI obtained photographs of fingerprints from the bombing incident. The FBI made a wrongful match of a fingerprint taken from near the Madrid bombing site to that of the plaintiff, supposedly in part because the plaintiff was a Muslim. Despite numerous signs that the match was erroneous, the FBI arrested and imprisoned the plaintiff from May 6, 2004, through May 20, 2004. After news reports revealed that the Madrid fingerprint matched an Algerian citizen, the plaintiff was released from prison. On November 29, 2006, the District Court (Judge Aiken) signed a stipulated settlement agreement reached by the parties. The agreement limited plaintiffs' remaining claims to a facial challenge to FISA, in which the relief available was a declaratory judgment of the unconstitutionality of these statues. On December 6, 2006, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint for declaratory judgment and sought removal of all illegally seized materials under government possession. Defendants argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek declaratory relief. On September 26, 2007, the District Court (Judge Aiken) found that the plaintiffs' claims alleging an on-going 'case' or 'controversy' provided the Court jurisdiction. The Court concluded that 50 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1804 and 1824 of FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, are unconstitutional as they violate the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment for declaratory relief was granted. On October 9, 2007, defendants filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. On March 24, 2010, the Appeals Court vacated the District Court's summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the only relief that would address the alleged Fourth Amendment violation would be injunctive relief. However, the plaintiffs were only entitled to declaratory judgment pursuant to the settlement agreement. On November 1, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.", "summary": "On October 4, 2004, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Government alleging that portions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), as amended by the Patriot Act was unconstitutional. On September 26, 2007, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon (Judge Aiken) concluded so and ordered summary judgment. On March 24, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit vacated the order based on that the plaintiffs lacked standing due in part to the settlement agreement."} {"article": "On July 19, 2017, death-row inmates in Florida filed this lawsuit alleging that the practice of placing death-row inmates in solitary confinement indefinitely violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, they claimed that the permanent solitary confinement posed a serious risk of harm to the health and safety of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida against employees of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by themselves, sought injunctive and monetary relief. Lastly, they sought to represent a class of all Florida inmates on death row and in FDOC custody at one of two state correctional facilities. The case was assigned to Judge Marcia Morales Howard. The defendants moved to dismiss the claim on October 6, 2017. They alleged that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and for lack of jurisdiction. On October 25, 2017, the case was referred to mediation. On November 17, 2017, the Florida DOC filed initial discovery disclosures. On September 10, 2018, parties stipulated to both a protective order and a confidentiality order. On March 28, 2018, the complaint was amended. On April 23, 2018, the motion to certify the class was denied as moot. On December 5, 2018, a memorandum denying the presence of a third-party observer at mental health examinations was filed stating that the presence of a third party is not necessary or proper. On May 28, 2019, both parties filed a joint status report to schedule mediation before Senior United States District Judge Harvey Schlesinger and stipulating to a non-jury trial. On June 12, 2019, Judge Howard issued an order setting the terms of the settlement proceedings in front of Judge Schlesinger. The court directed the clerk to administratively close the case, to be reopened when the settlement efforts have concluded. Judge Howard directed the clerk to open a new case, In re: Davis v. Inch Settlement Conference, Case No. 3:19-mc-17, and assign it to Judge Schlesinger. On October 30, 2019, the parties notified the court that discussions are continuing and the parties request more time for mediation. A mediation session was held in January 2020 and is ongoing as of May 11, 2020.", "summary": "In 2017, death row inmates from Florida filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that the policy of placing death row inmates in indefinite solitary confinement violates their eighth and fourteenth amendment rights. In 2019 the parties entered into settlement discussions. This case is ongoing."} {"article": "This action, filed on May 26, 2004 in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, was brought by three adopted children placed in an abusive and neglectful home by the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS). The plaintiffs were represented by private counsel and Children's Rights, Inc.; they sought compensatory and punitive damages, claiming that the state violated their federal and state civil rights by placing them in a foster-turned-adoptive home (approved and monitored by the DYFS) that systematically starved and otherwise neglected them. Not long after the case was filed, a guardian ad litem from Children's Rights was named for the plaintiffs. In 2003, B.J. (the plaintiffs' oldest brother) was found looking for food in his neighbor's trash. B.J. was 19 years old but weighed only 45 pounds. Shortly thereafter, the police entered his home and discovered 3 other adopted boys, the plaintiffs in this case, all of whom were extremely underdeveloped (K.J., age 14, weighed 40 pounds; T.J., age 10, weighed 28 pounds; M.J., age 9, weighed 23 pounds). Upon the police's discovery, DYFS removed the plaintiffs from the home that day. (note: the DYFS had visited the home over 38 times within the past 4 years and were aware of the plaintiffs' living conditions) The complaint alleged that the defendants, having placed the plaintiffs in their foster care custody, had a special relationship with the plaintiffs that imposed upon the state an affirmative duty to care for and protect the plaintiffs from harm; that the defendants failed to adequately screen, approve, and monitor the foster home in order to ensure the plaintiffs' safety and welfare, despite the repeated signs and observations indicating that the plaintiffs were not receiving adequate care; that the acts and omissions of the defendants were a substantial departure from the exercise of reasonable professional standard and amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs' welfare; that the defendants did not adequately train or supervise employees handling such cases; that the defendants' conduct placed the plaintiffs in state-created dangers; that the defendants failed to regularly visit the plaintiffs; that the defendants failed to conduct a pre-adoptive and post-adoptive home study; that the defendants failed to investigate suspected child abuse reports regarding the plaintiffs; and that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis of their perceived handicaps. All this, the plaintiffs said, violated federal Substantive Due Process and Procedural Due Process, state Substantive Due Process and Procedural Due Process, the state's Violation of Child Placement Bill of Rights Act, the state's Tort Claims Act, the state's Law Against Discrimination, and various state adoption and regulation laws. The requested relief included compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and prejudgment interest. On April 6, 2005, the court denied the defendants' Motion to Dismiss with respect to counts under Section 1983, the New Jersey Child Placement Bill of Rights, and the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. However, plaintiffs' counts under the New Jersey Constitution, the New Jersey statutes and regulations, and the Law Against Discrimination were dismissed for failure to state a claim. The parties reached a settlement agreement on September 30, 2005, awarding a sum of $7,500,000 to the plaintiffs, without any admission of liability by any party. The settlement amount was inclusive of attorneys' fees. The settlement also ensured that the guardian ad litem (GAL) would attempt to obtain educational services from the children's local school districts for the plaintiffs (including 10 hours per month of cognitive remediation therapy, 1 hour per week of vocational therapy, 1 hour per week of occupational therapy, and 4 hours per week of one-on-one academic tutoring), and that until the plaintiffs exited the custody of DYFS, the state would provide the GAL, on a bi-monthly basis, with updated records regarding each plaintiff. The defendants also agreed to provide each plaintiff with a Medicaid card entitling them to benefits under Medicaid \"Family Care Plan A,\" from the date of the settlement agreement to the date each plaintiff reaches age 21, and to waive any and all Medicare liens. The court approved this settlement in its entirety on November 30, 2005. While the settlement agreement was pending in early November, B.J., the oldest brother who was not a party to the case, filed a Motion to Intervene. The Motion was granted in mid-November. On November 29, 2005, the court approved the settlement B.J. and the state reached in mid-November, which awarded B.J. a sum of $5,000,000, continued his medical care via Medicaid, and in which the state waived any and all Medicaid liens. The plaintiff's attorney fees were also waived, though the costs were not.", "summary": "Plaintiffs, three minor children, sought compensatory and punitive damages, claiming that defendants placed them in a foster-turned-adoptive home that systematically starved them. This case was filed in 2004, and the parties agreed to settle in September 2005. The court granted final approval of the settlement agreement in November 2005, which awarded plaintiffs a lump sum of $7,500,000."} {"article": "On September 26, 1990, prisoners in the Stanislaus County jail system filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the county and the county sheriff, challenging their conditions of confinement. The prisoners, represented by the Prisoner Rights Union and private counsel, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging a violation of their rights under the Eight Amendment. Specifically, they claimed that the county jails were overcrowded and, among other things, provided inadequate access to law libraries and to medical, dental and mental health care. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On October 12, 1990, the plaintiffs moved the District Court for a preliminary injunction, and on February 27, 1991, following discovery, the Court (Chief Judge Robert E. Coyle) adopted the recommendations of Magistrate Judge John F. Moulds and granted a limited injunction, prohibiting prisoners from being bedded on the floor, prohibiting the addition of more beds to the prison during the case, and authorizing the Sheriff to release prisoners when the jail was 90% full. The Court also certified the case as a class action. The parties began negotiations to settle the case in 1991, and in March 1992 they came to an agreement. Like the preliminary injunction, the settlement enjoined the County from bedding prisoners on the floor and allowed the Sheriff to deny new prisoners and release current prisoners when the jail came within ten percent of its maximum capacity; in addition, it settlement also addressed issued with law library access and medical, dental and mental health care. It applied to the Men's Jail, the Public Safety Center, the Men's Honor Farm, and the Female Facility (closed in 1993). The Court (Judge Oliver W. Wanger) approved the settlement and terminated the case on May 4, 1992. Three days later, the Court (Magistrate Judge Moulds) ordered defendants to pay plaintiffs' attorney fees. In 2008, a class member filed a motion seeking enforcement of the settlement, but the Court referred the movant to class counsel. The settlement was still in effect in 2012, and played a part in the County's application for state funds to finance an expansion of its jail facilities.", "summary": "On September 26, 1990, prisoners in the Stanislaus County jail system filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the County and the County Sheriff, challenging their conditions of confinement. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction in 1990, and the parties settled in 1992."} {"article": "On July 25, 2014, a former pre-trial detainee of the Montgomery County Jail filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. The plaintiff sued Montgomery County, its sheriff, and its jail administrator under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, claiming violations of the Eighth Amendment\u2019s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause. The plaintiff alleged that the jail did not provide adequate food and nutrition, which caused him and other inmates to experience dramatic weight loss, hair loss, skin conditions, and other medical conditions, including scurvy. The plaintiff sought to represent a class of inmates who, like himself, had been denied proper nutrition at the Montgomery County Jail. On September 29, 2017, District Judge Brenda K. Sannes denied the motion for class certification, without prejudice, ruling that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the typicality and adequacy requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). On May 29, 2018, the court dismissed the plaintiff\u2019s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. Those claims were moot because he had filed his complaint four months after he was released from the jail. He filed an amended complaint on August 9, 2018. A second former inmate of the jail joined as plaintiff in this amended complaint. The new plaintiff had been detained at the jail for several months both before and after conviction. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs sought again to represent a class. The court granted class certification on August 20, 2018, defining the class as all detainees, from July 24, 2011 onward, who had been detained at the jail for at least two consecutive weeks. The class was divided into two sub-classes: pre-trial detainees and post-trial detainees. On November 7, 2019, the court denied the county\u2019s motion for summary judgment. However, the court did strike the demand for declaratory and injunctive relief, as those claims had been dismissed on May 29, 2018, before the plaintiffs re-asserted them in the amended complaint. 2019 WL 5842822. The parties set three different trial dates before agreeing to a settlement in late February. On July 8, 2020, the plaintiffs informed the court that they were ready to finalize the settlement agreement, except for one detail: the county was insisting that the plaintiffs\u2019 attorneys agree not to publicly share information about the settlement, though the settlement would be a matter of public record. On July 15, 2020, the county informed the court that the parties had resolved the issue, and the settlement is pending.", "summary": "In 2014, a former pre-trial detainee at the Montgomery County Jail filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. The plaintiff alleged the facility failed to provide adequate food and nutrition, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In 2018, the class was certified. The class was divided into two subclasses of pre-trial and post-trial detainees and was generally defined as all detainees who have been or will be placed into the custody of the jail and were detained for at least two consecutive weeks since July 24, 2011. As of July 13, 2020, a settlement agreement is pending."} {"article": "On September 28, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against Grace Episcopal Church of Whitestone, Inc (Grace Church). and Episcopal Diocese of Long Island (Diocese) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the complaint alleged the defendants subjected the female complaining party to a sexually hostile work environment and terminated her in retaliation to her opposing these practices. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief against the defendants. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge William Wall. The defendants successfully had the lawsuit dismissed in July 2007, as the EEOC failed to demonstrate that Grace Church and Diocese were an integrated enterprise or an employer of the complaining party. At the same time the EEOC's partial motion for summary judgment was denied. The court granted the EEOC leave to amend their complaint. 2007 WL 4914663. On December 18, 2007, the EEOC filed an amended complaint against the defendants. On January 25, 2008, Diocese moved to dismiss the EEOC\u2019s amended complaint. Diocese argued that the EEOC did not sufficiently plead that Diocese was an employer under Title VII, and therefore the amended complaint should be dismissed. The court did not agree. On July 15, 2008, the court denied Diocese\u2019s motion to dismiss EEOC\u2019s amended complaint. For nearly three years, the parties underwent discovery proceedings. On November 30, 2012, settlement discussions began. The complainant intervened as a plaintiff, on May 20, 2013. The next day, the parties\u2019 reached an agreement, and the court approved their consent decree. This consent decree allowed the court to retain jurisdiction for three years to ensure compliance. The decree concerned monetary and injunctive relief. For the monetary relief, the Grace Church agreed to pay $192,000.00 to the charging party and claimant. For injunctive relief, the defendants agreed to refrain from retaliation and sex discrimination. The defendants next agreed to adopt non-discriminatory policies and procedures. In addition, the defendants agreed to provide anti-employment discrimination training to all employees, post notices of this lawsuit\u2019s resolution in prominent places where employee notices were posted, report regularly to the EEOC, and keep records up to date that were relevant to employment discrimination. There are no indication of non-compliance by the parties, and the duration of the consent decree has lapsed. The case is presumably closed.", "summary": "In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against Grace Episcopal Church of Whitestone, Inc (Grace Church). and Episcopal Diocese of Long Island (Diocese) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging discrimination on the basis of sex, female, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complainant intervened in this lawsuit. In 2013, the court approved the parties' consent decree. This decree concerned monetary and injunctive relief. For the monetary relief, the Grace Church agreed to pay $192,000.00 to the charging party and claimant. For injunctive relief, the defendants agreed to refrain from retaliation and sex discrimination. The case is presumably closed."} {"article": "On March 4, 2019, two named plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the Missouri Department of Social Services Family Support Division as well as the Governor of Missouri, the Director of the Missouri Department of Social Services, the Director of the Family Support Division, the Director of the Department of Revenue and the Director of the Motor Vehicle and Driver Licensing Division. Under Missouri law, the Family Support Division (\u201cFSD\u201d) has the authority to issue an order suspending the driver\u2019s license of non-custodial parents that owe at least three months\u2019 worth of child support payments or at least $2,500, whichever is less. The complaint challenged the statute, alleging that it perpetuates a cycle of poverty by unconstitutionally suspending the driver\u2019s licenses of parents who are unable to pay child support. The plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201 and the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint alleged that the statute makes no inquiry into the reason for the nonpayment before ordering a license suspension and provides no notice about the procedure for contesting suspension. The plaintiffs claimed that the statute drives parents further into poverty because these individuals often lose their jobs because of lack of reliable transportation to travel to work. Further, parents who have had their licenses suspended are often unable to visit or help care for their children. Furthermore, the complaint raised the issue that noncustodial parents who cannot afford to make their child support payments are already criminalized under a different Missouri law that is punishable with fines and jail time. The complaint alleged that once the licenses are suspended, it is extremely difficult to obtain reinstatement, even if the parent manages to start making regular payments because the reinstatement process is entirely without clear process, guidelines or communication. The plaintiffs argued that even attorneys making in-person visits to the child support offices, filing petitions with FSD, requesting hearings, and communicating directly with FSD could not navigate the process successfully. Thus, the plaintiffs claimed that FSD\u2019s indefinite suspension of non-custodial parents\u2019 driver\u2019s licenses because of their inability to pay child support violates their constitutional rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the suspensions violate substantive due process because they discriminate on the basis of wealth and are not narrowly tailored to the collection of child support, the best interests of children, or any compelling government interest. The complaint further alleged that the suspensions infringe on plaintiffs\u2019 substantive due process because it violates their fundamental right to travel and violates their procedural due process because FSD does not guarantee a hearing or provide notice of a hearing. The complaint also alleged that the suspensions deprive the plaintiffs of equal protection because the defendants use their unique position as government actors to use debt collection methods that are not available to private creditors. The two named plaintiffs filed the complaint on behalf of themselves and a class, defined as anyone who has had or will have his or her driver\u2019s license suspended due to an inability to pay child support. The class sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from ordering and enforcing driver\u2019s license suspensions, reinstate plaintiffs\u2019 and class members\u2019 driver\u2019s licenses and grant reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees and costs to the plaintiffs. On August 30, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The amended pleading added two new named defendants and supplemented the factual allegations of the original complaint. After filing their amended complaint, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and a motion to certify a class on November 1, 2019. The case was first assigned to District Judge Ronnie L. White and later reassigned to District Judge Rodney W. Sippel on February 5, 2020. On May 1, 2019, the court partially granted the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on all counts except the plaintiffs\u2019 claim for violation of procedural due process. 2020 WL 2104766. The case proceeded to discovery. On July 28, 2020, the court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 Motion to Certify Class without prejudice and instructed the plaintiffs to refile it after the court issues an amended case management order. On September 24, 2020, the court held the plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction, filed on June 1, 2020, in abeyance until the court receives notification from the defendants that they plan to resume issuing new license suspensions for failure to pay child support. The case remains ongoing.", "summary": "On March 4, 2019, two named plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the Missouri Department of Social Services Family Support Division and a number of other Missouri public officials challenging a Missouri law that allows the Family Support Division (\"FSD\") to suspend the driver's license of non-custodial parents that owe at least three months' worth of child support payments or at least $2,500 in child support payments, whichever is less. The plaintiffs claimed that FSD\u2019s indefinite suspension of non-custodial parents\u2019 driver\u2019s licenses because of their inability to pay child support violates their constitutional rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The two named plaintiffs filed the complaint on behalf of themselves and a class, defined as anyone who has had or will have his or her driver\u2019s license suspended due to an inability to pay child support. The class sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from ordering and enforcing driver\u2019s license suspensions, reinstate plaintiffs\u2019 and class members\u2019 driver\u2019s licenses and grant reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees and costs to the plaintiffs. On August 30, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The amended pleading added two new named defendants and supplemented the allegations of the original complaint. On May 1, 2019, the court partially granted the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on all counts except the plaintiffs\u2019 claim for violation of procedural due process. 2020 WL 2104766. The case remains ongoing."} {"article": "On May 31, 2012, the United States Department of Justice (\"DOJ\"), on behalf of over 20,000 African American and Hispanic borrowers, filed this lawsuit under the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts against SunTrust Mortgage in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The DOJ asked the court for injunctive and monetary relief, claiming that the defendant engaged in discriminatory lending practices that adversely affected African American and Hispanic borrowers. Specificlly, Plaintiffs claimed that from 2005 to 2009, Defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of race and national origin in residential mortgage lending. On September 14, 2012, the Court approved a consent order resolving the plaintiffs' claims. The settlement provided $21 million in compensation for African American and Hispanic borrowers who were charged higher fees based on their race or national origin. The settlement also required the defendant to continue using the new policies and practices that it adopted during negotiations leading up to the lawsuit and that avoided discriminatory practices by the mortgage lenders. On November 4, 2016, Judge Robert E. Payne signed off on the parties Consent Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. The order stipulated that two organizations which received a portion of the settlement, The Up Center and Tallahassee Lenders' Consortium, and had not yet spent all of the money distributed to them. The order states that these organizations had until November 30, 2016 and January 15, 2017 respectively to spend those funds in accordance with the 2012 Consent Order, or they will return unutilized money to SunTrust. The case is now closed.", "summary": "The United States, on behalf of more than 20,000 African-American and Hispanic borrowers, filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts. The same day, the court approved a consent decree in which Defendants agreed to pay $21 million to plaintiffs and to follow policies and procedures to prevent discrimination against borrows for reason of race or national origin. The case is now closed."} {"article": "This class action involving adult care givers, either relatives of the children or close friends of the children's parents, caring for Pennsylvania children whose parents are unable to provide care was filed on August 16, 2000, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs were represented by the Juvenile Law Center and ACLU; they sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the state for failing to provide for the financial needs of these children, claiming that the state violated Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 670, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Pennsylvania state laws. The complaint alleged that the state violated state and federal law by failing to meet the financial needs of these children. Specifically, the state failed to: notify the plaintiffs and other similarly situated caregivers (\"kinship caregivers\") of their right to apply for and receive per diem foster care benefits for the children in their care, process applications for foster care benefits from them and other kinship care givers, and reimburse them for the care of the dependent children placed in their homes at the same per diem rate as non-kinship foster care givers. The plaintiffs filed for class certification on August 17, 2000. In late August of 2004, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of a proposed settlement agreement. After many amendments of the proposed class, the court finally granted the class certification for settlement purposes on October 29, 2004. On April 1, 2005, the court approved and ordered the settlement agreement, in which, according to the plaintiff's website, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare agreed to issue a bulletin clarifying the obligation of county youth agencies to treat caregivers similar to the plaintiffs, like all other foster parents. Additionally, the agreement included a notice to be provided to all kinship caregivers stating their rights to receive their legal benefits. The docket does not include any additional activity after the approval of the settlement.", "summary": "Plaintiffs, either relatives of the children or close friends of the children's parents, are adult care givers caring for children whose parents are unable to provide care. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the state for failing to notify and provide the plaintiffs with per diem foster care benefits for the children in their care. This case was filed in 2000, and a settlement agreement was reached in 2005."} {"article": "The U.S. Justice Department filed a lawsuit against Maricopa County Arizona officials in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona on October 31, 1997, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. This action stems from an investigation authorized under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997, as a result of allegations that poor conditions in the Maricopa County Jails (Jails) violated inmates' constitutional rights. The investigation was commenced on August 8, 1995, and it focused on allegations of excessive force and denial of adequate medical care. On March 25, 1996, the Justice Department sent a letter to the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, stating that the Department of Justice had concluded that unconstitutional conditions exist at the Jails with respect to the use of excessive force against inmates and deliberate indifference to inmates' serious medical needs. Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, to Ed King, Chairman, Maricopa County Board of Supervisors (Mar. 25, 1996). The findings of excessive force included punching and kicking inmates and the use of cuffs, restraint chairs and stun guns. Systematic factors in the Jails were found to lead to excessive force because of inadequate and inexperienced staffing, the overavailability of non-lethal weapons, overcrowding in intake, insufficient training and inadequate tracking of potentially problematic staff. The findings regarding medical care included insufficient access to medical care, inadequate medical screenings in intake, inadequate protection from infectious disease, inadequate psychiatric care and deficient medical care for prisoners on work furlough. The letter concluded by stating that pursuant to CRIPA, the Attorney General would be permitted to institute a lawsuit if the identified deficiencies were not corrected. The instant lawsuit was subsequently filed, alleging that Maricopa County had failed to adequately address the stated constitutional violations resulting from the CRIPA investigation. On November 18, 1997, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona (Judge Roger G. Strand) issued an order granting the dismissal of the civil action conditioned upon compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement by the defendants. U.S. v. County of Maricopa, No. 97-2273 (D.Ariz. Nov. 18, 1997) (order granting conditional dismissal). The remedies mandated by the settlement agreement included the construction of a new intake facility to reduce congestion and waiting time, access to adequate toilet and shower facilities for inmates on work furlough, increased staffing, increased in-service training, changes in Jail policy regarding use of force and restraint techniques, and improved investigations and increased sanctions for incidents of use of excessive force. The case was dismissed by Judge Strand on July 6, 1998.", "summary": "On October 31, 1997, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Justice Department filed this lawsuit against Maricopa County Arizona officials in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997 et seq. The lawsuit was filed after the DOJ conducted an August 1995 investigation that found that poor conditions in the Jails had violated the constitutional rights of the inmates. The case was conditionally dismissed pursuant to the fulfillment of a settlement agreement on November 18, 1997. The case was fully dismissed on July 6, 1998."} {"article": "On March 12, 2015, five immigration attorneys and thirteen noncitizen individuals filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Represented by Stacy Tolchin, the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, and the American Immigration Council, plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They claimed that CBP had failed to timely respond to their or their clients' FOIA requests, in violation of FOIA's statutory requirement for government agencies to respond to requests within 20 business days. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that CBP had a systemic pattern and practice of such delays. The plaintiffs had been waiting for CBP\u2019s response to their FOIA requests for at least seven months and most for more than a year. These delays had, in turn, prevented them from filing for immigration status. On September 17, 2015, Judge James Donato denied CBP\u2019s Motion to Dismiss, stating that \"CBP\u2019s records [as available through FOIA] are critical to noncitizens and their attorneys in evaluating immigration options and the possibility of remaining legally in the United States.\" 132 F. Supp. 3d 1170 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2015). The parties settled, and Judge Donato granted their joint motion to dismiss on September 3, 2016. On September 8, 2016, the parties signed the settlement agreement. During the litigation, CBP had made significant progress in clearing its FOIA backlog from over 30,000 cases to just over 3,000, and had responded to all plaintiffs' requests. The parties agreed that CBP would post its monthly FOIA statistics on its website for three years, and that CBP would pay plaintiffs' attorney fees. The settlement agreement did not explicitly state that it was court-enforceable.", "summary": "Immigration attorneys and noncitizen individuals sued U.S. Customs and Border Protection for violating the Freedom of Information Act by failing to respond to FOIA requests within 20 business days. CBP significantly cleared its FOIA backlog during the litigation, and in a settlement with plaintiffs, CBP agreed to post its monthly FOIA statistics on its website."} {"article": "On June 9, 2014, the United States Department of Justice filed a complaint in the Western District of Texas on behalf of African-American and Hispanic applicants to entry-level firefighter positions against the City of Austin. The plaintiff alleged that since at least 2011, the fire department's practice of requiring applicants to pass an examination in order to be considered for entry-level firefighter positions has had a disparate impact on the hiring of African-Americans and Hispanics, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. They sought injunctive relief to stop the defendant's discriminatory hiring practices. Specifically, they alleged that African-American and Hispanic applicants passed the 2012 test at a rate that was statistically significantly lower than white applicants, and that by only selecting the top 1500 candidates to move on to interview stage of the process, the City of Austin increased this disparity. The city also used the scores as a component of an applicant's ranking on the fire department hiring list, leading to African-American and Hispanic individuals being processed for hire at a significantly lower rate than white individuals. They also alleged that a similar testing and ranking process used in 2013 will have a similar disparate impact, that these tests are not essential to the duties of firefighting, and that there are alternative means for screening candidates that would not have a discriminatory impact. On the same day, the U.S. and the City of Austin offered a joint settlement agreement pending a fairness hearing before the court. The agreement provided that:
1) the city will develop a new nondiscriminatory test for screening applicants but that the city can use parts of its previous tests for filling up to 90 open positions immediately; 2) the city will provide back pay to African-American and Hispanic applicants from 2012 who claim to have passed the work-related parts of the test but not the unrelated parts; 3) the city will make 30 priority appointments of Hispanics and African-Americans (the shortfall of diversity candidates in 2012 due to the discriminatory hiring practices), with retroactive seniority dates; and 4) there will be a fairness hearing to rule on the legality and equitability of the agreement, with any objections from interested parties such as the firefighters' union and those who may claim back pay. The parties also proposed a second fairness hearing for the court to approve or modify any individual relief awards. As proposed, the court will enforce the decree for four years, until the city's back-pay obligations are satisfied, or until the implementation of a new, nondiscriminatory testing procedure; whichever comes later but no more than eight years.On June 11, 2014, District Judge Lee Yeakel granted the motion for provisional approval of the consent decree and scheduled a fairness hearing on the consent decree. The Austin Firefighters Association (AFA) filed a motion to intervene in the case but on September 15, 2014, Judge Yeakel denied their motion because at the time of the suit the AFA did not have a current collective bargaining agreement with the city. Furthermore, the AFA failed to show that they had an interest that could not be satisfied by other means, such as collective bargaining and the objection process within the settlement agreement. On October 18, 2014, Judge Yeakel denied the AFA's motion to reconsider their motion to intervene, at which point the AFA appealed to the Fifth Circuit (docket # 14-51132). In a per curiam opinion, the Fifth Circuit denied the AFA's motions to stay the proceedings in the lower court, and to expedite their appeal. On October 29, 2014, the first of the fairness hearings was held before Judge Yeakel. On November 7, 2014, Judge Yeakel approved the consent decree. In response to objections, the Court found no basis to conclude that the priority hire and retroactive seniority provisions of the Decree would compromise public safety, or stigmatize or provide an unearned windfall to individuals hired through the priority hire process. Rather, the Court found that those provisions achieved an appropriate balance between providing effective remedial relief under Title VII, and protecting the legitimate interests of the City and its existing firefighters. The parties agreed to pay their own costs of litigation. Following a fairness hearing, Judge Yeakel approved the individual relief of backpay on August 21, 2015. The consent decree expired on November 7, 2018. The parties had complied with all of the terms of the agreement.", "summary": "On June 9, 2014, the United States Department of Justice filed a complaint in the Western District of Texas on behalf of African-American and Hispanic applicants to entry-level firefighter positions, against the City of Austin. The plaintiff alleged that since at least 2011, the fire department's practice of requiring applicants to pass an examination in order to be considered for entry-level firefighter positions has had a disparate impact on the hiring of African-Americans and Hispanics, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On November 7, 2014, the Court approved a consent decree that would eliminate any discriminatory hiring practices and compensate those who had been impacted by these practices. The parties had fully complied with the consent decree as of November 7, 2018, and the consent decree accordingly expired on that date."} {"article": "On November 18, 2010, the United States, on behalf of a Caucasian tenant and her mixed-race child, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, under the Fair Housing Act against the manager and owners of a Vicksburg, Mississippi apartment building. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming that the tenant's lease was terminated due to both the race of the tenant's daughter and the tenant's association with African-Americans. The parties proceeded with discovery for the next two years and trial was set for August of 2012. The parties also initiated a settlement conference in January 13, 2012, which resulted with an agreement subject to the court's approval. On March 20, 2012, the court entered a consent decree enforcing the settlement agreement. The defendants did not admit to any violation of the Fair Housing Act, but agreed to change their practices and policies to prevent future violations. This agreement required the defendants to notify the public of their compliance with the Fair Housing Act, provide nondiscrimination training to their employees, provide notification to the United States of other complaints of discrimination, and pay plaintiffs $17,500 in settlement of the case. The consent decree was in effect until 2014. The case is now closed.", "summary": "The United States, on behalf of a Caucasian tenant and her mixed-race child, filed a federal lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act against the manager and owners of a Vicksburg, Mississippi apartment building, claiming that the tenant's lease was terminated due to both the race of the tenant's daughter and the tenant's association with African-Americans. The parties entered into a consent decree in which the defendants agreed to comply with the Fair Housing Act, notify the public of their compliance with the Fair Housing Act, provide nondiscrimination training to their employees, 4) provide notification to the United States of other complaints of discrimination, and pay plaintiffs $17,500. This consent decree is in effect until 2014."} {"article": "On August 19, 2002, female prisoners in Alabama filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The prisoners sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 challenging conditions of their confinement under the Eighth Amendment. This class action suit, brought on behalf of all female state prisoners in Alabama, was based on the following claims of unconstitutional conditions: overcrowding, inadequate supervision in open dorms, inadequate inmate classification, inmate violence, the availability of weapons, the small number of segregation cells, inadequate living space, inadequate ventilation, extreme heat during the summer, and inadequate medical and mental health care. The prisoners were represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights along with several private attorneys. On December 2, 2002, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama (Judge Myron H. Thompson) granted a preliminary injunction to prisoners incarcerated at the Julia Tutwiler Prison for Women (Tutwiler). Laube v. Haley, 234 F.Supp.2d 1227 (M.D.Ala. 2002). The Court found that significant understaffing in greatly overcrowded inmate dorms resulted in an impermissibly unsafe environment for inmates. The Court also ordered state officials to submit a plan to remedy the unconstitutional conditions. Judge Thompson rejected the initial plan submitted by the state by holding that a lack of funding was no excuse for deficiencies in the plan. Laube v. Haley, 242 F.Supp.2d 1150 (M.D.Ala. 2003). In February 2003, Judge Thompson granted the defendant's motion to substitute parties. The case was subsequently referred to as Laube v. Campbell. Correctional officers then moved to intervene in the action by contending that the unconstitutional conditions at Tutwiler prevented them from performing duties which were necessary to avoid civil liability and criminal penalties. Judge Thompson denied the motion and held that correctional officers' interests did not warrant intervention. Laube v. Campbell, 215 F.R.D. 655 (M.D.Ala.2003). On March 28, 2003, Judge Thompson held that that the preliminary injunction had expired. Laube v. Campbell, 255 F.Supp.2d 1301 (M.D.Ala. 2003). The Court found that under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3626, a preliminary injunction automatically expires after 90 days. The Court additionally noted that the prisoners were able to move for another preliminary injunction if they so desired. Subsequently, the parties reached settlement agreements. On August 23, 2004, Judge Thompson approved the two four-year settlement agreements proposed by the parties: a conditions settlement agreement and a medical settlement agreement. Laube v. Campbell, 333 F.Supp.2d 1234 (M.D.Ala. 2004). The conditions settlement agreement covered population flow, heat, ventilation, exercise, recreation, safety and security staffing, segregation cells, and classification. The medical settlement agreement covered access to care, intake medical screening, available medical services, medical staffing, pharmaceuticals, records and reporting. Litigation continued over attorney's fees and modifications to the settlement agreements. On August 31, 2007, Judge Thompson issued a 107 page Opinion and Order, ruling on the prisoners' application for attorneys' fees and awarding plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and expenses totaling $538,178.14. The Court noted that if additional enforcement fees were incurred, the prisoners could make further application for payment of those fees. On December 17, 2009, the Court held a status conference during which the parties notified the court of the defendant has satisfied all of the terms of the settlement agreements. In light of this conference, on January 25, 2010, the court issued an order of final judgment closing the case. However, on May 12, 2010, another prisoner filed a motion for reconsideration. On May 14, 2010, the court (Judge Myron H. Thompson) denied the motion for reconsideration. The prisoner appealed this denial to the Eleventh Circuit. On November 10, 2010, the Eleventh Circuit found that the appeal was frivolous and dismissed the appeal.", "summary": "In 2002, female prisoners in Alabama filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The prisoners sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 challenging conditions of their confinement under the Eighth Amendment. In 2004, the parties agreed to two settlements agreements addressing the conditions. In 2010, after the defendants reached compliance with all terms in the settlements agreements, the court closed the case."} {"article": "On April 17, 2014, a group of immigrants awaiting \"reasonable fear\" determinations (part of the process of seeking relief from deportation for people who fear persecution in their home country) filed this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California under the Administrative Procedure Act (\"APA\") and the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 against the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (\"USCIS\"). The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Southern California, the ACLU of Northern California, the National Immigrant Justice Center, and private counsel, asked the court for injunctive relief, claiming that USCIS is violating plaintiffs' rights under the APA and federal regulations. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that USCIS does not conduct timely reasonable fear determinations, which are mandated to be completed within 10 days of referral to USCIS. On July 17, 2014, the defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and (6), arguing that the named Plaintiffs' individual claims are now moot as all five named Plaintiffs have now received reasonable fear determinations, and that the 10-day period is \"only a non-binding internal processing goal, not a mandatory deadline that confers enforceable rights on aliens.\" Plaintiffs filed their opposition on August 18, 2014, responding that the claims of the putative class are inherently transitory and strongly rebuking defendants' claims of the \"aspirational\" nature of the 10-day period. On November 21, 2014, the Court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, and further granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification. Settlement discussions then began, and on August 20, 2015, the Court approved a preliminary class action settlement pending a fairness hearing. On October 27, 2015, the Court approved the final settlement and attorneys' fees and costs of $327,047.66. Under the settlement, USCIS must meet a goal of making a reasonable fear determination with an average of 10 days, and not in excess of 20 days. The settlement also included provisions to ensure compliance; it was scheduled to last for 5 years after its approval.", "summary": "On April 17, 2014, a group of immigrants filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California alleging that the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services unlawfully delays reasonable fear determinations beyond the mandatory 10-day period. On October 27, 2015, the Court ordered a settlement requiring USCIS to meet a goal of making a reasonable fear determination with an average of 10 days, and not in excess of 20 days. The settlement also included provisions to ensure compliance."} {"article": "On May 22, 2018, two prisoners at the Anchorage Correctional Complex, both practicing Muslims, brought this lawsuit against the Alaska Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging that prison officials failed numerous times to accommodate their religious needs during Ramadan. According to the plaintiffs, during both the 2017 and 2018 Ramadan seasons they received only two bagged meals per day, which were smaller, less in number, and lower in calorie count than the legally required amount. In some instances these meals allegedly included sandwiches containing pork, which they did not eat because of their religious beliefs. They alleged that this \u201cRamadan Policy\u201d violated the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, the Eighth Amendment\u2019s ban on cruel and unusual punishment, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Represented by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), they filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees. Since Ramadan was still ongoing at the time the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs also moved for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction that would compel prison officials to provide them with nutritionally adequate and pork-free meals through the end of Ramadan on June 15. The case was initially assigned to District Judge John W. Sedwick, but was re-assigned to District Judge H. Russel Holland on May 23, 2018 after Judge Sedwick recused himself (Judge Sedwick did not give a reason in his recusal order). After a hearing, Judge Holland granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order after deciding that they were likely to succeed on their RLUIPA claims. 2018 WL 2392498. The court reserved the issue of a preliminary injunction for later adjudication after the parties briefed the issue. But on May 31, the defendants stipulated that they would comply with the TRO's provisions through the end of the month of Ramadan and any subsequent Ramadan that occurred during the litigation. The plaintiffs withdrew the motion for preliminary injunction as moot. The DOC filed its answer to the complaint on June 26, 2018, largely denying the plaintiffs' pertinent factual allegations. In addition, the department also asserted several affirmative defenses: that the DOC official defendants in the suit were protected by qualified immunity, that the plaintiffs\u2019 alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies made a lawsuit in federal court premature, and that the damages suffered by the plaintiffs were de minimis. On July 6, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to further allege that officials at the prison prohibited Muslims from holding religious services or study groups, while allowing Christian prisoners to do the same. The DOC denied these allegations in its answer filed on July 20, 2018. After the parties proceeded through discovery, the court ordered the case ready for trial by the end of August 2019. But on September 3, the parties notified the court that they had reached a settlement. They filed the agreement with the court on September 5, 2019 and the court filed approval the next day. The court dismissed the case with prejudice and retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. The settlement provided that prisoners fasting during the month of Ramadan would receive meals consisting of 3,000 calories per day, and that they would be two hot meals between sunset and dawn. The defendants agreed to provide pork-free meals with labels indicating as much. And the settlement provided that Muslim prisoners would be permitted to congregate for daily prayers, weekly religious services, and Islamic study groups. The settlement also included that CAIR would provide a four-hour religious sensitivity training to staff statewide. The defendants agreed to pay $102,500 in damages and attorneys' fees. The settlement did not indicate an enforcement period, but that the court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement's terms. The case appears closed.", "summary": "Two practicing Muslim prisoners at the Anchorage Correctional Complex filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska in May 2018. They alleged that the prison instituted a \"Ramadan Policy\" during the Ramadan seasons of 2017 and 2018 that provided them with meals that were less in number and nutritional content than that which was legally required, and in some cases included pork, which their faith forbids them from eating. Plaintiffs alleged that this \"Ramadan Policy\" violated their rights under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. On May 23, 2018, they obtained a temporary restraining order compelling the Alaska Department of Corrections (DOC) to provide them with legally adequate meals that met their religious needs through the end of Ramadan that year. In September 2019, the parties settled for injunctive and monetary relief."} {"article": "On June 4, 1999, a former student filed this lawsuit against Pleasant Hill Public School District (Missouri) in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri, under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive relief and monetary damages, claiming that he was harassed on the basis of his sex and sexual orientation. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the school district was aware that he was enduring discrimination on the basis of sex and were deliberately indifferent to that discrimination and its injurious effects on his education. On July 20, 2000, the Department of Justice filed a complaint against the school district and entered the case as a plaintiff-intervenor. On July 31, 2000, the court (Judge Gaitan) approved the parties' consent order. The school district agreed to allow a court-appointed expert to develop a comprehensive mandatory training program for all school district board members and employees, develop a plan to prevent, identify, and eliminate harassment and discrimination on the basis of sex and sexual orientation, conduct a climate report, report to the court for a two-year period. Plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages and attorney's fees.", "summary": "A former student filed a lawsuit against his school district for ignoring the harassment and discrimination he faced because of his sex and sexual orientation while attending high school. The parties signed a consent order awarding the plaintiff monetary and injunctive relief."} {"article": "On June 28, 2010, the publisher of a Prison Legal news, a monthly civil rights magazine for prisoners, filed a civil rights action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas against the sheriff of Galveston County Jail, alleging violation the plaintiff's constitutional rights to free speech and due process. Plaintiff, represented by the Texas Civil Rights Project, sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as nominal compensatory and punitive damages. Galveston County Jail had implemented a policy in December 2006 that only permitted inmates who subscribed to Prison Legal News to receive it with special authorization from prison administration; otherwise, the publication was placed in their stored property. Plaintiff asserted that it did not receive notification of the change in the prison's policy nor did their subscribers prior to censorship. On February 24, 2011, the case settled, and the Court (Judge Kenneth M. Hoyt) dismissed it accordingly (although retaining jurisdiction over the case for purposes of enforcing this stipulated judgment). The settlement recognized that PLN is entitled to receive notifications of mail rejection from every publication that it sends, and the subscribers are allowed to receive their subscriptions unless there is a safety or security concern. The Sheriff must maintain a subscription to PLN for five years in the law library available to the prison population. The Defendant was ordered to pay $5,500 in damages. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In June 2010, Prison Legal news, a monthly civil rights magazine for prisoners, filed a civil rights action against the sheriff of Galveston County Jail, alleging that Galveston County Jail had implemented a policy in December 2006 that only permitted inmates would receive PLN mailings; otherwise, the publication was placed in their stored property. Plaintiff noted it did not receive notification of the change in the prison's policy nor did their subscribers prior to censorship. The case was settled in February 2011. The settlement acknowledged PLN's right to receive notification os rejection and for subscribers to continue receiving subscriptions unless there is a security concern. Defendant was also ordered to pay damages."} {"article": "This lawsuit, filed February 13, 2017, challenged President Trump\u2019s January 27, 2017 Executive Order (EO-1) barring legal immigrants and refugees from seven majority-Muslim countries from entering the US and barring Syrian refugees indefinitely. The complaint argued that by indefinitely barring Syrian refugees, EO-1 violated the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, and exceeded executive power under Article II of the Constitution. This lawsuit argued that EO-1 effectuated President Trump's long-standing campaign promise of implementing a \"total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,\" and that it unlawfully and unconstitutionally prevented the plaintiff, a Syrian refugee, from reuniting with his wife and daughter, who resided in Aleppo. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff filed the complaint in the Western District of Wisconsin, where it was immediately assigned to District Judge William M. Conley and Magistrate Judge Stephen L. Crocker. The plaintiff was a Syrian Sunni Muslim asylee who, after fleeing to the United States in 2014 and being fully vetted by US immigration authorities, was granted asylum status in 2016 because of the torture and religious persecution he had suffered in Syria. After being granted asylum in the US, the petitioner filed a derivative asylum application in 2016 in order to reunite with his wife and only surviving child, who remained in Syria. The petitioner claimed that his derivative asylum application had cleared the security vetting process and had been returned to the USCIS Nebraska Service Center for final processing before it was halted by EO-1. The plaintiff filed a motion to proceed anonymously in order to protect his wife and daughter from harm that they stood to suffer in Aleppo, were his identity to have been revealed. Along with the complaint, the plaintiff filed a motion requesting a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and summary judgment. On February 13, 2017, District Judge Conley issued an order granting the plaintiff's motion to proceed anonymously. In the same order, Judge Conley instructed the government to file a response by February 17, 2017, informing the court of: 1) the current status of the plaintiff's derivative asylum request; 2) whether the government continued processing derivative asylee/refugee petitions for Syrian nationals after the January 27 EO; and 3) if not, whether the government took the position that the preliminary injunction issued by the court in State of Washington v. Trump enjoined EO-1's enforcement as to the processing of derivative asylee/refugee petitions for Syrian nationals. Upon receipt of these filings, the court said it would determine the next steps. On February 17, the government filed a response to Judge Conley's February 13 order (documents not available), and the court issued an order denying the motion for preliminary injunction as moot. On March 6, 2017, after adverse developments in Washington v. Trump, the President rescinded the January 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780 (EO-2). As a result, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 10, 2017, and moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. District Judge Conley set a telephone status conference for that day, and at the conference found that the plaintiff was at great risk of suffering irreparable harm were the TRO to be denied. The court then granted the TRO as it applies to plaintiff John Doe, noting that \"while defendants object to the entry of temporary injunctive relief, they argue during the hearing that the executive order may not even apply to plaintiff's asylum relative petition, thus ameliorating any harm to the government, or at least any harm caused by the brief period covered by this temporary restraining order.\" This was the first temporary restraining order to be granted in a case responding to EO-2. The court ordered the defendants to respond to the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction by March 16, and scheduled an in-person hearing for March 21. After a number of extensions to the hearings and filing deadlines, on April 28, the plaintiff filed a notice of withdrawal of the motion for a temporary restraining order and permanent injunction, as well as a notice of voluntary dismissal. On May 1, the case closed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) without further order of the court. Many documents in this case are unavailable.", "summary": "The plaintiff was a Syrian Sunni Muslim asylee who was granted US asylum because of the torture and religious persecution he had suffered in Syria. The plaintiff filed this suit because President Trump's January 27, 2017, EO halted the derivative asylum application that plaintiff had filed on behalf of his wife and sole living child, who remain in war-torn Aleppo. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the provisions of Trump's executive order which prevent his family's applications from being processed. This case featured the first temporary restraining order granted by a federal district court in response to the March 6, 2017, version of the Travel Ban (EO-2). The parties presumably settled as the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on April 28, 2017."} {"article": "On September 13, 2006, several Department of Juvenile Justice parolees filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. (They amended the complaint a week later.) The plaintiffs sued California and the persons and entities administering California's juvenile parole system under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. In their complaint, they claimed that California's policies and practices regarding the revocation of juvenile parole violated the their constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and assistance of counsel. They also alleged violation of statutory rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because California failed to provide training and accommodations to permit juveniles with physical and mental disabilities to participate effectively in the revocation proceedings against them. The plaintiffs were represented by private counsel, as well as attorneys from the Prison Law Office and the Youth Law Center. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, attorney's fees and costs, and that the court retain jurisdiction until fully assured of compliance with remedial orders. For their constitutional claims, the plaintiffs alleged that, in contrast to the process provided for adult parole violators (pursuant to a 2004 stipulated order in Valdivia v. Schwarzennegger, No. S-94-0671 (E.D. Cal.), PC-CA-0052 in this Clearinghouse), California failed to provide preliminary hearings for juveniles accused of parole violations, and that prompt hearings, even if a single revocation hearing process was constitutional, did not occur, in any event. The complaint listed numerous deficiencies in the juvenile revocation limited hearing process then available (e.g., unfairly burdensome continuances, vague standards, use of unreliable evidence, lack of translation of documents or advice of procedures/rights, insufficient accommodation of disabilities, insufficient availability of counsel). On February 28, 2007, in an unpublished order, the district court (Senior District Judge Lawrence K. Karlton) certified a class consisting of juvenile parolees in or under the jurisdiction of California, including all juvenile parolees with disabilities, as defined under federal law, who are: (i) in the community under parole supervision or who are at large; (ii) in custody in California as alleged parole violators, and who are awaiting revocation of their parole; or (iii) in custody, having been found in violation of parole and returned to custody. In the same order, the court denied several defense motions, including motions that the plaintiffs disclose their full names (instead of using their initials in their pleadings) and that certain allegations be stricken. As the case proceeded, discovery disputes came at times to the court's attention. In a May 25, 2007, unpublished ruling, Magistrate Judge Gregory G. Hollows allowed California to withhold certain budget documents from discovery under the deliberative process privilege. On reconsideration, however, Judge Karlton held on July 6, 2007, in an unpublished ruling, that since the deliberative process privilege was qualified (rather than absolute), the budget documents should be produced to the plaintiffs in light of their need for the materials and the need for accurate fact-finding, given the documents' relevance in depicting the administrative burden associated with providing increased procedural protections to the class. On September 18, 2007, the district court issued an unpublished order granting the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment as to their due process claim, but denying that portion of the motion seeking, without trial, injunctive relief. The court ruled that California's system of juvenile parole revocation failed to afford due process because the state failed to afford a sufficiently prompt hearing to those juveniles facing parole revocation. Judge Karlton did not determine whether the state needed to afford both a preliminary hearing and a final revocation hearing in every circumstance (i.e., both for alleged technical violators and for alleged law violators) but ruled that, since in neither circumstance was the hearing promptly provided, the state parole revocation process for juvenile offenders violated the juveniles' due process rights. Three days later, Magistrate Judge Hollows granted a motion to impose sanctions on defendants for failing to produce discoverable files and to adequately provide answers to interrogatories. On April 21, 2008, Judge Karlton appointed Chase Riveland to be the Special Master in the case. The plaintiffs followed that appointment with a series of motions for summary judgment, which Judge Karlton referred to the Special Master on June 3, 2008. On June 4, 2008, the parties reached a settlement in the case. Under the terms of the settlement:
Our reading of the statutes is dictated by the ordinary tenets of statutory construction. By their plain text, neither law explicitly terminates the bond-hearing requirement for unaccompanied minors. Moreover, the statutory framework enacted by the HSA and TVPRA does not grant ORR exclusive and autonomous control over the detention of unaccompanied minors. Rather, the statutes leave ample room for immigration judges to conduct bond hearings for these children. Additionally, holding that the HSA and TVPRA do not deny unaccompanied minors the right to a bond hearing under Paragraph 24A affirms Congress's intent in passing both laws. These statutes sought to protect a uniquely vulnerable population: unaccompanied children. In enacting the HSA and TVPRA, Congress desired to better provide for unaccompanied minors. Depriving these children of their existing right to a bond hearing is incompatible with such an aim.862 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. July 5, 2017). The defendants did not file a petition for rehearing en banc. The Ninth Circuit's mandate came into effect on Sept. 28, 2017. The plaintiffs requested $448,540 in attorneys' fees in the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 1, 2017. However, on Jan. 9 the parties jointly asked the Court to stay the proceedings and place the matter in mediation; the Court did so on Jan. 16. Back in the district court, on Aug. 28, 2017, the defendants appealed Judge Gee's June 27, 2017 order to enforce the Agreement. The Ninth Circuit opened a new appeals docket (No. 17-56297) the same day. The defendants filed their brief on Jan. 5, 2018. The Ninth Circuit set oral argument for the week of Dec. 10, 2018. On Nov. 14, 2017, Judge Gee ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs $1,061,160.80 in attorneys' fees and $3,848.82 in costs and expenses. On Jan. 16, the defendants appealed this order to the Ninth Circuit, which opened a new appeals docket (No. 18-55063) the next day. However, the Ninth Circuit later closed the docket on Apr. 27 after the parties moved for voluntary dismissal. Plaintiffs' 2018 Motion for Further Enforcement of the Agreement On Apr. 16, 2018, in the district court, the plaintiffs moved to enforce the Agreement, and the defendants then filed an ex parte application seeking relief from the Agreement in the form of (1) exemption from the Agreement\u2019s release provisions so that ICE could detain alien minors who had arrived with their parent or legal guardian together in ICE family residential facilities, and (2) exemption from the Agreement\u2019s state licensure requirement. On July 9, 2018, the court denied such relief, holding that the request was a \"thinly veiled motion for reconsideration\" and that there was no \"showing of changed circumstances that the parties could not have foreseen at the time of their Agreement.\" 2018 WL 4945000. The defendants appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit, which in turn assigned the latest appeal case number, 18-56204. Shortly after, on July 30, the district court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the Agreement. The court held that the plaintiffs sought procedural remedies not available in the Agreement but that they were \"entitled to only such relief as is explicitly or implicitly authorized\" in the Agreement. Ultimately, the court held that it had the authority to determine if the defendants had breached the Agreement. Accordingly, the court ordered the defendants to (1) transfer class members out of the Shiloh Treatment Center if they posed a risk of harm, (2) abandon unnecessary security measures at Shiloh and allow class members to make private phone calls, (3) provide notice of reasons for placement in secured facility, (4) take out of secured facilities class members who did not meet certain conditions, (5) comply with all Texas child welfare laws, (6) stop requiring ORR approval prior to release, and (7) stop requiring post-release services be in place prior to the release. 2018 WL 10162328. Once again, the defendants appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit, which assigned the appeal case number 18-56286. However, the Ninth Circuit later closed the docket on Mar. 22, 2019, after the defendants moved for voluntary dismissal. On Oct. 10, 2018, the plaintiffs cross-appealed the July 30th decision to the Ninth Circuit to the extent that it denied the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the Agreement; the Ninth Circuit assigned the cross-appeal case number 18-56335. However, the Ninth Circuit later closed the docket on Apr. 1, 2019, after the plaintiffs moved for voluntary dismissal. Due to the ongoing issues of non-compliance with the Agreement, Judge Gee also found it necessary to appoint an Independent Monitor to ensure compliance with the June 27, 2017, and July 30, 2018 orders (as well as other orders issued during the history of the case). On Oct. 5, 2018, the court appointed Andrea Sheridan Ordin as the Special Master/Independent Monitor (\"the Monitor\") of the Agreement. However, on Oct. 12 the defendants requested reconsideration of the appointment; the defendants were concerned that the order expanded the scope of the Monitor's oversight to include ORR's compliance with the July 30 order, which had found ORR in partial breach of the Agreement. On Nov. 5, the court denied the defendants' motion for reconsideration. On Nov. 2, 2018, the plaintiffs gave notice that they would be filing another motion to enforce the Agreement, seeking a classwide order declaring the defendants in anticipatory breach of the Agreement, and enjoining the defendants from implementing a new regulation that they proposed on Sept. 7, 2018. That regulation, 83 Fed. Reg. 45486, sought to create a federal alternative to the Agreement's requirement that facilities be state-licensed, which would allow DHS to detain families together until immigration proceedings were completed. Where state licensing was unavailable, a family detention would still be considered \"licensed\" if DHS hired a third party to ensure compliance with ICE-established standards for family residential centers. The defendants claimed that these regulations would implement the Flores Agreement and thereby trigger the termination of the Agreement 45 days after publication, per the 2001 stipulation in the case. On Nov. 21, Judge Gee deferred ruling on the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the Agreement until the defendants published the final regulations, finding that the plaintiffs would not suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief because their motion prompted the defendants to affirm that they would not immediately implement the final rule. Once the final regulations were issued, both parties would file briefs with the court addressing the question of whether the regulations were consistent with the terms of the Flores Agreement. Back on Nov. 13, the Ninth Circuit consolidated two of the defendants' appeals (17-56297 and 18-56204). Then, on Dec. 4, 2018, the defendants appealed the district court's Oct. 5 and Nov. 5 orders (relating to the appointment of the Monitor and the denial of the defendants' motion for reconsideration of the appointment, respectively). The Ninth Circuit assigned the appeal case number 18-56596. This appeal was voluntarily dismissed upon the motion of the government on May 22, 2019. Plaintiffs' 2019 Motion to Enforce and Application for TRO in Response to Poor Conditions of Confinement On June 26, 2019, plaintiffs filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (TRO), alleging violations of the settlement agreement. The TRO demanded that the government remedy conditions amounting to a \u201cpublic health emergency\u201d at its El Paso and Rio Grande Valley CBP facilities. The District Court granted the TRO, ordering the government to immediately permit medical professionals and intensive case management teams access to the affected facilities and class members held therein. The following day the government filed its response, and on June 28, the District Court ordered the parties to participate in expedited mediation before the Monitor to remedy the conditions at issue. This matter remains subject to ongoing mediation. The same day, the plaintiffs also filed a Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement. The motion alleged that the minors\u2019 confinement at an unlicensed detention center in Homestead, Florida violated provisions of the settlement agreement. According to the plaintiffs, this practice resulted in the government routinely failing to, \u201cexpeditiously transfer minors to licensed[, non-secure] facilities,\u201d regulated by child welfare and foster care authorities. Detention at Homestead purportedly resulted in detained children being held for periods of up to several months in prison-like conditions. Through this motion, the plaintiffs requested that the District Court order class members to be transferred to a licensed detention center within 14 days of arrival at the Homestead facility or released to a sponsor. On Aug. 2, 2019, the government responded by contending that the facility was not a \u201csecure\u201d juvenile detention facility per the terms of the agreement. The government argued that it was under no obligation to expeditiously transfer detained children to licensed facilities to conform to the terms of the settlement agreement. On Aug. 15, 2019, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the defendants\u2019 consolidated appeal (17-56297). In a panel decision authored by Judge Berzon, the Court held that the issues raised by the government were beyond its jurisdiction. The Court noted that the terms of the settlement agreement limited the scope of the Ninth Circuit\u2019s review to modifications of the agreement. Flores v. Barr, 934 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2019). Here, the Court held, the orders of the District Court properly enforced the terms of the agreement and did not alter its content. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that the District Court\u2019s order requiring that the government provide specific hygiene and sleeping arrangements was an interpretation of the agreement\u2019s demand that minors be held in \u201csafe and sanitary\u201d conditions. Id. at 912. Further, the Ninth Circuit held that the District Court\u2019s order that the government make and record efforts aimed at releasing class members subject to expedited removal was consistent with the INA and the Ninth Circuit\u2019s prior interpretation that the Flores Settlement, \u201ccreates a presumption in favor of releasing minors.\u201d Id. Last, the Ninth Circuit considered the District Court\u2019s order that the detaining of minors in secure, unlicensed family detention centers was prohibited under the agreement. The Ninth Circuit rejected the government\u2019s complaint as to this order, holding that the government failed to challenge the order until after its appeal had already been submitted. Id. at 914. Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce in Response to the Government's Final Rule and Notice of Termination of Settlement Agreement On Aug. 23, 2019, the government issued a final rule in the Federal Register relating to the \u201cApprehension, Processing, Care, and Custody of Alien Minors and Unaccompanied Alien Children,\u201d which purported to constitute final regulations implementing the Flores Settlement. On Aug. 30 the government filed a notice of termination of the Agreement and a motion to the same effect. According to the government, the final rule satisfied the government\u2019s obligation to publish regulations implementing the provisions of the settlement agreement. The government claimed that the final rule sufficiently addressed the \u201cmain substantive provisions of the Agreement\u201d as to conditions of confinement and procedural rights owed to detained minors. The same day, the plaintiffs filed a supplemental motion to enforce in response to the government\u2019s issuance of the final rule. According to the plaintiffs, the final rule was in violation of the agreement\u2019s mandate that, \u201c[t]he final regulations shall not be inconsistent with the terms of th[e] Agreement.\u201d They claimed that the rule: (1) permitted, \u201cDHS to detain accompanied class members indefinitely;\u201d (2) allowed, \u201cDHS to detain children in secure facilities having no state license to house children;\u201d (3) stripped, \u201cchildren of their right to neutral and detached review of decisions of the Office of Refugee Resettlement [\u2026] to detain them in lieu of release to their parents and other available custodians;\u201d and (4) replaced, \u201cthe Settlement\u2019s mandatory and enforceable provisions with aspirational declarations of dubious force and effect.\u201d The plaintiffs requested that the District Court order the defendants\u2019 continued adherence with the Flores Settlement. On Sept. 27, 2019, the District Court issued a permanent injunction denying the government\u2019s motion to terminate the Settlement and enjoining its implementation of the new regulations. According to the Court, the final rule did not have the effect of terminating the agreement and the government had not established a valid alternative reason to terminate. Flores v. Barr, 407 F. Supp. 3d 909 (C.D. Cal.). The District Court\u2019s finding was based on various provisions of the final rule that were held not to conform to the Flores Agreement. These breaches concerned the fact that the final rule did not comport with the settlement agreement as to both its standards regarding acceptable conditions of confinement and its provisions ensuring appropriate oversight over the detention of minors. Further, the final rule failed to provide mandatory protections stipulated under the agreement and to follow criteria for determining when detention should be imposed on minors. Hence, the District Court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion to enforce insofar as it sought to ensure the Flores Settlement would remain in effect. On November 14, 2019, the government appealed the District Court\u2019s permanent injunction to the Ninth Circuit. In its opening brief, the government argued that the district court failed to consider \"dramatically changed circumstances,\" \"including the promulgation of comprehensive new rules that the parties themselves envisioned as terminating the Agreement, statutes implementing much of the Agreement over a decade ago, and a crisis of irregular migration by families and children.\" Moreover, the government argued that the district court focused too heavily on the \"outdated\" decree and its history of compliance, rather than \"evaluating the agencies chosen solutions\" and the equities of the final rule going forward. The plaintiffs maintained that the district court did not abuse its discretion and that \"the new regulations are inconsistent with the agreement and fail to trigger the agreement's sunset clause.\" The court vacated the scheduled oral argument in April due to the outbreak of COVID-19 and it has yet to be rescheduled. COVID-19 Proceedings On March 26, 2020, plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO) due to the nationwide outbreak of COVID-19. They sought an order to \"promptly release children to available custodians, or if they are not entitled to release under Paragraph 14, to transfer them to non-congregate settings, or justify why it has done neither.\" The plaintiffs argued that COVID-19 threatened children and the unprecedented social distancing measures being enforced to combat the transmission of COVID-19 \"are all but impossible for children held in congregate detention.\" The plaintiffs asserted that a TRO was appropriate because continued detention despite the risk posed by COVID-19 violated the plaintiffs' rights to prompt release and safe and sanitary conditions of confinement under the settlement agreement. In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that \"increased risk of exposure to a deadly virus by virtue of placement in congregate detention facility for children who are neither flight risks nor a danger represents a paradigmatic example of imminent irreparable harm.\" The next day the government filed its opposition to the application for TRO, arguing that the TRO should not be granted because the plaintiffs had not established that there had been any violations of the agreement, that the requested relief would \"increase the risk of harm to class members in ICE and ORR custody by eliminating existing protections and creating confusion,\" and because \"Plaintiffs\u2019 proposed order would also have the Court order extensive procedural and coercive relief that is found nowhere within the four corners of the Agreement.\" On the same day, Judge Gee issued an order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' TRO application. Judge Gee declined to order an immediate release of all class members but concluded that \"an orderly, yet prompt, disposition of minors\u2019 claims of suitable placement is a responsible way to proceed.\" Judge Gee ordered that the government, by April 10, 2020, show cause why a permanent injunction should not issue requiring the government to make and record efforts to release class members and \"enjoining Defendants from keeping minors who have suitable custodians in congregate custody.\" Moreover, Judge Gee ordered that ORR and ICE facilities make themselves available for inspection and provide an accounting of their efforts to release those in custody by April 6. Judge Gee found that plaintiffs demonstrated \"serious questions as to the merits of their claim that ICE has breached the FSA with regard to the provision of safe and sanitary conditions and appropriate medical care and living accommodations in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak.\" Judge Gee also concluded that plaintiffs \"have a strong likelihood of succeeding on their claim that both ICE and ORR have breached the FSA in their failure to release minors to suitable custodians in a prompt manner and to record their continuous efforts towards minors\u2019 release.\" On April 6, the defendants filed an opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for TRO, which acted as a show of cause as to why preliminary injunction should not be issued. The defendants asserted that a preliminary injunction should not be issued because the plaintiffs did not satisfy their burden of demonstrating that defendants had violated the Flores Agreement. Furthermore, the defendants contended that a preliminary injunction would hold the defendants to a requirement not found in the Flores Agreement, \"that any \u2018unexplained delay in releasing a child in ORR and ICE custody. violates [] Paragraphs 14 and 18 of the FSA.\u2019\u201d In their reply to the defendants' opposition, the plaintiffs argued that requiring the defendants to share the efforts towards prompt and continuous release does not modify the terms of the Agreement. Moreover, the plaintiffs asserted that a preliminary injunction was appropriate because preliminary reports indicated that the TRO resulted in defendants releasing children without unnecessary delay. In accordance with the TRO, defendants submitted spreadsheets with information about the class members, containing detail about each minor's circumstances and \"detailed summaries of efforts to release the minors and reasons why the minors remained in custody.\" Defendants also submitted video tours of selected facilities and reports about steps taken and areas of improvement with regards to compliance with COVID-19 guidance. From this data, plaintiffs identified \"several issues that may result in unnecessary delay of minors\u2019 release in violation of the FSA.\" Plaintiffs also argued that ICE had not sufficiently implemented protective measures against COVID-19 and requested a preliminary injunction ordering defendants to \"abide by the FSA and to continue to require, as an interim measure, that the agencies provide summaries of efforts towards family reunification or release of minors to the Monitor and Class Counsel.\" In light of the materials submitted by the defendants and the questions raised by the plaintiffs, on April 10 Judge Gee issued an order extending the TRO by 14 days and required the defendants, by April 24, to show cause as to why a preliminary injunction should not be issued. Moreover, Judge Gee granted the defendants request to file a second supplemental response to plaintiffs' concerns about conditions at the facilities and their questions \"regarding whether certain of their policies have caused unnecessary delay in the release of Class Members in violation of Paragraphs 14 and 18 of the FSA. Judge Gee ordered that defendants' second supplemental response be filed by April 17 and that Plaintiffs may file their reply by April 22. After monthlong briefing, on April 24, Judge Gee issued an order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' request for enforcement of the FSA. 2020 WL 2758792. Judge Gee ordered defendants to \"continue to make every effort to promptly and safely release Class members who have suitable custodians.\" Judge Gee also found that because the COVID-19 pandemic made fingerprint checks difficult to obtain, defendants' requirement of a fingerprint-based check violated the FSA. Judge Gee also ordered that ORR and ICE Juvenile Coordinators submit monthly reports documenting their compliance with the court's order. Following this order, ICE and ORR coordinators filed interim reports on May 15. Plaintiffs filed responses to each report, identifying deficiencies and raising concerns about defendants' compliance with the FSA, CDC guidance, and court orders. On May 22, Judge Gee issued an order about the updated juvenile coordinator reports, highlighting deficiencies with defendants' compliance. 2020 WL 2758795. Judge Gee stated that \"[c]ontrary to the April 24, 2020 Order, ORR has not provisionally released any minors whose vetted sponsor are unable to obtain fingerprints due to pandemic-related closures.\" Judge Gee ordered the provisional release of one minor whose release has been delayed due to fingerprinting. Judge Gee also found that ICE's report \"continues to show lack of compliance with Paragraph 18 of the FSA, which requires Defendants to 'make and record the prompt and continuous efforts on its part toward family reunification and the release of the minor.\" Finally, Judge Gee expressed concern with the implementation of public health guidances at the FRCs. The order required defendants to file updated reports by June 8 and the parties to confer regarding appropriate protocols to inform detained guardians about their children\u2019s rights under the FSA. The defendants appealed the April 24 order to the Ninth Circuit on June 23. On June 25, ALDEA - The People\u2019s Justice Center, Proyecto Dilley, and the Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services submitted an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs, arguing that the court's intervention is needed as ICE continues to violate the FSA and the April 24 and May 22 orders. A status conference was held on June 26. The court recognized that while there was progress made from the defendant's side, there was an increase of COVID-19 cases in their facilities and there are potential issues of non-compliance raised by the plaintiffs, the amicus brief, and the independent monitor. Therefore, the ICE was ordered to transfer the class members who have resided at the FRCs for more than 20 days to non-congregate settings by July 17 and to urgently enforce its existing COVID-19 protocols. Further, the parties were directed to file a joint status report regarding the outcome of their efforts to meet and confer. On July 8, the parties submitted a joint status report, the defendants objected to the court's prohibition on the transfer of minors in ICE juvenile detention to adult facilities when they age out of juvenile detention, and stated their intent to bring a motion asking the court to lift this prohibition. The plaintiffs stated their intent to oppose such motions, arguing that the health situation at the Northwest ICE Processing Center where the remaining two minors would likely be transferred, is described as a \u201ctinderbox\u201d where COVID will spread rapidly to detainees. The other minor plaintiff was to be released. On July 20, three Flores Class Members who were detained by ICE together with their parents sought to intervene. The defendants opposed, arguing that they are already represented by class counsel in this matter. On July 21, the defendants appealed the May 22 order to the Ninth Circuit. The monitor's July 22 Report on the Use of Temporary Housing for Minors and Families under Title 42 noted that the temporary housing program has been transformed by the Title 42 expulsion policies into an integral component of the immigration detention system for UACs in U.S. custody. The monitor recommended the expulsion of all UACs, particularly those below the age of 15 years, from the current temporary housing program, as the temporary housing program was not constructed to serve as a major detention system to care for large numbers of young children for protracted periods of time and it a COVID-19 outbreak is also likely. The defendants sought to stay the case pending a decision on the motion to intervene on July 23, which was denied two days later. On July 29, the court denied the intervention. On August 6, the Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services (RAICES), Proyecto Dilley, and Aldea - the People\u2019s Justice Center filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs. They claimed that the ICE continues to fail to conduct individualized custody determinations or make and record continuous efforts at prompt release, and that COVID-19 outbreaks continue to grow at Karnes and Dilley because of this failure. The plaintiffs filed two motions to enforce the settlement on August 14. The plaintiffs argued that the current administration substantially restricted its asylum policies and the defendants are no longer in compliance with the FSA because ICE fails to provide advisals to parents regarding their children\u2019s release rights or to adopt release procedures. The plaintiffs requested the court order ICE adopt advisals of rights and procedures to release class members. The plaintiffs also argued that ICE's history of failing to comply with the FSA warrants a finding of contempt. In the second motion, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants were placing children in hotels and unlicensed placements for weeks at time before expelling them pursuant to the COVID-19 border closure. The settlement agreement required that children must be placed in non-secure facilities licensed to care for dependent minors. The defendants appealed the June 26 order to the Ninth Circuit on August 24. On August 28, Aldea The People's Justice Center, Proyecto Dilley, and The Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs. Three days later, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International USA sought to file amicus briefs in support of the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement regarding ICE\u2019s placing of children in hotels and unlicensed facilities on September 4. 2020 WL 5491445. The other motion to enforce the settlement filed on August 14 remained pending. Judge Gee ordered the defendants to cease placing minors at hotels and to transfer all minors currently held in hotels to licensed facilities. The defendants appealed the order, and moved for a temporary administrative stay and a stay pending appeal. The administrative stay was granted by the Ninth Circuit on September 13, however, the stay of the order was denied on September 16, reasoning that the district court is familiar with the detention conditions of immigrant children in facilities administered by the DHS and HHS, and therefore the defendants should first bring their request for a stay to the district court. The same day, the defendants moved to stay September 4 order the pending appeal, which the district court denied on September 21. 2020 WL 5666550. The district court ordered the September 4th Order to be effective as of September 28. On September 28, DHS was to cease placing minors at hotels. However, they were permitted to implement brief hotel stays as necessary and in good faith for not more than 72 hours. Again, the defendants renewed their emergency motion for a temporary administrative stay and a stay pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit granted a temporary administrative stay, but then denied the emergency motion for a stay on October 4. 977 F.3d 742. The defendants appealed the denial of the stay to the Ninth Circuit on October 15. On September 18, Judge Gee granted in part the plaintiffs\u2019 other motion to enforce the settlement agreement regarding the defendants\u2019 failure to provide advisals of rights to class members and their parents. Judge Gee ordered ICE to disseminate a notice of rights as revised by the court and to issue an updated policy or instruction regarding the settlement to its employees. The court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion to the extent it sought to provide a specific release protocol to ICE employees or release decision worksheet to class members and parents. The plaintiffs, defendants, and amicus parties (Aldea, The People\u2019s Justice Center, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Proyecto Dilley, RAICES) each filed comments on the proposed procedures and advisal notice. The court made revisions to the draft notice of rights and the ICE directive to employees. The parties are to attempt to finalize the documents and file a joint status report by November 30, 2020. On October 16, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to terminate a transfer restriction contained in the June 26 order which prohibited ICE from transferring into an adult detention facility, a minor who ages out of an ICE juvenile detention facility. More coming soon.", "summary": "This longstanding matter concerns the detention of foreign minors apprehended by immigration authorities. It was filed in the 1980s and settled in 2001. In 2015, C.D. Cal. found that DHS's 2014 family detention policy violated the 2001 settlement, and entered an order to show cause requiring substantial remediation. In 2016, the 9th Cir. largely denied an appeal by the U.S. against C.D. Cal's ruling in favor of plaintiffs. C.D. Cal. continues to order the defendants to comply with the settlement agreement, and defendants continue to appeal these rulings. In September 2019, the district court issued a permanent injunction and the government appealed to the Ninth Circuit in November; the appeal is pending. In March 2020, in response to the outbreak of COVID-19, the district court issued an order for the government to promptly dispose of the class members' claims for release to outside sponsors and for the inspection of government facilities to ensure compliance with public health guidelines. The Court issued further orders in April and May of 2020 requiring defendants to comply with the settlement agreement and expressing concern with their compliance. The plaintiffs again sought to enforce the settlement on August 14, which was granted on September 4. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "On September 29, 2014, the surviving widow of a same-sex marriage filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island against the Social Security Administration (SSA). The plaintiff, represented by the Gay & Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, asked the court to declare that several SSA regulations were invalid and contrary to the governing Social Security statutes, affirm that the plaintiff met the marriage requirements, declare that a person previously married to someone of the same sex met the marriage requirements for Social Security Survivor benefits, so long as the courts of the state the individual resided in would find that the marriage valid, declare that the plaintiffs marriage would have been recognized by Rhode Island, enjoin the defendant to process the plaintiff's application for widow's and lump sum death benefits, and to award the plaintiffs any attorney's fees or costs of suit. At the time of her wife's death, the plaintiff had been in a same-sex marriage that was formalized in Massachusetts. The plaintiff claimed that on January 17, 2012, the SSA informed her that her marriage did not meet the marriage requirements, and denied her application for benefits. The SSA decision was partially due to the reasoning that the plaintiff's marriage was never a valid marriage under Rhode Island State law. The plaintiff alleged that the SSA violated the rights guaranteed to her by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution by discriminating on the basis of sex and refusing to recognize same-sex marriages that occurred out-of-state. She further claimed that though Rhode Island had not legalized same-sex marriage, it still recognized marriages validly performed in other states. According to a press release by GLAD, the plaintiff received $30,000 in back benefits from SSA as a part of a private settlement on December 1, 2014. On December 15, 2014, the plaintiff filed a notice of dismissal with the court.", "summary": "On September 29, 2014, the surviving widow of a same-sex marriage filed a lawsuit in the District of Rhode Island, U.S. District Court, against the Social Security Administration (SSA). The plaintiff asked the court to affirm that the she met the marriage requirements, declare that a person previously married to someone of the same sex meets the SSA marriage requirements (so long as the courts of the state the individual resides in would find that the marriage valid), declare that the plaintiffs marriage would have been recognized by Rhode Island, enjoin the defendant to process the plaintiff's application for widow's and lump sum death benefits, and to award the plaintiffs any attorney's fees or costs of suit. In a private settlement in December 2014, the plaintiff received back benefits from SSA."} {"article": "The Detroit District Office of the EEOC brought this action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, against Victory Lane. The complaint, filed in May 2004, alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; specifically that Defendant subjected the charging party to a sexually hostile work environment. The parties entered into a consent decree in January 2005. The decree, valid for two years, required Defendant to pay the charging party a total of $7,500 and provide Title VII training to its managers and supervisors. Defendant was enjoined from discriminating or retaliating in violation of Title VII and required to post a notice of non-discrimination at its facility. The decree was entered in 2005 and scheduled to last 2007. No further docket entries exist, so the case is closed.", "summary": "The Detroit District Office of the EEOC brought this action in 2004 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against Victory Lane, alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. The parties entered into a consent decree in 2005, which provided for monetary and injunctive relief."} {"article": "On August 18, 2014, an individual who had been ordered to refrain from standing for more than five seconds on public sidewalks in the City of Ferguson or face arrest, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The suit was filed against the County of St. Louis under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and sought injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to nominal damages and attorneys' fees. The plaintiff's claims arose from allegations that the County of St. Louis, and various law enforcement agencies involved in the protests arising from the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, instituted a policy of prohibiting individuals from standing on public sidewalks for more than five seconds under threat of arrest in violation of the First Amendment and Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. On October 6, 2014, the District Court (Judge Catherine D. Perry) entered a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiff on the basis that the defendant's policy of requiring peaceful protestors to walk, rather than stand still, violates the Constitution and that defendant would likely continue to apply the policy without such an injunction. 52 F.Supp.3d 936. Specifically, the preliminary injunction barred defendants from enforcing or threatening to enforce a policy or practice of arresting individuals who are peaceably standing or assembling on the public sidewalks and otherwise complying with all laws. On November 4, 2014, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint with the defendants' consent, adding three additional plaintiffs and the City of Ferguson as a defendant. On December 22, 2014, upon the joint motion of the parties, Judge Perry entered an order permanently enjoining the defendants from enforcing or threatening to enforce any rule, policy, or practice granting law enforcement officers the authority to arrest, threaten to arrest, or order to move individuals violating no statute, ordinance, or regulation and who are peaceably standing, marching, or assembling on public sidewalks in Ferguson. Judge Perry awarded the plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $153,767 on September 24, 2015. 2015 WL 5638064. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On August 18, 2014, plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the County of St. Louis and associated law enforcement agencies. The suit alleged that the law enforcement agencies' policy of prohibiting protesters from standing still in the wake of the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri violates the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. On October 6, 2014, the District Court (Judge Catherine D. Perry) issued a preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiffs finding that such policy violates the Constitution and barring defendants from threatening to arrest individuals otherwise complying with the law while standing still on public sidewalks. Upon the joint motion of the parties, the court entered a permanent injunction on December 22, 2014. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On August 4, 2010, Communities Actively Living Independent and Free (CALIF) and a few individuals with mobility disabilities filed a class action lawsuit against the City of Los Angeles in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that the city unlawfully failed to properly install accessible pedestrian rights of way, including curb ramps, sidewalks, crosswalks, and pedestrian crossings. The complaint asserted two federal claims under the American with Disabilities Act (the ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and four state law claims. Represented by private counsels, the plaintiffs sought declarations, preliminary and permanent injunctions and damages relief. On December 10, 2010, the court (Judge Consuelo Marshall) dismissed plaintiff's the state law claims without prejudice and the plaintiffs commenced a state court action against the City following this Court\u2019s dismissal. On January 3, 2011, Judge Consuelo Marshall granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification for injunctive and declaratory relief only, and appointed class counsel. The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment and on February 25, 2013, the Court granted the motion but denied without prejudice any request to preclude evidence that may be used for multiple purposes. In the mean time, plaintiff and the City undertook extensive discovery and engaged in extensive discovery as well as numerous discussions regarding settlement of the claims. On January 8th, 2016, the plaintiff motioned for approval of settlement and certification of settlement class. On February 29, 2016, the court certified the settlement class and granted preliminary approval. On August 25th, the court granted the approval of the final settlement agreement and found that it is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of the Settlement Class as a whole. In the settlement Agreement, the city agreed to expend a total of $1,367,142,684 during the compliance period for program access improvement. The agreement laid out specific amount of funding for every five years that the city must spend for the next thirty years. Both parties agreed all program access improvements and new construction in the city will comply with the standards set forth in the 2010 standards in the Americans with Disabilities Act. In accordance with the settlement agreement, the court reserves exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the plaintiffs, the settlement class members, and the City, throughout the term of the settlement agreement, for the sole purpose of supervising the implementation, enforcement, construction, and interpretation of the settlement agreement. Following the approval of the settlement agreement, the court entered the final judgment of this case, releasing all plaintiffs' claims against the City. On August 25th, the court also granted plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and costs. Through calculation and evidence submitted, the court awarded $10,269,745.07 in attorneys\u2019 fees and $1,533,751.77 in costs to the plaintiffs.", "summary": "On August 4, 2010, Communities Actively Living Independent and Free (CALIF) and individuals with mobility disabilities filed a class action lawsuit against City of Los Angeles in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff alleged that the City unlawfully failed to properly install and maintain accessible pedestrian rights of way. On August 25th, 2016, the court granted the final approval of the settlement between the parties. The settlement requires the City to expend a total of $1,367,142,684 to implement an access improvement program during the compliance period."} {"article": "In February 2002, the EEOC's Baltimore District Office filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against L.A. Weight Loss, a company that at the time operated over 400 \"weight loss centers\" nationwide. The complaint alleged a \"pattern or practice\" of failing to hire men, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The EEOC also alleged that L.A. Weight Loss fired a female employee in retaliation when she complained about the company's hiring practices. Shortly after the suit was filed, the discharged female employee intervened as a plaintiff. In November of 2005, she and the defendant came to terms on a settlement. The EEOC's case continued on, despite repeated settlement conferences before Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm. In 2007, the parties both moved for summary judgment; the defendant's motion was denied, and the EEOC's motion was granted in part and denied in part. In early 2007, LA Weight Loss changed its name to Pure Weight Loss. In January of 2008, Pure Weight Loss filed a Chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy. On March 19, 2008, the bankruptcy trustee filed a motion to stay the proceedings for six months. Judge William D Quarles, Jr denied the motion to stay proceedings on May 20, 2008. The parties negotiated a consent decree, which Judge William D Quarles, Jr. approved on December 1, 2008. According to the EEOC website, the consent decree included a $20 million claim in bankruptcy (16,842,656 in back pay and $3,157,344 in punitive damages) payable to the men who the EEOC deemed were subjected to discrimination from L.A. Weight Loss's illegal hiring practices from January 1, 1997 through the entry of the decree. The consent decree also included injunctive relief. It prohibited the company from discriminating against job applicants and employees on the basis of sex and from retaliating against employees. It required the company to use an electronic tracking system for applicants, to retain information on applicants based on categories defined by the EEOC, and to create a discrimination-complaint procedure. The decree provided relief for the men discriminated against under the old practices by requiring the company to hire some of them. Lastly, the decree set hiring goals for Pure Weight Loss and mandated that the company do quarterly reviews to assess its progress. This 10-year consent degree expired in 2018 without any motions to enforce noncompliance. The case is closed.", "summary": "In February 2002, the EEOC's Baltimore District Office filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against LA Weight Loss. The EEOC alleged that LA Weight Loss violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act through a \"pattern or practice\" of failing to hire men and for firing a female employee in retaliation when the employee complained of these hiring practices. On December 1, 2008 Judge William Quarles, Jr. approved the parties consent decree. The 10-year decree expired in 2018."} {"article": "Plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit against the Defendant-lender on April 25, 2006, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging that the Defendant-bank had an unwritten policy of not lending in predominantly minority areas of Detroit. Plaintiffs' suit included claims under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601-3619, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 1691, and federal civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982. On October 27, 2006, the Court (Judge Nancy G. Edmunds) granted the Defendant's motions to dismiss some of the claims under the FHA and ECOA as time-barred. JAT, Inc. v. Nat'l City Bank of the Midwest, 460 F. Supp. 2d 812 (E.D. Mich. 2006). Judge Edmunds rejected other defense motions at this stage, finding that Defendant's substantive defenses were more appropriate at the summary judgment stage. On July 9, 2007, Judge Edmunds denied Plaintiffs' motion for class action certification. JAT, Inc. v. Nat'l City Bank of the Midwest, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49198 (E.D. Mich. July 9, 2007). After extensive discovery proceedings, the Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on June 10, 2008, holding that the Plaintiffs did not have enough factual support to proceed with their claim. 2008 WL 2397657 (E.D. Mich. June 10, 2008). The Plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, they withdrew their appeal and the case was dismissed on December 19, 2008.", "summary": "This Fair Housing Act lawsuit was filed on April 25, 2006 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against a branch of a national bank. The Plaintiffs, representing a class of minorities in Detroit, claimed that the Defendant had an unwritten policy of not lending in predominantly minority areas of Detroit. The court denied class certification and after extensive discovery, the granted summary judgment for the Defendants on June 10, 2008, holding that the Plaintiffs did not have enough factual support to proceed with their claim. The Plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, they withdrew their appeal, and the case was dismissed, on December 19, 2008."} {"article": "On September 30, 2004, former and current employees of FleetBoston Financial Corporation filed a lawsuit under ERISA against FleetBoston in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs claimed that they were negatively impacted when FleetBoston changed its Pension Plan to one based on a cash balance formula. The Court (Judge Janet C. Hall) granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion to dismiss on March 31, 2006. The Court dismissed Counts II, III, and VI in their entirety. It further granted the motion to dismiss as to all claims pursuant to ERISA \u00a7 503(a)(1)(B). However, the Court denied the motion to dismiss as to the remaining claims in Counts I, IV, and V. Richards v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 427 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Conn. 2006). Also on March 31, 2006, the Court certified Plaintiffs' class under 23(b)(2). The class was defined as follows: people who \"(a) are former or current Fleet employees who on December 31, 1996 [the day before the Amended Plan's effective date] were not at least age 50 with 15 years of vesting service, and (b) participated in the Fleet Pension Plan before January 1, 1997, and (c) have participated in the Fleet Pension Plan at any time since January 1, 1997.\" Richards v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 235 F.R.D. 165 (D. Conn. 2006). On July 24, 2006, the Court granted Defendant's second motion to dismiss with respect to Count II and the part of Count V premised on the Summary Plan Description's (SPD) lack of an explanation of how benefit accruals under the plan are reduced by advancing age. The Court denied the motion with respect to the remaining parts of Count V. Richards v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 2006 WL 2092086 (D. Conn. Jul. 24, 2006). On October 16, 2006, the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for amended class certification and certified the proposed class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(1)(A). Further, the Court denied Defendant's motion to certify the SPD class (Count IV) under Rule 23(b)(2). Richards v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 238 F.R.D. 345 (D. Conn. 2006). Also on October 16, 2006, the Court denied Defendant's motions for a certificate of appealability or for reconsideration of the decision in which the Court refused to dismiss Count I of the Complaint. The Court found that an interlocutory appeal was not appropriate because it would not help to avoid protracted litigation, nor was this an exceptional or rare circumstance. The Court denied the motion to reconsider because it found that the statutory language in question was unambiguous. Richards v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 2006 WL 3000768 (D. Conn. Oct. 16, 2006). The Court preliminarily approved the class settlement between the parties on April 24, 2008. Including attorneys' fees and incentives for class representatives, the total monetary payment to the class totaled $83,401,000. On October 15, 2008, the Court granted final approval to the settlement and dismissed the case. By a separate order on the same day, the Court granted Plaintiffs' attorneys about $17.5 million in fees and costs. The Court also granted $15,000 to the class representative. The case was closed in October 2008. There was some later litigation related to bonding issues, but the case is now complete.", "summary": "This case was brought by current and former employees of FleetBoston Financial Corporation alleging violations of ERISA as a result of FleetBoston changing to a cash balance formula for determining pension benefits. The case was settled in October 2008, resulting in a payment of more than $80 million for the benefit of the class."} {"article": "On November 15, 2017, the National Women\u2019s Law Center and the Labor Counsel for Latin American Advancement filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The case was assigned to Judge Tanya S. Chutkan. The plaintiffs sued the federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Administrator for the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) (a division of the Office of Management and Budget), and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), under the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and an order from the court vacating an order issued by OIRA that stayed planned revisions to employer demographic reporting obligations. Because a pay gap persisted\u2014between both men and women and between white, non-Hispanic men, and people of color\u2014the EEOC and other federal agencies sought to improve enforcement of federal laws prohibiting pay discrimination. After a multi-year study, the EEOC concluded that it would revise a longstanding employer survey, the Employer Information Report EEO-1, to require that employers include W-2 earnings data for employees by sex, race, ethnicity, and job category. Beginning in February 2016, the revisions to EEO-1 went through a seven-month process of notice and comment, public hearings, and changes to reduce employer burdens. The final revisions to the EEO-1 were sent to OMB in September 2016, and OMB approved the changes. However, in August 2017, after President Trump took office, the new Administrator of OIRA issued a short memorandum that immediately stayed the revisions to the EEO-1. The memorandum provided virtually no explanation, citing the Paperwork Reduction Act to justify its actions. The decision to issue this memorandum was made in secret and without notice and comment. Following the decision, the EEOC published a Federal Register notice stating that EEO-1 filers should not submit pay data in their filings. The plaintiffs claimed that the agencies lacked the authority to stay a collection of data required by the agency rule governing the EEO-1 and, thus, that the stay was unlawful. Specifically, the plaintiffs made the following claims that the agencies had violated the Administrative Procedures Act:
The Attorney General in this case used the sword of federal funding to conscript state and local authorities to aid in federal civil immigration enforcement. But the power of the purse rests with Congress, which authorized the federal funds at issue and did not impose any immigration enforcement conditions on the receipt of such funds. [. . .] It falls to us, the judiciary, as the remaining branch of the government, to act as a check on such usurpation of power.Subsequently, in the Seventh Circuit, the DOJ moved for a partial stay of the injunction (as applied to localities other than Chicago), pending a rehearing en banc and if necessary a petition for a writ of certiorari. However, the Seventh Circuit denied this motion on April 24. The DOJ then petitioned for a rehearing en banc, and also moved for a partial stay pending that rehearing, which was again denied; the DOJ again asked for an en banc reconsideration of the partial stay request. On June 4, 2018, the Seventh Circuit granted the partial stay request, staying the preliminary injunction beyond the City of Chicago. 2018 WL 4268817. Meanwhile, on July 27, 2018, the district court granted the City's motion for partial summary judgment and denied the DOJ's motion to dismiss. The court held that in light of a 2018 Supreme Court decision, the anti-commandeering analysis was now \"whether Section 1373 'evenhandedly regulates an activity in which both States and private actors engage,' as opposed to regulating activities undertaken by government entities only, thus conscripting state action in the implementation of a federal scheme.\" The court then held that \u00a7 1373 violated the Tenth Amendment on its face because it did not \"evenhandedly regulate activities in which both private and government actors engage;\" rather, it requested immigration information be provided to federal authorities by local government employees acting in their official, state-employed capacities. Further, Judge Leinenweber held that the DOJ still had not proven its statutory authority to impose the notice and access funding conditions and so the Seventh Circuit's prior reasoning in affirming the earlier injunction controlled. The Judge also held that while the compliance funding conditions were likely within statutory authority, they were otherwise unconstitutional and therefore not subject to such analysis. Finally, the court held that the pending Seventh Circuit rehearing did not bar the district court from granting this new injunction, though it limited the injunction to just Chicago pending the Seventh Circuit's rehearing en banc. 321 F.Supp.3d 855. The DOJ again appealed this latest injunction to the Seventh Circuit. On August 10, 2018, the Seventh Circuit vacated its prior order granting a rehearing en banc in order to avoid piecemeal appeals. The Court found that because of the district court's July 27 decision (and its intent to enter a permanent injunction), the preliminary injunction had become meaningless and the appeals process needed to restart. So, the Court maintained the stay of the nationwide scope of the earlier injunction until the district court issued a proper permanent injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, and it indicated it would hear an appeal once there was a final judgment from the lower court. 2018 WL 4268814. The district court then entered final judgment on August 15, 2018 in favor of the City and against the DOJ. Once again, the DOJ appealed to the Seventh Circuit (docket no. 18-02885). The Seventh Circuit heard oral argument on April 10, 2019. On October 12, 2018, the City of Chicago had filed another lawsuit in this district court, again challenging the imposition of immigration-related conditions on federal funding, but for FY2018 grants (City of Chicago v. Sessions III). The case was also assigned to Judge Leinenweber. The challenged conditions in that case were almost identical to those presented here, and on September 19, 2019, Judge Leinenweber granted summary judgment to the city of Chicago and entered a permanent injunction. The nationwide scope of that injunction was also stayed due to the pending appeal of the injunction in this case. The government also appealed that injunction to the Seventh Circuit. Consequently, on November 20, 2019, the Seventh Circuit ordered the appeals in these two cases to be consolidated for purpose of disposition. On April 30, 2020, the Seventh Circuit affirmed Judge Leinenweber's grant of injunctive relief to Chicago and extended it nationwide. The Court found that while the executive branch has significant powers in the realm of immigration, it does not have Congress' power of the purse and thus cannot withhold Byrne JAG grants in order to force Chicago to alter its behavior. The Court affirmed the district court's grants of declaratory relief to Chicago, finding that the Attorney General exceeded the authority delegated to him by Congress in imposing the challenged conditions to the FY2017 and FY2018 grants, and that the Attorney General's decision to impose the conditions in both years violated the separation of powers. The Court found it unnecessary to reach the constitutionality of \u00a7 1373 under the anti-commandeering doctrine. The government had relied on language in 34 U.S.C. \u00a7 10153 to support its imposition of the compliance condition. \u00a7 10153 states that in a request for a grant, the application shall include a certification that the applicant \"will comply with all provisions of this part and all other applicable Federal laws.\" The government had argued that the reference to \"all other applicable Federal laws\" allowed it to require that applicants certify compliance with \u00a7 1373. However, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with this interpretation and instead found that the phrase could not be construed so broadly as to encompass all federal laws that applied to states or localities, including federal immigration statutes. The Court also held that a nationwide injunction was proper due to the interconnected nature of applicants for the Byrne JAG grants. In order for the grant amounts to be properly calculated for Chicago, the Court held that the unlawful conditions could not be imposed elsewhere. Finally, the Court remanded for the district court to determine whether any other injunctive relief was appropriate in light of its determination that \u00a7 10153 could not be used to incorporate laws unrelated to the grants or grantees. 957 F.3d 772. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "This lawsuit, filed by the city of Chicago on August 7, 2017 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, challenged the federal government's imposition of immigration-related conditions on federal funding to the city (specifically, for FY2017 Byrne JAG grants). Chicago sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction on Sep. 15, 2017. The DOJ appealed to the Seventh Circuit and on April 19, the preliminary injunction was upheld, but the nationwide scope of the injunction was later stayed by the Circuit Court pending a rehearing en banc. The district court granted the city's motion for partial summary judgment in July 2018, finding a permanent injunction was warranted, but staying its nationwide scope pending the Seventh Circuit appeal. The DOJ again appealed this latest injunction. On August 10, 2018, the Seventh Circuit decided to vacate its prior order granting a rehearing so that the district court could formally enter a permanent injunction, which the government could then appeal; the nationwide scope of the injunction would remain stayed. The district court then entered final judgment in favor of the City, and the DOJ appealed. After hearing oral argument, the Seventh Circuit consolidated the appeal in this case with the appeal of an injunction in the related case, (City of Chicago v. Sessions III) (which challenged essentially the same funding restrictions, but for FY2018 Byrne JAG grants). On April 30, 2020, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of injunctive relief to Chicago and extended it nationwide."} {"article": "On March 27, 2007, individuals with mobility impairments and an advocacy group filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado against five operators of \"over the road bus\" transportation, for violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, and Colorado law. The plaintiffs alleged the defendants failed to provide accessible bus service. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that they all experienced numerous problems with wheelchair access, including drivers not knowing how to operate wheelchair lifts, defective lifts, drivers not allowing them off the bus at rest stops, and accessible buses not being available despite 48 hours advance notice to the bus companies. The plaintiffs claimed the defendants' actions violated the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12184; the Rehabilitation Act, Section 504, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794; and the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA), Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 6-1-112. The plaintiffs alleged violation of the regulations 49 C.F.R. 37, which implemented the ADA as to companies that operated bus service. The CCPA allows a claim for damages against defendants who engage in deceptive trade practices. The plaintiff alleged defendants engaged in deceptive practices by promising accessible bus service but then failing to deliver. The plaintiffs sought an injunctive relief, damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. All defendants eventually settled and were dismissed by stipulation. The only substantive motions were a motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment by two defendants, which they withdrew on June 5, 2008. It is unclear whether Greyhound and Busco/Black Hills also settled with the plaintiffs. Presently, none of the settlement agreements are publicly available.", "summary": "Disabled individuals brought claims against five operators of \"over the road bus\" transportation, for violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, and Colorado law. The plaintiffs alleged the defendants failed to provide accessible bus service. All five defendants were dismissed by stipulation of the parties and it appears they all settled with the plaintiff, though presently the settlement agreements are not publicly available."} {"article": "On August 3, 2018, the Human Rights Defense Center filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement under the Freedom of Information Act. In March 2018, the plaintiff had requested from ICE certain records related to litigation against the organization. The plaintiff appealed ICE\u2019s denial of its records request to the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, but had not received a response to the appeal by the time it filed the complaint. The plaintiff alleged that ICE wrongly withheld documents responsive to its properly submitted request in violation of the Freedom of Information Act. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief, as well as an order that ICE disclose the requested records and attorneys\u2019 fees. The case was assigned to Judge Thomas S. Zilly. On August 7, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to note that the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor had emailed a final denial of the appeal on August 6. On March 15, 2019, the parties submitted a joint status report in which the defendants acknowledged that the plaintiffs were entitled to the requested records subject to exceptions delineated in the Freedom of Information Act. The parties noted that they had conferred regarding a rolling production schedule. Although the court set a trial date for December 2, 2019, the parties noted in their joint status report that the case will most likely be resolved by motions practice. On February 14, 2020, the parties requested that the court continue the trial until after ICE's anticipated completion of its production of documents in response to plaintiffs' FOIA request. The motion states that \"the parties agreed on a rolling production schedule where ICE processes 500 pages per month\" and that ICE anticipates production through October 2020. The parties also submitted a proposed briefing schedule to begin in December 2020, but the parties stated that the case will most likely be resolved without the need for a trial. Judge Zilly granted the parties' motion on February 18; plaintiff's dispositive motion is due December 18, 2020 and a bench trial is set for April 26, 2021.", "summary": "On August 3, 2018, the Human Rights Defense Center filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement under the Freedom of Information Act. On March 20, 2018, the plaintiff requested from ICE certain records related to litigation against ICE. The plaintiff appealed ICE\u2019s denial of its records request to the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, but as of the date of filing this action had received no response to the appeal. The plaintiff alleged that ICE wrongly withheld documents responsive to its properly submitted request in violation of the Freedom of Information Act. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief, as well as an order that ICE disclose the requested records and attorneys\u2019 fees. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "This class-action lawsuit was filed on January 12, 2017, in the United States District Court For The Middle District Of Tennessee. The plaintiffs and the proposed class was incarcerated in the Tennessee Department of Corrections (\u201cTDOC\u201d) and housed at Trousdale Turner Correctional Facility in Hartsville, TN, a private prison owned and operated by CoreCivic. The class is defined as persons with insulin-dependent diabetes (Type 1 or insulin dependent Type 2) who were, who had been, or who in the future would become, housed at Trousdale Turner correctional facility. The plaintiffs were represented by private council, and the case was been assigned to District Judge Eli J. Richardson. The named defendants are CoreCivic, TDOC, and the Commissioner of TDOC. The plaintiffs alleged that defendants had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act by failing to provide accommodations and discriminating on the basis of disability resulting in physical injury. They also alleged that defendants had demonstrated deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the class resulting in physical injury in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process. Specifically, the complaint alleged that as a result of CoreCivic's policy and practice of understaffing, defendants were often unable to provide persons with insulin-dependent diabetes with access to basic diabetes care, including blood sugar checks and insulin administration coordinated with regular mealtimes. They sought permanent injunctive relief, court orders to transfer those with insulin-dependent diabetes out of the Trousdale prison and to cease assigning these prisoners to that facility, and court orders to change training and institutional policy regarding diabetes care. The court certified the class on Oct 3, 2018 (2018 WL 4776081). That same day, the court also dismissed the defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment and denied the American Diabetes Association's motion to intervene (2018 WL 4800836 and 2018 WL 4799770, respectively). The parties entered a joint motion for class settlement on May 16, 2019, which was subsequently granted on May 23, 2019. On July 25, 2019, Judge Richardson entered judgment against CoreCivic requiring that they provide access to blood sugar checks and insulin administration in coordination with regular mealtimes, as well as procedural changes to accommodate inmates with insulin-dependent diabetes. The judgment also requires training changes, as well as a payment of $99,950.00 to the plaintiff's counsel for attorneys fees. The court dismissed all claims against TDOC and its commissioner with prejudice. The settlement agreement was to be in force for two years. The case is ongoing for the purposes of enforcement.", "summary": "Inmates at a privatized prison in Tennessee run by CoreCivic sue in a class action lawsuit in the Middle District Of Tennessee. They allege that the prison has failed to provide them adequate accommodations for their insulin-dependent diabetes, demonstrating deliberate indifference to their serious medical need. The court certified the class and ruled in their favor, requiring the prison to change their policy to provide adequate care for diabetic inmates, as well as paying attorneys fees."} {"article": "On November 1, 2006, private counsel and attorneys for the Southern Poverty Law Center filed a class-action civil rights suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, challenging a series of raids conducted by federal immigration authorities in Southeast Georgia over the course of at least two weeks in September 2006. Plaintiffs alleged that federal agents with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, under the guise of locating suspected undocumented workers who had been employed at the Crider poultry facility in Stillmore, Georgia, illegally raided and searched the homes of Latinos in an effort to drive the Latino community out of Southeast Georgia. Plaintiffs specifically alleged that agents searched, detained and interrogated citizens merely because they looked \"Mexican,\" in violation of their rights secured by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Plaintiffs sought actual, compensatory, and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and class certification. Defendants responded by moving to dismiss the case. On May 1, 2007, the District Court (Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.) stayed discovery and briefing on plaintiffs' request for class certification, pending the Court's ruling on defendants' dispositive motions. A first amended complaint was filed on June 14, 2007. Defendants responded by moving to dismiss, or for summary judgment, the various counts alleged in the amended complaint. On December 5, 2007, the court (Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.) granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief to redress violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The court found that plaintiffs had not shown a real and immediate threat of future harm. Therefore, on March 27, 2008, the court denied as moot plaintiffs' motion for class certification with respect to the dismissed claims. That same day, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint asserting Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) claims against the United States. The FTCA claims were for false imprisonment, assault, battery, and trespass. Plaintiffs also asserted Bivens claims against the federal law enforcement agents employed by ICE for violation of plaintiffs' Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Once again, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. They argued that the FTCA claims should be dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing the FTCA claims, the claims fell under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, and the plaintiffs didn\u2019t state viable tort claims under Georgia law. They also argued that the Bivens claims should be dismissed because the claims were against unidentified John Does. Plaintiffs then asked for leave from the court to file a third amended complaint that identified the John Does by their actual names. On March 31, 2009, the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the FTCA and Bivens claims. 2009 WL 900800. The court found that plaintiffs had exhausted their remedies prior to filing the FTCA claims and that the FTCA claims did not fall under the discretionary function exception. The court also granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, which they filed on June 19. On July 31, 2009, plaintiffs, citing a settlement agreement, filed an unopposed motion asking the court to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice. The case was dismissed on July 31. The Southern Poverty Law Center provided the settlement agreement. In the settlement, the United States agreed to pay plaintiffs $35,000 and plaintiffs agreed to voluntarily dismiss the case.", "summary": "In November 2006, private counsel and attorneys for the Southern Poverty Law Center filed a class action civil rights suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, challenging a series of raids conducted by federal immigration authorities in Southeast Georgia. Plaintiffs alleged that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (\"ICE\") agents had illegally raided and searched the homes of Latinos in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Those claims were dismissed, but in an amended complaint plaintiffs asserted that defendants had violated the Federal Torts Claim Act (\"FTCA\") and the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the FTCA claims. In July 2009, the parties settled the case and defendants agreed to pay plaintiffs $35,000."} {"article": "On June 12, 2015, three individuals incarcerated and suffering from complications due to Hepatitis C viral infections filed this class action suit in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, claiming violations of the Eighth Amendment, and of Article I \u00a7 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Represented by private counsel and the PA Institutional Law Project, the plaintiffs alleged that the DOC had a policy and practice of denying necessary medical care to inmates diagnosed with Hepatitis C. In denying care, the DOC placed the inmates at serious and unnecessary risk for irreparable harm and death. The plaintiffs estimated that 20% of the state's prisoners were infected with Hepatitis C at the time of the lawsuit. The defendants did not authorize treatment with drugs that recently were established to be effective and the new standard of care, and in fact ceased providing treatment altogether. The plaintiffs sued for declaratory and injunctive relief. On March 7, 2016, Judge John Padova ordered that the motion for class certification be stayed pending resolution of the defendant's motion to dismiss. On March 21, 2016, Judge Padova issued an order partially granting and partially denying the defendants' motion to dismiss. 2016 WL 1125580. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 3, 2017, and the defendants filed another motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on February 8. The court ruled on this motion on August 8, 2017, granting it in part and denying it in part. The court found that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that defendants had been deliberately indifferent, and that portion of the complaint met the standard to survive a motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the allegations of the medical defendants, finding that they were not responsible for creating the DOC's policy and could not be held responsible for it. A number of additional claims were dismissed pursuant to the agreement of the parties. 2017 WL 3394605. The defendants moved for summary judgment on October 2, 2017. Meanwhile, the court granted the plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification on May 24, 2018. The class was certified as all persons who are currently incarcerated in a Pennsylvania DOC facility with a diagnosed condition of Chronic Hepatitis C, who have at least twelve weeks remaining on their sentences, and who have a life expectancy of over a year. 2018 WL 2388665. On July 12, 2018, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion with respect to one plaintiffs' personal claims for injunctive relief, the plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief under Article I, \u00a7 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and a portion of the medical malpractice claim. The court denied the remainder of the counts. 2018 WL 3388305. The parties held a settlement conference on October 17, 2018. On November 19, 2018, the parties entered into a settlement agreement on plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief. The defendant agreed to replace its current Hepatitis C protocol with a new protocol that incorporated the terms of the settlement agreement. The defendant agreed to provide enhanced medical evaluation and treatment to class members, including direct-acting antivirals to class members when necessary. The settlement agreement also amended the class to include inmates with Hepatitis C who entered the Department of Corrections after the date of class certification. DOC also agreed to provide ongoing reports to plaintiffs' counsel with data regarding testing, diagnosis, evaluation, and treatment of all class members in prison currently diagnosed with Hepatitis C. The agreement also allowed for a notice-and-comment period prior to any revisions or changes to the Hepatitis C Protocol. Plaintiffs' counsel agreed it would provide the defendant with notice of any potential noncompliance. The parties agreed to enter into good-faith discussion to solve any disputes that may arise from unforeseen circumstances. The parties agreed that the Settlement Agreement was to be subjected to the final approval of the court, and that the court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the Agreement and to resolve any disputes that may arise. The DOC agreed to pay the plaintiffs\u2019 $195,000 in attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The court approved the settlement agreement on February 7, 2019. The court retains jurisdiction over the case until June 30, 2022. The court may only extend the agreement in one year increments in the event of a finding of noncompliance with its terms, but not beyond five years from the date of approval. Therefore, the case remains ongoing.", "summary": "In 2015, three inmates suffering from Hepatitis C viral infections filed this class action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had a policy and practice of denying inmates diagnosed with Hepatitis C viral infections the necessary medical care, despite effective available treatments, thereby placing inmates at serious and unnecessary risk for irreparable harm and death. The case settled in February 2019 and remains in effect."} {"article": "On July 19, 2017, four prisoners suffering from the Hepatitis C virus who were under the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, sued the executive director of the CDOC, the chief medical officer of the CDOC, and the director of clinical and correctional services of the CDOC under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had denied the plaintiffs, and others similarly situated, direct-acting antiviral (DAA) medication in violation of the Eighth Amendment\u2019s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. This case was originally assigned to Magistrate Judge Gordon P. Gallagher, but on August 1, 2017, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya. Then, on September 19, 2017, because all parties did not consent to jurisdiction under Judge Tafoya, the case was reassigned to Judge R. Brooke Jackson. On September 11, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding four plaintiffs and one defendant, the Interim Chief Medical Officer of the CDOC, without altering the claims or requests for relief. On October 2, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently allege both the objective and subjective components of an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment. In congruence with this motion, the defendants filed a motion to stay discovery pending its resolution, but Judge Jackson denied the motion to stay discovery on October 27, 2017. On February 7, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to certify a class defined as \"[a]ll current and future prisoners in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections who have been or who will be diagnosed with chronic Hepatitis C virus, who have at least 24 weeks or more remaining on their sentences and a life expectancy of more than one year, with the exception of prisoners who are already receiving or who have already completed treatment with Direct Acting Antiviral medications.\" The parties submitted a joint notice of private settlement agreement on August 18, 2018. The contents of the settlement are not available through PACER, but Prison Legal News reports that under the terms of the settlement prison officials agreed to: 1) spend all available funding for 2018-19 in the amount of $20.5 million to treat prisoners with HCV; 2) reduce the threshold liver damage score to allow more prisoners to receive treatment; 3) provide another $20.5 million in treatment for 2019-20; 4) eliminate the drug and alcohol program precondition; and 5) remove the disciplinary action restriction. The CDOC also agreed to pay attorneys\u2019 fees and costs totaling $175,000. In response to the notice of settlement, the court dismissed as moot the pending motion for class certification and motion to dismiss. The parties jointly moved to administratively close the case on April 22, 2019. The motion was granted the following day. This case is now closed.", "summary": "This 2017 class action lawsuit was brought by four prisoners under the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs claimed that the CDOC and other defendants had violated the Eighth Amendment\u2019s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment by refusing to give the plaintiffs medically necessary treatment for Hepatitis C. The parties settled. Under the settlement, the CDOC agreed to spend more on Hepatitis C treatment and relax treatment eligibility guidelines."} {"article": "The Denver and New Mexico Offices of the EEOC filed this action in the District Court for the District of South Dakota. The Defendant was Siouxland Oral Maxillofacial Surgery Associates, LLP, an outpatient surgical center for oral and maxillofacial surgery. The controversy involved the alleged termination of one complaint because of her pregnancy, and the alleged failure to hire the other complainant due to her sex. The lawsuit was filed in December 2004 and was tried to a jury in April 2007. The jury awarded a total of $21,098 to the two complainants, both of whom had intervened in the case. The defendant initially filed a motion to sever, and later a motion for separate trials, both of which were denied. They also had a motion for summary judgment denied in part, although the court did dismiss the EEOC's pattern-or-practice claim. After the jury verdict in their favor, the EEOC filed for injunctive relief, which was denied. Both parties appealed, but consented to withdrawing the appeal to allow the district court to determine the amount of prejudgment interest due on the award of backpay. The defendant appealed the district court's award of interest, which is still pending as of 4/22/2008.", "summary": "The Denver and New Mexico Offices of the EEOC filed this pregnancy and sex discrimination action in the District Court for the District of South Dakota against Siouxland Oral Maxillofacial Surgery Associates, LLP, on behalf of two women, who intervened in the case. The jury awarded a total of $21,098 to the two complainants, both of whom had intervened in the case. The EEOC's motion for injunctive relief was denied. An appeal of prejudgement interest was pending as of this writing."} {"article": "Pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (\"CRIPA\"), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (\"DOJ\") conducted an investigation of conditions at the Ft. Bayard Medical Center (\"Ft. Bayard\"), a public nursing home facility in southwest New Mexico, operated by the state in an old military facility. The investigation resulted in a May 1, 2006, findings letter being sent by DOJ to the governor. The letter stated that in July and October 2005, the DOJ conducted an investigation of the facility pursuant to CRIPA authority. The investigation relied upon site visits by DOJ personnel and consulting experts, reviews of medical records and facility documents setting out procedures, policies, and practices, and interviews of Ft. Bayard administrators, professionals, staff, and residents. The letter noted that earlier, when concluding the first of the on-site visits, the DOJ expressed to state personnel \"deep concerns\" concerns about the life-threatening conditions at the facility. These prompted the Chief of the DOJ Civil Rights Division's Special Litigation Section to send a July 25, 2005 letter to counsel for the State of New Mexico. That letter memorialized the concerns and documented the nursing home's inadequate medical care and dangerous psychotropic medication usage, requesting that the State take immediate remedial action to address the most serious deficiencies. By the time of the second on-site visit, according to the May 2006, findings letter, the State had taken several steps to begin to remedy the deficiencies that had been identified. Significant deficiencies remained, however, such that the findings letter advised the state that residents of Ft. Bayard suffered significant harm and risk of harm from (1) the facility's inadequate medical and nursing care services; (2) improper and dangerous psychotropic medication practices; (3) failure to provide adequate safety; (4) inadequate nutritional and hydration services; and (5) inadequate restorative care and specialized rehabilitation services. Additionally, the investigation found that the state failed to provide services to certain Ft. Bayard residents in the most integrated setting, as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (\"ADA\"), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12132 et seq. In every medical record reviewed, the DOJ consultants found substantial departures from the generally accepted standards in nursing home care. In nearly every record reviewed where psychotropic medication was prescribed, there were often multiple failings, including: the absence of a diagnosis justifying the use of the medication; the absence of behavioral indications warranting the administration of the medication; the absence of any evidence that non-medication interventions were tried and/or considered and found ineffective; the absence of monitoring of the medication's efficacy; the absence of side-effect monitoring; the absence of appropriate response to medication side-effects; and the absence of informed consent for the use of the medication. Relatedly, DOJ found that medications were also prescribed in excessive dosages. The letter set out specific examples of deaths, pain, and suffering resulting from the many deficient practices at Ft. Bayard. Additionally, the investigation noted a possibility that Ft. Bayard staff may have allowed residents to suffer needless pain while staff members took (or sold) pain medication intended for residents. Residents were often at risk from falls, yet few had sufficient fall prevention planning provided for them. Others would repeatedly become combative with other residents or staff without adequate interventions from staff to ameliorate the harm or risk of harm. The environment itself at Ft. Bayard was unsuited for usage as a nursing home, according to the findings letter. The DOJ also found that Ft. Bayard's nutritional and hydration services substantially departed from generally accepted professional standards of care and that the nursing home offered grossly substandard activity programs for its residents. While most residents were appropriately placed in a nursing home and their reintegration in the community would be inappropriate, those able to and who could benefit from community residence were deprived of that option by Ft. Bayard's inadequacies in assessing and planning for such transitions, as well as by the state's few non-nursing home resources for such persons. The DOJ findings letter proposed what it termed as \"minimal\" remedial actions to remedy the deficiencies, invited the state to address the issues, and alerted the state to the possibility of a CRIPA lawsuit brought by the United States to compel remedial action. The DOJ's letter described a cooperative approach with the state during the course of the investigation. This atmosphere evidently continued during ensuing negotiations, because the state and the DOJ soon entered into a settlement agreement obligating the state to improve a wide range of policies and practices at Ft. Bayard. The settlement contained substantive provisions addressing (1) timely assessments and care planning, (2) safe and appropriate psychotropic medication usage, (3) improved and appropriate pain management practices, and disciplinary reporting of employee diversion of residents' medications, (4) adequate protection of residents from harm from neglect, abuse, and assaults, (5) fall prevention, (6) appropriate nutrition and hydration services, and aspiration prevention, (7) activities program improvements, (8) improvements in environmental aspects of the facility, particularly increasing privacy, (9) treatment in the most integrated setting appropriate to individualized needs, and (10) compliance with applicable federal laws and implementing regulations, including Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1395i-3 et seq.; Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1396r et seq.; Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12132 et seq.; and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794. The settlement allowed for DOJ and its consultants to retain access to Ft Bayard, its residents, and documents and records, for monitoring and technical assistance purposes. The state had to implement the changes called for in the settlement document which, by its terms, expired in two years. Attorneys for the state and DOJ signed and filed the agreement on or about May 14-16, 2007, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico and, at the same time, the United States filed its complaint against the state and the state official responsible for the operation of Ft. Bayard. The CRIPA-based complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, citing the deficiencies at the facility and alleging that the defendants' conduct violated residents' federal constitutional, statutory, and regulatory rights, including those due process protections provided by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the statutory protections provided by Social Security Act, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act (and implementing regulations). On Jan. 28, 2008, the parties jointly moved to partially dismiss the settlement agreement. In the motion, the DOJ stated that after a number of visits, it was satisfied that the facility was in compliance with the Environment and Most Integrated Setting sections of the settlement agreement. The other aspects of the settlement agreement were not affected by the motion. The Court (Judge William P. Johnson) granted the motion on Feb. 5. On Oct. 8, 2008, Judge Johnson granted a joint motion to extend the effective date of the settlement agreement until Nov. 2011. The Court also required that the defendants submit to the DOJ plans of correction setting forth the tasks and timetables for the state to come into compliance with all the settlement agreement provisions. On Oct. 11, 2009, Judge Johnson accepted the parties joint corrective action plan outlining timetables for implementing the settlement agreement. On Oct. 17, 2011, Judge Johnson granted the parties' joint motion to dismiss the complaint. The parties agreed that the facility was in substantial compliance with the settlement agreement.", "summary": "In May 2007, after a years-long investigation, the DOJ filed suit against a New Mexico-run nursing home facility for violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The parties soon entered into a settlement agreement, which set timetables for the state to substantially change their treatment programs. By Oct. 2011, the parties both agreed that the state had substantially satisfied the agreement, and the Court granted their joint motion to dismiss the complaint."} {"article": "On April 16, 2004, a former Macy\u2019s employee filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff sued the City of New York, the New York City Police Department, Federated Logistics, Federated Department Stores, Inc., Macy\u2019s East, the Frick Company, managerial staff and other employees at Macy\u2019s East, and individual police officers under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, New York State Human Rights Law, Executive Law \u00a7290, and the New York City Human Rights Law \u00a7 8-107. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, alleged that his employers discriminated against him because of his race. He further alleged that his employers accused him of stealing from the store, denied him legal or union representation, and subsequently took him to the police station after he refused to sign a document stating that he had stolen. The plaintiff sought punitive damages and legal fees. The plaintiff had two allegations against his employers: (1) discrimination because the plaintiff and fellow employees of color were passed over for promotions despite the plaintiff\u2019s lengthy employment at Macy\u2019s and his positive performance reviews; and (2) hostile work environment as evidenced through racist comments and a \u201cShortage Awareness\u201d program that rewarded employees for accusing fellow employees of theft. The plaintiff also claimed that on March 6, 2002, he was arrested for allegedly stealing from Macy\u2019s. The plaintiff claimed that the prosecution continued despite his employer\u2019s inability to produce proof of theft. The plaintiff therefore included the City of New York, the New York City Police Department, and individual police officers for his alleged unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution. On September 2, 2004 the defendants filed a motion to sever the plaintiff\u2019s discrimination allegations from his arrest and prosecution allegations. The defendants argued that the allegations pointed to different occurrences. On September 26, 2005 U.S. Magistrate Judge Pitman denied the defendants\u2019 motion. 2005 WL 2105550. On April 1, 2005, the defendants filed three separate motions for summary judgement. The NYPD and the City of New York filed a motion for summary judgement on the grounds that: (1) \u201cthe NYPD is not a suable entity; and (2) the plaintiff failed to meet his burden to establish liability against the City of New York.\u201d Macy\u2019s filed a motion for summary judgement and claimed the plaintiff could not prove that he was passed over for promotion because of discrimination and that Macy\u2019s could be held liable for the conduct of its employees in this case. Finally, an individual defendant manager at Macy\u2019s East filed a motion for summary judgement on the claim that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence that the manager was involved in the plaintiff\u2019s arrest or was liable for the plaintiff\u2019s treatment at work. On March 15, 2006, Judge Jones granted all three motions for summary judgement citing the reasons laid out in the motions for summary judgement and for the plaintiff\u2019s failure to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On April 13, 2006, the plaintiff filed an appeal. On January 12, 2007, this appeal was dismissed with prejudice. No further explanation for the appeal or dismissal is accessible, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2004 a Macy's employee filed this suit against a number of defendants including The City of New York, the New York Police Department, and Macy's East. The plaintiff alleged employment discrimination, intentional arrest, and malicious prosecution. The defendants filed three separate motions for summary judgement, all of which were granted."} {"article": "On March 13, 2013, a for-profit company filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff, represented by the American Center for Law and Justice, asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that providing insurance coverage of contraception would violate the religious beliefs of the company's owners. On April 1, 2013, United States District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig granted the plaintiff's unopposed motion for preliminary injunction and stay of the case. The court ordered the defendant not to enforce the ACA insurance mandate regarding contraception against the plaintiffs until 30 days after the appeal of either of the cases (1) O'Brien v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, 894 F.Supp.2d 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012) or (2) Annex Medical, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12\u20132804 2013 WL 101927 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2013), was decided by the Eighth Circuit, whichever occurred first. Both of these cases involved similar legal issues and the same defendant. Before a decision was reached in either case, on June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), a substantially similar case. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. In light of this decision, on November 10, 2014, the parties submitted a Joint Motion for Entry of Injunction and Judgment, in which they jointly agreed that that judgment should be entered in favor of the plaintiffs on their Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim, that a permanent injunction should be entered, that all other claims against the defendants should be dismissed, and that the deadline for any petition by plaintiffs for attorneys' fees should be extended to 60 days after the entry of judgment. On November 18, 2014, Judge Fliessig signed the consent injunction and judgment, and the case was dismissed. The plaintiffs never moved for attorneys' fees.", "summary": "A for-profit company sought an exception to the Affordable Care Act's mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception because it violated the owner's religious beliefs. The case was stayed pending other cases involving the same legal issues and the same defendant. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the parties submitted a consent judgment permanently enjoining the defendants from enforcing the mandate, which was signed on November 18, 2014."} {"article": "On May 21, 2012, the Catholic Diocese of Fort Worth filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2)), and the First Amendment. The Catholic Diocese represented several other religiously affiliated schools and organizations. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violated their sincerely held religious beliefs. On January 31, 2013, U.S. District Court (Judge Terry R. Means) denied the U.S. motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness. On August 22, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint addressing the government's newly released accommodations for non-profit, religious organizations. On October 9, one of the plaintiffs\u2014The University of Dallas\u2014filed a motion for preliminary injunction. On December 31, 2013, Judge Means granted the plaintiff's motion, adopting the analysis set out by Judge Rosenthal in her opinion in E. Texas Baptist Univ. v. Sebelius just three days prior. Both Judges agreed that the accommodation imposition on the plaintiffs to self-certify their religious objections to this requirement of the ACA met the substantial burden test. On February 24, 2014, the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit. (Case No. 14-10241) The remaining plaintiffs\u2014Catholic Charities, Diocese of Fort Worth, Inc., Our Lady of Victory Catholic School, and Roman Catholic Diocese of Fort Worth\u2014filed a motion for preliminary injunction on April 18, 2014. Judge Means granted the preliminary injunction on June 5, 2014, enjoining the defendant from enforcing the ACA provision at issue in this case until further order from the court. The defendant filed an interlocutory appeal to the 5th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals on June 9, 2014. The plaintiffs Roman Catholic Diocese of Fort Worth and Our Lady of Victory Catholic School filed a motion for voluntary dismissal, and on September 30, 2014 Judge Means entered a final judgment dismissing the case without prejudice as to the two plaintiffs. Given the lead plaintiff\u2019s dismissal from the case, the name of the plaintiff in the case was changed to \u201cCatholic Charities, Diocese of Fort Worth, Inc.\u201d at this time. In addition to this case, there was also a case filed in the Eastern District of Texas and one filed in the Northern District of Texas, all alleging the same ACA violation. The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals of the claims in all three district courts into one appeal, under the case name, East Texas Baptist University v. Burwell. Judge Jerry E. Smith delivered the opinion on June 22, 2015. The Circuit Court\u2019s decision reversed all of the District Courts\u2019 decisions, including Judge Means' grant of the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction, because the \u201cplaintiffs have not shown and are not likely to show that the requirement substantially burdens their religious exercise under established law.\u201d 793 F.3d 449. The plaintiffs of this consolidated case filed a petition to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on May 17, 2016. The Supreme Court vacated the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals decision on the same day in the case University of Dallas v. Burwell. The Court remanded this consolidated case back to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in light of its recent remand in Zubik v. Burwell, which reached no decision on the merits of a similar case. 136 S.Ct. 2008. On October 6, 2017, President Trump changed federal government's policy on the matter, removing the requirement that employers provide contraception coverage through health insurance plans. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss the case. A final judgment was entered in accordance with the plaintiffs\u2019 joint stipulation of dismissal on January 11, 2018. The case was dismissed with prejudice and is now closed.", "summary": "On May 21, 2012, the Catholic Diocese of Fort Worth filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2)), and the First Amendment. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, seek to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contend that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs."} {"article": "On August 28, 1997, three African-American farmers, on behalf of a putative class of 641 African-American farmers, filed a lawsuit against the United States Department of Agriculture (\"USDA\") under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (\"ECOA\"), 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1691, and the Administrative Procedure Act (\"APA\"), 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 551. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and monetary relief, alleging that both the USDA and county officials to whom the USDA delegated authority discriminated against them in the provision of farm loans and other credit programs. The plaintiffs challenged a history of discrimination in the USDA's farm lending programs and benefits programs, a history that led to a dramatic decline in the number of African-American farmers in America. The USDA administers billions of dollars in farm loans and guarantees each year. It has delegated authority to approve or deny loan and benefit applications to county committees elected by local farmers and ranchers. Under one percent of the commissioners nationwide were African American. The plaintiffs alleged that the county commissions either denied them loans because of their race or made it much more difficult for them to obtain credit than similarly situated white farmers. This problem was compounded by the fact that the USDA disbanded its Office of Civil Rights in 1983, and therefore stopped responding to African-American farmers' claims of discrimination. A USDA-sponsored investigation conducted in 1997 revealed that the USDA had a large backlog of uninvestigated complaints. Because of the USDA's policies and practices, many African Americans lost their farms to foreclosure and had to leave farming. Others were able to continue farming, but suffered the consequences of institutional discrimination. The plaintiffs brought their fair lending claims under the ECOA and alleged that the discriminatory provision of non-lending benefits, such as disaster relief benefits, violated the APA. Ultimately, the District Court (Judge Paul L. Friedman) approved a consent decree on April 14, 1999. Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1998). The Consent Decree covered a class of all African-American farmers who farmed or attempted to farm between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996, applied for a farm loan or USDA benefit program, believe they were discriminated against on the basis of their race, and filed a complaint on or before July 1, 1997. Class members could either opt out of the Consent Decree or resolve individual claims pursue one of two settlement tracks. The settlement tracks allowed for out-of-court adjudication of individuals' claims. Class members could have elected to submit \"substantial evidence\" that they were victims of discrimination and receive a capped settlement amount under Track A of the Consent Decree. Class members with better-documented claims of discrimination could have elected to pursue Track B, which entitled them to a one-day trial in front of an arbitrator. Track B was only available to farmers with ECOA claims; it was not available to farmers who only brought claims under the APA relating to discrimination in the distribution of non-credit benefits. A court-appointed monitor (Randi Roth) oversaw the implementation of the Consent Decree. Track A of the Consent Decree was designed for the large majority of the class. As the District Court recognized, many of the class members lacked the type of documentation of the USDA's discrimination necessary to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard. This was in part due to the USDA's failure in processing discrimination complaints from farmers. Track A participants could prove that they submitted a complaint to the USDA by providing documents demonstrating that they complained directly to the USDA, to a member of Congress, to the White House, or to a government official who forwarded to complaint to the USDA. Class members who did not have such documentation could submit an affidavit from a non-family member which, based on personal knowledge, described the way in which the class member lodged a complaint. To receive relief under Track A, class members claiming ECOA violations needed to prove that they owned or leased land or attempted to own or lease land, that they applied for USDA credit at a county office between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996, that the USDA discriminated against them by denying the loan or providing it on less favorable terms than similarly situated white farmers, and that they were harmed by the discriminatory treatment. Class members claiming discriminatory denial of benefits in violation of the APA needed to prove that they applied for a benefit program between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996 and that the request was denied or provided on less favorable terms than similarly situated white farmers received. Track A claims were to be resolved within 110 days of the filing date. The claimant submitted the application to a facilitator, to whom the USDA could also submit information on damages and liability. The facilitator then submitted a recommendation to an arbitrator who was to issue a decision. The arbitrator's decision was final, unless a Court-appointed monitor determined a clear and manifest error occurred. Claimants that submitted successful claims received a $50,000 cash payment, forgiveness of all debt owed to the USDA stemming from a program upon which their claim was based, a tax payment equivalent to a quarter of the total debt forgives and cash payment, immediate termination of any USDA-initiated foreclosure proceedings, and one-time consideration for a priority loan. Under Track B, claimants with more documentation could choose to litigate their claims in mini-trials. Claimants who unsuccessfully pursued a remedy under Track B were ineligible to receive Track A benefits. Class members seeking damages under Track B could have chosen to be represented by class counsel or counsel of their choice. Claimants opting in to Track B were able to conduct limited discovery, including depositions, for 180 days before a one-day mini-trial. Following the trial, in which class members had to demonstrate that they were the victim of lending discrimination and suffered damages from the discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, an arbitrator issued a decision within sixty days. Successful claimants under Track B were entitled to actual damages as well as priority consideration for loans. As with Track A, the decision of the arbitrator was final unless the Court appointed monitor found that \"a clear and manifest error\" had occurred and that the error was \"likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.\" The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (Judges Judith W. Rogers, David B. Sentelle, and David S. Tatel) affirmed the District Court's approval of the Consent Decree. Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000). A number of factors led to the parties entering the Consent Decree. Shortly after the complaint was filed in 1997, a number of farmers sought to intervene in the case. Class counsel added those farmers as named plaintiffs, and allowed their attorneys to join as class counsel on the condition that they would only seek attorneys' fees through statutory fee-shifting provisions and would not bill the individual farmers or take a contingency fee. On October 9, 1998, the District Court (Judge Paul L. Friedman) certified a class of plaintiffs. Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341 (D.D.C. 1998). On October 21, 1998, President Clinton signed into law a bill waiving ECOA's statute of limitations for farmers that filed a discrimination complaint with the USDA between January 1, 1981 and July 1, 1997. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999P.L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, \u00a7741. This bill mooted the USDA's statute of limitations defense. The plaintiffs filed a Seventh Amended Complaint on October 26, 1998. In January 1999, the parties filed a joint motion to consolidate the Pigford case with Brewington v. Glickman, Case No. 98-1693. The allegations in the Brewington complaint tracked those in the original Pigford complaint, but were made on behalf of farmers who filed discrimination complaints with the USDA after February 21, 1997 and before July 7, 1998. The parties also jointly moved to expand the class definition to reflect the addition of the Brewington class members, and filed a motion for preliminary approval of a proposed Consent Decree along with a notice to class members. The court approved each request, and scheduled a fairness hearing for March 2, 1999. After hearing objections, the Court approved the final Consent Decree on April 14, 1999. Following the entry of the consent decree, various class members continued to litigate issues specific to the Consent Decree and attorneys fees. Parties were still filing papers with the court through 2014. As of April 1, 2012, 15,645 out of 22,552 Track A claimants prevailed in their claims. Approximately 169 claimants elected to pursue Track B, of which 104 prevailed or reached a class settlement. The federal government paid a total of $1.05 billion to prevailing Track A and Track B claimants. A large number of farmers filed claims after the Consent Decree's deadline. The Consent Decree required claimants to submit claims by October 12, 1999. The court (Judge Paul L. Friedman) provided the arbitrator with the discretion to extend the filing deadline until September 15, 2000 for farmers who missed the deadline because of extraordinary circumstances. Farmers who could not participate in the Consent Decree are the subject of subsequent litigation, In re Black Farmer's Litigation, found in this database at FH-DC-0007. The case now appears to be closed, though the court retained jurisdiction over the consent decree's implementation.", "summary": "In 1997, four African-American farmers represented by private counsel sued the United States Department of Agriculture (\"USDA\"), alleging that the USDA discriminated against them and a class of other farmers in the provision of farm loans and other benefits. They brought their claim under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1691, and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 551. In April of 1999, the parties entered into a Consent Decree that allowed the farmers to pursue their claims out of court utilizing one of two tracks. Track A provided successful claimants with $50,000 and other benefits provided the claimants produced evidence of discrimination. Track B allowed claimants to recover full damages if they prevailed in a one-day mini-trial. As of April 2012, the United States made over $1 billion in payments to over 15,000 claimants."} {"article": "On February 25, 2005, the Jesus Christ Christian Ministry, along with fifteen California prisoners, brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the California Department of Corrections, under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Pacific Justice Institute, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging that the Department's refusal to deliver mail that contained religious material from the Ministry violated the RLUIPA and the prisoners' First Amendment rights to free speech and free exercise of religion. The Ministry sent the indigent prisoners books of worship and CDs with music to allow the prisoners to practice their chosen religion, Christianity. However, California prison policy only allowed religious materials to be acquired through a list of four organizations. The Ministry was not one of these four organizations. As such, any Ministry materials that were mailed to prisoners were returned to sender, and any Ministry materials found within the prison were considered contraband. The prisoners filed grievances with the Department, but those grievances were either rejected or ignored. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. On September 28, 2006, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Dale Drozd) granted in part and denied in part the prisoners' motion for summary judgment, while also granting the Department's motion as to one prisoner (456 F.Supp.2d 1188). In the decision, Judge Drozd held that the policy violated the prisoners' First Amendment right to free exercise and free speech, as well as their rights under the RLUIPA. The Court determined that the distinction between approved and unapproved vendors was arbitrary, and thus could not serve any legitimate penological interest. Following the grant of summary judgment, the two sides reached a settlement. According to a Prison Legal News article, \"the parties stipulated to a Temporary Operational Procedure for SATF, to be a pilot project at (only) SATF for the purpose of developing a workable final CDCR-wide policy.\" Under the pilot program, \"once per month, JCPM shall ship all such requests in bulk to SATF,\" at which time \"the designated chaplain shall be responsible for randomly reviewing tapes/CDs to verify valid religious content.\" The District Court maintained jurisdiction for six months after implementation of the pilot program, and $16,400 in attorneys' fees and costs were also awarded. Following the settlement, the case was voluntarily dismissed.", "summary": "The Jesus Christ Christian Ministry, along with fifteen California prisoners, brought suit against the California Department of Corrections, alleging that the Department's refusal to deliver mail that contained religious material from the Ministry violated the RLUIPA and the prisoners' First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs were granted summary judgment on most substantive points, at which point to parties agreed to a settlement which called for the establishment of a pilot program to allow the Ministry to send mail to prisoners."} {"article": "On April 13, 2010, several employees of the State of California with same-sex domestic partners or spouses recognized under California law filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, Oakland Division, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201, and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 702, against the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Board of Administrators of the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS). The plaintiffs, represented by private and public interest counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and a provision of the federal tax code violate the Constitution's guarantees of equal protection and substantive due process by barring the same-sex legal spouses and registered domestic partners of California public employees from enrollment in the CalPERS long-term care plan, even though opposite-sex legal spouses are permitted to enroll. The plaintiffs' initial complaint included only claims by same-sex married couples and none by same-sex domestic partners. On January 18, 2011, the Court (Judge Claudia A. Wilken) denied a defense motion to dismiss these claims, finding that the plaintiffs had \"sufficiently stated a claim that the laws at issue...do not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.\" Dragovich v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Shortly after this, on February 25, 2011, the Department of Justice, representing the federal defendants, notified the court that it had come to the conclusion that \u00a7 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional and that it would thus cease to defend that provision. In response, the House Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group intervened to provide a defense. On September 17, 2011, plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint including claims by same-sex domestic partners. The Department of Justice, while no longer opposing the claims of the same-sex married couples, moved to dismiss these new claims. On January 26, 2012, however, the Court (Judge Wilken) denied this motion, finding plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim for domestic partners as well. Dragovich v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, No. C 10-01564 CW, 2012 WL 253325 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2012). Meanwhile, on January 19, 2012, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, and the Department of Justice submitted a brief supporting the motion as it pertained to same-sex married couples. It made a cross-motion for summary judgment as to the domestic partnership claims, and defendant-intervenors cross-moved for summary judgment as to all claims. On May 24, 2012, the District Court (Judge Wilken) granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the cross-motions of defendants and defendant-intervenors. It held that Section 3 of DOMA violates the equal protection rights of same-sex spouses and that Section 7702B9(f)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code violates the equal protection rights of registered domestic partners, and issued an injunction prohibiting CalPERS from denying enrollment to same-sex spouses or registered domestic partners based on those provisions. It also enjoined the Treasury from disqualifying CalPERS's plan from beneficial tax treatment for following its order. The order was stayed pending appeal. On October 28, 2013, the 9th Circuit granted appellants motion to vacate in part and remanded the case for further processing consistent with United States v. Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry. On November 26, 2013, Judge Wilken ordered briefing regarding subsequent legal developments, including the Windsor and Perry cases, and their implication on this case. On August 28, 2014, plaintiffs moved for additional remedies in the case, for leave to file a supplemental complaint, and for summary judgment. The defendants replied in opposition and filed cross motions for summary judgment. The court heard the proceedings on November 20, 2014. The court issued its order on December 4, 2014, maintaining the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as to same-sex spouse class members and granting the defendants' request for summary judgment as to same-sex registered domestic partner class members. The court found that there was insufficient evidence of ongoing discrimination against the latter group in light of the
No person shall be permitted to attend the regular high school program after attaining the age of nineteen (19). Those who attain the age of nineteen during a school year may complete that school year. Persons who are seventeen years old or older and who, by earning eight credits per academic year, cannot meet graduation requirements, including grade point average, prior to the end of the year during which they attain the age of nineteen, shall not be permitted to attend the regular high school program beyond the end of the academic year in which they attain the age of seventeen. Such persons shall be afforded any opportunity to pursue a high school diploma through the Adult High School or General Educational Development (GED) programs of the District.In May 2016, the School Board shifted enrollment of high school to a centralized location, the Student Relations Department. Whenever a student who is seventeen or older seeks to enroll, an enrollment specialist gathers the academic records and other pertinent records and gives these to the Executive Director for Secondary Programs, Curriculum, and Instruction. The Executive Director then makes the final recommendation as to enrollment. The Executive Director considers certain factors, including the student's English proficiency, as well as whether the student has an interruption or gap in prior education. The plaintiffs alleged that the noncitizen children were systematically excluded from enrolling in the local public high school because they did not speak English fluently. Instead, plaintiffs claimed that the County was funneling these students into the local technical college, which does not provide instruction in basic subject areas or provide credit towards a high school diploma. Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 alleging violations of the Equal Education Opportunities Act (\"EEOA\"), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (\"Title VI\"), along with violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The complaint also alleged the defendants were violating the Florida Educational Equity Act (\"FEEA\"). The plaintiffs were represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center. After the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs amended the complaint. The defendants again filed a motion to dismiss on September 9, 2016. The Department of Justified filed a statement of interest and recommended that the court deny the motion. On March 17, 2017, Judge Sheri Polster Chappell granted in part and denied in part the motion. 2017 WL 1050374. Judge Chappell dismissed the Title VI claim against the Superintendent, agreeing with the defendants that the Superintendent could not be sued under Title VI because she was not a recipient of federal funds. The Court also dismissed the \u00a7 1983 claims for violations of Equal Protection and Due Process against the Superintendent, finding them duplicative of the claims against the School Board. The Court denied the motion to dismiss all the other claims and permitted the Title VI and \u00a7 1983 claims against the School Board to proceed. On June 21, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction requiring the School Board to enroll in school all English Language Learners identified in regular high school. After the motion was argued before a magistrate, the court denied the motion on March 14, 2018, finding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the irreparable injury needed because they had not established how they or others similarly situated will face actual and imminent injury unless the preliminary injunction issued. The court first noted that Adult ESOL proves a pathway for student plaintiffs to attain their future goals of pursuing higher education at a college, university, or technical school, or to enter the labor market. The court also reasoned that this was different from cases where other plaintiffs had suffered injury because of denial or effective denial of any public educational opportunity at all. The court looked to whether the challenged practice \"significantly interferes\" with the exercise of a right to education and found that it did not. The plaintiffs were still receiving English-language instruction at the other schools and still had the ability to obtain a GED, which would empower them to pursue their future goals. Finally, the court noted that the plaintiffs' excessive delay in moving for mandatory preliminary injunctive relief mitigated against finding irreparable harm. Around the same time, on January 12, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, which the court granted in part and denied in part on October 17, 2018. The court only granted class certification for the due process claim because it found the remaining claims failed to satisfy the commonality requirement of FRCP Rule 23 The due process claim relied on the alleged total absence of any procedure to contest the denial of enrollment in public high school, and the question of whether defendants had any such procedure is one that applied equally to all putative class members. By contrast, the EEOA claim required to show that the defendant had failed to take \"appropriate action\" under the statute. In determining this, the court would need to examine each student's relative success or failure in overcoming language barriers to determine if the defendant's action of placing them in ELCAE or Adult ESOL qualified as appropriate action. As for the remaining claims, commonality failed because each of them required the court to examine why defendants denied a particular student enrollment in regular high school. Because each of the remaining claims had discrimination as one element of proof, and the record demonstrated that defendants actually did conduct individualized reviews of each student before deciding whether to permit enrollment, the court decided that these claims were not capable of classwide resolution. For the due process claims, the certified class was defined as:
All foreign-born, English Language Learner (ELL) children ages fifteen to twenty-one whose last completed schooling (not including adult education courses) was at a non-U.S. school, and who, after August 1, 2013, while residing in Collier County, sought or will seek to enroll in the Collier County public school system serving grades K-12, and were or will be denied enrollment by the Defendants.Since then, the parties continued litigating various discovery disputes, and the plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief based on the due process claim. On March 12, 2019, the parties held a mediation that resulted in an impasse, and the litigation continued. The parties participated in a court-ordered settlement conference on May 13, 2019. As a result, the parties reached an agreement and filed approval of their class-action settlement on July 23, 2019. After a fairness hearing on October 8, 2019, the court approved the settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice. The agreement established a notification and administrative appeals process for any student determined to be ineligible for enrollment in the regular high school program. As of May 26, 2020, there have been no additional entries in the docket to enforce the settlement.", "summary": "In May 2016, plaintiffs filed this class action suit against the School Board of Collier County, Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that the school systematically excluded English Language Learners (ELL) from enrolling in the local public school. Instead, the complaint alleged that ELL were funneled into a local technical college that does not provide high-school credit. In September 2016, the United States issued a Statement of Interest in support of the plaintiffs' claim. The court granted the motion for class certification for the due process claim, but denied class certification the plaintiffs' remaining claims. The parties settled the case in July 2019; as of May 26, 2020, there have been no additional entries in the docket to enforce the settlement."} {"article": "On October 10, 2014, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the County of San Diego. The plaintiff, represented by public interest and private counsel, sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages, claiming that the county's mail policies and practices in its jails violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, PLN claimed that the County's postcard-only mail policy and its book-size limitation unconstitutionally limit PLN's ability to communicate with prisoners. Further, PLN contended that the County violated the Due Process Clause by failing to provide them with adequate notice and an opportunity to appeal these censorship decisions, and that by prohibiting the delivery of PLN's publications but allowing the delivery of the publications of others who are similarly situated, the County deprived PLN of equal protection under the law. On October 17, 2014, PLN moved for preliminary injunction. On May 7, 2015, the Court (Judge M. James Lorenz) granted in part and denied in part PLN's motion for a preliminary injunction requesting that the Court enjoin the County from continuing to enforce both the postcard-only mail policy and the soft-cover book-size limitation, as well as a mandate that County comply with due process requirements. Finding that PLN had established a likelihood of success on the merits, the Court (Judge M. James Lorenz) ordered the County to suspend enforcement of the postcard-only policy for incoming mail no later than May 21, 2015, and to provide written notice and an administrative appeal process to senders and inmates when the County refuses to deliver publications and correspondence to inmates at the County's jails. The Court (Judge M. James Lorenz) denied PLN's motion to enjoin the book-size restriction, concluding that PLN failed to establish a likelihood of success on its claim that the restriction violated its First Amendment rights. On June 5, 2015, the County sought an interlocutory appeal in the 9th Circuit. On November 18, 2015, PLN and the County moved for a joint settlement. The county agreed to allow plaintiffs to receive both unsolicited and subscription non-postcard mail, as long as such material does not conflict with regular mail policy. The agreement also held that any time a piece of mail was not delivered, both the sender and the receiver would receive notice of the censorship, with information on how to appeal the decision to a person who is not the original censor. Both the interlocutory appeal and the original claims were dismissed with prejudice. On May 18, 2016, the Court granted the parties' joint motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), which governs voluntary dismissal. Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes retained jurisdiction over all disputes between the parties arising out of the settlement agreement, including the interpretation and enforcement of its terms. Both parties consented to the Magistrate Judge's jurisdiction. The case was dismissed on February 7, 2018, with the Magistrate Judge retaining jurisdiction over the settlement agreement. The case is ongoing for settlement purposes. As of April 10, 2020, there have been no further entries in the docket.", "summary": "In October 2014, Prison Legal News (PLN) brought this suit seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages against the County of San Diego, alleging that the County's mail policies and practices in its jails violate the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection clauses. In May 2015, the Court (Judge M. James Lorenz) granted a preliminary injunction, which enjoined the County's enforcement of its postcard-only policy, and mandated that the County comply with due process requirements. It declined to enjoin enforcement of the County's book size restrictions. In November 2015 PLN and the County moved for a joint settlement. The County agreed to allow most non-postcard mail to reach inmates, so long as such material does not conflict with regular mail policy."} {"article": "On April 17, 2007, the Michigan Paralyzed Veterans of America (MPVA) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a712131 et seq. (ADA), against the University of Michigan. The complaint alleged that the University was discriminating against disabled members of the Plaintiff group and others similarly situated by denying them equal access to seating at the University of Michigan Football Stadium. The United States of America joined the case as a Plaintiff Intervenor on November 27, 2007, bringing additional claims under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7794. The University of Michigan Football Stadium is the biggest football stadium in America--it has a seating capacity of over 107,000. At the time of the MPVA's initial complaint, there were fewer than 100 wheelchair accessible seats in the stadium, and these seats were consolidated in a single area. The MPVA alleged that the stadium had undergone multiple substantial renovations which the University knew or should have known would trigger compliance with the ADA, and that under the ADA guidelines the stadium must have at least 1% of its seating be accessible to wheelchair users. These seats must be distributed throughout the stadium, at various price ranges. The MPVA alleged that the wheelchair accessible section failed to provide adequate companion seating, as only one companion could accompany each wheelchair user, and these companions were forced to sit behind the wheelchair user, instead of next to him or her. It was also alleged that, among several other issues, the restrooms and the concessions were largely inaccessible and there was insufficient parking space for the disabled. The complaint alleged that the denial of basic accessibility resulted in the isolation of the disabled and the perpetuation of social stigmas, loneliness, and social deprivation, and that therefore the University seriously injured the MPVA and its members, and others similarly situated. The United States of America joined the case as an intervening plaintiff on November 27, 2007, represented by attorneys from the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division. In its complaint, the government raised many of the same arguments as the MPVA, and made additional claims arising under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7794. The United States and the MPVA sought to have the court enjoin the University from engaging in discriminatory policies and practices against the disabled, and order the University to bring the stadium into compliance with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. On March 10, 2008, the parties entered into a consent decree, in which the University denied having violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, but agreed to make substantial changes to its practices and policies, and to the stadium itself. The University agreed to add one section of additional 96 accessible seats and 96 companion seats by the start of the 2008 football season, and to add several more sections in locations around the stadium by the start of the 2010 season, as well as at least 379 additional accessible seats dispersed throughout the stadium, also by the start of the 2010 season. The parties committed to negotiate, at the end of 2010, regarding whether additional seats were necessary. The University also committed to ensuring its ticketing and pricing policies to afford wheelchair users the opportunity to fully participate in the stadium's services, programs, and activities. The University agreed to create a separate waiting list for purchasing season tickets solely for individuals needing wheelchair-accessible seating, and to assign these purchasers the same wheelchair and companion seats throughout the season. The University agreed to make substantial changes to increase the accessibility of the restrooms in the stadium. It agreed to add wheelchair parking spots to two parking lots, and to provide accessible transportation from these lots to the stadium and back. Beginning in March 2009, both the United States and the MPVA can initiate negotiations regarding additional parking or accessible transportation, if they have concerns about the adequacy of the parking or transportation arrangement. The University further agreed to provide training on all components of the Consent Decree to all its employees and contractors who have contact with patrons with disabilities. The Department of Justice has the option of attending these training sessions while the Decree is in effect. The University agreed to aggressively market and publicize, during the full period of the Decree, the availability, location, and prices of the newly expanded accessible seating, as well as other accessibility-enhancing changes to the stadium. The University agreed to report regularly to the MPVA and the Department of Justice on its progress in implementing the Consent Decree, and to submit to their monitoring of the same. The University also made several other commitments secondary to those discussed above in the Consent Decree. The Consent Decree expired in March 2013, five years after its start date.", "summary": "On April 17, 2007, the Michigan Paralyzed Veterans of America filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the University of Michigan. The United States, represented by attorneys from the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, joined the case as an intervening plaintiff on November 27, 2007. The plaintiffs brought the case under under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. They alleged that the University was discriminating against disabled members of the Plaintiff group and others similarly situated by denying them equal access to seating at the University of Michigan Football Stadium. The stadium had less than 100 wheelchair accessible seats out of a total capacity of 107,000. The University denied the allegations, but entered a Consent Agreement with the plaintiffs, committing to substantially improve the accessibility of the stadium and agreeing to report its progress to and allow monitoring by the plaintiffs for five years."} {"article": "This case is about discriminatory housing practices in New York City. In the fall of 2012, the Fair Housing Justice Center received a complaint alleging that the Esplanade Residences refused to rent to people who use wheelchairs. As a result, the FHJC launched an investigation into the matter by sending \"testers\" to observe the residences' polices while posing as potential renters. Based on the findings of the investigations, on May 29, 2013, the FHJC filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 3601. Represented by a private public interest firm and a non-profit legal organization, the plaintiffs alleged that the owners and managers of five independent senior living residences were discriminating on the basis of disability, religion, and race in violation of fair housing laws. Specifically, the complaint alleged three violations of the Fair Housing Act for discrimination of the bases of disability, religion, and race, as well as violations of state fair housing laws. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, in the form of policy change, and damages. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Ronald Ellis and Judge Analisa Torres. The defendants filed their answer on July 22, 2013. Following a pretrial conference on August 30, the parties agreed to a settlement conference before a magistrate judge prior to proceeding to trial. Initially, this conference was set for October 8, 2013, but was rescheduled twice. FHJC filed an amended complaint on October 2, 2013 and added a jury demand. On November 1, the plaintiff withdrew the amended complaint, making the complaint filed on May 29 the operative complaint. On November 8, FHJC filed a motion for leave to amend their complaint in order to add Chestnut Operating Company as a defendant in light of information uncovered in discovery. On November 21, the defendants consented to the amendment of the complaint and, on December 18, they filed an answer. The settlement conference was held on November 22, 2013 and did not settle at that time, according to a minute entry. The conference was adjourned to January 6, 2014. The parties engaged in several conferences that did not result in settlement throughout 2014, many of which were adjourned multiple times for reasons related to discovery. The case was reassigned to Judge Valerie E. Caproni. The final conference was held on November 12, 2014. The parties reached a settlement on December 11, 2014 and a stipulation for voluntary dismissal was filed on January 8, 2015. The settlement included policy changes to conform the defendants' policies to the requirements of the Fair Housing Act. The defendants would not discriminate against residents or prospective residents on the basis of disability, religion, or race by denying housing, falsely representing unavailability of housing, advertising in a way that indicated discrimination. Specifically, the defendants would end a practice of inquiring into a prospective renters religion or disability, they would provide reasonable accommodations and a means by which to request them, include more diverse models and the phrase \"Equal Opportunity Housing\" in their advertising, and train their employees on these new policies. The agreement also contained certain measures particular to each housing complex. In addition to the policy changes, the settlement agreement included a monetary settlement of $297,500 for damages, attorneys\u2019 fees, and costs. The obligations under the settlement agreement would continue for four years, through which the court would retain jurisdiction. The case was dismissed with prejudice on January 12, 2015 with the court retaining jurisdiction only to enforce compliance with the settlement. No docket entries have been filed since 2015, and the case is presumably closed.", "summary": "In the fall of 2012, the Fair Housing Justice Center received a complaint alleging that the Esplanade Residences refused to rent to people who use wheelchairs. As a result, the FHJC launched an investigation into the matter by sending \"testers\" to observe the residences' polices while posing as potential renters. Based on the investigation's results, on May 29, 2013, the FHJC filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 3601. It alleged violations of the FHA for discrimination of the bases of disability, religion, and race, as well as violations of state fair housing laws. The parties reached a settlement on December 11, 2014 and a stipulation for voluntary dismissal was filed on January 8, 2015. The settlement included policy changes to conform the defendants' policies to the requirements of the Fair Housing Act, as well as a monetary settlement of $297,500 for damages, attorneys\u2019 fees, and costs."} {"article": "On December 9, 2013, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against Step Three, Ltd, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Title VII. Step Three, Ltd. is a Hawaiian resort retailer. The EEOC brought the lawsuit on behalf of a former employee who was fired when she became pregnant. The EEOC sought injunctive relief and monetary damages for pregnancy discrimination. Two days after the complaint was filed, the parties settled; Judge Alan C. Kay signed off on their jointly proposed consent degree on December 13, 2013. The two-year consent decree requires the defendant settled to pay $60,000 to the victim and provide her with a neutral reference. The defendant also agreed to hire a consultant to ensure compliance with Title VII and the ADA; revise the company's anti-discrimination policies and procedures; provide annual training for staff; and hold supervisory staff accountable for engaging in or failing to address discrimination, harassment or retaliation on the job. The EEOC will monitor compliance with the agreement. There is nothing more in the docket sheet after the 2013 settlement; presumably the case was closed as of December 2015.", "summary": "On December 9, 2013, the EEOC filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Title VII against Step Three, Ltd. The EEOC brought the lawsuit on behalf of a former employee who was suffering from infertility and was fired when she later became pregnant. The parties reached a settlement agreement, which the district court signed as a consent order. The defendant was required to pay $60,000 to the victim and revise the company's anti-discrimination policies and procedures as well as training for staff."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: Immigration detainees held by ICE, each being over the age of 50 or having a serious underlying condition, petition the court for protection due to COVID-19. The court granted a temporary restraining order to the most vulnerable petitioners, as defined by the CDC, which grants selected petitioners protection through social distancing by single celling and PPE. The order was amended to require the defendants to post informational signage and to test vulnerable detainees bi-weekly for COVID-19.
1. \u201cYou are an arriving alien\u201d upon entering the United States. 2. \u201cYou are an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled.\u201d 3. \u201cYou have been admitted to the United States, but are removable for the reasons stated below.\u201dUnder the second and third designations, asylum seekers may be released on bond. While an immigrant designated as an \"arriving alien\" may be detained without a bond hearing; each of these designated persons may challenge his or her designation and seek to be re-categorized. The complaint alleged that under Trump\u2019s policy, every immigrant arriving with the caravan would be designated as an \"arriving alien,\" subject mandatory detention, and unable to challenge his or her designation. These immigrants would be detained and housed in tents and tent cities, with no promises by the President that such facilities would comply with laws intended to protect immigrant alien children. All immigrants would be detained indefinitely until they were sent back to Central America. The Plaintiffs argued that this \u201cno release\u201d policy was being used to deter asylum seekers, and that the use of detention as a deterrent to asylum seekers violated their Due Process rights. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs argued that denying immigrants any opportunity to challenge their inclusion in an immigrant category that prohibits them from seeking bond and release from detention violated their Due Process rights. Lastly, the Plaintiffs claimed that Trump and the federal agencies violated the Administrative Procedures Act by disregarding several laws and an agreement related to immigration, including the following:
1. 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1225, which requires that applicants applying for asylum must be referred for a \u201ccredible fear interview,\u201d and will likely be granted asylum if an asylum officer determines that the asylum seeker has a \u201ccredible fear of persecution\u201d 2. 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1182, which gives discretion to the Attorney General to provide bond and release asylum seekers temporarily, and ICE Directive No. 11002.1, which requires that \u201c[e]ach alien\u2019s eligibility for parole should be considered and analyzed on its own merits and based on the facts of the individual aliens case.\u201d 3. The Flores Settlement Agreement, which requires that minors must be held in facilities run by licensed programs that are \u201csafe and sanitary and are consistent with [Defendants\u2019] concern for the particular vulnerability of minors\u201d and must \u201cprovide access to toilets and sinks, drinking water \u2026 adequate temperature control and ventilation, adequate supervision to protect minors from others, and contact with family.\u201dOn January 16, 2019, the parties jointly requested that the Court stay proceedings because the appropriations act that had been funding the Department of Justice expired and the required appropriations lapsed. Absent an appropriation, the Department attorneys, including the Assistant United States Attorney assigned to this case, were prohibited from working on substantive matters. The lapse occurred because of a government shutdown that lasted from December 22, 2018-January 25, 2019. The Court granted the motion on January 17, 2019 and gave the Defendants an extension to file their answer. On February 7, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntarily dismissal without prejudice. The case is closed. Although the notice does not give a reason for Plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal, it was likely because on January 25, 2019, the Department of Homeland Security issued a memorandum indicating that it would begin a process of implementing Section 235(b)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In this process, all non-Mexican nationals who arrive on land seeking to enter the United States from Mexico illegally or without proper documentation would be returned to Mexico for the duration of their Section 240 removal proceedings and could only return to the United States as necessary and appropriate to attend their immigration court proceedings. (see the resource titled \"Policy Guidance for Implementation of the Migrant Protection Protocols\")", "summary": "In 2018, a group of citizens of Honduras traveling with a migrant caravan to the United States to seek asylum filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs claimed that President Trump's plan to house all immigrants arriving with the caravan in tents until they were returned to Central America violated their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights and disregarded several federal laws in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act. The court stayed the case during the government shutdown, and the Plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice shortly after the shutdown ended, likely in response to a memorandum issued by the Department of Homeland Security."} {"article": "On October 13, 2006, the Department of Justice filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against Centier Bank under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601-3619, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 1691. The DOJ alleged that Centier Bank had engaged in a practice called redlining by unlawfully failing to market and provide its lending products and services on an equal basis to majority-minority census tracts in northwestern Indiana. The DOJ specifically alleged that Centier Bank intentionally failed to serve heavily African-American and Hispanic communities in the cities of Gary, East-Chicago, and Hammond. The two parties entered a settlement agreement that was agreed to by the court on October 16, 2006. Under the settlement agreement, the Defendant-lender agreed to open branch offices during the three year term of the settlement agreement. Centier Bank will also invest $3.5 million in a special financing program and spend at least $875,000 for consumer financial education and outreach purposes. On January 5, 2010 both parties and the court (Judge Lozano) agreed to an order amending the original settlement by extending the deadline for Centier Bank to open its new branch in Hammond, Indiana. Similar cases brought forth by the Department of Justice against lenders under allegations of redlining include United States v. Old Kent Financial Corporation, United States v. First American Bank, and United States v. Citizens Republic Bancorp, Inc..", "summary": "The Department of Justice filed suit on October 13, 2006 against Centier Bank of Whiting, Ind., alleging that the Defendant-lender engaged in a practice called redlining. More specifically, the DOJ alleged that Centier Bank unlawfully failed to market and provide lending products and services to majority-minority census tracts in northwestern Indiana. The two parties entered a settlement agreement that was agreed to by the court on October 16, 2006. The agreement requires Centier Bank to invest more than $4.3 million and open new branches in minority neighborhoods in the northwestern portion of the state, to resolve allegations that it engaged in a pattern of discrimination on the basis of race and national origin."} {"article": "On December 3, 2015, U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (Magistrate Judge David T. Bristow) authorized a search and seizure warrant of an iPhone owned by one of the San Bernardino shooters who killed 14 people in California in 2015. However, despite the search warrant, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (\u201cFBI\u201d) was unable to access the iPhone. The encrypted iPhone was protected by a passcode that had security protocols that erased the phone\u2019s data after ten tries. On February 16, 2016, U.S. Attorney\u2019s Office in Los Angeles asked the district court to order Apple to assist the FBI in the investigation of the iPhone pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1651. That same day, Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym ordered Apple to assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation (\u201cFBI\u201d) with accessing the iPhone owned by one of the San Bernardino shooters. The order required Apple to remove the auto-erase function and the limit on the number of passwords one can enter on the iPhone. The order also indicated that Apple could be asked to write custom software to access the iPhone. See 2016 WL 618401 This case received enormous public attention as Apple formally opposed the district court\u2019s order. In order to manage litigation, the district court decided to split this issue to its own case and reassigned the case 5:15-MJ-00451 to a new docket number 5:16-CM-00010. On February 19, 2016, the government filed a motion to compel Apple to comply with the court\u2019s February 16 order to access the iPhone. On February 25, 2016, Apple filed a motion to vacate the order and opposition to government\u2019s motion to compel assistance. Apple countered that government\u2019s request for a code to access the iPhone would create a backdoor to all such devices that would be exploitable by other entities. Technology companies such as Facebook, Twitter, Yahoo, Google, Microsoft and others filed amicus briefs supporting Apple\u2019s position in March 2016. On March 21, 2016, the government asked the court to delay the scheduled hearing, claiming that an \u201coutside party\u201d might be able to unlock the iPhone without Apple\u2019s help. On March 28, 2016, the government notified the court that it had successfully accessed data stored on the iPhone and no longer required the assistance from Apple. The government officially withdrew its legal action against Apple. On March 29, 2016, Judge Pym vacated the February 16 order compelling Apple to assist agents in search. This case is closed. See this Order.", "summary": "On February 16, 2016, Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym ordered Apple to assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation (\u201cFBI\u201d) with accessing the iPhone owned by one of the San Bernardino shooters. The order required Apple to remove the auto-erase function and the limit on the number of passwords one can enter on the iPhone. The order also indicated that Apple could be asked to write custom software to access the iPhone. 2016 WL 618401. On February 25, 2016, Apple filed a motion to vacate the order and opposition to government\u2019s motion to compel assistance. On March 28, 2016, the government notified the court that it has successfully accessed data stored on the iPhone and no longer required the assistance from Apple. The government officially withdrew its legal action against Apple. The case is closed."} {"article": "On 04/06/2004, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the ACLU Foundation filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of a John Doe plaintiff against the United States and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Plaintiff was an internet access and consulting corporation that received a National Security Letter (NSL) from the FBI directing it to disclose names, addresses, and records of communications relating to one of its clients. Plaintiff also received a gag order forbidding it from disclosing to anyone that the FBI sought or obtained information. Plaintiff claimed that 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2709, which authorizes issuance of NSLs and attendant gag orders, violates the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. Plaintiff sought an injunction prohibiting the FBI from enforcing the requests in the NSL issued to plaintiff and enjoining the FBI from further use of \u00a7 2709. Many documents in the public docket are redacted pursuant to a May 2004 order. Doe v. Ashcroft, 317 F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). In July 2004, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and the United States moved to dismiss the complaint. In September of that year, the District Court (Judge Victor Marrero) granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding that \u00a7 2709 as applied violated the Fourth Amendment by effectively barring judicial challenge to the NSL request. Additionally, the nondisclosure requirement under \u00a7 2709(c) was a violation of the First Amendment as an unjustified prior restraint and content-based restriction on speech. The Court enjoined the United States and the FBI from issuing NSLs and enforcing gag orders under \u00a7 2709. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Further proceedings were stayed pending the appeal of the United States to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Meanwhile, Congress amended the nondisclosure prohibition under \u00a7 2709(c) to require nondisclosure only upon certification by senior FBI officials that certain enumerated harms may occur. 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 2709(c), as amended in 2008. Congress also provided for judicial review to permit NSL recipients to petition to modify or set aside the NSL. 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3511(a). In May 2006, the Second Circuit vacated the decision of the District Court and remanded the case in light of the amendments. Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F. 3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006). The United States subsequently informed the District Court that it no longer sought to enforce the NSL. The District Court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment in September 2007, finding that \u00a7 2709(c) and \u00a7 3511(b) were facially unconstitutional, notwithstanding the amendments. The District Court found that the nondisclosure requirement violated the First Amendment under a strict scrutiny standard of review. Because it found the various subsections inseverable, the District Court invalidated the entirety of \u00a7 2709(c) and \u00a7 3511(b). Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The United States again appealed to the Second Circuit. That court construed the newly amended statutes to permit nondisclosure only upon certification and to place the burden on government to demonstrate risk of an enumerated harm upon disclosure. Section 2709(c) and \u00a7 3511(b) are unconstitutional to the extent that a District Court must treat the certification as conclusive, and to the extent that they impose a nondisclosure requirement without requiring the government to initiate judicial review of the requirement. Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2009). Upon remand, in October 2009 the District Court ruled that the United States and the FBI were permitted to enforce the nondisclosure provisions \u00a7 2709(c) \u00a7 3511(b) as applied to the NSL issued to plaintiff. The plaintiff moved the District Court for partial reconsideration, and in March 2010, the Court amended its order enforcing nondisclosure. The Court directed the United States to lift the nondisclosure requirement as applied to two categories of information: material that the NSL statute identifies as permissible for the FBI to collect, and material that the FBI has publicly acknowledged it has previously requested by means of NSLs. The plaintiff appealed to the Second Circuit in May 2010, but later withdrew the appeal. On July 30, 2010, the District Court entered a stipulation and order of dismissal. The FBI stipulated that the John Doe listed on the complaint could disclose his identity and show a redacted version of the letter sent to him demanding information (document NS-NY-0004-0001 in this Clearinghouse). The FBI further stipulated that the ACLU could publish the information on their website (press release NS-NY-0004-0017 in this Clearinghouse). In return, the ACLU agreed to withdraw the appeal pending before the Second Circuit. On November 10, 2010, the ACLU motioned for attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. After several motions between the parties, the United States stipulated and agreed to pay $225,000 in attorney's fees and litigation costs to the plaintiff. The court retained jurisdiction over this case for four additional years with no activity on the docket. On April 15, 2014, the Court entered a modified stipulation and order of dismissal. The modified stipulation held that any remaining nondisclosure obligations set forth in 18 U.S.C \u00a7 2709 as pertaining to the plaintiff were lifted, except for the redacted information in the initial letter and attachment. This stipulation did not affect Doe's rights to pursue future claims under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3511(b). This case is now closed.", "summary": "In April 2004, an internet access and consulting corporation filed suit in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the United States and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) after the FBI directed it to disclose names, addresses, and records of communications relating to one of its clients pursuant to a National Security Letter (NSL). The complaint claimed that NSLs issued under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2709 violated the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The District Court ordered the United States to alter several portions of the NSL and in July 2010, dismissed the lawsuit."} {"article": "On July 17, 2017, the Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. HRDC sued both the former and current commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC), as well as many agents of the KDOC, all under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. HRDC, a charitable organization and publisher of Prison Legal News, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief as well as attorneys\u2019 fees. The plaintiffs claimed that KDOC's policy of banning books sent to prisoners violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. More specifically, HRDC alleged that KDOC prohibited prisoners from receiving books that were not directly purchased by prisoners and also prohibited them if the sender was not on a pre-approved vendors list. The complaint alleged that dozens of books sent to prisoners were censored, and that on several occasions, HRDC received notices indicating the books were rejected for a variety of reasons. On March 6 and July 17, 2018, HRDC filed a first and second amended complaint adding several defendants but making few substantive changes to the allegations or claims. After several months of discovery, the parties reached a settlement agreement and HRDC moved for the approval of this agreement on January 28, 2019. The defendants agreed to deliver all HRDC publications sent to people incarcerated in their facilities, so long as the publications were consistent with legitimate penological interests. The defendants also agreed not to reject books simply because they were not on a list of approved senders or for because they were mailed in colored envelopes. Judge Gregory F. Van Tatenhove issued an order on March 26, 2019 approving the settlement agreement of injunctive claims; retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement; and dismissing the injunctive claims against the defendants with prejudice. On July 15, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss the case. The court issued an order on July 17, 2019 asserting its retained jurisdiction over the execution of the settlement agreement and adjudication of attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses. It dismissed with prejudice all other claims for damages and declaratory relief. After the defendants opposed the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs by arguing that it was unreasonable, Judge Van Tatenhove reduced the award slightly but largely granted the plaintiff's counsel their full requested fees and costs. 2020 WL 2513822. The final amounts awarded were $102,660 in attorneys' fees, and $2,051.37 in costs. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This 2017 lawsuit was brought by the HRDC in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. HRDC the the commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. HRDC claimed that KDOC's policy of banning books sent to prisoners violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case has settled but litigation of attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses is ongoing."} {"article": "On December 5, 2019, Doc Society and the International Documentary Associate, U.S.-based documentary film organizations that host screenings and discussions with international partners, filed this lawsuit on behalf of themselves as well as their members and partners. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. State Department in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Administrative Procedure Act. They objected to the State Department's new \u201cregistration requirement\u201d that required applicants for U.S. visas from abroad to register their social media identifiers from a host of platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. The U.S. government additionally claimed the authority to disseminate the handles abroad. The plaintiffs claimed this requirement exceeded the Secretary of State\u2019s authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act and violated their free speech and association rights. Represented by the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, and the law firm Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asking the court to declare the registration requirement to be unlawful and to enjoin the government from enforcing or relying on them. The case was assigned to Judge Timothy J. Kelly. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the \"registration requirement,\" which compels disclosure of even pseudonymous social media accounts, has chilled their freedom of expression by causing applicants to use social media less freely than they otherwise would, or refrain from using it entirely. For pseudonymous users in particular, who seek to speak anonymously about controversial issues in order to protect themselves or their families from retaliation, the plaintiffs claimed that the requirement conditioned their eligibility for U.S. visas on their readiness to surrender their online anonymity. As of January 2020, the defendants have not filed an answer and no motions were pending. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2019, two U.S.-based documentary film organizations filed this lawsuit under the Administrative Procedures Act against the U.S. State Department in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs objected to the State Department's new \u201cregistration requirement\u201d that required applicants for U.S. visas from abroad to register their social media identifiers from a host of platforms. The policy also gave the Department authority to disseminate the handles abroad. Plaintiffs argued that the requirement exceeded the exceeded the Secretary of State\u2019s authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act and violated their free speech and association rights. This case is ongoing."} {"article": "On August 3, 2015, two minor children with disabilities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The plaintiffs sued the Kenton County Sheriff's Office, the Sheriff for Kenton County (in only his official capacity), and the Sheriff's Office's School Resource Officer (in his official and individual capacities) under 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief and damages, claiming the defendant used unnecessary and excessive physical restraint and handcuffs on schoolchildren with disabilities. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' actions constituted unreasonable seizure and excessive force in violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiffs based on their disabilities and failed to accommodate their disabilities. On September 9, 2015, the defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On September 30, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a cross motion for judgment on the pleadings. On December 28, 2015, Judge William O. Bertelsman denied the defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice. The Court found that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded a constitutional violation in order to make out a \u00a7 1983 claim. The plaintiffs also adequately pleaded plausible claims for discrimination under Title II. In October 2016, both parties filed cross motions for partial summary judgment. Additionally, the defendants filed a motion to sever the claims of the two students on September 14, 2017. Judge Bertelsman denied the defendants' motion to sever because of the substantial factual similarities between the two handcuffing situations and the existence of a common question of law: whether the elbow-cuffing of these children was unconstitutional. On October 11, 2017, Judge Bertelsman ruled on the parties' cross motions for partial summary judgment. Judge Bertelsman held for the plaintiffs on their claims of unlawful seizure and excessive use of force and municipal liability against Kenton County for those violations. The Court applied the Graham factors and found that although the severity of the crime weighed in favor of the defendants, the other factors -- whether the children posed an immediate threat to themselves or others; the age and stature of the children; and the method of handcuffing -- weighed in favor of the plaintiffs. However, Judge Bertelsman ruled against the plaintiffs on their ADA discrimination and reasonable accommodation claims. The Court found that no reasonable jury could find that the defendants' handcuffing of the plaintiffs would not have occurred \"but for\" their alleged disabilities, as opposed to their behavior on the days in question. Additionally, Judge Bertelsman held for the defendants on the issue of qualified immunity. Although the Court said it was a close call, it found that the plaintiffs failed to show that it was clearly established that the handcuffing was unconstitutional. The Court found that the Supreme Court precedent that the plaintiffs relied on was too generalized and that the plaintiffs failed to cite to any Sixth Circuit precedent. On February 7, 2018, the defendants (in their official capacities) filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' constitutional claims under \u00a7 1983 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Before hearing oral argument on the issue of damages, the Court noted that it would take the defendants' motion to dismiss under advisement. However, following a settlement conference on April 13, 2018, the parties privately reached an agreement whereby the defendants agreed to pay more than $337,000 in damages. The Court dismissed the action with prejudice on November 1, 2018, ordering that each party must pay their own costs.", "summary": "In August 2015, two minor children with disabilities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The plaintiffs sued under to 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act against the Kenton County Sheriff's Office and the Office's School Resource Officer claiming use of unnecessary and excessive physical restraint and handcuffing on the children. In October 2017, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' ADA claims, held in favor of the plaintiffs on their excessive force claims, and held that the officers in their individual capacities were entitled to qualified immunity. In 2018, the parties agreed to privately settle the case and the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs more than $337,000 in damages."} {"article": "This lawsuit grew out of Kentucky\u2019s attempts to impose Medicaid work requirements. On August 24, 2016, the Governor of Kentucky, Matt Bevin, submitted an application under Section 1115 of the Medicaid Act to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). He requested a waiver of various Medicaid Act requirements to implement the \u201cKentucky HEALTH\u201d project, which required Medicaid enrollees to work in order to receive health insurance. Kentucky also sought to increase premiums and impose other eligibility restrictions. HHS approved the waiver. In response, several Kentucky residents enrolled in the Kentucky Medicaid Program filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on January 24, 2018. The plaintiffs sued HHS for violating the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 551 et seq.). The plaintiffs, represented by the National Health Law Program, the Kentucky Equal Justice Center, and the Southern Poverty Law Center, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The plaintiffs claimed the defendant\u2019s waiver constituted an unauthorized attempt to rewrite the Medicaid Act and violated the APA. On March 29, 2018, Governor Bevin filed an unopposed motion to intervene to defend his Section 1115 waiver. The court granted this intervention and the Commonwealth of Kentucky intervened as a defendant. On March 30, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, arguing that the defendant lacked the authority to fundamentally restructure Medicaid through the approval of Kentucky HEALTH. The plaintiffs further argued that the defendant\u2019s approval of the Kentucky HEALTH provisions exceeded statutory authority and was arbitrary and capricious. On April 25, 2018, the defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment. The Commonwealth argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing, that their arguments about the scope of Section 1115 and Medicaid\u2019s objectives were demonstrably wrong, and that HHS's approval of Kentucky HEALTH\u2019s provisions was valid. HHS argued that Section 1115 of the Social Security Act conferred broad discretion to approve state projects and that it complied with all APA standards. HHS further argued that both the plaintiffs\u2019 challenge to the individual components of Kentucky HEALTH and their challenge to HHS\u2019s approval letter were non-justiciable and failed on their merits. On June 29, 2018, the court (Judge James E. Boasberg) granted plaintiffs\u2019 partial summary judgment motion and denied both defendants\u2019 motions for summary judgment. In so doing, the court held that the plaintiffs had standing, the court had the ability to review the waiver approval, and that HHS\u2019s waiver approval violated the APA. The court reasoned that the defendants\u2019 \u201csignal omission\u201d was that it failed to \u201cadequately consider [] whether Kentucky HEALTH would in fact help the state furnish medical assistance to its citizens.\u201d In an attempt to cure the deficiencies that the court had identified, HHS conducted further review and re-approved Kentucky HEALTH. That prompted another plaintiffs\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment, which was filed on January 17, 2019. The defendants responded with separately filed motions for summary judgment on February 4, 2019. On March 27, the court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment and denied both defendants\u2019 motions for summary judgment. The court again held that the Commonwealth had failed to adequately consider whether the program would help to provide adequate medical assistance to its citizens. On April 10, the defendants appealed to D.C. Circuit, which heard oral arguments on October 11, 2019. But Kentucky abandoned the Kentucky HEALTH project on December 16. The D.C. Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot but declined to vacate the district court\u2019s judgment. That allowed the plaintiffs to seek attorney\u2019s fees, although they have not done so as of January 2020. The case remains open to the extent that the plaintiffs can pursue attorney\u2019s fees. This is one of a number of cases challenging Medicaid work requirements. In Philbrick v. Azar, a New Hampshire case, the court vacated the Trump administration\u2019s approval of New Hampshire\u2019s demand for work or community service from \"able-bodied\" adults enrolled in its Medicaid Program. In Gresham v. Azar and Rose v. Azar, from Arkansas and Indiana, respectively, courts similarly forbade the states from conditioning Medicaid eligibility on compliance with work requirements.", "summary": "In 2018, several Kentucky residents enrolled in the Kentucky Medicaid Program sued the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs argued that HHS violated the Administrative Procedure Act in approving the Kentucky HEALTH program, which required recipients of Medicaid to work in order to receive insurance. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and the case was dismissed after Kentucky abandoned the Kentucky HEALTH program."} {"article": "On May 17, 2007, attorneys who represented detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba filed a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act (\"FOIA\"), 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552, against the National Security Agency (\"NSA\") and Department of Justice (\"DOJ\"). The plaintiffs, represented by counsel from the Center of Constitutional Rights as well as private counsel, asked the court to compel defendants to comply with requests to turn over all records of NSA's wiretapping of the plaintiffs, claiming that the plaintiffs had a statutory right to such records, and that there was no legal basis for the defendants' refusal to disclose them. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government began to intercept electronic communications, including telephone and email, of thousands of individuals, including U.S. citizens, both within and outside the United States. The surveillance was conducted without warrants, and without oversight by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (\"FISC\"). The surveillance program was conducted in secret until media reports in December 2005, and subsequent U.S. government acknowledgement. By separate letters to the NSA and DOJ dated January 18, 2006, plaintiffs submitted FOIA requests seeking seven categories of records. FOIA Request No. 1 sought \"records obtained or relating to ongoing or completed warrantless electronic surveillance or physical searches regarding, referencing or concerning any of the plaintiffs.\" The defendants refused to confirm or deny whether they possessed records responsive to the request--a non-informative response known as a \"Glomar Response.\" The other six FOIA requests did not become at issue in the litigation as the parties voluntarily dismissed claims relating to those requests on July 12, 2010. Thus, the only issue before the court was plaintiffs' FOIA Request No. 1 and the Glomar response issued by defendants. On June 25, 2008, the District Court (Judge Denise Cote), granted summary judgment to the defendants as to FOIA Request No. 1. The court held that defendants' Glomar Response was lawful. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Judges Jose A. Cabranes, Debra Ann Livingston, and Edward R. Korman) affirmed the district court's opinion in all respects on December 30, 2009. The Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' petition for certiorari on October 4, 2010.", "summary": "On May 17, 2007, attorneys who currently represent or have represented detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba filed a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act (\"FOIA\"), 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552, against the National Security Agency (\"NSA\") and Department of Justice (\"DOJ\"), to compel the product of agency records alleged to be improperly withheld despite being subject to a FOIA request. The court held that the defendants' response to the plaintiffs' FOIA request was lawful. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' perdition for certioari."} {"article": "On April 9, 2018, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) filed this complaint against defendant U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). EPIC alleged that ICE had failed to timely respond to its FOIA request for records concerning \"ICE\u2019s purchase and use of mobile forensics devices and technology.\" EPIC sought injunctive relief under FOIA so as to have the responsive records released. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and assigned to Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly. EPIC argued that one of ICE's law enforcement activities was \"conducting warrantless electronic device searches 'without individualized suspicion,'\" and that such searches have increased at the border. EPIC contended that such searches included text messages, private emails, contact lists, photographs, and other personal information. In order to conduct such searches, the complaint stated that ICE entered into contracts with mobile forensic technology providers, such as Cellebrite, which provided the technology for accessing the desired information on electronic devices. EPIC argued that \"ICE\u2019s data retrieval techniques for mobile devices pose significant threats to privacy\" by allowing ICE to gather personal information without suspicion or a warrant. Further, EPIC argued, it was not clear what happens to this gathered information after it was in ICE's possession. A joint status report filed on July 12, 2018 indicated that the government would start producing records on a rolling basis within a month. A September status report indicated that the production and its review were ongoing. A November status report indicated the production was complete and that EPIC was reviewing it. The March 2019 joint status report stated that EPIC had identified several issues in dispute, to which ICE agreed to review the withholdings to resolve or narrow the issues in dispute. After ICE provided the requested documents, EPIC notified it that there were still issues in dispute. As of the November 2019 status report, ICE had provided EPIC with 60 pages of reprocessed documents that were representative of the issues in dispute. The parties continued to work to resolve issues in the document production without court intervention. In February 2020, the parties notified the court that they had resolved all outstanding issues with the document production and were working towards a settlement on attorneys' fees and costs. The parties reached an agreement on attorneys' fees and costs in early June 2020. On June 23, 2020, the parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal, and the court dismissed the case. The documents produced by ICE can be found on EPIC's site, here. This case is closed.", "summary": "On April 9, 2018, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) filed this complaint against defendant U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). EPIC alleged that ICE had failed to timely respond to its FOIA request for records concerning \"ICE\u2019s purchase and use of mobile forensics devices and technology.\" EPIC sought injunctive relief under FOIA so as to have the responsive records released. ICE began producing documents in July 2018, and the parties continued to work out issues with the productions without court intervention through 2018 and 2019. In February 2020, the parties notified the court that they had resolved all outstanding issues with the document production. They then settled attorneys' fees and costs and stipulated to dismissal on June 23, 2020. This case is closed."} {"article": "In September 2004, the Charlotte District Office of the EEOC (with participation from the Raleigh Area Office), brought this suit against Triad Clinical Laboratory, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the defendant terminated the charging party, a female employee, because of: her association with an individual who had filed a charge of discrimination against the defendant, her participation in the EEOC's investigation of the charge, and her complaints of sexual harassment. After some scheduling orders and discovery, the parties reached a tentative settlement in mid October 2005 and entered into a final settlement agreement about two weeks later. The two-year decree prohibited the defendant from discriminating or retaliating. In addition, the defendant agreed to pay the charging party $10,300. In the event the defendant resumes business operations, the decree also required the defendant to: adopt and distribute an anti-discrimination policy, report to the EEOC at specified intervals, and provide Title VII training for all its employees. The decree was entered in 2005 and scheduled to last 2007. No further docket entries exist, so the case is closed.", "summary": "In 2004, the Charlotte District Office of the EEOC, brought this suit against Triad Clinical Laboratory, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina alleging sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The parties reached a settlement in 2005, which provided for monetary and injunctive relief."} {"article": "On September 7, 2005, plaintiff filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, \u00a7 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 1001 et seq., (ERISA) against his employer, Dun & Bradstreet Corp., in United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff alleged that when the defendant switched his pension plan from a defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan on January 1, 1997 it had violated ERISA and engaged in age discrimination because his benefits were reduced compared to those awarded to younger employees because of how interest accrued in the new plan. He also alleged that the defendant had provided false and misleading information about the change. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief as well as monetary damages. He also sought to have a class certified consisting of all other employees similarly situated. On March 30, 2006, the district court (Judge Plunkett) ordered that the case be transferred to the District of New Jersey. The defendant's principle place of business was in New Jersey and of the 5,000 putative class members only 4% resided in Illinois while most of the rest resided in or near New Jersey. The case continued in New Jersey as Finley v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp. Subsequent developments can be found in EE-NJ-0126.", "summary": "On September 7, 2005, plaintiff filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) against his employer, Dun & Bradstreet Corp., in United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff alleged that modifications to his pension plan violated ERISA and age discrimination and sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary damages. On March 30, 2006, the district court ordered that the case be transferred to the District of New Jersey since the defendant and most putative class members resided in or near New Jersey. Subsequent developments can be found in EE-NJ-0126."} {"article": "On July 2, 2007, plaintiffs who had voluntarily dismissed their claims in a prior lawsuit styled Zhang v. Gonzales [IM-CA-0055 of this collection] refiled their claims in a new case in the U.S. District Court California Northern District. The refiled case was styled Ahmadi v. Chertoff, 07-3455-WHA. Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint on August 10, 2007. The Ahamdi amended complaint alleged that plaintiffs were all long-time lawful permanent residents of the United States whose naturalization applications had been pending for over two years with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (\"USCIS\"), an agency of the Department of Homeland Security, awaiting the results of an \"FBI name check.\" Plaintiffs asserted that the unreasonable delays caused by the FBI name check process violated the Administrative Procedures Act and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought a judicial determination of naturalization applications pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1447(b), as well as other declaratory and injunctive relief. Attorneys with the Asian Law Caucus, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Immigrants Rights Project, the ACLU Foundation of Northern California, Inc. and the Council on American-Islamic Relations represented the plaintiffs. Several of the plaintiffs subsequently dismissed their claims because their naturalization applications had been accepted or their FBI name checks were finally completed. The U.S. denied the plaintiffs' allegations and moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs moved for class certification on September 5, 2007. Ruling on that motion was deferred until the Court ruled on the government's motions to dismiss. On October 15, 2007, the District Court (Judge William H. Alsup) granted in part and denied in part the government's motion to dismiss. The Court refused to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, but dismissed plaintiffs' claims under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for failure to state a claim. Ahmadi v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 3022573 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 15, 2007). In April 2008, the court granted the Plaintiffs permission to file a Third Amended Complaint, and denied class action status. On July 20, 2008, in response to Third Amended Complaint and upon Plaintiffs' motion, relief was granted in the form an Order for Voluntary Dismissal, Remand, and Dismissal of Claims. USCIS had failed to adjudicate Plaintiffs' applications with the 120-day time line, which, the Court found, began to run after their naturalization interviews, contrary to the government's contention that the 120 window for adjudication did not being until after the name-check was completed. One Plaintiff was dismissed as his claim had become moot, his application was accepted, and dismissal was necessary for him to take his oath of citizenship. Remand, the effective remedy, was granted to two Plaintiffs to USCIS for instructions do adjudicate their applications within the 120 day limit. The case was to remain open until such action was certified to the court, and required to be done so by August 18, 2008. Their applications were accepted the next day. Claims regarding the APA and a writ of mandamus compelling completion of background checks were dismissed as moot per Plaintiff's argument. The case was closed on August 4, 2008, after certification of adjudication of Plaintiffs' applications.", "summary": "On July 2, 2007, plaintiffs refiled previously dismissed claims with the U.S. District Court California - Northern District. Plaintiffs sought class action status, and complained of unreasonable delays in the adjudication of their applications for citizenship, particularly as regards waiting times for the FBI name-check requirement. The government had failed to adjudicate Plaintiff's applications with the 120-day time line that, the Court found, began to run after their naturalization interviews, contrary to the government's contention that the 120 window for adjudication did not being until after the name-check was completed. The Court denied class action status, but granted relief was granted in the form of remand of several plaintiff's claims to USCIS with instructions to complete the adjudication of their applications in a timely fashion, not to exceed one month. Their applications were granted the next day."} {"article": "On November 19, 2013, the Department of Justice notified Mohamed Osman Mohamud, the criminal defendant in this case, that it had used evidence from a FISA warrantless wiretap in the proceedings leading to Mr. Mohamud's conviction. This was the second time the DOJ notified a criminal defendant of this information, following a new, broader interpretation of when the government was using evidence \u201cderived from\u201d warrantless wiretapping. These new notifications provide standing for defendants to challenge the constitutionality of the 2008 FISA Amendments Act. All the cases are available in the Criminal cases challenging FISA surveillance special collection. Prior to his arrest, the FBI had been had been investigating Mohamud for over a year after Mohamud's father had called the FBI to report his son's intent to travel to Yemen to study and his fear of radical recruiters overseas. The FBI began monitoring Mohamud's emails, particularly e-mails he was exchanging with an Islamic extremist who promoted international terrorism and violent jihad. The FBI had even interrogated Mohamud when he was prevented from flying to Alaska from the Portland airport because he was on the No-Fly list. The government claimed that during the FBI's sting operation the undercover agents proposed other, less lethal ways Mohamud could help his radical cause, but that Mohamud was steadfast. One of the main defenses that Mohamud argued was that he was entrapped. The government initiated the criminal prosecution of Mohamed Osman Mohamud in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon on November 19, 2010. The Oregon U.S. Attorney's Office and the Department of Justice charged Mohamud with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction, against a person or property within the U.S., in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2332a(a)(2)(A). Mohamud, a naturalized American from Somalia, allegedly tried to detonate what he thought was a car-bomb at a Christmas tree lighting event in Portland. The bomb was a fake supplied to the 19-year-old by federal agents as part of a sting operation. On November 26, 2010, the FBI arrested Mohamud. At the start of the proceedings, the government filed a FISA notification which gave Mohamud notice that the government intended to use information obtained and derived from electronic surveillance and a physical search conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (\"FISA\"), specifically Title I and Title III. On May 7, 2012, Judge Garr King denied Mohamud's motion to disclose FISA-related material necessary to litigate the motions for discovery and for suppression of the fruit of the FISA activity. On January 31, 2013, the jury found Mohamud guilty of attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction against a person or property within the United States. Judge King rejected Mohamud's motion for a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial on April 22, 2014. On November 19, 2013, while sentencing was pending, the government filed a supplemental FISA notification informing the court that the government had used information collected under FISA section 702, a part of Title VII, a different title from what the government indicated at the beginning of the trial. Prosecutors had only just discovered that the information might have been derived from prior Title VII FISA collection. In particular, the information might have been derived from \u00a7 1881a of Title VII, which does not require the government to demonstrate probable cause that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power. Unlike traditional FISA, \u00a7 1881a does not require the government to specify the nature and location of each of the particular facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance will occur. The government had based their interpretations on the Supreme Court's ruling in Clapper v. Amnesty International, NS-NY-0006 in this Clearinghouse. In light of that revelation, and in anticipation of the defendants' FISA-related motions, Judge King canceled Mohamud's sentencing. Mohamud then challenged both the government's compliance with provisions of the FISA and those provisions' very legality. In order to do so, Mohamud moved for full discovery regarding the facts and circumstances underlying surveillance and to compel immediate production to the court of classified documents related to the pending post-trial discovery motion. On March 19, 2014, Judge King denied Mohamud's motions, finding that there was no need to go beyond the procedures outlined in FISA \u00a7 1806. On June 25, 2014, Judge King issued the first district court opinion on the constitutionality of FISA section 702, upholding the constitutionality of the statute and the legality of the disclosure provided to the defendant. The court denied Mohamud's motion for vacation of conviction and alternative remedies of dismissal of the indictment, suppression of evidence, and new trial for the government's violation of the Pretrial Notice Statute. Judge King also denied the defendant's alternative motion for suppression of evidence and a new trial based on the government's introduction of evidence at trial and other uses of information derived from unlawful electronic surveillance, and the defendant's second motion for a new trial. 2014 WL 2866749. After the court convicted Mohamud for a criminal charge--an attempted use of a weapon for mass destruction--on October 3, 2014, Mohamud appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on October 14, 2014. On September 6, 2016, the Ninth Circuit (per an opinion by Judge Owens) allowed the ACLU, the ACLU of Oregon, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (collectively, \"Amici\") to file supplemental briefs relating to Mohamud\u2019s constitutional challenge to FISA \u00a7 702 and the applicability, if any, of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. On October 3, 2016, Amici filed a supplemental brief in support of Mohamud and argued that the court should hold the surveillance of Mohamud as unconstitutional. However, on December 5, 2016, the Ninth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the government\u2019s acquisition of the defendant\u2019s e-mail communications did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights and warrantless search of foreign national\u2019s e-mails pursuant to FISA was reasonable. Thus, the court held that the government\u2019s monitoring of the overseas foreign national\u2019s emails fell outside the Fourth Amendment. The court also applied the incidental-overhear approach and found that \u201cthe fact that government knew some U.S. persons\u2019 communications would be swept up during foreign intelligence gathering does not make such collection any more unlawful in this context than in the Title III or traditional FISA context.\u201d As a result, it ruled that incidental collections occurring as a result of constitutionally permissible acquisition did not render those acquisitions unlawful. Aside from these decisions, the court also held that there was sufficient evidence of Mohamud\u2019s predisposition to engage in criminal activity and agreed with the jury\u2019s rejection of Mohamud\u2019s entrapment defense, and held that government\u2019s post-trial notification of its use of evidence obtained from electronic surveillance pursuant to FISA did not mandate suppression of evidence. Following the Ninth Circuit\u2019s decision that held that government surveillance, investigation, and prosecution of Mohamud were constitutional, Mohamud filed to petition for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc, followed by the Amici's brief on February 27, 2017, which supported Mohamud\u2019s petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. On March 16, 2017, however, the Ninth Circuit\u2019s panel denied Mohamud\u2019s petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc. In December 2010, shortly after the Mohamud was arrested, Attorney General Eric Holder made statements on the merits of the case to the media. As a result, Mohamud asked the court to direct the government to cease and desist from making inappropriate pretrial comments. Mohamud was concerned that these comments had compromised his ability to obtain a fair trial by unbiased jurors. On February 23, 2011, Judge King denied Mohamud's motion because there was already an applicable standard that the DOJ had to adhere set forth in the Release of Information by Personnel of the Department of Justice Relating to Criminal Civil Proceedings. Judge King made it clear that the Attorney General should not have made his comments since according to the Statement of Policy, it is inappropriate for DOJ personnel to give personal opinions regarding the supposed facts of the case or to make available a defendant's statements that could be construed as an indication of guilt. 2011 WL 654964. Previously in 2011 and 2012, the government had moved for rulings that certain classified materials potentially discoverable by Mohamud either failed to meet the standard for disclosure because they were not relevant to the defense or were otherwise subject to deletion or substitution under the Classified Information Procedures Act. Judge King ruled on the motions ex parte by filing classified orders but did not file any public orders. Mohamud then asked the court to also enter public orders that were as specific as possible in the event that appellate review was required. The government did not oppose the public filing orders but did oppose Mohamud's request for specificity in the orders preferring more general terms. On October 2, 2012, Judge King granted Mohamud's motion but with less specificity than Mohamud requested. Judge King explained that the orders were specific enough to allow Mohamud to appeal them, if necessary. 2012 WL 4594746. Next, Mohamud moved to suppress the evidence seized during an investigation by the Oregon State Police (OSP) after a student accused him of date rape. The FBI was also involved in the investigation. The evidence included statements he made and information from his computer and cell phone. Mohamud claimed that his consent for the search was not freely and voluntarily given, and the searches and seizures went beyond the scope of his consent. Mohamud also moved to suppress all evidence collected by the government in its parallel national security investigation because he claimed all evidence obtained after the OSP investigation is the fruit of evidence obtained illegally in the OSP investigation. On October 22, 2012, Judge King denied Mohamud's motion to suppress because the information that FBI learned from the OSP investigation did not taint the evidence gathered later and the that evidence gathered later had an independent source. Thus, Judge King concluded that there was no need to address the alleged constitutional violation. Judge King also found that Mohamud made the statements at the Portland airport voluntarily. 2012 WL 5208173. On January 4, 2013, after both parties objected to certain expert witnesses that the other party planned to use, Judge King ruled that he would allow all of the expert witnesses to testify at trial, but he would limit their testimony in ways explained in the opinion. 2013 WL 71806. After Mohamud's Jan. 31, 2013 conviction, Judge King denied Mohamud's motions for acquittal or new trial. Judge King held that (1) sufficient evidence negated Mohamud's entrapment defense; (2) the District Court's response to the jury note seeking clarification on the entrapment instruction did not unfairly favor the prosecution's evidence; (3) the prosecutor did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof during closing argument; (4) the District Court's admission of the Interpol notice into evidence identifying a fugitive wanted for prosecution with whom Mohamud was in contact with did not result in miscarriage of justice; (5) the recordings of meetings between Mohamud and undercover government agents were not testimonial evidence; (6) the District Court's deletion of undercover government employees' true names from discovery did not deprive Mohamud of fair opportunity to cross-examine employees; and (7) the denial of the true identity of the government operative who exchanged e-mails with Mohamud did not violate Mohamud's right to confrontation. 941 F. Supp. 2d 1303. On October 3, 2014, the court found Mohamud guilty on a criminal charge of attempt to use a weapon of deadly destruction. Mohamud appealed his conviction and sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On March 24, 2017, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff\u2019s arguments and affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision, upholding Mohamad's conviction. On July 14, 2017, Mohamud petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari; the petition was denied in mid 2018. The case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Marco Hernandez on June 8, 2018. Mohamud filed a motion for a writ of habeas corpus on November 8, 2018. The writ of habeas corpus was vacated in a court order dated January 28, 2020 and a copy of the order was sent to the U.S. Marshalls. On June 1, 2020, Mohamud moved to vacate or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. \u00a72255. The parties have since engaged in a series of back-and-forth motions for extension of time to answer; thus, Mohamud's motion to vacate or correct the sentence has yet to be ruled on. The case remains open.", "summary": "In 2010, the government initiated criminal prosecution of Mohamed Osman Mohamud in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon charging him with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction. At the start of the proceedings, the government filed a FISA notification which gave Mohamud notice that the government intended to use information obtained and derived from electronic surveillance and a physical search conducted pursuant to FISA. When Mohamud challenged the government's compliance with the notification procedures and their legality, the district court upheld the statute and scope of required notification of surveillance under FISA Section 702. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari. Mohamud filed a motion to vacate or correct his sentence in June of 2020; the motion has yet to be ruled on and the case remains ongoing."} {"article": "On August 9, 2002, an individual brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Kentucky Fried Chicken of America (\"KFC\") alleging unlawful discrimination in violation of Title I of the American Disabilities Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12101. Plaintiff was hired by KFC through the Illinois Mental Program. Plaintiff alleged he was subjected to a continuous course of threats, comments, insults, ridicule, and harassment, including mistreatment at work and phone calls and personal threats to him and his family while plaintiff was at home. According to the complaint, the plaintiff notified the store's regional manager of the threats and misconduct but he local managers and employees continued to make threatening comments. On June 25, 2002, the plaintiff alleged he was forced to quit due to the harassing conditions at the restaurant and KFC's failure to correct the harassment. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued a Notice of Right to Sue on July 11, 2002. The plaintiff brought suit and sought a permanent injunction restraining KFC from engaging in unlawful discrimination based on disability. On December 16 2002, Judge George W. Lindberg dismissed the action on plaintiff's voluntary motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(1), with prejudice.", "summary": "In August of 2002, a mentally handicapped employee filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against his restaurant employer alleging harassing work conditions. The case was was voluntary dismissed, with prejudice, by the plaintiff."} {"article": "On February 4, 2019, the plaintiff, a nonprofit legal aid organization providing public defense services for indigent clients in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, filed this suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) after fire damage at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC), a major pre-trial detention facility in Brooklyn, limited access to the plaintiff's clients. The plaintiff also alleged that the fire worsened living conditions at the facility. Represented by private counsel, plaintiff made its claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and invoked the Sixth Amendment right to access counsel. It sought declaratory judgment, a preliminary and permanent injunction, a hearing, a Special Master inspection of the MDC, and costs. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that, after a fire at MDC on January 27, 2019, all visits were suspended for five days. The complaint alleged that visits resumed on February 3, but were again suspended indefinitely the day after. It also alleged that a temporary procedure to use different rooms for visits was not implemented. The plaintiff also wrote that the power outage resulting from the fire led to heating issues in the prison during winter. On the same day the complaint was filed, Judge LaShann DeArcy Hall granted the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order requiring MDC to resume normal visitation hours immediately. She added that, if the defendant could show cause that visiting hours impacted MDC security and would lead to two hours or more of interruption, the plaintiff would have at least 24 hours notice before suspension of visits occurred. 416 F.Supp.3d 249. Discovery continued on the case under the supervision of Judge Margo K. Brodie. At a March 1, 2019 hearing, Judge Brodie denied the plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief, saying that it did not have a cause of action, since Sixth Amendment claims must be brought by the person being denied counsel, and a group of attorneys is not within the \"zone of interest\" permitted by the APA. She offered the plaintiff an opportunity to amend its complaint, but the plaintiff declined to do so. On May 20, 2019, she dismissed the case sua sponte. The clerk filed the dismissal on June 4. Upon dismissal of the complaint, the plaintiff filed an appeal on June 18, 2019. On March 20, 2020, a Second Circuit panel composed of Judges John M. Walker, Barrington D. Parker, and Susan L. Carney vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits. They stated that the District Court failed to consider the impact of BOP regulations on attorneys accessing clients in its APA zone of interest analysis. 954 F.3d 118. The appellate panel urged the parties and the District Court to refer this case to mediation. During a March 23, 2020 telephonic hearing, the parties agreed to mediation under the guidance of former U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch. Mediation is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2019, the plaintiff, a nonprofit legal aid organization providing public defense services for indigent clients in federal cases, filed this suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) after fire damage at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC), a major pre-trial detention facility in Brooklyn, limited access to its clients. The case was initially dismissed sua sponte after the District Court Judge found no cause of action under the Sixth Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs appealed the decision, and the Second Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Second Circuit recommended mediation, and mediation is proceeding under the guidance of former U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch."} {"article": "On May 19, 2004, inmates at the Fulton County Jail in Atlanta, Georgia filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs sued Fulton County and the Georgia Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 challenging the conditions of their confinement under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The class action suit, brought on behalf of inmates who were currently or would be incarcerated in the future at the Fulton County Jail facilities in Atlanta, sought compensatory and punitive damages along with declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that the inmates were confined in unconstitutional living conditions due to an excessive number of inmates in the jail, an inadequate number of detention officers to ensure their safety, the breakdown of the ventilation, plumbing and laundry systems, and other circumstances. The plaintiff class was represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights and additional private counsel. The conditions at the jail were described in a report of Dr. Robert Griefinger dated May 31, 2004. Dr. Greifinger was a consultant with regard to health care at the jail, initially for the United States District Court and then for Fulton County. The parties agreed that Dr. Greifinger's report accurately described the conditions at the jail. Pursuant to the Consent Order of the District Court (Judge Marvin H. Shoob) on July 7, 2004, the parties agreed to the appointment of a Receiver by the Court. On July 14, the Court appointed a Receiver to take charge of the jail. On December 21, 2005, the Court entered a Consent Order which provided the terms and conditions necessary to ensure constitutional compliance by the jail. The terms of the Consent Order set minimum staffing levels, staff training procedures, inmate population limits, inmate processing requirements and other inmate housing requirements. The Consent Order also covered inmate visitation, medical care (including prescription medication, mental health care and dental care requirements), inmates with physical disabilities, safety and emergency procedures and inmate grievance procedures. The Consent Order also appointed a Court Monitor. In December 2005, Georgia Public Defenders challenged the transfer of inmates at the jail to distant locations in a separate case filed originally in state court: Georgia Public Defender Standards Council v. Freeman, 1:05-cv-03286-MHS (N.D. Ga) (JC-GA-0024 in this Clearinghouse). That case was removed to federal court where a separate Consent Order was entered on February 28, 2006, after it was consolidated with the this case (Harper v. Bennett). The Court Monitor filed his First Quarterly Report on May 15, 2006. After the Monitor's Fourth Quarterly Report, the plaintiffs filed a Memorandum on Compliance on June 22, 2007. In the Memorandum, the plaintiffs commended the Sheriff and the County for the progress that had been achieved in many areas covered by the Consent Order. However, the plaintiffs stated that in some areas, especially in areas related to the safety and security of inmates and staff, full compliance with the Order had not been achieved. After the Seventh Quarterly Report, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause on July 10, 2008. The Court mentioned that nearly two-and-a-half years after the Consent Order, the Sheriff was still not in compliance with many of its mandates, including requirements in such critical areas as staffing and security, population limits and housing, provision of medical services, and timely release of inmates. The Court ordered that the Sheriff appear in Court and show cause why he should not be held in contempt. On August 22, 2008, the Sheriff filed a Status Report Pursuant to Court Order. In his Report, the Sheriff Freeman acknowledged his failure to comply with the Consent Order in the critical areas of jail staffing and population. However, the Sheriff contended that his efforts have been hampered by Fulton County's failure to authorize funding for all the staff positions needed and for outsourcing pretrial inmates to other jails. Fulton County denied any lack of adequate funding. On January 26, 2009, the Court issued an Order concerning the County's decision to cut the Sheriff's FY09 budget, stating that if the necessary funding was not provided, the County defendants might be held in contempt. On January 4, 2010, the Sheriff filed a Status Report Pursuant to Court Order describing the steps he was taking to eliminate inmate outsourcing and to provide adequate space for all Fulton County inmates. The monitor continued to file quarterly reports. On January 29, 2013, the Court denied the defendant's motion for prospective relief on the grounds that the jail had yet to address two pressing issues within the jail: the understaffing and the malfunctioning locks. And stated that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of plaintiffs' federal rights, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation. On October 10, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a class motion for the defendants to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. The motion supported this point by discussing how the appointed monitor, Mr. Calvin Lightfoot, plainly stated in his reports to the Court that the defendants have violated the Consent Order by forcing detainees to sleep on the floor of their housing units, by failing to staff all mandated posts in the Jail, and by continuing to detain people in cells whose locks are broken or compromised. The plaintiffs sought an order imposing monetary sanctions until compliance with the Consent Order was achieved, and requiring the defendants to submit a plan to the Court to bring themselves into compliance with the Consent Order. On November 25, 2013, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion that the defendants must show cause as to why they should not be held in contempt. The court found that the defendants were clearly in violation of the Consent Decree as overcrowding, understaffing, and poor facility maintenance continued to be the norm at the jail. A show cause hearing was to be scheduled for the near future, wherein the Chairman of the Fulton County Commission and the Sheriff of Fulton County will be required to attend the hearing in person. On February 3, 2014, the parties filed a joint motion to remove the show cause hearing from the calendar and decided to hold a status conference in its place. This joint motion was granted in an order on February 4, 2014. On May 12, 2015, the Court issued an order granting the defendants' motion that all prospective relief be terminated. Based on the evidence of the jail conditions presented by the defendants and the testimony of the Court Monitor the Court found that the defendants were in compliance with the Consent Decree. Based upon the evidentiary record, the Court could not find that there were current and ongoing violations of the plaintiffs\u2019 federal rights. As such the civil case against the defendants was terminated. Plaintiffs did not appeal.", "summary": "In 2004, inmates at the Fulton County Jail in Atlanta, Georgia filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs sued Fulton County and the Georgia Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 challenging the conditions of their confinement under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs alleged unconstitutional living conditions. In 2005, the court entered a consent order which remained in effect until 2015, when the court terminated the case."} {"article": "On July 28, 2004, female police officers filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e, against the police chief, the Wichita Police Department, and the City of Wichita in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. The plaintiffs alleged that they were discriminated against and asked the court for relief in the form of damages and an injunction against future discriminatory actions. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that they were subjected to a hostile work environment, denied promotions or the ability and opportunity to be meaningfully considered for promotions, denied proper training opportunities, and denied terms and conditions of employment that are commonly granted to similarly situated or less qualified males. In October of 2004, the court (Judge Monti L. Belot) dismissed claims against the police chief in his official capacity and claims against the Wichita Police Department. Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30727 (D. Kan. 2004). The plaintiffs continued with their claims against the police chief personally and against the City of Wichita. According to the PACER docket, the court (Judge Belot) denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification on September 29, 2005. On April 27, 2007, the court (Judge Belot) granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 2007 WL 1246223 (D. Kan. 2007). On December 22, 2008, the appellate court reversed the trial court's summary judgement with respect to the hostile work environment and retaliation claims of one of the plaintiffs but upheld the judgement against the other plaintiffs. Semroth v. City of Wichita 304 Fed.Appx. 707 (10th Cir. 2008). The parties jointly stipulated to dismissal of the case with prejudice on June 1, 2009. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On July 28, 2004, female police officers filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e, against the police chief, the Wichita Police Department, and the City of Wichita in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. the plaintiffs contended that they were subjected to a hostile work environment, denied promotions or the ability and opportunity to be meaningfully considered for promotions, denied proper training opportunities, and denied terms and conditions of employment that are commonly granted to similarly situated or less qualified males. In October of 2004, the court (Judge Monti L. Belot) dismissed claims against the police chief in his official capacity and claims against the Wichita Police Department. On April 27, 2007, the court (Judge Belot) granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 2007 WL 1246223 (D. Kan. 2007). After the appellate court reversed the summary judgement with respect to one of the plaintiffs, that parties jointly stipulated to dismissal of the case with prejudice. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On October 10, 2001, the plaintiff, an inmate at the Oneida Correctional Facility in New York, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. The plaintiff filed pro se (though counsel began representing the plaintiff in 2004) and brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against a number of defendants, including the commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (\"DOCS\") as well as other DOCS officials. The case was before Judge David Hurd. The plaintiff claimed that these officials violated his First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights by requiring him to participate in a Sex Offenders Rehabilitation Program that required him to give a detailed account of his sexual history and to admit responsibility for the instant offense. The plaintiff first alleged that requiring him to admit responsibility and disclose their entire sexual history as a condition of the program violated the Fifth Amendment because it could incriminate him and subject him to further criminal charges. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that his refusal to participate in the program would lead to additional consequences, including: higher classification status under Megan's Law, a loss of good time credits, denial of his parole consideration, and other loss of privileges such as organizations and programs and transfers to other facilities with better trade programs. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of an order prohibiting DOCS from mandating a detailed written disclosure of a participant's instant offense and sexual autobiography. The plaintiff also alleged that this practice violated a Fourth Amendment right to privacy. On April 15, 2004, after almost three years of litigation over procedural questions such as the form of the complaint and various discovery disputes, the Court granted in part the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's second amended complaint. The Court dismissed the plaintiff's privacy claim, Equal Protection claim, Due Process claim, and Fifth Amendment claim to the extent that it relates to the denial of parole. However, the Court did not dismiss the plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claim related to the loss of good time credits. The defendant argued that because participation in the program was not part of the plaintiff's sentence, but instead was only recommended, there was no compelled self-incrimination. The Court rejected this argument with respect to the Fifth Amendment claim based on the threatened loss of good time credits, explaining that labeling the program \"recommended\" or \"voluntary\" did not necessarily determine if the plaintiff was compelled for Fifth Amendment purposes. That same day, the Court granted in part the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction on that Fifth Amendment claim, holding that while the plaintiff was not entitled to a preliminary injunction restoring his lost good time credits, the plaintiff was entitled to an order enjoining defendants from requiring participants, as part of the SOCP, to divulge a history of sexual conduct, including illegal acts for which no criminal charges had been filed. On April 23, the Court amended that to issue a system-wide preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from denying any prisoner good time credits based on a refusal to provide his sexual history so as to be eligible for SOCP. The defendants appealed, and in June 2004, the Second Circuit stayed the preliminary injunction pending the defendant's appeal of the District Court's order. Around this time, the plaintiff moved to certify a class, which was held in abeyance for some time pending a determination of the appeal before the Second Circuit. However, that stay on the motion for class certification was lifted on February 1, 2005, after plaintiff filed to lift the stay and defendants did not oppose. The District Court went on to grant the motion for class certification, this time over opposition from the defendants, on February 15, 2005. The Class was defined as \"Current or former New York State prisoners who have lost or been denied good time credits or have been threatened with the loss or denial of good time credits because of a refusal to admit guilt to criminal sexual conduct as part of the Sexual Offender Counseling Program.\" On March 22, 2006, the Second Circuit ruled on the appeal regarding the district court's system-wide preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from denying good time credits based on a refusal to provide his sexual history so as to be eligible for SOCP. The Circuit Court vacated and remanded on the grounds that the district court had not complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)'s requirement that a trial court state its findings and conclusions explicitly when granting or denying a preliminary injunction. Specifically, the Circuit Court held that the district court's findings were not clear with respect to whether DOCS denied good time credit as an automatic and direct result of a prisoner's refusal to provide the requested sexual history. Donhauser v. Goord, 181 Fed.Appx. 11, 2006 WL 1525720 (2nd Cir. Mar. 22, 2006). Some years of further litigation, which focused largely on discovery and other procedural matters, passed before the parties proposed a class action settlement agreement on March 13, 2008. Objections to the agreement were filed under seal with the Court, and on September 23, 2008, the Court directed the parties to submit a revised Private Settlement Agreement. The parties did so on October 3, 2008. Two weeks later, the Court approved the October 3 revised private settlement agreement as \"fair, reasonable, and adequate,\" and dismissed the class action with prejudice. In the settlement agreement, defendants denied all allegations regarding any violations of the class member's Fifth Amendment rights, but agreed to provide inmates admitted to the SOCP program with a \"Limits of Confidentiality, Partial Waiver of Confidentiality and Acknowledgment\" form that set forward the program's policy with respect to confidentiality and reporting requirements. Significantly, this form would disclose to inmates that they were not required to admit the commission of a particular crime, whether that crime resulted in the present commitment or not. Instead, inmates could successfully complete the program by discussing behavior in general terms without: providing the full names of victims; disclosing the exact dates, times, or places of the sexual offending behavior; or admitting to any specific crime or the violation of any specific section of the penal law. However, successful completion of the program did require inmates to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility for the conduct that resulted in conviction and demonstrate an understanding of their sexual offending behavior and cycle of abuse. The form also informed inmates that no written or oral statements made by them in conjunction with treatment services rendered in connection with the SOCP could be used against them in any subsequent criminal proceeding. Finally, it forbade inmates from revealing in any subsequent criminal proceeding any information disclosed by another inmate in a group therapy session or otherwise disclosed in conjunction with treatment services rendered as part of the SOCP program. The agreement also provided for compliance monitoring by plaintiff's counsel, and for defendants to pay plaintiff's counsel $28,920 in attorney's fees. Finally, the agreement was set to remain in effect for a period of 2 years from the date it was signed by the parties. After that, consistent with provisions of 18 USCA \u00a7 3626(b)(2), the terms and conditions of the agreement would automatically cease to bind the parties, and all claims on behalf of the plaintiffs would be discontinued and dismissed with prejudice. In 2009, a class member filed a motion to reopen the case and alleged that the defendants violated the preliminary injunction issued in 2004. However, because that injunction had been vacated by the Second Circuit, the District Court treated the motion as a request under the settlement agreement, and denied the motion to reopen the case, finding that the request was premature because the settlement's requirement that class members give defendants notice before bringing a claim had not been met. As the agreement was positioned to automatically cease in 2010, the case is presumably closed.", "summary": "In 2001, the plaintiff, an inmate at a New York State correctional facility who was denied good time credits based on a failure to participate in a sex offender rehabilitation program, filed this lawsuit challenging the facility's practice of requiring inmates to admit guilt regarding their sexual offenses and divulge a complete sexual history. The plaintiff alleged that this compelled disclosure violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In 2005, the litigation became a class action, with the class defined as: \"Current or former New York State prisoners who have lost or been denied good time credits or have been threatened with the loss or denial of good time credits because of a refusal to admit guilt to criminal sexual conduct as part of the Sexual Offender Counseling Program.\" The parties eventually settled in 2008. The settlement provided for, among other things, notice to any inmates that wished to participate in the program that would inform them that they could do so without admitting to the commission of any particular crime. This notice would also inform inmates that any information they disclosed during the program would not be used against them in any subsequent criminal proceedings. The settlement was set to expire after two years, and there is no reason to think that it has been extended."} {"article": "On February 2, 2016, a class of St. Louis County residents, primarily impoverished and African-American, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs sued St. Louis County and the St. Louis County Police Department under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, claiming violations of their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the ArchCity Defenders and the Center for Constitutional Rights, asked the court for injunctive relief and monetary damages. The plaintiffs claimed that St. Louis County Police maintained a practice of issuing arrest warrants excessively and without judicial oversight. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that police officers issued arrest warrants, referred to as \u201cWanteds,\u201d without seeking any judicial determination on probable cause. The \u201cWanteds\u201d were visible to law enforcement throughout the state and beyond, and remained active indefinitely. The complaint alleged that this was an unaccountable exercise of police power that was particularly devastating to the largely impoverished black residents of St. Louis County. The case was initially assigned to Judge Carol E. Jackson. The plaintiffs amended their complaint on July 8, 2016, naming two additional plaintiffs. The parties engaged in discovery throughout 2016 and 2017. On July 28, 2017, the case was reassigned to Judge John A. Ross. On August 25, 2017, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the plaintiffs moved to certify a class, requesting certification of two classes: Class 1, consisting of \"all persons who, since February 24, 2011, have been arrested pursuant to a Wanted issued by Defendants without a judicial determination of probable cause either prior to or promptly after their arrest, including those persons who were arrested without probable cause; and Class 2, consisting of \"all persons who, since February 24, 2011, have been the subject of a Wanted issued by Defendant St. Louis County and have been denied procedural remedies to quash the Wanted.\" Oral argument on the motions for summary judgment and class certification was held on February 28, 2018. On March 9, 2018, Judge Ross entered an order of recusal, stating that \"on the Court\u2019s own motion and after further review of the case, I have determined that I should disqualify myself to avoid any potential appearance of impropriety.\" The case was reassigned to Judge Henry Edward Autrey that day. Judge Autrey ruled in favor of the defendants on the earlier cross-motions for summary judgment on October 15, 2018. He found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions, and, since all claims against the officers were dismissed, the claims against the city were dismissed alongside them. He did not provide an opinion on the class certification, since all complaints were dismissed. He allowed the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint, which they did on November 5, 2018. The plaintiffs maintained claims against a series of officers and the city on similar facts as the initial claim. They also maintained a request for class certification. However, they brought new claims, including a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claim of unlawful seizure, a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claim of retaliation, and a Fourteenth Amendment deprivation of liberty without due process claim. After this new complaint was filed, some of the defendants filed for summary judgment for their individual actions in January. Judge Autrey granted in part and denied in part the motion on March 15, 2019 (2019 WL 1227460). He disposed of the Fifth Amendment claims against all defendants, because he stated that there was no evidence of the plaintiffs invoking the Fifth Amendment in the complaint or in discovery. Judge Autrey dismissed some of the unlawful seizure complaints as it related to defendants that could prove probable cause, but maintained the complaints against others that could not. Finally, he maintained the deprivation of liberty claim against all defendants. Litigation is ongoing in the case. The parties filed a joint status report with the District Court on May 29, 2020.", "summary": "On February 2, 2016, a class of St. Louis County residents, primarily impoverished and African-American, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs sued St. Louis County and the St. Louis County Police Department under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, claiming violations of their First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth amendments and asking the court for injunctive relief and monetary damages. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "On October 1, 2009, several disabled individuals requiring in-home support services filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the California Department of Health Care Services and California Department of Social Services. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' proposed budget cuts would threaten their ability to remain in the least restrictive settings appropriate, which would have violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Medicaid Act, Title XIX of the Social Security Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Medicaid Maintenance of Effort Clause of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. They raised these allegations under Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. Represented by attorneys from Disability Rights California and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The case was originally assigned to Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero and then reassigned to Judge Claudia Wilken. Due to budget cuts, the defendants planned on cutting funds for In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS). The IHSS program enabled aged, blind, and disabled poor to avoid institutionalization because they could remain in their homes with proper supportive services. Seniors with disabilities utilized IHSS services to avoid living in more costly nursing homes. But the defendants had scheduled the statewide budget cuts to occur on November 1, 2009. These cuts to programs would cause immediate and irreparable harm to over 130,000 people with disabilities, according to the plaintiffs, by depriving them of services that would keep them in the least restrictive setting appropriate, putting them at risk of unnecessary institutionalization. The plaintiffs claimed that because of these consequences, the cuts violated the Americans with Disabilities Act under the 1999 Supreme Court precedent, Olmstead v. L.C. In the first month of this case, the plaintiffs addressed the defendants\u2019 plans to mail notices that IHSS benefits had been reduced or terminated. The plaintiffs filed several motions for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to provide adequate notice and opportunity to be heard prior to depriving the plaintiffs of necessary IHSS services, thus violating due process, as well as the Medicaid Act's notice and hearing provisions. Separate injunctions to halt mailing of these notices were granted on October 14 and October 23. The judge ruled that California could not proceed with cutting funding that would so greatly affect a large number of people with disabilities in California. On October 23, 2009, the Court prohibited the defendants from delaying benefits payments to IHSS providers, even if the defendants had planned on terminating their eligibility. The defendants appealed the order to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (09-17581). The case was deferred pending the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in the consolidated appeals of several other cases in the Ninth Circuit, all of which also involved beneficiaries seeking to enjoin the California Department of Health Care Services from implementing state legislation reducing payments to certain medical service providers. (Maxwell-Jolly v. Indep. Living Ctr., 572 F.3D 644; Maxwell-Jolly v. Calif. Pharmacists Ass'n, 2010 WL 737650; Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rose Mem. Hosp., 2010 WL 2124276; certiorari granted, 2011 WL 134272). 504 Fed.Appx. 555. On January 5, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint adding another individual plaintiff. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on February 2, claiming that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the action, that several of their claims for relief failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and that their claim for damages was barred by Eleventh Amendment state immunity. On April 23, 2010, the parties stipulated to stay all district court proceedings pending the resolution of the defendants\u2019 appeal of the injunction. While the preliminary injunction was in place pending the outcome of the appeal, the California legislature re-wrote the applicable statutes to modify the IHSS coverage formula. Signed by the Governor on June 30, 2011, SB 73 aimed to reduce all IHSS hours by 20%. The new regime would contain a number of exemptions and provide recipients with an opportunity to request additional service hours in light of the across-the-board reductions. SB 73 was set to take effect on January 1, 2012. On December 1, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a new motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in light of the legislation. They also amended their complaint to add four more plaintiffs and remove one of the original plaintiffs, and submitted a motion to certify the class. The judge granted the TRO, which the defendants again appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (12-15366) on February 22, 2012. On March 2, 2012, the judge granted the injunction to enjoin implementation of SB 73. The court also certified a class of \"all recipients of IHSS in the State of California whose IHSS services will be limited, cut, or terminated due to the budget cuts, and all applicants to IHSS in the State of California who would have been eligible for IHSS services but who are either not eligible, or are eligible for fewer services, as a result of the budget cuts.\" In the meantime, the United States submitted a statement of interest because the litigation implicated the proper interpretation and application the ADA's integration mandate under Title II. On January 7, 2013, the defendants\u2019 first appeal to the Ninth Circuit (09-17581) was dismissed and remanded back to the district court. The court held that the claim was moot\u2014it no longer presented a \"live controversy\" amenable to federal court adjudication because it could no longer grant effective relief in light of California's suspension statute. In March 2013, the parties submitted a joint status report with a proposed class action settlement, which was approved on May 23, 2013. The settlement prevented the planned permanent 20% cut and replaced it with smaller temporary reductions. Following the California legislature's action on these changes, the parties moved jointly on August 7, 2013 to dismiss the case and pending appeals, including a second appeal to the Ninth Circuit (12-15366). In an order filed September 3, 2014, Judge Wilken approved a modification to the settlement agreement submitted by both parties: they agreed to cooperate on legislation that would authorize an assessment of home care services as well as subsequent submission of the assessment to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for approval. We do not have information about how CMS proceeded on the assessment. The parties agreed that the district court would retain jurisdiction for 30 months after the date of CMS approval or disapproval of the assessment. The parties agreed to return to the district court if there were problems with this process. The 2015 California state budget, SB 97, eliminated the remaining 7% cut to IHSS services from July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016. There was no further activity in the court after the September 3, 2014 order and the case is now closed.", "summary": "This 2009 lawsuit was filed as a challenge to California's planned coverage reductions under its In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) program. A federal district court judge enjoined reductions in November 2009, finding that the proposed cuts were likely to violate federal law. When California enacted a new statutory provision to reduce its IHSS coverage in 2011, the court once again enjoined its implementation. In March 2013, the parties entered a settlement that allowed the state to implement much smaller and temporary coverage reductions. And in 2015, the state passed legislation to eliminate the reductions entirely starting July 1, 2015 for one year."} {"article": "On December 5, 2007, a practicing Muslim woman, represented by the ACLU, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the County of San Bernadino in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. She alleged that the defendants had violated her civil rights by forcing her to remove her headscarf (hijab) while she was in custody in San Bernardino County's West Valley Detention Center. (She had been arrested for having an invalid train pass.) On October 17, 2008, the parties settled the case. The settlement agreement specified that Muslim women must be provided a private area to remove their headscarves after arrest and must be provided with county-issued headscarves to cover themselves when they are in the presence of men. The county also paid $10,000 in damages and $35,000 in attorney fees.", "summary": "On December 5, 2007, a practicing Muslim woman filed a lawsuit against the County of San Bernadino in which she alleged that the defendants had violated her civil rights by forcing her to remove her headscarf (hijab) while she was in custody.
\u201ca. Where the inmate is being transferred: b. That the transfer is pursuant to a substitute jail order; c. The reason for the transfer; d. That the inmate will be brought back to New York City for court dates; e. That the inmate will be subject to the rules and regulations of the new jail, including rules about visiting; f. That the new jail is governed by New York State\u2019s Minimum Standards for Management of County Jails; g. That the inmate has the right to make phone calls to the inmate\u2019s lawyer; and h. That if the inmate wants to talk to his lawyer to let them know where they are being moved the inmate, he/she should ask the staff at the new jail.\u201dAdditionally, from January 1, 2022 \u2013 December 31, 2023, any persons New York City DOC housed in Albany County Correctional Facility would be subject to the limits on punitive segregation contained in 40 R.C.N.Y \u00a7\u00a7 1-17(a-g), including age restrictions and enhanced due process protections like the ability to call witnesses at infraction hearings. The case was dismissed with prejudice on October 21, 2019 pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, but the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement.", "summary": "In 2018, four pre-trial detainees filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the New York City Department of Corrections (DOC), the Albany County Correctional Facility, and the Albany County Sheriff's Office. They alleged that the defendants violated their First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and committed assault and battery when they beat and sexually assaulted the plaintiffs during processing. Both New York City and Albany County settled: this included payments to the plaintiffs and changes in practice on the part of the defendants, including notices explaining reasons for transfers, and a ban on transferring NYC detainees to Albany until 2022. The case remains open for enforcement."} {"article": "The four plaintiffs in this case are high school track athletes who alleged that having to compete against transgender female peers (consistently referred to as \"biological males\" in their briefs) has caused the plaintiffs to lose out on significant opportunities to win competitions and further advance in their track careers. They filed suit on February 12, 2020 in the District Court for the District of Connecticut against their school districts and the Connecticut Interschool Athletic Conference, represented by the nonprofit Alliance Defending Freedom. They alleged violations of Title IX and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, along with a preliminary injunction to prevent transgender female athletes from competing against other female athletes for the spring 2020 track season. Background Specifically, the student-athlete plaintiffs alleged that by allowing transgender female athletes to compete in girls' sporting events, the defendant school districts violate rights of other girls competing in high school sports under Title IX in two ways. First, the plaintiffs complain, they fail to provide effective accommodation for the interests and abilities of girls, by failing to provide an appropriate competitive environment for girls. Second, they fail to provide equal treatment, benefits, and opportunities for girls as compared to boys' sports. Procedural history This case was filed just as the novel coronavirus pandemic was beginning to affect the operations of public schools across the country. On April 8, 2020, plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction was denied by Judge Robert N. Chatigny, who stated that it was highly unlikely that the spring track season would occur and that therefore plaintiffs had no need of preliminary relief. A more detailed scheduling order was filed, with settlement conferences and trial both scheduled for 2021. Several additional parties have taken an interest in this case. On February 21, 2020, two transgender female students who were repeatedly named in the complaint filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by the court on April 22, 2020. They are represented by the ACLU and the ACLU of Connecticut. On March 24, 2020, the United States filed a statement of interest through the Department of Justice indicating support for the plaintiffs' position. On April 20, 2020, the school district defendants filed a motion to join the Department of Education (DOE) as a party to the case. They noted that the plaintiffs in this case had also filed a DOE Office of Civil Rights (OCR) complaint, and they were worried about getting two different outcomes if DOE was involved in the OCR complaint, but not in this lawsuit. They also expressed confusion that the United States had indicated an interest in this case through its March 24 filing, but that the DOE, which is responsible for interpreting and enforcing Title IX, was not involved. The DOE submitted a memorandum in opposition to joinder on May 11, 2020. Current status On April 16, 2020, during a telephone hearing, Judge Chatigny instructed plaintiffs' counsel to refer to the intervenors as \"transgender females\" rather than as \"males.\" On May 8, 2020, plaintiffs filed a motion to disqualify, alleging that this order indicates a lack of impartiality and rejects the core arguments of plaintiffs' lawsuit. The judge denied the motion on June 16, 2020. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "Plaintiffs are four high school track athletes in Connecticut who allege that their schools and the Connecticut high school athletic association have discriminated against them under Title IX, specifically through their policies allowing transgender female athletes (who they refer to as \"biological males\") to compete in women's sports. Two specific transgender female high school athletes, who are referenced by name in plaintiff's complaint, filed a successful motion to intervene and are represented by the ACLU. Plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as a preliminary injunction. Due to the coronavirus pandemic and the impending cancellation of spring sports, plaintiffs' preliminary injunction was denied. The United States filed a statement of interest on March 24, 2020. Defendants have attempted to join the Department of Education to the lawsuit. On April 16, 2020, Judge Chatigny ordered platintiffs' counsel to refer to the intervenors as \"transgender females\" rather than as \"males.\" In response to this order, plaintiffs filed a motion to disqualify the judge. The case in ongoing."} {"article": "On July 1, 2014, the Catholic Benefits Association and the Catholic Insurance Company filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The Catholic Benefits Association is an association of Catholic nonprofits and closely held for-profit employers that provide health benefits to their employees, and the Catholic Insurance Company, Inc. sells stop-loss insurance to some of these employers who self-fund their insurance plans. The plaintiffs alleged that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and related agencies' enforcement of the Affordable Care Act's (ACA's) contraceptive services mandate ('mandate') violated the plaintiffs' rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and violated the Administrative Procedures Act. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that notifying HHS of their religious objection to contraception started a chain of events that ended with their employees receiving contraceptive services. The plaintiffs claimed this violates their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech clauses of the First Amendment, and the Administrative Procedures Act. The same plaintiffs had filed an earlier suit, The Catholic Benefits Ass'n v. Sebelius, No. 5:14-cv-00240-R (W.D. Okla. June 4, 2014), which had resulted in an injunction for their nonprofit and closely held for-profit member employers at the time. They filed an additional motion to add employers who joined the association following that date, but it was denied. The current suit is to add those members to the injunction. The court in the preceding case also ruled that the Catholic Insurance Company did not have standing to sue in its own right. On December 29, 2014, the court granted the Catholic Benefits Association a preliminary injunction against federal enforcement of the mandate for their current members who were nonprofit religious employers and for current members who were non-exempt closely held for-profit employers. 81 F.Supp.3d. 1269 (W.D. Oka. 2014). The court did not provide preliminary injunctive relief for future members of the association, for employers that met the ACA definition of religious employer and are exempt from mandate, or for the Catholic Insurance Company. In early 2015, both parties cross appealed the court's decision to grant in part and deny in part the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. On March 17, 2015, however, the Tenth Circuit granted the government's unopposed motion to hold this case and related appeals in abeyance pending resolution of Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell (FA-CO-0006), Southern Nazarene University v. Burwell (FA-OK-0005), and Reaching Souls International v. Burwell (FA-OK-0002). On October 23, 2017, the Tenth Circuit dismissed both appeals pursuant to the plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment on November 1, 2017. They argued that although there was a circuit split over whether the accommodation under the mandate substantially burdened religious exercise, the government changed its position once the issue was before the Supreme Court in 2016. Zubik v. Burwell (FA-PA-0010). In Interim Final Rules issued in October 2017, the government admitted that the accommodation did substantially burden religious exercise and was illegal under RFRA. On March 7, 2018, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction. The Court permanently enjoined the government from enforcing the mandate against CBA members, their health plans, their health insurance issuers, or third-party administrators in connection with their health plans, to the extent that it required CBA members to contract, arrange, pay, or refer for religiously-objectionable medical care. The Court also declared that the mandate violated RFRA. In August, 2018, the Court awarded the plaintiffs $699,725.95 in attorneys' fees and $18,881.41 in expenses not recoverable under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1920. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This suit was filed in the Western District of Oklahoma in July of 2014. It was brought by an association of Catholic employers, the Catholic Benefits Association, to add additional member employers, both religious nonprofits and closely-held for profits, to preliminary injunctive relief the Association had secured for earlier members from the contraceptive services mandate. In March, 2018, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction and declared that the mandate violated RFRA. The Court awarded the plaintiffs $699,725.95 in attorneys' fees and $18,881.41 in expenses. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On December 12, 2011, two former inmates of the Warren County Jail (\u201cJail\u201d) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The plaintiffs sued Warren County (\u201cCounty\u201d) and the South Central Bank of Bowling Green (\u201cBank\u201d) under 42 U.S.C \u00a71983 and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive and monetary relief, claiming violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs argue that the Warren County Jail had a policy of taking checks and cash from the inmates during their admission and, without their knowledge or consent, presenting the checks and cash to the Bank, which accepted them for deposit into Jail\u2019s accounts at the Bank. The plaintiffs also alleged that the Jail retained proceeds of such checks and cash without plaintiff\u2019s consent, and in excess of the amounts authorized by the state law (KRS 441.265) to cover the charges and fees the Jail was entitled to receive. The plaintiffs proposed three classes:
(a) all persons incarcerated in the Jail who were not sentenced prisoners who have had checks in their possession when admitted to the Jail taken, endorsed and deposited by the County Defendants in the Jail\u2019s account or accounts with the Bank or other financial institutions; (b) all persons incarcerated in the Jail who were not sentenced prisoners who have had the cash and checks in their possession when admitted to the Jail retained by the County Defendants without their written consent, and/or in violation of and/or in excess of sums permitted under KRS \u00a7 441.265; and (c) all persons incarcerated in the Jail who were not sentenced prisoners who have had the cash and checks in their possession when admitted to the Jail retained by the County Defendants without giving an accounting to such persons upon release from the Jail.The Bank moved to dismiss the complaint on January 20, 2012. It alleged the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C \u00a71983, because (i) the Bank did not act under color of state law, and (ii) the plaintiffs' constitutional rights were not infringed. Moreover, it argued that the plaintiffs' complaint did not contain plausible violations of Kentucky Law. In the alternative, the Bank stated that the state law claims should not be examined by the court. The County filed a motion for summary judgment on the same day. It argued that (i) part of the claims related to a 2003 incarceration of one of the plaintiffs and, thus, were barred by the statute of limitations; and (ii) the plaintiffs could not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 because the Jail policy did not violate plaintiffs\u2019 constitutional rights and there was no state law violation. Additionally, the County stated that the state law claims failed, and that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies established by Kentucky before bringing the suit. On April 16, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, in order to (i) add a new plaintiff and class representative, (ii) specify that the Bank was a state actor and its conduct was taken under color of state law, and (iii) add a claim for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. On May 29, 2012, Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. granted the Bank\u2019s motion to dismiss and the County\u2019s motion for summary judgment as to the 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 claim. The opinion stated (i) the jail policy was not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, provided the provision of KRS \u00a7 441.265 were followed; (ii) a 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 claim was not the appropriate remedy for the plaintiffs, thus their allegations concerning their Fourteenth Amendment rights should be dismissed; and (iii) the Bank was not acting under the color of state law for purposes of a \u00a71983 claim. The opinion also denied plaintiffs\u2019 motion for leave to file an amended class action complaint, stating that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act was not applicable to the case and, therefore, the amendment was futile. Finally, Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice. The case was then closed.", "summary": "In 2011, two former inmates of the Warren County Jail filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The plaintiffs argued that their Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments\u2019 rights were violated by the Warren County Jail\u2019s policy of taking checks and cash from the inmates during their admission and, without their knowledge or consent, presenting the checks to the Bank, which accepted them for deposit into Jail\u2019s accounts at the Bank. The plaintiffs also allege that the Jail retained proceeds of such checks and cash without plaintiff\u2019s consent, and in excess of the amounts authorized by the state law (KRS 441.265) to cover the charges and fees the Jail is entitled to receive. In 2012, the court dismissed the case, stating that the Jail\u2019s policy did not violate the plaintiffs\u2019 constitutional rights. The case was closed in May 2012."} {"article": "On December 21, 2011, patients civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program filed this lawsuit pro se in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. The plaintiffs sued the Minnesota Department of Health & Human Services (DHS) and the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Seeking injunctive and monetary relief, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fourteenth, First, and Fourth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that recent amendments to the Minnesota sex offender treatment statutes and replacements in DHS and MSOP administration had caused a drastic change in the program. Despite being classified as civilly committed patients, the plaintiffs were now placed in a maximum security facility and repeatedly experienced violations of their personal liberty and dignity. They were provided limited access to the outside world: no access to the internet, exorbitant rates for telephone communications, and harsh and limited policies for in-person visits, including a pat-down of the visitor. The patients further alleged that they were no longer able to have much of their previously allowed personal property and that any incoming property was systematically destroyed by the administration. The patients alleged negligent staff and negligent medical care, resulting in deaths of patients. The sex offender treatment was alleged to be grossly inadequate, resulting in a de facto inability to graduate out of the program and reintegrate into society. The plaintiffs also alleged that the administration deliberately spent the money provided for the sex offender program on the staff, and then unreasonably charges the patients for the inadequately provided basic necessities. The plaintiffs also allege inadequate grievance procedures. The plaintiffs sought to proceed as a class and were provided representation by the state bar's Pro Se Project. On January 25, 2012, and February 6, 2012, Chief Judge Michael J. Davis stayed all other MSOP cases, pending the resolution of the class certification in this lawsuit. The case was also assigned to Magistrate Judge Jeffery J. Keyes on February 6, 2012. The first amended complaint was filed on March 15, 2012. In it, the plaintiffs incorporated their previous allegations and added that their treatment also violated the Minnesota state Constitution and the Minnesota Civil Commitment and Treatment Act. The plaintiffs' complaint relied heavily on a March 2011 Evaluation Report on the Civil Commitment of Sex Offender issued by the Office of the Legislative Auditor for the State of Minnesota. According to the complaint, several years before, a new Executive Director of the MSOP program had been hired and substantially altered program policies. The plaintiffs alleged that the result was vague treatment plans, a lack of qualified clinical staff, and a denial of proper medications and treatments. The plaintiffs also alleged that punishments included solitary confinement, denial of group therapy, denial of exercise, denial of employment opportunities and denial of treatment. In addition, the double-bunking of individuals had led to increased physical and sexual assaults. The plaintiffs alleged they were subjected to intrusive searches without reasonable suspicion, and that their correspondence was searched. Finally, there was no way to leave the program: only one patient had been released without revocation of discharge. On April 30, 2012, all parties stipulated to the defendants' motion for an extended time to answer. This was presumably due to settlement negotiations, as preliminary settlement conferences were scheduled the following week. On July 24, 2012, the defendants additionally stipulated to a temporary restraining order, and Judge Donovan W. Frank certified the plaintiff class of \"[a]ll patients currently civilly committed in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program pursuant to Min. Stat. \u00a7 253B.\" 283 F.R.D. 514 (D. Minn. 2012). Because of these developments, on July 26, 2012, Judge Frank held that the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order was moot. 2012 WL 3061863. On August 15, 2012, Chief Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan found that further study was necessary to address these issues. The court ordered the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services to create a Sex Offender Civil Commitment Advisory Task Force for two years. The court ordered the Task Force to provide the Commissioner with recommendations on less restrictive alternatives and other recommended legislative reforms. On October 5, 2012, Chief Magistrate Judge Boylan issued an order affirming the appointment of specific individuals to the Task Force. Magistrate Judge Jeffrey J. Keyes approved five more appointments to the Task Force on December 13, 2012, Between August and September 2012, several individuals or groups of individuals committed to MSOP filed motions to intervene, to consolidate, to create a sub-class, or for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. These were filed without the assistance or approval of the class counsel. On December 5, 2012, Judge Frank denied each such motion. 2012 WL 6044652. Over the next two years, the parties continued to concurrently participate in settlement negotiations and file motions against each other in court. The commissioner also proceeded with his court-ordered evaluation of the program. On August 8, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. On December 6, 2013, Judge Frank appointed experts under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. On February 20, 2014, Judge Frank granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the equal protection claim raised in the second amended complaint and denied all plaintiffs' and defendants' other motions. In the opinion, Judge Frank warned that he might ultimately find the program to be unconstitutional and urged the legislature to take action. 6 F. Supp. 3d 916. Having received expert recommendations, on June 2, 2014, Judge Frank ordered the defendants to show cause as to why the continued confinement of E.T. (one of the patients at MSOP) did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and why E.T. should not be immediately and unconditionally released from MSOP. On June 9, 2014, plaintiffs filed a motion for the immediate transfer of an individual the court identifies as R.B., on the basis of the same report. On June 11, 2014, the defendants issued a response to the court's order to show cause regarding E.T.'s continued confinement. On June 19, 2014, the Hennepin County Attorney filed an amicus memorandum on the applicable standard for discharge of persons committed as sexually dangerous persons under current Minnesota law as interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme Court. On June 27, 2014, the matter of E.T. and R.B were assigned to Judge Frank and Magistrate Judge Keyes following the show cause hearing in this class action and petitions for habeas corpus filed by E.T. and R.B. On August 11, 2014, Judge Frank declined to declare that confinement of E.T and R.B in MSOP was unconstitutional and refused to order the immediate discharge of E.T and immediate transfer of R.B. 6 F. Supp. 3d 958. On September 9, 2014, Judge Frank denied the defendants' request for a jury trial and granted the plaintiffs' request for a bench trial. 2014 WL 4446270. On October 27, 2014, Judge Davis stayed all \u201ccurrent and future civil rights cases brought by an individual or group of individuals who has or have been civilly committed to the MSOP that are sufficiently related to [Karsjens] . . . pending resolution of the [Karsjens] litigation.\u201d On October 28, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint. On November 6, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied the defendants' petition for review. On February 2, 2015, Judge Frank denied defendants' partial motion to dismiss the third amended complaint as well as the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 2015 WL 420013. Then, on February 9, 2015, the bench trial commenced before Judge Frank. After the six-week bench trial, on June 17, 2015, Judge Frank granted the plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief with respect to counts I and II of their third amended complaint. Judge Frank found that Minnesota's civil commitment statutory scheme was unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied. Applying the strict scrutiny standard, the court concluded that Minnesota's civil commitment statutory scheme was not narrowly tailored and was punitive without the criminal justice system's safeguards. The court also held that the determination that the MSOP and its governing civil commitment statutes were unconstitutional, concluding phase one of the trial. Judge Frank ordered that counts VIII, IX, and X, would be tried in the second phase of trial. 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139. Judge Frank also issued an opinion granting the plaintiffs\u2019 motion to dismiss counts IV, XI, XII, and XIII of the third amended complaint on the condition that the motion to dismiss be with prejudice. The order gave the plaintiffs the option to withdraw their motion if they did not wish to accept the condition of prejudice. 2015 WL 3755930. He had previously deferred ruling on the matter in an April 24, 2015 order. 2015 WL 1893191. On July 22, 2015 Judge Frank denied the defendants' request for certification of appeal. 2015 WL 4478972. The next day, Judge Frank designated former Chief Justice Eric J. Magnuson as Special Master to oversee the injunctive relief imposed by the court. The special master would have \u201cauthority to monitor compliance with the remedies\u201d and \u201cauthority to implement and enforce the injunctive relief imposed by the court and to mediate any dispute between the parties with regard to the implementation of the remedies.\u201d On August 7, 2015 Judge Frank denied various news agencies their request to obtain court records to intervene for the limited purpose of asserting public access to court proceedings. 2015 BL 254617. On August 10, 2015, Judge Frank granted the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss counts IV, XI, XII, and XIII of the third amended complaint with prejudice, and overruled objections filed by plaintiff class members. On August 20, 2015, a further amended stay order was entered, staying all current and future civil rights cases sufficiently related to this case, pending resolution of the appeal. On October 29, 2015, Judge Frank entered an interim injunctive relief order, requiring the defendants to conduct independent risk and phase placement reevaluation of all current patients at the MSOP. These independent risk assessments aimed to determine whether each patient (1) continued to meet the constitutional standard for commitment as set forth in Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1995); (2) could be appropriately transferred or provisionally discharged; (3) could be housed in or monitored by a less restrictive alternative; and (4) was in the proper treatment phase. The defendants were required to complete these assessments within 30 days. 2015 WL 6561712. On October 29, 2015, the defendants filed an appeal to the Eighth Circuit regarding the interim relief order. Accordingly, on November 23, 2015, Judge Frank denied defendants' motion to stay or suspend the interim order, pending the Eighth Circuit appeal. 2015 WL 7432333. The Eighth Circuit granted the defendants' motion for a temporary administrative stay on December 2, 2015. The Circuit Court heard oral argument on April 12, 2016. Back in the district court, on April 14, 2016, the Court Chief Judge John R. Tunheim lifted the 2012 stays 16 individual cases. He held that these cases \u201cwere not integral\u201d to the relief orders in Karjsens. All other cases not identified remained stayed under previous district-wide stay orders. On January 3, 2017, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court\u2019s ruling and vacated the injunctive relief order from October 2015. It found that the district court applied an incorrect standard of scrutiny when it considered the plaintiffs\u2019 due process claims. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit posited that a proper standard was whether MCTA bared a rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose and not the strict scrutiny standard that the district court applied. 845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2017). It remanded the case to district court \u201cfor further proceedings on the remaining claims in the Third Amended Complaint.\u201d Id. As a result of this ruling, the plaintiffs filed a motion for rehearing en banc on January 31, 2017. This motion was denied on February 22, 2017. On March 14, 2017, the District Court Judge Donovan W. Frank ordered a temporary stay pending the parties\u2019 submission on whether the case and other stayed cases with similar claims should remain stayed pending further appeal, and the next steps in this case if the claims are not stayed. On May 3, 2017, Judge Frank again stayed the case pending the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for certiorari in the Supreme Court as to the Eight Circuit's January 3rd ruling. At that point, the following claims remained open in the case: - Fourteenth Amendment Failure to Provide Treatment - Fourteenth Amendment Freedom from Punishment - Fourteenth Amendment Denial of Less Restrictive Alternatives - Fourteenth Amendment Freedom from Inhumane Treatment - First and Fourteenth Amendment Religious Freedom - First Amendment Free Speech and Association - Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure 2017 WL 1743511. Judge Frank stayed the case for an additional 60 days on August 16, 2017. On October 2, 2017, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, refusing to hear the case. 2017 WL 2266349. In light of the Eighth Circuit's opinion, on December 8, 2017, the defendant's filed a motion for summary judgment as to the following claims contained in the plaintiffs' third amended complaint: First Amendment Free Speech and Association, First and Fourteenth Amendment Religious Freedom, Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure. On August 23, 2018, Judge Frank addressed the remaining claims as a result of the Eighth Circuit\u2019s decision and the defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment. The court ultimately granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the surviving claims from the Third Amended Complaint without prejudice, as well as dismissing the remaining four remaining earlier claims, also without prejudice. The court dismissed the early claims (Fourteenth Amendment failure to provide treatment, freedom from punishment, denial of less restrictive alternatives, and freedom from inhumane treatment). The district court did so in accordance with the Eighth Circuit's opinion and the rational basis standard for liability they articulated: conduct must be conscience-shocking to support substantive due process liability. Additionally, the district court was bound by the Eighth Circuit\u2019s decision to conclude that the defendants were not liable under the Fourteenth Amendment for failing to provide less restrictive alternatives to the plaintiff class. Regarding the surviving claims from the Third Amended Complaint, the district court dismissed them due to several factors. For the First and Fourteenth Amendment Religious Freedom claim, the court concluded that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment due to the fact that even if the plaintiffs could establish that the defendants\u2019 policies respecting religion impose a substantial burden on the class members\u2019 religious practices, the plaintiffs failed to identify record evidence by which a jury could conclude that the MSOP\u2019s policies applied to the class as a whole are not reasonably related to legitimate therapeutic and institutional interests. In evaluating the plaintiff's First Amendment freedom of speech and association claim, the court reasoned defendants were entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute over whether the defendants\u2019 policies implicating speech and association are an unreasonable restriction on plaintiffs\u2019 First Amendment rights as applied to the class as a whole. Furthermore, the court granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim because the record lacked substantial evidence showing that MSOP\u2019s policies were unnecessary or unjustified responses to problems of institutional security, and thus the court was bound to defer to defendants\u2019 institutional judgment regarding the need for particular search policies. As a result of this district court order, the plaintiffs appealed to the Eighth Circuit on October 24, 2018. The appeal was limited to the court's dismissal of the following Fourteenth Amendment claims: failure to provide treatment, freedom from punishment, denial of less restrictive alternatives, and freedom from inhumane treatment. On December 20, 2018, Judge John R. Tunheim issued a stay pending the outcome of the plaintiff's appeal to the Eighth Circuit. The appeals court issued their opinion on February 24, 2021, affirming in part and vacating in part the district court's judgment. 988 F.3d 1047. In the opinion written by Judge Shepherd, the appeals court concluded that the district court employed the wrong legal standard in evaluating some of these claims. First, however, the appeals court approved the district court's dismissal of the claim of constitutionally inadequate treatment, holding that the trial court correctly applied the \"shocks the conscious\" standard. The court next addressed the three remaining conditions of confinement claims \u2014 punishment, denial of less restrictive alternatives, and freedom from inhumane treatment. The court held that the district court should have applied the deliberate indifference standard to the inadequate medical care claim. Regarding the other conditions of confinement claims, the court held that they should be evaluated under the Bell standard which typically applies to pretrial detainees. Here, the court held that it should be applied to civil confinement and the trial court must review the totality of circumstances of plaintiffs class' confinement. The Eighth Circuit remanded the case to the district court, where it is ongoing as of March 31, 2021.", "summary": "Patients currently civilly committed in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) filed a lawsuit against the Minnesota Department of Health & Human Services and MSOP seeking injunctive relief and damages. They alleged that defendants violated the Due Process Clause, the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Minnesota Constitution, and the Minnesota Civil Commitment and Treatment Act. The Court certified this group as a class. On August 15, 2012, the Court ordered that the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services create a Sex Offender Civil Commitment Advisory Task Force. On June 17, 2015, the court granted the plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief, but on January 3, 2017 the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling. After the district court issued a new order in light of that remand, the plaintiffs appealed and the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and denied in part that judgment on February 24, 2021. The appeals court remanded the case and it is ongoing."} {"article": "On October 12, 2017, nine passengers of a domestic flight sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) after Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers asked to see every passenger\u2019s identification prior to deplaning. The plaintiffs brought this challenge pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Declaratory Judgment Act, and alleged that the defendants violated the passengers\u2019 Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure, as well as the APA. Represented by the ACLU and the private law firm Covington & Burling, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, as well as an injunction restraining the defendants from further such searches and seizures. The suit was brought in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The complaint asserted that on February 22, 2017, at the request of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), CBP officers stopped and searched every passenger on the domestic Delta Airlines flight. Prior to deplaning at New York City\u2019s JFK Airport, CBP officers required all passengers to provide identification. The plaintiffs\u2014all of who were passengers from the flight\u2014stated that the passengers understood they had no option but to comply. Indeed, CBP officers blocked the airplane exit. The plaintiffs argued that the officers had no warrant for the search, nor probable cause that any passenger had committed a crime or reasonable suspicion to justify investigation. The plaintiffs did not consent to any search or seizure. The plaintiffs described the search as frightening and upsetting, and described the officers\u2019 behavior as coercive. According to the complaint, CBP officers asserted that the incident was part of their routine practice. After media reports on the incident, the complaint indicated that CBP further added that the investigation was part of a search for a particular individual subject to removal from the U.S. The plaintiffs argued, however, that CBP still had not provided a reason for searching every passenger on the flight, especially considering it could have just relied on the flight manifest (passenger list). The case was assigned to Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis on October 12, 2017. On January 16, 2018, the defendants moved to stay discovery pending their anticipated motion to dismiss, a request which Magistrate Judge Vera M. Scanlon denied on January 25. On March 9, the defendants filed their motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Though the court ordered the defendants to comply with discovery orders, that fall, the defendants moved to stay discovery pending the motion to dismiss, among other discovery disputes litigated that year. On December 13, 2018, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing to sue because the defendants' conduct was part of an alleged widespread practice, which increased the plaintiffs' chances of being searched on a future domestic flight. The court also found that the plaintiffs had satisfied the final agency action requirement to bring an APA claim. The parties continued to litigate discovery through the first half of 2019 until the parties notified the court that they had reach a settlement in July and would file for dismissal by September. On September 30, 2019, the parties filed for dismissal and agreed to settle the case. Under the terms of the agreement, CBP circulated a new policy directive to ports of entry nationwide clarifying that CBP does not have a policy or practice of checking the identification of deplaning domestic passengers. If CBP officers do seek to conduct document checks of deplaning domestic passengers in the future, they were required to make clear through their words and actions that participation is voluntary and request that airline personnel announce over the airplane\u2019s public address system that participation is voluntary. The officers were also required to provide an unimpeded path for passengers to exit the airplane and explain, if asked, that passengers who decline to participate will face no law enforcement consequences as a result. The settlement also allocated $10,000 in attorneys' fees to the ACLU and $30,000 in fees to Covington & Burling. The court entered judgment dismissing the case on October 10, 2019. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On Oct. 12, 2017, nine passengers of a domestic flight sued the DHS after CBP officers asked to see every passenger\u2019s identification prior to deplaning. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the APA and Fourth Amendment, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs survived a motion to dismiss in December 2018. After continuing to litigate various discovery issues, the parties reached a settlement in summer 2019 and dismissed the case voluntarily in September 2019. The settlement ensures that CBP communicates in the future that any document checks conducted are truly voluntary. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On October 29, 2015, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. The Plaintiff sued the County of Tulare under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by the Human Rights Defense Center and Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld, the Plaintiff asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as damages. PLN claimed that the County of Tulare violated its free speech, due process, and equal protection rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. Specifically, the Plaintiff claimed that the County of Tulare censored its publication by adopting and implementing mail policies that prohibited delivery of the PLN mail, and the County failed to provide due process notice or opportunity to challenge the censorship. The Plaintiff requested declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages. Four days later, the Plaintiff requested a preliminary injunction. On December 16, 2015, Judge John A. Mendez, granted in part the Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court denied the request that the prison be barred from censoring mail because it contained staples. Because the Defendants already ceased this policy and implemented a new one that allowed delivery of the Plaintiff's publications to jail inmates after staff removed any staples and tapes, the court held that the Plaintiff did not have a likelihood of current irreparable harm. But the court granted the Plaintiff's request that Defendants provide adequate written notice and an administrative appeal process to both prisoners and senders when Defendants refuse to deliver publications to prisoners at the County jails. The court found sufficient likelihood of success on this due process claim, that the Plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm, and that the preliminary injunction was in the public's interest. In February 2016, the parties began settlement negotiations and the court appointed Magistrate Judge Edmund F. Brennan to mediate the settlement. The parties reached an agreement and on July 6, 2016, Judge Mendez entered a consent decree. Under the agreement, the Defendants agreed to deliver publications, correspondence, or documents sent by any publisher to prisoners and not refuse them because they contain staples, provided that the Defendants may remove the staples. Additionally, the Defendants agreed to provide adequate written notice and an administrative review process of decisions to refuse any publication, correspondence, or document sent from the publisher. The Defendants agreed to include an explanation of the new mail policy in its handbook and website and pay $15,000 in damages and an additional amount for attorneys' fees and costs. The court retained jurisdiction for the consent decree to remain in effect until a motion for termination by either party. However, the court found that the case concerned the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of a publisher and therefore, was not a case concerning prison conditions under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. On August 8, 2016, the court ordered the Defendants to pay $140,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. As of March 21, 2020, there has been no additional activity on this case, but it is still ongoing since the consent decree is still in effect.", "summary": "Prison Legal News filed a lawsuit against the County of Tulare under \u00a7 1983 claiming the County Jail refused to deliver its publication without notice or opportunity for appeal. On December 16, 2015, the Court signed a preliminary injunction ordering the Tulare County Jail to provide Prison Legal News adequate notice and opportunity for appeal when the jail refused to deliver PLN's publication. On July 6, 2016 the parties reached a settlement. The Defendants agreed not to refuse to deliver publications, correspondence, or documents sent by any publisher to prisoners because the items contained staples, provided that the Defendants may remove the staples. They also paid $15,000 in damages and $140,000 in fees and costs."} {"article": "This summary is based on the documents available on the U.S. Dept. of Justice (DOJ) website. On March 24, 2000, a former high school student filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee (Judge Thomas G. Hull) against the Sullivan County Board of Education (SCBE) and several students (student defendants), under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000d. On September 24, 2000, an amended complaint was filed to add another former student as a plaintiff. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged that they were subject to racial harassment while attending Sullivan East High School. The plaintiffs alleged that the harassment (including a barrage of racial slurs, derogatory graffiti, and paraphernalia) were known or should have been known to school officials, but they failed to take appropriate steps to address the problems in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages resulting from the SCBE's deliberate indifference to the verbal and physical racial harassment committed by students under the SCBE's disciplinary authority. On November 28, 2000, the DOJ filed a complaint-in-intervention to seek relief to ensure that the SCBE will operate a school system free of racial harassment for its students. On July 27, 2002, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss claims against the student defendants. The docket indicates that there was a settlement with at least one student defendant. On October 16, 2002, the District Court (Judge Hull) entered a consent decree settling the lawsuit. The SCBE agreed to, among other things: (1) hire an expert to evaluate its policies for preventing and remedying discrimination; (2) conduct school climate assessments; (3) develop comprehensive plans and education programs to prevent discrimination; and (4) maintain records of harassment allegations. The SCBE agreed to submit quarterly reports to the DOJ. The consent decree was to remain in effective for four years. Monetary damages for the plaintiff were set forth in a separate confidential agreement. The consent decree ended in 2006 without any further litigation, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2000, former high school students filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee against the Sullivan County Board of Education (SCBE) for deliberately being indifferent to racial harassments committed by other students under its disciplinary authority. On November 28, 2000, the U.S. Dept. of Justice filed a complaint-in-intervention to ensure that the SCBE complied with federal rules for non-discrimination. On October 16, 2002, the District Court (Judge Hull) issued a consent order which settled the lawsuit and dismissed the action."} {"article": "On August 12, 2012, the Hawaii Defense Foundation and two of its members filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii. The plaintiffs sued the City and County of Honolulu, an employee of the Honolulu Police Department (HPD), and ten anonymous administrators of the Honolulu Police Department Facebook page under 42 U.S.C \u00a71983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause. The plaintiffs alleged that the Honolulu Police Department banned members of the public from participating in the public forum of their Facebook page. Specifically, the named plaintiffs in this case had their comments and posts criticizing the HPD deleted from the Official Honolulu Police Department Facebook Page and were subsequently banned from the Facebook page. The plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to restore their own posts, allow them to continue posting, and prohibit defendants from banning people or removing political posts. Following several status conferences, defendants agreed to work with the American Civil Liberties Union alongside the plaintiffs to develop a policy governing public posting on the Official Hawaii Police Department Facebook page. The court subsequently deemed the motions for the Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction moot. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on October 23, 2013 after settlement negotiations failed due to disagreements over the forms of dismissal and attorneys\u2019 fees. Defendants filed for Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on claims against the employee of the Hawaii Police Department. The parties then reached a settlement on all issues except attorneys\u2019 fees on January 16, 2014 and the pending motions were terminated. Although the private settlement is not available, the stipulation for dismissal states that the plaintiffs had their posting privileges restored, and the HPD changed their policies and procedures regarding the administration of their Facebook page. Plaintiffs sought attorneys\u2019 fees of $64,690.29. On April 12, 2014 Magistrate Judge Richard L. Puglisi recommended attorneys\u2019 fees of $22,064.39, believing that the requested hourly rates were not based on Hawaiian market rates, the attorneys billed for excessive time and duplicative work, and that a reduction of 25% was appropriate to offset the attorneys\u2019 practice of billing in half-hour increments. 2014 WL 2804445. Plaintiffs filed an objection to the reductions. On June 19, 2014, Judge J. Michael Seabright adopted in part and modified in part the recommended fees. He affirmed that the hourly rate was not in line with Hawaiian market rates, that the billed hours were excessive and duplicative, and that the magistrate judge\u2019s recommendation was within a reasonable fee range but recommended an upward adjustment on hourly fees to ensure lawyers continue to represent novel civil rights cases. Judge Seabright awarded $31,610.56 in attorneys\u2019 fees. 2014 WL 2804448. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2012, the Hawaii Defense Foundation filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii. Plaintiffs alleged that the policy of deleting critical or political posts and comments on the Official Honolulu Police Department Facebook page violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. In 2014, the parties reached a private settlement and the plaintiffs were awarded attorneys' feeds. The case closed in June 2014."} {"article": "On August 8, 2012, two Missouri prisoners filed this class-action lawsuit under \u00a7 1983 against the Missouri Department of Corrections. The prisoners, represented by the ACLU, asked the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri for declaratory relief that a state constitutional amendment, voted on by the public on August 7, 2012, was unconstitutional and for injunctive relief against the enforcement or implementation of that amendment. Under Missouri's constitution, freedom of religion, the plaintiffs explained, had long been broader than under the federal First Amendment. Amendment 2 would strengthen religious rights still further -- except for prisoners. For prisoners, Amendment 2 shrank religious rights, providing that the Missouri freedom-of-religion section \"shall not be construed to expand the rights of prisoners in state or local custody beyond those afforded by the laws of the United States.\" The prisoners claimed that the voter-approved amendment to the Missouri Constitution would, if enforced, deprive prisoners of the additional protections of religious liberty guaranteed by the Missouri Constitution (the prisoners claimed Missouri's Constitution was more protective of an individual's right to religious liberty and expression than federal law). essentially sought to limit Missouri prisoners' religious liberty to that protected by federal law, while providing even greater protection to non-prisoner Missouri citizens. The prisoners claimed this violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. They sought to define a class of all current and future prisoners in the custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections. On September 10, 2012, the state moved to dismiss the case. On February 25, 2013, the Court (Judge Howard F. Sachs) agreed with the state that the prisoners had not identified any specific endangered exercise of religious liberty, and thus, the case was a \"moot dispute over abstract, hypothetical concepts, unripe for judicial resolution.\" 2013 WL 684189. In dismissing the prisoners' claim, Judge Sachs said that the prisoners did not offer any reason or cite any cases to support a claim that the Missouri Constitution, prior to Amendment 2, provided prisoners any greater protection of religious liberty than federal law. Thus, there was no change in the law for prisoners, and absent a concrete injury, or even a hypothetical situation where religious liberty would be altered by the new amendment, the court had no controversy before it. The docket shows no sign of an appeal, so the opinion is presumably final.", "summary": "Missouri prisoners filed a class-action lawsuit against the Missouri Department of Corrections challenging a state constitutional amendment. The challenged provision, Amendment 2, sought to limit Missouri prisoners' religious liberty to that protected by federal law. Judge Sachs dismissed the prisoners' complaint as moot and unripe because there was no change in the law for prisoners, and therefore, the court had no controversy before it."} {"article": "On May 28, 2019, the County of Santa Clara, CA and various healthcare providers sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California for violating the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and various constitutional clauses in a Final Rule published on May 21, 2019. The Rule, which plaintiffs called the \u201cDenial-of-Care\u201d Rule, changed the way healthcare institutions must protect and accommodate healthcare providers\u2019 religious objections to providing certain medical services. Represented by Lambda Legal, the Center for Reproductive Rights, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, and Mayer Brown LLP, plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to strike down the Rule as unlawful and unconstitutional, and enjoin Defendants from implementing and enforcing it. They also sought attorneys fees. This case was first assigned to Judge Nathanael M. Cousins and later reassigned to Judge William Alsup. Plaintiffs included the County of Santa Clara (as an owner of healthcare facilities); five private healthcare facilities that provided reproductive-health services and healthcare services for LGBT individuals; four individual physicians and a licensed counselor who worked for these entities; three national associations of medical professionals; and two organizations that provided a wide range of services to the LGBT community. They alleged that the rule endangered patients\u2019 health in the name of advancing the religious beliefs of those who are entrusted with caring for them, elevating religious objections over all other interests and values. They noted that the rule expanded the types of healthcare workers that can decline to serve patients based on religious objections, expanded the types of activities that may be objected to, and failed to reconcile the objections with the needs and rights of patients. Their complaint contained ten separate causes of action, including three different APA violations (arbitrary and capricious, in excess of statutory authority, and not in accordance with other federal laws), as well as constitutional violations (Establishment Clause, Substantive Due Process/Right to Privacy and Personal Autonomy, Free Speech, and Equal Protection) brought by the non-County plaintiffs. Santa Clara County also alleged two violations independent from the other plaintiffs under the Spending Clause and Separation of Powers. On June 11, 2019, plaintiffs filed a motion for a nationwide preliminary injunction to enjoin the Rule. On June 13, 2019, the court issued an order relating two other Ninth Circuit cases challenging the same HHS rule to this case; the plaintiffs in both of the related cases had also filed motions for preliminary relief. Because one or more of the parties in these cases declined to consent to have a magistrate judge hear their cases, all three were randomly reassigned to District Court Judge William Alsup. On July 1, 2019, the court issued an order approving a stipulated request made by the parties. The order postponed the effective date of the Final Rule to November 22, 2019, and suspended the preliminary injunction motions. It also scheduled a summary judgment hearing for October 30, 2019. On July 8, the court issued an order granting all three cases\u2019 parties\u2019 Joint Administrative Motion for Relief from Automatic Referral to the Alternative Dispute Resolution Multi-Option Program, excusing them from mandatory participation. On August 21, 2019, HSS filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment. Following the hearing on October 30, 2019, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion of summary judgment and denied HHS's motion to dismiss on November 19, 2019. The court vacated the Rule for its discriminatory and unconstitutional scope. Specifically, the court found that some of the Rule's definitions extended the scope of its religious exemption beyond the text of underlying federal statutes that authorized conscience objections by healthcare workers. Final judgment was entered on January 8, 2020. 411 F.Supp. 3d 1001. HHS appealed the decision on March 6, 2020. The appeal was assigned USCA Case Number 20-15399 and is ongoing.", "summary": "The County of Santa Clara and various healthcare providers sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services on the grounds that HHS's Final Rule (published on May 21, 2019), violated the Administrative Procedure Act and various Constitutional clauses. The Rule changed the way healthcare institutions must protect and accommodate healthcare providers\u2019 religious objections to providing certain medical services. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to strike down the Rule as unlawful and unconstitutional, and enjoin Defendants from implementing and enforcing it. On June 11, 2019, plaintiffs filed a motion for a nationwide preliminary injunction to enjoin the Rule and on August 21, 2019, HHS filed a motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment. After a hearing on October 30, 2019, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied HHS's motion to dismiss on November 19, 2019. The court vacated the Rule for its discriminatory and unconstitutional scope, and final judgment was entered on January 8, 2020. HHS appealed the decision on March 6, 2020. The appeal was assigned USCA Case Number 20-15399 and is ongoing."} {"article": "On September 5, 2008, a non-profit immigrants rights organization and individual Latino residents of Sonoma County filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Northern California, under \u00a7 1983, Bivens, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act and state tort law against the Sonoma County Sheriff's Department and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The plaintiffs, represented by private and public interest counsel, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging a violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the Sheriff's Department and ICE had been illegally collaborating to stop and search people who appeared to be of Latino origin, interrogate them about their immigration status, and detain them in the county jail without informing them of what charges they were being held on, providing them with access to legal or consular services, or notifying them of their right to a hearing. On January 28, 2009, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, and on July 31 the Court (Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton) partly granted and partly denied their motion. Comm. for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County v. County of Sonoma, 644 F.Supp.2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2009). The Court held that plaintiffs' Bivens claims were not subject to dismissal based on sovereign immunity and that plaintiffs had stated a claim under federal and state law for discrimination in programs that receive government funding, but also held that the regulations authorizing immigration officers to issue detainers to other law enforcement agencies were not invalid, that plaintiffs' claims for unlawful withholding and unreasonable delay of hearings was not cognizable under the APA, that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for conspiracy and that plaintiff's failure to comply with state law requirements precluded state tort claims. Plaintiffs amended their complaint on August 28, 2009 and again on September 14 to include federal tort claims. Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint on October 29. On March 10, 2010, the Court (Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton) granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Comm. for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County v. County of Sonoma, C 08-4220 PJH, 2010 WL 841372 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2010). The Court held that ICE's interpretation of regulations allowing it to issue immigration detainers to initiate local custody of immigration detainers was reasonable, but withheld judgment on whether the defendants' implementation of those regulations and their use of immigration detainers violated the law, and did not dismiss any of plaintiffs' claims. On March 18, 2010, the case was reassigned to Judge Richard Seeborg, and defendants moved for reconsideration of Judge Hamilton's March 10 order. The Court (Judge Richard Seeborg) reaffirmed the order in all respects on June 11 and allowed the parties to proceed with discovery. Comm. for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County v. County of Sonoma, C 08-4220 RS, 2010 WL 2465030 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2010). On July 15, 2011, plaintiffs came to a private settlement with the Sheriff's Department. The terms of the settlement required the Sheriff's Department to (1) pay damages ($3000 to one of the remaining individual plaintiffs and $5000 to the other), (2) change its policies on immigrations violations to, among other things, prohibit independent sweeps for such violations and not to alert ICE concerning people arrested for low level traffic violations unless the law so required, (3) change its booking procedures to include, among other things, alerting the consulates of non-citizens who had been arrested, (4) post information on the rights of non-citizens in its jails, and (5) give notice to plaintiffs of any changes to the above policies and procedures during over the following three years. Plaintiffs concluded a private settlement with ICE about six months later, on December 5, 2011. Under the settlement, ICE (1) affirmed its interim policy governing the use of immigration detainers, adopted in August 2010, which only allowed the use of detainers after another law enforcement agency had independently arrested a non-citizen for a criminal violation, (2) agreed to distribute the above policy to all of its agents, and three (3) agreed to post information on free legal counsel and on the rights and procedures of the immigration system in Sonoma County jails for a period of three years.", "summary": "On September 5, 2008, a non-profit immigrants rights organization and three Latino residents of Sonoma County filed a lawsuit against the Sonoma County Sheriff's Department and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), claiming that the Sheriff's Department and ICE had been illegally collaborating to stop, search, interrogate and detain people who appeared to be of Latino origin. The suit was settled in 2011, with one agreement requiring the Sheriff's Department to pay damages to individual plaintiffs and to change its policy on immigration violations and its booking procedure, and another agreement requiring ICE to affirm its amended policy limiting the use of immigration detainers."} {"article": "This is a case brought by eight same-sex couples seeking to marry or have their marriages recognized by the State of Nevada. Represented by Lambda Legal and private counsel, they brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada, suing the Governor and several clerks/recorders. The Nevada Constitution prohibited official recognition of same-sex marriages. See Nev. Const. art. I, \u00a7 21 (\"Only a marriage between a male and female person shall be recognized and given effect in [Nevada].\"). There was, however, a law offering \"domestic partnership\" status to two persons of any gender. Under Nev. Rev. Stat. ch. 122A, Nevada recognizes both out-of-state same-sex marriages and out-of-state same-sex marriage-like relationships as \"domestic partnerships.\" A couple not having the status on the basis of an out-of-state partnership/marriage can enter into a Nevada domestic partnership after satisfying marriage-like eligibility requirements and filing with the Secretary of State a form declaring their decision \"to share one another's lives in an intimate and committed relationship of mutual caring.\" By statute, Nevada gives domestic partners the same rights and responsibilities as spouses, except, most notably, that it \"do[es] not require a public or private employer in this State to provide health care benefits to or for the domestic partner of an officer or employee.\" On November 26, 2012, Judge Robert Jones, of the District of Nevada, held the Nevada scheme constitutional. 911 F.Supp.2d 996. The Court first held that the Supreme Court's summary disposition in Baker v. Nelson was largely dispositive; in that case, the Supreme Court summarily dismissed an equal protection challenge to Minnesota's marriage laws for lack of a substantial federal question. In case the Court of Appeals disagreed with this approach, however, the District Court continued to address the issues on the merits. It found that the appropriate constitutional analysis was rational basis scrutiny, because the \"homosexual-rights lobby\" \"has great political power.\" And applying rational basis review, the court held that Nevada's ban on same-sex marriage was rationally related to its legitimate goal of nurturing heterosexual marriage and families:
Should [marriage] be expanded to include same-sex couples with the state's imprimatur, it is conceivable that a meaningful percentage of heterosexual persons would cease to value the civil institution as highly as they previously had and hence enter into it less frequently, opting for purely private ceremonies, if any, whether religious or secular, but in any case without civil sanction, because they no longer wish to be associated with the civil institution as redefined, leading to an increased percentage of out-of-wedlock children, single-parent families, difficulties in property disputes after the dissolution of what amount to common law marriages in a state where such marriages are not recognized, or other unforeseen consequences.\"Accordingly, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit on December 4th, 2012. The 9th Circuit stayed the appeal while the DOMA and Perry cases were pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. On February 10, 2014, the Nevada Attorney General withdrew the state's brief defending the state's same-sex marriage ban because of a recent 9th Circuit case, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbot Laboratories, which established that laws making distinctions on sexual orientation faced heightened scrutiny. The state did not believe that the ban could survive this level of review. The 9th Circuit heard oral arguments, on September 8, 2014, before Judges Stephen Reinhardt, Ronald M. Gould, and Marsha S. Berzon. On October 7, the 9th Circuit overturned the district court's decision and held that Nevada's denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples was unconstitutional. The next day, the Supreme Court (Justice Anthony Kennedy) initially stayed the 9th Circuit's decision. Later in the day, Justice Kennedy reversed himself and lifted the stay as it applied to the state of Nevada. On October 9, 2014, the Nevada District Court (Judge James Mahan) granted the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction preventing the state from enforcing its same-sex marriage ban in light of the 9th Circuit's decision, and the state began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. On October 13, 2014, appellee Coalition for the Protection of Marriage filed a petition for an en banc rehearing, and on January 9, 2015 the court issued an order denying rehearing. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This is a case brought by eight same-sex couples seeking to marry or have their marriages recognized by the State of Nevada. On November 26, 2012, Judge Robert Jones rejected their claim. On Oct. 7, the 9th Circuit overturned the district court's decision and held that Nevada's denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples was unconstitutional."} {"article": "On August 7, 2013, several residents of New York City filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the City of New York under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for Fourth Amendment Constitutional violations. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief in addition to compensatory and punitive damages and attorneys' fees. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the New York Police Department (\"NYPD\") operation known as \"Operation Lucky Bag\" resulted in systematic unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the U.S. Constitution and other state laws. Operation Lucky Bag involved NYPD officers leaving bags containing valuable items unattended and in plain sight. The officers waited for individuals to pick up the bag or valuable item and then arrest those individuals under the assumption that they intended to keep the items. The plaintiffs alleged that these incidents represented arrest without probable cause in violation of their right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. On December 24, 2013, the City filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim in their complaint. They raised that the officers would be protected by qualified immunity and, in the alternative, the municipality would not be liable under Monell without proof of an official pattern or practice. The plaintiffs pursued court-supervised discovery to prove that Operation Lucky Bag was an official custom within the department. Meanwhile, settlement discussions ensued such that the court never ruled on the motion to dismiss. On September 16, 2014, the parties entered a settlement agreement. In the agreement, the defendants agreed to amend Operation Lucky Bag so that arrests would only be made in the following instances: (i) when the valuables are separated from the other property and that remaining property is discarded, (ii) where property is removed from someone else's belongings, or (iii) an individual, having taken property and been confronted by a police officer, lies about having taken the property. The defendants further agreed to train NYPD officers on these criteria and report to the plaintiffs' counsel on compliance while subject to the District Court's jurisdiction for one year. In addition, the defendants agreed to pay the named plaintiffs $50,000 and to pay all attorneys' fees and costs associated with the action (it is unclear from the docket how much the defendants paid in attorneys' fees and costs). In return, the plaintiffs released the defendants from all liability arising from the facts of the lawsuit. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On August 7, 2013, several residents of New York City filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the City of New York alleging that a NYPD operation known as Operation Lucky Bag violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Operation Lucky Bag consisted of leaving valuable items unattended and in plain sight, waiting for individuals to pick up the items, and then arresting them under the belief that the individual intended to keep the items. On September 16, 2014, the parties entered a settlement agreement providing for amendments to Operation Lucky Bag procedures, regular compliance reports to plaintiffs' counsel, attorneys' fees, and damages to named plaintiffs totalling $50,000.00."} {"article": "On September 30, 2004, the United States Department of Justice (D.O.J.) filed a lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e, et seq. (Title VII) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority and the New York City Transit Authority. The D.O.J. asked the court for injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants had violated Title VII by discriminating against Muslim and Sikh employees because of their religion. Muslim and Sikh individuals are required by their religion to wear head coverings. The defendants demanded that Muslim and Sikh employees remove their head coverings or cover them with an employer issued hat. The uniform policy provided that employer-issued hats were optional or that non-employer issued hats were prohibited. When the Muslim and Sikh employees refused to cover or remove their head coverings, they were transferred to assignments with no passenger contact. The complaint alleges that the defendants discriminated because of religion by (1) selectively enforcing uniform policies regarding employer issued hats to target Muslim and Sikh employees who are required by their religion to wear head coverings; (2) taking adverse employment action against Muslim and Sikh employees because of their religious obligation to wear head coverings; (3) failing or refusing to reasonably accommodate sincerely held religious beliefs; and (4) failing or refusing to take appropriate action to remedy the discriminatory effects of the policies and practices. This case has been consolidated with five other lawsuits filed by individual employees of the defendants alleging discrimination because of religion. Those cases are: (1) Small v. New York City Transit Authority (1:03-cv-02139), (2) Muhammad v. New York City Transit Authority (1:04-cv-02294), (3) Lewis v. New York City Transit Authority (1:04-cv-02331), (4) Harrington v. Reuter (1:05-cv-03341), and (5) Singh v. New York City Transit Authority (1:05-cv-05477). The individual employees in each of these cases are Sikh or Muslim and allege discrimination because of their refusal to cover their religious head coverings with an employer issued hat, remove their religious head coverings, or emblazon their religious head coverings with the employer logo. The plaintiffs in Small, Muhammad, and Lewis are Muslim women further allege discrimination because of gender. (The defendants permitted Muslim men to wear their religious head coverings uncovered and un-emblazoned.) The parties engaged in protracted discovery disputes, but on May 30, 2012 entered into a settlement agreement. Under it, the MTA will permit any religious headgear, so long as it is blue, and that it will pay $184,500 to eight current or former employees who had been denied religious accommodations under the old policy.", "summary": "This is the lead case of a number of consolidated cases in which Muslim and Sikh employees of the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority and the New York City Transit Authority claimed they were being discriminated against because the Authority refused to allow them to wear their religious head coverings without also wearing an MTA logo or hat. Employees who refused were reassigned to positions in which they would have no contact with the public.
\"Rather than continuing this litigation, the President intends in the near future to rescind the Order and replace it with a new, substantially revised Executive Order to eliminate what the panel erroneously thought were constitutional concerns. In so doing, the President will clear the way for immediately protecting the country rather than pursuing further, potentially time-consuming litigation. Under the unusual circumstances presented here\u2014including the extraordinarily expedited proceedings and limited briefing to the panel, the complexity and constitutional magnitude of the issues, the Court\u2019s sua sponte consideration of rehearing en banc, and respect for the President\u2019s constitutional responsibilities\u2014the government respectfully submits that the most appropriate course would be for the Court to hold its consideration of the case until the President issues the new Order and then vacate the panel\u2019s preliminary decision.\"En banc proceedings before the court were then stayed pending further orders. Meanwhile, the State of Oregon filed a motion to intervene in the district court on Feb. 22, along with a series of declarations in support of the motion. The motion argued that \"the States of Washington and Minnesota are not in a position to speak to the injuries suffered in Oregon,\" and that \"[i]f Washington and Minnesota prevail in this case, as they should, it is possible that this Court may craft a more limited remedy, short of a nationwide injunction, that will not address the harm to Oregon\u2019s unique sovereign interests.\" On Feb. 24, the government filed a motion in the Ninth Circuit to hold proceedings in abeyance pending further order of the court. The government argued that the court's Feb. 16 order staying en banc proceedings \"reflects the appropriateness of awaiting further developments before committing further resources of the parties or the Court to appellate litigation.\" The plaintiffs immediately countered that the motion to hold proceedings in abeyance should be denied: \"[a]lthough Defendants contend that this case presents urgent national security issues, they now request indefinite delay of the Ninth Circuit proceedings.\" The plaintiffs also noted that \"there appears to have been a lack of communication between the Department of Justice and the White House\" regarding whether the government plans to repeal the existing EO or defend it on appeal. The plaintiffs further argued that, given that the government's motion does not make new representations about whether the President intends to rescind the EO, and given that the White House has \"repeatedly stated that the Executive Order will not be rescinded,\" there is no justification for the abeyance request. For these reasons, plaintiffs said, appellate briefing on the merits of the preliminary injunction should continue as planned. On Feb. 27, the Ninth Circuit denied the motion to hold proceedings in abeyance. However, on its own motion, the court extended the appellate briefing schedule, so that the opening brief would be due on Mar. 10; the answering brief on Mar. 31; and an optional reply brief on Apr. 5. Back in the district court, on Feb. 28, the parties held a telephone conference regarding the defendants' request to extend disclosure and status report deadlines. The FRCP 26(f) Conference Deadline was extended to Mar. 15; the Initial Disclosure Deadline to Mar. 29; and the Joint Status Report to Apr. 5. On Mar. 6, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 EO and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. On the same day, the government filed court notice of the new EO in this case. On Mar. 7, the government, with the plaintiffs' consent, moved to dismiss its Ninth Circuit appeal. The court granted this motion on Mar. 8. On Mar. 15, the Court denied en banc review, and also (explaining that no party had formally moved for vacatur) retained the opinion rejecting a stay as a precedential, published opinion. There were several separate opinions filed: Three dissents, by Judge Bybee, Judge Kozinski, Judge Bea (each joined by each other and by Judge Callahan and Judge Ikuta), expressing the view that the panel opinion was wrong. Judge Reinhardt and Judge Berzon each filed concurrences emphasizing that the dissents were addressing issues not before the court, since the appeal had been withdrawn. (The formal mandate ending appellate jurisdiction issued on Mar. 24.) Back in the district court, on Mar. 9, the court granted the State of Oregon's Motion to Intervene. Also on Mar. 9, both the plaintiff State of Washington and the plaintiff State of Minnesota filed a Response to the government's new EO. The State of Washington argued that the President could not evade an injunction by simply withdrawing the enjoined EO and issuing a new one. More specifically, Washington argued that two of the second EO's provisions, (1) the 90-day ban on entry of persons from several Muslim-majority countries; and (2) the 120-day suspension of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, were simply reinstated versions of the provisions that the court had already enjoined. Washington argued that the court should confirm that its original injunction continues to apply to the reissued provisions. The plaintiff State of Minnesota noted in its Response that the government could not unilaterally modify a preliminary injunction by issuing a new EO. On Mar. 10, Judge Robart issued an \"Order Regarding Defendants' Notice of the Filing of a New Executive Order and Plaintiffs' Response.\" In it, the court noted that, though the parties had respectively filed a \"notice\" and a \"response\" regarding the new EO, neither party had filed a motion to either modify or enforce the injunction. The court declined to decide any of the issues raised in the parties' filings until a motion was filed. The court further declined to resolve the parties' dispute regarding the applicability of the prior injunction to the new EO until the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. Following those instructions, on Mar. 13, the plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint, along with an emergency motion to enforce the court's Feb. 3 preliminary injunction. The proposed second amended complaint was on behalf of Washington, California, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Oregon. In the amended complaint, plaintiffs contended that the new EO violated the First, Fifth, and Tenth Amendments, as well as the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief; specifically, the plaintiffs requested that the defendants be enjoined from implementing or enforcing Sections 2(c), 3(c), 5(a)-(c), 5(d), 5(e), 6(b), and 6(a) of the EO, which they asserted would otherwise have a detrimental economic impact on state operations, specifically with regard to tourism and to hospital and university recruiting. The court ordered the U.S. to file a response to the plaintiffs' emergency enforcement motion by the end of the day on Mar. 14. In that Mar. 14 response, the U.S. argued that the court's injunction was specific to the first EO, and that the policies in the new EO were \"substantially different\" from the previously-enjoined policies, such that the injunction no longer had any effect. On Mar. 15, as a backup should the court decline to rule on its Mar. 13 Emergency Motion to Enforce Preliminary Injunction, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order. A similar request had been filed a few days earlier in Ali v. Trump, a related case also pending before Judge Robart. In this case, the states explained, \"To avoid any prejudice to Defendants, the States present no new substantive arguments in this motion, instead joining in full the arguments for emergency relief advanced by the plaintiffs in Ali v. Trump, in which Defendants have had an opportunity to respond in writing and this Court has scheduled a hearing at 2pm today.\". In another case about the second EO, Hawaii v. Trump, filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii, on March 15, the District Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the U.S., nationwide, from enforcing or implementing Sections 2 and 6 of the new EO. This was the first nationwide injunction of EO 13780. On Mar. 16, in this case, the district court allowed the filing of the Second Amendment Complaint described above, but denied the plaintiffs' emergency motion to enforce the court's prior preliminary injunction against Sections 2(c) and 6(a) of the second EO. The court referenced the \"substantial distinctions\" between the first and second EOs, namely the second EO's delayed implementation, exclusion of Iraq in the list of banned countries, and elimination of the religious minority preference. On Mar. 17, the court stayed, sua sponte, the plaintiffs' motion for a TRO so long as the TRO entered in Hawaii v. Trump or a preliminary injunction of equal scope remained in effect. The court noted that, should circumstances change such that lifting the stay is warranted, either party could move to do so. On Mar. 30, the federal government appealed Hawaii v. Trump to the Ninth Circuit, and in this case filed a motion to extend response time and stay district court proceedings pending resolution of that appeal. On Apr. 5, the parties filed a joint status report and proposed discovery plan. The U.S. continued to seek a stay of all proceedings in this case; the plaintiffs disagreed, asking for a discovery plan and briefing deadlines. Judge Robart did not rule on the stay motion, but did extend the U.S.'s time to respond to the second amended complaint to seven days after the court's disposition of the government's motion to stay the entire case. Briefing concluded on that stay motion on Apr. 14. On May 17, Judge Robart granted defendants' motion to stay all proceedings in the case, pending resolution of the Hawaii v. Trump appeal. Any party could move to lift the stay should circumstances warrant it. On Oct. 10, the Supreme Court was set to hear the Hawaii v. Trump case on the merits. However, the travel ban imposed by the second EO expired on Sept. 24. That same day, the Trump Administration signed a proclamation (\"EO-3\") indefinitely restricting travel from the following eight countries: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen. The Supreme Court cancelled the Oct. 10 hearing and asked the Hawaii and IRAP parties to file new briefs in light of the government's new order. On Oct. 11, the states in this case filed a motion requesting that the district court lift the May 17 stay and allow the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint and seek emergency relief against EO-3. The states simultaneously filed a motion for a Temporary Restraining order and a motion for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint. On Oct. 12, the federal government filed a notice of its intent to oppose the TRO. That same day, Judge Robart granted the plaintiffs' motion to lift the stay and to amend their complaint. The court scheduled a hearing for Oct. 30 on the TRO motion. The court directed the defendants to submit their response by Oct. 23, and the plaintiffs to reply by Oct. 26. On Oct. 16, the states filed their third amended complaint. The states argued that EO-3 will prevent state residents -- including U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents -- from seeing spouses, parents, or other family members; will cause the states' colleges and universities to lose students, tuition revenue, and faculty/staff; will cause the states to lose tourism revenue; will deny states' hospitals the opportunity to compete for top medical residents and physicians; will cost the states' businesses talented job applicants and revenue; will cause the states to lose tax revenue; and will undermine the states' sovereign interest in maintaining the separation between church and state, in upholding the states' non-discrimination policies, and in remaining \"welcoming place[s] for immigrants.\" On Oct. 17, the states filed a notice with the court. In light of the Hawaii v. Trump district court's Oct. 17 order granting a nationwide temporary restraining order against EO-3, the states asked the court to (1) maintain the Oct. 30 hearing date and issue a ruling on the states' motion even though preliminary relief had been granted in Hawaii; and (2) to treat the states' motion for a TRO as a motion for a PI. The states emphasized the number of people the states represent who are harmed by EO-3, and argued that their harms are different in both degree and kind from those presented in other cases. The states filed additional declarations in support of the Amended Complaint on Oct. 19. On Oct. 23, the DOJ filed its response brief arguing that the plaintiffs' challenges are not justiciable, that EO-3 fits within the President's broad constitutional and statutory authority to suspend the entry of aliens abroad, and that EO-3 is constitutional because it provides a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for excluding aliens and does not violate the Establishment and Equal Protection clauses. The plaintiffs replied on Oct. 26. On Oct. 27, the district court stayed its decision on the plaintiffs' TRO motion so long as the PI in Hawaii v. Trump \"or a [PI] of identical or broader scope\" concerning EO-3 remains in place. On Nov. 21, 2017, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' Feb. 11 petition for a writ of certiorari. After very little activity, on Nov. 5, 2018, Washington gave notice of voluntary dismissal, though other states remain parties. The remaining states voluntarily dismissed the case on Nov. 9.", "summary": "In January 2017, Washington Attorney General Bob Ferguson filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington challenging President Trump\u2019s January 27, 2017 Executive Order (EO) barring legal immigrants and refugees from seven majority-Muslim countries from entering the U.S. and barring Syrian refugees indefinitely. Washington was joined by the State of Minnesota. The complaint alleged that the EO violated Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On February 3, 2017, District Judge Robart granted a nationwide temporary restraining order (later deemed a preliminary injunction), barring implementation of the EO. The U.S. appealed and sought a stay of the TRO pending that appeal, but the Ninth Circuit denied the stay on February 9, finding that the government had no demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits or that a stay was necessary to prevent irreparable injury. That same day, however, the Ninth Circuit decided to review, sua sponte, the matter \"en banc.\" On March 6, 2017, however, the President rescinded the January 27 EO and replaced it with a narrower one. The Ninth Circuit granted the government's motion to dismiss its appeal and denied en banc review as well. On March 13, the states filed a motion to amend their complaint (joining California, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Oregon as plaintiffs) and an emergency motion to enforce the court's February 3 preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, in another case about the second EO, Hawaii v. Trump, the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii issued a nationwide injunction against enforcement and implementation of Sections 2 and 6 of the new EO. On March 30, the U.S. appealed Hawaii v. Trump to the Ninth Circuit. Judge Robart then granted the government's motion to stay all proceedings in this case pending resolution of the Hawaii v. Trump appeal. In June 2017, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Hawaii v. Trump, consolidated with IRAP v. Trump, the analogous case from the District of Maryland. In September 2017, however, the travel ban imposed by the second EO expired and the Trump Administration signed a third EO indefinitely restricting travel from the following eight countries: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen. Although the plaintiffs filed a motion for a TRO and amended their complaint accordingly, the court stayed its decision on that motion so long as the preliminary junction in Hawaii v. Trump \"or a [PI] of identical or broader scope\" concerning EO-3 remains in place. On November 21, 2017, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' February 11 petition for a writ of certiorari. After little activity for nearly a year, all states gave notice of voluntary dismissal in November 2018."} {"article": "On May 2, 2008, the Parents' League for Effective Autism Services (PLEAS), along with three autistic children with autism who received medically necessary services funded by Medicaid, filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, against the Director of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services and the Director of the Ohio Department of Mental Health. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and alleged violations of plaintiffs' rights under federal Medicaid law. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the loss or reduction of medically necessary services. The plaintiffs claimed that amendments to Ohio administrative rules (O.A.C. \u00a7\u00a7 5101:3-27-02 and 5122-29-17, which were scheduled to be effective July 1, 2008) promulgated by the defendants would deprive the plaintiffs of services required by the federal Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) program. The federal requirements for EPSDT require states to provide \"such other necessary health care, diagnostic services, treatment, and other measures to correct or to ameliorate defects and physical and mental illnesses and conditions discovered by the screening services, whether or not such services are covered under the State plan.\" 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396d(r)(5). Further, the Medicaid Act required states to fund \"preventive and rehabilitative services, including any medical or remedial services recommended by a physician . . . for the maximum reduction of physical or mental disability and restoration of an individual to the best possible functional level[.]\" 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396d(a)(13). Plaintiffs received physician-recommended services including \"full day center-based applied behavior analysis, psychological assessments and diagnosis, parent advocacy and resource information and home outreach services including one-to-one services,\" which plaintiffs characterized as rehabilitative and resulting in the \"maximum reduction of physical and mental disabilities and restoration to the best possible functional level.\" Under the new rules promulgated by the defendants, only services that were rehabilitative, rather than services that were ameliorative or that prevented deterioration, would available to Medicaid recipients. The rules also would restrict the definition of certain rehabilitative services, including applied behavioral analysis, so that they would only to patients whose diagnoses were categorized as \"mental illness,\" a grouping that did not include autism and related diagnoses. Plaintiffs sought injunctions ordering the defendants to continue or begin providing 35-40 hours of applied behavioral analysis services to the plaintiff children. They sought orders enjoining the defendants from enforcing the new rules, and requiring them to develop new rules that complied with federal Medicaid law. That sought declarations that the rules violated the plaintiff's rights and that they were unlawful. Plaintiffs also sought attorney's fees and legal costs. On June 20, 2008, the Court (Judge James L. Graham) ordered that, pursuant a motion filed by the defendants and to Fed. R. Civ. 19(a), the plaintiffs file an amended complaint, adding as a necessary defendant the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, the federal agency responsible for approving state Medicaid plans. The amended complaint was filed on June 24, 2008. On June 30, 2008, the Court found that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the suit and denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss the case. Parents League for Effective Autism Servs. v. Jones-Kelley, 565 F. Supp. 2d 895 (S.D. Ohio 2008). On the same day, the Court issued a separate opinion granting the plaintiffs' motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction preventing the State from implementing the amendments to O.A.C. \u00a7\u00a7 5101:3-27-02 and 5122-29-17, finding that the plaintiffs case had a strong likelihood of success on the merits, and that the plaintiffs would likely suffer irrevocable harm if the rules were to go into effect. Parents League for Effective Autism Servs. v. Jones-Kelley, 565 F.Supp.2d 905 (S.D.Ohio 2008). The defendants appealed this decision and filed a motion for stay of the proceedings before the District Court and a stay of the preliminary injunction, pending the outcome of the appeal. On July 17, 2008, Judge Graham granted the motion to stay proceedings, but left the preliminary injunction in place. Parents League for Effective Autism Servs. v. Jones-Kelley, 2008 WL 2796744 (S.D. Ohio 2008). On July 29, 2009, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge John M. Rogers) affirmed the District Court's grant of the preliminary injunction. Parents' League for Effective Autism Servs. v. Jones-Kelley, 339 F. App'x 542 (6th Cir. 2009). On September 18, 2009, the District Court referred the case to mediation. Two years later, on September 14, 2011, the parties informed the court that they had reached a settlement, and requested that the preliminary injunction and restraining order be lifted. The Court dissolved the restraining order and injunction the next day. On December 15, 2011, the parties filed a joint stipulation requesting the dismissal of the case with prejudice, which specified that the defendants had fulfilled their obligations under the settlement. The court dismissed the case. The terms of the settlement do not appear to have been made public. According to the Ohio Disability Rights Law and Policy Center (Disability Rights Ohio) website, the settlement \"[r]equires maintaining [the prior rules] that [do] not restrict services based on cognitive ability or recovery of lost skills; Authorizes [the filing of] a new rule that implements a prior authorization process for more than 104 hours of CPST services per year; Exempts 123 PLEAS member children and settlement beneficiaries from the prior authorization process for CPST services until those children reach age 21, and; Reimburses plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.\" See their summary of the case at http://www.disabilityrightsohio.org/legal-library/pleas for more information.", "summary": "The Parents' League for Effective Autism Services (PLEAS), along with three children with autism and their guardians, filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, against two officers of the State of Ohio. Plaintiffs claimed violations of their rights under federal Medicaid law. The Plaintiffs claimed that amendments to Ohio administrative rules promulgated by the Defendants would deprive the Plaintiffs of services required by the federal Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) program. Plaintiffs sought injunctions ordering the State to continue or begin providing 35-40 hours of applied behavioral analysis services to the plaintiff children. They sought an injunction preventing the State from enforcing the new rules. A preliminary injunction was granted. On December 15, 2011, the parties filed a joint stipulation requesting the dismissal of the case with prejudice. They had apparently reached a settlement that resolved the issues in a manner satisfactory to the plaintiffs."} {"article": "On May 4, 2016, Planned Parenthood of Kansas and Mid-Missouri (PPGP), Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region (PPSLR), current and former employees of Planned Parenthood, and Kansas Medicaid patients filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. The plaintiffs sued the Kansas Department of Health and Environment under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for violations of the Medicaid Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the defendant from terminating provider-plaintiffs from Kansas Medicaid. The plaintiffs claimed that on May 3, 2016, the defendant issued a decision to terminate Planned Parenthood and current and former Planned Parenthood employees from their Kansas Medicaid Provider agreements. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the state made the decision to terminate in response to unfounded and irrelevant allegations made about Planned Parenthood's activities. In particular, the state noted a highly misleading YouTube video created by antichoice activists alleging that Planned Parenthood had sold fetal body parts. The plaintiffs claimed that a termination of their Kansas Medicaid provider agreements would irreparably harm Kansas Medicaid patients by denying them access to their health care providers of choice. On July 5, 2016, Judge Julie Robinson denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification but granted their motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The order enjoined the defendant from terminating their Kansas Medicaid Provider agreements. 2016 WL 3597457. On August 3, 2016, the defendant appealed the decision to the Tenth Circuit. On February 21, 2018, a panel of the Tenth Circuit (Circuit Judges Robert E. Bacharach, Gregory A. Phillips, and Carolyn B. McHugh) affirmed the district court\u2019s order granting the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction as to PPGP, thus restraining Kansas from terminating PPGP\u2019s Medicaid provider agreement. The appeals court, however, vacated the district court\u2019s order as to PPSLR, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to meet standing requirements. Since there were no affidavits from any persons receiving or expecting to receive medical care at PPSLR, the plaintiffs had failed to establish any injury they would suffer from the termination of PPSLR. The court remanded the case back to the district court to determine whether PPSLR itself had sufficiently alleged standing to proceed and whether it was entitled to a preliminary injunction. 882 F.3d 1205. On March 21, 2018, the defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. On December 10, 2018, the Supreme Court denied the petition; Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch dissented from the denial of certiorari. Shortly after cert was denied, the defendants rescinded the terminations of both PPGP and PPSLR from the Kansas Medicaid program. The case was remanded to district court. The parties jointly stipulated to dismissal on April 12, 2019, and the civil case was terminated on April 16. The parties continued to litigate attorneys fees. The parties reached an agreement on August 12, 2019 that the defendants would pay $464,366.28 in fees and costs to the plaintiffs. There has been no further action in the docket as of April 2021, and the case is closed.", "summary": "On May 4, 2016, Planned Parenthood of Kansas and Mid-Missouri, Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region, current and former employees of Planned Parenthood, and Kansas Medicaid patients filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Health and Environment under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for violations of the Medicaid Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the defendant from terminating provider plaintiffs from Kansas Medicaid. On July 5, 2016, Judge Julie Robinson denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification but granted their motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendant from terminating their Kansas Medicaid Provider agreements. On August 3, 2016, the defendant appealed the decision to the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's order granting the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction as to Planned Parenthood of Kansas and Mid-Missouri. However, the court vacated the district court\u2019s order as to Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to meet standing requirements. On March 21, 2018, the defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. On December 10, 2018, the Supreme Court denied the petition. Shortly after cert was denied, the defendants rescinded the terminations of both PPGP and PPSLR from the Kansas Medicaid program. Back in the district court, the parties jointly stipulated to the case's dismissal in April 2019; the defendants paid $464,366.28 in fees and costs to the plaintiffs. The case is closed."} {"article": "On March 23, 1993, plaintiffs, a class of prisoners incarcerated at the Fresno County Jail, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of their First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the Fresno County Jail. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the overcrowding due to construction and simple overcrowding made the conditions in the jail unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment, and led to deprivation of their other constitutional rights. The Fresno County Jail is split into three parts: The Main Jail, the North Annex, and the South Annex. At the time plaintiffs made their complaint, the third and fourth floors of the South Annex were being remodeled, requiring jail staff to relocate 434 inmates that were housed there to the North Annex and the Main Jail, leading to severe overcrowding. As a result, the prison also restricted access to exercise, recreation, religious activities, and the law library. Prisoners were allowed one hour per week for legal research, and two trips per week to a facility that doubled as a space for religious activities. The exercise space was also alleged to not contain enough equipment or room for plaintiffs to adequately exercise. The plaintiffs alleged that the South Annex, rated for 511 prisoners, was housing over 700. The plaintiffs also alleged that 300 prisoners were sleeping on the floor in the Main Jail, in the common areas, and that the solitary confinement unit had 3 prisoners per cell. They also alleged that the North Annex had 200 prisoners that slept on the floor. On February 25, 1993, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order that would require the defendants to add beds and ensure that no prisoner slept on the floor, and allow compliance monitoring. On March 9, 1993, the defendants admitted the class status of the plaintiffs and agreed that they currently were exceeding their capacity in the jail system, but denied that it was unconstitutionally overcrowded. However, before the Court could rule on the TRO and the certification motion, the parties reached a consent decree. On May 25, 1993, the consent decree was modified to give more detail concerning the exact number of beds in each cell block in each facility, and to give the Sheriff the power to release or to refuse to house prisoners when the jail system was at 90% capacity. On November 3, 1993, the consent decree was again modified to reflect transition of the housing in the jail under a state pilot program into a triple-bunked \"general population,\" double-bunked \"special population,\" and single-bunked \"administrative segregation\" scheme. The consent decree specifically reserved the issues of law library access and adequacy of exercise for trial. On February 25, 1994, the parties settled the outstanding recreational issues, providing for one-hour of exercise a day, and up to 20 hours a month, with 1.5 hours being roof-recreation. A few months later, the Court entered a final order approving the settlement agreement and placing the Fresno County Jail under a permanent injunction. On July 14, 2011, the Fresno County Superior Court filed a motion to intervene in the case. The state court system alleged that, because the Fresno County Jail had closed two floors, the consent decree could not be maintained, and the ability to sentence defendants consistent with California law had been adversely affected. On December 5, 2011, the defendants and plaintiffs reached another consent decree clarifying the meaning of the word \"capacity\" in the original consent decree rendering the defendant-intervenor's contentions moot. The Court thereafter denied the State Court's motion to intervene as moot. This case is still open because of the permanent injunction running against the Fresno County Jail. The plaintiffs also moved for attorney fees, though the Court denied the motion on May 31, 2012. As of January 31, 2018, there has not been any new meaningful litigation.", "summary": "The plaintiffs were a class of prisoners at the Fresno County Jail. Hundreds had been forced to sleep on the floor of the jail, in the common areas, and had virtually no access to exercise or a law library. The plaintiffs settled with Defendant county Fresno in a series of Consent Decrees that established a population and bed cap in the jail, and guaranteed consistent access to exercise facilities. A permanent injunction now runs against the Fresno County Jail."} {"article": "On November 15, 2018, seven female students in Dartmouth's Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences filed this putative class action suit against the Trustees of Dartmouth College under Title IX and New Hampshire common law in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire. The plaintiffs claimed a hostile educational environment, gender discrimination, quid pro quo sexual harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title IX. Additionally, the plaintiff class claimed that the Trustees of Dartmouth College breached their fiduciary duties and negligently supervised and retained professors in violation of New Hampshire common law. The plaintiff class, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Specifically, the plaintiff class claimed that three professors in the Department of Psychology and Brain Sciences leered at, groped, \"sexted,\" intoxicated, and raped female students. The plaintiffs further alleged that though they had contacted Dartmouth\u2019s Title IX office in April 2017, Dartmouth failed to take action. Twenty days after the plaintiffs had contacted Dartmouth\u2019s Title IX office\u2014after Dartmouth\u2019s inaction\u2014one plaintiff was sexually assaulted. At least 27 complainants came forward to participate in the Title IX investigation. Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that when Dartmouth finally did take action by beginning an investigation, it was unilaterally stopped in July and the three professors in question were allowed to resign or retire. In the complaint, the plaintiffs defined the class as \"every current and former female graduate and undergraduate student who has matriculated or will matriculate at Dartmouth in the Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences between March 31, 2015 and the date of judgment.\" The case was assigned to District Judge Landya B. McCafferty. On May 1, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint, adding two more Jane Does and their factual allegations to the record. The defendants contested these two additional Jane Does proceeding under pseudonyms, but Judge McCafferty approved the plaintiffs' motions to proceed under pseudonym on January 29, 2020. The parties quickly moved to settlement negotiations. On September 10, 2019, the parties jointly proposed a settlement agreement. The parties modified the definition of the class slightly in this settlement agreement. The class include any female undergraduate or graduate student at Dartmouth that satisfies any of the following criteria: were graduate advisors or research assistants of the three former professors in the complaint, were graduate assistants in the Psychological and Brain Sciences Department that co-authored at least one paper based on lab research they conducted with the professors or co-authored three papers with the professors without lab work, were graduate students in the Department that do not fall into these categories but can attest to emotional and psychological harm, or undergraduate student research assistants of the three professors. The parties did not include a specified monetary amount in the settlement agreement. Instead, they wrote that the defendant must pay a base amount of $1,000 for any class member that comes forward, that amount can increase based on an Independent Claim Expert's assessment of the severity of the claims, and that the defendant will pay the plaintiff's attorney fees. Judge McCafferty preliminarily approved this settlement agreement on September 25, 2019. As of June 17, 2020, she has not granted final approval to the agreement, and notifications to the class are ongoing.", "summary": "Seven plaintiffs filed this Title IX class action alleging that Dartmouth employed and retained three professors that the institution knew had sexually harassed and assaulted students. They requested declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The parties released a preliminary settlement agreement guaranteeing compensation to any class member on September 10, 2019, and it was preliminarily approved on September 25. The final settlement has yet to be approved, and notification of the class is ongoing."} {"article": "This lawsuit stems from Searcy v. Strange, (PB-AL-0005 in this Clearinghouse), in which a federal district court held that Alabama's same-sex marriage ban violated the U.S. Constitution. That case involved a same-sex couple, legally married in California, whose adoption petition was denied in Alabama because they were not considered \"spouses\" under a state law, which allowed a non-biological parent to adopt the spouse's child. On February 9, 2015, the Searcy v. Strange order went into effect: the ban on same-sex marriage was now illegal in Alabama, at least according to the federal courts. The same-sex couple re-filed their adoption petition in Mobile County, Alabama. Mobile County Probate Judge Don Davis issued an initial adoption decree but he added language saying \"that this Decree is qualified in nature, and the Court will not issue a final adoption order until a final ruling is issued in the United States Supreme Court on the Marriage Act cases before it.\" On February 24, 2015, the non-biological parent filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, against Probate Judge Davis, claiming that he violated her rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court to order the probate judge to vacate his qualified adoption order and to issue a new order without the added language. On March 26, 2015, Judge Callie V. S. Granade granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. After the complaint was filed, Probate Judge Davis had removed the qualified language from the adoption decree, giving the couple what they wanted.", "summary": "On February 24, 2015, the plaintiff, a member of a same-sex couple seeking to adopt her spouse's child, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama (Judge Callie V. S. Granade) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Mobile County Probate Judge Don Davis. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court to order the probate judge to vacate his earlier qualified adoption order and to issue a new order. The case was dismissed after Judge Davis issued the requested adoption decree."} {"article": "On October 4, 2017, five organizations serving Black and Latino communities in Chicago (the ACLU of Illinois, Communities United, Community Renewal Society, Next Steps, and ONE Northside), filed this lawsuit in the United States Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Illinois state law, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Based on findings from a Department of Justice investigation, the plaintiffs claimed that the Chicago Police Department engaged in a pattern and practice of unreasonable force, particularly against Black individuals, Latinos, and individuals with disabilities. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that a lack of policy, guidance, and oversight of foot pursuits continued to encourage the unnecessary use of force. They argued that these practices violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Illinois Civil Rights Law. This lawsuit resulted from a Department of Justice investigation that was opened in 2015 and that concluded with a published report in January 2017. The investigation's purpose was to determine if the Chicago Police Department was engaging in a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct and, if so, what systemic deficiencies or practices might be causing this pattern or practice. The investigation was jointly conducted by the Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section, and the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois. The investigation was opened in the aftermath of the release of a video showing a White Chicago officer fatally shooting a Black teenager, Laquan McDonald, that caused protests around the city. Relatedly, Chicago experienced a surge in shootings and homicides in the year following the killing. According to the report, ninety-six percent of CPD\u2019s shooting victims and 97% of those tased were Black or Latino. People with disabilities were acutely affected. This included individuals with mental illness or intellectual or developmental disabilities, and also deaf individuals. Black and Latino people with disabilities face an overwhelming risk. The investigation concluded that CPD officers were inadequately trained and did not know how to de-escalate situations. The case was assigned to Elaine Bucklo. On January 24, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, that the claims were moot because the defendants had changed their policies, and that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. On March 20, 2018, the parties filed a joint motion to stay proceedings and discovery in light of ongoing negotiation of a consent decree in Illinois v. City of Chicago. After the proceedings were stayed, the parties filed two status reports with the court regarding progress in negotiation, one on September 12, 2018 and one on November 7, 2018. After the parties reached a settlement agreement in Illinois v. City of Chicago, they stipulated to dismissal in this case on May 17, 2019. The case was officially dismissed without prejudice on May 22, 2019, although the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. The settlement detailed that if the parties had not moved to reinstate the action or enforce the agreement by August 21, 2019, the dismissal without prejudice would convert to a dismissal with prejudice. There are no further entries in the docket as of May 26, 2020, so this case is presumed to be closed.", "summary": "ACLU of Illinois sued City of Chicago for the unreasonable use of force of its police officers. The plaintiffs sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Illinois state law. These claims were informed by a Department of Justice report that confirmed that \"CPD officers engage in a pattern or practice of using force, including deadly force, that is unreasonable.\" The plaintiffs, represented by public counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs claimed that the Chicago Police Department engaged in a pattern and practice of unreasonable force, particularly against black, Latino, and disabled individuals."} {"article": "On April 2, 2019, five former employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense, represented by the ACLU and Knight First Amendment Institute, brought this suit challenging a system of prepublication review instituted by these agencies. Specifically, these agencies require that former employees who seek to write or speak about their government service must get approval from the agency prior to doing so or risk facing sanction. Plaintiffs argued that the regimes violated plaintiffs\u2019 First Amendment rights in granting executive officers sweeping discretion to suppress publications and speech. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining defendants from continuing to enforce the prepublication review regimes against plaintiffs or any other person. The case was assigned to Judge Jarrod Hazel. In their complaint, plaintiffs recognized that the agencies had a legitimate government interest in protecting bona fide national security secrets but argued that prior restraint is an extreme measure justifiable only in circumstances involving a compelling government interest, where procedural safeguards against censorship would be necessary. Plaintiffs argued that to meet First Amendment standards, systems of prepublication review would need to contain certain features, including but not limited to strict and definite time limits for completion of review, explanations of censors\u2019 decisions, and clear notice of the application of standards. At the time the case was initiated, none of the defendants\u2019 prepublication review regimes contained these features. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on June 14, 2019, to which plaintiffs responded with a request for a hearing with oral argument on the motion to dismiss. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On April 2, 2019, five former employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense, brought this suit challenging the agencies\u2019 system of pre-publication review. Plaintiffs alleged the regimes of review violated their First Amendment rights in granting executive officers sweeping discretion to suppress publications and speech. The case was assigned to Judge Jarrod Hazel. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and the case is ongoing."} {"article": "In 2018, President Donald Trump asked Congress to appropriate $5.7 billion for construction of a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border. On February 14, 2019, Congress denied that request and instead appropriated only $1.375 billion. Although President Trump signed this appropriations bill, he simultaneously declared a national emergency under the National Emergencies Act, and directed the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and the Treasury to reallocate military and other funds in order to build the border wall. Five days later, the Sierra Club and the Southern Border Communities Coalition responded by filing this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking to prevent construction of the wall. They sued the president, the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of the Treasury under the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a74332), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7701\u2013706), the All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. \u00a71651), and the Declaratory Judgments Act (28 U.S.C. \u00a72201), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, ACLU of Northern California, and ACLU of Texas, argued that the president\u2019s attempt to fund the wall using the National Emergencies Act was a constitutional violation. The Constitution grants Congress exclusive authority to control appropriations. Although Congress has given the president some authority under the National Emergencies Act, the plaintiffs argued that the Act was never intended to allow the president to circumvent explicit appropriations decisions of Congress. His actions were therefore a violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Statutorily, the plaintiffs argued that funding the wall was an inappropriate use of the National Emergencies Act because (a) there was no national emergency, (b) the border wall was not a military construction project, as required by the Act, and (c) the border wall was not \u201cnecessary to support\u2026the armed forces.\u201d Finally, they alleged that the president and the defendant departments were in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act, because they had failed to review the environmental impacts of the border wall construction project. The case was assigned to Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., who ordered it related to Sierra Club v. Trump on March 6, 2019. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 18, 2019. On April 4, they moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent construction along certain stretches of the border (Yuma Sector Projects 1 and 2, and El Paso Sector Project 1). The United States House of Representatives filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs, and was permitted to present arguments at the Preliminary Injunction Hearing held on May 17, 2019. On May 24, 2019, the court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and the Treasury from taking any action to build the wall using certain reallocated military funds. The injunction applied only to two of the three sectors requested by the plaintiffs (Yuma Sector Project 1 and El Paso Sector Project 1). 379 F. Supp. 3d 883. On May 29, 2019, the government appealed the preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit, and moved for the district court to stay the injunction pending appeal (a motion that the district court denied the following day). Also on May 29, the plaintiffs moved for a supplemental preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent construction along four additional stretches of the border (El Centro Project 1 and Tucson Sector Projects 1, 2, and 3). In June 2019, both parties moved for partial summary judgment. On June 28, the court denied the government\u2019s motion for summary judgment, and partially granted the plaintiffs\u2019. It declared that the government\u2019s use of certain military funds to build the wall in the disputed sectors was unlawful, and issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the government from using those funds to build in those sectors. The court certified its judgment for immediate appeal, but declined to stay the injunction pending appeal. 2019 WL 2715422. The following week, on July 3, the Ninth Circuit similarly denied the government\u2019s motion for stay. 929 F.3d 670. Later that month, on July 26, 2019, the Supreme Court of the United States overruled the district court and the Ninth Circuit, granting a stay of the injunction pending completion of the appeal in the Ninth Circuit. 140 S.Ct. 1. The plaintiffs sought summary judgment on some issues on October 11, 2019. Like the June 28, 2019 ruling, the issues in dispute here regarded the legality of reallocating funds for wall construction; however, this motion dealt with a different source of funds, and covered more segments of the border. The government similarly moved for summary judgment on October 25, 2019. The House of Representatives again filed a brief in support of the plaintiffs, and was again allowed to present argument. A hearing on summary judgment took place on November 20, 2019, after which the court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on December 11, 2019, denying the government\u2019s motion. Like on June 28, 2019, it ruled that it was unlawful for the government to use certain reallocated funds for construction on the disputed border segments, and issued a permanent injunction. However, unlike in June, the district court immediately stayed its injunction pending appeal, citing the Supreme Court\u2019s July 26 ruling. On December 30, 2019, the Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion to lift the stay, also citing the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling. It further explained that since the Western District of Texas had issued a nationwide injunction on December 10, which covered the sections of wall at issue in this case, lifting the stay would have no practical effect. On February 5, 2020, the plaintiffs dismissed their claims regarding border wall funding reallocated from yet another source (the Treasury Forfeiture Fund). In light of this dismissal, the court sought to close the case, since all of the plaintiffs\u2019 claims had been resolved by summary judgment or voluntary dismissal. The parties jointly requested that the case remain open: although the claims regarding fiscal year 2019\u2019s appropriations had been resolved, they expected that similar disputes would arise regarding fiscal year 2020\u2019s budget. The fiscal year 2020 dispute, however, was assigned to another case, Sierra v. Trump, filed by the plaintiffs on February 28, 2020 (docket number 4:20-cv-01494). The two cases were ordered related on March 2, 2020. On June 26, 2020, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court\u2019s June 28, 2019 ruling, including the permanent injunction. However, due to the Supreme Court\u2019s July 26, 2019 order, the injunction remains stayed until the government\u2019s appeal to the Supreme Court is either decided or rejected.", "summary": "In February 2019, President Trump declared a national emergency in an effort to redirect funding from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and the Treasury to the construction of a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border. The Sierra Club and the Southwest Border Communities Coalition filed this lawsuit in the Northern District of California, seeking to prevent construction of the wall. They argued that the president\u2019s use of a national emergency declaration to fund the border wall was unconstitutional and illegal under the National Emergencies Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court issued preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the use of reallocated funds for construction of the wall; the Ninth Circuit upheld those injunctions. However, on July 26, 2019, the Supreme Court of the United States stayed the injunctions; that stay remains in effect until the government\u2019s appeal to the Supreme Court is either decided or rejected. As of July 11, 2020, the government has yet to appeal to the Supreme Court."} {"article": "On August 29, 2011, plaintiff, a male Muslim prisoner, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania under Bivens and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiff, represented by public interest lawyers, asked the court for compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of himself and an injunction preventing defendants from continuing their unconstitutional housing, recreation, and restraint patterns, practices and policies on behalf of all current and future United States Penitentiary (USP) Lewisburg prisoners. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated plaintiff's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by placing him with cellmates with whom he had a documented hostile relationship, placing him in restraints on multiple occasions as punishment for refusing dangerous cell assignments, and failing to react in a timely manner to stop assaults. Plaintiff claimed that defendants engaged in a pattern, practice, or policy of carrying out these actions. In 2008, the Bureau of Prisons created the Special Management Unit (SMU) at USP Lewisburg to serve prisoners who present unique security and management concerns including prisoners who participated in or led group/gang-related activity. Plaintiff was incarcerated at USP Lewisburg in 2005 and 2006, and returned to join to the SMU in 2009, at which time he had an intake review and expressed his separation needs. On October 24, 2012, the U.S. District Court (Judge William B. Nealon) issued an order denying the plaintiff's motion to certify the class and an order granting defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff on all claims. On November 20, 2012, plaintiff submitted a notice of appeal. On March 2, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the district court's order denying class certification and grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the Eighth Amendment claim. The Court of Appeals upheld the district court's judgment dismissing the plaintiff's FTCA claim. The case was reopened in the district court on March 5, 2015. The parties reached a settlement and the case was dismissed without prejudice to either party on July 20, 2017. Judge Nealon left open the possibility that the case could be reopened if the terms of the settlement agreement were not consummated within 60 days. The exact terms of the settlement agreement are not available. Since the case has not been reopened, it is presumably closed.", "summary": "On August 29, 2011, plaintiff, a male Muslim prisoner, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania under Bivens against the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated plaintiff's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by placing him with cellmates with whom he had a documented hostile relationship, placing him in restraints on multiple occasions as punishment for refusing dangerous cell assignments, and failing to react in a timely manner to stop assaults. On October 24, 2012, the U.S. District Court (Judge William B. Nealon) issued an order denying motion to certify the class and an order granting defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff on all claims, and on November 20, 2012, plaintiff submitted a notice of appeal. The Third Circuit reversed the findings of the district court in part. The parties eventually reached a settlement agreement and the district court case was dismissed without prejudice on July 20, 2017."} {"article": "On February 20, 2009, a Muslim prisoner at the Central New York Psychiatric Center filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. The pro se plaintiff sued the Director of the Sex Offender Treatment Program, the New York State Office of Health Commissioner, and the Executive Director of the Central New York Psychiatric Center under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. The plaintiff sought injunctive and monetary relief, claiming violations of the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses, and the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiff alleged that his facility, the Central New York Psychiatric Center (CNYPC) did not allow him to properly participate in Al-Jumu\u2019ah prayer services, forced him to attend classes on Fridays in violation of Muslim practice, and denied him food in compliance with Halal. On March 17, 2010, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment. He argued there was clear evidence the CNYPC misunderstood the requirements for Al-Jumu\u2019ah prayer and in doing so deprived him of Free Exercise. On April 14, 2010, the defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing (1) that the reason Al-Jumu\u2019ah prayer has not been provided is that there are no Imams in the area who are available to facilitate, (2) the food offered in the cafeteria allows those following a Halal diet to sustain good health without violating their dietary laws, and (3) the utensils are sufficiently washed so as to be in compliance with Halal. On December 23, 2010, Magistrate Judge George Lowe issued a report and recommendation to Judge David Hurd, (2010 WL 5620908), which Judge Hurd then adopted in full on January 20, 2011. Judge Hurd denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment while granting in part and denying in part the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. The surviving claims included the Free Exercise and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claims regarding the lack of Al-Jumu\u2019ah services, the lack of a Halal-compliant menu, the denial of access to sacred food on religious holidays, and the requirement to attend classes on Fridays. The court dismissed the Free Exercise claims regarding bowls, utensils, and serving fish on Fridays; the Establishment Clause claim regarding serving fish on Fridays; the Due Process Claims; the Eighth Amendment claim; and the claim against the New York State Office of Health Commissioner. 2011 WL 195648. After the appointment of pro bono counsel on September 29, 2011, parties moved to settle the lawsuit. On November 14, 2011, the parties consented to have Magistrate Judge Lowe oversee the negotiations and final resolution of the case. On February 7, 2012, the parties settled and Magistrate Judge Lowe signed off on the settlement the next day. According to the settlement, the defendants would pay the plaintiff $15,000, which included all damages, costs, and attorney\u2019s fees, and the defendants further agreed to have a Halal menu in place and retain an Imam to lead Al-Jumu\u2019ah services on Fridays. As no action has been taken on this case since, it is likely this case is closed.", "summary": "On February 20, 2009, a Muslim prisoner at the Central New York Psychiatric Center filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. The pro se plaintiff sued affiliates of CNYPC under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 for various constitutional violations which he alleged denied him of freedom to freely practice his faith. After both parties were denied summary judgment, the parties settled on February 7, 2012, agreeing that the defendants would take measures to ensure the inmate\u2019s religious requirements were met."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is an ongoing case to challenge the constitutionality of the NYPD's stop and frisk practices, in which the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion calling for a moratorium and investigation of NYPD's alleged discriminatory enforcement of social distancing policy. No outcome yet on plaintiffs' motion.
1. whether a letter written by the Plaintiff to the director of the CDCR constituted protected speech; 2. whether the Defendants were protected by qualified immunity; 3. whether the erroneous jury instruction on protected speech was harmless error; and 4. whether the damages or attorney\u2019s fees amounts were valid in light of the jury instruction error.The Circuit Court issued an amended opinion November 3, 2006 with minor additions, and in that opinion denied a rehearing. 486. F.3d 528. The Defendants appealed the decision, but the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 549 U.S. 1323. On remand, the District Court found for the plaintiff on all remaining issues. Specifically, the Court:
1. found the letter was protected speech because the Plaintiff was not acting pursuant to her official job duties when she wrote it; 2. rejected the Defendants\u2019 argument that they were entitled to qualified immunity under Ceballos, indicating that that case did not alter the long-standing right of public employees to speak out on matters of public concern as a citizen. 3. found that the erroneous jury instruction resulting in harmless error\u2014despite the instruction, the weight of the evidence for the Plaintiff\u2019s retaliation claim clearly supported a finding of the Defendants\u2019 liability; and 4. held that because the jury instruction was harmless, the damages award and attorneys\u2019 fees award would remain unchanged.2007 WL 1670307. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on April 11, 2008. 289 Fed. App'x 146. The parties continued to litigate over attorneys\u2019 fees and monitoring costs issues. The case was closed in 2010, but plaintiff\u2019s counsel continued to monitor the defendants\u2019 compliance with the injunction. In May 2012, the defendants moved to terminate the injunction (or, alternatively, to modify the monitoring process). On November 5, 2012, the Court denied the motion to terminate the injunction, reasoning that the defendants had not provided a legal basis for terminating a permanent injunction. However, because there had been no reports of the defendants ever failing to comply with the injunction, the Court granted the motion to modify the monitoring process and discontinued the plaintiff\u2019s monitoring responsibilities. The parties then continued to litigate to resolve all remaining fees and costs issues. The case remains closed and has had no filing activity since December 2012.", "summary": "In 2000 a former female corrections officer at Pelican Bay State Prison filed this Title VII sexual harassment lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and several Pelican Bay officials. The Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and Title VII, alleging that the Defendants had failed to remedy the sexually hostile environment created by prison inmates, in violation of her rights under Title VII, and had wrongfully terminated her as a result of her complaints, in violation of her First Amendment rights. At trial, a jury found the CDCR liable and awarded monetary damages, and the plaintiff moved for and received a permanent injunction prohibiting the CDCR from engaging in unlawful employment practices. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the CDCR's liability under Title VII, but remanded the First Amendment retaliation claim in light of the intervening Supreme Court decision Garcetti v. Ceballos. On remand, the District Court found for the plaintiff on all remaining issues and upheld the jury verdict, finding that any errors in jury instructions were harmless. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, and the case is now closed."} {"article": "On November 7, 2007, a hearing-impaired inmate at Polk Correctional Institution in Polk City, FL, filed this lawsuit, pro se, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. He sued four corrections officials responsible for organizing and providing accommodations for disabled inmates in his lawsuit under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, alleging that the defendants had discriminated against him because of his disability. Representing himself, the plaintiff asked the court for injunctive relief. The plaintiff also sought class certification. To reduce or eliminate noise levels to better monitor and control prisoners in the television day rooms, the prison installed modular audio level cut-off equipment on the institution televisions that would convert the television audio to a FM radio signal for air wave transition. These \"audio decorders\" permit the televisions to be turned down to their lowest speaker level, this reducing the noise pollution while allowing prisoners to hear, understand, and clearly enjoy the television audio through a radio with earbuds or headphones at a personally selected audio level. However, these radios were insufficient for the plaintiffs' impairment, so he requested that the institution allow him to have his family pay a special vendor for a speaker-less AM-FM radio with the decibel level high enough to accommodate his hearing impairment. According to his complaint, the plaintiff submitted a formal request to Defendant Young, for \"reasonable modification or accommodation\" on June 26, 2007. Defendant Young sent the plaintiff's request to Defendant Long, the Chief Health Officer of the prison, to get verification of his disability and for the medical officer's findings and opinion of the requested accommodation. On August 2, 2007, Defendant Long issued a discussion of findings to Defendant Young saying that though the plaintiff is hearing-impaired, he was not sure that the AM-FM radio requested by the plaintiff would provide any better benefit that the radio available through the prison store. On August 3, 2007, Defendant Young denied the plaintiff's reasonable accommodation request. On August 23, 2007, Defendant Taylor, the statewide ADA coordinator, agreed with Defendant Young's decision to deny the plaintiff's request. The plaintiff then filed a request for administrative review, which was received by a representative of Defendant Secretary McDonough, and referred it to Defendant Taylor who again denied the plaintiff's request, adding that allowing the requested radio would be a security risk. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging that the defendants were discriminating against him on the basis of his disability. In an amended complaint filed on December 3, 2007, the plaintiff dropped the class action attempt. On May 21, 2008, the plaintiff filed a motion for appointment of counsel, that, though originally denied by Magistrate Judge William C. Sherrill, Jr., was eventually granted and the plaintiff was appointed counsel. On September 9, 2008, the defendants filed their first motion for summary judgment. In a June 22, 2009 report, Magistrate Judge Sherrill recommended the motion be granted in part and denied in part. He concluded that there was sufficient evidence that the plaintiff had been excluded from the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of the correctional facility and his disability had not reasonably been accommodated and therefore the motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims should be denied. As for the equal protection claim, the magistrate judge concluded that the plaintiff had come forward with evidence to show that other inmates have received radios with higher decibel audio as he has requested and therefore the motion to dismiss to that claim should be denied. The magistrate judge also recommended that the defendants' motion to dismiss as to the plaintiff's speech therapy claim (that he needs the higher decibel radio and speech therapy to learn to speak) and the plaintiff's individual capacity liability claim under the ADA be denied. On August 11, 2009, U.S. District Court Chief Judge Stephan P. Mickle, accepted the magistrate's recommendations over the defendants' objections to the magistrate's recommendations. The plaintiff again tried to amend the complaint, to re-add class action allegations, and the magistrate judge, in an August 12, 2010 report and recommendation, suggested that the Court grant the motion to amend in part, and deny it in part. The magistrate's recommendations were accepted by Judge Mickle on November 22, 2010, permitting the plaintiff to file an amended complaint with class action allegations, but disallowing the addition of prisoner plaintiffs. A month later, the defendants appealed that November 22 opinion adopting the magistrate's recommendations, but their appeal was dismissed, sua sponte, for lack of jurisdiction. On January 11, 2011, the plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate this case with Blackburn v. Florida Department of Corrections (4:10-CV-569-SPM/WCS) and Johnson v. Florida Department of Corrections (4:10-CV-570). While waiting for the Court to rule on this motion, the plaintiff filed a number of motions including an emergency motion to enjoin the defendants from retaliating against him, an emergency motion for writ of habeas corpus, an emergency motion for injunction to ordering the defendants to transfer the plaintiff, and an emergency motion to depose the plaintiff. These motions were either deferred or immediately denied by the magistrate judge. As for the motion to consolidate, the magistrate recommended it be denied in a February 23, 2011 report and recommendation, a recommendation that was accepted by Judge Mickle on March 28, 2011. A month later, Magistrate Judge William C. Sherrill Jr. denied the plaintiff's motion for a hearing concerning the motion for preliminary injunction and petition for writ of habeas corpus at that time. On July 20, 2011, he issued a report and recommendation that the plaintiff's motion to certify and motion for a preliminary injunction be denied. This recommendation was adopted in a September 19 order by Judge Mickle, and the parties were permitted to file motions for summary judgment within 20 days of this order. On October 11, 2011, Magistrate Judge Sherrill, Jr. granted a motion to substitute a party, replacing former Department of Corrections Secretary Edwin G. Buss with Secretary Kenneth S. Tucker. On October 31, 2011, the substituted defendant filed a second motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff filed his own motion for summary judgment. Magistrate Judge Sherrill recommended that the defendant's motion was granted as to liability for nominal damages for the ADA claim, but otherwise denied, and that the plaintiff's motion be completely denied. Before the parties filed objections to these recommendations, they filed a notice of settlement. The settlement allowed the plaintiff's attorneys to send electronic equipment for the plaintiff to use with his hearing aid to hear the television transmissions and radio signals. On March 8, 2012, the Judge Mickle dismissed the case. On May 3, 2012, the parties filed a joint motion to reopen the case to modify the settlement agreement. Judge Mickle reopened the case on May 10, and adopted a modification of paragraph 4. The case was dismissed with prejudice. On July 26, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion for injunction and notice of inquiry but the Court denied the motion in an opinion the next day. The parties went to mediation of August 2, 2012, after which the defendant agreed pay $237,500 in settlement of any and all claims for attorney's fees, expenses, and costs of litigation. This case is closed.", "summary": "On November 7, 2007, a hearing-impaired inmate at Polk Correctional Institution in Polk City, FL, filed this lawsuit, pro se, in the District Court for the Northern District of Florida. He sued four corrections officials responsible for organizing and providing accommodations for disabled inmates in his lawsuit under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, alleging that the defendants had discriminated against him because of his disability. Representing himself, the plaintiff asked the court for injunctive relief. The plaintiff also sought class certification. The parties eventually settled, and allowed the plaintiff to have electronic equipment, approved by the facility, that he could use with his hearing aid to hear the television transmissions and radio signals. This case is closed."} {"article": "The town of Gilbert, Arizona, enacted a town code that limited the number of signs churches could place announcing the time and place of their meetings. On March 8, 2007, Good New Presbyterian Church, represented by attorneys from the Alliance Defense Fund, challenged this code by filing this \u00a7 1983 action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs alleged that the code violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment because the code regulated signs based on the content of the speech. Specifically, the plaintiffs noted that the code allegedly afforded ideological and political signs more protections than signs for religious assemblies. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the code violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because groups and individuals similarly situated to the Good News Presbyterian Church were allowed to display larger signs, more signs, signs without time limits, and signs that are not restricted to certain areas. The code violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because the sign restrictions hindered the plaintiffs\u2019 ability to invite others to their services, which was an instruction of their sincerely-held religious beliefs. The plaintiffs also alleged that the code violated the Arizona Religious Freedom Amendment because it penalized the exercise of religion by subject it to greater restrictions that were not applicable to other activities. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the code violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the code did not define what would be considered an \u201cideological\u201d sign and, thus, there was allegedly no warning or notice as to what would be considered an ideological sign. For these violations, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On March 30, 2007, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction against the defendants that would keep them from enforcing the town code. On April 17, 2007, the defendants also moved for a preliminary injunction. The defendants stated that the parties stipulated to an injunction pending the outcome of the litigation and asked the district court to enter it. On May 9, 2007, the court entered the stipulated preliminary injunction. On January 8, 2008, the town amended its code. The changes allowed event signs to be displayed for 12 hours before the event, stated that four signs per property were permitted, and permitted non-profit organizations to display signs in addition to religious assemblies. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that alleged that the amended sign code still violated Free Speech, Free Exercise, Equal Protection, and Arizona state law. The amended complaint no longer alleged that the town code violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following the amendments, the plaintiffs moved for a second preliminary injunction that would enjoin the defendants from enforcing the amended code. The court denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion for a second preliminary injunction on September 30, 2008. 2008 WL 11339947. On October 27, 2008, the plaintiffs appealed the district court\u2019s denial of their preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit. On November 5, 2008 the defendants moved for summary judgment. However, on December 2, 2008, the district court ordered that the plaintiff\u2019s response to the motion for summary judgment would be stayed until the Ninth Circuit ruled on plaintiff\u2019s appeal. On November 20, 2009, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court\u2019s denial of the second preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that the code was a content-neutral regulation that did not impermissible favor commercial speech over non-commercial speech. The Ninth Circuit then remanded the case to the district court to consider the plaintiff\u2019s allegations that the code violated the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause by favoring some noncommercial speech over other non-commercial speech. 587 F.3d 966. The case then proceeded to discovery. On August 27, 2010, both parties moved for summary judgment. On February 11, 2011, the district court granted the town of Gilbert\u2019s motion for summary judgment stating that the Code did not violate the First Amendment\u2019s Freedom of Speech because the code did not distinguish on the basis of the message. Additionally, the district court found that the code did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the code did not regulate on the basis of content, \u201cbut rather to address legitimate concerns of safety and aesthetics.\u201d The district court also found that the code did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the code, while applying restrictions to qualifying event signs that were different from those applied to political and ideological signs, did not apply restrictions that were more restrictive. Additionally, the court noted that the qualifying event sign restrictions applied to both the plaintiffs and \u201cany other non-profit wishing to direct the public to an event.\u201d Finally, the district court found that the code did not violate Arizona state law because it did not compel the plaintiffs to do something in violation of their religious beliefs. 832 F.Supp.2d 1070. On March 11, 2011, the plaintiffs appealed the district court\u2019s decision to the Ninth Circuit. On February 8, 2013, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s decision. The Ninth Circuit stated that the code was permissible, as there was no discrimination \u201camong similar events or speakers\u201d and that the treatment on the signs was content neutral. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit stated that the code did not violate the plaintiffs\u2019 right to free exercise of religion or equal protection of the laws. 707 F.3d 1057. The plaintiffs then petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on July 1, 2014. 573 U.S. 957. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit\u2019s decision on June 18, 2015. The Supreme Court held that the signs were content based and, thus, the code must be subject to strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court found the code lacked narrow tailoring because the code was \u201chopelessly underinclusive\u201d because of the greater flexibility it allowed ideological and political signs to operate with. As a result, the Supreme Court found the town code unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The Court then remanded to the district court consistent with the opinion. 135 S.Ct. 2218. On December 30, 2015, the district court entered a permanent injunction with prejudice against the town from enforcing the code. No attorneys' fees were awarded and the case is now closed.", "summary": "A church in Arizona challenged the Town of Gilbert's Sign Code, which limited the number of signs, the location of signs, and the duration the signs could be up regarding the church's weekly meetings. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found the Code violated the First Amendment."} {"article": "On March 31, 2004, a Native American inmate in the California Department of Corrections (CDC) filed a lawsuit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against the CDC in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Western Division. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU, claimed that the CDC's hair grooming policy that prohibits male inmates from maintaining their hair longer than three inches violates his rights to religious freedom. The plaintiff asked the court for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting the CDC from punishing him for his religious beliefs and compelling the CDC to lift all disciplinary sanctions that have been imposed on him as a consequence of his refusal to adhere to the grooming policy. He also asked for a declaration that the policy violates his rights under RLUIPA. The plaintiff is a Cahuilla Native American and an active participant in his tribe. According to the plaintiff's religious faith, hair is a symbol of knowledge and wisdom and is only to be shorn upon the death of a close relative. The plaintiff believed that if he were to cut his hair he would be unable to join his relatives in the afterlife. Except upon his father's death in 1980, the plaintiff had not cut his hair since 1971. On May 11, 2004, the Court (Judge Ronald S.W. Lew) issued an order denying the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. On appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court (Judge Pregerson) reversed and remanded the District Court's order holding that (1) the policy imposed a substantial burden on the plaintiff's religious practice, (2) the policy was not the least restrictive alternative to achieve the CDC's interest in prison security, and thus violated RLUIPLA, (3) the plaintiff faced the possibility of irreparable injury absent issuance of an injunction, and (4) the balance of hardships favored the plaintiff. On January 1, 2007, the parties reached a settlement agreement. The CDC agreed to a permanent injunction against the grooming policy that had been in place (the record is unclear, but presumably, the new policy includes some exemptions). California also agreed to expunge from the plaintiff's record all violations of the hair grooming policy, and to not re-incarcerate the plaintiff based on these violations. If re-incarcerated for other reasons, they agreed to not use these violations to determine his classification. Lastly, the CDC agreed to pay $130,000 to the ACLU of Southern California for reasonable attorneys fees. On July 5, 2007, the case was dismissed with prejudice and the court retained jurisdiction for the sole purpose of enforcing the terms of the settlement agreement.", "summary": "This lawsuit was filed in 2004 in the federal district court for the Central District of California by a Native American prisoner in California, who sought an exemption from the prison's hair and grooming policy under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. After the district court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction was reversed on appeal, the parties reached a settlement agreement in January 2007. The State agreed to change the hair grooming policy, to expunge from the plaintiff's record all violations of the prior policy, and to not re-incarcerate the plaintiff based on these violations. If re-incarcerated for other reasons, the State agreed to not use these violations to determine the plaintiff's classification. Lastly, the ACLU of Southern California received $130,000 for attorneys fees."} {"article": "On March 29, 2017, plaintiffs, death row prisoners held in prolonged solitary confinement at Louisiana State Penitentiary (Angola) filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued the warden of Angola under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. They claimed that placing prisoners in solitary confinement merely because they had been sentenced to death violated their Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment and their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The plaintiffs, represented by the Cardozo Civil Rights Clinic, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary relief and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. This case was assigned to Judge Shelly D. Dick. The plaintiff noted in the complaint that anyone sentenced to death was automatically confined to solitary confinement on death row upon their arrival at Angola. The placement in solitary confinement was not based on violation of prison rules, behavioral considerations, or anything other than their death sentence. Over 75 percent of the 70 prisoners had been in solitary confinement for over a decade. The complaint also alleged that the plaintiffs were confined to windowless cells the size of an average home bathroom for 23 hours per day. In contrast to other prisoners at Angola, those on death row were denied any opportunity to challenge their placement in solitary confinement through any administrative means, nor were they given periodic reviews to determine whether they needed to remain in solitary confinement. In the complaint, the injunctive relief sought included permanently enjoining the defendants from violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of prisoners. The plaintiff also asked the court to grant a permanent injunction requiring the defendants to present a plan to the Court within 30 days that provided for the release from solitary confinement of the death row prisoners. On December 15, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify two classes. The first, a due process class, included \u201c[a]ll current and future Death Row prisoners at Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana, as well as other prisoners sentenced to death at Angola who are similarly situated.\u201d The second, an Eighth Amendment class, included \u201c[a]ll current and future Death Row prisoners who are now, or will be, on Death Row under the conditions described above for more than five continuous years.\u201d In August 2018, the parties began settlement negotiations. As part of the negotiations, the plaintiffs withdrew their motion for class certification under the condition that it would be reinstated if negotiations were unsuccessful. Their motion to withdraw was granted by Judge Dick on September 8, 2018. The parties continued to negotiate for settlement (unsuccessfully) through the rest of 2018 and all of 2019. On January 6, 2020, the court informed the parties that further efforts to facilitate settlement by the Court would not continue, and that the parties should anticipate going to trial if they could not reach an agreement. As of May 26, 2020, this case is ongoing.", "summary": "This 2017 class action lawsuit was brought in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana by death row prisoners held in solitary confinement for over 25 years. The prisoners challenged their placement in solitary confinement, which they claimed violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "On October 10, 2013, Prison Legal News (\u201cPLN\u201d) filed this lawsuit on behalf of itself and Sullivan County Jail prisoners in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. The plaintiff sued Sullivan County under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiff, represented by both private and public interest legal counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming violations of the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause. The plaintiff claimed that Sullivan County and its sheriff implemented unconstitutional policies that censored prisoner\u2019s access to PLN\u2019s monthly publication and correspondence mailed to prisoners. The policy (Policy I), established in October 2011, required that all mail communication fit on a standard postcard. Any mail the Jail received that did not fit the permitted standard was returned to the sender. The plaintiff also argued that the jail\u2019s current policies were a form of content-based discrimination because the defendants maintained and permitted other magazines inside the jail and prohibited the plaintiff\u2019s materials. On October 30, 2013, plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction, enjoining the defendants from implementing their policy prohibiting non-postcard mail communication to prisoners as a violation of both sender and recipients\u2019 First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. District Judge J Ronnie Greer ordered for defendants to provide a response to plaintiff\u2019s motion by November 22, 2013. On November 21, 2013, the defendants filed a motion requesting a time extension to submit their response to the plaintiff\u2019s motion for preliminary injunction, claiming that it was unaware of the previously provided deadline. Judge Greer granted that request and the defendants filed their response on December 9, 2013. The defendants argued that the preliminary injunction request was inappropriate and unnecessary given jail safety concerns, permittance of plaintiff\u2019s content to prisoners if properly addressed to an individual, and the October 24, 2013, policy that abandoned the previous postcard-only policy. During 2014, both parties filed subsequent supplement briefs in support and opposition of the preliminary motion under local rule 7.1(d). On March 26, 2015, Judge Greer submitted an order denying the plaintiff\u2019s motion for preliminary injunction because the issue of due process was not properly before the Court. Judge Greer permitted the plaintiff\u2019s ten days to amend its complaint and allege claims based on Sullivan County Jail\u2019s new policy. The plaintiff filed a new motion for preliminary injunction on the same day. On March 27, 2015, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, in compliance with the District Court\u2019s order. Plaintiff argued that the new jail policy (Policy II) did not go into effect until November 4, 2013, after receiving the plaintiff\u2019s first complaint. Further, the policy provided no clear procedure regarding magazines, the \u201cmail rejection\u201d section remained identical to Policy I and violated senders\u2019 due process rights, and the \u201cmail collection and delivery\u201d section violates both sender and recipient due process rights. Defendants filed their answer and response to the motion for preliminary injunction on April 10, 2015. In the answer and response, the defendants argued that the new policy that went into effect on April 9, 2015 (Policy III), addressed the plaintiff\u2019s remaining concerns and rendered the plaintiff\u2019s argument moot. The plaintiff filed another response and supplemental brief on June 4, 2015. The plaintiff renewed its motion for preliminary injunction on June 19, 2015. On June 24, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to strike, on grounds that the renewed preliminary injunction did not fairly comply with local rules and unfairly imposed on the time and resources of the defendants. Additionally, the defendants argued the plaintiff lacked standing to sue on behalf of prisoners. On March 16, 2016, Judge Greer granted the defendant\u2019s motion to strike and granted the plaintiff motion for preliminary injunction filed on March 26, 2015. The Court determined that the plaintiff did have standing to sue on behalf of prisoners because they both shared common constitutional interests. A jury trial was set for August 15, 2017, however, both parties reached an agreement on July 18, 2016. Both parties agreed to settle the case on grounds that the defendants pay $50,000.00 in damages and attorney\u2019s fees. On July 21, 2016, the Court Clerk filed an offer of judgment in favor of the plaintiff. On August 11, 2016, the plaintiff filed a satisfaction of judgment notice. The case is closed.", "summary": "In 2013, Prison Legal News filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. The complaint alleged that Sullivan County Jail's mail correspondence policy violated the First Amendment and Fourteenth Due Process Rights of both the plaintiff and Sullivan County Jail prisoners. Plaintiff requested preliminary, declaratory, and monetary relief. In 2016, the Court granted the plaintiff preliminary injunctive relief and the parties reached a settlement that awarded $50,000.00 in damages and attorney's fees. The case closed in August 2016."} {"article": "On June 11, 2018, the U.S. Government filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff sued the New York City Housing Authority (\"NYCHA\") under the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1437d(j)(3)), the federal Anti-Fraud Injunction Act (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1345), and the Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2616(a)(1)). The government sought injunctive relief, appointment of a monitor, and equitable relief. The plaintiff claimed that NYCHA violated the basic health and safety regulations of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and repeatedly engaged in deceptive practices. Specifically, they claimed that NYCHA failed to protect the residents from lead paint, failed to provide \"decent, safe, and sanitary\" housing per HUD's regulations, falsely said that they comply with HUD's regulations by disguising the true conditions of its properties, provided inadequate heat to the homes, and did not fix leaks, peeling paint, and other deteriorations. The plaintiff also claimed that NYCHA's typical response to external inquiries is to cover up or minimize problems that it knows to exist and make false statements to HUD and the public. The case was assigned to Judge William H. Pauley III. In addition to filing the complaint on June 11, 2018, the plaintiff also submitted a proposed consent decree calling for a non-judicial monitor, and among other injunctive and monetary agreements:
(1) a requirement that NYCHA comply with federal, state, and local lead paint statutes and regulations; (2) a requirement that NYCHA comply with federal regulations requiring HUD housing to be decent, safe, sanitary, and in good repair; (3) injunctive relief requiring NYCHA to establish a Compliance Department, Environmental Health and Safety Department, and Quality Assurance Unit in consultation with the monitor; and (4) injunctive relief requiring NYCHA to comply with federal regulations and rules relating to lead-safe work practices, lead abatement, lead paint disclosure and notification, and prioritization of lead paint hazards.On November 14, 2018, Judge Pauley III denied the consent decree for not being fair, reasonable, or consistent with the public interest. He also claimed that it had fatal procedural flaws, including unrealistic enforcement mechanisms. 347 F.Supp.3d 182. On January 31, 2019 the parties signed an agreement that called for the appointment of a non-judicial monitor. The agreement provided that within 14 days of appointment of the monitor, the plaintiff would voluntary dismiss the claims without prejudice. The parties also filed a joint motion to stay the proceedings for forty-five days in order to allow them to obtain a monitor to satisfy the condition precedent to dismissal under the parties\u2019 agreement. On February 1, 2019, Judge Pauley III approved this motion. On March 14, 2019 the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, and the court ordered the case be dismissed without prejudice on March 15, 2019 because the parties had appointed a monitor on February 28, 2019 and finalized a settlement agreement. The defendant agreed to remedy the deficient conditions in NYCHA properties, comply with all obligations under federal law, reform its management structure, and coordinate with HUD and the City. The settlement required installing a monitor to oversee development, issuing quarterly reports, convening with a community engagement committee, and changing the leadership (CEO) for NYCHA. Additionally, NYCHA was required to meet specified compliance requirements for lead paint and other health and safety issues, establish a compliance department, environmental health and safety department, a quality insurance unit, submit to inspections, and update all systems related to heat, elevators, trash, pests, and other disruptions. The monitor, HUD, EPA, and the U.S. Attorney\u2019s Office all held certain oversight roles under the agreement. At any time five years from the effective settlement date (March 15, 2019), either party can move to terminate the agreement and it will be terminated if the defendants have satisfied the specified criteria, which includes with compliance with obligations outlined in settlement for the twelve months prior to requesting termination and complying with all applicable laws. Regarding costs, the settlement required the City to bear the costs of the monitor, consultant, and all updates necessary. The City agreed to commit at least $2.2 billion in funding in the next 10 years to address issues with the NYCHA buildings. If the defendant fails to comply with the agreement, HUD, EPA, or the United States may enforce the agreement by seeking injunctive relief or an order of specific performance. The court agreed to retain jurisdiction over the settlement until termination of the agreement. As of May 29, 2020, there was no additional activity on this case. The settlement agreement is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2018, the U.S. government filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that the New York City Housing Authority violated basic health and safety regulations of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and repeatedly engaged in deceptive practices. The parties have settled, and NYCHA is required to comply with laws and standards outline in agreement. The settlement agreement is ongoing."} {"article": "On July 22, 2015, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the University of Michigan. The DOJ brought this suit on behalf of an employee of the University who had filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming that the University had discriminated against her in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act by denying her a reasonable accommodation. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the University of Michigan did not offer the employee a transfer or reassignment after she suffered a back injury that prevented her from being able to carry out her job. In addition, according to the complaint, the University did not give the employee \"priority placement\" into a vacant position as outlined in the University's own Standard Practice Guide, even after the employee applied for several jobs at the University. Instead, the University utilized a \"best qualified\" standard in selecting candidates for a vacant position, even when considering reassignments for reasonable accommodation. The DOJ requested monetary relief on behalf of the employee and injunctive relief to address the University's ADA violations. The University of Michigan settled with the DOJ in a consent decree filed with the complaint. Without admitting fault, the University agreed to modify its policies, practices, and procedures, including eliminating the application of the \"best qualified\" standard when considering reassignments as a reasonable accommodation and implementing a policy to reassign employees with disabilities to vacant positions for which they are qualified without competition for the position, when no accommodation is available in the current job. In addition, the University agreed to train its supervisors and human resource staff regarding the requirements of reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Finally, the University agreed to pay $156,674.37 to the employee mentioned in the complaint and an additional $58,445.47 to another affected individual. The consent decree was signed by District Judge Bernard A. Friedman on August 3, 2015 and scheduled to last 2018. No further docket entries exist, so the case is closed.", "summary": "In 2015, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the University of Michigan. The DOJ brought this suit on behalf of an employee of the University who had filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming that the University had discriminated against her in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act by denying her a reasonable accommodation. The case was settled in a consent decree, requiring the University to modify its policies, practices, and procedures and train its supervisors and human resource staff, as well as pay a total of $215,119.84 to affected individuals."} {"article": "On June 12, 2012, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit against the State of Florida and the Florida Secretary of State in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The DOJ brought this action under Section 8 of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1973gg-9, alleging that the State of Florida violated the NVRA by conducting a systematic program to purge voters from its voter registration rolls within the statutorily-required 90-day quiet period before an election for federal office. In addition, the DOJ alleged that Florida's use of inaccurate and unreliable voter verification procedures violated NVRA's requirements that any such program be uniform and nondiscriminatory. The DOJ sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction against Florida taking any further steps in connection with its voter purge program. On June 15, 2012, the DOJ moved for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the State from implementing the program. Various organizations, including the Judicial Watch, True the Vote, and the Brennan Center for Justice at the NYU School of Law filed amicus briefs in support of the motion. On June 28, 2012, U.S. District Judge Robert Hinkle denied the motion finding that the State had \"abandoned the [voter purge] program.\" Judge Hinkle held that the State's program did not violate the 90-day quiet period provision of the NVRA. However, Judge Hinkle noted that it was likely that the voter purge was invalid because it was not \"uniform\" and \"non-discriminatory.\" Judge Hinkle emphasized that it was possible for the State to design a program program that \"accurately identifies noncitizens who are registered to vote without unnecessarily challenging citizens could meet the requirement of uniformity and nondiscrimination,\" but that the current program likely violated the NVRA. 870 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (N.D. Fla. 2012). In June of 2012, four individuals and an organization, Judicial Watch, moved to intervene in this action, claiming that if noncitizens were improperly registered to vote, it would dilute the votes of properly registered voters. Another organization, True the Vote, moved to intervene as well, wanting to ensure that the state properly maintained accurate voting lists. On September 27, 2012, the parties moved jointly to stay the proceedings until after the election. Judge Hinkle granted the motion on October 10, 2012. Judge Hinkle denied the motions to intervene on November 6, 2012, finding that the intervening parties had their interests adequately represented by the State. On January 10, 2013, the parties jointly stipulated to dismiss this action, and on January 16, 2013, Judge Hinkle dismissed the case. Although the legality of the program was not fully litigated in this case, in 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the 2012 voter purge program did, in fact, violate the NVRA. Arcia v. Fla. Sec'y of State, 772 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2014). More information about that case can be found at VR-FL-0170 in this Clearinghouse.", "summary": "In this lawsuit, filed in June 2012 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice alleged that Florida has violated the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) by conducting a systematic program to purge voters from its voter registration rolls within the statutorily-required 90-day quiet period before an election for federal office. In addition, the DOJ alleged that Florida's use of inaccurate and unreliable voter verification procedures violates the requirement in Section 8 of the NVRA that any such program be uniform and nondiscriminatory. The lawsuit seeks a declaratory judgment and an injunction against Florida taking any further steps in connection with its list purge program. U.S. District Judge Robert Hinkle denied the government's motion for a temporary restraining order, finding that the State had abandoned the program. The DOJ voluntarily dismissed this case in January 2013."} {"article": "On December 23, 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the United States Department of Justice, on behalf of approximately 76,000 African-American and Hispanic residential mortgage borrowers, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against National City Bank, alleging that it engaged in discriminatory lending practices. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the defendant's policies and practices, African-American and Hispanic borrowers unfairly paid higher prices for their home mortgage loans than non-Hispanic White borrowers. The complaint asked the court for injunctive relief, rescission or reformation of contracts, and monetary damages. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant allowed its mortgage brokers to set wholesale loan prices unrelated to credit risk characteristics and loan terms; did not require mortgage brokers to justify or document the reasons for the amount of broker fees and prices set above the par rate; failed to monitor for disparities based on race or national original because of its policies and practices; and created a financial incentive for mortgage brokers to charge higher fees and interest rates. The plaintiff filed a proposed consent order with the complaint that was entered by the Court (Judge Cathy Bissoon) on January 9, 2014. The Consent Order addressed National City Bank's practices between 2002 and 2008. Subsequently, PNC Bank acquired the defendant, and so the Consent Order is between PNC Bank and the plaintiffs. Per the order, the bank was to establish an interest-bearing settlement fund of $35 million \"to compensate affected borrowers for monetary damages, equitable relief, and other damages that they may have suffered as a result of National City Bank's alleged violations of the ECOA and the FHA.\" The order also provided a process for determining who the settlement fund recipients should be and for disbursement. The order was to terminate three months after final disbursement. On Jan. 6, 2017, the court approved disbursement of the last of the settlement fund. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On December 23, 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the United States Department of Justice, on behalf of approximately 76,000 African-American and Hispanic residential mortgage borrowers, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against a bank, alleging that it engaged in discriminatory lending practices. A consent decree was entered on January 9, 2014. As of February 24, 2014, this case is still open, pending a motion to intervene filed by several African-American and Hispanic borrowers."} {"article": "On October 18, 2016, a Louisiana naturalized citizen filed this lawsuit against the State of Louisiana in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana for denying his constitutional rights to marriage. Proceeding under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Louisiana\u2019s Act 436, which required all applicants for a marriage license to provide a certified birth certificate and permitted this requirement to be waived by individuals born in the U.S. The plaintiff, born in an Indonesian refugee camp without a birth certificate, alleged that Act 436 violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the 14th Amendment because it prevents certain foreign-born individuals from exercising their fundamental right to marriage. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the State's denial of his marriage license violated the Constitution, in addition to a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining defendants from further denying a marriage license to the plaintiff. On February 2, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction. Amicus briefs were filed in support of the plaintiff by Constitutional Accountability Center, ACLU, and National Center for Lesbian Rights. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on February 23. On March 23, Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion for preliminary injunction and denied the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. The Court found that the plaintiff had standing and that he satisfied all the necessary elements for a preliminary injunction. 2017 WL 1091261. The plaintiff then filed the first amended complaint on April 12, 2017 with minor modifications. On May 24, the plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment, declaratory judgment, and permanent injunction. On August 8, Judge Lemelle granted the plaintiff\u2019s motions. The court found that Louisiana failed to demonstrate that \u201cthis classification based on national origin furthers a compelling governmental interest that justify treating this Plaintiff and other similarly situated U.S. citizens differently from U.S. born citizens.\u201d In addition, the court found that the plaintiff has also demonstrated actual success on the merits of the due process claim. 301 F.Supp.3d 661. On February 21, 2018, Judge Lemelle ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiff $154,754 in attorney\u2019s fees and costs. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On October 18, 2016, a Louisiana naturalized citizen filed this lawsuit against the state in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana for denying his constitutional rights to marriage. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of State of Louisiana\u2019s Act 436 for violating the equal protection and due process clauses of the 14th Amendment. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On March 23, 2017, Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion for preliminary injunction; On August 8, 2017, Judge Lemelle granted the motion for permanent injunction. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On September 21, 2005 the Chicago District Office of the EEOC filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff sued Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire LLC under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiffs, representing Hispanic and African American employees of Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire LLC, asked the court for injunctive and monetary relief. The plaintiff claimed that African American and Hispanic employees were subjected to different terms and conditions of employment and were subjected to a hostile work environment because of their race and national origin. The plaintiff also alleged that one employee was discharged in retaliation for complaining about the discrimination. On August 21st, 2006, the plaintiffs and defendants jointly moved for a protective order to maintain confidentiality over certain information and documents. On September 6, 2006, Judge Joan B. Gottschall entered the agreed protective order. Specifically, the order stated information and documents such as wage, financial, or tax information; social security numbers; physical and mental health information; trade secrets; performance evaluations; employee complaints; proprietary business processes and procedures; and defendant's affirmative action plans were to remain confidential. Between 2007 and 2008 the parties conducted multiple settlement conferences. On April 4, 2008, both parties consented to transferring the case to Magistrate Judge Arlander Keys. On April 9, 2008, Chief Judge James F. Holderman signed an Executive Committee Order transferring the case to Magistrate Judge Arlander Keys. On May 21, 2008 the Honorable Arlander Keys signed a consent decree. The decree included injunctive and monetary relief. The injunctive relief enjoined the defendant from discriminating against employees on the basis of race; required the defendant to create a policy prohibiting discrimination in the workplace; and required posting, record keeping, and training. The monetary relief totaled $425,000 to be distributed among 17 class members.", "summary": "On September 21, 2005 the Chicago District Office of the EEOC filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff sued Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire LLC under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiff claimed that African American and Hispanic employees were subjected to different terms and conditions of employment and were subjected to a hostile work environment because of their race and national origin. The plaintiff also alleged that one employee was discharged in retaliation for complaining about the discrimination. On May 21, 2008 the Honorable Arlander Keys signed the consent decree. The decree included injunctive and monetary relief."} {"article": "On April 21, 2004, eleven former male detainees of the Fulton County Jail, represented by private attorneys, brought this 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs challenged as unconstitutional the Jail's practices of (a) conducting \"blanket strip searches\" of inmates entering and/or returning to the Jail without any individualized determination that such searches would reveal contraband; and (b) detaining inmates past their scheduled release dates (\"over-detention\"). The plaintiffs alleged that these practices had persisted at the Fulton County Jail for years and estimated that some 10,000 or more inmates were affected. The plaintiffs claimed that the practices were improper under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Georgia Constitution and common law. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages and class certification. The complaint was amended four times. In addition to suing the former and current Fulton County Sheriffs, the plaintiffs sued Fulton County and the City of Atlanta, alleging that those governmental entities were liable because their police forces had entrusted arrestees to the Fulton County Jail with knowledge of the unconstitutional conditions that existed there. The plaintiffs alleged that three types of blanket strip searches occurred at the Jail: (1) blanket strip searches of arrestees as part of their point-of-entry booking into the Jail (AR Group); (2) blanket strip searches of detainees who posted bond or were ordered released at the Jail before their point-of-entry booking into the Jail (AL Group); and (3) blanket strip searches of detainees who returned to the jail from a court appearance after having been ordered released in state court (CR Group). The defendants denied all allegations and sought dismissal of the action for failure to state a claim and under the defenses of both Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified immunity. On July 5, 2005, the District Court (Judge Richard W. Story) granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions to dismiss. The Court determined that: (1) the Sheriffs were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for the monetary claims against them in their official capacity; (2) the Sheriffs were entitled to qualified immunity for the strip search claims; (3) the Sheriffs were not entitled to qualified immunity as to the over-detention claims; (4) the detainees adequately stated \u00a7 1983 claims against the county; and (5) the detainees lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the county defendants. Powell v. Barrett, 376 F.Supp.2d 1340 (N.D.Ga. 2005). All parties appealed. In two separate August 23, 2007, opinions, one published and one unpublished, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the District Court. In the published opinion, the Eleventh Circuit panel (Justice Susan Harrell Black) found that some plaintiffs could pursue their strip search claims against former Sheriff Barrett in her individual capacity. All of the strip search claims against current Sheriff Freeman, Fulton County, and the City of Atlanta were ordered dismissed. Powell v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2007). In the unpublished opinion, the Eleventh Circuit panel (per curiam) let stand the over-detention claims against former Sheriff Barrett in her individual capacity. All other over-detention claims were ordered dismissed. Powell v. Barrett, 246 Fed.Appx. 615 (11th Cir. Aug 23, 2007). On February 4, 2008, the Eleventh Circuit, acting en banc, vacated the August 23, 2007 panel opinions and agreed to rehear the appeal. On September 4, 2008, the en banc Eleventh Circuit issued an opinion in which they ruled that a policy or practice of strip searching all arrestees as a part of the process of booking them into the general population of a detention facility, even without reasonable suspicion to believe that they may be concealing contraband, is permissible, so long as the strip search is no more extensive than the one upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). The en banc panel then remanded the case back to the original Eleventh Circuit panel for proceedings in line with this decision. The case was promptly remanded to the district court, which on March 27, 2009, dismissed the City of Atlanta, the State of Georgia, and Fulton County from the case and entered judgment in their favor. The case proceeded against other defendants. On March 3, 2011, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants as to the strip-search claims, but denied the motion for summary judgment for the over-detention claims. Discovery continued regarded the over-detention claims. On February 17, 2012, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' over-detention claims. Since no claims remained, the court entered final judgment in favor of the defendants. 2012 WL 567065. The plaintiffs appealed both grants of summary judgment for the over-detention claim and the strip-search claim. On March 7, 2013, the Eleventh Circuit (Judge Hull) affirmed the district court's holding that the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity as to the plaintiffs' over-detention and strip search claims. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit held that 1) assuming without deciding that, when they were over-detained, the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by jail employees, the plaintiffs failed to establish that sheriff was liable as a supervisor; 2) the jailers did not violate pre-trial detainees' Fourth Amendment rights by visually searching them for legitimate safety and penological reasons prior to admitting or readmitting them to the jail's general population; and 3) pre-trial detainees have no constitutional right, much less a clearly established right, to be held in a particular cell or a separate area of a jail and not be placed back in the general jail population. 511 F. App'x 957, 964 (11th Cir. 2013). The plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court to hear the case, but on November 4, 2013, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 134 S. Ct. 513 (2013). The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2004, eleven former male detainees of the Fulton County Jail, brought a class action lawsuit challenging the Jail's strip search and over detention practices. Overruling its own circuit precedent, the en banc Eleventh Circuit ruled in 2008 that a policy or practice of strip searching all arrestees as a part of the process of booking them is permissible, so long as the strip search is no more extensive than the one upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment on all claims to the defendants, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court declined to hear the case in 2013."} {"article": "On October 26, 1999, a disabled athlete and employee of the Paralympic Games sued the U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, claiming the USOC gave better training, benefits, and rewards to non-disabled olympic athletes, in violation of Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12181 et seq.; and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794. As an employee of the USOC, he also sued under Title I of the ADA for employment discrimination, and state law for breach of contract . Although the Court never specifically ordered consolidation, a June 14, 2006 an order consolidated the Shepherd Case with Hollonbeck v. U.S. Olympic Committee, also filed in the District of Colorado before Judge Kane. This case appears in the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse Database as DR-CO-0016. The facts are largely analogous - paralympic athlete sued the USOC for discrimination in training, accommodations, funding, and so forth. Many other motions and appeals were consolidated in the two cases after the June 14, 2006 order. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed the USOC provided benefits to non-disabled olympic athletes, including tuition assistance, health insurance, financial support, access to training facilities, and rewards for medals achieved in the Olympic Games. The USOC provided either inferior benefits to paralympic athletes or no benefits at all. Count II of the complaint alleged violation of Additionally, the plaintiff's position at the USOC required that he promote awareness of disabled sports and promote them, among other functions. The complaint alleged that the USOC failed to provide him with pay, advancements, bonuses, budgeting, support staff, and promotions that it provided to similarly situated non-disabled employees of the USOC. The plaintiff also alleged retaliatory termination. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. On April 20, 2000, the District Court addressed the USOC's motions for summary judgment and to strike, with varied results. A summary of this order appears on the docket. The parties then engaged in a lengthy discovery battle, in which several third parties sought protective orders. On September 21, 2005, the District Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and on June 14, 2006, the District Court ordered the parties to submit proposed orders regarding the viability of Counts I and II of the complaint, the \"athlete\" claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Shepherd v. U.S. Olympic Committee, No. 99-2077, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39295 (D. Colo. Jun. 14, 2006). This order also consolidated similar motions for summary judgment by the defendants in Hollonbeck v. U.S. Olympic Committee, mentioned above. On November 16, 2006, in a published order, the District Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Counts II and III, the \"athlete\" counts, leaving only the \"employment\" counts, I and IV. Shepherd v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (D. Colo. 2006). The Court found many parts of the claims problematic: the training facilities were not really \"public accommodations\" because they were limited to athletes preselected by the USOC; and the ASA separated the Olympics and Paralympics programs and created separate governing bodies, thus plaintiffs had not been \"excluded.\" On January 10, 2007, final judgment was entered against the plaintiff as to Counts II and III. In this order, the court also granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary adjudication regarding the employment claims. On July 2, 2007, the docket indicates that a 2 week jury trial was scheduled for February 18 to 29, 2008. It appears the parties settled the employment-related claims. The case was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation on January 10, 2008. No settlement agreement is publicly available at this time. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated the Shepherd and Hollonbeck cases on Plaintiff's appeal of the District Court's grant of the defendant's motion to dismiss the \"athlete\" claims. Judge Paul J. Kelly, Jr., writing for himself and Judge Jerome A. Holmes upheld the District Court's dismissal, finding that although the USOC's policy resulted in disparate impact on disabled athletes, this did not state a claim under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Judge William J. Holloway, Jr. dissented and would have reversed the District Court. Hollonbeck v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 513 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2008). There has been no further development in this case.", "summary": "A disabled athlete of the Paralympic Games sued the U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC) under the Americans With Disabilities and Rehabilitation Acts because the USOC gave better training, benefits, and rewards to olympic athletes. The plaintiff was also an employee of the USOC and he sued under the ADA and breach of contract for discrimination in employment. The District Court dismissed the disparate treatment claims and it appears the parties settled the employment claims, though no agreement is publicly available."} {"article": "On June 12, 2014, the mother of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide while in jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff sued the County of San Mateo, the Mateo County Sheriff, the County of Monterey, the Monterey County Sheriff, the City of Monterey, the Monterey Police, the California Forensic Medical Group, and the Community Hospital of Monterey Peninsula under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1983 and 1988, as well as state law. Represented by private counsel, she asked the court for monetary relief, claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, she alleged failures to provide medical care, to protect from harm, and to furnish medical care. She also claimed a deprivation of substantive due process, medical malpractice, negligent supervision, training, hiring, and retention, and wrongful death. In 2013, the detainee committed suicide while in his administrative segregation cell at the Monterey County Jail by hanging himself with a bed sheet. The detainee had a history of mental illness and had been arrested three days prior for a murder he committed during a bipolar episode. The plaintiff alleged that the Jail's policies and practices for screening, supervising, and treating prisoners at risk for suicide were inadequate. The plaintiff also alleged serious deficiencies in the delivery of mental health care at the Jail. The detainee had been previously detained at the Jail and had not received adequate mental health care. On October 9, 2014, the District Court granted in part Monterey City's and Monterey County's motions to dismiss with leave to amend to the complaint. The Court also denied the County's motion to strike. On October 28, 2014, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding a claim of general negligence and allegations to other claims against Monterey and Monterey County. Then, on November 19, 2014, Judge Labson Freeman denied the Hospital's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On September 22, 2015, Judge Freeman approved the stipulated dismissal of the County and the Sheriff as defendants. Two days later, she approved the stipulated dismissal of the Hospital as a defendant. Presumably these were based on out-of-court settlements. The case proceeded against the remaining defendants. On January 12, 2016, the court granted summary judgment for a defendant police officer and denied summary judgment for defendant Monterey City. The court found that the plaintiffs had indicated an intention to dismiss the police officer and did not oppose summary judgment as to him. With respect to the City, the court held that there was a dispute as to the issue of whether or not the City \"lacks minimally necessary policies and procedures for identifying a detainee\u2019s mental health issues and responding to those issues appropriately by either transferring the detainee to a mental health facility or transmitting information regarding the detainee\u2019s mental health to the next custodian.\" On February 22, 2016, the court granted partial summary judgment for county defendants and medical defendants. The parties then progressed toward trial, but on March 28, 2016, the parties indicated they had reached settlement. Accordingly, they moved for voluntary dismissal two days later, which the court granted while retaining jurisdiction over the settlement's enforcement. The court related this case to Estate of Sandra Vela v. County of Monterey, No. 5:16-cv-02375, on May 12, 2016. The settlement is not publicly available, though a status report indicates that \"[t]he Agreement required payment of all funds by June 24, 2016, as well as the return of Mr. Claypole\u2019s personal property and handwritten suicide note by that date.\" There has been no further docket activity since July 2016. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2014, the mother of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide while in jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff sued the jail, the hospital, and the communities who interacted with him prior to his suicide for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and other claims including wrongful death. The case settled."} {"article": "NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see their tracker. COVID-19 Summary: On May 1, 2020, two qualified voters and five public interest organizations filed this lawsuit against the Tennessee Secretary of State, the Tennessee Coordinator of Elections, and the Shelby County district attorney general, challenging Tennessee\u2019s restrictions on absentee voters, its criminal penalties against those who aid voters to obtain absentee ballots, and the inability for absentee voters to fix their ballots if they are rejected due to errors such as a signature mismatch. The petitioners sought declaratory and injunctive relief. No outcome yet.
\"All African American and Latino individuals Employed as New York City public school teachers by Defendant, on or after June 29, 1995, who failed to achieve a qualifying score on any administration of the LAST, and as a result either last or were denied a permanent teaching appointment.\" 2016 WL 9777081.Defendant's Crossclaim On September 20, 2000, the Board of Education filed a crossclaim against the State Education Department for indemnification and contribution, arguing that because the Department had required the Board to administer the NTE and LAST, the Board should be indemnified. By 2003, all the plaintiffs' claims against the Department had been dismissed, but the Board's indemnification claims remained. On June 25, 2009, the District Court (Judge Kimba M. Wood) dismissed the crossclaim, finding that the cross-claim failed as a matter of law because there is no right to indemnification or contribution under Title VII. The District Court Summary Judgment Decisions On November 25, 2002, the Court (Judge Motley) granted the plaintiffs' and the defendants' summary judgment motions in part and denied them in part. Specifically, the court decided the following issues:
(1) Segregation for HIV positive prisoners who are found to be guilty of misconduct if it is determined that the behavior presented a significant risk of HIV transmission; (2) Timely reporting the misconduct to the Assistant Chief Medical Officer, who will review the actual misconduct reports and document the behavior in the prisoner's health record; (3) If the behavior presented a significant risk of HIV transmission, the Correctional Facilities Administration Deputy Director, upon consultation with the Chief Medical Officer shall be informed in writing of the incident and shall review the case to determine if the prisoner should be classified to administrative segregation.The settlement allowed for judicial enforcement. On November 14, 2018, pursuant to their settlement agreement, the plaintiff submitted a Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal, which stated that the parties reached a settlement agreement resolving all the issues in this lawsuit, including costs, attorney's fees, and expenses. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2015, an HIV positive prisoner filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the Western District of Michigan under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1983 and 1988 against the Michigan Department of Corrections. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's enforced a policy that disproportionately and unlawfully discriminated against prisoners with HIV, by subjecting them to drastically more severe punishment than others for sexual misconduct. The parties reached a settlement out of court and submit a stipulation of voluntary dismissal on November 14, 2018."} {"article": "On October 11, 2013, a non-profit company filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Oklahoma under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Administrative Procedure Act and First Amendment against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff, represented by the public interest firm The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage for contraception. The plaintiff is suing on behalf of all non-profit, Christian-owned corporations that participate in a health plan provided by GuideStone Financial Resources of the Southern Baptist Convention. These corporations do not already qualify for the religious exception for the ACA's contraception insurance mandate. On October 25, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction for all similarly-situated corporations, which was granted by United States District Court (Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti) on December 20, 2013. Judge DeGiusti relied on the U.S. Court of Appeals 10th Circuit decision Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius v. Sebelius in granting the motion for preliminary injunction. In the same order, Judge DeGiusti denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs had filed a request for class certification in the event the preliminary injunction was denied; as the court granted the preliminary injunction, the motion for class certification was denied as moot on December 23, 2013. On February 11, 2014, the defendants appealed the Judge DeGiusti's December 20, 2013 order granting the plaintiff's preliminary injunction and denying the defendants' motion to dismiss to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. On March 26, 2014, the district court stayed proceedings pending the appeal. On March 31, 2014, the Tenth Circuit declined to consolidate this case with two others before it, Southern Nazarene University v. Sebelius and Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, on the government's request. However, on July 14, 2015, the Tenth Circuit (Judges Scott M. Matheson, Monroe G. McKay, and Bobby R. Baldock, dissenting in part) issued an opinion addressing all three cases. Little Sister of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015). The court found that the accommodation scheme under the ACA relieves Plaintiffs of their obligations under the Mandate and does not substantially burden their religious exercise under RFRA or infringe upon their First Amendment rights. It therefore reversed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs, and remanded the case to the district court. The Tenth Circuit's decision reversing the preliminary injunction was vacated and remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court in Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). In Zubik, the Supreme Court had directed the parties to file supplemental briefs suggesting a solution to their disagreement, in which employees could still receive contraception coverage without employers giving any notice to the government. On May 16, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that that \"accommodates petitioners\u2019 religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners\u2019 health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'\" 136 S.Ct 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of this case. After a change in administrations, the defendants moved without opposition for voluntary dismissal and Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal on October 23, 2017. Back in the district court, the issued status reports indicating they had entered into settlement negotiations with the new Trump administration. On February 16, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for the court to convert the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction and declaratory relief. The motion stated that the government had now admitted that the mandate violates RFRA. The court (Judge DeGiusti) entered declaratory relief and issued a permanent injunction on March 15, 2018, enjoining the defendants from \"any effort to apply or enforce the substantive requirements of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 300gg-13(a)(4) and any implementing regulations as those requirements relate to the provision of contraceptive drugs, devices, or procedures and related education and counseling to which Plaintiffs have sincerely-held religious objections, and are enjoined and restrained from pursuing, charging, or assessing penalties, fines, assessments, or other enforcement actions for noncompliance related thereto.\" 2018 WL 1352186. A final judgment was entered in the case on July 17, 2018, with judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the RFRA claim and any of the plaintiffs' remaining claims dismissed without prejudice. On August 30, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for an extension of time to file a bill of costs and motion for attorneys fees. The court granted this on August 31, 2018. As of April 14, 2020, the parties have not filed any further motions and the case is presumed closed.", "summary": "A non-profit Christian corporation filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for an exemption to the Affordable Care Act's contraception insurance mandate on behalf on all corporations participating in a specific health insurance plan. On October 25, 2014, United States District Court (Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti) granted a preliminary injunction for the plaintiff and all similarly-situated employers. Though this injunction was reversed by the Tenth Circuit in 2015, that decision was vacated by the Supreme Court in Zubik v. Burwell, and a change in administration led the parties to dismiss the case. Declaratory relief and a permanent injunction were entered in favor of the plaintiff in 2018."} {"article": "On August 8, 2016, the plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon against the Oregon Department of Corrections (ODOC) and the State of Oregon, claiming violations of the Eighth Amendment and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act. In July 2015, the plaintiff, a former prisoner, became paralyzed in his cell. Before his release into the community without any resources or the ability to take care of himself, the plaintiff sought emergency injunctive relief that he be released to an appropriate care facility paid by the State of Oregon for a reasonable period of time to provide him the ability to access care, as well as declaratory relief, and attorney's fees and costs. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants failed to provide a reasonable accommodation and planned to release him without an adequate release plan, and denied him the rights and benefits in violation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. On August 11, 2016, District Judge Michael J. McShane granted in part the plaintiff's motion for an emergency preliminary injunction. Judge McShane held that the ODOC was required to provide the plaintiff with a wheelchair upon release, and to release the plaintiff to an ADA-compliant motel. The ODOC was ordered to conduct twice-daily check-ins on the plaintiff through August 26, 2016: one contact by phone and one contact in-person. On August 12, 2016, the defendants moved to modify the order to allow the check-ins to be provided by a representative from an adjacent correctional facility. The court granted the motion on the same day. On September 1, 2016, Judge Michael J. McShane granted the defendants' unopposed motion for extension of time to answer. Because the court's TRO made the plaintiff's claim moot, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed this action without prejudice on September 13, 2016.", "summary": "On August 2016, a physically disabled prisoner sued Oregon Department of Corrections (ODOC) and the State of Oregon in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, claiming violations of the Eight Amendment and Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. The court ordered that ODOC will provide the plaintiff with a wheelchair and conduct twice-daily check-ins for two weeks after his release."} {"article": "This class-action lawsuit was brought on June 2, 2020, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. The suit arose out of the protests that engulfed the nation following the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. Defendants in this case are the City of Minneapolis and John Does 1-100, one of whom was a police officer who sprayed pepper spray on the plaintiff. The complaint alleges that Minneapolis law enforcement used tactics during these protests which constituted violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the city's failure to keep police in line also violated the Constitution. Specifically, the complaint cited 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, claiming that the police used excessive force and retaliation against protesters in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that attacks on the protesters were violations of free speech and free assembly under the First Amendment. It sought at least $50,000 in monetary damages plus interest, a temporary restraining order, a permanent injunction, and attorney's fees and costs of the suit. On June 3, 2020, the case was assigned to Judge David S. Doty and referred to Magistrate Judge Becky R. Thorson. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "This class-action alleged that the Minneapolis police used tactics on peaceful protesters that were in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The case arose out of the nationwide protests following the police killing of George Floyd. The plaintiff in this case alleged that a police officer (John Doe 1) used pepper spray on her and her daughter while they were peacefully protesting on the sidewalk. The plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, claiming that the police violated her right to free speech and free assembly, and that their actions represented excessive force and illegal retaliation. They also launched a Monell complaint, saying that the city is responsible for the police officers' actions. The case is ongoing as of August 4, 2020."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas petition filed on behalf of immigrant detainees in Texas, seeking release from detention due to COVID-19. The court denied to enter any relief for the plaintiffs on July 6, 2020. Later, the plaintiffs were released and the court dismissed the case on July 31.
Entry of a declaratory judgment that N.Y. City Adm. Code \u00a7 10-110(c) parading without a permit code provision is unconstitutional, facially or as applied to the extent it is applied as a strict liability offense, and entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement as a strict liability offense (i.e., enforcement in the absence of fair notice or warnings/orders to those subject to potential arrest);Id. 42. This was added in response to the defendants' motion to dismiss the original complaint. In their motion to dismiss, the defendants argued that the Fourth Amendment claims should be dismissed because N.Y. City Adm. Code \u00a7 10-110(c) had provided the arresting officers with probable cause for the arrests. New York City Adm. Code \u00a7 10-110(c) provides that a \"procession, parade or race shall be permitted upon any street or in any public place only after a written permit therefor has been obtained from the police commissioner.\" On December 23, 2011, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. The defendants advanced two main arguments, namely (1) that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because probable cause existed for the arrests, and (2) that the plaintiffs' claims for damages against the City and its officials should be dismissed because the rights at issue were not clearly established. On the qualified immunity point, the defendants argued that probable cause existed for the arrests because the plaintiffs participated in a \"parade\" without a permit in violation of N.Y. City Administrative Code, \u00a7 10-110, and that the video proof on which the plaintiffs relied in their complaint demonstrated that the marchers violated Penal Law \u00a7 240.20(5) by \"obstruct[ing] vehicular ... traffic\" on the roadway of the Brooklyn Bridge. On June 7, 2012, the District Court (Judge Jed S. Rakoff) granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint in part and denied it in part. Specifically, the Court denied the motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims against the officers who arrested them, but dismissed the claims for damages against the City, Mayor Bloomberg, and Police Commissioner Kelly. In denying the motion to dismiss the claims against the arresting officers, the Court explained that the defense of qualified immunity at this stage hinged on whether it would \"be clear to reasonable police officers, in the situation the defendant officers confronted, that they lacked probable cause to believe (i) that the plaintiff demonstrators had committed a crime and (ii) that the plaintiff demonstrators had received fair warning?\" Garcia v. Bloomberg, 865 F. Supp. 2d 478, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The Court found that there were two criminal statutes that the plaintiffs apparently violated. However, the Court found that the Second Amended Complaint adequately alleged that the plaintiffs failed to receive fair warning, and thus concluded that the defense of qualified immunity did not defeat the claims at this stage of the litigation. As to the claims for damages against the City, Mayor Bloomberg, and Police Commissioner Kelly, the Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately allege such claims. The plaintiffs had advanced three arguments for these claims. First, they argued that the existence of \"Disorder Control Guidelines,\" the arrests of protesters in 2003 and 2004, and arrests that occurred a week before the incident in this case, all supported the conclusion that the City has a policy of conducting mass false arrests in order to discourage protesting. Second, the plaintiffs argued that Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly either ratified or directly participated in the alleged constitutional violations by failing to act or investigate the incidents. Finally, the plaintiffs argued that Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly faced liability based on their failure to train the arresting officers. The Court rejected each of these three arguments, finding the facts cited in support of them too attenuated or implausible to support actionable claims, and thus dismissed those claims. Id.at 491-94. On June 28, 2012, the officer defendants appealed the District Court's denial of their motion to dismiss the complaint against them on qualified immunity grounds. The defendants argued that the District Court had erred in concluding that the complaint, and the other materials that could properly be considered on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, did not establish that the defendants had probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs for disorderly conduct. The Second Circuit disagreed. On August 21, 2014, a divided Second Circuit (Judges Guido Calabresi and Gerard E. Lynch, with Judge Lynch writing the opinion) affirmed the District Court's ruling. The Second Circuit found that:
Taking plaintiffs' allegations as true, as we must, we believe that they have adequately alleged actionable conduct. Plaintiffs have alleged that the police directed the demonstrators' activity along the route of their march, at times specifically condoning, or even directing, behavior that on its face would violate traffic laws. When the bottleneck at the pedestrian walkway of the Bridge led the demonstrators to pool into the roadway, the police did not immediately direct them out of the street, and when they did undertake to issue such a warning to clear the roadway, they did so in a way that no reasonable officer who observed the warning could have believed was audible beyond the first rank of the protesters at the front of the crowd. According to plaintiffs' account, the police then retreated back onto the Bridge in a way that would reasonably have been understood, and was understood, by the bulk of the demonstrators to be a continuation of the earlier practice of allowing the march to proceed in violation of normal traffic rules. We emphasize that the procedural posture of this case presents a formidable challenge to defendants' position. They urge us to find that qualified immunity is established for all defendants based on plaintiffs' version of events (plus a few inconclusive photos and videos). The evidence, once a full record is developed, may contradict plaintiffs' allegations, or establish that some or all of the defendants were not aware of the facts that plaintiffs allege would have alerted them to the supposed implicit permission. We express no view on whether some or all of the defendants may be entitled to qualified immunity at a later stage of the case. But to reverse the district court's denial of qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss, we would have to say that on the basis of plaintiffs' account of events, no officer who participated in or directed the arrests could have thought that plaintiffs were invited onto the roadway and then arrested without fair warning of the revocation of this invitation. Since we cannot do so on this limited record, we affirm the judgment of the district court.Garcia v. Does, No. 12-2634-cv, 2014 WL 4099270, at *9 (2d Cir. Aug. 21, 2014) (footnotes and citation omitted). Judge Debra Ann Livingston dissented. She wrote that the majority had turned the qualified immunity standard upside down, and would have found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at *13. On December 17, 2014, the Second Circuit entered an order granting the defendants' petition for rehearing en banc and withdrawing its opinion of August 21, 2014 was. On the petition for rehearing, the Second Circuit then concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. On February 24, 2015, the Second Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. The court found that:
In this case, the facts alleged in the Complaint, and those depicted in the videos, do not bear out plaintiffs\u2019 legal conclusion that the officers\u2019 actions constituted \u201can actual and apparent grant of permission\u201d to the demonstrators to utilize the roadway. Still less do those facts plausibly describe a situation in which reasonable officers would have clearly understood that their actions were interpreted by the demonstrators as a grant of permission, such that arresting the demonstrators would violate clearly established law. Accordingly, dismissal of the Complaint is required.Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 97 (2d Cir. 2015). The Second Circuit's remanded the case to the district court. On April 28, 2015, the plaintiffs requested leave to filed a third amended complaint. The third amended complaint would contain new allegations, most relating to a police chief who was the ranking officer on the scene. These included allegations that the chief admitted he erred in not using police resources like scooters or mesh to block protestors from accessing the roadway. Other new allegations in the third amended complaint would concern the command and decision-making structures of the NYPD, again focusing primarily on the chief on the scene. In a September 10, 2015 order, Judge Rakoff denied the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend. He found that none of the additional allegations would contradict the Second Circuit's findings, stating that the new material had no bearing on its finding that the police had probable cause to arrest the marches, and that the further similar allegations of limited permission earlier in the march or implied permission on the roadway would still not be enough to defeat qualified immunity. Judge Rakoff, finding the proposed amendments to the complaint futile, denied leave to amend, and directed the clerk of court to enter a final judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice and close the case. 2015 WL 54441222. Per Judge Rakoff's order, the district court closed the case on September 15, 2015. The plaintiffs appealed the decision denying their request to amend their complaint to the Second Circuit on October 2, 2015. On October 13, 2016, the Second Circuit (Circuit Judges Gerard E. Lynch, Christopher F. Droney, and Chief District Judge Christina Reiss of the District of Vermont, sitting by designation) issued a summary order affirming the district court's decision. It found that:
The proposed Third Amended Complaint does not alter our conclusions in Garcia III. Rather, it only asserts that Esposito had better knowledge of the state of mind of the demonstrators than the other individual officers had, namely that Plaintiffs lacked the intent to violate the law. But the state of mind of the demonstrators\u2014whether they thought that they were participating in a sanctioned, First\u2013Amendment\u2013protected roadway march or whether they were intentionally or recklessly blocking traffic\u2014is irrelevant to the question of probable cause . . . Absent the allegation of specific facts to support a direct communication from police to marchers that the marchers were permitted to occupy the road, the Third Amended Complaint fails to change our prior conclusion that the defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs for violating N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7 240.20(5).Garcia v. Bloomberg, 662 Fed. App'x 50, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2016). The plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of certiorari, but the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review on June 19, 2017. 136 S.Ct. 2266 (Mem). The case is now closed after the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint.", "summary": "In October 2011, members of the Occupy Wall Street movement filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs' lawsuit stems from arrests that occurred during demonstration and march crossing the Brooklyn Bridge on October 1, 2011. The case was dismissed on qualified immunity grounds."} {"article": "An group of lawyers and other professionals involved in criminal defense sued the state of Arizona on May 8, 2017 to toss out as unconstitutional a state law that bars defense lawyers from contacting crime victims without obtaining permission from the prosecutor\u2019s office. Represented by the ACLU of Arizona, the plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona and sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorneys\u2019 fees. Describing that some of them had been subject to professional discipline and even threatened with criminal charges for alleged violations of the \u201cvictim\u2019s rights\u201d law, they alleged that that the law was unconstitutionally overbroad and constituted a prior restraint on free speech in violation of the First Amendment. Two days later, on May 10, they moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the state from enforcing the law. The state filed an answer on May 30, 2017. It indicated its intention to file a motion to dismiss the complaint and questioned the allegation that some of the plaintiffs had been threatened with criminal charges, noting that none had ever been brought for violations of the victim\u2019s rights law. The state filed its motion to dismiss on June 21. It argued that a favorable decision would not actually redress the plaintiffs\u2019 alleged injuries because the Arizona State Bar, which is the primary enforcement body for the no contact law, would be the proper defendant. On June 29, 2017, a group of crime victims and victims\u2019 advocates (\u201cthe victims\u201d) moved to intervene in the litigation, saying that the the state would not be able to adequately represent crime victims\u2019 interests in upholding the law. The state did not object to their intervention. The victims also filed a proposed response to the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for preliminary relief, arguing that the plaintiffs did not have a realistic possibility of succeeding on the merits. On March 30, 2018, after several months of discovery, District Judge Steven P. Logan dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint, and also denied both motions for a preliminary injunction and the victims\u2019 motion to intervene (2018 WL 1570244). He concluded that the plaintiffs\u2019 lacked standing to bring the lawsuit. The court agreed with the state that, since it was not responsible for enforcing the law, the plaintiffs\u2019 alleged injuries could not be traceable to it. However, the court was unpersuaded by the state\u2019s arguments that the plaintiffs would never be able to make a sufficient showing of standing, and gave the plaintiffs\u2019 leave to file an amended complaint. The plaintiffs did just that on May 4, 2018 to address the defect identified in Judge Logan\u2019s opinion. They cited the state attorney general\u2019s authority to seek attorney sanctions with the state bar and role as the administrator of the victims\u2019 rights program. The state filed its reply brief on May 25, asserting that the new allegations were substantially no different from the old ones, and also arguing for Younger abstention (which prohibits federal courts from adjudicating claims if it would interfere with ongoing judicial proceedings at the state level). Judge Logan again granted the state's motion to dismiss this second amended complaint in a March 15, 2019 order (373 F.Supp.3d 1242). He stated that the plaintiffs have sufficiently stated an injury, the threat of enforcement action against what they believe is an unfair law. However, he wrote that the injury is not traceable to the Attorney General's conduct because he is not the primary enforcer of the law in this instance; the Attorney General could only refer violations of the law to the state bar association, which would then take disciplinary action. This denied the plaintiffs standing to sue the Attorney General. Judge Logan gave the plaintiffs another chance to amend their complaint. The plaintiffs filed another amended complaint on April 26, 2019. This complaint sought identical declaratory and injunctive relief from previous complaints, but added the state bar association, Chief Bar Counsel for the State of Arizona, and the bar association's private investigator as defendants. Shortly after this complaint was filed, both the state and the state bar association moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and on a Younger abstention. The state bar association also sought immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Judge Logan partially granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the second amended complaint on February 27, 2020 (2020 WL 954941). Though neither defendant argued that the complaint lacked traceability, the Judge noted that the complaint amended very few facts from the prior complaint, which was dismissed for lack of traceability. Therefore, he said that the claims against the state should be dismissed. This time, he dismissed the case with prejudice, since filing another complaint on this same fact pattern would be futile. As for the state bar association, Judge Logan agreed with the Eleventh Amendment immunity claim, since the bar association is the investigative arm of a state agency. However, Judge Logan found that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded a traceable, redressable injury against the Chief Counsel of the Bar Association and the private investigator. Those defendants would oversee and carry out an investigation into the contested law, chilling the plaintiff's ability to fight what they see as an unconstitutional state law. The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the lack of dismissal of the case against the investigator on March 12, 2020. They argued that the Judge did not adequately consider the factual basis for relief and the subject matter jurisdiction arguments he raised in his motion to dismiss. The Judge has not ruled on this motion, and the case is ongoing.", "summary": "A group of criminal defense lawyers challenged the constitutionality of an Arizona law that bars counsel for criminal defendants from contacting crime victims or their relatives without having the prosecutor's office serve as an intermediary. They brought their lawsuit in May 2017 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. They alleged that the \"victim's rights\" law was unconstitutionally overbroad and constituted an impersmissible prior restraint of free speech in violation of the First Amendment. The plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the Chief Counsel of the state bar association and her investigator, and the case continues against these new defendants; all other defendants have had the case against them dismissed with prejudice"} {"article": "On March 16, 2001, four plaintiffs paroled from the Big Muddy Correctional Center in Ina, Illinois, who were subsequently arrested for alleged technical parole violations filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on behalf of themselves and on behalf of their classes. The plaintiffs sued the Illinois Department of Corrections under color of state law and under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The plaintiffs, represented by private council, asked for injunctive relief prohibiting the Illinois Department of Corrections from continuing to follow the Department's policy of transferring parolees out of Cook County Jail before the parolees had, or had waived, their constitutional right to a preliminary parole revocation hearing. The plaintiffs also asked the court to permanently enjoin the Department from continuing this policy and for award costs and attorney\u2019s fees. The plaintiffs alleged as follows. Each of the four plaintiffs was paroled from the Big Muddy Correctional Center, and, during their parole, was assigned to a parole agent in Cook County. Each of the four plaintiffs was arrested on a technical violation of their parole; each of the plaintiffs denied committing the violation. Each of the plaintiffs, after his arrest, was taken to Cook County Jail. The plaintiffs further allege that none of them were notified of their charges. None of the plaintiffs were scheduled for a parole revocation hearing, and the Illinois Department of Corrections did not obtain a waiver of their right to a preliminary parole revocation hearing. Despite the fact that the plaintiffs each had a constitutional right to a prompt preliminary parole revocation hearing, they were transferred out of the Cook County Jail to the Joliet Correctional Center. From there, the corrections department acted according to policy and transferred the plaintiffs to the site of their parole, the Big Muddy Correctional Center in Ina, Illinois, which is hundreds of miles from Cook County and Chicago. Three of the plaintiffs had been detained for over 60 days and had still not had their preliminary parole revocation hearing. The fourth plaintiff was detained for over 60 days before his preliminary parole revocation hearing, where the court eventually found no violation and ordered him released. Each plaintiff has a constitutionally protected right to a prompt preliminary parole revocation hearing nearby the site of his arrest. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the plaintiffs should have had preliminary hearings within ten days of arrest. Instead, they were transferred hundreds of miles away from the site of their arrest and were forced to wait at least two months for their hearing. The violations of the plaintiffs\u2019 constitutional rights were allegedly a direct result of Illinois Department of Corrections policy. The number of parolees affected by this particular Department of Corrections policy was estimated to be over 500. Despite the impact of the policy on hundreds of parolees, the policy had been in place for less than a year. On August 15, 2001, the plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint. The only substantive change between the original class action complaint and the amended class action complaint was the replacement of one of the class representatives. Now, two of the class members had been released following extremely delayed preliminary parole revocation hearings instead of just one. The two classes now being represented were (1) \u201ca class of Cook County parolees who have been or will be arrested for technical parole violation in Cook County, Illinois form June 1, 2000 to the present\u201d and (2) \u201ca class of Cook County parolees who were detained without the benefit of a prompt preliminary parole revocation and who have been, or will in the future be, found not to have violated the terms and conditions of their parole.\u201d On September 13, 2001, less than a month after the amended class action complaint, the parties submitted a stipulated dismissal to the court. The dismissal was subject to an agreement with the Illinois Department of Corrections to change their policy with regard to the detainment of parolees with alleged technical parole violations. First, the Department directed that, absent exigent circumstances, parolees who are arrested for technical parole violations must be held in a location reasonably near the arrest or alleged violation. For alleged violators in Cook County, the holding site must be within sixty miles of Cook County or the nearest Department Reception and Classification Center. Second, the Department directed its administrators to notify alleged violators that they may retain an attorney and procure witnesses for their hearings. This notification was to come when the administrators notified the alleged violators of their charges. Third, the Department directed its administrators that parolees who request witnesses or who confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses can obtain testimony either in person or through a \u201ctelephonic link up.\u201d The only caveat to this is that if the witness testimony \u201cbears substantial guarantees of trustworthiness\u201d in-person or telephonic testimony would not be required. Fourth, the Department directed its administrators that parolees arrested for technical parole violations in Cook County must have preliminary hearings within ten business days. The ten-day deadline need not be followed when (1) the parolee waives the preliminary parole revocation hearing; (2) the parolee requests a continuance; (3) the parolee is unavailable due to health reasons (to be determined by the Department), or (4) the hearing officer continues the hearing for up to fourteen business days to obtain evidence, ensure the attendance of witnesses, or for other good cause shown. Finally, the Department directed its administrators that when alleged parole violation is supported only by an unverified written statement by a parole agent, that hearing officer must also see (1) an affidavit or other sworn document from the parole agent, (2) a copy of the violation of the violation report, or (3) sworn oral testimony of the parole agent. The last provision of the stipulated dismissal asserted that the dismissal was not an admission of liability and would not serve as precedent or be admissible in any proceeding. (However, see King v. Walker on this Clearinghouse, in which this case's Stipulated Dismissal was attached as an appendix to that case's complaint.) On September 13, 2001, the Court (Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly), in a minute order, dismissed the case based on the terms of the Stipulated Dismissal. Judgment was entered on July 24, 2003. There is no reason to believe the case is still open.", "summary": "On March 16, 2001, plaintiffs on parole in Cook County, Illinois filed this action in the Northern District of Illinois suing the Illinois Department of Corrections under state law and 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 alleging violations of their constitutional right to due process. Plaintiffs were allegedly denied their constitutional right to prompt preliminary parole revocation hearings nearby the site of their arrest and were instead transferred hundreds of miles from Cook County and forced to waits months, all according to Department policy. In a stipulated dismissal, the Illinois Department of Corrections changed their policies with regard to parolees arrested for technical violations to be more reflective of those parolees' constitutional rights."} {"article": "Here is the summary I posted on the Clearinghouse, 6/23/2020: On November 19, 2018, individuals whose driver\u2019s licenses were suspended because of failure to pay traffic tickets filed this putative class action against the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 that Alabama\u2019s practice of suspending driver\u2019s licenses without procedural protection violated the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case was assigned to Judge William Keith Watkins. A provision in the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure authorized courts to order the suspension of driver's licenses without notice, hearing, or inquiry, for nonpayment of traffic tickets. The plaintiffs failed to pay traffic tickets because of their financial difficulty and as a consequence, their driver\u2019s licenses were suspended. Because they lived in rural areas where public transportation was unavailable, this left them without transportation between work, home, education, and medical care. On November 19, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction; on December 21, 2018, the state moved to dismiss. On May 1, 2019, the court issued orders on a series of motions. First, it denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motions for preliminary injunction. Because the plaintiffs had outstanding traffic tickets in addition to the tickets at issue in the case, and the court therefore could not restore the plaintiffs' driver's licenses even if the plaintiffs prevailed in the case, the court found that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. As the court determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit, it dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. Second, the court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification. The court determined that as the plaintiffs lacked standing, class certification is inappropriate. Third, the court found that it need not decide the merits of the defendants\u2019 claims to dismiss. 2019 WL 1938794. The court dismissed the case with prejudice.", "summary": "On November 19, 2018, plaintiffs filed this class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, claiming that the Alabama law which authorized courts to suspend driver's license following non-payment of traffic ticket without procedural protection violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendant moved to dismiss the claim for failure to state the claim, lack of standing, and sovereign immunity. The court dismissed the case with prejudice on May 1, 2019."} {"article": "On June 30, 2010, this suit was filed by a group of Americans denied boarding onto international flights into the United States because of their inclusion on the \"No Fly List.\" The suit was filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The complaint named as defendants the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Terrorist Screening Center, which created the list. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, the plaintiffs alleged violations of their constitutional rights to due process, as well as violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs sought clearance to return to the United States and injunctions requiring the defendants to adopt procedures for notice and opportunity to challenge inclusion on the list. The case was assigned to U.S. District Judge Anna J. Brown. The plaintiffs immediately sought a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to allow them to return from locations abroad where they had been stranded by their inclusion on the list. On October 20, 2010, without a response to this motion from the defendants or an injunction from the court, the defendants apparently allowed the plaintiffs to return to the U.S. The plaintiffs withdrew their motion for preliminary injunction, but they remained on the list, and the suit continued with respect to notice for the reasons of their inclusion and a meaningful process for challenging their inclusion. The defendants then filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that the District Court lacked jurisdiction, and that the plaintiffs had failed to include as a defendant the Transportation Security Administration, which administers the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP), the statutory redress process for individuals wrongfully denied boarding. On May 3, 2011, Judge Brown granted the government's motion to dismiss. Judge Brown held that because the internal orders of the TSA denying removal from the list were reviewable only in federal courts of appeals, the District Court lacked jurisdiction. 2011 WL 1667471. The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the District Court's decision on July 26, 2012. Writing for a unanimous panel, U.S. Circuit Judge Richard C. Tallman held that the District Court had jurisdiction to review the plaintiff's procedural challenge because the plaintiffs did not request review of a TSA order, but rather challenged the adequacy of the redress process itself. The case was remanded to the lower court. 686 F.3d 1122. The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the District Court. Ruling on these motions on August 28, 2013, the court held that the plaintiffs' due process rights were potentially implicated by the denial of their ability to fly. But the court lacked a sufficient factual record to determine whether the defendants' policies actually violated the plaintiffs' due process rights. It requested that the parties submit further information regarding the defendants' existing policies. 969 F.Supp.2d 1293. Following these submissions, on June 24, 2014, Judge Brown issued an opinion holding unconstitutional the No Fly List redress procedures. The court held that the procedures did not sufficiently apprise the plaintiffs of the reasons for their inclusion or allow meaningful administrative challenges. The result was an unfair and stigmatizing deprivation of the liberty interest in international travel. However, Judge Brown declined to issue an injunction, instead requiring that the government propose new procedures. The defendants initially appealed this decision but quickly withdrew their appeal. 28 F.Supp.3d 1134. On December 19, 2015, the government notified the court that seven of the plaintiffs had been removed from the list, and that the remaining plaintiffs had been provided letters of explanation for their continued inclusion. The court entered non-final judgment in favor of these plaintiffs. 2015 WL 1883890. The court asked the parties to brief on the details and adequacy of the new review procedure used by the defendants. Accordingly, the parties submitted stipulated facts and cross-motions for summary judgment. The defendants argued that they had instituted new procedures which allowed the plaintiffs to receive written explanations for their inclusion on the list and to submit a written response or other evidence contesting the decision. The plaintiffs argued that this new process was still insufficient because it did not allow the plaintiffs to contest their inclusion in front of a neutral fact finder or provide other due process safeguards. On March 28, 2016, Judge Brown denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgement and granted the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgement in part. The court held that due process did not require the defendant to allow the plaintiffs to challenge their inclusion on the list before a neutral fact finder. However, the court asked the defendant to develop the record as to whether some of the plaintiffs had received full notice regarding the reasons for their inclusion. 2016 WL 1239925. The court allowed the defendants to submit this additional information under seal due to its classified status. After they submitted, the court granted the defendants' remaining motions for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs\u2019 claims that they had not received adequate notice from the court's earlier March 2016 order. The court asked the parties to submit a status report with respect to the remaining issue of whether the District Court retained jurisdiction to review substantive challenges to the plaintiffs\u2019 inclusion on the No Fly List in light of the adopted redress and review process. The parties stipulated to the outlines of the new review process, and the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on January 18, 2017, arguing that decisions under the new process were final administrative decisions that were unreviewable by the District Court under the Administrative Procedure Act. On April 21, 2017, Judge Brown granted the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, agreeing that the new TRIP procedures made the defendant\u2019s No Fly List determinations final and unreviewable by the District Court. 2017 WL 1434648. On August 7, 2017, the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit; the appeal was captioned as Kashem v. Barr. The plaintiffs argued the revised review procedures still failed to provide adequate due process protections. A panel of Circuit Judges Raymond C. Fisher and Consuelo M. Callahan and District Court Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo upheld the District Court's dismissal on October 21, 2019. Procedurally, the panel found that, because the TSA had final say over who is placed on the No Fly List and who is not after an internal policy chance, district courts no longer had jurisdiction to rule on No Fly List cases. They found that the an association with terrorist groups and potential for future criminal activity was not impermissibly vague criteria for classification on the No Fly List. In addition, they wrote that balancing the state interest of national security against the potential denial of liberty from a wrongful placement on the list, with the chance to appeal classification to DHS, did not deprive the plaintiffs of their due process rights. 941 F.3d 358. The plaintiffs declined to appeal the outcome to the Supreme Court. The case is closed.", "summary": "A group of citizens and lawful permanent residents contested their inclusion on the No Fly List on due process grounds. The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon ordered the Department of Justice to develop new procedures allowing the plaintiffs to challenge their inclusion on the list, and dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs contested the proposed new procedures for inclusion on the list, and, due to internal administrative changes at the TSA, the district court found that it no longer had jurisdiction to hear the case. The plaintiffs appealed; the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's opinion on jurisdiction and held that the new review procedures protected the plaintiff's due process rights and were not unconstitutionally vague. The case is closed."} {"article": "On October 15, 2007, several religious groups teamed with other individuals and filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, asserting a constitutional challenge to Oklahoma state law - HB 1804 (\"Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007\"). The law made it a felony crime for a person who, knowingly or in reckless disregard of an alien's status, transported, harbored or concealed any undocumented immigrant. Plaintiffs maintained that the state's attempt to enforce federal immigration law through HB 1804 was unconstitutional as such action was pre-empted by the Supremacy Clause. This challenge was similar to the one made in Lozano v. City of Hazleton, Pennsylvania [IM-PA-1] and other cases filed throughout the country. In addition to federal pre-emption, plaintiffs asserted violations of due process, equal protection and other provisions of the U.S. and Oklahoma Constitutions. Shortly after filing suit, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and expedited hearing on the matter. On its own, without any motion by the parties, the District Court (Judge James Payne) considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' challenge to HB 1804. Judge Payne determined that none of the named plaintiffs had standing to bring the action and therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction over the case. Judge Payne recognized that HB 1804 could still be subject to a constitutional challenge at some point but reasoned that could \"only be achieved through a suit brought by Plaintiffs with well-defined injuries causally connected to HB 1804.\" The case was dismissed on October 22, 2007. Nat'l Coalition of Latino Clergy, Inc. v. Henry, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78658 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 22, 2007). Instead of appealing the ruling, plaintiffs refiled the lawsuit on October 25, 2007. The refiled case was assigned to District Judge James Payne and given case no. 4:07-cv-00613-JHP-FHM. On October 31, 2007, the District Court (Judge Payne) denied plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. National Coalition of Latino Clergy, Inc. v. Henry, 07-CV-613-JHP, 2007 WL 3232442 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 31, 2007). That day, plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint, which challenged the constitutionality of the Act, as well as the constitutionality of five other Oklahoma state statutes relating to the issuance and renewal of driver's licenses. Defendants moved to dismiss the case. On December 12, 2007, Judge Payne granted defendants' motion and again dismissed the case for lack of standing. In his order, Judge Payne found that \"some Plaintiffs ignore the need to describe the injuries actually caused by the challenged statutes, while the illegal alien Plaintiffs complain of grievances that could best be remedied by simply compliance with federal law.\" National Coalition of Latino Clergy, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-CV-613-JHP, 2007 WL 4390650, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91487 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2007). Plaintiffs' request to reconsider was denied. Nat'l Coalition of Latino Clergy v. Henry, No. 07-CV-613-JHP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94871 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 28, 2007). Plaintiffs did not appeal the ruling.", "summary": "On October 15, 2007, several religious groups teamed with other individuals and filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, asserting a constitutional challenge to the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007. The law made it a felony crime for a person who, knowingly or in reckless disregard of an alien's status, transported, harbored or concealed any undocumented immigrant. Just one week later, the District Court (Judge James Payne) dismissed the case sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction. Several days later, Plaintiffs refiled the case; Judge Payne subsequently granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, holding the Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the law."} {"article": "On December 23, 2008, several homeless individuals with mental or physical disabilities, represented by attorneys from the ACLU of Southern California, filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, against the City of Laguna Beach, CA, and its Police Department and City Council. The plaintiffs alleged that \u00a718.04.020 of the Laguna Beach Municipal Code, which banned sleeping and camping in public places, violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment by criminalizing the involuntary condition of homelessness. They also alleged that their Fourth Amendment right to be free from illegal searches and seizures and Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process were violated, and that the City was in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12101 - 12181, which forbids discrimination on the basis of disability by public entities. The plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing the enforcement of the contested local ordinance, and declaratory judgments acknowledging that the Defendants had violated the rights of the Plaintiffs in the manner alleged. They also sought to recover legal costs, including attorneys' fees and expenses. A year prior to filing the lawsuit, the ACLU of Southern California had initiated discussions with the City of Laguna Beach about changing the ordinance; these discussions were not fruitful. The plaintiffs in their complaint pointed to a report prepared by a City-appointed Homeless Task Force, which found that the wealthy community of Laguna Beach was unique among cities in Orange County, CA in that its homeless population, at the time numbering close to fifty people, consisted almost exclusively of \"chronically homeless\" individuals--persons with mental or physical disabilities who experience long term or repeated homelessness. The Task Force had also determined that Orange County as a whole and Laguna Beach in particular had insufficient shelter space, which according to the report meant the homeless often had no option but to sleep outdoors. Laguna had no year-round beds available in shelters for the homeless. The City made beds available only intermittently from mid-December through mid-March, with funding available for no more than forty nights during this period. The homeless plaintiffs had been regularly subjected to police harassment and cited for sleeping in public when they had nowhere else to sleep. On March 3, 2009, the City Council voted to repeal the contested portion of the Laguna Beach Municipal Code. On June 19, 2009, the parties entered a Settlement Agreement, wherein the City agreed to provide plaintiffs' counsel with written notice at least thirty days prior to any City Council public meeting at which action would be proposed to add or revise provisions pertaining to the restriction or prohibition of sleeping or camping in public places within the City. The parties agreed to ask the Court to seal, expunge, or destroy any record created after June 18, 2007, relating to arrests of or citations to the Plaintiffs or any other persons for violating the repealed portion of Laguna Beach Municipal Code \u00a718.04.020. The City agreed to pay the Plaintiffs $9000 in attorneys' fees. On July 20, 2009, in light of the settlement, the Court issued an order granting the plaintiffs' unopposed motion to have all records created after June 18 relating to arrests or citations under the contested ordinance sealed, expunged, or destroyed. On the same day, the Court (Judge Cormac Carney) ordered the case dismissed, but retained jurisdiction for the three year period of the settlement.", "summary": "On December 23, 2008, several homeless individuals with mental or physical disabilities, represented by attorneys from the ACLU of Southern California, filed a suit in federal Court against the City of Laguna Beach, CA. The Plaintiffs alleged that a local ordinance that banned sleeping in public violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment by criminalizing the involuntary condition of homelessness. They also alleged that their Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated, and that the City was in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The Plaintiffs sought injunctions preventing the enforcement of the contested local ordinance, and declaratory judgments acknowledging that the Defendants had violated the rights of the Plaintiffs in the manner alleged. On March 3, 2009, the City Council voted to repeal the contested portion of the Laguna Beach Municipal Code, and on June 19, 2009, the parties entered a Settlement Agreement, wherein the City agreed to provide Plaintiffs' counsel with written notice at least thirty days prior to any City Council public meeting at which action would be proposed to add or revise provisions pertaining to the restriction of sleeping or camping in public places within the City. The parties agreed to ask the Court to seal, expunge or destroy any record created after June 18, 2007, relating to arrests of or citations to the Plaintiffs or any other persons for violating the repealed portion of the Municipal Code relating to sleeping in public. The City agreed to give the Plaintiffs $9000 in attorneys' fees."} {"article": "On July 22, 2005, the Detroit and Indianapolis offices of the EEOC filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan against the Magna Donnelly Corp., Inc., a for profit corporation, under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The complaint alleged that the employer had failed to give a physically disabled employee a reasonable accommodation and discharged her in violation of the ADA. EEOC asked the court to permanently enjoin the employer from engaging in unlawful employment practices and grant relief to those employees who had been discriminated against. On October 26, 2005, the case was consolidated with the ongoing litigation in EEOC v. Magna Donnelly Inc., EE-MI-0048. Both cases had been brought under the ADA in the same court, and dealt with the same corporation's employment discrimination practices and policies.", "summary": "On July 22, 2005, the EEOC filed a lawsuit against the Magna Donnelly Corp., Inc., a for profit corporation, under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The EEOC claimed that the corporation had failed to reasonably accommodate persons who were able to perform the essential functions of the position yet suffered from disabilities. On October 26, 2005, the case was consolidated with the ongoing litigation in EEOC v. Magna Donnelly Inc., EE-MI-0048."} {"article": "On March 14, 2014, several same-sex couples residing in Indiana filed a lawsuit against the state of Indiana, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, asked the court to declare that the Indiana law banning same-sex marriage was unconstitutional; they sought both temporary and permanent injunctive relief. (Plaintiffs amended the complaint on April 3, 2014.) Plaintiffs claimed that Indiana's ban on same-sex marriage violated their rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Furthermore, they claimed that the lack of Indiana's recognition of same-sex marriages in the state, and marriages legally conducted in other states, had interfered with the flow of various benefits, both tangible and intangible, within their families. On June 25, 2014, the Court (Judge Richard L. Young) decided the case for the plaintiffs. In an opinion entered in this case, as well as Baskin v. Bogan (PB-IN-0005), and Lee v. Pence (PB-IN-0008), Judge Young entered a judgment on both plaintiffs' and defendants' motions for summary judgment. He entered a permanent injunction ordering the State: not to deny marriage licenses to same-sex applicants and not to enforce the same-sex marriage ban; and to administer the same services and benefits to all married couples regardless if they are same-sex or different-sex. The district court stayed its decision pending appeal; defendants filed that appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on the same day. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in an opinion by Judge Posner. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014). As in the district court, that opinion addressed this case as well as Baskin v. Bogan (PB-IN-0005), and Lee v. Pence (PB-IN-0008). The defendants sought review in the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals stayed the effective date of its decision pending the Supreme Court's resolution of that review petition. The Supreme Court denied review in Bogan v. Baskin (as well as several other cases) on October 6, 2014, and the next day, the Seventh Circuit issued its mandate affirming the District Court's judgment invalidating and enjoining Indiana's prohibition of same-sex marriage.", "summary": "This is one of three federal district court cases challenging the same-sex marriage ban in Indiana. The District Court enjoined Indiana's prohibition on same-sex marriage. On October 7, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its mandate affirming the decision."} {"article": "On October 11, 2013, children with disabilities enrolled in New York City public schools, filed this lawsuit against the New York Department of Education in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, \u00a7504 of The Rehabilitation Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the school district had forcibly interrupted the education of students with disabilities through repeated misuse of emergency medical services (EMS) to remove these students from school even though they were not in need of medical care. Instead, the district relied on EMS to address disruptive behavior. The plaintiffs also alleged this practice was unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and that it violated state law and city regulations. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to halt this practice, as well as damages and attorneys\u2019 fees. The plaintiffs were represented by Legal Services NYC and private counsel. On March 18, 2014, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding five additional plaintiff-parents and their children as well as new factual details. On March 31, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. April 7, 2014 \u2013 referring case to magistrate judge James L. Cott for settlement. From June 30, 2014 through November 6, 2014, the parties held five settlement conferences in front of Magistrate Judge Cott. In light of the settlement conferences, the defendants removed their motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on September 24, 2014. On December 15, 2014, the parties entered a settlement agreement that required policy changes and training for the defendant, as well as reporting requirements throughout the stipulation period that runs until June 30, 2018. In addition to injunctive relief, the defendant won $502,621.7 in emotional damages and out-of-pocket costs for eleven plaintiff-children and their parents and $613,000 in attorneys fees. The terms of agreement were enforceable by the court. On January 14, 2015, Magistrate Judge Cott approved all the individual plaintiffs\u2019 infant compromises, which outlined how the plaintiff parents would use the plaintiff children\u2019s damages money. Most put the money into trusts for their chidlrens\u2019 future use. Although the court maintains jurisdiction to monitor the settlement, all the disputes are now resolved.", "summary": "In 2013, children with disabilities in New York City sued the New York Department of Education in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs allege that New York City Schools frequently misused emergency medical services to remove students with disabilities in non-emergency situations, in violation of federal disability laws, among other claims. In 2014, the parties reached a stipulated agreement that required the City change its policies and practices relating to its handling of children with disabilities and awarded monetary damages to the plaintiffs. The period of the stipulation agreement runs until June 30, 2018."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: Five immigration detainees filed a habeas petition and a motion for a temporary restraining order challenging their continued detention in Michigan jails despite their heightened vulnerability to COVID-19. On April 14, the district court denied the plaintiffs' request for a TRO. On April 29, the court issued an opinion denying the plaintiffs' habeas petition and dismissing their claims.
All Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan era\u2014the period between October 7, 2001 to present\u2014who:A few weeks later, on January 9, 2019, the Court rejected the Army's motion to dismiss, citing the same reasoning discussed in his order certifying the class. The parties began to negotiate discovery plans. On November 12, 2019, the case was reassigned to Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr. It was then referred to Magistrate Judge Robert Spector on January 7, 2020 for the purpose of considering settlement by the parties. Since then, the parties have participated in a series of settlement conferences. The parties filed a Joint Motion for Settlement on November 17, 2020. The parties agreed that class members that already applied to reconsideration of their discharge status would be permitted to reapply for reconsideration if their symptoms indicated PTSD or PTSD-related conditions. Veterans that had not already applied for reconsideration would be provided referred to legal and medical assistance to support their reconsideration applications. The defendants also agreed to update their review procedures and provide annual training to the reviewing board that is specifically tailored to mental health conditions. Finally, the defendants agreed to pay $185,000 in attorneys' fees and costs to the plaintiff's counsel. As the settlement agreement is being implemented, the case remains ongoing.", "summary": "In 2016, a veteran filed this suit against the Secretary of the Army, claiming that the Army failed to treat and accommodate his mental health conditions, which were a direct result from his post-9/11 deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan, and improperly dismissed him with less-than-Honorable discharges. Now as a civilian, his less-than-Honorable \u201cstatus\u201d impedes his access to the very services and benefits normally available to veterans to enable them to heal their wounds and thrive in civilian life. In 2018, additional plaintiffs joined the suit, making this a class action on behalf of other similarly situated veterans. The parties have participated in a series of settlement conferences and filed a joint motion for settlement on November 17, 2020. This case is ongoing."} {"article": "IN 2010, after Louisiana proposed a reduction in available nursing hours as part of Louisiana Medicaid's Long-Term Personal Care Services (LT-PCS) program, the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The named Plaintiffs, seeking to represent a class of similarly situated individuals with disabilities, had each been approved for about 40 in-home nursing hours through the LT-PCS program. The proposed cuts would cap nursing hours at 32. The Plaintiffs alleged that this reduction would put them at risk of unnecessary institutionalization in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (under the Supreme Court precedent, Olmstead v. L.C.) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Plaintiffs also argued that the state had provided inadequate notice of the changes in violation of the Medicaid Act and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The State filed a motion to dismiss (October 21, 2010) which was later converted (in December 2010) to a motion for summary judgment, seeking to resolve the case in their favor before trial. In April 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a Statement of Interest in support of the Plaintiffs. On May 18, 2011, Judge James J. Brady denied the Defendants' motion and allowed the case to proceed, and on June 6, 2011, Judge Brady certified the plaintiff class. After these plaintiff successes and a period of discovery, the parties settled. In January 2012, the court entered a settlement agreement designed to meet the care needs of the plaintiff population. Under this agreement, the State promised to create enrollment slots so that the affected population could enroll (in an expedited fashion) in the Louisiana's Community Choice Waiver program to meet their home care needs. Recipients who are deemed eligible to receive the new maximum of 32 LT-PCS hours will be notified of the option of expedited enrollment in the CC Waiver instead. The agreement outlines the criteria for admission to the CC Waiver program and obligates the state to resolve such requests by June 30, 2012. The agreement is to be enforceable only until December 31, 2012, but the deadline will be extended if the state has failed to meet its obligations by that time. On Jan. 18, 2013, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the case with prejudice, because both agreed that the conditions outlined in the Settlement Agreement have been met. On Jan. 29, 2013, Judge Brady dismissed the case.", "summary": "Plaintiffs, individuals with disabilities requiring home care services, challenged Louisiana's proposed reduction of in-home nursing care hours under the state's Medicaid-provided Long Term Personal Care Services (LT-PCS) program. After a period of litigation, the state agreed to provide a substitute for the LT-PCS care by allowing individuals receiving the maximum care hours to apply for new Community Choice Waiver slots."} {"article": "This is one of many lawsuits brought challenging the Obama Administration's 2012 Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate requiring employers to pay for employees' contraception and abortifacients via medical insurance coverage. Many religious hospitals, charities, universities, and other enterprises owned or controlled by religious organizations or individuals who opposed contraception on doctrinal grounds argued the mandate violated their religious beliefs. For a full list of contraception insurance mandate cases, please see our collection here. On February 21, 2012, a college organized as a not-for-profit corporation, along with its majority stakeholder, another shareholder, and two affiliated companies filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the federal government, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 551 et seq.). They alleged violations of the First and Fifth Amendments. Plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the Alliance Defense Fund and private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending mandatory contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violated their sincerely held religious beliefs. A motion by the ACLU to file an amicus brief was denied by District Judge Joy Flowers Conti. On September 13, 2012, Judge Conti denied defendants' motion to stay discovery pending resolution of defendants' motion to dismiss. On March 6, 2013, Judge Conti granted defendants' motion to dismiss in part and denied the motion to dismiss with respect to RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause, and the notice and comment claim under the APA. 929 F. Supp. 2d 402. On April 19, 2013, Judge Conti granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. On May 22, 2013, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. On June 17, 2013, defendants filed a notice of appeal for the April 19 preliminary injunction. On June 18, 2013, Judge Conti granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. 960 F. Supp. 2d 588. On August 17, 2013, defendants filed notice of appeal of the June 18 preliminary injunction. On September 12, 2013, defendants filed a motion to vacate both preliminary injunctions, which was eventually denied on October 18, 2013. 2013 WL 5704948. On November 12, 2013, the plaintiff filed another motion for a preliminary injunction, which the District Court granted on December 23, 2013. The injunction lasted until a decision on the merits of the case. On February 11, 2014, the defendant filed notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. (No. 14-1374). On February 11, 2015, the Third Circuit (Chief Judge McKee and Circuit Judges Rendell and Sloviter) ruled that the accommodation to the contraceptive services mandate does not impose a substantial burden on the plaintiff\u2019s religious expression. 778 F.3d 422. Next, Geneva College asked for a rehearing en banc, and the Third Circuit denied the motion on April 13, 2015. On May 6, 2015, the same panel of the Third Circuit granted a temporary stay pending response by the Supreme Court in Zubik v. Burwell. On August 11, 2015, Geneva College filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case. The Court planned to consider whether notifying the federal government by signing a form identifying the employer as a religious nonprofit that objects to the contraceptive services mandate (so that the government can work with the insurer or benefits provider to ensure employees have contraceptive coverage) violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or constitutes the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. This case was consolidated with six other cases dealing with this issue. Together, the cases are known as Zubik v. Burwell. This case was argued on March 23, 2016. On March 29, 2016, in an unusual move, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs suggesting a solution to their disagreement, in which employees could still receive contraception coverage without employers giving any notice to the government. On May 16, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that that \"accommodates petitioners\u2019 religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners\u2019 health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'\" 136 S. Ct 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of this case. The case then went back to the Third Circuit for consideration on remand. On June 20, 2016, on remand, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit revoked its prior mandate in light of the Supreme Court\u2019s opinion. On April 16, 2018, by agreement of the parties, the Third Circuit dismissed the appeal with respect to District Court\u2019s grant of preliminary injunctive relief to Geneva College. The case returned once again to Judge Conti of the District Court. The change in presidential administrations during the appeal regarding the District Court's earlier grant of a preliminary injunction prompted Geneva to file a motion for permanent injunction and declaratory relief on March 20, 2018. The Court granted the motion on July 5, 2018. 2018 WL 3348982. The Court reasoned that the government\u2019s position conceding that enforcement of the ACA\u2019s Mandate and accommodation process against Geneva would violate RFRA and the Government's indication that it did not intend to offer a substantive defense with respect to that matter, along with the Court\u2019s prior orders, opinions, and findings of fact and conclusions of law, led to the conclusion that Geneva made the required showing for a preliminary injunction. The Court noted that the proposed injunction and declaratory relief requested by Geneva in the March 20 motion was broader than the relief requested in the second amended complaint, and did not refer to the requirements of the mandate and accommodation that Geneva showed violated Geneva\u2019s rights under RFRA. Consequently, the Court narrowed the injunction, granting Geneva:
- were discharged with a less-than-Honorable service characterization (this includes General and Other-than-Honorable discharges from the Army, Army Reserve, and Army National guard, but not Bad Conduct or Dishonorable discharges);
- have not received discharge upgrades to Honorable; and
- have diagnoses of PTSD or PTSD-related conditions or record documenting one or more symptoms of PTSD or PTSD-related conditions at the time of discharge attributable to their military service under the Hagel Memo standards of liberal and special consideration.
permanent injunctive relief against application of the mandate, . . . regulations and accommodation process by defendants to Geneva, or to the health insurance plan of or insurer for Geneva, with respect to Geneva providing, paying for, making accessible, or otherwise facilitating or causing access to coverage or payments through an insurance company or any other third party for contraceptive coverage services to which Geneva has religious objections (including those Geneva College views as abortion, abortifacients, embryo-harming pharmaceuticals, or related education and counseling).Additionally, the court granted Geneva declaratory relief, stating that defendants' enforcement of the mandate and the accommodations procedure violated Geneva\u2019s rights under RFRA. Since the Court granted plaintiffs' requested relief, Geneva filed a consent motion for voluntary dismissal of its remaining claims on July 9, 2018. The Court granted the motion on July 12, and dismissed the case without prejudice. The parties came to a settlement regarding attorneys' fees on October 11, 2018. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On February 21, 2012, a college organized as a not-for-profit corporation, along with its majority stakeholder, another shareholder, and two affiliated companies sued to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending mandatory contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. On March 6, 2013, Judge Conti granted defendants' motion to dismiss in part and denied the motion to dismiss with respect to RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause, and the notice and comment claim under the APA. Plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction, and on June 18, 2013, Judge Conti granted the motion. Next, Geneva College appealed to the Third Circuit, and on February 11, 2015, the Third Circuit (Chief Judge McKee; Circuit Judges Rendell and Sloviter) ruled that the accommodation to the contraceptive services mandate does not impose a substantial burden on the plaintiff\u2019s religious expression. On August 11, 2015, Geneva College filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether the accommodation to the contraceptive services mandate violates the RFRA. This case was consolidated with six others, and is known as Zubik v. Burwell. After the case was argued in the Supreme Court on March 23, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order on May 16, 2016 remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals. The Court ordered that the parties be given time to come to agreement on ensuring contraceptive access without burdening religious freedom. 136 S. Ct 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of these cases. On June 20, 2016, on remand, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit revoked its prior mandate in light of the Supreme Court\u2019s opinion. Due to the vastly different attitude towards the mandate by the new presidential administration, the plaintiff moved for a permanent injunction and declaratory relief from the District Court, which the Court granted in July of 2018. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On October 6, 2017, parents with perceived or actual intellectual disabilities who had been investigated for child abuse or neglect by New York City's Administration for Children's Services filed this class action lawsuit against New York City in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendant for violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12131 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to provide services, programs, and training tailored to the plaintiffs' needs and, as a result, they were disadvantaged during each stage of a child welfare case. The plaintiffs were represented by the New York Legal Assistance Group and private counsel. The case was assigned to Judge Alison Nathan. The plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on September 28, 2018. On September 3, 2019, Judge Nathan referred the case to Magistrate Judge Barbara Moses for the purpose of settlement. The next day, Judge Nathan administratively denied the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class. This would allow the plaintiffs refile the motion later if they so chose. The parties have been engaged in settlement discussions and the case is ongoing as of May 2020.", "summary": "Parents with perceived or actual intellectual disabilities who had been investigated for child abuse or neglect by Defendant City's Administration for Child Services brought this class action lawsuit claiming violations of Title II of the Americans with Disability Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This class action about medical care in the Riverside County jails settled in 2015. On April 4, 2020, plaintiffs brought a motion to enforce the consent decree, seeking implementation of expert-endorsed coronavirus-related protocols including social distancing. On April 16, the Court agreed, requiring planning and potentially prisoner transfers. A formal COVID-19 plan was approved in July 2020 and revised in October 2020.
At the hearing, Defendant did not have information regarding conditions in the existing county jail facilities, insisted that moving prisoners to a newly completed, empty jail in Indio was not feasible, and admitted that it had not researched alternative housing options such as recreation centers, halfway houses, and hotels. Rather than having created a plan to safeguard those most vulnerable to the COVID-19 virus, Defendant conceded that it has not conducted an analysis of its own records to identify particularly vulnerable prisoners. It also has not conducted an analysis of its jail population to determine whether there are any low-level offenders who might be eligible for early release.The Court found, \"Should the County be unable to implement adequate social distancing within its existing jail facilities and take other necessary steps to decrease risk of infection, this Court has the authority to order the transfer of prisoners to different facilities.\" It therefore granted plaintiffs' request that the County be required \u201cto submit a plan to the Court to implement the Governor\u2019s order for physical distancing for all Californians housed in the jails.\" Specific requirements were outlined in the written order dated April 16, 2020: 1. An evaluation of current jail capacity to house people safely consistent with physical distancing to reduce transmission of COVID-19 2. A plan to safely house and care for people incarcerated in the jails who are at high risk for severe complications from COVID-19 based on guidance from the CDC and the Court experts. 3. Adequate hygiene and cleaning measures, including education of the people incarcerated in the jails, consistent with the CDC\u2019s guidelines. 4. Measures to address the mental health needs of people held in quarantine or isolation The court also ordered mediation to resolve any disputes over the adequacy of the plan and the production of underlying data. A status report was provided on April 24, detailing that during the mediation the Defendants provided information that satisfied a significant number of the issues posed by Plaintiffs, and that the Defendant was in process of preparing a written plan to provide to Plaintiffs pursuant to the court\u2019s order on April 14. Furthermore, the Defendant agreed to provide the Plaintiffs\u2019 counsel relevant COVID-19 statistics every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday for the duration of the State of Emergency. The Court approved the proposed COVID-19 plan on July 22, 2020. On October 15, 2020, the court approved a stipulated agreement between the parties to revise the COVID-19 plan. The defendants agreed to allow ten people out of their cells in the dayroom at a time to provide the inmates with more time out of their cells. The defendants also agreed to allow individuals in dorm housing to move around when other inmates had dayroom time without limitations. The Defendants also agreed to provide Plaintiffs' counsel with weekly data reports of out-of-cell time for each cohort in celled housing for each day and test results including the purpose of testing and the housing location at the time of testing. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2013, three prisoners in Riverside county jails filed this class-action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued the County of Riverside (California) alleging that the access to both physical and mental healthcare was so deficient that it violated the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. On April 28, 2016, the Court approved the parties' Consent Decree and Remedial Plan, which called for enhanced provision of medical and mental health services to inmates and awarded the plaintiffs $1,250,000 in attorneys' fees and expenses. The Consent Decree was set to last four years and its enforcement is still ongoing as of January 3, 2019. On April 4, 2020, plaintiffs brought a motion to enforce the consent decree, seeking implementation of expert-endorsed coronavirus-related protocols including social distancing. On April 16, the Court agreed, requiring planning and potentially prisoner transfers. A mediation was held on April 17, during which the Defendant satisfied many of the issues posed by the Plaintiffs. On October 15, the court approved a stipulated agreement between the parties to revise the COVID-19 plan."} {"article": "On March 30, 2000, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against a bank, in coordination with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Federal Trade Commission, alleging that it engaged in discriminatory lending practices. The plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the defendant's discriminatory policies and practices, African-American female borrowers were charged higher mortgage broker fees than similarly situated white male borrowers. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendant provided financial incentives to mortgage brokers to steer loan applicants to Delta and that the defendant approved loans without regard to the borrower's ability to repay. The plaintiff filed a proposed consent order on April 10, 2000 that was signed by the court (Judge Sifton). Under the settlement agreement, the Defendant-bank is prohibited from lending engaging in any lending practices based on sex, race, or color. In addition, Delta has agreed to create a $7,250,000 remediation fund as well as an amelioration fund consisting of 525,000 unregistered shares of common stock to compensate borrowers impacted by the Defendant-bank's previous discriminatory measures. This case was the first case for DOJ to litigate with combined allegations of fair lending and consumer protection.", "summary": "On March 30, 2000, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against a bank, in coordination with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Federal Trade Commission, alleging that it engaged in discriminatory lending practices. The parties agreed to a consent decree, under which the bank is prohibited from lending engaging in any lending practices based on sex, race, or color. In addition, Delta has agreed to create a $7,250,000 remediation fund as well as an amelioration fund consisting of 525,000 unregistered shares of common stock."} {"article": "On October 8, 2012, two affiliated companies, Autocam Corporation and Autocam Medical, LLC, along with their owners, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan against the federal government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2)), and the First Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from CatholicVote Legal Defense Fund, the Thomas More Society, and private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending mandatory contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. The state of Michigan, the Life Legal Defense Fund, and the Bioethics Defense Fund appeared as amici curiae in support of plaintiffs; the ACLU and the ACLU Fund of Michigan submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of the defendants. On October 12, 2012, District Judge Robert Jonker denied the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction; the plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit denied a temporary injunction pending appeal. On September 17, 2013, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to deny a preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court to dismiss the plaintiff's RFRA claims for lack of jurisdiction. On September 30, 2013, the district court dismissed the plaintiff's RFRA claims without prejudice. On October 22, 2013, the plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. That petition was held at the Supreme Court while the Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (also known as Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius). The Hobby Lobby decision issued on June 30, 2014: In 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. The Court emphasized, however, that alternative methods for meeting the government's asserted interest were available. In light of the Hobby Lobby opinion, on July 1, 2014, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment in this (Autocam) case, and remanded it to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further consideration. On December 11, 2014, the Sixth Circuit granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand to the District Court for entry of a permanent injunction. On January 5, 2015, the District Court entered a permanent injunction preventing the federal government from enforcing the version of the contraceptive mandate that applied in Hobby Lobby against the plaintiffs. The injunction only applied to that version of the mandate, and did not enjoin the government from enforcing a revised version of the mandate that complied with the decision. On February 25, 2015, the parties notified the District Court that they had reached an agreement on attorney's fees and costs and no further proceedings were necessary.", "summary": "In 2012, two affiliated companies, Autocam Corporation and Autocam Medical, LLC, along with their owners filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan against the federal government, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2)), and the First Amendment. Plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from CatholicVote Legal Defense Fund, the Thomas More Society, and private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), contending that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On October 12, 2012, District Judge Robert Jonker denied plaintiffs' motion for an injunction in an unpublished opinion, which plaintiffs appealed to the 6th Circuit. The 6th Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion and remanded the case for dismissal. Autocam sought Supreme Court review, and on July 1, 2014, the Supreme Court vacated the 6th Circuit judgment , and remanded for further consideration in light of its Hobby Lobby decision issued the day before. Following Hobby Lobby, the District Court granted the plaintiffs a permanent injunction against enforcement of the contraceptive services mandate on January 5, 2015."} {"article": "This action, filed February 3, 2017, challenged President Trump\u2019s Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order ban on admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Represented by private counsel and several advocacy organizations--the University of Minnesota Center for New Americans and the Immigrant Law Center of Minnesota -- plaintiffs argued that in preventing valid US visa holders from entering the US, the EO violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause, Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The complaint sought emergency declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs were two married couples. In each couple, one individual was a citizen or lawful permanent resident of the US petitioning for visas for his/her respective spouses. The visas were granted, and the spouses, who were nationals of one of the seven nations subject to the Executive Order, were prevented from entering the U.S. In both cases, the couples were separated as a result of the Executive Order. With their complaint, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order seeking to enjoin the defendants from both revoking the issued visas and prohibiting the visa holders from entering the US. The case was assigned to District Judge Tanya Chutkan. On February 5, 2017, plaintiffs' counsel wrote to Judge Chutkan that one of the plaintiffs was allowed to enter the US and had become a Lawful Permanent Resident. A second plaintiff was allowed to board a plane to the US on February 6, 2017. On February 7, 2017, the plaintiffs submitted a notice that they were withdrawing the emergency motion for a temporary restraining order. On Mar. 6, prompted by adverse developments in another lawsuit challenging the Executive Order, in Washington v. Trump, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780 (EO-2). On March 8, the parties reached an agreement in this case and stipulated to a dismissal, with each party to bear its own costs and fees. The court granted the dismissal on the same day. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This action, filed February 3, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, challenged President Trump\u2019s January 27, 2017, Executive Order also known as the travel ban. The plaintiffs were two married couples. In each couple, one individual is a citizen or lawful permanent resident of the US petitioning for visas for their respective spouses. The visas were granted, and the spouses, who are nationals of one of the seven nations subject to the EO, were prevented from entering the US. In both cases, the couples were separated as a result of the EO. On February 5, 2017, plaintiffs' counsel wrote to the district court judge that one of the plaintiffs was allowed to enter the US and had become a Lawful Permanent Resident. A second plaintiff was allowed to board a plane to the US on February 6, 2017. On February 7, 2017, the plaintiffs submitted a notice that they were withdrawing the emergency motion for a temporary restraining order. On March 8, the parties reached an agreement in this case and stipulated to a dismissal, with each party to bear its own costs and fees. The court granted the dismissal on the same day. This case is now closed."} {"article": "On September 07, 2010, the United States filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a73601, against the Eastman Housing Authority (\"EHA\") in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. (Judge Dudley H. Bowen, Dublin Division). The Defendant maintains and owns nine public housing developments in the City of Eastman and surrounding areas. The Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination based on race or color in connection with the rental of dwellings in EHA housing developments. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges the Defendants steered applicants and residents to housing complexes on the basis of race and color; 2) selected white applicants over eligible black applicants who had higher positions on the EHA waiting list so that white applicants could be placed in vacant housing units ; 3) selected black applicants over white applicants on the EHA waiting list so that white applicants would not be housed in vacant units in majority black complexes; and 4) provided inferior treatment to black tenants in the terms, conditions and/or privileges of rental of EHA properties. The Plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The parties announced a settlement the same day the Complaint was filed, and on October 18, 2010, the Court (Judge Bowen) approved a five year consent decree. In addition to general prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of race or color, and the use of HUD-approved policies with respect to applications and admissions, record-keeping and permission to inspect, the decree required the Defendant to pay $320,000 into an escrow to compensate persons harmed the EHA's discriminatory rental practices. The settlement ended in 2015 without any further litigation. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On September 07, 2010, the United States sued the Eastman Housing Authority (\"EHA\") in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia for violations of the Fair Housing Act. Allegedly the defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination based on race or color by steerig African American families away, falsley denying the availability of units, and other practices designed to avoid renting to people of color. The parties announced a settlement the same day the Complaint was filed and the District Court (Judge Bowen) approved a five-year Consent Decree that set out specific HUD-approved policies and practices for Defendant to follow in the application and admission processes, along with record keeping, reporting, and openness to inspection."} {"article": "This case was originally named West v. City of Santa Fe. It was recaptioned when one of the court severed one of the plaintiffs from the original case to pursue claims against the City of Santa Fe alone; the original case pursued claims against the city of Hitchcock, Texas. The new case was titled Fuller v. Santa Fe, 3:18-cv-00283 (S.D. Tex.). On November 3, 2016, three individuals under threat of being jailed for failure to pay fines to the City of Santa Fe filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued the City of Santa Fe, the Municipal Judge, and the Chief of Police under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging that the defendants run a modern-day debtors' prison to raise revenue for the City. They claimed that city officials have colluded on an unconstitutional two-tiered system of justice by which the City and Municipal Judge agreed to raise the costs of the traffic and other misdemeanor fines to boost revenue and the City extracts payments from local residents. Police officers regularly jail people who fail to pay their fines without giving them access to a lawyer or the chance to mount a legal defense, nor are they given the opportunity to see a judge for the constitutionally mandated hearing on their ability to pay. Moreover, the police chief makes jail intolerable, giving detainees too little food to eat and depriving them of medical care. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Texas, the plaintiffs asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, damages, and attorneys fees. They also sought class certification. The plaintiffs alleged that the revenue-generating scheme begins with Municipal Court proceedings, which its jurisdiction is limited to tickets for class C misdemeanors. These offenses are defined by Texas law as \"nonjailable,\" \"fine only\" offenses, punishable by a fine up to $500. For an individual unable to make timely payments in full, the Municipal Court issues a \"capias pro fine\" warrant for failure to pay a fine. Individuals who have a capias pro fine have two options: pay in full or turn themselves in to the police. Police also search for people subject to capias pro fine warrants, sometimes arresting people at their homes in front of family, friends, and neighbors. Though police have the option of taking such individuals before a court, they do not. Instead, they transfer them to the police chief and book them into jail where they will be held until they pay their debt in full or satisfy the fines with \"jail credit.\" The allegations continued, claiming that once in jail, individuals are subjected to unsafe conditions without proper food. The complaint terms this the \"Hungry Man policy,\" and alleges that jailed individuals are fed one Pop Tart for breakfast, one Pop Tart for lunch, and a frozen meal, such as a Hungry Man meal, for dinner. This amounts to only about 750 calories a day, which is less than half of the calories the average sedentary adult requires, and less than a third of the calories sedentary young men require. Judge George C Hanks, Jr. denied class certification without prejudice on September 18, 2017, without providing a detailed reason in the order. On October 11, 2017, one of the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed his claims; the other two plaintiffs proceeded on this single case without him. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 23, 2017, adding a magistrate judge, in his individual capacity, and the Chief of Police, in his official capacity, as defendants. The case was temporarily assigned to Magistrate Judge Andrew Edison on June 1, 2018. On June 4, 2019, the defendants filed a sealed motion calling the plaintiff's capacity to prosecute the lawsuit into question. This appeared to be due to some health issue, since the District Court granted a 60-day stay of the case on June 18, 2019 to allow the plaintiff to access medical care in hopes of continuing the suit after. Magistrate Judge Edison provided a recommendation against granting the defendant's various motions to dismiss on August 16, 2018, saying that all plaintiffs in the case had standing and that the injuries alleged in the case amounted to civil rights violations. 2018 WL 4047115. Though he did not explicitly recommend severing the claims against Hitchcock and Santa Fe at this point, the Magistrate Judge discussed each plaintiff's claims against their respective cities separately. This likely influenced Judge Hanks's decision to sever the two cases when he adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation on September 19. 2018 WL 5276264. The case was reassigned to Judge Jeffrey V. Brown. Judge Brown conditionally dismissed the case on October 23, 2019 because the parties had come to a settlement agreement in Fuller v. City of Santa Fe that covered the class of plaintiffs named here. The Clearinghouse has been unable to find text of a settlement agreement. The case was officially dismissed on December 6, 2019 because neither party filed a motion to dispose of the case on a final judgment by that deadline set in in the October 23 order.", "summary": "On November 3, 2016, three individuals who have been, or fear they will be, jailed for failure to pay their outstanding fines to the City of Santa Fe, filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Eventually, this case was severed into two separate ones: this one, against the city of Hitchcock, and Fuller v. City of Santa Fe, against the city of Santa Fe. Fuller v. City of Santa Fe settled for an undisclosed amount, and the plaintiffs in this case were covered by that settlement. The case is closed."} {"article": "On April 27, 2010, Shelby County, Alabama, filed this lawsuit in the District Court of the District of Columbia, challenging the Voting Rights Act's preclearance provision, Section 5. The county sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional in declaring Shelby County a \"covered\" jurisdiction and requiring that it obtain approval from the Department of Justice prior to implementing any voting changes. Following a decision in September of 2010 that the United States could not conduct additional discovery regarding issues of standing and Section 4(a)'s bailout provision, 270 F.R.D. 16 (D.D.C. 2010), the District Court (Judge Bates) granted the Justice Department's motion for summary judgment and granted Shelby County's motion for summary judgement on September 21, 2011. 811 F.Supp.2d 242. The main issue was whether the Act's preclearance requirement constituted a \"congruent and proportional\" response to a real threat that states would violate minority voting rights. Judge Bates found the Act was indeed a\"congruent and proportional remedy\" to the 21st century problem of voting discrimination in covered jurisdictions. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals likewise held that the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act fell within Congress' authority under the Fifteenth Amendment and that the disparate effect on different jurisdictions was sufficiently related to the targeted problem of voting discrimination to survive judicial review. 679 F.3d 848. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 133 S.Ct. 594, and on June 25, 2013, reversed. In a 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court struck down Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act. It found that Section 4's formula, under which states and other jurisdictions needed preclearance, was unconstitutional. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). The Court held that Section 4, while appropriate at the time it was passed, no longer provided an accurate list of jurisdictions that discriminated against minority voters. The formula at the time of the Act's passage, named as \"covered\" jurisdictions those states or political subdivisions that had maintained a test or device (like literacy and knowledge tests, good moral character requirements, etc.) as a prerequisite to voting as of November 1, 1964, and had less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout in the 1964 Presidential election. Subsequently, the trigger election was changed to 1972. The Court concluded Section 4 impermissibly violated the \"equal sovereignty\" of the states. The Court did not express its views on the constitutionality of Section 5, under a different coverage formula. Justice Ginsburg dissented (joined by three others), and Justice Thomas concurred to express his view that Section 5 was unconstitutional. Without a coverage formula, the Act's preclearance regime is not operative. It remains technically possible for the Congress to pass a new coverage formula.", "summary": "On April 27, 2010, Shelby County filed this lawsuit in the District Court of the District of Columbia, challenging the preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act, under which certain states and localities must obtain approval from the Department of Justice prior to implementing any voting changes. The District Court and the Court of Appeals held the Act constitutional, but on June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act--the formula for which jurisdictions were governed by the preclearance regime--impermissibly undermined the \"equal sovereignty\" of the states. Because the Court offered no view on Section 5 of the VRA, it remains technically available to the Congress to pass a new coverage formula. Without such a formula, the Act's preclearance regime is not operative."} {"article": "On August 14, 2015, the Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services (RAICES) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiff is a consortium of immigrant advocacy organizations that represents civil detainees. It sought declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. The plaintiff claimed that ICE had unjustifiably failed to respond to a request for records within the statutorily mandated timeframe. These records related to allegations that detention officers employed by the GEO Group sexually abused female asylum-seekers who were detained with their children in the ICE family detention center in Karnes City, Texas. The plaintiff maintained that the records contained information about the facility\u2019s laundry room, which GEO detention officers allegedly used to sexually assault women in the late night and early morning hours. Earlier in 2015, an investigation of the substantive allegations had led to a report by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG). Reviewing over 360 hours of time-lapsed surveillance video footage, OIG explained that it had uncovered no evidence substantiating the allegations. However, according to former detainees, the sexual assaults happened in a \"blind spot\" in the laundry room where they would not be captured on the security camera. Therefore, the plaintiff submitted a FOIA request for physical and electronic records concerning the laundry room and its associated security camera. At the time of the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff had received no agency records responsive to the request. On August 14, 2015, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint stating that ICE's online FOIA tracking tool indicated that a request for documents had been sent, and that an estimated delivery date of those documents was to be on August 19, 2015. However, there is no note of the documents being delivered on that date or any date thereafter. After a long stretch of rescheduling orders, on June 29, 2016 the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing it had fulfilled its statutory obligations under FOIA. The plaintiff, however, filed no response brief by the deadline. The Court took the plaintiff's silence to mean that the plaintiff did not oppose the defendant's argument that the search was adequate, that the defendant had produced all non-exempt portions of responsive records, and that the defendant had properly withheld material under FOIA's statutory exemptions. Therefore, the Court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion and closed the case on August 22, 2016. This case is now closed.", "summary": "On Aug. 14, 2015, the immigration advocacy organization RAICES sued ICE under FOIA for records pertaining to possible sexual assaults in an ICE detention facility. After ICE produced records, plaintiff did not file an opposing brief, and the Court granted ICE's motion for summary judgment and closed the case on Aug. 22, 2016."} {"article": "In June 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division launched an investigation into the conditions at the juvenile justice facilities at the Adobe Mountain School, Black Canyon School, and Catalina Mountain School in Arizona, pursuant to Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (\"CRIPA\"), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997 et seq. and the pattern or practice provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141. Based on its investigation, the DOJ concluded that the conditions and practices at the Arizona facilities violated the constitutional and statutory rights of juvenile residents in the areas of: suicide prevention, education, mental health care and medical care. On January 23, 2004, the DOJ issued a findings letter which detailed the violations and set out a series of minimum remedial measures to bring the facilities up to constitutional standards. The State accepted the recommendations and the parties entered into a Memorandum of Agreement to ensure compliance. So that the Agreement could be judicially enforced, the DOJ filed a formal complaint on September 15, 2004 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. That same day, the parties filed a joint motion for approval of the Memorandum of Agreement. The agreement identifies and proscribes remedies for five substantive areas: training in suicide prevention; the installation of a juvenile justice system in which youths can raise grievances without fear of retribution from staff; provisions in special education; adequate health care services; and adequate mental health services. On September 27, 2004, District Court Judge Earl H. Carroll ordered that the case be conditionally dismissed and placed on the inactive docket pending compliance w/the Memorandum of Agreement lodged with the Court. The Court retained jurisdiction over the case for a period of three years to monitor compliance. On September 26, 2007, Judge Carroll granted a joint motion to dismiss the case. A Consultants Committee report attested to Defendant compliance with the negotiated agreement, thus allowing for the case dismissal.", "summary": "In June 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division launched an investigation into the conditions at the juvenile justice facilities at the Adobe Mountain School, Black Canyon School, and Catalina Mountain School in Arizona. Based on its investigation, the DOJ concluded that the conditions and practices at the Arizona facilities violated the constitutional and statutory rights of juvenile residents. The DOJ and the State negotiated an Agreement for reforms. The DOJ then filed a formal complaint on September 15, 2004 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona so that the Agreement could be judicially enforced. On September 27, 2004, Judge Earl H. Carroll ordered that the case be conditionally dismissed pending compliance with the Agreement lodged with the court. The court retained jurisdiction over the case for three years to monitor compliance. On September 26, 2007, Judge Carroll dismissed the case on grounds that compliance with the Agreement had been satisfied."} {"article": "On September 14, 2007, the EEOC filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC represented a class of individuals claiming discrimination based upon race and national origin in hiring, promotion, job assignment, demotion, and discharge by Faribault Foods. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Faribault Foods engaged in disparate treatment against its Hispanic workforce. For example, it allegedly enforced English-proficiency requirements for entry-level positions that did not require English proficiency. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief. On October 17, 2007, the District Court (Judge Richard House Kyle) approved a consent decree. The decree consolidated this case with a separate class action suit filed by the same aggrieved individuals (Mendez v. Faribault Foods, Inc.). Under the decree, Faribault Foods was generally enjoined from any future violations of Title VII or the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. It was also required to conduct three hours of diversity training annually for its managers. Further, the defendant was required to conduct all employee orientation and workplace policy training in Spanish, translate its safety procedures and job openings into Spanish, and provide a Spanish interpreter for all reviews and disciplinary actions. The decree also required Faribault Foods to establish a diversity committee to promote and provide feedback of its diversity efforts. It was further required to reimburse tuition for any successfully completed English-language courses by its employees. Finally, the defendant was to pay $465,000 to the class claimants. The consent decree was to remain in effect for a period of two years. On March 28, 2008, the Court granted final approval and certification of the settlement class and the consent decree. The certified class was defined as: \"Hispanic current and former employees of Faribault Foods that were discriminated against during their employment on the basis of their race and national origin.\" In the March 28 order, the Court also retained jurisdiction over these matters for purposes of ensuring compliance with the consent decree. The three year enforcement period ended without any further litigation, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "This case was brought by the EEOC on behalf of Hispanic employees of Faribault, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and damages for the company's discriminatory practices against Hispanic employees based on race and national origin. This case was resolved through a class-action settlement which was granted final approval by the Court on March 28, 2008. The settlement included monetary damages, and the establishment of non-discriminatory policies."} {"article": "On August 23, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a black employee, filed a lawsuit in the Southern District Court of Texas, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Satchel's BBQ & Steaks, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant subjected the complainant to a racially hostile work environment because of his race, Black. On September 20, 2005, the District Court (Judge Kenneth M. Hoyt) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $12,000.", "summary": "On August 23, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a black employee, filed a lawsuit in the Southern District Court of Texas, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Satchel's BBQ & Steaks, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant subjected the complainant to a racially hostile work environment because of his race, Black. On September 20, 2005, the District Court (Judge Kenneth M. Hoyt) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $12,000."} {"article": "On September 11, 2000, a paraplegic woman sued the Santa Cruz School District in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California for failing to provide access to persons with mobility impairments at the nursery school her children attended. Specifically, the Plaintiff claimed that paths from the parking lot to the school grounds, front doors, playground, bathrooms, and activities requiring parent-child involvement were inaccessible, all in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 USC \u00a712131 et seq; (2) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, \u00a7 29 USC 794; (3) California Government Code \u00a7\u00a74450 et seq; and (4) The California Civil Rights Acts, Cal. Civ. Code \u00a7\u00a7 54 and 54.1. The Plaintiff sought an injunction forcing the Defendant to remove architectural and other barriers to disabled access, unspecified damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. On August 7, 2003, the District Court dismissed the case, noting that a settlement agreement had been reached. The details of this settlement agreement are not publicly available. The case is now closed.", "summary": "A paraplegic woman filed suit agains the Santa Cruz School District for alleged violations of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The case settled, but the settlement agreement is not publicly available."} {"article": "COVID-19 summary: This is an action brought on March 24, 2020 by 13 immigration detainees in California, seeking release from ICE detention in light of the grave threat of infection. Six plaintiffs with underlying medical conditions were granted a TRO, and were later granted preliminary injunctive relief.
Barrier configuration for demonstrations should not unreasonably restrict access to and participation in the event. For example, attendees should be permitted to leave a barricaded area at any time. In addition, if crowd conditions and other circumstances permit, participants should be permitted to leave and return to the same area. Sufficient openings in the barricades should be maintained for purpose of permitted attendees to leave expeditiously and return to the event as described in this paragraph.In their complaint, the plaintiffs asked the court to issue an order compelling the NYPD to comply with this section. On Mar. 6, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for (1) failure to state a claim and (2) failure to fulfill conditions precedent to filing suit. The defendants argued that the barricades amounted to a reasonable time, place, manner restriction under the First Amendment, and that the need to ensure the President's security rendered the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim non-actionable. The defendants also pointed to New York General Municipal Law \u00a7 50-i(1), which sets forth certain procedures for suing the City. The defendants claimed that plaintiffs' had failed to comply with \u00a7 50-i(1), and that their claims were therefore barred. On Nov. 21, 2013, District Judge Thomas P. Griesa for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. Judge Griesa acknowledged that although it was \"a close question as to whether [the complaint] states a valid cause of action for violation of constitutional rights . . . [t]he court believes that it is not appropriate at this stage to rule on the merits of the case.\" Berg v. Kelly, 12-cv-03391 TPG, 2013 WL 6153253, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2013). However, the court noted that \"a summary judgment motion, or cross-summary judgment motions, may be appropriate in order to avoid a drawn-out litigation with full discovery and trial.\" Id. On Dec. 18, 2015, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On Jan. 21, 2016, the defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. On Aug. 10, 2016, the district court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court denied the defendants' summary judgment motion with respect to the Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim, the First Amendment retaliation claim, the Fourteenth Amendment selective-enforcement claim, and the failure-to-intervene claim, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed. The court also found that the defendants had failed to show that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The court granted the motion to dismiss with respect to the plaintiffs' \u00a7 1983 claims against the Commissioner of the NYPD and the Chief of Department of the NYPD, finding that they failed for lack of sufficient involvement in the alleged constitutional violations, as neither defendant was at the scene was at the scene of the protest. The court also dismissed the state constitutional claims, because as the plaintiffs had alternate remedies available under a federal statute such as \u00a7 1983, their state constitutional tort claims were \"redundant and precluded\" under Biswas v. City of New York, 973 F. Supp. 2d 504, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). On Sept. 9, 2016, the defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, from the district court's opinion dated Aug. 10, 2016. The case was assigned Docket No. 16-3146. On Nov. 18, 2016, several of the plaintiffs-appellees moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, but the Sixth Circuit denied the motion on Jan. 11, 2017. A Second Circuit panel of Judges Reena Raggi, Susan Carney, and Peter Hall ruled on the appeal on July 25, 2018 (897 F.3d 99). They noted that the officers did have a special need that could exempt them from the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement--the need to protect the President--but found that the ensuing detention procedure did not balance the competing interests of protecting the President, since the protesters were not allowed to leave at all while non-protesters successfully left the area in small groups without incident. However, they overturned the District Court's analysis that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because there was a question of material fact as to the mental state of the officers erecting the barricades. They stated that qualified immunity is analyzed through the lens of a reasonable officer, not the mental state of the officer at issue, and found that a reasonable officer protecting the President could think that this detention strategy did not violate any Constitutional rights. With this grant of qualified immunity, all the Constitutional complaints were invalidated, and the Second Circuit recommended that the District Court dismiss the case with prejudice. District Court Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, assigned to the case since 2018, took up the Second Circuit's recommendation and declined to reargue the case on April 22, 2019. The decision to decline to reargue was based on a November 30, 2018 recommendation from Magistrate Judge Gabriel Gorenstein (343 F.Supp.3d 419). In the same order, he noted that all claims were now dismissed, and ordered the plaintiffs to pay attorney's fees. The case is closed.", "summary": "In May 2012, five members of Occupy Wall Street brought this putative class action against the City of New York. The plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, and alleged that officers of the New York City Police Department had violated their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as their rights under the Constitution of the State of New York. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that they were unlawfully detained by NYPD officers during an Occupy Wall Street demonstration held in New York City on Nov. 8, 2011. The defendants appealed the district court's partial denial of their motion for summary judgment to the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit granted qualified immunity to the officers at issue, and dismissed all remaining Constitutional charges under this theory. The case is closed."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This constitutional claims action was filed by Pennsylvania counties, residents, and businesses on May 7, 2020, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from the state's public safety orders. The court granted declaratory relief to the plaintiffs on September 14, 2020.
The steady rate of unlawful enforcement of section 240.35(1) that has persisted for almost thirteen years after Loper is simply unacceptable. Defendants' long-standing apathy towards this problem was offensive. Nevertheless, the Court is convinced that defendants have made avoiding contempt a top priority and are now striving to fully comply with the June 23, 2005 Order. Certainly, this includes treating the issuance of a single summons under section 240.35(1) as a serious problem deserving urgent attention. To this end, the Court is prepared to revisit the issue of defendants' diligence every two months, until every outstanding bench warrant has been vacated and no more summonses for violations of an unconstitutional statute are issued . . . Until December 2006, defendants' failure to comply was unreasonable and harmful; but for plaintiff's persistence in monitoring and investigating the continued enforcement of section 240.35(1), defendants' noncompliance would have continued indefinitely. It is also clear from the record that but for the specter of contempt\u2014precipitated by plaintiff's repeated request to file this motion\u2014defendants would not have taken the actions that saved them from coercive sanctions. Plaintiff is thus entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys' fees for its efforts with respect to this motion.Id. at *6. On July 24, 2007, the court certified class, granting the plaintiffs' motion for certification of the state-wide injunctive class, the city-wide damages subclass, and the state-wide defendant class. 244 F.R.D. 222. The court also granted leave to amend the complaint. The second amended class action complaint added the six additional named plaintiffs and class representatives, added nine individual police officer defendants, supplemented the allegations against the defendants, and added a cause of action for violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The defendants appealed the district court's order granting the plaintiffs' motion for class certification to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The named plaintiff was awarded attorney's fees in February 2008 on the motion for contempt in the amounts of $48,741. 620 F.Supp.2d 435. In June 2009, Judge Scheindlin ordered the City to release all records of those who were arrested/summonsed/charged under \u00a7 240.35(1). On March 11, 2008, Judge Scheindlin accepted the case Casale v. Kelly (08-cv-02173-SAS) as related to this lawsuit. The plaintiffs in Casale v. Kelly filed a putative class action complaint against the city for continuing to enforce loitering statutes \u00a7 240.35(3) and (7), after both were declared unconstitutional. These provisions dealt with loitering for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct and loitering in a transportation facility without sufficient reason. In an opinion issued jointly in this case and Casale v. Kelly on April 26, 2010, Judge Scheindlin held the City in contempt of court for failing to cooperate in ceasing the enforcement of \u00a7 240.35(1), (3), and (7):
The City of New York, operating principally through the New York City Police Department (\u201cNYPD\u201d), has continuously enforced three unconstitutional loitering statutes for decades following judicial invalidation of those laws and despite numerous court orders to the contrary. While arrests, summonses, and prosecutions under the void statutes generally have diminished over time, the City\u2019s description of its anti-enforcement efforts as \u201creasonably diligent and energetic\u201d simply does not comport with reality. Over time, the City has implemented a variety of measures to half enforcement of the statutes. However, the City has done little on its own initiative or with reasonable conviction and speed to end the illegal enforcement; indeed, the City has actively dragged its feet. Year after year, the Court and plaintiffs have pushed and prodded the City into meaningful action. The City\u2019s obstinance and uncooperativeness throughout the present actions is offensive to the rule of law. The human toll, of course, has been borne by the tens of thousands of individuals who have, at once, had their constitutional rights violated and been swept into the penal system. More disturbing still, it appears that the laws\u2014which target panhandling, remaining in a bus or train station, and \u201ccruising\u201d for sex\u2014have been enforced particularly against the poor and gay men.710 F.Supp.2d 347, 350. The order subjected the City to a system of sanctions in which each future enforcement of the void laws would result in a progressively higher fine (beginning at $500). Finding that the contempt citation and monetary sanction should \"furnish sufficient incentive\" for the City not to enforce the statutes, the court denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction that had accompanied their second motion for civil contempt on December 23, 2009. On July 7, 2010, the plaintiffs were awarded attorney's fees in connection with the second motion for civil contempt in the amount of $175,000. On June 24, 2010, the Second Circuit (Judges Robert D. Sack and Robert A. Katzmann) affirmed the district court's July 24, 2007 certification of the city-wide plaintiff class, but vacated and remanded the certification of the state-wide plaintiff and defendant classes, finding that the district court abused its discretion in certifying those classes. 609 F.3d 467 (2d Cir. 2010). The parties began settlement discussions in July 2010. On July 30, 2010, the New York State Legislature repealed N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 240.35(1), (3), and (7). A stipulation and order of settlement between the parties in this case and in Casale v. Kelly was entered on February 6, 2012. The settlement agreement created a $15 million class fund for those who were arrested, charged, or summonsed under the three void sections of the loitering statute. The fund also included attorney's fees and $25,000 to each of the named plaintiffs for services provided to the class. The City was also to vacate, dismiss, and seal all cases charging the statutes and to take continuing measures to cease the statutes' enforcement, including continuing to train police officers on the matter and investigating any attempt to charge the statutes. The settlement agreement was to be in effect and under the court's jurisdiction for two years following the effective date. Following a fairness hearing, the court entered final approval of the settlement agreement on December 21, 2012. On July 29, 2011, Judge Scheindlin accepted the case Long v. The City of New York as related to this action. The plaintiff in that case was an individual who begged in Times Square holding a sign that said, \"Help! I Need Money for Weed!\". He was arrested by the NYPD on multiple occasions under the same loitering statute, NY Penal Law \u00a7 240.35(1), and sued the City under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The case settled for $45,000 and $85,000 in attorney's fees. A final judgment was entered in this case on January 3, 2012. Late claimants continued to seek settlement funds based on good cause through 2014. In April 2015, the remaining $160,000 in the Class Fund was given to four non-profit organizations dealing with issues of homelessness. The case is now closed.", "summary": "The City of New York failed to stop enforcing three loitering statutes [NY Penal Law s. 240.35(1),(3),(7)] that were declared unconstitutional by the courts in 1983, 1988, and 1992. NYPD and the DA's office was held in contempt of court for its failure to follow court orders in ceasing to arrest, charge, and prosecute individuals under the statutes, subjecting it to escalating fines for any future enforcement. A Class Action Fund of $15 million was awarded to the plaintiffs in a settlement agreed to in 2012."} {"article": "On July 21, 1993, eight prisoners housed at the Washington State Reformatory in Monroe who did not speak English filed a civil rights complaint pro se in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, seeking class certification, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. They filed their complaint under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging that, contrary to a Department of Corrections directive from 1990 requiring that \u201c[a]ll institutional rules, policies, and other relevant data shall be published in Spanish when they are issued in English,\u201d the Reformatory had no resources available in Spanish. The failure to provide materials in Spanish, the plaintiffs claimed, violated their due process and equal protection rights. On August 9, 1993, Judge William L. Dwyer referred the case to Magistrate Judge David E. Wilson. The plaintiffs moved to have an attorney appointed for them. But Magistrate Judge Wilson denied their motion, reasoning that they had not met the criteria for the appointment of an attorney, and had seemed able to handle filing the complaint and affidavits on their own. On September 15, 1993, John B. Midgley appeared as an attorney for some of the plaintiffs. On January 11, 1994, the complaint was amended, removing two of the defendants, and adding the Director of the Division of Prisons of the Washington Department of prisons. One of the plaintiffs was also removed, and several more were added. Ultimately, the parties reached a settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the Department of Corrections would develop materials, services, and programs in Spanish. Then, \u201c[i]f the parties agree that DOC has provided the agreed materials,\u201d the case would be dismissed with prejudice. The DOC agreed to provide information regarding its progress to plaintiffs\u2019 counsel, as well as outside consultants and experts. The plaintiffs\u2019 counsel also had a right to view translated materials and interview DOC employees. The agreement also specified which documents would be translated into Spanish, specified a timeframe, and provided for translation services and legal resources to be made available in Spanish. The settlement provided for an 18-month implementation window. The parties stipulated to stay the case while the settlement was implemented on January 23, 1995, and the court agreed to hold the case in abeyance while the parties implemented the settlement on January 30. The settlement agreement also provided for a 12-month enforcement window following implementation during which the plaintiffs could enforce the agreement's provisions. On October 10, 1996, the parties stipulated to dismiss the case with prejudice, and Judge Dwyer dismissed the case with prejudice that same day. The enforcement period ended in 1997 without any further docket activity, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "This \u00a7 1983 suit was filed in 1993 by Spanish-speaking prisoners at the Washington State Reformatory in Monroe, which, contrary to policy, did not have materials available in Spanish. The parties settled in 1995, and the defendants agreed to make materials in Spanish available over a period of 18 months, after which, their agreement would be enforced for 12 months. The enforcement period ran without any further docket activity, and the case is now closed."} {"article": "On April 5, 2018, The Fortune Society, Inc., a not-for-profit whose mission is to support the successful reentry of formerly incarcerated individuals, and two former employees of the Target Corporation filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued Target under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that Target utilized a job applicant screening process that systematically eliminated thousands of qualified African Americans and Latinos from jobs based on their race or national origin. The plaintiffs, represented by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund and Outten & Golden, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief as well as attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Deborah A. Batts and Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman. At issue in this case was Target\u2019s use of criminal background checks to screen applicants for prior convictions, many of which are unrelated to the job sought or occurred long before the individual\u2019s application for employment at Target. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant\u2019s hiring practices and procedures were unlawful under Title VII because they had a significant adverse impact upon African Americans and Latinos and because these practices were neither job-related nor consistent with business necessity. On the same day the complaint was filed, the parties moved for preliminary approval of a class action settlement, conditional certification of a settlement class, and appointment of class counsel. The class was defined as, with some exceptions, all African-American and Latino applicants who were denied employment from a Target Stores Job due to a final adjudication on a pre-employment background check that did not clear the applicant to proceed based on their criminal history record, from the start of the class liability period on May 11, 2006, to the date of preliminary approval of the proposed settlement. The settlement agreed to a priority hiring process for members of the class. For class members who were hired but were terminated within six months of their employment due to no fault of their own, Target agreed to write them employment letters stating that they had hired the candidates with knowledge of their criminal record and that the candidates had been fired through no fault of their own. The agreement also required Target to retain two experts in the field of industrial and organizational psychology to design, develop, and implement properly validated adjudication guidelines for the hiring of job applicants with criminal histories for hourly jobs at Target stores. These experts were to monitor compliance for the one-year settlement term. Target agreed to establish a settlement fund of $3,742,500. Two named plaintiffs were to receive up to $20,000 each, one named plaintiff was to receive $2,500, and members of the class no longer eligible for the hiring process were to receive up to $1,000 each. Cash settlement payments were limited to $1,200,000 and $1,900,000 was reserved for attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. Target agreed to give $600,000 in donations to non-profits focused on the re-entry of formerly incarcerated individuals. The court was to retain jurisdiction over the matter to assure compliance. The court conditionally approved the settlement agreement on October 29, 2019 pending and objections from class members who had been served notice late. No class members objected, and the court gave the settlement final approval on December 4. The monitoring period is in force as of March 2020.", "summary": "This 2018 class action lawsuit was brought by The Fortune Society and two former employees of the Target Corporation in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that Target had violated in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by using criminal background checks to screen applicants for prior convictions to the detriment of thousands of qualified African American and Latino job applicants. A settlement has been reached and the court currently retains jurisdiction to ensure compliance."} {"article": "On February 11, 2013, a class of current and former female sales employees filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act, the California Equal Pay Act, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, and the California Business and Professions Code against pharmaceutical manufacturer Daiichi Sankyo, Inc. (\"DSI\"). Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed disparate impact in pay, benefits and promotional opportunities as well as discrimination for pregnancy and family responsibilities. The class, represented by private counsel, asked the court for permanent injunctive relief, the implementation of programs that provide equal employment opportunities for female employees, and damages for gender discrimination in employment. On April 12, 2013, the defendant moved to transfer venue to the District of New Jersey where its corporate headquarters was located, arguing that since key evidence and witnesses were located there, it would serve the interests of convenience and efficiency. On June 25, 2013, the Court (Judge Claudia Wilken) denied the defendant's motion, stating that it failed \"to meet its burden of establishing that the balance of inconvenience weighs heavily in favor of transfer.\" 2013 WL 3242294. On May 15, 2014, the Court granted plaintiff's April 28, 2015 motion for conditional certification of class. The court defined the class as: \u201cCurrent, former, and future female sales employees in a sales representative and first level district manager role\u2026who worked at any time in Defendant's sales organization in the United States during the applicable liability period.\u201d 2014 WL 2126877. The parties reached a settlement agreement on October 16, 2015. The classes were settled as: California Settlement Class: All female sales force employees who were or would be employed in a sales representative and/or first level district manager role\u2026in DSI's sales organization in California for at least one day between April 16, 2011 and October 16, 2015. Non\u2013California Settlement Class: All female sales force employees who were or would be employed in a sales representative and/or first level district manager role\u2026in DSI's sales organization in the United States for at least one day between April 16, 2011 and October 16, 2015. The plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the action and defendants agreed to make available a settlement fund of $8,200,000. $200,000 of that fund was set aside in order to implement changes to defendant\u2019s employment policies and practices, $4,600,000 was paid into an interest-bearing class settlement fund, and the remaining $3,600,000 was used to reimburse costs and expenses of the litigation, pay class counsel's fees as awarded by the Court, pay service payments to class representatives and lawsuit participants, and pay for the administration of the settlement process. The interest-bearing class settlement fund was separated into two components. The core component consisted of $3,700,000 that was to be divided among all named plaintiffs and class members for back pay related to the claims asserted in the case. The calculation of individual shares was based on the total workweeks of all class members during the damages periods and workweeks worked by each class member. The claim form component consisting of $926,200 was proportionately divided among named plaintiffs and class members who submit a claim form for alleged gender, pregnancy, and caregiver discrimination related to denial of promotion to District Manager, harassment, retaliation, or emotional distress damages. In addition to the $8,200,000, the defendant agreed to programmatic relief which included: (1) providing all employees with written or electronic communication of commitment to equal employment opportunities and copies or links to policies addressing non-discrimination, anti-harassment, and anti-retaliation; (2) retaining an independent HR consultant to review its policies and practices and enhance its policies and practices in relation to the issues raised in this lawsuit; (3) posting all District Manager positions with clear posting of the requirements and qualifications for the role; (4) continuing to support the Women's Forum and continue to maintain DSI's mentoring program, including providing the opportunity for the Women's Forum to meet with the HR consultant for at least two hours; (5) working with the HR consultant to develop a training module that will provide guidance to all employees on the appropriate way to treat new mothers returning to work, and create a brief hand-out informing returning mothers of their rights and appropriate procedure to follow if they feel those rights have been violated; (6) establishing an internal compliance panel of senior executives from the HR and Legal departments to meet semi-annually to review compliance with the above requires; and (7) providing certification to class counsel every six months for two years from October 16, 2015 detailing what programmatic changes were actually done. 2015 WL 10090564. The settlement was finally approved, and the action was dismissed, on February 11, 2016. The court maintained jurisdiction over the case. There has been no action on the docket since July 12, 2016.", "summary": "In February of 2013, female pharmaceutical sales employees sued their employer for gender discrimination in regard to pay, benefits and promotional opportunities. The case was settled in October 2015. Defendants agreed to implement programmatic changes and establish a settlement fund of $8,200,000."} {"article": "On December 20, 2013, the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau and the United States Department of Justice filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against a bank, alleging that it engaged in discriminatory lending practices. The plaintiffs alleged that, as a result of the defendant's policies and practices, African-American, Asian/Pacific Islander, and Hispanic borrowers unfairly paid higher prices for their automobile loans than non-Hispanic White borrowers. The complaint asked the court for a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and monetary damages. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant allowed its automobile dealers to set wholesale loan prices unrelated to credit risk characteristics and loan terms. The defendant did not require automobile dealers to justify or document the reasons for the amount of broker fees and prices set above the par rate; failed to monitor for disparities based on race or national original because of its policies and practices; and created a financial incentive for automobile dealers to charge higher fees and interest rates. The plaintiffs filed a proposed consent order that was entered by the Court (Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon) on December 23, 2013. Under the consent order, the defendant agreed to implement policies and procedures designed to ensure that the dealer markup on automobile retail installment contracts was negotiated in a nondiscriminatory manner. In addition, the defendant would compensate certain African-American, Hispanic, and Asian/Pacific Islander borrowers through the establishment of an $80 million dollar settlement fund. The consent order was to remain in effect dependent on defendant compliance - essentially 2 years if the defendants were in compliance, or 3 years if they were not. On August 2, 2017, the court dismissed the case with prejudice, finding the consent decree completed.", "summary": "On December 20, 2013 the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau working alongside the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against a bank, alleging that it engaged in discriminatory lending practices. The plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the defendant's policies and practices, African-American, Asian/Pacific Islander, and Hispanic borrowers unfairly paid higher prices for their automobile loans than non-Hispanic White borrowers. The court entered a consent decree on December 23, 2013, under which the defendant agreed to implement policies and procedures designed to ensure that the dealer markup on automobile retail installment contracts is negotiated in a nondiscriminatory manner. In addition, the defendant will compensate certain African-American, Hispanic, and Asian/Pacific Islander borrowers."} {"article": "On March 24, 1988, individual nonimmigrant aliens and various immigration rights organizations filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, challenging certain INS policies and regulations relating to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). Specifically, plaintiffs challenged the interpretation of the requirement that to qualify for legalization under the IRCA the nonimmigrant must have lived continuously and unlawfully in the U.S. since January 1, 1982, and that their unlawful status was \"known to the government.\" The IRCA established a one-time only amnesty program through which aliens could apply for lawful temporary resident status and then, after a one-year waiting period, apply for permanent residency. 8 U.S.C. \u00a71255a. To qualify for this program, the alien must have (1) applied for such adjustment within the 12-month period between May 5, 1987, and May 4, 1988; (2) lived continuously and unlawfully in the U.S. since January 1, 1982 with their unlawful status \"known to the government\"; and (3) been continuously physically present in the United States except for ''brief, casual, and innocent absences,'' since November 6, 1986. Plaintiffs challenged the INS' regulations 8 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 245a.1(d), 245a.2(b) (1992) which interpreted the IRCA's \"continuous unlawful residence since 1982\" and \"known to the government\" requirements. Plaintiffs alleged that the regulations violated the plain meaning of the IRCA, as well as the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought class certification and declaratory and injunctive relief. They were represented by attorneys with various advocacy groups, including the Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law, as well as private counsel. This case was one of several major lawsuits filed throughout the country, challenging different policies and practices used by the INS to implement the IRCA amnesty program. 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1255a. See Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, No. 1:88-cv-00625-SS (D.D.C.) [IM-DC-0003]; Catholic Soc. Servs. v. Attorney General, No. 2:86-cv-01343-LKK-JFM (E.D. Cal.) [IM-CA-0011]; Zambrano v. INS, No. 2:88-cv-00455-EJG-PAN (E.D. Cal.) [IM-CA-0008] and League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. INS, No. 2:87-cv-04757-WDK-CW (C.D. Cal.) [IM-CA-0019]. Like the other cases challenging the INS' interpretation of 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1255a, this case resulted in litigation which spanned over a decade and produced a very complicated procedural history of appeals and remands from the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court. A brief synopsis of that history follows. On August 29, 1988, plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, which the INS moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The District Court granted the motion as to the individual plaintiffs, but denied it as to the organizational plaintiffs, finding that they had standing in the case in that they alleged the challenged regulations impaired their goals of helping immigrants and caused a financial burden on their resources. Class certification was denied. On March 7, 1989, the District Court (Chief Judge Barbara J. Rothstein) granted in part plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, dismissed certain plaintiffs from the case and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. The Court declared that the regulations were unlawful and issued an injunction, which was narrower than requested by plaintiffs. Immigration Assistance Project of the L.A. Cnty. Fed'n of Labor (AFL-CIO) v. INS, 709 F. Supp. 998 (W.D. Wash. 1989). The judgment was amended on June 3, 1989, see Immigration Assistance Project of the L.A. Cnty. Fed'n of Labor (AFL-CIO) v. INS, 717 F.Supp. 1444 (W.D. Wash.1989); affirmed in part and reversed in part by the Ninth Circuit, see Legalization Assistance Project of the L.A. Cnty. Fed'n of Labor (AFL-CIO) v. INS, 976 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1992); and vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312 (1993), and Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U. S. 43 (1993) [IM-CA-0011], see INS v. Legalization Assistance Project of the L.A. Cnty. Fed'n of Labor, 510 U.S. 1007 (1993). On remand, the plaintiffs sought leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, which again sought class certification and declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court preliminarily certified the case as a class action, and entered a TRO. A series of orders and appeals followed. (See Immigrant Assistance Project of the L.A. Cnty. Fed'n of Labor (AFL-CIO) v. INS, 306 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2002), for a more detailed procedural history). Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's reinstatement of its class certification order and its modified reinstatement of its TRO. Id. The case was remanded to allow plaintiffs to amend the complaint to cure any jurisdictional and venue defects. After five more years of litigation, the case was settled. Simply stated, the settlement allowed certain individuals, who were turned away when they attempted to apply for legalization or \"amnesty\" under the Immigration to Reform and Control Act of 1986, to apply for legalization. The settlement also allowed certain individuals who had filed applications and whose applications had been denied to move to reopen their applications with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS). Under the settlement, the parties agreed to class certification. The requirements for class membership were quite complex, and prospective class members were required to fill out a detailed Class Member Worksheet. A copy of the Stipulation for Settlement and its attachments is part of the collection of documents we have for this case. The District Court (Judge James L. Robart) approved the settlement, along with attorney's fees and costs, on September 9, 2008.", "summary": "On March 24, 1988, individual nonimmigrant aliens and various immigration rights organizations filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, challenging certain INS policies and regulations relating to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). Specifically, plaintiffs challenged the interpretation of the requirement that to qualify for legalization under the IRCA the nonimmigrant must have lived continuously and unlawfully in the U.S. since January 1, 1982, and that their unlawful status was \"known to the government.\" After two decades of litigation, the case was settled in 2008."} {"article": "This is a conditions of confinement suit brought by the putative class of prisoners at the Vienna Correctional Center (\"Vienna\"), a minimum security Illinois state prison, against the Illinois Department of Corrections. The case was filed by private counsel and the Uptown People's Law Center, on June 13, 2012. It alleges disgusting and crowded conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment-1900 prisoners housed in a facility meant for 925, rampant vermin, contaminated food, heat and ventilation problems, and endemic mold and mildew. By April 2013, the parties had engaged in settlement discussions. In August of 2013, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for class certification for settlement purposes. However, District Judge J. Phil Gilbert held that, as the named plaintiffs had all been released from Vienna, the proposed class was not adequately represented by the current named plaintiffs. The Court reserved ruling on the motion until plaintiffs either found a suitable class representative, or made a compelling argument to the Court that the current named plaintiffs were adequate class representatives. Boyd v. Godinez, Civil Action No. 3:12-cv-704-JPG-PMF, 2013 WL 5230238 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2013). Plaintiffs subsequently amended their complaint to add a named plaintiff who was currently incarcerated at Vienna, but also argued that the \"inherently transitory\" exception to the mootness doctrine should apply in this case. Judge Gilbert held that the plaintiffs had not adequately explained their inherently transitory argument, especially in light of the fact that they had successfully found a putative class representative and added him to their complaint. Nevertheless, having secured an adequate class representative, the Court granted the plaintiffs' unopposed motion to certify a class for settlement purposes. In light of the progress made toward settlement, the District Court vacated the pretrial schedule in December 2013. The parties engaged in settlement discussions for several years, but in May 2016 they notified the Court that the discussions had stalled and they desired to proceed with litigation. On June 7, 2016, the case was reassigned to Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan. Judge Reagan scheduled a jury trial for March 26, 2018. On August 15, 2016, the Court issued an order directing the plaintiffs to file a brief supporting their need to keep their September 2012 class certification motion pending on the docket. Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court precedent called into doubt the ongoing need for plaintiffs to file early class certification motions to avoid mootness. The plaintiffs submitted a brief arguing that the Court had already implicitly ruled on class certification for settlement purposes, or at the very least that settlement certification removed any mootness concerns. Judge Reagan, however, disagreed. On the first point, he explained that the defendants had agreed not to oppose the second motion for class certification on the condition that certification was only for settlement purposes. However, Judge Reagan agreed that the settlement certification, without subsequent decertification, was enough to protect the plaintiffs from mootness issues; once certified, the class achieved a legal status separate from the interest asserted by the named plaintiffs. Thus, the Court found that there was no longer a need to keep the original motion for class certification on the docket to safeguard plaintiffs from any mootness problem and denied that original motion without prejudice on September 22, 2016. On December 9, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a voluntary motion to dismiss the action in its entirety. The motion stated that the Illinois Department of Corrections had made significant improvements to the living conditions at Vienna that resolved the unconstitutional conditions. Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly ordered that notice of the dismissal be provided to the settlement class. The notice informed the class that they could file objections or comments, but none were filed. After holding a fairness hearing, Magistrate Judge Daly issued a recommendation of dismissal to the District Court, noting that dismissal was a fair, reasonable, and adequate resolution of the litigation. Thus, on September 7, 2017, the District Court dismissed all claims without prejudice. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On June 13, 2012, a putative class of prisoners at the Vienna Correctional Center, a minimum security Illinois state prison, filed a conditions of confinement suit against the Illinois Department of Corrections in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Uptown People's Law Center, alleged disgusting and crowded conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment-1900 prisoners housed in a facilty meant for 925, rampant vermin, and endemic mold, to name a few. In October 2013, District Judge J. Phil Gilbert certified the plaintiff class for settlement purposes only. Settlement discussions, which had proceeded for several years, stalled in May 2016 and the case was set for trial in 2018. However, on September 7, 2017, the District Court granted the plaintiffs' voluntary motion to dismiss the action in its entirety given that significant improvements had been made to the living conditions at Vienna, resolving their unconstitutionality. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On November 8, 2007, the plaintiff brought a complaint against the Clatsop County Jail and Clatsop County, on behalf of himself and thousands of others pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The complaint challenged the jail's policy of strip-searching all individuals entering the county jail and then placing them in jail clothing. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff contended that all people, even those convicted of minor crimes and misdemeanors, were strip-searched upon their entry into the jail. Judge Garr M. King granted plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint on September 18, 2008. The amended complaint joined six new plaintiffs to the action who had all been stripped and cavity-searched. Discovery continued until January 26, 2009. During that time, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all but two of the plaintiffs. On February 27, 2009, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The defense argued that the searches were constitutional because the plaintiffs met established criteria for strip searches and the defendant officer was shielded by qualified immunity. On May 5, 2009, Judge King entered summary judgment for the defendants. We are not able to obtain a copy of the order entering summary judgment.", "summary": "An Oregon plaintiff brought a class action suit against an officer and the county, claiming the county was conducting illegal strip and cavity searches for misdemeanor offenses. After all but two plaintiffs left the case voluntarily, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon granted summary judgment for the defendants."} {"article": "On March 1, 2016, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The EEOC, on behalf of a gay employee, sued Scott Medical Health Center under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC asked the court for a permanent injunction and compensatory and punitive damages. In the complaint, the EEOC claimed that the Center engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII, including harassing conduct, sex discrimination, and employment termination based on sex. Specifically, the EEOC claimed that a gay male employee at the Center was subject to a continuing course of unwelcome and offensive harassment from a supervisor, including derogatory name-calling and offensive statements concerning the employee\u2019s sexual practices. The work environment was so hostile that the employee eventually resigned, which the EEOC claimed amounted to a constructive discharge based on sex. This is a somewhat novel claim, in that the EEOC claimed that discrimination based on the employee's sexual orientation was sex discrimination. The employee, by virtue of his sexual orientation, did not conform to sex stereotypes. Prior to filing suit, the EEOC attempted to resolve the discrimination through informal methods. The EEOC was unable to secure an acceptable conciliation agreement from the defendant. On May 9, 2016, Scott Medical moved to dismiss the case. On November 4, 2016, the District Court denied Scott Medical\u2019s motion to dismiss. The court rejected the defendant\u2019s claim that Title VII did not protect discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, holding that \u201cTitle VII\u2019s \u2018because of sex\u2019 provision prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.\u201d 217 F.Supp.3d 834. The parties made a brief attempt at Alternative Dispute Resolution, but they were excused from it on January 5, 2017. On May 3, 2017, the Court scheduled a jury trial for December 4 of that year. On September 13, 2017, all three of Scott Medical\u2019s lawyers sought to withdraw as counsel, and the Court gave them leave to do so. Scott Medical did not seek new counsel. (Scott Medical had recently filed for bankruptcy and likely could not afford to pay its lawyers.) The next day, the EEOC sought default judgment, as Scott Medical had no intention or ability to defend against the EEOC\u2019s action without legal representation. On September 25, 2017, the Court granted the motion for default judgment. On November 16, 2017, the Court granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff and found that by a preponderance of the evidence, the plaintiff was entitled to back pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief. 2017 WL 5493975. Scott Medical had to pay a total of $55,500.43 to the plaintiff. The Court also required Scott Medical to send the EEOC a written report on every sex harassment complaint, allegation, and charge made by any Scott Medical employee for the next five years. Until the injunction period is over, the Court retains jurisdiction in the event of a compliance dispute. The EEOC presumably continues to monitor Scott Medical\u2019s compliance.", "summary": "On March 1, 2016, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The Commission alleged sex discrimination under Title VII on behalf of a gay male previously employed at Scott Medical Health Center. In November 2017, the Court entered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding $55,500.43 in damages and requiring Scott Medical to send regular reports to the EEOC about every sex harassment allegation by employees for the next five years."} {"article": "On December 4, 2017, several pretrial detainees representing the class of affected detainees in Lake County Adult Correctional Facility filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs sued the County of Lake, its sheriff, the Chief of Corrections at the Lake County Sheriff\u2019s Office, and other correctional officers and supervisors at the Lake County Jail under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought compensatory damages, claiming violations of their rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs alleged that Lake County turned off the water for three days at Lake County Jail without notifying the detainees housed there. Plaintiffs were limited by Defendants to five water bottles per day for all personal needs. Requests for additional water bottles were denied or resulted in the detainees being placed on lockdown. Defendants also implemented a policy of prohibiting detainees from flushing the toilets in their cells unless feces were present, and detainees were not allowed to flush their toilets overnight. Defendants did provide a communal barrel of water to be used for bathing, cleaning cells, and flushing toilets. Attempts to flush toilets when feces were present were often unsuccessful, and feces and urine remained in the toilets. The detainees remained in the cells with urine and feces festering for prolonged period of times. This festering produced a putrid aroma that caused detainees to become sick, sleep deprived, and agitated. It also attracted insects. Detainees suffered from a variety of ailments, including dehydration, migraine headaches, sickness, dizziness, constipation, and general malaise. The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on February 22, 2018. They argued that the Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and that they were entitled to qualified immunity due to their employment and thus should be shielded from liability. On July 23, 2018, District Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman denied in part and granted in part Defendants\u2019 motion. She held that the Plaintiffs had sufficiently pled a \u00a7 1983 claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, but that the Eighth Amendment had been held to not apply to pretrial detainees. Thus she denied the Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, but dismissed the portion of the Plaintiffs\u2019 allegations that concerned the Eighth Amendment. She also held that the Defendants were not shielded from liability, and so denied the Defendants\u2019 motion for qualified immunity. 2018 WL 3533254. On August 3, 2018, Defendants petitioned to appeal Judge Coleman\u2019s decision denying Defendants\u2019 motion for qualified immunity to the 7th Circuit. On August 14, 2018, Defendants filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss Defendants Lake County and Lake County Sheriff\u2019s Office from the appeal. This motion was granted, and the appeal remained active for all other parties. On August 12, 2019, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals denied Defendants\u2019 motion for qualified immunity, affirming the district court\u2019s decision to reject the defense (Chief Judge Diane Wood and Circuit Judges Joel Flaum and Diane S. Sykes). 933 F.3d 816. A status hearing was held before Judge Coleman on September 30, 2019. At the status hearing, the plaintiff stated that he would file a motion for class certification. On November 8, the plaintiffs moved to certify a class. The next substantive docket entry did not appear until July 2020, as the case appears to have taken a hiatus due to Coronavirus from March, 2020 until July. On November 17, 2020, the Court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification. Subclasses were defined as all persons present in the Lake County Adult Correctional Facility between November 8, 2017, and November 10, 2017, being held as (A) pretrial detainees and as (B) post-conviction inmates. The Court also left open the possibility for individualized damage calculations at a later stage. 2020 WL 6747018. On January 4, 2021, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim for discovery and settlement. Defendants were ordered on January 6 to produce a complete list of class members and their last known contact information. By January 20, the defendants had identified 577 class members, and had passed this information on to counsel for the class. The case remains ongoing.", "summary": "In 2017, pretrial detainees at Lake County Adult Correctional Facility filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The Plaintiffs alleged that by shutting down the water in the facility for three days without notice, their rights under the 8th and 14th Amendments had been violated. In 2018, Defendants appealed to the 7th Circuit the decision denying them qualified immunity. The 7th Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to reject the defense. In November, 2020, the trial court certified a class. As of March 2021, the case is ongoing."} {"article": "On April 1, 2020, the Baltimore Board of Estimates approved a contract between the Baltimore Police Department (BPD) and Persistent Surveillance Systems, LLC (PSS) for an \u201cAerial Investigation Research\u201d (AIR) pilot program in Baltimore, Maryland. The pilot program was to take place for six months during which PSS would fly planes over the city for approximately twelve hours per day. While in flight, the planes would use advanced wide-angle camera systems to collect images of the city that would be reconstructed as slow-frame-rate video recordings of pedestrians and vehicles to be used by BPD. Eight days after the contract was approved, on April 9, 2020, the plaintiffs, Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle (a self-described \u201cgrassroots think tank\u201d that advocates for policy change to improve conditions for Baltimore\u2019s black community) and two individual activists, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland (in Baltimore). Represented by the ACLU of Maryland, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the BPD for two types of Constitutional violations. The first set of claims arose under the Fourth Amendment. The plaintiffs argued that AIR violated the Fourth Amendment\u2019s warrant requirement because its ability to capture images of pedestrians and vehicles amounted to indiscriminate searches that lacked \u201cindividualized suspicion or judicial approval.\u201d The use of these images by the BPD similarly violated the Constitution, according to the plaintiffs, because the police could analyze information from the planes without warrants. The second claim was based on the First Amendment\u2019s protection of freedom of association. The plaintiffs claimed that planes' ability to capture aerial images of 90 percent of the city every second during their 12 hour flights was \u201cconstant and inescapable\u201d monitoring that violated the Constitutional right to association. For example, the plaintiffs cited the effect that the surveillance would have on one of the named plaintiffs who regularly visited Baltimore neighborhoods affected by street violence to meet with community members shortly after events like murders occurred as part of her work as an activist. This plaintiff was apprehensive about how her work would be unjustifiably scrutinized by police because the AIR program would be likely to generate an individualized report of her movements based on the frequency that she visited these high-crime areas. Because the contract between BPD and PSS established an official municipal policy under color of state law, the plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. The plaintiffs asked the district court to: 1) declare the AIR program to be violative of the First and Fourth Amendments; 2) permanently enjoin the BPD from operating the AIR program or collect any images from it; 3) to order the BPD to expunge all records of plaintiffs gathered as a result of AIR surveillance; 4) award them attorneys\u2019 fees. District Judge Richard Bennett was assigned to the case. On the same day that they filed the complaint, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants from operating the AIR pilot program and using any of the data collected from it. District Judge Bennett held a telephone hearing on the afternoon of April 9, 2020. On the same day Judge Bennett entered an order prohibiting any AIR program flights to collect, retain, or access photographic imagery of Baltimore until a hearing on the preliminary injunction could take place on April 21, 2020. However, the District Judge did allow the BPD to continue undertaking preparatory activities for the launch of the AIR program. On April 21, 2020 the court conducted a telephone hearing and heard arguments on the motion for a preliminary injunction. On April 24, 2020 Judge Bennet issued an opinion denying the plaintiff\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction. He held that the AIR program did not constitute a \u201csearch\u201d under the Fourth Amendment or violate the First Amendment, that the balance of the equities weighed against the grant of a preliminary injunction, and that it was not within the public interest to grant a preliminary injunction. 456 F. Supp. 3d 699. Because the plaintiffs did not succeed on their motion for a preliminary injunction, Judge Bennett entered an order allowing the AIR pilot program to proceed. On the same day, the plaintiffs filed an appeal on the denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. While the parties were awaiting the Fourth Circuit\u2019s decision on the preliminary injunction, the BPD filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on August 12, 2020. Before the plaintiffs could file a response to this motion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction on November 5, 2020. Circuit Judge Harvie Wilkinson wrote a majority opinion for a three judge panel. In the opinion, Circuit Judge Wilkinson held that District Judge Bennett did not abuse his discretion in denying the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their claims that: 1) the AIR program violated the Fourth Amendment\u2019s protection of a reasonable expectation of privacy, 2) the AIR program violated the Fourth Amendment under a balancing test, or 3) the AIR program violated the plaintiffs\u2019 right to association under the First Amendment. Furthermore, Circuit Judge Wilkinson held that the equitable balance weighed against the issuance of a preliminary injunction, noting that the high-crime rate in Baltimore and newness of the pilot program supported the BPD\u2019s effort to implement a technological innovation to stem violence. Chief Judge Roger Gregory wrote a dissenting opinion in which he disagreed with the majority\u2019s characterization of the AIR program as a form of short-term surveillance and pointed to the program\u2019s capacity to track individuals over time to reveal their \u201cmost intimate associations and activities\u201d to support his conclusion that the AIR program violated the Fourth Amendment. 979 F.3d 219. However, the November 5 decision was not the end of the battle over the preliminary injunction. On December 22, 2020, the Court of Appeals granted the plaintiffs\u2019 petition for a rehearing en banc. A 15-judge panel heard arguments from both parties on March 8, 2021. Following an eight-seven vote, the Fourth Circuit overruled its prior decision and reversed the district court\u2019s denial of the preliminary injunction on June 24, 2021. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the majority opinion supported by two separate concurrences. The first concurrence by Chief Judge Gregory himself was joined by Circuit Judges Wynn, Thacker, and Harris. The second concurrence was written by Circuit Judge Wynn and joined by Circuit Judges Motz, Thacker, and Harris. The minority filed three separate dissents. The first dissent was written by Circuit Judge Wilkinson and joined by Circuit Judges Niemeyer, Agee, and Quattlebaum, and joined in part by Circuit Judges Diaz, Richardson, and Rushing. Circuit Judges Niemeyer and Diaz filed their own independent dissenting opinions which no other Judges joined. 2021 WL 2584408. One of the issues on appeal was whether the case was moot due to the fact that the Board of Estimates voted to terminate the AIR program on February 3, 2021. According to the majority opinion, while AIR program planes stopped flying over Baltimore on October 31, 2020, BPD submitted requests to RSS for analysis of data collected during the pilot program up until December 8, 2020. On February 2, 2021, BPD and PSS announced that they had deleted most of the data (all but 14.2 percent of images collected) that had been collected over the course of the AIR program. Because the remaining data that the BPD had access to documented thousands of hours of public movement and were being used in around 150 open criminal investigations, the Fourth Circuit held that the preliminary injunction sought by the plaintiffs was not moot as the requested relief, a prohibition on the usage of RSS data by police, could still be granted. 2021 WL 2584408. On the merits of the plaintiffs\u2019 claim for preliminary injunctive relief, Chief Judge Gregory\u2019s analysis was similar to that in his dissenting opinion from November 5, 2020. Here, the Fourth Circuit found that District Judge Bennett erred in holding that the AIR program was capable only of short term tracking, pointing to the fact that the information collected by RSS from its planes was even more precise than GPS and cellphone tracking data. Further, Chief Judge Gregory wrote that the AIR program went beyond an \u201caugmentation\u201d of ordinary police capabilities. Instead, he described the data collected by the program as \u201crecord[ing] the movements of a city\u201d in a way that can be readily analyzed to identify the locations of individuals over an extended period of time. The majority held that police access of AIR program data constituted a search and as a result, warrantless collection and analysis of the data violated the Fourth Amendment. The case was remanded to the district court for proceedings consistent with the en banc opinion. 2021 WL 2584408. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In April 2020, two Baltimore activists and a local grassroots think tank filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs alleged that the Baltimore City Police Department\u2019s contract with a private surveillance company to fly panes that captured images of the city for use in police investigations violated the First and Fourth Amendments of the Constitution. The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction a few weeks after the lawsuit was filed. The plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit and were initially unsuccessful as the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion in November 2020. However, after an en banc rehearing of the case in March 2021, the Fourth Circuit overturned its prior decision in an eight to seven vote and reversed the denial of the motion for a preliminary injunction on June 24, 2021. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "TSA and DEA seized and confiscated $82,373 in cash from the plaintiff\u2019s carry-on as she boarded a domestic flight in Pennsylvania in August 2019. Visiting her father for the weekend, she had learned that he had stored his life savings, in cash, in numerous envelopes hidden in his home. She offered to deposit the money in a new account she planned to create for him, but the cash was seized before she could deposit it. On January 21, 2020, she and her father filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the agencies had confiscated her father's property without suspecting or accusing her of a crime. The plaintiffs, represented by the Institute for Justice, claimed that TSA had acted beyond its statutory authority (49 U.S.C. \u00a7114 and \u00a7\u00a744901-2), and that both TSA and DEA had violated her Fourth Amendment rights, by confiscating her property without probable cause. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan. The plaintiffs sought certification of two classes: a \u201cTSA Class\u201d of air travelers from January 15, 2014 onward whose property or person was seized by TSA because of a \"large amount\" of currency in their possession; and a \u201cDEA Class\u201d of air travelers from January 15, 2014 onward whose property was seized by DEA because they were traveling with at least $5,000 in currency. For both classes, the plaintiffs sought class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief against the agencies. Individually, they sought the return of the $82,373, along with compensatory damages and costs and fees. In February 2020 DEA offered, without explanation, to return the money. On May 29, 2020, both agencies moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. As of June 9, 2020, those motions are pending.", "summary": "The plaintiffs filed this putative class action litigation against TSA and DEA, claiming that the agencies acted illegally and violated class members' Fourth Amendment rights by seizing and confiscating currency without reasonably suspecting them of a crime."} {"article": "On September 26, 2007, ten individuals who had been arrested by the Danbury, Connecticut police for alleged civil immigration violations, represented by attorneys and law student interns with the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization of the Yale Law School, filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut alleging discriminatory and unauthorized enforcement of federal immigration laws against Latino residents of Danbury, in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Connecticut Constitution and state common law. They sued the Mayor and Chief of Police of Danbury, local officers, and ICE officials. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that the Mayor and the Danbury Police Department engaged in an unlawful campaign against immigrant and Latino communities, which included targeting Latinos for pretextual traffic stops for the purpose of investigating their immigration status. Plaintiffs alleged that officers would search detained drivers' names in the FBI's National Crime Information Center database, arrest them for civil immigration violations, and then turn the arrestees over to ICE for deportation. Plaintiffs further alleged that, as part of the Mayor's plan to rid the city of immigrants, the Danbury Police Department conducted a September 19, 2006 immigration raid with ICE officials, during which eleven Latino day-laborers (the \"Danbury 11\") who had gathered at a Danbury park were arrested, detained, and turned over to ICE. Nine of the eleven arrested laborers were plaintiffs in the instant lawsuit. Plaintiffs alleged that the eleven men were racially profiled and arrested without probable cause. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages for the alleged violations. An Amended Complaint was filed on November 26, 2007. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez for entry of a scheduling order and to supervise discovery. On February 1, 2008, Defendants filed a motion to disqualify Plaintiffs' counsel because the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization had advised another organization with which the Mayor had been affiliated. On July 3, 2008, Judge Martinez denied Defendant's Motion to Disqualify. Following that, both parties filed numerous motions regarding various issues in discovery that Magistrate Judge Martinez resolved. A Second Amended Complaint was filed on October 1, 2009. On February 22, 2011, the case was dismissed without prejudice as both parties reported that this action had been settled in full. The terms of the settlement are not available at the time of this writing.", "summary": "Individuals who had been arrested by Danbury, Connecticut police for civil immigration violations sued the city and ICE under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 alleging violations of the U.S. Constitution and state law. The parties reached a settlement agreement, and the court dismissed the case. The settlement's terms are unknown."} {"article": "On May 7, 2008, a black New York City resident filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiff, represented by attorneys from the New York Civil Liberties Union, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages and attorneys' fees, alleging that the City of New York's \"stop and frisk\" policy violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as various rights under the New York State Constitution and laws. This case is related to Floyd v. City of New York, 08-cv-1034 (PN-NY-0009 in this Clearinghouse). The facts giving rise to the lawsuit occurred on November 28, 2007 when plaintiff was stopped, frisked, and taken to and detained at the 49th Precinct. Plaintiff was issued two summonses for disobeying a lawful order and making unreasonable noise, both of which were ultimately dismissed. On September 24, 2008, the parties settled all of plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff received $15,001 and attorneys' fees of $9,000.00, and the City of New York agreed to treat the record of his detention as sealed.", "summary": "On May 7, 2008 a black New York City resident filed this lawsuit against the City of New York alleging that his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was detained and searched pursuant to New York City's \"stop and frisk\" policies. This case is related to Floyd v. City of New York, 08-cv-1034 (PN-NY-0009 in this Clearinghouse). On September 24, 2008 the parties settled all claims; the plaintiff received $15,001 in damages, $9,000.00 in attorneys' fees, and an agreement that the record of his detention would be sealed."} {"article": "A woman incarcerated at Pennsylvania\u2019s Berks County Jail filed this lawsuit against the County and several county officials and jail officials. Her complaint, filed November 30, 2018 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleged that the jail violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating against her on the basis of her sex: her \u201cTrusty\u201d security classification did not qualify her for lower-security housing in the off-site Community Reentry Center, but male inmates with the same security classification did qualify for such off-site housing, with increased freedom of movement, work-release privileges, and expanded educational opportunities. She sued on behalf of herself and others similarly situated. For the entire class, she sought declaratory judgment (under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a72201-2202), as well as injunctive relief requiring the County to give female \u201cTrusty\u201d inmates housing, privileges, and programming comparable to those granted to their male counterparts. Individually, she alleged that jail officials had retaliated against her for filing grievances, and sought monetary damages. She was represented by the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project. The case was assigned to Judge Mark A. Kearney. In December 2018, the plaintiff twice sought a preliminary injunction and was twice denied. On January 15, 2019, the court granted her third request for a preliminary injunction, 355 F. Supp. 3d 239 (E.D. Pa. 2019). Two days later, the Third Circuit stayed the injunction in part. The First Amended Complaint, on January 17, joined as plaintiffs two other women incarcerated at the Berks County Jail, similarly unable to qualify for housing and privileges commensurate with their \u201cTrusty\u201d security classification. Together, the three plaintiffs moved for class certification, which the court denied. In February 2019, the court dissolved the preliminary injunction of January 17; the lead plaintiff and one of her co-plaintiffs had been released from custody, and the third plaintiff had not properly exhausted administrative remedies. 2019 WL 653788. On April 5, 2019, the court partially granted the County\u2019s motion to dismiss. 2019 WL 1507769. Discovery could proceed on: injunctive relief to prohibit the disparate treatment; the lead plaintiff\u2019s damage claims against the non-immune individual defendants; some of the lead plaintiff\u2019s First Amendment retaliation claims; and the sex discrimination claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court dismissed all other claims. Two weeks later, the lead plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint, replacing the original co-plaintiffs with two other women similarly incarcerated at the Jail. They moved for a preliminary injunction on April 24, and the injunction was granted on May 20. In the meantime, one of the new co-plaintiffs had, without explanation, dismissed all of her claims with prejudice. On June 3, the two remaining plaintiffs moved for class certification. The same day, the court denied the County's motion to stay all proceedings. 2019 WL 2368579. The court granted class certification on July 8, 2019: \u201cAll current and future female inmates committed to the Berks County Jail System who have the Trusty custody-level classification but denied assignment to the Community Reentry Center (\u201cCRC\u201d) and denied access to the privileges and services available to men assigned to the CRC.\u201d 2019 WL 2950171. The same day, the court granted partial summary judgment to the County. While the Fourteenth Amendment claim was allowed to proceed, all other claims were dismissed. Several individual defendants were also dismissed. On July 11, 2019, the court held Berks County in civil contempt for failure to comply with the May 20 preliminary injunction. 2019 WL 3068991. The lead plaintiff was granted compensatory sanctions and attorneys fees. However, this contempt finding was later reversed by the Third Circuit, which found that the May 20 preliminary injunction had not included an explicit needs-narrowness-intrusiveness finding as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The injunction was thus invalid and could not be a basis for a contempt finding. Throughout the litigation, the County brought a total of 5 interlocutory appeals (Third Circuit docket numbers 19-01329, 19-02193, 19-02648, 19-02695, and 19-03060). Only the appeals regarding the May 20 preliminary injunction and the July 11 contempt order were successful. On October 17, 2019, the court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs. 2019 WL 5266147. The court found that \"Berks County violated [the plaintiffs'] rights when it discriminated against them in disparate treatment as to freedom of mobility, access to privileges, and visitation on the basis of their sex in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.\" However, there remained questions of material fact as to whether the County provided equal access to furloughs for female \"Trusty\" inmates. This question, along with the question of a permanent injunction and the lead plaintiff\u2019s individual damages, would be decided at trial. The week before the trial, the County announced that the Community Reentry Center had been closed and that all male inmates had been returned to the jail proper. The 3-phase trial was held from Tuesday, November 12 through Friday, November 15, 2019. In the first phase, the jury found that Berks County had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by providing the plaintiffs less access to furloughs than their male counterparts. In the second phase, the jury found that the County\u2019s violation of the Equal Protection Clause had caused the plaintiff emotional pain, and awarded the lead plaintiff $2,800 in damages. The third and final phase was tried without jury; the court ordered a permanent injunction against the County. 2020 WL 236911. {DID IT INCLUDE PLRA FINDINGS?} The court entered judgment on April 7, 2020, and ordered the County to pay approximately $510,000 in costs and attorneys\u2019 fees. 2020 WL 1694600. As of June 15, 2020, no appeal had been filed.", "summary": "A woman incarcerated in the Berks County Jail (Pennsylvania) was discriminated against because of her sex. Alleging that the County had violated her Fourteenth Amendment and First Amendment rights, and her rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution, she sued the County for class-wide injunctive relief and for individual damages. The litigation concluded with a 4-day trial. The jury found that the County had violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and awarded the plaintiff $2,800 in damages. The court ordered a permanent class-wide injunction, and awarded the plaintiff nearly $510,000 in costs and attorneys' fees."} {"article": "On February 26, 2009, inmates at Donaldson Correctional Facility filed this class action lawsuit against Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) and relevant officials under 42. U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Represented by Southern Center for Human Rights (SCHR) and private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that overcrowded facility resulted into serious physical violence and denial of plaintiff\u2019s basic human needs. This, they alleged, violated the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, monetary relief, as well as class action certification. The plaintiffs defined the class as \u201call persons who are now or will in the future be incarcerated at Donaldson Correctional Facility.\u201d This case was assigned to district Judge William Keith Watkins. After a year of engaging in discovery, the parties each moved for summary judgment in February 2010. Judge Watkins denied the motion for class certification without prejudice on September 16, 2010. After a settlement conference on February 23, 2010, parties continued to engage in settlement negotiations and finally settled this case on April 19, 2011. The remedy included a payment of attorneys\u2019 fees and costs of $66,860.10 to the plaintiffs\u2019 counsel. The settlement agreement specifically required the ADOC officers to be physically present 24 hours per day in many of the prisons dorms and revise its use of force policy significantly. The ADOC agreed to end the practice of triple-bunking prisoners in cells built for two men and to solicit technical assistance from the National Institute of Corrections for help in reducing the presence of weapons and other contraband at Donaldson. The agreement required the ADOC to forward to SCHR documentation regarding violent incidents at Donaldson. The court granted the parties\u2019 joint motion to stay the case on April 20, 2011. The action was stayed for over a year to allow defendants to improve conditions at the prison. The plaintiffs did not file any motion to lift the stay. Judge Watkins dismissed this lawsuit without prejudice on March 30, 2012.", "summary": "On 2009, inmates at Donaldson Correctional Facility filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' overcrowded facility resulted into serious physical violence and denial of plaintiff\u2019s basic human needs. They sought declaratory, injunctive, monetary relief, as well as class action certification. The parties reached a settlement agreement on 2011."} {"article": "On October 15, 2013, seven Michigan prisoners under the age of 18 but confined in adult correctional institutions filed this putative class action in the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs brought claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1591 against the Michigan Department of Corrections, the Governor of Michigan, and a number of named correctional officers and administrators. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that they were sexually assaulted or harassed by adult prisoners and guards while confined in adult correctional institutions run by the Michigan Department of Corrections. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the policy and practice of placing juveniles in adult prisons without taking adequate steps to protect them from known harm constituted deliberate indifference to their safety in violation of rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and various international treaties. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as monetary damages. In addition to this lawsuit, the plaintiffs also filed a complaint in state court for damages based on the same alleged facts. A summary of that lawsuit is available here. On December 20, 2013, the defendants moved to dismiss the case. Two months later, they also moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they were no longer minors, and that the claims were moot because minor prisoners were no longer housed with adults. The following month, the United States submitted a statement of interest clarifying its position on the Prison Rape Elimination Act. It stated that the defendants were incorrect in their assertions (1) that the PREA did not apply to states, and (2) that the \u201calleged risk\u201d of harm to youthful offenders became moot when the MDOC changed its practices and began separating youthful offenders from adults. The U.S. instead stated that the PREA did apply to state institutions and compliance alone did not render a claim moot. On May 28, 2014, District Court Judge Robert H. Cleland granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss. He held that the plaintiffs did have standing, despite no longer being underage, as standing is determined at the time the complaint is filed. As for mootness, the court held that the defendants' voluntary cessation of the practice of housing minors with adults was not enough to render the case moot. The practice was still permissible under state law and the defendants themselves had characterized their compliance with this provision of PREA as voluntary. However, the court did grant the defendants summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and customary international law. The court dismissed these claims because none of the treaties created an independently enforceable right and because there was no peremptory norm of international law against housing youth and adults together in correctional institutions. 2014 WL 2207136 (E.D. Mich. May 28, 2014). The defendants filed an additional motion to dismiss, alleging that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims should be dismissed because the issues were better suited for Eighth Amendment analysis, and that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The court denied this motion on August 5, 2014. For the next few years, much of this litigation focused on whether the plaintiffs had exhausted their administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. First, in May 2014, the defendants moved for summary judgment as to Plaintiff John Doe 3. They filed an additional motion in May 2015, which the court granted in part and denied in part on February 8, 2016. The court granted summary judgment for the claims by all of the named plaintiffs except for John Doe 3, whose claim could go forward because there was a triable issue of fact related to whether defendants had thwarted his previous efforts to grieve. 2016 WL 465496 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2016). The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 15, 2016, adding five new John Doe plaintiffs. Several of the plaintiffs dismissed under the February 2016 order subsequently exhausted the administrative remedies and filed a separate case in the same court (docket number 16-13765). Judge Robert Cleland consolidated the cases on May 8, 2017. Meanwhile, the defendants filed another motion for summary judgment based on exhaustion. On March 14, 2017, the court granted in part and denied in part the motion. It dismissed two plaintiffs and allowed one to remain. The defendants then moved for summary judgment twice more, which the court denied on February 21, 2018 and then later granted in part on November 5. In response to the defendants\u2019 attempts to dismiss plaintiffs from the case, the plaintiffs moved to apply a single John Doe exhaustion to the entire putative class. The court denied this motion on February 21, 2018, holding that it was not the appropriate time to determine the imputed exhaustion question because the plaintiffs had not yet shown actual exhaustion by any class representative. On November 5, 2018, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss some of the claims, finding that some of the John Doe plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The court explained that these plaintiffs could not demonstrate exhaustion by compliance with the defendants' PREA grievance process because these plaintiffs' claims arose before MDOC adopted that process. The court also dismissed the Michigan Department of Corrections from the case on sovereign immunity grounds. 2018 WL 5786199 (E.D. Mich. 2018). Judge Cleland terminated the case without prejudice on March 20, 2020. Judge Cleland noted that the state court case settled, so he therefore terminated this case. More information can be found with regards to the state court adjudication and eventual settlement here: PC-MI-0039.", "summary": "In 2013, seven individuals under the age of 18 confined in adult correction institutions, filed suit against the Michigan Department of Corrections, Governor of Michigan, and a number of named correctional officers and administrators alleging sexual assault by adult prisoners and guards while confined in adult correctional institutions run by defendants. After multiple summary judgment motions chipped away at the plaintiffs' case and a successful dismissal of the Michigan Department of Corrections as a defendant, few claims survive and the case is ongoing."} {"article": "On September 28, 2009, the EEOC filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona against Creative Networks LLC under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12112(a). The EEOC alleged that Creative Networks LLC violated the ADA by failing to provide reasonable accommodations to deaf and hard of hearing job applicants through its policy of capping the money spent on accommodations for job training at $200. The EEOC argued that such caps were both a violation of the ADA and had the effect of discriminating against deaf and hard-of-hearing applicants. On January 14, 2011, the EEOC filed a motion for partial summary judgement. The court denied that motion without prejudice on April 8, 2011 finding that the parties should conduct further discovery. In December 2011, both parties moved for summary judgement. On September 20, 2012, the court granted the EEOC's motion to partial summary judgment and denied the defendant's motion. The court found that Creative Networks did not provide sufficient evidence to create a issue of disputed fact as to whether the Defendant denied the charging party a reasonable accommodation in violation of the ADA. On September 19, 2013, the District Court (Judge David A. Ezra) approved a Consent Decree, which included [1] an injunction that orders the Defendant to not discriminate against persons with disabilities, not to retaliate against those who complained of discrimination, [2] monetary relief for the woman discriminated against in the amount of $57,500, [3] Defendants will change their policies including removing any cap on spending for accommodations, [4] Defendants will train their employees in disability awareness and accommodations, and [5] Defendants will report on progress to the Regional District Attorney for the EEOC for Arizona during the term of the Decree. The Decree lasted for two years. It has since run its course without any further litigation. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On September 28, 2009, the EEOC filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona against Creative Networks LLC, alleging it violated the ADA by failing to provide reasonable accommodations to deaf job applicants through its policy of capping the money spent on accommodations for job training at $200. The court approved a monetary settlement of $57,500 and a two-year Consent Decree where the defendant was required to adopt non-discriminatory policies."} {"article": "On April 19, 2000, a woman formerly employed by Rent-A-Center filed this action in the U.S. District Court of Western Illinois against her employer alleging sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, and retaliation. Her claims were brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Missouri state law. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that she was sexually and physically harassed by her manager. The manager called the plaintiff several sexually explicit names, made explicit comments, and told her that women did not belong in the workplace. In one incident, the manager intentionally caused the plaintiff to cut her face while she moved furniture. Neither the local manager nor Rent-A-Center\u2019s regional manager responded to the plaintiff\u2019s repeated complaints about her treatment. In addition to the harassment, the plaintiff also alleged that she was paid less than similarly situated male employees, offered fewer promotional opportunities, assigned different job duties, and assessed by different standards of conduct because of her sex. Finally, the plaintiff alleged she was fired because of her sex, and in retaliation for her repeated complaints about the work environment. The plaintiff sought back pay, front pay, compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiff filed an amended class action complaint on December 18, 2000, brought on behalf of herself and other women who were subjected to similar harassment while employed by Rent-A-Center. The amended complaint sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and monetary damages under the same claims as the initial compliant. It alleged that Rent-A-Center engaged in a pattern of sex-based discrimination by creating a hostile work environment, paying women less, and systemically denying female employees the same opportunities for advancement as male employees. In particular, the plaintiffs claimed that Rent-A-Center had imposed an arbitrary seventy-five pound lifting requirement for all new hires for the purpose of hiring fewer women. In addition to narrowing the pool of potential hires, the plaintiffs claimed that the lifting policy created a trickle-down effect that reduced the representation of women at all levels of the company. The plaintiffs also alleged that Rent-A-Center systemically retaliated against women who complained about the discrimination and that, by disbanding its Human Resources department, Rent-A-Center made it more difficult for women employed by the company to obtain relief from the hostile workplace environment. Following the filing of the amended complaint, Rent-A-Center filed a motion to dismiss or to compel arbitration on January 2, 2001, claiming that the plaintiffs had signed an arbitration agreement as a condition of their employment. Rent-A-Center also filed a motion for transfer of venue. On May 1, Judge Ortrie D. Smith ordered the parties to file additional briefing on whether the arbitration agreement was effective only during employment or extended after the plaintiff had left her job with Rent-A-Center. Judge Smith granted the motion to compel arbitration on July 18, and stayed the proceedings until arbitration was complete. Judge Smith found that, while the arbitration agreement could be narrowly read to only cover grievances during employment, such a reading was not consistent with the intentions of either party when signing the contract. On September 14, Judge Smith denied the motion for transfer of venue. On August 13, the plaintiffs moved for a reconsideration of Judge Smith\u2019s order to compel arbitration. The plaintiffs asserted that the arbitration agreement was invalid under Missouri state law. On November 9, Judge Smith granted the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider and stayed the case during arbitration, which was not opposed by Rent-A-Center. The plaintiffs and Rent-A-Center filed a motion for preliminary approval of a settlement agreement on October 31. Part of the proposed settlement was an injunction barring any other class certification in similar lawsuits against Rent-A-Center. The settlement was opposed, however, by a group of women formerly employed by Rent-A-Center who were pursuing a similar class action case against Rent-A-Center in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois at the same that this case was being litigated in Missouri. This group, the objectors, filed a motion to oppose the settlement in the Bunch case on November 5. The objectors alleged that their case was almost identical to this case, but that they, and not the plaintiffs in this case, were the \u201clegitimate representatives\u201d of the class of women who were discriminated against by Rent-A-Center. Further, the objectors alleged that the proposed settlement was designed by Rent-A-Center to end the class action on more favorable terms than Rent-A-Center would be able to obtain from the objectors. In particular, the objectors pointed to the fact that the settlement in this case was filed the day after the objectors filed their motion for class certification. On November 9, the objectors filed a motion to intervene to oppose both class certification and the settlement agreement in this case. Judge Smith granted the objectors\u2019 motion to intervene to challenge the preliminary injunction against other class action certifications on November 29. On the same day, Judge Smith approved the preliminary settlement between the plaintiffs in this case and Rent-A-Center, while denying the objectors\u2019 motion to oppose the settlement. Judge Smith held that the objectors\u2019 opposition to the settlement was premature and would be more appropriate later in the proceedings. In a third order on November 29, Judge Smith also granted the motion for class certification in this case. The class was defined as \u201c[a]ll females who worked at, applied for work, and/or who attempted to apply but were affirmatively discouraged by the Defendant from applying for work at any Rent-A-Center, Rent-A-Center, Inc., or Renters Choice, Inc. store in the United States or any of its territories, at any time between April 19, 1998 and October 1, 2001 . . . except that the Class does not include any female employed as a Market Manager and/or Regional Director nor any female who previously entered into a written settlement agreement with Rent-A-Center, Rent-A-Center, Inc., or Renters Choice, Inc. which releases claims of gender discrimination.\u201d On December 3, the objectors appealed Judge Smith\u2019s decision to deny their motion to intervene on the settlement approval process. The appeal was denied on December 11. On January 18, 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a motion to intervene in the settlement proceedings, on the grounds that Title VII is administered by the Commission and the federal agencies have a right to intervene in cases that rely on a statute administered by that agency. The Commission moved to intervene to \u201cprotect absent class members and to subject this settlement to heightened scrutiny,\u201d among other reasons. The motion to intervene was opposed by both the Bunch plaintiffs and Rent-A-Center. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission\u2019s motion to intervene was granted by Judge Smith on February 28. The objectors again moved to intervene to object to the proposed settlement on January 25. Prior to this filing, the objectors had been appointed as class representatives in their class action in Illinois against Rent-A-Center. They argued that the Bunch plaintiffs did not adequately represent the interests of the objectors' class in this proceeding. Intervention was opposed by both the Bunch plaintiffs and Rent-A-Center, on the grounds that the objectors had already opted out of the class settlement that had been proposed in this case. On February 28, Judge Smith denied the objectors' motion to intervene. Judge Smith ruled that the objectors had no substantial interest in this litigation, because they had preserved their right to litigate separately by opting out of the settlement in this case. Judge Smith further held that the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, whose intervention was approved on the same day, would adequately represent the objectors\u2019 interests in ensuring a fair settlement in this case. On March 26, the plaintiffs moved for final approval of a settlement agreement. The settlement included monetary damages for all class members, an alternative dispute resolution fund where class members who were dissatisfied with the offered sums could seek different monetary compensation, and a consent decree compelling Rent-A-Center to take measures to improve gender equity within the company. The settlement was endorsed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on April 9, by the Impact Fund and the National Organization of Women Foundation on April 11, and by Rent-A-Center on April 16. Before the settlement was approved, however, the objectors announced a separate settlement with Rent-A-Center in their own lawsuit. The objectors\u2019 settlement preempted the settlement in this case because of the near total overlap in class members, but that settlement did not include an alternative dispute resolution process. On July 15, Judge Smith held that the alternative dispute resolution process in this case would supplement the objectors\u2019 settlement, and that class members who were dissatisfied with the compensation offered by the objectors\u2019 settlement could utilize the alternative dispute resolution process in this settlement. 2002 WL 35645390 (W.D. Mo. July 15, 2002). Judge Smith issued an order approving an amendment to the alternative dispute resolution plan on December 13, 2002. Judge Smith also approved the arbiter\u2019s ruling on distribution of funds On December 5, 2003 (2003 WL 27382901) and issued a correction to that ruling on December 12 (2003 WL 27382900). The case was dismissed on February 25, 2004, after the adjudication of all claims by class members who opted to participate in the alternative dispute resolution process. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2000, a former employee of Rent-A-Center brought this class action in the Western District of Missouri alleging pervasive sexual harassment against female employees. The plaintiffs brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and state law. In 2002, the parties reached a settlement creating a process for adjudicating claims arising from the harassment. After extensive litigation regarding the fairness of the settlement, the settlement was finally approved and the case is now closed."} {"article": "The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on August 31, 2006 against Albion River Inn, Inc., on behalf of an Arab restaurant manager who was fired for refusing to apologize to a customer he asked to leave the restaurant. Because the customer allegedly used racial epithets, slurs, and violent language toward the manager and a Tunisian employee, the EEOC sued for race- or national-origin-based retaliation and discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. sections 2000(e) et seq. The EEOC sought monetary and injunctive relief for the employee, including back pay, benefits, compensation for emotional harm, punitive damages, and revision of antidiscrimination policies. The EEOC also sought its costs. On February 9, 2007, the employee intervened in the case with the approval of the Court seeking monetary relief. His complaint included the Title VII charges but added claims under state law for discrimination and retaliation in violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful termination. During discovery the parties had a dispute about whether mediator privilege (the right to keep discussions with a mediator confidential) extended to a friend of the owners of Albion River Inn, who was a certified financial planner and whose help the owners requested in resolving financial and management disputes. The Court (Judge Susan Illston) held that no privilege applied, because the "mediator" was not part of the court's official program and was mediating, if at all, between the defendants rather than between adverse parties to a lawsuit. 2007 WL 2667430 (N.D. Cal. 2007). The Court denied Defendant's later request to reconsider the issue. 2007 WL 2560718 (N.D. Cal. 2007). The parties participated in official mediation on May 8, 2007, but did not reach a settlement. The parties eventually did decide to settle, reaching agreement on February 4, 2008, the first day of trial, before the trial began. (The Court later ordered the parties to pay the costs of empaneling a jury for the first day of trial.) The Court entered their settlement agreement as a consent decree on February 27, 2008. The decree contained both monetary and injunctive relief. The employee was to be paid $165,000, inclusive of $75,000 for attorneys' fees and $15,000 for costs. Under the injunctive terms of the decree Albion River Inn was required to revise its anti-discrimination policies and complaint procedure, to post notice of settlement and the complaint procedure, to give employees anti-discrimination training, to report completion of training to the EEOC, and to communicate discipline policies as well as the duty to actively monitor the workplace for discrimination to managers and supervisors. The decree was to remain in effect for three years. No further Court involvement appears on the docket, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a race-or-national-origin retaliation and discrimination lawsuit against Albion River Inn, Inc., on behalf of an Arab restaurant manager who was fired for refusing to apologize to a customer he asked to leave the restaurant. The customer allegedly used racial epithets, slurs, and violent language toward the manager and a Tunisian employee under him. The EEOC sought monetary and injunctive relief for the employee and also sought its costs.The employee intervened in the case adding state-law claims and seeking monetary relief. The parties eventually did decide to settle, agreed to settle on February 4, 2008, the first day of trial. The Court later ordered the parties to pay the costs of empaneling a jury for the first day of trial. The Court (Judge Susan Illston) entered their 3-year settlement agreement as a consent decree. The decree contained both monetary and injunctive relief. The employee was to be paid $165,000, inclusive of $75,000 for attorneys' fees and $15,000 for costs. No further Court involvement appears on the docket, and the case is now closed."} {"article": "On September 8, 2015, the Disability Law Center, a non-profit organization that advocates on behalf of individuals with disabilities, and three individuals who were charged with criminal offenses but declared incompetent to stand trial, filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah. The plaintiffs sued Utah, the Utah Department of Human Services, the Utah Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health, and the Utah State Hospital, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. Represented by Disability Law Center attorneys and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the state violated their rights under Article I Section 7 of the United States Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, and parallel provisions in the Utah Constitution. Specifically, they alleged that criminal defendants who were declared incompetent in Utah were forced to wait for an average of 6 months in county jails, without appropriate treatment, before they could receive competency restoration treatment (each named plaintiff had waited in a county jail for 5 to 6 months). This was because the Utah State Hospital, the only facility in Utah authorized to provide competency services, was past its capacity. Criminal defendants in jail while awaiting treatment were often placed in protective custody or solitary confinement. The state moved to dismiss the complaint on October 30, 2015. On April 7, 2016, District Judge Robert J. Shelby denied the state\u2019s motion to dismiss, holding that a pretrial detention amounted to punishment and thus violated the plaintiffs\u2019 substantive due process rights when their detention was not reasonably related to a government interest. 180 F. Supp. 3d 998. On September 17, 2015, the plaintiffs sought to certify a class. A year later, on September 27, 2016, the court granted certification, defining the class as: \u201cAll individuals who are now, or will be in the future,
1. make all records, reports, transcripts, minutes, appendixes, working papers, drafts, studies, agenda, or other documents which were made available to or prepared for or by the Pence-Kobach Commission open for public inspection; 2. hold all meetings of the Commission, including meetings conducted by telephone or other electronic medium, open to the public; 3. cease all activities that have no reasoned basis and/or are not provided for in the Executive Order establishing the parameters under which the Pence-Kobach Commission can operate, including ceasing all activity aimed at investigating particular voters; 4. make provisions to \u201crequire the membership of the advisory committee to be fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be performed by the advisory committee,\u201d and \u201cto assure that the advice and recommendations of the advisory committee will not be inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or any special interest\u201d; and 5. cease all action by the Commission until it is properly constituted.The same day, President Trump issued an executive order terminating the Commission. The defendants moved to dismiss the case in September 2018, arguing that the case was moot due to the Commission\u2019s dissolution, that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim, or that mandamus was either unavailable or should not be exercised. A week later the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to stay proceedings in light of similar case, Dunlap v. Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity, (17-2361). The plaintiffs moved to stay the case because the result of Dunlap might otherwise cause them to voluntarily dismiss the case. On July 20, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed notice of voluntary dismissal. According to their motion, the court had resolved Dunlap; the documents that the plaintiffs sought were released. Accordingly, on July 22, the court dismissed the case with prejudice and denied defendants' motion to dismiss as moot. The case is closed.", "summary": "In 2017 the ACLU filed this suit for injunctive, mandamus, and declaratory relief against President Trump, Vice-President Pence, and the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging violations of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The court denied the Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, claiming that jurisdiction for mandamus relief did not exist. President Trump ultimately dissolved the Commission, and the case is stayed pending the outcome of a related case, Dunlap v. Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity."} {"article": "Nearly three years after applying for naturalization, plaintiff had still not received an appointment to be interviewed for citizenship, the next step in his naturalization process. On February 1, 2007, represented by private counsel, plaintiff petitioned the U.S. District Court for the district of Pennsylvania to compel U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) to schedule him for an interview and to render a decision on his citizenship application within thirty days. The case was assigned to District Court Judge Michael M. Baylson. Administratively, plaintiff was in a complicated position: under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1101, et. seq, naturalization applicants have a right to petition the district courts if their application is denied or if they do not receive a response within 120 days of their interview. Here, as the plaintiff had never actually received an interview, he met neither requirement, leaving him in an application limbo. Therefore, plaintiff asked the courts to consider the extended delay a constructive denial of his application and to invoke its right to review under the INA. Alternatively, plaintiff suggested that the court might invoke either the Administrative Procedure Act or its mandamus powers to compel USCIS to perform its duty of conducting citizenship appointments. In January 2018, the court became aware that it had six nearly identical cases, including this one, and held a hearing on all cases simultaneously. In a following memorandum and order, the court suggested that the government, \"overwhelmed by these applications, ha(d) adopted a strategy of favoring delay by litigation, instead of developing an orderly and transparent administrative resolution.\" The court recommended that all six plaintiffs cross-file for summary judgment and enjoined the USCIS from preemptively resolving any of their immigration cases, thus mooting the cases, before a final judgment could be filed. One month later, the court granted the plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment, finding that the FBI name check procedure which had delayed their applications was not authorized by statute and was thus reviewable as an administrative procedure. USCIS filed an emergency motion to stay the order and was denied. Plaintiff was naturalized on March 12, 2008, at which point the parties agreed to dismiss the case as moot. The court entered the stipulated order of dismissal on March 20, 2008. The case is closed.", "summary": "After waiting nearly three years for his naturalization application to be fully processed, plaintiff petitioned the court to compel U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services to grant him a citizenship interview and render a decision on his application. The court concluded that, \"overwhelmed by these applications, (the government had) adopted a strategy of favoring delay by litigation\" and granted summary judgment to the plaintiff."} {"article": "On May 18, 2014, inmates at the Clackamas County Jail (CCJ) filed this class action lawsuit against Clackamas County and one of its senior Department officials. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, brought this claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments for strip and visual cavity searches conducted on pre-trial detainees and convicted inmates at the CCJ beginning in May 2012. The plaintiffs sought compensatory damages on both individual and class-wide basis, as well as punitive damages. They also sought a declaratory judgment that the strip search practices of the County were unconstitutional. Lastly, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Clackamas County and its officials from continuing to implement the strip and visual cavity searches in group and public fashion without adequate privacy and reasonable suspicion. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on May 4, 2015 to add plaintiffs and claims. They then sought to amend the complaint again on February 27, 2017. The motion was denied by Magistrate Judge Youlee Yim You on April 6, 2017 and that recommendation adopted by Judge Michael Simon on April 21, 2017. The defendants moved for summary judgment on November 2, 2016. They alleged that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue claims of unconstitutional searches on behalf of female inmates and future inmates, among others. On May 2, 2018, Magistrate Judge You granted the motion as to all claims under the Eighth Amendment and plaintiffs\u2019 claims for constitutional violations based on the emergency search of October 10, 2012. Otherwise, the defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment was denied. Judge Simon confirmed the order on July 23, 2018. The plaintiffs sought to certify three classes and moved for partial summary judgment on February 27, 2017. Class One included everyone who had undergone unjustified strip searches at CCJ since May 19, 2012. The two subclasses included persons undergone group and public strip searches since September 25, 2012 as well as a group of inmates searched on October 10, 2012, respectively. On May 2, 2018, Magistrate Judge You certified Class One, but only as to \u201cthe Fourth Amendment claims of male inmates at the CCJ who underwent return-from-court visual strip searches between September 25, 2012, and the date in May 2013 on which the County installed privacy panels in CCJ\u2019s hallway.\u201d As for the partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs\u2019 motion was denied. The recommendations were confirmed by Judge Simon on July 23, 2018. On September 7, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. They alleged that the plaintiffs\u2019 claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because some plaintiffs made no showing of a physical injury as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. As for the remaining named plaintiffs, the defendants alleged that none of them were in custody at the CCJ when the second amended complaint was filed. In addition, Article III of the Constitution prevented the current plaintiffs from pursuing this case on behalf of the female CCJ inmates. This motion was denied on July 23, 2018 by Magistrate Judge You. On April 10, 2019, the defendants moved to decertify the class, and on May 21, 2019, the defendants moved for imposition of sanctions. Oral argument was held on May 21, 2019 on the motion to decertify the class. On August 6, 2019 Magistrate Judge You recommended that the motion to decertify the class be granted. Magistrate Judge You also denied the defendants' motion for sanctions on the same day. The plaintiffs filed objections to the recommendation. 2019 WL 6709545 (D.Or. Aug. 06, 2019). On December 9, 2019, District Judge Simon adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations and granted the defendant's motion to decertify the class. 2019 WL 6709381 (D.Or. Dec. 09, 2019). Eight days after the order was issued, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit (Appeal Docket No. 19-36084). On December 23, 2019, the deputy clerk of the Ninth Circuit filed an order stating that the Ninth Circuit may not have jurisdiction over the appeal because the district court's decision to decertify the class may not be final or appealable. The court ordered that within 21 days, the appellants must move for voluntary dismissal of the appeal or show cause as to why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On January 13, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a response to the order to show cause, but the Ninth Circuit (Judges William C. Canby, Ronald M. Gould, and Paul J. Watford) dismissed the appeal in a February 25, 2020 order. 2020 WL 1290290 (9th. Cir. 2020). Meanwhile, back in the district court, on October 1, 2019, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On April 20, 2020, Magistrate Judge You issued a recommendation on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Magistrate Judge You recommended that the motion for summary judgment should be granted in full, stating that: \"1) the \u00a7 1983 claims against Sheriff Roberts should dismissed; 2) the Fourth Amendment claim against the County should be dismissed; and 3) the state claim against defendants should be dismissed.\" 2020 WL 2544781 (D.Or. Apr. 20, 2020) Two weeks later, the plaintiffs filed an objection to the magistrate judge's recommendations. In May 2020, District Judge Simon adopted the recommendations of Magistrate Judge You, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the case with prejudice. 2020 WL 2545312 (D.Or. May 19, 2020) On June 16, 2020, the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit (Appeal Docket No. 20-35544). Six days later, the plaintiffs filed a Mediation Questionnaire briefly describing the issues in the case, and the next day, the Ninth Circuit filed a mediation order saying that this case had not been selected for inclusion in the court's mediation program. As of July 2020, the appeal is ongoing.", "summary": "On May 18, 2014, inmates at the Clackamas County Jail sued the county and the sheriff over their strip search policy in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The plaintiffs brought this claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments for strip and visual cavity searches conducted on pre-trial detainees and convicted inmates at the CCJ beginning in May 2012. The court granted class certification in 2018, but upon a motion by the defendants to decertify the class, the court decertified the class in 2019. The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit, but the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims in October 2019. In May 2020, the court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case with prejudice. The plaintiffs have appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit. The appeal is ongoing."} {"article": "This is one of many lawsuits brought challenging the Obama administration's 2012 Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate requiring employers to pay for employees' contraception and abortifacients via medical insurance coverage. Many religious hospitals, charities, universities, and other enterprises owned or controlled by religious organizations and individuals who opposed contraception on moral grounds argued the mandate violated their religious beliefs. For a full list of these cases please see our collection of the Contraception Insurance Mandate cases here. On October 9, 2012, two Baptist universities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. They alleged violations of their rights under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (\"RFRA\"), and the Administrative Procedure Act (\"APA\") (5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 551 et seq.) by the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) violated their religious freedom and free speech rights by requiring them to provide coverage for contraception through their group health insurance plans. Claiming that providing contraceptive coverage would both defy their Baptist faith and compel speech contrary to their beliefs, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other organizations with similar religious objections. On March 8, 2013, Westminster Theological Seminary filed a motion to intervene, and the court allowed intervention. On December 27, 2013, the District Court (Judge Lee H. Rosenthal) granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their RFRA claim and enjoined the government from enforcing the ACA contraception insurance mandate against the plaintiffs. 988 F.Supp.2d 743. On February 24, 2014, the government appealed the case to the Fifth Circuit. On April 28, 2014, the Fifth Circuit consolidated this case with University of Texas v. Sebelius and Roman Catholic Diocese of Beaumont v. Sebelius. On January 19, 2015, the Fifth Circuit denied the plaintiffs\u2019 request for hearing en banc. On June 22, 2015, the Fifth Circuit (Judge Jerry E. Smith) reversed the relevant district court holdings that the requirement to notify the government of their religious objection to the contraceptive services mandate violated RFRA. 793 F.3d 449. On July 2, 2015, the court denied the request of plaintiff Westminster Theological Seminary to stay the mandate or rehear the case. On September 30, 2015, the court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 request for rehearing en banc, but granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion to stay on October 7, 2015, pending filing of a petition for writ of certiorari. 807 F.3d 630. On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider whether notifying the federal government by signing a form identifying the employer as a religious nonprofit that objects to the contraceptive services mandate (so that the government can work with the insurer or benefits provider to ensure employees have contraceptive coverage) violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or constituted the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. This case was consolidated with six other cases dealing with this issue. Together, the cases are known as Zubik v. Burwell. This case was argued in the Supreme Court on March 23, 2016. On March 29, 2016, in an unusual move, the Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs suggesting a solution to their disagreement, in which employees could still receive contraception coverage without employers giving any notice to the government. On May 16, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that that \"accommodates petitioners\u2019 religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners\u2019 health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'\" 136 S.Ct 1557. The Court took no position on the merits of this case. Back in the Fifth Circuit, the parties submitted a series of status reports indicating they had entered into settlement negotiations with the new Trump administration. On Oct. 16, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeal, which the court granted on Oct. 19. Despite granting the joint motion, the parties continued to submit a series of status reports through 2018. On January 2, 2019, Secretary Azar filed an unopposed motion to dismiss the appeal. It was granted by the Court the following day. On January 10, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to lift the case\u2019s stay and to amend the December 2013 order that enjoined the government from requiring them to cover certain contraceptives under the Affordable Care Act. They wanted the Court to clarify that the injunction applied to the current and ensuing versions of the regulations at issue and that it applied only to the extent that the regulations would require Plaintiffs to violate their beliefs. This motion was prompted by developments regarding the regulations at issue. In late 2017, the government issued Interim Final Rules (IFR) revising its stance on the accommodation granted to religious employers regarding contraception. Two courts have since issued nationwide preliminary injunctions against the expanded religious exemption under the APA: Pennsylvania v. Trump, 2017 WL 6398465 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2017); California v. HHS, 2017 WL 6524627 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017). To avoid creating confusion or conflicting obligations, the Court deferred ruling on the plaintiffs\u2019 motion, pending developments in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit. On August 2, 2019, the Court denied the plaintiffs' motion without prejudice, which would give the plaintiffs the opportunity to renew their motion as long as they could explain the impact of any opinions from several identified, related cases. As of May 14, 2020, there has been no docket activity subsequent to this order.", "summary": "In 2012, two Baptist universities filed this RFRA challenge to rules adopted under the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on their religious freedom and free speech rights by requiring them to provide coverage for contraception through their group health insurance plans. The district court enjoined the rule, and the defendants appealed. The appeal eventually reached the Supreme Court as part of Zubik v. Burwell, deciding whether the exception to the contraceptive services mandate for nonprofit religious organizations violated RFRA. On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases consolidated in Zubik to their respective courts of appeals, and it ordered that the parties be given time to come to an agreement on ensuring contraceptive access without burdening religious freedom. 136 S.Ct 1557. In this case, the parties agreed to dismiss the appeal, but the trial court expressed reluctance to conclude the case until separate challenges to the current versions of the ACA's rules are resolved."} {"article": "On January 12, 2017, the United States of America filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Alleging a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers in deprivation of people's rights under the United States Constitution and federal laws, the United States brought this action against the Police Department of Baltimore City and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000d, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 3789d, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12131\u201312134. The action was brought following an investigation by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). In May 2015, the DOJ opened an investigation into the Baltimore Police Department (BPD) after Baltimore city officials and community members voiced concerns about possible unlawful police practices. On August 10, 2016, the DOJ released its findings. The DOJ concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that BPD engaged in patterns and practices that violated individuals' rights under the First and Fourth Amendments and federal anti-discrimination laws, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the DOJ noted BPD\u2019s use of excessive force, retaliation, and unconstitutional stops, searches, and arrests. The DOJ also summarized how BPD\u2019s policies and procedures disparately impacted African Americans. Additionally, the report highlighted how BPD infringed on individuals\u2019 First Amendment right to free expression, engaged in gender-biased policing when investigating sexual assaults, and used unreasonable force against those with mental health disabilities in violation of the ADA. These problems developed from poor training, policies, supervision, and accountability measures. The report emphasized the importance of rebuilding trust within the community and including Baltimore citizens in the reform process. In response to the DOJ\u2019s findings, BPD and the City of Baltimore entered into an Agreement in Principle to work on creating a judicially-enforced consent decree that would help resolve the problems uncovered during the DOJ investigation. The Agreement in Principle outlined several key areas that the future consent decree should address, including: policies, training, data collection, and analysis; technology and infrastructure; officer support; and community policing strategies. On January 12, 2017, the same day that the United States filed its complaint with the district court, the parties filed a proposed consent decree and a joint motion for settlement and entry of the agreement. The court (Judge James K. Bredar) provided an opportunity for public comment on the proposed consent decree and held a fairness hearing. During the hearing, held on February 1, 2017, the government asked for more time to consider the proposed consent decree, presumably in light of the change in administration, requesting additional time to \u201cassess whether and how the provisions of the proposed consent decree interact with [certain post-agreement] directives of the President and the Attorney General.\" The Trump Administration did not want to continue enforcing many consent decrees, a stance that was made official by Attorney General Sessions' November 2018 memo. Judge Bredar's order entering the consent decree found this \"problematic,\" stating that it:
\"would be extraordinary for the Court to permit one side to unilaterally amend an agreement already jointly reached and signed. Moreover, early in the Court's review of the joint motion, but after the new administration was in office in Washington, the Government affirmed its commitment to this draft and urged the Court to sign it. The Defendants, for their part, continue to urge entry of the proposed decree, consistent with the earlier joint submission. As between the parties, this case is settled.\"The court entered and approved the consent decree on April 7, 2017, retaining jurisdiction over the consent decree until its termination. 249 F.Supp.3d 816. According to the consent decree's terms, it terminates upon the court's determination that the defendants have achieved full and effective compliance, and have (a) maintained such compliance for one year in the areas of the community oversight task force; interactions with youth; transportation; First Amendment; technology; and coordination with school police; and (b) have maintained such compliance for two years in the areas of community policing and engagement; stops, searches, arrests, and voluntary police-community interactions; impartial policing; responding to and interacting with people with behavioral health disabilities or in crisis; use of force; handling of reports of sexual assault; supervision; misconduct investigations and discipline; and recruitment, hiring, and retention. On October 3, 2017, the court approved the appointment of Kenneth Thompson as the independent monitor of the consent decree. 282 F.Supp.3d 897. Over the next year, the monitoring team worked with the parties to develop a monitoring plan, and the court held quarterly public hearings and approved certain minor modifications to the consent decree, mostly in respect to deadlines. See, e.g., 290 F.Supp.3d 420 (D. Md. 2018). The first public hearing to review progress toward \u201cfull and effective compliance\u201d with the Consent Decree was held on April 13, 2018. The monitoring team submitted its first semiannual report on July 18, 2018, the contents of which were discussed during a July 26, 2018 quarterly hearing. Much of the first year under the consent decree was devoted to establishing an implementation plan, so the monitor's first semiannual report found that it was too early in the reform process to gauge BPD\u2019s progress toward satisfying the vast majority of the Consent Decree\u2019s requirements, because BPD was still in the preliminary, preparatory stage of reform. For example, BPD had not yet finished revising its policies, much less implementing and training officers on them. The monitor did express a primary concern that, \"although BPD and City leadership are, to their credit, fully committed to reform, it is not yet apparent whether BPD has the capacity to implement the linchpin requirements of the Consent Decree.\" Notable elements of the report included its emphasis on the need for structural reform of BPD's Office of Professional Responsibility, finding that BPD needed to revamp OPR's basic operational model to improve the fairness, objectivity, thoroughness, and timeliness of its investigations. The monitor also highlighted the pressing need for a disciplinary system, finding BPD\u2019s system for holding officers accountable for misconduct to be \"broken.\" The report also outlined BPD's response in the aftermath of the shooting of a BPD detective, who was found dead in the Harlem Park neighborhood of Baltimore. The monitoring team conducted an independent review of the BPD's response to the shooting, noting that while it was too early to be a reflection on compliance, the BPD's actions did raise some serious concerns and would provide a vital learning opportunity to the BPD going forward. In evaluating the BPD's conduct in establishing and enforcing a perimeter around the neighborhood, the monitoring team had concerns about whether BPD command staff and supervisory officers were adequately ensuring adherence to Fourth Amendment requirements and corresponding consent decree provisions. The monitor found the response to the shooting to confirm the need for a culture change within BPD around stops, searches, and arrests.", "summary": "On January 12, 2017, the United States of America filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers in deprivation of people's rights under the United States Constitution and federal laws. The complaint was filed at the same time as a joint motion for entry of a proposed consent decree, both the result of a DOJ investigation beginning in 2015. The consent decree was approved on April 7, 2017, and monitoring and implementation of the consent decree's provisions is ongoing."} {"article": "On November 1, 2005, non-union employees who paid compulsory union fees, filed this class-action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, against the California State Employees Association (CSEA) in the Eastern District of California. The plaintiffs, represented by the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation and private counsel, sought immediate injunctive and declaratory relief, and damages, claiming that the defendant violated public employees' rights, privileges, and immunities under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant violated the constitutional safeguards compelled by Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986) by failing to properly notify employees of a temporary dues increase to fund political activities through the \u201cEmergency Temporary Assessment to Build a Political Fight Back Fund.\u201d On November 2, 2005, the plaintiffs filed a motion to set a date for a preliminary injunction hearing and for a temporary restraining order to stop the defendant from taking money from the plaintiffs' fees for political use and to place that money into a separate escrow account. Judge Morrison C. England granted the plaintiffs' motion for the temporary restraining order on November 8, 2005, recognizing that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if the restraining order was not granted, and granted a hearing on their motion for preliminary injunction. 2005 WL 3031622. Because Judge England granted the temporary restraining order, he denied further relief through a preliminary injunction on November 8, 2005. 2005 WL 3031622. On October 31, 2006, Judge England granted the plaintiffs' class certification request, deeming the plaintiffs adequate representation of the class. The certified class consisted of individuals who pay compulsory fees to CSEA who are not members and who have, at one time or another, specifically objected to the use of their agency fees for politics or other non-bargaining activities. The plaintiffs represented two classes of nonunion employees: those who objected to the Union's notification to deduct money for non-bargaining purposes and those who did not. On February 12, 2007, Judge England denied the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment filed on September 29, 2006 on the grounds that CSEA\u2019s evidence of its notification and procedure of using the non-members fees for political purposes did not meet the constitutional safeguards laid out by Hudson, and therefore did not warrant judgment as a matter of law. 2007 WL 516263. The plaintiffs\u2019 filed a motion for summary judgment on July 13, 2007, arguing that the evidence proved the defendant failed to comply with the constitutional standards of Hudson. The defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment on July 17, 2007, alleging that the class of plaintiffs who did not object to the use of their money for political purposes should be precluded from bringing suit because they failed to make a timely objection to the defendant\u2019s notice of this procedure, which constituted, as a matter of law, their consent to the procedure. Judge England denied the defendant\u2019s partial motion for summary judgment as to the non-objector class, but granted the plaintiffs\u2019 summary judgment motion on March 27, 2008. Judge England stated that the first notice the defendant\u2019s referred to could not possibly have supplied the essential information with which nonmembers could make an informed choice of whether or not to object to the deduction. The Union was ordered to issue a proper notice as to the deductions for political purposes, with a renewed opportunity for nonmembers to object to paying the non-chargeable portion of the fee and to issue appropriate refund with interest. Judge England ordered this second notice not because the first notice could not conceivably cover any assessment or dues increase, but because the actual notice in this case was inadequate to provide the essential information regarding the specific deduction for political purposes. 2005 WL 3031622. The defendant submitted its amended notice of appeal of the District Court\u2019s denial of summary adjudication as to the class of non-objectors on August 26, 2008. The Ninth Circuit (David R. Thompson, Sidney R. Thomas, Clifford Wallace) reversed the District Court\u2019s ruling on the motions for summary judgment on December 10, 2010, concluding that the union\u2019s notification complied with the Hudson procedural requirements. 628 F.3d 1115. Back in District Court, on February 15, 2011 Judge England ordered, in accordance with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, the denial of the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment, reversal and denial of the defendant\u2019s partial motion for summary judgment, the granting of the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment, and the reversal of the award of nominal damages to the plaintiff. However, the plaintiffs appealed the Ninth Circuit decision and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 27, 2011. Writing for the majority, Justice Alito reversed the Ninth Circuit decision and remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit on June 21, 2012. Justice Alito held that Hudson requires that any fee-collection procedure be tailored to minimize the infringement on First Amendment rights and the defendant in this case failed to meet this standard. The notice was insufficient and charging nonmembers fees to be used for \u201celectoral purposes,\u201d even if they would be paid back had they chosen to opt out after the relevant period, was a violation of the First Amendment. 567 U.S. 298. On remand, the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court opinion and remanded the case back to the District Court for further proceedings. On December 4, 2012 the district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and ordered the defendant to refund the plaintiffs all money extracted from the assessment period with interest, as well as pay nominal damages in the amount of one dollar within 120 days of the order. The defendant was required to check in with the court every thirty days to update on its progress. The plaintiffs\u2019 moved for attorney\u2019s fees on January 2, 2013, which Judge England granted on June 5, 2013. The plaintiffs were awarded $ 1,201,176.00 in attorney\u2019s fees and $15,412.93 in expenses. A supplemental motion for attorney\u2019s fees was denied by Judge England on April 16, 2014. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This case was brought by California state employees against the California State Employees Association, Local 1000, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC claiming unlawful deduction of membership fees for political use. After an appeal to the US Supreme Court, the case was decided in favor of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were awarded a refund of the money inappropriately used for political purposes, with interest, as well as nominal damages and attorney's fees."} {"article": "On November 17, 2009, several lesbian and gay employees of the State of Arizona, each of whom was receiving family coverage for his or her committed same-sex life partner, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona against the State of Arizona. Plaintiffs, represented by the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and by private counsel, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging that Section 38-651(O) of the Arizona Revised Statutes (\"Section O\") violated the United States Constitution. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that Section O, which eliminated family health insurance coverage for non-spouse domestic partners, violated the equal protection and substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment because precluded same-sex domestic partners but not opposite-sex domestic partners from obtaining coverage. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On January 25, 2010, the State moved to dismiss the case, and on April 1, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. On July 23, 2010, the District Court (Judge John W. Sedwick) addressed both motions in one order, granting the State's motion to dismiss as to the plaintiffs' due process claim but otherwise denying it, and granting plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Collins v. Brewer, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D. Ariz. 2010). The Court found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim, as the denial of benefits to employees with same-sex domestic partners was not rationally related to the State's interests in cost control, administrative efficiency, and the promotion of marriage; it therefore enjoined the State from enforcing Section O and ordered it to make family health insurance coverage available to employees with same-sex partners. The State appealed, and the District Court stayed proceedings pending the decision of the Court of Appeals. On September 6, 2011, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit (Circuit Judges Mary M. Schroeder and Sidney R. Thomas and District Judge Mark W. Bennet of the Northern District of Iowa, sitting by appointment) affirmed. Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). In an opinion by Judge Schroeder, the panel held that the District Court had correctly applied the rational basis test, and that while state employees have no constitutional right to benefits, \"when a state chooses to provide such benefits, it may not do so in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner that adversely affects particular groups that may be unpopular.\" Id. at 1013. 656 F.3d 1008, 2011 WL 3890755, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18467. The State filed a petition for panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc, both of which the Ninth Circuit denied on April 3, 2012. Diaz v. Brewer, 676 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2012). Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, joined by Judge Carlos T. Bea, dissented, arguing that there was no evidence that the Arizona legislature passed Section O with discriminatory intent and that the District Court had misapplied the rational basis test. He also noted that the District Court and panel's holding that opposite-sex-only marriage rules serve no rational purpose may be dispositive in challenges to state laws refusing to recognize same-sex marriage. 676 F.3d 823, 2012 WL 1109335, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6623. On July 2, 2012, the State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, and the District Court again stayed its proceedings pending the petition's resolution. On June 27, 2013, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on the same day it issued its decisions in Windsor (PB-NY-0017 in this Clearinghouse) and Hollingsworth . The court ordered the case to proceed with discovery and indicated complaints should be amended to reflect the effect of the Supreme Court's decisions. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on September 9, 2013. The Court granted class action status on December 23, 2013. The class included all same-sex partners who are now or will in the future be eligible for partner health insurance benefits Ariz. Admin. Code \u00a7 R2-5-10. On September 30, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, and on October 1, 2014, the defendants did the same. However, on October 31, 2014, before the court ruled on those motions, the plaintiffs and defendants entered a Joint Motion seeking to dissolve the preliminary injunction and dismiss the case. On November 6, 2014, the court granted the motion, dissolving the preliminary injunction on midnight of December 31, 2014 and dismissing the case. The Joint Motion was filed based on the plaintiffs' belief that, following the decisions in Connolly v. Brewer (PB-AZ-0003 in this Clearinghouse) and Majors v. Jeanes (PB-AZ-0004 in this Clearinghouse) and the Attorney General of the State's announcement that those decisions would not be appealed, same-sex couples' right to marry in Arizona would not be challenged and so the preliminary injunction in this case was moot. On November 20, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate the previous order dissolving the preliminary injunction and dismissing the case, due to the November 17, 2014 appeals of Connolly v. Brewer and Majors v. Jeanes by the Attorney General that could potentially result in the dissolution of the Connolly and Jeanes permanent injunctions. On December 10, 2014, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion and on January 13, 2015, the preliminary injunction was dissolved and the case closed in regards to all matters except ongoing litigation over attorney's fees. On March 5, 2015, the court ordered that within seven days of receipt of the notices from plaintiffs, defendants must affix address labels and send them by U.S. mail to all State of Arizona employees who received family health coverage for a same-sex domestic partner or domestic partner\u2019s child(ren) in 2014. On June 5, 2015, the court granted plaintiffs\u2019 application, and was awarded attorneys\u2019 fees in the amount of $305,049.95 and costs in the amount of $1,936.67. 2015 WL 3555282. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This is a lawsuit brought by several lesbian or gay employees of the State of Arizona, each of whom was receiving family coverage for his or her committed same-sex life partner, against the State, alleging that the enactment of a statute eliminating family health insurance coverage for non-spouse domestic partners and thereby precluding same-sex domestic partners but not opposite-sex domestic partners from obtaining coverage violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Other concurrent cases in the court had ruled that Arizona law barring same-sex marriage was unconstitutional, and both parties consequently filed a joint motion for dissolution of the preliminary injunction and voluntary dismissal of the case in November 2014, which was granted by the court one month later. This case was dismissed in January 2015, and in June 2015 the court granted plaintiffs\u2019 application, and was awarded attorneys\u2019 fees in the amount of $305,049.95 and costs in the amount of $1,936.67."} {"article": "This case, Maryland NAACP v. Baltimore City Police Department, 1:06-cv-01863-CCB (D. Md. 2006) was one of three cases filed about the same time alleging mistreatment of persons arrested and taken to Baltimore Central Booking and Intake Center (\"Central Booking\" or \"CBIC\") for booking and processing. (The other cases were JC-MD-0007: Jones v. Murphy, Case No. 1:05-cv-01287-CCB (D. Md. 2005) and JC-MD-0011: Rodney v. Murphy, 24-C-05004405, filed in Maryland state court.) Central Booking was opened in 1995 as the central location for booking and processing arrestees in Baltimore City. Operated by the Maryland Division of Pretrial Detention and Services, part of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, Central Booking processed approximately 100,000 arrestees annually. This case was a class-action lawsuit filed in the United States District for the District of Maryland on July 21, 2006, by five individuals and two NAACP entities. Represented by the ACLU of Maryland Foundation and private attorneys from New York and Washington, D.C., the plaintiffs alleged that the Baltimore City Police Department engaged in a pattern and practice of illegally arresting tens of thousands of individuals each year who were not and could not be prosecuted. The plaintiffs further alleged that, after being illegally arrested, the individuals were taken to Central Booking where they were strip-searched and detained for days, as long as 54 hours, in inhumane conditions, until they were released without being charged with a crime. This practice, plaintiffs alleged, was encouraged by the Baltimore Police Department, which rewarded officers for high arrest productivity and punished officers with few arrests, regardless of the success of the prosecution. In 2005, 30% of those arrested without a warrant were never charged. The plaintiffs alleged there were illegal arrests for things such as stopping on the street to watch a woman being handcuffed, handing out religious pamphlets, sitting on the steps of a building, dropping a food wrapper, and walking down the street. The plaintiffs sought monetary damages, injunctive relief, and certification for a class consisting of \"arrestees who were (1) arrested by the Police Department without probable cause and (2) released without charges after being booked at CBIC.\" The defendants included the City of Baltimore, the Baltimore Police Department, the warden of Central Booking, and other state officials. The State defendants answered by generally denying the charges. The City and Police Department moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On December 1, 2006, the District Court (District Judge Catherine C. Blake) denied the motion to dismiss. 2006 WL 3626898 (D. Md. Dec 01, 2006). As discovery progressed, Judge Blake required the parties in this case and Jones v. Murhpy, another pending before her, to provide periodic status reports to the Court. The state defendants produced electronic data pertaining to arrests from 2002--August 2007 and numerous hardcopy documents. The plaintiffs also took the depositions of various officials with the Police Department and Central Booking. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on December 18, 2007, adding 9 individual plaintiffs and several new defendants, including the new Mayor of Baltimore and several police officers. On February 27, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint adding additional plaintiffs and defendants. On April 25, 2008, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. Following leadership changes at BPD, the parties entered into settlement negotiations, which culminated in settlement agreement to end the lawsuit. On June 29, 2010, the parties reached a settlement agreement that was approved by the court. The comprehensive settlement provided for significant reforms of the BPD's arrest and monitoring practices and the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement for three years. The BPD committed to new policies and training to ensure officers knew the limits of their authority, and would address low level offenses with actions short of arrest whenever possible. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs $630,000 in damages and attorneys' fees. The agreement also required the BPD to implement a new system of comprehensive data collection and monitoring, which would be overseen by an independent auditor. The job of the auditor was to ensure not only that the data is being kept and appropriately used and analyzed, but also to review probable cause statements to verify that officers had sufficient cause for an arrest, and that supervisors are adequately monitoring officers' actions, and intervening as necessary. The auditor's reports can be found on the ACLU's website here. On April 30, 2012, the auditor released his first report and the plaintiffs alleged in a press release that the BPD had failed to comply with the settlement agreement. The plaintiffs stated that the status report revealed that BPD officers did not or could not justify arrests for quality of life offenses in at least 35 percent of the cases examined; that the BPD was almost one and half years late in creating a database to allow it to effectively monitor officer and supervisor behavior; and that the BPD was improperly refusing to give the auditor records of arrests that resulted in persons being released without charge, the very arrests most likely to be improper, and the ones that led to the lawsuit in the first place. The docket sheet does not reveal any plaintiffs' motion regarding this alleged noncompliance with the settlement agreement. For the next three years, the auditor continued to file report documenting the defendants' implementation of the settlement agreement. The auditor filed his final report in 2015. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2006, the NAACP, represented by the ACLU of Maryland, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs challenged a pattern of improper arrests by the Baltimore City Police Department (BPD). In 2010, the parties settled the case. The settlement agreement changed policies and training within in the BPD and established an independent auditor who filed reports regarding compliance. The auditor filed his final report in 2015 and the case is now closed."} {"article": "On April 16, 2019, ten children in the custody of the Oregon Department of Human Services filed this putative class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The plaintiffs sued the Governor of Oregon, the Director of the Oregon Department of Child Welfare, and the Oregon Department of Human Services along with its director, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12131(2)), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 USC \u00a7 794), the Adoption Assistance Program (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 670 et seq.), and the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (CWA) of 1980 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 620 et seq.). The plaintiffs, represented by A Better Childhood, Disability Rights Oregon, and private counsel, sought a declaration that the defendants had violated the plaintiffs\u2019 rights under the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act. They also sought an injunction against the defendant\u2019s unlawful practices and attorney\u2019s fees. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the Oregon DHS exhibited a pattern of 1) failing to follow through on numerous federal recommendations to hire more caseworkers, follow up with foster-home monitoring, and improve \u201cpermanency planning;\u201d 2) failing to ensure a sufficient number of foster homes for the disabled and non-disabled children in its care; 3) sending excess disabled and non-disabled children to for-profit, out-of-state foster care centers unequipped to properly care for disabled children while failing to maintain oversight of such centers\u2019 practices and child welfare; and 4) subjecting disabled and non-disabled children to the risk of harm through placement instability. On June 24th, parties convened settlement negotiations, setting additional conferences for the months ahead. But the negotiations went nowhere and, during the second conference on July 11th, future settlement conferences were cancelled. Only July 25th, the defendants moved to dismiss or make more definite the complaint. They argued that the court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction because it would be inappropriate for a federal court to tell Oregon how to run its juvenile court system as the plaintiffs demanded. They also argued that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the ADA, Child Welfare Act, and \u00a7 1983. Specifically, the defendants illustrated DHS efforts to improve its foster services, placement, and permanency, and argued that these efforts met the Constitution's requirement that the State care for children\u2019s basic needs; they also asserted that the ADA and CWA require reviews to be conducted only in state court. On August 8th, 2019, the plaintiffs filed their response to the motion to dismiss. They argued that abstention should only be exercised in the most extraordinary of cases and that the cases cited by defendants did not apply to the factual background of this case. The plaintiffs argued that DHS\u2019 practices and case plans were inconsistent with provisions under the CWA and ADA and alleged that the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss both lacked legal merit and was inconsistent with the congressional intent to have the ADA and CWA apply as equally to disabled children as to non-disabled children. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "Ten children in the custody of the Oregon Department of Human Services filed this putative class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The plaintiffs sued the Oregon Department of Human Services under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (CWA) of 1980. The plaintiffs, represented by A Better Childhood, Disability Rights Oregon, and private counsel, sought a declaration that the defendants had violated the plaintiffs\u2019 constitutional and statutory rights and injunctive relief to prevent future harm. The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss, and the case is ongoing as of October 2019."} {"article": "On May 16, 2013, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in the Western District of New York under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (collectively Title VII) against Founders Pavilion, Inc. (Founders). The class, employees and applicants, claimed that the defendant employer requested family medical history as part of its hiring and continued employment practices, terminated employment on the basis of disability, failed to provide reasonable accommodation, discriminated against pregnant applicants and terminated an employee because she was pregnant. The plaintiffs asked the court to grant permanent injunctions to prevent the defendant from discriminating on the basis of genetic information, disability or pregnancy; to require the defendant to provide equal employment opportunities for qualified individuals regardless of genetic information, disability or pregnancy; and to provide compensatory and punitive relief to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices. Founders sold its nursing facility on July 2, 2013 and has since ceased operating any business. On November 26, 2013, the parties entered into a consent decree, recognizing the class. The consent decree had a duration of five years. If Founders ever owned or operated any healthcare facility or other business, they would be enjoined by the consent decree from requesting genetic information, including family medical history from any applicant or employee. They were further enjoined from failing to provide reasonable accommodation to applicants or employees with disabilities, terminating any employee on the basis of that employee\u2019s disability or perceived disability, and failing to hire an applicant or terminating an employee because of her pregnancy. Additionally they had to institute training and provide information about these policies. The consent decree further required Founders to pay a total of $259,600 to five claimants as compensatory damages and back pay. Founders also paid a class award of $110,400, with each class member eligible to receive $800. The class consisted of the 138 individuals who were hired by Founders during the time that Founders utilized the \u201cOccupation & Environmental Health Services Patient History Form\u201d that included a \u201cFamily History\u201d section. The five year time period passed without any further litigation and as of March 2019, the case is presumably closed.", "summary": "In 2013, the EEOC sued an employer for unlawful employment practices that discriminated on the basis of genetic information, disability and pregnancy, seeking injunctive, compensatory and punitive relief. Founders entered into a consent decree to pay $259,600 to five claimants and $110,400 in a class award for all individuals hired by Founders during the time that Founders used a form that included a \"Family History\" section. The five year stated time period for the consent decree passed without any further litigation and as of March 2019, the case is presumably closed."} {"article": "The U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division filed this lawsuit against the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) on June 13, 2016 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The action proceeded under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000 et. seq., alleging policies and practices that discriminated on the basis of sex. In 2009, MDOC allocated certain officer positions in its female correctional facilities as female-only assignments, such as Food Service Officer, Yard Control Officer, Property Room Officer, and Electronic Monitor Officer. MDOC instituted a freeze on all transfers out of female correctional facilities. MDOC denied female officers' transfer requests, while allowing male officers to move between facilities. The case was assigned to Judge Paul D. Borman. In the complaint and the amended complaint, filed July 27, 2016, the DOJ alleged that MDOC policies denied female employees the opportunities provided to men and were required to work overtime at the expense of their health. DOJ sought monetary damages and an order to enjoin the defendants from further discrimination in job assignments based on sex and in the grant of transfer requests. The complaint also sought to compel the state to develop and implement appropriate and effective measures to prevent discrimination, such as policies, procedures, and training for employees. On October 9, 2018, the parties notified the court that they had reached a settlement and stated that they planned to submit the settlement to the court for approval. As a part of the proposed settlement, the defendant agreed to create a Title VII-compliant process in consultation with the DOJ, provide a limited number of priority transfers to class members, create a compensation fund of $750,000, and establish a dispute resolution process. Before the court made a decision on the settlement, four members of the class who had filed complaints with EEOC filed a motion to intervene. The intervenors alleged that the DOJ was not keeping them informed on the litigation and failed to consult with or notify the intervenors regarding the settlement. In light of the government shutdown, Judge Borman granted a stay lasting from December 28, 2018 to February 5, 2019. On March 29, 2019, Judge Borman denied the intervenors' motion, stating that DOJ representatives had been in regular contact with the intervenors and that the proposed settlement was was fair and would allow them an opportunity to object at a fairness hearing. As a result, Judge Borman believed that granting the motion to intervene would be futile. The proposed settlement is currently pending the court's approval.", "summary": "In 2016, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiff alleged that Michigan Department of Corrections violated Title VII by engaging in sex discrimination by denying female employees the professional opportunities provided to men. The plaintiff sought injunctive and monetary relief. The parties reached a proposed settlement that awaits the court's approval."} {"article": "On November 16, 2011, an individual resident of Louisiana filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the U.S. Department of Justice (\"DOJ\") and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (\"FBI\"). The plaintiff, represented by various public interest and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that defendants violated the Freedom of Information Act (\"FOIA\") by failing to make records available. Following Hurricane Katrina, the plaintiff co-founded Common Ground Relief (\"CGR\") to provide short-term relief to Gulf Coast storm victims, as well as long-term support for rebuilding communities in the greater New Orleans, Louisiana area. After discovering that one of CGR's employees was an FBI informant, the plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to the FBI seeking documents pertaining to the informant and either the plaintiff or CGR. The FBI denied the FOIA request, stating that it would not respond to a FOIA request concerning an individual absent a \"privacy waiver\" from that individual. The plaintiff appealed the denial, but the DOJ affirmed the FBI's refusal to produce the documents. On May 31, 2013, the District Court (Judge Susie Morgan) granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court found as a matter of law that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his request for records pertaining to himself and CGR. In addition, with respect to the plaintiff's request for records pertaining to the FBI informant, the Court found that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence that any alleged government impropriety occurred. Finally, the Court concluded that if any exclusion was in fact employed by the defendants as to the records requested, it was justified. On May 31, 2013, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims with prejudice.", "summary": "On November 16, 2011, an individual resident of Louisiana filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, claiming they violated the Freedom of Information Act by failing to produce records about a third party unless a privacy waiver was submitted. The complaint was dismissed on a motion for summary judgment on May 31, 2013."} {"article": "In December 2013, the EEOC brought this lawsuit against Children's Hospital and Research Center in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In this case, an employee of the Children's Hospital and Research Center suffered breast cancer and could not perform the daily tasks of caring for herself because she was weakened from her impairment and its treatment. The plaintiff initially took a two month medical leave of absence in January 2012 and sought to extend the medical leave three times to undergo treatment for her disability, including a double mastectomy, reconstruction surgery for each breast and removal of her fallopian tubes, ovaries and uterus. In July 2012, the hospital rejected her doctor's medical certification, which stated that the employee was still recuperating from surgery but could return to work in September 2012. The hospital denied any further medical leave and fired her as an office assistant because they thought that she would not be able to return to work by September 2012. The EEOC requested (a) a permanent injunction enjoining the Children's Hospital and Research Center from terminating employment because of a disability, and engaging in other employment practices that discriminate against an employee on the basis of disability; (b) an order for the Children's Hospital and Research Center to institute and carry out policies, practices and programs prohibiting discrimination; (c) an order for the Children's Hospital and Research Center to provide backpay and compensation to the discharged employee; and (d) punitive damages. On August 14, 2014, Judge Edward M. Chen approved a joint stipulation by the parties to refer the case to private mediation. On February 10, 2015, Judge Chen approved a joint proposed consent decree. The consent decree provided for both general and specific injunctive relief, including enjoining the Children\u2019s Hospital from unlawfully discriminating against any employee due to his or her disability, requiring the Hospital to make reasonable accommodations for disabled employees as required by law, and having the Hospital revise its employee and supervisor ADA training. For the specific terminated employee, the Hospital was required to provide her with a neutral reference for her future employers and pay $300,000 in monetary relief. Each side agreed to bear its own attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The court maintained jurisdiction over the consent decree for three years. It terminated in 2018 without any further litigation, and the cases is now closed.", "summary": "In December 2013, the EEOC brought this suit against Children's Hospital and Research Center for not providing a reasonable accommodation and discharging its employee who got breast cancer and required treatment and recovery. In February 2015, the District Court granted approval of a joint proposed consent decree that provided for general and specific injunctive relief, as well as $300,000 for the plaintiff."} {"article": "The City and County of San Francisco filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) on Aug. 11, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff explained that following a series of Trump Administration efforts to target so-called \"sanctuary cities,\" the Administration released a new such policy on July 25, 2017. It imposed two new conditions on recipients of federal funding for policing (such as San Francisco) including: \"to (1) provide federal immigration officials access to local detention facilities to interrogate any suspected aliens held there ('Access Requirement'); and (2) provide the Department of Homeland Security ('DHS') with 48 hours\u2019 notice before releasing an individual, where the federal government has requested notice in order to take that individual into custody for immigration reasons ('Notice Requirement') (together, the 'Notice and Access Requirements').\" San Francisco argued that the Notice and Access Requirements could compel city officials \"to unlawfully hold inmates longer than they otherwise would to ensure that DHS receives the required 48 hours of advance notice\" and would force the plaintiff to ignore its own laws. As such, the plaintiff argued that the Notice and Access Requirements violated the U.S. Constitution's separation of powers and spending clauses. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief to ensure it retains federal funding while preventing the defendant from enforcing its newest policy. San Francisco's \"sanctuary city laws\" prohibit city employees from using city resources to enforce federal immigration laws unless legally required to do so. Specifically, local law enforcement officers are prohibited from cooperating with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) voluntary detainer requests, and are also limited in when they may provide the federal government advance notice of a person\u2019s release from jail. The plaintiff's complaint states that the city enacted these laws \"based on robust evidence showing that San Francisco is a safer, healthier, and stronger city when its officials do not enforce federal immigration laws.\" San Francisco's complaint stated that the funding at risk comes from the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (Byrne JAG). By imposing new conditions on this funding, the plaintiff alleged, the Notice and Access Requirements threatened the implementation of the plaintiff's sanctuary city laws while also threatening a critical source of municipal funding. The case was assigned to Judge Saundra Brown Armstrong on Aug. 15, and reassigned to Judge William H. Orrick on Aug. 24. On Aug. 17, the State of California moved to relate this case to its own case, State of California v. Sessions, also challenging the Byrne JAG funding conditions. On Aug. 23, the U.S. consented to relate the case but reserved the right to make objections. Judge Orrick then related the two cases on Aug. 25. The City of Los Angeles moved to intervene on Aug. 22; DOJ opposed this motion on Aug. 29 and Los Angeles replied the next day. Judge Orrick denied the motion on Sept. 11. DOJ requested an extension of time to answer the complaint. San Francisco objected, noting that the government had recently moved to stay the nationwide injunction in Chicago v. Sessions. Judge Orrick nevertheless granted DOJ's request. DOJ moved for summary judgment on Oct. 31. It argued that statutory language (in the INA and Byrne JAG statute) authorized DOJ to impose the immigration-related conditions on the grants, without violating the Separation of Powers or Spending Clause principles. San Francisco filed an amended complaint on Dec. 12, noting that DOJ's grant conditions included San Francisco's compliance with 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1373, which provides that a local government entity cannot prohibit or restrict communication between government entities or officials and federal immigration authorities. San Francisco requested a declaration that it complies with \u00a7 1373. Judge Orrick held a motion hearing on summary judgment on Dec. 13. On Jan. 19, 2018, DOJ moved to dismiss the case. DOJ argued that the challenged conditions were not unlawful under any statutes, the Separation of Powers Clause, the Spending Clause, or any independent constitutional bar. DOJ also maintained that San Francisco was not entitled to a declaration of its compliance with \u00a7 1373 due to lack of standing and ripeness. San Francisco responded on Feb. 2, and DOJ replied on Feb. 14. After a Feb. 28 motion hearing, on Mar. 5, Judge Orrick denied DOJ's motion to dismiss. First, Judge Orrick held that San Francisco had standing because it had a well-founded fear of enforcement, injury-in-fact, and ripe claims (because DOJ would not provide a Byrne JAG grant to San Francisco due to its sanctuary city laws), similar to how the plaintiffs in Judge Orrick's other cases County of Santa Clara v. Trump and State of California v. Sessions established standing. Next, Judge Orrick held that San Francisco had stated legally sufficient claims for relief with respect to the notice and access conditions, following the reasoning in City of Chicago v. Sessions and City of Philadelphia v. Sessions which found the conditions to exceed DOJ's statutory and constitutional authority. On Sept. 10, 2018, the court related this case to two additional cases: City and County of San Francisco v. Sessions III and State of California v. Sessions. On October 5, 2018, Judge Orrick granted summary judgment for San Francisco. 2018 WL 4859528. The court held that the challenged conditions violated the separation of powers and that the DOJ exceeded its Spending Power and therefore violated the Constitution. The court reasoned that Congress inappropriately delegated its spending power to the executive, and that even if validly delegated, the conditions were too ambiguous and unrelated to their goal for the DOJ to validly exercise the delegated power. The court also held that the conditions were arbitrary and capricious under the APA, because the DOJ did not give adequate reasons for imposing the conditions and it did not consider important problems with its conditions. Finally, the court held that California and San Francisco's laws comply with the federal conditions anyway under the court's interpretation of Section 1373 \"limiting it to information relevant to citizenship or immigration status not including release date information\" and not requiring \"state and local governments to share contact information and release status information with federal immigration officials.\" The court thus issued a nationwide injunction. On November 20, 2018 the court amended the judgment, at the government's request, so that it would not preclude the DOJ from bringing preemption claims under other federal statutes. The amended judgment retained the prohibition on the government from relying on \u00a7 1373 as an independent federal ground for placing conditions on other programs. The DOJ appealed to the Ninth Circuit (docket #18-17308). The Ninth Circuit finally heard oral argument on December 2, 2019. On July 20, 2002, the Ninth Circuit ( Circuit Judges Richard R. Clifton, William A. Fletcher, and Eric D. Miller) affirmed in part, and vacated in part, the district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment. 965 F.3d 753. The Ninth Circuit upheld the injunction barring DOJ from using Access and Notice Conditions as Byrne funding requirements for any California state entity and the injunction barring DOJ from denying funds based on plaintiffs\u2019 alleged non-compliance with \u00a7 1373. However, the Court limited the reach of the injunction to California\u2019s borders, finding that the district court abused its discretion in granting a nationwide injunction. Though San Francisco offered evidence of other locations across the country that may like an injunction against the funding requirements, the Court found that nothing in the record suggested that such broad relief was needed to fully protect the plaintiffs. On November 13, 2020, the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court (docket #20-666). In response to the petition, on January 13, 2021, California suggested that the Supreme Court defer action on the petition until President Joseph Biden took office and it could understand the incoming administration\u2019s stance on these issues. After President Biden took office, the government filed a letter on January 27, 2021, agreeing with California, and recommended the Court hold the petition in abeyance. In addition, the government recommended that the petition in this case be consolidated with similar petitions filed in New York v. Department of Justice and City of New York v. Whitake. The parties filed a joint stipulation to dismiss the cert petition on March 4, 2021. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "The City and County of San Francisco sued DOJ on Aug. 11, 2017 over policies targeting \"sanctuary cities\" by imposing immigration enforcement conditions on federal funding for law enforcement. The U.S. District Ct. for the District of Northern California granted summary judgment for San Francisco, entering a nationwide injunction. DOJ appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court but limited the scope of the injunction to just California. The government filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court in November 2020. In January 2021, President Joesph Biden took office and the government filed a letter with the Supreme Court recommending it hold the petition in abeyance until it could determine the administration's position on these issues. Then on March 4, 2021, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss the cert petition. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "An amended complaint was filed on March 22, 2006, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada by private counsel on behalf of two plaintiffs who also claimed to be friends, one an attorney and the other a Nevada state prisoner. The initial complaint had been filed on June 2, 2005, and initially amended on June 15, 2005. The amended complaint stated that officials of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) violated the plaintiffs' First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by interfering with the prisoner's efforts, via mail, to provide paralegal/law clerk-type assistance, both for free and for pay, to the attorney. The marked legal mail that the defendants allegedly refused to forward from the attorney-plaintiff to the prisoner-plaintiff related to cases other than the prisoner's own cases and, sometimes, contained public record-type court documents that the prisoner had ordered from court clerks, according to the amended complaint. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages, filing their case pursuant to 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983. The defendants were said to have censored and refused to deliver marked legal mail without providing due process or an adequate review procedure and, similarly, denied without due process or sufficient review the prisoner's right to conduct a paralegal/law clerk business from prison. Plaintiffs claimed that other similarly-situated prisoners had been allowed to conduct businesses from prison. In addition to denial of due process and equal protection rights, plaintiffs complained that the defendants' conduct impinged upon rights to privileged attorney-client communications, to free speech, to free association, to petition the government for redress of grievances, and to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Prison officials were also said to have violated these same rights by retaliation, via imposing restrictions on the prisoner's activities and inhibiting his work on civil rights cases other than his own personal legal matters. On November 18, 2005, District Judge Edward C. Reed granted a preliminary injunction against the defendants, enjoining the prison officials from restricting non-legal correspondence between the plaintiffs but allowing, for security reasons, the officials' required redaction from the plaintiffs' correspondence of some information personally identifying others. Evans v. Vare, 402 F.Supp.2d 1188 (D. Nev. 2005). The plaintiffs and the prison officials cross-appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court's unpublished October 13, 2006, memorandum decision partially affirmed and partially reversed the district judge's ruling. The appellate court noted that not all correspondence between an attorney and a client is necessarily privileged or presumed confidential. While the defendants argued that the prisoner was restricted from engaging in a business relationship as a paralegal by state statute, the court observed that the defendants had not shown in the district court that the prisoner was engaged in such a business activity, as opposed to corresponding about a common interest or hobby. Still, as long as restrictions on a prisoner's First Amendment rights reasonably serve a legitimate penal interest, the officials could impose such restrictions. Thus, the Ninth Circuit panel felt that the preliminary injunction was not too restrictive of the plaintiffs' freedoms. Privacy and security concerns warranted allowing the defendants to examine mail between the two plaintiffs and requiring the attorney, with respect to documents that have not been published, to redact from those documents personal identifying information about other persons. The case was remanded to the district court. There, Judge Reed modified his earlier injunction on December 29, 2006, in view of the appellate ruling. His unpublished modified order allowed prison employees to examine mail from the attorney to the prisoner, but barred denying receipt or forwarding of their mail which either (1) consisted of regularly-published court decisions law or regulations, or (2) was other legal correspondence than described in (1), above, and had the names, social security numbers, addresses and other identifying information of other persons blacked out. Discovery proceedings ensued over the next several months in the district court, as reflected by the PACER docket sheet. The last entry we have on that docket sheet is on May, 21, 2007, and indicates that discovery was due by September 26, 2007, with pretrial motions due a month later. We have no further information about the case. There was a settlement conference on January 25, 2008, during which each party agreed to pay their own attorney's fees and costs. On April 11, 2009, the court ordered a permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from denying plaintiffs the receipt or forwarding of mail involving legal matters, when either of two conditions are met: (1) The mail consists of regularly published court decisions, laws or regulations or (2) Where to mail does not consist of regularly published court decisions, laws or regulations, Plaintiff's correspondence regarding legal matters shall not be interfered with if the names, social security numbers, addresses, and other identifying information of other persons are blacked out.", "summary": "Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 on behalf of prison officials monitoring legal mail between the two plaintiff without due process. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Defendants were permanently enjoined from restraining or denying transfer of mail between plaintiffs that falls under two established categories."} {"article": "This case, filed on February 23, 2012 in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, is one of a number of cases filed in various federal district courts across the county by Catholic organizations seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the federal government. Plaintiffs claim their free exercise of religion and freedom of speech rights are being violated by the portion of the interim final regulations adopted to implement the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (\"the ACA\") that would require them to cover contraception as part of their health insurance offerings. On April 30, 2012, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, among other things, that the regulations were in the process of being amended; that no part of the law had been enforced against any of the Plaintiffs; and that the Plaintiffs lacked standing. On July 17, 2012, in a 45-page opinion, the Court, (Senior Judge Warren K. Urbom) granted the Motion to Dismiss without prejudice. On September 14, 2012, the plaintiff appealed the decision to the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals. However, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the appeal on August 21, 2013.", "summary": "This case, filed on February 23, 2012 in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, is one of a number of cases filed in various federal district courts across the county by Catholic organizations seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the federal government. They claim their rifghts to free exercise of religion and spech are violated by the portion of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) that requires inclusion of contraceptive care as part of their health insurance plans. The Court dismissed the case without prejudice on July 17, 2012."} {"article": "On October 16, 2018, PEN America, Inc. brought this lawsuit against President Donald Trump in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff, an organization representing writers and literary professionals, sued under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201(a) alleging that the President used his power against media and press to violate the First Amendment freedom of speech and the press. PEN America was represented by the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic at Yale Law School and Protect Democracy. The case was assigned to Judge Lorna G. Schofield. The complaint alleged that President Trump used, or threatened to use, the regulatory and enforcement powers of government to punish the speech of journalists in at least four ways: initiating a government review to raise postal rates to punish the owner of the Washington Post; directing DOJ enforcement actions against media companies, including CNN\u2019s parent company; interfering with press access to the White House; and threatening to revoke broadcast licenses. Further, it alleged that President Trump expressed his animus toward media entities for their coverage of him and then threatened government retaliation. PEN America sought declaratory and injunctive relief. In its amended complaint of February 6, 2019, PEN America included allegations related to the President\u2019s threatened and actual revocations of security clearances of media commentators and White House press credentials, including those of PEN America member and CNN reporter Jim Acosta. On April 10, 2019, President Trump sought to dismiss the complaint, claiming that PEN America lacked standing to bring claims on behalf of its members and on its own behalf, and that it failed to state a plausible claim for relief. He also claimed that prospective relief could not be implemented, as \u201cthe Supreme Court has repeatedly held that such injunctive relief [i.e. a district court injunction against the President of the United States] would be 'extraordinary' and beyond the power of the federal courts.\u201d On March 24, 2020, the court granted in part the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and denied the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On the remaining claims, the court granted declaratory relief but found injunctive relief improper. 2020 WL 1434573. As of June 29, 2020, discovery has been stayed until at least July 6.", "summary": "On October 16, 2018, PEN American Center brought this lawsuit against President Donald Trump in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff, an organization representing writers and literary professionals, sued under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201(a) alleging that the Presidents used his power against media and press to violate the First Amendment freedom of speech and the press. Specifically, the complaint alleged that President Trump used, or threatened to use the regulatory and enforcement powers of government to punish the speech of journalists. PEN America filed an amended complaint on February 6, 2019. In the amended complaint, PEN America included allegations related to the President\u2019s threatened and actual revocations of security clearances of media commentators and White House press credentials, including those of PEN America member and CNN reporter Jim Acosta. Discovery was stayed on April 16, and will remain so until at least July 6."} {"article": "This is a case about Harris County's practice of arresting people without warrants by finding probable cause based on unsworn statements. On December 28, 2016, two individuals arrested without warrants filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued Harris County under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and under provisions of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Represented by the Civil Rights Corps and the Texas Fair Defense Project, the plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment, an injunction, and attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's practices violated their Fourth Amendment rights to probable cause determinations and their Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural due process. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class for those arrested without a warrant \"who are currently detained, or will be detained, by Harris County and who have not been provided, or will not be provided, a prompt, neutral determination of probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.\" They also sought to certify a subclass for those arrested for misdemeanors without a warrant \"who are currently detained, or will be detained, by Harris County and who have not been provided, or will not be provided, a neutral determination of probable cause supported by oath or affirmation within 24 hours of arrest.\" The plaintiffs claimed that keeping people in custody after a warrantless arrest on account of probable cause based on unsworn statements violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Similarly, they also claimed that keeping people in custody after a warrantless misdemeanor arrest without offering bond when eligible for release violated Tex. Code Crim. P. Ann. \u00a7 17.033(a)\u2013(b). The same day the plaintiffs filed their complaint they also moved the court for a preliminary injunction to cease this practice. The case was initially assigned to Judge Kenneth M. Hoyt. It was transferred to Chief Judge Lee H. Rosenthal following an agreement between the judges. The defendant filed an answer on May 18, 2017. On November 1, 2017, the parties settled. The District Attorney agreed to change the process of presenting probable cause statements for warrantless arrests so that an officer now swears to the facts inputted into the District Attorney Intake System (DIMS). The defendants paid the plaintiffs $75,000 in attorneys' fees, but did not admit liability or that they engaged in the practices alleged by the plaintiffs. The court ordered for the settlement to be monitored for three years by an independent monitor to ensure the District Attorney made the promised changes to DIMS. The monitoring is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2016, two individuals arrested without warrants filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas against Harris County. Represented by the Civil Rights Corps and the Texas Fair Defense Project, the plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment, an injunction, and attorneys' fees. They claimed that keeping people in custody after a warrantless arrest without providing a determination of probable cause based on sworn statements violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Similarly, also claimed that keeping people in custody after a warrantless misdemeanor arrest without offering bond when eligible for release violated the Texas Criminal Procedure Code. On November 1, 2017, the parties settled. The District Attorney agreed to change the process of presenting probable cause statements for warrantless arrests so that an officer now swears to the facts inputted into the District Attorney Intake System (DIMS). The defendants paid the plaintiffs $75,000 in attorneys' fees, but did not admit liability or that they engaged in the practices alleged by the plaintiffs. The court ordered for the settlement to be monitored for three years."} {"article": "On December 10, 2013, the owner of a non-profit religious corporation filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff alleged the Affordable Care Act's requirement that employee health plans provide coverage of contraception violates his religious freedom. The plaintiff, represented by Alliance Defending Freedom and private counsel, asked the court to strike down the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate, even with the accommodation for non-profit religious organizations. Specifically, the plaintiff sought both preliminary and permanent injunctions barring the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate against it. On January 21, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction on the grounds that the contraception insurance mandate substantially burdened the plaintiff's religious exercise. On April 17, 2014, the Court (Judge Robert E. Blackburn) granted the preliminary injunction. Dobson v. Sebelius, 38 F.Supp.3d 1245 (2014). The federal government appealed to the Tenth Circuit, and on July 7, 2014, the Tenth Circuit agreed to the parties' request to hold the appeal in abeyance until the seven cases consolidated as Zubik v. Burwell were resolved by the Supreme Court. Nearly two years later, on May 16, 2016, in Zubik, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective Courts of Appeals; instructing the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that \"accommodates petitioners\u2019 religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners\u2019 health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'\" 136 S.Ct 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of that case. Two of the Zubik cases had come from the Tenth Circuit -- Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius and Southern Nazarene University v. Sebelius. Both were remanded to the Tenth Circuit as part of the Zubik decision; that judgment issued on June 17, 2016. In this case, on June 22, the U.S. defendants filed a status report requesting another 30 days to evaluate appropriate next steps in light of the Zubik order. On September 27, 2016, Judge Blackburn ordered the original case closed administratively, as there was no knowing how long the appeal would continue to be abated. The Appellees, or the original Plaintiffs, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on July 21, 2017. Judges Matheson and Bacharach denied the motion, and declared that the abatement would continue and that the parties would file status reports advising the court of the status of rulemaking proceedings and any other related events. On October 6, 2017 the Appellants, now representing the administration, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The order was granted without judicial action on October 23, 2017. On June 19, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to reopen the case, again seeking permanent injunction and declaratory relief, and Judge Blackburn reopened the case. On March 26, 2019 Judge Blackburn granted a permanent injunction to prohibit enforcement of the mandate by defendants against the plaintiffs and to prohibit defendants from assessing penalties against plaintiffs for their refusal to comply with the mandate. The court explained that with regard to the RFRA claim, the plaintiffs have been successful on the merits under RFRA and face potential irreparable harm unless an injunction is issued. Per the Declaratory Judgment Act, the court also declared that the rights of plaintiffs under RFRA are violated by enforcement of the mandate against plaintiffs in a way that (1) requires plaintiffs to include coverage of abortifacients in the group health plan for employees; (2) requires plaintiffs to execute and deliver the exemption form; or (3) imposes a penalty on the plaintiffs due to their failure to include coverage of abortifacients in its group health plan or to execute and deliver the exemption form. The court declined to rule on anything other that the RFRA claim. On April 16, 2019, the plaintiffs submitted their next status report and moved for dismissal with prejudice of the remaining non-RFRA claims and entry of final judgment on the RFRA claim. They also asked for additional time to submit a motion for attorney\u2019s fees. Defendants did not oppose the motion. On March 13, 2020, Judge Blackburn granted plaintiffs\u2019 motions and entered the Final Judgment. Plaintiffs notified the court on March 24 that the parties had reached a resolution and settlement on attorneys\u2019 fees, but the notice does not specify the amount. As of May 2020, the case is ongoing.", "summary": "On December 10, 2013, a non-profit religious corporation filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the District of Colorado against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff believes the Affordable Care Act's requirement that employee health plans provide coverage of contraception violates his religious freedom. On July 7, 2014, the Tenth Circuit ordered the case held in abeyance pending resolution of Zubik v. Burwell. Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Zubik on May 16, 2016, which took no position on the merits. On June 19, 2018, plaintiffs moved to reopen the case, again seeking permanent injunction and declaratory relief, and Judge Blackburn reopened the case. The court granted the permanent injunction on March 26, 2019 for the RFRA claims. On April 16, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for dismissal with prejudice of the remaining non-RFRA claims and entry of final judgment on the RFRA claim, which Judge Blackburn granted. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "On November 12, 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit against the city of Albuquerque in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. The DOJ brought this action under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141, alleging that officers of the Albuquerque Police Department (APD) were engaging in a pattern or practice of use of excessive force, including deadly force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and \u00a7 14141. Specifically, the DOJ claimed that the APD used excessive force unreasonable deadly force during arrests and detentions, posing an unacceptable risk to the Albuquerque community, and that the city and the APD had failed to address these issues. The DOJ requested declaratory and injunctive relief against the APD to enjoin them from this unlawful conduct. This lawsuit resulted from a civil investigation conducted by the DOJ beginning in 2012, documented in a findings letter sent to the Albuquerque city government on April 10, 2014. On November 14, 2014, the parties filed a joint motion notifying the court that a settlement had been reached. The agreement required the APD to revise and implement force policies, training, and accountability systems to ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment and other applicable law. In addition, the agreement established a new Civilian Police Oversight Agency to receives and investigates complaints of misconduct against the APD. The agreement called for the appointment of an independent monitor to assess and report on the implementation of the agreement. Finally, the parties also moved for an opportunity for community members and other stakeholders to express their views as amici curiae to assist the court in the development and execution of the agreement. On January 21, 2015, District Judge Robert C. Brack held a fairness hearing for interested parties to express their views on the proposed agreement. Seven groups presented their arguments, among them the Albuquerque Police Officers' Association (APOA), the exclusive bargaining representative of the police force. Prior to the hearing, the APOA and 23 concerned citizens filed motions to intervene in this action. Of the 23 individual motions, 14 were eventually withdrawn. On February 19, 2015, Judge Brack granted the APOA's motion to intervene, finding that the APOA had a sufficient interest in this action for intervention as of right. Judge Brack denied the individual motions to intervene, finding that the government (through the DOJ) adequately represented the individuals' interests. In a separate order also filed on February 19, Judge Brack appointed Dr. James D. Ginger as independent monitor to assess and report on whether the APD was fulfilling its obligations under the agreement. On March 6, 2015, Disabilities Rights New Mexico, the ACLU of New Mexico, and the Native American Voters Alliance Education Project filed a motion to intervene. On June 2, 2015, Judge Brack denied the motion to avoid delays in the implementation of the agreement and the litigation of the current parties' rights. In a separate order also filed on June 2, Judge Brack approved the settlement agreement and entered it as a consent decree. Reviewing amici submitted by community organizations, Judge Brack found that amendments to the agreement adequately addressed the community's concerns. In addition, Judge Brack found no conflicts in the agreement with the APOA's collective bargaining agreement, state, or federal law. Regarding the duration of the consent decree, the parties said that if after six years from the effective date the parties disagree whether the City has been in full and effective compliance for two years, either party may seek to terminate the settlement agreement. On August 21, 2015, the parties filed a joint stipulation to modify certain deadlines set forth in the consent decree. The independent monitoring team determined that while the APD had made significant progress, an extension of certain deadlines would be beneficial. On September 24, Judge Brack granted the motion. Since the settlement began, numerous status reports have been filed without indication of significant noncompliance. As of May, 2017, the APD had accomplished most of the \"low-hanging fruit\" required by the consent decree, such as writing and approving policies and designing and initiating training programs. However, Dr. Ginger identified eight specific actions by the APD that had substantially slowed compliance achievement, such as extended delays in revising the department\u2019s use of force policy and use of covert \u201cSpecial Orders\u201d to subvert policies agreed upon by the parties and Dr. Ginger. Dr. Ginger also issued over 300 recommendations for the APD. The case was reassigned to Judge James O. Browning on February 27, 2019. As of June 10, 2020, implementation of the consent decree is ongoing. According to Dr. Ginger's twelfth report, filed on September 3, 2019, the APD continued to increase compliance over the years, and has shown good faith effort in complying with the consent decree. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "On November 12, 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit against the city of Albuquerque alleging that officers of the Albuquerque Police Department (APD) were engaging in a pattern or practice of use of excessive force, including deadly force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141. The parties reached a settlement agreement on November 14, 2014, which was entered as a consent decree on June 2, 2015. Implementation of the consent decree is ongoing."} {"article": "The New York District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a putative class action complaint against Preferred Labor LLC (doing business as Preferred People Staffing) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in August 2006. The complaint alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. According to the EEOC, the defendant employment agency discriminated against female applicants on the basis of their sex; unlawfully classified jobs on the basis of sex; complied with requests for employees on the basis of sex; and retaliated against a female employee who complained about the discrimination. The case was referred to a magistrate judge for mediation. In April, a status conference was scheduled for 7/14/2008. On July 21, 2008, the plaintiff amended its complaint to include Preferable People LLC as a defendant. Preferable operated a temporary day laborer operation similar to Preferred but had not operated in Worcester, Massachusetts. Preferable purchased most of Preferred\u2019s assets in Worcester and purchased the rights to use the name \u201cPreferred.\u201d Preferable then operated out of Preferred\u2019s former offices but did not engage in any discriminatory practices. EEOC acknowledged that Preferable had not engaged in any discriminatory practices, but argued that Preferable was Preferred\u2019s successor and that liability should attach. In response, Preferable asked the court to dismiss them from the lawsuit. On February 13, 2009, District Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV granted Preferable\u2019s request to be dismissed from the lawsuit. On July 6, 2009, the court approved a consent decree in favor of the plaintiff. This decree took into account that the defendant no longer operated the business at issue. So, although the decree had a duration of five years, if the defendant resumed its business within that time-frame, then the duration would be reset from the time the business resumed. The court retained jurisdiction throughout the duration of the decree to resolve any issue related to the decree. If the defendant resumed its business, then it would have to implement non-discriminatory policies and procedures, this would include prohibiting sex discrimination and retaliation. The defendant would then be required to implement anti-discrimination training for its employees. If the defendant resumed business, this decree required that the defendant implement a complaint procedure for applicants and employees who believed they have been discriminated or retaliated against. Afterwards, the defendant was then required to implement and maintain procedures to investigate complaints. After an investigation, the defendant had to provide the EEOC with reports on any complaints of discrimination and/or retaliation within the first four months it resumed business and every four months after. In addition, this decree required the defendant to pay $ 250,000 in monetary damages. The five years for the consent decree have passed, and there has been no further litigation. The case is now presumably closed.", "summary": "The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought this sex discrimination and retaliation lawsuit against Preferred Labor in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts on August 2006. The defendant allegedly discriminated against women applicants and its women employees. And in one instance, the defendant retaliated against an employee that complained about the discrimination. On July 6, 2009, the court approved a consent decree in favor of the plaintiffs. This decree demanded that the defendant adopt anti-discriminatory practices and train employees should the defendants operate as a temporary day laborer and to pay the plaintiff $250,000 in monetary damages. The court retained jurisdiction for five years to ensure the defendant complied with the decree."} {"article": "On June 29, 1994, disabled prisoners and parolees in California filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California, charging that, on account of their disabilities, the two divisions of the California Youth and Adult Corrections Authority California, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (\"CDCR\") and Board of Prison Terms (\"BPT\"), were generally depriving disabled prisoners of benefits and accommodations provided to other prisoners or required by due process. The plaintiffs were represented by the Prison Law Office, the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, and private attorneys. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12131-34, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehab Act), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794, and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The district court (Judge Claudia Wilken) certified the plaintiff class in January 1995. In December 1998, the parties stipulated to amend the class definition to include \"all present and future California state prisoners and parolees with mobility, sight, hearing, learning, and kidney disabilities that substantially limit one or more of their major life activities.\" The class was further modified in January 1999 to include prisoners and parolees with developmental disabilities. By agreement of the parties, the claims against CDCR (prison claims) and BPT (parolee claims) were bifurcated and proceeded on two different litigation tracks. The plaintiffs and CDCR entered into a settlement agreement that agreed to liability for CDCR, if the district court found the ADA and Rehab Act applied to prisons. The district court did find that both statutes applied to state prisons. Armstrong v. Wilson, 942 F.Supp. 1252, 1258-59 (N.D. Cal. 1996). The court also found that the State was not entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for its violations of the ADA and Rehab Act. Id. at 1263. The district court entered a remedial order and injunction directing CDCR to develop a plan for compliance with the statutes by improving access to prison programs for prisoners with physical disabilities at all of California's prisons and parole facilities. The State appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Judge Alfred Goodwin) affirmed. Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 1997). The claims against BPT were litigated by the parties; the district court held a bench trial in April 1999. The plaintiffs offered evidence including stories of a prisoner who used a wheelchair forced to crawl to a hearing, a deaf prisoner rendered unable to communicate with a sign language interpreter because he was shackled, and a blind inmate left without assistance to read complicated written materials. The court issued a permanent injunction in March 2001 and ordered the State to come into compliance with the ADA and the Rehab Act by identifying disabled prisoners and providing them with accessible locations for parole hearings, assistance in communicating, and special aid in the screening, appeals, and grievance processes. The State appealed, asserting that the injunction regarding parole hearings was overbroad and violated the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). In November 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Judge Stephen Reinhardt) found that the class certified by the district court was overbroad, in that it included \"sexually violent predators, mentally disordered offenders, and prisoners or parolees with renal impairments\"--groups not represented by any named plaintiff. Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001). The injunction was upheld in all other respects. The court entered a Revised Permanent Injunction on February 11, 2002, which required that the State create and maintain a system for tracking prisoners and parolees with disabilities, take reasonable steps to identify prisoners and parolees with disabilities prior to parole proceedings, and provide reasonable accommodations to prisoners and parolees with disabilities at all parole proceedings, including parole revocations and revocation extensions, life prisoner hearings, mentally disordered offender proceedings, and sexually violent predator proceedings. The State failed to fully comply with the provisions of the Revised Permanent Injunction and the Plaintiffs filed an enforcement motion, which was granted in an order against the BPT defendants entered on May 30, 2006. In November 2006, the plaintiffs sought imposition of a population cap in California state prisons. Many of the plaintiffs' complaints about disabled prisoners being denied their rights stemmed from the fact that prisons were dramatically overcrowded, resulting in disabled prisoners often being placed in administrative segregation due to lack of space. However, at this time there were several ongoing class action law suits having to do with prison conditions in California. In this case, the district court appointed an expert in 2007 to facilitate the coordination of remedial processes in this case with three other pending class actions: Coleman v. Brown (E.D. Cal.), Plata v. Brown (N.D. Cal.), and Perez v. Tilton (N.D. Cal.). The district court also decided that issues relating to the sought population cap would be addressed in the other lawsuits. On January 18, 2007, Judge Wilken issued a separate Injunction. She found that despite extensive monitoring of CDCR institutions by plaintiffs' counsel, the State was continuing to severely violate the rights of prisoners with disabilities under the ADA and Rehab Act. She found the State was not compliant with the law, the Revised Permanent Injunction, or its own Remedial Plan (first put forth in 1998, and amended in 2001, 2002, and 2006). The violations were occurring with regard to inaccessible housing, denial of sign language interpreters to prisoners who need them, confiscation of medically prescribed assistive devices, late and inadequate disability grievance responses, and inadequate disability tracking. Judge Wilken ordered that the State increase the number of staff on its compliance and grievance response teams, develop and implement a statewide computerized tracking system and integrate it with the tracking system previously ordered in February 2002, generate an inventory of accessible housing, develop a system to hold wardens and prison medical administrators accountable for compliance with the Remedial Plan and other court orders, provide proper training to health care staff and correctional officers, and establish permanent salaried positions for sign language interpreters. The remedial phase of the litigation has continued since 2007. The defendants argued unsuccessfully on numerous occasions that they have no duty to provide reasonable accommodations for prisoners and parolees under the ADA. The defendants also argued that when they sent class members sent to county facilities, they were not responsible for any ADA noncompliance that occurred. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Judge Stephen Reinhardt) issued an opinion in 2010 that summarily rejected these arguments. However, it did remand to the district court for further hearings on whether system-wide relief was necessary on the grounds that the evidentiary record as presented was not sufficient. Once remanded, the plaintiffs submitted additional evidence as to the nature and extent of violations, and the district court issued an order granting the renewed system-wide enforcement motion. On March 28, 2011, the court entered a stipulation order requiring the parties to file periodic joint statements describing the status of the litigation every other month, beginning on May 16, 2011. In 2012, the district court modified the 2007 injunction to clarify what was expected of the State. The modified injunction provided that the court-appointed expert would solve disputes between the parties. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Judge Tashima) vacated the provisions in the modified injunction relating to the dispute resolution mechanism, finding that it was an impermissible delegation of authority to an expert. The district court then amended the dispute resolution mechanism to make it reviewable by the district court on motion by any dissatisfied party. On February 3, 2015, the district court granted a motion for further enforcement of the 2007 injunction. Judge Wilken found the State was still routinely housing class members in administrative segregation because of lack of housing in violation of the ADA and the court's prior orders. She ordered that if the State placed class members in administrative segregation, they needed to fully document their reason for doing so and submit such report to plaintiff's counsel. 2015 WL 496799. On March 26, 2015, Judge Wilken filed a stipulated order confirming the undisputed attorneys' fees and costs for the fourth quarter of 2014. The amount totaled $1,190,379.99. On June 29, 2015, Judge Wilken filed a stipulated order confirming the undisputed attorneys' fees and costs for the first quarter of 2015. The amount totaled $1,090,718.30. On September 25, 2015, Judge Wilken filed a stipulated order confirming the undisputed attorneys' fees and costs for the second quarter of 2015. The amount totaled $1,246,103.35. Attorney fees and costs remained undisputed. Over the next four years, the parties filed several joint status reports. As of May 2020, the most recent status report was filed on January 15, 2020. The statement presented the status of issues such as allegations of abuse and violence by CDCR staff, accommodations for deaf prisoners, the problem of equal access to job and program assignments for people with disabilities, statewide durable medical equipment reconciliation and accuracy of disability tracking information, accommodations for blind and low vision class members, and more. For the most part, the parties continued to work collaboratively and in good faith. However, the plaintiffs expressed concern about ongoing reports of discrimination by CDCR staff against class members. In 2019, the plaintiffs had sent a letter cataloguing multiple incidents of staff misconduct against Armstrong and Coleman v. Brown (E.D. Cal.) class members at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (\"RJD\") over the past two and a half years and demanding that CDCR implement remedial measures by January 1, 2020. Given the ongoing reports of abuse, plaintiffs had begun taking depositions of CDCR staff members in January 2020. Additionally, plaintiffs remained concerned about accommodations for D/deaf prisoners, in particular with respect to defendants' heavy reliance on video remote interpretation (VRI), which plaintiffs' counsel have observed to be inadequate in many group settings, in violation of the ADA and court orders. On February 28, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a sealed motion for an injunction stopping defendants from assaulting, abusing and retaliating against people with disabilities at RJD. In support of their motion, 54 incarcerated people submitted declarations. Some of the declarants alleged instances in which correctional officers at RJD retaliated against them or others for, among other things, submitting or threatening to submit complaints regarding staff misconduct or failures to provide disability accommodations. Some of the declarants also alleged instances in which correctional officers at RJD retaliated against incarcerated people by charging incarcerated people with false rules violations reports. On March 17, 2020, the court entered a stipulation in which defendants agreed to prohibit RJD staff members from retaliating against declarants (or others involved in the February 28 motion) and to implement procedures to assess allegations of retaliation. On March 6, 2020, Judge Wilken entered a stipulated order confirming the undisputed attorneys' fees and costs for the fourth quarter of 2019. The amount totaled $2,215,330.36. On June 3, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for an injunction, alleging similar abuse to the February 28, 2020 motion through CDCR's many facilities and requesting statewide relief. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order on July 1, 2020, requesting that the court move some of the declarants who had been victims of retaliation. Judge Wilken granted the temporary restraining order the next day, though the defendants had not transferred the declarants in question on July 16, 2020. The court heard arguments on the February and June injunction motions on July 16, 2020. On July 30, the court issued a preliminary injunction, finding that the defendants had retaliated against the two declarants who were the subject of the TRO and again ordering the defendants to move them to a different facility. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that another declarant had died at the hands of his cellmate, after a corrections officer ignored his requests to be moved for his safety. After an August 11, 2020 oral argument, on September 8, 2020, the court issued a lengthy opinion granting much of the relief requested by the plaintiffs in the February 28, 2020 motion. After describing numerous instances of unpunished staff violence on class members at RJD, the court found that the defendants violated the class members' rights under the ADA and the Rehab Act. In one such instance, one of the declarants who Judge Wilkens ordered transferred to another facility on July 30 received a threatening note signed by a \"correctional officer gang\" the night before his transfer. Finding that the defendants' failure to investigate and discipline staff was the \"root cause\" of the violations, the court ordered the defendants to work with the plaintiffs to create a modified remedial plan including: installing surveillance cameras in areas of RJD accused by class members, equipping RJD corrections officers with body cameras and creating policies for their use, revamping the staff complaint, investigation and discipline process, third party monitoring, information sharing with the plaintiffs' counsel, increased supervision and training of staff, and further anti-retaliation measures. 484 F.Supp.3d 808. The court also set a schedule for the development of the remedial plan, with a due date of October 20, 2020 for both the plaintiffs and defendants. It appears from the docket, however, that this deadline was extended. On September 25, 2020, the defendants appealed the district court's September 8 injunction to the Ninth Circuit, where the case was docketed as number 20-16921. The defendant-appellants' brief is due on May 5, 2021. During this time, the district court entered stipulated orders for attorneys' fees and costs. The order on September 17, 2020, confirmed $2,227,769.01 for the second quarter of 2020; the order on January 27, 2021, confirmed $3,000,035.18 for the third quarter. The district court had left the June 3, 2020, motion for statewide injunctive relief pending in its decision on September 8, 2020, because the issue had not been fully briefed. A hearing on this motion was held on December 12, 2020. On March 11, 2021, the district court granted the motion in part, requiring new remedial procedures at five of the seven prisons named in the motion. The court set another schedule for a remedial plan for these five prisons and required measures including installing security cameras, wearing body cameras throughout the prisons, reforming staff complaint and disciplinary procedures, and increasing supervisory staffing. 2021 WL 933106. The defendants appealed this to the Ninth Circuit on April 2, 2021. (21-15614). On March 31, 2021, the district court confirmed the undisputed attorneys' fees and costs for the fourth quarter of 2020: $2,432,256.82. (This brought the running total to $13,402,593.01.) By this point, the remedial plan for the September 8, 2020, injunction had been submitted, and the parties disagreed over one of its sections. On April 7, 2021, the district court set a briefing schedule, with objections due by May 4, 2021. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "Disabled prisoners and parolees in California filed a class action lawsuit in 1994 in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California, charging that, on account of their disabilities, the state was depriving disabled prisoners of benefits and accommodations provided to other prisoners or required by due process. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (\"ADA\"), the Rehabilitation Act (\"RA\"), and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. In a series of injunctions and remedial orders, the court ordered that the State had to identify and track disabled prisoners and parolees and provide reasonable accommodations in prison facilities and at parole hearings. The court has declared that failing to adhere to the ADA and its prior orders on the grounds of shortage of bed space is impermissible and a violation of law. Currently the State is under extensive monitoring by plaintiff's counsel. The court granted injunctive relief for one prison on September 8, 2020, and for five more on March 11, 2021. The defendants appealed both injunctions. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "On November 15, 2001 a group of current and former African American managers filed suit against Cargill in the Federal District Court for the District of Minnesota. Plaintiffs alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 and state law by a pattern or practice of discrimination that resulted in both disparate treatment and disparate impact on African Americans employed by Cargill in terms of advancement, compensation, and termination. On July 15, 2002 the district court (Judge Donovan Frank) granted defendant's motion to dismiss in part and motion for summary judgment in part. The remaining claims continued into discovery. Plaintiffs sought class action certification and a hearing was scheduled for October 2004. In the process of discovery, however, defendant learned of possible unethical conduct by plaintiffs' counsel, Sprencer & Lang (S & L). The conduct concerned the behavior of one attorney from S & L who obtained documents, some of which were privileged, from a former high-level executive in Cargill's Human Resources Department. The privileged documents were at least cursorily examined and retained, likely by mistake. Though the facts were highly disputed the court found on September 24, 2004 that the conduct of S & L was unethical and was sufficient to disqualify them from representing plaintiffs in the case. New counsel was obtained and discovery resumed. On June 20, 2006 the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Subsequently some individual plaintiffs dropped out of the case while others pursued settlement negotiations with Cargill. Individual settlements were finalized in June 2007 for all remaining plaintiffs and the court entered a final order dismissing all plaintiffs' claims with prejudice on July 10, 2007. The details of each individual settlement are not known.", "summary": "On November 15, 2001 a group of current and former African American managers filed suit alleging that Cargill had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination relating to advancement, compensation, and termination. Plaintiffs obtained new counsel after the court ruled on September 24, 2004 that their previous attorney had engaged in unethical conduct. Class certification was denied on June 20, 2006. The individual plaintiffs then either dismissed their claims or reached settlements with Cargill."} {"article": "On July 1, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The EEOC sued four private corporations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The complaint asked the court for a permanent injunction and damages, including back pay and other monetary compensation. Suing on behalf of three named black employees and all others similarly situated, the EEOC claimed that defendants had allowed black employees at a Pennsylvania construction project to be subjected to egregious and sustained racial harassment, creating a racially hostile work environment. The EEOC alleged that despite being aware of the situation, the defendants failed to take any remedy the situation. Specifically, the four black individuals named in the suit worked on a construction site outside of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, as employees of the defendant construction companies. The employees alleged that they were subjected to a racially hostile work environment, including: (1) Racist graffiti on the walls of the portable toilets (including comments such as \"n----- trash mother f--ker\", \"who let that dirty n----- into local 36\", \"sieg heil,\" and \"KKK\"); (2) Racially offensive comments made by foreman, including \"black people are no good and you cannot trust them\"; (3) A hangman's noose in the work area. The employees alleged that despite the fact that defendants had notice of such incidents and treatment, they failed to take any remedial action. On October 13, 2005, the court (Judge Gene E.K. Pratter) consolidated four individual suits (filed by the three employees mentioned above and another employee) into this litigation by the EEOC. On May 25, 2006, the court dismissed the fourth employee's claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. 2006 WL 1451527. However, on July 21, 2006, Judge Pratter granted that same plaintiff's motion to intervene. On August 9, 2006, the case was transferred to the Hon. Thomas M. Golden. Through 2006, 2007 and into early 2008, the case continued to move to trial, with Judge Golden denying various parties' motions for summary judgment and entertaining other pretrial motions. On July 24, 2007, however, the court granted summary judgment to defendants Ironworkers Local Union 36 and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 375. One of the plaintiffs had sued these unions as part of his separate suit stemming from the incidents at the construction site -- a suit that was consolidated with the EEOC suit against all of the workplace defendants noted above. In granting the motion, the court noted that a labor union may only be held liable under Title VII if the Union itself instigated or actively supported the discrimination or if it refuses grievances. Further, labor unions do not have an affirmative duty to investigate and take steps to alleviate discrimination on the part of employers. The employee-plaintiff later appealed, but then withdrew the appeal when the matter settled. Apparently the parties reached an agreement on money, but not injunctive relief, because on February 19, 2008, Judge Golden entered an order that the case was \"dismissed without prejudice so that the parties can resolve the non-monetary aspects of the litigation.\" Notwithstanding this purported dismissal, on May 8, 2008, the court approved separate consent decrees between the EEOC and the four defendants. The court retained jurisdiction over the consent decrees, which were set to last for four years. The defendants agreed to pay, in total, $1,650,000 to the employees. The also agreed to develop and implement a written policy prohibiting racial discrimination and unlawful harassment and retaliation against their employees. Additionally, the defendants agreed to implement complaint procedures and to provide for prompt investigation of all complaints of harassment. They also agreed to do a Title VII training for management. The four years have passed, so the case is presumably closed.", "summary": "In this case, the EEOC brought suit on behalf of four African-American workers, who claimed that the defendant employers on a large construction site had allowed them to be subjected to severe racial harassment, in violation of Title VII. The court approved a consent decree between the EEOC and each of the defendants, providing for monetary for the employees and injunctive relief for the employees and all those similarly situated."} {"article": "On November 20th, 2014, four persons convicted of capital murder, sentenced to death, and awaiting execution of that sentence while confined on death row at Virginia\u2019s Sussex I State Prison (SISP) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiffs sued the Virginia Department of Corrections and SISP under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs asked the court to extend the declaratory relief awarded to Mr. Prieto in Prieto v. Clarke to themselves, to enjoin defendants from failing to extend to the plaintiffs their rights and privileges afforded Mr. Prieto as a result of this court's order in his case. The plaintiffs also sought reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a71988. The plaintiffs alleged two violations. First, they contended that the conditions of their confinement on death row and the procedures for placing them there violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Second, they argued that their permanent segregation subjects them to an inhumane existence unrelated to any legitimate penological goal, amounting to imposition of cruel and unusual punishment violating the Eighth Amendment. On Feb 4, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. This motion was denied on April 17, 2015. On December 21, 2015 both parties filed motions for summary judgment. On July 8, 2016, Judge Leonie M. Brinkema granted defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment, denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment as moot. 2016 WL 3766301. The court found that defendants made several significant changes to the conditions of SISP, resulting in new conditions of confinement that plaintiffs conceded do not violate the Eighth Amendment. The court also found that because the improvements voluntarily made by defendants have rendered plaintiffs' claims moot, it would be inappropriate under the specific facts of this action to reach the merits of plaintiffs' claims or to invoke the injunction authority of the court. On August 4, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an appeal to U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, claiming that the improvements made to the conditions on death row did not moot their claims (16-07044). On January 25, 2017, the court (Judges Paul v. Niemeyer, William B. Traxler, Jr., and James A. Wynn, Jr.) heard oral arguments. Judge Wynn delivered the opinion of the court on March 24, 2017, ruling that the improvements made did not render the plaintiffs\u2019 claims moot. 852 F.3d 358. The case was reversed and remanded to the district court due to the defendants' unilateral capacity to reinstitute the challenged policies, their refusal to promise not to reinstitute said policies, and the defendants' outlining of certain instances when those policies might be reinstituted. Back in the district court, the parties reopened discovery, and on August 25, 2017 both parties moved for summary judgment. On February 21, 2018, Judge Brinkema granted the plaintiffs' and denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment. 290 F.Supp.3d 518. Judge Brinkema declared that the pre-2015 conditions of the prison, including periods of isolation lasting up to 23 hours a day, were unconstitutional and in violation of the plaintiffs\u2019 Eighth Amendment rights. It was further ordered that the defendants be enjoined from reinstituting the pre-2015 conditions. The injunction was to remain in place for two years, absent a finding that the prison reverted to pre-2015 conditions. The defendants appealed the order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on March 13, 2018. On December 13, 2018, the court (Judges Paul V. Niemeyer, Robert B. King and James A. Wynn) heard oral argument. Judge Wynn delivered the opinion of the court on May 3, 2019, amending the opinion on May 6 and affirming the district court's decision. First, the court found that the district court's grant of summary judgment was appropriate. Under the undisputed facts, the challenged conditions of confinement on Virginia\u2019s death row created a \u201csubstantial risk\u201d of serious psychological and emotional harm, thus satisfying the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis. Further, the court found that the subjective prong was also satisfied, as the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk of serious psychological and emotional harm. Second, the court upheld the district court's injunction against reinstituting the pre-2015 conditions. 923 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2019). The defendants filed a petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc; it was denied on July 26, 2019, with five votes to grant rehearing en banc (Judge Wilkinson, Judge Niemeyer, Judge Richardson, Judge Quattlebaum, and Judge Rushing). As of April 1, 2021, the case appears to be closed.", "summary": "On November 20th, 2014, four persons convicted of capital murder, sentenced to death, and awaiting execution of that sentence while confined on death row at Virginia\u2019s Sussex I State Prison (SISP) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiffs sued the Virginia Department of Corrections and SISP under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. On July 8, 2016, Judge Leonie M. Brinkema granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. On August 4, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an appeal to U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judge Wynn ruled in the plaintiffs' favor and remanded the case to the District Court. On remand, Judge Brinkema granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declaring the death row conditions unconstitutional and enjoining the defendants from enacting policies to create such conditions. On March 13, 2018, the defendants filed an appeal to U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judge Wynn affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and an injunction for the plaintiffs, finding that the pre-2015 prison conditions were unconstitutional and in violation of the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment rights. The defendants filed a petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc; it was denied on July 26, 2019, with five votes to grant rehearing."} {"article": "On March 31, 2016, U.S. citizens who had engaged in peaceful protest filed this lawsuit in Jefferson Circuit Court (State Court, Kentucky). The case was later moved to the District Court of the United States, Western District of Kentucky. Plaintiffs sued then-Presidential Candidate, Donald J. Trump, and two individual participants at Trump's rally. The plaintiffs brought claims alleging assault and battery and incitement to riot. They alleged that these claims attached to Trump through agency and vicarious liability, and that he had acted negligently for a failure to provide better security. Specifically, the plaintiff's complaint explained that they had attended a presidential campaign rally for Donald J. Trump with the intention of peaceful protest. As Plaintiffs were protesting, Trump allegedly said \u201cGet \u2018em out of here,\u201d following which the individual defendants physically attacked the Plaintiffs until they were forced to leave the rally. Trump also allegedly said \u201cDon\u2019t hurt \u2018em. If I say \u2018go get em,\u2019 I get in trouble with the press, [\u2026]\u201d Plaintiffs sought compensatory damages (for physical injury, humiliation, emotional distress, mental anguish), punitive damages, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest and recovery of their costs. On May 20, 2016, Trump and one of the individual defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which Judge David J. Hale granted in part and denied in part on March 31, 2017. The Court denied Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss for counts on incitement-to-riot and negligence but granted Defendant Trump\u2019s motion to dismiss on counts of vicarious liability, as the plaintiff\u2019s allegations were insufficient to state a plausible claim that these individual defendants had acted as agents of the Trump defendants. The individual defendant's motion to dismiss a claim for punitive damages was granted as well. To this, Defendants moved for interlocutory appeal or, alternatively, for the judge in the district court to reconsider the earlier order. Judge Hale granted this motion on August 9, 2017. Here the Court revisited its earlier decision and reversed its prior ruling as to the defendants' negligence, leaving only the count of incitement-to-riot standing. The Court\u2019s rationale was that the negligent-speech theory was incompatible with the First Amendment. It further found that negligence was an inappropriate vehicle for Plaintiff\u2019s allegations in that they failed to establish that the security provided at the rally was inadequate to prevent violence, and that the purported negligence of ordering audience members to remove protestors was subsumed by Plaintiff\u2019s incitement-to-riot claim. This remaining question of \u201cDoes the First Amendment protect Donald J. Trump\u2019s [\u2026] statement \u201cGet \u2018em out of here,\u201d or may the statement be found to constitute incitement of a riot?\u201d was promptly certified for immediate appeal. Defendant Trump also moved for a writ of mandamus, but this was dismissed as moot. On September 12, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed Plaintiff\u2019s final claim of incitement to riot. The Court found that the district court failed to identify which allegations supported a plausible finding that Trump had incited tumultuous and violent conduct posing grave danger of personal injury (this conduct was a necessary element of Kentucky\u2019s statutory definition of a riot), especially when considering Trump\u2019s later statement of \u201cDon\u2019t hurt \u2018em.\u201d The Court thus concluded that Plaintiffs had not satisfied their burden of \u201crendering all other [explanations] implausible, and that Plaintiff needed more than to allege a mere probability or possibility that Defendants acted unlawfully. The Court also referred to First Amendment Protection, finding that the reaction of listeners did not alter the otherwise protected nature of speech and that Defendant Trump\u2019s speech did not include a word encouraging violence that would have transformed it into unprotected speech. This case is now closed.", "summary": "On March 31, 2016, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in Jefferson Circuit Court (State Court, Kentucky). The case was later moved to the District Court of the United States, Western District of Kentucky. Plaintiffs sued Defendant Donald J. Trump, and Defendants H and B for assault and battery, as well as counts of incitement to riot, agency and vicarious liability, negligence, and punitive damages. The allegations are as such: Plaintiffs attended a presidential campaign rally for Defendant Donald J. Trump with the intention of peaceful protest. As Plaintiffs were protesting, Defendant Trump allegedly said \u201cGet \u2018em out of here,\u201d following which Defendants H, B, and an unknown defendant physically attacked the Plaintiffs until they were forced to leave the rally. Defendant Trump also allegedly said \u201cDon\u2019t hurt \u2018em. If I say \u2018go get em,\u2019 I get in trouble with the press, [\u2026]\u201d Plaintiffs sought compensatory damages (for physical injury, humiliation, emotional distress, mental anguish), punitive damages, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest and recovery of their costs. On May 20, 2016, Defendant Trump and B moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the Court granted in part and denied in part on March 31, 2017. To this, Defendants moved for interlocutory appeal, which was granted on August 9, 2017. Defendant Trump also made a petition for a writ of mandamus, but this was dismissed as moot. On September 12, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed Plaintiff\u2019s final claim of incitement to riot."} {"article": "On December 27, 2013, a Latino individual filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court in the Western District of Washington. He sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States of America, specifically the United States Border Patrol (USBP) and the Anacortes Police Department (APD) in Anacortes, WA. The plaintiff, represented by the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, asked the court for compensatory damages and attorney fees on the basis of five claims: false arrest, false imprisonment, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and abuse of process. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that that the APD improperly took him into custody during a routine traffic stop when they suspected that he was not in the country legally. On March 23, 2015, Judge James L. Robart granted summary judgment partially in favor of the plaintiff and partially in favor of the government. On the counts of false arrest and false imprisonment, Judge Robart determined that the police acted outside their authority when they initially took the plaintiff into custody, but that later, after the plaintiff admitted that he was in the country illegally, it was proper to place him in a detention center. On the other three counts, Judge Robart granted summary judgment to the government. Shortly after, the parties reached a settlement agreement of $10,000. The plaintiff further recovered $8,500 from the Anacortes Police Department in a separate complaint. As a result, on March 31, 2015, the court dismissed the remaining claims and closed the case.", "summary": "In 2013, a Latino plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Border Patrol and Anacortes Police Department alleging false arrest and imprisonment after he was taken into custody at a routine traffic stop on suspicion that he was in the country illegally. The case was settled out of court and the plaintiff received $10,000."} {"article": "On July 8, 2010, an African-American 1st grade boy, on behalf of the rest of the students at his elementary school, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The suit was filed under 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983 against the Recovery School District and the Louisiana Board of Elementary and Secondary Education. The plaintiff, represented by council from the Southern Poverty Law Center and the Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana, asked the court for injunctive relief on behalf of the students at Plaintiff's school as well as a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and compensatory damages for himself. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the school district's policy of having armed police officers restrain students who violate minor school rules by handcuffing them to chairs caused the plaintiff serious harm, and violated plaintiff's rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. At the time of the alleged violations, plaintiff was a first-grade student at Reed Elementary School. Plaintiff was six years old, was about four feet tall, and weighed approximately 60 pounds. On May 4, 2010, plaintiff allegedly failed to follow his teacher's directions. As a result, a police officer took plaintiff to an in-school suspension room where plaintiff was confined with much older students who harassed and teased him. Plaintiff was confined in this room by having his ankle chained to a chair. Two days later, on May 6, 2010, plaintiff got into a minor altercation with a classmate over a seat in the lunchroom. An armed police officer observed this, dragged plaintiff to the principal's office where plaintiff was again forcibly chained to a chair. Plaintiff's parents were not made aware of these incidents until plaintiff complained of pain on his arm and leg after the May 6th incident. Plaintiff's father then met with school officials. At this meeting he was told that the school's policy of restraining children for minor offenses would continue. At his meeting, plaintiff's father was informed that his son would now be suspended for three days. On February 2, 2011, the court (Judge Lance M. Africk) signed an order dismissing the case after a settlement was reached. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center's website, the settlement included changes to the district's policies which prohibited the use of fixed restraints, limited the use of handcuffs, and provided formal training to all security personnel.", "summary": "In 2010, an Aftrican-American 1st grade boy, on behalf of the rest of the students at his elementary school, filed a lawsuit against the Recovery School District after being forcibly restrained by being handcuffed and shackled to a chair for violation of minor school rules in accordance with school policy. In early 2011, a settlement was reached which involved changing the district's policy on using restraints and handcuffs. The settlement also provided for formal training of school security personal."} {"article": "In June 2005, the EEOC district office in Wilmington, Delaware brought this suit against Nabstar LLC, a regional hotel chain, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. The complaint alleges that the defendant violated 29 U.S.C. section 626(b) (ADEA) when it terminated a 74-year old female two weeks after the defendant acquired her former employer. Specifically, the defendant replaced the 74-year old with a 28-year old after the aggrieved employee performed satisfactorily for 6 years prior. After the parties could not reach a settlement in mediation and a defendant motion for summary judgment was pending for two months, the parties entered into a consent decree in August 2006. The consent decree stated that the defendant must (1) not discriminate or retaliate against persons because of his or her age; (2) not divulge any details pertaining to this litigation to any identifiable or potential employer of the aggrieved employee; (3) pay the aggrieved employee a total of $10,000 in satisfaction of all claims relating to this litigation; (4) conspicuously post a notice in its Wilmington facility conveying its commitment to anti-age discrimination; (5) draft a policy or policies against age discrimination and provide a reporting system for complaints; (6) distribute the policies to individual employees and have a receipt of receipt in each personnel file; and (7) provide ADEA training to all of its supervisors and managers in its Newark, Delaware facility. The term of this agreement was two years. The docket sheet does not show any further enforcement took place; the case was presumably closed in 2008.", "summary": "The EEOC sued a hotel chain that had replaced a 74-year-old employee who performed satisfactorily with a 28-year-old under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The parties entered into a two-year consent decree that required the hotel chain to pay $10,000 in damages and comply with ADEA requirements."} {"article": "This case is part of the series of Signal International cases. It was consolidated with Achari v. Signal International and continues on that page. On Aug. 7, 2013, 28 Indian guestworkers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. Plaintiffs filed this suit after District Judge Jay Zainey denied class certification on Jan. 3, 2012 in a related case, IDavid v. Signal International. Plaintiffs were brought to the United States to provide labor and services to defendant Signal International, a company in the business of providing repairs to offshore oil rigs that was based in Pascagoula, Mississippi and had operations in the Gulf Coast region. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs paid Signal's recruiters as much as $25,000 for travel, visa, and recruitment fees, but upon arrival in the United States found out they would not receive the green cards promised to them. Instead, plaintiffs were allegedly forced to pay additional fees ($1050 per month) to live in racially segregated labor camps, and were subject to squalid living conditions and threats of both legal and physical harm if they complained about the conditions or decided not to provide labor. The complaint alleged violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. \u00a71589 (forced labor) and 18 U.S.C. \u00a71590 (trafficking)) and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. \u00a71981), as well as claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. Plaintiffs were represented by private law firms. In Oct. 2013, the Court (Chief U.S. District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr.) consolidated this case and Achari v. Signal International, Krishnakutty v. Signal International, and Devassy v. Signal International, and then transferred the consolidated case to the Eastern District of Louisiana. On Oct. 24, 2013, the case was assigned to Judge Susie Morgan and consolidated with the Achari case. This case continues on that page.", "summary": "On Aug. 7, 2013, 28 Indian guestworkers filed suit in S.D. Miss. for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. In Oct. 2013, the court transferred this case to E.D.La where it was consolidated with the Achari lead case."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This class action was brought on behalf of all people confined at Federal Correctional Institution Fort Dix in New Jersey who are vulnerable to COVID-19 because of their age or underlying health conditions. Petitioners sought temporary enlargement of custody for all class members, or if temporary enlargement is insufficient, the immediate release of all class members. The court denied the motion for preliminary injunction and dismissed the case on May 27, 2020. On June 10, the district court denied reconsideration of the order; the case appears to be closed now.
While the City compares Plaintiffs' claims to the conclusory allegations in Iqbal, those were far from what we have here. In our case, Plaintiffs allege specifics about the Program, including when it was conceived (January 2002), where the City implemented it (in the New York Metropolitan area with a focus on New Jersey), and why it has been employed (because of the belief \"that Muslim religious identity... is a permissible proxy for criminality,\" Compl. \u00b6 36). The Complaint also articulates the \"variety of methods\" by which the surveillance is carried out. See, e.g., id.\u00b6 39 (\"tak[ing] videos and photographs at mosques, Muslim owned businesses and schools\"); id. (\"monitor[ing Muslim] websites, listservs, and chat rooms\"); id. \u00b6 46 (\"snap[ping] pictures, tak[ing] video, and collect[ing] license plate numbers of congregants as they arrive at mosques to pray\"); id. \u00b6 47 (\"us[ing] undercover officers... to monitor daily life in [Muslim] neighborhoods ... and sermons and conversations in mosques\"); id. \u00b6 49 (\"plac[ing] informants or undercover officers in all or virtually all MSAs\"). These allegations are hardly \"bare assertions ... amount[ing] to nothing more than a `formulaic recitation of the elements' of a constitutional discrimination claim.\"Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, 545, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).In addition, the Court emphasized that the District Court had erred in its understanding of the Equal Protection Clause: \"While the absence of a legitimate motive may bear on whether the challenged surveillance survives the appropriate level of equal-protection scrutiny, \"intentional discrimination\" need not be motivated by 'ill will, enmity, or hostility' to contravene the Equal Protection Clause.\" Religious discrimination is unconstitutional, said the court, unless it satisfies the \"strict scrutiny\" test. Plaintiffs had said enough to survive dismissal under this test. The Court concluded:
What occurs here in one guise is not new. We have been down similar roads before. Jewish-Americans during the Red Scare, African-Americans during the Civil Rights Movement, and Japanese-Americans during World War II are examples that readily spring to mind. We are left to wonder why we cannot see with foresight what we see so clearly with hindsight \u2014 that \"[l]oyalty is a matter of the heart and mind[,] not race, creed, or color.\" Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302, 65 S.Ct. 208, 89 L.Ed. 243 (1944).\"(Judge Roth concurred, arguing that intermediate rather than strict scrutiny was applicable, but agreeing that the District Court erred and the case should be remanded to proceed towards trial.) The case was reopened in the District Court on November 6, 2015. The defendants answered the complaint on January 15, 2016. On February 4, 2016, the parties met and conferred and agreed to resolve the matter through settlement. Settlement discussions continued for two years. One of the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed her claims on October 27, 2017. The parties reported settlement of the matter at a February 20, 2018 settlement conference, and Judge Martini ordered administrative termination of the action. Pursuant to the order, the case was to be automatically dismissed 60 days from February 20, 2018, unless the parties filed for dismissal, or requested that the case be reopened for failure to consummate the settlement, prior to that time. In the settlement agreement the defendants agreed to the following policy changes:
- the defendants shall act in accordance with the Revised Handschu Guidelines - the defendants will provide the plaintiffs with the full draft of the Proposed Policy Guide; the defendants will meaningfully consider Plaintiffs\u2019 recommendations and proposed revisions and will respond to them in writing or meet and confer with Plaintiffs\u2019 Counsel on a timely basis after receiving recommendations and proposed revisions - the defendants will make public, with necessary redactions, the final version of the Proposed Policy Guide within 60 days of finalizing revisions - the defendants will include in the Proposed Policy Guide a written protocol setting forth the manner in which the NYPD Intelligence Bureau will fully comply, absent exigent circumstances, with N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-35 through -37 regarding proposed entry into New Jersey for law enforcement purposes - the defendants agree that the Revised Handschu Training PowerPoint shall positively emphasize the City\u2019s stated interest and obligation in protecting the Equal Protection and First Amendment rights of all individuals regardless of race, ethnicity or religion, and avoiding racial, ethnic and religious stereotyping - the defendants will provide Plaintiffs\u2019 Counsel the opportunity to provide suggested changes and comments which Defendant will meaningfully consider incorporating into the Revised Handschu Training PowerPoint - the defendants agree to disclose all of the Zone Assessment Unit\u2019s (f/k/a the Demographics Unit) DD5s, \u201cWeekly MSA Reports,\u201d and all other documents created or maintained by the NYPD Intelligence Bureau, except Handschu investigative statements, if any, regarding Plaintiffs to Plaintiffs\u2019 counsel for their review and thereafter to use reasonable and diligent efforts to expunge them permanently from the NYPD Intelligence Bureau information systems. Defendant further agrees to seal and archive the Demographic reports of Muslim communities in New Jersey and make them available to members of the NYPD only with approval of the Deputy Commissioner for Legal Matters, Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence and Counterterrorism, Chief of Intelligence or the Executive Officer of the Intelligence Bureau. - the defendants agree that a high-ranking official from the Intelligence Bureau, shall attend a public meeting in New York City where the plaintiffs and members of the Plaintiffs\u2019 community in New Jersey will have the opportunity to speak directly with the designated representatives of the city - the defendants will issue a statement affirming that it exercises care in the conduct of investigations involving political activity so as to protect constitutional rights, including the right to be free from investigation in which race, religion or ethnicity is a substantial or motivating factorIn addition, the defendants agreed to pay a combined $52,500 to the plaintiffs and $950,000 in attorneys' fees. On April 11, 2018 Judge William J. Martini signed an order approving the settlement and dismissing the case with prejudice.", "summary": "Several individuals and organizations affiliated with New Jersey's Muslim community filed suit against the City of New York in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging they had been subjected to illegal surveillance by the New York City Police Department solely because of their religion. The NYPD's monitoring, the plaintiffs claimed, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating against them on the basis of their religion and contravened the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment because, by singling out Muslims, it was not neutral with respect to religion or general applicability. The District Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, finding Plaintiffs lacked standing and nevertheless had pled insufficient facts to state a claim. On October 13, 2015, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment and the case remanded to the District Court for further proceeding. The parties reached a settlement agreement in the matter on February 20, 2018. On April 11, 2018 Judge William J. Martini signed an order approving the settlement and dismissing the case with prejudice."} {"article": "On August 1, 2011, the United States filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against the State of Alabama, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The U.S. sought to prevent the implementation of the recently enacted state legislation H.B. 56, arguing it was preempted by the Immigration and Nationality Act and therefore in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. H.B. 56 was designed to address numerous aspects of immigration regulation and enforcement. H.B 56's provisions require, whenever practicable, the determination of immigration status during any lawful stop by the police where there is \"reasonable suspicion\" that an individual is unlawfully present. The United States claimed that the emphasis on maximum enforcement of immigration status laws ignores other objectives that Congress has established for the federal immigration system and undermines the federal government's balance of immigration objectives and priorities. On August 2, 2011, the district court (Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn) consolidated this case with two related cases, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Governor of Alabama (IM-AL-0006) and Parsley v. Bentley (IM-AL-0007), for consideration of Motions for Preliminary Injunctions made by plaintiffs in each of the cases. A month later, however, the court dissolved the consolidation order and ordered all pleadings to be filed in the separate cases, as appropriate. The court granted amicus curiae status to many organizations, including many South and Central American countries, the NAACP, several fair housing organizations, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, and the National Lawyers Guild. A day before the Preliminary Injunction hearing in August 2011, Alabama filed a Motion to Dismiss. After the hearing, on August 29, 2011, the court ordered enforcement of H.B. 56 temporarily enjoined. A month later the court issued a memorandum opinion granting a Preliminary Injunction for certain provisions of H.B. 56, but denying it for other provisions. Both plaintiffs and defendants then filed cross-appeals with the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals heard oral arguments on March 1, 2012. Following the hearing, the court issued an order expanding the district court's injunction pending complete resolution of the appeals. On November 20, 2012, the Court of Appeals (Judge Charles R. Wilson) held that most of the challenged provisions could not stand. United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012). The court found that Section 28, which requires the immigration verification of newly enrolled students, violates the Equal Protection Clause. In addition, the court affirmed the district court's decision that section 11(a), 13(a), 16, and 17 are likely preempted. The court reversed the district court's holding as to section 10 and 27 and remanded for the entry of a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Alabama v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2022 (2013). On remand, the parties reached agreement on a proposed final order to end the case. They filed this with the district court on October 29, 2013. The order would permanently enjoin defendants from implementing the majority of the challenged provisions. The state would not enforce provisions criminalize the solicitation of work by unauthorized or failing to register one's immigration status. Plaintiffs will agree to dismiss their remaining claims without prejudice. On the same day, the parties in a related case, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Governor of Alabama (IM-AL-0006), submitted a similar agreement and proposed order. There the parties also agreed to the permanent injunction of sections 10, 11(a), 13 and 27 as well as additional provisions 11(f) and (g). The settlement in this case would also enjoin enforcement of sections 16 and 17. In Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, the parties agreed to the permanent injunction of Section 28. The plaintiffs in this case agreed to dismiss their claim against Section 28, assuming the court enters the permanent inunction against the provision sought in Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Governor of Alabama (IM-AL-0006). In Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, the plaintiffs also agreed to dismiss the rest of their claims, but specified that a number of those agreements to dismiss (sections 12, 18, 19, and 20) depended upon the defendants' representation that they would interpret the provisions to be consistent with U.S. v. Arizona and \"neither require nor authorize state or local law-enforcement officers to stop, detain, arrest, or prolong the detention of any person for the purpose of ascertaining that person's immigration status or because of a belief that the person lacks lawful immigration status.\" On November 25, 2013, the Court (Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn) issued an order pursuant to the parties' agreement and the Eleventh Circuit's decision. The order permanently enjoined defendants from implementing sections 10, 11(a), 13, 16, 17, and 27 of H.B. 56. The court also dismissed without prejudice the plaintiff\u2019s challenges to Section 12(a), 18, and 30 of H.B. 56. Finally, the court dismissed the plaintiff\u2019s claims that challenged Section 28 because of the permanent injunction that was entered in Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama. The case was closed on November 25, 2013.", "summary": "On August 1, 2011, the United States filed a lawsuit under the Immigration and Nationality Act against the State of Alabama for declaratory and injunctive relief in the U.S. District Court of Alabama, Northern District. The United States sought to prevent the implementation of the recently enacted state legislation H.B. 56 as preempted by federal law and therefore a violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. H.B. 56 was designed to address numerous aspects of immigration regulation and enforcement. The United States claims that the emphasis on maximum enforcement of immigration status laws ignores other objectives that Congress has established for the federal immigration system and undermines the federal government's balance of immigration objectives and priorities. The district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of certain provisions of H.B. 56. Plaintiffs appealed, seeking an injunction for further sections of H.B. 56. The U.S. Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit expanded the injunction to further sections and found that section 28 violated the Equal Protection Clause. In November 2013, the Court enjoined defendants from enacting most of H.B. 56 and dismissed the plaintiff's remaining claims without prejudice."} {"article": "On November 27, 2013, eleven minority individuals who had been subjected to stop-and-frisks by the Miami Gardens Police Department filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against the city of Miami Gardens, its mayor, city manager, and chief of police as well as numerous individual members of the MGPD. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, brought their suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, seeking redress for the violation of their constitutional and civil rights. Specifically, they alleged the defendants' stop-and-frisks are conducted on the basis of race or national origin--instead of probable cause or reasonable suspicion--and thus contravene both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In their complaint, the plaintiffs identified three defective policies of the MGPD that gave rise to the alleged violations. First, the MGPD employed a quota policy, requiring officers to make a monthly minimum amount of citations, field contact reports, and arrests. Second, MGPD officers abused the \"Zero Tolerance Zone Policy\" aimed at reducing trespassing and loitering. Officers policing zero tolerance zones would conduct stop and frisks and arrest individuals, notwithstanding that property owners had opted out of the policy or requested--during such incidents--officers desist. And third, the \"Racial Targeting Policy\" commanded officers to focus their stop-and-frisks on young black males, even where reasonable suspicion was lacking. Accordingly, in addition to monetary compensation, the plaintiffs requested (1) declaratory judgment that the stop-and-frisk policy and practice is unconstitutional; (2) an injunction prohibiting the MGPD's stop-and-frisks generally and its use of quotas and employment of the Zero Tolerance Zone and Racial Targeting policies specifically; and (3) an order that the MGPD adopt remedial policies and programs terminating its practice of stop-and-frisks. The defendants initially filed several motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but the Court (Judge Donald L. Graham) denied the motions as moot in light of the plaintiffs' amended complaint. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed claims against most of the individual defendants, leaving claims only against the city, chief of police, deputy chief of police, and the major in the MGPD who issued the Racial Targeting Policy. The defendants subsequently filed another motion to dismiss, which the Court granted and denied in part. The Court found that Florida statute immunized the defendants against the plaintiffs' conversion claim, but it refused to dismiss their battery claims, explaining the record was insufficiently developed to make such a determination. Finally, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim of tortious interference with a business relationship, noting that the plaintiffs had not opposed the motion. On April 25, 2014, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, in which they removed the individual police officer defendants. Thus, the remaining defendants were the City of Miami Gardens, as well as the Chief, Deputy Chief, and Major of the MGPD. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs filed their third and final amended complaint, in which they added a few details about the MGPD's practices. The parties then engaged in extensive discovery. On August 11, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to bifurcate, requesting separate trials for each individual plaintiff. The City and the MGPD defendants each filed separate motions for summary judgment on January 30, 2015. On that same date, several plaintiffs filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment. On May 27, 2015, Judge Graham rule on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion and denying the plaintiffs' motion. 2015 WL 11202372. Specifically, the Court granted summary judgment for defendants on the plaintiffs' state law claims because the plaintiffs did not strictly adhere to the notice requirements set forth in Florida's sovereign immunity waiver statute. The Court also held that all incidents occurring prior to November 27, 2009 were time-barred pursuant to the Florida statute of limitations for tort actions. Although the Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs' Monell claims premised on the zero tolerance zone ordinance, the Court declined to grant summary judgment for the defendants' on the plaintiffs' Monell claims predicated upon the unwritten quota policy and the racial profiling policy. The Court held for the defendants on the plaintiffs' failure-to-train claim, but held that neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the selective enforcement claims. Finally, the Court held that neither party was entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs' supervisory liability claims and that, assuming the plaintiffs could establish their constitutional injuries, the defendants would not be entitled to qualified immunity. At settlement conference on June 23, 2015, the parties reached a full settlement. The details of the settlement are unknown, but according to news reports, under pressure from the harassment allegations, Police Chief Matthew Boyd resigned in 2013. On July 14, 2015, the parties filed a joint notice of voluntary dismissal with prejudice. Each party agreed to bear their own fees and costs. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Eleven minority individuals who had been subjected to stop-and-frisks by the Miami Gardens Police Department brought this action against the city of Miami Gardens and various individual defendants. They alleged the defendants' stop-and-frisks are conducted on the basis of race or national origin-instead of probable cause or reasonable suspicion-and thus contravene both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. On May 27, 2015, the Court ruled on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motions, while denying the plaintiffs' motion. The parties reached a settlement agreement in June 2015 and agreed to a voluntary dismissal with prejudice. The case is now closed."} {"article": "This case is a revival of a dismissed claim from the Northern District of Alabama. (FA-AL-0002) On October 28, 2013, a nonprofit Catholic media network filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (\"RFRA\") and the Administrative Procedure Act (\"APA\"). Plaintiffs, represented by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, asked the court to issue a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (\"ACA\") extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Specifically, plaintiffs noted that they had always ensured that their self-insured health plan did not cover services inconsistent with their religious beliefs and contended that compliance with the contraception coverage requirement was a substantial burden on their religious exercise. Plaintiffs further claimed that, though they were eligible for the accommodation to the mandate available to nonprofits, they remained burdened by the mandate which, they alleged, violated the First Amendment. On June 17, 2014, Judge Callie V. S. Granade granted summary judgment for the defendants on the counts related to RFRA, the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause on substantial burden to religious exercise and establishment of religion, and compelled speech. Judge Grande also granted the defendants' motion to dismissed all the remaining constitutional claims. She denied defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss the claims related to violations of the Administrative Procedure Act. On June 18, 2014, the District Court stayed the remaining claims, all related to the Administrative Procedure Act, pending the appeal of partial summary judgment. On June 18, 2014, the plaintiffs appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. On June 30, 2014, following the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the Eleventh Circuit granted the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction pending appeal. The Eleventh Circuit heard oral argument in this case on February 4, 2015, and on February 18, 2016, Judge Jill Pryor ruled that the contraception regulation did not substantially burden the plaintiffs' religious exercise. The court further held that the government had a compelling interest in ensuring contraception coverage, and the mandate was the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. However, the court stayed its ruling pending a Supreme Court decision in Zubik v. Burwell. On May 16, 2016, in Zubik, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that that \"accommodates petitioners\u2019 religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners\u2019 health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'\" 136 S.Ct 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of the case. Following the ruling in Zubik, on May 31, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit vacated their prior decision against the plaintiffs, and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing addressing the Supreme Court's concerns in Zubik. The court also enjoined enforcement of the contraceptive mandate against the plaintiffs pending further order of the court. On July 29, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to stay the appeal in order to have more time to finish the research necessary for their supplemental brief and they proposed submitting status reports every 60 days or until a resolution between the parties was found. This motion was granted on August 10, 2016. Also on August 10, 2016, the defendants requested a materially identical order to the remand order given in Zubik. The order was granted on October 3, 2016. The order stipulated that the Government could still ensure that women covered by the plaintiff\u2019s health plans obtained without cost the full range of FDA approved contraceptives and the government could rely on this order to facilitate this process. It also required the plaintiffs not to be penalized for failure to provide the relevant notice. The parties continued to file status reports until October of 2017. In October of 2017, President Trump signed an executive order related to the Affordable Care Act. On October 6, 2017, new regulations were passed that would affect this case and the department of Health and Human Services conceded that requiring certain objecting entities to follow the requirements in the Affordable Care Act violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act because the enforcement did not serve a compelling government interest and was not narrowly tailored. In response to this development, on October 16, 2017, the plaintiffs requested a stay while the parties discussed a resolution. On October 19, 2018, the plaintiff filed an unopposed motion to lift the stay, vacate the lower court\u2019s ruling, and remand the case given concessions made by the government and new interpretations of the Affordable Care Act promoted by the Department of Health and Human Services. The government had issued interim final rules that acknowledged that its interests would be satisfied as long as women had access to a plan with some contraceptive coverage, including that of a family member in addition to their earlier concessions. On November 29, 2018, the ruling of the District Court was vacated. With the challenged rules no longer in effect, the plaintiff filed an unopposed motion to dismiss on January 9, 2019, which the court granted the next day. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This case is a revival of a dismissed claim from the Northern District of Alabama. (FA-AL-0002). In 2013, a Catholic media network filed a RFRA challenge to the Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. After the Supreme Court directed lower courts to oversee negotiated solutions to similar cases in Zubik v. Burwell, the government conceded that the original rules violated the RFRA. With the rules no longer enforced, the plaintiffs dismissed the case."} {"article": "On May 1, 2018, a D.C. resident with intellectual disabilities civilly committed in a North Carolina federal prison filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the District of Columbia, the D.C. Department of Disability Services (DDS), and the director of DDS in his official capacity. The complaint alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and D.C. laws, including the D.C. Human Rights Act (DCHRA) and the Citizens with Intellectual Disabilities Act (CIDA). The plaintiff was represented by American University, Washington College of Law, Disability Rights Law Clinic, the Arc of the United States, and private counsel. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. This case was assigned to Chief Judge Beryl Howell. The plaintiff alleged that D.C. law entitled him to treatment for his intellectual and developmental disabilities in the D.C. area. Specifically, he claimed that after being arrested and found incompetent prior to standing trial, DDS should have begun civil commitment proceedings in the D.C. Superior Court. This would have allowed him to receive treatment close to his family in D.C. Instead, the plaintiff was placed in a federal prison in North Carolina and a separate petition for federal civil commitment had been filed. The plaintiff claimed that this could lead to his indefinite incarceration in the federal prison system, which would prolong separation from his family. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on June 14, 2018 for failure to state a claim. They alleged that the plaintiff was not a qualified individual under the ADA, that he had not allege discrimination on the basis of his disability, and that CIDA did not create a private right of action. On September 28, 2018, the court granted the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss the complaint. The court held that under the ADA, the plaintiff failed to show that defendants discriminated against him because of his disability. The court found that the defendants\u2019 decision not to petition the court for him to remain in D.C. was not apparently on the basis of his disability. And, the plaintiff failed to prove that D.C was required to begin commitment proceedings in every case regarding civil commitment for a D.C. resident. Instead, the court held that CIDA provides D.C. with discretion in beginning commitment proceedings. 2018 WL 4682023. In response, the plaintiff filed a motion on October 26, 2018 to alter the judgment to be without prejudice and to permit him to amend the complaint. On May 8, 2019, the court denied the motion to alter the judgment and amend the complaint. The court again focused on how the defendants\u2019 decision not to petition the court for him to remain in D.C. was not based on his disability. The court noted this could not be cured by additional facts and that the new factual alleged by the plaintiff were available prior to the entry of judgment. The plaintiff then appealed both the dismissal of the claim and the denial of his motion to alter the judgment to the D.C. Circuit on June 7, 2019 (docket number 19-7057). The parties and amicus for the plaintiff have filed numerous briefs on the appeal. Oral argument was scheduled for April 2, 2020. As of January 2020, the appeal remained pending and the case was ongoing.", "summary": "In 2018, a D.C. resident with intellectual disabilities civilly committed to a federal prison in North Carolina sued D.C. and DDS for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the D.C Human Rights Act, and the Citizens with Intellectual Disabilities Act. The plaintiff claimed that after being found incompetent to stand trial, DDS should have begun civil commitment proceedings in the D.C. Superior Court. This would have allowed the plaintiff to receive treatment close to his family rather than being placed in the federal prison system. The defendants moved to dismiss the case in June 2018. In September 2018, the court granted the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. The court held that the plaintiff had not proved he was being discriminated against based on his disability and that D.C. was not obligated to begin commitment proceedings in every case regarding the civil commitment of a D.C. resident. The plaintiff filed a motion on October 26, 2018 to alter the judgment to be without prejudice and to permit him to amend the complaint. After the court denied the motion to alter the judgment, the plaintiff appealed this and the dismissal of his claim. As of January 2020, the appeal remained pending and the case was ongoing."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This lawsuit was brought on May 19 by the League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund and an individual voter to challenge Minnesota\u2019s absentee voting laws requiring the physical presence of a witness. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief requiring the defendant to waive the witness requirement for the August 2020 primaries and the November 2020 general elections. Two of the plaintiffs' three claims were dismissed on March 29, 2021.
\"Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, an election-code provision of this kind must serve a legitimate purpose that is sufficient to warrant the burden it imposes on the right to vote. And under the National Voting Rights Act, an organization has a federal right to conduct a voter-registration drive, collect voter-registration applications, and mail in the applications to a state voter-registration office. But \u00a7 97.0575 and Rule 1S-2.042 severely restrict an organization's ability to do this. The statute and rule impose a harsh and impractical 48-hour deadline for an organization to deliver applications to a voterregistration office and effectively prohibit an organization from mailing applications in. And the statute and rule impose burdensome record-keeping and reporting requirements that serve little if any purpose, thus rendering them unconstitutional even to the extent they do not violate the NVRA.\"The defendants filed an appeal to this order on July 2, 2012, but after the parties jointly moved for permanent injunction, the appeal was dismissed with prejudice. On August 30, 2012, Judge Hinkle granted the joint motion for permanent injunction, which enjoined the named Florida officials from taking any step to demand compliance with or enforce certain provisions of the statute in question. This case is closed.", "summary": "On December 15, 2011, the League of Women Voters of Florida, Florida Public Interest Research Group Education Fund, and Rock the Vote brought this lawsuit in the District Court for the Northern District of Florida. They sued relevant Florida officials to prevent the enforcement of a Florida Statutes \u00a7 97.0575, as amended in 2011, and an implementing rule, Florida Administrative Code Rule 1S-2.042, which they claimed unconstitutionally and unlawfully burdens their efforts to encourage civil engagement and democratic participation by assisting Florida citizens in registering to vote and exercising their fundamental right to vote. The plaintiffs had all conducted and wish to continue to conduct voter-registration drives in Florida. The statute and rule regulate organizations that conduct voter-registration drives. After U.S. District Court Judge Robert L. Hinkle granted the parties' joint motion for permanent injunction, the case was closed."} {"article": "On November 5, 2011, hundreds of people rallied in downtown Oakland to protest what they considered to be the inadequate sentence given to former police officer, Johannes Mehserle, for the killing of unarmed BART passenger, Oscar Grant. After the rally, a group of the demonstrators began to march to the BART station where Grant had been killed. The Oakland Police and other law enforcement agencies forced this group of marchers onto a side street, where they announced that the demonstration had been declared an unlawful assembly. The demonstrators were then detained, prevented from dispersing, and arrested. This class-action lawsuit was filed on behalf of the nearly 150 demonstrators who allegedly were never ordered to disperse or given an opportunity to do so, and who allegedly were arrested without probable cause or legal basis. One of the named plaintiffs informed the police that he was there as a legal observer with the National Lawyers Guild and asked to be allowed to leave. He was arrested nonetheless. The demonstrators were held in buses and vans for several hours with their hands handcuffed behind their backs. Many class members alleged that they were denied bathroom access and were thus forced to urinate on themselves in the crowded vehicles. Almost all of the class members were then imprisoned in the Alameda County Jail overnight in overcrowded holding cells without room to lie down. All of the female class members were forced to submit to pregnancy tests under threat of transfer to the Santa Rita Jail in Dublin, CA, where they would be held for a longer period. Some class members were forced to submit to oral DNA swabbing. None of the class members were ever charged with crimes relating to these arrests. The plaintiffs filed the lawsuit against the City of Oakland, Alameda County, and related individual defendants (the Chief of Police, various officers, etc.) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The complaint alleged that the Oakland Police Department actions violated multiple provisions of the Oakland Crowd Management/Crowd Control Policy established in accordance with the settlement agreement in Local 10 ILWU et al. v. City of Oakland. The Crowd Control Policy restricted the City's power to declare an assembly unlawful only to those circumstances where demonstrators had already acted illegally or where they posed a clear and present danger of imminent violence. It also forbade the City from dispersing demonstrations that had not been declared unlawful, and required the City to provide an opportunity for demonstrators to disperse prior to arrest. Plaintiffs also alleged that the mass arrest was the result of unlawful and unconstitutional policies and practices of Oakland, its Police Department, and Alameda and its Sheriff's Department. The Complaint specifically alleged that the defendants had violated the plaintiff class members' constitutionally guaranteed rights to freedom of speech and association, their right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, their rights to equal protection and due process, their right to be free from the use of excessive and arbitrary force, and their right to privacy. The case was brought under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, which allows private actions to be brought against States for violations of rights guaranteed by federal constitutional and statutory law. The plaintiffs sought class certification, and injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from engaging in the alleged unconstitutional and unlawful practices in the future. They sought an injunction ordering the sealing and destruction of all records of the arrests of the class members, including fingerprints, DNA samples, and photographs, as well as the disclosure of any agencies and entities to whom such information had been relayed. They also sought compensatory, punitive, and exemplary damages, and legal costs. On March 23, 2012, the Court (Judge Thelton E. Henderson) granted the plaintiffs' unopposed motion to certify a class of, \"the approximately 150 people who were arrested in the mass arrest on 6th Avenue between East 17th and 18th Streets in Oakland on November 5, 2010, and who were never charged with any crime related to this arrest. (2012 WL 994644). The parties spent the next several months discussing a settlement, which the Court preliminarily approved on June 13, 2013. The proposed agreement would result in the a payment of $1,025,000 to the class members, of which $350,000 would be paid to the plaintiffs' attorneys for fees and costs. The four plaintiffs acting as class representatives would receive $9,000 each for serving in that role. The remaining money would be distributed between the class members. The settlement also would require the sealing and destruction of the arrest records and related documents and information arising from the incident. The agreement would also require systemic changes. It would authorize the parties to amend certain sections of the Local 10 Settlement, in consultation with the National Lawyers Guild - SF Bay Area Chapter. The Oakland Police Department and the Alameda Sheriff's Department would, in compliance with state law, be required to cite and release qualifying individuals accused of misdemeanors. Other provisions regarding the treatment of detained demonstrators, for instance, guaranteeing access to bathrooms and forbidding the taking of fingerprints and DNA samples of demonstrators facing only misdemeanor citations, were also included in the settlement. On September 9, 2013, the Court approved the settlement and ordered sealing and destruction of arrest records for those found factually innocent of the charges for which the arrests were made. The agreement was set to last for four years, with the option of extending for an additional three if requested by either party. The initial four-year timeline passed without request for extension, and so the case is now presumed closed.", "summary": "Demonstrators brought this class action suit on behalf of 150 individuals who had been illegally detained by Oakland police. The case ended in a settlement granting monetary and injunctive relief."} {"article": "On January 28, 2017, two lawful permanent residents of the United States who were detained at Boston Logan Airport as they were trying to return home to Massachusetts from abroad filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, the plaintiffs sued the United States under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 551 et seq.), 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The plaintiffs claimed that they were detained pursuant to an executive order (the \u201cExecutive Order\u201d) issued by President Donald Trump on January 27, 2017 suspending entry into the United States of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The plaintiffs alleged that denying lawful permanent residents entry back home after a brief visit abroad violated equal protection and due process rights protected by the Fifth Amendment, the First Amendment\u2019s Establishment Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The complaint was filed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (to seek immediate release of plaintiffs from detention) and a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs were Iranian nationals, Muslims, and employed as associate professors at the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth. They were detained at Logan Airport upon returning home from an academic conference. Counsel for the plaintiffs attempted to contact them at Logan Airport but could not because of the detention. The plaintiffs requested a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Executive Order, and Judge Allison Burroughs held a hearing on the TRO on January 28, 2017. On January 29, 2017, Judge Burroughs granted a seven-day TRO and ordered the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint. Per the TRO, the defendants were to comply with airport screening protocols in effect prior to the Executive Order. Further, they were prohibited from detaining or removing individuals from Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen who had lawful visas to enter the United States. The scope of the TRO was unclear\u2014it referenced people \"similarly situated\" to the plaintiffs but did not explain whether that meant just in the District of Massachusetts or nationwide. On Monday, January 30, 2017, the case was assigned to Judge Nathaniel Gorton. The next day, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the University of Massachusetts moved to intervene; Judge Gorton granted the motion on February 2. On February 1, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on behalf of all \"noncitizens who are lawfully in the United States after being thoroughly vetted by the U.S. government\" as well as Oxfam America, Inc., \"a U.S. organization dedicated to reducing poverty around the world.\" The amended complaint included allegations that the executive order significantly hampered Oxfam's humanitarian mission. It also claimed that the Executive Order continued to be enforced despite the TRO. To secure effective relief, the plaintiffs requested an order requiring defendants to immediately notify airlines about the relief granted. They also added claims that the Executive Order violated free speech, association, and petitioning rights secured by the First Amendment. On February 3, Judge Gorton held a hearing to determine if the TRO should be extended. In an opinion issued that same day, Judge Gorton began by noting that the Executive Order's use of the word \"entry\" was best read to indicate that lawful permanent residents (LPRs) were not affected by the travel ban. In light of this reading, plus the Administration's disavowal of coverage of LPRs, he held that the plaintiffs' claim seeking to enjoin the application of the Executive Order to LPRs was moot\u2014there was \"no ongoing conduct to enjoin.\" On the remaining claims, the court held either that the claim was unlikely to succeed or that the remaining plaintiffs lacked standing to assert it. Accordingly, the court declined to extend the TRO. On March 6, 2017, President Trump rescinded the January 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. Shortly afterwards, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the University of Massachusetts filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. And the named plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on March 20. This case is now closed. More information about this case is available at the ACLU of Massachusetts' website, here.", "summary": "On Jan. 28, 2017, two lawful permanent residents of the United States, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs challenged President Trump\u2019s Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order (EO) ban on admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The complaint alleged that in denying lawful permanent residents entry back home after a brief visit abroad, the executive order violated Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. While the plaintiffs secured temporary relief, the court eventually determined that they were not subject to the travel ban, which in any event President Trump soon withdrew and replaced with a new version. The plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed the case."} {"article": "On February 22, 2018, four noncitizens, on behalf of a proposed class of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients, filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Represented by the American Immigration Council and the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, challenging the defendants\u2019 denial of their applications for lawful permanent resident (LPR) status. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Secretary of Homeland Security may find that a country\u2019s conditions temporarily prevent its nationals from returning safely, or that the country is unable to adequately handle the return of nationals. Temporary Protected Status allows recipients to remain and work legally in the United States. During the Trump administration, the defendants had announced the termination, phasing-out, or review of TPS for nationals of various countries. Following years of residence in the United States, TPS recipients from those countries then faced an uncertain future. Some applied for Legal Permanent Resident status on an independent basis through sponsorship by a family member or employer. The plaintiffs in this case, however, alleged that the defendants had denied their LPR applications based on an erroneous interpretation of the INA. To adjust to lawful permanent resident status, a noncitizen must demonstrate to USCIS that she was inspected and admitted to the United States. 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1255(a), (k). A TPS holder, for purposes of adjustment of status, is \u201cconsidered as being in, and maintaining, lawful status as a nonimmigrant.\u201d 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1254a(f)(4). In the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, courts have held that a TPS holder is deemed to have been inspected and admitted because she is deemed to be in \u201clawful nonimmigrant status,\u201d and an individual in such status necessarily has been inspected and admitted. But, plaintiffs alleged, in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, the defendants had a policy of denying the LPR applications of TPS holders who initially entered without inspection and admission, refusing to give effect to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1245a(f)(4) and refusing to acknowledge that a grant of TPS constitutes the inspection and admission required to adjust status. The plaintiffs challenged the defendants' policy under the INA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as contrary to law and exceeding the defendants\u2019 statutory authority. The plaintiffs sought mandamus (for the defendants to lawfully adjudicate the LPR applications) and declaratory and injunctive relief. In their class certification motion, the plaintiffs also proposed a class of all TPS recipients in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, who initially entered the United States without inspection, who had applied or would apply for LPR status, and whose applications had been or would be denied on the basis of USCIS\u2019s policy that TPS does not constitute an \u201cadmission\u201d for purposes of adjusting status under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1255. On February 22, 2018 this case was assigned to Judge Roslynn R. Mauskopf. On March 26, 2018 the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. In May, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the group Asian Americans Advancing Justice offered amicus curiae briefs. The parties submitted letters to the court ahead of a May 30 conference. In their letter, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and the court ordered the plaintiffs to respond to this motion and to the defendants\u2019 opposition to class certification. The court heard oral arguments on the outstanding motions at the May 30 conference. On June 12, 2018 the defendants then filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs filed their own motion for summary judgment a little over a month later. On July 20, 2018 the plaintiffs filed a second motion for class certification. While these motions were still outstanding, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction on November 16, 2018. The parties both submitted reply briefs. With the government shutdown, the defendants filed a motion to stay proceedings due to a lapse in funding on January 23, 2019. The plaintiffs opposed the stay. Shortly after, the defendants moved to withdraw the motion to stay. On January 24, 2019, the plaintiffs filed and the defendants opposed a motion for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction in the alternative. One of the plaintiffs sought an order directing the defendants to reopen and re-adjudicate his application for adjustment of status before March 30, 2019, when his employer and visa petitioner would cease operations. The defendants sought to stay his motion until the government reopened. Once funding was restored, the defendants responded to the motion for a temporary restraining order. On February 15, 2019 the court denied the plaintiff\u2019s request for a temporary restraining order, and directed him to provide further information on whether he had standing to challenge the defendants\u2019 \u201cinspected and admitted\u201d policy described above. 2019 WL 653139. Within the month, both parties filed reply briefs in support and in opposition to the plaintiff\u2019s request for relief. The plaintiffs November 16, 2018 motion for a preliminary injunction also remained pending. The court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for preliminary injunction on May 18, 2020. 460 F. Supp. 3d 291. The court found that although the plaintiffs \u201cmust make a \u2018strong showing\u2019 of irreparable harm\u201d in order to obtain injunctive relief, they had failed to do so. The court noted that a preliminary injunction in another case Ramos v. Nielsen already enjoined the defendants \u201cfrom engaging in, committing, or performing, directly or indirectly, by any means whatsoever, implementation and/or enforcement of the decisions to terminate TPS for Sudan, Haiti, El Salvador, and Nicaragua\u201d and ordered defendants to take \u201call steps needed to ensure the continued validity of documents that prove lawful status and employment authorization\u201d for these TPS holders \u201cpending completion of discovery and a ruling on the merits of the action.\u201d Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1108-09 (N.D. Cal. 2018). The court found that this injunction, combined with a Federal Register notice that assured TPS would not be terminated immediately regardless of the outcome of the appeal in Ramos, the plaintiffs' argument of imminent harm was unpersuasive. On January 8, 2021, the Supreme Court granted review in a parallel case, Santos v. Wolf, proceeding in the Third Circuit. In Sanchez, the plaintiff and his wife were citizens of El Salvador who had applied for and received TPS, but had been denied adjustment of status when they sought to become lawful permanent residents because they had not been admitted to the United States. The district court in Sanchez granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment and found that TPS met \u00a7 1255(a)\u2019s requirement of inspection and admittance or parole. The Third Circuit reversed though and found that TPS could not serve as admission. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "On Feb. 22, 2018, four noncitizens, on behalf of a proposed class of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients, filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Represented by the American Immigration Council and the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, challenging the defendants' denial of their applications for lawful permanent resident (LPR) status."} {"article": "This entry describes the consolidated federal class action lawsuits arising out of complaints about the treatment of prisoners in Montana State Penitentiary. The Initial Class Action Suit On January 28, 1992, inmates at the Montana State Penitentiary filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Montana Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana. The plaintiffs alleged that their constitutional rights had been violated by poor medical care, dental care, and mental health care, overcrowding, fire hazards, environmental hazards, and security hazards, programming of prisoners, classification procedures, access to the prison for disabled inmates, and physical abuse by prison guards resulting in injury and death of inmates. In May 1992, the Defendants twice moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Magistrate Judge Leif Erickson held the Defendants' motion in abeyance until the Plaintiffs could file their amended complaint. On September 4, 1992, attorneys from the National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union entered the case to represent the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed multiple amended complaints, and the plaintiffs also moved for class certification on October 7, 1992. On July 23, 1993, the plaintiffs were granted certification. Judge Erickson also denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss on August 12. The Consolidation On September 10, 1993, Magistrate Judge Leif Erickson consolidated this case with several other suits stemming from poor conditions at Montana State Prison (In re: Conditions at MSP, 6:93-cv-00046. On July 23, 1993, the district court certified the plaintiffs as a class, consisting of the current plaintiffs and other similarly situated inmates in the Maximum Security Unit since July 1, 1988 and in the future. Over the next few years, the court added 63 other lawsuits to the consolidation. The Clearinghouse has a list of the docket numbers for each of those suits, along with the names of the suits and the dates they were filed for most of them. Settlement Agreement and Early Litigation On October 28, 1994, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana (Magistrate Judge Erickson) granted preliminary approval. The agreement covered the areas of medical staffing, tuberculosis screening for inmates, intake medical screening, sick call, access to medication, annual physicals for prisoners, eye care, dental care, mental health care, out of cell recreation, preventive maintenance for prison buildings, compliance with public health and fire codes, objective classification, development of a disciplinary handbook, priority for treatment programs, maximum security procedures, staff supervision and training procedures, a prison-wide intercom system, procedures for use of force, population caps, revision of good time statutes, additional administrative staff, annual review of treatment plans, coordination with the parole board, and compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act. On November 28, 1994, the U.S. Department of Justice filed notice of objections to the settlement agreement. On November 29, 1994, the district court (Judge Erickson) approved the settlement agreement. On March 30, 1995, the plaintiffs asked the court to award them attorneys' fees and expenses. On November 9, 1995, the district court (Judge Erickson) ordered the defendants to pay $232,131.44 in attorneys' fees and expenses. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the award. On April 29, 1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeals and affirmed the district court's decision, ordering both parties to pay their own costs on appeal. Early Efforts Toward Reaching Compliance On June 25, 1997, the defendants asked the court to dismiss the portions of the complaint dealing with the areas where they had already substantially complied with the settlement agreement. On August 1, 1997, the district court (Judge Erickson) found the defendants partially substantially compliant and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in the areas of out of cell time, coordination with the parole board, annual review of treatment plans, priority for treatment programs, creation of a disciplinary handbook, use of force, revision of good time statutes, and additional administrative staff. On October 9, 1998, the plaintiffs asked the court to award them reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses for the litigation period following the first award of attorneys' fees. On September 30, 1999, the district court (Judge Erickson) granted the plaintiffs' second request for attorneys' fees and expenses. The court ordered the plaintiffs to advise the court on how much additional billable time they had spent on the litigation. Langford v. Racicot, 1999 WL 33208662 (D.Mont. Sept. 30, 1999). On February 29, 2000, the parties advised the court that the motion for attorneys' fees had been resolved privately, and that all plaintiff parties had been paid. Earlier, on January 27, 1999, the district court (Judge Erickson) held that the defendants were substantially compliant in several areas except the tuberculosis screening, and the court dismissed those complaints accordingly. On September 9, 1999, the tuberculosis issue was dismissed as well. Later Efforts Toward Compliance Most of what happened in the early 2000's were just fights about attorney's fees. A September 30, 1999 order determined that defendants did have to pay plaintiff's attorney's fees, 1999 WL 33208662, and the precise amount in question was solved privately in early 2000. By June of 2005, however, Judge Erickson ordered the parties to submit a report summarizing the current status of the case and giving a timeline as to when the court could expect resolution. That report was due later that month, but it was not publicly available. On August 18, 2005, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the rest of the settlement agreement. In October of that year, Judge Erickson granted dismissal of one section, saying that defendants were substantially compliant, but then in January of the following year denied dismissal of the settlement agreement as a whole, instead granting the appointment of an expert to supervise. Unhappy with this result, defendants appealed, and the court stayed all other proceedings in the case until the appeals court ruled. On May 15, 2007, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the defendants' appeal in part and affirmed the lower court's decision in part. Defendants were stuck with the district court's decision after all. In the meantime, Judge Leif Erickson retired from the bench in June of 2006, and Judge Jeremiah C. Lynch was assigned the case. In December of that year, Judge Lynch was assigned as the referral judge on pretrial matters, while Judge Donald W. Molloy would be the presiding judge. By May of 2008, attention shifted to the ADA provisions of the case, which represented the final step for Montana to become compliant. The court appointed an ADA expert, Peter Robertson, but he was fired in July of that year, \"based upon his utter inability or refusal to complete the assigned tasks.\" Doc. 1470. The case then dragged on for several years as defendants continued to submit status reports and make improvements to the prison in an effort to become compliant. On April 11, 2012, the court ordered parties to engage in good faith talks to appoint an expert that would evaluate whether defendants were ADA compliant. On July 12, the court appointed Ralph Frazier and Paul Bishop as experts, ordering the parties to split the costs. They made the inspections in September and were given November 1 as the deadline for their report. We do not have the report, but plaintiffs' June 24, 2013 motion for specific performance indicates that the experts found that defendants were still not substantially compliant. The court denied this request, however, asking that the parties first try to work it out amongst themselves. On November 11, 2013, the court granted the parties' stipulated motion to extend the monitoring period. Defendants agreed to begin a tracking system for disabled inmates, and the parties were to submit a final list of remaining issues by March 2014. On February 12, 2016, the court again granted the parties' stipulated motion to extend the monitoring period until August 12, 2016. However, the day before that deadline the court granted one more extension (although warning that it would be the last) until February 12, 2017. Final Settlement Agreements The parties jointly moved for class action settlement on March 2, 2017. This Settlement Agreement was intended to resolve the parties' only remaining dispute from the 1994 Settlement Agreement, the integration of disabled prisoners into housing, facilities, programs, and services as required by the ADA. However, for unknown reasons this agreement was never addressed by Judge Lynch. The parties moved jointly for a separate Settlement Agreement regarding prison conditions on January 19, 2018. The court denied this Settlement Agreement on January 24, 2018. Although the court generally accepted the terms of the agreement, it did not wish to retain jurisdiction over the matter, and requested that the parties revise their motion to include an alternative procedure for dispute resolution, such as binding arbitration. The parties jointly moved for the court to approve their revised Settlement Agreement on February 23, 2018, and the court approved the Settlement Agreement on February 27, 2018. The parties acknowledged that the defendant had moved significantly toward compliance in two major areas: barrier removal and policy change, and reached a resolution toward full compliance in the remaining disputed areas. On June 19, 2018, the court entered judgment in accordance with the February 23, 2018, Class Action Settlement Agreement, and gave the Agreement final approval. The agreement revised the 2017 settlement to reflect that defendants had made substantial improvements in providing access and had very few issues left to solve. The dispute resolution provision in the new agreement required that any disputes first go through an arbitrator before going back to the court as a forum of last resort. The court left open the possibility of appointing a Special Master if future disagreements arise from the terms of the Settlement Agreement. In February of the next year, the judge ordered the defendants to pay a sum total of $950,000 in attorney's fees to plaintiffs, pursuant to the 2018 Settlement Agreement.", "summary": "In 1992, inmates at the Montana State Penitentiary filed a class-action lawsuit against the Montana Department of Corrections alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated by means of numerous health and safety violations. On October 28, 1994, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana (Judge Erickson) granted preliminary approval, but the court retained jurisdiction. Over the years the state complied with the vast majority of provisions. However, on November 11, 2013, Magistrate Judge Jeremiah C. Lynch, now monitoring the case, granted the parties' stipulated motion to extend the monitoring period because there is still one provision of the settlement agreement, compliance with the American Disabilities act, that still requires monitoring."} {"article": "This was the lead case before the Supreme Court in 2020 when it held that \"[a]n employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964].\" District Court On May 5, 2016, a male county employee filed this lawsuit, pro se, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, against his employer, the Clayton County Board of Commissioners. He sued for damages under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming that the defendants, as his employer, had violated Title VII by discriminating against him on the basis of sexual orientation. Specifically, he claimed that his employer had terminated him, despite 10 years of positive past performance evaluations, from his position as the Child Welfare Services Coordinator assigned to the Juvenile Court of Clayton County after finding out that he was participating in a gay recreational softball league. He also alleged other incidents of harassment at work. The case was assigned to Judge Orinda D. Evans on May 9, 2016. On August 2, 2016, the plaintiff had acquired the assistance of private counsel and filed a first amended complaint, in which he sought declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction to prevent his employer from engaging in unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII, full backpay from his termination date, reinstatement to his former position, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. On August 23, 2016, the employer filed a motion to dismiss claiming that Title VII does not encompass discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and because the Board of Commissioners was not capable of being sued. The plaintiff requested leave to file a second amended complaint on September 9, 2016. On September 12, 2016, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. In the complaint, the plaintiff changed the defendant to be Clayton County and amended the allegations to discuss his discrimination as based on sexual orientation and failure to conform to a gender stereotype. On September 26, 2016, the employer filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint for failure to state a claim. It argued that Title VII does not include claims on the basis of sexual orientation. In November 2016, Magistrate Judge Walter E. Johnson recommended to grant the employer's motion. 2016 WL 9753356. However, the district court deferred decision until the 11th Circuit gave a decision in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, another Title VII case regarding discrimination based on sexual orientation. On July 21, 2017, Judge Evans adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation and granted the County's motion to dismiss the case. The court found (1) that the 11th Circuit had foreclosed claims under Title VII for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; and (2) the plaintiff had not adequately pleaded facts of gender stereotyping. 2017 WL 4456898. Court of Appeals The plaintiff appealed to the 11th Circuit on August 11, 2017 (docket no. 17-1380). In May 2018, the 11th Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court. 723 Fed. App'x 964 (Mem), reh'g denied, 894 F.3d 1335. U.S. Supreme Court On June 1, 2018, the plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, which was granted on April 22, 2019. 139 S.Ct. 1599. The case was consolidated with Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc. and EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. for briefing and oral argument. In the other cases, plaintiffs' counsel was the ACLU and the Stanford Law School Supreme Court Clinic; those lawyers did the oral argument here, as well. Oral argument occurred on October 8, 2019 and the Supreme Court rendered its decision on June 15, 2020. Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote that Title VII prohibits employers from engaging in discrimination \"because of\" sex. Justice Gorsuch stated that the statutory language \"because of\" implies a but-for causation analysis, meaning that \"so long as the plaintiff's sex was one but-for cause of that decision [to fire], that is enough to trigger the law.\" The opinion stated that \"if an employer would not have discharged an employee but for that individual's sex, the statute's causation standard is met and liability may attach.\" LGBT discrimination against employees met this test, because \"an employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have question in members of a different sex. Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids.\" 590 U.S. ___. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded for further proceedings. The case remains ongoing.", "summary": "This case addresses the scope of Title VII's ban on sex discrimination. A gay man filed this suit on May 5, 2016 against Clayton County, arguing that he was terminated from his employment there on the basis of his sexual orientation. In so doing, the plaintiff argued that the defendants discriminated against him on the basis of sexual orientation and so violated Title VII. The complaint was dismissed in the district court for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The 11th Circuit affirmed and refused to hear the case en banc. The case was taken up by the Supreme Court of the United States on April 22, 2019 and the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit on June 15, 2020, holding that firing an employe for being gay or transgender violates Title VII."} {"article": "On February 1, 2012, a military veteran with multiple sclerosis who married her wife in California in 2008 filed suit challenging DOMA and other laws governing the Department of Veterans Affairs. The plaintiff, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, the ACLU of Southern California, and private counsel, alleged that the laws violated her equal protection rights, because she would be entitled to larger monthly disability payments if she were recognized as a legally married person. She sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2001-2202. The House Republican-appointed \"Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group\" (BLAG) appeared to defend the constitutionality of the challenged statutes. BLAG sought a stay of proceedings while similar issues were resolved in Golinski v. OPM, a DOMA case in the 9th Circuit. On August 3, 2012, Judge Consuelo B. Marshall, the district court judge in this case, denied the stay. In December, after the Supreme Court granted review on the issue in United States v. Windsor, BLAG renewed its motion for a stay, pending the outcome in the Supreme Court. The U.S. has declined to defend the constitutionality of the statutes in question, but it filed a motion to dismiss, on the grounds that the Veterans' Judicial Review Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the VA Secretary over benefits claims, depriving the district court here of jurisdiction to order an award of benefits. The U.S. noted that this plaintiff had already initiated proceedings before the VA (though those proceedings were stalled). On August 29, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. On March 12, 2014, Judge Marshall declared that DOMA was unconstitutional under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court ruled against sections within DOMA that required a \"spouse\" or \"surviving spouse\" to be a member of the opposite sex. The defendants were enjoined from using DOMA to deny recognition of the plaintiff's same-sex marriage, which had been recognized by the State of California. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Plaintiff is a military veteran with multiple sclerosis who married her wife in California in 2008. On February 1, 2012, the plaintiff filed suit challenging DOMA and other laws governing the Department of Veterans Affairs. The plaintiff alleged that the laws violate her equal protection rights, since she would have been entitled to larger monthly disability payments if she had been recognized as a legally married person. The U.S. sought to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, although it did not defend the statutes' constitutionality. The dismissal was denied, and, on March 12, 2014, the court declared that DOMA was unconstitutional under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution."} {"article": "On November 2, 2017, individuals facing arrest because of their inability to pay their court fines and costs filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs sued the Oklahoma Sheriff\u2019s Association, every Oklahoma county sheriff, and Aberdeen Enterprises, a private collections company. The plaintiffs sued under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, and Oklahoma state law. The plaintiff, represented by Civil Rights Corps, the Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection at Georgetown Law, and private counsel, sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney\u2019s fees and costs. The plaintiffs also asked the court to certify the class as all people living in poverty, found to be indigent by the Courts of Oklahoma Counties, who were victims of an extortion scheme by defendants. Specifically, the lawsuit alleged that Aberdeen Enterprise on behalf of, and in concert with, the Oklahoma Sheriff's Association, violated RICO by operating an extortion scheme targeting indigent individuals who have been assessed fines in criminal and traffic court in Oklahoma. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants, motivated by a desire to extort, threatened plaintiffs that if they did not pay money to Aberdeen, they would have a warrant issued, be arrested, face testimony from Aberdeen about non-payment, face additional fees, and be sent to jail. According to the complaint, collected fines were then split between Aberdeen and the Sheriff's Association, and this scheme made the Sheriff's Association $829,075 in 2016 alone. In addition, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of defendants\u2019 actions, arguing violations of their rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and Fourth Amendment. Plaintiffs claimed that the policies of keeping debtors in jail and placing them on onerous probation supervision solely because of their wealth status and inability to pay violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Additionally, plaintiffs alleged abuse of process by Aberdeen in using the justice system to accomplish ulterior motives in the form of profiting at the expense of these individuals. Aberdeen Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss on January 8, 2018, but the motion was denied as moot, when shortly after the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 1, 2018. In the amended complaint, six new plaintiffs joined the suit, some county sheriffs were dropped as defendants, and the additional allegations focused on the collections systems in Tulsa and Rogers counties. Two of the plaintiffs also sought preliminary injunctions to prevent Tulsa and Rogers Counties from jailing them for unpaid court debts. By the end of March 2018, all defendants filed motions to dismiss. The plaintiffs responded by seeking leave to amend the complaint for a second time. On March 26, 2018, the court found good cause to delay starting discovery until the motions for preliminary injunctions and motions to dismiss were resolved. On September 20, 2018, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint and denied the motions to dismiss as moot. The second amended complaint clarified certain allegations in response to the motions to dismiss, added the allegation that Tulsa County stopped using Aberdeen when the lawsuit was filed, and added an additional plaintiff. The defendants subsequently filed new motions to dismiss. Throughout the end of 2018 and 2019, the parties engaged in briefing on the motions to dismiss and for preliminary injunctions. On August 24, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion to open discovery. In response, the defendants urged the court to delay the opening of discovery pending the resolution of the plaintiff's motions for preliminary injunctions and future motions to dismiss by the defendants. On August 26, 2020, the court lifted the stay on discovery, but on September 11, 2020, the court granted the defendant's motion to reconsider. The court then referred the motions for a preliminary injunction to Magistrate Judge Jodi F. Jayne on September 26, 2020. On September 30, 2020, a motion hearing was held for the plaintiff's seeking preliminary injunctions. As of February 5, 2020, the motions for preliminary injunctions are still pending and no discovery has taken place. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "Plaintiffs, representing a putative class of indigent individuals who were assessed fines in criminal and traffic court in Oklahoma, filed a suit against Aberdeen Enterprises II Inc., a private collections company, and the Oklahoma Sheriff's Association over Aberdeen's debt collection practices. Plaintiffs alleged that Aberdeen and the Sheriff's Association ran an illegal extortion scheme and threaten poor Oklahomans with arrest and jail time unless they pay their court fees and assessing new fines when these individuals are unable to pay. The plaintiffs have twice amended their complaint and have pending motions for a preliminary injunction. The defendants filed motions to dismiss in later 2018 and the parties engaged in briefing on these motions for much of 2019. Discovery is currently stayed pending resolution of the motions for a preliminary injunction and motions to dismiss. This case is ongoing."} {"article": "On August 23, 2010, several individuals with incontinence caused by disability filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to challenge Missouri Medicaid's (MO HealthNet) policy of only covering incontinence briefs for those individuals residing in institutions. Each plaintiffs requires incontinence briefs to prevent skin deterioration and infections, which can pose serious health risks. Without access to the briefs, the plaintiffs risk institutionalization so that all of their needs could be met. The plaintiffs alleged that this policy reflected a preference for institutionalization, which violates the ADA (under the Supreme Court precedent Olmstead v. L.C.) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiffs also claimed that this policy violated several provisions of the federal Medicaid act. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction along with their plaintiff, and the United States (DOJ) filed a statement of interest supporting the motion. The defendants opposed this motion and claimed that incontinence briefs for non-institutionalized adults are personal hygiene items rather than medical supplies. Judge Nanette K. Laughrey granted a preliminary injunction on December 27, 2010. The December 27 order found that plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success on the merits, and on February 17, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. The United States also supported this motion. After oral arguments, Judge Laughrey granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on June 24, 2011, finding that MO HealthNet's policy of excluding adult incontinence briefs from home health services coverage violated the federal Medicaid act, the ADA, and Section 504. The court ordered the state to change its policy to cover incontinence briefs. The parties then briefed the issue of attorney's fees, and the court ultimately granted attorney's fees and closed the case in October 2011.", "summary": "Adults with disabilities who were incontinent challenged Missouri Medicaid's exclusion of adult incontinence briefs from its home health services coverage. The state Medicaid authority had a policy of providing incontinence briefs to institutionalized adults, but not to adults with disabilities living in the community. This policy placed the plaintiffs at risk of skin deterioration, infection, and ultimately, placement in an institution so that their medical needs could be met. Judge Nanette K. Laughrey granted injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, who had successfully demonstrated that the state's policies violated the federal Medicaid Act, the ADA (under Olmstead), and Section 504. The state was ordered to include adult incontinence briefs among its covered medical supplies for home health care services."} {"article": "On May 10, 2000 plaintiffs, African American employees of Lockheed Martin, filed a lawsuit alleging discrimination on the basis of race pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against their employer in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought class certification, an order declaring liability, injunctive and equitable relief, back and front pay, lost benefits, compensatory damages, emotional distress damages, pain and suffering damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that they had been systematically excluded from the promotional process by the predominantly Caucasian managerial staff. They also alleged that they had not been provided with necessary opportunities for overtime or training and that they were subjected to a hostile work environment. The EEOC sought to intervene, but on January 29, 2001 the district court (Judge Forrester) denied this motion. On August 2, 2001 class certification was denied by the district court (Judge Forrester) and the plaintiffs thereafter were ordered to proceed individually. On August 1, 2003 the district court (Judge Forrester) dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of prosecution.", "summary": "On May 10, 2000 plaintiffs, African American employees of Lockheed Martin, filed a lawsuit against their employer alleging discrimination on the basis of race. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that they had been systematically excluded from the promotional process, that they had not been provided with necessary opportunities for overtime or training, and that they were subjected to a hostile work environment. On August 2, 2001 class certification was denied by the district court (Judge Forrester) and on August 1, 2003 the case was dismissed without prejudice for lack of prosecution."} {"article": "On June 30, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the Philadelphia U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Ross Stores, Inc. on behalf of a Russian employee. The EEOC alleged that Ross Stores had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et. seq.) by discriminating against the employee on the basis of her national origin. According to the EEOC, the employee was denied the pay increase she was entitled to receive upon promotion to Area Supervisor because of her Russian accent. The EEOC sought its costs and monetary and injunctive relief for the employee, including policy reform, anti-discrimination training, back pay, and compensation for emotional harm. The parties reached a settlement, which the Court (Judge William H. Yohn Jr.) entered as a consent decree on January 3, 2007. The two-year decree provided the employee with $20,000, and contained a variety of injunctive provisions. Under the decree Ross was prohibited from retaliating and from discrimination, and was required not to disclosure the details of the case to potential employers, to expunge the employee's personnel file, to change its policies, to implement a complaint procedure, to investigate claims promptly, to distribute policies to employees, to provided biennial antidiscrimination training for supervisors, and to post an EEOC notice. The parties bore their own costs. No further activity appears on the docket and the case is now closed. The decree was to last for two years. The docket sheet doesn't show any further enforcement took place; the case was presumably closed in 2009.", "summary": "On June 30, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this Title VII national-origin-discrimination suit in the Philadelphia U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Ross Stores, Inc. on behalf of a Russian employee. According to the EEOC, the employee was denied the pay increase she was entitled to receive upon promotion to Area Supervisor because of her Russian accent. The parties reached a settlement, which the Court (Judge William H. Yohn Jr.) entered as a consent decree on January 3, 2007. The decree provided the employee $20,000 and included a variety of injunctive povisions. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On February 9, 2012, a former prisoner filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois. The plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law against the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), claiming violations of the First, Eight and Fourteenth Amendments. Represented by the MacArthur Justice Center and Uptown People's Law Center, the plaintiff asked the court for monetary damages,. The complaint alleged that the IDOC employees were never disciplined for their role in his rape investigation. The plaintiff began serving a term of imprisonment with the Illinois Department of Corrections in February 2011. At a prison, his cellmate made physical contact with him. The plaintiff reported the incident to officer in charge and was moved to Health Care Unit. The plaintiff received a disciplinary ticket for providing false information about his alleged sexual assault. His cellmate passed the lie detector test and the plaintiff claimed he was threatened into recanting his allegation and the investigation was conducted in a retaliatory manner. The parties scheduled discovery. On April 16, 2012, the IDOC moved to dismiss part of the complaint, claiming state sovereign immunity. On June 27, 2012, the court (Judge Sue E. Myerscough) denied the motion, determining that a factual record needed to be more fully developed. 2012 WL 2459399. On July 12, 2013, Judge Sue E. Myerscough granted a motion to compel discovery. 2013 WL 3712406. After more than two years of discovery, on March 23, 2015, the defendants moved for summary judgment. On March 28, 2016, Judge Sue E. Myerscough denied the motion; the case went to jury trial in June 2016. In the middle of the third day of trial, the parties reported to the Court that they had settled. On September 2016, the plaintiff and the defendants submitted a stipulation of settlement and request for dismissal to the court. The settlement itself is not part of the public court record. But according to the Chicago Tribune, the IDOC agreed to pay the plaintiff $450,000. On September 8, 2016, Judge Myerscough dismissed this case with prejudice, each party to bear their own costs.", "summary": "In 2012, a former prisoner in the Logan Correctional Facility in Lincoln, Illinois, filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois. The plaintiff alleged that he was sexually assaulted by his cellmate during his time in Logan. The plaintiff sought monetary damages. In 2016, the parties reached a settlement of $450,000."} {"article": "On Oct. 17, 2017, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, and the States of California, Hawai'i, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, New York, Oregon, and Washington filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its components U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). All plaintiffs were represented by their respective Attorneys General. The plaintiffs sought disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of agency records that would shed light on federal immigration enforcement activities within their respective States. Due to a significant increase in such enforcement in 2017, the plaintiffs asserted that they had an urgent need for this information. The complaint alleged that on June 29, 2017, the plaintiffs submitted a FOIA request to ICE, USCIS, and CBP seeking copies of records relating to: 1. the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA); 2. arrests and/or detentions of individuals at certain locations; and 3. ICE or CBP detainer requests and databases. The complaint further alleged that, to date, the plaintiffs had not received a substantive response from ICE. The plaintiffs sought an expedited disclosure order under FOIA and sought legal fees. The case was assigned to Judge F. Dennis Saylor, IV. On Feb. 15, 2018, the parties filed a joint statement. The plaintiffs sought production of all responsive documents by Aug. 1, whereas the defendants anticipated production by Sept. 30 for CBP and USCIS and Nov. 30 for ICE. The defendants completed their productions at the end of November 2018, with the exception of a subset of records that were referred to other agencies for review and production. On Sept. 10, 2019, the plaintiffs requested that the district court set a deadline for the defendants' completion of remaining document production; the court set the date of Oct. 7, 2019. On Oct. 1, 2019, the parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal. The parties explained that the defendants had made a final production of records responsive to their FOIA requests on Sept. 12, and thus they had agreed to dismiss this case, with each party to bear its own costs, attorneys fees, and expenses. This case is closed.", "summary": "On Oct. 17, 2017, Massachusetts, DC, California, Hawai'i, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, New York, Oregon, and Washington, sued DHS, ICE, USCIS, and CBP under FOIA, seeking agency records on federal immigration enforcement activities within the respective States. The defendants produced all records responsive to the plaintiffs' FOIA requests on September 12, 2019. The parties then agreed to dismiss the case."} {"article": "On May 14, 2003, deaf and hard-of-hearing employees of the United States Postal Service, on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of people similarly situated, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service in his official capacity, under The Rehabilitation Act 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 791 et. seq. after beginning an action with the EEOC that stalled for about seven months. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Washington Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and attorneys fees. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to provide reasonable accommodations as required by the Rehabilitation Act and thereby caused the plaintiffs and their putative class to suffer harm of frustration, anxiety, fear and distress conditions particularly exacerbated by the anthrax threat in 2001. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiffs and their putative class by failing to provide licensed sign language interpreters to its deaf and hard-of-hearing employees during important staff meetings that discussed safety, work place practices, and Postal Service policies. On May 26, 2004, the District Court (Judge Richard J. Leon) granted the defendant's motion to strike and dismiss the class action portions of the plaintiffs' complaint because the plaintiffs failed to show that their claims were common and typical of their class as required by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a). However, the Court granted in part the plaintiff's motion to compel and denied the defendants's motion for a protective order. The parties proceeded to discovery. During the next six years, the parties engaged in various discovery disputes and plaintiffs entered several amended complaints. In 2010, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations and mediation. On October 24, 2011, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for class certification and court approval of attached Global Settlement Agreement among the parties. On October 19, 2012, in an order, the District Court (Judge Leon) certified the class for purposes of settlement and granted leave for the plaintiffs to amend their complaint, a hearing for the final settlement agreement, and preliminary approval. In compliance with Judge Leon's order, the plaintiffs filed their third amended class action compliant alleging the defendant failed to provide reasonable accommodations and that failure \"impeded [plaintiffs'] ability to perform an essential job function.\" The plaintiff also added plaintiffs from a parallel action against the defendant then being litigated in front of the EEOC whose added allegations where incorporated into the class definition quoted above. On July 31, 2013, the District Court (Judge Leon) approved the Global Settlement Agreement that awarded the plaintiffs $4.33 million, including $1,550,000 for plaintiffs' attorneys fees and expenses, and $3,525,783 in compensatory damages. The Court also granted an injunction that, among other things, required: the to defendant provide alternative means of communication to their deaf and hard-of-hearing employees for \"important workplace communications\" upon request; the defendant to create the Postal Service Reasonable Accommodation Assistance Center to monitor provision of reasonable accommodations in the postal service; and both parties to appoint a independent ombudsmen for three years to enforce the agreement. The District Court stayed dismissal of the case for a period of three years in order to retain jurisdiction with respect to enforcement of the terms of the agreement. The period of enforcement ran from August 30, 2013-August 30, 2016 without further litigation or conflict. The parties completed their respective obligations pursuant the settlement agreement and the case was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice on September 8, 2016.", "summary": "On May 14, 2003, plaintiffs, deaf and hearing impaired employees of the United States Postal Service, brought a class action lawsuit against the United States Postal Service in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging the defendant failed to provide reasonable accommodation to allow plaintiffs to communicate during important work meetings. On July 31, 2013, the parties entered a Global Settlement Agreement that awarded the plaintiffs $4.33 million, required the defendants to adopt assistive communication technology to allow for better communication, required enforcement by an independent ombudsmen for three years, and gave the Court continuing jurisdiction over disputes over the Agreement for three years."} {"article": "This suit was filed by eleven New York residents against the City of New York and the New York City Police Department on October 26, 2020 in the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983 alleging excessive force and unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as well as retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs also brought claims under the New York State Constitution on the same facts. The complaint sought declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys\u2019 fees and costs, and any other relief the Court deemed just and proper. The complaint alleged that NYPD officers, with the approval of their supervisors, regularly used excessive force against and falsely arrested peaceful protesters during the widespread racial justice protests that took place in the summer of 2020. Two of the plaintiffs attended protests as journalists and one as a medic. The complaint specifically alleged that on different occasions, officers responded to the plaintiffs\u2019 peaceful participation in the protests with violence, including: striking plaintiffs repeatedly with batons; tackling plaintiffs to the ground and pinning them with their bodies; indiscriminately pepper spraying plaintiffs; threatening plaintiffs with tasers; punching and kicking plaintiffs; tightly zip-tying or handcuffing plaintiffs\u2019 wrists for extended periods of time, causing significant pain; and kettling plaintiffs to prevent their compliance with curfew. According to the complaint, the actions taken by officers resulted in lacerations, fractures, nerve damage, bruising, abrasions, head injuries, debilitating pain, and emotional distress to the plaintiffs and other protesters. In addition, the complaint alleged that several of the plaintiffs were arrested and held without cause in unclean, overcrowded cells, without any medical assistance to treat their injuries. Plaintiffs further alleged that, despite the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, police officers responding to protests frequently failed to wear masks or to assist detained protesters in covering their noses and mouths, exposing protesters to a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19. One plaintiff also alleged that NYPD officers intentionally humiliated the plaintiff by repeatedly misgendering them. The case was assigned to Judge Colleen McMahon. In January 2021, Judge McMahon consolidated this case with three later-filed police conduct cases (People of New York v. New York, Sow v. City of New York, and Wood v. De Blasio) for pre-trial purposes. On February 4, 2021, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein. In early March, the Police Benevolent Association of the City of New York and the Detectives Endowment Association of New York City moved to intervene in the case. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 5, adding a request for injunctive relief ordering the defendants to take appropriate steps to refrain from using the unconstitutional policies and practices alleged in the complaint. As of March 16, 2021, the case remains pending in the District Court.", "summary": "Eleven New York City residents filed this lawsuit against the City of New York and the NYPD on December 14, 2020. The suit alleged that the NYPD falsely arrested and used excessive force against peaceful protesters during the 2020 racial justice protests in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments, as well as the New York State Constitution. It further alleged that the plaintiffs suffered physical and mental injuries as a result of the NYPD's practice of using excessive force against peaceful protesters. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys\u2019 fees and costs, and any other relief the Court deemed just and proper."} {"article": "On December 3, 2010, the United States of America filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against Lake County, Indiana, pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1997. The plaintiffs, represented by the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, sought permanent injunctive relief, alleging that the County's actions and omissions in maintaining the Lake County Jail exhibited deliberate indifference to the health and safety of detainees at the Jail. The case was assigned to Judge Theresa Springmann. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to appropriately screen for suicide risk, failed to provide sufficient and adequate staffing, failed to provide intake and referral process for persons with serious psychiatric needs, failed to provide sufficient medical staffing and adequate access to medical care for persons with serious medical needs, failed to provide adequate fire safety, and maintained a physical environment at the Jail that caused harm and posed an unreasonable risk to health and safety. On September 12, 2008, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice notified the County of its intention to investigate conditions of confinement at the Jail. On December 15-18, 2008, DOJ consultants in the fields of correctional suicide prevention, mental health care, medical care, fire safety and environmental health toured the Jail. On December 7, 2009, the plaintiff issued a \"Findings Letter\", where it concluded that certain conditions at the Jail violated the constitutional rights of the detainees. The parties entered into a settlement agreement on August 18, 2010. On December 3, 2010, the plaintiffs and the defendants filed a joint motion to enter the settlement. On December 20, 2010, Judge Springmann issued an order approving the settlement agreement in its entirety. The Court retained jurisdiction over the case to ensure timely and proper implementation of the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement provided that the County did not admit any fault or liability. Under the agreement, the County had to use its best efforts to establish a suicide prevention program, to develop and implement a comprehensive fire safety program and ensure compliance with it, to revise and implement written housekeeping and sanitation plans for proper cleaning of housing, shower and medical areas, and to implement comprehensive and contemporary policies and procedures related to the use of force. Under the agreement, the Jail had to submit bi-annual compliance reports to the U.S. Department of Justice. The plaintiff agreed to have a Liaison whose duty is to supervise the implementation of the agreement and file the reports with the Court. The agreement was set to terminate when the Jail achieved substantial compliance with the provisions of the agreement and maintained such compliance for one year. If the plaintiff believed that the County had failed to substantially comply with any of the obligations under the agreement, it would, prior to seeking judicial enforcement of the agreement, give written notice of failure to the County, and the parties were to attempt good-faith resolution of the dispute. In the event of the failure of mutual resolution, the parties could submit the dispute to mediation or invoke the jurisdiction of the Court. On January 18, 2012, a compliance report was filed with the Court. The report indicated non-compliance and partial compliance with the provisions of the agreement. Status and compliance reports continued to be provided over the next two years. On September 17, 2015, the parties jointly moved to terminate Subsection D (Fire Safety) of the settlement agreement, noting that the defendants had reached and maintained compliance with Subsection D for one year. The Court granted this motion on October 6, 2015. Then, by the same reasoning, the parties moved to terminate Subsection A (Medical Care) and Subsection C (Suicide Prevention) on August 10, 2017. The Court granted this motion on August 31, 2017. The parties continued to provide status reports through December 8, 2019, when they submitted their eighteenth and final report. On December 17, 2019, the parties jointly moved to terminate the settlement agreement and for final dismissal. Judge Springmann granted the motion the following day, December 18, 2019. This case is now closed.", "summary": "The United States of America filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1997, on December 3, 2010. It alleged violations of constitutional rights of detainees at the Lake County Jail through acts and omission of Lake County, Indiana. The parties entered into a settlement agreement, approved by the Court, under which the Lake County provided bi-annual compliance reports with the obligations to improve Jail conditions. The Court retained jurisdiction over the matter to ensure timely and proper implementation of the settlement agreement. On December 17, 2019, the parties jointly moved to terminate the settlement agreement. The motion was granted, and the case was closed the following day."} {"article": "On January 21, 2009, an inmate at Rikers Island filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 against the City of New York. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for monetary damages as well as an award of costs and attorneys fees, claiming that Officers of the New York City Department of Corrections in their official capacity intentionally subjected the plaintiff to excessive force, assault and battery, and deprivation of liberty. At the time of the incident, the plaintiff was in custody at Rikers Island as a pre-trial detainee and was awaiting trial for the murder of police officer Russel Timoshenko. The plaintiff alleges that on October 26, 2007, on the order of their Captain, four corrections officers searched his cell and that the search failed to reveal any contraband. The officers then performed a strip search, which also failed to result in any contraband. After a few hours, the plaintiff claims that the guards returned to perform a second strip search. At that time, the plaintiff asked why he needed to be strip searched again and put his arm on top of the holding pen lock. In response, the guards repeatedly jabbed the key into the lock until the plaintiff removed his hand. The five guards then entered the plaintiff's cell, handcuffed him, and proceeded to punch the plaintiff in the ribs, kick him repeatedly, beat him with handcuffs meant to bind prisoners' feet, and called the plaintiff \"a f*****g cop killer,\" a \"black stupid monkey,\" and told the plaintiff that they should kill him. The plaintiff lost consciousness during the assault. When he later came to, Emergency Medical Services transferred the plaintiff to Elmhurst Hospital where he received multiple x-rays to his chest, pelvis and fingers, as well as CT SCANS of his head, spine, pelvis and chest. The plaintiff was found to have suffered various fractures to his face, bruising and hemorrhaging to his left eye, a laceration above his right eye, a broken nose, a spinal fracture, and a chipped incisor tooth. The plaintiff brought suit, alleging that the guards used excessive and unnecessary force for no penological purpose when they repeatedly hit, punched and kicked the plaintiff while he was handcuffed. The plaintiff requested a jury trial, where he sought monetary damages (special, compensatory and punitive) against the defendant, as well as an award of costs and attorneys' fees and any other relief the Court deemed proper. The City of New York also demanded a jury trial, which began on August 15, 2011 and concluded on August 24, 2011. The jury deliberated for five hours and returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. On September 7, 2011, Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein decreed that the plaintiff's civil suit was dismissed.", "summary": "Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 suit against New York City and five guards, employees of the New York City Department of Corrections, for excessive force, assault and battery, and deprivation of liberty. The plaintiff requested a jury trial, seeking special, compensatory, and punitive damages, as well as costs and attorneys' fees and any other relief the Court deemed appropriate. The trial lasted for seven days in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein) and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. Judge Hellerstein dismissed of the suit on September 7, 2011."} {"article": "This class action lawsuit alleged that the City of Chicago\u2019s failure to equip signalized street intersections with accessible pedestrian signals (ASPs) constituted illegal discrimination against Chicago\u2019s blind residents and visitors. ASPs are used by blind pedestrians to travel safely at intersections. In municipalities which have installed ASPs, blind pedestrians can receive information and warnings about oncoming traffic by listening to the sounds played by the signal (e.g. \u201cWalk sign is on\u201d) or by holding a button at the intersection which will vibrate to communicate the same information that seeing persons can read on pedestrian signals. According to the plaintiffs, of the over 2,500 signalized traffic intersections in Chicago, only 11 communicate information to people with vision related disabilities. On September 23, 2019, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (in Chicago). An amended complaint was filed on October 3, 2019. The plaintiffs included three named blind individuals and a non-profit organization American Council of the Blind of Metropolitan Chicago (ACBMC). The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all persons with vision-related disabilities who use, or seek to use, pedestrian signals in Chicago. The plaintiffs estimated that the putative class consisted of over 60,000 Chicago residents and also encompassed many more legally or completely blind people who visit or commute to Chicago every year. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs named the City of Chicago, the Chicago Department of Transportation, Chicago Mayor Lori Lightfoot in her official capacity, and Acting Commissioner of the Chicago Department of Transportation Thomas Carney in his official capacity, as defendants. Represented by Disability Rights Advocates and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The lawsuit was brought under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The crux of the ADA claim was that the City of Chicago\u2019s management of its street crossing signals violated its statutory non-discrimination duty to operate \u201cprograms, services, or activities\u201d in a way that is readily accessible to and usable by people with disabilities. The Section 504 claim was based on the fact that the City of Chicago receives federal financial assistance and the law mandates that no individual shall \u201csolely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.\u201d 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794(a). In response to a motion to dismiss by the Defendants, District Judge Elaine Bucklo issued an order dated March 9, 2020, dismissing claims against the Chicago Department of Transportation, Mayor Lightfoot, and Acting Commissioner Carney. In the same order, the judge also struck the plaintiffs\u2019 claims based on violations affecting only deaf or blind-deaf individuals. The remainder of the motion to dismiss was denied. Amidst discovery proceedings, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a Complaint in Intervention on April 14, 2021. The DOJ complaint reasserts many of ACBMC\u2019s allegations but, importantly, introduces a demand for compensatory damages from injuries caused by Chicago\u2019s failure to comply with Title II and Section 504. With the DOJ\u2019s involvement in the case, fact discovery was extended until September 30, 2021, and expert discovery till January 31, 2022. Dispositive motions and accompanying memoranda following discovery were set for a due date of February 22, 2022.", "summary": "In 2019, American Council of the Blind of Metropolitan Chicago filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs allege that the City of Chicago\u2019s failure to equip signalized street intersections with accessible pedestrian signals (ASPs) violates the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In April 2021, the DOJ intervened as a plaintiff. Discovery is ongoing and scheduled to end in early 2022. Plaintiffs are seeking injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and compensatory damages against the City."} {"article": "This case is one of a pair of lawsuits filed against the Arizona Attorney General to challenge his practice of seizing money wire transferred to Mexico through Western Union. In an attempt to curtail the smuggling of undocumented immigrants by trafficking organizations (known as \"coyotes\") from Mexico to Arizona, the Arizona Attorney General had obtained warrants and seized millions of dollars of money that was wire transferred to Mexico. The Attorney General focused on amounts over $500, which were believed to have been sent as payments to Mexican smugglers who had transported people or drugs into Arizona. On October 18, 2006, three individuals who claimed they had transferred money through Western Union for legitimate purposes but had their money seized by authorities brought this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. They brought the complaint under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging that the seizures violated their rights secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as money damages. The case was assigned to Judge Stephen M. McNamee. Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended twice, but the substantive claims remained the same. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certification. On March 31, 2010, the court denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification, Torres v. Goddard, No. CV 06-2482-PHX-SMM, 2010 WL 3023272 (D. Ariz. July 30, 2010), and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit then denied plaintiffs' permission to immediately appeal the court's ruling. Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and defendants' filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On September 4, 2012, the court granted defendants' motion, finding that defendants were entitled to absolute immunity. Torres v. Horne, No. CV-06-2482-PHX-SMM, 2012 WL 3818974 (D. Ariz. Sept. 4, 2012). The case was therefore dismissed. Plaintiffs then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit [Docket Number: 12-17096]. On July 15, 2016, the panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court\u2019s summary judgment. The panel was made up of Judge Stephen Reinhardt, Judge Alex Kozinski, and Judge Jay S. Bybee. The Ninth Circuit found that, although defendants did have qualified immunity in regard to some actions, they did not have absolute immunity over all of their actions. The case was remanded back to the district court. Torres v. Goddard, 793 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2015) On July 1, 2016, the district court ruled in favor of defendants again, holding that defendants had qualified immunity for the acts for which they did not have absolute immunity, and dismissed the case. Torres v. Goddard, 194 F. Supp. 3d 886 (D. Ariz. 2016). Plaintiffs once more appealed the case to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On June 25, 2018, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s opinion. Due to Judge Reinhardt\u2019s death and Judge Kozinski\u2019s retirement, the panel was made up of Judge Jacqueline Nguyen, Judge John Owens, and Judge Jay S. Bybee. Torres v. Goddard, No. 16-16315, 2018 WL 3099433 (9th Cir. June 25, 2018). This opinion was filed with the District Court on July 17, 2018, and the case closed without appeal.", "summary": "In October 2006, three individuals who sent money through a wire transfer and had that money seized filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued the Arizona Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging hat the seizures violated their rights secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs were ultimately unable to recover because the defendants had qualified immunity. The case closed without appeal."} {"article": "On April 4, 2002, current and former Hispanic employees of Bashas', Inc. filed a class action in the U.S. District Court of Arizona under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981, against Bashas'. The plaintiffs, represented by an Impact Fund attorney and private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief as well as class certification. They alleged national origin and race discrimination of their employer in pay and working conditions on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated Latino employees. After some discovery disputes, Parra v. Bashas', Inc., 2004 WL 5642419, on August 29, 2005, the District Court (Judge Robert C. Broomfield) certified the proposed class on the issue of working conditions, but denied certification of such class as to the issue of pay due to a lack of commonality within the class. Parra v. Bashas', Inc., 2005 WL 6182338 (D. Ariz. Aug. 29, 2005). Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration and offered to redefine the pay discrimination class. The District Court denied their motion, 2006 WL 5987819, and the plaintiffs appealed the Court's decision to the 9th Circuit Court. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's ruling that the plaintiffs failed to establish commonality within the proposed class regarding the pay discrimination claim, in an opinion by Judge Procter R. Hug on July 29, 2008. The Court found it an abuse of discretion of the lower court and remanded the case back to the District Court for further consideration. Parra v. Bashas', 536 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2008). (In the meantime, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was also proceeding against the same defendant, seeing enforcement of an administrative subpoena. The court in this case agreed to plaintiffs' request that that matter be transferred to it. 2009 WL 1024615. ) Upon remand, the District Court (Judge Broomfield) finally granted the plaintiff's original motion for class certification on the pay issue on May 31, 2013. In the same opinion, the court also, at defendants' request, decertified the working conditions class, in light of the recent Supreme Court precedent of Dukes v. Wal-Mart. This ended the decade-long dispute as to the issue of class certification. Parra v. Bashas', Inc., 2013 WL 2407204 (D. Ariz. May 31, 2013). Pursuant to party stipulation, the court amended the class on March 31, 2014 to \"All Hispanic workers currently and formerly employed by defendant Bashas\u2019 in an hourly position at any Food City retail store between April 4, 1998 and July 1, 2007, who have been subject to the challenged pay policies and practices.\" The court explicitly excluded \"any member who worked for Food City for less than eight (8) hours during the Class Period or any person who was first hired for an hourly position at Food City after January 2, 2005.\" The case was reassigned to Judge Diane J. Humetewa on July 2, 2014. On July 11, 2014, the parties filed notice that they had reached a settlement. The proposed class settlement, filed with the court on Aug. 27, 2014, required Bashas' to pay $6.5 million \"for class damages, administrative expenses, service awards to the named plaintiffs..., and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs.\" From this fund, the settlement proposed to set up a $400,000 administrative cost fund to account for challenges associated with the duration of the litigation. Specifically, locating class members would be difficult because 90% of them were no longer employed at Food City and many of whom likely moved from the addresses on file to new homes, including Mexico and Central America. Further, the fact that many class members only spoke Spanish made communicating updates to them more difficult. Payouts to class members were to be determined on the basis of payroll records by calculating \"the difference between his or her actual hours worked and hourly rates received at Food City, with the same number of hours at the hourly rates paid at Bashas\u2019 and A.J.\u2019s Fine Foods for the same time period.\" Further, if a class member did not qualify for a payout, the settlement provided a mechanism for disputing the determination. The settlement also provided for the possibility of a second round of distributions using residual funds after the first payout. Any funds left after these payouts were to be given to the University of Arizona Law School Immigrant Workers\u2019 Clinic, the ASU Alumni Law Group, and Community Legal Services of Arizona. The court approved the settlement on April 24, 2015 after a fairness hearing. The same day, the court granted attorneys\u2019 fees of $1,625,000 and costs of $178,761.26. The court dismissed the case with prejudice, but retained jurisdiction for the purposes of enforcing the settlement. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On April 4, 2002, current and former Hispanic employees of Bashas', Inc. filed a class action in the U.S. District Court of Arizona under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 against their employer Bashas', Inc. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief as well as class certification. They alleged national origin and race discrimination of their employer in pay and working conditions on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated Latino employees. The District Court in 2005 certified the proposed class on the issue of working conditions, but denied certification of such class as to the issue of pay. The 9th Circuit reversed in 2008, concluding the District Court abused its discretion in the denial. Upon remand, the District Court certified the class on both issues in 2013. This case is ongoing."} {"article": "This case was brought in response to an event that occurred on April 14, 2017 in Worth County. That day, approximately 40 uniformed police officers arrived at Worth County High School and put the school on lockdown to conduct a drug search. They did not have a search warrant. Although the officers had a \u201ctarget list\u201d of thirteen suspected students, the officers subjected the entire student body of 900 students to hands-on body searches. The plaintiffs reported that officers had touched them inappropriately, \u201cmanipulated\u201d students\u2019 breasts or genitals, and inserted their hands inside students\u2019 undergarments. On June 1, 2017, nine high school students filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The case was assigned to Judge Leslie Abrams. Under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law, the plaintiffs sued the Worth County Sheriff\u2019s Office \u2014 specifically the officers who were involved in the searches. The plaintiffs alleged that the drug searches were an unconstitutional search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment; that they violated their right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment; and that they violated the Georgia State Constitution. Represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought damages, declaratory relief, and attorneys\u2019 fees. On June 20, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding additional officers as defendants; and on June 23, the court granted an unopposed motion to dismiss claims against 26 individual defendants. On August 4, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. The proposed class would consist of \u201call students seized and searched by Worth County Sheriff\u2019s Office employees at Worth County High School on April 14, 2017, other than those identified on the Sheriff\u2019s target list.\u201d On September 5, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 state law claims. They argued that Georgia law had no damages remedy for violating the state constitution and that the defendants were entitled to official immunity. On October 10, 2017, the parties filed a motion to stay discovery because they had begun discussions regarding class certification and a possible settlement. The court granted this motion nine days later. On November 21, the court granted a motion to stay all proceedings. On December 4, the parties had reached a settlement agreement, and they filed a joint motion to certify the class. Under the terms of the proposed $3 million settlement, the defendants agreed to notify the class members through mail and newspaper advertisements and collect response forms from the class members regarding the April 2017 drug search. They would pay damages between $1,000.00 and $6,000.00 to each class member and attorneys' fees of $450,000. The remaining funds would be used to start a fund to benefit Worth County High School students. The court preliminarily approved this settlement agreement and certified the class on March 23, 2018. The last fairness hearing for class members to voice their concerns was held on July 11, 2018. There were no objections. The court approved the final settlement on January 9, 2019. The case is presumably now closed. A similar case was filed in criminal court around the same time that this case was filed in civil court. On October 3, 2017, a grand jury in South Georgia indicted the Worth County Sheriff and two of his deputies for sexual battery, false imprisonment and violation of oath of office by a public officer. After subsequently being indicted two more times on a combined 156 charges involving events unrelated to this case, the sheriff pled guilty on July 25, 2018 to three counts of violation of oath of office, one of which stemmed from the school search. As part of his plea deal, he was sentenced to six months in prison (including time served), five years probation, and was barred from holding public office for five years, among other conditions.", "summary": "On April 14, 2017, approximately 40 uniformed officers arrived at Worth County High School and put the school on lockdown to conduct a drug search without a search warrant. Nine high school students filed a putative class action. The parties came to a settlement that was approved in January of 2019."} {"article": "On December 14, 2012, Domino's Food and its owner filed this lawsuit in the Eastern District of Michigan against the federal government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the First Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by the Thomas More Law Center, a Catholic non-profit legal aid organization, seek to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The plaintiffs contend that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On March 14, 2013, Judge Lawrence P. Zatkoff granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. Judge Zatkoff found that, while the question of whether or not a for-profit corporation possess free exercise rights is unresolved, Domino's Farms, distinct from its owner, may assert free exercise rights on his behalf. In this way, Domino's Farms Corp. is merely the instrument through which the owner exercises his religious beliefs. And because the contraception mandate burdens the plaintiffs' sincerely held religious beliefs beyond the least restrictive means, plaintiffs showed a high likelihood of success of the merits and would suffer irreparable without the injunction. On May 13, 2013, the government filed an interlocutory appeal with the Sixth Circuit challenging the preliminary injunction. On June 26, 2013, Judge Zatkoff granted the parties' joint motion to stay the proceedings pending the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in two substantially similar cases, Autocam Corps. v. Sebelius, FA-MI-0005 and Weingartz Supply Co. v. Sebelius, FA-MI-0006. On October 23, 2014, following the Supreme Court's June 30, 2014 decision in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius and subsequent decision to remand Autocam to the Sixth Circuit for consideration under Hobby Lobby, the government voluntarily dismissed its interlocutory appeal. On December 3, 2014, Judge Zatkoff entered a permanent injunction and judgment against the government, based on the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby. The injunction protected the plaintiffs against government enforcement of the version of the contraception mandate that existed prior to the Hobby Lobby decision. Prior to Hobby Lobby, closely-held for-profit religious employers did not have an opportunity to notify the government of their objection to the contraception mandate, and compel the government to work with their insurer to provide contraception coverage directly to their employees. The decision did not preclude the plaintiffs from bringing suit under later versions of the mandate. On March 9, 2015, the parties notified the court that they had reached an agreement on attorneys' fees and costs.", "summary": "On December 14, 2012, Domino's Food, and its owner filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Michigan against the Federal Government, seeking to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The plaintiffs contend that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On March 14, Judge Lawrence P. Zatkoff granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, the plaintiffs were granted a permanent injunction on December 3, 2014, against government enforcement of the version of the contraceptive mandate that was in force at that time."} {"article": "On May 8, 2017, ten residents of Madison County filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued Madison County under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, filing both class action-based and individual-based claims. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and the Southern Poverty Law Center, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary relief and attorneys\u2019 fees. The case was assigned to District Judge William H. Barbour, Jr. In their complaint, the plaintiffs pointed out that, although only 38% of Madison County residents were black, approximately 73% of arrests in Madison County between May and September 2016 were of black individuals. Black individuals were nearly five times more likely to be arrested compared to white individuals. The plaintiffs claimed that, in implementing a coordinated top-down program of methodically targeting black individuals for suspicionless searches and seizures while they are driving their cars, walking in their neighborhoods, and even just spending time in their own homes, the defendants had violated the plaintiffs\u2019 Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. This program included discriminatory practices in the use of vehicular roadblocks, pedestrian checkpoints, and warrantless and consentless searches black residents' homes. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants used excessive force, made unreasonable searches and seizures, and violated the plaintiffs\u2019 right to equal protection. In July 2017, the parties began discovery. In February 2018, the defendants filed two motions to dismiss the claims of two specific defendants for failure to prosecute, arguing that the two plaintiffs failed to respond to interrogatories, prejudicing the defendants. The judge granted these two motions, dismissing without prejudice. In March and April 2018, the defendants filed seven different motions for summary judgment. These motions targeted the various claims of individual plaintiffs and some class action claims. In all of these motions, the defendants argued that none of the plaintiffs had evidence to support their claims of intentional race discrimination. The defendants further alleged that some of the claims were time barred by statutes of limitation. On March 14, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify three classes. The first, the targeting class, was defined as all black persons who presently or in the future will reside in or travel through Madison County. The second, the roadblock subclass, was defined as all black persons who travel or will travel by car through majority-black areas of Madison County. The third, the pedestrian stop subclass, was defined as all black persons who travel or will travel by foot in Madison County\u2019s majority-black neighborhoods. On April 13, 2018, the defendants moved for summary judgment again, this time with respect to the target class and the pedestrian stop subclass. The defendants argued that the complaint presented no evidence of a top-down policy of intentional race discrimination. On January 4, 2019, the court denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion to certify class, finding that the membership in all of the proposed classes could not be ascertained, and there was doubt as to whether all of the class members were harmed in the same way. The court noted that plaintiffs could amend their complaint to cure these defects, and the plaintiffs did so on February 4, 2019 and filed a new motion to certify class on the same day. The case was had been reassigned to District Judge Carlton W. Reeves on January 15, 2019. On February 12, 2019, the defendants moved for a settlement conference and to stay proceedings. The court granted both motions on February 26, and also granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion to file a second amended complaint. The parties engaged in a settlement conference on June 10, 2019, and the plaintiffs were allowed to file their second amended complaint. The parties continued to negotiate in settlement discussions before the magistrate judge, until they filed a Joint Motion to Approve Consent Judgment on September 23, 2019. The court granted the motion on October 9, 2019, and the case was dismissed with prejudice on October 23, 2019. The resolution was captured in three documents: the Consent Decree, the Settlement Agreement, and the Apartment Incident Agreement. The parties agreed to maintain the confidentiality of the Settlement Agreement and the Apartment Incident Agreement. The Consent Decree enjoins the Madison County Sheriff\u2019s Department (MCSD) to implement and provide training on three new policies: an Unbiased Policing Policy, a Checkpoint Policy, and a Pedestrian Stops and Enforcement Policy. The Consent Decree also requires Madison County and MCSD to establish a five-member Community Advisory Board with the authority to (1) review MCSD Data regarding vehicular checkpoints and pedestrian stops, (2) receive civilian complaints concerning the MCSD, (3) make recommendations to the MCSD about its compliance with the Consent Decree, and (4) file enforcement proceedings against Defendants following a process outlined in the Consent Decree. The Consent Decree was determined to remain in effect for four years. The case is ongoing, given the ongoing nature of the consent decree.", "summary": "This 2017 class action lawsuit was brought by ten residents of Madison County in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had racially discriminated against black residents in vehicular roadblocks, pedestrian checkpoints, and warrantless searches of the homes of black residents. The parties agreed to a Consent Decree implementing new policies for vehicular checkpoints and pedestrian stops, and also establishing a Community Advisory Board to monitor adherence to the Consent Decree."} {"article": "Two consolidated federal district court cases in North Carolina alleged voter intimidation before the November 2020 elections. One was Drumright v. Cole, 1:20-cv-00998; the other was Allen v. City of Graham, 1:20-cv-00997. Both were filed on the same day by participants in the same event. On October 31, 2020, police dispersed an event held in front of the Graham, NC courthouse, using pepper spray. The event titled, the \"I Am Change March to the Polls,\" was held on the last day of early voting and same-day voting registration. Participants marched from the Wayman Chapel AME Church to the Alamance County Courthouse. Once arriving at the north-side of the courthouse, event organizers began assembling a small stage, gave a speech about a local Confederate monument, and held a silent vigil for George Floyd who had died in police custody. At the top of the courthouse\u2019s northern steps was a row of deputies from the Alamance County Sheriff\u2019s Office. According to the event's participants, police began dispersing the event seconds after the silent vigil ended and without warning. This prevented the event\u2019s planned march to local polling stations. Many attendees sought medical attention because of the pepper spray. On November 2, 2020, participants from the dispersed event filed two separate complaints in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. Judge Catherine Eagles was assigned to both cases.
Contemporary news reports and first-hand accounts indicate that officials of respondent Customs and Border Protection (CBP) did not comply with the Court\u2019s directive in paragraph (a) that \u201crespondents shall permit lawyers access to all legal permanent residents being detained at Dulles International Airport.\u201d Moreover, because such access was not provided and respondents have not disclosed, despite request, whether any such persons were removed from the United States after they knew of the TRO, it cannot be determined whether respondents complied with the prohibition on such removal in paragraph (b). The Commonwealth has attempted since Sunday, January 29, to obtain that information, but respondents have not answered. Under these circumstances, the Court should require that respondents demonstrate their compliance with the TRO and show cause why they are not in contempt.On Feb. 1, the parties jointly moved to put the case briefly on hold while they tried to work out what would happen to the Aziz brothers. In addition, Virginia moved for a preliminary injunction. Oral arguments took place, and Judge Brinkema eventually extended the TRO until Friday Feb. 10. She also allowed two individuals (a Somali citizen deported from Dulles under the Executive Order and his U.S. citizen fiance) and the Commonwealth of Virginia to intervene in the case. In addition, the court ordered the U.S. to provide the Commonwealth, by close of business Thursday Feb. 9, with \"a list of all persons who have been denied entry to or removed from the United States since the Executive Order . . . who, as of 8:00 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, on Friday, January 27, 2017, had a residence in the Commonwealth of Virginia and had lawful permanent resident status, an immigrant visa (or accompanying family or spousal visa), a valid student visa (or accompanying family or spousal visa), or a valid work visa (or accompanying family or spousal visa).\" On February 7, the Aziz brothers and John Does 1-50 moved to voluntarily dismiss their part of the case. That motion was granted, leaving only the Commonwealth of Virginia as a plaintiff. On February 13, Judge Brinkema granted the Commonwealth of Virginia's motion for a preliminary injunction, with an accompanying memorandum order. This enjoined the defendants from enforcing the section 3(c) enforcement clause of the Executive Order against any person who was a Virginia resident or an employee or student of a Virginia public educational institution; and who, as of the time that the Executive Order was issued, had LPR status, an immigrant visa entitling the person to LPR status upon admission, a nonimmigrant student visa, a nonimmigrant work visa, or was a derivative of one of the latter two visas. In the accompanying memorandum order to the preliminary injunction, the court noted that the Executive Order presented a risk to the status of LPRs from the seven covered countries; that the Executive Order had injured the Commonwealth of Virginia and its residents by disrupting the functioning of its public higher education institutions; and that the defendants had offered no evidence to prove that the Executive Order was necessary for national security concerns -- but instead had made statements suggesting that animus was the motivating reason for the \"Muslim ban.\" The court held that the plaintiff's claim was justiciable because the plaintiff had alleged constitutional violations; and that the plaintiff had established all elements of its preliminary injunction showing (it was likely to succeed on the merits of its Establishment Clause claim, it was likely to suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief, the balance of equities tipped in its favor, and an injunction would be in the public interest). However, the court also declined the plaintiff's request for a nationwide preliminary injunction, instead limiting the injunction to affected Virginia parties, pointing to the nationwide temporary restraining order from State of Washington v. Trump, deferring to other circuits to make their own decisions on the matter, and wishing to avoid challenges to the preliminary injunction as over broad. On Mar. 6, 2017, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. On the same day, DOJ filed notice of the new EO in this case. On Mar. 30, 2017, the court ordered the U.S. to respond to Virginia's intervention complaint by May 1, 2017, and commented that the parties were discussing amicable resolution of the case. That deadline was extended to June 1, 2017. On June 1, 2017, the case was dismissed without prejudice, dissolving the preliminary injunction. After this court's preliminary injunction order as to the first EO, that EO was revoked and other nationwide preliminary injunctions were put in place in IRAP v. Trump and Hawaii v. Trump as to the second EO. This case is closed.", "summary": "On Jan. 28, 2017, lawful permanent residents of the United States filed this case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiffs were detained at Dulles International Airport pursuant to the Jan. 27, 2017 executive order (EO) issued by President Donald Trump to ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen, and denied access to counsel. The original named plaintiffs--the Aziz brothers--are Yemeni citizens, legal permanent residents of the U.S. who were denied admission at Dulles. They brought the action as a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, and they simultaneously filed an emergency application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to compel the defendants to allow them access to counsel and to prohibit the defendants from deporting them for seven days. The complaint argued that detaining the plaintiffs solely pursuant to the executive order violated Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The plaintiffs also argued that they would suffer irreparable harm if they continued to be denied counsel and if they were deported. On Jan. 28, 2017, Judge Leonie Brinkema granted the plaintiffs' motion and issued a seven-day TRO granting detainees at Dulles International Airport access to counsel and prohibiting deportation of detainees. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on January 30, 2017, clarifying the class as: \"individuals with legal permanent resident status or who are traveling on valid U.S. immigrant visas who have been or will be either detained and/or coerced into signing a Form I-407.\" The amended complaint sought an injunction ordering respondents to invalidate the improperly coerced I-407 forms, reinstate the petitioners\u2019 immigrant visas and/or LPR status, return the petitioners (who had been deported to Addis Ababa) to Dulles Airport, and admit them into the United States, subject to the laws and regulations existing prior to Jan. 27, 2017. The Commonwealth of Virginia moved to intervene in the case on Jan. 31, with its stated interest being protection of its universities from the disruption created by the EO. The Commonwealth moved for a preliminary injunction. On February 7, the Aziz brothers and John Does 1-50 moved to voluntarily dismiss their part of the case. That motion was granted, leaving only the Commonwealth of Virginia as a plaintiff. On February 13, Judge Brinkema granted the Commonwealth of Virginia's motion for a preliminary injunction, with an accompanying memorandum order. This enjoined the defendants from enforcing the section 3(c) enforcement clause of the Executive Order against any person who was a Virginia resident or an employee or student of a Virginia public educational institution; and who, as of the time that the Executive Order was issued, had LPR status, an immigrant visa entitling the person to LPR status upon admission, a nonimmigrant student visa, a nonimmigrant work visa, or was a derivative of one of the latter two visas. On Mar. 6, 2017, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. On June 1, the case was dismissed without prejudice, dissolving the preliminary injunction. After this court's preliminary injunction order as to the first EO, that EO was revoked and other nationwide preliminary injunctions were put in place in IRAP v. Trump and Hawaii v. Trump as to the second EO. This case is closed."} {"article": "On December 3, 2013, the University of Notre Dame, a religious nonprofit university, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Notre Dame alleged that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate, even with the accommodation for nonprofit religious organizations, violated the Establishment Clause and Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Notre Dame sought preliminary and permanent injunctions barring the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate to avoid a violation of Notre Dame's deeply held religious beliefs. On December 20, 2013, the District Court (Judge Philip P. Simon) denied Notre Dame's motion for preliminary injunction. The Court found that the ACA's insurance accommodation, which allowed the head of an eligible organization to provide self-certification which in turn triggered a third-party administrator to provide contraception coverage to the organization's employees, did not impose a substantial burden on the free exercise of the religion. University of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 988 F.Supp.2d 912 (N.D. IN. 2013) The same day, Notre Dame filed an interlocutory appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (No. 13-3853) and a motion for preliminary injunction with the District Court pending their appeal. On December 23, 2013, the District Court denied the plaintiff's motion for injunction pending appeal and on December 30, 2013, the Seventh Circuit denied the plaintiff's emergency motion for injunction pending appeal. On February 21, 2014, the Seventh Circuit (Judge Richard Posner) affirmed the District Court's denial of preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals found that the ACA's insurance accommodation was consistent with the balancing act required by RFRA and therefore it did not substantially burden the free exercise of plaintiffs. University of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547 (N.D. IN. 2014). On May 7, 2014, the Seventh Circuit denied plaintiffs' April 4, 2014, motion for rehearing. Notre Dame sought review in the Supreme Court, and on March 9, 2015, the Court granted the writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit for further consideration in light of its decision (after the Seventh Circuit's decision) in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 135 U.S. 1258 (2015) (cert. granted). In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court had held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA, when applied to closely held for-profit corporations. The Court emphasized, however, that alternative methods for meeting the government's asserted interest were available. On remand, after hearing oral arguments on April 22, 2015, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of preliminary injunction on May 19, 2015, holding that Notre Dame had still not met its burden of establishing an entitlement to a preliminary injunction. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2015). On June 17, 2016, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to Seventh Circuit in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. \u2013\u2013\u2013 (2016). Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016). The Supreme Court explained that through the Zubik litigation, the petitioners made the Government aware of their view that they met requirements for exemption from the contraceptive coverage requirement on religious grounds, and nothing precluded the Government from relying on this notice. As it appeared that proceedings in the Seventh Circuit would continue for some time, in district court the case was administratively closed on March 2, 2017, until the appellate proceedings concluded. Meanwhile, in circuit court the parties engaged in settlement negotiations and were required to file status reports. On October 7, 2017, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services issued a new rule offering an exemption to any employer that objects to covering contraception services on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions. Thus, on October 17, 2017, the Seventh Circuit closed the case after the parties filed a joint stipulation to dismiss the appeal.", "summary": "On December 3, 2013, a non-profit religious university filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff alleged that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate violated the establishment clause and free speech clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and sought preliminary and permanent injunction On December 20, 2013, U.S. District Court denied the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, which the plaintiff appealed. On February 21, 2014, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's December 20, 2013, order. On March 9, 2015, the Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, vacating the Judgment and remanding the case to the Seventh Circuit. On May 19, 2015, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of preliminary injunction. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing for En Banc or Panel was filed on July 2nd but it was remanded back to the Circuit Court. The case was voluntarily dismissed from the Seventh Circuit on October 17, 2017, after the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services issued a new rule offering an exemption to any employer that objects to covering contraception services on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions."} {"article": "On December 5, 2005, several former and current employees of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Division of Resolutions and Receiverships filed a lawsuit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 621 et seq., against the agency in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and compensation for litigation costs, alleging that the agency had illegally discriminated against them on the basis of age. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that, through the defendant's design and implementation of its Reduction in Force (RIF) in 2005, their employment was either terminated or else reduced in grade because of their age. The FDIC is a U.S. government agency responsible for insuring money deposits at banks and savings associations. In the 1980s and 1990s, the FDIC was handling the fallout from failed financial institutions during the savings and loan crisis. As the banking crisis eased, so too did the FDIC's workload, and this spurred the 2005 RIF. Aliotta v. Gruenberg, 237 F.R.D. 7-8 (D.D.C. 2006). The defendant offered a buyout to division employees not eligible for full retirement. Aliotta v. Gruenberg, 237 F.R.D. 8 (D.D.C. 2006). The plaintiffs who did not accept the buyout were placed on a re-employment priority list, but the defendant allegedly filled the spots with younger and less senior employees who had no better qualifications. The remaining plaintiffs took a demotion in a different division to avoid being laid off. Aliotta v. Gruenberg, 237 F.R.D. 8 (D.D.C. 2006). On October 31, 2005, the plaintiffs' attorney sent a letter to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) notifying it that a group of plaintiffs intended to file suit against the FDIC pursuant to the ADEA. Aliotta v. Gruenberg, 237 F.R.D. 8 (D.D.C. 2006). While the defendant argued that the plaintiffs did not notify the EEOC that this would be a class action, the Court (Judge Ricardo M. Urbina) stated that an explicit mention was not necessary. Aliotta v. Gruenberg, 237 F.R.D. 9 (D.D.C. 2006). Thus, on July 25, 2006, the Court granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The class consisted of former or current employees of the FDIC's DRR who were born on or before September 30, 1955 and who, as a result of the 2005 RIF, either accepted a buyout or reduction in grade or else were terminated from their positions in the DRR. Aliotta v. Gruenberg, 237 F.R.D. 13 (D.D.C. 2006). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and on September 18, 2008, the Court issued an opinion granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Aliotta v. Bair, 576 F.Supp.2d 113 (D.D.C. 2008). The court held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate (1) that the buyouts or transfers were involuntary and (2) that the 2005 RIF, when considered independently, had a discriminatory effect on older employees. Aliotta v. Bair, 576 F.Supp.2d 113 (D.D.C. 2008). The plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision, but on August 13, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court's decision. Aliotta v. Bair, 2010 WL 3190828 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The case is now closed.", "summary": "This case was brought by a class of former or current employees of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Division of Resolutions and Receiverships against the FDIC. The plaintiffs alleged that their employment was either terminated or was reduced in grade as a result of illegal age discrimination, and the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and compensation for litigation costs. On September 18, 2008, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment."} {"article": "On November 10, 2011, Belmont Abbey College, a Catholic liberal arts college, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (\"RFRA\"), and the Administrative Procedures Act (\"APA\"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiff, represented by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (\"ACA\") violated its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. Claiming that providing coverage for contraception would both contravene its Catholic faith and compel speech contrary to its beliefs, the plaintiff sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for itself and other institutions with similar religious objections. On February 16, 2012, the government moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The government argued that the plaintiff could not claim any imminent harm because it had not alleged that its insurance plan would be ineligible for the regulations' grandfathering provision; because the plaintiff qualified for the enforcement \"safe harbor\" period extending until January 1, 2014; and because the defendants were in the process of amending the contraceptive coverage regulations to accommodate the objections of religious institutions like the plaintiff. In its brief opposing the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argued that it could claim imminent harm because its plan was ineligible for the grandfathering provision, because it might not qualify for the enforcement safe harbor, and because the anticipated amendments likely would not change the emergency contraception coverage requirement. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on March 30, 2012, detailing why its insurance plan was ineligible for grandfathering, and explaining that the plan might not be eligible for the enforcement safe harbor because it may have supplied hormonal birth control to enrollees for non-contraceptive medical purposes (e.g., treating ovarian cysts). On April 5, 2012, the government filed again moved to dismiss this amended complaint, arguing that, as before, the plaintiff had not alleged any imminent harm. The plaintiff opposed this motion on the same grounds as the first motion to dismiss. On July 18, 2012, the district court (Judge James E. Boasberg) granted the government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Boasberg found that, in light of the government's efforts to address the plaintiff's concerns via the safe harbor period and the anticipated amendments, the plaintiff had not alleged a concrete and imminent harm, and that as a result the plaintiff lacked standing and its claim was not yet ripe for review. Belmont Abbey College v. Sebelius, 878 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2012). On September 5, 2012, Judge Boasberg denied the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order. Belmont Abbey College v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 3861255 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2012). The plaintiff appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Case No. 12-5291). The case was consolidated with Wheaton College v. Sebelius (Case No. 12-5273) on appeal. On December 18, 2012, the D.C. Circuit (Judges Merrick B. Garland, Thomas B. Griffith, and A. Raymond Randolph) affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of ripeness, and ordered that the lawsuit be held in abeyance pending the issuance of the amended contraceptive coverage regulations. The defendants were directed to file status reports with the court every 60 days from the date of the abeyance order. Wheaton College v. Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2012). On August 13, 2013, D.C. Circuit ordered that the consolidated cases be remanded to the district court for the complaints to be dismissed as moot. This case was refiled, however, on November 20, 2013, under the same caption. That case can be found at FA-DC-0019 in this Clearinghouse.", "summary": "In 2011, a Catholic liberal arts college filed a RFRA challenge to rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. In July 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, which was affirmed on appeal. This case was refiled on November 20, 2013, under the same caption."} {"article": "On July 12, 2007, four named plaintiffs filed a lawsuit on behalf of all black consumers in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Countrywide Bank and its two wholly-owned subsidiaries, under under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (\"ECOA\") and the Fair Housing Act (\"FHA\"). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants maintained a pattern or practice that had a discriminatory impact on black consumers in their home financing policies and practices. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' policy authorizing unchecked, subjective surcharge of additional points and fees to an otherwise objective risk-based financing rate, had a discriminatory impact on black home mortgage loans applicants, making them more likely to pay higher interest rates and charges than similarly situated white applicants. The plaintiffs sought injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief. On September 10, 2007, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On July 30, 2008, the Court (Judge Nancy Gertner) issued an order denying the motion. In 2008, the plaintiffs have moved for consolidated or coordinated pre-trial proceedings of the present litigation with two other class-wide actions against Countrywide and its subsidiaries (Garcia v. Countrywide Financial Corp., C.A. No. 5:07-1161 (C.D. Cal.); Jenkins v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., C.A. No. 1:08-2935 (N.D. Ill.)). The U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation issued a transfer order and centralized the three cases in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. Judge John G. Heyburn II was assigned to the case. The cases were associated under a docket 3:08-MD-1974. The case then proceeded into discovery. On June 13, 2011, the case was stayed pending the outcome of the Supreme Court case, Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). On October 13, 2011, the Court (Judge John G. Heyburn II) issued an order that, in light of the decision in Wal-Mart, the plaintiffs did not satisfy the commonality requirement. The plaintiffs had not identified the common method of exercising discretion that would discriminate against the class members in a similar fashion. The plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Sixth Circuit issued its decision on January 15, 2013. The District Court's denial of class certification was affirmed. On August 9, 2013, the four named plaintiffs entered separate stipulations to dismiss the case with prejudice, without costs and right of appeal. On August 12, 2013, the Court issued an order granting the stipulations and dismissing the case with prejudice.", "summary": "On July 12, 2007, four named plaintiffs filed a lawsuit on behalf of all black consumers in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Countrywide Bank and its two wholly-owned subsidiaries, under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair Housing Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants maintained a pattern or practice that had a discriminatory impact on black consumers in their home financing policies and practices. On August 12, 2013, the case was dismissed with prejudice."} {"article": "On July 15, 2014, the plaintiff, a New York City resident, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1983 and 1988. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, alleges that the New York Police Department's (\"NYPD\") policy and practice of interfering with the right of individuals to film, photograph, videotape or record NYPD officers performing their official duties in public places violates the First Amendment. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged that her detention violates her Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff sought monetary damages, a declaratory judgment that plaintiff's First and Fourth Amendment rights were violated, and a permanent injunction preventing the City of New York from retaliating against anyone who, without interfering with police activity, records police officers performing official duties in public. Plaintiff also alleged that the defendants used excessive force during arrest. Plaintiff's claims arise out of a September 25, 2013 incident in which she was allegedly arrested by NYPD officers after filming NYPD and paramedics' interactions with an apparently homeless person. She alleges that after she began filming the incident, NYPD officers began filming her, at which point she informed them they had no right to film her. The NYPD officers arrested her subsequent to a \"verbal exchange.\" In support of the proposition that the NYPD maintains such a policy of interfering with the public recording them performing their official duties, the complaint cites numerous documented instances of such interference, letters of concern to the NYPD from major media outlets, and the allegation that the NYPD has failed to adequately respond to those incidents. On February 18, 2015, plaintiff's claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and First Amendment retaliation were dismissed due to the defendant's qualified immunity. This left only the excessive force allegation for litigation. On March 11, 2015, the plaintiff filed an interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit on these dismissed claims, but shortly after withdrew it because on April 20, 2015, a private settlement agreement was reached between the parties and the case was dismissed with prejudice.", "summary": "On July 15, 2014, plaintiff, a New York City resident, filed a lawsuit against the City of New York and the NYPD alleging that it maintains a policy of interfering with the rights of individuals to film or photograph NYPD officers performing their official duties in public places in violation of the First Amendment. Furthermore, she alleges that her detention subsequent to filming NYPD officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The plaintiff was arrested subsequent to a September 25, 2013 incident in which she filmed NYPD officers and paramedics performing their official duties, however the charges were eventually dismissed. Plaintiff is seeking declaratory judgment that the NYPD's practice in regards to individuals filming NYPD officers performing their official duties violate the First Amendment, a permanent injunction preventing the City of New York from retaliating against anyone who records NYPD officers, and compensatory damages. The case is currently ongoing."} {"article": "On July 11, 2019, a group of organizations dedicated to helping immigrant families and children including Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project, Central American Resource Center \u2013 LA, Immigrant Defenders Law Center, and Public Counsel filed this lawsuit, pro se, in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, sued Attorney General William Barr, the directors of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and other U.S. officials under Ex Parte Young and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated the due process of the Fifth Amendment by entering removal orders without first affording unrepresented immigrant families proper notice of a hearing or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the refugee-protection provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act and its prohibition on removal to a country where the individual would face persecution or torture. Represented by the ACLU of Southern California, New York Civil Liberties Union, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. They sought a declaration and corresponding injunctive order that, under the due process clause, \u201call currently unrepresented families and children who were ordered removed in absentia on or after May 1, 2014 are entitled, prior to their physical removal, to . . . a hearing before an immigration judge\u201d and, in advance of the hearing, to access to their immigration files and certain related records. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that thousands of immigrant families, mostly from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, were in danger of deportation during rumored en masse arrests in the summer of 2019. These families had all arrived to the United States within the past 5 years and claimed asylum, but never had their claims for asylum and related relief heard by an immigration judge. Instead, they were ordered deported in absentia for failing to appear at their hearings. The plaintiffs claimed that these orders violated the refugees\u2019 due process rights as they had little to no notice of the hearings. According to the plaintiffs, hearing notices were frequently sent to the wrong address, sent with no date or time specified, or specified for dates and times (including weekends) when no hearings could actually take place, or dates that did not exist, such as September 31. When notices were sent to the right address for the right time, the plaintiffs alleged the notices were sent too late and for locations far from the immigrants\u2019 homes. This meant that immigrants received the notice days after the hearings, or were forced to travel across the country on only a few days\u2019 notice. Finally, deportation in absentia was ordered on multiple children, who could not read English had no control over whether they could attend their own hearings. The plaintiffs argue that the process by which unrepresented immigrants may challenge the removal orders, by filing a written motion to reopen, is effectively unavailable to those who speak limited English and lack the capacity to read, understand, and comply with the requirements for writing and filing a motion to reopen. On July 16, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for an expedited discovery process due to the imminent harm that could come to the immigrant families. District Judge Jesse M. Furman granted the motion and ordered counsel for all parties to meet on July 18th. Judge Furman issued an opinion on July 17, 2019 lifting the usual limitations on remote electronic access to the court docket for actions related to an order of removal. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on July 24, 2019. The defendants claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). The defendants argued the claims should be dismissed because under the IIRIRA, all challenges of immigration proceedings and removal orders must be channeled to the courts of appeals. They also argued that 8 U.S.C. section 1252(g) eliminated the court\u2019s jurisdiction because it barred review of claims arising from the decision or action to execute removal orders. Finally, they argued the injunctive relief that the plaintiffs sought was impossible due to immigration regulations that only allow injunctive relief for individual plaintiffs, not groups (8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(f)(1)). On September 5, 2019, Judge Furman agreed with the defendants\u2019 arguments and granted the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. 409 F. Supp. 3d 221. Judge Furman was troubled by the plaintiffs\u2019 allegations but found that any remedy for these circumstances lied elsewhere: in immigration court (by way of a motion to reopen), in the Court of Appeals (by way of a petition for review), or in Congress (by way of changing the law). The court clerk issued final judgment and dismissed the complaint the next day. On November 4, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an appeal with the 2nd Circuit. However, the plaintiffs withdrew their appeal on November 21, 2019, and the appeal was dismissed with prejudice. The case is closed.", "summary": "In 2019, multiple non-profit organizations filed a suit against Attorney General William Barr, the directors of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and other U.S. officials. The plaintiffs sought declaratory injunctive relief to prevent the deportation of thousands of immigrants seeking asylum. The court dismissed the complaint in August 2019 for lack of jurisdiction."} {"article": "This is a case about an Interim Final Rule concerning how federal COVID relief CARES Act funding is allocated to private and public schools. On August 10, 2020, The Council Parent Attorneys and Advocates (Parent Advocates) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in District of Maryland. Parent Advocates sued the Secretary of Education, Betsy Devos, and the U.S. Department of Education. Represented by The National Center for Youth Law and private counsel, Parent Advocates sought declaratory and injunctive relief to disallow the enforcement of the Department of Education\u2019s Interim Final Rule regarding school funding under the CARES act, as well as attorney\u2019s fees. The case was assigned to Judge George Levi Russell. Parents Advocates claimed that the Department of Education and Devos in her official role as Secretary of Education violated the Administrative Procedure Act. Parent Advocates claimed the Administrative Procedure Act was violated because the new interim final rule was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion that exceeded their statutory authority. Parent Advocates argued that the interim rule would restrict and reduce CARES Act funding to public schools, and would narrow the permitted uses of the CARES Act funding. Parent Advocates contended that the interim final rule would divert funding from public schools in several ways. The rule changed how funding is allocated by moving from a poverty-based formula to an enrollment-based formula. Previously, funding was allocated under a poverty-based formula only. The new rule added an enrollment-based formula option in addition to new restrictions that would be imposed if a school district continued to use a poverty-based formula. Parent Advocates argued that the impact of the new enrollment-based formula paired with the poverty-based formula restrictions would result in public school funding being negatively impacted. The plaintiffs contended that if a school district chooses the poverty-based formula for funding, none of their non-Title 1 schools would receive CARES Act funding despite serving disabled, poverty-level children. If they chose the enrollment-based formula, the plaintiffs argued that they would be allocated a greater amount of money would but more will be diverted to private schools in the district. Parent Advocates argued that this new interim rule would end up pushing schools into the enrollment-based option to try and have their non-Title 1 schools receive a fraction of the necessary CARES Act funding they need to serve students. On September 3, 2020, Parent Advocates filed a motion for summary judgement. Judge Russel initially stayed the proceedings in this case because summary judgment was granted to the plaintiffs in NAACP v. DeVos, resulting in the interim final rule being vacated nationwide. More information about NAACP v. DeVos can be found here. The defendants announced that they would not appeal the NAACP v. DeVos ruling, thereby ensuring that the decision would stand. On December 18, after it was clear that the summary judgment from NAACP v. DeVos would stand, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed this case. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In August 2020, the National Center for Youth Law on behalf of Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs alleged that the interim final rules changing CARES Act school funding stipulations violated the Administrative Procedure Act. After NAACP v. Devos resulted in the rule being vacated, this case was voluntarily dismissed."} {"article": "On Dec. 19, 2017, the Center for Investigative Reporting (CIR) and one of its journalists brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Represented by its own counsel, the plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The organizational plaintiff is a national nonprofit investigative news organization. The individual plaintiff is one of its staff reporters. Plaintiffs sought information on expedited removal, a process by which an immigration enforcement official may remove a noncitizen from the United States, without a hearing before an Immigration Judge or review by the Board of Immigration Appeals. Expedited removal currently applies to noncitizens who entered without inspection and who were apprehended within 100 miles of the border and within two weeks of arrival in the country. Plaintiffs alleged that the Trump Administration's Jan. 25, 2017 Executive Order 13767, which instructed the DHS Secretary to apply expedited removal to the fullest extent of the law, had raised public concern about the fairness of the procedure. The plaintiffs sought to produce news reports on the topic. The complaint alleged that on June 14, 2017, plaintiffs had submitted a FOIA request to defendant seeking materials since 2012 instructing U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) on the following procedures: 1. Issuing expedited removal orders; 2. Reviewing expedited removal orders; 3. Identifying individuals with facially-valid visas who may receive an expedited removal order because they intend to immigrate; 4. Identifying asylum seekers; 5. Identifying individuals who have not been continuously physically present in the United States for at least two weeks; 6. Understanding evidence that individuals may introduce to demonstrate they should not be subject to expedited removal; 7. Identifying lawful permanent residents (LPR), U.S. citizens, or individuals admitted as refugees or previously granted asylum; 8. Handling cases of suspected asylum fraud; 9. Handling cases of suspected fraud in claiming LPR, U.S. citizen, refugee, or asylee status; 10. Rescinding an expedited removal order; 11. Allowing withdrawal of a request for admission; 12. Using prosecutorial discretion in expedited removal; 13. Handling claims of U.S. citizenship; and 14. Handling individuals' requests to contact attorneys or consulates. The complaint further alleged that at the time of filing, the plaintiffs had not received a substantive response from defendant. Plaintiffs sought a disclosure order under FOIA, legal fees, and expedited action. On Dec. 19, 2017, the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth D. Laporte. A case management statement was due by Mar. 13, 2018, with a case management conference scheduled for Mar. 20. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on Jan. 23. The organization reported that since it filed the suit, the defendant had located but had still not released responsive documents. On Mar. 13, the parties filed a joint case management statement, in which the defendant maintained it had already complied with the request in full but would meet with the plaintiff about the requested additional documents. The parties entered into alternative dispute resolution. On September 18, 2018, the parties filed stipulation of dismissal. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the claim with prejudice. Each party bore its own costs and fees. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On Dec. 19, 2017, the Center for Investigative Reporting (CIR) and one of its journalists brought this suit in N.D.Cal, suing DHS under FOIA. Plaintiffs sought information on expedited removal of noncitizens since the Trump Administration's Jan. 25, 2017 EO 13767. The parties disagreed whether the defendant complied had complied with the plaintiff's FOIA request, but the case was voluntarily dismissed in 2018. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On October 15, 2002, undergraduates and law students at Georgetown University who had been arrested at a protest in September 2002, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the District of Columbia, the D.C. police department, the Fairfax, Virginia sheriff's department, and several individual police officers under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and Bivens. Represented by a private firm, the plaintiffs asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief as well as for damages for the injuries that occurred when they were arrested. The plaintiffs claimed that the District of Columbia violated their rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the \u2018trap and arrest\u2019 method of policing, where police surrounded people and arrested them without giving them an order to disperse, violated the plaintiffs\u2019 due process rights while acting as student journalists and legal observers. They further claimed that the police had not warned them of their Miranda rights or their right to counsel and that they had been subjected to false arrest and false imprisonment. Several other civil cases were filed at the same time as Chang v. United States. The most important of these was the Barham v. Ramsey class action suit. That lawsuit finally settled in 2015. The plaintiffs in Chang declined to join that class. On January 15, 2008, Judge Emmet J. Sullivan ordered that the plaintiffs\u2019 arrest records be expunged. On January 30, 2008, the case was stayed as the parties were ordered to engage in the mediation process. On January 7, 2009, the stay was lifted and the pre-trial proceedings continued. There was a great deal of contention over discovery; the plaintiffs filed multiple motions to compel the defendants to release information and two motions to impose sanctions on the defendants for discovery abuses. Judge Sullivan appointed Magistrate Judge John Facciola as Special Master on May 5, 2010, to determine if the defendants had engaged in the destruction of evidence in both this case and the Barham case. On September 19, 2010, Judge Sullivan released an order granting the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgement on the plaintiff\u2019s claims for equitable relief, saying that the plaintiffs did not have standing to ask for declaratory and injunctive relief. 738 F.Supp.2d 83. After this order, the trial went on only for damages. Contentious discovery continued until April 2012. After the completion of discovery, the proceedings before Magistrate Judge Facciola continued. Judge Sullivan stayed the proceedings on December 24, 2013 and the parties returned to mediation on June 4, 2014. On November 4, 2014, Magistrate Judge Facciola released his Report and Recommendation of Law, denying all of the plaintiffs\u2019 motions for sanctions. He called the loss of the evidence on the part of the District of Columbia negligent but not malicious, and denied the plaintiffs\u2019 request for attorney fees. On December 30, 2015, the parties once more returned to mediation. On April 7, 2016, the parties finally settled. The overall settlement amount was $2,810,000. The plaintiffs were awarded $110k each from the District of Columbia and $5000 each from the federal government; the plaintiffs\u2019 attorneys were awarded $2.35 million to be paid by the District of Columbia.", "summary": "Students arrested in a trap-and-arrest action in World Bank/IMF protests in 2002 filed this lawsuit in October 2002 alleging violations of their constitutional rights by the District of Columbia. Discovery was a long and contentious process and included the appointment of a Special Master to determine if there had been any spoliation of electronic data. The parties finally settled on April 7, 2016 for $400,000 for the plaintiffs and $2.5 million for their attorneys."} {"article": "On December 13, 2007, the United Farm Workers and Farmworker Justice, two worker advocacy groups, filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). They filed under the Freedom of Information Act in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and the case was assigned to Judge Henry H. Kennedy. The plaintiffs, represented by the Public Citizen Litigation Group and Farmworker Justice sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, they requested that their document requests be fulfilled without delay or cost and that the defendant's failure to produce these documents previously be declared as unlawful. The plaintiffs alleged that the DOL failed to release public information about employers who had used the H-2A visa program to hire foreign guest workers instead of U.S. workers. The plaintiffs wrote that they had made 7 separate FOIA requests, some nearly a year ago, which the DOL had either ignored or responded to in a deficient manner. The plaintiffs alleged that the FOIA requests were made in order to uncover documents which they believe will show employer abuses in the H-2A program. On February 8, 2008, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint after the DOL identified 32,809 documents that would fulfill the plaintiffs sixth and seventh FOIA requests but refused to produce them without reproduction costs of $723.50. The amended complaint reiterated their request for the documents without cost. On March 10, 2008, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and a motion for summary judgment, which was answered by the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment on April 11, 2008. Before the court decided on these motions, the plaintiffs filed a status report on July 18, 2008. The report stated that the DOL had produced documents in response to all 7 FOIA requests to the plaintiffs' satisfaction, and also granted fee waivers for all requests. The report concluded that all matters had settled except for attorneys' fees and costs. The defendants entered a stipulation of settlement paying attorneys' fees and voluntary dismissal on September 5, 2008, which was accepted by the Court on September 11, 2008. The case is now closed.", "summary": "United Farm Workers and Farmworker Justice filed suit against the U.S. Department of Labor due to 7 separate ignored or deficient FOIA requests. The parties agreed to settle after the defendants fulfilled all 7 FOIA requests at no cost. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case with the defendants paying the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On September 2, 2019, 18 prisoners filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the New York Department of Corrections and a group of its doctors under 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983 for violations of the Eighth Amendment. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought damages, attorneys' fees, and an injunction against the defendants' practices and conditions for which this suit was brought. The plaintiffs also requested certification of a class of all present and future patients who require medications with abuse potential. The case was eventually assigned to Judge Preska. In 2017, the New York Department of Corrections instituted the Medications With Abuse Potential (\u201cMWAP\u201d) Policy in response to the opioid epidemic, which intended to reduce the amount of pain medications in the New York prison system. After medical providers prescribed pain medications, the policy required an additional approval from either a Regional Medical Director or the Chief Medical Officer before giving the pain medication to prisoners. The plaintiffs claimed that the policy prevented prisoners from receiving pain medications needed for legitimate medical purposes. They alleged that the administrators that provided the extra approval invariably denied the pain medications. As a result, patients with medical issues including severe spinal and neurological issues, phantom pain from amputations, and multiple sclerosis, were denied pain medication. On September 11, this case was related to another case involving a prisoner denied pain medication, captioned Medina v. Buther (7:15-cv-01955-LAP). This case is ongoing.", "summary": "In September 2019, 18 prisoners sued the New York Department of Corrections alleging that a medications policy violated the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought compensation for pain and suffering, as well as an injunctions against the prison's practices. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "On February 15, 2019, President Trump issued an executive order, Proclamation 9844, declaring a national emergency concerning the southern border of the United States. Following Proclamation 9844, Sierra Club and Southern Border Communities Coalition filed this suit on February 28, 2020 against President Trump and his administration on its own behalf and on behalf of its 825,000 members in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Sierra Club is a national nonprofit organization that advocates for environmental education and wildlife protection. Southern Border Communities Coalition is a nonprofit public benefit corporation that brings together 60 organizations from California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas to promote policies and solutions that improve the quality of life in border communities. Represented by the ACLU, ACLU of Northern California, ACLU of Texas, and the Sierra Club Environmental Law Program, the plaintiffs alleged that President Trump\u2019s administration sought to unlawfully divert billions of dollars appropriated for the military towards the border wall project, despite Congress having appropriated only $1.375 billion on any border barrier construction in fiscal year 2020, per Congress\u2019s Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020. The plaintiffs sued the President, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, and the acting U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security under the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a74332), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7701\u2013706), the All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. \u00a71651), and the Declaratory Judgments Act (28 U.S.C. \u00a72201), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs argued that the President unlawfully declared a national emergency in an attempt to circumvent Congress\u2019s exclusive control over appropriation, following Congress\u2019s consideration and rejection of the President\u2019s requests for billions of dollars in wall funding with the passing of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020. In doing so, the plaintiffs argued that the President violated the separation of powers, given that the Constitution vests all powers of appropriations exclusively in Congress. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the National Environmental Policy Act, because they failed to review the environmental impacts of the border wall construction project, per the regulations required and outlined in NEPA. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants' decisions to transfer military funds to wall construction constitute a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act because it was contrary to the Constitution and in excess of statutory authority. The case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Laurel Beele, but quickly reassigned to Judge Haywood S. Gilliam. Jr. Judge Gilliam ordered the case related to Sierra Club v. Trump, a similar case challenging 2019 appropriations. On April 13, 2020, the Sierra Club and Southern Border Communities Coalition filed a partial motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Trump administration's use of 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 284 to divert military funding to the construction of the border wall was unlawful. The motion detailed that, similar to the court's holding in Sierra Club v. Trumpi, 379 F. Supp. 3d 883 (N.D. Cal. 2019), the President's administration could not use transfer authorities to fund a border wall that Congress considered and rejected. The defendants responded with a partial motion for summary judgment in opposition to the Sierra Club and Southern Border Communities Coalition, arguing that the plaintiffs' recreational and aesthetic interests fall outside the zone of interests of \u00a78005 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act. Furthermore, the defendants' motion argued that \u00a78005 authorized the transfer of funds by the Department of Defense and that the administration's use of 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 284 to divert funding for Counter-Drug purposes was lawful. Meanwhile, on April 16, 2020, the U.S. House of Representatives submitted an amicus brief outlining their compelling interest in this case. The brief was filed in support of the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and requested that the court enjoin the President's administration from spending billions more than Congress appropriated for border wall construction. While the cross-motions for summary judgment were still pending, the nation elected a new President in November 2020. Upon taking office on January 20, 2021, President Biden issued an executive order, Proclamation 10142, terminating the national emergency declared by Proclamation 9844. President Biden\u2019s order further directed that officials pause work on the construction of the southern border wall and develop a plan to redirect funds and repurpose contracts. In light of Proclamation 10142, on January 21, 2021, Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. directed both parties in this suit to file a joint status report regarding the effect President Biden's executive order has on the case and the pending motions for summary judgment. The joint status report was due February 16, 2021. As of February 5, 2021, the case is pending further updates.", "summary": "Sierra Club and Southern Border Communities Coalition brought suit against the Trump administration over funds diverted towards the construction of the border wall project, after President Trump\u2019s declaration of a national emergency in 2019. This suit is pending further updates following President Biden\u2019s executive order terminating the national emergency concerning the southern border of the US and pausing the construction of the border wall."} {"article": "[The following summary is adapted with some additions from the Background section of the District Court's Order of March 30, 2007. See Ali v. Gonzales, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1199-1202 (W.D. Wash. 2007).] On November 13, 2002, five Somali nationals detained pending execution of a final order of removal to Somalia filed a petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington challenging respondent federal government's deportation methods and post-removal-order detention. Petitioners, represented by private counsel, claimed that removal to Somalia would violate 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1231(b)(2) because Somalia had no government which could accept deportees, and therefore asked the court to enjoin their removal and order their release. Prior to the initiation of this lawsuit, each of the petitioners had been detained for many months while the Government tried to achieve their removal, and were released from post-removal-order detention only in the wake of Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (holding that an alien may not be held in confinement once it is determined that there is no likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future). Petitioner Mohamud was re-detained in July 2002 upon revocation of his order of supervision, and petitioners Ali, Hundiye and Aweys were re-detained in November 2002 because the local immigration authorities were informed that their removal to Somalia was imminent. All the petitioners were informed that they would soon be removed to Somalia. Petitioners filed this action shortly after their re-detention. The Court (Judge Marsha J. Pechman) issued a stay preventing petitioners' removal on the day their petition was filed. After petitioners filed an amended petition on Novermber 26, 2002, seeking certification of a nation-wide class, the stay was extended to a class of all individuals with final orders of removal to Somalia. On December 10, 2002, the Court granted petitioners' motion for a temporary restraining order pending a hearing on the merits. Following a hearing on January 13, 2003, on January 17 the Court granted petitioners' request for a class-wide permanent injunction preventing the removals to Somalia, finding that 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1231(b)(2) allowed deportation to a country only if its government could accept the deportees. Ali v. Ashcroft, 213 F.R.D. 390 (W.D. Wash. 2003). On the ground that there was no likelihood that petitioners would be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Court also ordered that three of the petitioners (Ali, Hundiye and Aweys) be released from detention pursuant to Zadvydas. (Petitioner Mohamud had a separate habeas proceeding pending before Judge Barbara Rothstein (Mohamud v. INS, No. 2:02-cv-01686-BJR (W.D. Wash.)) and was thereafter ordered released by Judge Rothstein.) The Government appealed the District Court's order, and on September 19, 2003, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2003). Earlier that year, however, the Eight Circuit had decided the issue differently, holding that the United States immigration authorities did not have to obtain the acceptance of the removal country's government before the United States could repatriate an alien. See Jama v. INS, 329 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2003). The Government's request for rehearing was thus held in abeyance pending the appeal of the Eight Circuit decision to the Supreme Court. On January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court held that the Government had authority to remove individuals to Somalia without the necessity of obtaining the acceptance of the removal country's government. Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005). In light of this ruling, the Government moved to vacate the panel decision of the Ninth Circuit and remand with instructions that the District Court vacate the injunction, de-certify the class and reverse the order releasing the Petitioners from detention. On August 26, 2005, the Ninth Circuit granted the unopposed request to vacate the injunction, but, citing the long history of logistical difficulties in deporting Jama himself, remanded to the District Court the issue of whether or not petitioners could be re-detained. Ali v. Ashcroft, 421 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2005). Upon returning to the District Court, the parties submitted a joint report in which they agreed that the injunction should be dissolved, the class decertified, and the detention claims of Petitioners dismissed without prejudice. The Court (Judge Pechman) entered an order adopting the parties' requests on April 27, 2006. Meanwhile, following the District Court's granting of relief on the merits in January 2003, petitioners had moved for an award of attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2412, for work billed through January 2003. With the exception of some paralegal fees, the Court granted the motion on May 27, 2003, awarding petitioners a total of $129,449.46. An appeal to the Ninth Circuit was stayed while the decision on the appeal on the merits proceeded forward. After briefing on the EAJA appeal following their order vacating the injunction, on November 30, 2006, the Court of Appeals remanded to the District Court to determine whether petitioners were still prevailing parties. Ali v. Gonzales, 237 Fed.Appx. 128 (9th Cir. 2006). On March 30, 2007, the District Court (Judge Pechman) found that petitioners were prevailing parties only to the extent that they had secured their release from detention, and thus reduced the award of attorney's fees to $54,468.25 to exclude work done on the class action portion of the suit. (The court also imposed a $1,000 fine on the Government for submitting an overlong brief; this fine was reversed by the Ninth Circuit as an abuse of discretion on May 9, 2008. Ali v. Mukasey, 277 Fed. Appx. 741 (9th Cir. 2008).)", "summary": "On November 13, 2002, four immigration detainees facing a final order of removal to Somalia filed a petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, Seattle Division, challenging respondent federal government's deportation methods and post-removal-order detention. Petitioners, represented by private counsel, claimed that removal to Somalia would violate 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1231(b)(2) because Somalia had no government which could accept deportees, and therefore asked the court to enjoin their removal and order their release. While the District Court issued a permanent injunction and the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed, the Supreme Court's decision in Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement subsequently forced the lower courts to vacate the injunction. Petitioners were still awarded attorney's fees under the EAJA."} {"article": "On September 20, 2017, two same-sex couples and one former foster child brought this lawsuit against the state of Michigan in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The case was assigned to Judge Paul D. Borman. The plaintiffs alleged that Michigan contracted with and funded private child placing agencies, some of which were religious organizations that refused to place children with same-sex couples. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that allowing state-funded child placing agencies to turn families away on the basis of sexual orientation violated the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sued the state under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorney's fees. On December 15, 2017, the state filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing because there was no constitutional right to adopt children and that the agencies' actions were private rather than state actions. On December 18, St. Vincent Catholic Charities (SVCC) and three individuals who had had successful adoptions through SVCC moved to intervene as defendants. SVCC was a religious non-profit child placing agency that refused to work with same-sex couples, and it claimed that it would lose funding and have to close if the plaintiffs were granted injunctive relief. The next day, the proposed intervening defendants filed a motion to dismiss that contained many of the same arguments as the state's. On January 30, 2018, State Senator Arlan Meekhof, on behalf of 53 Michigan legislators, sought leave to file an amicus brief in support of the defendants. The court granted this request on February 26, 2018. In this brief, Senator Meekhof agreed with the arguments made by the state and the intervenor-defendants in their motions to dismiss, as well as emphasized the \"key roles\" that religious agencies had played in adoption and foster care in Michigan. On March 5, 2018, the Court granted the intervenor-defendants' motion to intervene as to SVCC. A hearing was held two days later as to the individual intervenor-defendants' ability to intervene, and on March 22, the Court granted the motion to intervene as to them as well. On September 14, 2018, the Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in part. 341 F.Supp.3d 706. Judge Borman dismissed one plaintiff's claims due to lack of standing but declined to dismiss the other claims. The defendants filed a motion seeking an interlocutory appeal of the court's decision on the motion to dismiss. Judge Borman denied the motion, explaining that the questions the defendants wanted certified for appeal were not issues that the plaintiffs actually raised. 2018 WL 5292022. The parties subsequently began engaging in settlement discussions. On March 22, 2019, the parties reached a settlement and filed a motion for voluntary dismissal. 2018 WL 8807229. As a part of the settlement, the Department of Health and Human Services agreed to enforce the nondiscrimination provision against all child placement agencies and made a public statement saying as much. The Department also promised to provide ongoing training to its employees regarding their obligations under the settlement agreement. Finally, it created a grievance process for families. The Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. On February 24, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of enforcing the settlement agreement. The plaintiffs alleged that they knew of a state-funded child placing agency refused to place children with same-sex couples. The motion is currently pending.", "summary": "In September 2017, two same-sex couples and one former foster child brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the state of Michigan because the state funded child placing agencies that discriminated against same-sex couples. The plaintiffs alleged that this violated the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The parties reached a settlement in which the State agreed to enforce nondiscrimination provisions against child placement agencies."} {"article": "On November 14, 2018, immigrants detained at the Cibola County Correctional Center filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. (Although the facility in question is located in New Mexico, the operator is organized as a Maryland corporation.) They sued the operator of the facility, CoreCivic, under the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 201-219), the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act, and the common law doctrine of unjust enrichment. The suit alleged that CoreCivic was using immigrant detainees\u2019 labor but paying them less than the federally mandated rate of $7.25 per hour (sometimes as little as $1 per day). Represented by private counsel, they sought to recover underpaid wages and attorneys\u2019 fees and require CoreCivic to treat all current and future Cibola detainees as employees so that they would be entitled to minimum wage. The case was assigned to Judge Richard D. Bennett. CoreCivic filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on January 11, 2019, arguing that the plaintiffs\u2019 custodial detention prevented them from assuming an employee/employer relationship. As such, CoreCivic argued, the plaintiffs were not eligible for the minimum wage under the statutes, and the unjust enrichment claim should therefore fail as well. On February 26, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion to conditionally certify a class consisting of \"all civilly detained immigrants who performed work for CoreCivic at Cibola through its work program at any time during the period beginning November 14, 2016, and continuing to the date on which notice is issued.\" The plaintiffs argued that their detention and working conditions at Cibola are sufficient conditions to meet the \u201csimilarly-situated\u201d threshold required to file a class action lawsuit. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 claims with prejudice on September 27, 2019. It held that the plaintiffs were not employees of CoreCivic and therefore not entitled to minimum wage. Because CoreCivic was not in violation of any statute, the unjust enrichment claim was also dismissed. 2019 WL 4735428 The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Fourth Circuit in October 2019; as of August 2020, that appeal is pending.", "summary": "In November 2018, immigrants at a detention facility in New Mexico brought this suit against the facility's operator, CoreCivic, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act. They claimed that CoreCivic had employed them to work at the facility but paid them as little as $1 per day. The case was dismissed in September 2019, when the court held that the plaintiffs were not employees of CoreCivic and were therefore not entitled to the minimum wage. As of August 2020, the plaintiffs\u2019 appeal is pending in the Fourth Circuit."} {"article": "This is a case about a Memphis Police Department (MPD) policy that resulted in the use of excessive force and unlawful arrests. On February 25, 2013, an officer of the MPD and a special agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) filed this class action lawsuit against the City of Memphis and six MPD police officers in the District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The plaintiffs sued on behalf of themselves and similarly situated persons for violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, as well as for negligence under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, fees and costs, and injunctive relief to stop Memphis from continuing this practice. The case was assigned to Chief Judge Jon McCalla. The \"Beale Street Sweep\" The MPD had a practice known as the \"Beale Street Sweep,\" where it would order all persons to immediately leave the sidewalks of Beale Street, even though there was nothing threatening the safety of the public or MPD police officers. This was typically early on Saturday and Sunday mornings, or during weekday entertainment events. The complaint stated that Memphis knew this incited hostile behavior among its police officers. The complaint additionally alleged that in the course of implementing this policy, the MPD assaulted, employed excessive force against, unlawfully detained and arrested, and fabricated criminal charges against numerous innocent people in an attempt to conceal their own unlawful conduct. The first plaintiff, an off-duty MPD officer, alleges that he was assaulted by the MPD while eating pizza outside of a club. Several MPD officers approached him, shouting \"didn't we tell you to get off the street?\" (the complaint claims he was not previously told this). The complaint goes on to say the police \"viciously attack[ed]\" him, slamming his body into a police vehicle with enough force to dent it, arresting him, and preparing fabricated charges against him. The MPD dismissed the charges shortly after. The other plaintiff, an off-duty ATF agent, was arrested after failing to gain entry to a club. The MPD confronted him and a family member after they were turned away, then arrested him for public intoxication. The complaint emphasizes that he was at no point intoxicated, and he was released immediately after his supervisor arrived on the scene. Both of these events occurred during Beale Street Sweeps. Plaintiffs claimed the sweeps violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to \"to remain in a public place with no apparent purpose and to travel locally through public spaces and roadways,\" as well as their Fourth Amendment right against excessive force and unreasonable seizure. On April 4, 2013, two of the defendant officers moved to dismiss. Another followed suit on May 16, and another on May 31. On June 4, 2013, Judge McCalla granted the first motion in part, dismissing the Fourteenth Amendment claim against the defendant on the grounds that his actions would more properly be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. The Court denied, however, that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim. He granted the other two motions on the same grounds on June 6 and July 10. The Court Grants Class Certification On November 27, 2013, plaintiffs moved for class certification. After 10 months of heated discovery, the Court granted class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) on September 29, 2014. He allowed plaintiffs' definition of the class as \"[a]ll persons who have been unlawfully removed from Beale Street and/or adjacent sidewalks by City of Memphis police officers pursuant to the custom, policy and practice known as the Beale Street Sweep.\" 2014 WL 8508560. The Court Mostly Denies Summary Judgment for the Defendants Both parties subsequently moved for summary judgment on October 27, 2014. That same day, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against the individual MPD officers, leaving the City of Memphis as the lone defendant. Judge McCalla granted in part the city's motion for summary judgment on January 18, 2015. 97 F.Supp.3d 947 (2015 WL 1567824). The plaintiffs had previously conceded that the record and case law did not support their claims for failure to train, investigate or discipline; negligence under the Governmental Tort Liability Act; and punitive damages. Consequently, Judge McCalla granted the motion for the defendant on those claims. However, he denied summary judgment against the plaintiffs on their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims as well as their municipal liability claims. He found that the plaintiffs had a Fourteenth Amendment right to travel that was potentially violated prior to their seizure. Additionally, genuine questions of fact remained on whether their Fourth Amendment rights had been violated and on whether the city was generally liable. A Jury Returns a Verdict for the Plaintiffs A jury trial began two days later on January 20, 2015. The jury returned a verdict for one of the individual plaintiffs (the MPD officer) but not the other (the ATF agent). In regards to the class, the jury found that: (1) Memphis had \u201cthrough its police officers, carried out a custom and/or well-established practice...of preventing persons from standing and/or walking on the sidewalk or street of Beale Street;\" (2) this well-established practice \u201coccur[ed] without consideration to whether conditions throughout the Beale Street area pose an existing, imminent or immediate threat to public safety;\u201d (3) this was \u201cthe cause of persons being prevented from standing and/or walking on the sidewalk or street of Beale Street;\u201d and (4) \u201csince at least 2007, thousands of persons were cleared off of Beale Street pursuant to\u201d that practice. On February 13, 2015, Memphis moved to decertify the class on the basis that class membership was \"unascertainable without a full adjudication on the merits of each potential member's claim.\" The Court denied this motion on May 28, though it granted a modification to the class definition by defining what the \"Beale Street Sweep\" was. 2015 WL 3442277. Simultaneously, it denied plaintiffs' October 27 motion for summary judgment. The Court Enters Judgment for the Plaintiffs and Grants the Injunction On June 3, 2015, Judge McCalla entered judgment for the plaintiffs and granted declaratory and injunctive relief. 108 F.Supp.3d 593 (2015 WL 3507110). The Court declared that \"since at least 2007, the City of Memphis violated the constitutional rights of thousands of persons who were subjected to 'the Beale Street Sweep,' that is, 'the policy, procedure, custom, or practice by which police officers of the Memphis Police Department order all persons to immediately leave the sidewalks and street on Beale Street without consideration to whether conditions throughout the Beale Street area pose an existing, imminent or immediate threat to public safety.'\" The Court also permanently enjoined the city from engaging in the Beale Street Sweep, issuing several instructions as orders to ensure it would not happen. The Court further determined that a monitor would be appointed to observe and report on the MPD's progress for one year after appointment. Memphis Appeals and the Court Grants Fees to Plaintiffs On July 6, 2015, Memphis appealed the Court's injunctive order, as well as the jury's verdict, the Court's earlier ruling on summary judgment, and the Court's granting of class certification, to the Sixth Circuit. On August 27, 2015, Judge McCalla granted attorneys' fees, reimbursement of expenses, entry of judgment, and post-judgment interest to the plaintiffs. 2015 WL 5076974. Memphis Appeals Again and the Court Stays the Judgment On September 11, 2015, Memphis filed notice of a new appeal to the Sixth Circuit of the August order and judgment. It also moved to stay the injunction, declaratory order, judgment, and monetary relief pending resolution by the Sixth Circuit. The court granted the motion in part on October 28, allowing a stay of the judgment and monetary damages, but denying a stay of the injunctive and declaratory relief. The Sixth Circuit Denies the Appeals A Sixth Circuit panel consisting of Circuit Judges Julia Gibbons, Bernice Donald, and Richard Griffin heard oral arguments for both appeals concurrently on June 14, 2016. On October 17, 2016, Judge Gibbons delivered an opinion joined by Judge Donald and joined in part by Judge Griffin (who also filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). She first held that plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment right was violated, and that it should be subject to intermediate scrutiny. Even though it was subject to strict scrutiny in the District Court, that was a \"harmless error\" (this was the only part on which the dissenting in part opinion disagreed). Next, Judge Gibbons found that there was no abuse of discretion in certifying the class of people subject to the Beale Street Sweep. Although Memphis had claimed \"ascertainability\" was a requirement for class certification, Judge Gibbons held that, in this case, the \"precise identity of each class member need not be ascertained.\" Finally, she addressed the City's claim that there was \"insufficient evidence\" that the Beale Street Sweep was the \"moving force\" behind the plaintiffs' arrest. She pointed out that Memphis had failed to preserve this issue procedurally, but even if it had, it would fail on the merits because there was sufficient evidence. 839 F.3d 530 (2016 WL 6068911). On October 31, 2016, Memphis petitioned for a rehearing by the Sixth Circuit en banc. The petition was denied on January 4, 2017, and the Sixth Circuit issued a mandate on January 12. The District Court Lifts the Stay of the Judgment Back in the District Court, the plaintiffs moved to lift the stay of judgment and moved for additional attorneys' fees and post-judgment interest on January 25, 2017. The Court granted the motion to lift the stay on February 28, 2017, holding that it lacked the authority to stay the mandate of the Court of Appeals. But it held off on granting the motion for supplemental fees, instead ordering Memphis to file a response. 2017 WL 782929. Memphis Appeals Yet Again, Unsuccessfully Undeterred, Memphis appealed the District Court's order on March 16, 2017. It also filed a petition for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court on April 7, 2017, hoping to obtain review of the Sixth Circuit's October 17 decision affirming the District Court's judgment. The Supreme Court denied the City's petition on June 7, 2017. Memphis then voluntarily dismissed its appeal to the Sixth Circuit on June 13. The Court Grants Supplemental Fees On July 31, 2017, the Court entered an order taxing costs, indicating that the parties had come to an agreement on expenses. On August 4, 2017, Judge McCalla issued an order and judgment granting attorneys' fees, enhancements of those fees, and post-judgment interest to the plaintiffs. As of April 10, 2021, there is no indication that Memphis has not adhered to the injunction or paid the fees. The case is likely not ongoing.", "summary": "A police officer and ATF agent filed this class action lawsuit against the City of Memphis, Tennessee for a police practice known as the \"Beale Street Sweep.\" This practice led to abusive behavior and unlawful arrests by the MPD in violation of the plaintiffs' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court granted class certification for the plaintiffs and denied summary judgment for the City. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the Court granted monetary and injunctive relief. Memphis tried to appeal to the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's judgment. Memphis also unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. It was subsequently ordered to pay supplemental fees to the plaintiffs."} {"article": "On February 19, 2009, the plaintiff, a New York resident of South Asian ethnicity, filed a lawsuit against the City of New York in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 The plaintiff, represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union, asked the court for a declaratory judgment that the City of New York's policing practices violated the Equal Protection Clause, and for injunctive relief mandating training, supervision, and monitoring to ensure that people are selected for searches without bias. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that in 2005 the City of New York established a subway-bag search program that encouraged racial profiling by officers, because officers do not need to report any demographic data on selected persons, and because allegedly officers have total discretion to set what fraction of passengers they search and may change that number at will. The plaintiff claimed that officers selected him twenty-one times over three years, a very disproportionate number. Officers stopped his partner, who is white, only once during the same three-year period. He alleged that this was based on his race, pointing out that officers stopped him in his work scrubs, in a suit, and while he was wearing casual clothing. The complaint explained that the plaintiff had reported these searches to the Civilian Complaint Review Board (\"CCRB\") eight times, but nothing was done to address his complaints. On May 20, 2009, the Court entered an order of dismissal after the parties reached a settlement. On June 30, 2009, the Court entered the stipulation and order of settlement. The settlement stipulated that the City of New York would pay the plaintiff $10,000, plus $15,000 in attorneys' fees/expenses. In return, he agreed to dismiss his claims and release the defendants from any liability resulting from the events alleged in the complaint.", "summary": "On February 19, 2009, the plaintiff, an occupational therapist of South Asian ethnicity, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York under \u00a7 1983 against the City of New York. He alleged that officers selected him for a bag search when entering the subway a disproportionate twenty-one times over three years, on the basis of his South Asian appearance. On June 30, 2009, the parties agreed to settle for ten thousand dollars, plus reasonable attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs."} {"article": "On February 20, 2018, a married same-sex couple filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the Administration for Children and Families, the Office of Refugee Resettlement, and the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) for violating the Establishment Clause (U.S. Const. Amend I) and the Fifth Amendment\u2019s Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process clauses. Plaintiffs claim that the Federal Defendants unconstitutionally provided taxpayer funds to USCCB (and their sub-grantees) to administer federal child welfare services for unaccompanied refugee children, as they granted these funds fully knowing that USCCB discriminates against same-sex couples seeking to foster or adopt children through these programs. Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief from Defendants admitting to their constitutional violations, and injunctive relief requiring Federal Defendants to ensure Plaintiffs can apply to these programs without discrimination and with adequate safeguards to prevent any use of religious or other criteria to exclude applicants based on their sexual orientation, sex, or the same-sex character of their marriage. They also sought nominal monetary damages and reasonable costs and attorney\u2019s fees. This case was assigned to Judge Amit P. Mehta. In February 2017, Plaintiffs, sought to foster a child through Catholic Charities of Fort Worth, a subgrantee of the USCCB under the Unaccompanied Refugee Minor (URM) Program and the Unaccompanied Alien Child (UAC) Program. After the Catholic Chartiy realized that the plaintiffs were a same-sex couple that did not \u201cmirror the holy family,\u201d their application was denied. Plaintiffs immediately reported this discrimination to the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), but did not receive a response until mid April 2017. ORR\u2019s response did not address the questions and only asked for the name of the staffer who allegedly discriminated against her and her wife. Plaintiffs provided this information in early May 2017 and received a \u201cthank you\u201d note the next day, but did not receive any further communication from either ORR or the Catholic Charity. In March 2018, about one month after their initial filing, Plaintiffs amended the complaint to add the National LGBT Bar Association as a plaintiff. The Association is a professional membership-based organization comprised of more than 10,000 members of the legal community who support LGBT rights. They joined the suit on behalf of their members who were federal taxpayers who contributed to the general revenues from which Congress appropriated funds to the child welfare programs at issue in this case. They objected to paying for federally funded child welfare services that were provided in a discriminatory manner based on religious principles to which they did not subscribe. In May 2018, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. They claimed that the individual plaintiffs lacked standing because their alleged injury was not fairly traceable to the government\u2019s challenged conduct, would not be redressable by a favorable decision, and that they did not have taxpayer standing to assert an Establishment Clause claim. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, and oral argument was set for late November 2018. After the argument, parties were instructed to submit a joint status report within two weeks of the hearing. The first status report was submitted on December 14, 2018, and the second was scheduled to be submitted a month later. However, the lapse of appropriations for the federal government in early January 2019 derailed this plan. The next joint status report, submitted on February 8, 2019, indicated that while parties engaged in a good-faith effort to reach a settlement, they remained unable to resolve their issues at that time. In mid-February 2019, the court issued an order stating that the proceedings for Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss would go forward, while encouraging the parties to continue their settlement discussions. On June 12, 2019, the court granted in part and denied in part Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. The court agreed that none of the plaintiffs had taxpayer standing to assert an Establishment Clause violation, and as that was the only claim asserted by the National LGBT Bar Association, they were dismissed from the case. The married couple, however, had sufficient individual standing to pursue all three causes of action, and therefore the remainder of the Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss was denied. 391 F.Supp.3d 23. As of March 17, 2020, the parties were still engaged in discovery.", "summary": "A married lesbian couple sued the Department of Health and Human Services and other federal agencies in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for violating the Establishment Clause and the Fifth Amendment\u2019s Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process clauses. Plaintiffs claim that the Federal Defendants unconstitutionally provided taxpayer funds to Catholic charities to administer federal child welfare services, as they granted these funds knowing that these charities discriminates against same-sex couples. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief from Defendants admitting to their constitutional violations, and injunctive relief, as well as nominal monetary damages and reasonable costs and attorney\u2019s fees. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which was granted in part and denied in part. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a joint class action lawsuit and habeas petition brought on behalf of children confined in four secure care facilities operated by the Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice, seeking release and mitigation in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs alleged that children are at-risk for contracting and transmitting COVID-19 and that they may be vulnerable to life-threatening complications both during and after the infection itself appears to have resolved. The plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order and later also requested an order requiring the defendants to give the plaintiffs access to confidential communication with their counsel. On June 2, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification for the proposed class. The defendants moved for summary judgment on July 29 and filed a motion to dismiss on October 20. A settlement conference was held on November 10. The parties reached a confidential settlement in November 2020 and, following a conditional dismissal period, the case is now presumed closed.
All people who are detained in ICE custody who have one of the Risk Factors placing them at heightened risk of severe illness and death upon contracting the COVID-19 virus. The Risk Factors are defined as being over the age of 55; being pregnant; or having chronic health conditions, including: cardiovascular disease (congestive heart failure, history of myocardial infarction, history of cardiac surgery); high blood pressure; chronic respiratory disease (asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease including chronic bronchitis or emphysema, or other pulmonary diseases); diabetes; cancer; liver disease; kidney disease; autoimmune diseases (psoriasis, rheumatoid arthritis, systemic lupus erythematosus); severe psychiatric illness; history of transplantation; and HIV/AIDS.Subclass two consisted of:
All people who are detained in ICE custody whose disabilities place them at heightened risk of severe illness and death upon contacting the COVID-19 virus. Covered disabilities include: cardiovascular disease (congestive heart failure, history of myocardial infarction, history of cardiac surgery); high blood pressure; chronic respiratory disease (asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease including chronic bronchitis or emphysema, or other pulmonary diseases); diabetes; cancer; liver disease; kidney disease; autoimmune diseases (psoriasis, rheumatoid arthritis, systemic lupus erythematosus); severe psychiatric illness; history of transplantation; and HIV/AIDS.On April 3, 2020, the defendants filed their opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not have a cognizable injury in that none of them had demonstrated that they had been exposed to COVID-19. They also argued that plaintiffs had failed to show that ICE had been deliberately indifferent to the putative class or that ICE's measures in response to COVID-19 resulted in punitive conditions of confinement. Finally, they argued that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm caused by ICE's response to COVID-19. The defendants also filed their opposition to plaintiffs' motion for class certification on April 3, 2020. The defendants argued that the court should deny the plaintiffs' motion for class certification because the five named plaintiffs had different medical conditions and were detained at different detention facilities. The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs' claims were not representative of the proposed class of individuals. On April 15, 2020, Judge Bernal rejected ICE's motion for reconsideration re transferring the case, and its motion to dismiss. The Court denied the government\u2019s motion to divide the nationwide lawsuit into 15 individual cases in eight district courts. He also denied ICE\u2019s motion to strike the 200-page complaint. On April 20, 2020, Judge Bernal granted plaintiffs' emergency motion to certify subclass and their emergency motion for preliminary injunction. The court held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim and would suffer irreparable harm as a result of the deprivation of their rights, thus warranting the granting of their motion for preliminary injunction. Judge Bernal stipulated that the preliminary injunction would remain in effect as long as COVID-19 continued to pose a substantial threat of harm to the members of the subclasses. On May 29, the defendants filed an answer to the plaintiff's complaint, claiming that the plaintiffs did not state a claim upon which relief may be granted or allege a cognizable cause of action. They also argued that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative exhaustion and the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case. On June 19, the defendants appealed the preliminary injunction and class certification to the Ninth Circuit. The plaintiffs sought to enforce the April 20 preliminary injunction on June 24, since about 70% of the Subclass members not subject to mandatory detention were still detained. The appeal was assigned USCA Case No. 20-55634. The parties attended oral argument on December 9. Back in the district court, Judge Bernal granted the motion to enforce in part on October 7, ordering defendants to conduct \"timely\" custody determinations that should take no longer than a week and provide notice of the determination to the Subclass member. 2020 WL 6541994. The Court clarified that only in rare cases should a Subclass member not subject to mandatory detention remain detained. The case was ordered to Magistrate Judge Shashi H. Kewalramani for settlement conference on August 19. The defendants sought to stay discovery pending appeal on September 17, but Judge Bernal denied the motion on October 30. On December 7, 2020, the defendants again appealed the preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit. The appeal was assigned USCA Case No. 20-56297. On December 17, they moved to stay the appeal On January 6, 2021, the defendants filed a motion to hold in abeyance the second appeal (USCA Case No. 20-56297), pending the resolution of the first appeal (USCA Case No. 20-55634). Back in the district court, on January 21, the plaintiffs moved for a Special Master to ensure the defendants' compliance with the preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants failed to conduct required custody determinations and continued to transfer people between facilities. The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants' pandemic response requirements document continued to be inadequate, unenforced, and failed to address emerging issues, such as vaccine distribution or new, more virulent strains of COVID-19. The defendants responded in opposition to the motion for a Special Master on February 15 and disputed that they were in noncompliance with the Court's orders. Regarding vaccine distribution, the defendants explained that ICE was not itself evaluating when to vaccinate, but instead, that vaccinations would follow the various state vaccination plans. With respect to new strains of the virus, ICE indicated there were no specific recommendations they were following other than the standard guidance. A hearing on the appointment of a Special Master is scheduled for March 8, 2021. As of February 18, the case remains ongoing with a trial before Judge Bernal set for April 26, 2022.", "summary": "In August 2019, 15 individuals who are currently detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs, as well as two nonprofit groups who advocate for immigrant rights, filed a class action suit against U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement for violating their Fifth Amendment rights, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is ongoing and is in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and immigration reform. In March 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the plaintiffs sought emergency relief to obtain protection against the disease. The court granted preliminary injunction on April 20, which the defendants appealed and plaintiffs sought to enforce the injunction."} {"article": "On March 14, 2000, an inmate in California corrections system (CDCR) filed this lawsuit in District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff sued the Secretary of CDCR in his official capacity and CDCR personnel in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983. The plaintiff claimed prison officials violated his due process rights by incorrectly validating him as a gang member and placing him in administrative segregation (\u201cAd-Seg\u201d) while at Deuel Vocational Institution, and later in a Security Housing Unit (\u201cSHU\u201d) at Pelican Bay State Prison. Prison officials placed the plaintiff in Ad-Seg and the SHU after he was \u201cvalidated\u201d as an associate of the Northern Structure prison gang. The plaintiff claimed that his due process rights were violated because he was not in fact an associate of the prison gang and his validation was not supported by sufficient, reliable evidence. The plaintiff also claimed that his due process rights were violated because he was not given notice and an opportunity to present his views before being placed in segregation, and because he was denied meaningful opportunities to challenge his validation and continued retention in segregated housing. The plaintiff originally filed this case pro se. By order filed May 17, 2002, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice on the ground that the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to all of the claims alleged in the complaint. (2002 WL 1034043). The plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit appointed the law firm of Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Falk & Rabkin to represent the plaintiff on appeal. In a published decision the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the Prison Litigation Reform Act did not require dismissal of an entire action where a prisoner\u2019s complaint contains exhausted and unexhausted claims. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit instructed that the proper treatment of a \u201cmixed\u201d complaint depends on the relatedness of the claims, and held that if an exhausted claim was intertwined with an unexhausted claim, the claims should all be treated as exhausted. Id. at 1177. The Supreme Court denied the defendant\u2019s petition for writ of certiorari. 549 U.S. 1204 (2007). On remand, the plaintiff continued to be represented by counsel. The Court found that plaintiff\u2019s due process claims were interrelated, and allowed the plaintiff to file an amended complaint alleging a single due process violation arising out of his gang validation and placement and retention in Ad-Seg and the SHU. As originally filed, the plaintiff's first amended complaint named as defendants a number of CDCR personnel sued for damages in their individual capacity, along with the Secretary of CDCR who was sued in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief. In December 2006, the law firm of Chapman, Popik & White replaced Howard Rice as the plaintiff\u2019s counsel of record. The parties engaged in extensive discovery and further motion practice, including motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants. On September 30, 2009, (Judge Susan Illston) denied the defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment (2008 WL 619017). The defendants noticed an interim appeal of the Court\u2019s denial of qualified immunity. The interlocutory appeal caused the cancellation of the March 23, 2008, trial date and stayed all proceedings in this Court. The plaintiff then decided to dismiss the remaining individual defendants and all claims for damages in order to moot the pending appeal. In October 27 2008, the Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion to dismiss the individual defendants and to dismiss the appeal as moot, and the case was remanded to the district court. Continuing to prepare for the trial, in December 2008, the Court ruled that the attorneys-eyes-only restrictions of the protective order for the defendant's confidential gang validation evidence would be lifted for trial purposes. The defendant took an emergency appeal from that ruling by petition for writ of mandamus, which the Ninth Circuit granted over the plaintiff\u2019s opposition on December 24, 2008. As a result, the Court was required to prevent disclosure to the plaintiff of certain materials compiled by CDCR in course of its gang validation process. From January 13 to February 12, 2009, the Court (Judge Illston) held a bench trial on the plaintiff\u2019s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff presented 17 witnesses, including three experts and testimony from plaintiff over three separate sessions. Defendant presented 4 witnesses, including its experts. Approximately 300 documentary exhibits were entered into evidence at trial. On September 30, 2009, the Court (Judge Illston) issued a Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court found that the plaintiff\u2019s due process rights were violated when he was initially validated as a Northern Structure associate because he was never given notice of the initial validation investigation, and was never afforded the opportunity to be heard prior being validated or placed in administrative segregation. The Court also found that this deprivation of procedural due process was not cured in any of the subsequent administrative hearings and inmate appeals because none of these proceedings constituted a meaningful review of the gang validation. Finally, the Court found that the plaintiff\u2019s substantive due process right were violated because the items of evidence used to validate the plaintiff as a prison gang associate lack sufficient indicia of reliability to meet the \u201csome evidence\u201d standard as required by the case law. Based upon expert psychological testimony and evidence at trial, the Court found that the plaintiff\u2019s experience in the SHU caused him to develop depression and post-traumatic stress disorder, and that he currently suffers from these conditions, despite his parole from Pelican Bay. The Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a judicial declaration that his gang validation was never supported by accurate or reliable evidence and was implemented in violation of his procedural rights. The Court directed defendant Matthew Cate, as Secretary of CDCR, to expunge the plaintiff\u2019s validation as a Northern Structure associate from CDCR records, to report the expungement to all gang-related law enforcement databases and clearinghouses to which the original validation was reported previously, and to remove all documents related to the validation from plaintiff\u2019s prison file. The parties continued litigating attorneys fees until 2012. The court awarded roughly $1,088,000 in total attorney's fees and costs. On June 22, 2012, the court issued an order confirming payment the attorneys' fees and costs. As of March 28, 2016, the case appears closed.", "summary": "In 2000, an inmate in California corrections system (CDCR) filed this lawsuit in District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff sued the Secretary of CDCR and individual CDCR personnel under 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983. The plaintiff claimed prison officials violated his due process rights by incorrectly validating him as a gang member and placing him in segregation while at Deuel Vocational Institution, and Pelican Bay State Prison. The Court found in favor of the plaintiff and directed CDCR to expunge plaintiff\u2019s validation as a Northern Structure associate from CDCR records, to report the expungement to all gang-related law enforcement databases and clearinghouses to which the original validation was reported previously, and to remove all documents related to the validation from plaintiff\u2019s prison file."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a lawsuit brought by the University of California regents regarding the July 2020 release of ICE regulations which, in effect, meant that students on F-1 visas could risk deportation if their school shifted to online learning. In a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same July directive, plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the regulations rescinded. In order to effectuate the rescission, ICE removed the guidance from its website and replaced it with the previous guidance which exempted students from the limitation on online learning credits in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The universities in this case later voluntarily dismissed their claims.
the injunctive relief ordered ... [in the Court\u2019s prior memorandum decision and order in this case] is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right, is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that there is no evidence that granting this relief will have any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of the criminal justice system.Judge Winmill denied this motion as unnecessary because her prior memorandum complies with the Prison Litigation Reform Act's requirements for preliminary injunctive relief. 2019 WL 1546927 (April 9, 2019 D. Idaho). In the Ninth Circuit, oral argument was held on May 16, 2019 before a panel comprised of Circuit Judges M. Margaret McKeown and Ronald M. Gould, and District Judge Robert S. Lasnik. On May 30, 2019, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court to address three issues. First, the district court needed to clarify if the order denying defendant's motion for stay pending appeal was meant to renew the preliminary injunction. Second, the court needed to clarify if its ruling on the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction also granted the plaintiff permanent injunctive relief. Finally, the court needed to clarify whether the plaintiff succeeded on the merits of her Eighth Amendment claim for permanent injunctive relief. In an opinion by Judge Winmill issued the next day, the court renewed the preliminary injunctive relief, clarified that the grant of preliminary injunctive relief also granted the plaintiff permanent injunctive relief, and clarified that the court had previously concluded that the plaintiff succeeded on the merits of her Eighth Amendment claim for permanent injunctive relief. 2019 WL 2319527 (May 31, 2019 D. Idaho). The Ninth Circuit issued a per curiam opinion on August 23, 2019 affirming all the decisions of the district court. 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019). The defendants appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit on July 1, 2019. (Appeal Docket No. 19-35552). On October 24, 2019, the district court issued an order requiring defendants to provide all pre-surgical treatments and corollary appointments or consultations necessary for gender confirmation surgery. The defendants filed yet another appeal on October 31, 2019 to the Ninth Circuit regarding Judge Winmill's October 24, 2019 order. (Appeal Docket No. 19-35917). The Ninth Circuit dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The same day, in the district court, the defendants filed an expedited motion to stay the court's October 24, 2019 order pending appeal. On November 8, 2019, Judge Winmill issued an opinion denying the defendant's expedited motion to stay. In this opinion, Judge Winmill deferred setting a deadline for the plaintiff to receive her first pre-surgical treatment and also allowed the court to hold a hearing on this limited issue. 2019 WL 5865620 (Nov. 8, 2019 D. Idaho). A hearing was held on November 21, 2019 before Judge Winmill. At the conclusion of this hearing, Judge Winmill reinstated her previous October 24, 2019 order and ordered that the plaintiff must begin receiving pre-surgical treatments no later than November 26, 2019. The defendants requested rehearing in front of the Ninth Circuit en banc, which was denied as the request failed to receive a majority of the votes of non-recused active judges in favor of en banc consideration. The Ninth Circuit issued an order denying rehearing en banc along with an opinion by Circuit Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain respecting the decision, and and dissents from denial of rehearing en banc prepared by Judge Collins and Judge Bumatay. The entire document was 161 pages. 949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. Feb 10, 2020). On March 2, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to stay litigation in the district court pending the defendants' forthcoming appeal to the United States Supreme Court. The plaintiff did not oppose the stay, but requested limited exceptions necessary to preserve critical evidence. In April 2017, Judge Winmill issued an order granting the stay. In the order, Judge Winmill ordered the defendants to preserve all relevant evidence and to continue to provide Plaintiff with pre-surgical treatment as required by the October 24, 2019 order. 2020 WL 1907560 (April 17, 2020, D. Idaho) On May 6, 2020, the defendants filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. (Appeal Docket No. 19-1280). The issues brought before the Supreme Court were
[w]hether the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding that the guidelines set by an advocacy organization constitute the constitutional minima for inmate medical care under the Eighth Amendment, when the First, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all concluded that they do not.and
Whether the Ninth Circuit\u2019s holding that a prison health care provider\u2019s individualized medical decision was unreasonable and therefore constituted deliberate indifference, regardless of his subjective reasoning, conflicts with Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding that mere negligence does not establish deliberate indifference), and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (holding the provider must have known of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to find deliberate indifference).On the same day, the defendant-petitioner's submitted an application to stay the district court's order to Justice Kagan. On May 21, 2020, Justice Kagan denied the application. 2020 WL 2569747 (May 21, 2020 S. Ct.). The plaintiff-respondent has filed an opposition to the defendant-petitioner's brief. The defendant has until August 10, 2020 to file a response. As of July 2020, the case remains open in front of the Supreme Court.", "summary": "A Native American, transgender inmate in Idaho alleged violation of her 14th and 8th Amendment rights. The Idaho Department of Corrections denied her access to adequate hormone treatment and gender confirmation surgery. The Court found for the plaintiff and enjoined defendants to provide gender reassignment surgery. The defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and a panel of judges affirmed the district court's decision. The defendants have now filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. Briefing before the Supreme Court is ongoing as of July 2020."} {"article": "This Clearinghouse record combines two cases, Heyer v. City of New York (S.D.N.Y., filed 1980), and Bennett v. New York City Housing Authority (originally E.D.N.Y., filed 2002; transferred to S.D.N.Y. in 2005 and consolidated with Heyer). On February 20, 1980, individuals with mobility impairments who were eligible for the Section 8 program commenced a class action lawsuit, Heyer v. City of New York Housing Authority, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the New York City Housing Authority under the United States Housing Act of 1937, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act alleging that the New York City Housing Authority failed to provide individuals with mobility impairments, who have been, are, or will be qualified for the Section 8 program, with effective assistance in finding accessible housing. The District Court certified a class, and in 1982 ordered a settlement agreement that required the defendant to take certain remedial steps under the supervision of the District Court. However, the settlement had no termination provision, and at some point the settlement fell into disuse. Then on June 17, 2002, a class of individuals with mobility impairment who were eligible for the Section 8 program filed Bennett v. New York City Housing Authority in the Eastern District of New York challenging similar violations by the Housing Authority. In Bennett, the plaintiffs sued under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Fair Housing Act, alleging that the New York City Housing Authority failed or refused to assist them in finding housing so that they can make use of their housing vouchers. More specifically, they claimed that the defendants failed or refused to assist them in finding housing with accommodations for individuals with mobility impairments. Represented by the New York Legal Assistance Group, the Bennett plaintiffs asked the Court for injunctive and declaratory relief. Unaware of the Heyer case and settlement agreement, the parties fully litigated a motion to dismiss, which was granted in a December 16, 2002 Memorandum and Order by U.S. District Judge Charles P. Sifton. The Judge agreed with the defendant that there was no subject matter jurisdiction, and denied the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the complaint as futile. 248 F.Supp.2d 166. Shortly thereafter, the parties began negotiating a settlement and on May 4, 2005, the parties signed a Stipulation and Order of Settlement in which the defendants agreed to: make accommodations for disabled individuals in the application process for public housing, regularly update its lists of available apartments, work with approved real estate brokers to locate apartments that may be suitable for individuals with mobility impairments, and recommend that landlords modify apartments to suit individuals with mobility impairments. The issue of attorneys' fees was handled privately by the parties. It was not until 2005, three years after Bennett was filed, that the parties became aware of the earlier Heyer case. The Bennett case was then transferred from the Eastern District of New York to the Southern District of New York so that the new (Bennett) litigation could be consolidated with the old (Heyer) litigation. The two consolidated cases were settled in 2006, which dissolved the 1982 Heyer stipulation and substituted a new stipulation imposing certain obligations, including a reporting requirement, on the Housing Authority for a three year period to begin on April 27, 2006. However, after the Housing Authority failed to fulfill its obligations during that three year period, the Court extended its jurisdiction over the consolidated cases from 2009 to 2011. On January 30, 2012, after the plaintiffs complained about the Housing Authority's continued failure to meet the monitoring requirements, the parties negotiated the terms of yet another revised stipulation, which imposed additional obligations on the Housing Authority, including monitoring by the attorneys for the plaintiffs for three months after signing the Stipulation. This stipulation was set to run until April 30, 2014 unless extended by consent of the parties or order of the Court. There has been no further movement on the case; presumably the case is now closed.", "summary": "On February 20, 1980, individuals with mobility impairments who were eligible for the Section 8 program commenced Heyer v. City of New York Housing Authority, a class action lawsuit against the New York Housing Authority for its alleged failure to provide individuals with mobility impairments who have been, are, or will be qualified for the Section 8 program with effective assistance in finding accessible housing. The District Court certified a class and in 1982 ordered a settlement agreement, which at some point fell into disuse. Then in 2002, a class of individuals with mobility impairment who were eligible for the Section 8 program filed Bennett v. New York City Housing Authority in the Eastern District of New York, challenging similar violations by the Housing Authority. Unaware of the Heyer case and settlement agreement, the Bennet parties fully litigated the defendant's motion to dismiss which was granted in a December 16, 2002 Memorandum and Order. It was not until 2005 that the Heyer litigation was discovered by the Bennett parties. After moving the Bennett case to the Southern District of New York, the parties reached an agreement in 2006 in which the Bennett case was consolidated with the 1980 Heyer case. Also in the 2006 stipulation and settlement agreement, the Housing Authority agreed to provide accommodations for individuals with disabilities looking for Section 8 housing. After the Housing Authority failed to fulfill its obligations under the agreement, the court elected to extend its jurisdiction over the case from 2009 to 2011. In 2012, the parties negotiated a revised stipulation which imposed additional obligations on the Housing Authority. Since then, there has been no further movement on this case, and the case has been closed."} {"article": "On November 20, 2018, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), an independent non-profit research center dedicated to privacy and civil liberties issues, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The case was assigned to District Judge Dabney L. Friedrich. The plaintiff sued the United States Department of Commerce and its agency, the Bureau of the Census, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Declaratory Judgment Act. EPIC, represented by its own in-house counsel, alleged that the Census Bureau\u2019s decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census without conducting and publishing Privacy Impact Assessments that analyze how citizenship data will be handled, was in violation of the APA and the E-Government Act of 2002. The plaintiff specifically alleged that the Commerce Department and the Census Bureau failed to conduct and publicly release a \u201clegally sufficient\u201d Privacy Impact Assessment for the \u201ccollection, processing, and storage\u201d of personally identifiable citizenship data on the 2020 Census, as required by the E-Government Act. The plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief. Specifically, EPIC sought to compel Department to create and publish Privacy Impact Assessment, and requested that the Court enjoin the Commerce Department from including the citizenship question on the 2020 Census until the Department has published a \u201cfull and complete\u201d Privacy Impact Assessment. On January 18, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction. On February 8, the Court denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Commerce Department from including the citizenship question to the 2020 Census. 356 F.Supp.3d 85. The Court found that the plaintiff did not have a high likelihood of success on the merits - the touchstone of the preliminary injunction inquiry. The Court reasoned that plaintiff did not have a high likelihood of success on the merits, because the Bureau did not act contrary to the E-Government Act by deciding to collect citizenship data before conducting, reviewing, or releasing a PIA addressing that decision. EPIC immediately appealed. On March 11, the defendants moved to dismiss the case. On June 28, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court\u2019s denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for the purpose of dismissal. The court found that the organization lacked standing as they failed to show injury. 928 F.3d 95. On August 12, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied on September 16. The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on October 3. Although the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on December 16, 2019, certiorari was denied on April 27, 2020. 2020 WL 1978949. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On November 30, 2018, the Electronic Privacy Information Center filed a lawsuit challenging the Commerce Department\u2019s decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census without conducting and publishing Privacy Impact Assessments that analyze how citizenship data will be handled. On Jan 18, 2019, the court denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction. On appeal, the order was vacated and remanded the case for dismissal as the organization lacked standing as they failed to show injury. The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and certiorari was denied on April 27, 2020."} {"article": "On February 14, 2013, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Jacksonville Branch (\"NAACP\") and the Jacksonville Brotherhood of firefighters, a Chapter of the International Association of African-American Professional Fire Fighters (JBOF) brought this class action lawsuit for violations of Title VII in the U.S. District Court of Middle District of Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that defendant, the Consolidated City of Jacksonville, through its Fire and Rescue Department (\"JFRD\"), engaged in discriminatory recruitment, hiring, assignment and transfer polices that have a disparate impact on black candidates and black firefighters. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. The class was specified as all black candidates or aspiring black candidates for employment who were denied employment or dissuaded from applying by JFRD's discriminatory hiring process and all present or past black firefighters who have been subject to a hostile work environment, and/or discriminatory assignment and transfer policies, from July 30, 2006 to the present, two years prior to the sworn filing of the EEOC complaint. The case was assigned to District Judge Timothy J. Corrigan. On June 3, 2013, the plaintiffs moved for temporary restraining order. On October 24, 2013, Judge Corrigan denied the motion and ordered the parties to mediate by December 16, 2013. Settlement negotiations proceeded for three years, and were ultimately successful. In March 2016, the parties proposed a settlement agreement. The remedy included a payment of $250,000 to settlement funds. The city agreed to hire a group of prospective firefighters over the next five years who did not yet have a state certification and allow them to complete the required training within the 18 months of hiring. This was to meet the goal to build a fire and rescue workforce reflective of the community, first announced in 1999. The agreement covered hiring through 2021. In addition, the settlement included policies on transfer, work environment, anti-harassment training, and record-keeping and reporting obligations. The city agreed to grant requests to transfer to the most senior individual with qualifications who submits a reassignment request. The city also agreed to maintain work environment free from harassment and retaliation, provide anti-harassment training to all current and new personnel and document harassment complaints or investigations. The city agreed to provide an annual report to the Jacksonville Human Rights Commission containing information about training, work environment policy and harassment and retaliation complaints. On May 13, 2016, the parties filed a joint notice of settlement and motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice. On May 16, 2016, Judge Corrigan granted the motion. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. The last compliance date within this agreement is in the year 2021 and so presumably the court will have jurisdiction until that point. Implementation of the settlement agreement is ongoing and there has been no change as of April 26, 2020.", "summary": "In 2013, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Jacksonville Branch (''NAACP\") and the Jacksonville Brotherhood of firefighters, a Chapter of the International Association of African-American Professional Fire Fighters (\"JBOF\") brought this class action lawsuit for violations of Title VII in the U.S. District Court of Middle District of Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that City of Jacksonville had hiring and workplace policies that had a disparate impact on Black firefighters. The parties agreed to a settlement agreement in May 2016, which included $250,000 payment, hiring and anti-harassment policies as remedy."} {"article": "Several individuals with disabilities filed this lawsuit to challenge Oklahoma's proposed reduction in prescription drug coverage under its Home and Community Based Services Medicaid waiver. Each of the plaintiffs has a range of (largely physical) disabilities and would qualify for nursing home care, but is able to remain in the community due to services provided via the Medicaid waiver. When the Oklahoma Health Care Authority announced that it would cover a maximum of 5 prescription drugs for those not residing in institutions, but would not limit the prescription drugs available to those residing in institutions, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint on October 1, 2002, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, claiming that this planned reduction violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) under the Supreme Court precedent Olmstead v. L.C. The Plaintiffs also claimed that the reduction in benefits violated the notice provision of the federal Medicaid Act and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. On November 1, 2002, the District Court (Judge James H. Payne) granted the state's motion for summary judgment. He found that this case was distinguishable from Olmstead because the Plaintiffs were not institutionalized, but were instead alleging a risk of institutionalization. Judge Payne held that the ADA would not apply to such a claim. The Plaintiffs subsequently filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. In a decision on July 15, 2003, the Court of Appeals (Judge Lucero) reversed the District Court. The Court found that it was not necessary for Plaintiffs to be currently institutionalized in order to bring a claim under the ADA's integration mandate, and nothing in the text of the ADA or in the Olmstead decision would suggest that institutionalization is a prerequisite. On November 17, 2003, the District Court dismissed the case because the parties had entered into a settlement agreement. Under the settlement, HCBS Waiver participants can have up to 7 generic prescriptions with the option to request more through an authorization process.", "summary": "Plaintiffs filed this challenge to the state's planned reduction of prescription drug coverage for individuals with disabilities who live in the community and receive services via a Medicaid waiver. The District Court held that non-institutionalized plaintiffs could not assert a claim under Olmstead. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that alleging a risk of institutionalization was sufficient. The case then settled."} {"article": "On July 6, 2004, individuals who had been granted the status of lawful permanent resident by the Department of Justice's Executive Office of Immigration Review filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the United States Attorney General, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services and its Director, and the San Francisco District Director under 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 551, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedures Act. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law of Texas, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs sought to compel the federal government to provide them with documentation of their permanent resident status in a timely manner. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the government no longer issued temporary documentation of a status change to lawful permanent residents and delayed its processes for issuing permanent documentation to individuals granted lawful permanent resident status. Without such documentation, the plaintiffs alleged, they were denied employment, travel, educational, and public benefits privileges granted to other legal permanent residents. On July 21, 2004, the case was reassigned from Judge James Larson to District Court Judge Marilyn Hall Patel. On October 12, 2004, Judge Patel certified the class as follows: \u201cThe class consists of all persons who were or will be granted lawful permanent resident status by the EOIR, through the Immigration Courts or the Board of Immigration Appeals of the United States, and to whom USCIS has failed to issue evidence of registration as a lawful permanent resident with the exception that the class excludes the 34 named plaintiffs in Lope-Armor v. U.S. Attorney General, No. 04-CV-21685 (S.D. Fla.) and the plaintiff class in Padilla v. Ridge, No. M 03-126 S.D. Tex.).\u201d 2004 WL 2297990. On April 1, 2005, a new system of EOIR regulations went into effect. The new system reorganized the procedures governing security and law enforcement investigations of putative class members in several ways. Most significantly, it changed the timing of security examinations of applicants, requiring those examinations be completed before an immigrant\u2019s application for adjustment of status could be heard by an immigration judge, rather than after a grant of adjusted status. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 claims because the new regulations rendered the claims of any class members granted LPR status after April 1, 2005 moot or otherwise non-justiciable. For those class members deemed LPRs prior to that date, defendants claimed that their claims should be dismissed without prejudice on the basis of non-justiciability, or that the class should be decertified for lack of numerosity and commonality. On July 1, 2005, Judge Patel denied the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. She held that questions remained as to whether the plaintiffs\u2019 problems would be solved under the new regulations. She also expressed concern that, \u201c[w]hile the record before this court does not evince that the DHS changed its regulations to move security clearances outside the reach of the plaintiffs\u2019 class action, the context of the case casts some doubt on defendants\u2019 capacity to will to address the needs of the class as a whole, rather than simply target agency action for purposes of evading review.\u201d 2005 WL 1592872. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the plaintiffs requested a permanent injunction. On July 25, 2005, District Court Judge Marilyn Hall Patel issued an order referring the case to Magistrate Judge Edward M. Chen for a settlement. On August 24, 2005, Judge Patel granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and request for a permanent injunction. The Court ordered the parties to submit proposals as to the appropriate scope of the injunction. 388 F.Supp.2d 1065. After reviewing proposals of the parties, Judge Patel issued a Permanent Injunction on December 22, 2005, requiring the government to begin timely processing of the plaintiffs' status documentation. 2005 WL 3542661. The class was divided into two subclasses based on differences in the procedures through which class members were adjudicated to be lawful permanent residents. Members of the pre-April 1, 2005 subclass were granted LPR status under regulations in force prior to April 1, 2005. Under the pre-April 1 regulations, an alien seeking LPR status was not required to undergo any background checks prior to his or her EOIR adjudication. Thus, members of the pre-April 1 subclass might have been granted LPR status without having completed the background checks now required by USCIS before issuing permanent documentation. In accordance with the Permanent Injunction, a Permanent Resident Card (I-551) should be mailed to the class member from the ICPS facility within 15 days of capture of the member\u2019s biometrics at an ASC, or 60 days from the member\u2019s USCIS InfoPass appointment, whichever date was later. In contrast, members of the post-April 1 subclass were required to complete the mandatory background checks prior to being granted LPR status. In accordance with the Permanent Injunction, a Permanent Resident Card (I-551) should be produced and mailed from the DHS Integrated Card Production System (ICPS) facility within 15 days of capture of the member\u2019s biometrics at the ASC, or 30 days from the member\u2019s USCIS InfoPass appointment, whichever date was later. If a class member (in either the pre- or post-April 1 subclasses) attended his initial appointment at USCIS for documentation processing on or before the effective date of this Plan, the applicable time period described in the Plan would be counted from either 15 days prior to the effective date of the Plan or the date of the initial USCIS appointment, whichever date was later. In all such cases where USCIS required the member to provide biometrics for card production, USCIS had 15 days from the effective date of this Plan or the date of the member\u2019s ASC appointment, whichever date was later, to produce and mail a permanent I-551. For three years from the effective date of the plan, DHS was required to provide quarterly reports to class counsel listing the class members who have contacted the POC during the reporting period. On January 30, 2006, the Court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 request for an entry of a final judgment in the case as being unnecessary at the time as the harm that was the subject of the lawsuit was ongoing. The government appealed the District Court's various rulings and orders. On February 7, 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without prejudice to reinstatement in the event the district court declined to approve the settlement. On April 9, 2008, Judge Patel ordered that the case Padilla et al v. Ridge et al Padilla v. Ridge was related to Santillan et al v. Ashcroft and was re-assigned to herself. On April 14, 2008, the parties filed a joint motion for approval of a settlement agreement. On June 16, 2008, the court granted the parties' motion to consolidate this case with Padilla v. Ridge. In addition, the Judge Patel re-certified the class as follows: \u201cAll persons who have been or will be granted lawful permanent resident status prior to termination of this Stipulation by the EOIR, through the Immigration Courts or the BIA, and to whom the USCIS has failed to issue evidence of registration as a lawful permanent resident, with the exception that the class excludes the 34 named plaintiffs in Lopez-Amor v. U.S. Attorney General, No 04-CV-21685 (S.D. Fla.).\u201d On July 21, 2008, Judge Patel approved a settlement agreement that covered both of the consolidated cases, vacated the injunction issued on December 22, 2005 and dismissed the cases. The obligations of the stipulation were to terminate 2 years from the effective day. The defendants were to institute requirements for the issuance of evidence of LPR status to class members who were issued any of the following final orders by EOIR: (i) orders granting adjustment of status to permanent residence; (ii) orders granting cancellation of removal and adjustment of status of a non-permanent resident to permanent residence; (iii) orders granting suspension of deportation and adjustment of status of a non-permanent resident to permanent residence; (iv) suspension of deportation of special rule cancellation or removal; or (v) any other form of relief from removal that EOIR may grant that results in a class member being granted LPR status at the conclusion of removal proceedings (collectively, the \u201ccovered orders\u201d). The defendants, acting through ICE, agreed to provide a written description of the post-order instructions for obtaining documentation of LPR status from USCIS at the time the class member received a covered order. The post-order instructions were to be posted on USCIS website with links to websites maintained by DHS and DOJ. USCIS were to issue Permanent Resident Cards to class members within a specified time period in the stipulation. Moreover, USCIS were to establish a national point of contact to accept inquiries from class members who did not receive status documents within a specified time period. This process was not available to a class member who in accordance with USCIS gathered information might be a risk to national security of public safety. The Court retained no jurisdiction in this case except for sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear any class claim. The case is now closed.", "summary": "A class of lawful permanent residents filed this suit against the U.S. Attorney General, Department of Homeland Security, and ICE seeking to compel the federal government to provide them with documentation of their permanent resident status in a timely manner. The case ended with a settlement agreement."} {"article": "On February 27, 2007, the Electronic Frontier Foundation filed this individual lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act (\u201cFOIA\u201d), 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552. The plaintiff, representing itself, sought injunctive and monetary relief, claiming that the defendant wrongfully withheld agency records requested by the plaintiff. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed the defendant withheld records concerning orders by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (\u201cFISC\u201d) that allegedly authorized surveillance of international communications where there was a probable cause to believe one of the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization, as referenced in a letter written by the then acting Attorney General dated January 17, 2007. Additionally, the plaintiff requested any related FISC rules and guidelines associated with such orders, as referenced by the then White House Press Secretary during a press briefing on January 17, 2007. The defendants moved for summary judgment on May 11, 2007 on the grounds that the plaintiff\u2019s requested material was exempted from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552(b) exemption 1, which exempts matters specifically authorized by an Executive order be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and exemption 3, which exempts records or information that could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings. On July 26, 2007, Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment on grounds that defendant sufficiently met its burden of showing with reasonable specificity the above exemptions applied to the documents at issue. In the same opinion, Chief Judge Hogan denied plaintiff\u2019s motion for an in camera review of the documents at issue as the court found the defendant\u2019s declarations sufficient to conduct a de novo review and to verify the applicability of the asserted FOIA exemptions. The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration on August 8, 2007. The plaintiff claimed that an August 3, 2007 article in the Washington Post offered new evidence that supported a motion for in camera review, as the article suggested that the documents at issue may primarily constitute legal analyses, and therefore, the documents at issue would not need to be classified. This motion was denied by Chief Judge Hogan on January 29, 2008, as the court found that the details discussed within the August 3, 2007 article did not provide any new evidence relevant to the documents referenced in the January 17, 2007 letter or press briefing. The case is now closed. 532 F.Supp.2d 22.", "summary": "The Electronic Frontier Foundation filed an individual lawsuit against the Department of Justice for failure to respond to a FOIA request regarding orders and guidelines that allegedly authorized surveillance of international communications when there was a probably cause to believe one of the communicants was a member of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization. The case was dismissed in summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the grounds that the defendant successfully showed that the requested documents were exempted from FOIA."} {"article": "On June 13, 2007, private attorneys and attorneys for the ACLU's National Prison Project, the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project, and the ACLU of San Diego & Imperial Counties filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, challenging allegedly inadequate medical care provided to immigrant detainees at the San Diego Correctional Facility (SDCF). The Facility was a contract detention facility in Otay Mesa, California, operated by the Corrections Corporation of America. Civil immigration detainees in the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, were housed there pursuant to a contractual agreement between CCA and the federal government. On average, the facility housed 600-800 male and female immigration detainees for periods of time ranging from several weeks to several years. Plaintiffs alleged that detainees were denied constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care, dental, and vision care. Plaintiffs further alleged that in some instances denial of treatment put pressure on immigrants to waive their hearing rights and thereby expedite their deportation, in hopes of receiving treatment. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. ICE responded by moving to dismiss the case. In October 2007, the court (Judge Sabraw) denied dismissal as to the majority of Plaintiffs, although a few were released from the litigation on technical grounds. After Judge Sabraw denied class certification in December 2007, plaintiffs were granted permission to appeal by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. Prior to argument in the Court of Appeals, they settled the case in mediation, in late 2010. Under the settlement, SDCF was required to comply with a number of National Council on Correctional Health Care standards, hire additional staffing to expedite care, take steps to expedite care when requested, new standards for balancing security and healthcare needs, and regular reporting requirements. SDCF had one year from the date of approval of the settlement to comply with NCCHC standards and receive certification from that organization of such, before the order could be terminated. The order applied only to SDCF, not to conditions in any other facility. A settlement class was certified and the settlement was approved by the District Court in June of 2011. The case was closed in July of 2012, indicating compliance with the court order without incident.", "summary": "On June 13, 2007, private attorneys and attorneys for the ACLU filed a class action law suit regarding deficiencies in medical care in the San Diago Correctional Facility (SDCF) for persons being held in immigration detention. A settlement agreement was reached requiring SDCF to meet various National Council on Correctional Health Care standards, increase staffing, and report on its progress for one year following the approval of the settlement in June of 2011. SDCF appears to have complied with the agreement without incident, and the case was finally dismissed in July of 2012."} {"article": "On February 9, 2007, the parents of a female minor student filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma against the Eufala Independent School District No. 1, McIntosh County Oklahoma. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the school violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972, 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1681 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consitution and 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 by depriving their daughter of her equal treatment and benefits to participate in athletics based on her gender. The plaintiff played softball and golf; she complained that her teams had facilities (fields, locker rooms, practice times, playing times) that were much inferior to those for the boys' teams. On March 26, 2008, the Court (Steven P. Shreder, J.) dismissed the case for reason of settlement whose terms were not disclosed.", "summary": "This 2007 federal lawsuit against the Eufala Public Schools, in Oklahoma, sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, alleging that the school violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972 and the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against the girls' athletic teams. The plaintiff played softball and golf; she complained that her teams had facilities (fields, locker rooms, practice times, playing times) that were much inferior to those for the boys' teams. On March 26, 2008, the Court Steven P. Shreder dismissed after a settlement whose terms were not disclosed."} {"article": "This is a case challenging the constitutionality of private prisons in Arizona. On June 6, 2020, a plaintiff who was incarcerated by the Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation & Reentry (ADCRR), filed this class action suit against the ADCRR Director David Shinn in the US District Court of Arizona. The plaintiff sued the Department under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by private counsel from the public interest organization Abolish Private Prisons, the plaintiff sought declaratory judgment that the Department\u2019s reliance on private prisons is in violation of the Constitution. The plaintiff also sought an injunction that would forbid Director Shinn and his successors from continuing to assign prisoners to serve time in private prisons and compel the Department to discontinue use of private prisons. Attorneys fees and further relief were also requested. The case was assigned to Judge Grant Murray Snow. The plaintiff argued that the ADCRR\u2019s reliance on private prisons amounted to a violation of his right to be free from forced servitude under the 13th amendment, his right to protection against cruel and unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment, and his due process rights and equal protection rights under the 14th amendment. According to the plaintiff, ADCRR turns prisoners into economic assets by entrusting their care to for-profit prisons, in effect turning prisoners into commodities and benefiting from their forced labor. By relying on private prisons, ADCRR also delegates the exercise of the punishment power solely belonging to the government to a private entity, a violation of the 13th amendment\u2019s \u201cpunishment clause.\u201d The complaint also highlighted the incentive misalignment created by the use of private prisons: through its contracts with private prisons, ADCRR incentivizes jail and prison workers and administrative professionals to work in ways that are contrary to prisoners\u2019 due process rights. In a final count, the plaintiff argued that ADCRR\u2019s reliance on private prisons creates disparate outcomes for prisoners in the public and private prison systems, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In July 2020, the defendants filed for a Motion to Dismiss for a Failure to State a Claim. As of October 15, 2020, the case remains open.", "summary": "In 2020, current prisoners within the Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry along with the Arizona State Conference of the NAACP, filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court of Arizona. The plaintiffs alleged that the agency was violating their rights under the 8th Amendment, 13th Amendment, and 14th Amendment by incarcerating them in private prisons instead of public facilities and refusing their application for transfer. In August, 2020, the defendants\u2019 counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. In early fall, the plaintiffs\u2019 counsel submitted their response for the defendants\u2019 motion. The case remains open."} {"article": "In September 2004, the Boston Area Office and New York District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit against Washington Group International, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts alleging discrimination on the basis of race (African-American) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complaint specifically alleged the defendant subjected the complainants to a racially hostile work environment and subjected them to retaliation following their complaints about this environment. The complainants intervened in the lawsuit in January and February 2005. Following some discovery and referral to mediation, the parties settled the lawsuit in January 2008 through a consent decree. The two-year decree, containing an anti-discrimination and retaliation clause, required the defendant to: make compliance reports, allow access to outsiders for monitoring, designate internal coordinators, develop its anti-discrimination policy, create a graffiti policy, post and distribute notice of employee rights, provide EEO training, implement a complaint resolution program and monitoring system, and pay $ 1,500,000 to be distributed among seventeen individuals. The settlement was scheduled to last two years, and there is no additional activity reflected in the docket sheet; presumably, the case closed in 2010.", "summary": "In September 2004, the Boston Area Office and New York District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit against Washington Group International, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts alleging discrimination on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The parties settled with a two-year consent decree which included a $1,500,000 payment to seventeen individuals."} {"article": "On October 13, 2017, a 17-year-old pregnant, unaccompanied immigrant in immigration custody filed this suit against the Acting Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Acting Assistant Secretary for Administration for Children and Families (ACF), and the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) for interference with her right to abortion. Filing via a guardian and represented by the National, District of Columbia, and California offices of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the plaintiff filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from obstructing, interfering with, or blocking other individuals\u2019 access to abortion. The Court assigned the case to Judge Tanya Chutkan. The plaintiff, held in a federally funded immigration facility in Texas, sought an abortion while in custody. Prevented from traveling for the abortion by facility staff, the plaintiff alleged that the March 2017 ORR policy relied on by the staff for the veto was unconstitutional. The plaintiff asserted that the policy resulted in an \u201cundue burden\u201d to her rights to reproductive healthcare under the protections of the First and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In addition, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants' practices also violated the terms of a previous settlement agreement mandating certain standards for the treatment of unaccompanied immigrants in detention, including reproductive healthcare access Flores v. Reno; and a 2013 ORR regulation requiring reproductive healthcare for victims of sexual assault. Additionally, the plaintiff filed a motion for class certification on October 18, 2017 for all similarly situated, pregnant, unaccompanied immigrant minors in the legal custody of the federal government denied their right to abortion. The Plaintiff\u2019s Temporary Restraining Order Fearing the health implications of late-term abortions, the plaintiff sought a TRO that would compel the defendants to allow her the necessary travel to have the abortion. On October 18, 2017, Judge Chutkan granted the TRO, finding that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm otherwise. 2017 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 175415. The defendants immediately appealed to the D.C. Circuit and sought an emergency stay pending the appeal. Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Carolina filed an amicus brief in support. The following day (October 19, 2017) the D.C. Circuit ordered an administrative stay of the TRO awaiting a hearing on the merits on the defendants' emergency motion for a stay. 2017 WL 4707112. On October 20, 2017 Judges Karen LeCraft Henderson, Brett M. Kavanaugh, and Patricia A. Millett heard the appeal. The majority lifted the administrative stay and then vacated and remanded part of the TRO. 2017 WL 9854552. The Court found that the plaintiff had an uncontested constitutional right to an abortion, but pursuant to HHS policy, the plaintiff required release to a sponsor. Judge Millett dissented. On October 22, 2017, the plaintiff sought an en banc rehearing in the D.C. Circuit, supported with an amicus brief from the District of Columbia along with California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Washington. At the October 24, 2017 hearing en banc, the D.C. Circuit vacated its previous order. 874 F.3d 735. Following the decision on and on the same day, Judge Chutkan issued an order for defendants to comply with the abortion request within 14 days without the sponsor requirement. Judge Chutkan reasoned that the process of securing an ORR sponsor could take weeks, whereas the plaintiff only had five weeks until Texas law prohibited abortions. The plaintiff successfully had an abortion on October 25, 2017 per this ACLU press release. Plaintiff Additions while Awaiting Class Certification On November 3, 2017, the defendants filed a motion in the District Court to stay proceedings of the claim for class-wide relief scheduled for November 20, 2017 because of the defendants\u2019 impending petition to the Supreme Court filed on the same day. While waiting for certiorari, the plaintiff amended their complaint on December 15, 2017 to include two additional individual plaintiffs, one 10 weeks pregnant and the other 22 weeks pregnant, each seeking a TRO based on the same rationale as the original, single plaintiff. Additionally, the amendment included labeling one of these new plaintiffs as the proposed class representative. Judge Chutkan granted the TRO on December 18, 2017 (and extended it on December 31, 2017), finding that the policy of ORR that rationally mandated the TRO for the original plaintiff warranted the same risk of irreparable harm to the two additional plaintiffs. 2017 WL 6462270. The defendants appealed the order for the 10-weeks-pregnant plaintiff to the D.C. Circuit the following day (December 19, 2017). However, the defendants voluntarily dismissed the appeal when they discovered that the plaintiff was not a minor, but rather 19 years of age. Under the umbrella of the TRO, the 22-weeks-pregnant plaintiff received her abortion per a December 21 news reports.) Finding that another minor within immigration custody sought an abortion, the plaintiffs again amended the complaint on January 11, 2018 to include this fourth individual plaintiff. On March 2, 2018, the plaintiff filed a renewed motion for class certification and a preliminary injunction, citing that the proposed class likely had more potential plaintiffs than anticipated. Specifically, at least three additional minors, besides the individual plaintiffs, held in the defendants' custody between August 2017 and December 2017 had requested abortions, an the defendant had allegedly obstructed these requests. The Resolution On March 30, 2018, Judge Chutkan granted the plaintiff's motions for a preliminary injunction and class certification. Judge Chutkan determined that plaintiffs had a strong likelihood of success on the merits because ORR\u2019s policies and practices unduly burdened plaintiffs\u2019 reproductive decisions. Additionally, Judge Chutkan determined that the class certified met the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Judge Chutkan issued the final, amended version of the orders on April 16, 2018. In these orders, Judge Chutkan certified the class as all pregnant, unaccompanied immigrant minor children who are or will be in the legal custody of the federal government. The District Court ordered that the defendants and their respective successors were enjoined from: (1) obstructing any class members access to judicial bypass, medical appointments related to pregnancy dating, non-directive options counseling, abortion counseling, abortions, or other pregnancy related care; (2) forcing any class member to reveal that pregnancy/abortion decision to anyone; (3) retaliation against class members for abortion decisions; and (4) retaliation against those that facilitate class members\u2019 ability to access abortion related medical care. On April 9, 2018, the defendants appealed the injunction and proposed class certification to the D.C. Circuit Court, which then denied the appeal for class certification on June 4, 2018. In the order, the D.C. Circuit Court denied the motion for stay except for the non-disclosure provision, which it granted review. On July 25, 2018 the D.C. Circuit then vacated the October 24, 2017 order, remanding to the D.C. District court to dismiss the individual claim for injunctive relief as moot. In accordance with the vacating of the October 24, 2017 judgment and the July 25, 2018 remand, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the individual plaintiff\u2019s claim for injunctive relief as moot on August 1, 2018. The plaintiff filed a third amended complaint on Sept. 18, 2018. This filing delayed the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss awaiting an appeal to the Circuit Court. In the interim, the District Court administratively closed the docket on March 15, 2019. The D.C. Circuit then issued the corresponding mandate on August 6, 2019, which allowed the plaintiffs to file a motion to reopen the case on August 8, 2019, which the District Court granted the subsequent day (August 9, 2019). The parties asked for additional time to provide joint status reports on whether an evidentiary hearing was necessary on August 27, 2019. The parties continued to file joint status report updating the court, culminating in a June 11, 2020 joint stipulation in which defendants agreed to abide by the portion of a previous August 12, 2019 joint stipulation stating that defendants will continue to act in accordance with the April 12, 2018 amended class certification and preliminary injunction order. The plaintiffs filed a stipulation of voluntary dismissal on September 29, 2020, as the ORR agreed to implement a revised policy prohibiting shelters from interfering with access to reproductive health care, including abortions. The defendants agreed to post Know Your Rights notices on housing bulletin boards, and also agreed to pay plaintiffs' counsel $336,710 in attorneys' fees and costs. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In October 2017, a pregnant unaccompanied immigrant minor in immigration custody filed a suit against the Acting Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Acting Assistant Secretary for Administration for Children and Families (ACF), and the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) for interference with her right to abortion and other reproductive healthcare. The plaintiff asked for declaratory and injunctive relief, class certification for immigrants similarly situated, and a Temporary Restraining Order allowing her abortion. The D.C. Circuit granted the Temporary Restraining Order, which occurred following review by the Court of Appeals. In the ensuing year, the three additional pregnant plaintiffs joined the original, with each seeking her own Temporary Restraining Order. The proceedings culminated on April 16, 2018, when the District Court certified the class of pregnant unaccompanied immigrant minors in the custody of the federal government. In the order, the D.C. District Court enjoined the ORR from refusing to provide the certified class with access to reproductive healthcare. Following the order, the federal government has abided by the stipulations of the order, no longer preventing access to reproductive healthcare for these pregnant minors. On September 29, 2020 the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of voluntary dismissal due to the government's promise to abide by the order. Current as of November 6, 2020."} {"article": "On December 21, 2012, after a thorough investigation, the United States, represented by the Department of Justice (DOJ), filed suit against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and its police department pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141). The Government alleged that the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRDP) violated the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments by engaging in unlawful patterns and practices. Filed along with the complaint was a joint motion for the Court to approve a comprehensive settlement agreement between the parties and also a motion to stay the proceedings. Specifically, the Government claimed the PRDP engaged in the following practices: using excessive force during routine police activities; relying on unreasonable force in response to public demonstrations; conducting unlawful searches and seizures; and engaging in discriminatory police practices against those who are or appear to be of Dominican origin. The Government further alleged that those practices were the result of longstanding, widespread failures of the department, including inadequate and ineffective investigation and discipline procedures, supervision, and training, as well as officer violence and corruption. On December 27, 2012, the Court (Judge Gustavo A. Gelpi) granted the motion to stay the proceedings in order to allow the recently elected government to familiarize itself with the agreement and make modifications. And, on January 18, 2013, the Government filed an amended complaint that removed reference to Puerto Rico as an unincorporated territory of the United States. This was because, under an old line of Supreme Court cases that established what is known as the Incorporation Doctrine, acquired territories were not necessarily protected by the Constitution and were considered not to be a part of the United States: Congress had the power to decide when/whether to incorporate the territory, which would bestow certain Constitutional status upon the territory. On April 1, 2013, the ACLU filed an amicus brief in support of the proposed settlement agreement, explaining the results of its own investigations in Puerto Rico, endorsing the comprehensive approach of the agreement, and suggesting a few possible improvements. Puerto Rico's Attorney Gregorio Igartua also filed an amicus brief, except he failed to take up the issue of whether Puerto Rico was an incorporated territory. He argued that the Court could not render a decision in the case without declaring Puerto Rico to be an incorporated territory because the United States was imposing upon Puerto Rico the burdens of full obligation to the Constitution while selectively withholding Constitutional rights, such as representation and voting power in Congress and greater ability to claim access to federal funds, such as federal funding for anti-crime policies. On July 17, 2013, the parties filed a modified settlement agreement along with a joint motion for dismissal. On the same day, the court (Deputy Clerk Carlos Rodriguez) conditionally dismissed the case while retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. The 101-page agreement provides a comprehensive set of provisions touching on nearly every aspect of the police department ( PN-PR-0001-0007). It calls for the development of policies on, among other things, the use of force, crowd control and public demonstrations, searches and seizures, and equal protection. It requires better pre-service training and education as well as continued training once recruits become police officers. It contains an array of investigatory, supervisory, and discipline obligations, as well as auditing procedures. To address community concerns, the Agreement establishes a commitment to more appropriate community policing and establishes joint boards of police officers and community representatives. In an effort to obtain nondiscriminatory policing, it also requires PRPD to establish the information systems and collect all information necessary to accomplish the goals of the agreement. Under the Agreement, Puerto Rico is required to hire a Technical Compliance Advisor (TCA) to monitor and report on the department's progress in meeting the goals and requirements of the agreement. The Agreement entailed a four year capacity-building period, subject to the development of Action Plans in each of the substantive areas of the Agreement. The Agreement would last at least 10 years, after which time either party could file for termination of the agreement. However, if Puerto Rico filed for termination, it would have the burden of demonstrating that it had fully and effectively complied with the agreement for at least two consecutive years. On October 30, 2013, upon joint motion of the parties, the court appointed Juan Mattos, Jr. as the Technical Compliance Advisor. However, he did not last very long on the job. Citing personal reasons, he resigned in February of 2014. In his stead, the parties selected Claudio Arnaldo to be monitor. The first compliance report was filed with the court on August 1, 2014 and was ordered to be made public on August 8, 2014. The report noted positive developments. From 2014 to 2016, the TCA filed status reports every six months assessing the PRDP's progress in implementing the Agreement. Additionally, the PRDP has filed period status reports until the present, delineating the steps taken to implement the Agreement, assessing the status of its progress, and addressing any concerns raised in TCA reports. On August 1, 2016, the court issued a Transition Order in light of the upcoming presidential election to prevent a transfer of critical personnel that would jeopardize the reform process. The TCA submitted its fifth biannual report on January 13, 2017. In the report, the TCA noted that the PRDP had made excellent progress in drafting 48 new policies and completed implementation of all 11 substantive areas of the Agreement. The PRDP submitted its Action Plans for each substantive area to the court on June 22, 2017. The report also noted that the PRDP had made important progress in training. However, the report noted three key areas of the Agreement that had not been adequately implemented: promotions, the human resource staffing study, and the reorganization of the Drugs, Vice, and Illegal Firearms Bureau. The Agreement's capacity-building period ended on October 7, 2018, at which point the compliance period began. In its eighth biannual report covering the period of April through October 7, 2018, the TCA noted several deficiencies relating to the PRDP's implementation of the Agreement. However, in its most recent status report submitted in March 23, 2019, the PRDP countered these allegations of deficiencies and claimed that it has the capacity, power, discipline, and determination to make police reform sustainable. Specifically, the report noted that during the capacity-building period, the PRDP had made significant strides in revising policies and procedures, conducting trainings, acquiring equipment, promoting safety, and providing personnel with the necessary tools to achieve the Agreement's objectives. On May 4th, 2019, Judge Gelpi filed an order that simply stated that the monitor, Arnaldo Claudio, had resigned from his position. Subsequent interviews in the press indicate that Claudio lost faith in the reform process, claiming that the federal government was insufficiently concerned about the process and that millions of dollars were being misspent on private lawyers, rather than reforming the police departments. Three months later, on August 8th, 2019, the parties informed Judge Gelpi that Claudio had publicly disclosed confidential and/or work-product information. This may have constituted a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Judge Gelpi announced that further proceedings would be necessary to address the issue. In March of 2020, the court appointed John Romero as the monitor. Romero had been Acting Monitor since Claudio left. Meanwhile, in January of 2020, the defendants began submitting motions to restrict public access to certain documents created in keeping with the consent decree. For example, defendants wanted to limit public access to community surveys mandated by the consent decree. The judge granted these motions. However, by April of 2020, the global COVID-19 pandemic had taken precedence. The court ordered the immediate development of a COVID Protocol that would be consistent with the consent decree. The outbreak delayed the filing of the status report that was to be submitted in the spring. As of June 17th, 2020 the report has not been submitted and the case is ongoing.", "summary": "On December 21, 2012, the United States filed suit against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and its police department under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141. The Government alleged that the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRDP) violated the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments by engaging in unlawful patterns or practices. On July 17, 2013, the parties filed a settlement agreement along with a joint motion for dismissal which the court approved. Under the agreement, Puerto Rico is required to hire a Technical Compliance advisor to monitor and report on the departments progress in meeting the goals and requirements of the agreement. The agreement is set to last at least 10 years. On October 7, 2018, the capacity-building period ended and the compliance period began. In August of 2019 the monitor resigned, citing exasperation with the DoJ's lack of care and accusing the defendants of using money meant for police reforms on private attorneys. A new monitor was appointed and he released his first report in March of 2020. Monitoring is ongoing."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: On May 1, 2020, Self Advocacy Solutions N.D., League of Women Voters of North Dakota, and an individual plaintiff filed a complaint against the Secretary of State of North Dakota and the County Auditor of Grand Forks County to challenge the absence of notice and cure procedures for the state\u2019s signature matching requirement. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction on May 11, which the court granted on June 3. On August 28, 2020, the court granted the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction.
1. all juveniles who appeared before former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 who were adjudicated or placed by Ciavarella (\"Juvenile Settlement Class\"); and 2. all parents and/or guardians of all juveniles who appeared before former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 and who, in connection with their child's appearance: (i) made payments or had wages, social security or other entitlements garnished or withdrawn; (ii) had costs, fees, interest and/or penalties assessed against them or their child; (iii) suffered any loss of companionship and/or familial integrity (\"Parent Settlement Class\").The Construction Defendants established a cash settlement fund of $17,750,000. Class Counsel were allowed to apply for up to 30% of the settlement amount in addition to litigation expenses. After payment of the above, taxes, and payment to the escrow agent, the Cash Settlement Fund was distributed to class members who turned in a proof of claim. Following this settlement, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against the Construction Defendants on December 26, 2012. 2012 WL 6552134. Throughout 2012, the plaintiffs and Provider Defendants, Judge Defendants, and Powell Defendants continued to engage in discovery. On March 21, 2012, the Court denied the Provider Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings that argued several of the plaintiffs' claims were untimely. Instead, the Court found that the statute of limitations was tolled because the Court was still deciding on the validity of class certification. In July 2012, the Court also denied several motions and cross-motions for partial summary judgment by the plaintiffs and Provider Defendants because disputed facts remained. On February 1, 2013, the plaintiffs moved to certify the class, and the Court granted their motion on May 14, 2013. There were two classes based on which violations the children experienced, Class A and Class B. Class A included a class for the Violation of Right to Impartial Tribunal:
\"All children who were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by Ciavarella between 2003 and May 2008, whose adjudications were vacated, expunged, and dismissed with prejudice by orders of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dated October 29, 2009 or March 29, 2010. See in re Expungement of Juvenile Records and Vacatur of Luzerne County Juvenile Court Consent Decrees or Adjudications from 2003-2008, No. 81-MM-2008 (Pa.)\"Class A also included two sub-classes. Subclass A.1 for Violations of Right to Counsel:
\"All children in Class A who were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by Ciavarella without counsel and/or without colloquies on the record that informed them of their rights and the consequences of waiving those rights, before either waiving counsel and/or pleading guilty, during the time between 2003 and May 2008.\"Subclass A.2 for False Imprisonment:
\"All children in Class A who were referred to placement at PA Child Care and/or Western PA Child Care by Ciavarella between 2003 and May 2008.\"Class B included children who experienced Violations of the RICO Act:
\"All children who were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by Ciavarella who paid fees, costs, fines, restitution, or any other monetary charges associated with their adjudications and/or placements during the time period between 2003 and May 2008, as well as all children's parents or guardians who paid fees, costs, fines, restitution, or any other monetary charges associated with their children's adjudications and/or placements during the same time period.\"2013 WL 2042369. The Plaintiffs, Judge Defendants, and Powell Defendants continued to engage in discovery throughout 2013. The Court granted default judgment against one of the Judge Defendants and several companies alleged to have participated in the wire transfers. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against the other Judge Defendant on January 9, 2014, finding him liable for all issues that were not protected by judicial immunity. 2014 WL 70092. On May 30, 2014, the plaintiffs and Provider Defendants moved for settlement and class certification. The Court granted final approval of the settlement on July 7, 2014. For the purposes of settlement, the classes were settled as:
\"a. all juveniles who appeared before former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 who were adjudicated or placed by Ciavarella (the \"Juvenile Settlement Class\")' and b. all parents and/or guardians of all juveniles who appeared before former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 and who, in connection with their child's adjudication or placement: (i) made payments or had wages, social security or other entitlements garnished or withdrawn; (ii) paid costs, fees, interest and/or penalties in their own names; (iii) suffered any loss of companionship and/or familial integrity (the \"Parent Settlement Class\"), and (iv) who were not fully reimbursed as a result of claims made in connection with the Mericle Settlement, defined in the MSA.\"The Provider Defendants established a $2,500,000 settlement fund. Following payment of court-approved costs and fees, the remaining amount was separated into a juvenile fund (70% of remaining funds), parent fund (15% of remaining funds), and holdback fund (15% of remaining funds). The holdback fund was to be held back and used to pay costs of appeals until all final accounting was complete for the cash settlement fund. 2014 WL 12638876. The Plaintiffs and Powell Defendants continued to engage in discovery. On March 10, 2015, the parties moved for settlement, which the Court approved on December 21, 2015. The classes were defined as:
A. All juveniles who appeared before former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella Jr. between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 who were adjudicated delinquent or placed by Ciavarella (\"Juvenile Settlement Class\"). B. All parents and/or guardians of all juveniles in paragraph (A) who, as a result of their child's adjudication of delinquency or placement by Judge Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008: (i) made payments in their own names or had wages, social security or other entitlements in their own names garnished or withdrawn; (ii) had costs, fees, interest and/or penalties in their own names assessed against them or their child; and/or (iii) suffered any loss of companionship and/or familial integrity (\"Parent Settlement Class\") and were not fully reimbursed as a result of claims made in connection with the Mericle Settlement and/or the Provider Settlement, defined in the Agreement.The Powell Defendants agreed to establish a cash settlement fund of $4,750,000. The Powell Defendants also agreed to make an additional payment of up to $2,750,000 based on Powell's net worth. The fund was established first to pay attorneys' fees and costs awarded by the Court, next to pay all settlement administration costs and costs of notice related to the settlement, and lastly, to distribute all remaining funds to the settlement class members who submitted a proof of claim form. 2015 WL 9268445. At this point, the case was fully litigated: all the parties either were dismissed or settled. However, the Court retained jurisdiction for the enforcement and interpretation of the settlement. On December 7, 2017, the Court granted in part the plaintiffs' motion to interpret the Powell settlement agreement in order to determine the amount of time necessary to complete an evaluation of Powell's net worth and ordered the evaluation be completed by February 6, 2018. On June 6, 2018, the Court granted in part plaintiffs' motion to interpret the Powell settlement agreement, again related to the completion of the net worth evaluation. The Court required that the evaluator provide missing, relevant financial information within twenty-one days. Litigation over the net worth professional fees continued until January, 2019, when they were finally resolved. On May 25, 2020, the case was reassigned to Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner. He issued an order on April 13, 2020 requiring the parties to file a joint status report apprising the court of which claims had settled and which remained open. The parties filed this report on April 24, 2020, stating that the Mericle, Provider, and Powell settlements had all been completed. The outstanding claims were those that plaintiffs intended to pursue against former Judges Michael T. Conahan and Mark A. Ciavarella for damages associated with existing judgments against the two. The court ordered plaintiffs to file the appropriate motion to proceed with the remaining claims by June 1, 2020. As of May 27, 2020, the case remains open and ongoing.", "summary": "In February 2009, children and parents of children whose cases had been heard by judges who accepted payments from private detention facilities and construction companies to place the children into those facilities brought this class action under RICO and \u00a7 1983. The case was consolidated with two other class actions and several other civil actions. The parties settled with various defendants over the following six years. The case remains open as the plaintiffs pursue satisfaction of judgments against the defendant judges."} {"article": "On June 7, 2005, Plaintiff, a Jewish former prisoner, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act against five employees of the Vermont Department of Corrections (DOC) in their official and individual capacities. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for damages and injunctive relief, alleging that the employees of the DOC denied or limited his ability to practice his Jewish faith during the time he was incarcerated. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the employees denied him minor modifications that would allow the plaintiff to observe his Jewish religion in a meaningful manner and denied his requests for certain food and religious items to celebrate Jewish holidays. The defendants moved for summary judgment claiming that sovereign immunity protects the employees of the DOC from being sued in their official capacities and that injunctive relief was moot because the plaintiff was no longer incarcerated. On November 28, 2007, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Jerome J. Niedermeier) filed a report recommending that summary judgment be denied in part and granted in part. Judge Niedermeier agreed with the defendants that the claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed as moot and that the defendants were protected under the 11th Amendment in their official capacities. However, the report stated that the plaintiff produced enough evidence to make a reasonable inference of malice to support his claims for punitive damages against certain defendants in their individual capacities. A settlement agreement was filed with the court and approved on March 21, 2008. The plaintiff agreed to release all claims against the State of Vermont and each of the named defendants in the present case in exchange for $25,000 and the acknowledgement that certain providers of religious food and articles are appropriate pursuant to the DOC's policies on religious observances. The parties agreed to dismiss the action with prejudice.", "summary": "The plaintiff, a Jewish former prisoner, filed a complaint against employees of the Vermont Department of Corrections in their official and individual capacities, alleging that the employees denied him minor modifications that would allow him to observe his Jewish religion in a meaningful manner. Defendants moved for summary judgment which the court denied in part and granted in part. The court stated that the defendants were protected by the 11th Amendment from being sued in their official capacities, but that the plaintiff produced enough evidence of malice to allow him to proceed against the defendants in their individual capacities. The parties agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice in exchange for a $25,000 settlement."} {"article": "On August 3, 2007, a person held in Cook County Jail (CCJ) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1983 and 1988, and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343 and 2201 against Cook County. The plaintiff, represented by civil rights attorneys, asked the court for compensatory damages, claiming that the jail's policies and procedures that denied prescribed medications to prisoners violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs specifically alleged that the defendant's policy allowed medical technicians to deny medications to detainees solely on the basis of a brief and cursory interview. Technicians failed to inquire about detainees' medical histories and made their decisions without consulting a physician. With respect to psychotropic medications, the plaintiffs alleged that CCJ routinely provided antidepressants to individuals as a less expensive replacement of their medically-required psychotropic medications, which lead to behavioral problems including suicide attempts. With respect to non-psychotropic medications, the plaintiffs alleged that the county's policy permitted technicians to cut off drug treatments for a wide range of conditions, including enlarged prostate, heart disease, acid reflux, congestive heart failure, asthma, hepatitis C, chronic pain and surgical wounds. As a result, the plaintiffs suffered a wide range of adverse medical consequences. On August 16, 2007, the plaintiffs filed the first amended complaint requesting class certification. On March 31, 2008, the plaintiffs filed the second amended complaint. On May 21, 2008, the defendants filed motions to dismiss the second amended complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to allege that a policy, custom, or practice for the Sheriff of Cook County was responsible was a cause or contributing cause for their alleged constitutional injury. On October 24, 2008, Judge Matthew F. Kennelly granted class certification to current and former inmates confined to the Cook County Jail who were denied prescribed drug therapies within 24 hours by the facility, rejecting the defendant's adequacy-of-representation argument that asserted felons cannot serve as class representatives. Parish v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 07 4369, 2008 WL 4812875 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2008). The court reassigned the case to Judge John Lee on June 1, 2012. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on July 2, 2012, and the defendants moved to decertify the previously certified class on July 5, 2012. The defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment one month later. After several hearings on the motion and supplemental briefing, the court denied the defendants' motion to decertify the class on March 31, 2016, concluding that there were no material changes in circumstance or the law requiring decertification. 2016 WL 1270400. On April 17, 2018, the court denied a motion by defendants to bar the testimony of four of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses. 2018 WL 1811330. On May 30, 2019, Judge John Lee addressed the parties\u2019 motions for summary judgment. He granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions and denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion. The court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Cook County, finding that it was not directly liable for the allegedly unconstitutional intake policies at the jail. However, the court held that Cook County remained an indispensable party to the litigation because of their statutory role of funding the sheriff\u2019s office. Addressing the claims against the Sheriff, the court granted the defendant\u2019s motion as to claims asserting constitutional violations prior to 2008 and claims based on medical conditions other than asthma, diabetes, depression, and other various illnesses. The court permitted the plaintiffs\u2019 remaining claims against the Sheriff to proceed. 2019 WL 2297464. Beginning in summer 2019, the parties began settlement discussions. The lead plaintiffs submitted a preliminary settlement agreement on December 20, 2019. The agreement directs the defendants to pay $7,500,000. Judge Lee granted preliminary approval of the settlement agreement on December 17, 2019. Upon notification, several members of the class filed objections to the settlement agreement. However, proceedings were delayed in early 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic; no final certification has been granted. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On August 3, 2007, a prisoner confined in the Cook County Jail (CCJ) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1983 and 1988 and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343 and 2201 against Cook County. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for compensatory damages, claiming that the jail's policies and procedures that denied prescribed medications to prisoners violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs specifically alleged that the defendant's policy allowed medical technicians to deny medications resulting in a wide range of adverse medical consequences. The court granted in part and denied in part cross-motions for summary judgment. The case moved into settlement negotiations in late 2019, and the Judge approved a preliminary agreement in December of that year. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "This case concerns the \"Improvement Standard,\" a rule of thumb that required many beneficiaries to show a likelihood of medical or functional improvement before Medicare would pay for skilled nursing and therapy services. As a result, some people are forced into nursing homes or suffer other adverse medical outcomes. The complaint, with five beneficiary plaintiffs and five national organization plaintiffs, was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont, along with a motion for certification of a nationwide class, on January 18, 2011. On March 3, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that added two more organization plaintiffs and one beneficiary plaintiff. The parties completed briefing of the class motion in early May 2011. Oral argument on the government's motion to dismiss was held on July 14, 2011. On October 25, 2011, the court largely denied the motion to dismiss. 2011 WL 5104355. After the Secretary filed an Answer on November 8, 2011, discovery was stayed for settlement discussions. On July 20, 2012, the parties reported to the court that they had reached an agreement in principle. In October 2012, the parties filed a settlement agreement, which was approved by the court (Chief Judge Christina C. Reiss) on January 24, 2013. The agreement significantly changes Medicare coverage rules; Medicare will pay for services if they are needed to \"maintain the patient's current condition or prevent or slow further deterioration,\" regardless of whether the patient's condition is expected to improve. The Court will monitor compliance for four years. In the settlement, the government agreed to pay an unspecified amount for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to the plaintiffs.", "summary": "This case concerns the \"Improvement Standard,\" a rule of thumb that required many beneficiaries to show a likelihood of medical or functional improvement before Medicare would pay for skilled nursing and therapy services. As a result, some people are forced into nursing homes or suffer other adverse medical outcomes. The complaint, with five beneficiary plaintiffs and five national organization plaintiffs, was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont, along with a motion for certification of a nationwide class, on January 18, 2011. In October 2012, the parties filed a settlement agreement, which was approved by the Court (Chief Judge Christina C. Reiss) on January 24, 2013. The agreement will significantly change Medicare coverage rules; Medicare will pay for services if they are needed to \"maintain the patient's current condition or prevent or slow further deterioration,\" regardless of whether the patient's condition is expected to improve. The Court will monitor compliance for four years."} {"article": "On February 25, 2008, the plaintiff, a pre-arraignment detainee in the Santa Cruz County Jail, filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the United States Court for the District of Arizona, Tucson Division against Santa Cruz County. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive and compensatory relief, claiming violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the blanket policy of strip-searching and cavity searching all pre-arraignment detainees without reasonable suspicion was a violation of the plaintiff's right to due process and to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, and violated established Supreme Court precedent in Bell v. Wolfish. Between 2006 and 2008, the plaintiff, the putative class representative, was arrested several times in Santa Cruz County on various minor offenses. Each time, when he was detained in the Santa Cruz County Jail, he was, in the company of other detainees and in full view of others, required to stand naked, lift his genitals, and expose his anus for visual inspection. This was a routine procedure that all detainees at the jail were compelled to undergo. The class was never certified because the case settled before the defendants and plaintiffs litigated class certification. On January 15, 2009, the Court (Judge Raner C. Collins) entered an unpublished order approving a stipulated settlement that would dismiss the case with prejudice, after a fairness hearing. In the Stipulated Settlement Agreement, the County agreed to pay 3.2 million dollars to a fund from which class members could claim damages. The class was described as people who had been subjected to strip and cavity searches without reasonable suspicion in the Santa Cruz County Jail, with the named plaintiff to receive $50,000. Attorney fees were awarded in the amount of $725,000. No injunctive-like provisions were included in the Stipulated Settlement. The fairness hearing was held on July 13, 2009, and the Court approved the settlement, and dismissed the case the same day. The case has been closed.", "summary": "A class of pre-arraignment detainees who had been subjected to strip and cavity searches in the Santa Cruz County Jail were successful in settling their case against the county for 3.2 million dollars. The Court approved the settlement agreement, and the case was dismissed with prejudice in July 2009."} {"article": "On February 25, 2011, four former job applicants of Howard Industries filed a lawsuit against the company in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Represented by private counsel, plaintiffs filed the lawsuit on behalf of themselves and a class of non-Latino (Caucasian and African-American) applicants who were harmed by the company's alleged discriminatory practices. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Howard Industries denied their job applications on the basis of their race or national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e et seq.). The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. On October 5, 2012, the District Court (Judge Keith Starrett) granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The court certified the class as \"All black and non-Hispanic white persons who applied for a bargaining unit position at Howard Industries' Laurel, Mississippi transformer facility between January 1, 2003, and August 25, 2008, and were not hired.\" The parties reached a settlement, and the court issued a consent decree on March 11, 2013, resulting in injunctive and monetary relief. Cook v. Howard Indus., 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP, 2013 WL 943664 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 11, 2013). Specifically, the settlement required Howard Industries (1) to create a settlement fund of $1,300,000 to be paid to class members and (2) to offer seventy of the class members a bargaining unit position at its Laurel transformer plant. The class members who qualified for these positions \"must initially choose between the Individual Settlement Benefit and the Employment Benefit, but any Qualified Class Member not selected for employment will receive an Individual Settlement Benefit.\" Lastly, the consent decree provided that Howard Industries pay plaintiffs' attorney fees in the amount of $457,500. The settlement agreement, not including the payment of attorney fees, was valued by the parties at $3,050,000.00. This case is now closed.", "summary": "This case was brought by a class of non-Latino (Caucasian and African-American) job applicants against Howard Industries. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that they were not hired by Howard Industries due to their race. The parties reached a settlement, and the court issued a consent decree on March 11, 2013, resulting in injunctive and monetary relief."} {"article": "On July 11, 2007, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et seq., against the City of Indianapolis in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The DOJ sought injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant violated Title VII by discriminating against employees on the basis of race (white) and sex (male). The defendant city maintains a police department, the Metropolitan Law Enforcement Agency aka the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD), and is responsible for establishing the terms, conditions, and other practices which bear upon the employment and promotion of police officers in the IMPD. The defendant city maintained competitive promotions processes by which applicants for promotion and appointment to the merit ranks of Sergeant and Lieutenant in the IMPD are screened, ranked, and selected. The allegations listed in the complaint are separated into two sections. In the first, the DOJ alleged that the defendant discriminated against a number of white males on the basis of race and/or sex by failing or refusing to promote or timely promote such individuals to the merit rank of Sergeant, instead promoting other lower ranking black and/or female candidates to this position. The second section contains allegations of discrimination on the basis of sex (male), which took the form of failing or refusing to promote or timely promote such individuals to the merit rank of Lieutenant, and instead promoting lower ranking female candidates. On July 31, 2007, the court granted the parties' joint motion to consolidate, and ordered that the case be consolidated with Lawrence Wheeler v. City of Indianapolis (1:05-CV-1220-LJM-JMS) and United States v. City of Indianapolis (1:78-CV-388-RLY-WTL) and the case proceeded under the number 1:78-CV-388-RLY-WTL. Following the consolidation, an Intervenor Complaint was filed on October 22, 2007. The complaint makes factual allegations regarding the discrimination on the basis of sex and race, and claims that the plaintiff-intervenors have been damaged through the loss of pay, reputation, professional opportunities and experience, collegiality with fellow officers, and consortium with family members, and have suffered stress and emotional distress. The plaintiff-intervenors sought remedial relief, including back pay, front pay, injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and compensatory and punitive damages. A motion to amend the Intervenor's Complaint was filed on October 24, 2007, which included the charge of violation of the First Amendment. The parties then entered into settlement negotiations and filed a joint motion to enter a consent decree. on August 22, 2008. The Court (Judge David Frank Hamilton) provisionally entered the decree on August 28, 2008. The decree contains two general injunctions: 1) the City was enjoined from engaging in acts or practice of racial or gender discrimination with respect to promotions within the Police Department; 2) prohibition on retaliation. The decree also provided individual relief to various employees of the Police Department, who were denied promotion because of their race or gender. The decree contained several uncontested allegations, whereas female or minority police officers were promoted instead of higher ranked male or white applicants. Those individuals received promotions, retroactive seniority, and varying payments as backpay and frontpay. The City agreed to keep records and submit reports to the United States. The latter had a right to monitor compliance. The decree was to dissolve within two years, or within ninety days of certification of full compliance. The decree was subject to a fairness hearing. The Court received objections from NAACP, alleging that the proposed consent decree would have a disparate impact on African Americans. On February 12, 2009, the Court entered the consent decree which was slightly modified, such as allowing the City to continue to lawfully pursue diversity within its employees. On November 29, 2009, the case was reassigned to Judge Sarah Evan Baker. On February 19, 2010, the parties filed a joint status report, stating that they propose no modifications to the decree, and that the city was in compliance with its reporting obligations and continues to improve its selection policies. On February 23, 2010, the case was administratively closed by the Court, subject to the Court's ongoing jurisdiction to enforce the consent decree. There has been no further activity on the docket. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On July 11, 2007, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et seq., against the City of Indianapolis in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The DOJ sought injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant violated Title VII by discriminating against employees on the basis of race (white) and sex (male). The parties settled, and the Court entered their consent decree on February 12, 2009. The decree provided for injunctions against racial and gender discrimination, and individual relief to various persons consisting of promotion, retroactive seniority and monetary relief. The case is ongoing, although it is administratively closed."} {"article": "On September 21, 2000, the Raleigh Area Office of the EEOC brought this suit in the Eastern District of North Carolina under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Georgia Pacific Corporation, one of the world's largest manufacturers of packaging and building materials. The EEOC, who brought this action on behalf of several of the company's male African-American employees and a male Hispanic employee, sought monetary and injunctive relief, claiming that Georgia Pacific's Butler, N.C. branch had engaged in discrimination based on race and national origin, sex discrimination, and retaliation against those who complained of the company's discriminatory practices. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the company's African-American employees were subjected to a hostile work environment that included racially derogatory comments, graffiti, and name-calling, and that many were fired or constructively discharged due to their complaints about the discriminatory practices. Additionally, the EEOC claimed that a Hispanic employee was subjected to national origin discrimination, primarily through derogatory comments, and sexual harassment, which included explicit comments and gestures and unwelcome touching. This employee was constructively discharged in retaliation for his complaints about the work environment. On December 20, 2000, the court granted four former Georgia Pacific employees' motion to intervene in the lawsuit. In addition to a Title VII claim, the plaintiff-intervenors (who included the discrimination victims named in the original EEOC complaint) brought suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981. The complaint in intervention further detailed Georgia Pacific's discriminatory practices, which included KKK, swastika, and confederate flag graffiti, and discriminatory work policies such as not letting African-American employees use the bathroom when needed. One of the plaintiff-intervenors also claimed that he was denied the opportunity to pursue a promotion due to his national origin. On February 1, 2001, the EEOC and Georgia Pacific signed a settlement agreement, which set forth that the Hispanic plaintiff-intervenor had received a monetary settlement embodied in a separate agreement and that he agreed to dismiss his claim with prejudice, and that if a satisfactory Consent Decree was entered or if the EEOC prevailed at trial, Georgia Pacific would have to provide training to its management and employees on Title VII and the company's anti-discrimination policy, report to the EEOC semi-annually, and would submit to EEOC oversight. The Consent Decree was entered on March 30, 2001, and was effective for two years. The class of African-American employees who were working or who had worked at Georgia Pacific's Butler, N.C. facility were awarded $198,417.05. One of the named African-American plaintiff-intervenors was further awarded $1,582.95. The Consent Decree additionally set forth the requirements discussed in the settlement agreement, including mandatory training, reporting, and EEOC oversight, and included a prohibition against discrimination.", "summary": "In 2000, the the EEOC brought this suit in the Eastern District of North Carolina under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Georgia Pacific Corporation, one of the world's largest manufacturers of packaging and building materials. The complaint alleged Georgia Pacific had engaged in discrimination based on race and national origin, sex discrimination, and retaliation against those employees who complained about discriminatory practices. A consent decree was entered in 2001; a class of African-American current and former employees was awarded $198,417.05, while a named plaintiff-intervenor was awarded an additional $1,582.95. The Decree, which was effective for two years, also provided for mandatory training, reporting, and EEOC oversight, as well as injunctive relief against discrimination."} {"article": "On October 24, 2008, plaintiff non-emergency medical transportation service filed this claim in the Central District of California against the Director of the Department of Health Care Services of the State of California. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the Director from implementing state legislation reducing payments to medical service providers under California's Medi-Cal program by ten percent. Plaintiff argued that the ten percent rate reduction violated Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act (the Medicaid Act), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396 et seq., and was therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause. The plaintiff sought declaratory judgment under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201. The Defendant submitted an ex parte application for an order staying this action and two related cases. In an order filed on November 3, 2008, the Central District of California (Judge Christina A. Snyder) granted the order staying the instant action and two related cases. The Court stayed this case as well as California Association for Health Services at Home v. Shewry (CV 08-07045) and Independent Living et al v. Shewry (CV 08-3315) until further order of the Court. On June 1, 2011, Judge Snyder issued an order removing this action from the active list of cases. The Judge ordered that counsel file a joint report detailing the status of the case every quarter until the action is reactivated or a stipulation for dismissal is filed. This is the last entry on the docket as of July 17, 2013.", "summary": "On October 24, 2008, plaintiff non-emergency medical transportation service filed this claim in the Central District of California against the Director of the Department of Health Care Services of the State of California. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the Director from implementing state legislation reducing payments to medical service providers under California's Medi-Cal program by ten percent. Plaintiff argued that the ten percent rate reduction violated Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act (the Medicaid Act), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396 et seq., and was therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause. The plaintiff sought declaratory judgment under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201. The Defendant submitted an ex parte application for an order staying this action. On November 3, 2008, the Court issued an order staying the action until further order of the Court. On June 1, 2011, Judge Snyder issued an order removing this action from the active list of cases. The Judge ordered that counsel file a joint report detailing the status of the case every quarter until the action is reactivated or a stipulation for dismissal is filed. This is the last entry on the docket as of July 17, 2013."} {"article": "This case is about Chicago's Gang Database and its constitutionality given Chicago Police Department's unlimited discretion to add names to the database without consistent guidelines or approval requirements. On June 19, 2018, a coalition of four individuals and community organizations filed a federal class action lawsuit against the City of Chicago and the Chicago Police Department (CPD) alleging that the city\u2019s Gang Database is unconstitutional and seeking injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. They filed the suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The four individual plaintiffs, three Black and one Latino, were falsely identified as gang members and placed in the database. The putative class consisted of all individuals included in the database and within that class a subclass of all Black and Latino individuals in the database. As of the date that the complaint was filed, the database included around 128,000 adults, 95% of whom were Black or Latino. CPD officers had unlimited discretion to designate someone as a gang member; this discretion was often wielded disproportionately against Black and Latino individuals. Individuals also lack the ability to challenge the gang member designation or be removed. This created the potential for lifelong false designations as a gang member, which could have serious repercussions, especially because CPD shares this information with third party agencies. CPD also relied on the Database in its work, which could lead to false arrests and imprisonment of individuals on the Database. The complaint alleged that the city\u2019s Gang Database and its usage violated individuals\u2019 rights to due process, the Equal Protection Clause, the Fourth Amendment\u2019s protection against unlawful search and seizure, and Illinois state law. The case was assigned to Judge Andrea Wood. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on September 14, 2018. The plaintiffs withdrew their motion for class certification on November 19, 2018, with leave to refile upon the conclusion of class discovery. In light of a number of developments outside of court, namely the Chicago Office of the Inspector General's audit of the Gang Database and CPD's responding new policy draft, the parties jointly filed a motion to stay to evaluate these developments and determine how CPD's anticipated new policy would affect the litigation. The court granted the motion on April 23, 2019. After the duration of the stay, the parties agreed to a several additional extensions of the timeline. The case was also pushed back several times due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On August 20, 2020, the parties reported to the court that they had reached an agreement to resolve the case. The individual plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew their complaint on September 2, 2020, and the organizational plaintiffs also voluntarily withdrew on September 4. The primary initiative that seems to have motivated the case's resolution is the Criminal Enterprise Information System (CEIS), which would be the new tool by which CPD vets, maintains, and utilizes criminal enterprise and street gang membership information. In addition to the implementation of CEIS, the old gang database would be unavailable, there would be disclaimers to those accessing CEIS regarding potential inaccuracies and appropriate uses of the information, and user agreements for those assessing CEIS prohibiting disclosing the information to other agencies. Furthermore, CEIS would be subject to an annual review. The notice of initiatives filed by the City of Chicago expressed that the document was not a settlement agreement and did not create binding obligations. In their voluntary withdrawal, the plaintiffs clarified that they did not endorse the initiatives, but rather a choice to terminate the litigation in order to \"focus their efforts on the ultimate relief they seek\u2014a complete abolition of CPD\u2019s gang database.\" The organizational plaintiffs asserted that they maintained their rights to and would not hesitate to file another lawsuit if CPD continued to designate people as gang members in a discriminatory and unconstitutional manner. As such, on September 10, 2020, Judge Wood dismissed the case without prejudice to the organizational plaintiffs and with prejudice to the individuals. Each party was ordered to bear its own fees and costs. The case is closed.", "summary": "A coalition of individuals and community organizations filed a federal class action lawsuit against the City of Chicago and the Chicago Police Department in 2018 alleging that the city\u2019s Gang Database was unconstitutional. The case was settled by the parties in 2020. Chicago announced a new process for designating individuals as gang members, among other initiatives."} {"article": "On October 4, 2006, a death-sentenced inmate of the Riverbend Maximum Security Prison in Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Tennessee Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The State of Tennessee allows death-sentenced prisoners who committed their crimes prior to 1999 to choose their method of execution - lethal injection or the electric chair. Plaintiff complained to the Court that both methods of execution used in Tennessee were unconstitutional because they would torture the executed prisoner. Plaintiff objected to the use of the state's electric chair (which was nicknamed \"Old Sparky\") during his execution by arguing that it had been modified and would not work properly because it would not deliver an adequate current. He quoted the manufacturer, who responded to the news of the chair's modifications by saying that the changes would make it an \"instrument of torture\" that is \"tantamount to somebody being burned at the stake.\" Plaintiff also referred to allegedly botched executions involving electric chairs in other states. Plaintiff also objected to the defendants' lethal injection protocol, arguing that it led to an unconstitutional risk of torture because it 1) did not specify the required credentials of the medical personnel involved, 2) involved the use of an anesthetic that would work only for a very short duration, therefore allowing the plaintiff to feel pain, 3) involved the use of a paralytic agent that would render the condemned unable to express the pain that he was feeling and unable to breathe, and 4) involved a dose of potassium chloride that was high enough to cause extreme pain but not high enough to arrest the heart and cause death. Plaintiff alleged that this combination of chemicals would render him conscious, paralyzed, and in extreme pain while he suffocated to death. On October 10, 2006, the defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint and motion for a preliminary injunction, arguing that Plaintiff had not shown any likelihood of success on the merits and that he had brought the complaint only to delay his execution. Nine days later, the District Court (Judge Todd J. Campbell) denied Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the motion to dismiss, finding that Plaintiff was unlikely to succeed at trial and that he had brought the case only to delay the execution. Plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted motions to stay and consolidate the case with a similar death-row case, Harbison v. Little (07-6225). In that case, the District Court ruled that the lethal injection method was unconstitutional, and the defendants appealed. These two consolidated cases were stayed until the United States Supreme Court decided a Kentucky case, Baze v. Rees, CJ-KY-0002. In Baze, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that the Kentucky legal injection method, which was similar to the method used in Tennessee, was constitutional. Following that decision, the parties in this case set an oral argument date in December 5, 2013. However, on December 3, 2013, the Court of Appeals granted a joint motion to dismiss the appeals as moot, following the implementation of a new lethal injection protocol by the state of Tennessee.", "summary": "This 2006 challenge to Tennesee's execution methods was dismissed at the Circuit Court level. The Plaintiff claimed that both execution methods (electrocution by \"Old Sparky\" and lethal injection - the choices offered condemned inmates) amount to torture. The District Court granted the state's motion to dismiss the case, and on appeal, on December 3, 2013, the Court of Appeals granted a motion to dismiss the case as moot after the state implemented a new lethal injection protocol."} {"article": "Plaintiffs were a group of ''Immigrant Investors'' who participated in the ''EB-5'' program, which granted lawful permanent resident (''LPR'') status in the United States to those who made qualifying investments that created jobs for United States workers under the Immigrant Investor Law (''IIL''), 8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1153(b)(5). On August 24, 1999, Plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) improperly applied its current interpretation of EB-5 retroactively to their applications. Shortly after filing suit, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case and then refiled it in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (Los Angeles), where it was assigned case # 2:99-cv-10518-GHK-AJW. The refiled suit was brought by more than two hundred immigrant investors and their family members. To pare down the case, the lawsuit was later amended as a class action, with seven named investor plaintiffs acting as class representatives. The plaintiff class alleged that they had submitted investment proposals and business plans which were preliminarily approved under the ''EB-5'' program. Class members and their families then moved to the U.S. In 1998, the Immigration and Naturalization Service changed the rules of the EB-5 program, which plaintiffs alleged were retroactively applied to them, causing their EB-5 applications to be rejected. Plaintiffs contended that by changing the EB-5 rules and retroactively applying them to the plaintiffs, the government violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 551 et seq. and due process and equal protection. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On June 27, 2000, the government moved for judgment on the pleadings. The District Court (Judge George H. King) granted it in part and dismissed the claims of six of the seven named plaintiffs as unripe. As to the claims of plaintiff Chiang, who had received a decision terminating his residency in the U.S., the Court held that he failed to state a claim under the Administrative Procedures Act. The Court remanded Chiang's retroactivity claim to the INS for further consideration in light of the retroactivity analysis in Montgomery Ward v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1982). Plaintiffs appealed. On April 29, 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Circuit Judge Betty B. Fletcher) affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the District Court erred in dismissing the claims of six plaintiffs as being not ripe. The Court also found that the INS impermissibly and retroactively applied its EB-5 rule changes to the plaintiffs. The case was remanded with instructions that the district court should determine whether class certification was appropriate. Chang v. U.S., 327 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2003). On remand, plaintiffs moved several times to amend their complaint and for class certification. On August 29, 2005, the District Court granted plaintiffs leave to file a second amended complaint. The Court also indicated that it was inclined to certify the case as a class action and ordered the parties to submit a joint definition of the proposed class. The Court also ordered that the case Ahn v. U.S.A., CV-01-7382 be consolidated with the Chang case. On July 17, 2007, the Court (Judge King) conducted a settlement conference with the parties. In the settlement conference, the parties came to preliminary agreement on the terms of the plaintiffs relief, specifically that the amount of additional money the plaintiffs would have to invest and how many jobs they would have to create in order for their I-829 applications to be approved. He ordered the parties to file a status report 130 days, updating the progress of settlement negotiations. On February 6, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a motion requesting sanctions on the defendants, claiming that they had started implementing contacts with the class members and regional immigration centers on good faith of the defendants verbal agreements in settlement conference and that the defendants had now impermissibly changed their position in negotiations. The plaintiffs alleged that they were unable to negotiate towards a settlement with the defendants any longer. As a result, the parties continued to file motions to amend the complaint and motions to dismiss. In March of 2012, the parties began formally informing the court of settlement negotiations, and, in August the parties submitted a joint status report, which included a settlement agreement. In September 2012, the court conditionally certified a class for settlement. The class consisted of all aliens who invested in one of the AIS Partnerships, who had an I-526 petition approved by the Attorney General after January 1, 1995, and before August 31, 1998, and were granted conditional resident status pursuant to the INA and who timely filed an I-829 petition requesting the removal of such conditional basis, and who have received or will receive a denial of their permanent residency because they are unable to comply with the INA's investment and employment requirements. The court then also preliminary approved the settlement agreement. Per the settlement, defendant agreed to favorably adjudicate each plaintiff's Petition to Entrepreneur to Remove Conditions (\"Form I-829\") subject to numerous conditions, including that the petition could be denied if it was determined that the petitioner made a willful material misrepresentation in his form or that the petitioner's investment was knowingly made solely as a means of evading the immigration laws. On February 13, 2013, the court granted final approval of the settlement. In March, the court granted plaintiffs' unopposed motion to order adjudication of plaintiffs' I-829 petitions. The case appears to be closed.", "summary": "A group of \"Immigrant Investors\" participating in the EB-5 program sued the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on August 24, 1999 for improperly applying its most recent interpretation of EB-5 retroactively to their applications. EB-5 granted lawful permanent resident status to those who made qualifying investments that created jobs for U.S. workers under the Immigrant Investor Law. The plaintiffs alleged that after submitting investment proposals and business plans, which were preliminarily approved, the INS changed the rules of the EB-5 program. In retroactively applying the rules to the plaintiffs' proposals and plans, the INS rejected them. After the District Court dismissed most of the plaintiffs' claims, the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Ninth Circuit held that the District Court erred in dismissing the claims of six plaintiffs as being not ripe, and also found that the INS impermissibly and retroactively applied its EB-5 rule changes to the plaintiffs. The case was remanded with instructions that the district court should determine whether class certification was appropriate. After years of litigation, the court conditionally certified a class for settlement in September 2012, and later granted final approval of the parties' settlement on February 13, 2013. Per the settlement, the defendant agreed to favorably adjudicate each plaintiff's Petition to Entrepreneur to Remove Conditions (\"Form I-829\") subject to numerous conditions."} {"article": "On April 26, 2018, the non-profit, Big House Books, along with two prisoners at the South Mississippi Correctional Institution (SMCI) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Judge Daniel P. Jordan, III was assigned to the case. The plaintiffs sued SMCI and the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), alleging that the MDOC\u2019s new policy of barring prisoners from receiving free books, unless they are religious books, was unconstitutional. More specifically, they brought this case under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging that this new policy was discriminatory on the basis of religious content and violated the First and the Fourteenth Amendments. Represented by the Mississippi Center for Justice and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. After the plaintiffs filed the complaint, there was little activity in the case, so the court issued an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute on December 3, 2018. The plaintiffs responded by filing a stipulation of dismissal on December 19, 2018. The plaintiffs explained that shortly after the complaint was filed, the parties met and reached an agreement to change the policies and practices that led to this lawsuit. The defendants stopped their practice of only allowing prisoners to receive free books if they were religious. In the summer of 2018, MDOC clarified their policy to make clear that free books from distributors, like Big House Books, could be sent to prisoners. The plaintiffs monitored the shipments to prisoners to ensure that the practice changed and found prompt and ongoing compliance. The parties then agreed that the plaintiffs would be paid attorneys\u2019 fees of $6,000 for their work. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In April 2018, two prisoners at the South Mississippi Correctional Institution (SMCI) and non-profit Big House Books filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued SMCI and the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), alleging that the MDOC\u2019s new policy of barring prisoners from receiving free books unless they are religious books violates the First and the Fourteenth Amendments. After little activity in the case, the court issued an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The parties then filed a stipulated of dismissal on December 19, 2018, indicating that earlier in the year the parties reached an agreement to settle the case. The defendants changed their policies and practices so that prisoners could receive free books from distributors like the plaintiff whether or not they were religious. The defendants also agreed to pay the plaintiffs $6,000 in attorney fees. This case is now closed."} {"article": " Romero I On August 01, 2001, thirty-two employees of Allstate Insurance filed a class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued Allstate under the Age Employment in Discrimination Act of 1967 (AEDA) and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The plaintiffs, represented by private attorneys, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The case was initially assigned to Judge John P. Fullham. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged three legal issues. First, plaintiffs alleged that Allstate Insurance, under the guise of cost reduction, forced all of its benefits-receiving, salaried insurance agents into independent contractor positions contrary to Section 510 of ERISA. Second, plaintiffs alleged that Allstate Insurance changed their benefits because the company wanted to hire younger staff who they could pay less, contrary to the AEDA. Finally, plaintiffs alleged that the company violated its fiduciary duties by requiring the employees to either sign an agreement that converted their position to a contract or be fired. Allstate had terminated the employment contracts of more than 6,200 employees, 90 percent of whom were over the age of . Therefore, the plaintiffs sought to represent a class which includes the 6,200 former employees, to nullify the releases, and pursued a wide range of claims: for breach of contract, for violations of the ADEA, ADA, Title VII, and ERISA. Romero II About four months later, the Romero I plaintiffs and four others brought a separate ERISA action against Allstate. The plaintiffs in Romero II sought to represent a class of persons whose rights under ERISA were allegedly violated by the changes in the pension plan. The defendant responded that the claims were barred because they had the affirmative defense of release. They also counterclaimed against the plaintiffs for unjust enrichment, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing based on state law. On December 27, 2001, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EOCC) brought its own action against the defendant (EEOC v. Allstate), alleging that they unlawfully retaliated against the agents, in violation of the ADEA and other federal employment statutes, by refusing to permit them to continue as Allstate employees unless they signed the release. They sought declaratory judgment that the release was invalid. Romero III On December 20, 2003, twenty-five employees filed a separate suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs alleged retaliation by Allstate Insurance, alleging frivolous counterclaims against the plaintiffs in Romero I. Lastly, on October 7, 2004, the EEOC filed a suit against Allstate . Additionally, it filed a motion to intervene and to oppose Allstate's motion for summary judgment in Romero. This case would letter settle for $4,500,000 in September 2009. In 2004, the district court dismissed Romero II claims, finding the complaints to be time-barred, and declared that the releases signed by former employees were voidable. 2004 WL 692231. The court additionally certified a class of agents who had signed the release for this purpose. However, in 2005 the Circuit reversed the opinion and remanded it back to the district court. 404 F.3d 212. The district court stated its intent to grant summary judgment in favor of Allstate in March 2007. 2007 WL 906158. The court also advised the parties that it was rethinking its previous ruling that the releases were voidable and that it believed the order should be vacated. On June 20, 2007, the district court granted Allstate's motion to dismiss for Romero II and motion for summary judgment for Romero I and found the previous declaration voiding the releases moot. 344 Fed.Appx. 785. However, this order was vacated and remanded by the Third Circuit in 2009. 344 Fed.Appx. 785. On remand, the two cases were consolidated for administrative purposes (see the links below for notes on consolidation). Discovery followed for the next three years, and an amended complaint was filed in 2010. On January 29, 2010, the case was reassigned from Judge John P. Fullham to Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter. On September 12, 2012, the Court consolidated Romero I, Romero II, and EEOC v. Allstate for administrative purposes. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss that year, which the court denied. 2010 WL 4670172. At the same time, the district court granted summary judgment to Allstate regarding the claims of retaliation in 2007, but the order was subsequently vacated on appeal and remanded back to a different district judge in 2009. 2007 WL 1811197; 344 Fed. Appx. 785. In a separate opinion on March 13, 2014, the District Court granted Allstate summary judgment in EEOC retaliation suit, holding that Allstate's claims were not facially retaliatory. 3 F Supp. 3d 313. EEOC appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed on February 13, 2015. 778 F.3d 444. On February 27, 2014, the court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment and directed that the issue regarding the validity of the release be decided by a jury. 1 F. Supp. 3d 319. Subsequently, on March 13, 2014, the court granted the defendant summary judgment on the EEOC's claim and dismissed that action in its entirety. 3 F. Supp. 3d 313. The decision was affirmed by the Third Circuit on March 26, 2015. Accordingly, the court granted Allstate's motion for partial summary judgment against the plaintiffs' ADEA disparate impact claims as well as against their ERISA Section 510 claims. 2017 WL 1508879; 251 F.Supp.3d 867. Thereafter, class certification was sought for the issue of the validity of release on May 23, 2014, which was denied on October 04, 2014, stating that individual factors must be considered to determine whether each release signer entered into the release knowingly and voluntarily. 52 F.Supp.3d 715. By 2015, after two appeals, over 400 additional agents intervened or became named plaintiffs in Romero I, and they filed a third amended complaint. The defendants attempted to dismiss the case again, and on November 15, 2015, the motion was denied. 143 F.Supp.3d 271. The case continued, and on June 17, 2015, the jury found that some plaintiffs signed their releases knowingly and voluntarily and while others did not sign their releases knowingly and voluntarily. On January 26, 2016, the court found that the releases were not procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. 158 F.Supp.3d 369. The case was reassigned to Judge Gerald J. Pappert, and then to Judge Mark A. Kearney three months later. As there were 499 plaintiffs involved by this time, the court ordered the consolidation of the cases on May 05, 2016, and the parties filed a consolidated amended complaint maintaining their ADEA and ERISA retaliation claims. The court also created a schedule for the resolution of all claims: a non-jury trial in December 2016 regarding plan amendments under ERISA in phase I, and a second trial in May 2017 to resolve employee benefits under ERISA and ADEA in phase II and the disparate treatment claims under ADEA at a later date. On July 06, 2016, Judge Kearney reviewed the final consolidated complaint and dismissed the plaintiffs' retaliation claims under ADEA and ERISA, and state law claims. 2016 WL 3654265. On December 5-6, 2016, the judge held bench trial for phase I. After the bench trial and before a ruling was to be issued, the vast majority of plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed in favor of private settlements. On April 27, 2017, the district court granted summary judgment in defendant's favor as to the ADEA disparate impact claim and ERISA section 510 claims. 251 F.Supp.3d 867. On September 05, 2017, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant regarding the retaliation claims, finding that the plaintiff failed to meet the burden of showing that the counterclaims were baseless. 2017 WL 3881217; 2017 WL 3881219. The same day, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, which argued breach of contract and fiduciary duty based on the release signed. 2017 WL 3881215. On January 29, 2018, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff's claims that the counterclaims violated the ADEA and ERISA and denied the defendant's summary judgment on the additional claims of retaliation. 2018 WL 627116. At this point, most of the plaintiffs involved settled privately except 31 individuals. Settlement talks continued for the remaining plaintiffs. Although the defendant attempted to argue that the statute of limitations had passed since the initial complaint, the court tolled the statute of limitations on May 08, 2018. The defendant then moved for partial summary judgment on the state law claims of twelve employees who did not bring their state law claims until 2010 or 2015, arguing that they were barred by Pennsylvania's statute of limitations. On May 22, 2018, the district court denied the defendant's statute of limitations argument and the motion for summary judgment. 2018 WL 2325405. According to the status report dated October 31, 2018, all but three plaintiffs had privately settled. That same the same day, the court granted complete dismissal of the case upon agreement of counsel.", "summary": "On August 1st, 2001, several employees of Allstate Insurance filed a class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs sued Allstate under the Age Employment in Discrimination Act of 1967 (\u201cAEDA\u201d) and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (\u201cERISA\u201d). In September 2009, the EEOC settled the age discrimination claim for $9,000,000. Between December 2016 and October 2018, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their complaints for private settlements. On October 31st, 2018, the court granted complete dismissal of the case upon agreement of counsel."} {"article": "On December 20, 2013, a group of non-profit organizations filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiffs, including The Ave Maria Foundation, Domino's Farms Petting Farm, and Thomas More Law Center, are represented by the public interest firm The Thomas More Law Center. The plaintiffs asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate, even with the accommodation for non-profit religious organizations, is unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked for both a preliminary and permanent injunction keeping the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate against them because it violates the owners' deeply-help, Catholic religious beliefs. On December 23, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order against the defendant. The defendants opposed this motion on the grounds that the accommodation to the ACA mandate does not substantially burden the plaintiffs' religious freedom under RFRA or cause the plaintiffs irreparable harm. On January 13, 2013 U.S. District Court (Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III.) granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. On January 23, 2014, the court granted a joint motion to stay the case pending the defendants' decision to appeal the preliminary injunction. The order referenced two expedited appeals in similar cases in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Catholic Diocese of Nashville v. Sebelius, FA-TN-0001 in this database, and Michigan Catholic Conference v. Sebelius, FA-MI-0014 in this database. Defendants filed an appeal to the Sixth Circuit on March 13, 2014, but the case closed before the Court of Appeals ruled on the case. The plaintiffs jointly stipulated to the case's dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) on February 2, 2018, presumably due to the result of Zubik v. Burwell, FA-PA-0010 in this database, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "On December 20, 2013, a group of non-profit organizations filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiffs believe that even with the accommodation for non-profit, religious organizations, the Affordable Care Act's contraception insurance mandate violates their owner's religious beliefs. On January 13, 2013 U.S. District Court (Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III.) granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. On January 23, 2014, the court granted a joint motion to stay the case pending the defendants' decision to appeal the preliminary injunction. In February 2018, the plaintiffs jointly stipulated to dismissal, and the case is now closed."} {"article": "On December 3, 2013, plaintiffs, two employees of BNSF Railway Company who were married to same-sex spouses, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in the Western District of Washington against the BNSF Railway Company under the federal Equal Pay Act, 29 USC \u00a7206(d)(1), \u00a7216, and related sections. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, they asked the court to declare that BNSF must pay company spousal benefits, regardless of the BNSF employee's sex or sexual orientation, and to enjoin the defendant from continuing its benefit discrimination and denial of plan benefits. The plaintiffs also asked for compensatory damages for the benefits they should have received thus far. Later, in an amended complaint, plaintiffs added causes of action under Title VII, ERISA, and a state anti-discrimination statute, all of which stemmed from the same denial of benefits. The case arose from BNSF's definition of marriage. Plaintiffs were residents of and legally married in Washington State. BNSF, however, defined marriage as between a man and a woman. As a result, the firm denied benefits to plaintiffs' same-sex spouses, which led to the lawsuit. On September 22, 2014, the District Court for the Western District of Washington (Judge Ricardo S. Martinez), dismissed the ERISA claim for lack of jurisdiction and allowed the remaining claims to continue, by granting in part and denying in part the defendant's motion to dismiss. On February 24, 2015, the Court (Judge Ricardo S. Martinez), dismissed the case pursuant to the parties' joint stipulation of dismissal. Prior to settling, BNSF had voluntarily started providing benefit coverage for same-sex spouses, including the plaintiffs' spouses.", "summary": "On December 3, 2013, plaintiffs, two employees of BNSF Railway Company who were married to same-sex spouses, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in the Western District of Washington against the BNSF Railway Company under the federal Equal Pay Act. Plaintiffs were residents of and legally married in Washington State. BNSF, however, defined marriage as between a man and a woman and denied benefits to plaintiffs' same-sex spouses. In January 2014, BNSF voluntarily changed its policies and started providing benefit coverage for same-sex spouses, including the plaintiffs' spouses. The parties eventually settled privately. On February 24, 2015, the Court (Judge Ricardo S. Martinez), dismissed the case pursuant to the parties' joint stipulation of dismissal."} {"article": "On July 9, 2013, several lesbian and gay couples, one widow, and two teenage children of one of the same-sex couples filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs were represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and private counsel, and they asked the court to declare that Pennsylvania laws banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, enjoin the enforcement of laws banning same-sex marriage, and award the plaintiffs with cost of suit and reasonable attorneys fees. The plaintiffs alleged that the ban violated their rights to Due Process and Equal Protection and that they suffered harm by being denied tax and employment benefits available to opposite-sex couples, along with the social stigma of not being allowed to marry. On May 20, 2014, the Court (Judge John E. Jones III) granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and declared Pennsylvania laws that ban same-sex marriage violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and permanently enjoined their enforcement. Whitewood v. Corbett, 2014 WL 2058105 (M.D. Pennsylvania 2014). A county clerk moved to intervene on June 6, 2014. This motion was denied by the court and the clerk appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (USCA). The USCA submitted this case to a panel of the court for possible summary action. On July 7, 2014, the USCA affirmed the District Court's (Judge Jones) denial of the motion to intervene. The case was closed on February 3, 2015.", "summary": "On July 9, 2013, several lesbian and gay couples, one widow, and two teenage children of one of the same-sex couples filed a lawsuit against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that Pennsylvania laws banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, enjoin the enforcement of laws banning same-sex marriage, and award the plaintiffs with cost of suit and reasonable attorneys fees. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and enjoined enforcement of laws banning same-sex marriage."} {"article": "Plaintiffs are service members in the U.S. Armed Forces, married to spouses of their same sex. They filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts on October 27, 2011, challenging the constitutionality of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and other exclusionary provisions of the U.S. Code. The statutes in question preclude the military from providing the plaintiffs marital benefits and family support that are offered to heterosexual couples. The plaintiffs, represented by the Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, allege that DOMA: (1) violates their Equal Protection rights, (2) violates the 10th Amendment and constitutional principles of federalism, (3) places an unconstitutional condition on the fundamental right to marry, and (4) is impermissible as a bill of attainder. On June 5, 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a motion to stay the case pending the outcome of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision on the petition for a writ of certiorari in the First Circuit Gill/Massachusetts case; Judge Stearns granted the stay the following day. The Supreme Court held Gill pending its decision in Windsor v. United States, which also raised the issue of DOMA's constitutionality. On June 27, 2013, in a 5-4 opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court struck down the relevant provision of DOMA. On October 2, 2013, the District Court in this case held (in light of Windsor, the decision by the Department of Defense to construe \"spouse\" to include same-sex spouses, and the President's directive to extend veterans' benefits to same-sex spouses) that the definition of \"spouse\" to exclude same-sex spouses is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment and that the plaintiffs are entitled to apply for benefits for which they were previously precluded from applying, \"without regard to being a couple of the same gender.\" On December 17, 2013, the District Court denied the plaintiffs attorneys' fees, finding that the United States' litigating position was \"substantially justified\" by its deference to Congress, and therefore that the United States is not liable for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). This decision was upheld by the First Circuit on September 23, 2014.", "summary": "Plaintiffs are former service members of the U.S. Armed Forces, married to spouses of their same sex. They filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts on October 27, 2011, challenging the constitutionality of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and other exclusionary provisions of the U.S. Code. The statutes in question preclude the military from providing the plaintiffs marital benefits and family support that are offered to heterosexual couples. In light of Windsor v. United States and executive decisions, the District Court held that the definition in the Code of \"spouse\" to exclude same-sex spouses is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment and that the plaintiffs are entitled to apply for benefits for which they were previously precluded from applying, \"without regard to being a couple of the same gender.\""} {"article": "On June 13, 2013, the Disability Rights Section of the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division (\u201cUnited States\u201d) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island against the State of Rhode Island (\u201cState\u201d) and City of Providence, Rhode Island (\u201cCity\u201d) (including the Providence Public School Department) under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (\"ADA\"), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12131-12134, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999). The United States asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The United States alleged that the defendants unnecessarily segregated 90 individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities (I/DD) (predominantly suffering from autism and Down Syndrome) in sheltered workshops and adult day programs by failing to provide adequate programs that would support positions in integrated settings that paid at least the minimum wage. Specifically, the United States alleged that these 90 individuals were sent to a workshop in an old elementary school and tasked with packaging TV remotes and medical supplies or sorting jewelry. These individuals were paid far below minimum wage, with an average per hour wage of $1.57. Though these individuals expressed a desire to work outside of the Training Thru Placement, Inc. (TTP) program, they were not given the opportunity to pursue outside employment. Some individuals in TTP had been working at TTP for up to 30 years. The United States further alleged that the defendants put 85 students between the ages of 14 and 21 in Providence Public School Department at risk of the same unnecessary segregation in the same programs by, among other things, placing them in sheltered workshops as part of the secondary school curriculum, failing to opportunities to explore integrated job placement settings in violation of Rhode Island law, and awarding the students certificates of attendance rather than granting them high school diplomas. These students also sorted jewelry for low to no wages. The United States alleged that this program (the Birch program) was a pipeline to the TTP program. The lawsuit developed from an investigation by the United States into the State\u2019s practices that began in January 2013. By June 7, the United States released a report that the State and City violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (\"ADA\"), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12131-12134. (The same investigation also led to another lawsuit, United States v. Rhode Island.) In this case, the parties entered into an eight-year interim settlement agreement and jointly moved to dismiss on the same day the case was filed, likely based on work that had already taken place during the United States\u2019 investigation. Under the agreement:
\"Individuals in the United States who currently have or will have an approved or pending petition to the United States government to sponsor a noncitizen family member for an immigrant visa; and whose sponsored family member is subject to the Proclamation and unable to demonstrate to a consular officer's satisfaction that he or she 'will be covered by approved health insurance' within 30 days after entry or will be able 'to pay for reasonably foreseeable medical costs;'\"(2) Visa Applicant Subclass
\"Individuals who are foreign nationals who (i) have applied for or will soon apply to the United States government for an immigrant visa; (ii) are otherwise eligible to be granted the visa; but (iii) are subject to the Proclamation and unable to demonstrate to the satisfaction of a consular officer that they 'will be covered by approved health insurance' within 30 days after entry or will be able 'to pay for reasonably foreseeable medical costs.'\"In his order, Judge Simon explained that the U.S. Petitioner Subclass plaintiffs had standing because they had shown a credible threat or realistic danger of injury from the Proclamation. On April 25, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent the enforcement of a new Presidential Proclamation that had been issued on April 22, 2020, titled \"Suspension of Entry of Immigrants who Present a Risk to the United States Labor Market During the Economic Recovery Following the 2019 Novel Coronavirus Outbreak\" (No. 10014). The plaintiffs requested that the court restrain enforcement of the Proclamation to the extent that it prevents certain underage members of the Visa Applicant Subclass from accessing emergency consular processing services to prevent their aging out of their place in the visa queue (which could prevent them from receiving visas). On April 29, Judge Simon issued an opinion and order denying the plaintiffs' motion. He found that the court's existing jurisdiction in this lawsuit focused only on the October 4th Proclamation, and that the new April 22nd Proclamation was completely unrelated. Thus, Judge Simon concluded that there was no basis for invoking the All Writs Act to suspend the new Proclamation. On May 4, 2020, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion and order denying the defendants' motion to stay the district court's preliminary injunction pending appeal. The Court found that the government had failed to meet its burden of showing irreparable harm. It also concluded that the government had not sustained its burden of showing that it had a strong likelihood of prevailing against the plaintiffs' claims on the merits. Finally, it held that the nationwide scope of the district court's injunction was appropriate given the nationwide class. 2020 WL 2110978. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On October 30, 2019, seven individuals and Latino Network filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, challenging President Trump's new proclamation, which restricts visas for immigrants without health insurance. The plaintiffs claimed the proclamation was ultra vires, and violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment. The court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction, which the defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit. In April 2020 the District Court certified two subclasses: (1) a subclass of U.S. citizens who are petitioners sponsoring a visa for family members; and (2) a subclass of foreign nationals who are visa applicants. On May 4, 2020, the Ninth Circuit denied the defendants' motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "On July 18, 2012, Wheaton College, a Christian liberal arts college, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (\"RFRA\"), and the Administrative Procedures Act (\"APA\"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel and the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (\"ACA\") violated its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. Specifically, the plaintiff objected to the ACA rules requiring it to provide coverage for emergency contraception, which the plaintiff considered an abortifacient. The plaintiff did not object to other forms of contraception. Claiming that providing coverage for emergency contraception would both contravene its Christian faith and compel speech contrary to its beliefs, the plaintiff sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for itself and other institutions with similar religious objections. On August 10, 2012, the defendant departments moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The defendants argued that the plaintiff could not claim any imminent harm because the plaintiff qualified for the enforcement \"safe harbor\" period extending until January 1, 2014, and because the defendants were in the process of amending the contraceptive coverage regulations to accommodate the objections of religious institutions like the plaintiff. In its brief opposing the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argued that it could claim imminent harm because the safe harbor period did not protect it from private ERISA lawsuits seeking to enforce the contraception mandate, and because the anticipated amendments likely would not change the emergency contraception coverage requirement. On August 24, 2012, the District Court (Judge Ellen S. Huvelle) granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge Huvelle found that, in light of the defendants' efforts to address the plaintiff's concerns via the safe harbor period and the anticipated amendments, the plaintiff had not alleged a concrete and imminent harm, and that as a result the plaintiff lacked standing and its claim was not yet ripe for review. Wheaton College v. Sebelius, 887 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D.D.C. 2012). The plaintiff appealed the dismissal and injunction denial to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals (Case No. 12-5273). The case was consolidated with Belmont Abbey College v. Sebelius (Case No. 12-5291) on appeal. On December 18, 2012, the Circuit Court (Judges Merrick B. Garland, Thomas B. Griffith, and A. Raymond Randolph) affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of ripeness, and ordered that the lawsuit be held in abeyance pending the issuance of the amended contraceptive coverage regulations. The defendants were directed to file status reports with the court every 60 days from the date of the abeyance order. Wheaton College v. Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2012). On August 13, 2013, the Court of Appeals remanded the case and ordered the lower court to vacate the August 24, 2012, judgment and dismiss both cases as moot. The plaintiffs refiled this case in the Northern District of Illinois on December 13, 2013. Wheaton College v. Sebelius.", "summary": "In 2012, a Christian liberal arts college filed a RFRA challenge to rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for emergency contraception through their group health insurance plan. In August 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiff had not demonstrated imminent harm. The plaintiff appealed that order to the D.C. Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal and injunction denial and ordered that the case be held in abeyance pending the issuance of amended regulations by the defendant departments. On August 13, 2013, the Court of Appeals remanded the case and ordered the lower court to dismiss both cases as moot. The plaintiffs refiled this case in the Northern District of Illinois on December 13, 2013."} {"article": "On November 22, 2010, HIV-positive prisoners incarcerated by the Massachusetts Department of Corrections (\"DOC\") filed a lawsuit against UMass Correctional Health and the Massachusetts DOC. They brought the case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794, et seq.; and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12131, et seq. The plaintiffs, represented by Massachusetts Prisoners' Legal Services, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the state's policies related to the distribution of HIV medications constituted cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and a denial of equal protection and the right to privacy, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. For many years prior to this lawsuit, prisoners in the Massachusetts DOC were able to keep their medications in their cells. This \"Keep on Person\" (\"KOP\") program enabled HIV-positive prisoners to take their medications consistently and privately. When UMass Correctional Health - an arm of the University of Massachusetts Medical School hired by the DOC to provide health services to prisoners - terminated the KOP program, HIV-positive prisoners were required to go to the \"med line\" at their prison's health services unit for each dose of medicine. No other medications were removed from the KOP program. Plaintiffs claimed that the removal of HIV medication from the KOP program has hindered plaintiffs' access to their needed medications and, as a result, has increased the risk for error, contagion, infection, breach of privacy, and the exacerbation of existing illnesses. On October 3, 2013, District Judge Rya Zobel granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims. 2013 WL 5505364 (D. Mass 2013). On plaintiffs' appeal, on September 12, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Judges Kayatta, Baldock (sitting by designation), and Selya, affirmed the grant of summary judgment in an opinion by Judge Kayatta. Nunes v. Mass. Dept. of Correction, 766 F.3d 136 (1st Cir. 2014).", "summary": "In November 2010, HIV-positive prisoners incarcerated by the Massachusetts DOC filed a lawsuit claiming that the DOC's policy prohibiting them from keeping medications in their cells constituted statutory and constitutional violations. In October 2013, the District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and in September 2014, the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment."} {"article": "On August 1, 2011, the religious leaders of the Methodist, Episcopal, and Roman Catholic churches of Alabama filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, against the governor and attorney general of Alabama, and the district attorney of Madison County, Alabama. The plaintiffs, represented by the churches' attorneys, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the recently enacted H.B. 56 violated their constitutional rights. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that enforcement of the law would prevent the churches and members of their congregations from freely practicing their religious duties to minister to \"all of God's children\" without regard to immigration status. Several provisions of H.B. 56 criminalize actions such as harboring or transporting an undocumented immigrant. Plaintiffs claimed that such actions were regularly undertaken by churches directly or by their congregants, and criminalizing the actions prevented the free exercise of their religious faith. The Court (Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn) ordered this case and two other related cases consolidated (United States v. Arizona and Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Bentley), but that order was dissolved a month later. On August 5, 2011, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, which the court denied on September 28, 2011. The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge one provision of the law, and the other challenges to separate provisions were moot because enforcement was already preliminarily enjoined in the related case, United States v. Alabama [IM-AL-0005]. The Court granted the parties' requests to stay proceedings given the appeals pending in the related cases, United States v. Alabama and Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Bentley [IM-AL-0006]. On October 30, 2013, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss the case as moot assuming the Court enters the proposed order in the related case, United States v. Alabama. In that case the parties asked the Court to enter a permanent injunction of Sections 13 and 27 of H.B. 56. If the injunction was granted, plaintiffs agreed that they would have received relief in this case. The day before, the parties in the related cases, United States v. Alabama and Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Bentley, filed joint reports and proposed orders for judgment. Unlike in this case, those parties did not move to dismiss but rather agreed to permanent injunctions of most of the challenged provisions. As noted above, if granted the proposed order in United States v. Alabama would permanently enjoin the sections of the law (13 and 27) that were at issue in this case. The court in the related cases issued orders on Nov. 25, 2013 approving settlements that permanently enjoined defendants from enforcing several provisions of H.B. 56, including 13 and 27. The same day, this court dismissed the case as moot without prejudice. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On August 1, 2011, the religious leaders of the Methodist, Episcopal, and Roman Catholic churches of Alabama filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 against the governor and attorney general of Alabama, and the district attorney of Madison County, Alabama in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Northeastern Division. The plaintiffs, represented by the churches' attorneys, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the recently enacted H.B. 56 violated their constitutional rights. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that enforcement of the law would prevent the churches and members of their congregations from freely practicing their religious duties to minister to \"all of God's children\" without regard to immigration status. The court denied part of a Motion for Preliminary Injunction for lack of standing. In October 2013, the parties filed a join motion to dismiss the case as moot."} {"article": "On August 27, 2019, the United States filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland (in Baltimore). The federal government sued Baltimore County for injunctive relief for employment dicrimination, alleging violations by the County Police Department of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-6(a), in its recruitment and hiring practices. Specifically, the federal government alleged that the Baltimore County Office of Human Resources and Baltimore County Police Department developed and issued a series of discriminatory written exams to screen entry-level police officer applicants. Three different variations of the exam were used from 2009\u20132013, 2014, and 2015\u20132016. All three variations resulted in statistically lower pass rates for African American applicants compared to the pass rates for white applicants. The exams allegedly used as a pass/fail screening device in a multi-stage application in which those who failed were not permitted to move on to subsequent stages of the application process. The Department of Justice alleged that the material tested on the exams was not job-related consistent with business necessity and did not otherwise meet the requirements of Section 703(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-2(k). DOJ further alleged that as a result of these exams, BCPD has hired fewer African American applicants as BCPD entry-level police officers and police cadets since January 1, 2013, than it would have had it used a nondiscriminatory screening device. The government sought injunctive relief requiring that the defendant: 1. Refrain from using written exams to screen applicants that result in a disparate impact on African Americans where such exams are not consistent with business necessity and do not otherwise meet the requirements of Section 703(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-2(k); 2. Provide remedial relief to and make whole all persons who have suffered individual loss as a result of the discrimination alleged; and 3. Adopt other appropriate nondiscriminatory measures to correct the present effects of its discriminatory policies and practices. The parties were referred to Magistrate Judge A. David Copperthite on August 27, 2019; it was reassigned in early September to District Judge Catherine C. Blake. Shortly after entering discovery, the parties began negotiating a settlement agreement. Following a year of telephone conferences (between the parties)and hearing resets, the parties agreed to a settlement. On May 19, 2021, Judge Blake entered an order granting the parties' joint motion to finalize the settlement agreement. The amended settlement includes the following: (1) Enjoining the County from using the challenged exams and requiring the County to develop a new schematic which would not lead to a disparate impact against African American applicants (unless the impact is job-related and consistent with business necessity) (2) Individual relief in the form of back pay for certain affected applicants who had been denied under the old policy, and priority hiring relief for up to twenty of those applicants in certain circumstances. (3) Procedures and timelines for implementing the above. The settlement agreement allowed the court to appoint an officer to monitor compliance with the settlement. Once the federal government and the county agree that everything in paragraphs 33-47 has been done, the case will remain open for approximately 90 days to give the federal government an opportunity to object to the rule change selected by the county. Based on the scope of the settlement, it seems likely that this will be at least a couple of years. The settlement has been entered as final by the court and all objections to the agreement were overruled in May 2021. So the case remains open for implementation.", "summary": "The United States sued Baltimore County seeking to enjoin the use of discriminatory exams used by the county police department in their hiring process. Following protracted negotiations, the parties came to a settlement agreement. The agreement stipulates that: (1) The County in enjoined from using the challenged exams and requires the County to create a new schematic which would not lead to a disparate impact against African American applicants (unless the impact is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity) (2) The County shall provide for individual relief in the form of back pay for certain affected applicants who had been denied under the old policy, and priority hiring relief for up to twenty of those applicants in certain circumstances. (3) Procedures and timelines for implementing the above."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This action was filed on April 28, 2020 by sixteen individuals with undocumented spouses alleging violations of the First and Fifth Amendment within the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act. Plaintiffs sought an injunction that would allow them to receive recovery payments and a declaration that the eligibility qualifications in the act were unconstitutional. On May 29, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss which was denied on August 5. No outcome yet.
I met with the DOJ concerning the declassification of various UNREDACTED documents. They agreed to release them but stated that so doing may have a perceived negative impact on the Russia probe. Also, key Allies\u2019 [sic] called to ask not to release. Therefore, the Inspector General . . . has been asked to review these documents on an expedited basis. I believe he will move quickly on this (and hopefully other things which he is looking at). In the end, I can always declassify if it proves necessary. Speed is very important to me \u2013 and everyone!The plaintiffs argued that this warranted discovery into 21 pages of the Page warrants, since the DOJ apparently promised to release unredacted versions of them in response to a Presidential \"order.\" Even if such a promise did not exist, the plaintiffs argued that discovery was warranted to know if it did exist or not. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the President's statement should still impact review of the redactions, and summary judgment in favor of the defense was not warranted. The DOJ replied to the plaintiffs on November 30, 2018, contesting the plaintiffs' characterization of the tweet and prior press releases as an \"order\" to disclose the Page FISA warrants, saying that it instead was a statement from the Press Secretary. The defendants denied the existence of any such order and argued that there was no issue of material fact that justified more discovery. The plaintiffs responded on December 20 that this statement from the Twitter account could not be a Press Secretary statement, the tweet was specific enough to allow discovery into this particular FISA warrant, and that the current record was not enough to show that there was no issue of material fact regarding the existence of an order or not. Judge Mehta released an opinion denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment on July 30, 2019. He stated that, under FOIA, the agency protecting the information has the responsibility to show that the information is protected by a national security exemption (exemption 1) and not disclosed by the government, and that enough ambiguity remains surrounding the President's supposed order to disclose the Page FISA warrants to allow more discovery into the matter. He added that there remains a dispute over whether exemptions 7d and 7e covered this content, since the President's order to declassify the documents might impact the sources and methods in the contested section. 2019 WL 3430728. The government filed another motion for summary judgment on August 30, 2019, including a statement from DOJ officials saying that they never received a declassification order for the information at issue. They argued that this settled the issue as to whether the press releases and tweets amounted to a declassification order. The plaintiffs submitted a response contesting this claim on September 13. The release of the FBI Inspector General's \"Crossfire Hurricane\" report into surveillance of the Trump campaign impacted this case; some of the confidential information requested in this case was released in that report. However, some information still remained classified, and litigation continued. For more information on the Crossfire Hurricane report, see NS-DC-0138 in this Clearinghouse. Judge Mehta granted the defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment on March 3, 2020. Upon reviewing the declaration from DOJ officials, he found that the lack of direction to declassify the documents at issue meant that the press release and tweets were not official orders, and summary judgment was warranted. 2020 WL 1033301. The plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider on March 13, 2020, arguing that, while the issue on the classification of the 21 pages was decided by the new statements from DOJ officials, outstanding questions remained as to the remaining classified pages in the Page FISA warrants, focusing on two other tweets from the President that cast doubt on the redactions in the warrants overall. The plaintiffs did admit that they failed to contest this issue in later motions, and in their response brief on March 26, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' lack of action on this issue meant they had abandoned it. Judge Mehta did allow reconsideration of the issue and released an opinion on May 4, 2020. However, he granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue, because the tweets the plaintiffs highlighted did not reveal any personal knowledge of a declassification order and were just \"bad faith assertions\" that were not enough to stand up to a motion for summary judgment. With all contested issues decided, the plaintiffs filed a notice of dismissal on July 31, 2020. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On April 4, 2017, the James Madison Project (a Washington, DC-based nonprofit dedicated to promoting public transparency in the intelligence community) and a USA Today national security reporter filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia asking for any information on surveillance of the Trump 2016 campaign under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). This case led to the disclosure of some of the Carter Page FISA warrants. It features extensive briefing on the use of President Trump's Twitter account and the White House press office as mechanisms to order declassification of records. The case closed in 2020."} {"article": "On June 16, 2015, an arrestee in Dothan, Alabama, filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Represented by attorneys from Equal Justice Under Law, the plaintiff sued the city of Dothan. The plaintiff filed the lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, alleging that Dothan had instituted a money-based detention scheme, where individuals who were arrested for minor traffic offenses and misdemeanors were released from custody almost immediately upon payment of a generically set bail amount. However, individuals who were too poor to pay this amount remained imprisoned for up to seven days while they awaited their docket to be called. Dothan did not allow for unsecured bonds, where an individual is released by promising to pay the amount if the person later does not appear. Furthermore, Dothan held the hearings for these imprisoned individuals in an empty courtroom that was closed to the public; the individuals appeared via video while still in jail. The plaintiff claimed that, as a result, Dothan had violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection of the plaintiff (and those similarly situated) by jailing him because he could afford to pay the generic bail amount. The plaintiff requested injunctive and declaratory relief, compensation for the damages suffered as a result of Dothan's conduct, and attorneys' fees. With the complaint, the plaintiff also filed a motion for class certification and a temporary restraining order (TRO) to grant the plaintiff's release and halt Dothan's policies. On June 18, 2015, Chief Judge William Keith Watkins granted in part the plaintiff's motion for a TRO, ordering the plaintiff's release, but denied all other respects of the motion. Judge Watkins also set a hearing to determine whether to convert the TRO to a preliminary injunction. However, on June 25, 2015, Dothan moved to deny the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction as moot because Dothan had begun allowing unsecured bonds for release from prison for minor traffic offenses and misdemeanors. Dothan noted that the plaintiff had conceded that this bail system cured any constitutional problems. Judge Watkins subsequently issued an order on June 26, 2015 requiring that Dothan and its employees, officers, and agents comply with the new bail system as outlined in Dothan's June 25 motion. Judge Watkins also dissolved the TRO as the parties pursued settlement on the remaining issues. On April 13, 2016, the court granted the parties' joint motion for entry of a consent decree. The parties agreed that the procedures set forth in Dothan's June 25 motion satisfied the plaintiff's concerns. Per the consent decree, (1) Dothan was to comply with the new procedures for a minimum of three years, (2) Dothan was to notify the court of any intent to materially alter the procedures, (3) the plaintiff could request a preliminary injunction if it found Dothan was noncompliant, and (4) all damages claims were dismissed with prejudice. The consent decree expired in 2019 without any further docket activity, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "On June 16, 2015, a recent arrestee in Dothan, Alabama, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Represented by attorneys from Equal Justice Under Law, the plaintiff sue the city of Dothan. The plaintiff claimed Dothan violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection as a result of Dothan's policy of requiring secured generically set bonds which the plaintiff was unable to pay. The case settled after Dothan began to accept unsecured bonds."} {"article": "This is the litigation that came out of the death of Sandra Bland in jail in Waller County after a routine traffic stop led to her arrest. Although the Clearinghouse does not focus on damage actions like this one, because of the widespread interest in this case, we've posted the key documents in the case for use by the public. On August 4, 2015, the mother of Sandra Bland filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiff sued the Texas Department of Public Safety (TDPS), Waller County, and several employees of the Waller County Sheriff\u2019s Office (WCSO) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code \u00a7\u00a7 71.002-004 and \u00a7 71.021. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff alleged that her daughter, Sandra Bland, was assaulted by a TDPS Highway Patrol Trooper and that officers of the WCSO and TDPS willfully and wantonly caused her daughter\u2019s death. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that on July 10, 2015, after a routine traffic stop a TDPS Highway Patrol Trooper instructed her daughter to get out of the car and he then assaulted and wrongfully arrested her. Afterward, Bland was brought to Waller County Jail where, after informing the officers that she had attempted suicide before, she was left in her cell unattended for three days, at which point she committed suicide. Video of the traffic stop is available via Youtube here, here, and here. After filing the initial complaint, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 26, 2015, again on September 29, 2015, and the final amended complaint on January 19, 2016. The defendants filed a motion to stay proceedings on January 8, 2016, in order to protect a defendant officer's Fifth Amendment constitutional rights during concurrent criminal proceedings. On April 21, 2016, Judge Hittner granted the defendant\u2019s motion in part and denied in part. Specifically, defendants were ordered to complete all discovery prior to their deposition during their criminal proceedings. 2016 WL 6915963. Several of the discovery requests are posted here and here. On October 31, 2016, the parties filed a Joint Order of Dismissal after reaching an out of court settlement which, according to the Houston Chronicle, granted the plaintiff $1.9 million and stipulated that county officials would improve how inmates are booked and supervised at the jail and other facilities lacking immediate access to medical services. The case was dismissed on November 1, 2016. The Department of Public Safety's investigative report was completed in 2017; the Clearinghouse obtained it via a records request to DPS, and it is posted here.", "summary": "On August 4, 2015, plaintiff filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiff sued the Texas Department of Public Safety (TDPS), Waller County, and several employees of the Waller County Sheriff\u2019s Office (WCSO) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code sections 71.002-004 and 71.021. On October 31, 2016, the parties filed a Joint Order of Dismissal after reaching an out of court settlement wherein the plaintiff received $1.9 million and the case was dismissed on November 1, 2016."} {"article": "In April 2006 the Milwaukee office of the EEOC brought this suit in U.S. District Court, Southern District of Iowa, alleging that the defendant, Von Maur, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by failing to hire black applicants because of their race. In July 2006, the case was consolidated for the purpose of discovery with a separate private action brought against Von Maur in the Southern District of Iowa, Ward v. Von Maur. On September 22, 2008 the two cases were consolidated for trial, however, the parties settled on October 29, 2008. For information about the settlement, see Ward in this Clearinghouse.", "summary": "In April 2006 the Milwaukee office of the EEOC brought this suit alleging that the defendant, Von Maur, Inc., violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by failing to hire black applicants because of their race. Later, the case was consolidated with a separate private action brought against Von Maur, and the parties settled on October 29, 2008 in which Von Maur agreed to pay a sum of $50,000, post a 2-year notice stating that they will not discriminate on the basis of race, to hold training sessions to prevent racial discrimination. The court also required the defendant to keep records of and report all applicants, racial information of hired applicants and of any complaints regarding racial discrimination."} {"article": "On September 30, 2016, three individuals with severe mental illness deemed incompetent to stand trial in criminal proceedings against them filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The plaintiffs sued the Alabama Department of Mental Health under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The plaintiffs, represented by the Alabama Disability Advocacy Program, the ACLU of Alabama Foundation, and private counsel, sought declaratory and both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The plaintiffs claimed that individuals with severe mental illness who had been deemed incompetent to stand trial in Alabama had to wait an average of eight months between the date of the court order committing them to the Alabama Department of Mental Health for treatment and the actual start of their treatment. During that time, these individuals were forced to stay in county jails that lacked the resources they needed. The case was assigned to Judge Myron H. Thompson and referred to Magistrate Judge Charles S. Coody. The Alabama Department of Mental Health moved to dismiss the case on November 4, 2016, and the court denied the motion on November 30, 2016. On December 23, the plaintiffs amended the lawsuit to proceed as a class action, and they sought a preliminary injunction. Settlement negotiations delayed the scheduled preliminary injunction hearing. The parties settled. They filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of the settlement on April 4, 2017, and the Court agreed on May 9, 2016. In doing so, the Court granted class certification. The class was defined as all persons who have been, or will be during the period that this Agreement remains in effect, charged with a crime, within the meaning of Rule 1.4(b) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, in a court of competent jurisdiction in the State of Alabama, and detained in an Alabama city or county jail or Alabama Department of Corrections facility while awaiting a court-ordered Mental Evaluation or court-ordered Competency Restoration Treatment. Before the settlement could be finalized, the parties had to provide notice of the settlement agreement to the settlement class and criminal defense counsel of settlement class members, state officials, and the Alabama Circuit Courts. The parties did so, and the Court held conferences for class members to voice their objections to the settlement. Because none of the class members who had voiced objections wanted to testify, the court decided not to hear testimony from class members. On January 25, 2018, the Court ordered a final settlement approval and approved the negotiated consent decree. (The motion for a preliminary injunction from December 2016 was denied because the settlement made it moot.) Under the terms of the settlement, the Alabama Department of Mental Health agreed to provide for mental health treatment for incarcerated individuals to be completed within forty-five days by the end of twelve months and within thirty days by the end of twenty-four months. The Department also agreed to install more beds to accommodate more patients and provide training for relevant personnel. The Alabama Disability Advocacy Program agreed to monitor compliance. The Decree was set to last at least 3 years. If the state failed to achieve substantial compliance nine months prior to the end of that term, the plaintiffs could move to extend the term by four months. In the meantime, the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the decree, on the plaintiffs' motion. Under the Consent Decree, the state was to pay the plaintiffs $270,000 in legal fees incurred through March 13, 2017. The Department agreed to pay for the monitoring at a rate of $195 per hour, as well as for attorneys' fees sustained after March 13, 2017 at a rate of $275 per hour. 2018 WL 564856. On February 2, 2018, the plaintiffs sought their legal fees, estimating that the state owed $342,986 in attorneys' fees and $9,677 for other litigation costs. The fee dispute settled on March 19, 2018, for $66,794 in attorneys' fees and $8,688.84 in other litigation costs. Monitoring of the consent decree is ongoing until at least 2021. The first status report of 2019 resulted in the parties entering into a joint remedial plan for noncompliance on November 4, 2019. The court held a status conference on the parties' progress and barriers to compliance on February 5, 2020, and the parties modified the consent decree later that month. The modifications required the defendant to update their policy of deciding how to prioritize the allocation of outpatient evaluations among the counties that the Health Department serves. As of April 12, 2020, this case is ongoing as the court monitors compliance with the consent decree.", "summary": "Three individuals with mental illnesses brought this lawsuit against the Alabama Department of Mental Health in September 2016 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The plaintiffs alleged they had been deemed incompetent to stand trial in the criminal proceedings against them and had been court-ordered to receive mental health treatment from the Alabama Department of Mental Health, but the average wait time for treatment was eight months, during which they had to stay in jail. The plaintiffs argued that the Alabama Department of Mental Health's failure to provide timely treatment violated their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. In 2018, the parties reached a settlement that outlined a plan for more efficient mental health treatment procedures for the plaintiff class over the next three years and required the state to pay the plaintiffs' legal fees."} {"article": "On October 12, 2010, the United States filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a73601-3631, against the owner and manager of a 26-unit apartment building located in Akron Ohio. The U.S. sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, and civil penalties, alleging that the Defendants had engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination on the basis of familial status in their rental of apartments. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the Defendants refused to rent to families with small children. The case was litigated for several months, but then settled. On June 8, 2011, the Court (Judge David Dowd) approved a three-year Consent Decree which, in addition to general prohibitions against discrimination based on familial status, requires Defendants to adopt a non-discrimination policy, to include the words \"Equal Housing Opportunity\" on all advertising, to train all personnel in equal housing opportunity requirements, and to report any complaints. Defendants agreed to pay $50,000 in damages to one family, and a $10,000 civil penalty to the United States. On June 5, 2014, just before the consent decree was set to expire, the parties jointly moved to extend it to June 8, 2015. Judge Dowd approved this motion the following day. There was no further litigation, and the consent decree has since terminated. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This fair housing case brought by the U.S. Department of Justice against the owner of a 26-unit apartment building in Akron was litigated for several months, but then settled on June 8, 2011. It was resolved by a three-year Consent Decree which, in addition to general prohibitions against discrimination based on familial status, requires Defendants to adopt a non-discrimination policy, to include the words \"Equal Housing Opportunity\" on all advertising, to train all personnel in equal housing opportunity requirements, and to report any complaints. Defendants agreed to pay $50,000 in damages to one family, and a $10,000 civil penalty to the United States."} {"article": "On May 6, 2008, individual plaintiffs filed a collective action in the Western District of Pennsylvania for unlawful retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) including the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), against PPG Industries, a Pennsylvania corporation. The plaintiffs, who were former employees of PPG, requested that the court certify the class, declare the individual plaintiffs to serve as representative plaintiffs, and grant a declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs had previously filed a class action in 2007, EE-PA-0242, against PPG for violations of the ADEA for PPG's practice of having terminated older workers sign release agreements in which the terminated workers waived claims under the ADEA. Plaintiffs argued, however, that the agreements were not compliant with the OWBPA and were therefore unenforceable. Defendant counterclaimed that plaintiffs were in breach of the agreements, which contained covenants not to sue. Plaintiffs claim they were essentially forced to sign these agreements in order to obtain severance benefits upon their termination. Based on the parties' interactions in the previous case, plaintiffs brought this suit claiming that defendant knew or should have known that its counterclaim in the first suit was not viable and that its intent in bringing the claim was to retaliate against the plaintiffs for enforcing their rights under the ADEA. Plaintiffs also claim that defendant has threatened future retaliation for plaintiffs' attempts to enforce their rights under the ADEA. On June 17, 2008, defendant filed an unopposed motion to consolidate this case with the original case filed by plaintiffs in May 2007, EE-PA-0242. On June 18, 2008, the District Court (Judge Arthur Schwab) granted defendant's order to consolidate the cases. Accordingly, further proceedings in this case can be found at EE-PA-0242.", "summary": "On May 6, 2008, individual plaintiffs filed a collective action in the Western District of Pennsylvania for unlawful retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act against PPG, plaintiffs' former employer. The claim was based on PPG's counterclaim in a prior suit, EE-PA-0242, brought by the same plaintiffs, which plaintiffs allege constituted retaliation under the ADEA. On June 17, 2008 on an unopposed motion, this case was consolidated with the original, EE-PA-0242."} {"article": "On November 27, 2012, a group of individual servicewomen and the Service Women's Action Network (a nonprofit organization that supports servicewomen and veterans) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the Secretary of the Department of Defense (\"DoD\"). The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from private practice and from the ACLU Women's Rights Project and its Northern California Chapter, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging as unconstitutional DoD's official policy barring women from serving in units whose primary mission is to engage in direct ground combat. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that this 1994 policy could not be justified by any important governmental objective and therefore violated their right to equal protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. On January 24, 2013, DoD rescinded the 1994 directive and stated that \"[i]ntegration of women into newly opened positions and units will occur as expeditiously as possible, considering good order and judicious use of fiscal resources, but must be completed no later than January 1, 2016.\" The Military Services, consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, were ordered to submit plans for implementing the new policy to the Secretary by May 15, 2013. The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint on October 31, 2013, arguing that DoD had continued to exclude women from applying for or serving in hundreds of thousands of combat positions despite rescinding the 1994 policy directive. DoD responded that this challenge was not ripe because the department was still in the process of implementing the new policy. At the parties' request, on May 5, 2014, the District Court (Judge Edward M. Chen) entered a limited stay of the case until January 1, 2016, the deadline for implementing the new policy; this was later extended. In a case management statement dated January 5, 2017, the plaintiffs took the position that the case should remain stayed until it becomes more certain if, and how, implementation of the directive will proceed under the Trump administration. The defendant countered that the plaintiffs do not have standing to maintain the action, and that the claims alleged are moot. The court continued the stay throughout 2017 and hosted periodic case management conferences. At the end of that year, on December 18, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. This complaint added further detail to the first amended complaint and restated the same request for relief: a declaration that the defendants had violated the plaintiffs' right to due process and equal protection of the laws, and injunctive relief ending gender-based exclusionary policies and practices and allowing women to apply for all combat-related positions. The defendants moved to dismiss for improper venue, non-justiciability, and lack of standing. Just under five months later, on May 1, 2018, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. 320 F. Supp. 3d 1082. The court allowed the plaintiff another opportunity to file a third amended complaint. On June 28, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint that challenged the DoD's Leaders First policy, which assigned junior servicewomen exclusively to units with female leaders, and the Marines' segregation of basic training by sex. The defendants again moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. On November 29, 2018, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. Specifically, the court found that the Network had organizational standing to challenge both DoD policies, associational standing to challenge the Marines' training policy, and that the plaintiffs had adequately stated a claim. However, the court found that the Network had not pled facts to establish that it had associational standing to challenge the Leaders First policy. 352 F. Supp. 3d 977. Following the previous order, the parties began engaging in discovery. On February 26, 2020, Judge Chen referred the case to Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler for settlement discussions. A settlement conference is scheduled for May 21, 2020. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On November 27, 2012, a group of individual servicewomen and the Service Women's Action Network, a nonprofit organization that supports servicewomen and veterans, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the Secretary of the Department of Defense (\"DoD\"). The plaintiffs challenged as unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment DoD's official policy barring women from serving in units whose primary mission is to engage in direct ground combat. DoD rescinded this policy on January 24, 2013, and the parties asked the District Court to stay the proceedings until January 1, 2016, the deadline for DoD to implement a new policy. In 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging that DoD continued to exclude women from some roles, which survived a motion to dismiss. Settlement negotiations are ongoing as of May 2020."} {"article": "This class action suit was brought on March 11, 1994 in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York by parents of preschool children with disabilities against Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York. The plaintiffs sued under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging that these children were denied their rights to appropriate educational services under state and federal law. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that preschoolers with disabilities were wrongfully denied timely referrals and evaluations to special education and were automatically being placed in the most restrictive classroom settings, which violated state and federal law. The plaintiffs also alleged that disabled preschool students with limited English proficiency were denied timely special education evaluations in the appropriate language and were being placed in inappropriately restrictive classroom settings. Throughout the pre-trial discovery process, the parties met several times for settlement negotiations. Eventually, on September 10, 1998, the parties notified the court they would submit a proposed order of settlement to include an order preliminary approving the settlement together with the notice to be provided to the class. The parties' proposed order of settlement was approved on January 28, 1999. The settlement document is not in this Clearinghouse, however, the order of settlement includes references to the defendant implementing integrated placement options; training; collecting data; and monitoring compliance. On September 25, 2003, the Court ordered that the total attorneys' fees and costs payable to plaintiffs' counsel was $60,000, including all outstanding attorneys' fees, costs, and disbursements incurred by the plaintiffs' counsel. This case is now closed.", "summary": "A class action suit was brought by the New York City parents of preschool children with disabilities against Board of Education, alleging that these children were denied their rights to appropriate educational services under state and federal law. The parties eventually settled, and the defendant agreed to implement integrated placement options and training, collect data, and monitor compliance. The plaintiff was awarded $60,000, including attorney's fees and costs."} {"article": "On December 19, 2013, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 against Lee's Food Corp.\u2014the owner entity of Food Rite Community Supermarket. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant discriminated against a prospective female employee when it failed to hire her as a part-time courtesy van driver because she is a female. In October of 2012, the prospective hire responded to an advertisement for a job as a part-time courtesy van driver. Although she met the minimum qualifications for the position, the defendant allegedly told her that he would not hire a female for the position out of concern that she would be at greater risk of being a victim of a crime while on the job. Instead, the defendant hired a male to fill the position. The case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge David J. Novak and referred to Magistrate Judge M. Hannah Lauck on May 8, 2014 with the intent of a quicker resolution. The parties entered into a consent decree on August 12, 2014. The consent decree provided that the defendant shall not discriminate against any person on the basis of sex or any other protected category within the meaning of Title VII, nor discriminate or retaliate against any person because of his or her opposition to any practice made unlawful under Title VII or because of the filing of a charge of discrimination, the giving of testimony or assistance, or the participation in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under the statute. The consent decree also required the defendant to adopt, implement, and distribute a formal, written anti-discrimination policy and post it so it was visible to employees. The defendant also agreed to provide an annual training program to explain the requirements of Title VII and its prohibition against sex discrimination in the work place, as well as the defendant\u2019s policy. The defendant agreed to provide the EEOC with reports every six months and allow the commission to review compliance with the decree. Lee\u2019s Food Corp was also ordered to pay the woman $10,500. The consent decree lasted for three years and the case is now closed.", "summary": "In December of 2013, a female applicant filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia alleging that the defendant company violated her civil rights when it refused to hire her because she was female. Parties entered into a consent decree on August 12, 2014. Defendant paid $10,500 to the plaintiff, adopted a formal anti-discrimination policy, implemented a training program, and agreed to send reports to the EEOC every six months of the decree's duration. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On June 9, 2000, three parents, as guardians ad litem of their minor daughters, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota against the South Dakota High School Activities Association. The students represented in the suit were all members of volleyball teams at high schools within the Association. The plaintiffs alleged that the Association violated Title IX of the Education Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by requiring girls volleyball to be played during the winter season. At the time the suit was filed, girls high school volleyball was played during the fall season in 46 of 50 states. All South Dakota boys high school athletic teams played their schedules during the traditional seasons for their sports. The complaint alleged that the South Dakota girls high school volleyball players were denied opportunities provided to South Dakota's male high school athletes. By requiring the sport to be played in the winter, the South Dakota girls were prevented from effectively competing for college athletic scholarships. The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction requiring the Association to schedule girls high school volleyball during the traditional fall season. On November 6, 2000, Judge Lawrence L. Piersol granted a motion for intervention by the United States. The United States filed an amended complaint on November 7, 2000. On December 5, 2000, the parties filed a stipulation agreeing that the Association would schedule girls volleyball during the traditional fall season for every school year, beginning with the 2002-2003 school year. The Association would also schedule girls high school basketball during the traditional winter season and would reimburse the plaintiffs for their attorneys' fees. Finally, within 180 days of the Consent Order, the Association would submit to the court and all parties a detailed plan establishing how the Association would implement the transition and new scheduling of the girls high school volleyball and basketball season. After, the Association would submit to the court and the parties a report annually for two consecutive years describing how the Association had completely and successfully implemented the approved plan. Judge Piersol entered a consent order approving the stipulation that same day. The Association submitted the plan to implement the season transition on May 11, 2001. After oral arguments, Judge Piersol approved the plan on August 30, 2001. The Association filed the required annual reports on August 28, 2003 and August 27, 2004. Judge Piersol directed dissolution of the consent order and dismissed the case on June 29, 2005.", "summary": "Parents, as guardians ad litem of their minor daughters, and the United States as a plaintiff-intervenor, filed suit against the South Dakota High School Activities Association, alleging that the Association had violated the students' rights under Title IX of the Education Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by requiring girls volleyball to be played in the winter, rather than the traditional fall season, while all male sports were held in their traditional seasons. In a settlement agreement, the Association agreed to implement a plan to permanently switch girls volleyball to the fall season and girls basketball to the winter season, thereby affording female athletes the same opportunities as provided to male athletes."} {"article": "On August 31, 2011, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Kansas under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Shawnee County and the Shawnee County Department of Corrections. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, claiming that the Defendants censored PLN's monthly publication and correspondence mailed to prisoners who were held in custody by the Shawnee County Jail in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs specifically alleged that the defendants adopted and implemented policies that unconstitutionally restrict correspondence to prisoners, which policies on their face prohibited prisoners from receiving any sort of book, magazine, or other publication, such as those published by the plaintiff. On February 23, 2012, the parties filed a joint stipulation for entry of stipulated judgment and settlement agreement. The agreement required the defendants to modify the Jail's mail policy, including allowing the PLN's mailings to be delivered. The defendants agreed to pay $75,000 in damages, attorney fees, and costs. On March 5, 2012, Judge Kathryn H. Vratil approved the stipulated judgment and settlement agreement.", "summary": "On August 31, 2011, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Kansas under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Shawnee County and the Shawnee County Department of Corrections, alleging that the Defendants censored PLN's monthly publication and correspondence mailed to prisoners. On February 23, 2012, the parties agreed to a settlement agreement requiring the defendants to modify the Jail's mail policy, including allowing the PLN's mailings to be delivered, and to pay $75,000 in damages, attorney fees, and costs."} {"article": "On October 19, 2012, two evangelical Christian business owners filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The plaintiffs brought suit under the First and Fifth Amendments, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (\"RFRA\"), and the Administrative Procedures Act (\"APA\"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. Represented by private counsel and the American Center for Law and Justice, the plaintiffs asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief. The suit alleged that federal rules adopted as part of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (\"ACA\") violated their religious freedom by requiring them to provide coverage for contraception through their company's group health insurance plans. Specifically, the plaintiffs objected to the ACA rules requiring them to provide coverage for emergency contraception, which the plaintiffs considered an abortifacient. Claiming that providing coverage for emergency contraception would both contravene their Christian faith and compel speech contrary to their beliefs, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other business owners with similar religious objections. On December 20, 2012, the District Court (Judge Richard E. Dorr) granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a threat of imminent irreparable harm and that the question of whether the mandate was justified by a compelling government interest merited \"deliberate investigation.\" American Pulverizer Co. v. DHHS, Slip Op. 2012 WL 6951316 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012). Judge Dorr further found that the facts of the case were nearly identical to those in O'Brien v. HHS, in which the Eighth Circuit had recently stayed the same defendant departments from enforcing the contraception mandate against the plaintiffs, evangelical Christian small-business owners. The defendants appealed the injunction to the Eighth Circuit (Case No. 13-1395). On February 20, 2013, District Court Judge Goldberg granted the defendants' joint motion to stay the district court proceedings pending the Eighth Circuit appeal. On February 26, 2013, in a clerk order not attributed to any individual judge, the Eighth Circuit granted the defendants' motion to hold the case in abeyance pending its own decision in the O'Brien appeal (Case No. 12-3357). On April 21, 2014, this case was reassigned to District Judge M. Douglas Harpool. On September 4, 2014, the Eighth Circuit granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal following the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, on June 30, 2014. On October 30, 2014, the District Court granted a permanent injunction for the plaintiffs. The injunction protected the plaintiffs against government enforcement of the version of the contraception mandate that existed prior to the Hobby Lobby decision. Prior to Hobby Lobby, closely-held for-profit religious employers did not have an opportunity to notify the government of their objection to the contraception mandate, and compel the government to work with their insurer to provide contraception coverage directly to their employees. The decision did not preclude the plaintiffs from bringing suit under later versions of the mandate. The parties agreed that petitions for attorney's fees or costs would be submitted to the court by January 28, 2015, but no petitions were submitted during that period.", "summary": "In 2012, evangelical Christian business owners filed a RFRA challenge to rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on their religious freedom by requiring them to provide coverage for emergency contraception through their companies' group health insurance plans. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, the plaintiffs were granted a permanent injunction against government enforcement of the version of the contraceptive mandate that was in force at that time."} {"article": "On November 20, 2012, the United States of America filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiff sued the Town of East Haven and the East Haven Board of Police Commissioners under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141. The Department of Justice asked the court for (1) a declaration that defendants' law enforcement practices violated the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141, and (2) an injunctive order that defendants cease engaging in such practices, implement procedures to remedy the unlawful policing, and adopt measures to identify, correct, and prevent future unlawful policing. The complaint alleged the East Haven Police Department (\"EHPD\") enforced traffic and immigration laws against Latinos in a discriminatory fashion and demonstrated anti-Latino bias through officials' derogatory statements made to that effect. Such practices, according to the complaint, violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, namely the rights to due process and equal protection. The USA further claimed the EHPD, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, violated Latinos' constitutional rights by subjecting them to unreasonable searches and seizures and exposed them to unjustified excessive use of force. The same day the complaint was filed, the parties--having entered into an Agreement for Effective and Constitutional Policing--filed a Joint Motion for Conditional Dismissal. U.S. District Court Judge Alvin W. Thompson approved the agreement and conditionally dismissed the case on December 21, 2012. The agreement entailed, among other features, implementing remedial training relating to the use of force, stops and searches and seizures, bias-free policing, supervisory review, and the complaint-review process. The agreement would terminate after the city had been in compliance with the provisions for two consecutive years. The parties anticipated that this would take four years to achieve. As stipulated by the agreement, the parties selected a compliance expert to report on the implementation of the terms of the agreement. In a joint status report filed June 28, 2013, the parties noted implementation was proceeding \"very well.\" Between 2012 and 2014, the parties file joint motions to amend or correct the agreement a number of times; each was granted by the court. The Town continued to be monitored by a Compliance Expert. On November 30, 2017, both parties moved for the termination of the Settlement Agreement, which was granted on December 13, 2017. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On November 20, 2012, the United States of America filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141 against the Town of East Haven and the East Haven Board of Police Commissioners, alleging the East Haven Police Department enforced traffic and immigration laws against Latinos in a discriminatory fashion. The parties entered into an Agreement for Effective and Constitutional Policing and the Court conditionally dismissed the case on December 21, 2012. Since then, the parties have been jointly modifying the agreement, and filing compliance reports, the last of which was filed and approved on July 13, 2017. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On January 17, 2006, Plaintiff, represented by private counsel, filed a 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California challenging Alameda County's policies and practices concerning strip searches in Alameda County jails. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to a group strip search prior to arraignment and in the absence of any reasonable suspicion of contraband or weapons. Plaintiff alleged that such a practice violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution as well as California state law. To remedy the alleged violations, Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and class certification. The District Court (Judge Maxine M. Chesney) held an initial scheduling conference and submitted the case to the Court's alternative dispute resolution program. Mediation was held on November 28, 2006, but did not produce a settlement. Through subsequent negotiations, the parties eventually settled. Following a November 16, 2007 fairness hearing, the District Court approved the class action settlement. Under the settlement, two separate classes of claimants were created: (1) those booked into the Santa Rita Jail from 1/17/04 to 12/31/06 who were strip searched in groups; and (2) those booked into Santa Rita Jail or Glenn Dyer Jail from 1/17/04 to 12/31/06 on charges not involving violence, drugs, or weapons who were strip searched, except for those who were required to submit to such searches as a condition of parole or probation. Defendants agreed to pay a maximum of $6.15 million to settle all claims of both classes. Of that sum, $1.175 million went to class counsel Mark Merin for attorneys' fees. Up to $275,000 was allocated for the costs of claims administration. Finally, a total of $4.7 million would be used to pay individual claims, based on an agreed distribution formula.", "summary": "On January 17, 2006, Plaintiff, represented by private counsel, filed a 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California challenging the Alameda County's policies and practices concerning the use of strip searches in jails. The named plaintiff, a citizen arrested for an outstanding traffic warrant, alleged that he was subjected to a strip search with a group of several others. He further alleged that his treatment was the result of the official Alameda County Jail policy, under which officers routinely subjected custodial detainees to strip and visual body cavity searches prior to arraignment and in the absence of any reasonable suspicion of contraband or weapons. Plaintiff alleged that such a policy violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution as well as California state law. The case was eventually settled in November 2007; Defendants agreed to pay a maximum of $6.15 million to settle all claims of both classes."} {"article": "On October 3, 2005, the Council for Disability Rights, in Chicago, brought this class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. \u00a712101. Plaintiffs also included individuals with visual or mobility impairments who live, work and for travel in Chicago, Illinois. Represented by private counsel, they sought injunctive relief to require the city to properly install and maintain sidewalks, curb cuts and ramps necessary for the mobility of persons with disabilities. Plaintiffs alleged the Chicago violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a712101 et seq. (the \"ADA\"), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability \"under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.\" 29 U.S.C. 794(a). Plaintiffs challenge the Chicago's pattern and practice of: (1) failing to properly install or maintain curb cuts and ramps when resurfacing streets and altering or installing city sidewalks; (2) failing to install all necessary curb cuts and ramps at a particular intersection when resurfacing streets and altering or installing city sidewalks; and (3) failing to properly install, repair or maintain city sidewalks. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. In September 2007, the parties settled. The settlement agreement provided: (1) The city of Chicago will install only curb ramps and sidewalks that meet or exceed the specifications of the Federal ADA guidelines; (2) For the next 5 years the city will spend $50,000,000 ($10,000,000 per year) in new money to repair and replace curb ramps and sidewalks in high traffic areas which are not on the city's schedule for repair or replacement. The city will also continue to spend approximately eighteen million dollars ($18,000,000) each year installing curb ramps and sidewalks as a part of the City's annual resurfacing work; (3) The city shall install curb ramps into intersections of each cross street at its intersection with the alteration or resurfacing, so that the altered or resurfaced intersections are fully accessible to mobility-impaired persons with disabilities. The Court entered the settlement as a final order, retaining jurisdiction to enforce its terms. At the time it was entered, this was the largest ADA settlement ever. The settlement finished in 2011, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "This is the largest Title II ADA settlement ever. It started with a lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on October 3, 2005, by plaintiffs with visual or mobility impairments who live, work and for travel in Chicago. They sought injunctive relief to require the City of Chicago to properly install and maintain sidewalks, curb cuts and ramps necessary for mobility of persons with disabilities. In September 2007, the parties settled. The settlement agreement provided: (1) The City of Chicago will install only curb ramps and sidewalks that meet or exceed the specifications of the Federal ADA guidelines; (2) For the next 5 years $10 million per year in new money to repair and replace curb ramps and sidewalks in high traffic areas not on the city's schedule for repair or replacement. The city will also continue to spend approximately $18 million each year installing curb ramps and sidewalks as a part of the City's annual resurfacing work; (3) The city shall install curb ramps into intersections of each cross street at its intersection with the alteration or resurfacing, so that the altered or resurfaced intersections are fully accessible to mobility-impaired persons with disabilities. The Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement terms."} {"article": "On July 25, 1989, prisoners at the old Lassen County Jail (\"Old Jail\") filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the County of Lassen and the Sheriff of the County of Lassen. The plaintiffs, represented by the Prisoner Rights Union and private counsel, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging that conditions in the Old Jail violated the First, Fourth and Eighth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Among other things, they alleged overcrowding, inadequate clothing, inadequate medical, dental and mental health care, inadequate privacy for conversations with attorneys, and unequal access to programs for women prisoners. Plaintiffs sought a broad set of injunctive remedies. When the suit was filed, Lassen County was developing and implementing plans for construction of a new, much larger jail (\"New Jail\"). On October 17, 1989, the District Court approved a stipulated order preliminarily enjoining certain Old Jail conditions. Pursuant to the stipulated order, the County agreed to: (1) limit inmate population at the Old Jail to forty-one inmates; (2) limit the temporary holding cell's population to the rated capacity; (3) limit time spent in the temporary holding cell to eight hours; (4) comply with California law in its use of the detoxification facility; (5) provide all prisoners with a permanent bed appropriate to his/her classification; and (6) provide all prisoners with daily access to the \"program room\" and outdoor recreation. Beginning on July 16, 1990, the case was tried before Magistrate Judge John F. Moulds. The trial concluded in September 1990. On July 1, 1991, the New Jail opened and the County ceased using the Old Jail. On August 1, 1991, Magistrate Judge Moulds entered his 129-page findings and recommendations. On September 17, 1991, District Judge Lawrence K. Karlton entered an order adopting the findings and recommendations, with one minor modification. The order granted the following relief: (1) For a period of one year, the County was prohibited from exceeding the established inmate capacities at the Old Jail or the New Jail; (2) The County was required to \"modify\" and follow written policies regarding access to the jail law library; (3) The County was required to clarify the procedures for staff handling of prisoners demonstrating a mental disorder; (4) The County was required to develop a procedure for ensuring a timely response to an inmate's request for mental health care. All further requests for relief were denied. On October 9, 1991, Judge Karlton entered a judgment. On November 7, 1991, the defendants filed their notice of appeal from the judgment. The attorney's fees litigation then commenced, with both sides seeking attorney's fees. On March 30, 1993, Magistrate Judge Moulds filed findings and recommendations on the attorney's fees issue. On April 20, 1993, Judge Karlton filed an order adopting the finding and recommendations in full. This order granted the plaintiffs some of the attorney's fees they had sought, for a total of $219,027.61, and denied the defendants' request for fees. On April 27, 1993, Judge Karlton entered his Judgment pursuant to the attorney's fees order. On April 28, 1993, the appellants filed their notice of appeal from the attorney's fees order, and the award was stayed pending appeal. On October 6, 1994, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit (Circuit Judges Arthur L. Alarcon and Ferdinand F. Fernandez and District Judge Stephen V. Wilson, sitting by designation) reversed the District Court's decision to grant permanent injunctive relief but affirmed its decision that attorney's fees were appropriate. Doty v. Cnty. of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540 (9th Cir. 1994). The panel, in an opinion by Judge Wilson, found that the injunction as a whole was erroneous because there was no evidence of constitutional violation at the New Jail. It also found, however, that since the plaintiffs had succeeded in obtaining a preliminary injunction and had catalyzed other reforms at the jails, they were \"prevailing parties\" under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988 and could be awarded reasonable attorney's fees; it therefore vacated the District Court's award and remanded for redetermination in light of plaintiffs' limited success. On remand, Magistrate Judge Moulds filed findings and recommendations on the attorney's fees issue on July 26, 1995, and Judge Karlton adopted them in full on September 19, awarding plaintiffs a total of $83,616.75. On the same day, Judge Karlton entered judgment in favor of the defendants per the order of the Court of Appeals. (This summary is adapted in part from the Appeals Court's discussion of the background of the case. See Doty, 37 F.3d at 542.)", "summary": "This is a class action brought by prisoners at the Lassen County jails challenging the constitutionality of their conditions of confinement. The District Court for the Eastern District of California issued a limited permanent injunction, but it was reversed by the Ninth Circuit, as a new jail had been built in the interim and there was no evidence of constitutional violations at the new facility."} {"article": "On April 24, 2004, the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division (\"DOJ\") sent a findings letter to Arkansas's governor, advising him of the results of the Spring 2003, DOJ investigation of conditions and practices at the Conway Human Development Center (\"CHDC\"), a facility housing developmentally disabled persons, including those with intellectual disabilities, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, and/or autism. The investigation occurred under the authority of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (\"CRIPA\"), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997. DOJ and expert consultants visited the facility, reviewed a wide array of documents there, and conducted interviews with personnel and residents. The letter commended CHDC staff for providing a high level of cooperation during the investigation, as well as the dedication many showed for resident well-being. Nevertheless, the investigation found deficiencies in resident care at CHDC, in that conditions and services at CDHC substantially departed from generally accepted standards of care. Constitutional and federal statutory rights of residents at CHDC were violated in several respects, according to the DOJ. DOJ concluded that deficiencies in conditions of resident care and treatment at CHDC existed as to multiple topic areas, including CDHC's causing residents significant harm or risk of harm through inadequate: (1) health care (termed \"grossly deficient,\" with particular problems in \"terribly inadequate\" medical and neurological care, physical and nutritional management and therapy services, and infection control and medication administration practices); (2) habilitative treatment services (e.g., \"grossly deficient\" and unreviewed restraint practices; \"critically inadequate\" activity programming and psychiatric services; inadequately trained and supervised staff; ineffective behavior programs; invalid data collection and recording practices; poor medication management); and (3) protection from harm policies (e.g., failure to conduct mortality reviews after resident deaths, meager investigation of abuse or neglect incidents, inadequacies in residents' rights and consent policies); as well as CHDC's (4) failure to provide required special education and related services pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (\"IDEA\"), 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1401; and (5) failure to provide services to individuals with disabilities in the most integrated setting appropriate to individual residents' needs, pursuant to statutory obligations imposed by Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (\"ADA\"), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12131 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794. The letter provided details of deficiencies for all five of these categories. Minimally-acceptable remedial measures for each of the five categories were outlined in the letter, which concluded by inviting continued further collaboration in implementing the remediation. The letter also provided notice that, absent a resolution of federal concerns, the DOJ would file a CRIPA lawsuit to compel correction of the identified deficiencies at CHDC. On January 16, 2009, the DOJ filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The complaint mirrored the findings letter. The State filed an answer on February 17, 2009. Over a year later, the U.S. filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction on March 9, 2010. Arkansas opposed the motion, and on April 7, 2010, the court (Judge J. Leon Holmes) denied the motion. Both parties then filed Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, which were denied by the court on July 30, 2010. On August 27, 2010, a group of parents and guardians of residents of CHDC filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the state. A six-week bench trial was held in September 2010. The court allowed the parties to extend the filing period for post-trial briefs to provide time for the transcripts to be prepared. The court issued its findings on June 8, 2011. The court found that the U.S. had not met its burden under the first claim for relief, that the practices at CHDC departed from generally accepted professional standards. The court also found the U.S. failed to meet its burden for the second claim for relief, that CHDC was not in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). On the U.S.'s third claim for relief, the court found that DOJ had shown that CHDC was not providing free appropriate public education for resident children. However, because CHDC had submitted a proposal for changing their education policy to the appropriate state agency (Arkansas Department of Education) at the time of trial, the court did not find it necessary to take any action. Accordingly, the court dismissed the action with prejudice. The court denied, however, the state's later request for attorneys' fees and only awarded costs in the amount of $150,580. Although the U.S. did not prove its case during the bench trial, the court found that CHDC had made certain changes in policies and practices, most likely as a result of the DOJ investigation. Apparently, the court did not want to find the DOJ's claims frivolous or groundless and have to grant attorney's fees to the defendants. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On January 16, 2009, following a CRIPA investigation, the DOJ filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas against the state of Arkansas regarding the Conway Human Development Center (CHDC), a facility housing developmentally disabled persons. The court found for the defendants and the case is now closed."} {"article": "On December 17, 2012 a Brooklyn resident filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the City of New York. The plaintiff brought this complaint under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, alleging violations of the First and Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as violations of Article 1 Sections 8 and 12 of the New York Constitution. The plaintiff, represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union, asked the court for declaratory relief and compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs, claiming that the NYPD unlawfully arrested her for filming a stop and frisk in her neighborhood. The complaint explains that it challenged the NYPD's practice of interfering with the right of individuals to film police activity in public areas. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that on June 5, 2012, after leaving the subway and on the walk to her house, she witnessed two NYPD officers questioning and frisking three youths she recognized from the neighborhood. To the plaintiff, it appeared the youths were only fixing an upturned bicycle. The youths repeatedly protested to the officers that they were only fixing the bicycle and that they had done nothing wrong. She asked the officers what they were doing, and when they brushed off her question, she began to film the event on her cellphone. The officers repeatedly told her to stop filming and to step further back. After repeatedly requesting that the plaintiff stop filming, one of the officers shoved her. The officers' sergeant was then called to the scene. Subsequently, the plaintiff informed the sergeant that she wished to file a formal complaint. Directly after voicing her desire to file a complaint, she was arrested and transported to the precinct where she was held for about an hour and a half. Her phone and purse were confiscated and the officers repeatedly asked her if she still wished to file a complaint. After issuing her a summons for disorderly conduct and receiving verbal confirmation from her that she did not intend to file a complaint, the officers released the plaintiff on her own cognizance. No criminal charges were filed against her. On March 11, 2013, the plaintiff moved to file an amended compliant, noting that the parties had conferred and reached resolution of the defendants\u2019 concerns regarding the claims for declaratory relief, which the defendants had moved to dismiss in their answer. Magistrate Judge Steven M. Gold granted the motion and the plaintiff filed an amended complaint excluding the declaratory relief claims and identifying a \"John Doe\" New York City police officer defendant. The plaintiffs engaged in discovery between 2013 and 2017. There were ongoing disputes regarding the video the plaintiff took of the officers' stop. The plaintiff's video of the incident went missing days after her arrest, and the defendants sought dismissal of a spoliation sanction. On October 8, 2014, the defendants moved for summary judgment on three grounds: 1) that the officers had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff; 2) that the plaintiff's retaliation claim required proof that the arrest was motivated by the videotaping and was unavailable when the arrest and subsequent prosecution was supported by probable cause; and 3) that the officers are protected by qualified immunity. The defendants also moved for dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against them for spoliation sanctions as a result of what they alleged was the plaintiff's destruction of the video she took of the subject incident. On February 8, 2017, the court (Judge Sandra L. Townes) denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and denied the motion for spoliation sanctions, without prejudice to renewal if the evidence at trial should establish that the video of the incident was likely to favor the defendants. After further discovery, the parties stipulated to a settlement and order of dismissal on June 7, 2017. The settlement agreement provided for $10,000 in compensation to the plaintiff and $35,000 for the plaintiff's attorney fees and costs for the dismissal of all claims against the defendants. The court ordered the dismissal on June 9, 2017.", "summary": "On December 17, 2012 a Brooklyn resident filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. She claimed that the NYPD unlawfully detained her because she attempted to film a stop and frisk of three youths. The parties settled for monetary compensation and attorney fees in June 2017 and the case against the defendants was dismissed."} {"article": "On August 21, 2007, two inmates in federal custody filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York challenging the Federal Bureau of Prison's (BOP) \"Standardized Chapel Library Project.\" Plaintiffs alleged that pursuant to this project, the Bureau banned and removed hundreds of religious books and materials not appearing on a pre-approved standardized list from chapel libraries across the country. Plaintiffs alleged that Bureau's actions were in response to a 2004 report by the Inspector General that examined the selection process of prison chaplains and warned of potential security risks created by inmates who were practicing extreme forms of religion, specifically Islam. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Administrative Procedures Act and the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. On September 26, 2007, the New York Times reported that the Federal Bureau of Prison had decided to alter its planned course of action with respect to the \"Standardized Chapel Library Project.\" On November 27, 2007, after receiving a letter from plaintiffs' counsel, the Court (Judge Laura Taylor Swain) granted a stipulation to dismiss the case and confirmed that the project had been canceled, following the filing of this class action suit.", "summary": "On August 21, 2007, two inmates in federal custody filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York challenging the Federal Bureau of Prison's (BOP) \"Standardized Chapel Library Project.\" Plaintiffs alleged that pursuant to this project, the Bureau banned and removed hundreds of religious books and materials not appearing on a pre-approved standardized list. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that this removal violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Administrative Procedures Act and the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. On November 27, 2007, after receiving a letter from plaintiffs' counsel, the Court (Judge Laura Taylor Swain) granted a stipulation to dismiss the case and confirmed that the project had been canceled, following the filing of this class action suit."} {"article": "On June 30, 2014, women civilly committed to the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Framingham (MCI Framingham) under Chapter 123, section 35 of Massachusetts law, filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court in the District of Massachusetts. They sued the Massachusetts Department of Correction, under 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Represented by Prisoners Legal Services Inc., the ACLU of Massachusetts, and private counsel, they sought a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing the Massachusetts Department of Correction from placing civilly committed women in MCI Framingham instead of an in-patient treatment facility. They sought to represent a class of others like them--women civilly committed because of drug and alcohol dependence who were placed in MCI Framingham alongside criminal inmates and without the facilities necessary for proper treatment of their disorders. On January 13, 2015, plaintiff\u2019s certification motion was granted. the class was defined as \u201call women who are now or will be civilly held at MCI-Framingham based solely on an order under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 123, Section 35.\" Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint on January 27, 2015 to include the complaints of seven other \u201cJane Does\u201d and to drop allegations of violations of parts of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. On January 21, 2016 the Massachusetts legislature passed a bill to amend Section 35 practices. Four days later, Governor Baker signed the bill into law, enacting the Women's Recovery from Addictions Program. The law provided civilly committed women with alternative treatment options outside of prison. On May 2, 2016, that year, the state moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the controversy and class no longer existed. On June 10, the court denied the motion to dismiss on the basis that the court was not in the position to determine mootness because the plaintiff requested injunctive relief. The court suggested the plaintiffs amend their complaint again to request declaratory judgment as the preferred remedy. On July 15, 2016, the plaintiffs submitted a reply to the court's order to amend and expressed an intention to file a motion for summary judgment based on the amended statute. The parties did not agree on what the next steps should be, but nothing more was filed for about two years. On March 31, 2018, Judge Woodlock entered an order, in which he explained:
\"The landscape of this certified class action was transformed by the amendment of Mass. Gen Laws ch. 123, sec. 35, which the plaintiffs had challenged to the degree it provided a basis for civil commitments to MCI-Framingham. The defendants take the position that in the wake of the amendment all such commitments have ceased and that there are no plans to make such commitments in the future. The parties, however, have continued to circle each other suspiciously. The defendants seek dismissal of the case based upon their statement of present intention; the plaintiffs seek a judgment interpreting sec. 35 as amended to prevent civil commitments to MCI-Framingham as a matter of law irrespective of the stated present intentions of the relevant state actors. There have been no submissions in almost two years to suggest that there is any foreseeable circumstance in which civil commitments to MCI-Framingham may be undertaken. This case lacks the type of foreseeable concrete injury that would support any relief the plaintiffs might successfully seek. It is plainly moot. Nevertheless, given the defendants' studied refusal to concede that sec. 35 categorically bars any civil commitments to MCI-Framingham, prudence - not to mention this court's duty to protect the inchoate interests of class members - requires making explicit that this dismissal is without prejudice to any future litigation challenging civil commitments to MCI-Framingham should they ever resume. Accordingly, the Clerk is directed to enter a judgment dismissing this case without prejudice.:", "summary": "On June 30, 2014, women civilly committed under chapter 123, section 35 of the Massachusetts general laws, to the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Framingham, for drug and alcohol dependence, sued the Massachusetts Department of Corrections. They alleged that by being sent to Framingham, as opposed of an in-patient rehabilitation facility, they would not receive the treatment they needed which violated the Americans with Disabilities act. Class certification was granted on January 13, 2015."} {"article": "On March 14, 2014, three lesbian women filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the State of Indiana. The plaintiffs, two of whom are married to each other, represented by private attorneys, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and asked the court for declaratory relief and both temporary and permanent injunctive relief. They claimed that Indiana's laws prohibiting the recognition of same-sex marriage, and the manner in which those statutes have been interpreted and enforced, violate the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses because they deny plaintiffs the right to the most important relationship in life and make them second-class citizens due to the range of benefits that the legal recognition of marriage allows. In addition, one of the plaintiffs wished to obtain a legal separation from her same-sex partner and was unable to legally to do so in Indiana. On August 19, 2014, Judge Richard L. Young entered a judgment on both plaintiffs' and defendants' motions for summary judgment. Bowling v. Pence, 2014 WL 4104814 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 19, 2014). The court ordered defendants permanently enjoined from: denying a marriage license to same-sex applicants, enforcing the same-sex marriage ban; and to administer the same services and benefits to all married couples regardless if they are same-sex or different-sex. In an interesting turn of events, Judge Young held that Governor Pence was a proper defendant in this case (Governor Pence was dismissed from the other same-sex marriage cases). On August 20, 2014, defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals stayed briefing in this case pending its decision in Baskin v. Bogan (PB-IN-0005), another same-sex marriage case from Indiana. On September 4, 2014, the Seventh Circuit issued its opinion in Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), holding the same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional (although staying operation of that opinion while the defendants sought review in the Supreme Court). On October 6, 2014, the Supreme Court denied review, and the Seventh Circuit issued its mandate from Baskin v. Bogan. The state declined to further litigate this case and it was dismissed. The parties subsequently reached an agreement on attorneys' fees that was not disclosed to the Court. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This is one of the federal district court cases challenging the same-sex marriage ban in Indiana. The District Court enjoined Indiana's prohibition on same-sex marriage. On October 7, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its mandate affirming the decision in three other same-sex marriage cases. The Court accordingly dismissed this case and it is now closed."} {"article": "On September 20, 2019, two nonprofit organizations, alongside nine individuals (six of whom were also representing their minor children) filed this lawsuit against the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Director and Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Attorney General of the United States. The suit challenged new federal expedited-removal immigration policies. The non-profits were Centro Presente--a state-wide Latin American immigrant membership organization dedicated to the self-determination and self-sufficiency of the Latin American population of Massachusetts; and Pioneer Valley Workers Center--an organization aimed at improving the lives of low-wage and immigrant workers in Western Massachusetts. The nine individual plaintiffs were all asylum-seekers who were threatened with expedited removal. The plaintiffs claimed that the new policy violated the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)(5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7551), the Suspension Clause (Habeas Corpus), the Appointments Clause, and the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a71101). The plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendants from continuing this policy and also requested attorney\u2019s fees. The plaintiffs were represented by Lawyers for Civil Rights and a private law firm. The case was heard in the District Court for Washington D.C. and was presided over by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. The new expedited removal rule allowed any foreign citizen who had lived anywhere in the United States for less than two years to be submitted for expedited deportation proceedings. Previously, expedited deportation only applied to those located within 100 miles of a U.S. international land border and had only been in the United States for two weeks or less. On October 9, 2019, the court ordered the plaintiffs to show cause for why the case at hand should not be stayed until a separate case (Make the Road New York v. McAleenan) had been resolved. Make the Road New York was a class-action suit filed in the same court by the ACLU which also challenged the legality of the new expedited-removal rule. More information on that case is available here. The plaintiffs responded to the order to show cause on October 22, 2019; however this document was not available to the Clearinghouse. The plaintiffs filed a motion to proceed pseudonymously which District Judge Jackson granted on July 8, 2020. The case then remained in the pleading stage for most of 2020 and 2021 as the government asked the court to reset the deadline for their answer on numerous occasions. As of August 1, 2021, the government has yet to file an answer to the complaint. Judge Jackson was elevated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit by President Biden in mid-2021; a new judge has yet to be assigned the case. As of August, 2021, many of the documents included on the docket are inaccessible because the case is classified as a private immigration matter. It is unclear if the case will be settled given the inauguration of the Biden Administration, but for now the case remains open.", "summary": "A group of asylum-seekers and two immigration nonprofits filed suit on September 20, 2019 against the U.S. Attorney General, ICE, and DHS to stop the implementation of an expedited deportation rule that would have greatly expanded who could be swept into fast-tracked deportation proceedings. The district court granted a motion by the plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously on July 8, 2020. The case has remained in the pleading stage for over a year, with multiple motions for extensions of time by the government to answer the initial complaint by the plaintiffs. The case remains open."} {"article": "This class-action suit was brought in the state court on June 4th, 2020. That same day, the case was removed by the defendants to the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The complaint was filed in response to police tactics used against protesters in Denver following the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis, MN. Plaintiffs were individuals who participated in, observed, or wanted to participate in or observe the protests; they were represented by private counsel. The complaint alleged that Denver police used chemical agents (including tear gas and pepper spray) as well as Kinetic Impact Projectiles (KIPs) against peaceful protesters. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, arguing that these tactics represented violations of the First and Fourth Amendments. Specifically, they argued that DPD's tactics constituted an infringement on plaintiffs' free speech and free assembly rights under the First Amendment, and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought class certification and several forms of relief including a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, declaratory relief, monetary damages for those injured by the police, and attorney's fees. The case was assigned to Judge Richard Brook Jackson and Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak. On June 5th, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order against the police; it was granted in part on that same day. The order enjoined the Denver Police Department from using chemical weapons or projectiles unless an on-scene supervisor (ranking Captain or above) specifically authorized it in order to prevent destruction of property that the Captain personally witnessed. In addition, the judge ordered that KIPs not be discharged at protesters' heads, pelvises, or backs and also prohibited them from being shot into crowds. The judge also enjoined the DPD from allowing non-Denver officers to use force in excess of what DPD used, made body cameras mandatory at all times, and said that chemical agents/irritants could only be used after an order to disperse had been given and adequate time to leave was granted. 2020 WL 3034161. Unhappy with this order, the defendants asked for two changes to the order. First, they asked for a change to the ruling regarding only using chemicals upon authorization of a Captain. Second, they requested a change to the body camera rule. Judge Jackson granted the first change, but denied the DPD's request with regard to the body cameras. On June 16, 2020, plaintiffs asked for an extension of the TRO, but Judge Jackson denied this request the following day, telling the parties to try to reach an agreement amongst themselves first. Several days later, Judge Jackson temporarily extended the TRO while negotiations continued. Then, on June 26, 2020, the parties agreed that while the lawsuit was pending, in response to a protest or demonstration, the Denver Police Department and any person acting on behalf of DPD would not:
All recipients of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (\"DACA\") who, after January 19, 2017, have had or will have their DACA grant and employment authorization revoked without notice or an opportunity to respond, even though they have not been convicted of a disqualifying criminal offense.Regarding the preliminary injunction motion, Judge Gutierrez first held that the Court had jurisdiction. Next, he held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their APA claim (that automatic termination was arbitrary and capricious) and would suffer irreparable without an injunction (because of loss of earnings, job opportunities, and drivers' licenses without DACA). 2018 WL 1061408. A Mar. 26 order clarified that the class consisted of DACA recipients, not subject to certain disqualifying categories, who have had or will have their DACA and employment authorization terminated without notice or opportunity to respond. The rest of the order specified the procedures by which defendants had to identify and notify the class. On Apr. 19, Judge Gutierrez denied defendants' motion to dismiss. First, he held that the organizational and individual plaintiffs had standing, and that the INA did not bar jurisdiction. Next, he held that plaintiffs had stated valid claims under the APA (i.e., that the applicable regulations do not allow automatic DACA revocation on the basis of a removal order, rendering it arbitrary and capricious) and under the due process doctrine (i.e., that the DACA grant is a conferred benefit that requires procedural safeguards before termination). Defendants then, on Apr. 26, appealed the preliminary injunction order to the Ninth Circuit, which opened a new docket (No. 18-55564). As the parties prepared to file their respective motions for summary judgment and the plaintiffs prepared to file a motion for permanent injunction, on Dec. 21, 2018, Judge Guitierrez ordered the defendants to certify the administrative record (AR) in this case. On Feb. 8, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion requesting the court to order the defendants to complete the AR. The plaintiffs asserted that the AR that the defendants provided was incomplete and did not include all documents directly or indirectly considered by agency decision-makers. The defendants asserted that these \"predecisional documents regarding the policy of terminating DACA with notice were properly withheld from the termination AR because they are protected by deliberative process privilege.\" On Apr. 8, 2019, Judge Guiterrez ordered that the defendants either add these \"predecisional documents\" to the AR or provide a privilege log. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' argument was \"more in line with the Ninth Circuit\u2019s instruction that the administrative record should consist all documents directly or indirectly considered by agency decision-makers.'\" On June 28, 2019, a Ninth Circuit panel (Circuit Judges Kim Wardlaw, Jay Bybee, and John Owens) issued an order staying the appeal proceedings pending resolution by the Supreme Court in Regents of University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Following the stay of the appeal proceedings, on July 25, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion to stay further district court proceedings pending the Ninth Circuit's resolution of the preliminary injunction appeal. The defendants opposed this motion, arguing that the plaintiffs would not suffer any irreparable harm absent a stay and requested instead that the court enter an order setting a briefing schedule on cross-motions for summary judgment. Judge Gutierrez granted the plaintiffs' motion on November 7, 2019, concluding that the court cannot properly decide the legal questions here without guidance from the Ninth Circuit in this case and the Supreme Court in Regents. Judge Gutierrez also found that the defendants did not establish that a stay would cause them any damage. 2019 WL 8011739. The Supreme Court heard oral argument in Regents on Nov. 12, 2019, on the issues of whether the DHS's decision to wind down the DACA policy is judicially reviewable and whether DHS\u2019s decision to wind down the DACA policy is lawful. On June 18, 2020, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor), the Court held in Regents that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA, that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program, and that the rescission was unlawful, arbitrary, and capricious in violation of the APA. 140 S. Ct. 1891. Following the Supreme Court's decision, the Ninth Circuit lifted the stay on the appeal of the preliminary injunction in this case on June 23, 2020. The Court directed the parties to file briefs addressing the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Regents on this case. In early July 2020, the parties filed their briefs. In January 2021, President Biden took office and immediately signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General \u201cto preserve and fortify DACA.\" The Ninth Circuit again stayed the case on April 7, 2021, pending anticipated rulemaking concerning DACA. The government is to file a status report every three months. As of May 14, 2021, this case is ongoing.", "summary": "In Oct. 2017, an immigrant rights' organization and an individual member sued DHS, USCIS, and CBP, seeking reinstatement of the member's terminated DACA status on the basis of an unsubstantiated criminal allegation, and nationwide class certification of people whose DACA status had been unlawfully revoked. The Court twice granted preliminary injunctions as well as class certification; defendants have appealed to the 9th Cir. The case was stayed pending resolution of Regents of University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security by the Supreme Court. On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA and that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program. Following the Supreme Court's decision, the Ninth Circuit lifted the stay on the appeal of the preliminary injunction and directed the parties to file briefs addressing the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Regents on this case. In early July 2020, the parties filed their briefs. In January 2021, President Biden took office and immediately signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General \u201cto preserve and fortify DACA.\" The Ninth Circuit again stayed the case on April 7, 2021, pending anticipated rulemaking concerning DACA. As of May 14, 2021, this case is ongoing."} {"article": "On March 14, 1990, attorneys for the Legal Services of Central New York filed a class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 on behalf of residents with intellectual disabilities of New York State psychiatric centers at Mohawk Valley, Hutchings and Binghamton in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. Plaintiffs alleged that the facilities at Mohawk Valley, Binghamton and Hutchings, as psychiatric centers, were not staffed or otherwise prepared to provide services, programs or training to persons with intellectual disabilities. Defendants included the state of New York and officials from the New York State Office of Mental Health (\"OMH\") and State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities (\"OMRDD\"). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Attorneys for the Public Interest Law Firm of Syracuse University Law College and Prisoners' Legal Services also assisted in the representation of plaintiffs. Our information as to the procedural history of the case is very limited. According to the PACER docket, the District Court (Senior Judge Neal P. McCurn) approved the Stipulation for Settlement of Class Action on April 15, 1999. On August 2, 1999, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order, awarding plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs $179,290.68. John S. v. Cuomo, 1999 WL 592693 (N.D.N.Y. July 29, 1999). We have no further information on this matter.", "summary": "On March 14, 1990, attorneys for the Legal Services of Central New York filed a class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 on behalf of residents with intellectual disabilities of New York State psychiatric centers at Mohawk Valley, Hutchings and Binghamton in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. Plaintiffs alleged that the facilities at Mohawk Valley, Binghamton and Hutchings, as psychiatric centers, were not staffed or otherwise prepared to provide services, programs or training to persons with intellectual disabilities. Our information as to the procedural history of the case is very limited. the District Court (Senior Judge Neal P. McCurn) approved the Stipulation for Settlement of Class Action on April 15, 1999, and later awarded plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $179,290.68."} {"article": "On August 1, 2018, six non-citizens detained at the Federal Correctional Institution Medium II, also called Victorville, filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and the Civil Rights Education Enforcement Center, among others, sued the President, the Attorney General, and the directors of the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBP), the Los Angeles ICE Field Office, and the Warden of Victorville Prison under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000bb. The case was assigned to Judge Jesus G. Bernal. ICE moved a large group of detainees to Victorville on June 8, 2018, and many of the plaintiffs had been detained there from that date. The plaintiffs alleged they were denied adequate food and recreation time, accommodations to practice their religions, and access to healthcare. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, claiming violations of their Fifth Amendment right to due process, First Amendment right to free exercise, and RFRA protections from policies that substantially burdened their religious practice. They asked the court to order the defendants to move all ICE immigration detainees from Victorville as quickly as possible. In the meantime, the plaintiffs also asked that they be provided with adequate health care, nutrition, out-of-cell time, programming, reading materials, and accommodations for religious practice, including compliant diet, clothing and jewelry, religious texts, and opportunities for prayer and group worship. In September 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, a preliminary injunction, and expedited discovery. The defendants requested extra time to respond, which the court granted. The parties then jointly requested additional time, saying they were actively working toward an agreement. On October 26, 2018, the defendants filed a notice of settlement with the court, indicating that the parties had reached a resolution. However, on November 28, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reopen the case. They stated that the parties had been unable to consummate a settlement. A court employee noted that the plaintiffs erroneously marked their filing as a status report but did not direct them to amend it. As of May 2020, there has been no further action in the case, and it is unclear whether the litigation remains active.", "summary": "In 2018, immigrants and refugees detained at Victorville Medium Security Prison filed this putative class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that detaining asylum seekers violated their Fifth Amendment rights to due process, and the conditions of their confinement violated their First Amendment and RFRA rights to free exercise of religion. The plaintiffs filed for class certification, a preliminary injunction, and expedited discovery in September. On October 26, the defendants filed a notice of settlement with the court; but, on November 28, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reopen the case, stating that the parties had been unable to consummate a settlement. As of May 2020, there has been no further action in the case."} {"article": "On September 26, 2013, a same-sex couple, married under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's marriage law, 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. \u00a7 1704, to the extent that it barred recognition of same-sex marriages legally valid under the laws of other states. They also challenged Section 2 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1738C, to the extent that the Pennsylvania statute purported to be authorized by this federal law. Specifically, the plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief including a declaration that Pennsylvania's refusal to recognize marriages validly entered into under the laws of another sovereign state violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the fundamental right to travel of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Pennsylvania statute barring same-sex marriage violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and that Section 2 of DOMA violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. Finally, the plaintiffs sought an injunction directing Pennsylvania to recognize the marriage of same-sex couples validly entered into in states other than Pennsylvania. On May 22, 2014, the Court ordered that the Plaintiffs show cause as to why their case should not be dismissed as moot, given that Whitewood v. Wolf held that the state law was unconstitutional. 2014 WL 2058105 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014) (PB-PA-0012 in this Clearinghouse). The Court then, on September 8, 2014, placed this matter in civil suspense pending an appeal to the United States Supreme Court in Whitewood v. Wolf. The parties then voluntarily dismissed the case on October 22, 2014, in accordance with the Court's decision in Whitewood permanently enjoining the enforcement of the Pennsylvania same-sex marriage ban. The Court denied the Philadelphia Metro Task Force's motion to intervene on November 29, 2014. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision to deny the motion to intervene and the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The case is now closed.", "summary": "A same-sex couple, married under the laws of Massachusetts, filed suit challenging Pennsylvania's prohibition on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages of same-sex couples validly entered into under the laws of another state. Following a decision in another related case holding that the Pennsylvania law was unconstitutional, the parties voluntarily dismissed the case."} {"article": "On December 9, 1977, a group of residents at the Dr. Joseph H. Ladd School, a state facility for intellectually disabled and other handicapped individuals, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs brought this action against the Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals (now the Department of Behavioral Healthcare, Developmental Disabilities and Hospitals) and the Ladd School under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201, and Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396 et seq. The plaintiffs claimed that the Ladd School, which was home to approximately 750 residents, failed to provide suitable living conditions to its residents in violation of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the Ladd School failed to provide residents with an individualized living program, provide safe and humane facilities, maintain adequate staffing, develop new facilities for transfer of residents into the community, and provide necessary medical and dental care. The plaintiffs claimed that as a result, the vast majority of residents had actually regressed and deteriorated since being admitted to the Ladd School. The plaintiffs also alleged that as a result of the Ladd School's actions, they had been denied benefits under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396 et seq., which requires that funds appropriated pursuant to the Act be spent to provide care and treatment in non-institutional facilities when possible. The plaintiffs requested injunctive and declaratory relief from the defendants' constitutional violations. On April 6, 1979, the parties reached agreement on an interim consent decree, which required the defendants to develop a comprehensive plan on service for all intellectually disabled citizens of Rhode Island, with special emphasis on residents of the Ladd School. The plan would include development of a policy for providing suitable facilities, rehabilitation services, and dental and medical care for these disabled individuals. The comprehensive plan was submitted to the plaintiffs on July 5, 1979. After additional discovery and discussion, the parties reached a final stipulation, which U.S. District Judge Francis Boyle ordered effective on April 29, 1982. The Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals agreed to provide services for the development, education, rehabilitation, and care of the intellectually disabled members of the plaintiff class. In addition, the Department would provide annual individualized assessments in accordance with Title XIX regarding whether individual residents could be placed in the community to reduce the resident population at the Ladd School. The stipulation also required a court order for placement in the Ladd School and that the Ladd School would serve only as a last resort for disabled individuals. The Ladd School agreed to maintain their facilities in a manner eligible for certification as an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded under Title XIX. The stipulation allowed for a monitor to ensure the defendants' compliance with the stipulation. The defendants also agreed to pay the plaintiffs $48,000 for attorneys' fees and costs. On December 15, 1985, after receiving a report from the Ladd Center Monitoring Committee, Judge Boyle ordered that the defendants reduce the resident population at the Ladd School to not more than 240 residents by January 1987. The defendants also agreed to pay the plaintiffs an additional $6,721 in attorneys' fees and costs. In 1986, Rhode Island Governor Edward DiPrete announced the closing of the Ladd School. On November 17, 1987, the defendants moved to vacate the previous stipulation and to dismiss this action. In 1994, the Ladd School was finally closed.", "summary": "In December 1977, a group of residents at the Dr. Joseph H. Ladd School, a state facility for intellectually disabled and other handicapped individuals, filed this class action lawsuit against the Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals and the Ladd School. The plaintiffs claimed the Ladd School failed to provide residents with an individualized habilitation program, provide safe and humane facilities, maintain adequate staffing, develop new facilities for transfer of residents into the community, and provide necessary medical and dental care, thus violating the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The parties reached a stipulation in April 1982 which required the Ladd School to improve the facility's conditions and to deinstitutionalize residents as possible. The Ladd School was closed in 1994."} {"article": "On April 15, 2010, plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on behalf of all children who are now or will be in the foster care custody of the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (\"DCF\") as a result of abuse or neglect. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that the Massachusetts foster care system is causing physical and psychological harm to the children within the system. Plaintiffs claimed that DCF harmed children through a high rate of child abuse and neglect within the system, a high degree of placement instability, a low rate of adoption from foster care, overadministration of psychiatric medication, not adequately preparing foster children to live independently as adults, and further abuse and neglect after reunification with their families. Plaintiffs alleged that these harms to children were caused by Defendants' failure to effectively manage the agency's workforce, resources and practices. Plaintiffs claimed that DCF and state officials had long been aware of the systemic failings of the program but had failed to remedy the situation. On August 20, 2010, Defendants filed a joint Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defendants attacked the sufficiency of Plaintiffs' allegations and offered three threshold arguments: (1) that Plaintiffs lacked standing; (2) that the court should abstain from hearing the case pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); and (3) that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars all claims as to Defendant Patrick. On January 4, 2011, the Court (Senior Judge Michael A. Ponsor) denied Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 771 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Mass. 2011). On February 28, 2011, the Court (Judge Ponsor) granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class and Appoint Class Counsel, holding that all necessary requirements to certify this Rule 23(b)(2) class were satisfied. Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 272 F.R.D. 288 (D. Mass. 2011). Following the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), Defendants moved to decertify the Plaintiff class. The Defendants argued that the Plaintiff class no longer met the higher burden for class certification that Wal-Mart imposed. On November 10, 2011, the Court (Judge Ponsor) denied the motion, holding that (1) the Wal-Mart case had \"little explicit application to this much different case,\" and (2) that Defendants' motion was \"the substantive equivalent of an appeal,\" and was therefore untimely, as it was filed seven months after the original certification order. Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 278 F.R.D. 30 (D. Mass. 2011). Over the next year, the parties completed fact and expert discovery. On October 18, 2012, with trial scheduled for January 2013, the Defendants moved to change venue. The Defendants argued that having a trial in Springfield would be burdensome for DCF officials who would be forced to travel to testify, and asked the Court to transfer the case to the Eastern Division in Boston. On November 14, 2012, the District Court (Judge Ponsor) granted Defendant's order of transfer, vacated the scheduling order, and transferred the case to Boston. The case was reassigned to District Judge William G. Young. The Court (Judge Young) largely reinstated the original scheduling order and set a trial date for January 22, 2013. Jut eleven days before trial, the Court denied Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, \"not on the merits, but as a matter of judicial economy,\" and indicated he would rule on all claims at trial. The bench trial before Judge Young commenced on January 22, 2013 and continued intermittently over the next few months. Plaintiffs rested their case on March 1, 2013. On April 30, 2013, Defendants moved for judgment on partial findings. The Court continued to take evidence at trial, and adjourned on May 14, 2013, following twenty-four days of trial. On September 30, 2013, the District Court (Judge Young) entered an order granting Defendants' motion for judgment on partial findings and entered judgment for Defendants on all counts. The Court, however, did not accompany his order with an opinion, and instead stated that \"[t]he parties ought rest assured, however, that a memorandum setting forth the relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c), is to follow in due course.\" Nearly two months later, on November 26, 2013, the Court (Judge Young) issued its findings and rulings. The Court was very critical of the state of the Massachusetts foster care system, but stated that Defendants were not responsible for the shortcomings. Instead, the Court stated that \"financial and administrative constraints - not the alleged mismanagement by DCF officials - pose the greatest threat to children in the Massachusetts foster care system today.\" In applying the two-pronged substantive due process standard formulated by Judge Ponsor, Judge Young held that (1) DCF did not substantially depart from accepted professional judgment, and (2) the conduct of the state with respect to foster children did not \"shock the conscience.\" The Court stated that, while the accounts of the Named Plaintiffs were \"harrowing,\" Plaintiffs failed to prove that \"the deprivations complained of were felt class-wide.\" Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 985 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D. Mass. 2013). Plaintiffs appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Plaintiffs argued that: (1) the District Court erred in applying a new, two-pronged standard for Plaintiffs' substantive due process claims; (2) the District Court erred in holding that Plaintiffs did not experience class-wide professional deprivations, and that such deprivations did not depart from accepted professional judgment; and (3) that the District Court improperly relied on fiscal considerations in denying Plaintiffs relief. Defendants, for their part, argued that DCF was imperfect, but that their failures did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. On December 15, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's granting of judgment on partial findings. The Court stated that Plaintiffs \"have not established, based on the facts, that there have been constitutional violations as to the class of foster children, [and] so they are not entitled to an injunction or federal court oversight.\" The Court held that, even if applying the two-pronged substantive due process standard was error, Plaintiffs failed to meet the lower standard that they sought: departure from accepted professional judgment. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not improperly rely on budget constraints to deny Plaintiffs relief--it did not find that there were violations and then excuse them by budgetary constraints. It found, in the first instance, that there were no constitutional violations. The Court stated that \"[t]he problems are now for the Governor and legislature of Massachusetts to resolve.\" Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 774 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2014).", "summary": "On April 15, 2010, plaintiff foster children filed a class action lawsuit against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the Commonwealth subjected them to unconstitutional harm and risk of harm, high degrees of placement instability, low rates of adoption, and overprescribed psychiatric medication. Mid-trial, the District Court (Judge William G. Young) granted Defendants' motion for judgment on partial findings and denied Plaintiffs relief on all claims. The ruling was subsequently affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit."} {"article": "On July 21, 2011, the ACLU of Michigan group filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The plaintiff asked the court for an injunction, claiming that the FBI was not timely in its response, and that information was improperly redacted from documents that were received. On July 27, 2010, the ACLU of Michigan submitted a FOIA request to the FBI requesting documents pertaining to the use of race and ethnicity to conduct assessments and investigations. More than four months later on December 22, 2010, the FBI released the first batch of documents to the ACLU. The documents included duplicate pages that had been redacted and none were specific to Michigan or the Detroit Field Office. More documents were released on September 29, 2011 and October 31, 2011. The FBI claimed that the documents were released in a reasonable timeframe and that any information withheld was proper under exceptions to FOIA. On September 30, 2012, the Court (Judge Lawrence P. Zatkoff) denied summary judgment for the ACLU and granted summary judgment for the FBI. The court found that the ACLU had not exhausted itsadministrative remedies and any information withheld by the FBI fell under the proper exceptions to FOIA. On August 21, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court's ruling. American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan v. F.B.I., 734 F.3d 460.", "summary": "Only July 21, 2011, the ACLU of Michigan filed a FOIA complaint against the FBI. They claimed that the information given by the FBI following their FOIA request was insufficient, improperly redacted, and not delivered in a timely manner as is required by FOIA. The FBI responded that the information withheld fell under exceptions to FOIA. On September 30, 2012, the Court granted summary judgment for the FBI. Finding that not only that the information withheld properly fell under the exceptions, but also that the ACLU of Michigan had not fully exhausted its administrative remedies."} {"article": "On November 21, 2007, three female inmates in South Dakota Women's Prison filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court of South Dakota, alleging that they were denied medication and treatment for their mental illnesses in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs alleged that they and other inmates were routinely denied medication that had been prescribed by their treating physicians on the orders of prison staff who were not doctors and not authorized to prescribe medication. Cost was one alleged factor for the medication denial. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well class certification. On October 31, 2008, Judge Charles B. Kornmann granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification of \"All individuals who are now or who will be in the future incarcerated at the South Dakota Women's Prison and who are denied or delayed access to medication or medical treatment that has been prescribed by a treating medical doctor . . . based on decisions made by persons who are not themselves medical doctors.\" 2008 WL 4774895. On Dec. 08, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied the defendants' appeal of the certification decision. On April 04, 2011, the defendants moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute, which Judge Kornmann denied on June 10, 2011. On April 17, 2012, Judge Kornmann approved a class action settlement and consent decree. 2012 WL 1339148. The defendants agreed that no prescription medication or dosage would be substituted, changed, increased, reduced or discontinued except under the direction of a qualified physician or other person authorized by law to prescribe medications. The settlement noted that the duration of the agreement would be in accordance with the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. That means the case was terminable by the defendant after a period of two years of enforcement. Each party agreed to bear its own costs and attorney's fees with the plaintiffs' attorney agreeing to donate his time, and the court maintained jurisdiction for the remainder of the decree. The case has been long dormant.", "summary": "On November 21, 2007, three female inmates in South Dakota Women's Prison filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 in the U.S. District Court District of South Dakota, alleging that they were denied medication and treatment for their mental illnesses in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs alleged that they and other inmates were routinely denied medication that had been prescribed by their treating physicians on the orders of prison staff who were not doctors and not authorized to prescribe medication. On October 31, 2008, the court granted class certification. On April 17, 2012, Judge Kormann approved the class action settlement and consent decree, in which the defendants agreed that no prescription medication or dosage would be substituted, changed, increased, reduced or discontinued except under the direction of a qualified physician or other person authorized by law to prescribe medications."} {"article": "On July 20, 2016, the executrix of the estate of an African-American man who died in the Sullivan Correctional Facility (NY) filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against various prison officials, both guards and guard supervisors, in their individual capacities and a doctor in his individual capacity that did not effectively diagnose and treat the decedent's mental illness. The plaintiff sought relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, 42 U.S.C. 1985(2, 3), and New York State medical malpractice law in the case of the doctor. The plaintiff, represented by pro bono private counsel, sought a jury trial, damages, and costs. Specifically, the complaint detailed the decedent's medical history, including a diagnosis of Schizoaffective Disorder, Delusional Disorder, Antisocial Personality Disorder, and Polysubstance Dependence. It alleged that his condition was stable under treatment at the Central New York Psychiatric Center (CNYPC), but upon transfer to Sullivan, he was routinely placed in isolation, where his condition deteriorated further. The complaint noted that the defendant doctor said the decedent should have been transferred back to CNYPC after a long stay in isolation, but he did not order the transfer. The complaint outlined a pattern of abuse and racial insensitivity by the guards. The complaint described an incident where guards \"trashed\" the decedent's cell and the decedent refused to clean it, asking the guards to do it. The guards forcibly removed the decedent from his cell and severely beat him. The complaint alleged that the decedent died of his injuries, and the prison administration withheld information surrounding the death from the decedent's family. Besides this lawsuit, the plaintiff filed two complaints in state court. The parties agreed to dismiss the state actions pending full relief on the federal claim, which they eventually got. Judge Colleen McMahon referred the case to trial after receiving the initial complaint. The plaintiff amended the complaint on April 25, 2017 to add the doctor as a defendant and outline allegations against him. The plaintiff amended the complaint again on February 18, 2018 to name previously unknown correctional officers involved in the beating. After discovery, the defendants filed three summary judgment motions (one motion each against the officers, supervisors, and doctor) in May and June of 2019. On August 21, 2019 (2019 WL 4383187), Judge McMahon issued one opinion on all three summary judgment motions. She denied the motions related to the officers and the supervisors, saying that genuine issues of material fact remain as to their conduct surrounding the beating. However, she partially granted the motion related to the doctor, dismissing claims related to deliberate indifference in failure to provide adequate medical care. She stated that genuine issues of material fact arose on the medical malpractice claim, but determined that those claims were separate to the beating issue at the center of this case. She asked the plaintiff to show cause that the medical malpractice issues should not be separated from the initial one, and the claims against the doctor were severed on September 12, 2019 through an order signed by Judge McMahon (2019 WL 4382206). The parties were unable to settle the case in pre-trial negotiations, and the case went to trial on February 24, 2020. Shortly before closing arguments on February 25, the parties jointly filed a proposed settlement agreement, terminating the case before the jury reached a verdict. Judge McMahon ordered the case to be dismissed on May 5, 2020. The terms of the settlement agreement showed that the State of New York agreed to pay the plaintiff $5 million, which covers compensatory damages and the plaintiff's attorney fees. The settlement added that the Sullivan Correctional Facility should install cameras to prevent future beatings, but left the details on camera installation vague. The plaintiff sought action from the Judge to clarify this point, but she denied the order, leaving it to the parties to settle. The case is closed.", "summary": "In 2016, the executrix of the estate of an inmate who died in the Sullivan Correctional Facility (NY) filed a complaint in the District Court for the Southern District of New York against guards and doctors at the facility. The complaint alleged that the guards beat the inmate to death and willfully ignored his mental illness. The case went to a jury trial in 2020, but before a verdict could be reached, the parties reached a landmark settlement that gave the plaintiff $5 million in attorney fees and damages, and mandated the installation of cameras in the facility where the inmate died."} {"article": "On March 28, 2013, MK Chambers, a for-profit company filed this lawsuit in the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that providing insurance coverage of contraception would violate the religious beliefs of the corporation's owners. On April 4, 2013, Judge Denise Page Hood denied the plaintiff's emergency ex-parte motion for a temporary restraining order. The plaintiffs had sought this motion in order to continue providing insurance coverage to their employees without the medications they object to. Judge Hood's order stated that it was not clear plaintiffs would succeed under their RFRA claim, not likely they would succeed on their First Amendment claim, since the ACA has no purpose to target religions. Judge Hood also found that since the plaintiffs had filed their lawsuit over two months after the mandate went into effect, their claim of irreparable injury was not convincing. On April 26, 2013, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction. It argued injunction relief was warranted to prevent the ACA mandate from infringing on the plaintiff's religious beliefs. On May 22, 2013, the defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to injunctive relief and a motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff will not suffer irreparable harm from the mandate. On June 6, 2013, the defendant re-filed their memorandum in opposition to injunctive relief and filed a separate, amended motion to dismiss as required by the court's local rules. No substantive changes were made to either. On September 13, 2013, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. The court found the plaintiff was unlikely to show the ACA mandate put a \"substantial burden\" on the corporation owner's religious beliefs. On January 31, 2014 the parties filed a joint motion to stay the case until the Supreme Court ruled in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, No. 13- 354; and Conestoga Woods Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 13-356. Judge Denise Page Hood granted the stay on February 21, 2014. On August 21, 2014, following the Supreme Court's holding in Hobby Lobby that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations, the parties agreed to a stipulated preliminary injunction in this case. The preliminary injunction said the government could not sanction the plaintiffs for failing to provide contraceptive care to which the plaintiffs hold religious objections. On November 21, 2014, the district court entered a stipulated order and judgment in this case. The judgment established a permanent injunction against government enforcement of the June 30, 2014 version of the contraceptive mandate at issue in Hobby Lobby, where for-profit corporations could not access a religious exemption to the contraception mandate. After the ruling in Hobby Lobby, the government designed an exemption similar to the one used for non-profit religious employers, allowing religious, closely-held for-profit employers to notify the government of their religious objection to contraception. The government would then work with the insurer directly to provide contraception coverage to the employees. The court's November 21, 2014 order further awarded attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs. On March 13, 2015, the plaintiffs withdrew their motion for a hearing on attorney fees and costs", "summary": "A for-profit company sought an exception to the Affordable Care Act's mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception because it violates the owner's religious beliefs. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, on November 21, 2014 the plaintiffs won a permanent injunction against enforcement of that version of the contraceptive services mandate."} {"article": "On December 9, 2004, an inmate in the Vermont Department of Corrections filed this lawsuit pro se in the U.S. District Court District of Vermont. The plaintiff sued the Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Corrections and the Superintendents of Southern State Correctional Facility and Northern State Correctional Facility under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. The pro se plaintiff sought declaratory relief stating the defendants\u2019 actions were unlawful and violated the plaintiff\u2019s rights, along with an injunction stopping the conduct itself. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment and inflicted cruel and unusual punishment by illuminating cells with bright lights twenty-four hours per day, thus preventing him and other inmates from sleeping. In September 2005, many other inmates attempted to join the suit by filing motions to intervene. The plaintiff filed a Notice of Class Action on September 15, 2005. However, the court denied these motions and issued an order denying class certification because Plaintiff was pro se on September 26, 2005. After the plaintiff filed three motions for appointment of counsel, the court finally appointed counsel on December 1, 2005. Over the next several months, more inmates filed motions to intervene, which were granted by the court. The plaintiff filed a new motion for class certification on July 11, 2006. On October 16, 2006, the court granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion for class certification shortly after a report and recommendation from Magistrate Judge Jerome J. Niedermeier. 2006 WL 2975752. The class consisted of inmates: \"who have been subjected, are currently being subjected, or who will be subjected to constant illumination in Vermont prison cells and who suffer injuries as a result.\" The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on April 16, 2007. After about two years of discovery, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on April 30, 2009. The court granted the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment on December 20, 2010. 2010 WL 5389996. The plaintiff appealed the summary judgment order to the Second Circuit on April 11, 2011. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the district court appointed class counsel whose performance was deficient. The Second Circuit agreed and found that the district court abused its discretion in appointing the class counsel because it did not consider counsel\u2019s inexperience in class actions and the lack of resources for counsel to litigate the case properly. In addition, the Second Circuit vacated the summary judgment order and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the district court appointed new class counsel for the plaintiffs. After further discovery, the parties came to a settlement agreement that was approved by the court on July 12, 2017. The settlement required that the correction facilities keep the lights dim, make sleep masks available to inmates, provide sleep masks, and pay $50,000 in attorneys\u2019 fees. On July 14, 2017, the court ordered the case dismissed with prejudice, costs, and attorney\u2019s fees in accordance with the settlement agreement. The parties agreed that the settlement agreement met the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3626). The PLRA provides that the settlement is terminable upon motion of any party two years after the date the court approved the settlement agreement. As of April 2021, there was no further activity on the case and the settlement agreement remained in place. The case is presumably closed.", "summary": "An inmate filed a lawsuit against the Vermont Department of Corrections in 2004 for constant illumination of cells, preventing inmates from sleeping well. Plaintiff eventually obtained class certification from the court for other affected inmates. The case settled when the Defendant agreed to dim the lights, make sleep masks available to inmates, and pay $50,000 in attorneys' fees."} {"article": "On October 23, 2014, a transgender woman in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (\"DCJ\") filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive relief, and damages against the defendants, several officials of DCJ, for violations of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and \u00a71988. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the abuse she received from male inmates and refused to place her into secure housing or take other steps to reduce her abuse. On January 9, 2015, the defendants moved to transfer venue to the Western District of Texas on the grounds that the plaintiff was housed in the Western District from 2011-13 and several defendants work and reside in the Western District. The Court (Judge Alfred H. Bennett) denied their motion as several Defendants resided in the Southern District and the Defendants failed to identify key witnesses that would not be available for testimony if the case remained in the Southern District, instead only offering mere allegations of witness unavailability and inconvenience. 2015 WL 1893737. The Defendant Executive Director of DCJ moved to the dismiss the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on February 17, 2015. The Defendant contended that the complaint failed to plead any specific facts establishing that the Executive Director participated in the failure to protect the Plaintiff, thus failing to meet the requirement established by the Supreme Court case Ashcroft v. Iqbal that a supervisory official must be personally involved to defeat qualified immunity. The defendant further argued that the injunctive relief claim should be dismissed because there was no actual ongoing controversy, as the Plaintiff no longer resided in the facility where she alleged abuses. Lastly, the defendant argued that retrospective injunctive and declaratory relief claims were improper as they implicated Eleventh Amendment concerns on state sovereign immunity. The Court denied the Executive Director's Motion to Dismiss on March 14, 2016. The Court found Plaintiff successfully stated a claim as the Executive Director had participated in hearings about prison rape and had been called by the Department of Justice to account for the statistics concerning sexual assault within DCJ. Because of the Executive Director's awareness, the Court found the Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged facts that the Executive Director knew of and was deliberately indifferent to the risk of sexual assault at the facilities. Further, the Plaintiff successfully stated a claim because she sought to hold the Executive Director liable for personally failing to train and supervise DCJ personnel and failing to establish adequate policy, and was not attempting to hold the Executive Director liable via respondeat superior. The Court found that qualified immunity would not apply because sending an LGBT prisoner back to the general population after experiencing multiple attacks is an unreasonable policy to maintain. 169 F. Supp. 3d 687. The Court next found that the Plaintiff successfully stated a claim for injunctive relief because the plaintiff could be transferred at any time, and thus the fact that she was not currently in a unit where she experienced assault did not render her claim moot. Finally, the Court found that the Executive Director's claim that the Plaintiff sought retrospective injunctive relief was incorrect because the Plaintiff sought expungement of her disciplinary records, and a request for expungement is prospective. 169 F. Supp. 3d 687. On March 1, 2017, the Court granted a motion to stay proceedings pending the parties' finalization of a settlement agreement. Settlement negotiations continued through February 26, 2018, when the parties submitted a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice pursuant to their settlement agreement. The settlement agreement was private, but was reported to include a monetary payment, systematic policy changes, and training of DCJ staff. Lamba Legal, Lamba Legal Reaches Favorable Settlement for Passion Star, Transgender Woman Sexually Assaulted in Texas Men's Prison, Lamba Legal (March 15, 2018), https://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20180315_tdcj-settlement. The case is closed; the settlement apparently did not include any provision for ongoing jurisdiction to enforce its terms.", "summary": "A transgender woman in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (\"DCJ\") filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas against DCJ personnel and executives for being deliberately indifferent to her reports of assault from male inmates and ignoring her request for secure housing. The parties eventually reached a private settlement. The Plaintiff received monetary payment and the Defendants agreed to impose policy changes and training for the DCJ staff."} {"article": "On January 17, 2006, the Center for Constitutional Rights and five of its attorneys who represented clients suspected of involvement with terrorist organizations, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Homeland Security, and Federal Bureau of Investigation. The plaintiffs originally sought an injunction that would prohibit the government from conducting warrantless surveillance of communications in the U.S, claiming that such surveillance violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (\"FISA\"), the Separation of Powers doctrine, and the First and Fourth Amendments. Plaintiffs based these allegations primarily upon statements by President George W. Bush and other government officials in December 2005 admitting that the NSA had monitored, without a warrant, communications between the U.S. and a foreign country where one of the parties was believed to be a member or affiliate of al-Qa'ida. FISA explicitly authorized electronic surveillance for the purposes of collecting foreign intelligence only upon orders issued by federal judges on a special court. By January 2007, the government claimed to have shut down the surveillance program, having received approval from a FISA Court judge to carry out the same surveillance pursuant to court order. (On re-application, it seems that another FISA Court judge disagreed; the threatened end of the program led to the enactment first of the Protect America Act and then the FISA Amendments Act, in 2007 and 2008, respectively; these allowed the surveillance in question.) There remained, however, one final set of claims not affected by the end of the non-FISA surveillance program: the plaintiffs asked the Court to order the government to destroy any records of surveillance of the plaintiffs. The government argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they lacked evidence that they had actually been surveilled. In late 2006, the Multi District Litigation (MDL) Panel transferred the case to the Northern District of California to be consolidated with the Multi District Litigation. On February 23, 2007, the Panel consolidated the case with the MDL, In Re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, NS-CA-11, in this Clearinghouse. For information about what happened while the case was a part of the consolidation see NS-CA-0004. Ultimately, on January 31, 2011, the District Court (Judge Vaughn R. Walker) granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish standing for any of their claims. The plaintiffs appealed. On June 12, 2013, Judge McKeown wrote for the Ninth Circuit and affirmed the district court's dismissal. In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecommunications Records Litig., 522 F. App'x 383 (9th Cir. 2013). The Court of Appeals relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Clapper v. Amnesty International, (133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013)), NS-NY-0006, in this Clearinghouse. On November 1, 2013, The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing, and on March 19, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari review. The case is therefore done.", "summary": "On January 17, 2006, a non-profit legal advocacy organization filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Homeland Security, and Federal Bureau of Investigation. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants engaged in electronic surveillance without court order and thereby violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (\"FISA\"), the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the First and Fourth Amendments. The lawsuit was subsequently transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California where summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendants as the District Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to establish standing for any of their claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court denied review."} {"article": "On July 26, 2010, two young adults in Hidalgo County filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Texas, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive and damage relief. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants, the county and county magistrates and justices of the peace, had violated their constitutional rights by failing to conduct an indigency examination prior to their jailing for the failure to pay the fines associated with the failure to attend school citations that had been issued by their school district's police department. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that, by failing to conduct an indigency examination to determine whether the plaintiffs were indigent and whether they had made a good faith effort to pay their fines, the defendants had violated their right to due process and equal protection by jailing them for being unable to pay a fine. On June 24, 2011 Judge Randy Crane granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief against the judicial defendants. The court found that \u00a71983 does not allow for injunctive relief against judicial officers for acts or omissions taken within their official capacities unless \"a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.\" The court further dismissed the claims against the Sheriff in his official capacity because case law in the 5th circuit allows for \"unnecessary parties\" to be dismissed. The district court found that the official capacity claims against the Sheriff in reality were claims against the county. As such, the district court found that the Sheriff's presence in the lawsuit was unnecessary and dismissed the claims against him in his official capacity. Judge Randy Crane denied, however, the defendants' motion to dismiss the claim for declaratory relief against the judicial defendants and the claims for injunctive, declaratory and damage relief against the county. On October 18, 2011, the remaining defendants filled a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs then filed a cross motion for summary judgment on November 10, 2011. In an order issued on February 15 2012, Judge Randy Crane 1) denied class certification, 2) dismissed Plaintiffs' individual claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Magistrates and County for lack of standing, 3) granted summary judgment to the named plaintiffs' for their claim for damages against the county because it violated their federal due process and equal protection rights by failing to afford them an affirmative indigency determination before incarcerating them for their failure to pay fines and costs, 4) ruled that plaintiff De Luna was entitled to nominal damages of $1, and 5) ruled that plaintiff Diaz\u2019s entitlement to compensatory damages could not be resolved on summary judgment. To demonstrate standing to obtain an order declaring as unconstitutional and enjoining Defendants\u2019 challenged practices, the plaintiffs had to show that they faced a \u201creal and immediate\u201d threat that, while indigent, they will again be charged with a Class C, fine-only offense and then arrested and incarcerated solely because they are unable to pay the fine, without being afforded an indigency screening. The court believed that there were simply too many contingencies for the threat to be \"real and immediate.\" In granting summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim for damages, the court focused on potential defendants who might not think to \"speak up\" during arraignment, saying that providing the opportunity to bring up indigency is merely a gesture of, but does not provide, due process. Plaintiff De Luna did not show \"actual injury\" so was only awarded $1 for the unconstitutional violation of due process rights. With the plaintiff Diaz, the court said that the question of whether she knew that she could avoid jail time by bringing up her inability to pay at arraignment still needed to be determined. If she voluntarily chose to serve jail time, there would be no actual injury and she would only recover nominal damages. A hearing on the remainder of the motions did not take place as the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss (R41) on April 29, 2012, saying that the matter had been amicably resolved. The agreement was filed under seal. The court then approved the motion on April 30.", "summary": "Two young adults who were jailed after nonpayment of fines for not attending school (a \"Class C\" fine) sued Hidalgo County (TX), its magistrates, and its justices of the peace for failing to conduct an indigency examination prior to their jailing. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that by failing to conduct an indigency examination to determine whether the plaintiffs were indigent and whether they had made a good faith effort to pay their fines, the defendants had violated their right to due process and equal protection. All claims for injunctive relief were dismissed during summary judgment by the court either because an injunction against a judicial defendant is not allowed under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, or that they lacked standing as the likelihood of being jailed in this manner again was not \"real and immediate.\" Class certification was also denied. However, in February 2012, the judge granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to declaratory relief - that the county violated their due process and equal protection rights by failing to afford an affirmative indigency determination before incarceration for failure to pay fines. One plaintiff was awarded $1 in nominal damages for this constitutional violation, but failed to show \"actual injury.\" The other named Plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages was not decided at the summary judgment stage. The parties filed a joint motion to dismiss rather than go to trial after coming to an agreement that remains under seal. The judge affirmed the motion on April 30, 2012."} {"article": "On October 24, 2012, two U.S. citizens detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) after taking pictures of ports of entry filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, under 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 702, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201 and Bivens, against CBP, an agency within the Department of Homeland Security. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the ACLU of San Diego and private counsel, sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, alleging that CBP's policy and practice of prohibiting the use of camera and video recording devices at or near CBP-controlled facilities without CBP's prior approval was unconstitutional, in violation of the plaintiffs' First and Fourth Amendment rights. The complaint explained that, as the Human Rights Director of Alliance San Diego, the plaintiff ran a blog and took pictures of the port of entry, CBP officers, and attempted to detail suspicious activity of law enforcement officers. The complaint detailed two separate interactions one of the plaintiffs had with CBP officers. On both occasions, the officers confiscated his camera/phone and deleted the pictures the plaintiff had taken of the entry port and male officers patting down females. On the first occasion, the plaintiff was also detained, and he claimed an officer used excessive force to take his camera away and arrest him. On both occasions, CBP officers explained it was their policy to not permit pictures to be taken. On this basis, the plaintiff claimed his First Amendment right to take pictures and use them in his blog was violated. Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that undergoing an unreasonable search and seizure of their persons and their phones violated their Fourth Amendment rights. On January 29, 2013, the plaintiffs filed for a preliminary injunction. On February 19, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On April 12, 2013, the District Court (Judge Thomas J. Whelan) denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs failed to show citizens had a First Amendment right to photograph the interior of secondary inspection areas for US ports of Entry, that they suffered irreparable harm, or that the First Amendment concerns outweighed the public interest of border security. 2013 WL 1561546. On September 30, 2013, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss in part and denied the motion in part. The court dismissed without prejudice the claim that the defendant\u2019s policy against picture taking violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The court also dismissed with prejudice the plaintiffs' claim that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the CBP photography policy was unconstitutional because the policy did not say the officers must delete the pictures. However, the claim that the practice of deleting the pictures and temporarily detaining the plaintiffs was not dismissed and neither was the claim for excessive use of force. 2013 WL 5462296. On November 27, 2013, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the partial dismissal of their motion to dismiss the case. On April 17, 2014 the court found that permitting leave to amend the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim was proper. However, the court ordered further briefing by the plaintiffs and the defendants because the lack of probable cause claim required reconsideration. 2014 WL 1600410. On April 24, 2014, the plaintiffs, and on May 1, 2014, the defendants, filed supplementary briefing. On January 29, 2015, the court granted the defendant\u2019s motion for reconsideration because taking pictures of the port of entry was considered a crime and therefore the CBP officers had probable cause to assume the plaintiffs had committed a crime. Under this logic, the court found a warrantless search was permissible. However, the remaining Fourth Amendment claim of excessive force remained. 2015 WL 12434362. On November 6, 2015, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The new complaint removed the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims and emphasized the First Amendment claims surrounding the CBP photography restriction and the importance of the removal of this policy. On December 18, 2015 and January 8, 2016, the defendant\u2019s filed a motion to dismiss the complaint again for failure to state a claim. On March 23, 2016 the court found the First Amendment claim was substantively the same and therefore the complaint was dismissed with prejudice. 2016 WL 4597529. On May 17, 2016 the plaintiffs filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. On September 28, 2016, the plaintiffs submitted a brief for review explaining why their complaint should not be barred by case law and their amended complaint to reiterate the factual and legal underpinnings. These alternations were ignored by the district court. On October 5, 2016, the CATO institute, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and seven media organization filed amicus briefs. The CATO brief argued that the First Amendment protected taking pictures of officers and the CBP\u2019s policy failed the strict scrutiny test because the restriction of photography in this way did not leave alternative options. The Reporters Committee argued that photography and visual recording were essential elements of the media\u2019s reporting of numerous matters of public concern, including those arising at the border. They also claimed there were strong policy reasons to allow photographing public officials including CBP officials and national security concerns did not provide the compelling interest to justify the CBP media restrictions. On August 14, 2018 the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court's holding on the First Amendment claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court found the First Amendment claim to not be precluded from reconsideration based on the earlier dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim. Moreover, the court held that the government\u2019s action was content-based restriction of speech in a public forum and required a more substantial showing that banning photography achieved the compelling interest of promoting border security. 899 F.3d 1035. Discovery continued throughout much of 2017 and 2018. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 10, 2019 that focused on their First Amendment claims. The case was transferred to Magistrate Judge Allison Goddard on September 16, 2019; she oversaw discovery and settlement negotiations. As of May 2020, the parties had not reached a settlement agreement, and negotiation is ongoing.", "summary": "On October 24, 2012, two U.S. citizens detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) after taking pictures of ports of entry filed a lawsuit against CBP in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. The plaintiffs sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, alleging that CBP's policy and practice of prohibiting the use of camera and video recording devices at or near CBP-controlled facilities without CBP's prior approval was unconstitutional. On April 12, 2013, the District Court (Judge Thomas J. Whelan) denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "On May 13, 1998, two individuals with developmental disabilities eligible for services under Florida's Medicaid Home and Community Based Services Waiver Program (\"HCBSW\") filed this class action lawsuit against various Florida state officials in their official capacities under the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12101, et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794; Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1396a, et seq., 1396n, et seq., and 42 C.F.R. \u00a7 431.200; the Due Process Clause; and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Fort Lauderdale Division. The plaintiffs, represented by the Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that state officials routinely denied or provided without reasonable promptness critical HCBW services for Medicaid-eligible, developmentally-disabled persons based on funding concerns rather than medical necessity concerns. On July 31, 1998, the plaintiffs amended the complaint, adding four new individual plaintiffs and one institutional plaintiff, the Advocacy Center for Disabled Persons. On January 19, 1999, the plaintiffs amended their complaint a second time to add, among other things, twelve additional individual plaintiffs and a cause of action to enforce certain sections of the Medicaid Act requiring states participating in Medicaid to provide early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment to eligible persons under the age of 21. On March 10, 1999, the Court (Judge Wilkie D. Ferguson, Jr.) granted the class certification motion. In response, defendants appealed the order to the 11th Circuit. On August 11, 2000, the 11th Circuit (Judge Stanley Marcus) vacated the class certification order and remanded the case to the district court. However, before the issuance of the Circuit Court opinion, on August 1, 2000, the parties filed a joint motion seeking approval of a settlement agreement. According to the Settlement Agreement, the Department of Children and Family Services (\"Department\") would, among other things, certify all Waiver providers, provide relevant training, create a Quality Assurance System, and incrementally enroll more eligible persons on the Waiver pursuant to the timeline in the Agreement. On August 9, 2001, the Court (Judge Ferguson) approved the settlement. On November 1, 2004, the parties reached an agreement regarding attorneys' fees and litigation expenses, according to which, the State of Florida agreed to pay $1.15 million in full settlement of all claims for attorneys' fees and litigation expenses. On September 7, 2005, the Court (Judge Patricia A. Seitz) ordered the case closed.", "summary": "This case was brought by a group of people with developmental disabilities eligible for the Home and Community Based Services Waiver Program against the state of Florida seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On September, the Court closed the case due to the fulfillment of the Settlement Agreement reached between the parties."} {"article": "On October 26, 2010, a group of Latino men and women filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1983, 1985(3), 1986, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against the Town of East Haven and the East Haven Police Department. The plaintiffs, represented both by private counsel and Yale Law School's legal services organization, sought (1) compensatory damages for their individual injuries; (2) punitive damages; and (3) injunctive relief adequate to prevent the continuation and recurrence of the unlawful conduct by the Town and Police Department. The complaint alleged the Town and Police Department engaged in a campaign of racial profiling against Latino men and women. The defendants allegedly enforced traffic and immigration laws against Latinos in a discriminatory fashion and demonstrated anti-Latino bias through officials' derogatory statements. The plaintiffs further claimed that the Town and Police Department denied Latinos their constitutional rights by subjecting them to unreasonable searches and seizures, beatings, use of Tasers, illegal arrests, and excessive use of force. These practices were done for the purpose of intimidating the Latino community. On April 24, 2012, the District Court (Judge Janet Bond Arterton) granted the United States' Motion to Intervene and stay the case pending the resolution of a related federal criminal case. The case was reopened on November 11, 2012 and, on June 26, 2012, transferred to Judge Alvin W. Thompson because he was presiding over a related civil case (USA v. East Haven, 3:12-cv-01652-AWT, PN-CT-0001) brought by the United States against the Town. Following the settlement of that case, the Town and Police Department were required to institute new policies and practices as part of the settlement agreement. As a result, on August 12, 2014, Judge Thompson approved the parties' Consent Motion to Approve Stipulation as they entered a Settlement Agreement for conditional dismissal, pursuant to the similar one reached in USA v. East Haven, against all defendants except one officer. East Haven agreed to: pay total damages in the amount of $450,000; implement remedial training relating to the use of force, stops and searches and seizures; and implement bias-free policing, supervisory review, and a complaint-review process. The agreement stated that the injunctive relief would remain in effect until the later of the two options: four years from the date that the Board implements its new policies or the time at which the district court terminates the settlement agreement. On September 26, 2014, the Court approved the parties' stipulation to dismiss the case with prejudice and without costs. As of January 30, 2019, no further docket activity occurs and the injunctive relief window is finished, so this case is presumably closed.", "summary": "In October 2010, a group of Latino men and women brought a civil action against the Town of East Haven and its Police Department alleging a campaign of racial profiling. In August 2014, the case settled and plaintiffs were awarded monetary damages. The Police Department's policies and procedures were changed under a settlement agreement in a related case brought by the United States. As of January 30, 2019, no further docket activity occurs and the injunctive relief window is finished, so this case is presumably closed."} {"article": "On October 2, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a female employee, filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Utah, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Reid School, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant terminated and/or failed to hire the complainant because of her sex and pregnancy. On March 27, 2008, the District Court (Judge Tena Campbell) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $34,500.", "summary": "On October 2, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a female employee, filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Utah, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Reid School, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant terminated and/or failed to hire the complainant because of her sex and pregnancy. On March 27, 2008, the District Court (Judge Tena Campbell) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $34,500."} {"article": "On January 3, 1979, prisoners housed in Puerto Rican prisons filed this class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, against the Administration of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The plaintiffs, represented by the Civil Action and Education Corporation, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the prison system provided inadequate healthcare. They also alleged that the living conditions in the system led to unusually high levels of inmate death, and that the use of solitary confinement cells known as \"calabozos\" for housing persons voluntarily seeking protective custody constituted cruel punishment. They also complained that the prisons were overcrowded and unsanitary, containing insufficient light and ventilation, as well as a lack of privacy. As the discovery process moved forward, the plaintiffs added complaints in the areas of due process, equal protection, rights of free association, and the right of access to the courts. On January 5, 1980, Judge Juan Manuel Perez-Gimenez found that the defendants had \"blatantly violated the federal Constitution's interdiction against cruel and unusual punishment,\" running a prison system that was rampant with suicides, violent deaths, raw sewage running in the dormitories and kitchens, toilets that didn't work, prescriptions that did not get filled, no beds or mattresses, no soap, toothbrushes, or toothpaste, food contaminated by rats or other vermin, untrained staff, and overcrowding. Judge Perez-Gimenez found that \"psychotic mad men are kept for weeks and months (some pre-trial detainees) caged like animals, without clothes, without toilet facilities, without medicines, forced to eat with their hands and in most cases without ever seeing a doctor.\" The Court also found that other inmates, seeking asylum from threats of death or serious injury in the general penal population, lost all their privileges, all rehabilitation programs, all chance for parole, and all recreation, all the while being locked in dungeons called \"calabozos.\" In light of these findings, the Court granted a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs, finding that the prison system needed system-wide changes, and that irreparable harm would occur if immediate relief were not granted. 497 F.Supp. 14. Six years later, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, alleging that their Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights continued to be violated. On March 21, 1986, Judge Perez-Gimenez re-examined the defendants' compliance with the injunction, and found that the defendants had \"all too frequently offered the appearance of compliance with the decree as a substitute for obedience, that the laws of the Commonwealth had been ignored by administrators (at all levels) who disobeyed in silence, and vast sums of money, whose expenditure had been repeatedly proffered to the court as evidence of reformation, had been wasted without bringing about any substantial and enduring change in the reality of daily life in Puerto Rico's prisons.\" In order to enforce its orders, Judge Perez-Gimenez decided to appoint two court monitors to assess compliance, report on conditions in the prison system, and prepare a detailed remedial order. 672 F.Supp. 591. On the same day, Judge Perez-Gimenez entered a second order finding that since the defendants had not appealed the court's orders, the plaintiffs were overwhelmingly likely to succeed in this case and it would be inequitable to delay awarding the plaintiffs their attorneys' fees. 1986 WL 21347. One year later, the plaintiff class asked the court to hold the Governor of Puerto Rico, the Administrator of Corrections, and individual parole board members in contempt for failing to comply with the court's orders. On July 23, 1987, Judge Perez-Gimenez held that the failure of the defendants to comply with the Court's orders amounted to civil contempt of court, ordering them to pay $50,000.00 for violations to the court's orders. Judge Perez-Gimenez also ordered that the defendants would pay a daily fine whenever an inmate was held living in an institution where the maximum capacity had been exceeded. 697 F.Supp. 37. On September 10, 1986, the parties entered into a stipulation requiring the defendants to provide each prisoner within the jurisdiction at least 55 square feet of living and sleeping space no later then December 31, 1987. Shortly before the deadline for compliance, the defendants asked the court to modify the space order. On September 14, 1987, Judge Perez-Gimenez denied the motion, holding that they had failed to show that compliance would result in pernicious consequences, and that they had failed to show changed circumstances warranting relief. He also held that the building project that the defendants had undertaken to increase dramatically the available beds for housing did not entitle the prison authorities to relief. 672 F.Supp. 627. The next week, Judge Perez-Gimenez ordered, due to defendants\u2019 continued non-compliance, a $50,000 sanction, with a daily fine of $10 per inmate whenever an inmate was held in an institution where the maximum capacity was exceeded. In an effort to lower the jail population, Judge Perez-Gimenez also ordered the implementation of an expedited bail project. These efforts, however, were ultimately unsuccessful in lowering the population to acceptable limits. On August 15, 1988, the court increased the daily fine to $50 per inmate. As further incentive, the court ordered that the daily fine would be increased in September to $60 per inmate. In response to this influx of funds, Judge Perez-Gimenez ordered a special advisory committee be appointed to help the court appropriately spend the accumulated money. On December 23, 1988, the defendants filed a second motion for relief, asking the court to change the requirement to 35 square feet rather than 55 for at least another year and a half. The court held hearings on this motion from May 3-8, 1990, and on June 7, 1990, Judge Perez-Gimenez denied the defendants' motion to change the 55 square foot standard and ordered the defendants to present the court with a comprehensive compliance plan within 30 days. Judge Perez-Gimenez warned the defendants that if they did not present the plan in a timely fashion, the court would grant damages to the plaintiffs. 1990 WL 83321. In the meantime, the inmates motioned the court to close the Ponce District Jail (popularly known as \"El Castillo\") because of the continuing violations of the rights of the detainees. On July 28, 1988, Judge Perez-Gimenez found that the defendants had violated the rights of the inmates of the jail by housing them with convicted inmates and by refusing them access to medical services. While Judge Perez-Gimenez refused to order immediate closing of the jail, he agreed to impose conditions on its continuing operation. 697 F.Supp. 37. The defendants appealed, and on September 26, 1989, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the First Circuit (Judge Stephen Gerald Breyer) affirmed the District Court's decisions, holding that the defendants' compliance with the court orders had not been substantial enough to invalidate the finding of contempt, and that the sanctions imposed by the district court were not too high. 887 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989). The defendants sought Supreme Court review, and on March 19, 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari. 494 U.S. 1046 (1990). A few months later, a member of the plaintiff class named Domingo Grajales Cardona filed a complaint with the court, alleging that several defendants had retaliated against him for his cooperation with the plaintiff attorneys in this lawsuit. The court held a hearing and found that the defendants had taken him from his cell, handcuffed him, beaten him, locked him inside a box, and shot several tear gas bombs at him inside the box. Judge Perez-Gimenez ordered each of the four named defendants in the lawsuit to pay the Grajales $125.00 in damages. 704 F.Supp. 16. Shortly after the court\u2019s June 7, 1988 order, negotiations between the parties broke down. The court found that the plaintiffs had been making reasonable requests, and that the defendants had not negotiated in good faith. The plaintiffs asked the court to hold the defendants in contempt, and the court held a hearing on October 22, 1990. Shortly before the hearing, the defendants again asked the court to modify the stipulation requiring 55 square feet of space for each inmate. On January 10, 1991, Judge Perez-Gimenez denied the defendants' motion and imposed contempt sanctions on them for their noncompliance with the Court's orders. 754 F.Supp. 942. A month later, the court ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. 757 F.Supp. 140. On May 30, 1991, the court entered an order directing the defendants to enter into a contract for conducting evaluations and preparing plans of corrective action to address problems in the jail's living environment. The defendants failed to do so, and on July 18, 1991, Judge Perez-Gimenez held that the court would appoint a special master to enter into the contract on behalf of the prison officials. 771 F.Supp. 11. The defendants asked the court to grant them partial and temporary relief from the contempt fines. On June 25, 1991, Judge Perez-Gimenez denied the motion, holding that the increase in population at some institutions due to the necessary closing of admission at other institutions due to life-threatening environmental and health conditions did not amount to an unforeseen condition that would excuse compliance. 775 F.Supp. 477. On October 10, 1991, Judge Perez-Gimenez expressed its extreme frustration with the defendants' ongoing disobedience to the court's orders, noting that the defendants had paid a total of $68,240,910.00 in fines based on their violation of the requirements that the inmates be given a stipulated amount of living space. In an effort to force compliance, Judge Perez-Gimenez ordered the Clerk of the Court to transfer $1,000,000.00 from the special account currently holding the fine money to the United States Treasury each week. 775 F.Supp. 487. For the next hear and a half, the court closely monitored the case, intermittently approving plans from the court monitors, the special advisory committee, and the appointed special master in areas of medical administration, rehabilitation of drug users, bed space and population management, building codes and staff training. The court also continued to disperse attorney\u2019s fees and other costs in monthly intervals. On August 19, 1992, the defendants orally requested an injunction barring the opposing counsel from engaging in ex-parte communications with employees, which was summarily denied by the court. The court also ordered that all future applications for funds be filed jointly by plaintiffs and defendants. The defendants also motioned for a permanent discharge of fines for the dates of November 1991 to May 1992 on September 1, 1992. This issue was fully briefed, and on March 12, 1993, the defendant additionally motioned for a permanent discharge of all fines. These motions were dismissed on June 14, 1993. The court continued to closely monitor various projects presented by the appointed monitors and committee. In the meantime, the plaintiffs motioned on April 29, 1993, to hold the defendants in contempt for violating the court\u2019s orders to construct a psychiatric hospital. Judge Perez-Gimenez set the hearing for September 27, 1993. Three days before the hearing, both parties motioned to continue the hearing, which was granted by the court. In October of 1993, the plaintiffs motioned for a temporary restraining order reducing the populations of Section Q of the Bayamon Metropolitan Institute and to increase custodial staff. The court held a meeting in his chambers later that month, where the both parties agreed to a stipulation regarding the restraining order. The plaintiffs submitted an order, which was signed by Judge Perez-Gimenez on October 28, 1993. On December 17, 1993, the court established that the parties would have a period of discovery, culminating in a pretrial hearing on April 5, 1994, to resolve any outstanding disputes. The plaintiff responded by filing an amended complaint on December 31. Both parties motioned for summary judgment. On April 28, 1994, the parties entered into a stipulation wherein the defendants agreed to file an organizational plan within 90 days, detailing their plan to achieve compliance with the court's orders on facility standards. The court continued to monitor monthly expenses of the monitors, committees, and programs. The court approved the stipulation regarding the facilities rehabilitation program on June 8, 1994. Two months later, on August 16, 1994, the plaintiffs motioned to compel the defendants to comply with the court-approved stipulation. The defendants continued to regularly stipulation to requests made by the plaintiffs regarding custodial and sociopenal staffing, security, and classification. These were approved on September 13, 1994. The court approved more stipulations regarding these issues and other miscellaneous items on December 5, 1994. The court continued close monitoring of the expense and programs authorized by the court. On January 31, 1995, Judge Perez-Gimenez ordered the defendants to file a list of all Administration of Correction Facilities reflecting the maximum capacity at 55 square feet of living and sleeping space per prisoner for each such institution and for each housing unit. The defendants filed an answer to the amended complaint on February 15, 1995. The defendants also continued to file motions requesting time to complete tasks in their multiple stipulations. The court granted some motions for more time and denied others, imposing fines for non-compliance with the stipulations. On May 24, 1995, the court ordered that a hearing to be set regarding the Roster Management and Facilities Rehabilitation Program. This hearing was continued upon information that the parties had reached an agreement. In June, the court held the Administrator of Correction in contempt, fining him $100 each day that he did not comply with the court\u2019s order of reference (specific order is not available). This was resolved on July 6, 1995, when the court ordered an injunction, directing the Administrator of Correction to refrain from allowing false documents of compliance before the court, and to circulate a notice to every employee of their duty to truthfully disclose all information to the court monitor. The monitoring of the expenses and programs in the Administration of Corrections continued for several years. On February 28, 1997, the court suspended the joint compliance consultant and instead appointed an expert witness to offer recommendations. The expert witness identified a health crisis within the prison health program, and recommended that a receiver be appointed. Both parties objected to this recommendation. A hearing on the correctional health program was throughout August and September. Judge Perez-Gimenez also issued a check to the Secretary of the Treasury of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in the amount of $1.5 million to cover the expenses for the existing contract until the defendants had an opportunity to develop a detailed budge proposal. The parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law following the hearing. The court-appointed expert witness also submitted a proposed order with a revised plan for a receiver of a correctional health program. On May 18, 1998, the court ordered a Joint Health Coordinator to run the correctional health program, with a reporting and financial structure fully dependent on the court for operation. Meanwhile, on January 30, 1998, the plaintiffs filed a motion asking the court to hold the defendants in contempt of the court's orders, asserting that the defendants had disobeyed in the areas of inmate classification, crowding, and staffing. On December 20, 2000, Judge Perez-Gimenez held the defendants in contempt, finding that they were not entitled to protection under the defense of impossibility. 124 F.Supp. 2d 774. A dispute arose regarding the extent to which the Secretary of the Puerto Rico Department of Health was to control decisions regarding the process of transfer of responsibility for inmate health care from the defendants to a nonprofit private corporation, an action that had been included in the earlier stipulation. The district court assigned new duties to the chief health care coordinator in order to facilitate the transition, and the Secretary appealed. On July 15, 2002, the First Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Bruce Marshall Selya, dismissed that appeal, holding that the District Court's order did not modify the previously issued injunction, and thus was not immediately appealable. 303 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002). On October 1, 2003, the defendants asked the court to terminate the consent orders that had been entered by the court pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). On January 26, 2004, Judge Perez-Gimenez denied the motion, finding that the historical systemic indifference to the inmates' medical and mental health needs, as well as the institutional failures to comply with the Court's orders, continued to threaten the health and safety of the plaintiff class, requiring the continued operation of the prospective relief in favor of the plaintiffs. 300 F.Supp.2d 321. The defendants appealed, and on August 6, 2004, the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. 378 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2004). The defendants asked for Supreme Court review, and on January 10, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari. 532 U.S. 1054 (2005). On February 8, 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion asking the court to order the defendants to show why they should not be held in contempt for failure to comply with food services that passed constitutional muster. The court set the matter for a hearing. Despite being granted additional time to file, the defendants opted not to file any response. Prior to the hearing the parties attempted to reach a negotiated stipulation which would address the various area of noncompliance. These negotiations were unsuccessful. As a result, the court held a multi-day hearing in May of 2010. At these hearings, the plaintiffs presented the testimony of 13 witnesses, including inmates currently in the custody, the Administration of Corrections' Director of Food Services, and an expert in nutrition, diets and food security, as well as voluminous documentary exhibits demonstrating the extent of the violations of the court's orders, and the defendant's knowledge and deliberate indifference to the ongoing constitutional violations. On this basis, Judge Perez-Gimenez required the implementation of critical food safety practices and permitted the oversight and implementation of those practices, ordering the defendants to submit an itemized list of what they will do in terms of creating the positions and staffing within forty-five days. 2010 WL 4922700. For the next several months, Judge Perez-Gimenez continued to monitor the defendants' compliance with the orders that had been entered, including food services order, mental health plan and financial disbursements. In April of 2011, Judge Perez-Gimenez recused himself from the case. On May 10, 2011, Judge Paul J. Barbadoro was assigned the case. Judge Barbadoro denied the plaintiffs next motion for disbursement of funds, and issued a statement reiterating that counsel needed to submit a memorandum with any future requests for funds. Judge Barbadoro further ordered on September 19, 2011, that the parties should submit reports of current compliance or non-compliance of the various orders to prepare for settlement discussions. The parties submitted these reports in November. On December 14, 2011, Judge Barbadoro appointed Judge Charles Cordero as settlement master for the negotiations, with regular status reports to the court. The parties reached an injunctive agreement the following year. The settlement agreement superseded all prior orders, and outlined nine areas where the defendant agreed to change its practices: (1) access to the courts, (2) laundry services, (3) classification, (4) medical services, (5) food services, (6) admission cells, and (7) recreation (8) staffing and security, and (9) environmental conditions. The defendants agreed to have a staffed library, legal supplies, access to attorneys and a working grievance procedure. The defendants agreed to provide three sets of clean clothes to each inmate, clean bedding that was changed weekly, adequate soap in the laundry service area, and a laundry procedure that guaranteed the laundry machines would be serviced within 30 days of a need for repair. The defendants agreed to follow the developed classification manual for classifying and housing inmates. The defendants agreed to follow the 2011 Mental Health Plan and to keep a file of each inmate\u2019s current medications. The defendants agreed to follow the 2009 Federal Food Code. The defendants agreed to use the prisons' admissions area as a temporary location for inmates and not keep them there for more than 24 hours. The defendants agreed to establish a recreation plan with at least two hours outside for five days a week. The defendants agreed to initiate a recruitment plan to fill the identified 635 missing officers system-wide, as well as the estimated yearly attrition of 250 workers per year. The defendants agreed that the new officers would receive 40 hours of initial training, as well as 40 hours of annual training. Finally, the defendants agreed to regularly evaluate and fix any environmental concerns. The defendants also agreed to other miscellaneous provisions, including the elimination of double bunking, canceling visits as a disciplinary measure, and regular parole review. On December 13, 2012, Judge Barbadoro signed the settlement agreement. It was scheduled to last two years, and stated \"Upon completion of said time period, the relief stipulated by the parties shall be terminated, unless otherwise provided by the Court pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act.\" The court continued to monitor the expenses of the prison system through monthly invoice reports. On May 16, 2013, the plaintiffs submitted a status report, alleging that the defendants were not in compliance in several areas. First, the plaintiffs stated that the inmates\u2019 access to court had been compromised, with no paralegal assistance in the prison libraries and an undeveloped grievance procedure. Second, the plaintiffs alleged there was a laundry service problem, causing clothing and bedding shortage. Third, the plaintiffs alleged that the prison did not have enough money in their budget to run the medial service program. The plaintiffs also had concerns with the defendant\u2019s ability to meet the required staffing, environmental and capacity standards. The court held a series of video status conferences with both parties to discuss the settlement agreement and budget issues. On May 5, 2014, Judge Barbadoro requested another status report with the ongoing points of contention between the parties. The parties submitted a spreadsheet that highlighted many of the same problems as the May 16, 2013 report: There were no paralegals, no grievance procedures, and not enough clean laundry. The plaintiffs expressed concern that there was still no transportation of inmates to medical care. The plaintiffs alleged that the food was not up to the agreed upon 2009 Federal Food Code standards. They alleged that the inmates were not receiving daily opportunities for physical movement. Finally, the plaintiffs were alleged that there was not enough trained staffing in most areas of the facility, that the buildings were in a state of disrepair, and that double bunking of maximum-security inmates was still occurring. The defendants asserted that they were either in the process of complying or had complied with all the regulations. On September 15, 2014, the defendants motioned to amend the settlement agreement, arguing that, in light of the current financial distress of Puerto Rico, it was too high of a financial burden on the defendants. The plaintiffs responded later that month, objecting to the changes. On December 4, 2014, the plaintiffs also filed a motion to extend the court\u2019s supervision of the settlement agreement, which was scheduled to end December of 2014. Judge Barbadoro immediately granted an order extending the settlement agreement until December 31, 2014. On December 19, 2014, the defendants withdrew their motion before the court to amend the settlement agreement. On the same day, the parties filed an unrelated, joint final private settlement before the court for damages to the prisoners incarcerated under unconstitutional conditions. The damages settlement, while nominally submitted to the court, continued to be discussed between the parties for several months. On March 2, 2015, Judge Barbadoro requested that the parties either file an amended damages agreement or file a notice of intent not to file an amended agreement. The parties immediately filed requesting until March 13, 2015 to submit the proposed agreement, which the court granted. The final damages agreement, a private settlement and benefits proposal, was submitted on March 30, 2015. In the agreement, the parties proposed a system of giving individual inmates who had been incarcerated between 1980 to present a package of various educational, housing, health, recreation, public transportation and Department of Correction commissary benefits. On May 4, 2015, the court entered an order requesting estimates from both the plaintiffs and defendants on final costs associated with complying with the 2012 injunctive settlement agreement. Judge Barbadoro approved the damages settlement on November 30, 2015. On February 3, 2016, the plaintiffs started destroying old files relating to this case. The court continued to be focus on financially resolving both the damages and injunctive agreement aspects of this case. On March 31, 2016, the parties submitted a joint motion requesting that the claims period begin on May 15, 2016 and end after 6 months on November 15, 2016. Judge Barbadoro granted the motion on April 1, 2016 and ordered that the plaintiffs publish notice of the claims via newspapers and take the notice website live to ensure that class members receive proper notice of the benefits they were entitled to under the settlement. On May 9, 2016, the court granted a motion that stipulated that the notification plan be paid for with fine funds. On August 23, 2016, Judge Barbadoro ordered that the remaining fine funds would be paid to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The more than $20 million would be used to benefit inmates in Puerto Rico's correctional system. The court would continue to oversee the funds and the Commonwealth had to receive approval for the intended use of the funds from the court. The Commonwealth's obligation to pay the remaining fines was cancelled. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico continued to request approval of the funds from the court that benefitted Puerto Rican inmates. The court approved all requests. Some of the funds were used for improved educational programs for inmates and improved electronic recording for the management of inmates. The last action on the docket was September 6, 2019.", "summary": "On January 3, 1979, prisoners being housed in Puerto Rican prisons filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Administration of Correction of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The District Court (Judge Juan Manuel Perez-Gimenez) found blatant violations of the federal Constitution's interdiction against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court is involved to correct the violations ever since. However the defendants have failed to comply for decades. On October 10, 1991, the District Court expressed its extreme frustration with the defendants' ongoing disobedience with the Court's orders, noting that the defendants had paid a total of $68,240,910.00 in fines based on their violation of the requirements that the inmates be given a stipulated amount of living space. On December 13, 2012, the District Court approved a final injunctive agreement, which was set to expired in 2014. The parties also settled a damages agreement for all inmates who have been incarcerated from 1980 to present with a series of government benefits, which is in the process of being dispersed. The court also stipulated that the remaining fine funds be given to Puerto Rico for the use of benefitting inmates in Puerto Rico."} {"article": "On June 2, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a class action against the Governor of Georgia and other state officials under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division. Plaintiffs are nonprofit organizations, business associations, and individuals. Plaintiffs challenged Georgia's comprehensive immigration law, House Bill 87 (\"HB87\"). The organizational Plaintiffs claimed that HB87 would cause them to divert resources from their traditional missions in order to educate the public on the effects of the new law. The individual Plaintiffs claimed that they would be subject to investigation, detention, and arrest under HB87 because of their status as, or association with, unauthorized aliens. In their complaint, Plaintiffs argued that HB87 violates the Supremacy Clause, the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the constitutional right to travel. Plaintiffs asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief. On June 8, 2011, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the enforcement of portions of HB87 that would go into effect on July 1, 2011. On June 14, 2011, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. Defendants contended that the Plaintiffs lacked standing and that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims. The Court held a hearing on the motions on June 20, 2011. On June 27, 2011, the District Court (Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.) issued an order granting Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction against Sections 7 and 8 of the law, and granting in part and denying in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2011). Section 7 of the law created three distinct state criminal violations: (1) transporting or moving an illegal alien, O.C.G.A. \u00a7 16-11-200(b); (2) concealing or harboring an illegal alien, id. \u00a7 16-11-201(b); and (3) inducing an illegal alien to enter the state of Georgia, id. \u00a7 16-11-202(b). The District Court found these provisions preempted by the criminal provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, particularly 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1324. Section 8 authorized police officers to investigate the immigration status of individuals who cannot produce adequate identification to prove citizenship, provided probable cause exists that the individual has committed a crime. O.C.G.A. \u00a7 17-5-100(b). In implementing this investigatory provision, officers were not permitted to \"consider race, color, or national origin . . . except to the extent permitted by\" the United States and Georgia Constitutions. Id. \u00a7 17-5-100(e). The District Court likewise enjoined this provision as preempted. Defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. In December 2011, Defendants sought to stay the appeal pending the outcome of the Supreme Court's decision of Arizona v. United States, a case involving the Ninth Circuit striking down an Arizona law similar to this one. (Click here for the Clearinghouse entry on this case.) The Eleventh Circuit declined to stay proceedings. On August 20, 2012, in an opinion by Judge Charles Wilson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the district court's preliminary injunction. The Court held that, as a result of the Supreme Court's Arizona v. United States analysis (which had since been decided), Section 7's criminalization of various immigration-related conduct was preempted. The Court also held that Section 8's authorization of police inquiry regarding persons without proper documentation (the \"papers please\" provision) was not properly subject of a pre-enforcement facial challenge; rather, plaintiffs' challenge would have to focus on implementation, and was therefore premature. Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2012). The Court denied the defendants' request for rehearing en banc. On March 20, 2013, the District Court (Judge Thrash) entered a permanent injunction, enjoining Section 7 of HB87. The same day, Defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' remaining claims against Section 8 of HB87, arguing that Plaintiffs' facial challenge could not move forward in light of the Arizona decision and the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in this case. In opposition, Plaintiffs argued that they needed more discovery to pursue their claims. On July 18, 2013, the District Court (Judge Thrash) granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' challenge to Section 8. The Court held that, as a result of the Arizona and Eleventh Circuit decisions, Plaintiffs' \"burden to establish the facial unconstitutionality of section 8 now appears to be insurmountable.\" The Court further held that \"[a]ny further challenges to [HB87] must take the form of as-applied challenges.\" In granting the motion, the Court dismissed all remaining claims in the case. Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 958 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2013).", "summary": "This case was brought on June 2, 2011 to challenge Georgia's comprehensive immigration law, HB87. On August 20, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's grant of a preliminary injunction staying enforcement of the part of the law that purported to criminalize transporting or harboring an illegal alien. However, applying the Supreme Court's recent decision in U.S. v. Arizona, the court of appeals found that challenge to the \"papers please\" provision of the state law was premature, and needed to await implementation."} {"article": "On December 17, 2003, a coalition of immigration rights advocacy groups, which included the National Council of La Raza (NCLR), New York Immigration Coalition (NYIC), American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), Latin American Workers Project (LAWP), and UNITE, filed suit against several federal agencies (FBI, DOJ, ICE, Homeland Security) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking to halt the government practice of entering and disseminating civil immigration information to state and local enforcement officials through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database. Plaintiffs contended that the federal government had been entering information into the NCIC about outstanding immigration warrants or orders of deportation, exclusion or removal (\"absconders\") and alleged violations of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (\"NSEERS violators\"). Plaintiffs further contended that because Congress had generally preempted state and local law enforcement officials from enforcing immigration law, defendants were causing state and local officials to make unconstitutional arrests based on the information entered. The federal agencies moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The District Court (Senior Judge I. Leo Glasser) granted the agencies' motion and dismissed the case for lack of standing. Judge Glasser held that \"speculation that some unauthorized party at some point in the future might access immigration violators file in NCIC database in violation of alleged privacy right of members of advocacy organizations was not actual or imminent and concrete and particularized injury necessary for advocacy organization to have standing.\" National Council of La Raza v. Gonzales, 468 F.Supp.2d 429, 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). Plaintiffs appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, (Judges Straub, Raggi, Sessions) affirmed the dismissal on July 3, 2008. There was no opinion issued.", "summary": "In 2003, a coalition of immigration rights advocacy groups filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against several federal agencies, seeking to halt the government practice of entering and disseminating civil immigration information to state and local enforcement officials through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database. The case was dismissed for lack of standing, and the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal in 2008."} {"article": "On October 22, 2018, media site Buzzfeed and one of its reporters brought this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and several of its components--Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Customs & Border Protection, and U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services. The case alleged violations of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Specifically, the plaintiffs had filed a FOIA request for unedited video, audio, and photographs of migrants and migrant children, and of children being separated from their parents and subsequently held in U.S. detention facilities. According to the complaint, the defendants had failed to provide an adequate response to the request. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs requested injunctive relief and attorney fees. The case was assigned to Judge Randolph D. Moss. This case was interrupted by a 34-day government shutdown. The case was therefore stayed from December 30, 2018 to February 6, 2019, when the shutdown ended. After the stay was lifted, the parties began submitting a series of joint status reports outlining their ongoing negotiations over the defendants\u2019 search for responsive documents. On June 5, 2020, the parties reported that negotiations had become deadlocked, with the defendants still refusing to hand over the requested child detention records. In response to the breakdown in negotiations, Judge Moss ordered the parties to submit short notices outlining the bases for any anticipated motions for summary judgement. On June 30, the defendants filed their notice, listing two anticipated arguments: first, that they argued that the plaintiffs\u2019 FOIA request did not \u201creasonably describe\u201d the records sought in a way that ICE could process without undue burden. Second, the defendants insisted that they had no responsive records depicting \u201cmigrant children being separated from their parents,\u201d because ICE did not separate children and parents, but rather held \u201cfamily units\u201d together in \u201cfamily residential centers.\u201d A week later, the plaintiffs submitted their own notice. They argued that the defendants\u2019 pre-motion filing ignored months of negotiations and concessions regarding the scope of their FOIA request, and that this request was no longer burdensome or unreasonably described, as they were now seeking only those records that should have been preserved in connection with five other federal lawsuits. This case is still ongoing as of August 15, 2020. The defendants\u2019 full motion for summary judgment is due on August 28, 2020 and the plaintiff\u2019s response and cross motion is due on October 2, 2020.", "summary": "On October 22, 2018, a Buzzfeed reporter and Buzzfeed brought this lawsuit against the U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security, Customs & Border Protection and Citizenship & Immigration Services in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They alleged the violation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiffs had requested from the defendants, agencies subject to FOIA, unedited video, audio and photographs of migrants and migrant children, and others seeking asylum and children being separated from their parent(s) and subsequently held in U.S. detention facilities. However, the defendants had not provided an adequate response to the request. The plaintiffs sought an injunctive order for compliance with the FOIA; specifically, that they release videos, audio recordings, and photographs depicting the detention, treatment, removal and intake of migrant children, as well as attorney fees and costs. The case is still ongoing."} {"article": "On February 17, 2007, the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division (DOJ), opened an investigation of the Cook County Jail, under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA). In July 2007, the DOJ conducted on-site inspections of the jail, interviewing staff and inmates, and on August 3, 2007, the DOJ notified jail officials of potentially life-threatening deficiencies at the jail, including grossly unsanitary conditions and inadequate emergency key precautions, which the jail immediately began to improve. As DOJ continued to investigate, its lawyers found a series of serious problems with the jail. For example, in one case, an inmate left untreated for a gunshot wound developed sepsis and died. Another inmate's medical problems went untreated, causing him to eventually need an amputation. Just one dentist served 9,800 inmates, and he only dealt in extractions. Indeed, the investigators found that twenty-five percent of the dental procedures result in infection. On July 11, 2008, the DOJ issued a 98-page findings letter detailing its conclusion that the jail was operating to deprive prisoners of their constitutional rights in many respects. The DOJ and the county then negotiated a settlement to the matter, and on May 13, 2010, DOJ filed its formal complaint and both parties filed a proposed settlement. On May 26, 2010, Judge Virginia M. Kendall issued an agreed order that addressed those problems and appointed four experts in the areas of Corrections, Medical, Mental Health, and Sanitation to monitor Defendants' compliance with the Order, who were to submit reports to the court on a semiannual basis. The proposed settlement contained comprehensive provisions on use of force, protection from harm, medical care, mental health care, sanitation, training, quality assurance/performance improvement, fire and life safety, and improved policies, procedures, and practices. The order would terminate when Defendants have achieved substantial compliance with each of the provisions of the Agreed Order and have maintained Substantial Compliance with the Agreed Order for a period of 18 months. On May 27, 2010, the Defendants filed a motion for a Prisoner Release Order. In a previous case, Duran v. Sheriff Thomas Dart (case no. 74 C 2949), Judge Shadur had ordered a Prisoner Release Order on March 22, 1983. (Duran is JC-IL-0002 in this Clearinghouse.) That order remained in effect over all the subsequent years. In addition to that order, Judge George M. Marovich, who succeeded Judge Shadur as the U.S. District Court Judge to whom this matter was assigned, entered a transfer order on November 14, 2003, permitting the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDOC) to transfer to the Illinois Department of Corrections all persons remanded to the CCDOC who had unexpired terms of imprisonment as a result of being released on a mandatory supervised release order (\"Parole\"). Despite having years to comply with the previous court orders, the CCDOC still had daily concerns whether a spike in arrests, or some other factor not under the CCDOC's control, would increase the number of inmates beyond the number of living units available. At the time, the daily population at CCDOC exceeded 90% of capacity. Therefore, the Defendants sought to continue the March 22, 1983 Prisoner Release Order entered by Judge Shadur and the November 14, 2003 Order entered by Judge Marovich pursuant to 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3626(a)(3)(C). Defendants asked that the Prisoner Release Order permit the Sheriff to release individuals in such numbers necessary to reduce and relieve overcrowding, thus allowing solutions to the identified constitutional deficiencies. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3626, even if the parties agree, such an order can be entered only by a three-judge district court after certain findings are entered by that court. The requisite findings include: an ongoing violation of constitutional rights, with crowding as the primary source of the constitutional deficiencies, and weighing of public safety concerns. Pursuant to this statute, a three-judge court was convened. On January 11, 2011, Judge Richard A. Posner, Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman, and Judge Kendall denied the motion for entry of the proposed released order without prejudice, inviting the parties to submit a revised motion consistent with the discussion and directives in their opinion, plus evidence to support an estimate of the number of prisoners expected to be released if a revised order was approved. U.S. v. Cook County, Illinois, 761 F.Supp.2d 794 (N.D. Ill. 2011). The Defendant responded and the Plaintiffs agreed with the revised proposed order. On March 14, 2011, the three Judges stated that the revised proposed order complied with the directives in their opinion and was satisfactory with the exception of the provision stating that the Sheriff \"may release detainees in order to reduce the population of CCJ to 85% of its available bed capacity,\" upon specified conditions. On March 29, 2011, the three Judges approved the modified released order that allowed the release on electronic monitoring of up to 1,500 pretrial detainees to prevent overcrowding and thus reduce the number of potential constitutional violations stemming from overcrowding at CCJ. On June 13, 2011, Judge Kendall ordered that, by agreement of the parties, the Sheriff of Cook County was authorized to retain Patricia Hardyman, Ph.D. of the Criminal Justice Institute, Inc. in Middletown, Connecticut to consult with and aid the Sheriff in creating a classification system compliant with the Agreed Order entered on May 26, 2010. The Court monitored the Defendants' compliance with the provisions of the order through reports of assigned monitors and the parties and periodic status conferences. The May 2017 monitoring report marked the first finding of achievement of substantial compliance with all areas of the order. On May 18, 2017, the DOJ moved to dismiss the Sheriff from the case, finding that the Sheriff and the CCDOC had achieved and sustained substantial compliance with the requirements assigned to the Sheriff under the order. At a June 9, 2017 hearing, Judge Kendall granted a motion to dismiss the Sheriff and lifted formal oversight of the Cook County jail in that respect. Because other provisions unrelated to the Sheriff still required 18 months of sustained compliance according to the order, limited twice-yearly monitoring continued. The November 2017 monitoring report found continued substantial compliance, marking 6 months of full substantial compliance. In that report, the monitor noted areas for improvement, particularly in regard to healthcare, and noted that in order to maintain substantial compliance regarding access to care, the County must address these areas prior to the next monitoring visit. The May 2018 report highlighted sustained substantial compliance with regards to medical and dental care. The parties filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss the remaining sections of the agreed order on June 12, 2018. The parties agreed that Cook County achieved and maintained substantial compliance with all of the Agreed Order provisions for which it bore responsibility, and therefore found it appropriate to conclude the Agreed Order. Judge Kendall granted the motion on June 26, 2018. The case is now closed.", "summary": "After an investigation of Cook County Jail (CCJ) under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division (DOJ), issued a findings letter on July 11, 2008, detailing its conclusion that the CCJ was operating to deprive prisoners of their constitutional rights in many respects. On May 13, 2010, the DOJ, on behalf of inmates from the CCJ, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997 against Cook County and the Cook County Sheriff, proposing a previously negotiated settlement. On May 26, 2010, Judge Virginia M. Kendall issued an agreed order that addressed those problems and appointed four experts to monitor the Defendants' compliance with the order, who were to submit reports to the court on a semiannual basis. Defendants achieved substantial compliance in all areas in May 2017, and monitoring concluded in May 2018."} {"article": "On June 12, 2015, this lawsuit was brought by an indigent person arrested by the City of Moss Point, Mississippi (the City), who was jailed for a prolonged period after she was unable to pay the fee demanded for release under the city\u2019s \u201csecured bail\u201d schedule. Under that policy, persons arrested by the city were required to post a bail ranging from several hundred to several thousand dollars, based on the offense committed, without any consideration of the person\u2019s ability to pay. The plaintiff argued that the City\u2019s policy violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Represented by public-interest legal groups Equal Justice Under Law and the MacArthur Justice Center, along with private counsel, the plaintiff brought suit in the U.S. federal Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, under \u00a7 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The plaintiff requested class certification to represent other similarly situated individuals, a declaration that the City had violated the constitutional rights of arrestees who were unable to pay the City\u2019s secured bail, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief requiring the City to stop jailing arrestees for their inability to pay the City\u2019s secured bail, damages to the named plaintiff to compensate for her period of confinement, and legal costs and attorneys\u2019 fees. On October 14, 2015, the parties notified the court that they had reached a settlement. That same day, the judge assigned to the case, District Judge Louis Guirola Jr., found the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief and plaintiff\u2019s motion for class certification moot in light of the settlement. Under the agreement, the City would abandon its secured bail requirement for persons seeking release from jail after a warrantless arrest or after an initial warrant arrest. Instead, it would release those persons if they agreed to provide an unsecured bond (under which persons only pay the court if they fail to adhere to the conditions of their bail) or a recognizance (a promise to comply with the conditions of bail). The City also agreed to improve its procedures for notifying arrestees of court dates. On November 6, 2015, Judge Guirola entered a declaratory judgment holding that the City's use of secured bail against the plaintiff was a violation of the 14th Amendment right to equal protection. 2015 WL 10322003. On November 12, 2015, Judge Guirola entered a final judgment, ordering the parties to abide by the terms of the settlement agreement. The plaintiff's counsel agreed to notify defendants of any perceived breach, and to give defendants a reasonable amount of time to resolve the breach before seeking enforcement of the agreement in court. The City also agreed to notify the plaintiff and counsel if it find that any of its employees or agents had violated the agreement. The case was dismissed and is now closed.", "summary": "On June 12, 2015, a person jailed by the City of Moss Point, Mississippi (the City) for failing to pay a secured bail fee sued the City in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, arguing that the City had violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. On November 12, 2015, District Judge Louis Guirola Jr. entered a final judgement ordering the parties to follow a settlement agreement that they had reached earlier, under which the City agreed to end its secured bail policy. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On September 16, 2015, the plaintiff, a former female technical employee of Microsoft, filed this class action lawsuit in the Western District of Washington against Microsoft Corporation. The plaintiff, represented by Outten & Golden LLP, sued the defendant under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000(e), and state law. The plaintiff alleged that as a result of defendant\u2019s policies, patterns, and practices, female technical employees received less compensation and were promoted less frequently than their male counterparts. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the force ranking system used by the defendant systematically undervalued female technical employees, resulting in lower pay and fewer promotions than male peers despite equal or better performance. On October 27, 2015, the plaintiff amended her complaint to include additional named plaintiffs. On November 12, 2015, the defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the following: plaintiffs\u2019 disparate treatment claims on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to allege intent to discriminate by defendant; plaintiffs\u2019 disparate impact claims for failure to allege a causal relationship between the forced ranking system and the alleged disparate impact; and plaintiffs\u2019 retaliation claims for failure to state a prima facie case of retaliation. Defendant also moved to strike plaintiffs\u2019 class definition on the grounds it was not ascertainable and the plaintiffs\u2019 Title VII claims on grounds of timeliness. On March 7, 2016, the court (Judge James L. Robart) denied defendant\u2019s motion to strike the class definition as it was not implausible on its face and the plaintiffs deserved to develop the facts and/or and definition of their class via class discovery. The court denied the motion to strike Title VII allegations on grounds of timeliness without prejudice as the motion raised a relevant dispute. The court denied the motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 disparate treatment claims as the plaintiffs satisfied the pleading requirements of the claim. The court also denied the motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s retaliation claim as the allegations created a plausible inference that the plaintiffs suffered at least one adverse employment action while working for the defendant. However, the Court granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the disparate impact claims as the plaintiffs did not demonstrate sufficient factual allegations to show how the forced ranking system caused a systematic undervaluation of female technical employees. The Court granted plaintiffs thirty days to amend the complaint to resolve the lack of detail with respect to the disparate impact claim. 2016 WL 4472930. On April 6, 2016, the plaintiffs submitted their second amended complaint, which contained additional factual allegations to support their disparate impact claim. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the disparate impact claims of the second amended complaint on April 25, 2016. On October 14, 2016, the court denied the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 disparate impact claim, finding the additional facts sufficient to make the plaintiffs\u2019 claims plausible. 2016 WL 6037978. Over the next year, the parties engaged in class discovery. On October 27, 2017, plaintiffs moved for class certification of female employees in Stock Levels 59-67 working in the Engineering and/or the I/T Operations Professions from September 16, 2012, to the present. On April 6, 2018 the defendants moved for summary judgement. They argued that the plaintiffs were procedurally barred from bringing their claims due to statute of limitation issues and that they could not establish a proper case for disparate treatment. They also alleged that the named plaintiff's constructive discharge claim failed due to her continuing to work long after the work conditions became allegedly intolerable, and that their retaliation claims failed due to no adverse action being taken against them. On June 25, 2018, the court denied the plaintiff's class certification in a sealed order. 2018 WL 3328418. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not affirmatively demonstrated commonality of fact, typicality of claims, or adequate protection of interests among the class. On July 9, 2018, the plaintiffs appealed this ruling to the Ninth Circuit (Docket No. 18-80080). On July 11, 2018, the court issue an order granting partial summary judgement for the defendants. 2018 WL 3584701. The defendant's motion for summary judgement for the denial of punitive damages under state law was granted, and the rest of their motion was denied, including leaving open the possibility for punitive damages under federal law. Due to identifying information contained within the order it has been sealed. On July 27, 2018, the plaintiffs appealed this order to the 9th Circuit (18-35791). Both appeals are ongoing.", "summary": "On September 16, 2015, the plaintiff, a former female technical employee, filed this class action against the defendant under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000(e). The plaintiff alleged that as a result of defendant\u2019s policies, patterns, and practices, female technical employees received less compensation and were promoted less frequently than their male counterparts. The court eventually denied class certification, and on July 11, 2018 partially granted the defendants summary judgement motion on the issue of state punitive damages. The plaintiffs have appealed both orders to the 9th Circuit and the case is ongoing as of November 19, 2019."} {"article": "On June 19, 2012, a prisoner incarcerated at the Red Onion State Prison in Pound, Virginia, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel and Equal Justice Initiative, sought relief from his sentence under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254. The plaintiff claimed that denial of relief by the Virginia courts ran contrary to federal law clearly established by Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, the plaintiff, who was serving two life sentences without parole for conduct committed as a minor, claimed that the state\u2019s refusal to give non-homicide juvenile offenders a meaningful opportunity to obtain release ran counter to Graham v. Florida, in which the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids sentencing juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide to life without parole. On July 15, 2002, nearly ten years prior to filing his habeas corpus petition, the plaintiff had been found guilty of rape and abduction for conduct that occurred on July 6, 1999, when the plaintiff was 16 years old. On March 4, 2003, he was sentenced to serve two terms of life imprisonment. Under the Virginia Code, the plaintiff was ineligible for parole. On May 17, 2010, more than seven years after the plaintiff received his sentences, the Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida. In light of the new Supreme Court precedent, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate Invalid Sentence in the Virginia Beach Circuit Court on May 11, 2011. The circuit court denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion, concluding that Virginia\u2019s geriatric statute, which allows prisoners to apply for condition release at the age of sixty, provides an appropriate mechanism for compliance with Graham. The Supreme Court of Virginia refused the plaintiff\u2019s petition for appeal on April 13, 2012, and denied his petition for rehearing on June 15, 2012. The plaintiff subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. On November 15, 2012, Red Onion State Prison and the Commonwealth of Virginia moved to dismiss. On July 24, 2013, Magistrate Judge Lawrence R. Leonard issued a report and recommendation, recommending that respondents\u2019 motion to dismiss be granted. 2013 WL 10799406. In his opinion, Judge Leonard discussed a Virginia Supreme Court case, Angel v. Commonwealth. The Angel decision explained that the state does have methods in place for allowing juvenile offenders an opportunity for release: the geriatric release statute provides prisoners with the opportunity to apply for conditional release at age sixty. Further, reviewing of a claim raised in a \u00a7 2254 petition is impermissible unless the state court decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; the report concluded that this showing was not made in this case. On July 1, 2015, after supplemental briefing, the District Court (Judge Arenda L. Wright Allen) denied the respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss and granted the prisoner's petition. 2015 WL 4042175. The District Court held that the state court determination was contrary to clearly established federal law and involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. First, Graham imposes a flat ban on life sentences without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders. Second, the theory that the state complies with Graham by allowing prisoners to apply for geriatric release misapplies Graham\u2019s governing principle that children warrant special consideration in sentencing. Respondents appealed, but on November 7, 2016, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the petitioner is entitled to relief from his unconstitutional sentence. 841 F.3d 256. Judge Wynn explained that the state court adjudication was an unreasonable application of Graham. It was unreasonable for the Virginia state courts to conclude that geriatric release amounted to a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on maturity and rehabilitation, as is demanded by Graham. Judge Niemeyer, in dissent, argued that the Virginia court\u2019s decision in Angel v. Commonwealth was reasonable and should be given deference. The state's petition for rehearing en banc was denied. On January 24, 2017, Red Onion State Prison and the Commonwealth of Virginia moved to stay the mandate pending the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari. On February 1, 2017, the Fourth Circuit granted the motion to stay the mandate. On June 12, the Supreme Court granted cert and, in a per curiam opinion, reversed. On August 25, Fourth Circuit then reversed the district court's judgment. Neither court provided reasoning for its decision. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On June 19, 2012, a prisoner incarcerated at the Red Onion State Prison in Pound, Virginia, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254. The plaintiff, who was serving two life sentences without parole for conduct committed as a minor, claimed that the state\u2019s refusal to give non-homicide juvenile offenders a meaningful opportunity to obtain release ran counter to Graham v. Florida, in which the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids sentencing juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide to life without parole. On July 1, 2015, the District Court granted the petition. On November 7, 20156, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. On February 1, 2017, the Fourth Circuit granted a motion to stay the mandate pending the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari."} {"article": "On June 25, 2004, an employee of Mills Fleet Farm Inc. filed a lawsuit under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. \u00a7 363, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e, against his employer in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. The plaintiff asked the court for injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that the defendant had maintained patterns, practices, policies, customs, and usages which were unlawful and which discriminated on the bases of race and gender. Specifically, the plaintiff contended that the defendant required potential hires to take a pre-employment test that collected race, color, and gender information and also failed to hire minorities while offering jobs to less qualified Caucasians. According to the PACER docket, the plaintiff never filed a motion for class certification. The parties reached a private, confidential settlement agreement, and on March 1, 2005, the court (Judge Paul A. Magnuson) dismissed the case with prejudice. No further information was available.", "summary": "On June 25, 2004, an employee of Mills Fleet Farm Inc. filed a lawsuit under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. \u00a7 363, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e, against his employer in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. The plaintiff contended that the defendant required potential hires to take a pre-employment test that collected race, color, and gender information and also failed to hire minorities while offering jobs to less qualified Caucasians. The plaintiff never filed a motion for class certification, and the parties reached a confidential settlement agreement. The parties stipulated to voluntary dismissal, and on March 1, 2005, the court dismissed the case with prejudice."} {"article": "On 07/10/2008, plaintiffs--a group of attorneys, journalists, and human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations represented by the American Civil Liberties Union--filed suit in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the National Security Agency (NSA), the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and the United States challenging the constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. \u00a7 1881 (FISA) under Article III of the Constitution, the Fourth and First Amendments, and separation of powers principles. FISA provides a framework governing \"applications for orders authorizing electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information, including surveillance of communications between persons located within the United States (\"domestic communications\") and surveillance of communications between persons located outside the United States (\"international communications\").\" Amnesty Int'l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Section 702 of FISA, 50 U.S.C. \u00a7 1881a, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), permits the Attorney General and DNI to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance targeting the communications of non-U.S. persons located abroad, but the government need not establish probable cause that the target of electronic surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, nor must government specify the nature and location of the facilities or places that surveillance will occur. Plaintiffs argued that Section 702 violates the Fourth Amendment because it authorizes government to acquire communications of U.S. citizens and residents without obtaining individualized warrants based on probable cause. They argue Section 702 violates the First Amendment by substantially burdening lawful expressive activity. They argue that Section 702 violates Article III and separation of powers principles by allowing the process of judicial review established in the FAA allows the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to issue orders in the absence of a case or controversy. Both parties moved for summary judgment, but the district court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing under Article III. In August 2009, the district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment. Amnesty Int'l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The district court found that the plaintiffs could only demonstrate \"an abstract fear that their communications will be monitored under the FAA,\" and that \"the chilling of their speech that they attribute to the statute is actually the result of their purely subjective fear of surveillance.\" Id. at 645, 653. The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of the Appeals for the Second Circuit, which reversed the district court's judgment in March 2011. Amnesty Int'l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2011), denied rehearing in banc, 667 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2011). The government appealed to the Supreme Court, which ruled 5-4 in February 2013 that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because they \"cannot demonstrate that the future injury they purportedly fear is certainly impending.\" Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1155 (2013).", "summary": "In July 2008, plaintiffs--a group of attorneys, journalists, and human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations--filed suit in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the National Security Agency (NSA), the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and the United States challenging the constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. \u00a7 1881 (FISA) under Article III of the Constitution, the Fourth and First Amendments, and separation of powers principles. In February 2013, the Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to bring the claim. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1155 (2013)."} {"article": "Starting in 2005 and continuing for more than a year, the City of Fresno, CA had a policy of immediately seizing and destroying on the spot the personal possessions of homeless individuals during sweeps conducted by the City of Fresno Police Department and City of Fresno Sanitation Department. The City used large compactors to immediately crush the seized possessions. These sweeps were all conducted without warrants and were intended to remove homeless persons, their encampments, and their property from both public and privately owned locations within Fresno, including repeated sweeps on land owned by California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). Several homeless individuals who had been affected by the policy filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated against the City of Fresno, Caltrans, and related officials. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California on October 17, 2006. The plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from the ACLU of Northern California, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, and private counsel. The named plaintiffs had lost possessions to these sweeps, including items critical to their survival such as medication, tents, blankets, and personal documents and records, as well as other irreplaceable items such as photographs and in one instance the ashes of a deceased relative. The plaintiffs alleged that these sweeps, often conducted without any notice, were raids that had the purpose and effect of harassing and removing homeless individuals. Plaintiffs argued that the sweeps constituted unlawful takings, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and also violated the Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures, and their Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights, 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983, and California statutory and constitutional law. Plaintiffs sought temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions enjoining Fresno from conducting the sweeps, a permanent injunction preventing the practice, and a judgment declaring the sweeps and the destruction of the Plaintiffs' property unlawful. They also sought the return of whatever property had not been destroyed, damages of no less than $4000 per incident, punitive and exemplary damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order on the same day as their complaint. On October 25, the Court (Judge Oliver W. Wanger) granted a restraining order until hearing on the issue of a preliminary injunction could be held. He found that the City had violated the plaintiffs' Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and the equivalent provisions of the Constitution of California. He held therefore that the Plaintiffs' case had a strong likelihood of winning on its merits. The Judge recognized that between 4,400 and 8,800 residents of Fresno, or one to two percent of the City's population, were homeless, and shelter was available for only about 1.4% percent of these individuals, and that despite the City's arguments to the contrary, the existence of shelters did not justify the confiscation of property belonging to homeless persons camping in public. Kincaid v. City of Fresno, 2006 WL 3542732 (W.D. Cal. 2007). On December 8, 2006, the Court ordered a preliminary injunction, enjoining the City from conducting sweeps that would result in the seizure and destruction of private property without first giving constitutionally adequate written notice of the pending sweep, seizure, and destruction, and a meaningful opportunity for individuals to be heard and to retrieve property prior to its destruction. Kincaid v. City of Fresno, 244 F.R.D. 597 (W.D. Cal. 2007). On January 12, 2007, the Director of Caltrans, named as a defendant in his official capacity, filed a motion for the claims against her to be dismissed for, among other things, lack of jurisdiction. The Court denied this on March 19, 2007. Kincaid v. City of Fresno, 2007 WL 833058 (W.D. Cal. 2007). This was followed by several months of discovery. On August 14, 2007, the Court certified the class. Kinkaid v. City of Fresno, 244 F.R.D. 597 (N.D. Cal. 2008). On April 25, 2008, during oral argument Judge Oliver W. Wanger declared that the City's \"practice of announce, strike, seize [and] destroy immediately is against the law.\" On May 12, 2008 the court issued two opinions, one of which denied various motions for summary judgment filed by both parties on a number of issues, and granted summary judgment in favor of two of the individual defendants in regard to State law claims against them for money damages. The substantial claims of the case were not decided in this opinion. Kinkaid v. City of Fresno, 2008 WL 2038386 (N.D. Cal. 2008). The other May 12 opinion granted in part and denied in part another motion for summary judgment filed by the Plaintiffs against the City defendant, holding that the City of Fresno's raids were unlawful, that any seizure and immediate destruction of property proven at trial would be held to be a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that State law established a private right of action against the City with respect to the State law claims. Kinkaid v. City of Fresno, 2008 WL 2038390 (N.D. Cal. 2008). On July 25, 2008, the Court approved a class-action settlement negotiated by the parties. According to the settlement, the City of Fresno would post written notice at least three days prior to any future sweeps that would involve the removal of personal property, and will store any items of apparent value for ninety days so that might be reclaimed. Caltrans also agreed to comply with the legal principles set forth in the court's preliminary injunction throughout the state. The Settlement divided the the class members into five subgroups, based on the value of their seized property, whether they were victims of repeated unconstitutional sweeps, whether they were present when the sweeps occurred and actively prevented from reclaiming their property, whether they suffered severe emotional distress or hardship as a result of the sweeps, and other factors. The City of Fresno agreed to pay $1,000,000 into a Housing Allowance Fund. This fund was established to assist the lawsuit's class members with expenses related to housing, such as security deposits, first and last months rent, or rent payments, or to aid in the purchase a vehicle or medical care. Only members of the third, fourth, and fifth sub-classes would receive assistance from this fund, in amounts of $1500, $3500, or $9000. The City also agreed to set aside $400,000 in a separate Cash Fund to compensate individuals who suffered the unconstitutional seizure of property. The settlement established a system for filing claims, accounting for the number of times claimants were subjected to the illegal sweeps and their value of the seized property. The minimum and maximum values for claims was $500 and $5000, depending on which sub-class to which the claimant belonged. Claimants could make multiple claims. Caltrans agreed to pay $85,000 into this cash fund. The City of Fresno agreed to pay $850,000 in legal and costs fees to Plaintiffs, and Caltrans agreed to pay $85,000 of the Plaintiffs fees and costs. At the time of the most recent report from the Settlement Administrator, March 8, 2012, there was just over $80,000 remaining in the two funds. Administrative costs were keep very low during the life of the settlement, and the funds were effectively distributed to the claimants. The Court retained jurisdiction over the case for five years in order to assure compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement. The settlement ended in 2013, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "The case was filed on behalf of homeless people whose personal property was confiscated by police and city workers. The court issued a temporary restraining order against the City of Fresno, followed by a preliminary injunction prohibiting the City from continuing to seize and destroy the property of homeless people. The parties settled the case in June 2008, with the defendants agreeing to stop their unlawful practices and to create two funds to provide relief valued at between $500 and $14,000 to each claimant, depending on the value of the property seized and the emotional distress caused, among other factors."} {"article": "On July 2, 2015, plaintiffs -- two same sex couples -- filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Rowan County Clerk Kim Davis, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Kentucky, asked the court for both injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that Davis's refusal to issue marriage licenses to same sex couples violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses and the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The plaintiffs also sought class action certification for all persons similarly situated. The case was assigned to United States District Judge David Bunning. This case is a direct result of the Supreme Court decision, Obergefell v. Hodges, which held that same sex couples had a fundamental right to marry. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Immediately after Obergefell, the Governor of Kentucky had explicitly instructed all county clerks to issue marriage licenses to same sex couples. So once this case was filed, Davis filed a third party complaint under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Governor and State Librarian of Kentucky alleging that the Governor's mandate to issue marriage licenses violated her right to religious conscience under the First Amendment. Arguments in the District Court centered on whether Ms. Davis, as an elected official, had a right to deny same sex marriage licenses as a matter of religious liberty. Judge Bunning found that the instruction by the Governor to issue same-sex marriage licenses was facially neutral as to its implication on any particular religion. The Court therefore found (applying a rational basis test) that the Governor's goal was simply to ensure that the activities of the State of Kentucky were consistent with the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court. Ms. Davis, therefore, had no relevant protected religious liberty interest. As a result of this reasoning, on August 12, 2015, Judge Bunning issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendant from continuing to refuse marriage licenses to same sex couples. 123 F. Supp. 3d 924 (E.D. Ky. 2015). Davis immediately appealed to the Sixth Circuit (docketed no. 15-5880), and filed a motion to stay the injunction pending appeal. The district court denied the motion to stay, but then temporarily stayed the order to give the appellate court an opportunity to review the denial of the stay. On August 26, 2015, the Sixth Circuit denied the motion for a stay. 2015 WL 10692640. Davis further appealed to the United Supreme Court, which also denied her application for stay. 136 S.Ct. 23. Nonetheless, Davis continued to refuse marriage licenses to same sex couples. After a hearing on September 3, 2015, she was held in contempt of court, and jailed for civil contempt until September 8, 2015, at which time she was released from jail provided that she not interfere with the ongoing issuance of marriage licenses by Rowan County's deputy clerks. Davis appealed. She also sought an injunction against the Kentucky government prohibiting state authorities from directing her to authorize the issuance of marriage licenses while her appeal was pending at the Sixth Circuit. On September 11, 2015, the district court (Judge David L. Bunning) denied Davis's request. 2015 WL 9461520 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 11, 2015). Davis also asked the Sixth Circuit to stay the plaintiffs' injunction against her pending her appeal. On September 17, 2015, the Sixth Circuit denied her request. Finally, Davis asked for an emergency stay of the injunction against her. The district court denied this request. 2015 WL 9460311 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2015). Davis then appealed the denial of the stay of the September 3 order (docket no. 15-5978), but the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial on November 5, 2015. 2015 WL 10692638 (6th Cir.). The Sixth Circuit scheduled oral argument on Davis's remaining appeals for July 28, 2016. After she was released from jail, Davis had returned to work and she changed the forms that they used to issue marriage licenses. Worried that these forms would not be considered valid, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the injunction against Davis and require her to use the old forms. However, on February 9, 2016, the district court denied the plaintiffs' request as moot because the forms were valid and same-sex marriage licenses were being issued by the office. On April 19, 2016, the Sixth Circuit issued an order dismissing the state defendants from the case for lack of jurisdiction. On July 13, 2016, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the multiple pending appeals pursuant to Senate Bill 216, which would allow the removal of the name of the county clerk from marriage license forms. 667 Fed.Appx. 537. SB 216 was to take effect prior to oral arguments in the Sixth Circuit, rendering the appeals moot. In response, the district court vacated the preliminary injunctions and denied all pending motions as moot on August 18, 2016. On July 21, 2017, the district court awarded the plaintiffs $224,703.08 in attorneys' fees and costs. 267 F.Supp.3d 961. It required Kentucky, rather than the Clerk\u2019s Office or Rowan County, to pay the award. Davis appealed the award in the Sixth Circuit on November 22, 2017 (docket no. 17-6404). The Kentucky defendants also appealed the fee award (docket no. 17-6385). Throughout 2018, the parties briefed the appeal. Oral argument was held on January 31, 2019. Judges Richard Griffin, Helene White, and John Bush affirmed the district court\u2019s award of attorney\u2019s fees on August 23, 2019. 936 F.3d 442. In addition, the Sixth Circuit affirmed that the liability should be imposed on Kentucky because Davis acted on Kentucky\u2019s behalf when issuing and refusing to issue marriage licenses. The plaintiffs then had until November 4, 2019 to submit a request for attorneys' fees for all work performed subsequent to the July 21, 2017 order. On November 4, 2019 the plaintiffs submitted a request for an extension to submit the request. As of January 2020, this case was ongoing.", "summary": "This case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky concerns the defendant county clerk's refusal to issue marriage licenses to same sex couples, because of her religious beliefs. District Judge Bunning found she lacks a protected religious liberty interest and held her in contempt. She was released from jail conditioned on her not interfering with deputy clerks' issuance of licenses. She appealed. While her appeals were pending, the Kentucky General Assembly passed Senate Bill 216, which would allow the removal of the name of the county clerk from marriage license forms. SB 216 rendered the appeals moot and the district court vacated the preliminary injunctions. The district court awarded the plaintiffs $224,703.08 in attorneys' fees and costs. This case is ongoing."} {"article": "On July 13, 2011, the plaintiffs, a Mormon man and four Mormon women who were cohabitating and involved in a polyamorous relationship, filed a lawsuit in the U.S District Court of Utah against the State of Utah under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs are a self-described \"plural family,\" in which only one couple, the male plaintiff and one of the female plaintiffs, holds an official marriage license. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Utah Code Ann. \u00a776-7-101 (\"Utah Statute\"), which makes it a crime when a person, \"knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the other person was a husband or wife . . . purports to marry another person or cohabits with another person,\" violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs began starring in a TLC reality television show in 2010 called \"Sister Wives,\" which documented their lifestyle and religious beliefs. They argued that they had been prosecuted under the Utah Statute solely because of their religious beliefs. On May 31, 2012, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for mootness because the plaintiffs had moved to Nevada, and the Utah County Attorney's Office had closed its file on the plaintiffs and adopted a policy (\"the UCAO policy\") under which the Utah County Attorney would bring bigamy prosecutions only against those who (1) induce a partner to marry through misrepresentation or (2) are suspected of committing a collateral crime such as fraud or abuse. The plaintiffs fell into neither category. On the same day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. On Dec. 13, 2013, District Court Judge Clark Waddoups granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and declared the Utah Statute facially unconstitutional. 947 F.Supp.2d 1170 (2013). The court found that while the cohabitation prong of the statute (the phrase \"or cohabits with another person\") was facially neutral, it was not operationally neutral and had been used, through a pattern of enforcement, to specifically target religious cohabitations. The court then found that because the cohabitation prong was not operationally neutral it was subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection clause, which it failed. The court further found that the cohabitation prong violated the Due Process clause under the right to privacy as articulated in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Finally, the court found that the cohabitation prong was not articulated with a reasonable degree of clarity and was therefore void for vagueness. In order to preserve the remainder of the statute, the court severed the phrase \"or cohabits with another person\" from the law. The court then narrowed the construction of the terms \"marry\" and \"purports to marry,\" as a broad understanding of these terms would once again give rise to the constitutional dilemmas posed by the cohabitation prong. The court thus ordered a narrowing construction of the terms to \"prohibit[] bigamy in the literal sense--the fraudulent or otherwise impermissible possession of two purportedly valid marriage licenses for the purpose of entering into more than one purportedly legal marriage.\" The court did not address the plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. On Dec. 20, 2012, the court's judgment on these issues was vacated because the case had mistakenly been closed before the plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 were heard. On Aug. 27, 2014, Judge Waddoups renewed his ruling that the cohabitation prong violated the constriction as outlined above and granted summary judgment in the plaintiffs' favor. 2014 WL 4249865. The Court further awarded plaintiffs their attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses incurred under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988. On Sept. 24, 2014, the State appealed the district court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. On Sept. 4, 2015, the court ordered that judgment in the amount of $242,500 for attorneys' fees in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants should be entered. On May 13, 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied the petition for en banc review. The panel decided, however, sua sponte, to amend the district court's decision. The Tenth Circuit found the case had become moot, but the district court nevertheless denied the Utah County Attorney's motion to dismiss the case as moot and instead granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. Any live case or controversy had been extinguished a year and a half before the district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and over two years before the entry of final judgment. Thus, because the case became moot prior to final adjudication, vacatur and dismissal without prejudice were appropriate. The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, but their petition for a writ of certiorari was denied. On Mar. 9, 2017, pursuant to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' remand instruction, the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs was vacated and the case was dismissed without prejudice.", "summary": "On July 13, 2011, a Mormon man and four Mormon women cohabitating and engaged in a polyamorous relationship filed a lawsuit asking the court to declare that Utah Code Ann. \u00a776-7-101 (\"Utah Statute\"), which makes it a crime when a person, \"knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the other person was a husband or wife . . . purports to marry another person or cohabits with another person,\" violated their Constitutional rights. On August 27, 2014, Judge Waddoups ordered that the \"cohabitation\" prong of the Statute was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and struck it from the Statute for vagueness."} {"article": "On February 19, 2019, a man serving a life sentence in a Florida prison filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiff sued the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The case was ultimately assigned to Judge Robert L. Hinkle. The plaintiff, represented by the Social Justice Law Collective and the Florida Justice Institute, sought a declaration that the Department had violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He also sought a preliminary and permanent injunction that would restore his access while in prison to digital media files that he had previously purchased. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the Department of Corrections had violated his constitutional rights when they switched from the Digital Music Player Program to the current Multimedia Tablet Program without allowing inmates to retain their previously-purchased digital media and digital media players. The Department implemented the Digital Music Player Program in 2011 in order to provide a secure method by which prisoners could browse, select, purchase, and download digital content to MP3/MP4 players, made specifically for use by inmates in a correctional setting. Advertisements to inmates emphasized that once they purchased media, they would always own it and could delete and re-order digital media that they had purchased from a cloud-based library at no additional cost. In 2017, the Department terminated its contract with the Digital Music Player Program vendor, entered into a new contract with a competing vendor, and transitioned to the Multimedia Tablet Program. Under the new program, inmates were required to purchase a new multimedia device and were required to surrender their previous digital media players, along with all the digital content they had purchased for the previous devices. Inmates had the option of sending the player/files to someone outside the prison at an additional cost, but they could no longer access the media files they had purchased while in prison. Although inmates who had participated in the Digital Music Player Program received discounts on the new program, they did not receive any other form of compensation for the taking of their digital media players and files. Because inmates had purchased the devices and files specifically to use while in prison, the plaintiff claimed that the Department\u2019s transition to the Multimedia Tablet Program amounted to an unconstitutional taking of private property (particularly for inmates serving a life sentence who would not benefit from sending the device to family or friends outside the prison). The plaintiff also claimed that the Department\u2019s transition to the new program violated the plaintiffs\u2019 substantive Due Process rights; he claimed that the transition was implemented in the Department\u2019s legislative capacity, was arbitrary and capricious, and had no rational basis. The plaintiff sought to represent a class defined as All Florida Department of Corrections prisoners whose digital media files were taken, or will be taken, pursuant to the Multimedia Tablet Program.\u201d On April 5, 2019, the Department filed a motion for a more definite statement. The court denied this motion on May 3, 2019. On May 20, 2019, the Department filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and failure to join a required party. The court denied the motion on on May 30, 2019, holding, among other things, that \u201cUnder the plain language of Rule 12(h)(1)(A), the Secretary waived the venue defense by failing to include it in the motion for a more definite statement.\u201d On June 3, 2019, the plaintiff moved to certify the class. The Department sought summary judgment on August 21, 2019. The court denied both motions on September 25, 2019. Regarding the class certification motion, the court held that the proposed class failed to meet the numerosity requirement, writing that \u201cthe Department\u2019s policy change, when coupled with the replacement media players and credits available to affected inmates, will make some inmates winners and some losers. The record gives no information at all on the number in each category. A class cannot properly be certified unless there are enough losers to meet the numerosity requirement.\u201d Regarding the Department\u2019s motion for summary judgment, the court held that the motion ignored a critical part of the plaintiff\u2019s claim, and contrary to the Department\u2019s assertions, the plaintiff\u2019s claims presented genuinely disputed material facts. The plaintiff sought amend the order denying class certification on October 25, 2019. On January 9, 2020, the court denied this motion, \u201cbased on evidence that, while the original class-certification motion was pending, [the plaintiff] prepared a fraudulent document for submission in a prison disciplinary proceeding,\u201d deeming the plaintiff inadequate as a class representative. On January 21, 2020, the plaintiff again filed a motion to alter or amend the order denying class certification. On March 2, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint. The proposed changes included addition of two new individual plaintiffs and new factual allegations. A day later, the Department moved for summary judgment. The court granted leave for plaintiff to amend the complaint on March 6, 2020. The Department filed a motion to dismiss the proposed changes to the complaint on March 20, 2020. At a hearing on April 15, 2020, the parties announced that they had reached a settlement agreement, contingent upon certification of a class for settlement purposes and, in due course, the court\u2019s approval of the settlement. The court partly granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion to reconsider class certification on April 16, 2020. According to this order, a class was certified consisting of \u201call current Florida Department of Corrections prisoners whose digital media files were taken, or will be taken, pursuant to the Department\u2019s termination of the MP3 program, and who purchased more than 75 songs through that program.\u201d In addition, the court denied the Department\u2019s motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment on the same day. The court reasoned that \u201cdenial is based on mootness with this exception: the Department\u2019s assertion that the plaintiffs lack standing and the court lacks jurisdiction is not moot but is denied on the merits.\u201d On May 14, 2020, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement. According to this motion, the Department \u201cagreed to restore the ability of each member of the Class to listen to a certain, agreed upon number of songs that were previously purchased under the Digital Music Player Program through the issuance of Settlement Credits,\u201d among other things. The agreement also required the Department to pay the plaintiffs $150,000 in attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The court issued an order preliminarily granting the proposed settlement on May 26, 2020. On July 13, 2020, the parties filed a joint motion to amend the class definition, to include inmates who had purchased 100 songs, rather than 75. In addition, on July 14, 2020, the parties jointly filed a fully executed settlement agreement, which, among other things, removed an individual plaintiff as a class representative. On July 27, 2020, the court approved the parties\u2019 joint motion to amend the class definition. As of August 3, 2020, this case is ongoing; the Final Fairness Hearing, which will determine whether the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, is scheduled for December 4, 2020.", "summary": "In 2019, a man serving a life sentence in a Florida prison filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. He claimed that the Florida Department of Correction\u2019s transition between digital media programs for inmates, without allowing the inmates to keep the devices and files they had previously purchased, violated their constitutional rights under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court gave preliminary approval of a settlement agreement on May 26, 2020. As of August 3, 2020, the Final Fairness Hearing is scheduled for December."} {"article": "On August 25, 2015, a woman jailed for her failure to pay an automatically set bail filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court of the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiff sued Ascension Parish under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201. The plaintiff, represented by attorneys from the Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center and Equal Justice Under Law, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief. Those who cannot pay an automatic bail amount are kept in jail for up to three days before a judicial hearing in which they can have a individually tailored bail set. In some cases, including this case, the court does not allow the defendant to obtain an individualized bail. On August 25, 2015, the plaintiff filed for class certification. While referred to as a class-action lawsuit in other documents, the motion was never acted on before the close of the case. On August 26, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the defendant. On August 27, 2015, the District Court (Judge Shelly D. Dick) granted the motion, ordering the release of the plaintiff from jail subject to a non-monetary, unsecured bond. On September 2, 2015, both parties filed a joint motion for a settlement agreement and dismissal. The defendant agreed to create a new policy to handle misdemeanor arrestees. The defendant also agreed to not hold misdemeanor arrestees in jail due to an unaffordable monetary bond. On September 3, 2015, the Court approved the settlement. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2015 a mother of two filed suit against Ascension Parish in Louisiana for unlawful detainment for her inability to pay the predetermined bail bond for her two misdemeanor crimes. After the court granted a temporary retraining order and preliminary injunction against the defendants, the two parties soon reached a court-approved settlement in which the defendant agreed to change the bail policy."} {"article": "On November 9, 2012, 8 inmates at the Idaho Correctional Center (ICC) filed a lawsuit in the District of Idaho. The plaintiffs sued Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), which operates the Idaho Correctional Center, under 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983 for violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the color of state law. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought compensatory damages and punitive damages. The plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief and an award of attorney\u2019s fees and costs at the court's discretion. The plaintiffs claimed that they had been victims of a gang assault in which six members from the Aryan Knights and the Severely Violent Criminals hid in a closet in order to attack the plaintiffs with shivs and shanks. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant used gang violence as a way to gain control over the inmate population and decrease operating costs. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant purposefully housed members of the same gang in the same block (creating what prisoners called a gang-controlled walk); operated at or above maximum capacity; and maintained an insufficient numbers of guards, which created a substantial risk of gang violence, pressure to join gangs, and pressure to participate in gang activities in and outside of the prison. Pictures, video of the attack, and other documents can be found on the plaintiff's lawyers' website. This case was assigned to Judge Dee V. Benson and referred to Judge Mikel H. Williams for settlement negotiations. On January 14, 2013, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. The defendant stated that (1) six of the eight plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); (2) the Complaint failed to allege with factual specificity the basis for a policy or custom violation; and (3) the complaint contained numerous immaterial and improper allegations. On January 18, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint as a result of an anonymous email from a member of the prison staff that alleged that the defendant had been falsifying its records to make it appear that the various blocks were fully staffed and in compliance with a settlement agreement from a previous case, Kelly v. CCA, PC-ID-0007. On June 4, 2013, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss because the warden had suggested that the plaintiffs had exhausted internal remedy procedures. For six plaintiffs, the court ruled that they could have reasonably believed that there were no additional steps for them to take in pursuing compensation within the prison system. The assistant warden had previously approved a decision that if the plaintiffs had wanted to pursue compensation, they could do so \"utilizing outside sources.\" Therefore, the plaintiffs partial exhaustion of the grievance process was sufficient to meet PLRA requirements. The six plaintiffs were allowed to proceed and had stated a plausible claim for relief based on the ghost worker allegation and gang member placement. But two plaintiffs' claims were dismissed because they had not yet exhausted available grievance procedures, and the case became Knight v. CCA (however, because the case continued to be referred to by its previous name, we have retained the named plaintiff above). On June 21, 2013 a collection of media entities (referred to as the Media Coalition) filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings so that it could oppose the defendant\u2019s proposed protective order on the grounds that it would interfere with the press's ability to gather and report news. On August 6, 2013, the Media Coalition\u2019s motion to intervene was granted. The court held that the protective order was necessary to ensure both the defendant\u2019s employees\u2019 safety and the plaintiffs\u2019 safety. The court deemed \\ this information unhelpful to the plaintiffs in their lawsuit. The parties began extensive discovery negotiations. However, upon a finding that the parties \u201crefused to interact with each other reasonably and civilly,\u201d the court referred the case for discovery mediation. On November 15, 2013, the parties filed a stipulation on certain discovery issues. This stipulation did not resolve all of the parties\u2019 discovery disputes. On February 7, 2014, the court denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion to compel for discovery requests related to the defendant\u2019s wage data and incentive plans (such as bonus reports). The court concluded that the plaintiffs had access to this information and that the request was frivolous. The court threatened awarding the defendant its attorneys\u2019 fees should the plaintiffs continue to engage in abusive discovery practices. The court also held that they would not consider any more motions to compel by either party unless the parties\u2019 attorneys had met face-to-face in at least one conference lasting at least two hours where they genuinely attempted to resolve each aspect of the motion to compel. On March 10, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to stay discovery after the FBI announced its intention to institute a criminal investigation into the defendant\u2019s alleged conduct. On March 19, 2014, the court denied this motion. The court held that the plaintiffs\u2019 interests in avoiding delay on a case that is nearly two-years old was greater than the highly speculative burden the investigation would pose to the defendant. On September 2, 2014, the plaintiffs\u2019 moved for partial summary judgment on the defendant\u2019s widespread custom of gang clustering and understaffing mandatory posts, the defendant\u2019s affirmative defenses, and the defendant\u2019s failure to respond to the plaintiff\u2019s contention interrogatories regarding these affirmative defenses. On September 15, 2014, the defendant moved for summary judgment or partial summary judgement in the alternative on the plaintiff\u2019s claim for punitive damages. On June 29, 2015, the court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgement. The court held that the plaintiffs\u2019 request did not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On December 3, 2015, Magistrate Candy Dale issued a Report and Recommendation that the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment be granted. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant was aware that its staffing or housing policy posed a risk to the plaintiffs. On December 21, 2015, the plaintiffs objected to the Report and Recommendation. And on July 7, 2016, the district court rejected portions of the reports that granted the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgement with respect to the understaffing claim and municipal liability. The court granted the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgement on the plaintiffs\u2019 \u201cgang clustering theory.\u201d On September 15, 2016, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the court\u2019s order with respect to the plaintiffs\u2019 understaffing claim. On November 10, 2016, the court denied reconsideration. The court found that the plaintiffs had adequately established Monell causation regarding the relationship between understaffing and their assault. The parties prepared for trial. Trial began on February 13, 2017 and continued through February 22, 2017. On February 22, 2017, the defendant moved for a directed verdict. The court denied the defendant\u2019s motion and took under advisement their motion to dismiss for punitive damages. On February 23, 2017, the jury returned a special verdict. The jury found that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiffs. The defendant disregarded this risk by failing to take reasonable measures to address it, which violated their Eighth Amendment rights. The jury also found that the defendant had a widespread practice and custom of understaffing at ICC. However, the jury did not find that the practice of understaffing caused a deprivation of the plaintiffs\u2019 Eighth Amendment rights on the day of the assault. So, it did not award the plaintiffs compensatory or punitive damages. On June 8, 2017, the plaintiffs filed motions to alter or amend the judgment and for a new trial. The next day, the defendant also filed motions to alter or amend the judgment and for a new trial. The court denied both of the plaintiffs\u2019 motions. It held that the jury instructions correctly delineated the elements necessary to prove causation and that the plaintiffs failed to object to jury instructions, thereby waiving their right to appeal. Regarding the plaintiffs claim that the special verdict form was superfluous and inconsistent, the court disagreed. The court also found that the plaintiffs had failed to object to its inclusion and therefore had no right to object. The court granted the defendant\u2019s motion to alter the judgement to state \u201cJudgment is entered in favor of Defendant, with Plaintiffs to take nothing.\u201d On November 2, 2017, the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On May 18, 2018, this appeal was voluntarily dismissed for reasons unknown. This case is now closed.", "summary": "Eight inmates at Idaho Correction Correctional Center filed a lawsuit against Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), which operates the facility. The plaintiffs had been the victims of a gang assault and alleged that CCA was using gang violence as way to gain control over the inmate population and decrease their operating costs. After a long litigation and a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. This case is now closed."} {"article": "On July 12, 2018, the Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates (COPAA) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. COPAA sued the U.S. Department of Education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Represented by the National Center for Youth Law and private attorneys, COPAA sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees and costs to stop the Dept. of Education from delaying regulations intended to identify and eliminate bias against students with disabilities and students of color. The case was assigned to District Judge Tanya S. Chutkan. In 2016, the Dept. of Education established Final Regulations that were aimed to help States fully comply with Section 618(b) of IDEA, which required states to implement measures that could address problems related to racial disproportionality. Section 618(b) was meant to capture whether significant disproportionality based on race and ethnicity was occurring in the States and local educational agencies of the States with respect to the identification, placement, and discipline of children with disabilities. Significantly, it also established a standard methodology for states to use to determine whether racial disproportionality was occurring. The Dept. of Education gave States until July 1, 2018 to implement the Final Regulations. On July 3, 2018, the Dept. of Education issued a notice in the Federal Register delaying by two years the requirement to comply with the 2016 Final Regulations. The plaintiffs alleged that this delay (the \"Delay Regulation\"), was an abuse of discretion and arbitrarily allowed states to delay their compliance with section 618(d) of the IDEA, in violation of the IDEA itself and also the APA. The Dept. of Education moved to dismiss the complaint on September 17, 2018. It claimed that the plaintiffs lacked standing for two main reasons. First, in defendants' view, plaintiffs' allegations of harm--that without the delay, more disproportionate school districts would have been identified--was speculative. The defendants also claimed that the plaintiff failed to identify people who actually had suffered or would imminently suffer harm due to the delay. On October 1, 2018, the plaintiffs filed both a memorandum in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss, and their own motion for summary judgment. On November 12, 2018, the defendants also moved for summary judgment. On March 7, 2019, the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss, granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgement, and denied defendants' cross-motion for summary judgement. First, the court held that plaintiffs had established 1) organizational standing, by demonstrating concrete injury resulting from the delay and showing a likelihood that vacating the delay would redress such injury; and 2) associational standing, by identifying two COPAA members with standing, demonstrating that the plaintiff's litigation goals were germane to its overall mission, and showing that this litigation pursued by plaintiff did not require participation by COPAA members. Second, the court held that the defendants had violated the APA. The court noted that the defendants failed to produce a reasoned explanation for the delay, instead offering inconsistent explanations that did not address the previous regulations' safeguards in an adequate or non-cursory manner. The court also found that the defendants' failure to consider the cost of the delay to states, society, and children alike connoted an arbitrary and capricious attitude to the possible disadvantages of the Delay Regulation. The court held that vacatur of the Delay Regulation was an appropriate remedy. On May 10th, 2019, the defendants filed a notice of appeal. On September 12, 2019, before the appellate court heard any oral arguments, the defendants filed an unopposed motion to dismiss the appeal. The case returned to the district court, where litigation over attorneys\u2019 fees is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2018, the Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates (COPAA) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that the Department of Education's delays in implementing regulations violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and also resulted in racial disparities in treatment of children with disabilities. The court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgement, and held that vacatur of the Delay Regulation was an appropriate remedy."} {"article": "This is one of a pair of lawsuits filed by state affiliates of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), each relating to two separate Freedom of Information Act requests seeking agency records on immigration enforcement practices in Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont. (The other case is IM-ME-0001, American Civil Liberties Union of Maine Foundation v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security.) Both cases were brought in U.S. District Court for the District of Maine; the ACLU sought declaratory and injunctive relief\u2014specifically, the release of documents responsive to each request\u2014as well as attorneys' fees and costs. This action was filed on May 8, 2018 against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component agencies U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). (The other had been filed seven days prior and did not include ICE as a defendant.) Both cases were partially coordinated and assigned to District Judge John D. Levy. The ACLU sent the FOIA request that triggered this case on September 5, 2017 amid reports of substantially increased raids, arrests, and searches by federal immigration authorities in Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire. The request asked for records pertaining to each agency's immigration enforcement practices in the three states, including its communications with local businesses and law enforcement. Two weeks later, according to the ACLU's complaint, DHS delivered its \"final response\" that contained only one page of data and only responded to arrests made by ICE; the ACLU alleged that DHS failed to search CBP records or otherwise respond to any of the other items of the request, in violation of its legal duties under FOIA. The complaint also said that DHS acknowledged receiving the ACLU's subsequent appeal in February 2018, but failed to issue a notification within 20 days indicating whether it would comply, again in violation of FOIA. DHS filed its answer on June 18, 2018. It acknowledged receiving the ACLU's September 5 request, but otherwise effectively denied the remaining allegations. On July 5, 2018, Magistrate Judge John H. Rich III granted the parties' joint motion, in which DHS said that it was in the process of searching for possible additional responsive documents, subject to later status report to be filed by August 17. That report indicated that the defendants had agreed to identify and produce additional responsive documents according to search parameters jointly drafted by the parties. A November 2018 status report indicated the parties were unable to agree on a production schedule. Judge Levy granted that request and set a schedule, which had to be amended several times. Finally, on October 11, 2019, plaintiffs submitted a status briefing with a proposed scheduling to adjudicate the issue of several redacted materials. Four days later, the court set the schedule telling plaintiffs to submit a brief as to why they were entitled to the redacted material by December 16, 2019. Following this, the defendants were to submit a brief in response by January 10, 2020. The plaintiffs would then have a chance to reply to that response by January 24, 2020. This schedule proved difficult to maintain and was altered a few times, so ultimately the plaintiffs submitted their first brief by December 20, defendants responded on February 5, 2020, and the plaintiffs replied two weeks later. On July 6, 2020, the court issued its order regarding the redacted materials. Judge Levy ordered some of the contested documents to be unredacted, but most of the documents he found were covered by Exemption 7(E) of FOIA. This exemption protects information that might reveal law enforcement tactics which are not known to the general public. The court ordered that the defendants release any of the unprotected information by July 20, 2020. 2020 WL 3643126. The case is ongoing as of July 9, 2020.", "summary": "On May 8, 2018, the American Civil Liberties Union of Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine. The ACLU sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. By October of 2019, plaintiffs and defendants came to a dispute regarding certain redacted materials, and they asked Judge Levy to adjudicate the issue. In July of 2020, the court issued their findings. Most of the documents that plaintiffs had requested were protected by Exemption 7(E) of FOIA, but some were not covered. The court ordered that defendants release the unprotected documents by July 20, 2020."} {"article": "On June 28, 2011, a devout Muslim prisoner at the Arkansas Department of Corrections' Cummins Unit filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (\"RLUIPA\") against the Director of the Arkansas Department of Corrections and the Warden of the Cummins Unit. The plaintiff, proceeding without counsel, asked the court for a temporary and permanent injunction against the enforcement of the prison's grooming policy, claiming that the prison was substantially interfering with his right to practice religion in violation of RLUIPA and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the prison's refusal to allow him to grow a 1/2 inch beard was not the least restrictive means of furthering the government's compelling interest in maintaining security in the prison. On July 6, 2011, United States Magistrate Judge Joe J. Volpe, relying heavily on Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2008), recommended that the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order be denied. On October 18, 2011, the District Court (Chief Judge Brian S. Miller), however, rejected the magistrate's proposed findings, noting that the defendants failed to satisfy their burden of proving that the grooming policy was the least restrictive means to achieve prison security as applied to the plaintiff's case. The District Court then granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, and remanded the case to the Magistrate Judge for further hearings on whether the grooming policy was the least restrictive means to maintain prison security. After an evidentiary hearing, on January 27 2012, Magistrate Judge Volpe recommended that the Court's October 18, 2011 order be vacated, that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Holt v. Hobbs, No. 11-cv-00164, 2012 WL 994481 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 27, 2012). Magistrate Judge Volpe noted that the state had brought forth credible evidence that a 1/2 inch beard presented security threats, notwithstanding the fact that under the policy a prisoner with a diagnosed skin condition was allowed to grow a 1/4 inch beard. For example, a 1/2 inch beard could conceal weapons and/or contraband; allowing a prisoner to keep a beard could allow him to disguise his identity (by shaving) in the event of an escape; and giving certain prisoners preferential treatment (allowing them to grow beards) could lead to other prisoners targeting them or seeing them as leaders. The plaintiff conceded that the government had a compelling interest in maintaining prison security, but argued that the policy was not the least restrictive means to do so. Specifically, the plaintiff referenced the procedures used by the New York Department of Corrections that maintain prison security by photographing inmates with and without a beard so that they may not disguise themselves in the event of an escape. Despite this evidence, Magistrate Judge Volpe declared that a high level of deference is owed to prison officials in judging the specific needs of their prison, and that policies of other prisons are not dispositive. Finally, the Magistrate Judge noted that because the plaintiff was already given several religious accommodations (a prayer rug, a list of distributors of Islamic material, correspondence with religious advisors, dietary accommodations, and unobstructed observance of religious holidays), the grooming policy did not \"substantially burden\" the plaintiff's religious exercise. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice. Moreover, he recommended that dismissal of the complaint count as a \"strike\" for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which penalizes prisoners if they file more than three lawsuits that are frivolous or fail to state a claim. On March 23, 2012, the District Court (Chief Judge Brian S. Miller) adopted the Magistrate's recommendations in full, and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. Holt v. Hobbs, No. 11-cv-00164, 2012 WL 993403 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 23, 2012). The plaintiff appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. On June 12, 2013, the Court (per curiam) held that the State met its burden under RLUIPA of establishing that the grooming policy was the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling government interest in prison security, and affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the case. The Court did, however, reverse the District Court's holding that the dismissal counted as a strike under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Holt v. Hobbs, 509 Fed.Appx. 561 (8th Cir. 2013); No. 12-3185, 2013 WL 2500568 (8th Cir. June 12, 2013). Still without counsel, the plaintiff then sought review in the Supreme Court of the United States; the Supreme Court granted certiorari, limited to the RLUIPA claims, and appointed counsel. Holt v. Hobbs, 134 S.Ct. 1512 (2014). On January 20, 2015, the Court reversed, unanimously. In an opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that Arkansas's grooming policy violates RLUIPA \"insofar as it prevents petitioner from growing a 1\u20442-inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs.\" The opinion focused on the fact that the state's asserted security interest was undermined by the fact that it allowed prisoners to grow 1/4-inch beards for medical reasons, and also allowed prisoners to grow their hair longer than 1/2 inch. On March 12, 2015, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot. Plaintiff then filed a motion for contempt on March 24, 2015, arguing that the Department of Corrections was misapplying the court ruling. The court denied this motion for contempt. On May 14, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion for permanent injunction, which was granted on June 4, 2015. The permanent injunction stated that prisoners can grow a 1/2 inch beard for religious reasons if they properly file for religious grooming accommodations. On June 9, 2015, the parties filed a joint notice stating that the Department of Corrections agreed to pay $134,000 to plaintiff's attorneys. On June 23, 2015, the court dismissed the case with prejudice. On November 3, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion to reopen the case, alleging that he was advised that he should not help other prisoners file for religious grooming accommodations and was told not to teach Islam beliefs in a religious group for prisoners. The court denied this motion on November 20, 2015, because plaintiff had already been granted relief and was adding new claims. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration on November 27, 2015, stating that he was impermissibly and wrongly discharged from the PAL (Principles and Applications for Life) program in retaliation for exercising his right to advise other inmates on how to file for accommodations and for educating fellow inmates. The court denied this motion for reconsideration, on the grounds that the claims brought in the motion for reconsideration were unrelated to whether he should be permitted to wear a half-inch beard. The court found that if plaintiff wanted to pursue his new claims, he had to file a new case. This case is now closed.", "summary": "On June 28, 2011, a devout Muslim inmate at the Arkansas Department of Corrections' Cummins Unit filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (\"RLUIPA\") alleging that the prison grooming policy interfered with his religious practices. The District Court held that the grooming policy was the least restrictive means of furthering the government's compelling interest in prison security, and dismissed the case. The Eight Circuit affirmed, but the on Jan. 20, 2015, the Supreme Court unanimously disagreed, and held that the prisoners must be allowed to grow a 1/2 inch beard. Plaintiff attempted to reopen the case in November 2015, but the court denied plaintiff's motion to reopen the case because he brought forth new claims."} {"article": "On September 12, 2005, three freight pickup and delivery drivers, who worked for EGL, Inc., filed this class action lawsuit under the California Labor Code and the California Unfair Competition Law against EGL in the Santa Clara Superior Court of California. On October 14, 2005, the case was removed to the U.S. District Court Northern District of California, San Jose on grounds of diversity jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for damages and declaratory relief, claiming that EGL denied them certain employee benefits required under the California Labor Code by misclassifying them as independent contractors instead of employees. Specifically, the Plaintiff's alleged that EGL violated the California Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Business and Profession Code \u00a717200-09) by misclassifying the Plaintiffs as independent contractors and thereby violating state laws requiring employers to pay overtime compensation (Cal. Lab. Code \u00a7\u00a7 510 & 1194) and minimum wages (Cal. Lab. Code \u00a71182.11 & 1182.12), prohibiting employers from making certain improper deductions from wages (Cal. Lab. Code \u00a7 221), requiring employers to reimburse employees for necessary business expenses (Cal. Lab. Code \u00a7 2802), requiring employers to provide accurate itemized wage statements to employees (Cal. Lab. Code \u00a71174 & 1174.5), requiring employers to pay all compensation to employers that are discharged (Cal. Lab. Code \u00a7201, 202, & 203), and requiring employers to provide off-duty meal periods (Cal. Lab. Code \u00a7\u00a7 226.7 & 512). EGL, Inc. is a global transportation, supply chain management and information services company incorporated under the laws of Texas and headquartered in California. One aspect of EGL's business is domestic delivery services. The plaintiffs were California residents who provided freight pick-up and delivery services for EGL in California. All three Plaintiffs signed agreements with EGL that expressly characterized the Plaintiffs as independent contractors and included a choice of law clause specifying Texas law as governing the agreement. On December 8, 2006, EGL moved for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiffs were independent contractors under the terms of the agreement, and therefore not entitled to employee benefits provided by the California Labor Code. The Plaintiffs argued that their claims fell outside the scope of the choice of law provision and that the application of Texas law is contrary to California law. U.S. District Court Judge Ronald M. Whyte granted summary judgment for the defendant. Narayan v. EGL, Inc., No. C 05 04181, 2007 WL 2021809 (N.D.Cal. July 10, 2007). On July 13, 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Edward R. Korman, reversed the District Court's order granting summary judgment. Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2010). The court reviewed the District Court's choice of law decision de novo, and held that Texas law applied only to the interpretation and enforcement of the contract itself. Id. at 899. Therefore, California law applied because the plaintiffs claimed benefits under the California Labor Code. Furthermore, the Court held that summary judgment was not appropriate under California's multi-faceted test of employment, because a reasonable jury could find the existence of an employee relationship between the Plaintiffs and EGL. Id. at 904. As a result of the 9th Circuit's reversal, the case was again before the District Court. As the parties discussed how to proceed with discovery and/or to settle the case, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on February 7, 2011, adding a cause of action for failure to pay minimum wage. Then on September 23, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certification. Seven days later in a joint report on Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), the parties discussed their failed attempts to reach a settlement. The plaintiffs wanted any settlement to be class-wide, and rejected the defendant's proposal to discuss settlement with only the named plaintiffs and other interested individuals. As such, though the plaintiffs believed mediation would be helpful in reaching a settlement, the defendants expressed doubt that mediation or any other form of ADR would be be beneficial unless the plaintiffs were willing to drop the class action. Over the next year, the plaintiffs submitted exhibits and declarations in support of their motion for class certification, while the defendants submitted exhibits and declarations supporting their opposition to the motion for class certification. The parties also deposed most of these declarants. A motion hearing held on March 30, 2012 before Judge Whyte. However, despite the plaintiffs calling the Court's attention to a recent decision, Scovil v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 2012 WL 3308831 (D.Me.)., their Motion for Class Action was denied on September 7, 2012. 285 F.R.D. 473. The plaintiffs filed for permission to appeal that decision, but their petition for permission to appeal was denied on December 17, 2012. On August 11, 2014, M&G Truck Service filed a notice of lein against one of the named defendants, claiming that he owed $27,606.54. After the parties in that matter came to a settled agreement, a release of lien was filed on October 13, 2015. That matter is closed. On December 3, 2015, the parties in this matter settled, agreeing to dismissal of the claims by three of the named plaintiffs, with prejudice. Each side was to bear its own costs of the suit except otherwise provided for in the parties' settlement agreement, and the settlement agreement is not available. This stipulation did not affect the claims by the fourth named plaintiff, who, pending resolution of his proposed bankruptcy resolution, maintained all of his causes of action in this case. This stipulation was granted on December 4, 2015. In February 2016, the parties filed a stipulation with proposed order to dismiss all of the claims by the remaining named plaintiff, with prejudice, against the defendants. This settlement agreement is likewise unavailable. The stipulation was granted on February 25, 2016 by Judge White. This case is closed.", "summary": "On September 12, 2005, three freight pickup and delivery drivers, who worked for EGL, Inc., filed a class action lawsuit under the California Labor Code and the California Unfair Competition Law claiming that EGL denied them certain employee benefits required under the California Labor Code by misclassifying them as independent contractors instead of employees. On December 8, 2006, the District Court (Judge Ronald M. Whyte) granted summary judgment for the Defendant. Narayan v. EGL, Inc., No. C 05 04181, 2007 WL 2021809 (N.D.Cal. July 10, 2007). On July 13, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (Judge Edward R. Korman) reversed the District Court order granting summary judgment. Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2010). After the plaintiff's motion for class action was denied, and their appeal rejected, the parties ultimately came to an agreement and all the claims were settled by February 25, 2016. This case is closed."} {"article": "On June 24, 2008, several sex offender plaintiffs brought an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada against several state defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada, alleged violation of several constitutional protections. Speficially plaintiffs' argued that new sex offender laws could not be applied retroactively, and that they resulted in excessive punishments to plaintiffs, thus seeking injunctive relief and declaratory judgment against the new state laws. On June 30, 2008, the District Court (Hon. James C. Mahan) denied a temporary restraining order but granted a preliminary injunction, postponing the enforcement of the new sex offender laws against plaintiffs. After obtaining the preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include new parties and a jury demand against all defendants, and to remove Washoe County and all law enforcement defendants. The Court also denied third parties' motions to intervene and a motion to file an amicus curiae brief, holding that no new legal issues were being presented and that affected persons were being adequately represented. On October 7, 2008, the Court held that because the retroactive application of the laws meant imposing a new punishment for an old crime, it violated the Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy, and Contracts clauses, and that because there was no procedural safeguard for the plaintiffs, it also violated the Due Process clause. Thus, the Court granted plaintiffs' revised order requesting permanent injunction against enforcing Nevada's new sex offender laws. In January of 2009, the Court also granted plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees in the amount of $145,823.50. The defendants appealed the District Court's decision, and requested that the court stay the order of attorney fees pending appeal, though the Court denied the motion to stay. On February 10, 2012, the Court of Appeals reversed the injunction against retroactive application of Nevada's New Sex Offender laws regarding recategorization of sex offenders, citing to previous 9th Circuit decisions holding that retroactive application of similar laws was constitutional. The Court of Appeals also dismissed as moot the defendants' appeal regarding the district court's injunction against retroactive application of new laws restricting movement and residency of sex offenders, basing their decision on the defendants' admission that such laws were not meant to be interpreted as retroactively applicable; the Court of Appeals ordered the parties to create consent decree to be signed by the District Court. The injunction against the movement and residency laws was to remain in force until such a decree was signed. The case remained open, with the parties resolving the matter and the Court conducting status checks, and handling a new issue regarding the scope of the injunction on the movement and residency laws. Further, the Court of Appeals held that the outcome regarding movement and residence laws was considered a ruling for the plaintiffs, and thus affirmed the District Court's grant of attorney fees to the plaintiffs; however, the amount to be paid by defendants was later settled by the parties, though the amount was not indicated in the record. No consent decree appears to have been filed, though it appears the parties resolved the matter. On June 10, 2015, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal, which the court granted two days later. There is little information available about the conclusion of the case. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On June 24, 2008, plaintiff sex offender sought injunctive and declaratory judgment against the state of Nevada's new sex offender laws that would result in excessive punishment and retroactive enforcement. As of May 31, 2014, the case is ongoing, with the most recent holding by the 9th Circuit holding that new law resulting in recategorizing of sex offenders is enforceable, and that parties should submit a consent degree with respect to nonenforcement of new law that restricts movement and residency."} {"article": "On June 12, 2013, a private citizen Verizon Wireless subscriber filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho, under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Constitution, against the President, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General of the U.S., and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the government's search and seizure of her telephone records under Section 215 of the Patriot Act violated the First and Fourth Amendment and 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the NSA was monitoring and searching her telephone records without showing first that there was probable cause to believe that she was engaged in criminal behavior. On November 7, 2013, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On December 20, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. On January 24, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction. On June 3, 2014, Judge B. Lynn Winmill granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief. Judge Winmill wrote that there was no Fourth Amendment violation in this case based on precedent, citing the Supreme Court case of Smith v Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), in which the Supreme Court held that a person has no expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers that she dials. Smith v. Obama, 2014 WL 2506421 (D. Idaho June 3, 2014). Although the NSA's data gathering goes beyond the telephone numbers dialed, this is still not a violation of the Fourth Amendment because the Ninth Circuit had extended Smith v. Maryland's holding to cover call length and call time, as well. The Court noted, too, that other courts had already found that the NSA was not violating the Fourth Amendment. See A.C.L.U. v Clapper, NS-NY-0003 and U.S. v. Moalin, U.S. v. Moalin, 2013 WL 6079518 (S.D.Cal. 2013). Plaintiffs appealed the decision on July 1, 2014. On March 22, 2016, the Ninth Circuit determined that the plaintiff\u2019s claims pertaining to injunctive relief were moot as the USA Freedom Act of 2015 prohibited further bulk collection of metadata. Plaintiff\u2019s claims pertaining to the data that the government had already collected were remanded to the district court and eventually voluntarily dismissed. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2013, a Verizon Wireless subscriber filed a federal lawsuit in the District of Idaho challenging the National Security Agency's search and seizure of her telephone records under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C. \u00a7 1861, claiming that it violated the Fourth Amendment. and 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706. In 2014, the court dismissed the case holding that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the injunctive relief was determined to be moot given that the USA Freedom Act of 2015 prohibited further bulk collection of metadata. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On September 14, 2016, a Mexican citizen who had been previously detained at the Northwest Detention Center in Tacoma, WA, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiff sued the local Field Office Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Director of ICE, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, the Attorney General of the U.S., and the warden of the Northwest Detention Center under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1101 et seq.) (INA), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 701 et seq.), the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Habeas Corpus (28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241), and the All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1331, 1361, and 1651). Represented by the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, the plaintiff sought a writ of habeas corpus, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants denied him his due process rights and violated the INA by detaining plaintiff class members for more than six months and by not offering individualized custody redetermination hearings (also known as bond hearings) before an Immigration Judge after having been found by asylum officers to have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. Specifically, the defendants had previously determined that Immigration Judges do not have jurisdiction over custody hearings for persons fleeing persecution and torture and placed in \"withholding only\" proceedings under the Procedures for Asylum and Withholding Removal (8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1208). However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that persons in immigration proceedings facing detention of six months or longer are entitled to a custody hearing. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015). An Immigration Judge could issue a custody redetermination on whether the person presents a flight risk or threat to the community, or whether the noncitizen is entitled to be released during the immigration proceedings. As a result of the defendants' determination, persons in withholding only proceedings remained incarcerated in federal facilities and private prisons (e.g. the Northwest Detention Center) often for more than a year, and sometimes for multiple years. The case was assigned to Judge James L. Robart. On October 19, 2016, the defendants moved to stay the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The next day, the plaintiff moved to certify the following class definition: \"All individuals detained in the Western District of Washington who are placed in withholding only proceedings under 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1208.31(e) who, (1) are thereafter denied an individualized custody determination before an Immigration Judge or, (2) on or before six months of civil immigration detention, are not provided automatic individualized custody hearings where Defendants must justify their continued detention.\" The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on November 7, 2016. Regarding their previous motion to stay, the district court denied it on November 29, 2016. Two days later, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on January 31, 2017. The changes included adding more named plaintiffs and revising the class definition so as to remove any ambiguity that the named plaintiffs belonged to the plaintiff class. On February 8, the plaintiffs amended the motion to certify the plaintiff class with the new class definition, which removed the first definition's specificity around denied custody hearings: \"All individuals who are placed in withholding only proceedings under 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1208.31(e) in the Western District of Washington who are detained or subject to an order of detention.\" On February 27, 2017, the defendants filed a second motion to dismiss for the newly-added named plaintiffs. The district court ruled on both motions to dismiss on July 11, 2017. It granted the first motion, which was directed at the claims of the original named plaintiff, and denied the second motion. For the first motion, the district court held that the plaintiff lacked standing because he was already released from detention and failed to show \"a sufficient likelihood\" of the defendants detaining him again. On August 4, 2017, the defendants filed an amended motion to dismiss. On September 13, 2017, the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, in part with prejudice and in part without. Because the original named plaintiff's claims were dismissed, his request for injunctive relief was denied with prejudice. The district court also denied with prejudice preliminary injunctive relief regarding immediate custody hearings after being placed in withholding only proceedings because the Ninth Circuit recently held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to those immediate hearings. Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 862 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2017). For the issue of custody hearings after a prolonged detention, the district court denied without prejudice preliminary relief because of the pending motions for dismissal and class certification. The district court certified the following version of the plaintiff class definition on December 11, 2017: \"All individuals who (1) were placed in withholding only proceedings under 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1208.31(e) in the Western District of Washington after having a removal order reinstated, and (2) have been detained for 180 days (a) without a custody hearing or (b) since receiving a custody hearing.\" This version added back elements regarding custody hearings and the length of detention that the first amended complaint had dropped. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on December 14, 2017, asking the district court to declare the defendants' actions unlawful and to order the defendants to provide all class members with individualized custody hearings. They argued that the defendants, by asserting that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the individualized hearings, had agreed that it was their policy to deny these hearings. The defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment on January 8, 2018. On April 4, 2018, the district court granted in part and denied in part both summary judgment motions and granted injunctive relief. It granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs\u2014they were entitled to automatic custody hearings after six months of detention. It also granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs for their due process claim as a result. On the other hand, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants for the due process claim. It also enjoined the defendants from enforcing the policy of not providing individualized custody hearings every six months, holding that the defendants violated the INA by failing to provide those hearings. The defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit on May 30, 2018. Meanwhile, back in the trial court on April 4, 2019, the defendants moved for relief from the district court's order. The district court deferred its ruling on June 4, 2019, pending the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Ninth Circuit heard oral argument on November 13, 2019. On April 7, 2020, it remanded the case, affirming in part and reversing and vacating in part the district court's opinion. The Ninth Circuit applied its holding in Aleman Gonzalez v. Sessions (IM-CA-0120 in this Clearinghouse) and affirmed the parts of the injunction (from April 4, 2018) that required the defendants to provide individualized hearings after six months when the class member's release was not imminent and to justified continued detention with clear and convincing evidence. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated the judgment that the defendants hold additional hearings every six months because no such requirement was explicitly found in previous cases or statutes. Because the district court had used this finding of requiring additional hearings to rule on the plaintiffs' due process claim, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for reconsideration of the due process claim. 955 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2020). On June 24, 2020, the parties moved to stay proceedings, which the district court granted on June 25, because the defendants were deciding whether to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Supreme Court had extended the time to file a petition, and so case proceedings were stayed until September 5, 2020. The defendants filed a petition to the Supreme Court on September 4, 2020, for both this case and Aleman Gonzalez v. Sessions. The petition and briefs were distributed on January 8, 2021. As of April 15, 2021, the case is pending the Court's decision on whether to grant a writ of certiorari.", "summary": "This is a case about individualized custody redetermination hearings for individuals placed in \"withholding only\" proceedings for prolonged detentions under the Procedures for Asylum and Withholding Removal. On September 14, 2016, a Mexican citizen who had been previously detained filed this class action lawsuit against the local Field Office Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Director of ICE, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, the Attorney General of the U.S., and the warden of the Northwest Detention Center under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Administrative Procedure Act, the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Habeas Corpus, and the All Writs Act. Represented by the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants denied due process rights and violated the INA by detaining plaintiff class members for more than six months and by not offering individualized hearings. The district court granted injunctive relief on April 4, 2018, requiring the defendants to provide hearings every six months. On April 7, 2020, the Ninth Circuit reversed the requirement to provide additional hearings after the first six-month hearing. The defendants have filed a petition with the Supreme Court, and the case is ongoing."} {"article": "On March 31, 2014, Disability Rights Montana (DRM), a not-for-profit advocating for individuals with serious mental illness incarcerated at the Montana State Prison, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Montana. The plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging violations of mentally ill prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiff also brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiff brought this lawsuit against the officials running various Montana governmental entities, including the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS), the Montana State Hospital, and the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC). The plaintiff was represented by the ACLU of Montana and private attorneys, and asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that the Montana State Prison violated the Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners with serious mental illness by, among other things, withholding medication, misdiagnosing prisoners with a long history of mental illness, and punishing prisoners for behavior caused by their mental illness. The complaint further alleged that prisoners with mental illness were routinely subjected to years of solitary confinement or so-called \"behavior modification plans\" that deprived them of clothing, working toilets, and proper food, all of which needlessly magnified the harms these prisoners suffered. With regard to a subset of prisoners\u2014individuals who had been sentenced as \"guilty but mentally ill\" (GBMI)\u2014the plaintiff also alleged violations of their due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that these individuals sentenced as GBMI were being transferred to the Montana State Prison, either because the Hospital wanted to open up bed space, or because it wanted to avoid treating prisoners who were disliked by staff. The plaintiff claimed these transfers would occur without giving patients any real opportunity to challenge them. On July 24, 2014, United States District Judge Sam E. Haddon dismissed parts of the case against the defendant officers who represented the DPHHS and the Montana State Hospital. The court found that the complaint did not contain any allegations of conduct that could be traced to those defendants because neither had been working there at the time these underlying events occurred. The court also found that the allegations related to the GBMI transfers failed to provide the necessary specificity mandated by pleading standards. Following a status conference, DRM was ordered to file the action as a separate case with a separate case number. The second case is available on the Clearinghouse as Disability Rights Montana v. Batista. The plaintiff responded by filing two rounds of amended complaints, which named new individual officers as representatives of the defendants. The Montana DPHHS and Montana State Hospital defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint for failure to state a claim but the district court summarily denied it on September 3, 2015. However, on March 31, 2016, the parties stipulated to a dismissal without prejudice with regard to the DPHHS and the Montana State Hospital defendants. As such, the case is closed.", "summary": "Disability Rights Montana filed this lawsuit against the Montana Department of Corrections, the Montana State Prison, the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services, and the Montana State Hospital, in the United States District Court for the District of Montana. The plaintiff alleged that the Prison and the Department of Corrections were violating the Eighth Amendment rights of seriously mentally ill prisoners by, among other things, putting prisoners with serious mental illnesses in solitary confinement. As for the hospital and the DPHHS, the plaintiff alleged that both were violating the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights of prisoners who had been sentenced as \"guilty but mentally ill\" (GBMI) by transferring them from the hospital to the state prison. This second claim was eventually dropped by the plaintiffs in a stipulated dismissal and the claims against the prison and the Department of Corrections were refiled under a different case number (available on the Clearinghouse under PC-MT-0010)."} {"article": "On February 16, 2016 two California organizations\u2014the California Council of the Blind and the Lighthouse for the Blind and Visually Impaired\u2014and four individuals with visual impairments filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that AMC Entertainment violated Title III of the ADA (42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12111 et seq.) by not providing the proper headsets to accommodate its blind patrons. Some plaintiffs claimed they had been denied access to any audio description equipment. Other plaintiffs claimed that when they were provided audio description equipment, the equipment would fail during the movie, preventing the plaintiffs from enjoying the film. Represented by Disability Rights Advocates and Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and an injunction requiring the defendants to provide properly functioning audio description equipment and services for individuals who are blind or visually impaired. The case was originally assigned to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth D. Lapotre. On May 31, 2016 the case was reassigned to Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, who presided over the rest of the proceedings. Starting on May 11, 2016 a mediator led settlement discussions between the parties out of court. They reached a settlement in April 2017 and filed a motion to dismiss the case. Judge Rogers granted the order on April 27, 2017. The settlement required that the defendant make reasonable and diligent efforts to maintain Descriptive Narration Equipment in its theaters and replace any malfunctioning equipment. The defendants were also required to train employees on availability of Descriptive Narration Equipment, including step by step guidelines for setting up the equipment and instruction to test the equipment weekly. The plaintiffs were also awarded attorneys' fees and costs. The court continued to monitor the terms of the agreement until April 21, 2019. The case is now closed.", "summary": "The plaintiffs represented blind individuals seeking accommodation from a movie theater chain. The case settled through mediation in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendants had to provide reasonable accommodation, employee training, and attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs."} {"article": "In September 2005, the Los Angeles District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada against Prospect Airport Services, Inc. The complaint was brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The plaintiff alleged that a male employee was sexually harassed by a female co-worker, and that the defendant company did not take steps to remedy the situation. The defendant moved for summary judgment, and on September 27, 2007 Judge Kent J. Dawson granted the motion. The court reasoned that the alleged harassment was not severe or pervasive enough to constitute sexual harassment under Title VII, and that the employer could not be held responsible because the male employee had specified to supervisors that he did not wish to bring a charge of sexual harassment. The EEOC appealed the court's ruling. Three years later, on September 3, 2010, Judge Andrew J. Kleinfield of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion reversing the district court\u2019s decision to grant judgment to the defendant. Judge Kleinfield held that the case was incorrectly withheld from a jury since the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence regarding sexual harassment and hostile work environment. Even though the plaintiff conceded that the male employee did not feel abused by his co-worker's first advances, the Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff had introduced evidence showing that the case should have been sent to a jury due to the frequency and pervasiveness of the continued advances. The Court of Appeals then stayed the reversal of the district court\u2019s decision pending the defendant\u2019s appeal to the United States Supreme Court. As the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari to the defendant, the mandate reversing the lower court\u2019s decision went into effect on February 9, 2011. The case was remanded to Judge Dawson. During discovery, parties went back and forth moving to exclude testimonial evidence. In December 6, 2011, Judge Dawson granted defendant\u2019s contested motion to bifurcate the case into two trials: one for liability and one for punitive damages. But ten days later, the parties notified the court that they reached a settlement. The defendant agreed to pay $75,000.00 by January 6, 2012 and the plaintiff had until January 10, 2012 to move for injunctive or other forms of non-monetary relief. On January 10, 2012, the plaintiff exercised its discretion and moved for an injunction requiring defendant to implement effective employment policies and practices to comply with anti-discrimination law. Judge Dawson granted only part of the plaintiff\u2019s motion in July 2012. The court found that the defendant company had already taken steps to ensure compliance with the sexual harassment provision of Title VII and both employees had since left the company. The granted portion of the injunction enjoined the defendant from violating the sexual harassment provision of Title VII for five years and required the company to implement a stronger anti-harassment policy and investigative procedure, including extensive employee trainings. In addition, the defendant had to submit monitoring reports once every six months for a period of three years. The case administratively closed in 2014 and is now closed.", "summary": "In September 2005, the EEOC filed suit in the District of Nevada on behalf of a male employee against his employer, Prospect Airport Services, Inc. for failing to address sexual harassment by a female co-worker. EEOC brought the complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, but on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case. In December 2011, the parties settled before trial and the defendant company agreed to pay $75,000.00. EEOC later moved for injunctive relief in January 2012. The court granted the motion in part, enjoining the defendant from violating the sexual harassment provision of Title VII for five years and requiring the company to implement a stronger anti-harassment policy and investigative procedure including extensive employee trainings. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On July 23, 2010, a prisoner at Stateville Correction Center filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff sued Wexford Health Services and the Illinois Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiff, representing himself pro se, asked the court for monetary damages and injunctive relief. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs resulting from Type 1 Diabetes, violating Stateville Correction Center's medical policy and depriving the plaintiff of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. Later in an amended complaint, the plaintiffs requested class certification and cited chronic understaffing as a root cause of the systemic problems with medical care, and that when prisoners were seen by clinicians, the care was substandard. The case was assigned to Judge Ruben Castillo. On August 10, 2010, the court appointed private counsel to represent the plaintiff, and on November 10, the plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. On October 7, 2011, the plaintiffs submitted a second amended complaint with counsel from Uptown People's Law Center joining the case. The plaintiffs sought class certification for a class of all people who were or will be confined in Illinois adult correctional centers that had not received adequate medical treatment due to misconduct of Wexford or its staff. The complaint included two subclasses: first for those who required but were not receiving a medically necessary diet, and second for those who were not receiving prescribed medical treatment in a timely manner. The complaint also added claims for violations of Illinois state law, including the state fraud and deceptive trade practices act and breach of contract. On January 9, 2012, the defendants filed motions to dismiss all counts against them. They claimed that the plaintiffs presented a \"mishmash\" of claims against unrelated defendants, that the plaintiffs class claims were overbroad, and that sovereign immunity protected the defendants from suit on the claims under state law. In December 2011, the case had been referred to Judge Morton Denlow for settlement conferences. But in light of the motion to dismiss, the parties indicated they were no longer interested in settlement until the issue of class certification had been decided. After acquiring multiple extensions for time and compelling discovery from the defendants, on October 31, 2012, plaintiffs filed a third amendment complaint. They requested certification of a new class of all present and future prisoners in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections. Moreover, they cited Wexford's private contract for flat payment to provide medical care for the entire Illinois prison population as the company's economic incentive to take short cuts on medical care. The plaintiffs removed the state law claims, leaving only the class-wide and individual claims of deliberate indifference under \u00a7 1983. By this complaint, the Roger Baldwin Foundation of the ACLU had joined as counsel for the plaintiffs. On December 20, 2012, defendants filed another motion to dismiss all counts for failure to comply with the PLRA. That same day, the parties filed an agreement to assure compliance with HIPAA. On January 10, 2013, the court denied the motion in open court without an order or opinion. Subsequently, the parties began settlement discussions. But in October 2013, the case was reassigned to Judge Sarah Ellis, which vacated all of the previously set dates to confer and hearings on discovery issues. In November 2013, the parties agreed to appoint an independent medical expert to evaluate the constitutionality of the medical care provided in the Illinois correctional system. On December 18, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the class-wide claims against Wexford without prejudice, leaving remaining claims against individual officers. In June and July 2014, the expert completed site visits. While waiting for the expert's reports, the defendants moved for summary judgment. In January 2015, the case was again reassigned to Judge Jorge Luis Alonso. In March 2015, the parties were unable to reach a settlement after multiple conferences. On May 19, 2015, the court-appointed expert's final report was filed with the court, describing that the health care program for prisoners in the State of Illinois was not meeting the minimal constitutional standard. On June 16, 2015, the court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgement. The court found that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference toward the plaintiff's serious medical needs\u2014in particular when the defendants knew that the plaintiff was an insulin-dependent diabetic but still ignored his requests for insulin (in one case, while the plaintiff was lying on the floor of his cell). 2015 WL 3777551. One of the defendants requested reconsideration of the decision, which the court subsequently denied in August. On December 7, 2015, plaintiffs filed a Fourth Amendment complaint, requested to bifurcate class claims from individual claims, and filed a new motion to certify class. The new alleged class was all prisoners in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) with serious medical or dental needs. On January 19, 2016, the court denied the plaintiffs' request to bifurcate the claims. On April 18, 2016, a plaintiff in another case about Wexford's medical care services filed to relate to this case (Everett v. Hardy, Docket No. 1:13-cv-04697). But because that case had been ongoing for three years, Judge Alonso denied the motion to relate the cases. The parties continued discovery as they waited on the court's decision as to class certification. On January 26, 2017, the court held a hearing on the motion to certify the class, and granted the motion on April 28, 2017. The court certified an injunctive relief class of all prisoners in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections with serious medical or dental needs. 2017 WL 1545672. In July, the individual plaintiff again requested to bifurcate his claims from the class claim, which the court this time granted. In August, the defendants and the individual plaintiff reached a private settlement. On March 24, 2017, the plaintiff dismissed the individual damages claims, which dismissed a handful of named defendants with prejudice. In December 2017, the court appointed another expert to determine whether any of the systemic deficiencies identified in the first expert\u2019s report from 2014 existed within IDOC. Throughout 2018, the parties continued to vigorously litigate discovery issues, including motions for sanctions against the defendants. In the fall of 2018, the parties began submitting pretrial motions and documents, as well as settlement conferences. On November 14, 2018, the second expert filed a report with the court. The expert found that overall, conditions had not improved since the first expert's report. Staff vacancies continued to be high and Wexford had not hired credentialed physicians, in both the medical and dental departments. And outdated systems like paper filings contributed to substandard care, in addition to poorly sanitized clinical areas. On November 16, 2018, the plaintiffs submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the court. On December 6, 2018, the plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction to create a staffing plan with the expert. But on January 3, the parties filed a joint motion for approval of a class action settlement and consent decree (mooting the motion for preliminary injunction). The settlement included provisions for minimum qualifications for staff and employ new healthcare administrators. The defendants also agreed to provide sanitary clinical spaces and to revise and improve the dental program. The settlement also appointed a monitor to implement and oversee the staffing plan. The defendants also agreed to provide detailed reports to the monitor and to plaintiffs' counsel every six months for the first two years, and then every year thereafter. The court would retain jurisdiction over the agreement for a minimum of three years and a maximum of ten years after its approval. Hundreds of class members subsequently filed objections to the settlement with the court. On March 29, 2019, the court appointed a third-party monitor. On May 9, the court approval the final consent decree. On November 24, 2019, the expert drafted the first report per the decree's terms, which was filed with the court in January 2019. Reporting and compliance with the decree is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2010, a prisoner from the Stateville Correction Center filed this case in the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The case certified a class of all prisoners in Illinois who receive medical or dental care. The plaintiffs alleged long-standing, systemic violations of Eighth Amendment rights in the failure to properly follow prescribe procedures for prisoners' medical treatment. After lengthy litigation, the parties settled on the eve of trial in 2019. The defendants are currently under a consent decree to reform medical care in the Illinois prisons. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "On May 21, 2012, an inmate who suffered from severe mental illness and had a developmental disability filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiff, representing himself, sued the Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC), claiming that the DOC's failure to provide him with adequate psychotropic medication was cruel and unusual punishment. On November 19, 2012, now represented by the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act, asking the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief. He alleged that the defendant subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and discriminated against him on the basis of his disability. More specifically, that the defendants placed him in administrative segregation, also known as solitary confinement, because of his disability. After the plaintiff's amended complaint survived a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff filed an unopposed motion to appoint a judicial officer for settlement conference. The plaintiff\u2019s motion was granted in an April 2, 2014 order, and a settlement conference was set to be held before Magistrate Judge Craig Shaffer for April 7, 2014. After the settlement conference, the parties were ordered to file a stipulated motion to administratively close the case and a further settlement conference was set. The parties complied with the order, and their motion to administratively close the case for six months was granted on April 9, 2014. After the Court granted the motion to administratively close the case, the parties began negotiations for settlement. In a settlement agreement dated July 24, 2015, the parties negotiated a private settlement agreement, which is not publicly available. The claims against the defendant were dismissed with prejudice by Judge Jackson on July 27, 2015. This case is closed.", "summary": "The plaintiff, an inmate who suffers from severe mental illness and has a mental disability, sued the Colorado Department of Corrections pro se. Later, while represented by the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement center, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant, by placing him in solitary confinement, subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and discriminated against him on the basis of his disability. In April 2014, the parties began negotiations for settlement, and on July 24, 2015, they agreed to a private settlement. On July 27, 2015, District Court Judge R. Brooke Jackson dismissed the plaintiff's claims with prejudice. This case is closed."} {"article": "On October 5, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a customer service representative (\"CSR\"), filed a lawsuit in the District Court of New Jersey, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\"AEA\"), against Port Elizabeth Terminal and Warehouse. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant treated the complainant less favorably than younger, non-black CSRs, eventually resulting in her discharge after she complained about the disparate treatment. On June 15, 2006, the District Court (Judge William J. Martini) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $28,500.", "summary": "On October 5, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a customer service representative (\"CSR\"), filed a lawsuit in the District Court of New Jersey, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\"AEA\"), against Port Elizabeth Terminal and Warehouse. The EEOC claimed that the defendant treated the complainant less favorably than younger, non-black CSRs, eventually resulting in her discharge after she complained about the disparate treatment. The parties entered into a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $28,500."} {"article": "On February 12, 2015, the National Association of the Deaf (NAD), on behalf of its members (including four named in the complaint) and a proposed class, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs sued Harvard University under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from the Disability Law Center, Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, the National Association of the Deaf Law and Advocacy Center, and private council. The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction that would require Harvard to provide accurate captioning on its online content along with declaratory relief and attorneys' fees. The parties claimed that Harvard had willfully violated the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act by not providing captioned video and audio content on its platforms and therefore excluding deaf and hard of hearing individuals from benefiting from said content. The plaintiffs alleged that Harvard did not have administrative procedures or policies in place to ensure that its online content had accurate captioning, whether or not that content had been created or produced by Harvard itself. This issue extended back to 2010, when the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Education issued a joint letter to university colleges and presidents to make clear that the requirements of \u00a7 504 and ADA include technological devices when used by places of public accommodation. The following year, the Department of Education released an FAQ explaining the letter, indicating that its contents were predicated on legal precedents and that the letter would apply to all forms of emerging technology, including online content. Despite this and repeated requests from the NAD, Harvard had not accurately captioned much of its online content. After the initial filing of the complaint on February 12, 2015, Harvard filed a motion to dismiss on May 11, 2015, citing issues of jurisdiction and a failure to state a cause of action. There were a number of responses to Harvard's motion, including the filing of an Amicus Brief by a representative from the U.S. Department of Justice, who agreed with the plaintiffs on this issue. On September 10, 2015, there was a hearing on the motion to dismiss held before Magistrate Judge Katherine A. Robertson. On February 9, 2016, Judge Robertson recommended that the court deny the defendant\u2019s motion to stay or dismiss in its entirety. 2016 WL 3561622. Judge Mark G. Mastroianni adopted Judge Robertson\u2019s recommendation, officially denying the motion on November 3, 2016. The parties then elected to try to settle the dispute using a private mediator. The parties met with the mediator several times, but on February 22, 2018 both parties declared that they were unable to come to an agreement. Judge Robertson set a trial date for 2019. On June 29, 2019, Harvard filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The parties agreed that Magistrate Judge Robertson could conduct this proceeding, and all subsequent proceedings. She granted in part and denied in part Harvard's motion. 377 F.Supp.3d 49. After receiving this order, the parties agreed to re-enter settlement negotiations. The parties mediated the case and reached a proposed settlement that they submitted to the court for approval. The proposed settlement included a consent decree whereby Harvard would caption all of its new online content created after December 1, 2019, caption content created prior to December 1, 2019 at the request of an individual who cannot access the content, establish and implement a \"cure process\" by which any member of the public can inform Harvard that content has not been captioned or has been inaccurately captioned, report on its compliance with the consent decree every six months, and give the court 42 months of jurisdiction to ensure compliance and enforcement of the settlement. In addition, Harvard pledged not to oppose the plaintiffs' motion for $1,575,000 in attorneys' fees. On December 9, 2019, Magistrate Judge Robertson granted the motion, thereby certifying the settlement class and preliminarily approving the consent decree. 2019 WL 6699449. The court conducted a fairness hearing on the content of the proposed settlement on February 25, 2020. Judge Robertson approved the consent decree and entered final judgment in favor of the National Association of the Deaf. Judge Robertson also also awarded the plaintiffs $1,575,000 in attorneys' fees. The effective date of the consent decree was February 26, 2020, set for expiration in August of 2023.", "summary": "In February 2015, the National Association of the Deaf filed a class action complaint against Harvard University in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Filed under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the complaint claimed that Harvard has harmed the plaintiffs and other deaf and hard of hearing individuals by not providing accurate captioning on much of its online audio and video content. The parties reached a settlement agreement whereby Harvard would caption all of its new online content and individuals could request captions for previously posted content. The court approved the settlement agreement in February 2020."} {"article": "On September 11, 2017, several states initiated this action in the District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging President Trump\u2019s attempted revocation of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). The plaintiffs alleged that DACA provided invaluable protections to young people across their states and allowed them to pursue education and employment. In turn, DACA recipients have contributed to state economies and the educational experiences of all students in state school systems. The complaint argued that the proposed revocation violated Fifth Amendment Due Process and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The plaintiffs sought equitable estoppel to prevent the government from divulging the personal information of DACA recipients, as well as an order from the court enjoining the government from rescinding the program. In 2012, the Obama administration created the DACA program via Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy statements. The program offered work permits and temporary protection from deportation to undocumented immigrants who had been brought to the United States as children (and who meet some additional requirements). As of 2017, there were an estimated 800,000 DACA recipients. On September 5, 2017, President Trump announced that he was ending the program in March unless Congress acted within the next six months. As the plaintiffs' complaint highlights, the Obama administration made key promises to applicants when it promoted DACA: that any information they provided in the application process would not be used for immigration enforcement purposes, and that, barring criminal activity or fraud in their DACA applications, DACA recipients would be able to renew their status and keep their benefits. The plaintiffs were the states of California, Maine, Minnesota, and Maryland. The complaint noted that California in particular was home to more DACA recipients than any other state in the country (over 200,000). The states argued that rescinding DACA \"violates fundamental notions of justice\" by leaving recipients without access to jobs and making them vulnerable to deportation. The complaint also alleged that DACA recipients were required to divulge confidential information in order to apply for the program, including information about their immigration status and address. Recipients were previously assured that the information would be kept confidential. By revoking DACA, the plaintiffs argued that the government created a \"confusing and threatening situation\" in which that private information was at risk of being used against recipients in future immigration proceedings. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James on Sept. 11, 2017, and reassigned to Judge William Alsup on Sept. 18, after it was related to Regents of University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security(No. 17-cv-05211). The cases were subsequently related to Garcia v. United States of America (No. 17-cv-5380), a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16156\">City of San Jose v. Trump, (No. 17-cv-5329), and County of Santa Clara v. Trump (No. 17-cv-5823). On October 6, in a related challenge led by Regents of University of California before this judge, the government filed the administrative record, available here, which included a series of government documents pertaining to DACA from its inception up to the decision to rescind it. On October 17, after the University in the related case moved to compel the defendants to complete the administrative record, the court ordered them to do so in all related cases, including this one. The court found that the defendants did not produce all documents leading to the rescission: specifically, they failed to produce related documents that Acting DHS Secretary Duke did not directly review. The defendants moved to stay further proceedings at this court on October 18 in light of their intent to appeal this ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court denied the requested stay on October 19, and the defendants appealed the next day by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus to the District Court and an emergency motion for stay. On October 23, the District Court replied to the Ninth Circuit's invitation to answer the government's petition, stating it would not stay proceedings in light of the narrow window of time until DACA was intended to end (March 5, 2018). On November 16, the Ninth Circuit denied the defendants' motion for a writ of mandamus and vacated the stay of discovery and record expansion that had been entered, and the District Court immediately ordered the federal government to file an augmented administrative record by November 22. On November 17, the federal government filed an emergency motion that it intended to file an application for mandamus with the US Supreme Court no later than November 20. The government requested that the Ninth Circuit stay its order pending the Supreme Court's resolution of that petition. On November 21, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the federal government's motion, noting that jurisdiction was with the District Court and instructing the federal government that further relief must be sought in a new petition for mandamus. Meanwhile, in the District Court, Judge Alsup on November 20 agreed to stay all discovery until December 22 when the augmented administrative record would be due. On December 1, 2017, the government filed notice that it appealed the Ninth's Circuit denial of mandamus relief and applied for a stay to the Supreme Court. On December 20 in a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's denial and remanded the case, arguing that the District Court should have stayed implementation of the October 17 order compelling the government to complete the administrative record. The Supreme Court stated that the lower court should have \"first resolved the Government\u2019s threshold arguments\" (that the Acting Secretary\u2019s determination to rescind DACA is unreviewable because it is \u201ccommitted to agency discretion,\u201d 5 U. S. C. \u00a7701(a)(2), and that the Immigration and Nationality Act deprives the District Court of jurisdiction). Either of those arguments, if accepted, likely would eliminate the need for the District Court to examine a complete administrative record. 138 S.Ct. 443 (2017). The same day, the District Court stayed the order compelling the government to complete the administrative record. 138 S.Ct. 371 (2017). On January 9, 2018, the court denied the government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and provided provisional relief to the plaintiffs. The order indicated the court would separately dismiss the government's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court ordered a nationwide preliminary injunction, ordering that DACA remain in effect on the same terms and conditions that existed prior to the rescission. However, the government did not need to process new applications from individuals who had never before received deferred action. 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011. The court then granted in part and denied in part the government's motion to dismiss on January 12, dismissing the plaintiffs' Regulatory Flexibility Act and equitable estoppel claims as well as the individual plaintiffs' declaratory relief claims. The court sustained the plaintiffs' APA, due process, and equal protection claims (with a few exceptions from the various complaints of the related cases). 298 F. Supp.3 d 1304. The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit on January 16, 2018. The government also sought certiorari from the US Supreme Court on January 18 while the Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, arguing that the Supreme Court's immediate review was warranted because of how long the appeal would take in the Ninth Circuit and how time-sensitive the issue was. The Supreme Court denied cert without prejudice on February 26, 2018, indicating the justices assumed \"that the Court of Appeals will proceed expeditiously to decide this case.\" 138 S.Ct. 1182. The related cases were consolidated in the Ninth Circuit for the purposes of appeal. In February and March 2018, the parties and amici filed their briefs, which can be found here. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings on November 8, 2018. The panel held that the government's decision to rescind DACA was reviewable because the government was not exercising discretion in rescinding the program, but rather acting out of a belief that DHS lacked the authority to issue DACA in the first place, and so rescission was necessary. The panel further concluded the decision was reviewable because it did not fall within one of the three discrete occasions when the INA bars judicial review of DHS decisions. 2018 WL 5833232. As to the merits of a preliminary injunction, the panel held that \"DACA was a permissible exercise of executive discretion,\" and that the government's belief that DACA was illegal was wrong. Thus, the panel concluded the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits in showing that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The panel also held that a nationwide injunction was appropriate because it \"promotes uniformity in immigration enforcement, and is necessary to provide the plaintiffs here with complete redress.\" Id. The defendants petitioned the Supreme Court of the U.S. for a writ of certiorari on Nov. 5, 2018. On June 28, 2019, the Supreme Court granted writs of certiorari in three DACA cases: Regents of University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, and NAACP v. Trump, all of which were pending before different circuit courts of appeal. The Court consolidated the three cases (No. 18-587). The Supreme Court heard oral argument on November 12, 2019, on the issues of whether DHS's decision to wind down the DACA policy is judicially reviewable and whether DHS\u2019s decision to rescind DACA is lawful. On June 18, 2020, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor), the Court held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA, that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program, and that the rescission was unlawful, arbitrary, and capricious in violation fo the APA. 140 S. Ct. 1891. Following the Supreme Court's decision, in another case challenging the DACA recession, Casa De Maryland v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Fourth Circuit issued a mandate to reinstate DACA and set aside the recession memo on a nationwide basis on June 30, 2020. On July 17, 2020, the District Court of Maryland ordered DHS to reinstate DACA as it existed before the issuance of the recession memo and ordered DHS to resume accepting initial DACA applications. However, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad Wolf instead issued a memorandum entitled \"Reconsideration of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled 'Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children\" on July 28, 2020 (\"Wolf Memorandum\"). In this memo, Acting Secretary Wolf stated that he would reconsider DACA's future in light of the Supreme Court's decision. In the interim, the memo instructed USCIS to reject all initial requests for DACA, to only grant advance parole to current DACA beneficiaries in exceptional circumstances, and grant DACA renewals for only one-year, rather than two-year, periods. Later in August, Deputy Director for Policy for USCIS Joseph Edlow issued a memorandum implementing the Wolf Memorandum. On August 4, 2020, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further action consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. In response to the Wolf Memorandum, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 2, 2020. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs substituted some of the defendants to reflect new individuals occupying the relevant roles and to add additional responsible officials, including Deputy Director for Policy Edlow. The amended complaint argued that the Acting Secretary Wolf actions were invalid under the Federal Vacancies Reform Action, Homeland Security Act, and the Appointments Clause of the Constitution because he lacked proper authority to issue the Wolf Memorandum. In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the Wolf Memorandum and Edlow Memorandum violated the APA because Wolf and Edlow acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and an injunction preventing the defendants from altering or limiting DACA program and vacating the Wolf and Edlow Memoranda. Before any additional activity on the amended complaint in this case, on December 4, the court in another case challenging the Wolf Memorandum,Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen and State of New York v. Trump, ordered DHS to fully reinstate DACA as it existed prior to the attempted recession in September 2017 after it found that Acting Secretary Wolf was not lawfully serving as Acting Secretary. The order required DHS to accept initial DACA applications, accept advance parole applications, and grant DACA renewals for two-years. On December 7, 2020 USCIS updated their website and indicated that effective that day, USCIS would accept initial applications, extend one-year DACA renewals to two-years, and accept applications for advance parole. Then, in early 2021, President Biden took office. On the day of his inauguration (January 20, 2021), President Biden signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General \u201cto preserve and fortify DACA.\u201d In light of potential additional agency action to implement the memorandum, the parties filed a joint stipulation to stay further proceedings and vacate pending deadlines on March 22, 2021. They agreed to provide the court with status updates every 60 days. The first is due May 24, 2021. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "Several states filed this lawsuit on September 11, 2017, challenging President Trump\u2019s revocation of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA). The plaintiffs alleged that the government's decision to end DACA violated due process and equal protection, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Regulatory Flexibility Act. In November 2018, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction to preserve the program. The government petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review and oral argument was heard on Nov. 12, 2019. On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA and that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further action consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. DHS then issued a memorandum on July 28, 2020, stating that Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf would reconsider DACA's future and in the interim, instructed USCIS to reject all initial requests for DACA, to only grant advance parole to current DACA beneficiaries in exceptional circumstances, and grant DACA renewals for only one-year, rather than two-year, periods. In response to the Wolf Memorandum, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, arguing that Wold did not have the authority to issue the memo and that Wolf's actions were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. Before any additional activity on the amended complaint in this case, on December 4, the court in Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen and State of New York v. Trump ordered DHS to fully reinstate DACA as it existed prior to the attempted recession in September 2017. On December 7, 2020, USCIS updated its website to indicate that effective that day it would accept initial DACA applications, extend renewals to two years, and accept applications for advance parole. On January 20, 2021, President Biden took office and signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General \u201cto preserve and fortify DACA.\u201d The parties agreed to stay the proceedings pending the implementation of this memorandum. As of May 14, 2021, this case is ongoing."} {"article": "On November 13, 2015, ten residents of Flint, Michigan filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued Governor Rick Snyder, the State of Michigan, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), several MDEQ officials, the Emergency Managers of Flint, the Mayor of Flint, the Director of Public Works for Flint, the Utilities Administrators of Flint, and the City of Flint under U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged that their Due Process rights were violated when the defendants took safe drinking water from Flint and replaced it with water known to contain high levels of lead and other corrosive contaminants. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that by replacing the safe water with corrosive water the defendants harmed their property, caused physical and emotional injury, and violated their right to bodily integrity. The plaintiffs sought an order certifying the class as all \u201cindividuals who from April 25, 2014 to present were exposed to toxic Flint water and experience an injury to their person or property or who in the future will be so injured.\u201d Furthermore, the plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys\u2019 fees and cost, and injunctive relief to remedy harm to property, establish a medical monitoring fund, and appoint a monitor to oversee Flint\u2019s water operation. Additionally, the plaintiffs demanded a jury trial. From 1964 until 2014, the City of Flint provided safe, clean water to residents via the Detroit water system. According to the complaint, although Flint and MDEQ officials were aware that the water of the Flint River was highly corrosive and dangerous, in April 2014, the Emergency Manager ordered the city to switch its water source to the Flint River. Despite continued protests from Flint residents, defendants insisted the water was safe and declined to switch back to the Detroit water system. It was not until October 8, 2015 that Governor Snyder ordered Flint to switch back to the Detroit water system. However, the plaintiffs alleged that due to the prolonged exposure to contaminated water they suffer from property damage and serious physical and emotional injuries, such as high levels of lead and copper in their bloodstreams, skin lesions, hair loss, and neurological and psychological disorders. On April 1, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to consolidate six class action cases pending before the Court and designate a process for selecting interim lead counsel. The six class actions were all brought on behalf of Flint residents, consumers or businesses and based on the City of Flint switching its water source to the highly corrosive and dangerous water of the Flint River. Shortly after, on April 4, 2016, Governor Snyder and the State of Michigan filed a motion to dismiss. Additional defendants-the Emergency Managers of Flint, the Director of Public Works, the City of Flint, the Utilities Administrators of Flint, and the Mayor of Flint-filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint on April 18, 2016. Both the motions argued that the officials were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Safe Drinking Water Act precluded action under \u00a7 1983 for alleged deprivations of constitutional rights related to water quality standards, and the complaint fails to state a claim for a violation of substantive due process. Instead, the defendants argued that this claim must be brought under the Safe Drinking Water Act. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 25, 2016, adding allegations that their Equal Protection rights were violated on the basis of race and wealth when the defendants elected to provide clean water to the remainder of Genesee County but not Flint. In addition, the plaintiffs added claims of conspiracy to violate the plaintiffs\u2019 constitutional rights under U.S.C. \u00a7 1985(3), allegations of state law violations, and several defendants, including the Treasurer for the State of Michigan, the Director of Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHSS), and the Genesee County Drain Commissioner. Finally, the plaintiffs anticipated that additional negligence claims would be added against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on October 25, 2016 or after. Following the amended complaint, multiple defendants again filed a motion to dismiss. Governor Snyder, the State of Michigan, the Treasurer and the Director of MDHSS filed a motion to dismiss on June 27, 2016 again arguing that the claims were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Safe Drinking Water Act precluded the plaintiffs \u00a7 1983 claims, and the amended complaint fails to state a claim for violation for substantive due process. They additionally argued that the plaintiffs\u2019 other claims fail because there was no showing of discriminatory intent or involvement of a fundamental right. Additional motions to dismiss were filed by the Emergency Managers, City Officials of the City of Flint, the MDEQ officials, and the Genesee County Drain Commissioner on July 29, 2016 and August 1, 2016. Although the groups of defendants filed separately, the motions all argued similar reasons for dismissing the plaintiffs\u2019 lawsuit. Due to the overwhelming local media coverage and publicity of the Flint water crisis, the MDEQ officials filed a motion for change of venue and requested that the case be transfer to an out-of-state venue or to the Norther Division of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The MDEQ officials simultaneously requested the Court stay all proceedings, such as the motions to dismiss, until the Court decided their motion for change of venue. On February 2, 2017, Judge John Corbett O\u2019Meara granted the defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss. 2017 WL 445637. Relying on its decision in Boler v. Earley (Case No. 16-10323), Judge O\u2019Meara agreed with the defendants that the Safe Drinking Water Act and its enforcement scheme precluded the plaintiffs from bring suit under \u00a7 1983. Judge O\u2019Meara concluded that without viable constitutional claims, the plaintiffs\u2019 conspiracy claims under \u00a7 1985(3) also fails. In addition, Judge O\u2019Meara declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs\u2019 state claims. Later in February 2017, the plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their complaint to the Sixth Circuit. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeal with an appeal to Boler v. Earley (Case No. 16-10323). On July 28, 2017, the Court of Appeals reversed Judge O\u2019Meara\u2019s decision to dismiss the claims because there was no express indication in the Safe Drinking Water Act Congress intended to preempt \u00a7 1983 claims, the remedies of the Act were not so comprehensive as to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude claims under \u00a7 1983, and the rights and protections of the Act diverge from the constitutional claims so as to prevent an inference of congressional intent. (Circuit Judges R. Guy Cole Jr., Jane Branstetter Stranch, and Bernice B. Donald). 865 F.3d 391. The Court of Appeals dismissed the claims against the State of Michigan because the claims were barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The defendants filed a writ of certiorari, but on March 19, 2018, the Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari. Because this case appeared to be a companion case to Waid v. Snyder (Case No. 16-10444), on October 19, 2017, this case was reassigned to District Judge Judith E. Levy and Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub. On April 6, 2018, this case was consolidated with Waid v. Snyder, PB-MI-0014 in this Clearinghouse; for subsequent activity, see that record.", "summary": "On November 13, 2015, ten residents of Flint, Michigan filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued Governor Rick Snyder, the State of Michigan, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), several MDEQ officials, the Emergency Managers of Flint, the Mayor of Flint, the Director of Public Works for Flint, the Utilities Administrators of Flint, and the City of Flint under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law. In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that their Due Process rights were violated when the defendants took safe drinking water from Flint and replaced it with water known to contain high levels of lead and other corrosive contaminants. The plaintiffs amended the complaint on May 25, 2016 and alleged that their Equal Protection rights were violated on the basis of race and wealth, that defendants conspired to violate constitution rights under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1985(3), and state civil rights laws were violated. In addition, the plaintiffs added e Treasurer for the State of Michigan, the Director of Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHSS), and the Genesee County Drain Commissioner as defendants. On April 6, 2018, this case was consolidated with Waid v. Snyder."} {"article": "This school desegregation case began after the DeKalb County School System (DCSS) adopted a free choice program in order to comply with the Supreme Court\u2019s integration mandate in Brown v. Board of Education. The plan had little overall effect; a few black students decided to attend the previously all-white schools, but no white students decided to attend the previously all-black schools. This summary is based on information from historical sources and judicial opinions. On July 5, 1968, several black school children with their parents, filed a putative class action complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against DeKalb County. They argued that the free choice plan was insufficient, based on the Supreme Court's May 1968 decision in Green v. School Board of New Kent County, holding that the mere adoption of school choice plans did not satisfy the desegregation requirements of Brown v. Board of Education. In Green, the Supreme Court held school districts needed to be desegregated with respect to all aspects of school administration including: student assignment, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and physical facilities. These six areas of school operations have come to be known as the Green factors. After the filing of the DeKalb complaint, the School District began working with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to create an integration plan. The plan eliminated school choice and required instead that all previously designated black schools be closed and the students be enrolled in the remaining, (previously white) schools. This plan was approved in a consent decree by the District Court in June of 1969 and the District Court maintained jurisdiction. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). In 1976 the District Court ordered additional requirements for the integration plan to be added. The DCSS was required to: (1) expand their Majority-to-minority transfer program (a program that allowed students that were in the majority race of their current school, to transfer to a school where they would be the minority race); (2) create a bi-racial committee to oversee future boundary line changes and the transfer program; (3) reassign teachers so that the ratio of black to white teachers at a given school was similar to the racial balance of the school district\u2019s population. According to Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992), there had been large population shifts in the district, resulting in an increase of black families and school children in the southern part of the district (and an increasingly white population in the northern district). Accordingly, in 1983, the District Court ordered DCSS was again to make changes to the transfer program. As populations continued to shift, DCSS made adjustments to the integration plans. But this brought about new issues. For example, when one primarily white school became over enrolled, DCSS attempted to expand the physical grounds of the school rather than transferring the extra students to a neighboring black school. The District Court found this action was acceptable because the DCSS had been a unitary school district since 1969. On March 22, 1985, the Fifth Circuit reversed this order, finding the school district was not desegregated, and that until it became a unitary district, any state action perpetuating the dual features would violate the mandate to desegregate. Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423 (11th Cir. 1985). In 1986 the School District moved to dismiss the case because it had met all of the requirements of the consent decree \u2013 creating a unitary system. In 1988, the District Court found that DCSS had achieved maximum practical desegregation from 1969 to 1986 and was a unitary system with regard to student assignments, transportation, physical facilities, and extracurricular activities (referencing the Green factors). The court ruled it would order no further relief in those areas. Additionally, it found the rapid population shifts in DeKalb County were not caused by any action on the part of the DCSS. The District Court relinquished jurisdiction over the four completed Green factors but ordered the School District to remedy the remaining factors of teacher and principal assignments, resource allocation, and quality of education. For the remaining three categories the District Court maintained jurisdiction. See Pitts by Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1989) for a detailed description of the satisfied Green factors. Both parties appealed to the 11th Circuit. The 11th Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that a school achieves unitary status only after satisfying all six factors addressed in Green and that judicial control over all categories was required. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438 (1989). The School District obtained review to the Supreme Court. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, reversed the 11th Circuit. The Court held that, in the course of supervising desegregation plans, federal courts have the authority to relinquish supervision and control of school districts before full compliance had been achieved in every area of school operations. Justice Kennedy stated the vestiges of segregation must be the actual causal link to the de jure violation being remedied and therefore the any remedy imposed could only be implemented in so far as it advanced the objective of alleviating the initial constitutional violation of segregation. But, where re-segregation was the result of private choice, it was beyond the authority of the federal courts to take measures to counteract massive demographic shifts. Justice Kennedy explained District Courts should consider whether there had been satisfactory compliance with the remedial decree, whether retention of judicial control was necessary, and whether the school district had demonstrated it had a good-faith commitment to the whole of the remedial decree and the requirements of the Constitution. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). The 11th Circuit remanded to the District Court to consider the remaining Green factors and the additional factors of education quality and the good faith commitment of the school district. Pitts by Pitts v. Freeman, 979 F.2d 1472 (11th Cir. 1992). The procedural history following the 11th Circuit remand is documented in Mills v. Freeman, 942 F. Supp. 1449 (N.D. Ga. 1996). On September 8, 1995 the Court issued an order stating it would not dismiss the suit with respect to the categories of faculty assignments, resource allocation, quality of education, and \u201cgood faith\u201d, because the district was not in full compliance. The Defendants later moved to dismiss. On June 12, 1996, the District Court found DCSS had met its requirements and dismissed the case. Mills v. Freeman, 942 F. Supp. 1449 (N.D. Ga. 1996). There was further litigation regarding attorney\u2019s fees as discussed in Mills by Mills v. Freeman, 118 F.3d 727 (11th Cir. 1997). This case is now closed. Reported decisions: Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423 (11th Cir. 1985). Pitts by Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1989). Pitts v. Freeman, 891 F.2d 907 (Table) (11th Cir. 1989). Freeman v. Pitts, 498 U.S. 1081 (1991). Freeman v. Pitts, 498 U.S. 1081(1991). Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). Pitts by Pitts v. Freeman, 979 F.2d 1472 (11th Cir. 1992). Mills v. Freeman, 942 F. Supp. 1449 (N.D. Ga. 1996). Mills by Mills v. Freeman, 118 F.3d 727 (11th Cir. 1997).", "summary": "The DeKalb County School System adopted a school integration plan after Brown v. Board of Education and Green v. New Kent County. In the process of integrating the school district the Court relinquished control back to the school district over areas the court deemed to be integrated. The Supreme Court held District Courts should relinquish control of the School Districts even if full compliance had not been met. Several years later the school district was finally considered integrated."} {"article": "On February 10, 2019, a group of beneficiaries of Temporary Protected Status (\u201cTPS\u201d) from Honduras and Nepal and their U.S.-citizen children filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU Foundation of Southern California, the National Day Laborer Organizing Network, Asian Americans Advancing Justice, and private attorneys, sued the Department of Homeland Security (\u201cDHS\u201d), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The plaintiffs challenged the Trump Administration\u2019s recent decisions to terminate the TPS designations for Honduras and Nepal, alleging that the decisions violated the APA as well as equal protection and due process under the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs pointed to another recent lawsuit challenging the Administration\u2019s decisions to terminate TPS (in that case for El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Sudan), where this District Court issued a preliminary injunction halting the terminations. The plaintiffs claimed that the same defects in the terminations at issue in that case, Ramos v. Nielsen (located here in this Clearinghouse), existed here. The case was originally assigned to Judge Jon Tigar, but was later reassigned to Judge Edward Chen after this case was related to Ramos v. Nielsen. TPS is a form of humanitarian immigration relief that permits individuals from TPS-designated countries to lawfully live and work in the U.S. when they cannot safely return to their country of origin due to an exceptional circumstance, such as armed conflict or a natural disaster. The complaint stated that more than 100,000 individuals from Honduras and Nepal currently have TPS, most of them having lived in the U.S. for the majority of their lives. Many are also the parents of U.S.-citizen children, who would be faced with the choice of being separated from their families or leaving the only home they had ever known if their parents lost TPS. The minor plaintiffs sought to represent the following nationwide class: U.S.-citizen children, from ages five to eighteen, of all TPS holders from Honduras and Nepal. The complaint explained that typically, when DHS was considering whether to terminate a country\u2019s TPS designation, it would consider all of the conditions in that country, including the impact of crises or exceptional circumstances that occurred after the country\u2019s original TPS designation. The plaintiffs then alleged that since President Trump took office, DHS, without any formal announcement, explanation, or acknowledgment of a departure from past practice, adopted a new interpretation of the TPS statute that no longer considers intervening country conditions. The plaintiffs claimed that this new interpretation and subsequent decisions to terminate TPS designations for certain countries were motivated by racial animus, highlighting President Trump\u2019s various past statements denigrating non-white, non-European immigrants. On March 12, 2019, the parties jointly stipulated to a stay of the proceedings in this case pending final resolution of the defendants\u2019 appeal of the preliminary injunction in Ramos. Judge Chen granted the stipulation, finding that the \u201cinterests of justice and judicial economy would be served by treating the decisions terminating TPS for Honduras and Nepal similarly to the decisions at issue in Ramos during the pendency of the Ramos appeal.\u201d The defendants agreed to abstain from implementing their decisions to terminate TPS for Nepal and Honduras pending the resolution of that appeal. The Ninth Circuit heard oral argument on August 14, 2019. The Ninth Circuit vacated the injunction in Ramos on September 14, 2020. 975 F.3d 872., but the appellate court has yet to issue a directive to the district court to make the decision effective. On December 9, 2020, DHS published a notice extending TPS for Honduras and Nepal through October 4, 2021 As of March 16, 2021, the injunction remains in effect, and the defendants still may not terminate TPS for Nepal and Honduras. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On Feb. 10, 2019, a group of TPS beneficiaries from Honduras and Nepal and their U.S.-citizen children filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging the Department of Homeland Security's decisions to terminate TPS designations for those two countries. The plaintiffs alleged that these decisions violated the APA, equal protection, and due process. In March, 2019, the case was stayed pending the resolution of an appeal in a parallel case, Ramos v. Nielsen, challenging TPS rescissions for another group of countries. As of March 16, 2021, DHS had extended TPS for Honduras and Nepal through October 4, 2021"} {"article": "On April 1, 2010, five current and former prisoners in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) who were transferred to experimental \"Communications Management Units\" (CMUs), and two spouses of those prisoners, filed suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) against the U.S. Attorney General and the BOP in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs were represented by the Center for Constitutional Rights as well as attorneys from Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, and asked the court for declaratory relief and injunctive relief either compelling the BOP to return them to the general population of an appropriate BOP facility or enjoining the BOP from operating the CMU in a way that violated the plaintiffs' rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that placement in the CMU was discriminatory and imposed atypical and significant curtailments on their ability to communicate with loved ones. That, they said, violated the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. They also alleged that the BOP had failed to provide an opportunity for notice and comment on a dramatic change in policy that contradicted existing regulations, violating the APA. In 2006 and 2007, the BOP secretly created two experimental prison units designed to isolate certain prisoners from the rest of the BOP and the outside world, called \"Communication Management Units.\" The CMUs, unlike other federal general population units, categorically banned any physical contact with visiting friends and family and placed severe restrictions on CMU prisoners' access to phone calls and prison programming. More than two thirds of the prisoners confined in the CMUs were Muslim, over-representing the BOP Muslim population by roughly 1,000%. On March 30, 2011, U.S. District Court Judge Ricardo M. Urbina denied in part and granted in part the defendants' motion to dismiss, allowing the plaintiffs to proceed on their procedural due process and retaliation claims. 774 F. Supp. 2d 147. The case then went into discovery for several years. During discovery, on April 4, 2012, the case was reassigned to Judge Richard Roberts. Then, on November 5, 2012, the case was again reassigned to Judge Barbara J. Rothstein. On July 12, 2013, Judge Rothstein dismissed one plaintiff's claims as moot, as the plaintiff had been released from BOP custody, and dismissed the other plaintiffs' claims for mental and emotional injury against one defendant in his individual capacity, as the Prison Litigation Reform Act barred such claims. The remaining claims (procedural due process violation for both plaintiffs, and retaliation for one plaintiff) continued in discovery. 953 F. Supp. 2d 133. On April 23, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on their remaining claims, and on May 21, defendants filed their own motion for summary judgment. The next year, on March 16, 2015, Judge Rothstein denied the plaintiffs' motion and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the two remaining plaintiffs' procedural due process claims and one plaintiff's retaliation claim. Judge Rothstein reasoned that the plaintiffs' procedural due process claims failed because they could not establish a \"private liberty interest\" as required by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). A plaintiff, Judge Rothstein explained, can establish a liberty interest by showing that restrictions impose \"atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.\" The baseline for \"ordinary incidents of prison life\" is administrative segregation (solitary confinement) or \"the most restrictive confinement conditions that prison officials . . . routinely impose.\" Here, Judge Rothstein found that the conditions of administrative segregation at the facilities were generally harsher than those in the CMUs, noting, \"except where communication is concerned, CMUs function like a general population unit.\" Judge Rothstein further granted summary judgment to the defendant on one plaintiff's retaliation claim, deferring to the judgment of the prison administrators that the plaintiff's transfer in response to speech had a \"valid, rational connection\" to a legitimate government interest. Prison officials had described the plaintiff's speech as \"inciting and radicalizing the Muslim inmate population,\" and Judge Rothstein deferred to their judgment, holding that the plaintiff's speech was not protected by the First Amendment. 2015 WL 3749621. The plaintiffs appealed and filed their opening appellate brief on October 28, 2015 in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. On August 19, 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court in part and reversed and remanded in part. 833 F.3d 242. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the government regarding the retaliation claim, agreeing that the plaintiff could not show his First Amendment rights were violated. The Court also upheld the District Court's earlier summary judgment dismissing the claims of mental and emotional injury. Unlike the District Court, it found the plaintiffs alleged harms qualifying for compensation under the PLRA but upheld the grant of summary judgment because the prison official was entitled to qualified immunity. On October 12, 2016, the Court of Appeals reversed on the \"liberty interest\" claim; it found the duration and atypicality of CMU designation sufficient to give rise to a liberty interest. On this claim, the case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the appellants were afforded sufficient process. The parties returned to discovery and litigation. In a joint status report filed on May 10, 2018, the defendants stipulated that given one plaintiff's release from prison and new CMU procedures, supplemental briefing addressing the court's jurisdiction and the merits of the case would be necessary. In the time before the briefing, though, the second plaintiff was released from prison custody in February 2019. On April 12, 2019, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because the plaintiffs' claims were moot. In early November 2019, the court first granted defendants' motion to dismiss in part and subsequently denied the motion to intervene. In the court's opinion granting the motion to dismiss, the court concluded that even though one plaintiff had since been removed from BOP custody, ongoing consequences from the continued existence of the CMU-related documents continued to affect the plaintiff. As to the second plaintiff, the defendant indicated that the plaintiff had since been deported following release from BOP custody. As a result, the court held that the second plaintiff's claim was moot. Between June 2019 and January 2020, four other CMU prisoners filed pro se motions to intervene in the case. Judge Rothstein denied these motions in a June 25, 2020 opinion. 2020 WL 7974325. In an October 13, 2020 opinion, Judge Rothstein granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment against the remaining plaintiff and denied the plaintiff's cross motion. She found that the process by which the plaintiff had been placed in the CMU, as well as the BOP's periodic reviews of his designation, did not violate his due process rights. 2020 WL 7251386. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on December 9, 2020. The appeal remains pending in the D.C. Circuit under docket number 20-5368 as of April 11, 2021.", "summary": "Five prisoners in the custody of the BOP filed suit in April 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging violations of their First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights as well as a violation of the APA's notice and comment rulemaking requirement. The prisoners had been transferred to experimental \"Communications Management Units,\" (CMUs), which restricted their ability to communicate and banned physical contact with visitors. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded in part. Some of the plaintiffs were released from prison, and the court held their claims were moot. The defendants won a summary judgment motion against the remaining plaintiffs in October 2020, which the plaintiffs have appealed."} {"article": "On August 14, 2017, the State of California's Attorney General filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), including its component Office of Justice Programs (OJP), in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The State challenged the DOJ's imposition of immigration-related conditions on federal funding to the state. California and its political subdivisions receive federal funding through the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG) Program administered by the DOJ. California alleged that the latest DOJ requirements for FY2017 program funding imposed new conditions on recipients: \"to: (a) provide federal immigration enforcement agents with the Department of Homeland Security ('DHS') access to detention facilities to interview inmates who are 'aliens' or believed to be 'aliens' (the 'access condition'); and (b) provide 48 hours\u2019 advance notice to DHS regarding the scheduled release date of an 'alien' upon request by DHS (the 'notification condition').\" California stated that it believed its relevant laws (the TRUST Act and TRUTH Act statutes, governing DHS's access to inmates in state and local custody) in fact complied with these conditions but that the DOJ misinterpreted these laws as non-compliant. In any event, California argued that the conditions were so ambiguous that the DOJ could continue to wrongly deny California the funding. Additionally, California believed that Congress did not intend Byrne Jag funding to be conditioned in this way. California argued that by imposing these conditions on this funding, the DOJ threatened the implementation of state laws and also a critical source of state and municipal funding to \"support law enforcement programs, reduce recidivism, conduct prevention and education programs for at-risk youth, and support programs for crime victims and witnesses.\" Furthermore, California stated that the access and notification requirements would compel it to choose between either maintaining federal funding or maintaining its own sovereignty over public safety, but not both. Finally, California argued that the access and notification requirements violated the U.S. Constitution's Separation of Powers and Spending Clauses (by usurping Congress' ability to set conditions for funding), as well as the Administrative Procedure Act (as arbitrary and capricious and exceeding the DOJ's statutory authority). Furthermore, California stated that the requirements would force it to violate the Fourth Amendment by holding detainees past their ordinary release time. In advance of the imminent Sept. 5, 2017 city deadline and Sept. 25, 2017 state deadline to apply for FY2017 Byrnes JAG funding, California sought declaratory and injunctive relief. California asked the Court to declare that California complied with relevant federal law, and that the notification and access requirements were invalid. California also asked the Court to enjoin the DOJ from conditioning funding on the notification and access requirements or otherwise withholding funding based on California's existing relevant laws. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James on Aug. 15 and reassigned to Judge William H. Orrick on Aug. 28. Judge Orrick had, on Aug. 25, related this case to City and County of San Francisco v. Trump following the State of California's motion in that case. California filed an amended complaint on Oct. 13. It included an update, maintaining that the DOJ had aimed to send award notification letters by Sept. 30, but that neither California nor any of its local jurisdictions had received a letter. California requested a declaration from the Court that relevant state laws (the Values Act and the Shield Confidentiality Statutes, in addition to the TRUST Act and TRUTH Act) do not violate the DOJ conditions. California then moved for a preliminary injunction on Oct. 31, amended Nov 7. It argued, first, that it would likely succeed on the merits of its claim that the JAG's 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1373 conditions are unlawful under the Spending Clause and arbitrary and capricious under the APA, and that the state's relevant statutes do not violate \u00a7 1373. California also alleged that the conditions would cause it permanent and irreparable harm. The DOJ opposed the preliminary injunction motion on Nov. 22. First, it argued that the funding conditions were constitutional because the INA links immigration enforcement and law enforcement. Additionally, the DOJ noted that it had not determined that the TRUTH Act or TRUST Act violated \u00a7 1373, and argued that the Values Act was unlikely to comply with \u00a7 1373. Finally, the DOJ alleged that California would not suffer harm because it had accepted the same funding condition in FY2016. On Dec. 4, the DOJ notified the Court that it had awarded a COPS grant to California, but that these funds were unavailable until the DOJ completed its inquiry into whether California complied with \u00a7 1373. Judge Orrick held a Dec. 13 hearing on California's motion for preliminary injunction, and denied it in a Mar. 5, 2018 order. 284 F. Supp. 3d 1015. He held that the DOJ's withholding of the grant would not cause irreparable injury because the amount of money was small in comparison to California's budget and payment appeared to be delayed rather than denied. On Jan. 16, 2018, the DOJ moved to dismiss the complaint. It argued that the challenged conditions were authorized by statute and did not violate the Spending Clause, separation of powers, or the APA. On March 5, 2018, Judge Orrick denied the DOJ's motion to dismiss. First, he held that California had standing because it had a well-founded fear of enforcement, injury-in-fact, and ripe claims. Next, he held that California had stated legally sufficient claims for relief with respect to the notice and access conditions, following the reasoning in City of Chicago v. Sessions and City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, which found the conditions to exceed the DOJ's statutory and constitutional authority. In response to Judge Orrick's Mar. 5 order denying California's motion for preliminary injunction, California moved for reconsideration. However, Judge Orrick denied this second motion on Apr. 24. 2018 WL 3399214. On Sept. 10, 2018, the court related this case to two additional cases: City and County of San Francisco v. Sessions III and State of California v. Sessions. On October 5, 2018, Judge Orrick granted summary judgment for California. 349 F. Supp. 3d 924. The court held that the challenged conditions violated the separation of powers and were unconstitutional, and that the DOJ exceeded its Spending Power and therefore violated the Constitution. The court reasoned that Congress inappropriately delegated its spending power to the executive, and that even if validly delegated, the conditions were too ambiguous and unrelated to their goal for the DOJ to validly exercise the delegated power. The court also held that the conditions were arbitrary and capricious under the APA, because the DOJ did not give adequate reasons for imposing the conditions and it did not take into account important considerations. Finally, the court held that California and San Francisco's laws comply with the federal conditions anyway under the court's interpretation of \u00a7 1373 \"limiting it to information relevant to citizenship or immigration status not including release date information\" and not requiring \"state and local governments to share contact information and release status information with federal immigration officials.\" The court thus issued a nationwide injunction. On November 20, 2018 the court amended the judgment, at the government's request, so that it would not preclude the DOJ from bringing preemption claims under other federal statutes. The amended judgment retained the prohibition on the government from relying on \u00a7 1373 as an independent federal ground for placing conditions on other programs. In December of 2018, the DOJ appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit finally heard oral argument on December 2, 2019. On July 13, 2020, the Ninth Circuit upheld the bases for the injunction but limited its scope, thus reducing it from a nationwide injunction to one applicable only within California's borders. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs did not offer reasons that relief needed to be extended to non-parties to the suit in order to shield the plaintiffs. The government appealed the case to the Supreme Court on November 17, 2020. Following the 2020 election of President Joseph Biden, however, the incoming Biden administration asked the Court to hold the petition in abeyance until the DOJ could re-formulate its policy. After the Supreme Court rescheduled the conference twice in February, on March 4, 2021, the DOJ and challengers agreed to dismiss the appeal to the Supreme Court.", "summary": "On Aug. 14, 2017, California sued the DOJ over policies targeting \"sanctuary\" jurisdictions by imposing immigration enforcement conditions on federal funding for law enforcement. In October 2018 the district court granted summary judgment for California and issued a nationwide injunction. The DOJ appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On July 13, 2020, the Ninth Circuit upheld the bases for the injunction but limited its scope, thus reducing it from a nationwide injunction to one applicable only within California's borders. The government then filed for review with the Supreme Court but dismissed their petition following the change in administration from President Trump to President Biden."} {"article": "On September 12, 2000 five elderly and disabled individuals filed suit against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Division of Medical Assistance, and the Executive Office of Health and Human Services in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. They alleged that the defendants had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12111 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794 et seq., and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They claimed that the defendants applied more stringent standards consisting of high recurring deductibles to the elderly in computing Medicaid benefits and that this forced elderly patients into nursing homes even though with appropriate care they could be treated within the community as they desired. Plaintiffs also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction on September 12, 2000 but these motions were avoided by a series of agreements that addressed the needs of the plaintiffs while the suit was pending. The parties negotiated adjustments to the system while conducting discovery and on December 31, 2001 Massachusetts submitted a State Plan Amendment to Center for Medicare and Medical Services for approval that would enable the state to meet the needs of the plaintiffs. On March 5, 2002 the district court (Judge Michael A. Ponsor) denied plaintiffs motion for class certification without prejudice. After the amendment to the state plan was approved the defendants proceeded to fully adjust state Medicaid rules to make it easier for the elderly to receive benefits that enabled community based care, developed new application forms and information booklets, and trained staff as to how to provide additional aid to the elderly. Based on these developments that parties settled the lawsuit and entered the settlement with the court on February 5, 2003. The settlement provided for a one year period of reports by the defendants to the plaintiffs regarding progress in providing additional care to the elderly. The settlement ended in 2004, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "On September 12, 2000 five elderly and disabled individuals filed suit against Massachusetts and two state agencies in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. They alleged that the defendants applied more stringent standards to the elderly in computing Medicaid benefits and that this forced elderly patients into nursing homes even though with appropriate care they could be treated within the community as they desired. The parties negotiated adjustments to the system and on December 31, 2001 Massachusetts submitted a State Plan Amendment for approval. After it was approved the defendants proceeded to adjust the state Medicaid system to address the plaintiffs' complaints. The parties entered the settlement with the court on February 5, 2003 providing for one year of reporting to monitor continued progress in addressing the needs of the elderly."} {"article": "Plaintiffs, prisoners in various Florida state prisons, brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) officials operating the prisons on October 28, 1997. In the allegations in the second amended complaint, their 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 case alleged that prisoners housed in \"Close Management\" (CM) status in these prisons suffered cruel and unusual punishment in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs, seeking class action status, also sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees. Their attorneys included counsel from the Florida Justice Institute. According to the plaintiffs, the thousands of Florida prisoners in CM Units are generally there for disciplinary reasons and live with marked restrictions upon, for example, time outside their cells, visitation and library access, religious and recreation opportunities, and communication with fellow prisoners and the outside world. The cells are small, sparse, and poorly ventilated. Although CM status allows for three level of restrictive conditions, the plaintiffs contend all levels result in physical and, particularly, mental harm. The harsh conditions exacerbate pre-existing mental illness in some prisoners and trigger mental illness in others, according to the plaintiffs, with resultant increases in prison violence and anti-social behavior by persons living in these conditions. On February 2, 1998, District Judge Federico A. Moreno denied the plaintiffs' request for class action status. However, after amended pleadings were filed, Judge Moreno certified the matter as a class action on July 26, 2000. At various times during this case, the defendants tendered settlement offers of judgment, without admitting liability. These offers included detailed plans for revised operation of the CM program in the Florida prison system. The revisions included consolidation of facilities, improved staff training and mental health services, and levels of access to reading materials, telephones, and media. New state administrative regulations and requests for legislative funding applicable to CM improvements were also part of the offer. On November 11, 2001, plaintiffs filed their notice of acceptance of one of these offers. The settlement required defendants to pay plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and to make periodic reports to plaintiffs' counsel and the court regarding implementation of the improvements to the CM program. District Judge Paul C. Huck approved the settlement on December 27, 2001, and sent a February 25, 2002, notice to class members that their time to object to the settlement had passed and that grievances, if any, about the CM program were to be sent to the FDOC. After nearly two years, on January 8, 2004, plaintiffs asked that the court restore the case to its trial docket, alleging that the state had failed to implement the promised reforms and that the CM program continued to operate to deny plaintiffs their Eighth Amendment protections. In support of their request, the plaintiffs submitted reports by experts they had retained who were familiar with the conditions imposed in the CM program. On March 10, 2004, District Judge Donald L. Graham issued an order transferring the case to the U. S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The case continued there and resulted in a bench trial before District Judge Henry Lee Adams, Jr., between September 11 and 21, 2006. The parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on February 27 and 28, 2007, in the case, now styled Osterback v. Secretary, docket number 3:04-cv-00210-HLA-MCR. The case was then reassigned again to Judge James R. Klindt, docket number 3:04-cv-210-J-25JRK. However, shortly thereafter, Judge Adams, terminated the proposed injunctive relief in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act's limitation on the time span of prison reform decrees and the clerk was directed to close the case on March 25, 2008.", "summary": "A certified class of prisoners in various Florida state prisons, brought a \u00a7 1983 suit against Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) officials alleging that prisoners housed in \"Close Management\" (CM) status in these prisons suffered cruel and unusual punishment in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. On November 11, 2001, plaintiffs accepted a settlement offer which included detailed plans for revised operation of the CM program, but defendants admitted no liability. On March 10, 2004 the case was transferred to the District Court for the Middle District of Florida because defendants did not follow through on their compliance promises. The case was again reassigned and ultimately dismissed in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act."} {"article": "On January 7, 2011, a prisoner in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons at Victorville filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff, a hearing-disabled adult, sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff claimed that the Federal Bureau of Prisons had violated the Rehabilitation Act by failing to provide reasonable accommodations for the plaintiff\u2019s hearing disability, and also alleged violations of his First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights. The plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The plaintiff alleged that, despite his numerous requests through the Bureau of Prisons\u2019s administrative relief process, he had been denied access to several accommodations that would enable him to communicate effectively and live more safely within the custody of the Bureau of Prisons. These accommodations included: access to a qualified American Sign Language interpreter, since the plaintiff did not read lips and had difficulty reading and writing; a non-aural notification system, such as a vibrating pager, so that the plaintiff could be alerted as to announcements and emergency situations occurring in the prison; access to closed-captioning on television; functioning hearing aids and replacement batteries; and access to a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) or videophone. The plaintiff also alleged that he had been arbitrarily placed in restrictive housing (the SHU) for failing to communicate and for failure to respond to announcements, despite his repeated assertions that he could not hear them. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on May 31, 2011, responding that the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies through the prison system as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Judge Christina A. Snyder granted in part and denied in part the defendants\u2019 motion on July 11, 2011, finding that the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies, but staying the constitutional claims until the conclusion of an administration determination of the merits on the Rehabilitation Act claims. 2011 WL 13261983. The plaintiff\u2019s claims then went before Administrative Law Judge Ellen K. Thomas. The hearing, a Bureau of Prisons Equal Employment Opportunity hearing, was originally scheduled for April 12, 2012, but the Bureau of Prisons failed to provide the plaintiff with a qualified American Sign Language interpreter as he requested, so the hearing was rescheduled to July 31. While the administrative hearing procedures continued, the parties conducted three separate, unsuccessful, settlement negotiations. On September 4, 2013, the Bureau of Prisons Equal Employment Opportunity hearing concluded, finding that the Bureau of Prisons had violated the Rehabilitation Act as alleged by the plaintiff. The Bureau of Prisons's Equal Employment Opportunity Officer issued a Letter of Findings, which found that the Rehabilitation Act required the Bureau of Prisons to acquiesce to the plaintiff's requests and that the Bureau had violated the Rehabilitation Act by failing to do so. The final Administrative Decision ordered the Bureau of Prisons to provide the plaintiff with the requested relief. However, the Bureau of Prisons failed to comply with all the requested relief. Notably, it failed to provide him with a qualified ASL interpreter for the GED course he attempted to take, and it failed to replace his hearing aid when it stopped working. The plaintiff therefore requested leave to file an amended complaint. Judge Snyder granted leave to file, and on December 20, 2013, the plaintiff filed a First Amended and Supplemented Complaint, containing and incorporating the results of the BOP EEO proceeding and the subsequent events. The plaintiff included, as part of this complaint, the defendants' failure to comply with the Administrative Decision, and expressed a concern in the complaint that whatever relief the defendants might provide would be short-lived and irregular. The defendants filed a motion to change venue on February 18, 2014, arguing that venue in the District of Arizona was proper because the plaintiff, who had originally been incarcerated in Victorville, California, he had been transferred to federal prison in Tucson, Arizona in 2011. The administrative hearing before Judge Thomas had been held in Tucson, and the defendants argued that the relief sought would eventually take place in Arizona. However, on March 26, 2014, Judge Snyder denied defendants\u2019 motion to change venue to Arizona, noting that there was no guarantee that the plaintiff would stay in Tucson and that the events giving rise to the original complaint had taken place in California. 2014 WL 1266241. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff\u2019s request for relief was moot, as the defendants had fulfilled his requests regarding his current situation in Tucson, and his request for relief from Victorville was moot since he had left that institution. Judge Snyder denied this motion as well. 2014 WL 2472255. The parties continued to hold regular settlement conferences, which continued to be unsuccessful. The parties began conducting pretrial proceedings simultaneously with settlement conferences. Finally, on September 12, 2016, the parties, under the supervision of Magistrate Judge Jay C. Gandhi, met for a seventh settlement conference, which was ultimately successful. Under terms which were not disclosed in a reported filing or order, the parties agreed to accept Magistrate Gandhi\u2019s \u201cmediator\u2019s proposal\u201d and to provide the details to Judge Snyder\u2019s Court within thirty days of the acceptance. On March 8, 2017, Judge Snyder dismissed the case pursuant to the settlement. There has been no further docket activity, and case is presumably now closed.", "summary": "In 2011, a hearing-disabled inmate of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons filed a Rehabilitation Act complaint against the Bureau in the U.S. District Court of Central California. The plaintiff alleged that the Bureau of Prisons had denied him necessary accommodations under the Act and had also infringed upon his First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights. In 2016, the parties reached a settlement under the guidance of a mediator magistrate judge, but the terms of the settlement are unknown. The district court closed the case in 2017."} {"article": "On June 12, 2014, six individuals formerly held in the Floyd County Jail filed a class-action complaint in the Southern District of Indiana, against Floyd County, Indiana, the Sheriff in his official and unofficial capacities, corrections officers of Floyd County Jail, and other sheriff department workers under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought actual and punitive damages for themselves and the other members of their class, declaratory judgment stating all policies enforcing humiliating and torturous practices were unconstitutional, and an injunction prohibiting the defendants from practicing or enforcing those policies. The plaintiffs claimed their Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights were violated. Specifically, they claimed that during detention in Floyd County Jail, through use of excessive force, they were stripped of their clothing and kept in a state of undress in a padded cell in violation of their constitutional rights. In the complaint, the plaintiffs claimed they were stripped of their clothing without probable cause or provocation. They claimed this action was done in front of members of the opposite sex, in view of jail employees, and on surveillance tapes containing images of the plaintiffs' naked bodies. The plaintiffs were kept in a padded room without access to a phone or bathroom and left in the state of undress until given a smock. The plaintiffs additionally claimed the defendants used excessive and unnecessary force through pepper spray or taser absent provocation or probable cause. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were using the same policies and practices implemented against them on other detained individuals. The plaintiffs alleged these abuses were a result of policies and practices implemented by the jail. The plaintiffs later amended their complaint on November 12, 2014, to include three more representatives. One of the new plaintiffs moved to sever their claim, which Chief Judge Richard Young granted on February 17, 2016. On June 15, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, which Judge Young granted on February 16, 2016. The final approved designated class was: \u201cAll inmates confined from June 12, 2012, to present in the Floyd County Jail who were not on a suicide watch, but were housed in a padded cell where they were deprived of clothing, bedding, and hygiene products.\u201d The court also approved a subclass of \u201c[t]hose class members who were subjected to weapons deployment while confined and secured in the padded cells.\u201d 313 F.R.D. 72. On March 1, 2016, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the class certification arguing that the main class did not meet the requirements for commonality and predominance. Additionally, the defendants argued the subclass did not contain enough members. On July 25, 2016, Chief Judge Young granted the defendants' motion in part and denied in part. He found that the court did not err with respect to the main class but the subclass did not include enough members. 2016 WL 4088748. The plaintiffs appealed the redetermination of the subclass on July 29, 2016, arguing there would be enough members. The motion was denied on October 27, 2016, because Chief Judge Young found the subclass definition involved an officer\u2019s choice to use force and therefore could not be used for class certification. The defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit the plaintiffs' main class certification and moved for a stay pending their appeal. On August 24, 2016 the appeal to the Seventh Circuit was denied. The motion for stay was denied two days later. On February 6, 2017, the parties moved jointly to approve settlement. Magistrate Judge Baker approved the settlement on August 2, 2017. The settlement detailed the creation of a settlement fund for $1,230,000. Attorney fees amounted to 37% of the settlement fund, and each plaintiff was paid an additional $15,000 for their time as class representative in the litigation. The rest of the settlement fund was to be distributed to the class. Each member who was subjected to the deployment of taser or pepper spray with a valid claim were to receive an additional $3,000. Any remaining funds were to be redistributed evenly among class members with each member not getting more than $25,000. Any remaining funds were to be returned to the defendants. The settlement fund was agreed to be explicitly for damages resulting from alleged personal injuries and not as a form of punitive damages. The settlement also detailed the policy advising the treatment of individuals in this manner was to be suspended. Additionally, Field Training Officers were to be independently certified, and new employees were to go through orientation and receive training on how to handle new inmates. Finally, the facility supervisor, security supervisor, and classification officer needed to attend Inmate Behavior Management and Training conducted by the National Institute of Corrections. The court approved the parties\u2019 Joint Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement on August 2, 2017. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2014, six former inmates of Floyd County Jail filed a class action complaint in the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiffs claimed the policies of the jail for stripping inmates of their clothes and use of force as enforced against them violated their Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. In 2017, the parties reached a settlement included a settlement fund of $1,230,000 and a change in policy as well as a update in training of corrections officers."} {"article": "On January 19, 2005, an African-American employee filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas against his employer, alleging discriminatory employment practices under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel alleged that the employer created a hostile work environment through the use of many racial slurs and jokes/comments. The plaintiff amended his complaint to include more detail in previous allegations and to include allegations of a hostile work environment and retaliation for refusal to commit illegal acts, as well as to add a request for more damages. On May 2, 2006, after consolidating this case with a similar case brought by the EEOC against the same defendant, the Court entered a consent decree that required, among other things, that the defendant pay plaintiff damages in the amount of $57,500, refrain from discriminating for the duration of the decree, give notice to employees of anti-discrimination employment law, and provide a positive reference for plaintiff's future employment.", "summary": "On January 19, 2005, an African-American employee filed suit against his employer for discriminatory employment practices under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The parties settled the suit outside of court and entered a consent decree signed by the court on May 24, 2006. The decree required defendant to pay plaintiff damages in the amount of $57,500, refrain from discriminating for the duration of the decree, give notice to employees of anti-discrimination employment law, and expunge plaintiff's employment record and provide a positive reference for plaintiff's future employment."} {"article": "On October 11, 2011, three protestors associated with Occupy Dallas, a large continuous political protest, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas against the City of Dallas under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 for violations of their First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, claimed that the City of Dallas' requirement that in order to be issued a event permit plaintiffs obtain general liability insurance in the amount of $1,000,000 deprived plaintiffs of their right to expression. Specifically, plaintiffs contended that the city acted intentionally to chill plaintiffs' speech, discredit them by damaging their reputation, and punishing them for exercising their free-speech rights. Plaintiffs sought damages for lost earnings and damage to reputation. On October 12, 2011, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary and permanent injunction to enjoin the City of Dallas from unreasonably interfering with their rights to free expression in public forums. The Court (Judge Jane J. Boyle) ordered a hearing on the motion. On October 14, 2011, the parties agreed to stipulations. The stipulation stated, inter alia, that the \"Special Events\" of the Dallas City Code did not apply to the grounds of the Dallas Convention Center. Accordingly, no permit from the city was necessary for the plaintiffs to continue their protesting activities. On October 18, 2011, the parties filed an agreed motion to dismiss the case without prejudice. The District Court (Judge Jane J. Boyle) entered the order on the same day.", "summary": "On October 11, 2011, three protestors associated with Occupy Dallas filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas against the City of Dallas under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 for violations of their First Amendment rights. On October 18, 2011, the case was voluntarily dismissed after stipulations were agreed to."} {"article": "On April 19, 2016, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a non-profit organization concerned with technology-related civil liberty issues, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against the United States Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7552. The case was assigned to Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. It was public knowledge that the government had attempted to compel third parties to assist in surveillance activities, such as when the FBI publicly demanded court orders requiring Apple to create a backdoor to the iPhone. The Electronic Frontier Foundation sought to learn about the government\u2019s efforts to obtain non-public court orders. The Foundation had filed a Freedom of Information Act request on March 7, 2016, seeking documents pertaining to requests for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to compel third parties to provide access to their customers\u2019 encrypted communications or to provide other technical assistance in gaining access to private communications. When the Justice Department withheld the requested documents, the Foundation filed this lawsuit for an injunction requiring the Department to produce all such documents created between 1978 and June 1, 2015. In the fall of 2016, both parties moved for summary judgment. While these motions were pending, the Justice Department worked to process the original Freedom of Information Act request. A year later, after the parties acknowledged that the scope of their dispute would not be known until the document production process was complete, the court denied both summary judgment motions as moot on September 29, 2017. On September 25, 2017, January 31, 2018, and August 22, 2018, the Justice Department released a total of 73 documents, out of 79 identified as responsive to the Foundation\u2019s request. The Department claimed that the remaining six documents, opinions written by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, were classified and exempt from disclosure. Both parties filed new motions for partial summary judgment in the fall of 2018. The Foundation argued that the Justice Department could not legally withhold the remaining documents: although the six documents were exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, they were also subject to Section 402 of the USA FREEDOM Act, which required the declassification of certain opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. On March 26, 2019, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Justice Department. 376 F.Supp.3d 1023. Although Section 402 might require the government to declassify the opinions, that statute created no private right of action to enforce the requirement. The court found that it would be inappropriate to use the Freedom of Information Act to enforce Section 402, and therefore declined to even address whether Section 402 actually required the government to declassify the opinions. It found that the Justice Department had provided sufficiently detailed factual information to support its exemption claims, and that the Foundation had failed to overcome the presumption of good faith to which the Department was entitled. On April 5, 2019, the parties filed a joint status report, notifying the court that aside from attorneys\u2019 fees, no dispute remained to be resolved. The parties submitted a proposed judgment in favor of the Justice Department as to its responses to the Foundations\u2019s requests. They also requested that the court order the parties to provide a status report, due by May 9, 2019, regarding their efforts to resolve the dispute over attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. Upon receipt of the status report on May 10, 2019, the court extended the deadline for notifying the court of the status of the parties\u2019 efforts to finalize the agreement concerning attorneys\u2019 fees and costs to June 10, 2019. On June 10, 2019, the parties submitted a joint status report indicating that the parties finalized their agreement concerning attorneys\u2019 fees and costs and have signed a settlement agreement. The parties jointly agreed to dismiss the case on July 3, 2019.", "summary": "In 2016, a civil liberties non-profit filed this freedom of information act (FOIA) complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief for for the release of any documents relating to DOJ applications to the FISC requesting third parties to provide access to encrypted communications or to provide other types of technical assistance to access private communications. On September 25, 2017, January 31, 2018, and August 22, 2018, the DOJ released a total of seventy-three out of seventy-nine documents it had identified as being responsive to EFF\u2019s FOIA request. The DOJ contended that the remaining six documents were exempted from disclosure under FOIA exemptions. On March 26, 2019, Judge Gilliam granted the DOJ\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment and denied the EFF\u2019s cross motion. On April 5, 2019, the parties filed a joint status report, notifying the court that, outside of attorney\u2019s fees, no dispute remained to be resolved."} {"article": "On January 7, 2010, the United States filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against the State of New Jersey Civil Service Commission. The U.S. claimed that the promotional practices established by the New Jersey Civil Service Commission had an illegal disparate impact on African-American and Hispanic candidates for promotion to the rank of Police Sergeant. The U.S. Department of Justice sought a court order barring written examinations as a pass/fail screening method for promotion to Police Sergeant, and certification of candidates for promotion to Police Sergeant from eligibility lists in descending-rank order. The U.S. also asked for retrospective remedies including back pay with interest and priority promotion with retroactive seniority to candidates affected by the allegedly discriminatory practices. The case focused on New Jersey's written multiple-choice examination, which was used as a pass/fail screening mechanism for eligibility for promotion; this testing protocol resulted in a statistically significant gap in the percentage of African-American and Hispanic candidates placed on an eligibility list. The practice of certifying candidates for promotion from the eligibility list in descending-rank order based on exam scores and seniority also resulted in a statistically significant percentage of African-American and Hispanic candidates on the list not being certified for promotion. On November 22, 2011, the parties agreed to a consent decree that enjoined the New Jersey Civil Service Commission from using the challenged promotion practices as well as any practices that violate Title VII, established settlement funds for awarding back pay, policies for enacting priority promotions, and dates and processes to notify individuals who may be eligible for relief. The consent decree was set to expire on the latest of the following dates: three years from the date of entry, upon fulfillment of the defendants' obligations regarding individual relief, or upon the state's administration of the second police sergeant exam. Each party agreed to pay its own attorneys' fees. On June 12, 2012, the District Court (Judge Katharine S. Hayden) issued an opinion approving the consent decree for final entry. 2012 WL 3265905. After notifying individuals eligible for relief under the consent decree, proceedings taking objections to the consent decree, and fairness hearings determining individual relief, the parties submitted a relief awards list and all objections to the list. On May 10, 2013, various parties who objected to the approval of the final relief awards list appealed the decision of the District Court to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Judges Sloviter, Fuentes, and Rother), which upheld the decision of the District Court on June 13, 2013. 522 Fed.Appx. 167. The same parties petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review, but cert was denied. Hamdeh v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 529 (2013). On April 10, 2014, the court (Judge Katharine S. Hayden) issued an opinion approving the final relief award list. 2014 WL 1404642. Subsequently, the DOJ moved to modify paragraph 67 of the consent decree arguing that in certain jurisdictions, alternating on a one-to-one basis between the two lists might afford some priority promotion candidates greater than make-whole relief because they would receive a promotion before individuals on an SRL who have earlier actual appointment dates. However, on September 30, 2015, the court (Judge Hayden) denied the motion. By its terms, the consent decree expired in September 2016 after Commission administered two police sergeant examinations. On September 12, 2016, the U.S. filed a motion for extension of the consent decree. Based on unsatisfactory results from the second administration of the exam, the U.S. sought to extend provisions of the consent decree that authorize it to oversee the composition and administration of a third examination. On June 30, 2017, Judge Hayden denied the U.S.'s motion for extension of the consent decree. The U.S. argued that, based on the unexpected results of the second examination, it hadn't actually had a chance to review New Jersey's police sergeant selection procedure as required by the consent decree, and that therefore a third examination was required. Based on its terms, extending the consent decree requires a showing of good cause. However, Judge Hayden applied a different standard: whether circumstances had sufficiently changed such that the basic purpose of the original consent decree had been thwarted. The Court found that the parties had fulfilled their defined obligations, and that the consent decree would be substantially modified were it revived and the DOJ given an additional measure of authority over the administration of a third examination. Therefore, the consent decree has expired.", "summary": "In 2010 the United States sued the New Jersey Civil Service Commission for violating Title VII. Police departments used an exam as a pass/fail screening device to determine who could be eligible for promotion to Police Sergeant and then certified candidates for promotion in descending order, resulting in a disparate impact on African-American and Hispanic Candidates. The parties agreed to a decree that forbade the current process, mandated back pay and priority promotion for those effected, and established guidelines for a new hiring process. The consent decree expired in September 2016."} {"article": "On September 30, 2002, the Miami District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of Florida under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against Airguide Corporation and Pioneer Metals. Airguide manufactured air conditioning units, and Pioneer Metals was Airguide's parent company. The EEOC, who brought suit on behalf of eight current and former male and female employees and other similarly situated individuals who were employed by Airguide, asked the court for injunctive relief and monetary damages, alleging that Defendants engaged in pervasive sexual harassment and retaliation. Specifically, the EEOC claimed that female Airguide employees were sexually harassed by their supervisor, which created a hostile work environment. The EEOC further alleged that Airguide retaliated against male and female employees by discipline, demotion, and termination for complaining to management about the discriminatory practices, participating in the EEOC's investigation, or filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. On February 6, 2003, eight current and former employees who were among those named in the EEOC complaint intervened in the lawsuit. On July 17, 2003, this case was consolidated with an action made by a male Airguide employee who was terminated in retaliation for complaining of discriminatory practices and participating in the EEOC investigation. An early referral to ADR did not bear fruit, but eventually the parties settled, and a consent decree was entered in June of 2004. The defendants agreed to pay a total of $1 million, of which $650,000 went directly to the complainants and $350,000 went for attorney's fees. As set forth in the Consent Decree, Airguide and Pioneer Metals were enjoined from engaging in conduct that violates Title VII and retaliating against any employees who participated in the lawsuit. Pioneer Metals was further required to establish a written policy prohibiting sexual harassment and retaliation, to disseminate that policy among all its employees, and to implement an anti-discrimination training program. The decree was entered in 2004 and scheduled to last 2007. No further docket entries exist, so the case is closed.", "summary": "In September 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of Florida under Title VII against Airguide Corporation and Pioneer Metals. The complaint alleged that Defendants had engaged in pervase sexual harassment and had retaliated against employees who had complained of the discriminatory practices, participated in the EEOC's investigation, or filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. In June 2004, the court entered the Consent Decree, which awarded Plaintiffs $1,000,000 and prohibited Defendants from violating Title VII."} {"article": "On September 27, 2006, parents, as next friends of their minor daughters, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1681 et seq. against Ponca City Independent School District No. 71, also known as Ponca City Public Schools. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Ponca City Public Schools had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972, 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1681, by denying plaintiffs' daughters' equal access to interscholastic and other school-sponsored athletics. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that Ponca City Public Schools had discriminated against plaintiffs' daughters in the funding of athletics; access to equipment and supplies; the scheduling of games and practice times; the assignment and compensation of coaches; and the provision of locker rooms and facilities for both practice and competition and training facilities and services. The parties held settlement conferences before the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma (Magistrate Judge Sam A. Joyner) on January 12, 2007 and March 27, 2007. On April 9, 2007, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that settled all claims, except that they agreed to submit the issue of attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded to the court for determination on the basis of briefs submitted. On September 11, 2007, the Court (Magistrate Judge Sam A. Joyner) reported and recommended that plaintiffs' motion for awarding of attorneys' fees and costs be granted in part and denied in part, and awarded plaintiffs $39965.33, which was to be paid by defendants. On September 26, 2007, the Court (Federal District Judge Claire V. Eagan) ordered that the magistrate judge's report and recommendation be accepted. On September 28, 2007, the parties submitted a joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice to the Court. While the settlement agreement is not available, media reports state that the defendant agreed to improve the softball field and upgrade the plaintiffs' uniforms, equipment, and locker-room facilities. The case was closed on September 28, 2007.", "summary": "In 2006, plaintiffs filed for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Ponca City Public Schools had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972, 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1681 and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 by denying plaintiffs' daughters' equal access to interscholastic and other school-sponsored athletics. The parties reached a settlement agreement on April 9, 2007, and plaintiffs were awarded attorneys' fees and costs on September 26, 2007. While the settlement agreement is not available, media reports state that the defendant agreed to improve the softball field and upgrade the plaintiffs' uniforms, equipment, and locker-room facilities."} {"article": "On August 12, 2003, four pretrial detainees in the Cook County Jail brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District Court of Illinois on behalf of those suffering from mental illness while confined. The plaintiffs sued Cook County, the president of the Cook County Board, the Cook County sheriff, and the Director of the Cook County Department of Health Services under 42 U.S.C. \u00a712101, 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declarative relief from the defendants' policy and practice of disallowing inmates with mental illness from participating in prerelease programs, claiming that this was in violation of the ADA. The plaintiffs also challenged the defendants' policy of discharging such individuals without providing them medication and referrals to manage their mental illness as violative of the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment and the ADA. On September 9, 2003, the defendants moved to dismiss both counts claiming that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies, that three of the defendants did not meet the definition of public entity under the ADA and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims. On March 2, 2004, Judge Elaine Bucklo granted defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs fell under a decree that authorized pre-release programs to alleviate overcrowding in the county jails. The judge held that because the plaintiffs claims were inextricably intertwined to the decree, the original court monitoring that decree was the proper forum to hear a proposed modification. Thus, the complaint was dismissed without prejudice, allowing plaintiffs to refile their claims before the appropriate presiding judges. The plaintiffs filed a motion to alter and amend the judgment on March 16, 2004 which was initially denied. On May 5, 2004, the plaintiffs appealed this denial to the Seventh Circuit, but on October 26, 2004, Judge Elaine Bucklo granted the plaintiffs' motion for relief and the case was reopened to rule on the previously filed motion to dismiss (the reason for this change is unclear). On February 1, 2005, Judge Elaine Bucklo granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the case. The court applied an exhaustion requirement to the ADA claim that inmates were prevented from participating in prerelease programs. 2005 WL 283419. The court also found plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that they lacked standing to bring the claim (all four had been released since the complaint was filed), but did not address the issue of whether defendants were not proper under the ADA.", "summary": "On August 12, 2003, four pretrial detainees in the Cook County Jail brought this class action suit in the Northern District Court of Illinois on behalf of those suffering from mental illness while confined. The plaintiffs sued defendants Cook County and county officials under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12101 and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. They sought injunctive and declarative relief from the defendants' policy and practice of disallowing inmates with mental illness from participating in prerelease programs, claiming that this was in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The plaintiffs also challenged the defendants' policy of discharging such individuals without providing them medication and referrals to manage their mental illness as violative of the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment and the ADA. The court granted the defendants motion to dismiss on February 1, 2005. It applied an exhaustion requirement to the ADA claim that inmates were prevented from participating in pre-release programs. The court also found plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that they lacked standing to bring the claim, but did not address the issue of whether defendants were not proper under the ADA."} {"article": "On January 4, 1974, the Ensley Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, together with certain named individuals, for themselves and on behalf of others similarly situated, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, against the City of Birmingham, the members of the Personnel Board of Jefferson County, and the Personnel Director of that Board, alleging that the defendants engaged in discriminatory hiring practices against Black people. A suit raising the same constitutional and statutory allegations was filed on January 7, 1974, by John W. Martin and other named plaintiffs [the \"Martin class\"] against the City of Birmingham, Jefferson County, and the Personnel Board of Jefferson County. On May 27, 1975, the United States Department of Justice (\"D.O.J.\") filed a lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a72000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against the Jefferson County Personnel Board, and the municipal and other governmental jurisdictions within Jefferson County. The DOJ asked the court for injunctive and monetary relief alleging a pattern or practice of discriminatory employment practices against Black people and women. On February 20, 1976, Lucy Walker filed suit challenging the employment practices of the Jefferson County nursing home. All four cases were consolidated for trial. On December 20-22, 1976, trial was held on the merits of the limited issue of whether the two tests used by the Personnel Board to screen and rank applicants for positions as police officers and firefighters [were] discriminatory and a violation of the constitutional or statutory rights of Black people. All other issues under the complaints were reserved until a later date. The District Court (Judge Sam C. Pointer Jr.) found that the police officer and firefighter tests violated Title VII. The court noted that both tests had a significant adverse impact on black applicants, a phenomenon defined as a passing rate \"less than four-fifths . . . of the rate for [whites].\" The judge ruled that the tests could be used only if, despite their adverse impact, they were sufficiently \"job related\" to predict effectively test takers' future job performance. The Judge Pointer concluded that the tests failed to meet this standard and found no statistically significant correlation between the applicants' scores on the firefighter test and their later job performance. A similar conclusion was made in regards to the police officer exam. The District Court ordered race-conscious relief \"pending adoption of some selection procedure which either has no adverse effect upon black applicants or is sufficiently job-related. The original plaintiffs' claims against the City never reached trial, and the following two cases deal directly with the Personnel Board of Jefferson County. The Board appealed the District Court's decision that the police and firefighter exams violated Title VII to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In doing so, the Board did not contest the district court's finding that the two tests had an adverse impact, but contended that the tests were in fact job-related. The United States and the Martin class of black plaintiffs jointly cross-appealed the district court's holding that use of the tests did not begin to violate Title VII until the dates on which the negative results of the test validation studies were reported to the Board. The District Court had reasoned that, until the final results were reported, the Board was justified in using the tests in anticipation of favorable results from the validation studies. The Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the District Court for additional fact finding. While the first appeal was pending, the District Court conducted a second trial. That trial involved challenges to other Board practices, including: written tests for eighteen more positions; various rules affecting promotional opportunities; the imposition of height, weight, and educational requirements for certain jobs; and the restriction of some job announcements and certifications to persons of a particular sex. While the first proceeding was on remand and the second was at trial, the parties entered settlement talks that eventually suspended both proceedings. The plaintiffs, in all the cases, entered into extensive negotiations with the Board and the City which culminated in two proposed consent decrees, one with the Board and one with the City. The parties submitted proposed consent decrees that settled all claims against the City and the Board, including allegations of gender discrimination raised by the United States. Although these decrees provided retrospective monetary relief such as back pay for some individuals, their keystone was an extensive regime of affirmative action for Black people and women. The Personnel Board of Jefferson County decree had various stipulations that had to be met, specifically: (1) subject to the availability of qualified applicants, that the Board annually certify Black people and women either according to racial and gender quotas set forth in the decree or in proportion to their representation in the applicant pool, whichever was higher. The decree's minimum certification rates ranged from ten to fifty percent, depending on the position involved and whether the goal applied to Black people or women. This stipulation would continue until the proportion of Black people and women employed by the City in any given job classification approximated the respective percentages [of Black people and women] in the civilian labor force of Jefferson County; (2) the Personnel Board must periodically review its hiring and promotion procedures to ensure that the procedures either had no adverse impact or were sufficiently job-related to pass muster under Title VII; (3) as long as the Board's procedures -- whether job related or not -- had a disparate impact on Black people or women, the Board must make a good faith effort to determine whether there are any alternative testing procedures which would reduce any adverse impact; (4) the decree prohibited the Board's prior practice of restricting job announcements on the basis of gender; (5) the decree mandated continued aggressive recruitment of Black people and women. The decree that the City of Birmingham entered into was similar to the Personnel Board decree. The city decree stipulated: (1) annual \"goals\" for hiring and promoting Black people and women and a \"long term goal\" of parity between the proportion of Black people and women in any City job classification and the proportion of Black people and women in the civilian labor force, specifically the city must hire and promote Black people and women according to either racial and gender quotas set forth in the decree, or at the rate of Black and female representation in the applicant pool, whichever was higher; (2) the City also agreed to request the Board selectively to certify qualified Black people and females whenever necessary to provide the City with a certification list that contains sufficient numbers of Black people and females to meet the decree's goals. During all the years of litigation involving the City and the Personnel Board, the defendant Jefferson County avoided the same scrutiny. Their original consent decree did not come until a year later than the consent decrees involving the City and the Personnel Board. The Court (Judge Sam C. Pointer Jr.) entered it on December 29, 1982, and it was signed by the Jefferson County, United States and one of the private class of plaintiffs. The County's consent ordered differed from the ones with the City and the Board. Its major purpose was to ensure that Black people and women are considered on equal basis with whites and males for employment. The County was enjoined from engaging in practice or pattern of racial and gender discrimination. The County was required to hire the percentage of Black people and females as linked to the number of qualified applicants, as determined under the nondiscriminatory procedures of both the Board's decree and the County's decree. Unlike the other two decrees, it has not been modified since. In August 1981 the court held a fairness hearing to consider the objections of all interested parties. Several interested non-parties soon appeared to challenge the decrees, claiming that the decrees would adversely affect their employment opportunities. Chief among the objectors was the Birmingham Firefighters' Association (\"B.F.A.\"), a labor association representing a majority of City firefighters, most of whom were white males. The B.F.A. contended that the proposed consent decrees would have a substantial adverse impact upon them. The court reasoned that the decrees did not preclude the hiring or promotion of whites or males and that the city's hiring goals were expressly made subject to the caveat that the city decree was not to be interpreted as requiring the hiring or promotion of a person who is not qualified or of a person who is demonstrably less qualified according to a job-related selection procedure. Subsequently, the court denied their motions as untimely, and approved, and entered, both consent decrees. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of the intervenr's cases. The District Court's approval of the consent decrees, and the Eleventh Circuit Appeals Court's refusal to allow the B.F.A. to intervene, brought forth a collection of cases that has come to be known as the \"Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation.\" In these cases, a number of male, non-Black City employees collaterally attacked the decrees and the \"affirmative action\" programs adopted under them. The United States, despite its status as a signatory of the consent decrees, also brought suit against the City, lodging allegations similar to those of the individual plaintiffs. The court dismissed for lack of evidence all claims against the Personnel Board leaving only the claims against the city standing. At trial, the plaintiffs claimed that some Black people were promoted over more-qualified non-Black people despite the fact that the City decree specifically did not require the City to promote a less qualified person, in preference to a person who is demonstrably better qualified based upon the results of a job related selection procedure. The district court found for the City, holding that the City had shown that its employment actions were required by the decrees. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision finding that this limitation was unfair to the male, non-Black plaintiffs, because they had not participated in the negotiation or signing of the consent decrees. The Appeals Court directed the District Court to re-examine the legality of the decrees under the heightened scrutiny applicable to voluntary government affirmative actions plans. The Appeals Court decisions also allowed the Wilks class (non-Black, male city employees) to intervene in challenging the legality of the decrees. This decision was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). The District Court on remand once again found for the city, finding significant evidence of past discrimination to support its affirmative action program and that the affirmative action provisions were narrowly tailored because the City had first tried alternative measures. The United States could not collaterally challenge the decrees but was able to seek modifications to them. After holding a hearing on these issues, the district court ordered several modifications to the decrees acknowledging that the decrees have impaired some employment or promotional opportunities of whites and males. Furthermore, the court stated that forty-five percent of the City's full-time employees were Black and twenty-three percent were female as of September 1990 fulfilling to some extent the original long term goal of the decrees. The modifications to the City of Birmingham decree were as follows: (1) The City must stop using annual goals for any particular job classification once the long-term goal for that classification is met; (2) The City must stop using annual goals for any promotional position once the long-term goal is met for the position from which the promotional candidates are normally chosen, except that the City should continue to promote Black people and women to high-level police and fire positions in proportion to those groups' representation in the position from which promotions are normally made until the long-term goal is reached with respect to the high-level positions; (3) The City must stop using annual goals for any particular job classification once the Board develops lawful screening procedures for that job; (4) The City should group similar jobs together for the purpose of determining whether a particular goal has been met; (5) The district court will, in 1996, reconsider the appropriateness of continuing the City decree. The District Court made only one modification to the Personnel Board decree, the modification requires that, until the Board develops a lawful test for a particular position, it must, at the City's request and subject to the availability of qualified applicants, certify Black and female candidates for that position in proportion to their representation among applicants -- even after the City has met its long-term goal for that position. In 1994 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Circuit Judge Edward Earl Carnes) rendered a decision that required the District Court to modify the original decree so that the City would be ordered to implement valid job selection procedures forthwith. On December 19, 1995, the decrees were modified again pursuant to instructions given by the court. The City's consent decree was modified to require the City to remove all race and gender conscious selection procedures from its employment policies. After the remand in Ensley v. Branch, the parties clarified their differences, narrowing to fourteen the number of positions that some or all parties contended were being filled by selection procedures that had an adverse impact. The City decree was modified yet again in December 18, 2000 to direct the City to provide data as to the impact of its selection procedures upon hiring for those jobs. At the same time, the decree was extended until June 2002. On June 19th, 2002 the consent decrees were once again extended. On July 8th, 2002 Judge C. Lynwood Smith, Jr. appointed Ronald R. Sims as receiver of the Jefferson County Personnel Board whose duties are chiefly to ensure that the Personnel Board complies fully in a timely and cost efficient manner to the 1981 and 1995 modified consent decrees. The City's initial motion to terminate its consent decree was filed on July 6, 2004. On December 2, 2004 the parties entered into a joint stipulation regarding selection procedures for the city in seven distinct job classifications. On December 9, 2004 the consent decrees were extended pending a motion to dismiss. On July 12, 2005 the District Court concluded that with the sole exception of one job classification had \"substantially achieved the basic purposes of paragraph 5 of its 1995 Modification Order,\" and had shown that its employment selection procedures do not result in an unjustifiable, discriminatory impact on the basis of race or sex. Therefore, the City's motion to terminate was granted with respect to all job classifications except one, and judicial supervision of the City was retained. The District Court subsequently directed the City: (1) to revise its selection procedure for the Fire Apparatus Operator classification; (2) await a certification of eligible applicants from the Personnel Board of Jefferson County (\"Personnel Board\"); 3) administer the revised selection procedure; and (4) deliver the results of the administration of the revised procedure and a validation study to the parties and Special Master for their consideration and objections, if any. The City of Birmingham complied and delivered the results of its administration of a revised selection procedure and a validity study to the parties on September 20, 2006. On August 20, 2007 Judge C Lynwood Smith, Jr. denied the City's motion to terminate the remaining portion of the consent decree and to be dismissed as a party. In December of 2007, defendants filed a motion for final relief from the 1981 Consent Decree, subsequently followed by a series of negotiations surrounding the inclusion of various plaintiff subclasses. In May, 2008, private plaintiffs moved for permanent injunction barring implementation of the Race-based Provisions of Act No. 2008-408 of the Regular Session of the Alabama Legislature, and were joined by the Board. In June, 2008, the city of Birmingham filed a motion to dismiss the city as a party of the case and to terminate the City of Birmingham Consent Decree. In the following months, responses were filed to both of these motions, as well as a series of status conferences and evidentiary hearings. On September 12, 2008, the Court (Judge C. Lynwood Smith Jr.) issued an opinion, granting the Board and private plaintiff's motion for injunctive and declaratory relief from the Alabama Act No. 2008-408. The Act was declared void ab initio, as violating the Supremacy Clause. On November 20, 2008, the court ordered that the 1981 Consent Decree with the Personnel Board of Jefferson County be immediately and unconditionally terminated, however the City of Birmingham Consent Decree still remains in effect. On May 14, 2009, the court awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $2,500,000.00 to the two private classes of plaintiffs against the Personnel Board. On March 1, 2011, the City filed its fourth motion to terminate its consent decree, and following a hearing at which no party objected, federal supervision of the City of Birmingham ceased on January 27, 2012, and the City was dismissed as a party. The court found full and satisfactory compliance with the City's consent decree. On March 16, 2012, the court approved a consent decree for attorneys fees in which the City agreed to pay the two private classes of plaintiff $350,000. In 2006, the private plaintiffs started gathering evidence on the compliance of the County with the consent decree. On October 3, 2007, they filed a motion to hold the County in contempt and to modify the consent order. The County admitted it disobeyed the decree in various ways, including among others, failure to follow the recruitment procedures, failure to instruct personnel of the need to follow the decree, and failure to file reports. The matter, however, spent a long on discovery and on the matters involving the City. In the interim, the court (Judge C Lynwood Smith Jr.) granted several hiring orders to allow the County to fill vacancies. It also issued several temporary orders holding the County in contempt until final resolution of the matter, with instructions on recruitment and hiring to the County. On August 20, 2013, the court issued an opinion, holding the County in contempt. It rejected the reasons for noncompliance and ordered the parties to confer on the identity of the receiver and the modifications to the original 1982 decree. On October 16, 2013, the court entered a modified consent decree. The decree included general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race, color or sex, and retaliation. The decree provided that the County had to implement following procedures: accelerated recruitment of black and female applicants, corresponding to the percentage of qualified Black people and women given by the Board's lists; recruitment into certain departments; affirmative recruitment procedures aimed at Black people and women; and other various procedures aimed at preventing racial and gender discrimination. Any failure to meet the objectives required a showing of good effort. The County also agreed to pay $298,000 in settlement of individual claims. It also included the recordkeeping and reporting requirement to be followed by the County. On November 12, 2013, the Court entered a modified decree, to address errors and omissions of the October 16, 2013 decree. On October 25, 2013, the court appointed Ronald R. Sims as receiver to ensure the County's full compliance with the modified consent decree. Lorren Oliver was appointed as a replacement reporter beginning on June 11, 2015. On December 19, 2013, the court granted defendants' unopposed motion to Terminate the Temporary Orders governing Jefferson County's hiring procedures. On March 16, 2017, the parties submitted a joint motion to terminate the consent decree with respect to the Sheriff of Jefferson County and requested approval of a settlement agreement. That motion was granted in part by the Court on March 23 with recording and reporting requirements kept in place. On June 21, 2017, the court also granted plaintiffs motion for attorney's fees, and the final settlement was approved. Judgment was entered in favor of Cravath, Swaine & Moore, LLP, John W. Martin, et al, and Gwendolyn Bryant, et al, jointly and severally and against the Sheriff in the amount of $150,000.00. On June 6, 2018, the court adopted the proposal by the receiver to transition authorities back to the County and allow various departments to re-assume responsibilities for tasks like hiring employees and reporting compliance. On September 1, 2020, the parties jointly moved to terminate the consent decree against Jefferson County. On December 21, 2020, the court granted the joint motion for termination subject to an additional 18-month window where recording and reporting requirements were kept. The court further awarded $7,289,532.90 in attorneys' fees on April 2, 2021. As of April 8, 2021, this case is ongoing.", "summary": "On May 27, 1975 The United States Department of Justice (\"D.O.J.\") filed this lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a72000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against the Jefferson County Personnel Board, and the municipal and other governmental jurisdictions within Jefferson County. The Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendants had discriminatory employment practices against Black people and women, and demanded monetary and injunctive relief. The parties entered several Consent Decrees aimed at correcting these practices, which were monitored closely by the courts for several decades. All of the consent decree were eventually modified. The County and the Board were both held in contempt for noncompliance, and were subject to receivership.The consent decrees against the Board, City, and County have all been dismissed. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "On April 27, 2001, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a female employee, filed a lawsuit in the District Court of New Mexico, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Brink's, Incorporated. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant denied the complainant a promotion to an Assistant Manager position because of her sex. On May 10, 2001, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On December 5, 2002, the District Court (Judge M. Christina Armijo) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $58,750.", "summary": "On April 27, 2001, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a female employee, filed a lawsuit in the District Court of New Mexico, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Brink's, Incorporated. The complaint claimed that the defendant denied the complainant a promotion to an Assistant Manager position because of her sex. The parties entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $58,750."} {"article": "On February 12, 2015, a prisoner in the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison (GDCP) filed this lawsuit, pro se, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Georgia. The plaintiff sued Georgia prison officials under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, claiming that by holding him in solitary confinement for five years in poor conditions they had violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural and substantive due process as well as state regulations. He sought injunctive relief enjoining the state from keeping him solitary confinement, declaratory relief, damages for physical, mental, and emotional consequences stemming from his confinement, and court fees. The plaintiff\u2019s problems at GDCP began in 2010 when, while incarcerated, he was charged with attempting to escape and destruction of state property. Investigating officers recommended that the charges be dropped, but the plaintiff was nonetheless brought to disciplinary court and was found guilty of both charges. On administrative appeal, the convictions were expunged from the plaintiff's record. For the next five years, however, he was kept in a Special Management Unit (SMU, solitary confinement) and segregated from the general prison population. Despite a prison policy enacted in 2013 stating that inmates in the SMU should be returned to the general population after four consecutive status reviews showing good behavior, after eight status reviews recommending and approving of transfer out of the SMU, he remained in solitary confinement without explanation; the grievances he submitted to prison officials regarding his placement were not addressed. The complaint also detailed substandard conditions and mistreatment in the Unit, including inadequate food and medical care and a total lack of recreational or educational opportunities. At the time the plaintiff filed his complaint, he remained in the Special Management Unit with his status there marked \"indefinite.\" Procedural History On May 18, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The motion indicated that prison officials had temporarily eliminated access to legal services for his unit due to budget restrictions; it asked that defendants be compelled to allow him the same access to legal research services that the general prison population received. On June 16, U.S. District Judge Marc T. Treadwell adopted Magistrate Judge Charles H. Weigle\u2019s recommendation to deny the motion because the plaintiff failed to show he faced irreparable injury or was likely to succeed on the merits. 2015 WL 13869065. In the meantime, on June 4, defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations had passed, that plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative procedures, that he failed to state a claim, and that defendants were immune from liability. The court stayed discovery while it considered the motion. On March 31, 2016, Judge Treadwell denied the motion to dismiss with respect to all claims regarding plaintiffs' confinement in the period after August 2013, when GDCP made policy changes requiring inmates to be removed from the SMU after four positive status hearings. However, Judge Treadwell granted the motion to dismiss with respect to all claims regarding plaintiffs' confinement prior to that period. Judge Treadwell also granted plaintiff leave to amend his complaint from February 2015 to include additional due process and Eighth Amendment claims. 2016 WL 1266950. On September 1, 2016, the court briefly stayed this case along with a number of other cases relating to SMU placement that were also filed pro se in order to determine whether the cases should be consolidated. The court appointed the plaintiff counsel from the Southern Center for Human Rights (SCHR) on October 17, 2016, and discovery commenced in December 2016. On March 11, 2017, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, this time represented by counsel from SCHR. The amended complaint greatly expanded the scope of the case, seeking class certification covering not just the named plainitff but everyone in the SMU and providing more detail about the extremely restrictive and isolating nature of GDCP's SMU. It alleged not only that the prison had failed to meaningfully assess the plaintiff's status in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment but also that the conditions of confinement in the unit violated the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, the Complaint claimed that the use of solitary confinement, grossly disproportionate punishment, and inadequate food constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The complaint sought to certify a class of all inmates who were in or would be placed in GDCP's SMU. On March 20, 2017 another prisoner moved to intervene in the case. The prisoner had been in solitary confinement at GDCP and was then moved to a similar unit at Georgia State Prison (\"GSP\"). Judge Treadwell denied the motion to intervene on September 15, 2017 because the other prisoner was ineligible for \"in forma pauperis\" status under the Prison Litigation Reform Act\u2019s Three Strikes provision and in any event had no right to intervene. 2017 WL 4102742. On October 2, the prisoner appealed the denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals, but his appeal was dismissed for failure to pay filing fees. The plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction on July 5, 2018, asking the court to order GDCP to allow all prisoners in SMU at least three hours of out-of-cell time daily, and to establish within thirty days plans to meaningfully increase programming for prisoners in SMU and to identify and move prisoners in SMU who suffered from mental illness. Plaintffs also amended the motion for class certification on July 13, 2018. The court took no action on these motions, but the parties entered settlement negotiations alongside continued discovery. On December 21, 2018, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of the class and a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement proposed various measures to improve the confinement conditions at the GDCP, including regular opportunities for outdoor and indoor out-of-cell time, as well as access to the library and other educational resources. On January 17, 2019, Judge Treadwell granted preliminary approval of the settlement. A fairness hearing was set for April 30, 2019. 2019 WL 479506. On February 5, 2019, Judge Treadwell denied the pending motions for preliminary injunction and class certification because the final approval of the settlement agreement would make these motions moot. Judge Treadwell also stated that if the settlement agreement were not approved, the plaintiffs could reinstate these motions. Settlement On May 7, 2019, Judge Treadwell issued an order certifying the settlement class and adopting the settlement agreement, which will remain in force for three years. The settlement agreement contains a range of provisions: a minimum of four hours outside cells each day Monday - Friday; access to tablet devices with games, books, and other educational materials; ability to request materials from the prison library and mobile book carts; out-of-cell programming and classes; and access to the same food, hygiene items, laundry and barbering services as the general prison population. The settlement also establishes a 24-month limit on confinement in the SMU and revised procedures for determining assignment to the SMU. The agreement provides for monitoring meetings every nine months, limited access to SMU records, yearly visits to SMU by class counsel, training for staff at GDCP, and confidential communications and meetings between class members and class counsel. Defendants agreed to pay $425,000 in attorneys' fees, which were granted by the court in a separate order on July 30, 2019. The court retains jurisdiction until the agreement expires on May 7, 2022. 2019 WL 2017497. Current Status The court granted $425,000 in attorneys' fees on July 30, 2019. Supervision is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2015, a prisoner in Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison (GDCP) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Georgia against various prison officials at the GDCP. Held in solitary confinement for many years, plaintiff alleged due process and Eighth Amendment violations and moved for class certification. On May 7, 2019, parties reached a settlement that applied to the class of all inmates who are or will be placed in GDCP's solitary confinement unit. The settlement required GDCP to make signification changes to out-of-cell time, access to educational materials and programming, and living conditions for individuals in solitary confinement. Additionally, the maximum time an individual can be placed in solitary is now 24 months."} {"article": "On March 15, 2007, the EEOC filed this sex/pregnancy discrimination case against Zale Corporation in U.S. District Court in Alaska. The complaint was filed on behalf of an employee who claimed she had been denied promotion to a mangement postion because she was pregnant. The parties quickly settled the case with a Consent Decree entered by U.S. District Judge John W. Sedwick on July 9, 2007, to last for two years, covering all employees at Zales Jewelers stores in the State of Alaska. The employer agreed to pay the claimant $55,000.00 in damages. The Decree prevents the employer from discriminating against its employees on the basis of sex/pregnancy. The Decree provides for evaluation and implementation of anti-discrimination policies, procedures and training, requires posting and distribution of those policies, requires anti-discrimination training for managers and supervisors and discipline of any supervisor or manager who violates the policies. It also requires the company to include the handling of EEO matters in its hiring and evaluation of managers and supervisors. The Decree was in effect for two years from the date of its entry, July 9, 2007; it expired on July 9, 2009.", "summary": "In this sex/pregnancy discrimination case, the EEOC settled with Zale Corporation on behalf of a female employee who claimed she was denied a promotion because she was pregnant. The Decree covers all employees of all Zales Jewelers stores in the State of Alaska. It prohibits sex/pregnancy discrimination and calls for training and evaluation of managers and supervisors to ensure they provide a workplace free of sex/pregnancy-based discrimination. Te Decree requires EEO policy posting and distribution and expungement of the employee's file. The employer paid the claimant $55,000.00 in damages and agreed to a two-year duration for the Decree. It expired on July 9, 2009."} {"article": "On April 2, 2014, three immigrant detainees incarcerated in the Northwest Detention Center (NDC) filed a lawsuit in the District Court in the Western District of Washington under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the United States Department of Homeland Security. The three detainees, represented by the ACLU, asked the court for injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order prohibiting the placement of prisoners in solitary confinement for exercising their freedom of speech and freedom to protest, as well as a declaratory judgment that the defendants' actions were in violation of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs' claim that they were incarcerated in solitary confinement for the sole reason that they exercised their First Amendment right of speech and petition. On March 7, 2014, several detainees in the Northwestern Detention Center (NWDC) went on a peaceful hunger strike to protest immigration policies and to raise awareness of the conditions of the NWDC facilities. Officers claimed to be taking detainees to a \"meeting\" with the assistant warden. When they were escorted out of the unit, the detainees were placed in handcuffs and put in solitary confinement spending 23 hours a day in a cell. ICE's policy does not permit NWDC to place detainees in solitary confinement for any reason other than medical observation. On May 13, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal because ICE had released the detainees from solitary confinement.", "summary": "Three immigrant detainees go on a hunger strike and as a result are put in solitary confinement by wardens of the detention center."} {"article": "This case concerns the legality of the United States Department of Health and Human Services\u2019 (HHS) June 19th, 2020 implementation of a rule under Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (commonly known as the Affordable Care Act or Obamacare), that (1) removed \u201csexual orientation, sex stereotyping, and gender identity\u201d from the definition of sex discrimination, (2) included a religious exemption, and (3) redefined the scope of entities covered under the rule. On July 16th, 2020 the state of Washington filed this lawsuit under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706) against the HHS and its Secretary in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Washington sought an injunction against, and vacatur of, the rule as well as declaratory relief. Washington alleged that the rule exceeded HHS\u2019s statutory authority and was arbitrary and capricious. Additionally, Washington alleged that the rule violated the equal protection and substantive due process clauses of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. After the Affordable Care Act was passed in 2010, the HHS in 2016 issued a rule under Section 1557 that included sexual orientation, sex stereotyping, and gender identity as part of its definition of sex discrimination and lacked a religious exemption. However, as a result of a lawsuit filed in August 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas vacated that rule's definition of sex discrimination on October 15, 2019 (Franciscan Alliance, LLC v. Burwell). The HHS\u2019 2020 rule tracked the result of Franciscan Alliance. However, as Washington\u2019s initial complaint pointed out, on June 15, 2020 the United States Supreme Court held in Bostock v. Clayton County that sex discrimination under Title VII included discrimination because of sexual orientation and gender identity. Along with its complaint, Washington filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on the grounds that its claims were likely to succeed, the rule would \u201cirreparably harm\u201d the state and its residents, and that an injunction would promote fairness and serve the public interest. Several amicus briefs were filed in support of the injunction. Before ruling on the preliminary injunction, on August 18, 2020, the HHS gave notice of the decision in Walker v. Azar against the HHS (E.D.N.Y. No. 20-cv-02834). The case was substantially similar to this case, and the Walker court had decided to grant a preliminary injunction against the HHS. Following the notice, the court in this case (Judge James L. Robart) ordered each party to show cause regarding the impact of Walker. Both parties did so. On August 28th, the court issued an order denying Washington\u2019s preliminary injunction. Judge Robart ruled that before considering the merits of Washington\u2019s claim, he had to consider Washington\u2019s standing. Washington claimed it had standing because the rule would cause: (1) \u201cadditional costs or other economic harms . . . resulting from an increase in discrimination against Washingtonians or decreased healthcare coverage for Washingtonians; and (2) increased administrative costs.\u201d Particularly in light of the protections afforded by Bostock, Judge Robart found that Washington lacked \u201csufficient evidence to show that the 2020 Rule\u2019s decision not to define on the basis of sex will yield an increase in discrimination against LGBTQ individuals or a decrease in available healthcare or health insurance coverage for that population,\u201d and therefore ruled that all of Washington\u2019s arguments concerning potential direct harm were insufficient. Moreover, the \u201cadministrative costs\u201d raised by Washington also failed to support standing as they would be \u201cself-inflicted.\u201d Judge Robart also found Washington lacked standing to challenge the rule\u2019s religious exceptions for \u201cmany of the same reasons.\u201d 2020 WL 5095467. He then ordered Washington to show cause in 10 days as to why the case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On September 8th, Washington gave notice of its voluntary dismissal of the case, and on September 9th, 2020 the case was closed.", "summary": "The state of Washington filed this suit on June 19th, 2020 against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services seeking to vacate three sections of a 2020 rule promulgated under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The disputed sections removed \u201csexual orientation, sex stereotyping, and gender identity\u201d from the definition of sex discrimination, added a religious exemption, and redefined of the scope of covered entities. Washington filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. It was denied. The court also found that Washington lacked standing to sue. As a result, Washington voluntarily dismissed its case."} {"article": "In 2004, Google and several major universities announced a project to scan and digitize the collections of the universities' research libraries. Google has since scanned more than 12 million books. The libraries retained digital copies of the books (see Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, in related cases). Google also kept copies of the books, which it added to its Google Books database. The content of these books was made available for online searching, with the full content of out-of-copyright works made available online, and with copyrighted works searchable, but visible to users only in \"snippets\" showing the search terms in context. Millions of the books scanned by Google were under copyright and Google did not obtain permission to scan the books from the Rightsholders. In 2005, the Authors Guild, together with several national and international organizations purporting to represent the interest of authors and publishers, as well as certain authors and publishers, brought a class action lawsuit against Google. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging copyright infringement. The authors sought both damages and injunctive relief, and the publishers sought injunctive relief. Google's principal defense was fair use under \u00a7 107 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 107. The case is included in the Clearinghouse because the proposed settlement agreement makes significant accommodations allowing access to the digitized works by blind or otherwise print-disabled individuals, and because important disability advocacy groups expressed their support of the settlement. In the fall of 2006 the parties began settlement negotiations, and on October 28, 2008 the parties filed a proposed settlement agreement. Preliminary approval of the proposed settlement was granted by Judge John E. Sprizzo on November 17, 2008. Hundreds of objections were received in response to the proposed settlement, and so the parties reentered discussions for possible modifications to the proposed settlement. On November 13, 2009, the parties filed an Amended Settlement Agreement. The Court, (Judge Denny Chin) granted preliminary approval to the Amended Settlement on November 19, 2009. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 2009 WL 5576331 (S.D.N.Y 2009). The Amended Settlement Agreement was 166 pages long, not including attachments. The Class addressed by the settlement consisted of all persons who, as of January 5, 2009, owned a U.S. copyright interest in one or more books implicated by a use authorized by the Amended Settlement Agreement. There were two subclasses, the Author Sub-Class and the Publisher Sub-Class. Under the Amended Settlement, Google would be authorized to continue digitizing books, and to beginning selling subscriptions to an electronic book database, to sell online access to individual books, and to sell advertising which would be placed on pages from books. The rights granted to Google in the settlement would be non-exclusive. Rightsholders could exclude their books from some or all of the uses listed above, or elect to remove their books from the database completely. Rightsholders could also demand that Google not digitize any of their books not yet digitized. Under the settlement Google would establish a Registry which would be required to make a reasonable effort to locate Rightsholders. The Registry would receive payments from Google on behalf of Rightsholders and would in turn distribute funds to registered Rightsholders. Unclaimed funds would, after five years, be used to cover the expense of locating owners of unclaimed works, and after ten years, any additional unclaimed funds would be distributed to literary charities. Under the settlement, Google would not display in-print books unless it received express authorization from the Rightsholders, however the agreement would grant Google the right to make non-display use of in-print books, including making the content of books searchable by Google Books users. The agreement would have allowed Google to display out-of-print books until they received a request from the Rightsholder directing them to stop. The Amended Settlement Agreement would have granted special access to academic and public libraries wishing to participate. Google would provide the library a digital copy of any book in the library's collection, either by scanning the library's copy or by giving them access to a copy of the title already in Google's database. The participating libraries would make these digital copies of their collections available to blind patrons and those with other print disabilities. In addition, certain other rights would have been granted to participating libraries under the Amended Settlement Agreement. The Amended Settlement would also have required Google to ensure that the books made available through its own services would be provided in formats accessible to people with print disabilities. The Court received approximately 500 submissions commenting on the settlement, the overwhelming majority objecting to it. Additionally, around 6800 class members opted out. The major arguments of the objectors were that: the proposed class notice was inadequate; that the interests of certain class members including foreign authors and academic authors were inadequately represented by the representative plaintiffs; that the settlement terms were overly broad, reaching issues not within the scope of the pleadings, and releasing future claims not before the court; that the settlement was at odds with federal copyright law and that it functioned to make Google the de facto copyright holder for \"orphaned works\"; antitrust concerns, including that the settlement would effectively give Google a monopoly over digital books and especially over unclaimed works (while its competitors, who had been carefully obtaining permission to digitize each work rather than copying everything without authorization would be pushed out), that the proposed pricing mechanisms violated the Sherman Act, and that the settlement would unfairly entrench Google's position as the dominant online search engine; privacy concerns about Google's ability to monitor the reading patterns of users, and about its use of information provided by Rightsholders; and concerns that settlement was at odds with international law and that it placed an unfair burden on foreign copyright holders. Among the relatively few submissions from supporters of the settlement were letters from the National Federation of the Blind (the NFB) and from the American Association of People with Disabilities. The NFB argued in its letter that the settlement should be allowed to proceed because of its terms granting access and accommodations for disabled users. The settlement would for the first time make almost all books in the collections of public libraries accessible to blind readers and to an estimated another 30,000,000 Americans unable to read printed text due to other disabilities. The NFB would later become an intervening defendant in Authors Guild v. HathiTrust (see related cases), which was the suit filed by The Authors Guild against the academic libraries that were Google's original partners in the book scanning project. That suit was decided on its merits in favor of the defendants, with the court finding that the libraries' use of the digitized works was permissible under the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act and that to the extent that digitization provided a unique degree of access to information for the blind and to individuals with other print disabilities, such digitization was allowed under the ADA. The Court (Judge Denny Chin) shared many of the objectors' concerns, and so in an extensive opinion dated March 22, 2011, it rejected the Amended Settlement Agreement, stipulating that it would likely approve a second amended settlement if the parties modified it so that it was an opt-in, rather than an opt-out, agreement. The opinion does not address the merits of the NFB's arguments in favor of the settlement. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc. 770 F.Supp.2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The parties appear to have decided against an opt-in settlement, and it seems likely that the case will proceed and will eventually be decided on its merits. On October 14, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a Fourth Amended Complaint, which appears substantially similar to the earlier complaints, except with minor rewording and with the substitution of certain named plaintiffs. On May 31, 2012, the Judge Chin denied a motion by Google to have the claims of the associational plaintiffs (The Authors Guild and other non-individual plaintiffs) dismissed. In the same decision, the court granted class certification to the plaintiffs. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Google filed an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals (USCA) for the Second Circuit, contesting the grant of class certification. Proceedings in the District Court were stayed pending the outcome of this appeal. On July 1, 2013, the USCA for the Second Circuit vacated the District Court's order on the grounds that class certification was premature in the absence of a determination of the merits of Google's \"fair use\" defense. The case was remanded without prejudice to any renewal of the motion for class certification. On November 14, 2013, the District Court (Judge Chin) granted Google's motion for summary judgment. Judge Chin found that Google's actions were protected by fair use. It was noted that Google's actions brought significant public benefits including enabling libraries to make copies available to print-disabled individuals. The plaintiff's complaint was dismissed with prejudice. On December 23, 2014, the plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision to grant summary judgment for Google on November 17, 2015, finding that Google's actions constituted fair use. The Court found that Google's making of a digital copy to provide both a search function and a snippet function were transformative uses, as they augmented public knowledge by making available information about the plaintiffs' books without providing the public with a substantial substitute for matter protected by the plaintiffs' copyright interests in the original works or derivatives of them. Additionally, the Court found that Google's profit motivation did not justify denial of fair use. Finally, the Court found that Google's program did not expose the plaintiffs to an unreasonable risk of loss of copyright value through incursions of hackers. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Google scanned millions of books without the permissions of the copyright holders, and made the content of these books searchable online. In 2005, the Authors Guild, together with several national and international organizations purporting to represent the interest of authors and publishers, as well as certain authors and publishers, brought a class action lawsuit against Google. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging copyright infringement. The parties attempted to enter a settlement which, among many other things, would have provided participating libraries full digital copies of the books in their collections. These libraries would then make these digital copies available to their blind or otherwise print-disabled patrons. Hundreds of copyright holders and other interested parties including foreign governments opposed the settlement on grounds unrelated to the accessibility issue. The District Court declined final approval of the settlement, and further settlement negotiations were unsuccessful. On May 31, 2012, the District Court granted class certification, but this order was vacated by the United States of Appeals (USCA) for the Second Circuit on the grounds that certification was premature because Google's \"fair use\" defense should be considered. On November 14, 2013, the District Court opinioned that Google's actions constituted fair use and granted Google's motion for summary judgment. On November 17, 2015, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On April 4, 2008, immigrant detainees in Maricopa County filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona against the County of Maricopa and head staff. The plaintiffs claimed that the Count of Maricopa violated the plaintiffs' rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and MALDEF, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, requesting an immediate bail hearing and declaration that Proposition 100 violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Proposition 100 did not limit pretrial incarceration or provide procedural protections for the criminal defendants. Plaintiffs also alleged that Proposition 100 violated their constitutional rights at several stages of the criminal proceedings, including allowing police to forego advising detainees of their Miranda rights and allowing the County of Maricopa to hold immigrant detainees categorically ineligible for bail and legal counsel. On March 29, 2011, the Court (Judge Susan R. Bolton) granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all charges but the one. On May 13, 2011, the Court dismissed the remaining count without prejudice. On June 10, 2011 the plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment order to the 9th Circuit. The plaintiffs stated at this time they were unsure as to whether they would refile their claim challenging Proposition 100. The case has been inactive since September 19, 2011.", "summary": "In 2008, immigrant detainees of Maricopa County jail filed a suit against Maricopa County, claiming it violated their constitutional rights by allowing the police to forego reading immigrant detainees their Miranda rights and allowing the county to deny immigrant detainees bail and legal counsel. All claims were dismissed by the Court and the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The case has been inactive since September 19, 2011."} {"article": "This case is one of several brought nationwide by States, counties, and nonprofit organizations challenging the Trump administration's revised, final public charge rule, which expands the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. District court judges from across the country granted preliminary injunctions enjoining the government from implementing the public charge rule but after multiple Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court issued stays of these injunctions, the public charge rule was implemented by the government on February 24, 2020. On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. A little over a month later on March 9, 2021, DHS officially abandoned the rule. Maryland Coalition Sues Over the Public Charge Rule On September 27, 2019, a coalition \"comprised by local governments, an elected representative, and a number of non-profit and faith-based agencies providing legal and social services to immigrant populations and their families,\" filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the City of Baltimore Department of Law, sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its acting secretary, in his official capacity, and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and its acting secretary, in his official capacity, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs sought declaration that the Department of Homeland Security\u2019s Final Rule (the Rule) violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment and an order setting it aside. The plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from implementing and enforcing the Rule. The case was assigned to Judge Peter J. Messitte. On August 14, 2019, the DHS published a revised, final public charge rule, which defines personal circumstances that affect the ability of individuals and their families to successfully enter the U.S. or acquire legal permanent resident status (i.e., get a green card). The final rule increases the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that if an immigration officer finds that a person seeking a visa is likely to become a public charge, that person is \u201cinadmissible.\u201d Thus, an immigrant who uses non-cash benefits such as food stamps or Medicaid, or is deemed likely to receive them in the future, may be found more likely to be a public charge and inadmissible for purposes of a visa or green card application. According to a New York Times article, the new standards would directly affect about 1.2 million applicants annually, primarily immigrants from Africa and Latin America. The rule was initially set to be implemented on October 15, 2019. The plaintiffs alleged that the Rule was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the APA, because the defendants failed to provide adequate justification for the change, utilized a \"patently inadequate cost-benefit analysis\" in promulgating the Rule, and disregarded facts and evidence. The plaintiffs also asserted that the Rule denied the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws because a discriminatory purpose was the motivating factor in promulgating the Rule. Moreover, the plaintiffs contended that the Rule will cause actual suffering by producing a chilling effect that discourages eligible members from utilizing public benefits and requiring plaintiffs to allocate significant resources to combat this chilling effect. Case is Deferred, Related to Another Case, then Reassigned On October 15, 2019, Judge Messitte entered an order deferring ruling on the complaint. Judge Messitte considered the nationwide preliminary injunctions enjoining defendants from implementing and enforcing the Rule instituted by district courts in New York (State of New York v. DHS) and Washington (State of Washington v. DHS) and concluded that there was not a \"need at present to enter into yet another consideration of the relief sought by Plaintiffs in this case.\" On December 3, 2019, the parties filed a joint notice of related case, asserting that the current case is related to (Casa de Maryland v. Trump) and requesting that the case be transferred to Judge Paul J. Grimm for concurrent adjudication. The parties contended that that \"the two cases 'arise from the same or identical transaction, happenings, or events,' that they involve identical defendants, and that hearing them separately 'would entail substantial duplication of labor if heard by different judges.'\u201d In that case, Judge Grimm had issued an order for a nationwide preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from implementing or enforcing the Rule. The cases were ordered related and the current case reassigned to Judge Grimm on December 6. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on January 3, 2020, in which they asserted the same causes of actions, claims for relief, and requests for relief. However, the amended complaint removed the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore as a plaintiff. On the same day, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore was added as a plaintiff in an amended complaint in Casa de Maryland. The Supreme Court Stays All Nationwide Injunctions Enjoining Implementation of the Public Charge Rule On January 27, 2020, the Supreme Court issued orders staying a nationwide injunction in State of New York v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security and an injunction for the State of Illinois in Cook County, Illinois v. Wolf. Following these decisions, the defendants indicated that the Rule would be implemented and enforced starting February 24, 2020. District Court Stays Discovery Pending Motion to Dismiss On March 17, 2020, Judge Grimm issued an order granting the defendants' motion to stay \"proceedings related to discovery and completion of the administrative record,\" but ordered the parties to continue with the motion to dismiss briefing. On May 27, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint. Defendants asserted that the complaint should be dismissed in full \"[i]n light of the Supreme Court\u2019s repeated stays of injunction, the Ninth Circuit\u2019s detailed opinion on the Rule\u2019s legality,\" and because the Rule does not violate the due process or equal protection clauses. The Fourth Circuit Reverses Judge Grimm's October 15, 2019 Nationwide Preliminary Injunction On August 5, a split Fourth Circuit panel (Circuit Judges Harvie Wilkinson III, Paul Niemeyer, and Robert King) issued an order and opinion denying the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction from the related case Casa de Maryland v. Trump. 971 F.3d 220. Writing for the majority, Judge Wilkinson held that Casa lacked standing; that the plaintiffs were unlikely to win on the merits of their claims because the Rule was a permissible interpretation of \"public charge;\" and that a nationwide injunction was an overly broad remedy. Judge King dissented. Citing a decision of the Seventh Circuit two months prior (962 F.3d 208), he disagreed on all points. He would have held that plaintiffs did have standing; that the plaintiffs were likely to win on the merits because the Rule was not a permissible interpretation of \"public charge\" given the statute and history; and that a nationwide injunction was an appropriate remedy given the circumstances. In light of this decision, back in the district court, Judge Grimm back issued an order on August 7, directing the parties to supplement their briefings on the pending motion to dismiss. The Reversal is Stayed Pending a Rehearing en banc On September 15, the Fourth Circuit's order was stayed pending ruling on a petition to rehear the case en banc. That petition was granted on December 3, 2020, and oral arguments were scheduled to begin in March 2021. President Biden Issues Executive Order to Review the Public Charge Rule On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. The parties began conferring to determine how this would impact the litigation. On March 1, 2021, the District Court denied the government's motion to dismiss without prejudice, noting that the motion would be subject to reinstatement once the administration reviewed the rule. The Rule is Officially Abandoned and Vacated On March 9, 2021, DHS formally abandoned the rule. The government voluntarily dismissed its appeal to the Seventh Circuit, lifting the stay of the Northern District of Illinois' November 2, 2020 decision that vacates the Public Charge Final Rule nationwide (Cook County v. Wolf). That same day, at all parties' requests, the Supreme Court dismissed the pending petition for Cook County, as well as similar petitions for the Ninth (City and County of San Francisco v. USCIS) and Second (New York v. DHS) Circuits. On March 11, the Fourth Circuit issued an order granting the government's voluntary dismissal of its appeal. That same day, eleven state attorneys general, led by Ken Paxton of Texas, moved to intervene as defendants. They also moved to reconsider the dismissal. They filed similar intervention motions in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, as well as an emergency application to the Supreme Court to intervene on behalf of the government and stay the judgment from Cook County. The Fourth Circuit denied the motion to intervene, as well as the motion to reconsider, on March 18. As of April 15, 2021, the case is ongoing.", "summary": "On September 27, 2019, two city governments, a U.S. Senator, and a number of non-profit organizations providing services to immigrant communities filed this suit in the United States District Court For The District Of Maryland. The plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security's Final Public Charge Rule (the Rule), which added non-cash benefits to the factors considered in determining whether a person applying for legal permanent residence is likely to become a public charge. The plaintiffs alleged that the Government violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The case was related early to Casa de Maryland v. Trump. A preliminary injunction was initially denied by the Fourth Circuit on August 5, 2020, but is pending rehearing en banc. However, the Rule was abandoned by DHS on March 9, 2021. As of April 15, 2021, the case is ongoing."} {"article": "On June 29, 2004, two females who, earlier, had been arrested for misdemeanors and now were represented, for civil case purposes, by private attorneys from Washington, D.C. and New York, filed a class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the North District of New York. They alleged that the Schenectady County Sheriff's Department had an unconstitutional blanket policy and/or practice of strip searching all individuals who entered the Schenectady County Jail, including those charged with misdemeanors or held on civil matters, regardless of the crime for which they were charged and without reasonable suspicion to believe that the individuals were concealing weapons or contraband. Plaintiffs alleged that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and class certification for the thousands of individuals that suffered the same alleged indignities. Defendants, the County and the Sheriff, answered by generally denying all allegations. The case was assigned to District Court Judge Gary L. Sharpe. A settlement conference was held on May 17, 2005 before Magistrate Judge Randolph F. Treece. The case was not immediately settled and discovery continued. Defendants moved to dismiss the claims of one of the named plaintiffs, Nichole McDaniel, alleging that she failed to appear for scheduled depositions on numerous occasions. Magistrate Judge Treece recommended that her claims be dismissed and that, should the case settle, the Court would decide whether to forfeit any class claim she had. McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 2005 WL 1745566 (N.D. N.Y. Jul 21, 2005). In November 2005, the Court (Judge Gary L. Sharpe) entered an order staying all activity in the case pending ongoing settlement negotiations. The stay order was continued several times until the case was ultimately settled. On November 29, 2006, the Court preliminarily approved the parties' Settlement Agreement and, later, set the matter for a fairness hearing on August 14, 2007. Final approval was granted on November 5, 2007, on all issues except attorneys' fees. Instead of awarding 26% of the settlement as fees, the Court awarded class counsel payment for the time spent at the hourly rates traditionally charged in their native jurisdiction. McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 2007 WL 3274798 (N.D. N.Y. Nov 05, 2007). Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, as approved, Schenectady County agreed to institute an appropriate strip search policy and pay $2.5 million into a settlement fund to resolve all class claims. From the fund, the Court awarded class counsel attorneys' fees in the amount of $343,744.50 and reimbursement of pre-settlement litigation expenses of $10,053.31. The sum of $296,202.19 (the disputed amount of attorneys' fees) was ordered to be placed into an escrow account by the Settlement Administrator, pending further litigation. The Court approved $12,000 and $1,500 to class representatives for a total of $13,500 in incentive awards. Administration expenses and costs in the amount of $107,233.40 were granted.", "summary": "On June 29, 2004, two females plaintiffs filed a class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the North District of New York. They alleged that the Schenectady County Sheriff's Department had an unconstitutional blanket policy and/or practice of strip searching all individuals who entered the Schenectady County Jail, including those charged with misdemeanors or held on civil matters, regardless of the crime for which they were charged and without reasonable suspicion to believe that the individuals were concealing weapons or contraband. The parties reach a court-approved settlement that stipulated that Schenectady County institute an appropriate strip search policy and pay $2.5 million into a settlement fund to resolve all class claims."} {"article": "On February 1, 2013, disabled seniors in Loveland and Ironton Ohio filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Plaintiffs sued the Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services and the Ohio Department of Aging under 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983 and state law. Represented initially by private counsel and in later stages also by the public interest group Justice In Aging, the plaintiffs sought class-action certification and injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming violation of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C \u00a7 1396) and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that Ohio unduly delayed enrolling eligible plaintiffs in the Medicaid Assisted Living Waiver Program, and also failed to either provide them with the opportunity to apply to state funded assisted living programs or to give them a written denial notice and opportunity for fair hearing. On January 16, 2015, plaintiffs sought summary judgment, asking the court to rule that the state violated federal law by failing to provide retroactive assisted living benefits for three months prior to their enrollment. On February 20, 2015, defendants countered with their own summary judgment motion, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit. One of defendants\u2019 main arguments was based on the Medicaid requirement that assisted living benefits were only available for treatment that was, \u201cpursuant to a written plan of care to individuals who, but for such services, would require the level of care provided in a hospital or nursing facility.\u201d Ohio argued that this provision required that a written plan of care be created before an individual would be eligible for assisted living benefits, and that plaintiffs lacked standing since they hadn\u2019t had written plan of care prior to the period that they were claiming retroactive benefits for. Another major argument by defendants was that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they were seeking retroactive relief from state officials, which is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Defendants also made a series of more technical arguments for why the plaintiffs lacked standing. They claimed that the Supreme Court had barred notice relief or declarations that a state was violating federal law when the federal law had been changed before the case was brought. They argued that one of the plaintiffs had died before the suit and her claim hadn\u2019t survived her death. And they argued that the other plaintiff lacked standing because she had moved to a nursing home and stopped being potentially eligible for assisted living benefits before the claim was brought. On September 1, 2015, Magistrate Judge Karen L. Likovitz granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motions for class-action certification and for summary judgment. The certified class included all Ohio individuals who meet the eligibility standards for the assisted living Medicaid waiver for the months occurring no earlier than three months prior to the month of application, but who are denied coverage under the assisted living Medicaid waiver for all or some of those months. 381 F.R.D. 345 (S.D. Ohio 2015). Judge Litkovitz dismissed all of the defendants\u2019 arguments that plaintiffs lacked standing. She found that the requirement that treatment be pursuant to a written plan should be read in the context of the rest of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396a(a)(34), which requires that benefits be provided retroactively to individuals who would have been eligible for said benefits if they had applied earlier. She found that the plaintiffs were asking for prospective injunctive relief, and thus weren\u2019t barred from suing the state by the Fourteenth Amendment. She found that the federal law hadn\u2019t been amended prior to the case and there was thus an ongoing violation of federal law. She found that death did not preclude standing under Ohio Law, which allows intangible property interest like those in Medicaid benefits to survive an individual\u2019s death. And she found that the fact that Mrs. Saunders was no longer eligible for assisted living waiver benefits at the time of bringing suit didn\u2019t preclude standing because a favorable ruling would allow her to sue for retroactive benefits. Id. at 358-359. Judge Litkovitz then issued the plaintiffs declaratory relief under her analysis of the state plan section of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396a). She held that the Ohio regulations prohibiting assisted living waiver benefits for up to three months prior to the month of application for individuals who were eligible for coverage at the time those services were furnished violated the retroactivity provision of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396a(a)(34). She also held that defendants' failure to notify applicants for assisted living waiver benefits that they were being denied coverage for months in which they met the eligibility requirements and the reasons for such action violated 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396a(a)(3) and the Due Process Clause. She further held that defendants' failure to provide plaintiffs and the class with retroactive Medicaid assisted living waiver coverage to which they were otherwise entitled violated the reasonable promptness requirement of 42 U.S.C. \u00a71396a(a)(8). Id. at 381. Magistrate Judge Likovitz then granted plaintiffs injunctive relief. She enjoined the state from denying plaintiffs and the class eligibility for Medicaid assisted living waiver benefits for months in which they are determined to meet eligibility standards, for as early as three months prior to the month in which application is made, and required the state to modify its policies and practices to achieve this relief. She also issued an injunction requiring the state to identify and provide written notice to plaintiffs and all class members that their Medicaid assisted living waiver coverage would begin on the first day of the month in which they meet all eligibility criteria, up to three months prior to the month of application, with a notice advising them of the state administrative procedure, compliant with due process requirements, available if they desire to have the state determine whether or not they may be eligible for additional days of Medicaid assisted living waiver coverage. Id. On September 30, 2015, the defendants appealed the court's ruling to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and asked for a stay in the ruling pending that appeal. The state argued that the ruling undermined the Medicaid assisted waiver program's requirement that assisted living waiver services be provided pursuant to a written plan of care, without which individuals would require a similar level of care in a hospital or nursing home. Judge Likovitz denied a stay, holding that any damage to the defendants was outweighed by potential damage to plaintiff class members. On January 22, 2016, plaintiffs asked the Sixth Circuit for a limited remand of the case to clarify an oversight in defining the class for class certification. On appeal, defendants had argued that the certified class was over broad because it didn\u2019t incorporate the two-year statute of limitations in Ohio Rev. Code \u00a7 2305.10. Plaintiffs wanted the Sixth Circuit to remand the class definition to Magistrate Judge Litkovitz so she could change the defined class to clarify that plaintiffs had filed the suit on behalf of individuals who were denied coverage on or after February 1, 2011. However, on January 29, the Sixth Circuit denied this request without explanation. On March 23, 2016, the U.S. DOJ filed a statement of interest in support of the defendants. The DOJ argued that the district court\u2019s ruling was contrary to the interpretation of the statute by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, would defeat the core purpose of the plan of care requirement, and undermined overall scheme of the state-provided Medicaid waiver system, which was intended to allow states to craft their own plans without excessive and unanticipated costs. In addition to the Statement of Interest by the DOJ, amicus briefs were filed in favor of the plaintiffs by public interest groups the Ohio Centers for Assisted Living and the Ohio chapter of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys. On February 1, 2016, the district court stayed briefing on the plaintiffs' pending motion for attorney fees and costs until after the Sixth Circuit's ruling on the defendants' appeal. Oral arguments were heard on April 28, 2016. On September 30, 2016, the Sixth Circuit reversed Judge Litkovitz's order of September 1, 2015. (Circuit Judge Raymond Kethledge, Danny J. Boggs, and District Judge William H. Stafford, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern District of Florida, sitting by designation). The Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue only their February 2013 claim that the defendants failed to comply with federal law by refusing to award retroactive assisted-living benefits under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396a(a)(34). However, the Sixth Circuit found that \u00a7 1396a(a)(34) did not require Ohio to pay for assisted living services rendered before the approval of a Medicaid beneficiary\u2019s service plan, and that the district court erred in interpreting \u00a7 1396a(a)(34) to find that it required retroactive benefits. 838 F.3d 739 (6th Cir. 2016). The Sixth Circuit issued its mandate on October 25, 2016. Under the Sixth Circuit's order and mandate, Judge Litkovitz entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims on October 31, 2016. The order also stated that because the plaintiffs were no longer prevailing parties, their motion for attorney's fees and costs was denied. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Ohio seniors eligible for assisted living waiver benefits sue the Ohio agencies responsible for administering the program for failing to provide them with retroactive benefits and for failing to provide them with the opportunity to apply to state funded assisted living programs or to give them a written denial notice and opportunity for fair hearing. Magistrate Judge Karen Likovitz ruled that the program violates the SSA and the Due Process clause of the Constitution and enjoined the defendants from denying retroactive benefits and also enjoined them to better notify and inform eligible seniors. The defendants appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the lower court decision, and summary judgment was entered in favor of the defendants on October 31, 2016 according to the Sixth Circuit's mandate."} {"article": "On 02/10/2010, a 22-year-old college student majoring in Middle Eastern studies filed this lawsuit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), FBI officials with the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), and the Philadelphia Police Department (PDP) based on civil rights intrusions at the Philadelphia International Airport. Upon discovering English-Arabic flashcards (including several listing words like \"kidnap\" and \"bomb\") and materials critical of U.S. foreign policy during routine airport security screening, TSA briefly detained and searched the plaintiff; he was then taken into custody by Philadelphia police officers and held for several hours. Eventually, two FBI agents came and interrogated him for a half hour; he was then released without charges. Represented by private attorneys, the national American Civil Liberties Union, and the Pennsylvania ACLU chapter, the plaintiff alleged violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments under Bivens, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2671-2680. The federal government defendants moved to dismiss the complaint because of their qualified immunity from suit. The district court denied the motion and proceeded to discovery. The federal defendants appealed the denial of their 12(b)(6) motion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit [11-04292]. On December 24, 2013, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded back to the District Court with instructions to grant the defendants' motion to dismiss as to the Fourth and First Amendment claims. In an opinion by Judge McKee [738 F.3d 562], TSA personnel's brief detention of the plaintiff was held lawful. The FBI's brief interrogation was likewise not unconstitutional. The local police's actions taking the plaintiff into custody and holding him for several hours may have been unlawful, but was not before the court; the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the local law enforcement had served as mere agents for federal agencies. On May 8, 2014, the District Court ordered a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Caracappa. A pre-trial hearing was then conducted on October 30, 2014. Finally, on January 22, 2015 the court approved a settlement agreement and dismissed the case. The plaintiff received $25,000 in compensatory damages and attorney's fees up to $6,250. The defendants also agreed to, on a quarterly basis, instruct all police officers assigned to the airport that \"investigative detentions may be made only on reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct and any arrest must be based on probable cause\" and that a referral from a TSA agent does not, in itself, constitute probable cause. The court retained jurisdiction to supervise the injunction for eighteen months (until July 2016). As of December 2018, no further docket activity occurred, and so the case is now closed.", "summary": "In February 2010, plaintiff, a 22-year-old college student majoring in Middle Eastern studies, filed suit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), FBI officials with the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), and the Philadelphia Police Department (PDP) based on his detention and interrogation at the Philadelphia International Airport. The district court denied the federal defendants' claim of qualified immunity, but on December 24, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, and held that the federal defendants had not violated the plaintiffs' rights, and that the local police were not before the court. On May 8, 2014, the District Court ordered a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Caracappa. On January 22, 2015 the court approved a settlement agreement and dismissed the case. The plaintiff received $25,000 in compensatory damages and attorney's fees up to $6,250. The defendants also agreed to, on a quarterly basis, instruct all police officers assigned to the airport that \"investigative detentions may be made only on reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct and any arrest must be based on probable cause\" and that a referral from a TSA agent does not, in itself, constitute probable cause. The court retained jurisdiction to supervise the injunction for eighteen months. The case is now closed."} {"article": "A pro-life organization and its members filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi on July 11, 2006. The plaintiffs alleged that police officers from the City of Jackson (City) had infringed on their free speech rights and threatened false arrest in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs contended these actions were illegal under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and various Mississippi state laws. The plaintiffs argued that the City restricted their free speech at rallies hosted by the plaintiffs outside the Jackson Women's Health Organization, an abortion clinic. At this rally, the plaintiffs claimed they expressed their views about abortion and \"offer[ed] literature and sidewalk counseling\" outside of the clinic. The City allegedly came to a 2005 rally and told participants they were violating a noise ordinance and needed a permit for their activities. In February 2006, another rally was held. This time, rally participants were allegedly threatened with arrest. Some of the pro-life supporters were arrested. In other protests outside of the clinic, the plaintiffs' private property was seized and never returned. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to prohibit the City from infringing on the plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights on July 17, 2006. District Judge William H. Barbour, Jr., denied that order on July 20, 2006. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Barbour on July 21, 2006. Two of the defendants, City police officers, filed motions to dismiss on July 31, 2006, claiming that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The case was stayed pending the motions to dismiss. On November 6, 2006, Judge Barbour denied both defendants' motions to dismiss, but allowed the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint clarifying the allegations against one of the defendants. If the plaintiffs failed to file an amended complaint clarifying these allegations, the case would have been dismissed against that particular defendant. An amended complaint was filed on November 22, 2006 and, as a result, the case was not dismissed based on qualified immunity. Five status/settlement conferences were held on May 11, 2007, June 26, 2007, July 9, 2007, September 13, 2007, and February 15, 2008. An additional status conference scheduled for March 2008 was cancelled because the parties reached a settlement agreement. Judge Barbour approved a consent decree on March 14, 2008. The consent decree stated that the City was not to engage in any practice that would violate any person's First Amendment rights on sidewalks and rights of way. The City also agreed to enforce all laws, ordinances, and statutes in an even-handed manner and could not threaten to use its noise ordinance unless decibel measuring machines were used. Additionally, the City had to amend its special events ordinance and its sign ordinance. The City was barred from seizing expressive materials from people exercising their First Amendment rights unless all other means were first exhausted. First Amendment training was required for all law enforcement officers in the City. Finally, the City was obligated to pay $15,000 in damages to various plaintiffs and return all fines/expunge all of their criminal records stemming from the events outside the Jackson Women's Health Organization. The parties were to resolve any disputes on their own and, if those conversations proved futile, were to submit issues to the court for resolution. The court retained jurisdiction of the consent decree through March 2009. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Pro-life group receives settlement for First and Fourteenth Amendment violations stemming from their protests outside of an abortion clinic."} {"article": "On October 1, 2015, a group of indigent Rutherford County, Tennessee residents who received sanctions for failing to pay probation fees, filed a class action suit against the county and Providence Community Corrections, Inc. (PCC), a private contractor overseeing probation. The plaintiffs alleged that: 1) the arrangement between PCC and Rutherford County constituted racketeering; 2) PCC's personal financial interest in the outcome of judicial proceedings violated the plaintiffs' due process rights; 3) the contract between PCC and the county was void under Tennessee law; 4) PCC's threats to jail plaintiffs over nonpayment of debts are unduly harsh and punitive; 5) PCC's further actions of placing debts, issuing arrest warrants, and jailing individuals solely based on wealth status or nonpayment of debts was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and 8) Rutherford County and PCC\u2019s actions were a general abuse of the legal process. On the same day that plaintiffs filed their complaint, they moved the court for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The case was assigned to Judge Kevin Sharp. The action arose under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1964(c) (RICO), and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201, et seq. and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 because of alleged violations of the plaintiff\u2019s Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Defendants' conduct was unlawful, an injunction against enforcing the illegal policies on their proposed class, which consisted of \u201c[a]ll persons who currently owe or who will incur debts to Rutherford County from fines, feed, costs, or surcharges arising from traffic and misdemeanor cases in the County Court and who have been placed on probation with PCC Inc. pursuant to the Contract between defendants Rutherford County and PCC, Inc.\u201d The plaintiffs also requested treble damages, and attorneys\u2019 fees. Specifically, the complaint arose because Rutherford County had entered into a contract with the private company (PCC) to provide probation services. According to the contract, PCC had to earn its profit solely and directly from the people that it supervised by operating a \u201cuser funded\u201d model in which probationers were ordered to pay, under threat of arrest and revocation of their probation, a variety of fees and surcharges to PCC in addition to their court costs. The county did not provide any compensation for PCC's services. If probationers could not pay their fees in full, they would be placed on \u201csupervised probation.\u201d This supervision agreement required probationers to, among other things, pay additional supervision fees to PCC, obey all orders of PCC officers, and allow warrantless property searches. Any violation of these \u201cconditions,\u201d notwithstanding the individual's history or the nature of the offense, would result in PCC petitioning for their probation to be revoked and for the issuing of a warrant for their arrest. The Plaintiffs had two primary civil rights contentions with this model. First, Plaintiffs alleged that PCC did not consider whether the probationer was indigent when making recommendations based on unpaid fees, and second, that the under policy, it was possible to be arrested and jailed solely for failure to pay a debt. In many cases, PCC officers did not inform eligible applicants about the available indigency waiver, or officers gave out misinformation that some fees had to be paid before an individual could apply for the indigency waiver. This led to indigent probationers failing to comply with the supervised probation conditions, which often resulted in jail time. On October 1, 2015, Plaintiffs moved for both a Temporary Restraining Order (\u201cTRO\u201d) and Preliminary Injunction (\u201cPI\u201d) enjoining Defendants from \u201cserving and executing any warrant sought and issued on the basis of violation of probation.\u201d On October 13, 2015 the court converted the TRO into a PI. On October 21, 2015, Plaintiffs moved for second PI to \u201cprevent their imminent and unlawful jailing by the defendants.\u201d On December 2, 2015, defendants moved for the court to dismiss the claim based on their alleged qualified immunity as probation officers. On December 17, 2015, Judge Kevin Sharp granted the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The injunction required Rutherford County through PCC to inquire into indigency whenever setting the amount of bond during supervised probation. It also mandated that an individual could not serve jail time if the only probation violation is a nonpayment of funds. The judge called the Defendants' actions towards the indigent Plaintiffs an \u201cextraordinary\u201d injustice. On January 15, 2016, Defendants filed an appeal of the preliminary injunction and requested a stay of the order before a ruling on the appeal. However, on March 15, 2016, both parties filed for voluntary dismissal of the appeal because defendants terminated the contract under which PCC has supervised misdemeanor probationers in Rutherford County. On June 9, 2016, the district court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss, filed on December 2, 2015. On June 28, 2016 the court stayed any remaining motions so that the parties could continue to mediate their case. On July 11, 2016, Defendants appealed the parts of the motion to dismiss that were denied to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In the meantime, the parties continued to work toward a settlement agreement. On October 5, 2017, the parties submitted a settlement agreement to the court. Part of that settlement agreement requested a settlement with a class, specifically \u201call persons who, at any time from October 1, 2011 to [October 5, 2017], (1) incurred court-imposed financial obligations arising from a traffic or misdemeanor case in Rutherford County General Sessions or Circuit Court; and (2) were supervised on probation in that case by Providence Community Corrections, Inc. or Rutherford County\u2019s Probation Department. Part of that settlement agreement was approved on October 5, 2017, and allowed for the payment of $14,300,000 to the class, with attorneys\u2019 fees coming out of that payment as well. $14,000,000 WAS to be paid by PCC while the remaining $300,000 is to be paid by Rutherford county (though PCC agreed to pay Rutherford County 350,000 to supply this amount). The court certified the class, but, due to missing information about the amount of money each member of the class had incurred as a result of their probation, denied the settlement. The court then allowed the parties to file a new settlement agreement on or before October 18, 2017. On October 18, 2017 the parties filed a second settlement agreement with the court. This was approved on July 18, 2018 by Judge David Lawson approved the final settlement agreement. Each named plaintiff received $10,000. Class members whose probation ended prior to October 1, 2014 was to receive 125% of the amount they paid to PCC from October 1, 2011 to October 1, 2014. Class members whose probation ended after October 1, 2014 were to receive 125% of fees actually paid and an additional $50 per month for each month on probation after October 1, 2014. The agreement also called for payments to the settlement fund administrator, and for attorneys fees and costs amounting to $1,395,761.39. Any remaining funds were to be distributed on a pro rata basis to class members. The county also agreed to the issuance of a permanent inunction that prohibited an individual from being \"held in jail for nonpayment of fines, fees, costs or a pre-probation revocation money bond imposed by a court without a determination, following a meaningful inquiry into the individual's ability to pay, that the the individual has the ability to pay such that any nonpayment is willful. The meaningful inquiry into the individual's ability to pay includes, but is not limited to, notice, an opportunity to present evidence, and assistance of appointed counsel.\" The court retained jurisdiction for purposes of enforcement. The case is now closed.", "summary": "A group of indigent probationers sued Rutherford County (TN) and its private probation contractor Providence Community Corrections, alleged that the contract arrangement constituted racketeering and that its penalties for underpayment violated civil rights. On December 2015, Judge Sharp granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The injunction stopped the practice of jail time after an arrest for individuals who only failed to pay the requisite fees. It also required the County and PCC to inquire whether the probationer is indigent when setting bond during supervised probation. On July 18, 2018 Judge David Lawson approved the final settlement agreement."} {"article": "On November 10, 2009, a Muslim American citizen who was detained and tortured while traveling abroad filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under Bivens and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1350, against several supervising agents and two unknown agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU and a human rights clinic at the Yale Law School, asked the court for compensatory damages, punitive damages, and other relief as necessary, claiming that he had been deprived of his Constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The plaintiff claimed that while he was traveling in the Horn of Africa, he was detained, interrogated, and tortured at the direction of and by officials in the American government. After four months of mistreatment, detained in handcuffs in an underground room, with no windows or toilets, he was returned home to New Jersey. He was never charged with a crime. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed \u201cdefendants detained him in secret, denied him access to counsel and the courts, and threatened him with torture and death. He sa[id] he was threatened with extradition to Israel and with rendition to Egypt.\u201d The plaintiff was told by defendants that he \u201cwould suffer the same fate as the protagonist in the movie Midnight Express\u2014a movie where a foreign prisoner is brutally beaten and confined in horrid conditions in a Turkish prison for refusing to cooperate.\u201d The plaintiff was promised that if he confessed his connection to \u201cal Qaeda, he would be returned to the United States to face civilian courts.\u201d The plaintiff alleged that this was done to \u201cextract a confession to terrorist activity as a prelude to prosecution.\u201d 804 F.3d 417, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The federal government moved to dismiss the case on April 19, 2010, alleging that even if the plaintiff's allegations were true, he had no right to hold federal officials personally liable for their roles in his detention by foreign governments on foreign soil. On May 10, 2010, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint and soon after, the government filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. For the next several months, the parties responded to the motion to dismiss, with numerous extensions and continuances of the hearing on the motion to dismiss granted. On February 21, 2012, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. The defendants renewed their motion to dismiss against this second amended complaint. Throughout the remainder of 2012, numerous circuit court decisions were issued in other cases which had the potential to impact the parties\u2019 arguments and the Court\u2019s consideration of the motion. Accordingly, the court held a supplemental hearing on the motion to dismiss on December 12, 2013. On June 13, 2014, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. Judge Sullivan wrote that the facts alleged in this case and the legal questions presented were deeply troubling. Judge Sullivan found that the plaintiff had plausibly alleged violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, and described his treatment as \u201cappalling\u201d and \u201cembarrassing.\u201d Nevertheless, Judge Sullivan wrote that the court was constrained by precedent that expressly rejected a Bivens remedy for citizens who allege that they have been mistreated, and even tortured, by the United States of America in the name of intelligence gathering, national security, or military affairs. 2014 WL 2648032 (D.D.C. June 13, 2014). On August 7, 2014, the plaintiff appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court regarding the motion to dismiss. The appeal was assigned USCA no. 14-5194. On October 23, 2015, the D.C. Circuit Court affirmed the judgement of the District Court in a 2-1 decision. (Hon. Janice Rogers Brown, Hon. Brett M. Kavanaugh concurring, Hon. Cornelia T. L. Pillard dissenting). The higher court echoed the District Court\u2019s opinion that the allegations of federal agents abusing an American citizen abroad were quite troubling, yet also dismissed the suit, finding a Bivens action unavailable. 804 F.3d 417, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The plaintiff\u2019s petition for rehearing en banc was denied on February 2, 2016. On June 6, 2016, a petition for writ of certiorari was filed to the Supreme Court, to resolve the question over whether a federal agent\u2019s assertion of national security considerations justifies dismissal of a Bivens actions for Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations. The case was docketed 15-1461. Briefs were submitted in favor of the plaintiff by the U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Torture, Commonwealth Lawyers Association, Constitution Project, and by law professors. On June 27, 2017, the petition for the writ of certiorari was denied. This case is closed.", "summary": "In 2009, a Muslim American citizen who was detained and tortured while traveling abroad filed a federal lawsuit in the District for the District of Columbia against the FBI agents who had been involved in his detainment and torture which lasted four months in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. In 2014, the case was dismissed. The dismissal was affirmed by the appellate court. The writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied in 2017 and the case is closed."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: In this case filed April 7, 2020, after the COVID-19 outbreak, 65 civil immigration detainees at the Plymouth County Correctional Facility requested habeas and injunctive relief in the form of immediate interim release from detention. A class was certified on June 8. No outcome yet.
1. Policies, practices, and procedures that went into effect on or after Jan. 27, 2017, relating to criteria for evaluating individual waiver requests; 2. Policies, practices, and procedures that went into effect on or after Jan. 27, 2017, concerning how officers should determine when a waiver request should be granted; 3. Internal guidance on how to assess when denying an individual's entry \"would cause undue hardship\" or when \"his or her entry would not pose a threat to national security and would be in the national interest\"; 4. Processes for accepting and adjudicating waiver requests; 5. The person or office to whom waiver requests should be directed; 6. The number of waiver requests received by defendants or any other DHS component agency; 7. The number of waiver requests granted by defendants or any other DHS component agency, and the reasoning for the grants; 8. The number of waiver requests denied by defendants or any other DHS component agency, and the reasoning for the denials; 9. Any guidance provided to defendants' field personnel regarding the waiver provisions of the Second EO; 10. Any memoranda providing guidance for defendants or any other DHS component agency, on enforcement of the waiver provisions of the Second EO in light of federal court decisions granting preliminary injunctions against the implementation of the EO.The complaint further alleged that, to date, plaintiffs had not received a substantive response from defendants. Plaintiff sought a disclosure order under FOIA, legal fees, and expedited action. On Oct. 6, 2017, the case was assigned to Judge Tanya S. Chutkan. The parties filed a status report on Feb. 20, 2018, stating that all defendant agencies had initiated searches. Status reports filed in June and October indicated that the government had produced some responsive records and that the review and production of additional records was ongoing. Document production continued largely without incident in ensuing status reports. However, in early 2020, the State Department reported significant delays in document production due to an inability to access files because of in-person work restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Department disclosed this in a June 2, 2020 status report, and the plaintiffs were concerned at the lack of ability to remotely access documents. Another status report is due on August 3, 2020. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On Oct. 5, 2017, Muslim Advocates, SPLC, and Americans United for Separation of Church and State, sued DOS, DHS, and CBP under FOIA, seeking records on how the government grants waivers to people whom the EO travel ban would otherwise exclude. This case is ongoing."} {"article": "On May 7, 2012, (1) Legatus, an organization of Catholic business persons and their spouses, together with (2) Weingartz Supply Co., a for-profit business and (3) its owner, Daniel Weingartz, also a Legatus member, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the federal government under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and Thomas More Law Center, a Catholic non-profit legal service, claimed that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate that required employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception violated the owners' religious beliefs. The plaintiffs sought both declaratory and injunctive relief, specifically an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other business owners with similar religious objections. The case was assigned to District Judge Robert H. Cleland. On Oct. 31, 2012, the court granted a preliminary injunction as to Weingartz Supply Co. and its owner, but denied without prejudice Legatus's injunction motion, finding that as a Catholic non-profit organization, Legatus did not have standing to challenge the contraceptive mandate because it was protected by a temporary safe harbor while the Government amended the final regulations regarding the religious employer exemption. The court also instructed the Government to file monthly reports on the status of the amendment process. Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Mich. 2012). The defendants appealed the Weingartz Supply Co. preliminary injunction order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Docket No. 13-01092), and Legatus appealed the denial of its motion for an injunction (Docket No. 13-01093). The Sixth Circuit consolidated the appeals. On Jan. 28, 2013, all of the defendants jointly moved to stay the district court proceedings pending the appeals, and Judge Cleland granted the motion three days later. The Government published the amended final regulations of the ACA on July 2, 2013. Legatus voluntarily dismissed its appeal and moved to lift the stay. On Aug. 9, 2013, the district court lifted the stay and reopened the case only with respect to Legatus and the defendants. On Aug. 30, 2013, Legatus amended its complaint to challenge the updated regulations. Legatus argued that the accommodations put forth in the amended regulation required the plaintiffs to provide self-certification to their insurance provider setting forth their religious objections, which in turn would trigger an obligation on the part of the insurance provider to procure the disputed services. On Sept. 20, 2013, Legatus moved for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the relevant provisions of the ACA under the RFRA. On Oct. 1, 2013, the Sixth Circuit granted the defendants-appellants' motion to waive oral argument. The panel requested that the parties file supplemental briefs by Oct. 15, 2013, addressing the effect of Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013), a recent Sixth Circuit decision, on the appeal. On Dec. 20, 2013, Judge Cleland granted Legatus' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the defendant's stated interests of promoting public health generally and promoting gender equality, while compelling, were not directly related to promoting the specific interests asserted in this litigation. Likewise, the contraception mandate was not the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Finally, the court found that a failure to grant a preliminary injunction would result in irreparable harm to Legatus. On Feb. 12, 2014, the defendants moved for an interlocutory appeal of the district court's ruling. On Apr. 7, 2014, the defendants moved to consolidate the two new appeals with Ave Maria Foundation v. Sebelius and to hold briefing in abeyance pending the resolution of Catholic Diocese of Nashville v. Sebelius, No. 13-6440, and Michigan Catholic Conference v. Sebelius, No. 13-2373, two appeals presenting substantially the same questions of law already pending before the Sixth Circuit and scheduled for oral argument on May 8, 2013. On May 5, 2014, the Sixth Circuit granted the motion. The Sixth Circuit issued a decision in Michigan Catholic Conference v. Sebelius on June 11, 2014. In an opinion by Circuit Judge Karen Nelson Moore, the court affirmed the district judge's denial of a preliminary injunction to all plaintiffs. The opinion found that organizations exempt from the contraception mandate faced no burden on their exercise of their religion, and therefore were unlikely to succeed in proving a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. And organizations eligible to receive an \"accommodation\" under the law needed only to provide a \"self-certification\" that documented that they had a religious objection. This self-certification did not constitute an unlawful religious burden. For similar reasons, the law did not violate the First Amendment's free speech, free exercise, or establishment clauses. Michigan Catholic Conference v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2014). However, on June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), a substantially similar case. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. In light of this decision, on Dec. 31, 2014, the District Court entered an injunction and judgment in favor of Weingartz Supply Co. and its owner. The injunction prevented the government from enforcing the contraceptive coverage mandate as it existed on June 30, 2014, against the corporate entity and its owner, and directed the parties to come to an agreement on attorneys' fees and costs. The ruling did not impact Legatus' claims. On Apr. 15, 2015, Weingartz Supply Co. and its owner notified the district court that they had reached an agreement on attorneys' fees and costs - they did not specify the details of the agreement - and that no further proceedings were necessary. In the Sixth Circuit, the plaintiffs in the consolidated appeal moved for voluntary dismissal of their appeals, which the Sixth Circuit panel granted on Nov. 9, 2017. On Feb. 2, 2018, all plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal in district court, and it appears the case is now closed.", "summary": "In the Eastern District of Michigan, a for-profit company, its owner, and a Catholic business organization objected to the ACA's contraceptive coverage requirement on religious grounds. The court initially granted a preliminary injunction to the business and its owner, but not the organization, and the case was appealed to the Sixth Circuit. After Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, the government was enjoined from enforcing the contraception mandate, and the parties voluntarily dismissed the case."} {"article": "On October 16, 2018, the ACLU of Southern California filed this lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff sued under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. \u00a7552, seeking the release of records related to U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) agents\u2019 practice of misrepresenting or concealing their identity when conducting enforcement actions. Specifically, the plaintiff sought to order the defendant to produce the public records requested on February 12, 2019, without further delay and to declare that the defendant failed to comply with FOIA. Judge John A. Kronstadt approved the defendant\u2019s Ex Parte Application to Stay Case due to the lapse in appropriations to the Department of Justice on January 11, 2019. The stay was lifted on February 5, 2019. In an August 15, 2019, status update, the defendant stated that it had produced records to the plaintiff on several occasions since litigation commenced and that the parties were continuing to discuss a possible resolution to the case without the need for further litigation. On February 3, 2020, the parties filed a joint stipulation to dismiss the case. The plaintiff stated that it was satisfied with the documents the defendant had produced in response to the FOIA request. On February 4, Judge Kronstadt issued an order dismissing the case with prejudice. The parties were to bear their own costs, fees, and expenses. The case is closed.", "summary": "On October 16, 2018, the ACLU of Southern California filed a lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security in the Central District of California. The plaintiff sued under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) seeking the release of records related to Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) agents\u2019 practice of misrepresenting or concealing their identity when conducting enforcement actions. After the defendant made several document productions to the plaintiff the parties filed a joint stipulation to dismiss the case on February 3, 2020. The court issued an order dismissing the case with prejudice on February 4. The parties were to bear their own costs, fees, and expenses. The case is closed."} {"article": "This case is a response to the Attorney General's decision in Matter of A-B-, issued in June 2018, and updated guidelines for asylum officers the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a month later, instructing them to apply Matter of A-B-'s holding to credible fear screenings. On August 7, 2018, this suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia by asylum applicants plaintiffs all ordered removed following the rejection of their asylum claims at the credible fear assessment stage. They alleged that the Attorney General's decision in Matter of A-B- articulated new, unlawful standards for adjudicating asylum claims relating to domestic and gang violence. The defendants were the Attorney General, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). The plaintiffs filed these claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and the Refugee Act of 1980. Represented by the ACLU and the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. They claimed that the defendants unlawfully implemented this new screening standard for asylum seekers in expedited removal proceedings, effectively depriving all applicants of their right to pursue asylum. The case was assigned to Judge Emmet Sullivan. The plaintiffs claimed that as a result of these new policies most credible fear claims connected to domestic or gang violence were categorically denied; applicants were required to show that their home government \"condones or is completely helpless\" to protect them from feared persecution (as opposed to the prior \"unable or unwilling\" standard). This placed a higher burden on individuals seeking asylum based on membership in a particular social group. Moreover, asylum adjudicators were instructed to ignore any federal court of appeals decisions that conflicted with these new credible fear policies. On August 8, 2018, the plaintiffs filed for a preliminary injunction and an emergency motion for stay of removal because two of the plaintiffs were subject to imminent removal. At an emergency hearing on August 8, the defendants agreed that the two plaintiffs would not be removed prior to 11:59 pm on August 9. However, following a hearing on the motions on the morning of August 9, the court learned that the two plaintiffs had in fact been removed from detention and placed on a flight to El Salvador during the hearing. The Court issued an oral order requiring the defendants to return the two plaintiffs to the U.S. as soon as possible. On August 9, 2018, the court also granted a temporary stay of removal for all the plaintiffs pending the Court's determination of whether it had jurisdiction to enter a stay of removal in the case. 2018 WL 3812445. On September 12 the defendants filed for summary judgment, claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' claims, and furthermore, that all of the plaintiffs' claims failed as a matter of law. The plaintiffs filed a cross motion for summary judgment on September 26, alleging that their claims were justiciable and that they were entitled to summary judgment on the merits. Four parties filed amicus briefs in support of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on October 2 and 3, 2018. The amici were filed by Tahrih Justice Center; a group of 10 law professors specializing in administrative law; the attorneys general of California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington; and the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees. The District Court heard arguments on the cross motions on November 19, 2018. Judge Sullivan partially granted and partially denied the motions for summary judgment in a December 19, 2018 opinion. He found several parts of the DHS's policies and rules based off of Matter of A-B- to be in violation of the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard:
the general rule against credible fear claims relating to domestic and gang violence. . . the requirement that a noncitizen whose credible fear claim involves non-governmental persecutors \u201cshow the government condoned the private actions or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the victim\u201d. . . the Policy Memorandum\u2019s rule that domestic violence based particular social group definitions that include \u201cinability to leave\u201d a relationship are impermissibly circular. . . the Policy Memorandum\u2019s requirement that, during the credible fear stage, individuals claiming credible fear must delineate or identify any particular social group in order to satisfy credible fear based on the particular social group protected ground. . . the Policy Memorandum\u2019s directive that asylum officers conducting credible fear interviews should apply federal circuit court case law only \u201cto the extent that those cases are not inconsistent with Matter of A-B-\u201d. . . [and] the Policy Memorandum\u2019s directive that asylum officers conducting credible fear interviews should apply only the case law of \u201cthe circuit where the alien is physically located during the credible fear interview.\u201dHe vacated all of these policies and permanently enjoined the defendants from using them going forward. In addition, he ordered the defendants to bring back any plaintiffs who had been removed from the United States under the now-enjoined policies and to give them a new creditable fear evaluation. He granted the defendant's summary judgment motion with respect to due process and nexus and discretion claims. 344 F.Supp.3d 96. The defendants appealed the summary judgment decision to the D.C. Court of Appeals on January 17, 2019. They also filed a motion to stay district court proceedings, but Judge Sullivan denied the motion on January 25; this left the injunction in place and forced the defendants to continue reporting on compliance with the injunction during the appeal. 2019 WL 329572. The appellate court has not ruled on the defendant's appeal as of June 2020. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the state attorneys general from the district court amicus briefs, among others, filed amici for the appeal as well.", "summary": "In 2018, a group of asylum applicants filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that the Administration had unlawfully implemented a new, heightened, screening standard for asylum seekers in expedited removal proceedings in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Refugee Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, separation of powers, and due process. Judge Emmet Sullivan granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, enjoining DHS from participating in several controversial practices surrounding creditable fear evaluations. The defendants appealed the case to the D.C. Court of Appeals; the case is ongoing."} {"article": "On August 29, 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the Atlanta U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against Boca Chica, Inc., (doing business as Loca Luna Restaurant) to enforce an agreement the parties had reached to settle a sexual harassment charge a female employee had filed with the EEOC. The EEOC sought monetary and injunctive relief, including specific performance of the requirements of the settlement, the employee's legal fees and costs in attempting to collect the amount owed, compensation for losses resulting from breach of the settlement, and punitive damages. Before the EEOC investigates charges it sometimes has the parties participate in mediation. The settlement agreement had been reached during one such mediation session and required Boca Chica to pay the employee $50,000 and provide a neutral reference. The parties had also agreed to a non-disparagement clause. At the end of the mediation session, the employee said something to the effect of "I hope you guys have learned a lesson." The defendant subsequently claimed that the comment violated the non-disparagement clause and refused to comply with the agreement. The parties eventually reached a settlement, which the Court entered as a consent decree on September 29, 2004. The 13-month decree provided monetary relief and subjected Boca Chica to a variety of injunctive provisions. Boca Chica was required to pay the employee $50,000 and supply a neutral reference, just as the original agreement provided. However, Boca Chica was further required to post an equal employment notice and to appoint a compliance official to oversee compliance with the decree. The parties bore their own costs and fees. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On August 29, 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the Atlanta U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against Boca Chica, Inc., (doing business as Loca Luna Restaurant) to enforce an agreement the parties had reached to settle a sexual harassment charge a female employee had filed with the EEOC. Boca Chica had refused to comply with the agreement, claiming that the employees comment to the effect of "I hope you guys have learned a lesson." violated the non-disparagement clause of their agreement. The parties entered into a 13-month consent decree that required Boca Chica to pay the employee $50,000 and supply a neutral reference, just as the original agreement provided, as well as to post an equal employment notice and appoint an official to oversee compliance with the agreement. The case is now closed."} {"article": "This case is part of the series of Signal International cases. It is stayed during defendant's bankruptcy and settlement proceedings. On May 21, 2013, 33 Indian guestworkers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. Plaintiffs filed this suit after District Judge Jay Zainey denied class certification on January 3, 2012 in a related case, David v. Signal International. Plaintiffs were allegedly brought into the United States to provide labor and services to Defendant Signal International at its Orange, Texas site. Signal is based in Pascagoula, Mississippi and is in the business of providing repairs to offshore oil rigs in the Gulf Coast region. The complaint alleges that plaintiffs paid defendant Signal's recruiters as much as $25,000 for travel, visa, and recruitment fees, but upon arrival in the United States found out they would not receive the green cards promised to them. Instead, plaintiffs were forced to pay additional fees to live in racially segregated labor camps ($1050 per month), and were subject to squalid living conditions and threats of both legal and physical harm if they complained about the conditions or decided not to provide labor. Plaintiffs also alleged that the fear and coercion plaintiffs they experienced were exacerbated upon learning of abuses occurring at Signal's Pascagoula, Mississippi site. The amended complaint, filed on behalf of 47 individuals, asserted claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. \u00a71589 (forced labor) and 18 U.S.C. \u00a71590 (trafficking)), the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. \u00a71962), the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. \u00a71981), the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. \u00a71985), the Thirteenth Amendment, as well as claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. Plaintiffs were represented by a private law firm. In February 2014, Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn denied Signal's motion to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs in this case only overlapped with the David case insofar as their FLSA claims in the David case were concerned. Additionally, the plaintiffs in this case sued based on events at Signal's Orange, Texas site, whereas plaintiffs in cases pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana sued based on events at Signal's Pascagoula, Mississippi site. Although the Court declined to transfer this case, in May 2014, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn entered a consent order that discovery from the cases in the Eastern District of Louisiana would be allowed to be used here. Additionally, in Dec. 2014, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn severed and transferred Signal's cross-claims against co-defendants (immigration attorneys, recruiters, and labor brokers) to the Eastern District of Louisiana. In Oct. 2014, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn granted Signal's motion to compel production of plaintiffs' T- and U-visas and applications for such visas. Although a similar motion had already been denied for the cases pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana, the court found that the materials' relevance outweighed any potential in terrorem effect. The Court warned that it would reconsider if Signal sought discovery that was clearly aimed at harassment. Plaintiffs did not comply with this order until Mar. 4, 2015, but the court denied Signal's motion for sanctions, saying its lack of diligence in pursuing the documents rendered it ineligible for relief. In March 2015, the Court held that Texas laws should apply in the breach of contract and fraud claims, because it did not find that a true conflict existed between Texas and other jurisdictions. In July 2015, the court stayed the case after Signal filed for bankruptcy. In re Signal Int\u2019l, Inc, et al., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 12, 2015). As a part of the bankruptcy filings, the plaintiffs entered into a plan support agreement (PSA) which contemplated a settlement of the claims of this lawsuit against Signal entities through a consensual Chapter 11 plan proposed by Signal. The PSA, with a liquidation trust for distribution of settlement proceeds, became effective on Dec. 14, 2015. In Dec. 2015, in the related EEOC case, the EEOC announced that the parties had reached a settlement for all cases, approved by the bankruptcy court. Signal would pay $5 million to 476 guestworkers through a claims process. All aggrieved individuals included in the litigation could receive relief in spite of the bankruptcy proceedings. Signal's CEO also issued an apology for its conduct. In this case, Joseph, the parties are updating the court every 120 days as to the status of the bankruptcy proceedings. As of the parties' most recent Feb. 27, 2020 update to the Court, this settlement process remains ongoing. The stay remains effective in light of Signal's ongoing bankruptcy case.", "summary": "On May 21, 2013, 33 Indian guestworkers filed suit in E.D. Tx. for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. In July 2015, the Court ordered to stay the case due to Signal's bankruptcy, with status reports on the proceedings due every 120 days."} {"article": "On September 30, 2011, the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against C&F Mortgage Corporation. The suit was brought on behalf of African-American and Hispanic borrowers against C&F Mortgage Corporation, alleging that it had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of race and/or national origin against black and Hispanic borrowers. Specifically, the complaint alleged that C&F Mortgage Corporation, on average, charged both black and Hispanic borrowers approximately 20 basis points more than it charged to similarly-situated whites. The plaintiff also filed a motion for approval of a consent order on September 30, 2011. The Court (Judge Robert E. Payne) entered a final consent order on October 4, 2011 and maintained that it would retain jurisdiction over the case to enforce the terms of the Order. Under the provisions of the order, C&F agreed to implement policies and procedures designed to ensure that the prices charged for C&F's residential loan products, including the portion of the price that reflects the discretion of the loan officer or any other employee, are set in a nondiscriminatory manner consistent with the requirements of the FHA and the ECOA. In addition, C&F agreed to compensate certain black and Hispanic borrowers. The terms of the Order ended on January 17, 2014 and the Court (Judge Robert E. Payne) dismissed the case with prejudice.", "summary": "On September 30, 2011 the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division filed a complaint and consent order on September 30, 2011 on behalf of African-American and Hispanic borrowers against CFMortgage Corporation alleging discriminatory lending practices. The Court entered a final order on October 4, 2011."} {"article": "On May 1, 2018, Texas and six other states brought actions for declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States and various officials in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiffs, represented by the Office of the Attorney General of Texas, claimed that the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, created by a 2012 executive action by the Obama Administration, violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution. The plaintiffs claimed that the DACA program granted lawful presence to millions of unlawfully present aliens without congressional authorization. They sought to preliminarily enjoin the government from issuing or renewing any DACA permits in the future and to declare that DACA violated the procedural and substantive aspects of the APA. On May 8, 2018, DACA recipients and state of New Jersey moved to intervene as defendants and Judge Andrew S. Hanen granted the motion on May 15. The defendant then moved to dismiss the case on May 29 without prejudice or transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, where a similar case was being litigated. Judge Hanen denied the motion to dismiss on May 30. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 25, 2018 and added the state of Kansas and two governors as plaintiffs. The amended complaint maintained the identical allegations and sought the identical reliefs as the original complaint. On July 5, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On August 31, Judge Hanen denied the plaintiffs\u2019 request for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim related to both the procedural and substantive aspects of the APA and that they had made a clear showing of irreparable injury. However, the court denied the injunction because it found that the plaintiffs had delayed seeking this relief for years, the balance of private interests fell in favor of denying of the relief, and implementing the relief was contrary to the public interest. The court did not rule on the whether the DACA program violated the Constitution\u2019s Take Care Clause. 328 F. Supp. 3d 662, 740 (S.D. Tex. 2018). On February 4, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts. In the defendants\u2019 reply, they agreed that the plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their substantive claim under the APA. However, the defendant opposed summary judgment on the procedural claim under the APA and the Take Care Clause claim. On November 22, 2019, Judge Hanen issued an order staying the motion until the Supreme Court ruled on cases involving the rescinding of DACA (Regents of Univ. of California v. DHS, NAACP v. Trump, and Wolf v. Vidal). These cases had been heard at oral argument three days prior on November 19. Even though they had been focused on the question of DACA's rescission, the Justices had touched on issues relevant to its issuance. Judge Hanen therefore agreed with the defendant-intervenors that the Supreme Court's opinion could potentially resolve this case. 2019 WL 6255351. On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court issued its opinion for Regents of Univ. of California v. DHS, holding that DHS's 2017 order rescinding DACA was arbitrary and capricious. Judge Hanen ordered the parties to compile a joint status report on how this would affect the case by July 24. On August 21, 2020, Judge Hanen denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Although he dismissed the defendant-intervenors' arguments that the Regents decision implied the need for additional discovery and supplemental briefings, he did hold that it may impact the legal issues here and that a \"clean slate\" would be the best way to proceed. Consequently, he denied the motion without prejudice and gave the plaintiff states leave to file a new motion for summary judgment. 2020 WL 6440497. The plaintiff states filed their new motion on October 9, 2020, essentially reiterating their original motion. The defendant-intervenors also moved for summary judgment on November 6, 2020, claiming that plaintiffs lack standing. The Court heard oral arguments for these motions on December 22, 2020. On the day of his inauguration (January 20, 2021), President Biden signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General \u201cto preserve and fortify DACA.\u201d Two days later, defendant-intervenors notified the court that the federal defendants would be taking steps related to the DACA memorandum and shifting their position on the case. The defendant-intervenors requested a status conference to discuss how President Biden\u2019s memorandum would impact the substantive and procedural aspects of this litigation. Considering both the Presidential memorandum and that the House of Representatives passed the American Dream and Promise Act\u2014an act that would create a pathway to citizenship for DACA recipients--, Judge Hanen granted defendant-intervenors request for a status conference. The parties discussed the possible impact of the American Dream and Promise Act on the litigation at a status conference on March 30. 2021. Both parties filed supplemental briefs on April 9, 2021. As of May 14, 2021, Judge Hanen had yet to rule on motions for summary judgment.", "summary": "On May 1, 2018, seven states brought actions for declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States in the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiffs claimed that the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, created by a 2012 executive action by the Obama Administration, violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution. The plaintiffs sought to preliminarily enjoin the government from issuing or renewing any DACA permits in the future and to declare that DACA violated the procedural and substantive aspects of the APA. The preliminary injunction was denied in August 2018. In October and November of 2020, both parties filed for summary judgment. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "On September 19, 2005, an African American employee, on behalf of other African American employees, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiff sued Tobacco Superstores Inc. under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiff, represented by the EEOC, asked the court for injunctive and individual relief, claiming that she and other African American employees were denied promotions because of their race, and that she was constructively discharged because of her race. The defendant filed two motions for summary judgment requesting that the court deny thirty-four individual class members from joining the case. The court granted and denied in part the defendants motion. On August 4, 2008, District Judge William R. Wilson approved a consent decree. The decree enjoined the defendant from discrimination or retaliation; required the defendant to create and distribute non-discrimination and promotion policies; and required management at Tobacco Superstores to participate in anti-discrimination trainings. The defendant also agreed to pay $425,000 in monetary relief to resolve the lawsuit. The decree's effective period was three years, and there is nothing more on the docket - so presumably the matter ended in 2011.", "summary": "On September 19, 2005, an African American employee, on behalf of other African American employees, filed this lawsuit against Tobacco Superstores Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiff, represented by the EEOC, alleged that she and other were denied promotions because of their race. She also alleged that Tobacco Superstores Inc. constructively discharged her because of her race. In 2008, District Judge William R. Wilson approved a consent decree granting injunctive and monetary relief. The decree's effective period was three years, and there is nothing more on the docket - so presumably the matter ended in 2011."} {"article": "On October 10, 2013 a female African-American victim of domestic violence filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff sued under the Federal Fair Housing Act, the Violence Against Women Act, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Borough of Norristown. The plaintiff, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, the Women's Rights Project, and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages for violation of the plaintiff's first, fourth, and fourteenth amendment rights. The plaintiff specifically alleged that she risked eviction from her home and bodily injury due to the enforcement of two consecutive ordinances that permitted landlords to evict tenants where tenants have required the assistance of law enforcement for repeated incidents of \"disorderly behavior,\" including instances of domestic violence. Between April and September 2012, the defendants enforced the Old Ordinance against the plaintiff's landlord and attempted to remove the plaintiff from her home because police were called too many times. The plaintiff was placed on a 30-day probationary period, during which she was attacked and almost killed by her former boyfriend, but did not call police for fear that she would lose her home. The defendants continued to take steps to remove the plaintiff from her home until the plaintiff's counsel interceded and demonstrated how the enforcement of the Old Ordinance violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. The defendants proceeded to enact a nearly identical replacement ordinance (the \"New Ordinance\") in December 2012, with the addition of enforcement of criminal fines against the landlords. On October 30, 2014, the parties settled. The defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff $495,000 in damages and to repeal the Ordinance. Further, in the future the defendants agreed not adopt an ordinance that would penalize a resident, tenant, or landlord as a result of requests for police or emergency assistance made by or on behalf of a victim of abuse.", "summary": "In 2013, a female victim of domestic violence filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff sued the Borough of Norristown. The plaintiff alleged that she risked eviction from her home and bodily injury due to the enforcement of two consecutive ordinances that permitted landlords to evict tenants where tenants have required the assistance of law enforcement for repeated incidents of \"disorderly behavior,\" including instances of domestic violence. The parties settled with the defendant agreeing to pay damages and to repeal the ordinance."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action complaint brought by six detainees in Wayne County Jail, seeking injunctive, declaratory and habeas relief. The petitioners sought the release or transfers to home confinement of medically vulnerable inmates in light of the virus, as well as an injunction requiring COVID-19 mitigation measures. The case was almost immediately stayed and the issues moved to a longstanding state-court litigation about the jail's conditions, Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Sheriff
It explained for the first time at oral argument that the Order is merely an exercise of the President\u2019s \u201cbully pulpit\u201d to highlight a changed approach to immigration enforcement. Under this interpretation, Section 9(a) applies only to three federal grants in the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security that already have conditions requiring compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373. This interpretation renders the Order toothless; the Government can already enforce these three grants by the terms of those grants and can enforce 8 U.S.C. 1373 to the extent legally possible under the terms of existing law. Counsel disavowed any right through the Order for the Government to affect any other part of the billions of dollars in federal funds the Counties receive every year.The Court held, however, that the Executive Order \"is not reasonably susceptible to the new, narrow interpretation offered at the hearing.\" Yet a broader reading was, Judge Orrick explained, unconstitutional: \"The Constitution vests the spending powers in Congress, not the President, so the Order cannot constitutionally place new conditions on federal funds. Further, the Tenth Amendment requires that conditions on federal funds be unambiguous and timely made; that they bear some relation to the funds at issue; and that the total financial incentive not be coercive. Federal funding that bears no meaningful relationship to immigration enforcement cannot be threatened merely because a jurisdiction chooses an immigration enforcement strategy of which the President disapproves.\" Accordingly, the Court granted a preliminary injunction against any broader implementation of the order, although it emphasized that the preliminary injunction \"does not affect the ability of the Attorney General or the Secretary to enforce existing conditions of federal grants or 8 U.S.C. 1373, nor does it impact the Secretary\u2019s ability to develop regulations or other guidance defining what a sanctuary jurisdiction is or designating a jurisdiction as such.\" County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017). The government moved for reconsideration pursuant to a May 22, 2017 memorandum from the Attorney General regarding the implementation of the EO. The memo specified that \"the Department of Justice will require jurisdictions applying for certain Department grants to certify their compliance with federal law, including 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1373, as a condition for receiving an award. This certification requirement will apply to any existing grant administered by the Office of Justice Programs and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services that expressly contains this certification condition and to future grants for which the Department is statutorily authorized to impose such a condition. All grantees will receive notice of their obligation to comply with section 1373.\" Further, \"the term 'sanctuary jurisdiction' will refer only to jurisdictions that 'willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373.'\" On May 23, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. The defendants moved to dismiss on June 6. On July 6, the plaintiff Santa Clara (followed by joinders from San Francisco and Richmond on July 7) moved for leave to file a surreply in opposition to the motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs argued that recent statements by President Trump and DHS officials contradicted assertions in the defendants' reply brief. On July 12, the plaintiff also filed a supplemental request for judicial notice of recent statements by AG Sessions. On June 16, 2017, the states of West Virginia, Louisiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas moved for leave to file an amicus brief in support of the defendants' motion to dismiss. On June 28, 2017, many organizations, including labor unions, civil rights groups, and public schools, as well as individual sheriffs and police chiefs, moved to file amici briefs in support of the plaintiff's opposition to the defendants' motion to discuss. On July 12, 2017, Judge Orrick held a hearing (in all three related cases) on the defendants' motions to dismiss and motion for reconsideration. He issued an order on July 20, denying the defendants' motions. He denied the motion for reconsideration because the AG Memorandum did not change the analysis from the preliminary injunction order. Additionally, he denied the motion to dismiss because the AG Memorandum did not change his findings of the plaintiff's standing and their claims' ripeness and likelihood of success. Finally, he concluded that the plaintiff had adequately stated a claim for declaratory relief. County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 2017 WL 3086064 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2017). On August 15 and 17, 2017, the plaintiff in an administrative motion and supplemental statement asked the court to relate City and County of San Francisco v. Trump to City and County of San Francisco v. Sessions. The plaintiff argued that both cases concerned substantially the same parties and challenged the President's withholding of federal funds from sanctuary cities. On August 18, 2017, the defendants responded, arguing that the cases should not be related because the first challenged an EO and the latter an AG program. On August 23, 2017, Judge Orrick granted the plaintiff's request to relate this case to City and County of San Francisco v. Sessions. Then on August 25, 2017, he found State of California v. Sessions to be a related case, and reassigned it to himself. That case also challenges DOJ's immigration-related conditions on law enforcement funding. On August 30, 2017 San Francisco and Santa Clara moved for summary judgment. San Francisco argued that the EO was unconstitutional because it violated the separation of powers, the Spending Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. Consequently, San Francisco argued, the court should permanently enjoin the EO's implementation. The defendants, in their September 27, 2017 response, argued that the Constitution authorized their broad immigration enforcement powers as implemented in the EO and \u00a7 1373. On September 18, 2017 the defendants appealed, to the Ninth Circuit, Judge Orrick's April 25, 2017 preliminary injunction and July 20, 2017 order denying the defendants' motions to dismiss and motion for reconsideration. The Ninth Circuit opened a docket for the appeal, No. 17-16886. The Ninth Circuit held oral argument on April 11. In the district court, Judge Orrick held an October 23 hearing on the plaintiffs' August 30 motion for summary judgment. On November 20, he granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, permanently enjoining the defendants from enforcing Section 9(a) of the EO against all jurisdictions deemed as \"sanctuary jurisdictions.\" The injunction applied nationwide because Section 9(a) was facially unconstitutional. In his opinion, Judge Orrick held that the EO had caused and would continue to cause constitutional injuries, by violating the separation of powers doctrine and depriving the plaintiffs of their Fifth and Tenth Amendment rights. Judge Orrick first stated that the EO's plain language impermissibly empowers the President to place new conditions on all federal funds -- a power properly reserved to Congress under the Spending Clause. The President's and AG's subsequent comments on the EO had confirmed, rather than narrowed, this broad scope. Further, the Fifth and Tenth Amendments forbid funding conditions that are vague, unrelated to the funds at issue, and coercive: \"Federal funding that bears no meaningful relationship to immigration enforcement cannot be threatened merely because a jurisdiction chooses an immigration enforcement strategy of which the President disapproves.\" On November 29, 2017 the parties jointly requested that the Court dismiss San Francisco's claim for declaratory judgment (that it did not violate \u00a7 1373), which the Court would consider instead in San Francisco v. Sessions. The next day, Judge Orrick granted this request. On December 14, 2017 the defendants appealed Judge Orrick's November 20 permanent injunction, asking the Ninth Circuit to consolidate this appeal with the other two appeals in process. The plaintiffs, for their part, asked the Ninth Circuit to dismiss the consolidated appeals as moot because they challenged a preliminary injunction that the permanent injunction had superseded. The defendants responded on December 27. Eleven states filed a December 22, 2017 amicus brief supporting the defendants. However, the Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiffs' request on January 4, denying all pending motions as moot. The Ninth Circuit held oral argument on April 11, 2018. On August 1, 2018 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment, but vacated and remanded for reconsideration of the nationwide injunction. The panel held that the executive branch could not refuse to disperse the federal grants without congressional authorization under the Separation of Powers principle and the Spending Clause. The panel found that Congress had not so authorized, and so summary judgment was proper, but that there were no findings to support an injunction with nationwide reach. 2018 WL 3637911. On August 29, 2018 the plaintiff in an administrative motion asked the court to relate City and County of San Francisco v. Sessions III and State of California v. Sessions. The defendants did not oppose the motion. On September 10, 2018, the court related the cases to this case. On August 15, 2019, by the plaintiffs' stipulation, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' request for a nationwide injunction and closed the case.", "summary": "On January 31, 2017, San Francisco challenged Trump\u2019s Executive Order which threatened to withhold federal funds from \"sanctuary jurisdictions\" and take enforcement action against any locality that impedes the federal government's immigration law. The City filed its complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, and asked for a declaration that San Francisco complies with 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1373, and that 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1373(a) and the Executive Order violate the Tenth Amendment. After a hearing, the district court, on April 25, 2017 entered a nationwide injunction against operation of the EO. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and issued a nationwide injunction to prevent enforcement of the EO. On November 20, 2017 the court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, permanently enjoining the defendants from enforcing Section 9(a) of the EO against all jurisdictions deemed as \"sanctuary jurisdictions.\" The injunction applied nationwide because Section 9(a) was found facially unconstitutional. On August 1, 2018 the Ninth Circuit upheld the grant of summary judgment, but disagreed that a nationwide injunction was proper. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "On June 26, 1998, a class of high school girls in Michigan filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan under \u00a71983, alleging that the Michigan High School Athletic Association (MHSAA) violated provisions of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Represented by private counsel and by the National Women's Law Center and Equity Legal, the plaintiffs contended that MHSAA refused to authorize additional sports for high school girls, provided inferior practice and playing facilities for post-season tournaments held in certain girls' sports, and required girls to play certain sports in disadvantageous seasons. This allegedly reduced participation opportunities for high school girls by shortening playing seasons, thereby preventing participation in club competitions and all-star competitions involving players from other states and negatively affecting their chances of being recruited for collegiate-level sports programs. MHSAA defended by arguing that its placement of the girls' sports seasons at issue was advantageous for female athletes and thus not discriminatory. The MHSAA also asserted that legitimate reasons (mostly logistical) existed for scheduling some male and female teams of the same sports in different seasons. On April 19, 1999, the District Court (Judge Richard Enslen) certified a class for the case of \"all present and future female students enrolled in MHSAA member schools who participate in interscholastic athletics or who are deterred from participating in interscholastic athletics because of Defendants' discriminatory conduct and who are adversely affected by that conduct.\" 192 F.R.D. 568, 570 (W.D. Mich. 1999) On September 30, 1999, the Justice Department filed an amicus brief supporting the plaintiffs. In addition, the Justice Department asked the court to allow the Justice Department to intervene on the plaintiffs' side. Judge Enslen allowed the United States to participate as \u201clitigating amicus\u201d on behalf of the class of Michigan high school girls. On January 21, 2000, the district court (Judge Richard Enslen) denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 80 F.Supp.2d 729. Judge Enslen granted MHSAA permission to take an interlocutory appeal, but a three-judge panel of the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals denied permission to appeal. In the summer of 2001, the parties participated in mediation which resulted in a settlement of all claims except for the issue of when the female athletes would have their playing seasons. That issue went to trial. (In May 2001, the court first released two opinions on evidentiary matters, which are misdated in Westlaw. 2007 WL 5830967 (correct date: May 2, 2001), 2007 WL 9221306 (May 2, 2001); The court conducted a two-week bench trial in September 2001 and received evidence concerning the following questions: (1) whether MHSAA, by assuming controlling authority over interscholastic athletics from member schools that receive federal funds, is subject to Title IX; (2) whether MHSAA is a state actor; and (3) whether MHSAA's scheduling of only girls' sports in disadvantageous seasons violated Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause. On September 24, 2001, the trial began on the scheduling of seasons issue and lasted two weeks. On December 17, 2001, the court found for the plaintiffs on all three issues. The court held that MHSAA is subject to Title IX and is a state actor, and that its scheduling practices violated Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause. The court ordered MHSAA to submit a compliance plan to remedy the discriminatory scheduling of girls' sports. Throughout early 2002, the parties fought over what kind of injunctive relief should be ordered. MHSAA submitted a compliance plan, which Plaintiffs and the United States opposed. Plaintiffs suggested other options, including the scheduling of boys and girls in the same season in all sports. MHSAA rejected this option outright, claiming that its member schools did not want it. Alternatively, Plaintiffs suggested flipping the girls\u2019 basketball and volleyball seasons because doing so would not impact any boys\u2019 sports. They then suggested moving girls\u2019 swimming to the winter to not only take advantage of the better season but to provide much needed athletic participation options for girls in the winter. They further suggested moving girls\u2019 soccer and/or golf to the fall. Again, MHSAA rejected those options. The Court held a public, evidentiary hearing on the compliance plan on July 26, 2002. Recognizing that any compliance plan must change the girls\u2019 volleyball and basketball seasons in order to be equitable, the Court rejected the compliance plan and gave MHSAA another opportunity to submit its own plan. MHSAA polled its member schools and held informational meetings throughout the state to discuss various options. The compliance options submitted to the schools were widely circulated in the press and were widely submitted to the schools, the coaching associations, the athletic directors\u2019 association, the principals, the superintendents, and the school boards. In the end, MHSAA submitted the option that it contended that its members and affiliated groups most supported. Although Plaintiffs again objected to the plan (Dkt #612), the Court approved it on November 8, 2002, and amended it on February 27, 2003. MHSAA was given a court-approved compliance scheme, which was to be implemented throughout Michigan by the 2004-2005 school year. The Court ultimately approved the rest of MHSAA's remedial plan, finding that the switching of the remaining sports at issue (soccer, golf, tennis, swimming, and diving) balanced the inequity of nontraditional playing seasons between high school boys and girls in Michigan. The plaintiffs filed a fee petition on January 30, 2002 seeking $5,155,136.05-- $5,023,991.25 in attorneys' fees and $131,144.80 in costs. On appeal, in July 2004, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that MHSAA's scheduling of sports violated the Equal Protection Clause. 377 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2004). MHSAA then sought review by the Supreme Court. On May 2, 2005, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and instructed the Sixth Circuit to reconsider the case in light of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005), a case addressing the availability of damages under federal statutes. On August 16, 2006, the Sixth Circuit issued an opinion that again affirmed the district court's ruling that the sports schedule discriminates against female athletes on the basis of sex. 459 F.3d 676 (6th Cir. 2006). On December 7, 2006, the Sixth Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en banc. Defendants again sought review by the Supreme Court, but on April 20, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review. 549 U.S. 1322. Shortly following that denial, the Michigan High School Tennis Coaches' Association and several parents filed a Motion to Intervene seeking to modify the Compliance Plan to maintain the Lower Peninsula high school girls' tennis season during the fall. On June 7, 2007, a second Motion to Intervene was filed by some coaches of Upper Peninsula high school girls' soccer teams and several additional parents, seeking to modify the Compliance Plan to maintain girls' soccer in the Upper Peninsula during the spring season. On June 12, 2007, a third Motion to Intervene was filed by some coaches of Upper Peninsula high school boys' soccer teams and certain parents of team members, as next friends, seeking to modify the Compliance Plan to maintain boys' soccer in the Upper Peninsula during the fall season. The Court denied these motions as untimely. 2007 WL 2078753 (July 13, 2007). On March 31, 2008, the court awarded the plaintiff $4.4 million in attorneys' fees and over $130,000 in costs, plus interest. 2008 WL 906031 (Mar. 31, 2008). On August 14, 2008, the court also awarded Plaintiffs\u2019 counsel an additional $94,309 in fees and expenses related to litigating fees. 2008 WL 3834024. The defendants appealed, but on April 1, 2009, the parties negotiated and entered into a Settlement Agreement pursuant to which plaintiffs agreed to payment of a lesser amount in satisfaction of the fee judgments so as to not compromise defendant\u2019s ability to operate the sports programs it provided the student-athletes in the state of Michigan. Specifically, the Settlement Agreement included that the plaintiff pay $6 million in full and complete resolution of any and all claims that Plaintiffs may have against the MSHAA arising out of, or relating to, the Litigation, the Fees Judgments, or any other fact, transaction, or occurrence as of the date of this Agreement. Upon the Agreement, the parties submitted a mutually accepted stipulated order for approval to the Sixth Circuit, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal with prejudice and without costs. The court approved the Settlement Agreement on April 3, 2009.", "summary": "Plaintiffs brought a suit against the Michigan High School Athletic Association, alleging that they were excluded from opportunities to participate in interscholastic athletic programs and received unequal treatment and benefits in those programs. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court's ruling. The United States Supreme Court also denied review of the defendant's petition for certiorari. The parties eventually negotiated and entered into a settlement agreement which plaintiffs agreed to payment of a lesser amount in satisfaction of the fee judgments."} {"article": "On July 14, 2004, a 62-year-old employee filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northeast District of Illinois. The plaintiff sued Maytag Corporation, his former employer, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). he plaintiff claimed that he was demoted and denied a promotion because of his age. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought lost profits, liquidated damages, reinstatement to his former position, attorney\u2019s fees, and pre-judgement interest. The case was assigned to Judge William Hart and subsequently transferred to Judge Ronald A. Guzman. On September 20, 2004, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to follow the necessary procedures of first filing a claim of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The court denied this motion on September 22, 2004 because it consolidated this case with EEOC v. Maytag, 1:04-cv-04632, a class-wide age discrimination against a group of Regional Sales Managers already begun by the EEOC. The court found that both cases involved the same issues and requested the plaintiffs to jointly file a new complaint. The defendant\u2019s motion for reconsideration of the consolidation was denied on October 28, 2004. As requested by the court, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 2, 2004. The amended complaint alleged that the defendant demoted a class of employees over the age of 50 from Regional Sales Managers to Zone Managers. The defendant again filed a motion to dismiss the original individual plaintiff's claims on November 12, 2004, claiming he had failed to file his claims within the statutorily mandated time period. The defendant also claimed that the EEOC never filed charges of discrimination, and so their claims also required dismissal. On May 12, 2005, the court disagreed. It denied the motion to dismiss because the EEOC had provided sufficient notice to the defendant of alleged age discrimination involving an entire class of employees. The EEOC's action was triggered by the individual plaintiff's complaint, sufficient to inform the defendant of the possibility of a class-wide issue. As to the time bar, the plaintiffs did not assert at what time the individual became aware of the fact that he was being discriminated against. This event, and not when the discriminatory action was alleged to have actually occurred, would trigger the time limit. The motion to dismiss was denied in its entirety. 2005 WL 1563109. The parties reached a settlement agreement on September 7, 2005 and a consent decree was entered on December 2, 2005 resolving both cases. The defendant agreed to pay class members a total of $334,500, to post notice of the decree on non-public bulletin boards used for employee communication, to provide training in age discrimination law for its managers and supervisors, and to report semi-annually to the EEOC on the age of employees promoted and demoted. The defendant also agreed its employees would not retaliate against any person who opposed practices that were unlawful under the ADEA. The parties incurred their own attorneys' costs and fees and the settlement agreement remained in effect for two years. This case is now closed.", "summary": "This lawsuit was filed in July 2004 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois by a 62-year-old employee against his former employer. The plaintiff alleged that he was demoted and not promoted because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In October 2004, the case was consolidated with EEOC v. Maytag, which alleged class-wide age discrimination against a group of Regional Sales Managers. After surviving a motion to dismiss, the cases resolved by consent decree in December 2005. Maytag agreed to pay class members a total of $334,500, to post notice of the decree for employees, to provide training in age discrimination law for its managers and supervisors, and to report semi-annually to the EEOC on the age of employees promoted and demoted. The settlement agreement remained in effect for two years. This case is now closed."} {"article": "On January 9, 2003, four persons represented by attorneys from several law firms in Louisville, Kentucky, filed this class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The plaintiffs challenged the strip search policy of the Hopkins County, Kentucky, jail. The plaintiffs alleged that they were searched pursuant to a blanket strip search policy of the jail which required all pretrial detainees transferred from other facilities to be strip searched, without regard to the individual circumstances surrounding the transfer or other factors indicating a reasonable suspicion to believe the transferee was concealing weapons or contraband. The plaintiffs maintained that the policy violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and sought monetary damages, injunctive relief and class certification. On March 18, 2005, the District Court certified the case as a class action involving two classes, pursuant to an agreed order of the parties defining the classes as: (1) an \"admission class\" consisting \"of all individuals arrested for minor offenses who were required to remove their clothing for a visual inspection on admission to the jail despite the absence of any reasonable suspicion that they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband;\" (2) \"release class\" consisting of \"all persons who were required by defendants in the jail, just after becoming entitled to release, to remove all of their clothing for a visual inspection despite the absence of any reasonable grounds for doing so.\" To determine the scope of the classes, some 7,000 questionnaires were mailed to potential members. The plaintiffs also filed an Amended Complaint on March 18, 2005. A Second Amended Complaint was filed on June 8, 2005 and a Third Amended Complaint on March 9, 2006. The defendants moved to dismiss the case on numerous grounds, including asserting a statute of limitations bar, lack of standing, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and failure to meet the physical injury requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (\"PLRA\"). The District Court (District Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr.) denied the motion in all respects. Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., 2005 WL 3478152 (W.D. Ky. Dec 19, 2005). The defendants then requested that the Court establish a deadline for the return of inmate questionnaires. The District Court (Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel) denied the request. Sutton v. Hopkins County, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11243 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 16, 2006). See also Sutton v. Hopkins County, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3152 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 11, 2007) (Judge McKinley overruled defendants' objection to Magistrate Goebel's order). Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the issue of the constitutionality of the jail policy of strip searching pretrial detainees who were transferred from other facilities, which remained in effect until May 25, 2006. The plaintiffs also moved for a preliminary injunction. The defendants, in turn, moved to decertify the class. Judge McKinley denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and for a preliminary injunction and granted defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that Hopkins County Jail's policy of strip searching pretrial detainees who were transferred from other facilities was reasonable and justified. Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., 2007 WL 119856 (W.D. Ky. Jan 11, 2007). The defendants' request for class decertification was denied. Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., 2007 WL 119892 (W.D.Ky. Jan 11, 2007). On July 17, 2008, the parties submitted a settlement agreement to the Court for approval. On July 18, 2008, the court (Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel) granted preliminary approval of the settlement agreement. On October 20, 2008, the court (Judge Joseph H. McKinley) granted final approval of the settlement agreement. The settlement was for $3 million, with the named class members getting a larger amount. Each class member would apply for compensation according to the procedure established in the settlement agreement. The settlement set forth procedures for claimants to appeal decisions from the claims administrator to the court. For example, on August 20, 2009, the court reversed and remanded a decision by the claims administrator denying relief to a plaintiff who had been strip-searched. 2009 WL 2589506 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 20, 2009). One of the potential class members had challenged the approval of the settlement agreement and filed for a declaration of rights, to intervene and to hold in abeyance. The class member also filed a motion for equitable relief, for relief pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), or, in the alternative, to reopen the case. On October 9, 2009, the court permitted the class member to submit a claim form to the claims administrator in accordance procedures set forth in the settlement. However, the Court declined to decide whether she qualifies as a member of the class at this time. Instead, the parties would adhere to the claims approval and appeal process set forth in the settlement. 2009 WL 3294843 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2009). Also on October 9, 2009, the court allowed another potential class member who had been left out of the proceedings to submit a late claim form. 2009 WL 3299597 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2009). On January 25, 2010, the court issued final judgment and dismissed this class action and all claims against defendants and their insurers with prejudice. All class members who did not make a timely request to be excluded from the class were barred and enjoined from commencing and/or prosecuting any claim or action against the defendants relating to the claims alleged in this case. In 2013, a prisoner who had been deposed by the defendants but did not receive his claim filed a motion for relief. On March 4, 2013, the court denied his motion for relief. No other motions have been filed in the case since then.", "summary": "In 2003, four persons represented by attorneys from several law firms in Louisville, Kentucky, filed this class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The plaintiffs challenged the strip search policy of the Hopkins County, Kentucky, jail. The parties settled the case in 2008 and the defendants agreed to pay $3 million to the plaintiffs."} {"article": "On January 3, 2012, a deaf prisoner filed a lawsuit against the Indiana Department of Correction in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. Represented by the ACLU of Indiana, the plaintiff filed his suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging that he was only allowed access to a TTY telephone during working hours or after-hours by making a written request for access while other prisoners had unlimited daily access to telephones from 6 am to 11 pm, seven days a week. In addition, the plaintiff's phone calls were restricted to a length that is not comparable to the length of time allowed to the prisoners who were not hearing impaired. He asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The parties negotiated a settlement agreement, and on March 5, 2012, Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson dismissed the case according to the plaintiff's voluntary dismissal. We do not have a copy of the settlement agreement.", "summary": "In 2012, a deaf prisoner filed lawsuit against the Indiana Department of Correction in the US District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiff filed under, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act alleging that his phone calls were restricted unlike other prisoner who were not hearing-impaired. The parties settled."} {"article": "On May 11th, 2010, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a non-profit corporation based out of California focused on civil liberties issues relating to technology, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the Department of Justice (DOJ), specifically the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiff, representing itself, sought injunctive relief, claiming that the FBI had wrongfully withheld agency records requested by the plaintiff under FOIA pertaining to the re-authorization of three provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the FBI had failed to comply with the statutory time limit for processing FOIA requests and that the plaintiff had exhausted all administrative remedies in trying to obtain the requested records. The plaintiff requested that the FBI immediately process the requested records in their entirety, disclose the requested records and make copies available to plaintiff upon completion of processing, and to do so in a timely and expedited manner. Subsequently, on June 14th, 2010, District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly ordered the parties to confer and propose a schedule for proceeding, specifically addressing, among other things, the status of the plaintiff\u2019s FOIA request, the anticipated number of documents responsive to the request, and the anticipated date of the documents\u2019 release. On June 28th, 2010, the parties submitted their status report from their conference. The defendant reported that it had completed its search for all potentially responsive documents to plaintiff\u2019s FOIA request, and they amounted to around 1,700 pages. The defendant reported that it had forwarded all potentially responsive documents for processing and classification review, and that it expected to be finished processing all 1,700 pages by November 15th, 2010. On November 30th, 2010, the parties submitted their updated status report. The defendant reported that it had completed processing plaintiff\u2019s FOIA request and had released all responsive, non-exempt information to plaintiff. Thus, on December 2nd, 2010, Judge Kollar-Kotelly ordered the defendant to submit its motion for summary judgment and all parties to submit their motions and cross-motions. On March 4th, 2011, the defendant moved for summary judgment. It claimed that, because that the FBI had satisfied its burden under FOIA and had released all reasonable, segregable information that was neither exempt nor not subject to FOIA to the plaintiff, the lawsuit should be resolved. However, on April 5th, 2011, the plaintiff filed a memorandum, partially opposing the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and supporting its own cross-motion for summary judgment, submitted on the same day. In it, the plaintiff supported most of the defendant\u2019s motion, but disputed the FBI\u2019s continued withholding of five pages of material showing charts and statistical information related to the FBI\u2019s use of expiring Patriot Act provisions. The plaintiff claimed that this information was non-exempt, responsive material to its FOIA request, and the defendant had not sufficiently proved that it legitimately withheld this information because the material did not pertain to national security or law enforcement. On April 22nd, 2011, the defendant answered the plaintiff\u2019s cross-motion for summary judgment. It claimed that the FBI was no longer withholding any material the plaintiff referenced in its cross-motion. Apparently, five out of six of the pages the plaintiff was seeking had already been inadvertently released to the plaintiff when the other responsive material was being processed, and the FBI just decided to voluntarily release the last remaining page, though the defendant maintained that these documents would have been exempt from FOIA under the deliberative process privilege. Because there was no longer any live issue at dispute, the defendant re-asserted that summary judgment should be granted. On June 16th, 2011, the parties reached a settlement agreement to satisfy the plaintiff\u2019s attorneys\u2019 fees, expenses, and litigation costs. The defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff $4,000 for the costs associated with the lawsuit. In return, the plaintiff agreed to seek dismissal of the case with prejudice. The case was dismissed on June 16th, 2011.", "summary": "In 2010, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a non-profit focused on civil liberties issues relating to technology, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiff alleged that the Department of Justice (DOJ), specifically the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), had wrongly withheld records the plaintiff requested under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) pertaining to three expiring provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). After an initial conference between the parties ordered by District Judge Coleen Kollar-Kotelly, the parties worked out a schedule for the processing and release of all responsive documents to plaintiff's FOIA request. However, even after the defendant released all 1,700 pages of requested documents to the plaintiff, the parties still disputed over six remaining pages pertaining to statistical information of the FBI's use of the expiring provisions via cross-motions for summary judgment. Ultimately, the defendant released the remaining six pages to the plaintiff and the parties settled over the plaintiff's attorneys' fees, with the defendant agreeing to pay the plaintiff $4,000. The case was then dismissed on June 16th, 2011."} {"article": "On October 13, 2017, the Protect Democracy Project filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. According to the complaint, plaintiff is a nonprofit organization with a \"mission is to protect our democracy from descending into a more autocratic form of government by preventing those in power from depriving Americans of a free, fair, and fully-informed opportunity to exercise ultimate sovereignty.\" As part of its mission, plaintiff aims to inform the public about executive branch activity, in part by filing FOIA requests and releasing the results on its website. Plaintiff was represented by its own counsel and the law firm Covington & Burling. The lawsuit was assigned to Judge Randolph D. Moss. Under the Freedom of Information Act, plaintiff sought disclosure of agency records by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component Customs and Border Protection (CBP), as well as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), that would shed light on government policies and plans to hire new immigration enforcement personnel. In his Jan. 25, 2017 Executive Order 13767 and Jan. 30, 2017 Executive Order 13768, President Trump directed DHS to hire 5,000 additional CBP agents and 10,000 additional Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents. In order to meet these targets, plaintiff alleged, defendants intended to relax hiring standards and use independent contractors -- decisions that might \"undermine the integrity of CBP and ICE and have negative consequences for border security.\" The complaint alleged that on Aug. 4, 2017, plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to all four defendant agencies, seeking records related to the agencies' plans for addressing border enforcement and illegal immigration. The request to OPM specifically sought all documents, including communications, memoranda, assessments, and final determinations, related to DHS' requests for hiring authorities addressed in its 90-day progress report on EO 13767. The complaint further alleged that, to date, plaintiff had not received a substantive response from any of the four defendant agencies. Plaintiff sought an expedited disclosure order under FOIA and sought legal fees. On Oct. 24, plaintiff filed a notice in another case with the same name, stating that these two cases were related: Protect Democracy Project v. DHS, No. 1:17-cv-02202 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 2017). The parties filed a series of status reports, showing that the defendants had produced some records and the parties continued to confer on the request's scope and production's responsiveness. In the joint status report dated May 6, 2019, the parties agreed that defendants CBP and OPM have completed their planned productions, and the parties had agreed that defendants DHS and OMB need not make further productions. The parties indicated that they continue to confer regarding any attorneys\u2019 fees. Accordingly, the court ordered that the OMB and DHS were no longer required to make future productions. The parties continued to discuss the calculation of attorneys\u2019 fees and the plaintiff\u2019s entitled amount. The most recent joint status report by the defendants on May 19, 2020 indicate that the discussion has been delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The next status report is due June 12, 2020. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "On Oct. 13, 2017, the Protect Democracy Project sued DHS, CBP, OMB, and OPM in D.D.C. under FOIA. Plaintiff sought disclosure of agency records on the government's policies and plans to hire thousands of additional CBP and ICE immigration enforcement agents, pursuant to Trump's EO 13767 and 13678. In their latest status report on May 6, 2019, the parties agreed that defendants CBP and OPM have completed their planned productions, and the parties had agreed that defendants DHS and OMB need not make further productions. The parties continue to discuss the matter of attorneys' fees."} {"article": "This is a case about how quickly United States Citizenship and Immigration Services must process, print, and mail Employment Authorization Documents (EADs or Form I-766) for immigrants who have received approval for their Applications for Employment Authorization (Form I-765). On July 22, 2020, an immigrant who had received employment approval but had not received her EAD filed this class action suit in the Southern District Court of Ohio Eastern Division. She sued the agency and its Acting Director and Chief of the Office of Intake and Document Production under 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(1), 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2) and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and a writ of mandamus for damage sustained by the plaintiff and putative class members resulting from the agency\u2019s intentional slowing and stopping of printing EADs and for the violation of plaintiffs\u2019 5th Amendment right to Due Process. The plaintiff had been unable to work due to the agency\u2019s delay in printing her EAD and her employer was threatening to fire her if she did not return to work before August. On July 28, 2020, the defendants filed for a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. On August 3, 2020, Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley denied defendants\u2019 motion and granted the plaintiff\u2019s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order that would require defendants to issue EADs to putative class members immediately or within seven days of the court\u2019s order. Counsel for plaintiffs and defendants began mediation talks in early August. Settlement talks continued until August 21, 2020, when Chief Judge Marbley signed the parties\u2019 consent order. As part of the consent order, the remaining plaintiffs filed an order of voluntary dismissal. In the consent order, the defendants denied all of plaintiffs\u2019 allegations and stated that the consent order was not and should not be taken as or construed to be an admission of responsibility. Plaintiffs also withdrew their motion for class status in the consent order. In terms of interim relief, the defendants agreed to post a notice on the agency\u2019s website explaining how an alternative form (Form I-797) could be used in place of an EAD while a person awaits the printing of that document (this policy expires October 15, 2020). The defendants also agreed to create a putative class list which will include all plaintiffs and putative class members. The list is divided into two categories: sub-class one and sub-class two. Subclass one members were defined as immigrants whose EADs are already queued for printing at the time of list creation. For these individuals, the defendants agreed to mail EADs within a week of the execution of the consent decree. Subclass two members were defined as immigrants who EADs have not been queued as of the day the list was created. For these members of subclass two, the defendants agreed to mail EADS within seven days of USCIS collecting biometric data for the individual. The class list list tracks the receipt number for the submitted I-676 form, the date the I-765 was approved, and the date the EAD was produced. In a status report filed on September 9, the agency reported that 45,565 putative class members had yet to receive their EADs. In the second report filed on September 30, USCIS reported that they had sent EADs to all of the sub-class one members and 15,177 of the 17,736 total sub-class two members. In addition to the list creation, the defendants also agreed to pay $90,000 in attorneys fees. As of October 15, 2020, the case remains ongoing.", "summary": "In 2020, immigrants who had received approval for their Applications for Work Authorization but who had not yet received Employment Authorization Documents (EADs) from United States Citizenship and Immigration Services filed this class action complaint in the U.S. Southern District Court of Ohio Eastern Division. The plaintiffs alleged that the agency was intentionally delaying or stopping printing the documents altogether, making it impossible for the putative class members to work. This was in violation of their substantive Due Process rights under the 5th Amendment and of the Administrative Procedure Act. In August 2020, the parties reached a settlement that required USCIS to create and update a list of putative class members and to produce and mail EADs to the pertinent class members. The case remains open."} {"article": "On July 13, 2016, organizations whose members have participated in and witnessed protests in Baton Rouge, Louisiana in response to the death of Alton Sterling, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. Represented by private counsel, the ACLU of Louisiana, and the New Orleans Workers' Center for Racial Justice, the plaintiffs sued the City of Baton Rouge under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for violating their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as rights arising from the Louisiana Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants and their high-ranking policymaking officials intentionally developed and implemented customs, practices, and/or policies under which protestors were detained, harassed, threatened, dispersed, and charged for allegedly obstructing vehicular traffic on public streets, even when the protestors were engaged in no actual obstruction and created no risk to pedestrian or traffic safety. The plaintiffs further claimed that the defendants' actions deprived the plaintiffs of a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct was criminal. On July 14, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for an emergency temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. A motion hearing was set for July 28, 2016, but the parties filed a joint motion to continue on July 20, 2016, which was granted. All of the previously fixed dates were thus vacated. On July 27, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice the plaintiffs' complaint with respect to the East Baton Rouge Parish District Attorney. After the plaintiffs advised the district court that they would not oppose this motion to dismiss in a August 4, 2016 telephone conference, U.S. District Judge John W. deGravelles granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on August 8, 2016. The case against the remaining defendants, however, would continue. On December 5, 2016, Judge deGravelles granted a joint motion to dismiss the case. The parties had come to a Memorandum of Understanding, which recognized \"the rights of all persons to assemble and engage in the public for the purpose of peaceful public discourse and protest,\" and stipulated that the law enforcement parties would make every effort to ensure reasonable alternatives were available if protesters disturbed other parties. Both parties maintained the right to return to the court if the Memorandum was violated. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On July 13, 2016, organizations whose members have participated in and witnessed protests in Baton Rouge, Louisiana in response to the death of Alton Sterling, filed this civil rights lawsuit in the District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued the City of Baton Rouge under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging that the defendants and their high-ranking policymaking officials intentionally developed and implemented customs, practices, and/or policies under which protesters are detained, harassed, threatened, dispersed, and charged for allegedly obstructing vehicular traffic on public streets, even when the protesters are engaged in no actual obstruction and create no risk to pedestrian or traffic safety. In December 2016, the court granted the plaintiffs motion to dismiss with prejudice, conditioned on the parties adhering to a Memorandum of Understanding voluntarily entered into by both parties."} {"article": "On June 13, 2005, represented by the Center for Justice, in Spokane, the plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, seeking to strike down a Washington state statute as unconstitutional. The statute, RCW \u00a7 70.48.390, allowed jails to require each person who is booked into jail to pay a fee based on the Jail's actual booking costs or one hundred dollars, whichever is less. The fee is payable immediately from any money then possessed by the person being booked into jail. RCW \u00a7 70.48.390. In accordance with RCW \u00a7 70.48.390, the Spokane County Board of Commissioners passed Resolution 04-0160 in February 2004. That resolution authorized the Spokane County Jail to develop and implement a procedure to collect a fee from persons booked into jail. On May 5, 2004, pursuant to Resolution 04-0160, the Jail adopted an official policy authorizing the collection of a booking fee. Under this Policy, federal inmates are charged the federal daily rate while non-federal inmates are charged the actual jail booking costs--$89.12. Pursuant to the statute, the Policy allows the fees to be taken directly from any funds found on the person at the time of booking. In this case, the plaintiff was arrested based on a domestic violence complaint and booked into the Spokane County Jail on October 31, 2004. His wallet was inventoried as personal property that would be returned upon his release, but the Jail took all of the money in it as payment on the booking fee. The Spokane County jail did not inform the plaintiff he was being charged a booking fee, that there was a reimbursement policy in place, or that the money was required to be returned if his charges were dropped or he was acquitted. He was released from jail the next day after all of the charges were dropped. Upon his release, his money was not returned and he did not receive a copy of the Jail's reimbursement policy. The Spokane County Jail eventually returned the plaintiff's money several months later, after his lawyer sent a letter to Spokane County stating the Jail's booking fee policy was unconstitutional. In January 2005, the Jail modified its forms and procedures related to the collection of booking fees, instituting the requirement that each person booked into jail receive paperwork outlining methods for obtaining reimbursement. Further, persons who were released and not charged within 72 hours, automatically, without request, were to have their booking fees returned if paid in part or in full. The Jail also automatically voided any unpaid--but not paid--booking fees for all inmates who were found not-guilty, acquitted, or had their charge dismissed. The plaintiff sought partial summary judgment, arguing that the statute and the implementing policy were facially unconstitutional. The County, joined by the State as intervenor, defended. On August 29, 2006, Judge Fred Van Sickle granted plaintiff's motion, holding that the statute and policy violated due process, because they allowed the deprivation of plaintiff's property without a hearing or other chance to oppose the confiscation. The County and State moved for reconsideration. On April 13, 2007, Judge Van Sickle granted defendants' motion and dismissed plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis that plaintiff lacked standing to bring a facial challenge as to the constitutionality of RCW \u00a7 70.48.390 and the Jail's booking fee policy. The plaintiff's damage claim survived. Judge Van Sickle ordered further briefing on the issue of whether the application of RCW \u00a7 70.48.390 and the Jail's booking policy to the plaintiff and others was constitutional. On October 12, 2007, Judge Van Sickle partially granted the plaintiff's summary judgment motion on the issue of liability. It held that under Matthews v. Eldridge [424 U.S. 319 (1976)], the application of the Jail's booking fee policy to the plaintiffs deprived them of due process of law. To satisfy the test, the court found that seizure of all of the funds in the plaintiffs' possession implicated a significant private interest, and that the risk of erroneous deprivation in application of the policy was extreme compared to the municipality's interest in increasing revenue. In this situation, due process required a pre-deprivation hearing. Class certification was granted on August 25, 2008. It included all individuals from May 5, 2004 to December 20, 2006 who were deprived of their property pursuant to the booking fee policy of the Spokane County Jail without being provided the constitutionally guaranteed due process of law. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider the grant of class action status, saying that the booking policy changed in January 2005. In denying the motion to reconsider, the court said that although the January 2005 policy mandated that individuals booked into jail receive paperwork outlining methods for reimbursement and booking fees and were automatically returned to persons not charged within 72 hours, it still resulted in the deprivation of individuals' property upon booking into the Jail without due process. The actual deprivation of property, without due process, occurred upon the collection of a booking fee without an opportunity to contest the taking of the money. In the same order, the judge denied the defendant's motion to reconsider the October 2007 grant of partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. However, he granted a certification for interlocutory review. On January 26, 2009, the defendant filed an appeal of the October 2007 grant of partial summary judgment to the plaintiff in the Ninth Circuit [09-35074]. For most of 2009, the parties worked on a settlement agreement. In the Ninth Circuit, the case was referred for mediation, but the parties never met before the mediator as a settlement was reached out of court. A preliminary joint settlement was approved by the District Court on September 18 of 2009. After hearing out some objections from the defendant's side, the parties filed a final joint motion for settlement on March 1, 2010. It was approved by the court on March 19. The appeal was dismissed after the settlement was approved by the District Court. The plaintiff class received $491,668, with $147,487.48 going to attorney's fees. The named plaintiff, Shawn Huss, received $10,000 as an incentive award. From March to December 2010, a handful of individual class members appealed with the Ninth Circuit in order to opt out of the settlement agreement. The case was voluntarily dismissed on April 9, 2012.", "summary": "Plaintiffs brought a class action suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 challenging a Washington statute and Spokane County Jail policy that collected fees from an individual booked into jail. The named plaintiff had his wallet inventoried as personal property that would be returned upon his release, but the Jail took all of the money in it as payment on the booking fee. The Jail did not inform the plaintiff he was being charged a booking fee, that there was a reimbursement policy in place, or that the money was required to be returned if his charges were dropped or he was acquitted. He was released from jail the next day after all of the charges were dropped. Upon his release, his money was not returned and he did not receive a copy of the Jail's reimbursement policy. The money was only returned months later after prodding by the plaintiff's attorney. Class certification was granted and it included all individuals, from May 5, 2004 to December 20, 2006, who were deprived of their property pursuant to the booking fee policy of the Spokane County Jail without being provided the constitutionally guaranteed due process of law. Claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were dismissed for lack of standing to bring a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute and Jail's booking fee policy. The claim for damages went forward and a settlement was approved by the court on March 19, 2010. The class received $491,668 in total."} {"article": "After a study of the Southeastern Virginia Training Center (SEVTC) revealed that essentially all of the individuals in the institution could be placed in the community, the Governor of Virginia announced his desire to close SEVTC. Contemplating revisions to the services Virginia provides to individuals with intellectual disabilities, the state legislature created a new plan to fund the construction of new Intermediate Care Facilities and to build a new and modern SEVTC with 75 beds. The Arc of Virginia inferred from that plan that 75 individuals currently placed in SEVTC would be moved to the new facility, and sued in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to enjoin the state from constructing the new facility, claiming that the diversion of state resources toward building a new institution violates the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Arc claimed that the state must provide services in the most integrated setting possible, and that the diversion of funds toward the construction of a new institution violates this command. On December 17, 2009, the court (Judge Robert E. Payne) granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the Plaintiffs' claims were not ripe. The Plaintiffs had not alleged that a current live controversy existed because it was not clear that placement decisions had been made or that the 75 beds in the new facility would be filled by residents of the current SEVTC facility. The state legislature may generally choose to create and structure its provision of services to people with disabilities. The court held that \"it is possible that the placement decisions, when made, may offend federal law. But, that will depend on future actions and there is no indication now that Virginia's decisional process is unlawful or that persons will be placed in settings that are inappropriate to their individual needs or at odd with their choice.\" Several years later, the DOJ and Virginia settled a procedurally unrelated Olmstead case dealing with the same issues. That case is PB-VA-0003 in the Clearinghouse.", "summary": "Arc of Virginia sued to prevent the construction of a new institution for individuals with intellectual disabilities in Virginia. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the lawsuit, finding that there was no ripe controversy at that time."} {"article": "This case is one of four lawsuits filed against the City of Farmers Branch, Texas, to challenge the City's anti-immigrant housing law, Ordinance 2892 (subsequently repealed and reenacted in slightly altered form as Ordinance 2903). See IM-TX-0001, IM-TX-0002 and IM-TX-0004. This case and two others filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Vazquez v. City of Farmers Branch (IM-TX-0001) and Barrientos v. City of Farmers Branch (IM-TX-0002) were assigned to District Court Judge Sam A. Lindsay. Judge Lindsay ordered that the three cases before him be consolidated. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch was designated as the lead case for purposes of the consolidated action. The Ordinance required apartment owners and managers to determine the citizenship or immigration status of their tenants and imposed penalties for their failure to do so. It was largely patterned after similar ordinances enacted by local governments in Hazelton, Pennsylvania, and Escondido, California. The constitutionality of those ordinances has also been challenged. See IM-PA-0001 and IM-CA-0001. On May 12, 2007, the voters of Farmers Branch approved Ordinance 2903 by a margin of 4,058 to 1,941. On May 21, 2007, a day before the Ordinance was to go into effect, the District Court (Judge Lindsay) granted plaintiffs' applications for a temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of the Ordinance. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 2007 WL 1498763, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36918 (N.D. Tex. May 21, 2007). Plaintiffs were ordered to post a $1500 security bond. On June 1, 2007, the Court (Judge Lindsay) dismissed the Barrientos plaintiffs' complaint for lack of standing. The Court reasoned that since the Barrientos plaintiffs operated retail businesses in Farmers Branch and were not tenants or property owners, the Ordinance had no direct effect on them. As such, they had no standing to challenge the Ordinance. The Court also denied the Federation of American Immigration Reform, Inc. leave to intervene in the case on behalf of the defendants. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 245 F.R.D. 551 (N.D. Tex. 2007). A preliminary injunction hearing was held on June 5, 2007, and on June 19, 2007, the Court (Judge Lindsay) issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining Farmers Branch from enforcing Ordinance 2903 pending a trial on the merits. He found that as the Ordinance attempted to regulate immigration, and did so differently from the federal government, it was preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F.Supp.2d 757 (N.D. Tex. 2007). Farmers Branch then requested an increase in the amount of the bond posted by plaintiffs. That request was denied. On June 26, 2007, the Court (Judge Lindsay) denied the City's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaints for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 2007 WL 1836844, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46508 (N.D. Tex. June 26, 2007). On December 11, 2007, however, the Court (Judge Lindsay) granted a more narrowly drawn motion by the City to dismiss the Villa plaintiffs' claims for compensatory damages, finding that the Villa plaintiffs had suffered no damage from the Ordinance because it had never come into force due to the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction issued by the Court. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, No. 3:06-CV-2371-L, 2007 WL 4322147, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91021 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2007). On February 22, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of preemption and due process violation. The City also filed for summary judgment on the same day. On May 28, 2008, the Court (Judge Lindsay) granted the plaintiffs' motion and deferred ruling on that of the City. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F.Supp.2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 2008). It found that the Ordinance was both preempted and a violation of due process and that a permanent injunction should be issued barring its enforcement. Following its granting of partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs, the Court allowed the parties to brief it regarding plaintiffs' remaining claims and whether judgment should be entered. After briefing, on August 29, 2008, the Court (Judge Lindsay) denied the City's motion for summary judgment, and denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the rest of its claims as moot, as they sought relief identical to that plaintiffs had already been granted. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F.Supp.2d 851 (N.D. Tex. 2008). On the same day, the Court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and issued a permanent injunction barring the enforcement of the Ordinance. There was no appeal, as the City had already passed a third iteration of the law, Ordinance 2952. (See IM-TX-0028 for the case on this law.) A dispute over attorney's fees was submitted to mediation and settled in 2009, although another mediation report in 2010 stated that the parties were unable to reach a settlement. This case is now closed.", "summary": "This case is one of four lawsuits filed against the City of Farmers Branch, Texas, to challenge a city ordinance that required apartment owners and managers to determine the citizenship or immigration status of their tenants and imposed penalties for their failure to do so. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas (Judge Sam A. Lindsay) issued a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and finally, on August 29, 2008, a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the law as preempted by federal law. A new, similar law, however, has since been passed. (See IM-TX-0028 for the case on that law.) This case is now closed."} {"article": "Plaintiffs filed their class action lawsuit on July 6, 1994, alleging that Citibank had engaged in redlining practices in the Chicago metropolitan area in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. 1691; the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601-3619; the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant-bank rejected loan applications of minority applicants while approving loan applications filed by white applicants with similar financial characteristics and credit histories. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, actual damages, and punitive damages. This case has received a good deal of press and blogger attention because one of the plaintiffs' lawyers was Barack Obama, then just a couple of years out of law school. U.S. District Court Judge Ruben Castillo certified the plaintiffs' suit as a class action on June 30, 1995. Buycks-Roberson v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 162 F.R.D. 322 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Also on June 30, Judge Castillo granted Plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery of a sample of Defendant-bank's loan application files. Buycks-Roberson v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 162 F.R.D. 338 (N.D. Ill. 1995). The parties settled the case on May 12, 1998, with an agreement that provided for waiver of some fees for class members, should they reapply for a loan, and also for various procedures to ensure that Citibank followed its own loan policies in a race neutral way.", "summary": "This was a discriminatory lending class action brought in 1994 against Citibank, in Chicago. The case has received a good deal of press and blogger attention because one of the plaintiffs' lawyers was Barack Obama, then just a couple of years out of law school. The case settled in 1998 with an agreement that provided for waiver of some fees for class members, should they reapply for a loan, and also for various procedures to ensure that Citibank followed its own loan policies in a race neutral way."} {"article": "On July 16, 2010, arrestees/inmates held in Franklin County Ohio Corrections Centers filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The plaintiffs, represented by Ohio Legal Rights Service, challenged the excessive use of force by deputies at the Corrections Centers. The plaintiffs brought claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and alleged that corrections deputies routinely used tasers to inflict pain, fear, corporal punishment, and humiliation in violation of the arrestees' Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and money damages. On December 14, 2010, the court (U.S. District Judge Edmund A. Sargus) granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification and permitted the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to intervene as a full party. 2010 WL 5173162. The court provisionally certified a class consisting of \"all persons who, now or at any future time during the pendency of this litigation, are or will be placed in the custody of the Franklin County Sheriff's Department at the Franklin County Corrections Centers.\" On January 25, 2011, the court permitted the intervention of the Fraternal Order of the Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9, which is the collective bargaining representative of the Franklin County Deputy Sheriffs. Shreve v. Franklin Cnty., Ohio, 2:10-cv-644, 2011 WL 250407 (S.D. Ohio 2011). On February 4, 2011, the plaintiffs and the DOJ agreed to separate settlement agreements with the Franklin County Sheriff's Office. The terms of the agreement between the plaintiffs and the DOJ required that the Sheriff's Office provide and enforce policies prohibiting the use of tasers except in exigent circumstances when other alternatives have been exhausted. The DOJ settlement also provided details around what alternative measures are and factors to consider before resorting to the use of tasers, and prohibited the use of tasers on restrained subjects. The DOJ settlement further provided for a reporting policy in instances of use of force and medical evaluation for those that have been tasered. The DOJ settlement established standards for training and internal accountability the Sheriff's Office must meet, as well as provisions around implementation of and compliance with the agreement. The terms of the agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendants incorporated the provisions of the settlement with the DOJ, but modified the provisions around implementation and compliance. The court approved the settlement agreement between the DOJ and the defendants the same day. On March 10, 2011, the court also approved the plaintiff's and defendant's settlement agreement and conditionally dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint subject to the defendants achieving substantial compliance with the terms of the agreement. The plaintiffs issued an order of non-compliance with the settlement agreement to the Sheriff's Office in August 2011. The Sheriff's Office responded stating that the cited instances of non-compliance occurred prior to the settlement's effective date. The Sheriff's Office also indicated that it would have to delay implementing the training required by the settlement agreement. The plaintiffs requested mediation, though it is unclear what proceeded as a result of this request. On September 7, 2011, the court consolidated this case with two other related cases (11-cv-261 and 11-cv-415), and with a third in March 2012 (2:12-cv-70). Litigation continued as the defendants sought to dismiss the claims of the various plaintiffs. In September 2012, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted on January 2, 2013, thereby dismissing the claims of one of the outstanding plaintiffs. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on January 24, 2013, which affirmed the district court's decision on February 6, 2014. Meanwhile, four of the other plaintiffs settled in January 2013. There is no further activity on the docket until December 2015, when the Court granted the parties motion to terminate the Court's authority to enforce the settlement agreement on the grounds that the Sheriff's Office achieved compliance with the agreement. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This class action case challenged the use of excessive force by taser by the Franklin County Ohio Correctional deputies and sought injunctive and monetary relief. The parties reached a settlement agreement on February 4, 2011, which required the defendant to develop and implement a revised policy, provide training, and develop improved accountability processes. This case was consolidated with three other cases, and litigation continued with regard the claims of the various newly added plaintiffs. Four plaintiffs settled, and one appealed the Court's granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to his claims to the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed in February 2014. In December 2015, the Court granted the parties motion to terminate the Court's authority to enforce the settlement agreement on the grounds that the Sheriff's Office achieved compliance with the agreement."} {"article": "On December 23, 2020, Catholic Legal Immigration Network, with several other immigration service organizations, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Catholic Legal Immigration Network sued the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) under the Administrative Procedure Act. Represented by private counsel, the National Immigration Law Center, and the American Immigration Council, Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (CLINIC) sought a stay in the effective date of a rule promulgated by EOIR that set a new fee schedule for removal proceedings. They claimed that EOIR's new fee-schedule rule was arbitrary and capricious and that its comment period was too short, violating the Administrative Procedure Act's notice-and-comment requirement. CLINIC also claimed that the new rule violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Equal Protection clause because the fees were so high that they effectively barred asylum seekers from meaningfully participating in removal proceedings. Judge Amit P. Mehta stayed the effective dates of the final rule as to a specific subset of fees pending adjudication of the lawsuit on January 18, 2021. 2021 WL 184359. The last action of the case was an order staying proceedings, including pleading deadlines, until April 2, 2021. As of February 18, 2021, the case remains ongoing.", "summary": "In 2020, Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. and other immigration service organizations filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that a new rule promulgated by the Executive Office for Immigration Review, which set a new fee schedule for removal proceedings, violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the due process and equal protection rights of asylum seekers. In 2021, the court stayed the effective date of the final rule pending the outcome of the litigation. This case is ongoing."} {"article": "On June 30, 2015, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed this lawsuit in Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit), under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, against Macomb County. PLN, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. PLN claimed that an October 2013 policy at the Macomb County Jail unlawfully prohibited its publication from reaching inmates at the jail, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On June 30, 2015, PLN also filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to stop Macomb County from improperly censoring publications and correspondence mailed to prisoners at Macomb County Jail by PLN and other senders pursuant to a postcard only policy. On September 30, 2015, the Court (Judge Avern Cohn) denied the motion without prejudice for reasons stated in court on the record at a hearing on September 30, 2015 for which transcripts have not been obtained. The Court ordered the claim for injunctive relief is to be tried by the Court and money damages to be tried by a jury, with the claim for injunctive relief tried first. On June 17, 2016, Judge Cohn ordered a stipulated injunction. The court ordered the defendants to deliver all publications to prisoners directly from any publisher, and clarified that defendants may censor a publication only if it is determined to be detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or if it might facilitate criminal activity, and not solely because its content is religious, philosophical, political, social or sexual, or because its content is unpopular or repugnant. The court additionally ordered defendants to deliver all mail to prisoners, including publications from the plaintiffs. The defendant was also required to establish an appeals process for any undelivered material, and to state the reason for any censorship. The court gave the defendant 30 days to comply and to notify its employees of the new policy, and 60 days to notify the plaintiff in writing of the compliance. The court retained jurisdiction for enforcement purposes. On January 11, 2017, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment. The court denied this motion on June 13, 2017. The court dismissed the case on October 10, 2017, and retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Stipulated Injunction of June 17, 2016. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2015, Prison Legal News filed this lawsuit in Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit), under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, against Macomb County. PLN claimed that an October 2013 policy at the Macomb County Jail unlawfully prohibited its publication from reaching inmates at the jail, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In June 2016, the Court issued a stipulated injunction delivery of publications to inmates. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On December 7, 2012, a journalist filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland (Greenbelt) under Section 1983 against Montgomery County, Maryland. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive relief and punitive and compensatory damages. He claimed that he had been falsely arrested, subject to unreasonable search and seizure, malicious prosecution, and battery. The plaintiff alleged violations of the the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as a violation of the Privacy Protection Act. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that while he had been peacefully observing and recording an arrest in which he thought the officers might be using excessive force from over 100 feet away, officers of the county police department had flashed him with a spotlight and instructed him to stop recording. When the officers realized that the plaintiff was recording the arrest, one of them approached him. The plaintiff identified himself as a journalist, the officer stated that he was under arrest, placed him in a choke-hold, and dragged him across the street to the police cruiser. The officers placed the plaintiff in the squad car and threatened to arrest his wife as well if she came any closer. Once they reached the police station, the plaintiff watched an officer take the battery and memory card from his camera and place it in his pocket. The plaintiff was charged with disorderly conduct. The report filed by the arresting officers showed no evidence of disorderly conduct by the plaintiff. When he was released some hours later, the memory card for his camera was not returned to him. On August 23, 2013, Judge J. Frederick Motz granted in part the defendants' motion to dismiss some of the charges. Charges against the individual officers were dismissed, but the charges against Montgomery County itself were allowed to proceed. On June 6, 2014, the case was reassigned to Judge Theodore David Chuang. Discovery was contentious and continued throughout the course of 2014. On January 20, 2015, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment on February 19. On November 5, 2015, Judge Chuang issued a memorandum opinion granting in part and denying in part both motions for summary judgment. Specifically, the court granted the defendants' motion with respect to the plaintiff's claim for damages for one officer for his alleged First Amendment violation. The court, however, denied the defendants' motion with respect to the claim for declaratory relief and all other counts at issue in the motion. Additionally, the court granted the plaintiff's cross motion as to the offenses of hindering an arrest and second-degree assault only, but denied the motion in all other respects. On June 24, 2016, the court granted the parties' partial stipulation of dismissal with prejudice of all claims except for the Privacy Protection Act claim asserted against Montgomery County. The parties engaged in settlement discussions regarding the remaining claims. After reaching a private settlement agreement, the court granted the parties' stipulation of dismissal with prejudice of all remaining claims on March 6, 2017, except for the plaintiff's claim for attorneys' fees. On March 22, 2018, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs, awarding the plaintiff $283,559.25 in fees and $12,402.34 in costs. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On December 7, 2012, a journalist filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against Montgomery County, Maryland and several of its police officers for false arrest, unreasonable search and seizure, battery and malicious prosecution stemming from the plaintiff's arrest while recording the defendants arrest another individual. After the court granted in part and denied in part both the defendants' and the plaintiff's motions for summary judgment in 2015, the court granted the parties' partial stipulation of dismissal with prejudice of all claims except for the Privacy Protection Act claim asserted against Montgomery County on June 24, 2016. After reaching a private settlement agreement, the court granted the parties' stipulation of dismissal with prejudice of all remaining claims on March 6, 2017, except for the plaintiff's claim for attorneys' fees. The court awarded the plaintiff $283,559.25 in fees and $12,402.34 in costs. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On Jan. 30, 2014, several Wyoming-based Catholic organizations, filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act against the federal department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the Affordable Care Act's contraception mandate (including the accommodation offered by the government to some of the plaintiff-organizations) violated the FRFA and First Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the accommodation provided by HHS for certain religious organizations, which requires them to self-certify that they meet certain criteria and provide a copy of the self-certification to its insurance company or third-party administrator, still burdens their religious faith. Under the accommodation, their insurance plans, the plaintiffs argue, \"are the vehicle by which 'free' abortion-inducing products, contraception, sterilization, and related counseling are delivered to the organizations' employees.\" The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, which District Judge Scott W. Skavdahl denied on May 13, 2014. The Court determined that submitting a self-certification to their insurance carriers is not a substantial burden on the organizations' religious exercise. The self-certification \"enables nothing,\" Jusge Skavdahl wrote. \"The sole 'enabler' is the federal statute that [plaintiffs] ha[ve] been allowed to opt out of.\" (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the Court held, the plaintiffs did not establish their likely success on the merits, and a preliminary injunction was not warranted. The plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal, and the district court stayed the case until that appeal was resolved. On June 30, 2014, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Judges Lucero and Matheson) reversed the district court and granted the preliminary injunction provided that the plaintiffs \"inform the Secretary of Health and Human Services in writing\" that they were non-profit, religious organizations with religious objections to providing contraceptive services. The plaintiffs did not, however, need to inform their insurance carriers of anything. The court based this injunction on one granted by the Supreme Court in a factually similar case, Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014). On Oct. 18, 2017, the stay was lifted. On October 6, 2017, President Trump changed federal government's policy on the matter, removing the requirement that employers provide contraception coverage through health insurance plans. Later in October 2017, the plaintiffs stipulated to dismissal of the case, which the defendant did not oppose. The case was dismissed on Nov. 8, 2017.", "summary": "On Jan. 30, 2014, several Wyoming-based Catholic organizations filed this lawsuit under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the First Amendment against the federal department of Health and Human Services, claiming that the ACA's contraception mandate, as well as the accommodation provided by HHS, violated their religious beliefs. The district court denied a preliminary injunction, but the plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which granted one. The resulting injunction required the plaintiffs to inform the Secretary of HHS in writing that they were non-profit, religious organizations with religious objections to providing contraceptive services, but did not obligate them to notify their insurers."} {"article": "On May 28, 2003, plaintiffs who had been granted the status of lawful permanent resident during their removal proceedings filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas to compel the federal government to provide them with documentation of their permanent resident status in a timely manner. Plaintiffs alleged they applied for their alien registration card (\"green card\") and temporary proof of their legal permanent resident status in the United States but that the government had not issued that documentation. Without such documentation, plaintiffs alleged, they were denied employment, travel, educational, and public benefits privileges granted to other legal permanent residents. Plaintiffs asserted claims for violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (\"INA\"), 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1101 et seq., as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (\"IIRIRA\"), the Administrative Procedure Act (\"APA\"), 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 701 et seq. and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Attorneys with the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law of Texas and private law firms, represented the plaintiffs. On March 31, 2004, the District Court (Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa) certified the case as a class action, over the objection of the government. Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction was denied. Thereafter, both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment which were amended and supplemented numerous times. Plaintiffs' complaint likewise underwent numerous amendments. Along with their filings, the parties also notified the Court in July 2004 that substantially identical cases were pending in federal courts in California (Santillan v. Ashcroft, No. 3:04-cv-02686 (N.D. Cal.), IM-CA-0003) and Florida (Amor v. Ashcroft, No. 1:04-CV-21685 (S.D. Fla.), IM-FL-0021). Discovery and litigation continued. On September 9, 2005, the Court (Judge Hinojosa) instructed the parties to refile new motions for summary judgment to address rulings made in the California case, Santillan v. Ashcroft. At a motion hearing on March 22, 2006, the Court (Judge Hinojosa) granted a motion to stay the case pending Santillan (a certified national class action on the same issue), and set a status conference for early the following year. The Court also denied the cross-motions for summary judgments without prejudice to refiling. After several continuances, a status conference was held on August 10, 2007 at which time the parties advised the Court that they were still waiting for the resolution to Santillan, but that they were also finalizing a resolution to the Padilla case. On September 27, 2007, the Court (Judge Hinojosa), noting that the parties had urged little action over the past two years, ordered an indefinite stay of the case pending the resolution of Santillan and inviting the parties to file for reinstatement if a resolution was reached in California that would allow the case to progress. Meanwhile, the parties had been negotiating, and in December 2007 both they and the parties in Santillan came to an agreement with the federal government. On January 25, 2008, the parties jointly moved to reactive the case and have it transferred to the Northern District of California to facilitate a settlement of both Padilla and Santillan on identical terms. On February 25, the Court (Judge Hinojosa) granted their motion and the case was transferred to be consolidated with Santillan. On July 22, 2008, the California court approved a settlement for both cases; see the entry on Santillan for more details.", "summary": "On May 28, 2003, plaintiffs who had been granted the status of lawful permanent resident during their removal proceedings filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas to compel the federal government to provide them with documentation of their permanent resident status in a timely manner. The parties reached a settlement in December 2007, and on February 26, 2008, the case was transferred to the Northern District of California to be consolidated and settled on identical terms with a case there, IM-CA-0003."} {"article": "On December 12, 2012, two individual plaintiffs filed suit against Contra Costa County (California) and its Office of the Public Defender (PD) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (in San Francisco). Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought to represent a class of indigent criminal defendants who, they alleged, were inadequately represented by the PD. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Joseph Spero. The written policy of the PD provided for indigent people accused of crimes (both felonies and misdemeanors) to appear alone at their first court appearance. The court would then refer the criminal defendant to the PD, and postpone the arraignment for an arbitrary period (typically five to thirteen days), not based on the needs of the Public Defender or the exigencies of the particular defendant\u2019s case. During that period, the person remained in jail and opportunities for bail or other release were delayed until the postponed arraignment. The plaintiffs argued that the Public Defender\u2019s policy was unconstitutional because counsel is required at all critical stages of criminal proceedings, including the initial court appearance. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel and their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process (procedural due process with respect to bail or other release, and both procedural and substantive with respect to statutory speedy trial rights). The plaintiffs sought a declaration of the policy\u2019s illegality and an injunction to block the policy and compel the PD to perform the duties required by California Government Code \u00a7 27706. The plaintiffs also requested nominal damages under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for violations of their constitutional rights, damages under the California State Civil Rights Act for denial of their statutory speedy trial rights, attorneys\u2019 fees, and punitive damages. The PD moved to dismiss the complaint on January 31, 2013. While this case was pending, the PD changed the contested policy for people charged with felonies, allowing for representation at their first court appearance, but the policy remained unchanged for misdemeanor defendants. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley for settlement negotiations on April 29, 2013, but a settlement was never reached. On May 8, 2013, the court granted the PD\u2019s motion to dismiss with leave to amend, citing insufficient facts and vague legal reasoning in the complaint. 2013 WL 1915700. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 13, 2013, and another on May 31. These amended complaints contained more developed legal reasoning, and alleged more particular facts regarding the ways that the delays had affected them. These effects included additional charges brought against the plaintiffs, exclusion of positive information from their bail reports, and loss of opportunity to interview witnesses. On August 7, 2013, the court granted the PD\u2019s motion to dismiss all federal claims with prejudice, and dismissed all California statutory claims without prejudice. 2013 WL 4042276. Magistrate Judge Spero directed the district court clerk to close the case on August 30, 2013. The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit (court of appeals docket # 13-16781). More than 2 years later, on December 7, 2015, in a joint opinion by Circuit Judges Kim Wardlaw, William Fletcher, and Mary Murguia, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s decision to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment claims (the plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, which did not hear their appeal). However, the court of appeals reversed the district court as to the dismissal of the Sixth Amendment claims. The Sixth Amendment, the court of appeals held, required that counsel be appointed at a reasonable time, and it was not clear how long of a delay would be constitutionally unacceptable. Because the district court had not considered this question before dismissing the claims, the Ninth Circuit remanded. 637 Fed. Appx. 986. On remand in the district court, the plaintiffs filed another amended complaint. On April 28, 2017, the court dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 claim that the PD had failed to provide counsel at a critical stage (namely the initial appearance), but declined to dismiss the Sixth Amendment claim of unreasonable delay. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on November 22, 2017, this was followed by a cross-motion for summary judgment by the PD. The court granted the PD\u2019s summary judgment motion on the Sixth Amendment claims on January 2, 2019. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 remaining California law claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, allowing the plaintiffs to bring that claim in a California court (it does not appear that the case was ever pursued in state court). On January 31, 2019, the plaintiffs filed another appeal in the Ninth Circuit (court of appeals docket #19-15152). The court of appeals affirmed the district court\u2019s ruling on March 30, 2020. In a joint opinion by Circuit Judges Ronald Gould, Morgan Christen, and Daniel Bress, the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs did not establish that the district court erred in ruling that the PD violated their Sixth Amendment rights by failing to provide counsel \u201cwithin a reasonable time\u201d after arrest and before trial. 799 Fed. Appx. 520. The plaintiffs\u2019 petition for rehearing in the Ninth Circuit was denied and the court of appeals stayed its ruling pending an appeal to the Supreme Court. The plaintiffs filed for certiorari on October 27, 2020; the Supreme Court issued an order denying certiorari on February 22, 2021. This effectively ended the case.", "summary": "Two criminal defendants filed this class action against the Contra Costa County Public Defender. The suit opposed a policy that denied representation to indigent detainees at their initial court appearance and allowed courts to postpone arraignment for five to thirteen days while the matter was referred to the Public Defender\u2019s office. During the pendency of this lawsuit, the Public Defender changed its policy with respect to felonies, but not with respect to misdemeanors. The district court dismissed the lawsuit; the Ninth Circuit remanded for reconsideration of one of the claims. The district court dismissed that final claim; the Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal. The plaintiffs sought and received a stay pending appeal to the Supreme Court and they filed for certiorari on October 27, 2020. The high court denied cert. on February 22, 2021, effectively ending the case."} {"article": "Parents, as next of friend of their minor daughters, filed suit on June 27, 2001 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma against Independent School District #9 of Tulsa County, also known as Union Public Schools, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that the school district had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972, 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1681 by denying female students, specifically female softball players equal access to interscholastic and school-sponsored athletics. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the school had discriminated against female softball players in the funding of athletics, equipment and supplies, the scheduling of practice times, travel and meals, assignment and compensation of coaches, provision of locker rooms and facilities for both practice and competition, and the provision of training facilities and services. The plaintiffs sought class certification for all present and future female students wishing to participate in softball at Union Public Schools. The parties held a settlement conference on December 13, 2001 before Magistrate Judge Claire V. Eagan. On February 12, 2002, the parties submitted a joint stipulation of dismissal to Federal District Judge Sven Erik Holmes. Judge Holmes granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification and accepted the parties' settlement agreement on March 26, 2002. In the settlement agreement, the defendant school district agreed to maintain accounting records for expenditures and revenues for male and female sports and to provide a copy of such record to a requesting party. The school district also agreed to maintain a substantially equal ratio to coaches for both the baseball and softball teams, negotiate for equalized salaries for softball and baseball coaches, provide access to the weight rooms on a gender-neutral basis and equip weight rooms with equipment appropriate for female athletes, and maintain practice and competition facilities on a gender-neutral basis. Additionally, the school district agreed to provide softball players with a designated locker/dressing area, ensure that private donations benefit the softball team on an equitable and gender-neutral basis as compared with other athletic teams, and increase promotion of the district's commitment to providing an equal opportunity to male and female students through publication and distribution of the Student Handbook, which would include a grievance process for parents and students. Oversight of compliance with the settlement agreement was referred to the district's Title IX Officer. The case was dismissed on March 26, 2002.", "summary": "Parents, on behalf of and as next of friends of their minor daughters, filed suit against Union Public Schools, alleging that the school district had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment with respect to accommodations and facilities provided to female softball players. Class certification was granted on behalf of all present and future softball players at Union Public Schools. In a settlement agreement dated March 26, 2002, the district agreed to remedy the discriminatory practices by offering funding and facilities on an equitable and gender-neutral basis for both softball and baseball players."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: The plaintiffs sued Governor Gretchen Whitmer and the Director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources Daniel Eichenger to challenge Executive Order No. 2020-42, which prohibited the use of motorboats in response to the coronavirus pandemic. The plaintiffs alleged that the prohibition on motorboat usage for fishing and recreation violated state and federal law. The plaintiffs requested the case be dismissed without prejudice.
All individuals who have been, or will be, arrested by ICE\u2019s New York Field Office and detained under Section 1226 of Title 8 of the United States Code for removal proceedings and who have not been provided an initial hearing before an immigration judge.On the same day, Judge Nathan granted in part and denied in part both the plaintiff\u2019s and the defendants\u2019 motions for summary judgment. Judge Nathan granted summary judgment for the plaintiff on their procedural due process claim, finding that that the government\u2019s practice of holding detainees for more than ten days before an initial hearing exceeded the 10-day limit established in Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40. But Judge Nathan granted the defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff\u2019s substantive due process and APA claims. Judge Nathan cited Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, in which detention periods of up to six months were held to be reasonable, and concluded that the detention period at issue did not violate the plaintiff\u2019s right to due process. Judge Nathan dismissed the plaintiff\u2019s claim under the APA because granting relief under the APA would effectively allow the plaintiff to obtain preliminary injunctive relief, even though it had been denied pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(f). 2020 WL 7028637. As of January 29, 2021, the defendants have filed an appeal.", "summary": "In 2018, a New York resident filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff, who had been arrested and detained by ICE in October 2018, alleged that the government\u2019s practice of detaining individuals for up to three months without scheduling an initial hearing violated their Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights. On November 30, 2020, the Court granted in part and denied in part the parties\u2019 cross motions for summary judgment. The defendants have appealed as of January 29, 2021."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: Thirteen individuals and a local NGO, Disability Rights Florida, alleged in this class action lawsuit that the Broward Sheriff's Office (BSO) provided inadequate safety measures to protect its prisoners from the COVID-19 virus. After an abbreviated discovery process, BSO entered into a class settlement with the plaintiffs, which was subsequently approved by the U.S. District Court in the Southern District of Florida.
We were pleased to see that the Sheriff\u2019s Department received authorization from the Sacramento Superior Court to grant accelerated release of prisoners, up to thirty days early on a person\u2019s sentence, effective through May 31, 2020. . . . We strongly encourage the County to explore and implement other mechanisms to safely reduce the jail population, including through (1) a broader early release order, (2) work release arrangements . . . and (3) expanded pretrial release.In light of the pandemic, the parties stipulated to the postponement of all scheduled site visits by the Court Experts and Plaintiffs\u2019 counsel and sought extension of the deadlines for the 180-Day Reports by the Court Experts. Instead, the parties requested leave to file a status report on or before June 24, 2020, providing further information to the Court about the status of their monitoring and proposing a modification to deadlines described in the Consent Decree. The parties also agreed that the compliance with the provisions of the Remedial Plan in the Consent Decree had not been reached. They told the court that they continued to work collaboratively to review and revise the jail\u2019s operational policies to reflect the requirements of the Remedial Plan. On April 30, the court granted the request and extended the deadline. The parties were ordered to submit a status report about the status of monitoring compliance with the Consent Decree and potential modifications to the reporting deadlines. On June 24, the parties reported that while on-site monitoring was feasible, some court experts who reside out of state indicated that they may be unable to travel to the jail depending on the circumstances of COVID-19. The parties jointly sought modification of the order and stipulated to remote access of records, a virtual tour, and timeline modifications. Two days later, the court approved the modifications. On September 3, the court received seven letters from individuals, claiming that they have been housed in solitary confinement at the Sacramento County Main Jail for periods ranging from 10.5 to 22 months, allegedly violating the consent decree. On October 7, the court adopted further modifications to the reporting timeline after one court expert resigned. On November 16, the court received a letter from five individuals who claimed that since August, despite filing grievances and raising issues with various authorities, they had been held in restrictive housing. The court directed class counsel to respond. Both parties have submitted periodic monitoring reports to update the court on defendant\u2019s compliance with the restrictive housing and ADA/disability provisions of the Remedial Plan. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "Prisoners in Sacramento County jails filed suit against the County of Sacramento alleging a series of issues present in Sacramento County Jails. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that there was understaffing, a lack of adequate mental health care and physical health care, and discrimination on the basis of disability. The plaintiffs argued that the conditions in the jails violated the Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and California State law. In June 10, 2019, the parties submitted a joint notice of settlement, submitting a proposed Consent Decree and Notice of Class Action Settlement. The Consent Decree was finally approved on January 8, 2020, with the $2.1 million in attorney fees to be paid in two installments of $1.05 million, dated January 31 and July 31, 2020. On March 18, 2020, class counsel wrote the county to urge significant responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. The letter requested population reductions and a variety of other steps (increasing education, access to cleaning supplies, free communications methods, and the like). On June 24, the parties reported that while on-site monitoring was feasible, some court experts who resided out of state indicated that they may be unable to travel to the Jail depending on the circumstances of COVID-19. The parties jointly sought modification of the terms of the consent decree and stipulated to remote access of records, virtual tour and timeline modifications. The court approved ongoing modifications. Between September and October, the court received letters from individuals in the Jail that alleged violations of the consent decree."} {"article": "On November 13, 2013, twenty-six protesters associated with Occupy Philadelphia, a large continuous political protest, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the City of Philadelphia and nine city police commissioners and officers. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, claimed, inter alia, that the City of Philadelphia had used excessive force, including assault and battery, to forcefully restrain protesters from exercising their freedom of expression on public property. Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 for violations of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and sought compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that in the early morning of November 30, 2011, police officers removed them from a public space where protesters had been gathering for the previous seven weeks as part of an ongoing protest. The process of removal involved destruction of encampments and all personal property contained therein. Additionally, the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the Philadelphia police made orders to arrest protesters, which the plaintiffs claim was based solely upon the anticipated protests resulting of their decision to evict the protesters. In the process of arrest, the plaintiffs were surrounded by defendant police officers on bicycles, corralled against the wall of a building, and unable to move. The plaintiffs were then handcuffed and taken into custody. On March 6, 2014, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The District Court (Judge Berie M. Schiller) ordered oral arguments on the motion to dismiss, which were held on April 15, 2014. On May 20, 2014, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims of excessive search and unreasonable search, finding that the plaintiffs' complaint had not offered sufficient facts on either claim. 2014 WL 2115479. The order granted the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint. On July 23, 2014, Judge Schiller consolidated another case, Reyes v. Ramsey, with this action, and directed that the claims of the plaintiff in Reyes be added to the plaintiffs' amended complaint. The plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on August 14, 2014. The parties engaged in discovery throughout the rest of 2014 and 2015. A discovery dispute arose concerning the deposition of the Police Commissioner. On November 15, 2014, the court granted the defendants' motion for a protective order for the Commissioner, finding that as a high-ranking official, he should not have to sit for deposition unless his testimony would be necessary and unavailable from a lesser ranking officer. The court stated that if information obtained in the depositions of lesser ranking officers were to suggest that the Commissioner's deposition was necessary, the plaintiffs could move for reconsideration of the protective order. The plaintiffs filed such a motion for reconsideration on November 30, 2015, and the court vacated the protective order, finding that subordinate officers' testimony provided ample evidence that the Commissioner was directly involved in the subject matter of the litigation and therefore permitting the plaintiffs to take his deposition. On July 25, 2016, the case was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the agreement of the parties. The settlement does not appear to be publicly available.", "summary": "On November 13, 2013, twenty-six protestors associated with Occupy Philadelphia filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the City of Philadelphia and nine city police commissions and officers in their capacities under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 for violations of their First Amendment and Due Process rights. The parties reached a private settlement agreement in 2016."} {"article": "On November 13, 2012, a mother filed a lawsuit against the Davis County Schools in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, on behalf of her two children, A.W. and C.W. The Plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and bringing suit under 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983, sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as nominal damages, alleging that the school district violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by removing a children's book, In Our Mothers' House, from the library shelves to a restricted access section. The book depicts a same-sex couple and their three adopted children. Specifically, the Plaintiffs alleged that the book should be returned to the regular collection and that similar books should not be restricted from student access. Plaintiffs also sought to class certification. Defendant argued that the book violated Utah's sex education law, U.C.A. 1953 \u00a753A-13-101, which prohibits sex-education curricula from using instructional materials that advocate homosexuality. Defendant also claimed that because elementary school students have structured time in the library, such time should be treated as part of the curriculum. The matter was referred to alternative dispute resolution on December 11, 2012. It then settled. Defendants agreed to return the book to regular circulation, to not remove the book from libraries for any reason based on its content, and not to rely on Utah Code \u00a753A-13-101 as a basis for content discrimination. Plaintiffs agreed that the book may be restricted on a per-student basis, just as any other book may, at the request of a parent or guardian. As part of the agreement, both parties filed motions to dismiss. The case closed on February 4, 2013.", "summary": "Plaintiff, on behalf of her two children, filed suit alleging that her childrens' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were restricted when the Defendant school district removed a book depicting children with same-sex parents from regular circulation to the restricted section of the school library. In February 2013, the matter settled: Defendants agreed to return the book to regular circulation, to not remove the book from libraries for any reason based on its content, and not to rely on Utah Code \u00a753A-13-101 as a basis for content discrimination. Plaintiffs agreed that the book may be restricted on a per-student basis, just as any other book may, at the request of a parent or guardian. As part of the agreement, both parties filed motions to dismiss. The case closed on February 4, 2013."} {"article": "This action was brought on March 23, 2011, by a married couple who sought an order allowing the U.S. citizen spouse to petition for his foreign national husband to become a permanent resident of the United States. Such petition is allowed for heterosexual spouses, but under the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), not for same-sex spouses. The U.S. citizen plaintiff filed his visa petition on January 9, 2011; when he brought the lawsuit, it had not been acted on. But they pointed out that the position of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) was that because of DOMA, it lacked authority to allow a spousal petition for a same-sex couple. Likewise, the Board of Immigration Appeals could not hold DOMA unconstitutional. Accordingly, plaintiffs sought relief by the district court. On January 5, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Chicago (Judge Harry D. Leinenweber), found that the plaintiffs could proceed with their lawsuit even though USCIS had not yet rendered a final decision on the visa application. 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1330, at *16. On July 12, the Court stayed the matter to give USCIS sufficient time to adjudicate the application. USCIS reached its decision on August 6, 2012, and informed the Court the following week that it was denying the visa, both because of DOMA and separately (and alone sufficient, the government said) for other, unrelated reasons. Those non-DOMA reasons were explained in a document filed under seal. On September 20, 2012, the Court granted the U.S.'s oral motion to dismiss without prejudice. Presumably this was with the agreement of the plaintiff, but no further details appear in the case record.", "summary": "This case was an action brought on March 23, 2011, seeking to allow a U.S. citizen to petition the government to allow his foreign national husband to become a permanent resident, in the way allowed for heterosexual couples but banned under DOMA for same-sex spouses. On August 6, 2012, USCIS denied the visa petition based on DOMA and another, separately sufficient, ground. On September 20, 2012, the cased was dismissed without prejudice."} {"article": "This case is about the legality of a rule change proposed August 3, 2020 by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which was set to go into effect October 2, 2020. The Final Rule (specifically, the USCIS Fee Schedule & Changes to Certain Other Immigration Benefit Request Requirements, 85 Fed. Reg. 46,788) increased the cost of applying for immigration benefits, including naturalization and asylum. The plaintiffs, eight non-profit organizations that provide a variety of services for low income applicants for immigration benefits, filed this lawsuit on August 20, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the acting secretary of the DHS, the senior official performing the duties of deputy secretary of the DHS, and the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Represented by the American Immigration Lawyers Association and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706) and sought an injunction against the enforcement of the Final Rule, a stay against its enforcement, and declaratory relief. The plaintiffs asserted that the Final Rule was procedurally defective, contrary to law, and arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (\u201cAPA\u201d). The plaintiffs further asserted the Final Rule violated the Fifth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Equal Protection Clause by denying indigent people the right to access a statutory process for seeking immigration benefits. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the Homeland Security Act, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 and the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution. Specifically, they argued that the two individual defendants had assumed their positions without constitutional or statutory authority, so the rule was void. In their complaint, the plaintiffs outlined the fee increases proposed by the Final Rule, and in particular, they highlighted the increase in price for asylum seekers: from $0 to $630. The rule, for the first time in U.S. history, would charge a non-waivable fee of $50 to apply for asylum plus $580 to obtain their first employment authorization for all asylum seekers. The USCIS and DHS\u2019s budgets would increase by 21% as a result of these and other changes in the rule. By switching from ability-to-pay principles on which the plaintiff\u2019 organizations relied to a beneficiary-pays principle, the plaintiffs contended the Final Rule would transform the purpose of the USCIS from \u201cadjudicating immigration benefits to one that serves this Administration\u2019s goals of reducing immigration and naturalization for low-income applicants and deterring asylum seekers.\u201d 2020 WL 4930113. On August 25, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge Jeffery S. White granted the motion on September 29, 2020. While he pointed out that \u201cthe Immigration and Nationality Act (\u201cINA\u201d) permits USCIS to impose a fee \u201cfor the consideration of an application for asylum [and] for employment authorization\u201d so long as the fees do not \u201cexceed the Attorney General\u2019s costs in adjudicating the applications,\u201d 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1158(d), he held that the plaintiffs\u2019 claim that the Acting Secretary of DHS was not validly serving in office was likely to succeed. Moreover, the court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on at least some of their APA claims. The court agreed with the plaintiffs\u2019 allegation that \u201ca more detailed justification\u201d was required for the \u201csignificant departure\u201d from the ability-to-pay principle to the beneficiary-pays principle. Because the defendants only looked at past data, and the U.S. had never charged a fee for asylum seekers before, the defendants failed to consider the effect of the decrease in ability to pay both on the plaintiffs\u2019 organizations and the asylum seekers themselves. 2020 WL 5798269. The court also held that the plaintiffs successfully established a likelihood of irreparable harm. The haste with which the plaintiffs filed their complaint after the rule change was proposed (within three weeks) supported their claim of urgency, and their showing of the need to significantly alter their programs to the determent of the population they served supported their claim of harm. Finally, the court found that the public interest would be served by the injunction. The court found that the public interest would be served both by not exposing vulnerable and low-income applicants to further danger and, in regard to the probable invalidity of the appointment, by avoiding an overreach of executive power. 2020 WL 5798269. As the validity of the entire Final Rule was called into question by the court\u2019s findings, Judge White held it \u201cappropriate to stay the effective date of the Final Rule pending resolution of the merits in this case.\u201d 2020 WL 5798269. The case is currently ongoing.", "summary": "This case is about the legality of a rule change by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The rule, for the first time in U.S. history, would charge all asylum seekers a non-waivable fee of $50 plus $580 to obtain their first employment authorization. Eight non-profit organizations that provided a variety of services for low income applicants for immigration benefits sued to enjoin enforcement of the rule. On August 25, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge Jeffery S. White granted the motion on September 29, 2020 and stayed the rule's effective date pending resolution on the merits."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a pre-existing class action about non-citizen kids in HHS Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) custody. Plaintiffs are seeking emergency releases of nearly all such children, in light of the grave risk of infection in congregate settings. The court denied the plaintiffs' application for TRO on April 2.
All persons who have applied or will apply for naturalization in the jurisdiction of the Seattle District Office, and who have been or may be denied on or after May 4, 1998 on the basis of a lack of good moral character, excepting those who have been subsequently naturalized or those who are statutorily barred from naturalization.On August 17, 2007, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. On January 2, 2008, the Court found that motion to be mostly moot, but ordered the defendants to process the application of one of the members of the plaintiff class. Lee v. Gonzales, No. 04-cv-00449, 2008 WL 53175 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 2, 2008). On April 3, 2008, the plaintiffs again filed a motion for enforcement, which the court partially granted on May 19, 2008. The Court ordered the defendants to complete their review of thirty-three applications within thirty days of the order. Lee v. Mukasey, No. 04-cv-00449, 2008 WL 2117064, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122359 (W.D. Wash. May 19, 2008). When the defendants, in a filing styled as a status report, requested additional time to process the remaining applications, the Court (Judge Lasnik) issued a third order regarding enforcement, requiring the defendants to provide detailed information regarding any delays in processing and to make updates on its progress every two months until all class members' applications were adjudicated. The defendants continued to process applications, submitting six bimonthly status reports to the Court, and on June 8, 2009, the Court (Judge Lasnik) issued its fourth and final order on enforcement, finding that all but three applications had been processed, and ordering the defendants to continue submitting status reports on these applications. On July 1, 2009, the defendants filed their final status report, informing the Court that the last three class members with pending applications had been naturalized. On September 24, 2009, the Court partially granted a motion by plaintiffs for attorney's fees, awarding them with $58,897.50 for work done prior to the defendants' final status report on July 1. Lee v. Holder, No. 04-cv-00449, 2009 WL 3064794, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92404 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 24, 2009).", "summary": "On February 27, 2004, plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, challenging the policies and procedures used by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services to adjudicate applications for naturalization. Plaintiffs alleged that the agency failed to apply the correct standard for determining whether applicants have \"good moral character\" and failed to adjudicate applications within 120 days as prescribed by law. A settlement agreement in which the defendants agreed to change their process for deciding \"good moral character\" issues and to readjudicate class members' applications was approved by the District Court on February 16, 2006, and the final class member's application was processed on on July 1, 2009."} {"article": "Two Occupy Wall Street protesters brought this suit on February 8, 2012 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the City of New York and the New York Police Department. During a 2011 demonstration, plaintiffs were pepper sprayed by highly-ranked police officer. Defendant officers further assaulted and detained the plaintiffs, all without a warrant or legal process. The plaintiffs brought this cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988, as well as state civil rights law. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought monetary relief for physical pain and mental suffering due to the violations. On May 21, 2014, the court related 9 other cases to this case for further proceedings. Two of these cases are in the Clearinghouse under Crisp v. The City of New York and Lawler v. City of New York . On March 9, 2015, Judge Robert W. Sweet reassigned the case to Magistrate Judge Michael H. Dolinger for general pretrial matters, including scheduling, discovery, and settlement. On June 30, 2015, the parties reached a settlement and agreed to resolve the remaining issues raised in the complaint without further proceedings and without admitting any fault or liability. The court dismissed the claim with prejudice, but retained jurisdiction over the action to enforce the terms of the settlements between parties. According to The New York Times, the defendant paid a total of $332,500 in damages (between $52,000 to $60,000 to each plaintiff). Additionally, the New York Times reports that the NYPD released a statement saying that the NYPD has not altered its pepper spray guidelines.", "summary": "On February 8, 2012 Two Occupy Wall Street protesters sued in the Southern District of New York for being pepper sprayed by a high-ranking police officer. On June 30, 2015, both parties settled and plaintiff received damages."} {"article": "On January 3, 2006, a group of former employees filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a71001-1461 (\"ERISA\"), against Pharmacia Pension Plan, Pfizer Inc. and Monsanto Company in United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for injunctive and equitable relief alleging that the defendants were unlawfully miscalculating pension benefits. On January 1, 1997, Monsanto converted its employees' pension plans from conventional benefit plans taking a specified percentage of a participant's salary to cash balance plans where the benefit is based upon a hypothetical account balance. Monsanto later split into two and plaintiffs alleged that after the conversion of their plans and split of the company they were no longer receiving the benefits they should have been receiving. On May 10, 2006 the district court (Judge G. Patrick Murphy) denied plaintiff's motion to appoint plaintiff's counsel as interim class counsel. On June 14, 2006 the court (Judge Murphy) denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. A number of other cases with the same essential complaints and issues had been filed between 2004 and 2006 and on September 1, 2006 the case was consolidated with others under the lead case Walker v. Monsanto Co. Pension Plan. Subsequent developments can be found under that case in the collection.", "summary": "On January 3, 2006, a group of former employees filed suit under the ERISA against Pharmacia Pension Plan, Pfizer Inc., and Monsanto Company in United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs asked the Court for injunctive and equitable relief alleging that the defendants had been unlawfully miscalculating pension benefits since their plans were converted from a conventional benefit plan to a cash balance plan. On June 14, 2006 the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. On September 1, 2006 the case was consolidated with others under the lead case Walker v. Monsanto Co. Pension Plan."} {"article": "Plaintiff is an employee of St. John's Medical Center who brought suit under \u00a7\u00a7 502 and 510 of ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act) when her employer's health care administrator denied coverage to her legal wife. The plaintiff filed a class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on June 19, 2012. On January 24, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for a preliminary injunction on the same day. On May 1, 2014, the Court (Judge Nelson S. Roman) dismissed the case, finding that the clause in the Plaintiff's plan excluding coverage of same-sex spouses was not in conflict with \u00a7 510 of ERISA, which says that discrimination against a beneficiary of a plan unlawful. The Court found that ERISA regulates plans but does not dictate terms, and that \u00a7 510 has been interpreted primarily to prevent termination of employees right before benefits come due to deny them those benefits. On May 22, 2014, the Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On January 13, 2015, the Court (Judges Jos\u00e9 A. Cabranes, Raymond J. Lohier, Jr., and Christopher F. Droney) affirmed the judgment of the District Court and dismissed the case. On March 6, 2015, costs taxed in the amount of $323.20 were awarded to Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield against Jane Roe.", "summary": "Plaintiff is an employee of St. John's Medical Center who brought suit under \u00a7\u00a7 502 and 510 of ERISA when her employer's health care administrator denied coverage to her legally married wife. The District Court dismissed the case in May 2014, saying the plan did not violate any part of ERISA. On January 13, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit confirmed the judgment of the District Court"} {"article": "On February 23, 2012, five Maryland state prisoners who are deaf filed a class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services and other state entities under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by private counsel, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Washington Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, plaintiffs alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the right to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants refused to provide the proper interpretive services, videophones, and other hearing devices. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and damages. On March 13, 2013, Judge Ellen Hollander issued an opinion and an order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Judge Hollander also denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Jarboe v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 2013 WL 1010357 (D. Md. Mar. 13, 2013). The parties entered into settlement talks and had several settlement conferences. Subsequently, the parties reached a tentative agreement. On February 20, 2015, Judge Hollander dismissed the case without prejudice to the parties' rights to reopen the case if the settlement agreement is not consummated.", "summary": "In 2012, five Maryland state prisoners who are deaf filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services and other state entities under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the right to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants refused to provide the proper interpretive services, videophones, and other hearing devices. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and damages. The parties have reached a tentative settlement agreement."} {"article": "On June 20, 1994, inmates of the Criminal Justice Complex in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, filed this class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands. The plaintiffs, who were represented by the National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union and others, sued the Governor of the Virgin Islands and the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections; they asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated by the poor conditions of their confinement. Specifically, they complained of the inadequacy of the building in which they were housed to hold prisoners, up to five prisoners in each cell, lack of a functioning sink in each cell, only one showerhead for use by all prisoners in each cluster, overcrowding (population was, they said, 4 times capacity), lack of sufficient beds, transmission of infectious diseases, and defective plumbing. They also complained of inadequacies in the areas of sanitation, programming, exercise, food service, medical care, personal safety, noise levels, and an environment of tension, stress, and hostility. They contended that the overcrowding led to a high risk of violence, as well as infestation with roaches, rats, flies, mosquitoes, and mice. They complained of contaminated drinking water, moldy showers, broken cooling and ventilation systems, broken windows, asbestos particles in the air, poor lighting, risk of fire, poor medical care, inadequate classification and screening procedures, lack of delivery of prescription medication, poor dental care, poor mental health care, discrimination against disabled prisoners, excessive use of force, failure to protect prisoners from one another, denial of access to a law library and to attorneys, and interference with religious practices. On October 12, 1994, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, which they submitted to the court for approval. Under the terms of the agreement, the defendants agreed to limit the population to 97 inmates (less than half of the former population), to house female inmates separately from male inmates, and to eliminate double-celling. The agreement also addressed problems in the areas of insufficient mattresses, providing a storage area in each cell for each inmates' personal possessions, establishing a comprehensive kitchen maintenance and sanitation plan, preventive maintenance, clean drinking water, plumbing, electrical, mechanical, ventilation, air conditioning, nutrition, lighting, noise levels, temperature control, personal hygiene, provision of linens, soap, shampoo, and toothpaste, vermin and pests, fire safety, medical care, substance abuse treatment, medications, intake evaluations, disease testing, record-keeping, mental health care, inmate safety, activities, recreation, education, use of force, and other concerns mentioned in the complaint. The case was assigned to Judge Stanley Brotman, and the court adopted the agreement as a consent decree in December of 1994 and awarded the plaintiffs $155,000 in attorneys' fees. Over the next two years, the defendants paid only one third of the attorneys' fees that had been ordered by the court, and the plaintiffs asked the court to hold them in contempt for this violation, as well as for other violations of the decree. Judge Brotman held hearings on these motions, and on November 26, 1996, the defendants asked the district court to modify the consent decree. They informed the court that over the two years following the adoption of the consent decree, the Virgin Islands experienced five major storms, which they alleged to have caused unforeseen and unbudgeted financial setbacks for the entire populace of the Islands, resulting in an unprecedented public debt. They alleged that due to these concerns, they were unable to comply with the consent decree in two areas: 1) overpopulation of the facility, and 2) psychiatric evaluation, care, and management of the prisoners. Due to this situation, they asked the court to excuse them from complying with these portions of the decree. The defendants then asked the district court to terminate the consent decree pursuant to the recently-enacted Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). On January 30, 1997, Judge Brotman found for the plaintiffs; he held that the defendants' conduct and the conditions at the prison violated the Eighth Amendment by subjecting the prisoners to inhumane conditions of confinement. The Court further found that the defendants had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by discriminating against prisoners with disabilities, and that they had violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) by instituting unreasonable policies regarding inmate religious practices. The Court also found that they had denied the inmates meaningful access to the courts and defied the court by refusing to pay the attorneys' fees. Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F.Supp. 727 (D.Virgin Islands 1997). A month later, the court held the defendants in contempt and ordered them to submit regular reports to the court on their progress. (In a separate case addressing whether the federal government could constitutionally house prisoners in any of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections facilities, on April 2, 1997, District Judge Thomas Moore found that the prison conditions were unconstitutional and issued an order that no persons detained under process of the U.S. Government and any of its agencies should be lodged or housed in any facilities of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections. In the Matter Of: Federal Detainees Housed or Lodged in the Facilities of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections on St. Croix, 1997 WL 182301 (D.Virgin Islands April 2, 1997). On April 25, 1997, Judge Moore modified that order to allow the U.S. Marshal to lodge federal detainees in Bureau of Corrections facilities in St. Croix when required by logistical difficulties of moving such prisoners between the Virgin Islands and the Guaynabo Metropolitan Detention Center. In the Matter Of: Federal Detainees Housed or Lodged in the Facilities of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections on St. Croix, 1997 WL 222647 (D.Virgin Islands, April 25, 1997).) On December 2, 1997, the district court (Judge Brotman) ruled on another motion by the plaintiffs for civil contempt. The Court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to monetary sanctions, and ordered the defendants to continue reporting on their progress. Carty v. Schneider, 986 F.Supp. 933 (D.Virgin Islands 1997). Four years later, the district court did hold the defendants in contempt of the consent decree, finding that they had not made a reasonable effort to comply with the court's orders. Carty v. Turnbull, 144 F.Supp.2d 395 (D.Virgin Islands 2001). On February 27, 2007, the district court again held the defendants in contempt, finding that the defendants had failed to even file a reply to the plaintiff class motion for an order holding the defendants in contempt for failure to comply with the consent decree's requirements in the area of mental health care. On February 21, 2008, the court ordered a corrections expert to inspect the prison facilities. On January 12, 2009, the defendants filed a motion to terminate the consent decree and remove the court supervision. The court then filed a scheduling order setting discovery deadlines and a date for a hearing. The defendants did not comply with the deadlines, leading the court to rule that the defendants would not be permitted to present evidence contradicting the findings of the plaintiffs' corrections expert or of any remedial efforts taken since the experts' tour of the prison facilities. The defendants ultimately withdrew their motion to terminate. On May 18, 2010, the court issued an opinion regarding the report made by the corrections expert on his visit to the prison facilities. Carty v. DeJongh, 2010 WL 2024524. The court found the defendants were still not in compliance with the settlement agreement and ordered them to resolve all deficiencies swiftly and fully. The order required that the defendants supply the court with periodic status reports on its compliance with the settlement agreement and other remedial orders. The defendants submitted the status reports, as ordered, for the following two years. On March 4, 2011, plaintiffs moved for the appointment of an expert to work with the defendants on population management and prisoner classification issues. Judge Brotman agreed on June 28, 2011, issuing an order assigning Dr. James Austin to serve as a population manager and classification expert. The order also required Dr. Austin to perform periodic criminal justice assessments to assist the government in reducing the prisoner population at the Criminal Justice Complex and Annex. The defendants moved for reconsideration, on October 7, 2011, and apparently this reconsideration motion was never ruled upon. On May 13, 2013, parties proposed a new settlement agreement. Under the settlement, the defendant agreed to make significant improvements to classification and housing of prisoners, prisoner supervision, general security, housing and environmental health conditions, population control, development of policies and procedures, use of force, use of physical restraints, addressing prisoner grievances, programming, staffing, fire safety, medical and mental health care, training of staff, and monitoring of the prison. The settlement also stated that relief would terminate when the defendant has achieved and maintained substantial compliance for one year. On August 14, 2013, the court approved the settlement. There was very little progress towards compliance, however. So as the court explained later (in an order dated March 11, 2016) on May 10, 2015, Dr. James Austin--who had been designated the court's expert on population management in 2011--sent an email to the defendants notifying them that he wanted to make a site visit to the correctional facilities in June 2015, to conduct his criminal justice assessment in line with the June 28, 2011 order. The defendants' response was that no provision of the consent decree authorized such an assessment and, as such, Dr. Austin could not perform that task. On June 2, 2015, plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the June 28, 2011 order. On December 9, 2015, a regularly scheduled quarterly evidentiary hearing was held. During the hearing, the defendants acknowledged that nothing had superseded the original order; the court (Judge Gomez) accordingly ruled orally that day that the 2011 appointment remained in effect. That decision was filed in written form in an order dated March 11, 2016. During the two years following the order, plaintiffs continued to work to enforce the settlement agreement more generally, with contested motions relating to site visits and the like. Following the settlement, notice of expert reports were filed monthly and status reports and evidentiary hearings occurred quarterly. In response to two years of continuing reports and evidentiary hearings, the plaintiffs filed a motion on December 13, 2018 to set additional goals and request information including (1) the total number of inmates in need of intermediate or inpatient care; (2) the dates those inmates will be transferred to psychiatric facilities; and (3) for the 2018 calendar year, the number of inmates in need of intermediate or inpatient care at appropriate psychiatric facilities that have been released. The court ordered on December 17, 2018 that the defendants produce the requested information. The defendants responded with the information on December 28, 2018. On January 4, 2019, the court ordered the defendants to submit a plan detailing how and when training will be completed on the Use of Force policies including: Umbrella Use of Force, Restraint Devices, Video Recording, Cell Extractions, and Reporting Requirement, being completed no later than March 15, 2019. On February 15, 2019, the parties filed their quarterly status reports. The defendants' report noted completed training of employees and ongoing plans to update their reporting requirements and policies. The plaintiffs status report indicated violent incidents from failure to hospitalize that occurred over the quarter and the defendants failure to meet five of their quarterly goals, which required mental health trainings, tracking referrals for mental health care, increased oversight, and improvements to disciplinary system. On February 19, 2019, the defendants filed a motion for a protective order in response to the plaintiffs' counsel publishing video footage online entitled \u201cBrutality Against Prisoners Is Often Unseen. In this Virgin Islands Jail, It Was Caught on Video.\u201d The defendants claimed this to be a security risk and requested that the video be taken down. The court denied the motion. On March 5, 2019, the court ordered that the parties each file a brief addressing if the court needed to appoint a receiver. The court expressed concerns regarding the defendants' continuing failure to provide for the timely transfer of seriously mentally ill prisoners in need of inpatient or intermediate care as required by the settlement agreement. The court asked the parties if the appointment of a receiver should be considered in this matter given the nearly 25-year history of non-compliance. Following the order, both parties requested time extensions to prepare their responses. On April 15, 2019, both parties submitted briefs addressing if a receiver should be appointed. On August 1, 2019, the court held a status conference with the parties to discuss how the defendants could make meaningful progress toward substantial compliance with the 2013 and the 1994 Settlement Agreements. The court and parties agreed to that the court appointed mental health expert and the security expert each submit an independent plan outlining a pathway to compliance. The court experts submitted plans and on August 15, 2019, the court ordered the defendants to complete certain short-term tasks by August 31, 2019 and September 30, 2019. These included developing a position description for an additional mental health professional at the Alexander Farelly Criminal Justice Complex, working to secure an alternate psychiatrist, submit a report identifying progress towards the 2018 staffing goals, and to complete hospital security training. The court further ordered that failure to comply with any of the tasks may result in sanctions starting at $2500 per day for each uncompleted task. The court experts also submitted numerous near-term, mid-term, and long-term tasks in their plans. However, the defendants asserted several objections to these tasks. The defendants did not present alternative tasks by which it could achieve substantial compliance with the 2013 and the 1994 Settlement Agreements. As a result, on September 13, 2019, the court ordered the defendants to file a plan proposing \u201cspecific, demonstrable, and tangible tasks necessary to be undertaken to obtain substantial compliance\u201d with the settlement agreements. The defendants filed a plan with the court on September 30, 2019. On November 27, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion to add a quarterly goal. The plaintiffs requested that the court add the complete installation, testing, and implementation of the new CCTV surveillance system. As of December 2019, the plaintiffs\u2019 motion to add a quarterly goal remained pending, the court had not appointed a receiver, and the parties continued to submit quarterly status reports. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On June 20, 1994, inmates of the Criminal Justice Complex in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Governor of the Virgin Islands and the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections. The inmates sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated by the poor conditions of their confinement, which they said fell below contemporary standards of human decency. After 20 years of successive court-ordered remedies, the parties most recently entered into a settlement agreement approved by the court in August 2013. Enforcement of the settlement continued."} {"article": "On September 12, 2012, youth confined in facilities operated by the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice (IDJJ) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court against the IDJJ. The plaintiffs, represented by counsel from the Roger Baldwin Foundation of the ACLU, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that systemic IDJJ conditions, services, and treatment violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the IDJJ:
The Court in fact agrees with the Government that the statutory scheme . . . allows them to do what was done here. But there are times when statutory schemes may be implemented in ways that tread on rights that are larger, more fundamental. Rights that define who we are as a country, what we demand of ourselves, and what we have guaranteed to each other: our constitutional rights. That has occurred here. In sum, the Court finds that when this country allowed petitioner to become a part of our community fabric, allowed him to build a life with and among us and to enjoy the liberties and freedom that come with that, it committed itself to allowance of an orderly departure when the time came, and it committed itself to avoidance of unnecessary cruelty when the time came. By denying petitioner these rights, the Government has acted wrongly. . . . Petitioner is entitled to the freedom to say goodbye.2018 WL 623557. On January 30, the plaintiff, now freed from detention, asked the Court to retain jurisdiction. The government had asked the plaintiff to report for deportation on February 30, but the plaintiff was concerned that the timing was premature. However, Judge Forrest responded that the Court's jurisdiction had been premised only on habeas, no longer applicable after the plaintiff's release. On May 28, 2018, the government appealed the District Court\u2019s order to the Second Circuit. On September 10, the government filed a motion to vacate the District Court\u2019s order and dismiss the case as moot. In its supporting memo, the government argued that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to review the plaintiff\u2019s habeas petition. Further, the government claimed that the District Court\u2019s holding as to its purported violations of the plaintiff\u2019s due process rights under the Fifth Amendment was unsupported by persuasive legal reasoning or precedent. Since the plaintiff had already been granted the relief sought, the government would not be able to obtain any redress on appeal. But, the government asserted, since it had been deprived of the opportunity to obtain review of the District Court\u2019s order (due to the plaintiff\u2019s release before review could be granted) the decision of the District Court should be vacated. On September 17, the plaintiff responded, contending that the risk of future re-detention in the event that his habeas relief was overturned sufficed to prevent his case from becoming moot. Accordingly, the plaintiff asserted that the government should be prevented from, \u201cmaking conclusory allegations about mootness in an attempt to simply erase the record of a decision it dislikes,\u201d and that its motion should be denied. On July 30, 2019, the Second Circuit granted the government\u2019s motion, dismissing the case as moot and ordering the District Court to vacate its order. Though the plaintiff sought a rehearing en banc, the Court denied his motion on November 1. The Second Circuit\u2019s order was carried into effect by the District Court on November 4. This case is now closed. First Amendment Challenge\u2014Southern District of New York (1:18-cv-01159) and Second Circuit (18-01597) On February 9, 2018 the plaintiff filed another complaint in the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of New York, claiming that he was targeted by immigration authorities on account of his political advocacy in violation of the First Amendment. This complaint was brought as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241. The complaint was filed against ICE leadership, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security. The case was heard by Judge Kevin Castel, and the plaintiff was represented by private counsel alongside co-plaintiffs from the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild and other immigration advocacy organizations. According to the complaint, U.S. immigration authorities engaged in a pattern and practice of targeting immigration rights activists on the basis of protected political speech. Further, it alleged that the plaintiff was targeted specifically in retaliation for his criticism of U.S. immigration policy. The complaint sought a declaration from the Court that the defendants\u2019 retaliatory enforcement of the immigration laws against the plaintiff and other immigration activists amounted to a violation of the First Amendment. Further, the plaintiff requested that the Court issue a preliminary and permanent injunction (1) restraining the defendants from removing the plaintiff from the U.S. unless they were able to demonstrate that the action was \u201cuntainted by unlawful retaliation or discrimination against protected speech;\u201d and (2) restraining the defendant from \u201cselectively enforcing the immigration laws against any individual . . . based on the individual\u2019s protected political speech about U.S. immigration law and policy.\u201d The same day that the complaint was filed, the Court issued a stay to prevent the plaintiff\u2019s removal from the U.S. by immigration authorities while his motion for a preliminary injunction remained pending. On February 12, 2018, the plaintiff filed a separate motion for a preliminary injunction, reiterating the injunctive requests articulated in the complaint. On May 23, 2018, the District Court dismissed the plaintiff\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 2018 WL 2338792. According to the Court, provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act eliminated federal court jurisdiction to review a challenge to the execution of an order of removal. Section 1252(g) provides that, \u201cno court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.\u201d The Court held that this provision foreclosed subject matter jurisdiction over any claim, including those alleging constitutional violations. Further, the Court concluded that since the plaintiff\u2019s First Amendment challenge itself was not adequately supported, it was not necessary to determine whether this statutory limitation on subject matter jurisdiction was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff. On May 25, the plaintiff appealed the District Court\u2019s dismissal to the Second Circuit. Though the plaintiff requested on June 1, 2018, that the District Court maintain its stay on his removal pending the outcome of this appeal, the Court denied his motion on June 19. 2018 WL 3038494. On July 3, the plaintiff again sought a stay to prevent his removal, this time from the Second Circuit. The defendants moved to dismiss in the district court after the first request to stay was denied, but on July 19, the Second Circuit granted the plaintiff's second motion and stayed proceedings in the district court. The Second Circuit vacated the District Court's holding on the First Amendment claim on April 25, 2019. 923 F.3d 53. According to the Second Circuit, the plaintiff\u2019s advocacy constituted \u201ccore political speech\u201d entitling it to the most vigilant protection available under First Amendment jurisprudence. Further, the Court held that the plaintiff\u2019s claims, if true as to the retaliatory measures taken by the government, amounted to egregious misconduct. Finding that the plaintiff raised a valid First Amendment claim, the Court concluded that Section 1252(g) unconstitutionally restricted the plaintiff\u2019s ability to have a court hear this claim as a habeas petition. The Second Circuit directed the District Court to reconsider the plaintiff\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction in light of its holding. Further, it ordered the District Court to prevent the plaintiff\u2019s removal until the District Court had the opportunity to assess whether a stay should remain in effect until reconsideration of the injunction, or through final adjudication of the merits. The government\u2019s motion for a rehearing before the Second Circuit was denied on September 26, 2019. The government filed a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court appealing the Second Circuit's decision on December 23, 2019. The Supreme Court granted the petition for the writ of certiorari. On October 5, 2020, the Court issued an opinion vacating the Second Circuit's judgment and remanded the case to the Second Circuit for further consideration in light of its holding in Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam (140 S.Ct. 1959). The case is ongoing as of November 17, 2020. Coram Nobis Petition\u2014District of New Jersey (2:17-cv-01256) and Third Circuit (19-01282) On February 22, 2017, the plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of Coram Nobis in the U.S. District Court of the District of New Jersey. A writ of Coram Nobis seeks to correct a final judgment issued by a court in light of subsequently discovered fundamental errors. Through his petition, the plaintiff sought to have his 2001 criminal conviction overturned. Private counsel represented the plaintiff before Judge Kevin McNulty, who heard the petition. The plaintiff claimed that overly broad jury instructions enabled the jury to convict the plaintiff on the basis of conduct that was not fraudulent or otherwise criminal. Further, the plaintiff alleged that he was provided with ineffective assistance of counsel both during his trial and appellate proceedings. On the day of the plaintiff\u2019s January 11, 2018 arrest, the District Court stayed the plaintiff\u2019s removal from the United States, pending final adjudication of this collateral challenge to his criminal conviction. This stay was litigated by the parties, and ultimately upheld on March 23, 2018. 2018 WL 1446407. On January 25, 2019, the plaintiff\u2019s Coram Nobis petition was dismissed by the District Court. Concerning the allegedly faulty jury instructions, the Court held that errors such as these cannot be considered sufficiently \u201cfundamental\u201d as to justify application of the writ. According to the court, since these errors were of the kind that could be corrected by a new trial, their existence could not sustain a collateral attack on a finalized judgment. Addressing the plaintiff\u2019s claim to ineffective assistance of counsel, the court held that plaintiff\u2019s counsel was either not deficient on the bases alleged, or the errors were not significant enough to warrant relief. Last, the Court held that the plaintiff\u2019s failure to adequately justify the numerous intervening years between the filing of this petition and his conviction was also a ground to foreclose the relief sought. On January 30, the plaintiff appealed the district court\u2019s order to the Third Circuit, and submitted a motion to the trial court requesting that it maintain its stay blocking his removal pending appeal. On February 4, the district court denied the stay, stating that the court's authority to maintain the stay expired when it decided the Coram Nobis petition. The same day, the plaintiff filed a motion for an emergency stay before the Third Circuit. On February 27, the Third Circuit denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion for a stay of his removal. This appeal remains ongoing.", "summary": "On Jan. 11, 2018, an LPR held in immigration detention filed this habeas corpus petition against the U.S. government. The plaintiff had been suddenly arrested and detained after many years in the U.S. on a stay of removal. On Jan. 29, 2018, the Court granted his petition and ordered his release so that he would have time for an orderly departure before removal."} {"article": "On February 10, 2016, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of State, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Education. The ACLU sought the release of records related to the federal government\u2019s \u201cCountering Violent Extremism\u201d programs under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552 (FOIA). The ACLU alleged that the agencies did not \u201cmake a reasonable effort to search for records in electronic forms or format responsive to Plaintiff\u2019s Request,\u201d in violation of FOIA. The case was assigned to Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly. The ACLU alleged that these initiatives likely posed a risk to the right of equal protection and the freedoms of speech, religion and association. It submitted the original FOIA requests on May 13, 2015. Five of the seven agencies did not respond to the request, or released only a small number of documents. The documents pertained to the 2011 \u201cStrategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.\u201d The plan identified three areas of priority action for the agencies in \u201cbuilding resistance to violent extremism\u201d: \u201cenhancing Federal engagement with and support to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists....Building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism\u201d; and \u201ccountering violent extremism propaganda while promoting our ideals.\u201d The pilot program was implemented in Los Angeles, Boston, and Minneapolis in September 2014. In February 2015, the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice participated in a summit where it was announced that the Department of Justice had already awarded \u201cnearly $3.5 million in grants \u2018to address domestic radicalization to violent extremism.\u2019\u201d In July 2015, the House Homeland Security Committee recommended passage a bill that would allocate $10 million to create a Countering Violent Extremism Office within the Department of Homeland Security. The Department of Justice also launched the \u201cStrong Cities Network,\u201d which is a platform to \u201cstrengthen community resilience against violent extremism\u201d with members New York, Atlanta, Denver and Minneapolis. Despite the strong governmental commitment to this initiative, the ACLU alleged that agencies had not released basic information on the Countering Violent Extremism programs including policy guidelines, training for officials, criteria for receiving funding or grants, or research and assessments justifying the need for and implementation of these projects. After the ACLU filed this lawsuit, the court ordered that the agencies issue joint status reports reporting their progress in fulfilling the FOIA requests. The agencies have filed 19 such Joint Status Reports as of August 3, 2020. The ACLU has reported receiving the documents listed here.", "summary": "The American Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Department of State, Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Education seeking the release of records related to the federal government\u2019s \u201cCountering Violent Extremism\u201d programs under the Freedom of Information Act 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552 (FOIA). The court ordered the release of records; as of August 3, 2020, the agencies have submitted 19 status reports to the court."} {"article": "On January 28, 2000, a former high school student who experienced persistent physical and verbal harassment at the hands of peers, sued the Washoe County School District in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel and Lambda Legal, requested injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs, and compensatory and punitive damages for the District's content and viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment, and for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause based on sexual orientation and sex discrimination under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983; sex-based discrimination in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, under 20 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1681, et seq. and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983; and violations of Nevada tort law. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the District's failure to respond to persistent complaints of student harassment and abuse while he attended school in the District from 1994 until 1997 constituted intentional discrimination based on his sex and sexual orientation. These actions and omissions resulted in the plaintiff's physical and emotional harms and prevented him from obtaining a high school diploma, as the persistent abuse caused him to drop out of high school. The plaintiff also claimed that school officials required him to stay quiet about his sexual orientation, resulting in First Amendment violations. On February 28, 2001, the Court (Magistrate Judge Robert A. McQuaid, Jr.) granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's 1st, 2nd, 3nd, 4th, 7th, and 8th claims for relief. Henkle v. Gregory, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1078 (D. Nev. 2001). The Court granted the defendant's motion as to the plaintiff's equal protection claims and the Title IX claims brought under Section 1983, as there was a separate enforcement mechanism under Title IX that covered the substance of both claims under Section 1681. See id. at 1072-74. The Court also granted the defendant's motion as to the plaintiff's First Amendment punitive damages claim in so far as it related to one of the defendants acting in an official capacity. See id. at 1077-78. However, the Court denied the motion as to the plaintiff's First Amendment claim generally and in relation to his request for punitive damages against the defendants acting in their individual capacities, and his Title IX (\u00a7 1681) claims against the School District. See id. at 1074-78. On May 22, 2001, the Court granted the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, reinstating his equal protection claim based on sexual orientation discrimination in light of a recent Ninth Circuit decision. The Court denied the plaintiff's motion for an interlocutory appeal and the defendant's qualified immunity defense. The Court entered a stipulation of dismissal of one of the individually named defendants without prejudice on September 9, 2002, due to a settlement agreement reached between the parties. On September 13, the Court entered a stipulation of dismissal as to the remaining defendants with prejudice due to a separate settlement agreement. According to Lambda Legal, the settlement resulted in the award of $451,000 in damages to the plaintiff and required the School District to implement new employee training and discrimination policies, and to explicitly recognize freedom of expression in relation to sexual orientation in schools. On January 17, 2013, the Court dismissed the claims against the remaining defendant, as she completed training required as part of the settlement agreement, closing the case.", "summary": "On January 28, 2000, a former high school student who experienced persistent physical and verbal harassment at the hands of peers, sued his school district in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. The plaintiff claimed that the school district's failure to respond to persistent complaints of harassment and abuse constituted violation of state tort law and intentional discrimination based on his sex and sexual orientation under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and Title IX, and that school officials' prohibitions against discussion of his sexual orientation resulted in First Amendment violations. The parties settled the case out of court, resulting in the award of $451,000 in damages to the plaintiff. The agreement also required the school district to implement new employee training and discrimination policies, and to explicitly recognize freedom of expression in relation to sexual orientation in schools. The case was closed on January 17, 2013."} {"article": "In Kitchen v. Herbert, on December 20, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah found Utah's ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional. About 1,300 same-sex marriages took place in Utah between that order and January 6, 2014, when the Supreme Court granted the state an emergency stay of order in Kitchen. Although these marriages were recognized as legal by U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, the State declined to recognize them. Instead, on January 8th, 2014, the Governor's office issued a directive stating that \"[b]ased on counsel from the Attorney General's Office regarding the Supreme Court decision, state recognition of same-sex marital status is ON HOLD until further notice.\" This case reflects litigation on that issue. On January 28th, 2014, four same-sex couples married in Utah between December 20th, 2013 and January 6th, 2014 brought suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 against the State of Utah in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah. The plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union. They sought recognition of their marriages and costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs alleged that they had valid marriages under Utah Code Title 30 Chapter 1, and argued that by putting their marriages \"on hold\", the defendants violated the plaintiffs' rights to due process of law under the United States and Utah constitutions. On February 4, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prohibit Utah from applying state marriage bans retroactively to same-sex couples who were married in Utah between December 20th, 2013, and January 6th, 2014. On May 19, 2014, the District Court (Judge Dale A. Kimball) granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. 2014 WL 2048343 (D. Utah, 2014). However, in the same ruling, the District Court stayed the preliminary injunction order for twenty-one days to allow the defendants to seek an emergency stay of case pending their interlocutory appeal to the Tenth Circuit. The state's interlocutory appeal was granted by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on June 4, 2014. Two days later the Tenth Circuit granted the defendant's motion for temporary stay of the district court's preliminary injunction order, pending its fuller consideration of a stay motion. On July 11, the Court of Appeals held that the state had not met the criteria for a longer-lived stay. However, it left the stay in effect until July 21, so that the state would have time to seek an emergency stay from the Supreme Court. On July 18, the Supreme Court granted such a stay, operative until resolution of the case by the Court of Appeals. The case mentioned earlier, Kitchen v. Herbert, which declared Utah's same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional, was denied review by the Supreme Court on October 6, 2014. By denying review of the decision in this case, the Supreme Court removed the stay, solidifying the constitutionality of same-sex marriage in Utah. With the stay of that decision removed, the defendants were now legally required to recognize the marriages of the plaintiffs in this case, and those similarly situated. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the appeal in the Tenth Circuit, which was granted by the Court of Appeals on October 8, 2014. The case was remanded back to District Court. On November 24, 2014, the parties filed a stipulation and joint motion to convert the District Court's preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction. The District Court (Judge Dale A. Kimball) granted this motion on the same day and awarded the plaintiffs $95,000.00 in attorney's fees and costs for the District Court as well as Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals litigation. This case is now closed.", "summary": "On January 28th, 2014, four same-sex couples who were legally married in Utah between December 20th, 2013, and January 6th, 2014 brought suit against the State of Utah in the District of Utah U.S. District Court under the Due Process Clause.They asked the court for an injunction ordering the State of Utah to withdraw any of its officials' instructions not to recognize the marriages by same-sex couples entered into during the time it was legal, a declaratory judgment stating that any statute preventing same sex couples from marrying does not retroactively strip recognition from the marriages by same-sex couples , to immediately recognize the marriages by same-sex couples entered into between December 20, 2013, and January 6, 2014 (including plaintiffs' marriages) as valid marriages, and costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. The District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on May 19, 2014 and, after the preliminary injunction was upheld by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, it was converted into a permanent injunction by the District Court on November 24, 2014. This case is now closed."} {"article": "On August 5, 1965, students of the Monroe City School System (MCSS), on behalf of black students and parents in the City of Monroe, filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana alleging racial segregation and discrimination in the operation of the schools. On September 17, 1965, a permanent injunction prohibiting the continued operation of a segregated school system was signed. After another decree was signed on February 11, 1970, the United States joined the action. In February of 1970, the Court also vacated the previous order and adopted a new plan that was eventually overturned by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for failure to establish a unitary system. On August 5th, 1970, the Court entered a decree in accordance with the Fifth Circuit mandate that was approved on June 30, 1971. This decree established a neighborhood school plan and oversight committee. There was subsequent litigation in the 1970s and 1980s brought by intervenors who challenged the validity of the plan, resulting in an appeal consolidating the intervention connected with this case with an appeal of another school desegregation case, Taylor v. Ouachita Parish School Board, 513 F. Supp. 375 (SD-LA-0021). The appeal attempted to consolidate the geographically overlapping school districts and relieve the MCSS of its desegregation plan. This litigation resulted in an order to eliminate the overlapping area between the two school districts and that MCSS devise a new desegregation plan that would ensure there was no discrimination in reassigning students to one of the two school systems (MCSS or Ouachita Parish schools). On July 6, 1992, the Court granted, in part, a motion for unitary status (that is, a motion declaring that vestiges of past segregation had been eliminated), stating that the MCSS was unitary in the area of facilities, extracurricular activities, and hiring and retention of teachers and administrators, but was not unitary in the area of teacher and principal assignments, student assignments, and transportation. On August 14, 2008, the District Court (Judge Robert G. James) issued an order clarifying the reporting requirements of the decree and amending it to state that the school district must report on its enrollment by grade and race for each school for the current year and the name and race of each teacher employed for the current year by October 15th of each year. On March 26, 2010, the Court amended the decree to allow the district to offer, in good faith, certain AP and honors courses and continue magnet, scholarship, and research programs, reporting the enrollment numbers of those courses and programs by race at the end of each year, with the rest of the decree remaining in effect. The Court also stated that the decree would be in force for five years, and that on June 30, 2014, the district would undergo a full evaluation and be given the chance to be declared a unitary district. On June 20th, 2012, the Court approved a change in attendance zones in the school district, saying that it would not affect the ongoing desegregation efforts. On August 15, 2014, the School Board submitted a status report stating that it has not communicated a desire to its legal counsel to have the Court declare the district unitary. Thus the litigation continues.", "summary": "In 1965, African American students of the City of Monroe sued the school district, alleging racial segregation, which resulted in various decrees to desegregate the school district. In 1992, the district was declared unitary in some aspects (extracurriculars, facilities, hiring and retention) but not in others (student and teacher assignments, transportation). In 2000, a judge was assigned to the case to continue monitoring the desegregation efforts, and the Court set a deadline of July 30, 2014 for the school district to submit a report for the Court to declare it unitary; the school district, however, did not choose to petition for unitary status by that deadline."} {"article": "On May 8, 2002, a prisoner at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility in Boscobel, Wisconsin filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The plaintiff asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants had violated his constitutional rights by taking away his clothes, forcing him to sleep on a concrete slab, denying him human contact, feeding him only \"nutri-loaf,\" and giving him only four squares of toilet paper at a time. He also alleged that his constitutional rights had been violated by a lack of due process, improper classification procedures, deprivation of heat in winter, inadequate health care, inadequate mental health care, deprivation of medication, and deprivation of soap, as well as denial of mail, visitors, phone privileges, canteen items, writing materials, and time with the law library. On March 31, 2005, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin (Judge William C. Griesbach) granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appealed. On November 14, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Judge Terence Thomas Evans) vacated the District Court's order of summary judgment and remanded the case to the District Court. Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2006). After remand, the parties entered a private settlement and the case was dismissed with prejudice on January 31, 2007. The terms of the settlement are unknown.", "summary": "This pro se prisoner 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin on May 8, 2002 against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections. The plaintiff alleged that the Defendants violated his constitutional rights and demanded declaratory and injunctive relief. On March 31, 2005, the Court (Judge William C. Griesbach) granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. However, on November 14, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Judge Terence Thomas Evans) vacated the order and remanded the case to the District Court. After remand, the parties entered a private settlement agreement, whose terms are not available to us, and the case was dismissed with prejudice on January 31, 2007."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action complaint requesting declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent infection of those confined in Philadelphia\u2019s Federal Detention Center (\u201cFDC\u201d), as well as writs of habeas corpus to achieve temporary release from FDC for the named petitioners and other detainees at an elevated risk from COVID-19. No outcome yet.
A national class of all persons currently and in the future (1) who have or will have an application for naturalization pending before USCIS, (2) that is subject to CARRP or a successor \"extreme vetting\" program, and (3) that has not been or will not be adjudicated by USCIS within six months of having been filed.And an \"adjustment class\":
A national class of all persons currently and in the future (1) who have or will have an application for adjustment of status pending before USCIS, (2) that is subject to CARRP or a successor \"extreme vetting\" program, and (3) that has not been or will not be adjudicated by USCIS within six months of having been filed.On July 5, 2017, the government filed a motion for reconsideration of District Judge Jones' June 21 order, arguing that plaintiffs could not show commonality in how CAARP had injured them and that the nationwide class certification and six-month adjudication deadline were erroneous. This was later denied on August 16, 2017. The court explained that the government had failed to identify an error in his order but instead simply had tried to re-argue the same position. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130836. The parties filed a joint status report and discovery plan on July 28, 2017. District Judge Jones scheduled the trial for Sept. 24-28, 2018 and set a discovery and briefing schedule. From October 2017 through April 2018, the parties engaged in a number of disputes over discovery. This resulted in an order to compel production of documents issued by District Judge Jones on April 11, 2018. In this order, the court criticized the government\u2019s intransigence during the discovery process, writing:
The Court has repeatedly explained to the Government that orders from the federal bench are mandatory, not voluntary...The executive branch does not stand alone in the federal system; the Government may not usurp the judicial branch and decide for itself when or if it will produce documents.In response, the government appealed to the Ninth Circuit, seeking vacatur of the district court's production orders, and, on April 20, filed an emergency motion in the district court for a stay of discovery pending appellate review. The Ninth Circuit opened a new docket (18-71171). District Judge Jones issued an April 24, 2018, order interpreting defendants' emergency motion as in fact a motion to consider the court's April 11 order, which Judge Jones declined. The district court ordered that rather than providing case-by-case determinations to plaintiffs, defendants could provide a sample of them instead to the court by May 1. 2018 WL 1737939. Defendants then asked the Ninth Circuit to stay the emergency petition in the meantime while defendants provided this sample to the district court. On May 10, 2018, the district court granted the government\u2019s motion for reconsideration of the April 11 order. This allowed the government to produce the class list under an attorney eyes only provision. 2018 WL 2159784. Later, the court granted the parties' stipulated order requesting that the district revise its protective order to permit plaintiffs\u2019 counsels\u2019 administrative and technical staff to also view and access the names, Alien numbers, and application filing dates of unnamed class members. The parties continued to dispute the scope of discovery and proposed deadlines throughout 2018. A bench trial was scheduled for July 2019, but on January 14, 2019, the court granted the defendants' motion to stay all deadlines in preparation for trial due to the lapse in appropriations funding for the DOJ. On February 14, 2019, the district court ordered the stay of deadlines lifted and for discovery to recommence. In October 2019, the district court set a bench trial for August 2020. But because of the time-consuming nature of the discovery process, the parties filed a joint motion to temporarily suspend the case schedule in March 2020. The court granted this and struck the August 17, 2020, trial date. Discovery continued through much of 2020. On December 18, 2020, the court set a March 2021 deadline for plaintiffs to file a motion and brief for summary judgment and an April deadline for defendants to file their cross-motion and brief. Despite President Biden\u2019s revocation of the Travel Ban EOs on Inauguration Day (January 20, 2021), the case continued. The district court reset the summary judgment deadlines on February 25, 2021, with all summary judgment motions and replies due by July 2, 2021. On April 5, 2021, the court substituted President Biden for former President Trump as a defendant. It appears that the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on March 25, 2021, and that the government filed its cross-motion for summary judgment on May 4, 2021, but this is difficult to confirm as these filings are sealed. As of July 23, 2021, the parties were disputing which filings related to the summary judgment briefs the district court should classify as \u201chighly sensitive documents.\u201d This case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2017, two Muslim men (one a Somali national and lawful permanent resident, the other an Iranian nonimmigrant visa holder) filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington (in Seattle). Suing the federal government, the plaintiffs alleged that US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) interpreted former President Trump\u2019s January 27 executive order (the first of the Travel Ban executive orders) to mandate suspension of adjudication of all pending petitions, applications, or requests from citizens or nationals of the seven banned countries, and that this suspension violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Establishment Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The plaintiffs also alleged that the order had or would expand USCIS's Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program (CARRP), which they argued imposed extra-statutory rules and criteria on Muslim applicants to delay and deny immigration benefits to which applicants were entitled."} {"article": "On June 24, 2014, plaintiffs, two same-sex couples living in Missouri, filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri Sixteenth Judicial Circuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Director of Jackson County Department of Recorder of Deeds in his official capacity. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Missouri Foundation, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the State of Missouri's laws barring same-sex marriage violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, plaintiffs argued that the bans deprived them of the fundamental right to marry under the Due Process Clause, made impermissible distinctions based on gender under the Equal Protection Clause, and would not pass rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. The Jackson County Recorder of Deeds had denied plaintiffs' marriage license applications solely because their relationships were same-sex. In response, plaintiffs brought suit asking the court to declare Missouri's same-sex marriage bans unconstitutional and to issue an injunction directing the defendant to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples with otherwise valid applications. On July 11, 2014, the Circuit Court (Judge Edith L. Messina) granted the Missouri Attorney General's uncontested motion to intervene as a matter of right on the state's behalf. Four days later, the Attorney General filed a notice of removal in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri, which moved the case to federal court. From then on, the Attorney General handled the defense on behalf of the state and the Recorder of Deeds. On November 7, 2014, the District Court for the Western District of Missouri (Judge Ortrie D. Smith) held that Missouri's same-sex marriage bans violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and it permanently enjoined the defendant at the Recorder of Deeds from denying marriage license applications based on the applicants' gender. Lawson v. Kelly, No. 14-0622-CV-W-ODS, 2014 WL 5810215, (W.D. Mo. 2014). The district court, however, dismissed one count in the plaintiff's complaint, which said that same-sex marriage bans did not pass rational basis review. This argument, the court held, was precluded by the decision in Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 867-68 (8th Cir. 2006). The district court stayed the effects of its judgment until the judgment was final. Plaintiffs filed a motion to lift the stay, which the district court denied. On December 5, 2014, the Attorney General filed a notice of appeal for the district court's November 7th order (No. 14-3779). On December 8, the plaintiffs filed a notice of cross-appeal for the count in its complaint (No. 14-3880), which the district court had dismissed. On the same day, the district court awarded plaintiffs attorneys' fees ($$31,610), expenses ($165.30), and costs ($100), staying the order pending completion of all appeals. On January 22, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied the same-sex couples\u2019 motion to vacate the district court's stay and the opposing party's motion to stay the appeal. Instead, the Eighth Circuit granted the same-sex couples' alternative motion to expedite the appeal. Argument was set both in this case and in two other same-sex marriage cases, Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard (PB-SD-0001 in this Clearinghouse) and Jernigan v. McDaniel (PB-AR-0004 in this Clearinghouse), for the second week of May, but on April 29, 2015, the Court of Appeals deferred further consideration of the cases until after the Supreme Court rendered a decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, in June 2015 (PB-OH-0003 in this Clearinghouse). On June 26, 2015, the day after the Obergefell decision by the Supreme Court, the parties moved to dismiss the case. On July 1, 2015, the Eight Circuit granted the State of Missouri\u2019s motion to dismiss its appeal and also granted appellees/cross-appellants' motion to dismiss their cross-appeal in No. 14-3880. The appellees/cross-appellants' motion to vacate the district court's stay order was denied as moot. On July 2, the district court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 second motion to vacate the stay of its November 7, 2014 judgment, and lifted the stay on the same day. On July 24, 2015, the appellees/cross-appellants\u2019 motion for attorney\u2019s fees was granted, at the amount of $27,883.50. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On June 24, 2014, plaintiffs, two same-sex couples living in Missouri, filed a lawsuit in state court under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Director of Jackson County Department of Recorder of Deeds in his official capacity. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Missouri Foundation, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the State of Missouri's laws barring same-sex marriage violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The District Court (Judge Ortrie D. Smith) held that Missouri's same-sex marriage bans violated the U.S. Constitution and permanently enjoined the defendant at the Recorder of Deeds from denying marriage license applications based on the applicants' gender. The court, however, stayed the effects of its judgment until the judgement was final. The case was on appeal to the Eighth Circuit, where it is being held pending the outcome of the Obergefell case in the Supreme Court. After the Obergefell decision, the Eighth Circuit dismissed the case in July 2014, and later that month the plaintiffs were awarded $27,883.50 in attorneys\u2019 fees. The case is closed."} {"article": "In June 2017, a JP Morgan Chase Bank employee filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). He received a right to due letter from the agency in February 2019. On May 30, 2019, the plaintiff filed this class action against JP Morgan Chase Bank in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Represented by the ACLU, the ACLU of Ohio, and the employment law firm Outten & Golden LLP, the plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. The plaintiff claimed that the company discriminated against him and other fathers by denying them paid parental leave on the same terms as mothers. He alleged that JPMorgan\u2019s parental leave policy violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Ohio Fair Employment Practices Act, and other state and local laws that prohibit employers from discriminating against employees based on sex or sex-based stereotypes. That same day, the plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for class certification, preliminary approval of a settlement class, and proposed notice procedure for absent class members. The case was transferred to Judge Susan Dlott days later. Under the settlement, the defendant agreed to maintain its current gender neutral parental leave policy, which was clarified following the filing of the plaintiff\u2019s discrimination charge. It also agreed to train those administering the policy on its gender neutral application and to pay $5 million to fathers who claimed they were denied the opportunity to take additional paid parental leave as primary caregivers. The Chase settlement is the first private class action to settle sex discrimination claims for a class of fathers who claim they were denied the opportunity to receive equal paid parental leave given to mothers. The court granted preliminary approval of the plaintiff\u2019s request for class certification of those who had similarly been unlawfully denied paid parental leave on the same terms as mothers on June 21, 2019. It set a date for a fairness hearing for November 6, 2019. The case is ongoing", "summary": "A plaintiff employee at JP Morgan Chase Bank filed this class action against his employer for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. He claimed that biological mothers were eligible for 16 weeks of paid parental leave, while fathers were only eligible for two weeks of paid parental leave. The case settled and is ongoing pending final approval."} {"article": "On September 11, 2014, two men, married in their church but not allowed to marry under Alabama law, filed this \u00a7 1983 lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama against the State of Alabama. The plaintiffs had applied, unsuccessfully, for a marriage license in Mobile County, Alabama. They initially represented themselves without lawyers. Later, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, Southern Poverty Law Center, ACLU of Alabama Foundation, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, and a private lawyer joined as counsel. The plaintiffs argued that Alabama's ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs requested that the court overturn the section of the Alabama State Code that mandated the ban on same-sex marriage. On October 17, 2014, the State of Alabama filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had named the state in their complaint, and the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against an unconsenting state. After retaining counsel the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 10, 2015, naming the Alabama Attorney General and a Mobile County Probate Judge as defendants. The plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief. Prior to the amended complaint the plaintiffs filed a motion for immediate preliminary and permanent injunctive relief on December 1, 2014. On January 26, 2015, the District Court (Judge Callie V.S. Granade) entered a preliminary injunction. It prohibited the Alabama Attorney General from enforcing the Alabama laws that ban same-sex marriage. Judge Granade adopted the reasoning from Searcy v. Bentley (PB-AL-0005), decided just three days earlier, in which she had held that Alabama's laws banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional because they violated the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. As in Searcy, the court stayed the injunction until February 9, giving the defendant time to seek a further stay pending appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. On February 3, 2015, the Eleventh Circuit sua sponte consolidated the appeals in this case and in Searcy and denied the Alabama Attorney General's motions for a stay pending appeal. In response, the Attorney General filed an application for stay with U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, the Circuit Justice for the Eleventh Circuit. Judge Granade denied the plaintiffs' request to lift the stay on February 4, 2015. Late on February 8, 2015, with Judge Granade\u2019s stay set to expire, the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, Roy Moore, sent an order to probate judges and state employees, threatening them with legal action by the governor if they issued or recognized same-sex marriage licenses. The Chief Justice claimed that the Searcy and Strawser orders bound only the Alabama Attorney General and his employees and not Alabama's probate judges. On February 9, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the application for stay, with Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting from the denial. Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940 (2015). As a result, Judge Granade\u2019s orders in Strawser and Searcy took effect: Alabama's ban on same-sex marriage was now illegal, at least according to the federal courts. Alabama's probate judges faced competing orders: Judge Granade\u2019s orders in Strawser and Searcy would allow same-sex marriage, but Chief Justice Moore's would not. The result was legal chaos. Some probate judges followed the federal court order and issued same-sex marriage licenses, but most probate judges refused; and many ceased issuing marriage licenses entirely. In the plaintiffs' county, Mobile County Probate Judge Don Davis refused to issue any licenses that day. As previously mentioned, on February 10, 2015, Judge Granade granted the plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended complaint, which added Probate Judge Don Davis as a defendant and also added, as plaintiffs, three other same-sex couples seeking marriage licenses from Mobile County. In addition, the district court scheduled a hearing, in two days' time, on the plaintiffs' proposed injunction, which would prevent the defendants from enforcing Alabama's same-sex marriage ban. On February 11, 2015, two conservative groups, the Alabama Policy Institute and the Alabama Citizens Action Program, filed an emergency petition in the Alabama Supreme Court. The petition sought a writ of mandamus ordering the state's probate judges \"not to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and not to recognize any marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples.\" See In Re: King (PB-AL-0009). The next day, on February 12, 2015, Judge Granade held a hearing and then issued an order, declaring the Alabama laws prohibiting same-sex marriage to be unconstitutional, and enjoining Probate Judge Don Davis from refusing to issue marriage licenses to the plaintiffs in this case. Strawser v. Strange, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1206 (S.D. Ala. 2015). In response, that afternoon, Mobile County began issuing same-sex marriage licenses. On February 15, 2015, Jefferson County Probate Judge Alan King filed a motion for leave to intervene in this case. The probate judge argued that the conservative groups were using their state court petition to thwart the district court's January 26 order. On February 17, 2015, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to enforce the January 26 order. They asked the district court to force the Alabama Attorney General to comply with the January 26 order by using his authority to dismiss the conservative groups' petition in the Alabama Supreme Court. The Attorney General had this power, the plaintiffs argued, because the conservative groups had filed as \"relators,\" purportedly on behalf of the state. Probate Judge Alan King made a similar motion. On February 20, 2015, Judge Granade denied Probate Judge King's request to intervene, because, the court held, Judge King did not have a legally recognizable interest in the lawsuit's subject matter. The court also denied King's and the plaintiffs' motions seeking to compel the state Attorney General to have the conservative groups' state court petition dismissed. On March 3, 2015, the Alabama Supreme Court, responding to the petition filed in In Re King, declared that the Alabama law prohibiting same-sex marriage did not violate the Constitution. The Alabama Supreme Court also enjoined Alabama's probate judges from issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, claiming that District Court decisions on the constitutionality of laws were not binding on Alabama courts, and that Judge Granade\u2019s injunctions applied only to the parties in Strawser and Searcy. 2015 WL 892752. Mobile County Probate Judge Don Davis, however, was under a February 12 federal injunction in this case, which forbid him from refusing to issue marriage licenses to the plaintiffs. Because of the conflicting injunction, the probate judge asked to be dismissed from the state action. The Alabama Supreme Court refused. Instead, the Alabama Supreme Court ordered him, by March 5, to advise it on whether there was a true conflict. The Alabama Supreme Court implied that there was no conflict if the February 12 federal injunction required Probate Judge Davis to issue licenses just to the plaintiffs in Strawser. Following the Alabama Supreme Court's decision, Mobile County stopped issuing marriage licenses entirely. Back in this case, on March 12, 2015, Judge Granade ordered Probate Judge Davis to respond to the plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended complaint (adding more parties), certification of plaintiff and defendant classes (as plaintiffs, all same-sex couples seeking to marry in Alabama and as defendants, all Alabama probate judges), and a preliminary injunction. Judge Granade later ordered the Alabama Attorney General to respond as well. On March 16, 2015, Judge Granade denied Probate Judge Davis's motion to stay the February 12 injunction against him. On May 21, 2015, Judge Granade granted class certification for both the plaintiff and defendant classes. The plaintiff class was defined as: All persons in Alabama who wish to obtain a marriage license in order to marry a person of the same sex and to have that marriage recognized under Alabama law, and who are unable to do so because of the enforcement of Alabama's laws prohibiting the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples and barring recognition of their marriages. And the defendant class was defined as: \"All Alabama county probate judges who are enforcing or in the future may enforce Alabama's laws barring the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples and refusing to recognize their marriages.\" 307 F.R.D. 604. In a separate order on that same date, Judge Granade issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting all members of the defendant class from refusing to issue marriage licenses solely on the basis that the couple asking for a license was of the same sex. In her order, Judge Granade specifically forbade the probate judges from following the contrary order from the Alabama Supreme Court. She stayed her injunction, however, pending the resolution of Obergefell v. Hodges, a case before the Supreme Court where the justices would consider whether the Constitution provided a right for same-sex couples to marry. On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court ruled on Obergefell v. Hodges. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). The Court held that the right to marry is fundamental, and that the 14th Amendment does not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. In response, Judge Granade lifted her stay, and the preliminary injunction requiring Alabama Probate Courts to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples went into effect. On July 17, 2015, the Alabama Attorney General\u2019s Office asked the Eleventh Circuit to dismiss Alabama's appeal, and to instruct Judge Granade that the final judgment in Searcy, which permanently enjoined the Alabama Attorney General from enforcing the Alabama Laws prohibiting same-sex marriage, rendered moot the Strawser plaintiffs\u2019 request for a permanent injunction against the Alabama Attorney General. On August 20, 2015, the Eleventh Circuit agreed to dismiss the appeal, but refused to issue the instructions that the Alabama Attorney General\u2019s Office had asked for, finding that the question of whether the Strawser plaintiffs\u2019 request for a permanent injunction was moot was properly left to Judge Granade in the first instance. On October 20, 2015, the Eleventh Circuit responded to a separate set of appeals from June 2015, by Alabama Probate Judge Tim Russel. The Court of Appeals found that Russel\u2019s appeal of Judge Granade\u2019s order denying his motion to dismiss on April 23, 2015, and his appeal of her preliminary injunction requiring him to issue same-sex marriage licenses on May 21, 2015, were moot because the Alabama Supreme Court\u2019s order requiring Probate Judges to follow the Alabama Laws prohibiting same-sex marriage was overturned by Obergefell. Separately, on January 6, 2016, then Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore issued an administrative order telling Alabama probate judges that, contrary to Strawser, Searcy, and Obergefell, they still had a duty to follow the Alabama laws prohibiting same-sex marriage and not issue marriage licenses to same sex couples. As a result of this order, the Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission filed charges against Roy Moore on March 4, 2016. Moore was suspended from his position pending the results of his hearing before the Alabama Court of the Judiciary, which took place on August 8, 2016. Moore was previously suspended and then removed from his position as Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice in 2003, when he placed a statue of the Ten Commandments in front of the Alabama Supreme Court\u2019s building and then failed to comply with a federal injunction ordering him to remove it. On September 30, 2016, the Alabama Court of the Judiciary again suspended Moore for the remainder of his term as Chief Justice. On June 7, 2016, Judge Granade again declared the Alabama laws prohibiting same-sex marriage unconstitutional, and granted the plaintiffs a permanent injunction requiring Alabama Probate Judges to issue same-sex marriage licenses. On June 15, the plaintiffs asked for an additional permanent injunction against the Attorney General of Alabama, which would be enforceable by the plaintiff class. They argued against the Alabama Attorney General\u2019s position that the injunction granted in Searcy made an additional permanent injunction unnecessary, noting that the injunction issued in Searcy wouldn\u2019t be enforceable by the plaintiff class in Strawser. On August 22, 2016, Judge Granade issued an amended final judgment, making the permanent injunction enforceable against the Attorney General of Alabama. On August 23, 2016, the plaintiffs were awarded $943.00 in costs. And on January 20, 2017, the plaintiffs' attorneys were awarded $315,000.00 in fees. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On September 11, 2014, two men married in their church, but not allowed to marry under Alabama law, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, against the State of Alabama. The plaintiffs had applied, unsuccessfully, for a marriage license in Mobile County, Alabama. They argued that Alabama's ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional because it violated their rights to Due Process, Equal Protection, and the free exercise of religion. The District Court granted the plaintiffs preliminary injunctive relief, prohibiting the Alabama Attorney General from enforcing Alabama laws that ban same-sex marriage. The Court's order was stayed until February 9. The defendant appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court, both whom refused to extend the stay. As a result, on February 9, the district court order took effect: the ban on same-sex marriage was now illegal in Alabama, at least according to the federal courts. Many state probate judges refused to issue licenses, however, citing an order from the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, and later a decision from that same court, requiring them not to issue same-sex marriage licenses. The case was stayed pending the outcome of Obergefell v. Hodges, which on June 26, 2015 held that the right to marry is fundamental, and that 14th Amendment does not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. On June 7, the district court judge ruled that the Alabama laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, and issued a permanent injunction requiring the Alabama probate judges to issue same-sex marriage licenses."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: On April 14, 2020, the State of New York filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to challenge Department of Labor regulations interpreting the Families First Coronavirus Response Act. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the state alleged that the rule conflicted with the plain language and purpose of the statute by creating broad, unauthorized benefits exclusions and imposed new restrictions and burdens on employees. On August 3, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and struck down four provisions of the FFRCA; the case closed shortly thereafter.
Richmond will accept the Court\u2019s invitation to continue as an amicus curiae in this important case and if Defendants\u2019 position against Richmond changes, Richmond will litigate the issues. . . . Richmond will continue to support its immigrant community and all residents of Richmond.In the absence of an amended complaint, this case appears to be closed in light of the July 12 dismissal.", "summary": "On Mar. 21, 2017, the city of Richmond, CA challenged Trump\u2019s Executive Order, which withholds federal funding from \"sanctuary jurisdictions.\" Richmond sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that it would be subject to financial and legal jeopardy if the federal government withheld funding from its municipal services. On Aug. 21, the Court granted the government's motion to dismiss, distinguishing Richmond's case from the related San Francisco/Santa Clara litigation. Because Richmond had not demonstrated that it had been targeted by the Order or that Richmond was not in compliance with the Administration's interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 1373, Judge William H. Orrick of the District Court for the Northern District of California found that Richmond lacked standing and that its claim was not yet ripe. Richmond declined to amend its complaint, and it appears this case has since been dismissed."} {"article": "On December 12, 2018, six low-income older adults and adults with disabilities filed a putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The case was assigned to Judge Robert L. Hinkle. Represented by Disability Rights Florida, Southern Legal Counsel, and Justice in Aging, the plaintiffs sued the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration and the Florida Department of Elder Affairs, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (\u201cADA\u201d) and the Medicaid Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants\u2019 administration of the Medicaid long-term care system violated the civil rights of the plaintiffs by requiring them to choose between receiving needed care and remaining in their homes. Specifically, the defendants\u2019 administrative, planning, and funding decisions heavily favored treatment in nursing facilities, perpetuating the unnecessary institutionalization and segregation of older adults and people with disabilities. The plaintiffs alleged that this violated Title II of the ADA. They sought declarative and injunctive relief. On March 12, 2019, the plaintiffs sought to certify a class. The proposed class consisted of adult residents of Florida who were at risk of unnecessary institutionalization without home- and community-based long-term care services because they: (1) were residing, and wish to remain, at home or in a community residential setting; (2) qualified or would qualify if allowed to enroll in the Long-Term Care Waiver; and (3) had been placed on the Long-Term Care Waiver waitlist. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 3, 2019, adding four new plaintiffs. On October 11, 2019, the defendants sought partial summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claim that \"despite the specific permission that federal law confers on Florida to limit the capacity of its program, the limits on enrollment in the long-term managed care program violate the general prohibition against discrimination in Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act.\" The court denied class certification on October 27, 2019, citing a conflict among proposed class members and stating that the plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently establish the numerosity requirement for class certification. 2019 WL 5677948. This led the defendants to file a second motion for partial summary judgment on February 6, 2020, asserting that the plaintiffs could recover only individual relief, not classwide relief. Following this motion, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for class certification on February 10, 2020, modifying the proposed class to eliminate conflicts among proposed class members. In addition, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, as to one plaintiff, on February 20, 2020. On March 31, 2020, the court issued a series of rulings on the motions. First, the court granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, stating that although \u201cthe ADA requires a state to provide reasonable accommodations for disabilities...the ADA does not require such an accommodation if it would fundamentally alter a state's programs.\u201d An injunction requiring the state to serve additional individuals through the waiver\u2014to obtain an increase in or to exceed the cap\u2014would fundamentally alter the state's program. 2020 WL 1547880. Second, the court denied the plaintiff\u2019s second motion to certify a class, finding that the motion was untimely and failed to adequately meet the prerequisites of class certification. 2020 WL 1545739. Third, the court granted in part the defendant\u2019s second motion for summary judgment. As the court denied the plaintiff\u2019s second motion to certify class, the court dismissed any claims for relief on behalf of individuals who were not named plaintiffs. 2020 WL 1545738. On May 11, 2020, the parties notified the court that they had reached a settlement in principle and would file dismissal documents in 30 days. The next day, the court dismissed all claims and reserved jurisdiction to enforce the order to comply with the settlement agreement. As of June 10, 2020, the settlement agreement has not been posted publicly. But as the enforcement of the settlement agreement is ongoing, this case remains open.", "summary": "On December 12, 2018, six low-income older adults and adults with disabilities filed a putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants\u2019 administration of the Medicaid long-term care system violated the civil rights of the plaintiffs by requiring them to choose between receiving needed care and remaining in their homes. On May 11, 2020, the parties notified the court that they have reached a settlement in principle. The next day, the court voluntarily dismissed on all claims, retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement."} {"article": "On May 11, 2016, Planned Parenthood of Greater Ohio and Planned Parenthood of Southwest Ohio filed this lawsuit in the U.S. Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The plaintiffs sued the Ohio Department of Health under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from cutting off the plaintiffs' access to state and federal funding. The plaintiffs claimed that on February 21, 2016, Ohio Governor John Kasich signed a law to bar Ohio Planned Parenthoods from receiving government funding for non-abortion services and programs. The plaintiffs alleged that the funding in question was necessary for vital health and education services used by the men, women, and teenagers of Ohio. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the law violated the First Amendment, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying funding in retaliation for the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected advocacy for abortion rights. On May 23, 2016, Judge Michael R. Barrett granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the defendants from cutting off funding until June 6, 2016. He held in abeyance the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. For the next few months both parties carried out discovery. 188 F.Supp.3d 684. On August 12, 2016, Judge Barrett granted the plaintiffs' motions for preliminary and permanent injunctions. The court found that the law in question did violate the plaintiffs' First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. Judge Barrett permanently enjoined the defendants from enforcing the law against the plaintiffs and other similarly situated. 2016 WL 10333130. On September 6, 2016, the defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. On April 18, 2018, a unanimous panel of the Sixth Circuit (Circuit Judges Helene N. White, Eugene E. Siler, Jr., and Eric L. Clay) affirmed the district court\u2019s grant of plaintiffs\u2019 motions for judgment on the merits and for a permanent injunction. 888 F.3d 224. However, the full court of the Sixth Circuit then voted for a rehearing en banc. On March 13, 2019, Circuit Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton, writing for the full court, reversed the district court\u2019s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court found that the plaintiffs did not have a due process right to perform abortions. Furthermore, the court found no evidence that the ban posed an undue burden on a woman\u2019s right to abortion. Although the plaintiffs argued that it had no obligation to establish an undue burden because the funding condition itself was unconstitutional, the court rejected that argument because the plaintiffs\u2014who were providers, not women\u2014did not possess the constitutional right to perform abortion; since there was no constitutional right, there was no unconstitutional condition. Circuit Judge White, who wrote the opinion for the April 2018 panel, dissented. 917 F.3d 908. The case was remanded to the district court, but the plaintiff stipulated to dismissal shortly thereafter. The case was officially dismissed on July 1, 2019. This case is now closed.", "summary": "On May 11, 2016, Planned Parenthood of Greater Ohio and Planned Parenthood of Southwest Ohio filed this lawsuit in the U.S. Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The plaintiffs sued the Ohio Department of Health under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from cutting off the plaintiffs' access to state and federal funding. On August 12, 2016, Judge Barrett granted the plaintiffs' motions for preliminary and permanent injunctions to enjoin the defendants from cutting off funding to the plaintiffs and others similarly situated. On March 13, 2019, the full court of the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The plaintiffs subsequently stipulated to a dismissal. The case was officially dismissed on July 1, 2019."} {"article": "On July 15, 2014, this class action was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the New York State Department of Health and the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance. The plaintiffs are elderly or disabled Medicaid recipients in New York who receive home-care services through Medicaid Managed Care Organizations (MCOs), which are privately-owned and operated companies contracted by the state. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief under the Medicaid Act, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, for violation of their due process rights under the 14th Amendment. The plaintiffs allege that these MCOs terminated or reduced their home-care services without proper notice; that the services were terminated or reduced without any change in their condition or circumstances that would warrant such an alteration; and that they were denied aid-continuing benefits pending internal appeals. The three named plaintiffs tell a similar story: They each received a letter from their MCO summarily reducing their amount of home care. The letters claimed to be new authorizations of care, rather than reductions in current services. In one case, the letter reduced the plaintiff's care from 10 hours per day to 5. Another's was tapered over a period of four months from 24 hours/day to a total termination of care. None of the notices identified any changes in the plaintiffs' conditions to warrant such a reduction. The plaintiffs were also denied continued care while their requests for fair hearings were pending. In filing their complaint, Plaintiffs claimed that this action was related to another case currently pending in the Southern District of New York, Strouchler v. Shah. Thus, this case was originally assigned to the judge of the Strouchler case (Judge Shira A. Scheindlin). But on August 4, 2014, the case was declined as not related. It was then assigned to Judge Colleen McMahon. The defendants filed an answer on November 14, 2014. The plaintiffs filed a motion to to amend the complaint to add another named plaintiff on March 16, 2015, and moved to certify class that day, with the proposed class defined as \"All current and future Medicaid recipients in New York State who receive home care services through Medicaid Managed Care Organizations and who have suffered or will suffer threatened or actual denials, reductions, or terminations of their home care services without timely and adequate notice, and/or without any change in their condition or circumstances which would justify a reduction or termination, and/or without aid-continuing benefits to which they are entitled.\" In April 2015, the Department of Health began to require the use of standardized forms to give recipients notice about the appeals process. The plaintiffs claimed that the adoption of the forms was \"not a panacea of for all of the systemic harms suffered by Plaintiffs.\" On July 27, 2015, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint to add another named plaintiff, but denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Though the court acknowledged that the case was paradigmatic of a type of case that was routinely certified as a class action prior to Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., it found it was not appropriate to certify it as a class action now. Class certification was denied because the claims of the named plaintiffs did not meet the \"commonality\" and \"typicality\" requirements after Wal-Mart. While the court acknowledged that the April 2015 implementation of model notices might provide some commonality, the named plaintiffs had not received the new standardized notices, and therefore the court found that their claims were not typical of the claims of individuals who were beginning to receive the new standardized form notice. The parties proceeded with discovery, until on October 13, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of all claims against the defendants, with all parties to bear their own costs and attorney's fees. Nothing in the docket indicates the reason for the dismissal\u2014we don't know if the case was settled out of court or if the plaintiffs simply gave up. The case was dismissed without prejudice on October 14, 2015.", "summary": "On July 15, 2014, this class action was filed in the Southern District of New York against that state's Department of Health. Plaintiffs are Medicaid recipients whose home care was terminated or reduced without proper notice. The court denied class certification on July 27, 2015, and the parties proceeded with discovery for some months until the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on October 13, 2015."} {"article": "On October 11, 2013, the Center for Rights of Parents with Disabilities (\"CRPD\") filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiff sued Colorado Homeless Families under the Federal Fair Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Represented by private counsel, CRPD asked for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's leasing policies discriminated against individuals with disabilities because they did not accept government benefits as a source of income. The defendant, Colorado Homeless Families, leases transitional housing to participants at favorable rates in order to help them \"get back on their feet\" and become self sufficient. On April 11, 2014, both parties filed a joint settlement agreement. The defendant agreed to alter its leasing requirements to accommodate individuals with disabilities. On April 11, 2014, the District Court of Colorado (Judge William J. Martinez) dismissed the suit in accordance with the settlement.", "summary": "In 2013, the Center for Rights of Parents with Disabilities filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the District of Colorado against Colorado Homeless Families, a transitional housing landlord. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant violated the Federal Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act by discriminating against individuals with disabilities whose only source of income was government benefits. The parties settled, and the defendant altered its leasing policies to accommodate individuals with disabilities."} {"article": "On July 19, 2006, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Colorado filed a 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, challenging the conditions of confinement at the Garfield County Jail in Glenwood Springs, Colorado. The plaintiffs alleged that prisoners in the Jail were subjected to a pervasive pattern of excessive force by Sheriff Deputies, including the misuse and abuse of pepperball guns, restraint chairs, tasers, electroshock belts, and pepper spray. The plaintiffs also alleged that the Sheriff failed to have proper written policies in place regarding the use of force and failed to enforce the policies that did exist. To remedy the alleged violations, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. An amended complaint was filed on August 1, 2006, adding claims that inmates were often subjected to harsh discipline without being afforded due process and that the Sheriff denied mentally ill prisoners mental health care. That same day, the plaintiffs also filed an amended motion to certify the case as a class action. The case was originally assigned to District Court Judge Phillip S. Figa. Judge Figa referred the handling of scheduling and discovery issues to Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe. On January 8, 2008, the case was reassigned to Judge Wiley Y. Daniel, in light of the death of Judge Figa. On March 13, 2008, the District Court partially granted and partially denied the motion to certify a plaintiff class. This decision was appealed, and on February 4, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ordered the District Court to reconsider its class certification order. The case is ongoing. On March 18, 2011, counsel for both parties filed a joint status report, indicating that they had reached a settlement subject to the approval of the four named plaintiffs, the terms of which are unknown. On April 28, 2011, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice, with each party bearing its own attorney fees, costs, and expenses. This case is closed.", "summary": "On July 19, 2006, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Colorado filed a class action lawsuit challenging the conditions of confinement at the Garfield County Jail in Glenwood Springs, Colorado. After the parties agreed to a settlement, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice, with each party bearing its own attorney fees, costs, and expenses. The terms of the settlement are unknown. This case is closed."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This class-action lawsuit originated with a claim that the Louisiana State Penitentiary provided inadequate medical care that violated the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment rights. Upon learning that the penitentiary planned to transfer individuals with COVID-19 to the penitentiary, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to stop the transfer and re-open discovery to determine that the defendant's policies for COVID-19 were adequate. Both motions were denied as non-justiciable. A settlement conference was held on June 4, and the case is ongoing with minimal docket activity.
Price subsequently sought class certification for female students at Yale who are discriminated against on the basis of sex by Yale's policies and practices \"with respect to the sexual harassment of women students by men in positions of authority, in particular by male faculty members and administrators, specifically by having to choose between toleration of, or compliance with, sexual demands and pressures by such men and any educational opportunity, benefit or chance to grow or advance educationally.\" Up to this time, the district court had not passed judgment upon the plaintiffs' request for class certification. Price also sought discovery aimed, in addition to adducing evidence supporting her personal claim, at adducing evidence supporting the claims of the class. Magistrate Latimer denied both the class certification and the extensive discovery request. In an unreported opinion, Magistrate Latimer found \"no compelling reason to certify a class, there being no reasonable probability that plaintiff's individual claim will become moot in the near future ... and any equitable relief to which she may be possibly entitled being obviously such as to inure to the benefit of all.\" He then narrowed Price's discovery request correspondingly.\"In addition, on June 30, 1978, Magistrate Judge Latimer denied a renewed motion to dismiss; Yale argued that because Price had been admitted to law school, her allegedly lowered grade was no longer affecting her in any way. Judge Latimer denied the motion because Price was still interested in pursuing other graduate school possibilities. The case proceeded to trial before District Judge Ellen Burns. After a seven day trial Judge Burns found that \"the grade of 'C' which she received in his course did not reflect consideration of any factor other than academic achievement.\" Nonetheless, Judge Burns proceeded to consider the adequacy of Yale's procedures for handling complaints of sexual harassment, and found that they were inadequate:
This court is in agreement that the procedures set forth above give no real guidance to students or to faculty as to procedure. . . . The suggestion that one first approach the offending faculty member seems particularly inappropriate in such a case.However, given its factual findings about the grade allegations, Judge Burns refused to enjoin Yale to establish a different procedure, concluding, \"(I)t does not follow that, if Yale University failed to articulate appropriate procedures to deal with such a claim, a plaintiff who can show neither an improper advance nor the injury she claimed has a grievance to be redressed by this court.\" The district court therefore entered judgment for Yale on July 3, 1979. Although the plaintiffs lost on the facts, they had won an important--and landmark--legal victory; the district court held both that \"academic advancement conditioned upon submission to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimination in education,\" and that Yale's investigatory and remedial processes were inadequate. This was years before the Supreme Court endorsed the legal theory that conditioning employment on submission to sexual advances similarly constitutes sex discrimination. Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal; on September 22, 1980, in an opinion by Judge Edward Lumbard, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980). It agreed with the District Court that--since plaintiffs sought only injunctive relief, not damages--plaintiffs' claims were mooted by their graduation. The Court noted, as well:
\"It is perhaps more important to note that, as Yale's counsel has assured us in brief and oral argument, Yale in fact has adopted a set of procedures for hearing such complaints. The procedures were proposed by a committee consisting of faculty, administrators and students, in a report published March 1979, following a year of careful study specifically limited to the problems involved in structuring procedures appropriate for consideration of student complaints of sexual harassment. Furthermore, Yale's counsel has also assured us that although the procedures were originally designed only to receive and consider claims of sexual harassment occurring at Yale College, their jurisdiction has since been expanded to afford consideration of claims by those who suffer harassment while participating in any program sponsored by the University. We have no reason to doubt that the procedures now in effect will tend to alleviate the \"atmosphere of inequality\" alleged by plaintiffs in this suit. Thus, it appears that the major relief sought in this suit has already been granted.\"The Court of Appeals agreed, as well, with the District Court that if the plaintiff had failed to prove the incident she claimed, she was not entitled to injunctive relief just because the procedures were inadequate. The case was therefore done.", "summary": "This case was the first sexual harassment case brought under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1681 et seq., which bans sex discrimination in education by institutions that receive federal funding. It further established that sexual harassment of female students could be considered sex discrimination, and was thus illegal."} {"article": "On June 30, 2016, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District Court of Illinois against Cook County Jail under section \u00a71983, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants prohibited delivery of written speech from PLN and other related publications, failing to provide due process via notice and opportunity to challenge the censorship and denying Plaintiff equal protection as required under the Constitution. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the censorship practices, as well as compensation for damages and legal fees. On July 1, 2016, the plaintiff motioned for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the Jail's mailroom policies and practice of allowing some newsprint while barring PLN violate the plaintiff's right under the First Amendment, Due Process, and Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution. On November 21, 2016, the court (Judge Joan Gottschall) denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, stating preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief. The court noted that the regulations were at least rationally related to prison security and that it could not grant such extraordinary relief on the indeterminate factual record plaintiffs had provided at that time. The parties appear to have been engaged in settlement talks after the denial. On March 30, 2017, the court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Marie Valdez for a settlement conference. Initially that proved unsuccessful, and on January 24, 2018, the parties informed the court that settlement discussions had been unsuccessful, leading the court to set a schedule for discovery. However, in the months that followed the parties returned to negotiating a settlement, and appear to have reached one that will resolve the case. On December 12, 2018, the parties informed the court that the settlement they reached called for the court to resolve the dispute over plaintiff's fees. The court set a date for a hearing on the motion for fees, but on March 11, 2019, the court granted a joint motion to stay that hearing in light of the parties' representation that they have agreed in principle to settle their dispute over costs and fees. On June 25, 2019, the parties agreed to a settlement agreement and the case was dismissed. The settlement agreement stipulated that the defendants would establish, implement, and enforce policies that will ensure the delivery of Human Rights Defense Center Publications. The settlement also stipulated that the defendants would pay $75,000 in attorneys\u2019 fees and $35,000 in damages. In addition, if any HRDC publications are withheld from prisoners, jail officials will provide written notice within five business days. Copies of the policies were made available to both jail staff and prisoners within 60 days after the settlement, and they will be included in the Prisoner Handbook. The parties agreed that, with the Court's finding, this case was only concerning the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of a publisher, and therefore was not a case concerning prison conditions that are defined in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996. The case was dismissed without prejudice with the right to refile prior to June 27, 2022. If no such refiling occurs, the case will become dismissed with prejudice.", "summary": "On June 30, 2016, PLN filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cooks County against Cook County Jail, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The case was settled on June 25, 2019 with the defendants agreeing to implement policies to ensure the delivery of Human Rights Defense Center Publications."} {"article": "On September 12, 2011, the Authors Guild and several other national and international organizations representing the interest of authors filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the HathiTrust, the President and Regents of the University of Michigan (the lead institution behind the HathiTrust), and the presidents, trustees, and regents of several other universities participating in the HathiTrust. The HathiTrust runs the HathiTrust Digital Library (HDL), a digital archive reproducing and making available online a substantial part of the collections of the libraries of the defendant universities. The HDL was produced in cooperation with Google, Inc.; in exchange for providing the digital scanning service and related services, the HathiTrust allowed Google to retain digital copies of all books. Google made these books searchable via its Google Books service, where non-copyrighted works are available for viewing and downloading in their entirety to any Google user. Users can search for terms even in copyrighted works, seeing an index of each occurrence of the term, with a small \"snippet\" of the text immediately surrounding it to provide context. A separate suit was filed by the Plaintiffs against Google. That case can be found at DR-NY-0006 in this Clearinghouse. The books digitized by the HathiTrust, numbering close to ten million volumes at the time of the suit, are all scanned by Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software so that their full text can be searched and so that they are accessible to blind and visually impaired readers by way of text-to-speech software and/or braille displays. The HDL makes out-of-copyright books in its collection fully available to its users. The HDL has an initiative called the \"Orphan Works Project\", which identifies works likely to be under copyright and seeks attempts to locate the copyright holder; if the copyright holder cannot be identified through the HDL's procedures, HDL then makes the work available to its users. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Orphan Works Project and the HDL more generally were in violation of the United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 101 et seq., and sought a declaration to this effect and an injunction that would effectively stop the HathiTrust from operating the HDL. Neither the original complaint nor an Amended Complaint addressed the issue of accessibility for blind users. On December 12, 2011, the National Federation of the Blind and several related individuals (NFB) filed a motion to intervene as defendants. This motion was granted with the consent of the plaintiffs on January 24, 2012. On June 29, 2012, the NFB and related intervenor defendants moved for summary judgment. In their motion the NFB argued that under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act Extension of 1976, universities are required to afford equal access to their libraries and that prior to the HDL, blind patrons did not have such access. They further argued that the legislative history of \u00a7 107 of the Copyright Act showed that Congress specifically considered making copies of works available to the blind to be an example of fair use. Prior to the creation of the HDL, the NFB argued, it was impossible for blind students and scholars to use effectively university libraries for research, even when the libraries offered scanning services for blind patrons, which would make specific works available to the blind, because this service was usually reserved for books assigned on class syllabi, and because the libraries often lacked indexes of the portions of their collections available to blind patrons. The NFB cited the Chafee Amendment to the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 121, which specifically authorizes the reproduction of copyrighted material when \"information access needs of blind or other persons with disabilities\" are \"a primary mission\" of a institution making the material available. They documented that the University of Michigan did consider the accessibility to be one of their primary goals motivating the HDL project. On the same day the NFB's motion was filed, the original defendants separately filed two additional motions for summary judgment, arguing that the activities of the HDL were permissible under the fair use exception of the Copyright Act, and that the plaintiffs lacked the necessary standing under the Act to bring the case. On October 10, 2012, U.S. District Judge Harold Baer granted the Defendants and intervening defendants motions for summary judgment, finding that specifically that the University of Michigan's participation was authorized under the ADA and the Chafee Amendment, and also that the HDL as a whole was authorized more broadly under the general fair use provisions of the Copyright Act. 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The defendants and intervening defendants filed motions to recover costs and attorneys' fees from the plaintiffs. On February 15, 2013, these motions were denied. The court reasoned that although the court found for the defendant intervenors regarding the larger question of how copyright should account for the advance of technology, the plaintiffs acted reasonably. The plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On June 10, 2014, the Second Circuit entered its decision. Going through a classic four-factor analysis under the fair use doctrine, the Circuit held that the doctrine of fair use allowed defendants to create a full\u2010text searchable database of copyrighted works and to provide those works in formats accessible to those with disabilities. Plus, the Circuit concluded and that claims predicated upon the Orphan Works Project are not ripe for adjudication. The Second Circuit remanded in part to the district court, however, on the issue that whether the remaining plaintiffs had standing to challenge the defendants making replacement copies of books that have been lost, destroyed, or stolen. On December 30, 2014, the district court entered a stipulation on this remanding issue and dismissed the this case. Specifically, the parties stipulated that defendants would only make copies when the original copy was damaged, deteriorating, lost, or stolen and that an unused replacement could not be obtained at a fair price. Within a five-year term, the defendants agreed to promptly notify plaintiffs if the policies were changed.", "summary": "A group of universities, led by the University of Michigan, organized the HathiTrust, which collaborated with Google to digitally scan the contents of their libraries and make their collections available online to researchers and library patrons. On September 12, 2011, the Authors Guild and several other groups representing the interests of publishers and authors filed a civil suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, against the HathiTrust and several affiliated universities, alleging copyright violation. The National Federation for the Blind joined the case as an intervening defendant, arguing that the HathiTrust provided a resource essential to making libraries accessible to blind patrons, and that its actions were permissible under the fair use exceptions of the Copyright Act and under the ADA. The court ruled in favor of the defendants and intervening defendants on summary judgment, but denied their motions for attorneys' fees."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: On March 31, 2020, the Women\u2019s Health Center of West Virginia and its patients brought this suit against West Virginia to enjoin the state enforcing the Governor's Executive Order which prevents people from obtaining abortion care during COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. On April 28, the defendant announced a new Executive Order which allowed the plaintiffs to resume its operations. With the new order, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case on May 6, which the court approved the next day. The case is now closed.
All individuals who are now or who in the future will be housed WGYCF and who live with a serious mental illness, referred to in this MOA as \"Plaintiffs\" or \"prisoners.\"And:
1) All male youth who are ages 17 and under and who are now or in the future will be housed in a Mississippi Department of Corrections prison and who live with a serious mental illness, and 2) all male youth who are ages 18 and 19 and who will be housed in the YOU who live with a serious mental illness, referred to in this MOA as \"Plaintiffs,\" \"prisoners,\" or \"youth.\"While this case was ongoing, the Department of Justice was conducting a separate investigation of the facility. The Department of Justice released its findings on March 20, 2012. Although the DOJ investigation and this case are very separate, the plaintiffs in this case entered the DOJ's findings into the record on March 21, 2012 for the court to take judicial notice of. On May 29, 2012, the Court held an emergency hearing, requested by the plaintiffs in light of two incidents, a rape and a stabbing, that had occurred after the consent decrees went into effect. The parties agreed that the defendants would alert the plaintiffs' counsel if there were any further incidents of violence at the facility, and that they would work together to keep further incidents from occurring as the consent decrees took effect and changes began to be made. On July 10, 2014, a riot took place at WGYCF, more extreme than a previous riot that took place six months earlier. These riots prompted the plaintiffs to file a motion for enforcement and modification of consent decree on August 6, 2014, in which they requested an evidentiary hearing in order to take testimony on whether additional remedial measures were required to provide reasonably safe living conditions and freedom from violence at WGYCF. No hearing was immediately set, as the Court allowed for the parties to pursue their mediation obligations between themselves and through the magistrate judge. On March 13, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to terminate prospective relief granted and ordered by the Court\u2019s approval of the consent decree. A hearing on both motions was held in April 2015. On June 11, 2015, the Court issued an order denying the defendants' motion to terminate the consent decree. The Court denied the plaintiffs' motion to modify the consent decree and granted in part the motion to enforce the consent decree's substantive provisions of regrading classification and housing system and protection from harm. The court found that, while the defendants had improved upon the conditions that existed at the time of the riots and a majority of the consent decree's provisions were no longer necessary, ongoing violations of the plaintiffs\u2019 Eighth Amendment rights remained. The Court continued to enforce the consent decree. 2015 WL 3795020. On July 13, 2015, the defendants filed an appeal from the denial of the defendants' motion to terminate the consent decree with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Before the Fifth Circuit could render an opinion, Walnut Grove was closed. On September 27, 2016, the Fifth Circuit found that the closing mooted the appeal and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, but held that the District Court retained jurisdiction to rule on the plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees and costs. 669 F. App'x 209. On September 22, 2017, Judge Reeves ordered the defendants to pay $496,859.25 in attorney's fees and costs. Judge Reeves also entered a final judgment in the case that day, with all the plaintiffs' claims dismissed with prejudice. The plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney fees on fees litigation. On April 25, 2018, the Court ordered the defendants to pay $35,343.15 in fees on fees. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This is a class action suit filed by boys and young men imprisoned at the Walnut Grove Youth Correctional Facility in Mississippi to challenge conditions of confinement that investigators for the federal government referred to as \"among the worst that [they] have seen in any facility anywhere in the nation.\" The parties reached a settlement agreement providing plaintiffs with injunctive relief in 2012. After the District Court declined to terminate the consent decree in 2015 and the defendants appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit, the Walnut Grove facility closed in 2016 and the case is now closed."} {"article": "On May 23, 2012, two women officers in the U.S. Army Reserve, sued the Department of Defense and the Army in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that their Fifth Amendment rights had been violated by the Department of Defense. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed the policy of excluding women from 'direct combat' operations violated the Administrative Procedures Act and the plaintiffs' equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment. As part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011, the Department of Defense (DoD) was required to submit a report reviewing its combat exclusion policies for women. The DoD had, since 1994, a specific policy of excluding women from being part of units, from the battalion-level down, that engaged in direct combat. The Army had a similar policy. On February 9, 2012, the DoD submitted the report to Congress, detailing how the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force would be given the power to place women into 'direct combat' units, and that the results of this practice would inform future policymaking. The plaintiffs claimed that the DoD policy still permits the exclusion of women from any position where 'job related physical requirements would necessarily exclude the vast majority of women Service members.' Plaintiffs claim that (1) the policy violates their equal protection rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (2) that Army officers are already circumventing the DoD policy by 'attaching' women to combat brigades, calling them \"Cultural Support Teams.\"; and (3) that the policy of excluding women is futile. The complaint points out that warfare has become non-linear, and that women who are not given weapons and combat training are ill-suited and endangered when the units to which they are assigned come under attack. On November 4, 2013, the parties submitted a notice of voluntary dismissal. The next day, the Court approved the notice and the case was dismissed without prejudice.", "summary": "Plaintiffs, two female Army Reserve officers, sued the Department of Defense, alleging that the exclusion of women from direct combat units violates their equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment. This is an ongoing case."} {"article": "A Seattle resident who had been terminated from the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program brought this class action suit on 02/20/2009, alleging that the administration of the Program in Seattle discriminated against residents with disabilities. The named defendants were the Seattle Housing Authority (SHA) and the Executive Director of SHA in his official capacity. Colombia Legal Services represented the plaintiff, and the case was assigned to Judge Marsha J. Pechman of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The Fourth Amended Complaint alleged that SHA\u2019s Section 8 voucher termination process prior to August 1, 2008 did not meet constitutional standards; SHA discriminated against voucher holders with disabilities by failing to provide them with reasonable accommodations; and SHA discriminated against voucher holders by not permitting them to live with closely related family members. The plaintiff filed the lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 3601 et seq.), and a collection of state and federal anti-discrimination statutes and their accompanying regulations. They also alleged that the defendants' conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment's and Washington State Constitution's Due Process Clauses. The plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction on March 25, 2010, requesting that her Title 8 voucher be reinstated. On May 13, 2010, after five additional filings from the parties and oral argument, Judge Pechman denied the motion (2010 WL 1945740). She found that it was not clear that the plaintiff was likely to prevail on the merits, making preliminary relief inappropriate. Over the course of the litigation, Judge Pechman ruled in favor of the plaintiff on three issues. First, on April 22, 2010, she denied defendants' motion to dismiss (2010 WL 1945740). Second, on February 3, 2011, she granted the plaintiff's motion for discovery sanctions (2011 WL 338793). Finally, on April 21, 2011, she granted the plaintiff's motion for a protective order (2011 WL 1561791). She also ruled in favor of the defendants once. The initial complaint had included claims against the Department of Housing and Urban Development, but the court granted summary judgment for the Department on March 29, 2011 (2011 WL 1213168). The parties filed a joint motion for a class action settlement on September 8, 2011. The settlement class included all 82 SHA Section 8 voucher holders who had a termination hearing on or after February 20, 2006 and before August 1, 2008, and whose Section 8 vouchers were terminated as a result of the hearing. The settlement had five main terms: 1) the SHA agreed to make substantive changes and clarifications in its policy regarding individuals with disabilities, 2) the SHA agreed to amend the list of documents it will accept as proof that a household is a primary residence of a minor, 3) the SHA agreed to amend its Administrative Plan to provide for discretionary extension of the time individuals may be allowed to remain in a subsidized residence, 4) addition of requirements that SHA hearing officers include written notice of the availability of judicial review in the termination of Section 8 vouchers, and 5) the SHA agreed to provide a new termination hearing to each class member who requests one. In addition to institutional reforms, the settlement awarded $15,000 in relief to named plaintiffs and $180,000 in attorney's fees. Judge Pechman issued her final order and judgement granting approval of the class action settlement on January 10, 2012. As part of the settlement, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claims with prejudice while retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. The Clearinghouse does not know if the court continues to enforce the settlement, but there has been no docket activity since the parties filed a redacted status report on March 11, 2013.", "summary": "On January 1, 2011, a plaintiff in Seattle, WA filed a class action complaint alleging that the Seattle Housing Authority's Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program impermissibly discriminated against residents with disabilities. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the program's termination proceedings, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, and policy regarding the inclusion of family members violated the rights of residents with disabilities under the Due Process Clause, Fair Housing Act, and federal and state anti-discrimination legislation. The parties came to a settlement agreement in which the SHA agreed to amend its policies and grant class members new hearings. The settlement was approved on January 10, 2012."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas action brought on behalf of classes of pre-trial and post-trial detainees at the Oakland County Jail, seeking release in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs also sought an injunction that would require the defendants to take concrete steps towards protecting those in the jail from COVID-19. On May 21, the judge conditionally certified the class and granted the preliminary injunction, requiring the jail to take certain safety and hygiene measures. This was reversed by the Sixth Circuit on July 9. The district court denied defendants' subsequent motion to dismiss the case and set discovery and settlement deadlines for summer 2021.
Credible Fear Interview Class: All detained asylum seekers in the United States subject to expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1225(b) who are not provided a credible fear determination within ten days of the later of (1) requesting asylum or expressing a fear of persecution to a DHS official or (2) the conclusion of any criminal proceeding related to the circumstances of their entry, absent a request by the asylum seeker for a delayed credible fear interview. Bond Hearing Class: All detained asylum seekers who entered the United States without inspection, were initially subject to expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1225(b), were determined to have a credible fear of persecution, but are not provided a bond hearing with a verbatim transcript or recording of the hearing within seven days of requesting a bond hearing. 2019 WL 1056466.On April 5, 2019, Judge Pechman issued an order granting the plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The injunction mandated that the defendants conduct bond hearings within seven days of a bond request by a class member and that the burden would be placed on the defendants to demonstrate why the class member should not be released on bond. The injunction also mandated that the bond hearing be recorded and that a written decision with individualized determinations and finding be produced at the conclusion of a bond hearing. 379 F. Supp. 3d 1170. On April 26, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to vacate the preliminary injunction. On May 20, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint in light of the Attorney General's decision in the Matter of M-S-, \"announcing that immigrants in removal proceedings awaiting the determination of their application for asylum must be detained for the duration of that process, subject to release only under a highly-limited 'parole' system adjudicated solely by immigration officials.\" The plaintiffs added three new claims to challenge the Attorney General's decision; (1) that section \u00a7 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) is unconstitutional, (2) that the Attorney General\u2019s decision in Matter of M-S- violates section 1225(b)(1), and (3) Matter of M-S- should have been issued in notice and comment rulemaking. The plaintiffs also amended the complaint to add declaratory and injunctive relief mandating that the defendants do not follow a policy of denying bond hearings to noncitizens found to have a credible fear of persecution. On May 28, 2019, in wake of the Attorney General's decision, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Modification of the Existing Preliminary Injunction. The plaintiffs sought to have the preliminary injunction modified to ensure that class members found to have credible fear would be granted a bond hearing before an impartial adjudicator to determine if further detention is justified. On July 2, 2019, Judge Pechman issued an order affirming the previously entered preliminary injunction and modifying the injunction to conclude that the Bond Hearing Class is constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing pending resolution of their asylum applications. Judge Pechman found that the statute denying these class members a bond hearing is unconstitutional because \"any statute that provides for 'no bond hearing at all' is unlawful on its face.\" 387 F. Supp. 3d 1219. On July 3, 2019, the defendants appealed the order affirming and modifying the preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit. Only July 9, 2019, the defendants filed an Emergency Motion to Stay Pending Appeal the district court's preliminary injunction, arguing that the injunction will cause substantial harm to the defendants by \"drastically limiting the government\u2019s ability to enforce the immigration laws that Congress has written.\" On July 12, 2019, the Ninth Circuit issued a temporary stay on the preliminary injunction to allow for the parties to file briefs on the Motion to Stay Pending Appeal. On July 22, 2019, Circuit Judges Mary Schroeder, William Canby, and Morgan Christen issued an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' Emergency Motion to Stay. The appeals court declined to stay the part of the district court injunction holding that the Bond Hearing Class is constitutionally entitled to bond hearings pending resolution of their asylum applications. The appeals court granted the motion to stay the part of the injunction regarding deadlines for requested bond hearings and the procedural guidelines for those bond hearings, finding that these procedures would impose a short-term hardship on the government and the immigration system. After hearing oral argument in October 2019, on March 27, 2020, a Ninth Circuit panel (Judge Sidney R. Thomas, Judge Michael Daly Hawkins, and Judge Bridget S. Bade) issued an opinion and order affirming in part the district court's preliminary injunction and directing the district court to \"reconsider some of the technical aspects of its order.\" 2020 WL 1482393. Writing for the panel, Judge Thomas concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their due process claim regarding the availability of bond hearings, \"that they are constitutionally entitled to individualized bond hearings before a neutral decisionmaker,\" and that \"the theoretical availability of the habeas process did not alone satisfy due process.\" Moreover, Judge Thomas held that the district court did not abuse its discretion \"in concluding that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm absent the grant of a preliminary injunction,\" in the form of \"substandard physical conditions, low standards of medical care, lack of access to attorneys and evidence as Plaintiffs prepare their cases, separation from their families, and retraumatization of a population already found to have legitimate circumstances of victimization.\" However, Judge Thomas vacated and remanded to the district court Part A of the preliminary injunction, which laid out the procedural guidelines for the required bond hearings, to further develop the factual record and to revisit the scope of the injunction. Judge Bade dissented from the panel's opinion and order and concluded that:
\"despite Congress unequivocally barring lower courts from issuing classwide injunctions against the operation of certain immigration statutes, the majority opinion gives a green light for the district courts in this circuit (as well as this court) to issue (and uphold) such relief. And, even if the district court had jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief, the preliminary injunction is overbroad and exceeds what the Constitution demands.\"The defendants then filed a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the Ninth Circuit\u2019s decision on August 24, 2020. The case was docketed in the Supreme Court as No. 20-234. The parties agreed to stay the case while the cert petition was pending in the Supreme Court, and the district court stayed the case on September 11, 2020. The Supreme Court granted the cert petition on January 11, 2021. In the same order, it vacated the judgment and remanded the case the Ninth Circuit in light of the Court\u2019s decision in Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security earlier in the summer. On February 16, 2021, the defendants requested that Ninth Circuit stay appellate proceedings. The Ninth Circuit granted this motion and held the appeal in abeyance. It further directed the parties to file a status report within 60 days of how the case should proceed. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "Three plaintiffs, mothers of minor children, filed this class action complaint challenging the federal government's forcible separation of minor children from their parents, as well as its practice of prolonging the separation by failing to conduct credible fear interviews in a timely manner and its practice of excessively prolonging the detention of asylum seekers by delaying their bond hearings. They plan not to pursue the separation claims, pending the government's compliance with a nationwide injunction against family separation, but they continue to seek relief for the bond hearings claims. The district court certified two classes; the Credible Fear Interview Class and the Bond Hearing Class. The district court ordered a preliminary injunction, mandating that the government conduct bond hearings within seven days of a bond request and finding that denying bond hearings to these class members is unconstitutional. In March 2020, a Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the district court's nationwide preliminary injunction and remanded proceedings to the district court to reconsider the procedures for the bond hearings. The defendants filed a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, seeking further review of the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Supreme Court granted the cert petition on January 11, 2021. In the same order, it vacated the judgment and remanded the case the Ninth Circuit in light of the Court\u2019s decision in Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security earlier in the summer. The defendants then requested the Ninth Circuit hold the appeal in abeyance. The case is ongoing."} {"article": "The U.S. Census Bureau, a division of the U.S. Department of Commerce, conducts a census every ten years. The census surveys the number of persons in each household and, in the process, gathers certain demographic information about those persons. The Bureau\u2019s stated goal in administering the census \u201cis to count every person living in the United States once, only once and in the right place.\u201d In 2018, the Department of Commerce announced the final list of questions for the 2020 decennial census that it will submit to Congress. This would include a question asking the citizenship status of every person in every household in the US, which has not been done since 1950. The citizenship question asked, \u201cIs this person a citizen of the United States?\u201d and required the respondent to select one of the following responses: 1) \u201cYes, born in the United States\u201d; (2) \u201cYes, born in Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, or Northern Marianas\u201d; (3) \u201cYes, born abroad of U.S. citizen parent or parents\u201d; (4) \u201cYes, citizen by naturalization \u2013 Print year of naturalization\u201d; or (5) \u201cNo, not a U.S. citizen On April 17, 2018, the city of San Jose and the Black Alliance for Just Immigration (BAJI) filed a complaint against Wilbur Ross, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce; the U.S. Department of Commerce; Ron Jarmin, in his official capacity as Acting Director of the U.S. Census Bureau; and the U.S. Census Bureau. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that including the citizenship question on the 2020 Census violated the Constitution\u2019s \u201cactual Enumeration\u201d mandate and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) prohibition against \u201carbitrary and capricious\u201d agency action. Further, to avoid irreparable harm, the plaintiffs sought an injunction prohibiting the Bureau from including the citizenship question on the 2020 Census. The plaintiffs claimed that that fewer people would respond to the 2020 Census if it included a citizenship question. The inaccurate data would in turn result in funding allocations that would disadvantage San Jose and its residents. The data from the 2020 Census would be used not only to allocate congressional seats but also to determine funding for public health, education, transportation and neighborhood improvements, all of which are determined based on the population as determined by the Census. An increase in the undercount of persons living in San Jose, and specifically an increased undercount of minority populations, would lead to San Jose and its residents suffering harm through both lost representation in the United States House of Representatives and millions of dollars of foregone federal funding. BAJI claimed it would also be harmed due to the diversion of essential and limited resources\u2014including time and money\u2014from other important matters that it ordinarily would have been addressing through dialogues, presentations, workshops, publications, technical assistance and trainings to build alliances between African American and immigrant communities, in order to educate its diverse constituents regarding issues related to the census citizenship questions. Like the residents in San Jose, the minority and immigrant communities BAJI serves would also be deterred from responding to the 2020 Census because of the citizenship question. The complaint was filed in the US District Court of California (Northern District \u2013 San Jose Division). The case was originally assigned to Magistrate Judge Howard R. Lloyd, but San Jose did not consent to a US Magistrate Judge\u2019s jurisdiction, and the case was randomly reassigned to U.S. District Judge Lucy H. Koh. On May 22, 2018, Judge Richard Seeborg signed an order relating this case to an earlier case assigned to him. In that case, State of California v Ross (PB-CA-0049 in this Clearinghouse), the plaintiffs also claimed that the inclusion of a citizenship question operated by design to depress an accurate count of certain immigrant communities residing in the United States, in violation of the Constitution and the APA. Thus, San Jose v. Ross was reassigned to Judge Seeborg for all further proceedings. The defendants moved to dismiss all claims asserted against them on June 21, but the judge rejected the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census and that the plaintiffs had properly stated claims for relief under both the Enumeration Clause of the Constitution and the APA. On November 2, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment, and the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The court found that there was a material dispute of fact regarding whether, and to what extent, the addition of the citizenship question would impact the final enumeration of the public. The judge also concluded that there were material disputes regarding whether Secretary Ross failed to \u201cconsider an important aspect of the problem\u201d before making his decision. The judge accordingly denied both parties\u2019 motions for summary judgment on December 14, 2018. 362 F.Supp.3d 749. After the case survived summary judgment, the parties prepared for trial. The bench trial began on January 7, 2019. On February 15, 2019, the same day as closing arguments, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a related case regarding the census, State of New York v. Department of Commerce (PB-NY-0032 in this Clearinghouse). The defendants recommended the court defer its ruling until the Supreme Court had finished its proceedings. The plaintiffs opposed staying the case, and the court agreed. On March 6, 2019, the court held that the decision to add a citizenship question violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Enumeration Clause. 358 F.Supp.3d 965. The court held that the decision to include the citizenship question was arbitrary and capricious, was an abuse of discretion, and was not otherwise in accordance with the law. Notwithstanding the discretion given to the Secretary, the court found that the addition of the citizenship question would result in an undercount. Accordingly, on March 13, 2019, Judge Seeborg issued an order entering judgment for the plaintiffs on their APA claims, vacating Secretary Ross's decision to include the citizenship question on the 2020 Census, and permanently enjoining the defendants from including the citizenship question on the 2020 Census. On the same day, the defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The case was docketed as No. 19-15457. On March 18, 2019, the defendants filed a petition for writ of certiorari before judgment in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court issued its opinion in Department of Commerce v. New York, and affirmed the district court\u2019s judgment that the decision to add a citizenship question violates the APA. Following its decision, the Supreme Court granted the defendants\u2019 petition for writ of certiorari, docket No. 18-1214. The judgment was vacated and the case was remanded to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Department of Commerce v. New York. The Ninth Circuit subsequent remanded the action the district court. The plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to enter final judgment on July 30, 2019. On August 1, 2019, Judge Seeborg granted the motion, vacated the prior judgment, and entered final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the APA claims and the defendants on the claims under the Enumeration Clause. The defendants were permanently enjoined from including a citizenship question or asking about citizenship on the 2020 census. The court was to retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the order until the 2020 Census results are processed and sent to the President by December 31, 2020. Since that date has passed, the case is closed.", "summary": "Plaintiffs sued the US Department of Commerce to prevent the Census Bureau from including a citizenship question on the 2020 Census. After trial, Judge Seeborg enjoined the defendants from including the citizenship question on the 2020 Census. The defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit and filed a petition for writ of certiorari before judgment. The Supreme Court issued its opinion in another case about the census, Department of Commerce v. New York, and affirmed the district court's judgment that the citizenship question violated the APA. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of its decision in Department of Commerce v. New York. Back in the district court, Judge Seeborg permanently enjoined the defendants from including the citizenship question and retained jurisdiction over the matter until the 2020 Census results are reported to the President by December 31, 2020."} {"article": "On October 23, 2012, a teenager detained awaiting a parole revocation hearing filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiff, represented by the MacArthur Justice Center and Uptown People's Law Center, asked the court for a declaratory judgment that the policies of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board regarding parole revocation hearings were unconstitutional. They also requested that the Court enjoin the defendant from subjecting juveniles awaiting a parole revocation hearing to these policies. The plaintiff alleged that the Illinois Prisoner Review Board was violating his due process rights by depriving him of counsel, not providing a timely hearing, and not allowing him to present evidence at his parole revocation hearing. The plaintiff also filed for class certification in a motion alongside the complaint. The case was initially assigned to Judge Samuel Der\u2212Yeghiayan, and later reassigned to Judge Andrea Wood and referred to magistrate judges for settlement conferences. In early 2014, the parties reached a consent judgment that was filed with the court. On May 2, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a new motion to certify a class for purposes of settlement. On May 8, the court preliminarily approved the settlement and class certification of \"all juvenile parolees in the State of Illinois who currently or who will in the future face parole revocation proceedings.\" On July 25, 2014, an amended complaint was filed to include the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice as a defendant and remove the governor. The court finally approved the class on July 31. The court also finally approved the consent decree on August 28, 2014. The decree provided that the Illinois Prisoner Review Board must provide counsel during the parole revocation hearing process and included terms for the procedures for presentation of evidence at the hearings and the time frame for the hearing to take place. The parties also agreed to third party monitoring of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board's compliance with the decree for 18 months. In February 2015, the plaintiffs filed to enforce the consent decree, arguing that the defendants refused to provide the documents necessary for the plaintiffs to evaluate compliance with the consent decree. However, they subsequently withdrew the motion in April 2015 after the plaintiffs received the information and documents they sought. The monitor proceeded to file numerous reports over the next several years. On February 17, 2016, the monitor filed three reports were filed with the court for the past quarters. Each report indicated that the defendants were making progress toward complying with the consent decree, but that they were still not fully compliant. Two more reports were filed on September 19, 2016, indicating that \"the spirit of the MH Consent Decree is being fulfilled and Defendants are in substantial compliance.\" The report also indicated that further monitoring was necessary to ensure that administration changes and budget issues did not threaten continued compliance. On April 26, 2017, the monitor filed two more reports indicating the same concern. The ninth quarter report on August 14, 2017 stated that there was still substantial compliance, but that a continued risk existed that certain individual cases would not be compliant and that the defendants were not complying with payment of fees to the monitor and youth attorneys. The monitor subsequently continued to provide oral reports to the court at status hearings in 2018. In September, the monitor filed a letter with the court indicating their conclusions. They stated that the defendants were still not consistently complying with the paragraph of the consent decree requiring payment of representation for the youths' representation, which was the final provision left for the defendants to complete. However, since the youths had had continued representation, the monitor suggested there was no longer a need for active monitoring. On October 12, 2018, the court terminated the independent monitoring provision of the consent decree, which closed the case.", "summary": "On October 23, 2012, a teenager detained awaiting a parole revocation hearing filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiff alleged that his due process rights were violated by the policies of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board for parole revocation hearings. The case settled with a consent decree in August 2014 and closed after the defendants achieved near-total compliance in October 2018. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On March 30, 2004, children in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Human Service's Division of Family and Children's Services, on behalf of abused and neglected children in the State of Mississippi, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Human Services (DHS) and the Division of Family and Children's Services (DFCS) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by private and public counsel, the plaintiffs asked for declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that the defendants harmed and put at risk members of the plaintiff class in numerous ways: failing to investigate or confirm credible reports of abuse and neglect; failing to provide services to children found to be abused or neglected; failing to respond to requests for applications by people interested in becoming foster and adoptive parents, resulting in a shortage of foster parents; placing children in unsafe or unsuitable care and failing to monitor in-custody children to ascertain that they are safe; over-institutionalizing foster children by placing children of all ages in institutional or group settings regardless of their needs; failing to provide foster children with necessary medical, dental, and mental health services; and failing to file petitions to free children for adoption by terminating parental rights in accordance with federal statutory timeframes. The complaint also alleged that the state was repeatedly denied federal funds because of deficient case record documentation and the placement of children in unlicensed homes and facilities, and that the defendants failed to follow through the reform plan they initiated in the late 1990s to address the state's systemic child welfare failures. All this, the plaintiffs said, was due to understaffing, mismanagement, and the failure to implement necessary reforms, which resulted in violations of Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, Equal Protection, state law, and the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the defendants' violation of class members' rights was unlawful; a permanent injunction forbidding the defendants to subject members of the plaintiff class to practices that violated their rights, including remedial provisions to ensure that a detailed curative plan was developed, implemented, and monitored; and an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. On March 30, 2004, plaintiffs sought class action certification for two plaintiff subclasses: (1) all children who are or will be in the custody of DFCS (\"In-Custody Class\"); and (2) all of those children who are not in DFCS custody, but have been or are at risk of being abused and neglected and about whom the defendants have received a report of abuse or neglect (\"Protective Services Class\"). The defendants then moved to dismiss on June 1, 2014 and filed a motion to stay consideration of the motion for class certification pending a ruling on the motion to dismiss. On November 18, 2004, the Court (Judge Tom S. Lee) dismissed all claims sought to be asserted by and on behalf of the \"Protective Services Class\" and also dismissed the claims of the \"In-Custody Class\" for violation of their alleged procedural due process rights and for violation of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act. Hence, there only remained claims of the putative \"In-Custody Class\" for violation of their substantive due process rights. 351 F. Supp. 543. On March 11, 2005, the Court (Judge Lee) granted class certification for the \"In-Custody Class\" only, reasoning that even though each plaintiff and proposed class member may not have suffered the same type or degree of harm, because it appeared that defendants' alleged acts and omissions posed a significant risk of similar harm to all (or at least the requisite \"significant number\" of) children in DHS custody, the requirements of commonality and typicality were satisfied. Judge Lee also held that plaintiffs' allegations related to defendants' actions and inaction with respect to the class as a whole and the relief plaintiffs sought would be relief with respect to the class as a whole. Discovery and litigation continued while the parties entered settlement discussions. These talks were successful and, on April 3, 2007, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a stipulated settlement agreement. The court granted this motion the same day. The settlement stated that the parties agreed to move directly to the remedial phase of the litigation, and that the parties would attempt to agree on a remedial plan developed by the defendants and the Council on Accreditation (COA). The plan would state specific actions and timelines for the defendants to achieve accreditation and conform the state standards with federal standards regarding foster care and would also cover the services and plans for the named plaintiffs. It would be court enforceable and provide for an outside monitor. The parties agreed to mediation to try to facilitate settlement and that they would proceed to a trial as to the scope of the necessary remedy, if such mediation failed. On November 8, 2007, the parties agreed upon the Mississippi Settlement Agreement and Reform Plan and filed a joint motion for its approval. On January 4, 2008, the court approved the plan. The Plan stated that:
1) Primary Offense is not violent; 2) Primary Offense is not sex offense; 3) Primary Offense is not terrorism; 4) No detainer; 5) Mental Health Care Level is less than IV; 6) PATTERN (BOP\u2019s new risk and needs assessment tool) score is MIN; 7) BRAVO (BOP\u2019s existing risk evaluation tool) score is LOW or MIN; 8) Completed at least 50% of their sentence; and 9) No Incident Reports in the past 12 months.The defendants also asserted that they anticipated expanding the criteria for review. On April 13, 2020, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a Temporary Restraining Order including requirements: that the defendant identify all medically vulnerable subclass members and that defendant present evident as to why they are challenging the release of the person; that the court immediately release all members that defendants did not make a required showing as to why they should not be released; that defendant provide all persons with educational resources on COVID-19; that defendants report weekly on the population of persons in Oakdale who are medically vulnerable; and a declaration that Oakdale's policies do not violate the Eighth Amendment. On April 13, 2020, Magistrate Judge Kathleen Kay issued an order denying as moot the motion for the Temporary Restraining Order and granting the plaintiffs' motion for emergency consideration of their motion for preliminary injunction. On April 15, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The defendants argued that the court was barred from reviewing defendants' decisions regarding classification and placement of inmates, and that plaintiffs had failed to assert sufficient facts to show that their confinement was unlawful or that the defendants had acted with deliberate indifference. On April 16, 2020, the defendants provided a second update regarding the prisoner review process at FCC Oakdale. They asserted that they continued to review individuals for release, preparing to release six prisoners. As of April 16, 2020, there were 32 active confirmed cases of COVID-19, fourteen prisoners who had recovered, and one death. On April 17, 2020, defendants moved to stay consideration of class certification pending adjudication of their motion to dismiss, \"to preserve resources and advance the interest of judicial economy.\" On April 22, 2020, Judge Doughty granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, finding that it was outside of the court's purview to direct BOP how to classify its inmates and thus the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. As of April 26, the case is closed.", "summary": "Inmates at Oakdale Federal Correctional Institution filed this putative class action lawsuit seeking immediate release of high risk inmates and a plan outlining mitigation efforts to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in the prison."} {"article": "On April 17, 2007, a U.S. citizen and a citizen of Mexico, represented by the ACLU Foundation, the ACLU of Pennsylvania and private attorneys, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to challenge the denial of their application for a marriage license. Luzerne County required persons seeking to obtain a marriage license to prove their lawful presence in the United States before their application for a marriage license would be accepted. Plaintiffs' \u00a7 1983 complaint alleged that this policy was unconstitutional in that it violated the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause and the Supremacy Clause. Plaintiffs moved for a TRO and/or a preliminary injunction the day after suit was filed. Following a hearing on the plaintiffs' motions, the District Court (Judge A. Richard Caputo) granted the plaintiffs' request for a TRO and enjoined the County from requiring the non-U.S. citizen plaintiff to produce a visa or other proof of his lawful presence in the United States as a condition of obtaining a marriage license. Judge Caputo reasoned that both the U.S. citizen plaintiff and the Mexican citizen possessed the same fundamental right to marry, that defendants' policy did not appear to be closely tailored enough to effectuate a sufficiently important state interest, and therefore, the plaintiffs demonstrated a reasonable probability that the County policy violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. After several months of negotiations, the court signed a consent order on February 11, 2008. The parties agreed that the defendant would no longer require any applicant to produce a visa or other proof of lawful presence in the United States and would post that policy publicly. The plaintiffs filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs, which the court granted on August 27, 2008.", "summary": "In 2007, a U.S. citizen and a citizen of Mexico, represented by the ACLU Foundation, the ACLU of Pennsylvania and private attorneys, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to challenge the denial of their application for a marriage license. Luzerne County law required persons seeking to obtain a marriage license to prove their lawful presence in the United States before their application for a marriage license would be accepted. The court entered a consent decree in February 2008 that prevented the defendant from continuing that policy."} {"article": "On February 23, 1976, six residents of Forest Haven, an institution operated by the District of Columbia for developmentally disabled persons, filed this lawsuit against the District's mayor and its Department of Human Resources. The lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 6001 et seq.); and 32 D.C. Code \u00a7 601 et seq. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive, and equitable relief on behalf of past and present residents of Forest Haven who would benefit from individual treatment and educational programs appropriate to their needs. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Forest Haven had not provided a level of habilitation consistent with the Constitution by failing to supply a setting that was the least restrictive of the residents' personal liberty. Shortly after the filing of the complaint, the United States was granted its motion to intervene as plaintiffs. Evans v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1978). Also, on June 3, 1976, the court (Judge John H. Pratt) granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Evans v. Williams, 139 F. Supp. 2d 79, 84 (D.D.C. 2001). On June 14, 1978, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. Evans v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 483, 484 (D.D.C. 1978). The court held that the District had violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which provided the plaintiff class with a constitutional right to habilitative care and treatment. Id. It then entered a decree governing virtually every aspect of the District's operation of Forest Haven. Id.; see also In re U.S., 925 F.2d 490, 1991 WL 17225, *1 (D.C. Cir. 1991). At its core, the decree required the deinstitutionalization of the residents and their placement in \"community living arrangement[s] . . . together with such community-based day programs and services as are necessary to provide the resident[s] with minimally adequate habilitation.\" Evans v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 483, 487 (D.D.C. 1978). In other words, for all intents and purposes, the judgment called for the closing of Forest Haven. Id.; see also Evans v. Williams, 206 F.3d 1292, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The judgment also required that the defendants, inter alia, draft an individualized habilitation plan for each resident as well as create and maintain procedures to monitor the defendant's compliance with the injunction. Evans v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 483, 484, 486 (D. D.C., 1978). In 1981 and 1983, the district court entered additional consent orders reaffirming its 1978 order and further mandating the placement of all Forest Haven residents in community living arrangements by the end of fiscal year 1988. In re United States, 925 F.2d 490, 1991 WL 17225, *1 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The Forest Haven facility was permanently closed in the late 1980s, but the case has remained open and continually active, as disputes regarding the execution of the consent orders and the alleged ongoing failure of the District of Columbia to provide adequate care in an integrated, least restrictive setting. On October 11, 1996, the Court appointed a Special Master, Margaret G. Farrell, to monitor and report on the District's compliance and to make recommendations to the court. On March 14, 1999, The Washington Post ran an article characterizing the District's efforts to provide safe community-integrated group homes in a least-restrictive setting as having \"fail[ed] completely.\" The article describes one of the group homes into which Forest Haven residents had been transferred as \"roach-dappled,\" with broken furniture and doors hanging off their hinges, and where at least one resident known to be a sexual predator was roomed next door to one of his victims. (Washington Post, March 14, 1999). On January 30, 2001, Clarence J. Sundram was appointed co-Special Master. On March 30, 2001, the court (Judge Stanley S. Harris), pursuant to the recommendation of the Special Master in her \"2001 Plan for Complainance and Conclusion of Evans v. Williams,\" entered a fourth consent order, in which the defendants agreed to create a nonprofit agency to, inter alia, provide independent monitoring of the services available to individuals with intellectual disabilities and developmental disabilities. The defendants agreed to fund this agency by paying $31.5 million over eleven years, and again made extensive commitments to improve its practices and the services and living conditions available to mentally disabled citizens of the District of Columbia. Evans v. Williams, 139 F.Supp.2d 79, 83 (D. D.C. 2001). On March 30, 2007, the Court found that there had been \"systemic, continuous, and serious noncompliance with many of the Court's Orders,\" and held the District of Columbia to be in noncompliance. Evans v. Fenty, 480, F.Supp.2d 280, 325 (D.D.C.2007). The court again had the Special Master produce a report, 2009 Special Masters' Report, in which the Special Master also found the District in non-compliance, and recommended the appointment of an \"Independent Compliance Administrator,\" who would bring the District into compliance. On April 7, 2010, the Court Issued an Memorandum Opinion, detailing extensively the prior history of the litigation and the various consent orders up until that point, and denying a motion by the District of Columbia to have the existing consent orders vacated and to have the case closed. Evans v. Fenty, 701 F.Supp.2d 126 (D.D.C. 2010). This was appealed, and the appeal was dismissed. 2010 WL 3447241 (D.C. Cir. 2010). On June 1, 2010, the Court adopted the 2009 Special Masters' Report's findings of fact and conclusions of law Evans v. Fenty, 714 F.Supp.2d 116 (D.D.C 2010). As a result of this decision, the Court approved on August 10, 2010, the Special Master's \"2010 Revision to the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Fenty.\" On October 26, 2012, the court issued an order approving and adopting the Special Master's conclusion that the District of Columbia had achieved compliance in several areas, including the safe guarding of class member's person possessions, and some aspects of staff training. Evans v. Gray, 2012 WL 5305790, (D.D.C. 2012). From 2013-2015, the court approved in full the reports and recommendations of the Special Master regarding various aspects of the consent decrees. These areas included protection from harm, vocational, residential, and day programs, as well as many other areas. See the documents for this case for a complete list. On March 31, 2015, the court (Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle) approved and adopted in part the Special Master's report and recommendation regarding individualized habilitation plans. The court held that: 1) altering the 90% threshold for \u201chigh\u201d compliance was unwarranted; 2) the defendants had complied with the occupational therapy services component of outcome criterion focused on implementation; but 3) the defendants failed to demonstrate compliance with the medical services component of outcome criterion focused on implementation; and 4) the defendants failed to demonstrate compliance with the criteria requiring assessment of residents' needs for services and mandating provision of certain adaptive equipment. 87 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2015) On May 10, 2017, the court terminated the case after compliance was achieved. Note: Among the several awards of attorneys' fees and costs to the Plaintiffs was a consent order and judgment, filed on May 16, 2011, wherein the court approved an award of $4,000,000, covering fees and costs from April 1, 2006, to June 30, 2010. Because of the age of the case and because the court docket is incomplete, the Clearinghouse has not attempted to calculate the total amount of attorneys' fees awarded.", "summary": "This case was brought by developmentally disabled residents of Forest Haven, an institution run by the District of Columbia, against the District. Plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and equitable relief, alleging that D.C. had failed to supply them with the minimal level of habilitation, as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The case was decided for the plaintiff class on June 14, 1978, requiring that the defendants, inter alia, close Forest Haven and place the residents in community living arrangements. The court entered a series of consent orders concerning the transfer of the plaintiff class into such arrangements and the administration of services to the mentally disabled residents of D.C.. D.C. has repeatedly been found to be non-compliant with the terms of these orders, and Special Masters have been appointed to ensure compliance."} {"article": "On April 12, 2017, the ACLUs of Oregon, Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, and Wyoming filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump's January 27, 2017 and March 6, 2017 Executive Orders (EO) that banned admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought information \"concerning CBP\u2019s local implementation of President Trump\u2019s January 27, 2017 Executive Order . . . as well as any other judicial order or executive directive issued regarding Executive Order No. 1, including President Trump\u2019s March 6, 2017 Executive Order.\" The request concerned implementation at international airports within the purview of CBP's Portland Field Office, including Portland International Airport, Denver International Airport, Ted Stevens International Airport, Boise International Airport, and Casper/Natrona County International Airport. The request also concerned the number of individuals who were detained or subjected to secondary screening, extended questioning, enforcement examination, or consideration for a waiver at the aforementioned airports pursuant to the EO. In the complaint, the plaintiffs argued that the requested records \"would facilitate the public\u2019s understanding of how the defendants implemented and enforced the Executive Orders\" and that \"[s]uch information is critical to the public\u2019s ability to hold the government accountable.\" The case was assigned to Judge Marco A. Hernandez. On May 8, 2017, the government filed a motion to treat all of these FOIA cases as \"multidistrict litigation\" effectively consolidating them before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. For the transfer motion see this case. The ACLU filed their opposition to the motion to transfer on May 30, arguing that \"[g]ranting consolidation and transfer would promote forum-shopping and delay, not justice.\" On Aug. 3, 2017, the U.S. District Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied the government's consolidation motion. In its order, the Panel found that although the thirteen FOIA cases share \"a limited number of factual issues,\" and these issues \"appear relatively straightforward and unlikely to entail extensive pretrial proceedings.\" The court approved multiple schedule extensions for discovery. The parties continued with discovery and court telephone conferences through January 11, 2019, at which point an order for a joint status report was stayed due to a \u201clapse in appropriations to the Department of Justice\u201d until February 25. On February 25, 2019, the parties jointly stipulated to dismiss with prejudice the case without award from the court. The dismissal was approved on February 26, 2019 and this case is closed. For the documents released by the government in all the ACLU cases see this case.", "summary": "On April 12, 2017, the ACLUs Oregon, Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, and Wyoming filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump's January 27 and March 6 Executive Orders that ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The parties filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice and the court approved the dismissal on February 26, 2019. This case is closed."} {"article": "On March 28, 2008, the Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (ICP) - a Texas non-profit that helps integrate low-income black families into Dallas's predominately white suburban neighborhoods - filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas against the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1982 and 1983, and the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 3604 and 3605. In its complaint, ICP, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive relief, alleging that the TDHCA allocated federal tax credits to housing developers in a discriminatory manner, disproportionately granting credits for development in minority neighborhoods and disproportionately denying credits for development in white neighborhoods, thereby perpetuating racially segregated communities by creating a concentration of subsidized low-income housing in minority areas. ICP offered two theories of discrimination: disparate treatment under \u00a7 1982 and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and disparate impact under the FHA. Disparate treatment requires that the plaintiff show discriminatory intent, whereas disparate impact allows a plaintiff to establish illegal discrimination by showing that seemingly race-neutral policies disproportionately harm racial minorities without adequate justification. In September 2010, the District Court (Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater) denied the TDHCA's motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings, and granted ICP partial summary judgment. The court concluded that ICP had standing to bring the suit and had made a sufficient initial showing of both disparate treatment and disparate impact discrimination. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 749 F. Supp. 2d 486 (N.D. Tex. 2010). The case then proceeded to trial. On March 20, 2012, Judge Fitzwater held that ICP failed to establish that the TDHCA had acted with discriminatory intent and thus found for the TDHCA on the disparate treatment claims. However, the court ruled in favor of ICP on its disparate impact claim under the FHA and imposed an injunction on the TDHCA. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 860 F. Supp. 2d 312 (N.D. Tex. 2012). Following trial, the court began to craft the injunction. It considered proposals from the parties and ultimately adopted a remedial plan in August 2012, which stipulated changes to the TDHCA's tax credit allocation process and provided for monitoring by the court for at least five years. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 2012 WL 3201401 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2012), amended in part, 2012 WL 5458208 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2012). In February 2013, the court awarded ICP attorneys' fees and costs totaling $1,893,969. The TDHCA appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on the issue of whether the District Court correctly found that ICP proved a violation of the FHA based on disparate impact. On March 24, 2014, the Fifth Circuit (Judge James E. Graves, Jr.) held that the District Court applied the wrong legal test for assessing disparate impact claims and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings under the correct test. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014). The Fifth Circuit's reversal also nullified the remedial plan, and vacated and remanded the award of attorneys' fees. Following the ruling from the Fifth Circuit, the TDHCA sought Supreme Court review, which the Supreme Court granted on October 2, 2014. The TDHCA had sought review on two questions: whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, altogether, and if they are, the appropriate standards. The Court limited its review to the former issue. The district court stayed proceedings until the Supreme Court's resolution. On June 25, 2015, the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit. In a majority decision by Justice Kennedy, the Court agreed that the Fair Housing Act encompassed disparate impact liability, but emphasized that liability followed only if the challenged policy or practice actually caused a racial disparity, not merely accompanied one. The Court emphasized, as well, that remedies should not themselves promote unduly racialized decision making. Justice Alito wrote the principal dissent, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas; Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings in light of its opinion. 135 S. Ct. 2507. On remand, the district court decided that the plaintiff\u2019s disparate impact claim should be decided on the current (or a supplemented) trial record. On August 26, 2016, Judge Fitzwater held that the plaintiff had not proved a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that a challenged practice caused a discriminatory effect and dismissed the disparate impact claim. The court applied a more onerous prima facie burden of proof than the one applied originally. 2016 WL 4494322. On October 4, 2016, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In March 2008, a Texas non-profit brought a housing discrimination suit against the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs, alleging its allocation of low income housing tax credits resulted in discrimination against African-Americans. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas (Sidney A. Fitzwater) granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff, and, after bench trial, found discrimination under a theory of disparate impact, adopted a remedial plan, and awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiff. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit (James E. Graves, Jr.) reversed and remanded, holding that the lower court employed the wrong legal test in assessing disparate impact claims. In October 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on issue of whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, and the District Court stayed the proceeding until the Supreme Court's resolution. On June 25, 2015, the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit. In a majority decision by Justice Kennedy, the Court agreed that the Fair Housing Act encompassed disparate impact liability. On remand, the District Court held that the plaintiff had not proved a prima facie case of discrimination and dismissed the disparate impact claim. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On August 15, 2014, a transgender woman from Pennsylvania filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff sued Cabela\u2019s Retail, Inc., under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a72000(e) et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a712101 et seq. (\u201cADA\u201d). The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorneys\u2019 fees. She claimed that she has been harmed by the defendant\u2019s discriminatory employment practices. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that due to her transgender status, she was harassed by her co-workers and subjected to hateful comments, was refused consideration for promotions and was forced to work alone in undesirable shifts. Although the plaintiff reported these incidents to higher ups in the company, it always fell on deaf ears. The Human Resources Director at the company would not even allow her to wear a name tag with her chosen female name or to use the women\u2019s bathroom in the store. The plaintiff was eventually dismissed from her position, despite excellent job performance. The plaintiff argued that her bad treatment constituted sex discrimination, in violation of Title VII, and disability discrimination, in violation of the ADA. She further argued that 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12211(b)--which excludes gender identity disorder from coverage by the ADA--is unconstitutional. On October 22, 2014, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss but after the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, the court rejected the dismissal motion as moot. On November 18, 2014, the defendant filed a new partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Subsequently, on February 10, 2015, the case was reassigned from Judge Jeffrey L. Schmehl to Judge Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. Meanwhile, on January 22, 2015 the plaintiff informed the United States that she was challenging the constitutionality of the Gender Identity Disorder (\"GID\") exclusion provision of the ADA. That provision excludes \"transexualism...[and] gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairment\" from the ADA definition of a disability. The United States responded with a Statement of Interest; it stated that the District Court should resolve the plaintiff's Title VII claims before addressing the constitutional challenge, because wherever possible, courts should seek to avoid adjudication of constitutional challenges. On February 23, 2015 six prominent LGBTQ advocacy organizations urged the court to invalidate the GID exclusion as unconstitutional or alternatively to find that gender dysphoria is outside the scope of the GID exclusion. Judge Leeson was apparently unpersuaded by the U.S.'s constitutional avoidance argument; on September 21, 2015, he ordered the United States to file a supplemental statement of interest actually addressing the constitutionality of the ADA's GID exclusion. Finally, on November 16, 2015, the United States filed a second Statement of Interest which argued that the District Court should adopt the construction that gender dysphoria, because it has a physical cause, falls outside the scope of the GID exclusion provision, allowing gender dysphoria to be included under the ADA's definition of \"disability\". This construction again allowed the District Court to avoid addressing the constitutionality of the GID exclusion provision itself. Various LGBT advocacy groups filed an amici statement in support of this construction that found gender dysphoria outside the GID exclusion. Oral argument on the issue was held on December 9, 2015. On May 18, 2017, Judge Leeson denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's ADA claims, in an opinion marking the first time the court ruled that transgender people are not categorically barred from seeking relief from discrimination under the ADA. 2017 WL 2178123. Judge Leeson did not rule on the constitutionality of the GID exclusion from ADA coverage, but adopted a narrow interpretation of the term gender identity disorders to \"refer to only the condition of identifying with a different gender, not to encompass (and therefore exclude from ADA protection) a condition like Blatt's gender dysphoria, which goes beyond merely identifying with a different gender and is characterized by clinically significant stress and other impairments that may be disabling.\" Judge Leeson found that Blatt's gender dysphoria was therefore not excluded from ADA coverage, and that Blatt had plausibly alleged the elements of an ADA retaliation claim: 1) she suffered from a disabling condition under the ADA, not encompassed in the GID exclusion; 2) she engaged in protected activity by reporting discrimination and requesting accommodations for disability; 3) she was subjected to a \"pattern of antagonism\" as a result of this activity, including Cabela's allegedly intentional and repeated refusal to provide her with a correct name tag. The defendant filed an answer to the plaintiff's amended complaint on August 1, 2017. The parties scheduled a mediation with former Judge Annette Rizzo on September 11, 2017. Magistrate Judge Henry S. Perkin dismissed the case on September 18, 2017 because the parties reached an undisclosed settlement. The court retained jurisdiction over the case for 90 days thereafter. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On August 15, 2014, a transgender female citizen of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed a lawsuit in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged harassment, discrimination and eventual termination due to her gender identity. The parties reached an undisclosed settlement in September 2017."} {"article": "On October 15, 2014, the plaintiff, an inmate at Crossroads Correctional Center, filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The plaintiff brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 against prison administrators, including the warden and guards, for violating his Eighth Amendment rights. The plaintiff filed pro se, but requested representation. Specifically, the inmate alleged that he was forced to inhale second-hand cigarette smoke which jeopardized his health in general and aggravated his asthma. He alleged that prison staff acted with deliberate indifference to the dangers cigarette smoke posed to his health, and even encouraged the smoking by selling large amounts of cigarettes to inmates. Moreover, he noted that the prison had a policy against indoor smoking, but this regulation was rarely if ever enforced. The inmate sought an injunction to stop the smoking at Crossroads and other correctional centers, as well as prohibiting the sale of tobacco products in prisons. On May 8, 2015, the plaintiff\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction was denied because the complaint called for post-judgment relief. On June 8, 2015 the case was dismissed due to the plaintiff\u2019s failure to state a claim, however, he was able to reopen the case by filing an amended complaint on June 30, 2015. On October 7, 2015, the plaintiff filed an appeal in the Eighth Circuit to challenge the district court\u2019s denial of preliminary injunctive relief. The Circuit Court assessed a $505 fee for the appeal, which the plaintiff was unable to pay. Therefore, on October 15, 2015 the plaintiff requested the appeal be dismissed, which the court granted on October 20, 2015. Months later, on July 11, 2016, the district court appointed private counsel to represent the plaintiff in this case. The parties subsequently entered into mediation to try reaching a settlement. However, these mediation talks fell apart in late October 2016, and the parties began to prepare for trial. On April 12, 2017 the trial was held before a jury. The jury delivered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff awarding him $40,000 in compensatory damages and $71,000 in punitive damages. Following the trial the plaintiff filed a motion for attorney\u2019s fees and expenses. On May 10, 2017, however, the defense filed a motion with the court requesting a judgment as a matter of law in their favor or a new trial. Both requests were denied on June 26, 2017. The court found that deliberate indifference was evident, in part, because the plaintiff was able to show he had previously filed eight grievances with information about his suffering health. Defendants did not do anything to alleviate the problem, and the court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that serious injury could result from such treatment. The damage amount remained in place and the Court found no evidence to support the defendants\u2019 motion for a new trial. On June 27, 2017, the court advised the parties to enter mediation concerning the injunctive relief. 2017 WL 2773709. While mediation continued, defendants appealed the amount of damages to the Eighth Circuit on July 26, 2017. On September 21, 2017, the two parties indicated they had reached an agreement regarding the implementation of injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff, and together made a joint motion for post judgment injunctive relief, which was then affirmed by the court, issuing an order for post judgment injunctive relief. The court ordered that all correctional facilities across Missouri should remove cigarette products from their facilities on or before April 1, 2018. On October 3, 2017 the court awarded plaintiff\u2019s counsel $161,681.02 in attorneys fees. The plaintiff was also ordered to pay $11,100, which was ten percent of the award granted to him by the jury. 2017 WL 4399566. In 2018, the Eighth Circuit issued their opinion. 900 F.3d 549. They held that, while plaintiff showed that defendants were sufficiently indifferent to his well-being to justify damages, plaintiff did not provide evidence that defendants were malicious in their treatment toward him, so he was not owed punitive damages. The court vacated the award of punitive damages and remanded for further proceedings. On April 1, 2019, the plaintiff filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice.", "summary": "An inmate at Crossroads Correctional Center brought this lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri under under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 against prison administrators. He alleged that the prison violated his Eighth Amendment rights by not enforcing a nonsmoking policy. The case went to trial, and the jury awarded the plaintiff both compensatory and punitive damages due to the prison staff's deliberate indifference to plaintiff's condition. The parties later agreed to a joint motion that ordered all prisons in Missouri to stop sales of tobacco products to inmates. The defendant appealed the damages amount to the Eighth Circuit, and the appeals court overturned the award of punitive damages against the defendants."} {"article": "On September 20, 1996 parents of a child with special education needs filed suit against the Arkansas Department of Education (ADE), Arch Ford Education Services Cooperative, and the local school district, in the Eastern District of Arkansas for their failure to provide additional treatment to their child, consistent with the \"Lovaas methodology,\" an educational methodology found to have had success in treating children with autism. The plaintiffs alleged that the school district's refusal to implement 40 weekly hours of Lovaas-based education was a violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), \u00a7 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The ADE moved for dismissal or summary judgment, asserting in part that the Eleventh Amendment prevented a federal court from exercising jurisdiction over the IDEA, \u00a7 504, and \u00a7 1983 claims. The district court judge denied this motion. The judge agreed with the order in Bradley v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., which held that the Congress properly exercised its power when it legislated the provisions of IDEA that abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Bradley v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ. (E.D. Ark. Nov. 21, 1997)(holding that Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) made IDEA's abrogation provisions valid.) In August, 1999, Bradley was reversed on appeal by the 8th Circuit. 189 F.3d 745, 756 (8th Cir. 1999). Arkansas subsequently filed an interlocutory appeal for this case, arguing that the Bradley panel's decision that declared \u00a7 504 invalid for stepping over state sovereign immunity should apply here. 189 F.3d 745, 756 (8th Cir. 1999). But on plaintiffs' suggestion for rehearing en banc on the spending-power issue alone, the 8th Circuit in January, 2001 vacated that portion of the panel's opinion in Bradley and held that Section 504 is a valid exercise of Congress's spending power. 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 949 (2001). In the same opinion, the 8th Circuit held that Arkansas waived its immunity with respect to Section 504 suits by accepting federal funds and accordingly affirmed the judgment of the District Court denying the State's motion to dismiss. 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 949 (2001). However, in April, 2001, the district court held that the defendant school district has provided the plaintiff with an education program that satisfies the district's legal obligations. First, the court agreed with the 1996 ruling from the administrative hearing that was in favor of the school district. Upon the plaintiffs' request to implement the Lovaas-based instruction, an adminisitrative due process hearing was held under IDEA. At the hearing, experts testified that there are similarities between the Lovaas method and the teaching methods adopted by the ADE and pointed out negative components of the Lovaas method. In a decision dated August 21, 1996, Hearing Officer Ammel ruled in favor of the school district. Second, the court found that after the 1996 hearing, the district continued to reimburse the Plaintiffs for 19 weekly hours of Lovaas instruction which were carried out in the Plaintiffs' home. Plaintiffs continued supplementing, at their own expense, the amount of Lovaas instruction funded by the district so that the plaintiff was receiving about 40 hours of weekly Lovaas instruction. Third, the court agreed with the 1999 administrative due process hearing, which ruled that the school district had met its burden of proving that J.C.'s IEP was reasonably calculated to offer him educational benefits. Therefore, the court concluded that the state defendant was compliant with IDEA and \u00a7 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, finding no manifest error of law or fact. The Supreme Court denied cert.", "summary": "Parents who demanded the \"Lovaas\" instruction for their child with special needs brought suit in 1996 against the Arkansas Department of Education, claiming that the ADE failed to comply with Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and \u00a7 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The State of Arkansas, defending ADE, filed an interlocutory appeal on the issue of whether the section 504 claim was moot. But pursuant to the 8th Circuit's decision in Bradley, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000), Arkansas was held to have waived its immunity with respect to Section 504 suits by accepting federal funds, and the lawsuit proceeded at the district court. In April, 2001, the district court held in finality that the defendant school district has provided the plaintiff with an education program that satisfies the district's legal obligations."} {"article": "On December 15, 2006, the United States filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the state of Oklahoma and its' officials and subgroups responsible for operation of the L.E. Rader Center (\"Rader\") juvenile detention facility. The complaint, as amended on May 4, 2007, alleged that the defendants (1) denied Rader's residents their rights to protection from harm from staff, from other residents, and from improper administration of psychotropic drugs; (2) provided inadequate mental health care at Rader, particularly as to screening, assessment, treatment and transition planning, and psychiatric and psychological services; and (3) failed to provide required special education services to qualifying Rader residents. Represented by Department of Justice Civil Rights Division attorneys, the federal government initiated the action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141, the pattern or practice provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. The amended complaint alleged that the state defendants' conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794, and related regulations, and the Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1401. The case, assigned to District Judge Gregory K. Frizzell, prompted motion and discovery practice resulting in several June 2007, unpublished orders by Magistrate Judge Frank H. McCarthy. These addressed matters such as protective orders to keep disclosed information about residents confidential; scheduling of on-site inspections at Rader by plaintiffs' counsel and expert consultants; who would bear the cost of security escorts during the visits (the United States, said the magistrate); and whether interviews conducted during the visits would have to be recorded (they would). In June 2008, a settlement was reached and on September 9, 2008, the court (Judge Frizzell) entered an order incorporating the consent decree. The case was terminated at this time. The consent decree included resolutions to protect juvenile residents from harm, prevention of suicide and self-harm, mental health care, and special education claims, and was set to expire three years from the date it was signed. In September 2011, a little over a week before the consent decree was set to expire, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to modify the decree. The plaintiffs alleged that since Rader was closed by the state in 2011, there had been several incidents at two \"replacement\" facilities. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had not given them full access to investigate the incidents. The plaintiffs wanted the consent decree modified to extend to these other facilities so that the incidents could be investigated with the support of the court. The defendants objected, arguing that Rader was the only facility under the order and that the two facilities are not replacements as defined in the consent decree. The court agreed with the defendants, finding that the separate, pre-existing juvenile centers were not replacements under the terms of the consent decree. Defendants then filed a Motion to Dismiss, citing the expiration of the consent decree, which the court granted on November 18, 2011.", "summary": "On December 15, 2006, the United States filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the state of Oklahoma and its' officials and subgroups responsible for operation of the L.E. Rader Center (\"Rader\") juvenile detention facility. Represented by Department of Justice Civil Rights Division attorneys, the federal government initiated the action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141, the pattern or practice provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. The amended complaint alleged that the state defendants' conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794, and related regulations, and the Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1401. A consent decree was entered in 2008 with a term of three years. The case is now closed, despite plaintiffs' efforts to extend the Consent decree after defendants closed the Rader facility and refused to abide by the decree with respect to incidents reported at centers plaintiffs argued constituted \"replacement facilities\" under the decree."} {"article": "On March 31, 2016, individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. They sued the state of Ohio, including the state's disability departments, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12111 et seq.), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, and the Social Security Act. The plaintiffs issued a press release on the same day, available here. The case was assigned to Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. The plaintiffs filed the suit on behalf of all patients institutionalized, or at serious risk of institutionalization, at Intermediate Care Facilities (ICF) for individuals with intellectual disabilities, even though they had preferred to reside in an integrated, community-based setting and receive integrated, community-based employment or day services. They claimed that they were experiencing, or were at risk of experiencing, pervasive and widespread isolation and segregation in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Olmstead v. L.C. (along with the listed statutes above). The Ability Center of Greater Toledo also joined the suit as a plaintiff, claiming that it suffered economic injury. The complaint estimated that the class included approximately 27,800 similarly situated individuals. In the period from May until October, the defendants made several motions to dismiss. On August 22, 2016, the plaintiffs moved to certify the class. On September 21, 2016, Magistrate Judge Deavers issued an order regarding discovery, setting a due date of January 31, 2017 for the plaintiffs\u2019 amended motion for class certification. On March 23, 2017, Judge Sargus issued an opinion and order denying the defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss (except for Governor John Kasich\u2019s motion, which was granted in part and denied in part). 244 F. Supp. 3d 662 (S.D. Ohio 2017). The court rejected the Director of Opportunities for Ohioans with Disabilities\u2019 argument that the court should dismiss the class action because Disability Rights Ohio (whose attorneys represented the plaintiffs and signed the complaint) was precluded from bringing the action; the court explained that the scope of representation was a collateral issue best left to the governing agency. The court granted in part the Governor\u2019s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 ADA and Social Security Act claims and denied in part his motion to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 Rehabilitation Act claim. The court rejected the Director of the Ohio Department of Developmental Disability\u2019s claim that a consent decree from a prior case, Martin v. Taft (S.D. Ohio, 2007), and res judicata compelled dismissal; the court explained that this case concerned allegations that arose after Martin. The court also rejected defendants\u2019 arguments concerning justiciability and standing under the Social Security Act. On March 27, 2017, the court (Judge Sargus) issued an opinion and order granting what it described as the plaintiffs\u2019 unopposed motion for class certification. 2017 WL 1148358. The court certified the class as consisting of the following: \u201cAll Medicaid-eligible adults with intellectual and developmental disabilities residing in the state of Ohio who, on or after March 31, 2016, are institutionalized, or at serious risk of institutionalization, in an Intermediate Care Facility with eight or more beds, and who have not documented their opposit[ion] to receiving integrate[d], community-based services.\u201d However, on March 30, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to expedite reconsideration of the class certification order, given that, according to the defendants, the parties were conducting class-based discovery and the defendants\u2019 response to the plaintiffs\u2019 motion was not yet due. On April 7, 2017, the court (Judge Deavers) issued an order setting a new deadline for conducting class discovery (May 19, 2017), and a new deadline for the defendants to file their motion in opposition to the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification (June 16, 2017). The court also granted the defendants\u2019 unopposed joint motion for extension of time to answer the plaintiffs\u2019 class action complaint. The defendants filed their answers on April 20, 2017. On April 19, 2017, ten individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities served by Ohio's ICF system filed, through their guardians, a motion to intervene as plaintiffs. Following the guardians' motion for intervention, 99 individuals (other guardians of individuals in Ohio ICFs) filed motions to join in intervention. The guardian intervenors indicated that, for their wards, they did not want movement from their current institutional setting and that forcing them to move would cause substantial harm. They feared that the plaintiffs' claims and relief would deny individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities the choice to remain in an ICF. They sought intervention to protect their choice for their ward to remain in an ICF and for ICF placement to be provided as an option for people living in the community with unmet service needs. On May 10, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a response in opposition, stating that the requested relief would in no way foreclose the right of individuals to exercise informed choice to remain in ICFs. On June 5, 2017, the court held a settlement conference in which the parties and the proposed intervenors participated. In an order of July 25, 2017, the court (Judge Sargus) permitted intervention by the guardian intervenors and by Ohio Association of County Boards of Developmental Disabilities (OCB). The parties engaged in mediation and significant discovery around the reconsideration of class certification. In light of the class-based discovery and the intervention by the ICF guardians and the county board association, the plaintiffs moved to modify the class definition on August 28, 2017. The court granted the motion on September 20, 2017, and in their October 20, 2017 reply brief, the plaintiffs submitted the following modified class definition: \"All Medicaid-eligible adults with intellectual and developmental disabilities residing in the state of Ohio who, on or after March 31, 2016, are qualified for home and community-based services, but (a) are institutionalized in an Intermediate Care Facility with eight or more beds, and, after receiving options counseling, express that they are interested in, or may be interested in, integrated community-based services; or (b) are at serious risk of institutionalization in an Intermediate Care Facility with eight or more beds and have, by placing themselves on a waiting list for community-based services, expressed an interest in receiving integrated services while continuing to live in the community.\" On March 30, 2018, the court (Judge Sargus) granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. 307 F. Supp.3d 701 (S.D. Ohio 2018). The court exercised its discretion to modify class definitions, and revised the class definition as follows: \"All Medicaid-eligible adults with intellectual and developmental disabilities residing in the state of Ohio, who, on or after March 31, 2016, are qualified for home and community-based services, and, after receiving options counseling, express that they are interested in community-based services.\" On September 14, 2018, the guardian intervenors filed a third-party complaint, filing suit against (1) Ohio and its disability departments and (2) the OCB and Disability Rights Ohio. The guardian intervenors filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Social Security Act, the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and state law. The sole intention of their suit was to ensure that ICF right was actually offered, properly administered, and adequately funded. Guardian intervenors sought declaratory relief stating that defendants were violating the statutes above, as well as permanent injunctive relief to remedy violations of those statutes. On September 25, 2018, the court (Judge Edmund A. Sargus) issued an order memorializing its definition of the class in response to the dispute about the class definition. The court defined the class as all Medicaid-eligible adults residing in Ohio with intellectual and development disabilities who were qualified for home and community-based service and, after receiving options counseling, wanted community-based services. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of this definition on October 9, 2018, arguing that the class definition should be broader. The court denied this motion on December 7, 2018. On October 25, 2018, the defendants moved to dismiss the guardian intervenor\u2019s claim. The guardian intervenors withdrew their complaint and voluntarily dismissed their claims on November 20, 2018. On May 10, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a proposed class settlement. On October 18, 2019, the court issued an order granting preliminary approval of the settlement. The settlement stipulated that the defendants would offer a second round of options counseling to run through June 30, 2021. The counseling would help to identify which individuals interested in community-based services. The defendants also agreed to allocate additional funds to facilitate home and community-based services, including $24 million for housing assistance. The agreement had a tentative end date of January 8, 2023 subject to the resolution of any compliance disputes. Judge Sargus conducted a fairness hearing on December 17, 2019. As with class certification, some individuals living in institutional settings who did not want to receive community-based services were concerned that they would lose access to their current services due to the settlement. On January 10, 2020, Disability Rights Ohio issued a press release asserting that existing services would not be reduced under the settlement. As of March 2020, Judge Sargus has not yet decided whether to give final approval to the settlement.", "summary": "On March 31, 2016, individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities filed a class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against the State and State departments. They claimed that they were experiencing, or were at risk of experiencing, pervasive and widespread isolation and segregation in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Olmstead v. L.C., and the Social Security Act. On March 23, 2017, the court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss the case. On March 27, 2017, the court granted class certification, but the defendants subsequently asked for reconsideration, and the court entered a revised class definition on March 30, 2018. On May 10, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion for settlement that would entail expanded options counseling and additional funding for individuals with intellectual and development disabilities."} {"article": "On May 10, 2000, children in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children\u2019s Services (including a subclass of African American foster care children) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, against the state of Tennessee. The plaintiffs, represented by Children\u2019s Rights and private counsel, sought to enjoin the state from subjecting class members to practices that violated their rights. The plaintiffs alleged that the state violated their substantive and procedural due process rights arising from the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended by the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, and relevant regulations; the Americans with Disabilities Act; and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The African American class members also alleged violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and its implementing regulations, 42 C.F.R. \u00a780.3 et seq. Specific alleged violations included the state\u2019s placement of children in restrictive institutional settings, placement in emergency shelters for long periods of time, large caseloads and inadequately trained caseworkers, inappropriate foster placements, and too-frequent foster placements. In sum, the actions (or inaction) of the state endangered the health and well-being of the children in the class. The district court (Judge Todd J. Campbell) denied the state\u2019s motion to dismiss on October 26, 2000. 149 F. Supp. 2d 941. The court urged negotiation of a settlement agreement, which was later approved in July 2001. The settlement agreement called for DCS to hire more caseworkers and to provide better training for them; to develop new placements; and to improve the computerized management system. It also required better review systems measuring outcomes in different areas impacting foster care, and an assessment of disparities related to African American children in care. Finally, an independent monitor was appointed to report on compliance. Following a monitor report that documented DCS\u2019s substantial failure to comply with the agreement, the plaintiffs filed a contempt motion on November 4, 2003. At that point, DCS was in full compliance with only 24 of 136 provisions. The plaintiffs requested an independent administrator to create a plan for implementing the remaining terms. In December 2003, the parties settled the contempt motion. They agreed that DCS would collaborate with a technical assistance committee of five child welfare experts to develop a new implementation plan, which was later approved by the court in August 2004. Although the progress of the implementation plan was slow at first, DCS improved in areas such as staffing and data reporting. The settlement agreement was modified in May 2007, October 2008, and December 2009. The plaintiffs reported that the new DCS leadership team had made significant strides in many areas, including placing more foster children with families and reducing institutional placements. However, Children\u2019s Rights also reported that they would remain in place as a watchdog to hold the agency accountable until all court-ordered reforms were implemented. Periodically, the parties filed modified settlement agreements and exit plans, which recognized the state\u2019s progress and set out specific requirements needed in order for the state to successfully complete the court-ordered improvements and end court involvement. On April 11, 2016, the district court ruled that DCS had reached all of the mandated goals to overhaul its foster care system. The state then entered a yearlong holding period, during which it had to sustain its performance on every measure before requesting an end to the court oversight. On April 27, 2016, the court approved the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for attorneys\u2019 fees, ordering the defendants to pay $186,000. On April 5, 2017, the court approved an additional $135,000 in post-judgment attorneys\u2019 fees. Finally, on November 27, 2017 and January 18, 2019, the court approved additional attorneys\u2019 fee awards of $226,000 and $35,000. On January 10, 2017, the case was reassigned to Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr. On July 17, 2017, having found that DCS had largely maintained its compliance, the court issued a modified settlement agreement and exit plan. The court terminated its jurisdiction over all matters except for the section of the exit plan pertaining to the external accountability reporting structure. Specifically, DCS was tasked with creating an external accountability reporting center and the court retained jurisdiction to monitor this portion of the agreement for 18 months. Upon termination of the court\u2019s jurisdiction, the Center would begin public reporting. On January 17, 2019, DCS filed an unopposed notice of compliance with the relevant section of the exit plan. On February 25, 2019, the court dismissed the case, terminating its jurisdiction.", "summary": "In 2000, children in the custody of Tennessee\u2019s Department of Children\u2019s Services filed this class-action lawsuit against the State of Tennessee, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The plaintiffs, represented by Children\u2019s Rights and private counsel, asked the court to enjoin the defendants from subjecting the members of the class to practices that violated their constitutional rights by endangering their health and well-being. The court approved a settlement agreement in 2000. After sixteen years of litigated implementation, the court determined in 2016 that Tennessee was in compliance with all the requirements of the agreement. On July 17, 2017, the court issued a modified settlement agreement and exit plan, terminating its jurisdiction over all matters except the section of the exit plan pertaining to the external accountability reporting structure (Section XIX), over which the court would retain jurisdiction for 18 months. The court approved a total of $582,000 in attorneys\u2019 fees. In January 2019, DCS filed an unopposed notice of compliance with Section XIX. The court terminated jurisdiction and dismissed the case on February 25, 2019."} {"article": "On May 1, 1990, male and female youth confined at the Ferris School and Bridge House in Wilmington, Delaware, filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Youth Rehabilitation Services (YRS) and the State of Delaware in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the National Prison Project of the ACLU, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law and to the least restrictive treatment under the least restrictive conditions, and under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended the defendants subjected the plaintiffs to overcrowding, fire safety hazards, unhealthy living conditions, inadequate medical care, abusive punishment, improper classification, inadequate education, lack of due process, restrictions on communication, inadequate nutrition and recreation. On January 10, 1992, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to expand the class and include more specific allegations with respect to (a) the physical environment, (b) living conditions, (c) physical and verbal abuse, (d) medical, dental and psychiatric care, (e) mental health care, programming and treatment, (e) classification, due process, and the grievance system, and (f) special education services. Further, the amended complaint added a First Amendment claim of right to access to the courts and families. On January 16, 1992, the case was reassigned from Judge Caleb M. Wright to Judge Sue L. Robinson. On March 31, 1992, the case was reassigned from Judge Sue L. Robinson to Judge Roderick R. McKelvie. On May 20, 1992, the District Court (Judge Roderick R. McKelvie) certified a class consisting of those presently or in the future confined at Ferris School or New Castle County Detention Center in Wilmington, Delaware. While settlement negations proceeded, a trial was scheduled. Apparently, the Court would not allow a continuance, so the parties agreed to dismiss the case without prejudice to allow more time for settlement. This dismissal happened on May 3, 1993. On joint motions, in January 1994, the case was restored to the active docket by vacation of the prior dismissal order. The parties submitted their proposed settlement agreement. After a fairness hearing, on May 6, 1994, the District Court (Judge McKelvie) approved the settlement agreement and issued an order for dismissal without prejudice, finding the negotiated settlement agreement to be fair, reasonable and adequate as a basis for compromising the claims of the plaintiff class. Under the settlement agreement, YRS agreed, for three years, (a) to follow stipulated policies on grievances, discipline, control and confinement, (b) to provide the plaintiffs with recreation, exercise, education, medical and mental health care, and (c) to do certain other things with respect to programming, staffing, life safety, sanitation and hygiene. Further, the settlement agreement required YRS to develop a plan to ensure compliance, including the appointment of a Monitor. The dismissal order allowed the plaintiffs to move to reopen the case to request a court order for the performance of the agreement's terms. We have no more information on this file.", "summary": "On May 1, 1990, male and female youth confined at the Ferris School and Bridge House in Wilmington, Delaware, filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Youth Rehabilitation Services (YRS) and the State of Delaware in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the National Prison Project of the ACLU, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law and to the least restrictive treatment under the least restrictive conditions, and under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794. Under a settlement agreement, YRS agreed, for three years, (a) to follow stipulated policies on grievances, discipline, control and confinement, (b) to provide the plaintiffs with recreation, exercise, education, medical and mental health care, and (c) to do certain other things with respect to programming, staffing, life safety, sanitation and hygiene. Further, the settlement agreement required YRS to develop a plan to ensure compliance, including the appointment of a Monitor."} {"article": "On December 7, 2016, an individual formerly detained in a D.C. jail filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief, damages, and attorneys\u2019 fees. The plaintiff claimed the district had violated his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The complaint labeled the plaintiff as both the \"Overdetained Named Plaintiff\" and the \"Strip Search Named Plaintiff.\" As the \"Overdetained Named Plaintiff,\" he sought to represent a class consisting of \"(a) Each person who has been, is, or in the future will be incarcerated in any District of Columbia Department of Corrections facility from August 1, 2013 forward; and (b) who was not released, or, in the future, will not be released by midnight on the date on which the person is entitled to be released by court order or the date on which the basis for his or her detention has otherwise expired (or within two hours of being ordered released or otherwise becoming entitled to release if the person was a court return).\" As the \"Strip Search Named Plaintiff,\" he sought to represent a class consisting of \"each member of the class who was, or in the future will be, from August 1, 2013, forward: (i) in the custody of the Department of Corrections; (ii) taken to court from a Department of Corrections facility; (iii) ordered released by the court or otherwise became entitled to release by virtue of the court appearance because the charge on which he had been held was no longer pending or was dismissed at the hearing, was ordered released on his own recognizance, or had posted bail, was sentenced to time served, was acquitted or was otherwise entitled to release; (iv) was not the subject of any other pending case or cases which imposed any condition of release other than personal recognizance; (v) was not the subject of any detainer or warrant; (vi) was returned from court to the DC Jail or CTF or other District facility, to be processed out of Department of Corrections custody; and (vii) was subjected to a strip search and/or visual body cavity search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons; before being released, regardless of whether he was over-detained.\" On March 21, 2017, the District of Columbia moved to dismiss the case, alleging that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. On April 5, 2017, the plaintiff submitted an amended complaint. The amended complaint claimed that the harm experienced by the plaintiff was part of the District's revived pattern and practice of overdetention. These claims were brought under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. On April 19, 2017, the defendant again moved to dismiss. The motion alleged the same arguments as the previous motion to dismiss. On August 22, 2018, Judge Dabney L. Friedrich granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss. The court granted the District's motion to dismiss as to the plaintiff's claim that his over-detention constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Judge Friedrich denied the district's motion to dismiss the claim that the plaintiff's over-detention violated his substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Judge Friedrich also denied the motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for municipal liability. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the claims that the strip searched violated the Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment. As for the plaintiff's common law claims, the court dismissed the the false imprisonment, false arrest claims, and invasion of privacy claims. 322 F.Supp.3d 78 (D.D.C. 2018). Eight days later, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration. The plaintiff asked the court to reconsider the only common law claims. The court held oral argument on April 3, 2019 on the issue of the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. Although the plaintiff had only requested reconsideration on the common law claims, the briefings made it clear that the arguments on the common law claims implicitly challenged the dismissal of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims. Two months later, Judge Friederich issued an opinion granting the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. The judge restored the common law claims for false imprisonment (based in over-detention) and invasion of privacy (illegal strip searches) in full. Judge Friederich restored the section 1983 claims for over-detention and illegal strip searches only to the extent that they asserted claims under the Fourth Amendment. 2019 WL 5690341 (D.D.C. 2019). In September of 2019, the parties issued a joint status report informing the court that the issues in the case had been resolved. On October 16, 2019 Judge Friederich issued a stipulation of dismissal. The parties agreed that the plaintiff's claims against the District of Columbia were resolved. Information on how the parties resolved this case is not available. The case was dismissed with prejudice. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On December 7, 2016, an individual formerly detained in a D.C. jail filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief, damages, and attorneys\u2019 fees. The plaintiff claimed the district had violated his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiff claimed that he had been over-detained and illegally strip-searched. Three years after the initial complaint was brought, the parties notified the court that they had resolved the plaintiff's claims. Information on how the parties resolved the case is not available. Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(i)(A)(ii) of the Federal Ruled of Civil Procedure, Judge Friederich dismissed the case with prejudice and the case is now closed."} {"article": "On Sept. 11, 2017, an individual private plaintiff in San Diego filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Private counsel from the law firm Arnold & Porter represented the plaintiff. In the complaint, plaintiff stated that he had been a two-time DACA recipient since 2013. He alleged that in May 2016, DHS had apprehended him in a raid, detained him for a month, and initiated removal proceedings against him solely for unlawful presence. DHS denied the plaintiff's allegations and claimed the arrest was for alien smuggling. Because of the removal proceedings, DHS automatically terminated his DACA status, including his employment authorization, leading to his job loss. Plaintiff argued that this automatic status termination, with no notice or opportunity to respond, ran contrary to USCIS's DACA Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and thus violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. The plaintiff also alleged that DHS's actions violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights. Plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief for his DACA authorization to be reinstated and not terminated prior to notice and an opportunity to respond, as required in the SOP. The plaintiff also noted that President Trump had, on September 5, 2017, announced a phase-out of the DACA program but with a renewal option for current DACA holders with a deadline of Oct. 5, 2017. Given this impending deadline, the plaintiff also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) on the same day as the complaint, requesting an expedited hearing. Judge Jeffrey Miller, who was assigned to this case, scheduled a motion hearing for September 28, 2017. On September 21, 2017, DHS responded to the plaintiff's TRO motion. The government argued that the plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits because he could challenge removal only in removal proceedings in Immigration Court and not in the District Court and because DACA and its associated employment authorization were a discretionary program not governed by the Constitution or the APA. The plaintiff replied on September 26, 2017 in support of his claims and that the defendants' jurisdictional arguments rely on a mischaracterization of the plaintiff and DACA, and that the harm imposed by the defendants is irreparable. Judge Miller held a TRO motion hearing on September 28, 2017. The next day, the court issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining DHS's revocation of plaintiff's DACA status, so that the plaintiff could apply for an extension. 2017 WL 4340385 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2017). The court found that they had jurisdiction to review DHS's termination of the plaintiff's status, even though the court lacked jurisdiction in the plaintiff's immigration removal proceeding. Next, Judge Miller held that the plaintiff had established a likelihood of success on his claim demonstrating that DHS's termination of his status without reference to the DACA SOP was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. Further, due to the status termination and loss of employment, the plaintiff had suffered irreparable harm. On November 13, 2017, the plaintiff moved to modify the preliminary injunction. He explained that USCIS had not yet adjudicated his pending DACA renewal application, but that his status would expire on December 22, 2017. He asked the Court to modify the preliminary injunction to ensure he would retain his status while USCIS processed the renewal application. DHS responded on December 4, 2019, and the plaintiff replied on December 7, 2019. Following a December 12, 2017 motion hearing, the plaintiff alerted the court of a December 13, 2017 a news report that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had detained a Pennsylvania DACA recipient after a postal delay with his renewal application had caused his status to lapse. DHS objected to the plaintiff introducing the news report. On December 15, 2017, Judge Miller denied the plaintiff's motion to modify the preliminary injunction. The court stated that DHS had complied with the order by reinstating plaintiff's DACA status and employment authorization and accepting his renewal request. Although DHS intended to terminate the plaintiff's status by December 22, 2019, USCIS was also adjudicating his renewal request. The court concluded that since it had ordered DHS to comply with the APA and SOP, DHS was unlikely to improperly terminate the plaintiff's DACA status, detain, or remove him before December 22, 2019. On December 22, 2019, DHS asked the Court for an order dissolving the preliminary injunction and allowing the status termination to take effect. On January 12, 2018, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint and motion for preliminary injunction. At this point in time, DHS had already terminated the plaintiff's DACA status and denied his renewal application based upon the removal proceedings. Plaintiff alleged that these actions violated the APA as they lacked reasoned explanation guided by the DACA SOP. The plaintiff asked for a preliminary injunction vacating and enjoining the purported termination and the purported subsequent denial of his renewal application. DHS responded on February 5, 2018, and the plaintiff replied on February 12, 2019. DHS moved to dismiss on February 23, 2018. DHS argued that the plaintiff lacked standing after his DACA termination, that the case belonged in removal proceedings rather than before the district court, and that the termination implicated no constitutional interest. On April 12, 2018, the court granted DHS's February 23, 2019 motion to dismiss without leave to amend the complaint, dissolved the initial preliminary injunction, and denied the plaintiff's January 12, 2019 motion for a new preliminary injunction. In the order, the court held that the second revocation of the plaintiff's DACA grant complied with the SOP, so that the preliminary injunction could be dissolved. In his view, DHS had considered all relevant factors in determining that the plaintiff due to the allegations of alien smuggling against him, even with no further evidence was an enforcement priority within the SOP and other agency materials. In addition to seeing no APA violation, the court also saw no constitutional violation. The court conceded that DACA implicated due process interests, entitling recipients to a notice and hearing before termination. Judge Miller held that the plaintiff had in fact received these procedural due process protections. In addition, the court dissolved the preliminary injunction issued on September 29, 2017. 2018 WL 1757668. On May 10, 2018, the plaintiff filled a motion for reconsideration for denying his motion for preliminary injunction and granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion for reconsideration on July 20, 2018 because no newly discovered evidence was presented, no error was made in the initial judgement, and that there had been no change in the controlling law. On August 3, 2018, the plaintiff filed an appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit Court, docket #18-56037. After reviewing the district court docket, the 9th Circuit ordered that the appeal did not appear to be a preliminary injunction appeal. The plaintiff last filed a reply brief on May 29, 2019 clarifying that the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction, dismissal of the case, and entry of judgement was legally erroneous and should be vacated, reversed, and remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction setting aside USCIS's termination of the plaintiff\u2019s DACA status and benefits, as well as its denial of his DACA renewal application, which was based solely on that unlawful termination. The appeal remained pending as of November 13, 2019 and this case is ongoing.", "summary": "On Sept. 11, 2017, a two-time DACA recipient in San Diego filed suit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for apprehending him in a raid, detaining him for a month, and initiating removal proceedings against him solely for unlawful presence. On April 12, 2018, the court granted DHS's February 23, 2019 motion to dismiss without leave to amend the complaint, dissolved the initial preliminary injunction, and denied the plaintiff's January 12, 2019 motion for a new preliminary injunction. On August 3, 2018, the plaintiff filed an appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit Court. The plaintiff's lawsuit was one of many challenges to DHS's decision to revoke DACA benefits in individual cases. A class actions filed for the American Civil Liberties Union in a separate federal district court in California."} {"article": "This is one of many lawsuits brought challenging the Obama administration's 2012 Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate requiring employers to pay for employees' contraception and abortifacients via medical insurance coverage. Many religious hospitals, charities, universities, and other enterprises owned or controlled by religious organizations or individuals who opposed contraception on doctrinal grounds argued the mandate violated their religious beliefs. For a full list of these cases please see our collection of the Contraception Insurance Mandate cases here. Several non-profit corporations (Affiliates), which were affiliated with the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Philadelphia (Archdiocese) and participated in the archdiocese health care plan, were required under the Affordable Care Act and its regulations (Mandate), as issued by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, to sign and deliver a self-certification to a third party administrator. The administrator could unilaterally choose to supply abortifacients and contraceptive services, in contradiction of the religious belief held by the Affiliates. Meanwhile, the Archdiocese, which was itself exempted from the Mandate, refused to facilitate any provision of contraceptive services in the archdiocese health care plan for the same religious reason. Not wanting to pay any monetary penalties for noncompliance with the Mandate or to expel the Affiliates from the plan, the Archdiocese, along with the Affiliates, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (the \"RFRA\"). The complaint against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Labor and U.S. Department of Treasury was filed on June 2, 2014 and the plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys' fees. They claimed that the defendants, through the Mandate, had imposed a substantial burden on their exercise of religion, in violation of the RFRA as well as the First Amendment Free Exercise and Free Speech clauses of the U.S. Constitution. On June 26, 2014, the District Court (Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter) denied the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge Buckwalter raised doubts as to Plaintiffs' standing to bring their RFRA challenge and found that Plaintiffs had not met their burden to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. 2014 WL 2892502 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2014). That same day, the Plaintiffs appealed to the Third Circuit (14-3126). On September 2, 2014, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's judgement and remanded the case for reconsideration of the denial of the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The Third Circuit also enjoined the Government from imposing any fines until the District Court makes its decision on reconsideration. On August 23, 2016, the parties issued a joint status report indicating that the district court had stayed all proceedings in this matter pending the Third Circuit\u2019s resolution of Zubik v. Burwell, which was remanded after the Supreme Court's directive that the parties develop accommodations for religious exercise. 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). The parties continued to file a number of status reports indicating that they were working on a joint resolution to this case. On August 24, 2018, the parties stipulated to dismiss this action with prejudice pursuant to private agreements entered into by the parties. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On June 2, 2014, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Philadelphia and its affiliated non-profit corporations filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, under the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Labor and U.S. Department of Treasury. The Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendants through the ACA Mandate had imposed a substantial burden on their exercise of religion. On June 26, 2014, the District Court (Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter) denied the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs appealed to the Third Circuit. After resolution of Zubik v. Burwell, the parties stipulated to dismiss this action with prejudice. The case is now closed."} {"article": "On March 9, 2017, the plaintiffs filed this class action suit challenging the adequacy of the Missouri State Public Defender (MSPD) on behalf of all indigent adults and juveniles who were charged with any offense that carries the potential for incarceration as a penalty and who are eligible to be represented by MSPD. The complaint was originally filed in Circuit Court of Cole County but defendants removed it to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri on April 7, 2017. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and the MacArthur Justice Center sued the State of Missouri along with its governor under 42 \u00a7U.S.C \u00a71983, alleging a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel also guaranteed by the Missouri Constitution Art. I, \u00a7 18(a) and the Missouri Criminal and Juvenile Codes. The plaintiffs also alleged a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments right to due process, also guaranteed by the Missouri Constitution Art. I, \u00a7 10. The lawsuit asked the court to declare Missouri\u2019s public defense system unconstitutional and to order the defendants to take the steps \u201cnecessary to bring the system into compliance with federal and state law.\u201d The complaint alleged that the State of Missouri had failed \"to provide the resources required to adequately represent poor people accused of crime in Missouri, leading to the actual and constructive denial of counsel for, and ineffective representation of, indigent defendant across the State.\u201d Moreover, it stated that the budget for indigent defense was \u201cshockingly inadequate\" and alleged that attorneys had little time to spend on each case, causing poor defendants to needlessly sit in jail for prolonged periods until their public defender has time to work on their case. The complaint stated that there was a lack of attorneys at arraignments and bond hearings, and that many appointed attorneys were unprepared to effectively advocate for a client. The case was assigned to Judge Nanette Laughrey and was also included in Missouri's Mediation and Assessment Program with Magistrate Judge Matt J. Whitworth assigned to be the mediator. On April 21, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On June 6, 2017, the case was reassigned to an outside mediator. The plaintiffs requested the court to certify their class on June 8, 2017. The proposed class consisted of \"all indigent persons who are now or who will be during the pendency of this litigation, under formal charge before a state court in Missouri of having committed any offense the penalty for which includes the possibility of confinement, incarceration, imprisonment, or detention (regardless of whether actually imposed), and who are eligible to be represented by MSPD.\" On July 5, 2017 the court held oral argument on the defendants' motions to dismiss, and on July 24, 2017 Judge Laughrey granted the defendant's motion to dismiss in part as to one of the plaintiffs who lacked standing to sue. 268 F.Supp.3d 992. The court denied the motion as to the other plaintiffs. Regarding the state of Missouri, the court found that the state had waived sovereign immunity by removing the case to federal court. The court also denied the motion to dismiss as it related to the governor of Missouri, finding that the plaintiffs had alleged that the governor had a sufficient connection to the challenged conduct to place him squarely within the Ex Parte Young exception to sovereign immunity. On August 18, 2017, two Defendants, the state of Missouri and its Governor, appealed to the Eighth Circuit their denied motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. (Docket No. 17-2857). Arguments were held on April 10, 2018, Meanwhile, in the district court, the parties began discovery until, on January 18, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to stay the case pending resolution of the appeal to the Eighth Circuit. The same day, the defendants filed a motion to realign the MSPD defendants as plaintiffs. The plaintiffs submitted an opposition to the realignment on January 31, contending that there was no legal basis to realign the MSPD defendants as plaintiffs and that there were actual and substantial conflicts between the two groups. On February 9, both parties filed their respective motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs sought summary judgment on all of their declaratory and injunctive claims and an order requiring the defendants to propose a plan to provide adequate representation to all indigent criminal defendants in Missouri within 30 days. The defendants contended that the Eleventh Amendment immunity barred all claims to the state, that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing, and that the plaintiffs failed to state plausible constitutional claims. On the same day, the defendants filed a motion to strike the designation of plaintiffs\u2019 experts and exclude the testimony of the experts at trial. The plaintiffs submitted an opposition to the motion to strike on March 2. The motions to realign the MSPD defendants, the parties\u2019 motions for summary judgment, and the motion to strike the plaintiffs\u2019 experts were all denied on April 17, 2018. In an opinion written by Judge Benton, the Eighth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court in favor of the defendants on January 10, 2019. 913 F.3d 736. Regarding the state of Missouri, the Eighth Circuit held that sovereign immunity is broader than Eleventh Amendment immunity and in the absence of an express statutory exception or a recognized common law exception, sovereign immunity is the rule and applies to all suits against public entities. The Eighth Circuit also reversed the district court's holding regarding the governor, rebutting point by point how the Ex Parte Young exception did not apply in this case. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The plaintiffs\u2019 claims against the state of Missouri and the governer were denied on February 26, 2019, and Judge Laughrey also denied the plaintiffs' class certification. 2019 WL 954982. The defendants\u2019 motion to stay was also denied as moot. District Judge Laughrey, in light of the Eighth Circuit decision, ordered parties to proceed with mediation on March 1, 2019. The parties submitted a joint motion to enter a consent judgment, proposing a variety of obligations to MSPD on May 13. Specifically, the consent judgment proposed that the MSPD must ensure public defenders argue for release at every client\u2019s initial appearance, implement a caseload standard on individual public defenders, and provide for a monitor to ensure compliance. The following day, the Attorney General filed a motion to intervene as a defendant and sought a temporary stay on the litigation. The Attorney General contended that despite their right to participate in litigation concerning the state\u2019s interest, the proposed consent judgment did not adequately consult the Attorney General in the mediation process. The plaintiffs filed an opposition to the two motions on May 28. On July 12, 2019, the motion to intervene was denied but the court permitted the Attorney General to submit an amicus brief addressing whether the proposed consent judgment comported with Missouri law, as well as other concerns on public safety and welfare. 2019 WL 3069856. On July 26, the Attorney General submitted the amicus brief and appealed the intervention decision to the Eighth Circuit with a motion to stay pending appeal. (Docket No. 19-2584). The district court partially granted the motion to stay and decided to stay the consent order pending resolution of the ruling. On January 27, 2020, the parties\u2019 joint motion for consent judgment was denied by the district court. Judge Laughrey determined that the rigid caseload capacity ceiling would impose an impossible constraint upon the public defenders in trying to comply with the consent decree and court orders to defend indigent clients. 2020 WL 420833. The parties engaged in a teleconference before the court on May 8, 2020. There, Judge Laughrey told the plaintiffs that they must either dismiss the case without prejudice or proceed to a bench trial. The plaintiffs opted for a bench trial, and Judge Laughrey noted that discovery was closed but permitted the parties to participate in consensual discovery. In another teleconference hearing held on May 19, the Defendants argued that only one plaintiff still had standing and therefore any remedy must be tailored to her specific case. On June 10, 2020, the parties notified the court that they had reached a resolution. The case was dismissed without prejudice on June 15, 2020. On June 16, the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the pending appeal before the Eighth Circuit as moot given that the district court case concluded. The Eighth Circuit granted the motion on July 8, 2020. This case is now closed.", "summary": "This lawsuit challenges the adequacy of the Missouri State Public Defender (MSPD), which provides legal representation to all indigent citizens accused or convicted of crimes in Missouri state court. After the state of Missouri and the governor were dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds, the case was eventually resolved through a private settlement."} {"article": "On July 25, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a black forklift operator (plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the Western District Court of Tennessee under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Stein World, LLC. The EEOC sought the defendant's compliance with a prior settlement agreement, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant violated a prior settlement agreement between the parties since it harassed the plaintiff-intervenor based on his race and discharged him in retaliation of filing this suit and participating in the an EEOC-sponsored mediation. In January 2005, the plaintiff-intervenor was hired by the defendant as a forklift operator. He was the only black forklift operator employed by the defendant. In April 2005, the plaintiff-intervenor reported to the defendant that a temporary employee had cursed him and that he was working in unsafe conditions. On May 5, 2005, his employment was terminated. On May 17, 2005, he filed a claim with the EEOC. Shortly after, he was hospitalized for pneumonia and eventually had to undergo a lung transplant. The defendants agreed to mediate the matter and on July 6, 2005, the plaintiff-intervenor and the defendant entered into a settlement agreement, where among other things, the defendant agreed to pay for the plaintiff-intervenor's medical expenses. When the plaintiff-intervenor gave the hospital bill to the defendant, they refused to pay more than $5,000, arguing that the mediator failed to include the $5,000 cap in the settlement agreement and that the plaintiff-intervenor made fraudulent misrepresentations to them by saying his medical expenses were only \"a few thousand dollars.\" On August 16, 2006, the defendant filed its answer and third-party complaint against the black employee involved in this suit, alleging that they never would have agreed to the prior settlement had the plaintiff-intervenor not made fraudulent misrepresentations to them. On October 11, 2006, the District Court (Judge Jon P. McCalla) entered a default judgment against the plaintiff-intervenor, but then that order was set aside on March 7, 2007. On March 15, 2007, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On March 27, 2007, the District Court (Judge Jon P. McCalla) denied the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's counter claim and third-party complaint. The parties then went through the discovery process. On May 27, 2008, the District Court (Judge Jon P. McCalla) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $15,000, and his hospital $42,426.41 for the third-party defendant's medical expenses.", "summary": "On July 25, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a black forklift operator (third-party defendant and plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the Western District Court of Tennessee, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against Stein World, LLC. The EEOC sought the defendant's compliance with a prior settlement agreements, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant violated a prior settlement agreement between the parties since it harassed the third-party defendant based on his race and discharged him in retaliation of filing this suit and participating in the an EEOC-sponsored mediation. On May 27, 2008, the District Court (Judge Jon P. McCalla) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the third-party defendant (plaintiff-intervenor) $15,000, and his hospital $42,426.41 for the third-party defendant's medical expenses."} {"article": "In 1998, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted an investigation of the Columbus Division of Police (CDP). As a result of the investigation, the DOJ determined that CDP officers were engaged in a pattern or practice of using excessive force, making false arrests and lodging false charges, and conducting improper searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. On October 21, 1999, the DOJ filed a complaint against the City of Columbus, Ohio pursuant to the Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14111, in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio to remedy an alleged pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct by officers of the CDP. The case was assigned to Judge John D. Holschuh and Magistrate Judge Norah M. King. Contemporaneously with the filing of the DOJ's complaint, the DOJ filed a motion to stay the proceedings so that the parties could explore settlement. Judge King entered a stay, which expired on December 20, 1999, without the parties reaching a settlement. On October 25, 1999, the Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9 (\"FOP\") filed a motion to intervene as a defendant in the action. Judge King granted the FOP's motion to intervene on February 7, 2000. The City then moved to dismiss the case, and the FOP moved for a judgment on the pleadings. In those motions, the defendants noted that no court had yet interpreted or applied the language of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141. The defendants maintained that \u00a714141 was an unconstitutional enactment, outside Congress' authority pursuant to \u00a7 5 of the 14th Amendment and in violation of the Tenth Amendment. The defendants further argued that \u00a7 14141 must be construed to incorporate the 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 cases for determining municipal liability. The defendants argued that the DOJ's complaint was therefore deficient because it failed to plead facts that the City caused, or was deliberately indifferent to, the pattern or practice of CDP officer misconduct as alleged in the complaint. The DOJ filed a brief responding to the constitutional challenge to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141. The DOJ also argued that the language of \u00a7 14141 imposed vicarious liability on the City for the acts of its officers. The DOJ argued that the \u00a7 1983 standards of municipal liability were not applicable to \u00a7 14141 cases, and therefore the complaint properly stated a cause of action. On April 26, 2000, Judge Holschuh referred the dispositive motions to Magistrate Judge Norah M. King for a report and recommendation. She issued her report in August, finding that 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141 was constitutional. She construed \u00a7 14141 to require the same level of proof as is required against municipal entities in actions under \u00a7 1983, as set forth in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) and its progeny. In response to the Judge King\u2019s report, U.S. Representatives John Conyers, Jr., the ranking minority member of the House Judiciary Committee, and other representatives moved for leave to participate as amici curiae. Representative Conyers was an original cosponsor of the Police Accountability Act - legislation that contained the language that ultimately was embodied in 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141. As grounds for their participation, the representatives stated that their interest was to correct the Judge King\u2019s interpretation of \u00a7 14141 as imposing \u00a7 1983's \"policy or custom\" test for determining municipal liability that they believed was a misapplication of the statute. The Grand Lodge of FOP, the national police officer labor organization, also filed an amicus motion, taking positions supportive of those taken by the City and the local FOP. On November 20, 2000, Judge Holschuh granted the motions for leave to participate as amici curiae, and amicus briefs were then filed. After an extended round of additional briefing, there was a lengthy period of case inactivity while settlement negotiations continued. On September 4, 2002, Columbus Mayor Michael Coleman submitted a settlement proposal to the DOJ that outlined various reforms the CPD agreed to make in exchange for the dismissal of the DOJ's complaint without prejudice. In the settlement proposal, Mayor Coleman listed their ongoing efforts to remedy the alleged issues through:
- The expansion of the staffing and scope of responsibility of the Internal Affairs Bureau implemented in July 2001. This included specialized training and community outreach programs to publicize and explain the new citizen complaint process; - The expansion of the definition of actions that constitute a use of force, enhanced reporting of all uses of force and adoption of a use of force continuum; - Heightened commitment to prevent racial profiling including specialized training as well as an implementation of regular, periodic reviews; - Passing of Ordinance 1475-01 by Columbus City Council on September 24, 2001, to specifically include racial profiling as a criminal offense; - Installation of video and audio recorders in police cruisers; and - Agreement to provide copies of relevant Division of Police documents to the Department of Justice through the end of 2003.The DOJ found the efforts satisfactory and agreed to end the litigation. On September 4, 2002, Judge Holschuh granted the DOJ's motion to dismiss the case without prejudice. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On October 21, 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint against the city of Columbus, Ohio, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a714111 to remedy a pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by officers of the Columbus Division of Police. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and it followed a DOJ investigation which analyzed the CDP's use of force. In September 2004, the Mayor of Columbus submitted a settlement proposal to the DOJ, and teh DOJ accepted the terms."} {"article": "On March 4, 2002, immigrants granted asylum in the United States filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota against the Attorney General of the United States and Immigration and Naturalization Services. Plaintiffs alleged that federal immigration agencies and officials had improperly administered the system and waiting list that determined when asylees could become lawful permanent residents and had failed to provide asylees with proper employment endorsements. Plaintiffs brought this case under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Bivens, and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), alleging violations of the INA, 8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1101 et seq.; the APA; 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 551 et seq.; and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. Represented by the American Immigration Law Foundation and the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as class certification. At issue was the government's handling of \"refugee admission numbers.\" Under the Refugee Act of 1980, the President could annually authorize the admission of up to 50,000 refugees to the U.S. Out of that number, the Attorney General could use up to 10,000 refugee admission numbers to grant lawful permanent resident status (green card) to asylees already in the U.S. Plaintiffs alleged that between 1994 and 2002, over 20,000 refugee admission numbers that had been set aside by the Attorney General for asylee adjustment went unused and that Defendants should have used those numbers to clear out the backlog of asylees who applied for green cards. Plaintiffs further claimed that once refugees were granted asylum the government was required to provide proper work papers to the asylees, but it continually failed to do so. Defendants denied the allegations and took the position that unused refugee admission numbers expired at the end of each fiscal year. On January 14, 2003, the District Court (Judge Richard H. Kyle) certified the case as a class action on behalf of tens of thousands of asylees, defining the class and subclasses as: All asylees in the United States who have applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence and whose applications for adjustment remain pending; Subclass I - All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications with the INS on or before January 16, 1998; Subclass II - All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications after January 16, 1998, and on or before June 9, 1998; Subclass III - All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications after June 9, 1998; Subclass IV - All asylees who applied for or applied to renew an Employment Authorization Document. The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On February 12, 2004, Judge Kyle denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment and granted Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. Judge Kyle ordered Defendants to (1) use all unused and misused asylee adjustment numbers that had been made available in prior years to adjust the status of asylees and (2) provide all asylees with an employment authorization endorsement that was valid throughout the duration of the alien's status as an asylee. Ngwanyia v. Ashcroft, 302 F.Supp.2d 1076 (D.Minn. 2004). Defendants appealed. Settlement negotiations followed, and the parties reached a proposed settlement agreement in January 2005. Defendants' appeal was stayed pending court approval of the settlement. The Court conducted a fairness hearing on June 15, 2005, and formally approved the class settlement on July 12, 2005. Ngwanyia v. Gonzales, 376 F.Supp.2d 923 (D.Minn. 2005). Under the Settlement Agreement, the government agreed to make an additional 31,000 asylee adjustment numbers available during 2005-2008 to adjust the status of asylees who had applied for permanent residence. The Agreement also provided for changes to the issuance of work permits to asylees. The agreement was to remain in effect for three years or until the Defendants completed the requirements of the agreement, whichever was longer. The District Court retained jurisdiction throughout the settlement. The Settlement has since finished and the case is now closed.", "summary": "On March 4, 2002, public interest attorneys filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota on behalf of immigrants granted asylum in the United States. Plaintiffs alleged that federal immigration agencies and officials had improperly administered the system that determined when asylees could become lawful permanent residents and had failed to provide proper employment endorsements. Three years later a settlement was reached between the parties that required Defendants to make additional asylee numbers available and to make changes to the issuances of work permits for asylees."} {"article": "This is a case about whether the federal government must include undocumented immigrants in the 2020 Census count. On July 21, 2020, President Trump issued a memo ordering the exclusion of undocumented immigrants from the state-population totals used to calculate the state's apportionments. In response, on July 24, 2020, twenty states, ten cities, four counties, and the District of Columbia filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by the New York State Office of the Attorney General and other government attorneys sued the President of the United States, the Department of Commerce, the Secretary of Commerce, the Bureau of the Census, and the Director of the United States Census Bureau. The plaintiffs claimed that the \u201c[d]efendants\u2019 decision to exclude undocumented immigrants from the apportionment base following the 2020 Census . . . is unauthorized by and contrary to the Constitution and laws of the United States;\u201d that the decision to do so is \u201cintentionally discriminatory in violation of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment[,]\u201d and that the \u201c[d]efendants\u2019 decision and any implementing actions they take are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law within the meaning of [the Administrative Procedure Act.\u201d The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, writs of mandamus, and reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees, costs, and expenses. This case was assigned to Judge Jesse M. Furman. The case was related to State of New York v. U.S. Department of Commerce, another 2020 Census case assigned to Judge Furman. That case is in the Clearinghouse, here. On August 3, 2020, the complaint was amended adding Maine, Wisconsin, the United States Conference of Mayors, and Howard County as plaintiffs. Additionally, the first claim was updated to emphasize the Constitution's use of the phrase \u201cactual Enumeration,\u201d and a new claim was added alleging the Memorandum violated the Census Act which requires the enumeration in the census of the whole number of persons in each State. Judge Furman ordered this case to be consolidated with New York Immigration Coalition v. Trump on August 4, 2020. That case can be found here in the Clearinghouse. The complaint was updated, on August 6, to reflect this consolidation. At the plaintiffs' request, on August 7, 2020, Judge Furman requested the Chief Judge of the Second Circuit appoint a three-judge panel because, under 28 U.S.C. \u00a72284, \"[a] district court of three judges shall be convened when . . . when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body.\" Chief Circuit Judge Robert A. Katzmann granted the request on August 10, 2020 and appointed Circuit Judges Richard C. Wesley and Peter W. Hall to join Judge Furman. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for partial summary judgment on their claims for relief under Article I, the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause, and the Census. In the alternative, they requested a preliminary injunction. Numerous organizations, including the U.S House of Representatives, businesses, the League of Women Voters, scholars and historians on the census and immigration, and the Immigration Reform Law Institute, filed motions for leave to file amicus briefs, and on August, 17, 2020 and August 21, 2020, Judge Furman issued in orders permitting them to file amicus briefs. On August 19, 2020, the government filed a motion to dismiss because they claimed that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim, that the court lacked jurisdiction, and that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The government also alleged that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary or permanent injunction because they could not establish any imminent irreparable harm. The Court heard oral arguments on the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, a preliminary injunction and the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss on September 3, 2020. A week later, on September 10, 2020, Judges Wesley, Hall and Furman granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment and denied the government's motion to dismiss. 2020 WL 5422959. Final Judgement was entered for the plaintiffs after the court found, that the President\u2019s Memo constituted an \u201cultra vires violation of Congress\u2019s delegation of its constitutional responsibility to count the whole number of persons in each State and to apportion members of the House of Representatives among the States according to their respective numbers under 2 U.S.C. \u00a7 2a and 13 U.S.C. \u00a7 141.\u201d. The Secretary of Commerce, the Director of the Census Bureau, the US Department of Commerce, and the US Census Bureau are permanently enjoined from \u201cincluding in the Secretary\u2019s report to the President pursuant to Section 141(b) any information permitting the President to exercise the President\u2019s discretion to carry out the policy set forth in section 2 of the presidential Memorandum.\u201d Section 2 of the President\u2019s memorandum concerned the number of aliens in each State who are not in a lawful immigration status under the Immigration and Nationality Act. On September 16, 2020, the government filed a motion to stay pending appeal. There was a question about jurisdiction, so the government appealed to both the Second Circuit (case number: 20-2630) and the Supreme Court (case number: 20-0366). The motion to stay pending appeal was denied on September 29, 2020. 2020 WL 5796815. On September 22, the government filed a motion for the Supreme Court to expedite consideration of the jurisdictional statement. On October 16, it was announced that the question of jurisdiction was postponed to the hearing of the case on the merits. The case is set for argument on Monday, November 30, 2020. As a result, the Second Circuit ordered the case before Circuit Judge Raymond J. Lohier, Jr. to be held in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's resolution. In early October, appellees, New York filed a motion to affirm, and appellees, New York Immigration Coalition, filed a motion to dismiss or affirm. Additionally, amicus briefs were submitted by Citizens United and the Immigration Reform Law Institute. Supreme Court are arguments set for Monday, November 30, 2020. This case is ongoing", "summary": "In July 2020, several states and local governments filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs claimed that the \u201cDefendants\u2019 decision to exclude undocumented immigrants from the apportionment base following the 2020 Census \u2026 is unauthorized by and contrary to the Constitution and laws of the United States;\u201d that the decision to do so is \u201cintentionally discriminatory in violation of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment[,]\u201d and that the \u201cDefendants\u2019 decision and any implementing actions they take are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law within the meaning of [the Administrative Procedure Act,] 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2)(A).\u201d In August 2020, this case was consolidated with New York Immigration Coalition v. Trump. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and the government filed a motion to dismiss. On September 10, 2020, the three judge panel denied the motion to dismiss and granted the motion for summary judgment. The government is appealing the permanent injunction to the Supreme Court. The government motioned for a stay pending appeal. The motion was denied. The Supreme Court is scheduled to hear arguments on Monday, November 30, 2020."} {"article": "On June 29, 2017, the Baltimore Brew (a media organization) and an individual who had previously settled a suit against the Baltimore Police filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. They sued the City of Baltimore and its police under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law. Represented by the ACLU of Maryland and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought an injunction, declaratory relief, and damages, claiming that the City\u2019s use of gag orders in police brutality settlement agreements violated the First Amendment. They also claimed that the gag order and liquidated damages provision in the individual plaintiff\u2019s settlement were void as contrary to public policy. Finally, the individual plaintiff alleged that the City had breached the settlement agreement. This case arose from a police brutality incident involving the individual plaintiff. In 2012, the plaintiff\u2019s apartment was burglarized. She called the police, but a dispute developed between the plaintiff and responding officers. By the end of the night, the officers had \u201cbeaten, tased, tackled, choked, and handcuffed\u201d her. So she sued the city for wrongful arrest and physical abuse. The City agreed to pay her $63,000 to settle the case. But there was a catch: the individual plaintiff had to \u201climit [her] public comments regarding the [case] and the [underlying incident] to the fact that a satisfactory settlement occurred\u201d (the gag order). And if she talked about the case with anyone, \u201cthe City is entitled to a refund of fifty percent,\u201d or $31,500. The Baltimore Sun got wind of the settlement and published an article about it. Online commentators accused the individual plaintiff of provoking the police to get settlement money. In response, she posted her version of events. The City viewed her posts as a breach of the settlement agreement. So it paid her only $31,500. In this lawsuit, the individual plaintiff alleged that the gag order was unconstitutional and against public policy; the liquidated damages provision was unenforceable; and the City breached the settlement because it paid her only $31,500 rather than the full amount, and then demanded a refund. For its part, the Baltimore Brew (the Brew) claimed that the City\u2019s widespread use of gag orders\u2014included in about 95% of police brutality settlements\u2014infringed on press freedoms. District Judge J. Frederick Motz dismissed the case in a terse one-page opinion issued on October 4, 2017. Judge Motz reasoned that the settlement provided for a payment of $31,500 if the individual plaintiff discussed the case, which she did, so the plaintiffs had no case. But he neglected to address the Brew\u2019s claims. So nine days later, Chief Judge James K. Bredar re-opened the case. And on October 18, the case was reassigned to Judge Marvin J. Garbis. The plaintiffs then moved for reconsideration of all issues. After another round of briefing, Judge Garbis dismissed the case on November 29, 2017. First, he dismissed the Baltimore Police as a defendant because it was not involved with the settlement agreement at issue. Next, he found that the Brew did not have standing because it was unable to identify a \u201cconcrete and particularized\u201d injury. Judge Garbis then dismissed the individual plaintiff\u2019s First Amendment claims because \u201cfostering confidence\u201d in settlements and \u201creducing time and resources spent on litigation\u201d outweighed any public interest in police \u201caccountability and transparency\u201d that might have been served by disclosing the terms of settlement agreements. Finally, he disposed of the individual plaintiff\u2019s breach of contract claims on statute of limitations grounds. 2017 WL 5885657. The plaintiffs appealed. The parties submitted briefing during the summer of 2018, and the Fourth Circuit heard oral arguments in January 2019. Circuit Judge Henry F. Floyd delivered an opinion on July 11, 2019, reversing the district court which Judge Stephanie D. Thacker joined. Judge Floyd held that the gag order \u201camounts to a waiver of [the individual plaintiff\u2019s] First Amendment rights,\u201d which \u201cstrong public interests rooted in the First Amendment make . . . unenforceable and void.\u201d He rejected the City\u2019s argument that \u201cfairness\u201d entitled it to \u201cthe full value of its hush money.\u201d In addition, Judge Floyd found that the Brew\u2019s allegations were sufficient to establish standing at the motion to dismiss stage because it had a \u201cright to gather news\u201d from \u201cwilling speakers\u201d that the City silenced with gag orders. Judge A. Marvin Quattlebaum, Jr. dissented. He would have upheld the district court\u2019s order because \u201cparties have a right to rely on the certainty of contracts entered into knowingly and voluntarily.\u201d 930 F.3d 213, 2019 WL 3022327. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court where it was reassigned to Judge Deborah K. Chasanow. On December 16, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. Now that the Fourth Circuit had declared the City\u2019s gag order inconsistent with the First Amendment, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants had committed a constitutional tort when they withheld half of the individual plaintiff\u2019s settlement award as punishment for speaking out about her abuse. While they conceded that a breach of contract claim for nonpayment of the full settlement award was barred by the statute of limitations, the plaintiffs insisted that damages for the constitutional tort should be equal to the withheld amount of $31,500, plus interest. In their opposition to summary judgment, the defendants argued that they had not committed a constitutional tort, as they had not prevented the plaintiff from speaking, nor punished her for doing so. Withholding the $31,500 was not a punishment but rather a contractual, bargained-for right to pay less for the settlement if the plaintiff chose to speak publicly about it. And even if the Court determined that the defendants had committed a constitutional tort, they insisted that the plaintiff would only be due nominal damages, not the full $31,500\u2014which should only be available for a breach of contract claim\u2014and certainly not the full amount, plus interest. This case is still ongoing. As of August 25, 2020, the Court has not yet adjudicated the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment.", "summary": "A news organization and individual who settled her police misconduct claim with Baltimore sued to stop the City from using gag orders to silence victims of police misconduct who settle with the City. After losing a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs appealed and the Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal. The case is now ongoing on remand."} {"article": "On September 26, 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\") filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. Brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC filed this lawsuit on behalf of an employee of ABC Propane against ABC Propane, as well as Bell Gas and Cortez Gas Company. The plaintiff sought injunctive and monetary relief, alleging that the individual employee had been retaliated against after she filed an earlier discrimination complaint with the EEOC. Specifically, the September 26 complaint alleged that before June 17, 2002, the individual employee had filed an employment discrimination charge with the EEOC against Ballew Distributing, a company that shared common management and ownership with both defendants in this case. Then, the employee began working for defendant, ABC Propane, around June 17, 2002. Around June 19, 2002, defendants\u2019 management officials discovered the employee had filed an EEOC discrimination charge and allegedly fired her. On September 26, 2002, the EEOC also followed up on the employee\u2019s charge against Ballew and filed another lawsuit, 02-cv-1213 on behalf of the employee. In that suit, the plaintiff alleged that the employee was subjected to a hostile work environment at Ballew based on her gender. These two cases were originally consolidated for pretrial purposes by Judge Bruce D. Black on June 16, 2003. He held that these cases involved common questions of law or fact, and that consolidating them would make discovery more efficient. He reserved a determination on whether these two cases should be tried separately. On December 24, 2003 each defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendant ABC argued that the employee\u2019s termination was not the result of retaliation. Judge Black denied the motion. Defendants Bell Gas and Cortez argued they were not the claimant\u2019s employer and therefore could not be held liable. Judge Black rejected this argument and dismissed Bell Gas and Cortez\u2019s motions for summary judgement as well. Meanwhile, in 02-cv-1213, Judge James A. Parker entered a consent decree on January 14, 2004 granting the claimant\u2019s co-worker $20,000 and dismissing the case as pertaining to the claimant\u2019s co-worker. On March 26, 2004 Judge Black referred the consolidated case to Magistrate Judge Lourdes A. Martinez to decide whether these two cases should remain consolidated for all purposes, including trial. Magistrate Judge Martinez recommended that the cases should not be consolidated because the two cases involved different claims, different parties, different elements of damages, the witnesses in the two cases would testify to different facts, and the defendant parties are different in each case. Judge Black affirmed Magistrate Judge Martinez\u2019s decision on July 14, 2004 and set a trial for this case for September 7, 2004. On September 22, 2004, Judge William P. Johnson, writing for Judge Black, entered a consent decree describing monetary and injunctive relief for the claimant. She was awarded $36,000 and all defendants were ordered to undergo specific training that had been required by a consent decree in another, also related case, 02-cv-1090. The specific training included distribution of the sexual harassment policy to all employees, and for each defendant company to retain and pay a lecturer to conduct an annual training about sexual harassment and retaliation that all employees were required to attend for the first year. Additionally, all defendants were required to report any changes in their sexual harassment and retaliation policy, as well as the results of the training to the Regional Attorney of the Commission\u2019s Albuquerque Office at least once every 6 months for two years. This two year period has passed, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2002, the EEOC filed suit on behalf of an employee of ABC Propane against ABC Propane, Bell Gas, and Cortez Gas Company for firing the employee in retaliation. Plaintiff alleged after ABC found out that the employee had filed a discrimination claim against parent company Bell Gas, ABC fired her. In 2004, the parties reached a settlement that resulted in monetary damages for the employee and instituted an annual, two year training program on sexual assault and retaliation for all defendant companies."} {"article": "On December 9, 2013, a United States citizen of Latino national origin filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff, represented by the Legal Aid Society Employment Law Center, brought this complaint under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, and state law against the state of California. He sought monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief, claiming employment discrimination in violation of the Due Process Clauses and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution and California State Constiuttion, national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and National Origin and Ancestry Discrimination in Violation of California Fair Employment and Housing Act. The case was assigned to Judge William Alsup. Specifically, the plaintiff had applied for a job as a Correctional Officer with the California Department of Corrections in 2011. He claimed that he was unlawfully removed from consideration because he reported in a background questionnaire that prior to becoming a permanent resident and then citizen of the United States, he used a social security number that was not his own to obtain work. Plaintiff paid all required taxes using an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN) until he obtained his own social security number. He was reportedly removed from consideration because his use of a fake social security number was deemed to \"show a lack of honesty, integrity and good judgment.\" A similar series of events occurred when plaintiff reapplied for the same position in 2013. The state responded that questions about the use of a false social security number were necessary to conduct a thorough background investigation of candidates. The state also asserted that there was no Title VII violation because the plaintiff's claim rested on immigration status and not national origin, and because the hiring statistics indicated that there was no discriminatory effect on Latino hiring at the California Department of Corrections. On May 7, 2014, the District Court (Judge William Alsup) dismissed plaintiff's Section 1983 equal protection and substantive due process claims, as well as the Title VII claim against the State Personnel Board, but denied motions to dismiss the Title VII claim against the California Department of Corrections and procedural due process claim. The District Court dismissed all state law claims without prejudice. 2014 WL 1867067. On July 17, 2015, the District Court denied without prejudice the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend, and directed plaintiff to engage in further discovery prior to his final opportunity to move to amend his equal protection claims and Title VII claim against the State Personnel Board. The court granted him leave on October 29, 2014. 2014 WL 5474950. The plaintiff filed his third and final amend complaint the same day. On March 12, 2015, the state filed another motion for summary judgment. On July 21, the court granted the plaintiff\u2019s Title VII claims, holding that asking applicants whether they had ever used a fake social security number had a disparate impact on Latinos. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' equal protection claim. 119 F.Supp.3d 1065. The court issued a final order as to relief on September 28, 2015. This order held that the plaintiff should be allowed to finish the hiring process. If he was able to successfully pass background investigation and complete the training academy, he would be awarded $140,362 in backpay. The plaintiff was also granted attorneys\u2019 fees. 2015 WL 5681029. On October 6, 2015, the state appealed the judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On October 30, 2015, the plaintiff moved for the award of his attorneys\u2019 fees. The parties disagreed about how much in attorneys\u2019 fees would be appropriate, so the court decided that a third party should decide the amount. 2015 WL 7423229. On January 28, 2016, the court appointed a special master to make this determination. The special master decided that the state owed the plaintiff $1,237,024.82 in fees and costs, and the court approved this amount on June 16, 2016. 2016 WL 3360638. Four days later, the state appealed the order granting attorneys\u2019 fees to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. (Its first appeal had not yet been ruled on.) On May 16, 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court\u2019s judgment as to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation but reversed the judgment as to the State Personnel Board because the Personnel Board was not part of the hiring process and had no say in the questions on the job application. 701 Fed.Appx. 613. The case was remanded to the District Court to reassess damages against one state defendant rather than two. 2017 WL 6270383. On January 30, the parties filed a stipulation in the Ninth Circuit stating that they resolved the attorneys\u2019 fees dispute informally, outside of court. In light of this stipulation, the Ninth Circuit dismissed all pending motions as moot on March 27, 2018. There are no further entries in the docket since March 2018. The case is presumably closed.", "summary": "On December 9, 2013, a United States citizen of Latino national origin filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California under Title VII, 28 U.S.C. \u00a71983, and state law against the state of California. The plaintiff asked the court for compensatory damages and injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming employment discrimination. Plaintiff was removed from consideration for a job as a Correctional Officer because he reported in a background questionnaire that he had previously used a social security number that was not his own to obtain work. The parties settled out of court in January 2018."} {"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action filed by inmates in the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison, seeking the release of medically vulnerable people and appropriate hygiene and social distancing measures for those still in the facility. The court denied to enter a temporary restraining order on July 3, and on February 4, 2021 the court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss.
(a) they are age 55 or older; or (b) they have the following chronic health conditions: cancer; autoimmune disease (including lupus, rheumatoid arthritis, psoriasis, Sjogren\u2019s, Crohn\u2019s); chronic lung disease (including asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, bronchiectasis, idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis or other chronic conditions associated with impaired lung function); history of cardiovascular disease; chronic arthritis; chronic liver or kidney disease; diabetes; hypertension; heart failure; HIV; on chronic steroids or other immunosuppressant medications for chronic conditions; (c) they have history of smoking or other substance abuse disorders; or (d) they are pregnant.On April 14, 2020, plaintiffs filed a motion to withdraw their request for a temporary restraining order and moved for a setting of a preliminary injunction hearing. On April 15, 2020, Judge Philip A. Brimmer granted the motion and set a preliminary injunction hearing for the week of April 27, 2020. On April 17, 2020, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for limited expedited discovery, seeking: (1) an inspection of the Weld County jail by plaintiffs' medical expert; (2) a daily report from April 11 to the date of the preliminary injunction hearing detailing the number of individuals in isolation or quarantine; (3) a daily report from April 11 to the date of the preliminary injunction hearing detailing the number of individuals at the jail who had tested positive for COVID-19; and (4) copies of all policies and procedures issued by defendants concerning COVID-19. Defendants opposed the motion, arguing that the inspection would be unnecessary and an undue burden. On April 21, 2020, Judge Brimmer granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs' motion for limited expedited discovery. Judge Brimmer granted a limited inspection of Weld County Jail and the requested daily reports, but denied the request for all policies and procedures. On April 26, 2020, defendant filed a motion for a protective order, seeking to block a public records request by the plaintiffs for \"policies, procedures, manuals, guidelines, training materials, and orders relating to the coronavirus.\" On April 27, 2020, Judge Brimmer denied the motion, asserting that the defendant had failed to show that it would suffer any harm by complying with the plaintiffs' request. On May 11, the plaintiff's motion for TRO and preliminary injunction was granted in part. 2020 WL 2320174. Specifically, the court ordered that on or before May 18, the defendant provide a list of persons \u201cmedically vulnerable\u201d currently held at the Weld County Jail (over the age of 65 or with medical conditions). Additionally, they were required to institute a policy to ensure medically vulnerable inmates are \u201csocially distanced\u201d from other inmates housed in the Jail, enhanced sanitization, and increased monitoring for COVID-19 for those medically vulnerable by May 21. The defendants were also required to provide a report on the same day. The case has been reassigned to Magistrate Judge S. Kato Crews on May 12. On May 18, the defendants notified the court of their complete compliance with the court's preliminary injunction order. The plaintiffs disagreed and filed a motion for a hearing regarding the defendant's non-compliance on May 21. On July 2, the court denied the motion finding that the plaintiff's purpose of asking for a hearing is unclear. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not ask that defendant be held in civil contempt for violating the preliminary injunction order nor ask the court to modify the preliminary injunction order. Instead, they sought a hearing because of an \u201cimbalance in access to relevant information,\" but failed to explain why this information must be probed at a hearing rather than through the discovery process. On July 24, the plaintiffs sought to renew the preliminary injunction for an additional 30 days, which was granted on July 29. The plaintiffs again sought to renew the preliminary injunction for an additional 30 days on September 3, which was granted the next day. The preliminary injunction continued to be extended until December 9, 2020. On November 11, 2020, the parties filed a joint motion for the preliminary approval of class settlement, certification of a class and appointment of class counsel, and permission to post class notice. The parties reported that they had successfully negotiated a resolution to the dispute. The parties included in their motion a proposed consent decree that would ensure measures to protect class members from COVID-19. The parties reported that the proposed consent decree was negotiated at arms-length without any conflicts of interest. Both parties conceded that they were uncertain of what the eventual outcome of the litigation would be considering the novelty of COVID-19. Both parties agreed that a settlement would be more valuable than proceeding to trial, given the complexity of the resolution and the immediacy of the COVID-19 crisis. Consent Decree The proposed consent decree implemented the CDC's definition of \"medically vulnerable\", subject to future modification by the CDC. The defendant agreed to identify medically vulnerable inmates during booking and intake and to protect such individuals during the remainder of the intake process. The WCJ agreed to attempt to house medically vulnerable inmates in single-cell units during intake and to use specified procedures to minimize exposure if single cells are not available. The WCJ agreed to continue to limit the exposure of medically vulnerable inmates in the general jail population and pledged to permit the maximum amount of daily out-of-cell time for inmates consistent with social distancing protocols. As part of the consent decree, the WCJ agreed to medically isolate COVID-19 positive inmates in isolation units and to ensure that such an environment would be non-punitive. The jail also promised to use enhanced sanitation procedures, to distribute masks, and to regularly monitor medically vulnerable inmates for COVID-19 symptoms. The jail also agreed to provide testing for inmates consistent with CDC guidelines and to continue remote visitation opportunities. WCJ agreed to maintain modified arrest standards that would remain in place for the duration of the COVID-19 crisis and pledged to advise Weld County police chiefs to be judicious with jail space. The consent decree also provided that the defendant comply with robust data reporting to plaintiffs' counsel to monitor compliance with the decree. The plaintiffs and the class were required to release all claims for injunctive and declaratory relief arising from COVID-19 at the WCJ prior to the decree. The expiration of the decree was set at the expiration of the executive order made by the Governor of Colorado declaring a state of emergency, unless the order was renewed or replaced. The defendant also agreed to pay the plaintiffs' counsel $122,387.60 for attorney's fees and costs. The November 11 motion also included a certification of settlement class and appointment of class counsel. The parties sought to certify all past, present, and future inmates housed at WCJ from April 7, 2020 through the end of the COVID-19 emergency who are \"medically vulnerable\". The two proposed class representatives fell within the high-risk populations vulnerable to COVID-19. Counsel for the plaintiffs were appointed class counsel. On December 11, 2020, Judge Brimmer ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs to clarify the meaning of \"past\" and \"future\" within the definition of the class and to discuss locations for posting the notice of the settlement within the WCJ in English and Spanish, as well as a location for sending objections. On December 29, 2020, Judge Brimmer granted the joint motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement, certification of a class and appointment of class counsel, and permission to post class notice. The parties agreed to withdraw past inmates from the proposed class and agreed that the extension of the consent decree to the end of the COVID-19 emergency covered future medically vulnerable inmates. The parties designated one of plaintiffs' counsel as the person to receive objections to the proposed settlement. The parties also agreed to upload the class notice to the WCJ's jail-wide television system in English and Spanish. The court preliminarily certified all present and future medically vulnerable inmates through the end of the COVID-19 emergency and ordered that plaintiffs' attorneys were appointed class counsel. On February 16, 2021, the court issued a final judgment granting the joint motion for final approval of class action settlement and final certification of the proposed class and dismissing the case with prejudice.", "summary": "Inmates held at Weld County Jail with high risks of complications from COVID-19 filed this putative class action lawsuit against the Sheriff of Weld County. They sought injunctive relief, in the form of following public health guidelines in the jail, and declaratory relief. On December 29, 2020, the court granted a joint motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement. On February 16, 2021, the court issued final judgment granting the class action settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice."} {"article": "On April 16, 2002, plaintiffs, Santa Cruz residents who suffered various forms of blindness, filed a complaint against the state transit agency in the United States District Court for the District of Northern California for violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12131, et seq.; (2) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 701, et seq. and various state laws. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief. Plaintiffs claim that the defendant failed to implement systems to announce at which stop a bus was stopping and, for individuals waiting at a bus stop, to announce which bus had arrived. Thus, the plaintiffs alleged they had missed stops and taken the wrong bus. The plaintiffs alleged the defendant had been aware of its inaccessible bus system since at least 1989 and that bus drivers were not helpful and lacked training. On July 11, 2003, the parties entered into a settlement agreement and filed it with the court. The defendant agreed to install \"talking technology\" equipment to announce bus stops, ensure discipline of drivers who did not comply with the changes, and pay for an outside agency to monitor compliance by riding buses for at least 100 hours per quarter. The agreement was to last two years from the date on which the last bus was fitted with the talking technology. The defendant also agreed to pay $5000 to each plaintiff and $135,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. On July 22, 2003, the court dismissed the case by stipulation. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Blind plaintiffs sued a state transit agency because its buses did not have an audio-announcement system to warn them when the bus was approaching their stop. The agency settled and agreed to install an electronic announcement system, pay $5000 to each plaintiff, and pay $135,000 in attorneys' fees and costs."} {"article": "On July 27, 2012, the North Carolina Environmental Justice Network (NCEJN), the Neuse Riverkeeper Foundation, and the Waterkeeper Alliance filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The plaintiffs alleged that the Taylor Finishing Company, a swine concentrated animal feeding operation, illegally polluted under the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and that this pollution endangered human health and the environment. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge James C. Dever III and Magistrate Judge James E. Gates. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had violated the CWA and RCRA by causing the release of pollutants, including nitrogen, phosphorus, and bacteria, onto the lands and into waters surrounding defendants\u2019 facilities near the Neuse River Basin. The complaint described that defendants caused illegal discharges of pollutants without a permit, illegal open dumping of swine waste, and illegal treatment, storage, and disposal of swine waste. The plaintiffs argued that this disregard for disposal requirements created an imminent and substantial endangerment to human health and the environment. Between September and November of 2013, the three defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint claiming that this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to serve a proper notice of intent to sue prior to filing the complaint. But before the motions were decided, on April 25, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. The defendants filed responsive motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. On August 26, 2013, Judge Dever denied the motion and the parties proceeded to discovery. On October 21, 2014, the NCEJN filed a stipulation of dismissal, asking that the court dismiss their claims with prejudice and that each party bear their own costs. The court granted this motion later that month. On November 21, 2014, the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the claim due to insufficient evidence and the undisputed fact that none of the plaintiffs had suffered an injury that could be causally connected to the defendants\u2019 conduct. On that same day, one of the defendants moved for summary judgment of count three of the second amended complaint, claiming that the plaintiffs could not establish that there was an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment caused by the defendant. Additionally, another defendant filed a similar motion for summary judgment, even asking that the court enter judgment in their favor on the grounds that there were no genuine issues of material fact and they were entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law. On January 14, 2015, Judge Gates entered a report and recommendation with the court, recommending that the court deny without prejudice the three pending motions for summary judgment. 2015 WL 1630602. On April 13, 2015, Judge Dever agreed with Judge Gates and denied the motions without prejudice. 2015 WL 1880200. Then, defendants filed a notice of bankruptcy with the court and on June 3, 2015, the court entered an order staying the action pending resolution of the bankruptcy case. After the stay, negotiations took place and on June 29, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a notice of a proposed consent decree. The agreement required that the contaminated lagoon be inspected annually, that the defendants remove sludge from the lagoon, and that records are kept regarding the activities. The consent decree further stipulated that the parties would make a joint public statement, that the plaintiffs could not do sample testing on the defendant\u2019s surrounding property, and that the defendants must operate their facility in accordance with the terms of the facility\u2019s permit. The parties agreed to seek enforcement of the terms in bankruptcy court so the court would not retain jurisdiction over the matter. On August 13, 2018, the court approved the consent decree. The parties subsequently filed a stipulation to a voluntary dismissal of the case. The case was closed on August 29, 2018.", "summary": "This 2012 lawsuit was brought by the North Carolina Environmental Justice Network (NCEJN), the Neuse Riverkeeper Foundation, Inc., and the Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The plaintiffs sued the Taylor Finishing Company under the CWA and the RCRA, alleging that the company had caused the release of hazardous pollutants into the Neuse River Basin. In June 2018, the parties entered into a private consent decree and the court approved it in August."} {"article": "In October 1969, plaintiffs, an independent candidate and his supporters, filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the Democratic Organization of Cook County, the City of Chicago, and various government officers at the state and local levels under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to enjoin the extensive patronage system of Chicago politics. They argued that this system violated their rights under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and of certain civil rights statutes. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that their constitutional rights as a candidate, and as taxpayers and voters, were violated by the defendants' practice of coercing employees as a condition of keeping their jobs to contribute money to various Democratic organizations and candidates. Defendants had also allegedly coerced employees into doing political and campaign work both during their regular working hours and on their own time for candidates endorsed by the organization and its affiliates. Finally, defendants had allegedly coerced employees into voting for specific party candidates. Plaintiffs asserted that these coercive practices directly resulted in the defeat of independent candidates and perpetuated the dominance of the Democratic Party in Cook County. On November 6, 1969, District Court Judge Abraham Marovitz granted defendants' motion to dismiss. 310 F.Supp. 1398 (1969). The district court found that plaintiffs did not have standing to assert the alleged violations of the rights of employees and that the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to demonstrate injury. Plaintiffs appealed and filed an amended complaint joining additional Democratic defendants and numerous Republican defendants also engaged in the patronage system. On October 23, 1970, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Thomas Fairchild reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. 435 F.2d 267 (1970). Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. Over the course of the next couple of years, the parties engaged in a series of negotiations resulting in a consent order entered into by the majority of the defendants. The order was approved by District Court Judge Marovitz on May 5, 1972. 356 F.Supp. 1241 (1972). The order prohibited compulsory or coerced political financial contributions and permanently enjoined politically motivated firings, demotions, transfers, or other punishment of government employees. This consent order came to be known \"the Shakman decree.\" Litigation continued for several years involving those defendants that declined to enter into the aforementioned consent agreement. On September 24, 1979, District Court Judge Nicholas Bua issued a ruling concluding that the patronage system infringed upon the plaintiffs' rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 481 F.Supp. 1315 (1979). Defendants appealed. On August 5, 1987, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Kenneth Ripple reversed the district court, finding that plaintiffs did not have standing. 829 F.2d 1387 (1987). The circuit court found that a number of very speculative inferences would be required to connect plaintiffs' alleged injury with activities attributed to the remaining defendants. However, the circuit court explicitly noted that nothing in the holding could be construed as affecting the continued validity of the Shakman decree. Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. Over the next two decades, litigation continued with periodic revivals for enforcement of the consent agreements and for seeking damages or lawyers' fees. Also, consent agreements, like that entered into in 1972, were periodically made with various defendants. Individual defendants found to be substantially compliant with the terms of consent decrees were intermittently dismissed from further requirements related to the consent agreements. On August 28, 2006, plaintiffs filed an application to hold Cook County and other government personnel in civil contempt for violation of the consent agreements. A series of negotiations between the parties began that month and a settlement was reached. As part of the settlement, on November 29, 2006, District Court Judge Wayne R. Andersen, appointed a compliance administrator in an effort to ensure future compliance with the decree. On May 15, 2014, the parties jointly moved for a hearing regarding the substantial compliance of the City of Chicago. On June 16, 2014, the court found the City of Chicago to be in substantial compliance and dismissed the City from the case. On November 18, 2014, the court appointed a Special Master to oversee the determination of which positions within the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) could be properly exempt from compliance with the consent decrees. Employers could take political affiliation into account when filling particular positions if that consideration was relevant for effective performance. This order arose from the IDOT's overuse of exemptions. On August 15, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to expand the Special Master's responsibilities to oversee all bodies under the jurisdiction of the Governor of Illinois. On November 28, 2016, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion, reasoning that the Special Master's experience and oversight would aid in compliance and avoid downstream litigation when non-compliance was uncovered. Tensions once again came to a head on September 6, 2019, when the plaintiffs moved for supplemental relief, alleging that the Clerk of Cook County violated the consent agreements. The County Clerk argued that the court was unable to rule on the alleged violations and that the consent agreements were irrelevant due to changes in legal and factual circumstances over the past few decades, but the court ultimately ruled on April 17, 2020, in favor of the plaintiffs. The court thus found the County Clerk in violation of the consent agreements and additionally appointed a Special Master to oversee compliance. On July 14, 2020, Governor Pritzker moved to vacate the consent decree, arguing that the State of Illinois has been substantially compliant with the decree. The State additionally argued that the consent agreements were so far removed from the original controversy that there was no longer a relevant claim under law. As of February 26, 2021, the litigation concerning the State of Illinois is still ongoing.", "summary": "In October 1969, plaintiffs, an independent candidate in the election for delegates to the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention and his supporters, filed a class action lawsuit against the Democratic Organization of Cook County, the City of Chicago, and various government officers at the state and local levels claiming that the extensive patronage system of Chicago politics violated their constitutional rights. Litigation was heavily complicated by procedural and standing issues, though it gave way to consent decrees prohibiting the patronage system. As of February 26, 2021, the State of Illinois has attempted to vacate the consent agreements, claiming that it is substantially compliant with the agreements' requirements."} {"article": "On December 19, 2007, attorneys with Community Legal Services of Arizona and Farmworker Justice filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona on behalf of American farmworkers who had been replaced by foreign workers during 2006-2007 and previous citrus harvesting seasons. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants, an Arizona grower and farm labor contractor, violated 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (\"AWPA\"), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1802 et seq., by providing false and misleading information to the federal government concerning the terms and conditions of employing farmworkers. Plaintiffs, who all worked for defendants during the 2005-2006 season, alleged that defendants refused to rehire them for the 2006-2007 season and instead told the government that they couldn't find any workers, therefore forcing them to hire migrant workers under the H-2A foreign guest-worker program. Plaintiffs sought lost wages and an injunction to prevent the defendants from discriminating against U.S. workers in their hiring practices. Shortly after the case began, it was consolidated with another action for pretrial purposes only (Reynaldo Guerra Jimenez, et al. v. Servicios Agricolas Mex Inc., et al., No. CV07-1492-PHX-GMS). On September 20, 2010, the Court (Judge G. Murray Snow) entered an order denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment and granting and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 742 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (D. Az. 2010). The Court found that the plaintiffs had put forth evidence that defendants had refused to rehire them and had instead hired non-citizen immigrant workers. The Court held that the defendants had deprived the plaintiffs of an equal right to contract, as was enjoyed by others, and that the defendants had engaged in such discrimination against the plaintiffs based on their citizenship status. The Court denied summary judgment to all other claims. On April 8, 2011, the parties notified the Court that they had reached a settlement in the Jimenez case; however, the parties also informed the Court that they were unable to settle the claims in this case. The Court unconsolidated the two cases and dismissed Jimenez with prejudice. From August 23 through September 2, 2011, a seven-day bench trial was held before Judge Snow. The defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law after they rested their case. On March 27, 2012, Judge Snow entered his findings of fact and conclusions of law. 2012 WL 1030084 (D. Az. Mar. 27, 2012). The Court found that the defendants violated the \"working arrangement\" they had undertaken with certain plaintiffs, and that they did not inform these plaintiffs prior to the beginning of the season that defendants would not be employing them. As a result, the Court found, a number of the plaintiffs were unemployed for some time at the beginning of the harvest season while they sought work elsewhere. The Court held this was a violation of a provision of AWPA, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1832(c), and awarded statutory damages in the amount of $500 to ten of the plaintiffs, $250 to another ten, and $150 to another eight. The Court awarded no relief to the remaining 143 plaintiffs. The Court entered judgment accordingly on April 26, 2012. On May 25, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal, seeking review of the Court's final judgment. The case was argued before and submitted to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in March of 2014. On March 6, 2015, a panel of three Ninth Circuit judges affirmed the District Court\u2019s holding, stating that the defendants had complied with the AWPA regarding the remaining plaintiffs. 592 Fed.Appx. 613 (Mem). The defendants were able to show that \u201cthe job\u201d in dispute was no longer the same opportunity due to a 90-mile location change. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On December 19, 2007, a group of U.S. citizens and permanent residents filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (\"AWPA\") against an Arizona grower and farm labor contractor. Following a trial, the District Court awarded statutory damages to certain of the plaintiffs, finding that defendants had violated a provision of the AWPA. The Court denied all further relief. Plaintiffs appealed the decision, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court holding on March 6, 2015."} {"article": "On July 9, 2014, a lawfully-present alien authorized to work in the U.S. under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (\u201cDACA\u201d) program filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff sued Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance, Inc., under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981, alleging discrimination based on alienage in the making of employment contracts. Represented by private counsel and MALDEF, he sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Citing the defendant\u2019s advertised practice of requiring new employees to have had three or more continuous years of U.S. residency, hold permanent visas, and read and write English fluently, the plaintiff alleged that the company unlawfully refused or rescinded employment contracts to individuals based on their status as non-citizens or permanent residents. The named plaintiff, who had applied for employment and interviewed with the defendant, alleged that after one of its employees learned of his status as a non-citizen without a green card, the company decided to decline him an employment contract because of his alienage status. On September 4, 2014 the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff\u2019s complaint. After hearing oral arguments, Judge Katherine Forrest denied the motion to dismiss on November 11, 2014, holding that the plaintiff could successfully plead intentional discrimination by alleging that the defendant acted pursuant to a facially discriminatory policy. In this case, Judge Forrest found that the policy facially discriminated against lawfully present aliens without green cards, who, as lawfully present aliens, are protected by \u00a7 1981. 69 F.Supp.3d 364. The defendants moved to appeal shortly after, and on December 20, 2014 Judge Forrest stayed the case pending the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\u2019s decision whether or not to accept the defendant\u2019s interlocutory appeal. On March 17, 2015, the Second Circuit granted the defendants permission to appeal the District Court\u2019s (non-final) denial of their motion to dismiss. However, before appellate briefing, the parties settled, out-of-court. On May 20, 2015 the plaintiffs filed a stipulation for dismissal of the case with prejudice, with each party to pay their own fees and expenses. Although the details of the settlement are unclear, on August 19, 2015, MALDEF posted the following on Facebook, which appears to be related to the settlement in this case: \"As part of an amicable legal agreement, MALDEF and Northwestern Mutual have launched a new recruitment program aimed at immigrants authorized to work, without sponsorship, including those in the DACA program, interested in a financial representative internship or financial representative contract.\" According to the post, individuals may be eligible for up to $7,500 in awards if they were told on or after July 1, 2010 that they were ineligible for a financial representative internship or contract because of their work authorization or immigration classification.", "summary": "In the Southern District of New York in July of 2014, a lawfully-present alien alleged he was denied employment contract because of his alienage status and brought a class action suit against Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance, Inc under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981, alleging discrimination based on alienage in the making of employment contracts. In May of 2015, the case settled out of court with a favorable outcome for the plaintiff."} {"article": "This lawsuit is part of an ongoing legal battle, across several cases, over allowing transgender individuals access to public facilities matching their gender identities. With eleven states joining together to challenge the DOJ, DOE, EEOC, and DOL over their interpretations of antidiscrimination statutes, it represents the broadest challenge to date of the Obama administration\u2019s position that transgender individuals should have access to bathrooms, changing rooms, and other public facilities and services that are in accordance with their gender identities. The eleven states filed this suit in response to the heightened debate over transgender rights that began after the North Carolina passed House Bill 2 (HB2), on March 23, 2016. The law prohibited municipalities from enacting antidiscrimination policies, curtailed private right of action to enforce antidiscrimination statutes in state courts, required that in restroom and changing facility access in government buildings be restricted based on biological sex, and formally changed the definition of sex in the state's antidiscrimination law to \"the physical condition of being male or female, which is stated on a person's birth certificate,\u201d which prevents discrimination against transgender people from being classified as a type of sex discrimination. The law sparked widespread condemnation from progressives, and a lawsuit from the ACLU, in North Carolina. It also prompted the DOJ to send a letter to North Carolina Governor Pat McCrory on May 4, 2016, informing him that they believe the law violates federal law and requesting that the governor not enforce it. After McCrory responded to their letter with a lawsuit against the DOJ on May 9, the DOJ brought its own lawsuit against North Carolina in the Middle District of North Carolina, arguing that HB2 violated Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Violence Against Women Re-Authorization Act (VAWA). The lawsuit that the DOJ brought against North Carolina threatens the state with a potential loss of millions of dollars in federal aid if the state is found to be non-compliant with the statutes cited. The eleven states that are plaintiffs in this case feared similar action by the DOJ against themselves, and so on May 25, 2016, they filed this lawsuit against the DOJ and against all other agency rules and guidance stating that antidiscrimination statutes require states to provide transgender individual access to public accommodations consonant with their gender identities. They filed their lawsuit in the Northern District Court of Texas, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201 (Declaratory Judgement Act), 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706 (Administrative Procedure Act), and 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 611 (Regulatory Flexibility Act). Specifically, they asked the court to find that the agencies have violated federal law and the Constitution and to issue an injunction preventing the agencies rules, regulations, and guidance on the subject from having legal force. The judge issued an order granting the preliminary injunction on August 21, 2016. 201 F. Supp. 3d 810. The order found that the action was reviewable and plaintiffs had standing. The judge also held that the Department of Education was not entitled to deference because Title IX was not ambiguous and referred to biological sex. The district court further clarified the preliminary injunction on October 18, 2016, ruling that the injunction did apply nationwide. 2016 WL 7852331. The preliminary injunction and clarification were appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on October 21, 2016 (Docket No. 16-1534). The district court denied a stay on the injunction on November 20, 2016, finding that the defendants were unlikely to succeed on appeal and suffered no irreparable harm. 2016 WL 7852330. After the change in presidential administrations, the DOJ and DOE issued new guidance that withdrew the previous guidance on transgender access to public facilities. That guidance can be found below. On March 2, 2017, the government filed an unopposed motion to withdraw the appeal, which was granted. The case was dismissed in the district court without prejudice on March 3, 2017.", "summary": "Eleven States sue the DOJ and other agencies over their position that transgender access to bathrooms and other public facilities is required by Title IX, Title VII, and the Violence Against Women Act, asking for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Northern District Court of Texas. The Court granted the preliminary injunction on August 21, 2016. 201 F.Supp.3d 810. The preliminary injunction was appealed and the case was ultimately dismissed without prejudice due to a voluntary withdrawal by defendants on March 3, 2017, due to a change in presidential administrations and policy."}