{"article": "On January 23, 2004, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et seq. and 2000e(k), against AT&T Corporation in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, was a former AT&T employee and asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, alleging that AT&T's health insurance policy discriminated against women. Specifically, the plaintiff contended that the defendant's health insurance plan, which did not provide prescription contraceptives (birth control) before 2002 and only through the mail after 2002, violated female employees' civil rights. The action originally started in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, but was transferred to Missouri on May 12, 2003. This is the date on which the docket begins. Originally, there were two plaintiffs on the case, but one dropped out of the litigation. Thus, a single plaintiff carried forth the case. On September 3, 2004, the Court (Judge Sachs) denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification. In the opinion, the Court barely discussed the requirements for a class-action lawsuit, except to point out typicality. The plaintiff, since the suit began, had stopped taking birth control and was seeking to get pregnant. Therefore, the Court declared that a class could not be certified without a class representative who would have an ongoing interest in the prayed-for relief. The plaintiff wanted to recover her past expenditures on the prescribed contraceptives. The Women's Law project came onto the case as an amicus. After a lengthy discovery period, the Court made another ruling. On June 7, 2006, the Court (Judge Sachs) granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification as to the damages in the complaint. The class was comprised of female employees of AT&T, who paid for their own prescription contraception from the dates of October 31, 2001 to July 2, 2002. The Court did not certify the claims for injunctive or declaratory relief because as of 2002, the health insurance provider covered birth control through mail order. While the cost of the plaintiff's potential recovery was relatively small, $68.07, the class action potential in the litigation, given AT&T's size made both parties fight vigorously. According to the docket, neither side was content with this decision. The plaintiff wanted the period of time for damages claims to be extended, and the defendant did not approve of the decision at all. Ultimately, the plaintiffs filed an appeal. On June 1, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit issued a preliminary judgment to the District Court (Judge Sachs). The Circuit Court advised the District Court to review the findings of another recent case, In Re Union Pacific Railroad Employment Practices Litigation, 479 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2007). This case featured a ruling that was fundamentally at odds with the decision of the District Court on June 7, 2006. On October 22, 2007, the District Court (Judge Sachs) vacated its previous decision, and ordered a decision in favor of the defendant. The case was closed the next day on October 23, 2007.", "summary": "This case was brought in 2004 by a female former AT&T employee against AT&T Corp. in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The plaintiff alleged that AT&T, specifically the company's health insurance policy, discriminated against women, and she sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages. The Court originally denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification, but later reversed its denial and granted summary judgment to plaintiff, certifying a class to determine compensation. However, the Court of Appeals referred the District Court Judge to a relevant case which rejected a challenge to a similar program, thereby forcing the Court to vacate its prior ruling and issue judgment in favor of defendants on October 22, 2007."}
{"article": "On April 25, 2016, three individuals that were blind and enrolled in the Barbri bar exam preparation course filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiffs brought this suit against BarBri Inc., aka Barbri Bar Review, a company that sells and provides products for bar exam preparation. The plaintiffs alleged that Barbri violated the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12111 et seq.) and the Texas Human Resource Code \u00a7\u00a7 121.002-.003. The plaintiffs, represented by Texas Civil Rights Project and Washington Lawyers\u2019 Committee for Civil Rights/Urban Affairs, sought injunctive, monetary, and declaratory relief as well as attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. This case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Renee Harris Toliver. The three plaintiffs were all enrolled in the Barbri bar preparation course and relied on Barbri to prepare for the bar examination. The Barbri bar preparation course provided online bar review resources including online live chat to match Barbri students with tutors, an online planner, study outlines, online lecture notes, and online lecture videos. The website, however, was not compatible with the software that the plaintiffs relied on to access the internet, like Job Access With Speech (\u201cJAWS\u201d) screen readers. The plaintiffs requested reasonable accommodation, but BarBri did not provide them. On July 1, 2016, the defendant moved to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The plaintiff amended their complaint on July 19, 2016. This new complaint added more factual allegations and slightly modified the definition of the sought class. The amended class definition was as follows: \u201cAll legally blind individuals nationwide who, on or after April 25, 2014, took, plan to take or attempted to take a Barbri bar review course at a time when Barbri\u2019s website, mobile application, or other course materials was or is not fully accessible to legally blind students, or who have been discouraged from taking the Barbri bar review course due to such inaccessibility.\u201d The defendant again moved to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on October 3, 2016. The plaintiffs moved to certify a class on February 10, 2017. The court never ruled on this motion. In October 2017, the parties underwent settlement discussions. Eventually the parties reached a confidential Settlement Agreement. Then on January 19, 2018, the parties jointly moved for a stipulation of dismissal and sought approval of a consent decree. Three days later, the court approved the parties\u2019 consent decree. The parties agreed that the court would retain jurisdiction for three years to ensure compliance with this decree. The consent decree prohibited the defendant from engaging in disability discrimination, required the defendant to comply with the ADA, and required the defendant to undergo an accessibility audit to ensure that all accessibility barriers for screen readers were removed. The defendant also agreed to provide accessibility training to all development team employees and to reform its procedures for implementing reasonable accommodations when students request accommodations. The consent decree remains in force as of May 2020.", "summary": "In 2016, three individuals who were blind law school graduates enrolled in the BarBri bar preparation course filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Plaintiffs alleged that Barbri\u2019s website, which offers bar preparation resources, was not accessible to blind students who relied on screen readers to access the internet. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that Barbri failed to provide reasonable accommodations. In late 2017, the parties reached a confidential settlement agreement, and then in early 2018, the court approved the parties consent decree. This decree granted the court jurisdiction over the matter for three years. In this consent decree, the defendant agreed to make their website accessible to students who relied on screen readers and other similar technology to access the internet. Moreover, the defendant was required to provide anti-discrimination training to its employees, audit its website to ensure accessibility, and refrain from discriminatory conduct. This case is ongoing. The court still retains jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the consent decree."}
{"article": "On November 23, 2014, two African-American teenage males filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 against the Hamilton County Juvenile Detention Center and Hamilton County, Ohio. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. They requested that the Court enjoin the Juvenile Court from arresting and detaining youth without conducting a probable cause hearing. The plaintiffs claimed that the detention of youth after 48 hours without providing a probable cause hearing violates their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The first plaintiff was arrested at school on September 12, 2014, on a charge of aggravated robbery. Based on the victim's description, a warrant was issued, and the plaintiff was taken into custody at the Hamilton County Detention Center. He was in isolation for two days. The Juvenile Court did not make a probable cause determination prior to issuing a warrant for the first plaintiff, nor within 48 hours of detention. The case was continued on October 6, 2014, for a probable cause hearing, which never happened. S.W. had a trial on October 10, 2014, where the case was dismissed on the merits. Although S.W. was released, he never received a probable cause hearing at arrest or during his detention. The second plaintiff was arrested outside his home on July 8, 2014, by Cincinnati police officers, who did not present an arrest warrant. He was taken to the local police station, interrogated for alleged involvement in a robbery, and taken to the Hamilton County Detention Center on July 9, 2014. He remained incarcerated at the Detention Center from July 8 to July 23, during which time no probable cause determinations in his case occurred. On December 10, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Although a preliminary injunction hearing was scheduled for March 24, 2015, the parties began settlement negotiations in February 2015 and the hearing was changed to a status conference on settlement progress. On September 29, 2015, the parties reached an agreement and Judge Susan Dlott approved and adopted an agreed order of dismissal without prejudice. The Hamilton County Juvenile Court agreed to plan, design, and implement a best practice model for processing complaints, issuing arrest warrants, making probable cause determinations, and conducting detention hearings. This included revisions to Rule 38 of the Rules of Practice for Hamilton County Juvenile Court. Additionally, the juvenile court agreed create a new training curriculum to assist clerks in making probable cause determinations. The Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney also agreed to assign an assistant prosecuting attorney to attend detention hearings at the Youth Center. The case is presumably closed.", "summary": "Two African-American teenagers, on behalf of a class of youth detained at the Hamilton County Juvenile Detention Center, Hamilton County, Ohio, are filing suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 for due process violations involving incarceration without probable cause determinations and hearings after 48 hours of arrest and throughout their detention. In September 2015, the parties reached a settlement agreement whereby the Hamilton County Juvenile Court agreed to improve procedures for processing complaints, issuing arrest warrants, making probable cause determinations, and conducting detention hearings. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On April 13, 2018, the Arab American Institute (\u201cAAI\u201d) sued the Office of Management and Budget (\u201cOMB\u201d) under the Freedom of Information Act (\u201cFOIA\u201d), 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. AAI alleged that OMB violated FOIA by failing to disclose requested records pertaining to OMB\u2019s decision not to include a combined race and ethnicity question or a Middle Eastern or North African (MENA) category on the 2020 Census. AAI asked the court to declare that OMB violated FOIA and to issue an injunction ordering the agency to release the requested records. This case was assigned to Judge Amy Berman Jackson. One month later, on May 18, 2018, the court ordered OMB to file a dispositive motion or a status report setting a schedule for OMB\u2019s production of documents to AAI. OMB chose the latter, filing its first status report on June 15, 2018. Over the next two years, the parties filed several joint status reports detailing which documents OMB had disclosed to AAI and which documents were still outstanding or disputed. By May 13, 2020, OMB had reviewed approximately 2,000 potentially responsive documents, producing \u201ca number\u201d of them to AAI and withholding 161 of them, claiming they were FOIA exempt. AAI objected to the withholding of five of the allegedly exempt documents. OMB filed a motion for summary judgment on February 10, 2020, arguing that the five disputed documents were exempt under FOIA Exemption 5, which allows agencies to withhold \u201cinter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency,\u201d including \u201cpredecisional and deliberative\u201d documents that reflect internal Executive Branch deliberations. AAI filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on March 12, 2020, arguing that OMB had not provided a sufficient basis for exempting the documents and that the exemption didn\u2019t apply because the documents were not \u201cpredecisional.\u201d On August 13, 2020, after conducting in camera review, the court granted OMB\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denied AAI\u2019s cross-motion, finding that the disputed documents were predecisional and exempt from FOIA. 2020 WL 4698098. As of December 25, 2020, AAI has not appealed the court\u2019s decision.", "summary": "On April 13, 2018, the Arab American Institute sued the Office of Management and Budget under the Freedom of Information Act in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. AAI alleged that OMB violated FOIA by failing to disclose requested records pertaining to OMB\u2019s decision not to include a combined race and ethnicity question or a Middle Eastern or North African (MENA) category on the 2020 Census. In May, the court ordered OMB to file a dispositive motion or a status report setting a schedule for OMB\u2019s production of documents to AAI. Over the next two years, the parties filed several joint status reports detailing which documents OMB had disclosed to AAI and which documents were still outstanding or disputed. OMB produced a number of documents to AAI but withheld some, claiming they were FOIA exempt. AAI objected to five claimed exemptions. The parties both filed motions for summary judgment. After conducting in camera review, on August 13, 2020, the court granted OMB\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denied AAI\u2019s cross-motion, finding that the disputed documents were predecisional and exempt from FOIA. As of December 25, 2020, AAI has not appealed the court\u2019s decision."}
{"article": "On March 7, 1980, inmates of the South Dakota State Penitentiary in Sioux Falls, South Dakota filed a class action in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the South Dakota Department of Corrections. The plaintiffs, represented by the National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union and by East River Legal Services, asked the court for class certification and declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated by the conditions of their confinement. Specifically, they complained of fire hazards, unsanitary food, work safety hazards, poor ventilation, inadequate plumbing, inadequate medical care, inadequate dental care, inadequate psychological care, overcrowding, lack of hot water, lack of heat in winter, inadequate law library, lack of recreation and exercise, and inadequate grievance procedures. On May 31, 1984, the district court (Judge Donald J. Porter) granted declaratory and injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, ordering the defendants stop double-celling inmates and to file a plan to fix the other problems within 120 days. Cody v. Hilliard, 599 F.Supp. 1025 (D.S.D. 1984). The defendants appealed. On October 28, 1986, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Judge Gerald W. Heaney) affirmed the district court's decision. Cody v. Hilliard, 799 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1986). The defendants asked the Eighth Circuit for a rehearing en banc, and on October 28, 1986, the Eighth Circuit agreed to rehear the case. Cody v. Hilliard, 804 F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1986). On October 6, 1987, the en banc Eighth Circuit (Judge Pasco Middleton Bowman II) reversed the district court's order forbidding double-celling, declaring that the practice was not unconstitutional, but affirmed all other orders of the district court. Cody v. Hilliard, 830 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1987). The plaintiffs appealed. On February 29, 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal. Cody v. Hilliard, 485 U.S. 906 (1988). On July 8, 1985, the district court (Judge Porter) issued a consent decree in the case, addressing issues such as prison environmental concerns, fire safety, medical care, psychological care, prisoners' access to courts, and food preparation and sanitation. In the years that followed, the defendants paid attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs on multiple occasions, never disputing the plaintiffs' entitlement to fees. On April 16, 1996, the defendants asked the district court to terminate the consent decree, arguing that they were in substantial compliance. On March 13, 1997, the district court (Judge Richard H. Battey) dissolved the consent decree and vacated all supplemental orders. The plaintiffs appealed. On March 27, 1998, the Eighth Circuit (Judge John R. Gibson) reversed the decision to dissolve the decree and remanded the case back to the district court, holding that the dissolution of the decree was not supported by sufficient findings or an articulation of basis for the decision. Cody v. Hilliard, 139 F.3d 1197 (8th Cir. 1998). On February 17, 2000, the district court (Judge Lawrence L. Piersol) approved a private settlement agreement between the parties and dismissed the case without prejudice. Cody v. Hilliard, 88 F.Supp.2d 1049 (D.S.D. 2000). According to Jude Piersol\u2019s opinion, the settlement agreement contained more specific language and guidelines than the 1985 consent decree and established procedures for continued monitoring of prison conditions. The defendants agreed to monthly self-inspections for fire safety and yearly OSHA-type inspections of all shop areas. The settlement agreement provided more relief with regards to the tuberculosis isolation provision, quality control provision, and specific shop provisions. The plaintiffs asked the district court to award them attorneys' fees. On November 15, 2000, the district court (Judge Piersol) awarded $106,877.74 in attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed. On September 11, 2002, the Eighth Circuit (Judge Gibson) affirmed the fee award. Cody v. Hilliard, 304 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2002). The case is now closed.", "summary": "On March 7, 1980, inmates of the South Dakota State Penitentiary in Sioux Falls, South Dakota filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the South Dakota Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota. The plaintiffs, represented by the National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union and by East River Legal Services, alleged that their constitutional rights had been violated by the conditions of their confinement. The District Court (Judge Porter) granted preliminary relief, and on July 8, 1985, permanent injunctive relief. The defendants paid attorney fees, and they complied with the consent decree until February 17, 2000, when the Court approved a settlement agreement and dismissed the case."}
{"article": "On April 14, 2004, individuals and an advocacy organization filed this First Amendment case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New Orleans against Jefferson Parish claiming the Parish had unfairly applied parish ordinances (including one known as \"the circus ordinance\") to squelch pro-life speech. the plaintiffs were represented by the Alliance Defense Fund, \"an alliance of more than 700 attorneys defending religious liberty through strategy, training, funding, and litigation.\" (ADF Press Release) The plaintiffs claimed they were unlawfully prohibited from using voice amplification equipment, a stage, and from playing religious songs in their 2004 protest against the Roe v. Wade decision. Before a hearing could be held on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, the parish council used an emergency procedure to approve changes to the ordinances and the case was dismissed.", "summary": "On April 14, 2004, individuals and an advocacy organization filed this First Amendment case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New Orleans against Jefferson Parish claiming the Parish had unfairly applied parish ordinances (including one known as \"the circus ordinance\") to squelch pro-life speech. the plaintiffs were represented by the Alliance Defense Fund, \"an alliance of more than 700 attorneys defending religious liberty through strategy, training, funding, and litigation.\" (ADF Press Release) Before a hearing could be held on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, the parish council used an emergency procedure to approve changes to the ordinances and the case was dismissed."}
{"article": "On November 5, 2015, the plaintiffs, nine pretrial detainees, filed this class action in the United States District Court of New Jersey. The plaintiffs sued Middlesex County under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for the deprivation of rights secured by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and the New Jersey Office of the Public Defender, asked the court to declare that the conditions in solitary confinement were unconstitutional, to enjoin Middlesex County to take all of its inmates out of solitary confinement, and to award costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the conditions in C-Pod, the solitary confinement unit in Middlesex County Jail, were unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they were locked in a small cell alone almost continuously; could not interact with other inmates; could not be visited by family; could not participate in religious, educational or rehabilitative programs; and were never allowed outdoors. The plaintiffs sought class action status. However, on January 4, 2016, Judge Peter G. Sheridan granted the plaintiffs' request to withdraw their pending motion for class certification without prejudice so that the ACLU attorneys could get acclimated to the case before proceeding with a dispositive motion. The parties then began settlement conversations. On May 24, 2017, the Court stayed discovery in order to further facilitate the parties\u2019 settlement discussions. The parties reached a settlement with eight of the nine plaintiffs signing the agreement by June 19, 2018. The ninth plaintiff indicated he was not unhappy with the agreement, but did not want to sign. After failing to show and respond to requests to explaining absence from a scheduled conference, Magistrate Judge Tonianne J. Bongiovanni recommended this plaintiff\u2019s claims be dismissed with prejudice. 2018 WL 4006809. Judge Peter G. Sheridan adopted the recommendation and dismissed this plaintiff\u2019s claims with prejudice on August 22, 2018. 2018 WL 4005749. The eight remaining plaintiffs entered a private settlement agreement with the defendants on September 25, 2018. Under the settlement agreement, the county would continue to operate a precautionary supervision unit, but also provide 28 hours per week out of cells, access to recreation time, in-unit programming, and law library services. Protections used would involve less restrictive security measures. Disciplinary detention could no longer exceed 15 days for a single disciplinary charge and 30 days for multiple disciplinary charges. The county also implemented a mental health screening policy that allowed the director of mental health to stop inappropriate placements in solitary confinement. The settlement agreement permitted the plaintiffs\u2019 counsel access to people detained in the jail, jail records, and the facility itself to ensure full compliance with the settlement. The defendants agreed to pay $11,123 in attorneys\u2019 fees and cost. Under the agreement, any alleged non-compliance would first be brought to the defendant\u2019s counsel, with the opportunity for mediation. The settlement agreement was enforceable for two years. If the mediation failed to resolve the issue, plaintiffs were permitted to move the Court for reinstatement or ask for a one-time one-year extension of the agreement. The two-year enforcement period began on the date the parties executed the agreement. Judge Peter G. Sheridan entered a stipulated of dismissal on October 25, 2018. As of March 21, 2019, the settlement is still in force.", "summary": "Pretrial detainees file lawsuit against Middlesex County in November 2015 to ameliorate the unconstitutional conditions of solitary confinement in the Middlesex County Jail. In September 2018, the parties reached a settlement agreement that restricted the maximum amount of time allowed in isolation and provides those in isolation with opportunities to interact with others."}
{"article": "On October 20, 2006, state prisoners at New Jersey's Adult Diagnostic & Treatment Center (\"ADTC\") filed this \u00a71983 suit against officials associated with ADTC in the District Court for New Jersey, alleging violations of their 8th and 14th amendment rights. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that officials associated with the facility violated their constitutional rights by failing to contain and treat a serious and contagious skin condition. Plaintiffs sought compensatory and injunctive relief, and moved to certify a class of all similarly situated persons. On January 25, 2007, the Court (Judge Stanley R. Chesler) dismissed thirteen of the prisoners sua sponte, with leave to file amended individual complaints, after concluding he was not authorized to join their matters together. The Court also denied class certification. On June 19, 2009, the 3rd Circuit reversed the categorical denial of joinder, vacated the denial of class certification for failure to adequately justify the denial, and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. As of February 14, 2016, the docket listed no further proceedings.", "summary": "On October 20, 2006, state inmates at New Jersey's Adult Diagnostic & Treatment Center (\"ADTC\") filed this \u00a71983 suit against officials associated with ADTC in the District Court for New Jersey, alleging violations of their 8th and 14th amendment rights. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that officials associated with the facility violated their constitutional rights by failing to contain and treat a serious and contagious skin condition. The district court denied class certification, and dismissed 13 of the prisoners sua sponte, with leave to file amended individual complaints, after concluding that prisoners were barred from permissive joinder. The 3rd Circuit reversed the categorical denial of joinder, vacated the denial of class certification, and remanded. As of April 30, 2013, the docket listed no further proceedings."}
{"article": "On October 25, 2010, an inmate at the LA County Men's Central Jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff sued Los Angeles County under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. Represented by private counsel, he sought damages for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as California state law. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that sheriff deputies used excessive force when the deputies beat him while he was handcuffed. The unprovoked attack caused severe injuries. On May 23, 2011, Magistrate Judge Paul L. Abrams issued an <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JC-CA-0115-0003.pdf\">order</a> compelling the disclosure of some discovery material requested by the plaintiff but also denying portions of the request. On October 12, 2011, Magistrate Abrams <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JC-CA-0115-0004.pdf\">granted</a> the defendants' motion for a protective to stop the deposition of one party witness and one nonparty witness, but did denied the defendants' motion for two other nonparty witnesses. 2011 WL 7128640 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2011). On December 15, 2011, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on twelve separate grounds, including that all of the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. On February 23, 2012, Judge George H. Wu circulated a tentative ruling denying in part and granting in part the motion for summary judgement. Judge Wu allowed the parties to file three-page briefs regarding the points raised in the tentative ruling. In particular, Judge Wu denied the defendants qualified immunity. On April 12, 2012, Judge Wu issued a final ruling granting in part and denying in part the motion for summary judgment, including denying qualified immunity. On May 9, 2012, defendants filed an interlocutory <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JC-CA-0115-0005.pdf\">appeal</a> of the denial of qualified immunity in the tentative rulings filed in February and March, 2012. On June 29, 2012, the parties agreed to a stipulated stay pending the appeal, and on July 6, 2012, Judge Wu granted the stay. While the appeal was pending, the parties settled the case and agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice on April 1, 2013. The LA County Sheriff's Department agreed to pay $475,000. The settlement has not been made public. The Ninth Circuit <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JC-CA-0115-0006.pdf\">dismissed</a> the case because the settlement mooted the appeal. On April 3, 2013, the district court <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JC-CA-0115-0007.pdf\">dismissed</a> the case with prejudice. In December 2013, one of the deputies (Deputy Fernando Luviano) who beat the plaintiff was included in a group of 18 L.A. County Sheriff's Department employees federally indicted in criminal cases alleging various types of misconduct, including abusing inmates and visitors and trying to intimidate a federal agent. (He was not indicted for this incident but for other later incidents of abuse.) The L.A. Times <a href=\"http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-sheriff-deputies-abuse-jail-visitor-20151130-story.html\">reports</a> that he was convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison.", "summary": "An inmate at the LA County Men's Central Jail filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 against Los Angeles County. The plaintiff claimed violations of the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that sheriff deputies used excessive force when the deputies beat him while he was handcuffed. In 2010, In 2013, the parties settled the case, and the LA County Sheriff's Department agreed to pay $475,000."}
{"article": "On April 14, 1999, a consent decree was approved in <i>Pigford v. Glickman</i> (FH-DC-0006 in this Clearinghouse; see \"related cases\", below), involving a class of thousands of African American farmers who had sued the U.S. Department of Agriculture over racially discriminatory farm loan denials. 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999). In the settlement, two \"claim tracks\" were created: Track A, which had a lower standard of proof of discrimination (paying up to $50,000 for credit claims and $3,000 for non-credit claims), and Track B, which required a preponderance of the evidence (paying up to $250,000). The deadline for claims under this settlement was October 12, 1999. The Consent Decree allowed claimants who could show \"extraordinary circumstances\" for missing the October 12 deadline to file at a later date, until the final deadline of September 15, 2000. In total 61,000 claims were brought late, but fewer than 3,000 were adjudicated based on the merits. On May 22, 2008, the Food, Conservation and Energy Act (a/k/a \"2008 Farm Bill\") was enacted, providing claimants a right to pursue discrimination claims if they had petitioned to participate but did not get their petitions considered on the merits because they were filed late. Pub. L. 110-234, 122 Stat. 923. Section 14012 of the bill created a completely new cause of action for these \"late-filers,\" which could be brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Subsequently, a large number of suits were filed under this new cause of action. On August 8, 2008, Judge Paul L. Friedman of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia consolidated 17 cases resulting from Section 14012 that were currently pending in the district court: Agee v. Schafer (C.A.. No. 08-0882); Kimbrough v. Schafer (08-0901); Adams v. Schafer (08-0919); National Black Farmers Association v. Schafer (08-0940); Bennet v. Schafer (08-0962); McKinney v. Schafer (08-1062); Bolton v. Schafer (08-1070); Copland v. Vilsack (08-1188); Hampton v. Schafer (08-1381); Robinson v. Schafer (08-1513); James v. Schafer (08-2220); Beckley v. Vilsack (09-1019); Sanders v. Vilsack (09-1318); Russell v. Vilsack (09-1323); Bridgeforth v. Vilsack (09-1401); Allen v. Vilsack (09-1422); and Anderson v. Vilsack (09-1507). All together, these matters were captioned In re Black Farmers' Litigation, and given the docket number 08-mc-0511. On November 14, 2008, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, including a request to certify a putative class of \"All individuals: (1) who submitted late-filing requests under section 5(g) of the <i>Pigford v. Glickman</i> Consent Decree on or after October 13, 1999, and on or before June 18, 2008; but (2) who have not obtained a determination on the merits of their discrimination complaints, as defined by Section 1(h) of the Consent Decree.\" On February 18, 2010, the parties came to a settlement agreement, which was submitted to the court. The settlement agreement created a class with the description language from the amended complaint (see above). This settlement maintained the two tracks of claims, established \"neutrals\" who were assigned to adjudicate the settlement claims, and created an ombudsman position, which was to act as the liaison between the claimants and the court. In return for the re-evaluation of late-filing claims, the plaintiffs agreed to move for dismissal of all pending consolidated cases with prejudice, to be effective upon the court's final approval. After the execution of the initial form of the settlement agreement, six additional complaints were filed and consolidated with this case: Edwards v. Vilsack (10-0456); Latham v. Vilsack (10-0737); Andrews v. Vilsack (10-0801); Sanders v. Vilsack (10-1053); Johnson v. Vilsack (10-0839); and Abney v. Vilsack (10-1026). On December 8, 2010, Congress passed the \"Claims Resolution Act,\" which appropriated $1.15 billion to fund this settlement agreement. Pub. L. No. 111-291, \u00a7201, 124 Stat. 3064, 3070 (2010). On February 11, 2011, Judge Friedman approved this settlement agreement. The order fixed the claim period between November 14, 2011, and May 11, 2012. On March 30, 2011, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for certification of the settlement class, described above. Judge Friedman approved certified the settlement class on May 13, 2011. On October 27, 2011, Judge Friedman approved the final proposed class settlement. 820 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2011). On November 15, 2011, one of the plaintiffs in the consolidated case, the Black Farmers and Agriculturalist Association (BFAA), moved for reconsideration of the settlement approval. The BFAA argued that the settlement should not have been approved because it unfairly prevented plaintiffs from pursuing substantive relief under the Section 741 of the 1999 Farm Bill. This motion was denied on January 13, 2012, by Judge Friedman. 2012 WL 8007271 (D.D.C. 2012). The BFAA and another class member, Charlie Latham, appealed this denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. On July 25, 2012, the Court of Appeals, in a per curiam order, denied the reconsideration appeal for the BFAA because the BFAA is not an \"individual\" under the class settlement, thereby not a part of the settlement. In the same order, the Court of Appeals also denied Latham's appeal because he had already received a determination on his <i>Pigford</i> claim. On February 26, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States denied BFAA and Latham's petition for a writ of certiorari. On February 6, 2012, Stephen Carpenter was appointed the independent ombudsman per the settlement agreement. 842 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D.D.C. 2012). On May 11, 2012, the claim process ended. The parties in this case moved on August 17, 2012 to alter the settlement to provide relief for claimants who missed the deadline for certain circumstances. On September 14, 2012, Judge Friedman approved this alteration of the settlement, which allowed claimants who made a claim before the May 11 deadline and made a prima facie showing of class membership but was not sent a claim form before May 1, 2012 to have their claim considered \"timely\" if resubmitted within 30 days of the approved alteration. On May 24, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion to further modify the settlement agreement to allow certain claims previously denied as \u201cincomplete\u201d to be considered for adjudication on the merits. There are potentially 384 claims under the subject of this motion. On June 21, 2013, Judge Friedman denied this motion. Judge Friedman granted many more motions to amend the settlement agreement on the following dates: August 27, 2013, April 7, 2014, September 17, 2014, August 31, 2016, March 28, 2017. As of August 2020, the court is still reviewing invoices submitted by the Ombudsman\u2019s office; the case is ongoing.", "summary": "Plaintiffs in this case are claimants under the <i>Pigford v. Glickman</i> settlement who were considered \"late-filers,\" but never received a determination of their claim on the merits, who receieved a new cause of action in the 2008 Farm Bill. This matter was a consolidation of 26 cases in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in front of Judge Paul L. Friedman. The final settlement agreement allowed the plaintiffs to file a new claim between November 14, 2011 and May 11, 2012 to be evaluated. The court is still reviewing invoices submitted by the Ombudsman\u2019s office."}
{"article": "On September 9, 2014, the National Federation of the Blind (NFB), along with several of its members who had been discriminated against by Uber drivers because of their service animals, filed this lawsuit in the U.S District Court for the Northern District of California. They sued Uber under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12811 et seq.), the California Unruh Civil Rights Act (California Civil Code \u00a7\u00a7 51 & 52), and the California Disabled Persons Act (California Civil Code \u00a7\u00a7 54-54.3). Represented by Disability Rights Advocates and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as damages for the named plaintiffs. The plaintiffs accused Uber drivers of, among other things, refusing to provide service to people with service dogs, mistreating the dogs and their owners, unfairly giving them negative feedback scores, and charging inappropriate cancellation fees. They alleged that Uber\u2019s response to complaints about driver behavior was opaque and insufficient: Uber generally failed to notify service dog owners of whether the company had investigated complaints, and denied responsibility for drivers\u2019 behavior. On October 22, 2014, Uber filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the NFB and the named plaintiffs all lacked standing to sue under both state and federal law. Uber also argued that even if the plaintiffs had standing, Uber wasn\u2019t a public accommodation and thus wasn\u2019t covered by Title III of the ADA. The United States Department of Justice issued a statement of interest on December 23, 2014. It asked the court to consider the Department of Transportation\u2019s Title III regulations, which are granted considerable weight since the DOT is responsible for implementing the ADA. DOT regulations state that Title III applies to any \u201cdemand-responsive\u201d service that doesn\u2019t operate on a fixed route, and that private entities cannot \u201ccontract away\u201d any responsibilities under the ADA. 49 C.F.R. \u00a7 37.3; 49 C.F.R. pt. 37, app. D \u00a7 37.23. The DOT regulations further require entities covered by Title III to permit service animals to accompany their owners into vehicles, and requires entities to apply eligibility criteria that don\u2019t screen disabled people out, unless doing so would make it impossible to provide the service. 49 C.F.R. \u00a7 37.167(d); 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12184(b)(1); 49 C.F.R. \u00a7 37.5(f). The regulations also require positive action on the part of private entities to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when necessary to avoid discrimination (except when those modifications would fundamentally alter the service), and to ensure that their personnel are trained to properly assist disabled individuals in a respectful and courteous way, with appropriate attention to the difference among individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12184(b)(2)(A); 49 C.F.R. \u00a7 37.173. On April 17, 2015, the court denied Uber\u2019s motion to dismiss. It found that even if not all Uber drivers discriminated against blind people with service animals, discrimination by some drivers was sufficient injury for the plaintiffs to bring suit. The court also found that the NFB could sue even if some of its members had signed binding arbitration agreements with Uber, because many of its members had not. The court didn\u2019t directly respond to the DOJ\u2019s statement of interest, finding instead that since there was a possibility that Uber was covered by the ADA and the California statutes, the parties should have the opportunity to litigate the question. 103 F. Supp. 3d 1073. On December 6, 2016, the court approved a settlement agreement. Uber agreed to: <ul><li>Require its drivers to provide service to blind people with service animals<li>Modify its cleaning fee policy for messes caused by service animals<li>Make it easier for service animal owners to file complaints<li>Implement enhanced procedures for investigating complaints<li>Dismiss drivers receiving multiple plausible complaints<li>Submit to third-party monitoring<li>Pay the NFB $75,000 per year for three years<li>Pay a lump sum of $45,000 for distribution among the named plaintiffs<li>Pay the plaintiffs\u2019 attorneys\u2019 fees and costs</ul>Uber also agreed to a class certification for purposes of the settlement, extending to all blind people with service animals who had used, attempted to use, or been deterred from attempting to use transportation through the Uber app. The settlement was to last for a default period of 3\u00bd years. Retired Judge Margaret A. Nagle was appointed as a neutral monitor to oversee compliance. The monitor had authority to extend the agreement by 1\u00bd years if Uber failed to substantially comply with the terms of the agreement in the second or third year. Any disputes related to the monitor would first be referred to an arbitrator, and if that failed, the court would exercise jurisdiction. Two weeks following the approval of the settlement agreement, on December 15, 2016, the court awarded the plaintiffs $2,485,000 in attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. Uber appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit, which dismissed the appeal with prejudice on March 7, 2017. On November 8, 2019, the court ordered Uber to pay the plaintiffs a total of $313,000 in attorneys\u2019 fees and costs incurred in monitoring and enforcing the agreement. On July 15, 2020, the court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion to modify the settlement. As of July 20, 2020, the court\u2019s jurisdiction over the settlement agreement is ongoing.", "summary": "The national Federation for the Blind and blind individuals discriminated against by Uber drivers brought action against Uber Technologies, Inc. for violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, and the California Disabled Persons Act. The court approved a settlement agreement, under which Uber would pay damages to the plaintiffs, pay for the plaintiffs' attorneys fees, improves its complaint process for complaints by service animal owners, submit to third party monitoring, and dismiss drivers receiving multiple plausible complaints."}
{"article": "In August 2005, the Chicago District Office of the EEOC brought this suit against H and M International Transportation, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that the defendant discriminated against the two charging parties and a group of similarly situated female employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by subjecting them to sexual harassment. In October 2005, one of the charging parties intervened in the suit. A few weeks later in early November, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. The second charging party intervened in the suit in mid November. The defendant's motion to dismiss was denied in January 2006. After some discovery disputes, one of the charging parties was voluntarily dismissed from the case in late June 2006. Thereafter, the parties participated in a settlement conference in October 2006, resulting in a tentative settlement. The parties entered into a final agreement in November 2006 through a consent decree. The two-year decree, containing non-discrimination and non-retaliation clauses, required the defendant to: revise and distribute its sexual harassment policy, post a notice of employee rights, provide Title VII training for all its employees, retain relevant records, report to the EEOC at specified intervals, and pay $150,000. The only additional activity that shows up in the docket is the notice to employees that the defendants were required to post as part of the consent decree. Since there appears to be no additional enforcement activity, it is presumed the case closed in November 2008.", "summary": "In August 2005, the Chicago District Office of the EEOC brought this suit against H and M International Transportation, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging Title VII violations. The parties entered into a final agreement in November 2006 through a consent decree, set to last two years. Since there appears to be no additional enforcement activity, it is presumed the case closed in November 2008."}
{"article": "On March 30, 2006, the Phoenix District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiff sued the automobile repairer AutoZone, Inc. under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiff, representing a female employee of AutoZone Inc., asked the court for monetary relief for the complainant and injunctive relief enjoining the defendant from future discrimination on the basis of sex. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that her manager at AutoZone Inc. had sexually harassed her, and that her employer had retaliated against her when she complained of the sexual harassment. On June 5, 2008 Judge Stephen M McNamee granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment with regard to the defendant's affirmative defense. AutoZone Inc. had argued as an affirmative defense that the complainant's previous conviction of disorderly conduct would have constituted termination regardless of her sexual harassment complaints. The Court found this defense lacked sufficient evidence and was merely speculation. AutoZone Inc. further argued an affirmative defense that punitive damages in this case were a violation of the state and federal constitution. Judge McNamee found this affirmative defense erroneous. On September 11, 2008 Judge Stephen M McNamee denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Judge McNamee ruled that material questions remained with regard to the sexual harassment, the plaintiff's actions following the sexual harassment, and whether the complainant was retaliated against after she filed complaints of sexual harassment. Given these remaining questions, summary judgement was inappropriate. The parties then disputed jury instruction. On December 11, 2008, the EEOC provided proposed jury instructions. The defendant claimed that the instructions were incorrect because the plaintiff had not pled that tangible employment action occurred in retaliation to her complaint. On June 1, 2009, Judge McNamee found the instructions proper. The model instructions direct the jury to find whether or not the complainant proved she had suffered a tangible employment action. If found, the defendant was vicariously liable for the manager's conduct, and the defendant's affirmative defense would not be considered. On June 10, 2009, a jury found for the plaintiff. The jury found that the plaintiff did experience a hostile work environment, but also found that AutoZone Inc. did not retaliate against the complainant. The jury found AutoZone Inc. liable to the complainant for $15,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. On June 22, 2009 the defendant moved for a judgment as a matter of law, or alliteratively, a new trial. On July 24, 2009 Judge McNamee found that there was legally sufficient evidence for the jury finding, and there was not mistake in the case. He denied both motions. On June 25, 2009, the EEOC moved to amend the judgment to include equitable relief. On November 9, 2009, Judge McNamee partially granted the EEOC's motion. He granted requests to require training programs, and he granted the request to require updated posters with specific information about Title VII and a complaint process. He denied the motion for a permanent injunction enjoining the defendant from discriminating against employees based on sex because the complainant in this case was the only to come forward with a complaint, and because AutoZone had sufficiently shown that sexual harassment was unlikely to reoccur. He also denied relief requiring the defendant to investigate all employee complaints of sexual harassment from the last three years, relief requiring the defendant to change its complaint process, and relief requiring monitoring and reporting. The Defendant then moved for partial reconsideration with regard to new postings on Title VII. One January 6, 2010, Judge McNamee ordered that the original posters may be used as a foundation, but he found three problems that must be corrected. The posters must be updated, they must include EEOC contact information for the Phoenix Field Office, and they must be moved further from the manager's offices. On July 23, 2012, Judge McNamee found that the defendant had paid the ordered monetary damages, so he ordered that the bond securing judgment could be released.", "summary": "On March 30, 2016, the Phoenix District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiff sued the automobile repairer AutoZone, Inc. under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiff, representing a female employee of AutoZone Inc., asked the court for monetary relief for the complainant and injunctive relief enjoining the defendant from future discrimination on the basis of sex. The plaintiff claimed that she had faced discrimination on the basis of her sex. The fury found AutoZone Inc. liable to the complainant for $15,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. On June 25, 2009, Judge McNamee partially granted the EEOC's motion to amend the judgment to include equitable relief."}
{"article": "On March 26, 1993, the United States Justice Department filed this lawsuit under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000a et seq. (the Public Accommodations Act), in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against TW Services and its subsidiary, Denny's, Inc., which operates Denny's Restaurants, alleging discriminatory treatment of African Americans by Denny's restaurants in California. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Denny's implemented terms and conditions for service of black customers, such as the requirement of prepayment and cover charges, that were not required of white patrons, that African Americans received poorer service, and that they were discouraged from patronizing the restaurant. The complaint was filed contemporaneously with a consent decree, which was approved by the Court on April 1, 1993. On July 2, 1993, the Court, on its own motion, consolidated the case with Ridgeway v. Denny's Corporation, a class action filed on March 24, 1993, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Both actions alleged violations of the Public Accommodations Act in relation to Denny's treatment of African American customers. The class action also alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1985(3), California Business and Professions Code \u00a7\u00a7 17200 et seq., California Civil Code \u00a7\u00a7 51 et seq. and California Civil Code \u00a7\u00a7 1750 et seq. Following execution of the original decree, numerous complaints of racial discrimination were submitted to the Plaintiff Class and the United States. The United States investigated the complaints and, on May 24, 1994, submitted an amended consent decree to expand the protections to customers and prevent future discrimination. The amended consent decree prohibited Denny's from engaging in discriminatory treatment of African Americans and established procedures for compliance, including a comprehensive non-discrimination training program, as well as provisions for notice, advertising, testing, monitoring and record keeping. It also required the defendants to establish a $28 million settlement fund for the plaintiff class, and appointment of a Special Master. The Amended Consent Decree was given final approval by the Court (Judge James Ware) on July 29, 1994. After preliminary approval of the Amended Consent Decree, the parties received reports that a number of individuals and organizations in California were charging fees for services related to the preparation and/or filing of claims in the case. The court (Judge Ware) issued several cease and desist orders to counsel concerning processing of potential claimants. Ridgeway v. Flagstar Corporation, Nos. C 93-20202, C 93-20208, 1994 WL 525553 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 22, 1994.), Ridgeway v. Flagstar Corporation, Nos. C 93-20202, C 93-20208, 1994 WL 564571 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 3, 1994)). The court (Judge Ware) also issued orders vacating depositions scheduled by class counsel. Ridgeway v. Flagstar Corporation, Nos. C 93-20202, C 93-20208, 1994 WL 665250 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 3, 1994), Ridgeway v. Flagstar Corporation, Nos. C 93-20202, C 93-20208, 1994 WL 665243 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 8, 1994), and denying requests of non-party lawyers to amend the judgment and get for fees defending motions to compel. Ridgeway v. Flagstar Corporation, Nos. C 93-20202, C 93-20208, 1994 WL 665414 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 8, 1994). The court (Judge Ware) further denied a second motion from the lawyers, vacated a scheduled hearing, and ordered the lawyers to prepare a list of any Denny's claimants who had signed contingency fees with them. Ridgeway v. Flagstar Corporation, Nos. C 93-20202, C 93-20208, 1994 WL 669935 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 18, 1994). In July and August of 1996 the court issued orders clarifying the confidentiality provisions of the decree and modifying dates for distribution of residual funds. After several years of status reports, the United States submitted a final report on January 16, 2001, recommending early dismissal of the consent decree. On April 4, 2001, the Court (Judge Ware) terminated the consent decree's provisions effective November 11, 2000, and dismissed the case.", "summary": "On March 26, 1993, the DOJ filed this lawsuit against Denny's for alleged discriminatory treatment of African American customers by Denny's restaurants. The complaint was filed contemporaneously with a consent decree. Litigation over enforcement of the decree continued for several years until the case was dismissed on April 4, 2001."}
{"article": "On May 4, 1990, the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division announced, in a letter to the Governor of Virginia, its intent to launch an investigation, pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997 et seq., into conditions at the Northern Virginia Training Center (NVTC), an institution for individuals with developmental disabilities in Fairfax, Virginia. Five experts from the Department of Justice toured the facility, reviewed policies and procedures, interviewed NVTC staff, and audited reporting and investigation practices. On April 9, 1991, the Department of Justice announced its findings. The Department of Justice reported that the health and safety of people living at NVTC was at risk for a number of reasons. NVTC employed too few people and inadequately trained those it did employ, which placed residents in danger of unnecessary chemical and physical restraint. Often mechanical restraints were accompanied by seclusion, which was a fire hazard. Individualized programming for residents was inadequate and recordkeeping deficiencies made it impossible to monitor an individual's progress. In addition, NVTC's medical care, physical therapy, occupational therapy, and medication and side effect monitoring we all inadequate. In addition, NVTC provided insufficient medical care, including medication monitoring and occupational therapy. Recordkeeping made it difficult to track the efficacy of individualized programming and medical care. In closing, the Department of Justice expressed the desire to negotiate a resolution. Negotiations did not make enough progress and, on May 31, 1994, the Department of Justice threatened to file a CRIPA lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality of conditions at NVTC. In addition to its earlier concerns, the Department of Justice chronicled systematic abuse and neglect at NVTC. For instance, individualized training programs were so inadequate that individuals became seriously sick or died as the result of aggressive, pica, and other self-injurious behaviors. One resident asphyxiated on a rubber glove, while another ate a reported seven cigarettes and one feminine hygiene pad in the span of two days. Similarly, inappropriate feeding techniques and poor nutrition endangered residents' health. Virginia may have made an effort engage in productive negotiations, but the Department of Justice was not satisfied. On February 8, 1995, the Department of Justice notified the Governor of Virginia that, in addition to being unconstitutional, the conditions at NVTC violated the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12101 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 794, the Social Security Act (\"Medicaid\"), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1396 et seq., and Virginia law. On March 4, 1996, the Department of Justice filed a CRIPA lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, challenging conditions at NVTC. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to address (1) individualized programming, (2) undue physical restraint and isolation, (3) facility safety, (4) medical care, (5) physical and occupational therapy, (6) medication monitoring, especially for tardive dyskenesia, and (7) staff numbers and training. On May 21, 1996, the court (Judge Leonie M. Brinkema) refused to consolidate this lawsuit with United States v. Virginia, No. 96-284, MH-VA-0002, an action challenging the constitutionality of conditions at a Virginia psychiatric hospital. On May 21, 1996, the court also granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, but stayed its ruling to allow for settlement. On July 18, 1996, the court approved a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement itself was mostly concerned with procedural elements, such as development of a plan for improvement, compliance deadlines, evaluation, and dismissal. The NVTC plan describes the required compliance. The plan emphasizes the importance of trained staff in the provision of developmental disability services. The plan stated detailed training requirements for direct care staff and incorporated training into almost every solution. For instance, the plan mandated the dismissal of employees who neglected or abused residents. Similarly, the plan sought to reduce the need for restraints by both improving staff development and requiring the interdisciplinary treatment teams' advance approval for the type of restraints to be used for each individual. Thus, both chemical restraints and draconian physical restraint techniques, such as papoose boards, were eliminated. Similar clauses addressed medical care, medication administration and tracking, physical and occupational therapy, abuse and injury reporting and investigations, recordkeeping, functional planning, community placement, and quality assurance. The parties modified the settlement on May 30, 1997. On August 29, 1997, the Department of Justice inspected NVTC and found it was in compliance with the plan. On June 3, 1998, the court dismissed the lawsuit.", "summary": "On May 4, 1990, the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) launched an investigation pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a71997 et seq., into conditions at the Northern Virginia Training Center (NVTC). On April 9, 1991, the DOJ released their findings; people at NCTC were at risk because of inadequate training of staff and inappropriate chemical and physical restraints. Negotiations were initiated, but broke down. On March 4, 1996 the DOJ filed a CIRPA lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. On July 18, 1996, the parties entered a court approved settlement agreement in which NVTC agreed to better train their staff and reduce their need for restraints. The court dismissed the lawsuit on June 3, 1998."}
{"article": "On September 22, 2016, this complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 on behalf of 104 unnamed sexual offenders, identified as John or Jane Does, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Idaho against the Idaho Attorney General, the Idaho Department of Corrections, and the Idaho State Police Force. The plaintiffs alleged that Idaho\u2019s Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process and the Ex Post Facto clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs also alleged that the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes further violated the Substantive Due Process, Equal Protection, Double Jeopardy, Contracts, and Takings clauses of the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. The plaintiffs were from across the country. Most were convicted of sexual offenses in 1980s and 1990s. One of their major complaints was that subsequent amendments to Idaho\u2019s sex-offender registry laws amounted to unconstitutional retroactive punishment. For example, John Doe 100, of Bannock County, was convicted of a misdemeanor sexual offense in Montana in 1996. His offense did not require registration in Montana. He moved to Idaho in 2005 and was not required to register until 2007, 11 years after his conviction, when Idaho authorities reclassified his offense as a felony rather than the original misdemeanor. The plaintiffs sought a permanent order to stop the state and its counties from enforcing specific provisions of the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes and laws. An amended complaint was filed on Apr. 26, 2017, which argued that the defendants further violated the plaintiffs' rights to: acquire, possess and protect property; seek and obtain safety and happiness; travel, life and liberty; and freedom of association and religion protected by the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. The complaint argued that the Registry and accompanying laws were unconstitutional both facially and as-applied. The case was assigned to Judge David C. Nye on Aug. 2, 2017. On Nov. 17, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. A hearing was held on March 6, 2018 before Judge Nye. On May 17, 2018, Judge Nye granted the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiffs leave to file a second amended complaint to cure deficiencies identified. Specifically, the plaintiffs must identify actual harms suffered by one or more \u201cDoes\u201d and present sufficient facts upon which the court can make a reasoned decision. 2018 WL 2275220. On August 30, 2018, the plaintiffs filed the second amended complaint against the defendants. The defendants filed another motion to dismiss on October 18, 2018. A hearing was held on March 12, 2019. On April 5, 2019, Judge Nye granted the motion to dismiss again and dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs added facts with respect to twelve defendants in the second amended complaint but failed to tie such facts to specific constitutional violations and allege essential details that would allow the court to evaluate whether any of the allegations are plausible. The plaintiffs also ignored most of the arguments raised in the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and failed to cite any binding authority to support their arguments. Accordingly, Judge Nye dismissed this case. 2019 WL 1508037. On May 5, 2019, the plaintiffs appealed this decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. As of January 20, 2020, this case is pending in the Court of Appeals.", "summary": "More than 100 sex offenders are challenging Idaho\u2019s laws that require registration and community notification of sex offenders, saying the laws violate an array of constitutional rights, from the prohibition on double jeopardy to freedom of religion. The lawsuit seeks a permanent order to stop the state and its counties from enforcing some portions of the law. On April 5, 2019, Judge Nye dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice because the plaintiffs failed to tie facts to specific constitutional violations. On May 5, 2019, the plaintiffs appealed this decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. As of January 20, 2020, this case is pending in the Court of Appeals."}
{"article": "On January 12, 2005, a group of pre-arraignment detainees filed this class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the United States District Court for New Mexico, challenging the strip search policy in effect at the Santa Fe County Detention Facility. The policy at issue required that all persons to be housed in the Detention Center be strip searched for weapons and contraband, regardless of the offense charged and whether or not there was individualized reasonable suspicion that the search would lead to the discovery of contraband or weapons. Plaintiffs maintained that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures. They sought monetary damages and injunctive relief. Management & Training Corporation (the company that was contracted to operated the Detention Center), the Santa Fe County Board of Commissioners and Santa Fe County Sheriffs were named as defendants. From January 2005 through November 2005, the parties engaged in extensive discovery, including document production, numerous depositions, inspection of the Detention Center and analysis of over 31,000 individual booking records. Settlement talks began in 2005 and included a six day mediation session before retired District Court Judge Raul A. Ramirez of California. Negotiations continued until a deal was reached in June 2006. On July 24, 2006, the District Court (District Judge Bruce D. Black) preliminarily approved the Stipulation of Settlement and certified the case as a class action. Following a fairness hearing, the District Court entered its final order approving the settlement and closing the case on December 8, 2006. Under the terms of the settlement, defendants agreed to pay $8.5 million into a settlement fund. Up to $5,529,750.00, plus interest earned on the settlement fund, would be allocated to pay verified claims. If the total amount of verified claims exceeded that amount, the amount payable to each member for each claim would be proportionately reduced. If the total amount of verified claims was less than that amount, the balance would be refunded to the defendants. $2 million was allocated for attorneys' fees and costs, and $470,250.00 was allocated equally among the class representatives. Up to $500,000 was to be paid for claims administration costs, with restrictions to come into play if administration expenses incurred were more or less than that amount. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In January 2005, a group of pre-arraignment detainees filed this class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the United States District Court for New Mexico, challenging the over-broad strip search policy in effect at the Santa Fe County Detention Facility. Plaintiffs maintained that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures, and sought monetary damages and injunctive relief from the contractors operating the Detention Center, the Santa Fe County Board of Commissioners and Santa Fe County Sheriffs. Under the terms of a 2006 settlement, defendants agreed to pay $8.5 million into a settlement fund, with $5,529,750.00, allocated to pay verified claims."}
{"article": "The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) requires the government to obtain a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) before it may conduct any domestic electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information. The warrant applications are made ex parte and must include a sworn statement by a federal officer of the facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the government's belief that the target of surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Once a FISC judge receives a warrant application, the judge can order approval of the surveillance only if the judge finds that there is probable cause to believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Because the orders only authorize surveillance up to 90 days, the government must file an application for an extension that meets the same requirements as the initial warrant application and obtain a renewal order from the FISC for continued surveillance. For the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse collection of FISA matters, see our <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=20\">special collection</a>. On January 29, 2018, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) voted to disclose a memorandum (the Nunes Memo) revealing existence of a FISA warrant for the electronic surveillance of Carter Page, who served as a onetime foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign until September 2016. The Nunes Memo was declassified by President Donald Trump on February 2, 2018. The Nunes Memo revealed that on October 21, 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) sought and received a probable cause order from the FISC authorizing electronic surveillance on Carter Page. The Nunes Memo further disclosed that in addition to the initial warrant application, the government had received three renewal orders from the FISC. On February 6, 2018, reporters Adam Goldman and Charlie Savage, along with the New York Times, filed a motion in the FISC for release of all court records, including opinions and application materials, in reference to the surveillance of Carter Page. See Misc. 18-01, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16844\">NS-DC-0126</a> in this Clearinghouse. On March 7, 2018, reporter Charlie Savage and the New York Times Company also filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for the same documents they requested in their FISC motion: the release of all documents regarding the surveillance of Carter Page. On July 21, 2018, the DOJ produced redacted documents it considered responsive to the FOIA request. See In re Carter W. Page, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17114\">NS-DC-0127</a> in this Clearinghouse. On August 9, 2018, the parties stipulated to settle their claims. In exchange for The Times's agreement to dismiss this action, the DOJ agreed to provide to the Times any additional documents responsive to The Times's FOIA Request that are released in any related actions. On August 9, 2018, United States District Judge Analisa Torres approved the settlement. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On March 7, 2018, reporter Charlie Savage and the New York Times Company filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for the release of all documents regarding the surveillance of Carter Page. On July 21, 2018, the DOJ produced redacted documents it considered responsive to the FOIA request, and on August 9, 2018, the Court approved a stipulation agreement between the parties to settle this case. The case closed in August 2018."}
{"article": "On October 16, 2014, three individuals with significant physical disabilities requiring substantial medical care filed this lawsuit against the California Department of Health Care Services (\u201cDHCS\u201d) in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that the state had violated Section II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (\u201cADA\u201d) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which require public entities to provide services to persons with disabilities in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs and to prevent unnecessary institutionalization. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction preventing DHCS from reducing at-home medical care and support for the plaintiffs, and a permanent injunction preventing unnecessary institutionalization in the future. They also sought attorney\u2019s fees. The plaintiffs were represented by Disability Rights California. At the time, the plaintiffs, who were once institutionalized because of their disabilities, were living in their own homes where they received Medicaid-funded nursing and attendant care through the California Medi-Cal Home and Community Based Nursing Facility/Acute Hospital Waiver Program (\u201cWaiver Program\u201d). They alleged that they were at risk of institutionalization because DHCS maintained unnecessarily low cost limits for these services. On January 29, 2015, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint. The amended complaint added an organizational plaintiff, In Spirit, a non-profit organization that provided financial assistance to persons with disabilities to receive medical care in their home. On July 7, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. This complaint added a new named plaintiff, dismissed one of the existing named plaintiffs, elaborated on the factual allegations, and added a third claim for violations of California state law. On September 23, 2015, In Spirit was voluntarily dismissed as a party in the lawsuit. On January 26, 2016, the parties held a mediation session but were unable to reach an agreement. Throughout the mediation, the parties continued to engage in discovery. On March 8, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On March 10, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgement. District Judge Fernando Olguin denied both motions on April 27, 2016. He further set out deadlines for continued discovery. On March 29, 2016, the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division (\"DOJ\") filed a statement of interest to clarify the defendant\u2019s obligations under the ADA. The DOJ explained that the ADA prohibits unjustified institutionalization and requires individuals with disabilities receive support and services in the most integrated setting as mandated in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). The DOJ also clarified that the defendants could not administer the Medicaid waiver without accounting for individual needs and that the integration mandate protects individuals at serious risk of institutionalization. The DOJ filed subsequent statements of interest on August 4, 2016 and September 16, 2016, which further clarified the states\u2019 ADA obligations in light of DHCS\u2019s arguments against the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgement. On July 18, 2016, the plaintiffs again moved for summary judgement, which Judge Olguin denied on August 4, 2016 due to continued factual disputes. Judge Olguin also noted being \u201cdeeply troubled\u201d by the defendants\u2019 repeated failure to comply in good faith with discovery requests and threatened to impose sanctions. On September 7, 2016, the plaintiffs again filed a motion for summary judgement. On June 5, 2017, the Court denied that motion, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether or not the California waiver program\u2019s cost limits created a serious risk of institutionalization and whether California had an existing deinstitutionalization scheme in place that was effective. 385 F. Supp. 3d 1048. The parties continued with discovery, and it appears they continued engaging in settlement talks as well. On March 14, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss their case without prejudice, and on March 19, 2018, the court granted this motion for voluntary dismissal of most of the case. There was some continued litigation over whether the plaintiffs were entitled to costs and attorneys\u2019 fees. The dismissal seems to come from the fact that DHCS eventually changed the waiver application process so that decisions would be based on medical necessity without any mention of cost limits. In their motion opposing attorneys\u2019 fees, the defendants asserted that this made the plaintiffs' claims moot, and that there was no basis for awarding attorneys\u2019 fees or costs. The plaintiffs argued that the overall course of events demonstrated that this litigation was a significant factor prompting defendants to eliminate waiver cost limits, which created a presumption that plaintiffs were a catalyst and, because defendants could not rebut that presumption, plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys fees\u2019 and costs under a state statute. On May 30, 2019, Judge Olguin granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for attorneys fees. The court found that the litigation led to the elimination of DHCS\u2019s cost limits, conferring a significant benefit for potentially thousands of people. The elimination of cost limits would ensure that participants would not have to resort to litigation to secure needed services and that they would be able to remain in their homes and avoid segregation and isolation. The court ordered the plaintiffs to file their motion for attorneys\u2019 fees and costs no later than July 31, 2019. 2019 WL 2590170. After a brief delay, the parties agreed on how much the defendants should pay in attorneys\u2019 fees. They notified the court that they had resolved all outstanding issues in this case on November 22, 2019. The notification did not state the size of the award, so the Clearinghouse is unaware of the amount. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2014, individuals with disabilities receiving Medicaid-funded care at their homes filed this lawsuit against the California Department of Health Care Services in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California alleging that they were at risk for institutionalization in violation of the Americans with Disability Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. After over 2 years of discovery and multiple Statements of Interests filed by the United States, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims in March of 2018, after the defendants adopted a new waiver process that did not contain any cost limits."}
{"article": "On September 13, 2012, the United States filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina against Bank of America, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Specifically, the federal government alleged that Bank of America discriminated against disabled mortgage applicants by requiring all disabled applicants to submit a letter from their doctors indicating the amount of the disability income they received. In some cases, the U.S. claimed that Bank of America required disabled loan applicants to provide information about the nature and severity of their disability as a condition of receiving a mortgage. The federal government further alleged that Bank of America discriminated against applicants receiving public assistance in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunities Act. The federal government asked the court for an injunction as well as monetary damages. A consent order was submitted on October 10, 2012 and later amended on December 6. The Court (Chief Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr.) approved the order, which prohibited Bank of America from requiring applicants to submit a letter from a doctor and required Bank of America to institute a monitoring program, train staff on the new policies, maintain a complaint resolution program, and to compensate affected applicants. According to the press release from the Department of Justice, Bank of America paid a minimum of $370 million in the settlement to about 200,000 borrowers. The order was to remain in effect for 42 months following the approval date. On June 5, 2013, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge David S. Cayer. The consent order terminated without any further litigation, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "On September 13, 2012, the United States (on behalf of disabled individuals applying for home mortgage loans while receiving Social Security Disability Insurance) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court Western District of North Carolina against Bank of America. The federal government claimed that Bank of America has violated the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunities Act. The case resulted in a Consent Order which required Bank of America to change its policies and pay a minimum of $370 million to approximately 200,000 borrowers."}
{"article": "On November 21, 2019, three refugee resettlement agencies filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, challenging the Trump Administration's recent Executive Order, \"Enhancing State and Local Involvement in Refugee Resettlement.\" The agencies (HIAS, Inc., Church World Service, Inc., and Lutheran Immigration & Refugee Service, Inc.), represented by the International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), sued President Trump, the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiffs alleged that the President\u2019s September 26, 2019, Executive Order violated the Refugee Act of 1980, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 551 et seq.), and principles of federalism. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, as well as a preliminary and permanent injunction to enjoin enforcement of the Order. The case was assigned to Judge Peter J. Messitte. The plaintiffs alleged that Executive Order 13888 made an unprecedented change to the refugee resettlement process by mandating that refugees not be resettled in the United States unless the state and locality where they are to be resettled take the affirmative step of providing written consent. As national refugee resettlement agencies, the plaintiffs were then charged by the federal government with the responsibility of soliciting and obtaining written consent from all states and localities where refugees they assist could be resettled. The plaintiffs claimed that such a change would provide individual states and local governments with effective veto power over refugee resettlement. The plaintiffs filed their motion for a preliminary injunction on November 22, 2019. Judge Messitte granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion on January 15. 2020 WL 218646. Judge Messitte concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, that they faced irreparable harm, and that the Executive Order was not in the public interest. Consequently, he issued a nationwide injunction enjoining the Executive Order. The government appealed the injunction to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on February 12, 2020 (Do. 20-1160), and Judge Messitte stayed the proceedings in the district court pending resolution of that appeal on February 14, 2020. On January 8, 2021, Circuit Judge Barbara Milano Keenan upheld the preliminary injunction. 985 F.3d 309. The court held that the plaintiffs demonstrated that they were likely to succeed on their claim that the order and notice violated the Refugee Act. The court also determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a nationwide injunction because the refugee resettlement programs were, by their nature. located throughout the country. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On November 21, 2019, three refugee resettlement agencies filed this lawsuit against the Trump Administration in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that Executive Order 13888 violated the Refugee Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and principles of federalism. The plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the Order was granted on January 15, 2020."}
{"article": "On October 5, 2012, the Catholic Archdiocese of Atlanta, the Catholic Diocese of Savannah, and affiliated Catholic organizations filed this U.S. District Court lawsuit in the Northern District of Georgia against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the First and Fifth Amendments, and as a violation of the Constitution's Separation of Powers provisions. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, seek to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contend that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. Plaintiffs amended their complaint a first time on December 31, 2012, and a second time on August 19, 2013 to challenge the ACA as amended by the 2013 Final Rules. They argued that while the Diocese itself likely fell within the \"religious employer\" exception, the affiliated Catholic entities did not and, instead, were considered \"eligible organizations\" qualifying for an accommodation. The accommodation would require plaintiffs to provide self-certification to their insurance provider setting forth their religious objections to the ACA, in turn trigging an obligation on the part of the insurance provider to procure the services plaintiffs find objectionable. According to the plaintiffs, this series of events makes them the but-for cause of providing contraception coverage in violation of their sincerely held beliefs. Plaintiffs continued to ask the court to grant a permanent injunction against enforcement of the relevant provisions of the ACA. On March 26, 2014, the District Court (Judge William S. Duffey, Jr.) permanently enjoined the government from enforcing the contraceptive mandate against plaintiffs. 2014 WL 1256373. The court noted that the contraception mandate, including the self-certification form, placed a substantial burden on plaintiffs by compelling them to affirmatively modify their behavior and violate their religious beliefs. The court also held that the general applicability of the law was not a compelling state interest nor was the conception mandate the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. On May 23, 2014, the government appealed this case to the Eleventh Circuit. On May 30, 2014, Judge Duffey issued an opinion and order in response to the government's motion for Reconsideration on the Dioceses' RFRA and free exercise claims. 2014 WL 2441742. The government had also asked the court to reconsider whether or not the affiliated entities maintained a \"church plan\" under ERISA. If they did, they would be exempt from the self-certification requirement, and not have standing to challenge the mandate. Judge Duffey held that the Dioceses' RFRA and free exercise claims should be dismissed, and clarified that the affiliated organizations did not need to establish that they were church plans, because the self-certification requirement was a substantial burden on their religious exercise. This case was consolidated on appeal with <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13619\">Eternal Word Television Network v. Sebelius</a>. On February 18, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit (Judge Jill Pryor) held that the contraception mandate does not violate the RFRA because it is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest, but enjoined enforcement of the mandate against the plaintiffs because the issue of whether the accommodation violates the RFRA was currently before the Supreme Court. 818 F.3d 1122. On May 31, 2016, following the Supreme Court's decision in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13465\">Zubik v. Sebelius [II]</a> that religious nonprofits and the government should return the related cases to the courts of appeals and attempt to negotiate a solution, the Eleventh Circuit vacated their February 19, 2016 order in this case, and directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing. On July 29, 2016 the parties jointly moved for a stay in the proceedings that was granted on August 10, 2016. The parties were ordered to file status reports sixty days after the given order. Also on August 10, 2016, the defendants moved for an order materially identical to the remand orders the Supreme Court issued in <i> Zubik </i>. The defendants moved for this motion because they wanted to modify the existing injunction against them and have the ability to tell insurance issuers and third party administrators of their requirement to make separate payments for contraceptives given the plaintiffs met the requirements under the accommodation. This would ensure the affected women that would be under the plaintiffs insurance receive coverage while the litigation continued. The plaintiffs opposed the motion. On October 3, 2016, the court granted the defendant's motion for materially identical orders. The new injunction stated: \u201cAs such, we modify the injunction entered on May 31, 2016 to add that: Nothing in this opinion, [in this Court's prior opinion or orders], or in the opinions or orders of the courts below, is to affect the ability of the Government to ensure that women covered by the [plaintiffs'] health plans \"obtain, without cost, the full range of FDA approved contraceptives.\" Through this litigation, [plaintiffs] have made the Government aware of their view that they meet \"the requirements for exemption from the contraceptive coverage requirement on religious grounds. Nothing in this opinion, [in this Court's prior opinions or orders], or in the opinions or orders of the courts below, \"precludes the Government from relying on this notice, to the extent it considers it necessary, to facilitate the provision of frill contraceptive coverage\" going forward. Because the Government may rely on this notice, the Government may not impose taxes or penalties on [plaintiffs] for failure to provide the relevant notice.\u201d Both parties filed status reports on October 11, 2016, stating the defendants were sorting through the 52,000 comments received during the governments\u2019 Request for Information (RFI) and required additional time to determine if modifications were necessary to accommodate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim still pending. The parties then continued to file monthly status reports with no changes to the case until October 16, 2017. However, during this time President Trump issued an executive order in May of 2017, called the \"Executive Order Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty\". As a result, on October 6, 2017, the US Department of Health and Human Services released a statement explaining the changes in policy related to President Trump's executive order requiring HHS to consider amending the accommodation requirements under the ACA for the contraception mandate. The new policy would expand the exception to fit entities that had sincerely held religious beliefs opposed to providing contraception. <a href=\"https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/10/06/trump-administration-issues-rules-protecting-the-conscience-rights-of-all-americans.html\"> Here is an article from HHS describing the change.</a> On October 16, 2017, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the case, with each party bearing its own costs. On November 7, 2017, the court dismissed the appeal. This case is now presumed closed.", "summary": "On October 5, 2012, the Catholic Archdiocese of Atlanta, the Catholic Diocese of Savannah, and affiliated Catholic organizations filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Georgia against the Federal Government, seeking to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. On March, 26, 2014, the Court permanently enjoined the Federal Government from enforcing the contraceptive mandate against plaintiffs. This case was consolidated on appeal with Eternal Word Television Network v. Sebelius. After the Supreme Court decision, the Eleventh Circuit directed the parties to negotiate a solution. The parties eventually moved to dismiss the case on October 16, 2017."}
{"article": "This action, filed by the City of Los Angeles, California on Sept. 29, 2017, challenged the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)'s imposition of immigration-related conditions on federal funding to the city. The plaintiff, represented by its legal department and the law firm Covington & Burling, filed its complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Los Angeles receives federal funding through the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG) Program and the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Program, both administered by the DOJ and its component agencies Office of Justice Programs (OJP) and Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). The latest DOJ requirements for FY2017 program funding imposed new conditions on recipient cities, including Los Angeles. One condition was compliance with 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1373, which provides that a local government entity cannot prohibit or restrict communication between government entities or officials and federal immigration authorities. The other two conditions required recipients to allow the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to access any correctional or detention facility and question suspected undocumented immigrants about their right to be in the U.S., and to provide DHS at least 48 hours advance notice of any noncitizen's scheduled release from custody. After several lawsuits challenged these conditions, the federal government was preliminarily enjoined from imposing them on Byrne JAG funding in <i><a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16080\">City of Chicago v. Sessions</a></i>. The DOJ continued to revise these conditions, but Los Angeles believed the revised requirements were ambiguous. Los Angeles alleged that accepting these conditions would force it to abandon its longstanding law enforcement policies, intended to improve cooperation between immigrant residents and municipal police. These policies restrict the city from seeking and disclosing information about residents' immigration status, as well as from honoring Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainer requests without an independent warrant or judicial determination of probable cause. Los Angeles explained its view that its policies in fact complied with 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1373, but that the notice and access conditions were so ambiguous that the DOJ could continue to wrongly deny Los Angeles the funding. Additionally, the city believed that Congress did not intend these immigration-related conditions in either the Byrne JAG statute or the COPS statute. Los Angeles argued that the access and notification requirements would compel it to choose between either submitting to an unconstitutional federal enforcement agenda, or losing critical funds. The city contended that this violated the U.S. Constitution's separation of powers, the Spending Clause (by usurping Congress' ability to set conditions for funding), the Tenth Amendment (by usurping Los Angeles's power over its own municipal policy), and the Administrative Procedure Act (as arbitrary and capricious agency action). On the same day that it filed its complaint, Los Angeles also moved for a preliminary injunction, pointing to what it described as the irreparable injury from the loss of critical public-safety funds. The case was assigned to Judge Manuel L. Real on Oct. 2, 2017. On Oct. 4, 2017 the parties moved for an expedited briefing schedule, because the DOJ expected to make FY2017 COPS funding decisions on or around Oct. 30. Judge Real granted the motion and planned for a hearing to be held on Oct. 23. The DOJ, in its response to the city's complaint, argued against the preliminary injunction, asserting that the city lacked standing (as it would not have been a successful COPS applicant anyway in FY2017, regardless of the immigration-related factors); that COPS' immigration-related factors were consistent with the program's purposes under the APA; and that the DOJ had broad discretion to make the grants. Los Angeles withdrew its motion for preliminary injunction on Oct. 16, 2017 because the DOJ had disclosed that Los Angeles' award application for this cycle would have been unsuccessful even without the immigration-related considerations. However, Los Angeles maintained its claims and request for permanent relief, because the DOJ continued to attach the immigration-related conditions to the COPS program. On Nov. 21, 2017 Los Angeles then moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the DOJ's use of COPS funding conditions violated the separation of powers, the Spending Clause, and the APA as arbitrary and capricious. On Feb. 1, five counties, seven cities, and the District of Columbia filed amici briefs supporting Los Angeles. The DOJ also moved for partial summary judgment on Jan. 12, 2018 arguing that Los Angeles' claims were non-justiciable or, in the alternative, that the funding conditions were consistent with the governing statutes, the Spending Clause, and the APA. Judge Real held a motion hearing on Feb. 28, 2018, and on Apr. 11, 2018 issued an order granting Los Angeles' partial summary judgment motion and denying the DOJ's. First, Judge Real held that the case was not moot because Los Angeles' harm was capable of repetition if the City applied for a FY2018 grant. As to the substantive claims, Judge Real held that the challenged conditions exceeded DOJ's legal authority (as federal power infringing on the state police power), in violation of the Spending Clause (because Congress did not unambiguously condition grant receipt on local compliance with federal authorities for a matter not reasonably related to COPS's goal), and in violation of the APA (as arbitrary and capricious without a reasonable basis). Judge Real then permanently enjoined the DOJ from imposing the challenged conditions nationwide. In doing so, Judge Real held that Los Angeles would suffer irreparable harm in future grant cycles against its competitors, making a nationwide injunction necessary. The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On July 12, 2019, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Los Angeles. 929 F.3d 1163. The Court rejected the plaintiff's claims that the DOJ's use of certain factors in scoring applicants for COPS grants violated the Spending Clause or the Tenth Amendment. The Court also held that the DOJ did not exceed its statutory authority or act arbitrarily and capriciously. The plaintiffs requested rehearing, but the Ninth Circuit denied to rehear the appeal. On December 23, 2019, the district court dissolved and vacated the April 11 injunction in accordance with the Ninth Circuit's ruling. Meanwhile, back in the district court, Judge Real had stayed Los Angeles' Byrne JAG claims pending one of the following events: (a) the nationwide injunction issued in City of Chicago v. Sessions is dissolved, in which case proceedings on these claims would resume; or (b) the case results in a nationwide permanent injunction of the challenged Byrne JAG conditions, after all opportunities for appeal were exhausted. On July 18, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction of the Byrne JAG funding conditions. On Sept. 13, 2018, Judge Real granted Los Angeles' application for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the notice and access conditions imposed upon the Byrne JAG grant. The court held that the statutes did not grant the Attorney General authority to impose such conditions. The court also held that Los Angeles faced irreparable harm because it was forced to make \"an impossible choice: either it must certify compliance with unconstitutional and unlawful directives that impinge on the City's sovereignty, damage community trust, and harm public safety, or it will lose congressionally authorized Byrne JAG funding.\" The government appealed this order to the Ninth Circuit, which then docketed the appeal as No. 18-56292. Four days later, the district court denied the government's motion to dismiss. On October 31, 2019, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction against the DOJ's use of the notice and access conditions on recipients of Byrne JAG grants. 941 F.3d 931. The Court found that the DOJ lacked statutory authority to impose the conditions. On December 31, 2019, the case was reassigned to Judge Josephine L. Staton. In light of the Ninth Circuit finding that the DOJ lacked statutory authority to impose the notice and access conditions on the Byrne JAG grants, Judge Staton entered final judgment for Los Angeles regarding the notice and access claim on March 20, 2020. Judge Staton converted the September 2018 preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the notice and access conditions. In addition, the Court entered partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the COPS claims and dismissed these claims with prejudice. The defendants appealed the final judgment in favor of Los Angeles on the notice and access claims in May 2020, docket 20-55545. The parties then began mediation, and the Ninth Circuit stayed the appeal pending mediation. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "This lawsuit, filed by the City of Los Angeles on Sept. 29, 2017 challenged the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)'s imposition of immigration-related conditions on federal funding to the city. Plaintiff filed its complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Los Angeles receives federal funding through the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG) Program and the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Program, both administered by DOJ and its component agencies Office of Justice Programs (OJP) and Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). The latest DOJ requirements for FY2017 program funding imposed new conditions on recipient cities, including Los Angeles. One condition was compliance with 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1373, which provides that a local government entity cannot prohibit or restrict communication between government entities or officials and federal immigration authorities. The other two conditions required recipients to allow the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to access any correctional or detention facility and question suspected undocumented immigrants about their right to be in the U.S., and to provide DHS at least 48 hours advance notice of any noncitizen's scheduled release from custody. After several lawsuits challenged these conditions, the federal government was preliminarily enjoined from imposing them on Byrne JAG funding in City of Chicago v. Session. DOJ continued to revise these conditions, but Los Angeles believed the revised requirements were ambiguous. Both parties moved for partial summary judgment, and the court granted Los Angeles' motion. On April 11, 2018, Judge Real held that the challenged conditions exceeded DOJ's legal authority (as federal power infringing on the state police power), in violation of the Spending Clause (because Congress did not unambiguously condition grant receipt on local compliance with federal authorities for a matter not reasonably related to COPS's goal), and in violation of the APA (as arbitrary and capricious without a reasonable basis). Judge Real then permanently enjoined DOJ from imposing the challenged conditions nationwide. The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On Sept. 13, 2018, Judge Real granted Los Angeles' application for a preliminary injunction. The court held that the statutes in question gave \"no indication that DOJ is authorized to add civil immigration conditions\" and that Congress did not grant the attorney general authority to impose such conditions. The court also held that Los Angeles faced irreparable harm because it was forced to make \"an impossible choice: either it must certify compliance with unconstitutional and unlawful directives that impinge on the City's sovereignty, damage community trust, and harm public safety, or it will lose congressionally authorized Byrne JAG funding.\" The government appealed this order to the Ninth Circuit, which then docketed the appeal as No. 18-56292. Four days later, the district court denied the government's motion to dismiss. The court held that the City had plausibly stated claims that the new funding conditions were ultra vires, and also violated the separation of powers, the spending clause, and the APA. This case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On September 4, 2013, a for-profit company filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of D.C. against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Administrative Procedure Act. and the First Amendment. The plaintiff, represented by the Thomas More Society, asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that providing insurance coverage of contraception would violate the deeply held, Catholic religious beliefs of the corporation's owners. On September 25, 2013, Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson granted the plaintiff's unopposed motion for preliminary injunction and stayed the case. The court initially ordered a stay until the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12714&\">Gilardi v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services </a>. The district court kept the stay in place until after the Supreme Court's ruling in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12661\">Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius </a> on June 30, 2014. In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court held that the version of the contraceptive services mandate in place at that time was a violation of the plaintiff's rights under the RFRA. Based on that ruling and the parties' joint status report, on October 27, 2014 the district court entered a permanent injunction and judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, enjoining defendants from enforcing the version of the contraception mandate at issue in Hobby Lobby against the plaintiffs in this case. The parties were instructed to meet and confer on attorneys' fees and costs. The most recent status report in following that order was entered on December 17, 2014.", "summary": "A for-profit company sought an exception to the Affordable Care Act's mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception because it violates the owner's religious beliefs. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, the District Court for the District of Columbia granted an injunction for the plaintiffs against the version of the contraceptive services mandate at issue in Hobby Lobby."}
{"article": "On June 27, 2018, a refugee from Guatemala filed this lawsuit on behalf of herself and her daughter in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the Attorney General of the United States and officers and executives of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Health and Human Services, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 551 <i>et seq.</i>) and the Declaratory Judgment Act (22 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201). Represented by the ACLU of Massachusetts and private counsel, the plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief, along with attorney\u2019s fees. The plaintiff alleged that she and her daughter had been separated upon their entry to the United States in violation of their Fifth Amendment substantive and procedural due process rights and their equal protection rights. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that the Office of Refugee Resettlement\u2019s family reunification requirements violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and that the Department of Health and Human Services had violated the Flores Settlement\u2019s requirements regarding immigrant detention. <i> See </i> <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9493\">Flores v. Reno</a>. Finally, the plaintiff filed petitions for mandamus and habeas relief for the defendants to release her daughter. The plaintiff brought the case in Massachusetts, where she was domiciled as she awaited her asylum hearing, while her daughter was kept in a shelter in Texas. The case was assigned to Judge George A. O\u2019Toole. The following day, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order for immediate injunctive relief, asking the court to order the release of the daughter. A copy of the motion was promptly sent to the defendants, who were ordered to respond by July 2, 2018. The defendants requested, and were granted, an extension until July 6. Rather than take advantage of the extension, the defendants decided to release her daughter. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case on July 5, 2018 after she and her daughter were reunited. The case is now closed.", "summary": "A refugee and her daughter were separated when they entered Arizona, and the mother sued in federal court in Massachusetts for injunctive and declaratory relief. The case was resolved eight days later, when the mother and daughter were reunited."}
{"article": "On May 17, 2007, Medicaid-eligible individuals with acquired brain injuries qualifying for long-term care services in nursing or rehabilitation facilities and the Brain Injury Association of Massachusetts filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. The plaintiffs sued Massachusetts under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12132 <i>et seq.</i>), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794(a)), and the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396a(a)(8), (a)(10)(A)). Represented by the Center for Public Representation and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin Massachusetts to comply with the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and Social Security Act by offering services and programs for individuals with acquired brain injuries in integrated community settings. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Massachusetts had illegally discriminated against them on the basis of disability. They cited the Supreme Court's decision in <a href=https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11643><i>Olmstead v. L.C.</i>, 527 U.S. 581 (1999)</a>, which held that the ADA forbids the unnecessary institutionalization of individuals with disabilities, and mandates that their rehabilitative and medical needs be provided in a manner that enables individuals with disabilities to be independent and integrated members of the community. The plaintiffs alleged that at least a quarter of the more than 8,000 individuals with traumatic brain injuries living in nursing homes or rehabilitation facilities in Massachusetts would be able to and would prefer to reside in an integrated community setting, provided they received appropriate aids and support. The plaintiffs alleged that in the absence of these services, they were unlawfully denied their personal liberty, freedom of association, and meaningful access to community life. On September 26, 2007, the court certified the class. On May 30, 2008, the parties entered a court-approved settlement agreement. Under the settlement, Massachusetts agreed that within six months of the effective date of the settlement it would issue a proposal to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to establish a Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services (HCBS) (\u00a71915(c) of the Social Security Act) waiver program that would enable individuals with traumatic brain injuries the option of a community-placed living situation. Initially this program would offer 300 such waivers. Individuals receiving the waivers would participate in developing their own Individualized Service Plan with an interdisciplinary team and would receive services appropriate to their level of need. Waiver recipients would have the option of living with family, where applicable, or of living in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs, e.g., their own apartment or home, or in a group home. Massachusetts reserved the right to deny waivers to any person whose annual costs of care to Medicaid from residential habilitation and other waiver services, plus Title XIX state plan services, would exceed $164,131, and also to deny waivers to any person whose annual Medicaid waiver costs, exclusive of Title XIX and residential costs, would likely exceed $87,919. The settlement limited the total cost of the waiver program, inclusive of all Medicaid and state-funded expenditures for the participants, to $15,000,000. In order to stay within this cap, the state reserved the right to take corrective actions, such as reducing the number of waivers available. Massachusetts also agreed to implement an education and outreach program in order to educate individuals with acquired traumatic brain injuries about the program. On June 2, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a motion seeking reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under the fee shifting provisions of the ADA, which allow a \"prevailing party\" plaintiff to recover expenses from a defendant. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12205. Massachusetts objected, arguing that the court-approved class action settlement, which expressly was not a court-ordered consent decree, was insufficient to establish the plaintiffs as the prevailing party. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion, ordering the State to pay $750,000 in attorneys' fees. 683 F. Supp. 2d 121. Massachusetts appealed. On February 17, 2011, the First Circuit Court of Appeals (Selya, J.) affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision. 636 F.3d 1. On June 19, 2013, the parties agreed to a new settlement agreement that would replace the original agreement, which the state was unable to fully implement because it could not secure federal grant funding for community-based services, leaving thousands of individuals with brain injuries languishing in facilities across the state. Under the Amended Agreement, the state would use another federal grant project, the Money Follows the Person (MFP) Demonstration, as well as other waiver programs, to provide residential and non-residential supports for up to 1,174 Medicaid-eligible people with brain injuries who were in long-term rehabilitation facilities and nursing homes. On July 11, 2013, the district court (Judge Michael A. Ponsor) issued final approval of the amended settlement agreement. The court retained jurisdiction over the case. The agreement was to last for six years. On June 27, 2014, Judge Ponsor revised a Protective Order originally granted on August 27, 2007, adjusting and broadening the scope of protected health information (PHI) for class members and their guardians. No substantive docket entries were made during the remainder of the six-year term, which ended on July 1, 2019, so the case is presumably now closed.", "summary": "In 2007, several Medicaid recipients with acquired traumatic brain injuries filed a class action suit in federal court against Massachusetts, alleging it was unlawfully failing to provide care to people with brain injuries in a community setting as required by the ADA, instead illegally segregating them in nursing facilities. The parties entered a court-approved settlement, with Massachusetts agreeing to provide a limited number of waivers allowing individuals with brain injuries the option of a community-placed living situation, provided their individual annual cost of care was below a certain cap. The court awarded the plaintiffs $750,000 in attorneys' fees under the fee shifting provisions of the ADA, finding them to be the \"prevailing party\" despite the fact that the parties had settled. In 2013, the parties amended the settlement agreement, which was set to expire in 2019. Little additional litigation occurred during the term of the settlement agreement."}
{"article": "On November 24, 1999, Plaintiffs first filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Agriculture (\"USDA\") in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs, Native American farmers who alleged they were victims of discriminatory lending practices by the USDA, brought suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a72201, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15, U.S.C. \u00a71691. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that the USDA's Farm Service Agency (\"FSA\") had failed to respond to investigation reports submitted by the Civil Rights Action Team and the Office of the Inspector General, which found widespread discriminatory lending practices against Native American farmers. According to the reports, the FSA utilized subjective interpretations of loan approval guidelines improperly to the detriment of Native American farmers, failed to advise Native Americans of the availability of USDA loan and loan servicing opportunities, and systematically erected barriers that prevented Native Americans from receiving loans or loan servicing. Plaintiffs claimed that the USDA failed to supervise in response to these reports, and failed to investigate the civil rights complaints that its office received in response to those discriminatory practices. The \"Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999,\" 7 U.S.C. \u00a72279, waived the statute of limitations for these civil rights claims, normally barred after two years. Plaintiff sought (1) declaratory judgment that the USDA had violated their rights to equal credit, participation in loan programs, and full and timely enforcement of discrimination complaints, and (2) monetary compensation and injunctive relief from the discriminatory practices outlined above. On July 22, 2000, the U.S. moved for judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative, summary judgment. Plaintiffs moved on October 11, 2000 for a preliminary injunction. However, District Court Judge Emmitt G. Sullivan denied both motions on June 18, 2001. On November 28, 2001, Judge Sullivan granted certification of the class. 2001 WL 34676944. This class was described as \"[a]ll Native American farmers and ranchers who (1) framed or ranched between January 1, 1981, and November 24, 1999, (2) applied to the USDA for participation in a farm program during that time period, and (3) filed a discrimination complaint with the USDA individually or through a representative during the time period.\" The U.S. filed an interlocutory appeal of the class certification with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and asked the District Court to stay the case pending the appeal on December 18, 2002. Judge Sullivan denied the motion to stay on December 28, 2001. The interlocutory appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals on October 29, 2002 (Judge David S. Tatel). 309 F.3d 789. On December 5, 2003, Judge Sullivan granted a motion by class-member Phil Givens to opt out of the class. In response, the Plaintiff class sought reversal by the Court of Appeals, petitioning the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus on February 9, 2004, but the petition was denied in a per curiam opinion on March 3, 2004. On March 23, 2006, Judge Sullivan entered an order granting the motions by multiple involuntary members to opt out of the class and pursue individual relief. 236 F.R.D. 1. Plaintiffs submitted their eighth amended (and final) complaint on February 11, 2008. On December 19, 2010, the parties notified the court that they had reached a settlement, and on December 22, Plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval of the settlement and settlement agreement class certification. Judge Sullivan granted the preliminary approval on November 1, 2010, and granted final approval of the settlement agreement on April 28, 2011. On April 29, 2011, Judge Sullivan entered an order of final judgment, dismissing this action with prejudice. This began the 180-day period of the settlement agreement claims process, ending on October 26, 2011. The settlement agreement created a total compensation fund of $680,000,000. In exchange for Plaintiffs' agreement to dismiss the suit, Defendants agreed to suspend all collection efforts that were currently in the Service Center Information Management System or on individuals who file claims pursuant to the agreement. In addition, all members of the class would be able to make a claim to an appointed \"claim administrator,\" who would make its best effort to make a determination on the claim within 10 days. These claims would be in one of two tracks: \"Track A\" required \"substantial evidence\" of discrimination, and awarded a liquidated damage amount of $50,000. \"Track B\" claims required more--a preponderance of the evidence of discrimination--and could pay an award up to $250,000. If any claimant was also making a claim in response to the <a href=http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12515><i>Pigford v. Glickman</i></a> or <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12757\"><i>Garcia v. Vilsack</i></a> settlements, that individual was not eligible for a claim award in this settlement. The deadline for claims under the settlement agreement was set at 180 days after final approval of settlement agreement. Pursuant to a cy pres provision, any leftover or unclaimed funds were to be distributed to non-profit organizations serving Native American farmers and ranchers. Additional provisions of the settlement included: the USDA agreed to create a Council for Native American Farming and Ranching (responsible for transmitting recommendations concerning changes to FSA regulations or internal guidance that would eliminate barriers to program participation by Native Americans), create an ombudsperson for Native Americans and other socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers, and commence a review of their policies and training materials, promising to make all necessary revisions to prevent further discriminatory behavior. On August 30, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a status report notifying the court that the claims process had concluded, but that approximately $380,000,000 remained available for cy pres distribution. On September 24, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to modify the settlement\u2019s cy pres provision: while the cy pres funds would still go to non-profit organizations serving Native American farmers and ranchers, the plaintiffs proposed changes in the mechanism for distributing funds. However, on May 19, 2015, Marilyn and George Keepseagle (\u201cthe Keepseagles\u201d), lead named plaintiffs and class representatives, opposed class counsel\u2019s proposed modification, retained their own counsel, and filed their own motion to modify the settlement agreement, proposing that the court order a pro rata distribution of the remaining settlement funds to successful claimants. On July 24, 2015, Judge Sullivan denied both motions to modify the settlement agreement, concluding that there was no basis to approve the modifications under the law governing the disposition of unclaimed settlements nor under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6). 2015 WL 4510837. On December 14, 2015, all the plaintiffs, including the Keepseagles, filed an unopposed motion to modify the settlement agreement\u2019s cy pres provision. The proposed modification was a compromise between class counsel\u2019s and the Keepseagles\u2019 prior proposals and provided for (1) a supplemental award of $18,500 to each claimant who prevailed in the original claims process, and (2) an amended process through which $38,000,000 of cy pres funds were to be distributed. On April 20, 2016, Judge Sullivan approved the modification. 2016 WL 9455764. In June 2016, two class members appealed Judge Sullivan\u2019s approval to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, contending that all of the remaining funds should have been distributed pro rata to the successful claimants and that the cy pres provision was unconstitutional. On May 16, 2017, the Court of Appeals (Judges Brown, Wilkins, and Edwards) affirmed the district court in finding that the modification was \u201cfair, reasonable, and adequate\u201d; the Court declined to reach the merits of the appellants\u2019 legal challenges to the cy pres provision, finding that they had explicitly waived those claims before the district court and forfeited them because they had never raised any legal challenges to the cy pres provision previously despite multiple clear opportunities to do so. 2017 WL 2111020. The Supreme Court then declined to hear the case on March 26, 2018, finally permitting the modification to the agreement to be implemented.", "summary": "On November 24, 1999, a group of Native Americans farmers and ranchers who claimed that they had been victims of discriminatory lending practices between 1981 and 1999 brought suit against the U.S. Department of Agriculture (\"USDA\") in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. On April 29, 2011, Judge Emmitt G. Sullivan of the District Court granted a final approval of the settlement agreement, in which the USDA agreed to revise policies to prevent further discrimination and create a compensatory fund of $680,000,000, from which claimants could bring evidence of discrimination in order to receive a monetary reward up to $250,000. On August 30, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a status report notifying the court that the claims process had concluded, but that approximately $380,000,000 remained available for cy pres distribution. On December 14, 2015, the Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to modify the settlement agreement\u2019s cy pres provision. The proposed modification provided for (1) a supplemental award of $18,500 to each claimant who prevailed in the original claims process, and (2) an amended process through which $38,000,000 of cy pres funds were to be distributed. On April 20, 2016, Judge Sullivan approved the modification. However, in June 2016, two class members appealed Judge Sullivan\u2019s approval to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. On May 16, 2017, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in finding that the modification was \u201cfair, reasonable, and adequate.\u201d The Supreme Court then declined to hear the case on March 26, 2018, finally permitting the modification to the agreement to be implemented."}
{"article": "On November 4, 1998 plaintiffs, a group of eight black employees and one Asian employee of a Sears store in Little Rock, Arkansas, filed suit against Sears, Roebuck and Co. in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas alleging that the defendant had unlawfully discriminated against them on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981, Title VII (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e), and state law. The complaint stemmed from an allegation of unequal pay but included other related allegations. Specifically the employees alleged disparate treatment and disparate impact in terms of pay, training, placement, transfer, and promotion. They sought a declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, damages, and costs and fees. On July 3, 2000 the district court (Judge Susan Webber Wright) denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the individual claims of each plaintiff and granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification as modified by the court. The class was comprised of current and former non-white hourly employees of the Sears store in question from November 4, 1995 for the disparate treatment claims and from November 4, 1997 for the disparate impact claims. The parties thereafter pursued settlement negotiations and on May 17, 2001 the court (Judge Wright) granted preliminary approval to their agreement. The settlement provided for injunctive relief and damages. The defendant agreed to hold a job fair for all class members, modify its hiring and promotion procedures, modify its evaluation and employee recordkeeping protocols, and monitor its compliance with the settlement and report to the court and class counsel. Class members were awarded a total of $1,142,000.00 and defendant agreed to pay attorney's fees of costs of $417,717.00. The case terminated on August 17, 2001 when the court (Judge Wright) granted final approval to the settlement agreement.", "summary": "On November 4, 1998 plaintiffs, a group of eight black employees and one Asian employee of a Sears store in Little Rock, AR, filed suit against Sears, Roebuck and Co. in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas alleging that the defendant had unlawfully discriminated against them on the basis of race. Specifically they alleged disparate treatment and disparate impact in terms of pay, training, placement, transfer, and promotion. On July 3, 2000 the district court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment and granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The case terminated on August 17, 2001 when the court approved a settlement agreement. The settlement required the defendant to implement various protocols to prevent discrimination and awarded the class $1,142,000.00 plus $417,717.00 for attorney's fees."}
{"article": "This case involves a dispute about visa processing. Following a March 20, 2020 decision by the State Department to cease most visa services, President Trump issued Presidential Proclamation 10014 on April 20, suspending the entry of all immigrants into the U.S. for two months, unless they qualified for an exception. Two months later, the entry suspension was extended to December 31, 2020 and expanded to include temporary nonimmigrant visas in Proclamation 10052. As a result, the State Department suspended review and adjudication of visas for non-excepted applicants (the No-Visa Policy). Many groups were affected, including diversity lottery (DV-2020) winners who had not yet been issued a visa and who would not have their eligibility carry over into the next year, and minors who would age out of the preferential treatment for which they were eligible. On May 28, 2020, U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents who had sponsored noncitizen minor children or other relatives for immigrant visas filed this class action lawsuit against President Trump, the State Department, and the Department of Homeland Security in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, with Judge Amit P. Mehta presiding. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing the government from acting to \u201cdeny or refuse consideration\u201d of their visa petitions, a declaration that the Proclamations were unlawful, and attorney\u2019s fees. They sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706) and the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1182, 1185) and alleged that the defendants\u2019 conduct exceeded their authority and violated the plaintiffs\u2019 rights under the Due Process Clause. The plaintiffs moved to certify a class of visa sponsors whose beneficiaries or derivative beneficiaries were subject to the Proclamations and at risk of aging out on June 2. On June 23, Judge Mehta denied the plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction and class certification because they failed to show that a justiciable case or controversy existed. Specifically, Judge Mehta found that the plaintiffs had not shown that they faced imminent injury because some of the plaintiffs\u2019 minor beneficiaries had successfully applied for visas under the \u201cnational interest exception\u201d (a separate administrative procedure), and others had been unable to apply for visas for reasons unrelated to the Proclamations. 2020 WL 3429786. The plaintiffs then amended their complaint on July 17, 2020, adding as plaintiffs corporations that were unable to hire necessary workers because workers\u2019 visas had not been issued along with diversity visa selectees whose visas had to issue by September 30 to remain eligible for entry. They also proposed the following four subclasses: 1. Those who will be unable to receive their diversity visas before Sept. 30 deadline, and will thus be unable to immigrate. 2. Citizens who have sponsored an immediate relative who now cannot immigrate. 3. Lawful permanent residents who have an \u201capproved immigrant visa petition for a preference relative\u201d who, because of the Proclamations, will be unable to immigrate. 4. U.S. employers whose employees or potential employees cannot now immigrate. Several states and the District of Columbia also filed an amicus brief arguing that immigrants were good for their economies and that the presidential action would hurt their recovery. Three other suits filed between July 10, 2020 and August 5, 2020 were fully consolidated with this case on August 13: <i>Aker v. Trump</i>, No. 20-cv-1926; <i>Mohammed v. Pompeo</i>, No. 20-cv-1856; and <i>Fonjong v. Trump</i>, No. 20-cv-2128. In all of these cases, the plaintiffs were diversity visa selectees and derivative beneficiaries challenging Presidential Proclamations 10014 and 10052 under the APA; two (<i>Mohammed</i> and <i>Fonjong</i>) were filed by the same law firm. Judge Mehta also partially consolidated <i>Panda v. Wolf</i>, No. 20-cv-1907, with this case to the extent that <i>Panda</i> raised similar issues. <i>Panda</i> involved an APA challenge to Proclamation 10052 but also included an equal protection argument that the government's conduct disparately impacted Indian nationals. On September 16, Judge Mehta denied the <i>Panda</i> plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction in the part of that case continuing separately. 2020 WL 5545554. The <i>Panda</i> plaintiffs appealed, and on September 29, <i>Panda</i> was stayed pending the outcome of the appeal. Following the consolidation, many influential companies filed an amicus brief as well, arguing that they would suffer serious economic harm from the proclamations. The companies included Adobe, Amazon, Apple, Google, Microsoft, Paypal, Reddit, Twitter, Uber Technologies, and Zillow. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on August 23, 2020, adding a claim under the Mandamus Act (28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361) and requesting that the court issue an order of mandamus requiring defendants to adjudicate visa petitions. On September 4, 2020, Judge Mehta granted the DV-2020 plaintiffs a preliminary injunction. The defendants were ordered to \u201cundertake good-faith efforts . . . to expeditiously process and adjudicate DV-2020 diversity visas.\u201d Defendants were preliminarily enjoined \u201cfrom interpreting and applying the COVID Guidance to DV-2020 selectees\u201d in such a way as not to process their visas because they were not \u201cmission critical.\u201d The remaining motions and requests were not granted. The court also delayed certifying a class, and the non DV-2020 plaintiffs did not obtain injunctive relief because vacatur of the policy would not eliminate their family separation problem. 2020 WL 5367010. On September 14, 2020, the court amended the preliminary injunction to prevent the State Department from waiting 14 days to issue visas to DV-2020 applicants who were inside certain COVID-affected regions because the delay served no rational purpose. 2020 WL 5886855. On September 24, 2020, non DV-2020 plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit over the ruling against their motion for a preliminary injunction. On September 30, 2020, the court certified a class in <i>Gomez</i> consisting of all \u201cIndividuals who have been selected to receive an immigrant visa through the U.S. Department of State\u2019s FY2020 Diversity Visa Lottery and who had not received their immigrant visa on or before April 23, 2020, when the Presidential Proclamation 10014, later extended by Presidential Proclamation 10052, took effect.\u201d But the court declined to certify a class in <i>Aker</i> because it was unclear how many applicants who were issued visas before the Proclamation had not been able to have them renewed, and because there was no legal impediment to renewing a visa. It also ordered the State Department to reserve 9,095 visas (calculated based on the expected reduction due to COVID-19) to correct for the loss of visas due to the illegal processing delays. 2020 WL 5861101. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the State Department ceased processing most visas on March 20, 2020. Over the next few months, President Trump issued two Proclamations which effectively suspended the entry of all immigrants to the US for two months, unless they qualified for an exception. The State Department also suspended review and adjudication of visas. Relatives of minors who would age out of preferential treatment filed suit, seeking injunctive relief. On July 17, plaintiffs amended their complaint and expanded the putative class to include companies that were unable to bring in necessary workers and Diversity Visa Selectees who must have visas issued before Sept. 30 to be eligible for entry. On September 4, Judge Mehta granted preliminary injunctive relief to the DV-2020 plaintiffs, but not the others. This was followed by further orders for the State Department to process the visas and to hold a number of DV-2020 visas for the plaintiffs past the September 30 deadline. The case in ongoing."}
{"article": "On September 2, 2010, the United States Department of Justice (\"DOJ\"), Civil Rights Division, filed this lawsuit under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the United States Court for the District of Arizona, Phoenix Division. The DOJ sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Maricopa County had violated the Civil Rights Act by failing to comply with a DOJ investigation. Specifically, the DOJ claimed that Maricopa County had refused to comply after a year of being minimally cooperative and obstructing the DOJ investigation into the police practices in Maricopa County. Maricopa County receives federal funds for its Sheriff's Office. Under an implementing regulation, offices that receive financial assistance agree to give the DOJ access to their records and they make contractual agreements to that effect. The DOJ was investigating a violation of the Omnibus Crime Control Act and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, and had requested documents from the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO). The DOJ made 51 specific requests. After over a year had passed, the MCSO had only partially complied with 3 of these 51 requests. The DOJ found them to be in violation of Title VI and initiated this lawsuit. On June 2, 2011, after the parties had both filed motions for summary judgment, a settlement agreement was reached. The agreement granted the DOJ access to the MCSO facilities. Additionally, the MCSO agreed to produce the documents that the DOJ had requested, as well as a blanket agreement to comply with Title VI. On August 1, 2011, the Court (Judge Murray G. Snow) dismissed the case 60 days after a Joint Motion to Remove Case to the Inactive Docket was made. There is no further activity and this case appears to be closed. On May 10, 2012, presumably as a result of the continued investigation, the United States filed a lawsuit against Maricopa County in a related case, United States v. Maricopa County, et. Al, docket #2:12-cv-00981-LOA, (Clearinghouse Code: <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12017\">PN-AZ-0001</a>).", "summary": "The United States filed this 2010 lawsuit against the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) for failure to completely respond to document and other requests related to an ongoing investigation of MCSO for violations of federal law related to unconstitutional profiling and treatment of Latinos. The case was settled on June 2, 2011 with MCSO agreeing to provide access to the facilities and production of the requested documents. The United States filed a related lawsuit (PN-AZ-0001) on May 10, 2012."}
{"article": "On April 7, 2015, Human Rights Watch (HRW), a non-partisan, non-profit human rights organization, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff sued under the Administrative Procedures Act against the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The plaintiff, represented by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief claiming that a mass surveillance program conducted by the DEA violated the HRW and its staff's First Amendment free speech and free association rights as well as their Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. Specifically, HRW alleged that the DEA had been engaged in a secret mass surveillance program as early as the 1990s. HRW noted that the DEA acknowledged the existence of this program in a declaration filed in January 2015 for a separate case (included as an exhibit in HRW's complaint). According to HRW, the surveillance program indiscriminately swept in call records for calls between the United States and \"Designated Countries\" that are \"determined to have a 'demonstrated nexus to international drug trafficking and related criminal activities.' \" HRW alleged that these call records were recorded in databases, which were then made accessible to the officers and employees of the DEA, DHS, and FBI. HRW claimed that during the course of its work, it communicated with individuals in Designated Countries, and that the surveillance program put HRW's contacts at risk and burdened HRW's human rights advocacy efforts. HRW alleged that the defendants violated its First Amendment and Fourth Amendment rights, and requested declaratory and injunctive relief and reasonable attorneys' fees. On June 15, 2015, the defendants, represented by an attorney from the Department of Justice, moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that HRW failed to establish that it has standing to pursue its claims. On August 14, 2015, Judge Philip S. Gutierrez issued an order holding in abeyance ruling on the defendants' motion. Judge Gutierrez determined that HRW should be allowed an opportunity to conduct discovery to respond to the defendants' attack on standing, and authorized HRW to serve a limited number of interrogatories on the defendants. On December 14, 2015, HRW filed for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, as the defendants had provided additional information through discovery concerning the destruction of call records collected in bulk. Two days later, Judge Gutierrez submitted an order dismissing the case without prejudice.", "summary": "In 2015, Human Rights Watch, a non-partisan, non-profit human rights organization, filed a lawsuit against the DEA and FBI, alleging that a mass surveillance program conducted by the DEA violated HRW's First and Fourth Amendment rights. HRW has requested declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was voluntarily dismissed by HRW without prejudice after the defendants demonstrated the destruction of call records. The case is closed."}
{"article": "Plaintiffs, ACLU national and the ACLU of Wisconsin, along with Covington & Burling attorneys, filed this class action alleging that the Milwaukee Police Department's (MPD) stop-and-frisk policies were unconstitutional. The case was filed in the Eastern District of Wisconsin on February 22, 2017. The complaint alleged under Section 1983 that Milwaukee's stop-and-frisk policies violated the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure protections as well as the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. It also alleged under Section 2000d that Milwaukee was in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorney's fees and costs. This case was brought as a class action on behalf of all persons who had been or would have been stopped by MPD officers after January 7th, 2008. More broadly, the complaint alleged that in 2008, when Milwaukee adopted a \"broken windows\" policy regarding crime prevention, MPD began engaging in high-volume, suspicion-less stops as well as stops illegally motivated by race and ethnicity. The complaint alleges a formal and informal quota system of stops that led to a threefold increase in stops from 2007 to 2015. Plaintiffs also defined a subclass of black and Latino individuals. All of the named plaintiffs in the class were black or Latino, and the complaint detailed specific allegations of suspicion-less stops for each of them as well as data indicating the impact that Milwaukee's stop-and-frisk policy had specifically on black and Latino communities. The parties were engaged in negotiations almost from the beginning - a Joint Interim Settlement Report was filed in September 2017, and minute orders show that the parties were engaged in mediation and later settlement negotiations throughout the fall of 2017 and into the spring and summer of 2018. A settlement was approved on July 23, 2018. The settlement covers a range of issues: changes to officer training; revisions to MPD policies and guidelines regarding reasonable suspicion and probable cause; body camera usage; data collection, coding, and publication; timely filing of reports after stops; supervision from within MPD for officers conducting stops; procedures for both external and internal complaints regarding stop-and-frisk; data auditing by MPD; hiring, counseling, retraining, and discipline; and community engagement. The District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement under Judge J. P. Stadtmueller. To achieve compliance with the agreement, MPD must incorporate all substantive parts of the agreement into policy, hire and train needed personnel, appropriate sufficient funds, and show sustained and continuing improvement on constitutional policing based on a variety of data-based factors. The settlement terminates after five years. The ACLU and an outside consultant (CJI) will act as monitors. The settlement indicates $1,900,000 in attorney's fees and costs, and Milwaukee is also responsible for paying for CJI's fees. <b>Current status</b> MPD is required to provide data on variety of police and civilian interactions quarterly, and to make training and policy materials available for review. CJI is to file a report each year regarding MPD's compliance and their review of relevant data. If MPD is non-compliant, CJI can submit six-month updates on those issues, indicating whether they have been fixed. The case is ongoing: CJI filed an initial report in September of 2019, a six-month report indicating items on which MPD is non-compliant in April of 2020, and a second semi-annual report on Jun 5, 2020.", "summary": "The ACLU and ACLU of Wisconsin brought a class action on February 22, 2017 in the Eastern District of Wisconsin against the City of Milwaukee, alleging that their stop-and-frisk program violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The case settled on July 23, 2018, requiring MPD to undertake reforms around training, data collection and dissemination, hiring, and more. The goal is to make sustained and continuing improvement on constitutional policing. The ACLU and an outside consultant will act as monitors for the five-year duration of the settlement."}
{"article": "In the fall of 2018, Florida voters amended the Florida Constitution, restoring voting rights to most people convicted of felonies \u201cupon completion of all terms of sentence, including parole or probation.\u201d (This excluded people convicted of murder or sexual offenses.) On June 28, 2019, Governor Ron DeSantis signed Senate Bill 7066 into law, defining \u201call terms of sentence\u201d to include payment of all conviction-related restitution, fines, fees, and costs (\u201clegal financial obligations\u201d). People who could not determine the amount of their obligations, or who could not afford to pay them, were effectively disenfranchised. In June and July 2019, five lawsuits were filed challenging SB7066: <ul> <li>June 15, <i>Mendez v. DeSantis</i></li> <li>June 28, <i>Jones v. DeSantis</i></li> <li>June 28, <i>Raysor v. Lee</i></li> <li>June 28, <i>Gruver v. Barton</i></li> <li>July 1, <i> McCoy v. DeSantis</i></li> </ul> All five suits, filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, were assigned to Chief Judge Mark Walker. Consolidated on June 30, 2019 for purposes of case management, they were ultimately tried together as a single consolidated case. Chief Judge Walker recused himself on July 17, 2019, because his wife\u2019s law firm had been retained to represent one of the defendants. The consolidated case was reassigned to Judge Robert L. Hinkle. The plaintiffs were 19 individuals, the League of Women Voters of Florida, the NAACP Florida State Conference, and the Orange County Branch of the NAACP. Each group of plaintiffs advanced different legal theories and named different defendants. Combined, the consolidated suit named as defendants Governor DeSantis, his Secretary of State, and the Supervisor of Elections for each county where an individual plaintiff resided. The consolidated suit alleged that SB7066 violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution; the First, Eighth, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments; the National Voter Registration Act; and the Florida Constitution. The plaintiffs, represented by the Brennan Center for Justice, the Campaign Legal Center, the Southern Poverty Law Center, the ACLU, the ACLU of Florida, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief restoring their voting rights. In their amended complaint of July 16, 2019, the <i>Raysor</i> plaintiffs sought class certification (which was eventually granted on April 7, 2020). The proposed class included \u201call persons who would be eligible to vote in Florida but for unpaid financial obligations.\u201d Class members asserting that they were \u201cgenuinely unable to pay\u201d would form a subclass. The Governor petitioned the Florida Supreme Court on August 9, 2019 for an advisory opinion on the validity of SB7066. The court\u2019s <a href=\"https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/Supreme%20Court%20Opinion.pdf\">advisory opinion</a> of January 16, 2020 announced that the constitutional amendment\u2019s language \u201call terms of sentence\u201d would have been understood by Florida voters to include \u201call legal financial obligations imposed in conjunction with an adjudication of guilt.\u201d While awaiting this advisory opinion, the Governor unsuccessfully sought a stay of proceedings in the district court. On August 15, 2019, the court denied the Supervisors of Elections\u2019 motion to dismiss the case or to stay discovery. The <i>Gruver</i> plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction the same day. The injunction was granted on October 18, 2019, effective against all defendants except the Governor and the Supervisor of Elections for Orange County. The injunction prohibited officials from taking any action to prevent the named plaintiffs from registering to vote (if they <i>asserted</i> inability to pay) or from voting (if they <i>demonstrated</i> their inability to pay). Simultaneously, the court denied the Governor and the Secretary of State their motion to dismiss or abstain. 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284. The Eleventh Circuit upheld on February 19, 2020. 950 F.3d 795. The <i>Gruver</i> plaintiffs sought in late October to expand the preliminary injunction to cover four additional named plaintiffs who were seeking to vote in November municipal elections. This motion was denied the first week of January 2020. In the meantime, the district court partially stayed the injunction on December 19, 2019. While still protecting the plaintiffs\u2019 ability to <i>register</i>, the modified injunction did not guarantee their ability to <i>vote</i>. This partial stay expired on February 11, 2020. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction on February 19, ruling that, among other things, the state\u2019s pay-to-vote requirement should be analyzed under a standard of heightened scrutiny rather than rational basis review. 950 F.3d 795. On March 30, 2020, the court denied the state defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment, but dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 abandoned Ex Post Facto and Florida Constitution claims. The plaintiffs\u2019 class certification motion was granted the following week, on April 7 (not in time for class members to vote in the March 2020 presidential primaries). The trial was held from April 27\u2013May 6 by videoconference (due to the COVID-19 pandemic). The court issued its opinion on the merits on May 24, 2020. Ruling that the state was in violation of the Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments and the National Voter Registration Act, the court declared Florida\u2019s requirements unconstitutional as applied to: those who could not vote because they could not afford to pay; those who could not vote because the amount to pay was unknown and \u201ccannot be determined with diligence\u201d; and those who could not vote because they owed the state \u201cfees\u201d or \u201ccosts.\u201d However, a requirement to pay \u201cfines and restitution\u2026is not unconstitutional as applied to those who are able to pay.\u201d The court named each plaintiff and specifically declared his or her eligibility to vote. It ruled that the plaintiffs in <i>McCoy</i>, <i>Raysor</i>, and <i>Gruver</i> could collect attorneys\u2019 fees and costs (the plaintiffs in <i>Jones</i> and <i>Mendez</i> had not actively participated in the majority of the litigation). As to the class and the subclass, the court issued an injunction requiring the state to create and advertise a form for obtaining an individual advisory opinion on voting eligibility. The injunction specified that if the state failed to respond to an individual submission within 21 days, the person would be automatically eligible to vote. It further directed the state to publish requirements for voting eligibility following a felony conviction. The court explicitly retained jurisdiction to enforce the declaration and injunction. The state defendants appealed the ruling on June 1, 2020. On June 14, the district court denied their motion to stay the ruling pending appeal. On July 1, the Eleventh Circuit granted the state\u2019s motion for initial hearing <i>en banc</i> (that is, before the entire court, rather than a panel of three judges). Without explanation, it also granted a stay of the district court\u2019s injunction, pending appeal. The Supreme Court, also without explanation and over a dissent by Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Kagan, denied a request to lift the stay. On July 15, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion in the Eleventh Circuit seeking to disqualify 3 of the court\u2019s 12 judges from hearing the appeal. Judges Lagoa and Luck had been justices of the Florida Supreme Court when it issued its advisory opinion in this case in August 2019; both had committed to the United States Senate that they would recuse themselves from cases in which they had previously played a role. Judge Brasher, as the Solicitor General of Alabama, had vigorously <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15502\">defended Alabama against a similar lawsuit</a> shortly before his appointment to the federal judiciary. Judge Brasher disqualified himself on July 21, 2020, but denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion to disqualify as moot: he emphasized that he was recusing because of his chambers policy, not as a result of the plaintiffs\u2019 motion. Judges Lagoa and Luck denied the motion to disqualify on July 27, 2020. The Eleventh Circuit heard oral arguments on August 18, 2020. On September 11, 2020, the court issued an opinion that reversed the judgment of the district court on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to prove Constitutional violation. The court held that: (1) the amendment and the statute did not violate Equal Protection Clause; (2) the amendment and the statute did not violate Twenty-Fourth Amendment; (3) felon re-enfranchisement laws were not void for vagueness; and (4) the amendment and the statute did not deny the plaintiffs' rights to procedural due process. Because section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly allows for felon disenfranchisment, the Supreme Court had held in <i>Richardson v. Ramirez</i> that the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid it. Applying that precedent, the court held that Florida's Amendment 4 and Senate Bill 7066 did not violate the Equal Protection Clause under rational basis review. Additionally, the court held that because court costs and fees are legitimate parts of a criminal sentence, there was no basis to regard them as a tax. As such, the laws did not disenfranchise the individuals for failure to pay a tax, but rather because they had not \"satisfied the demands of justice\" as mandated by state statute. The state's justification for these voting requirements qualified as a constitutionally legitimate interest. Therefore the statutes satisfied the requirements of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. Lastly, the criminal processes necessary for a conviction were sufficient to justify denying individuals the right to vote. The deprivation was a consequence of a felony conviction in Florida, so the court upheld Florida's conditional restoration of the right to vote. The appeals court reversed the judgment of the district court and vacated the challenged portions of its injunction. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit severed and lifted the stay of the cross-appeal (Case No. 20-12304). This cross-appeal had been filed on June 19, 2020 by the plaintiffs in the <i>McCoy</i> case, which has been consolidated earlier in the litigation. On October 21, 2020, the plaintiffs in the <i>McCoy</i> case filed an opening brief for the cross appeal on the questions of (1) whether a Nineteenth Amendment claim requires proof of discriminatory intent and (2) the appropriateness of the test applied by the lower court to the equal protection claims, given that the plaintiffs in <i>McCoy</i> are women. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "Florida voters in 2018 passed Amendment 4, amending the Florida Constitution to restore voting rights to people with felony convictions \u201cupon completion of all terms of sentence, including parole or probation.\u201d In response to this amendment, the state legislature passed Senate Bill 7066, which redefined \u201call terms of sentence\u201d to include the payment of restitution, fines, and fees, also known as \u201clegal financial obligations (LFO)\u201d. The Campaign Legal Center filed a class action federal lawsuit on behalf of formerly incarcerated Florida citizens challenging Senate Bill 7066 under the Fourteenth Amendment and other constitutional and statutory provisions. After a bench trial, the district court issued an injunction barring the state from preventing people from voting solely because of unpaid obligations that they were unable to pay. On September 11, 2020, the Eleventh Circuit issued an opinion that reversed the judgment of the district court on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to prove Constitutional violation. The stay on the cross-appeal was lifted and the <i>McCoy</i> plaintiffs filed a brief in the Eleventh Circuit on October 21, 2020."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas action filed by four immigrants held at the Montgomery Processing Center, seeking release in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs alleged that they were particularly vulnerable to the virus due to their medical conditions. In April, the court issued a temporary restraining order that provided for the release of one of the individual plaintiffs. In September, the court entered an order granting the plaintiffs' motion for individualized bail hearings. Three detainees were released in October. The defendants appealed in November. The case is ongoing. <hr> On April 8, 2020, a group of four immigrants in detention filed this lawsuit against U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (\"ICE\"), ICE officials, and the warden of the Montgomery Processing Center (\"MPC\"). Represented by the ACLU and private counsel, the petitioners sought writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241. Alternatively, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the petitioners argued that by detaining them, the defendants were subjecting them to an unreasonable risk of contracting COVID-19 in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The case was assigned to Judge Keith P. Ellison. On April 10, the plaintiffs filed a motion for temporary restraining order. On April 17, Judge Ellison entered an order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order. 455 F.Supp.3d 330. The government was required to release one plaintiff from detention because the plaintiff did not have a history of violence, so the danger to the plaintiff in detention outweighed the public interest in safety; the court issued this order as a preliminary injunction rather than a temporary restraining order. The court declined to order the release of another plaintiff due to his history of violence and violation of previous court protective orders. Ten days later that plaintiff was transferred to a different detention facility. (The two other individual plaintiffs had already been released.) On April 29, the plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint with four additionally plaintiffs with medical conditions that put them at higher risk of serious illness or death if they contracted COVID-19. Two of those plaintiffs were later released on May 1. The plaintiffs also filed a motion to certify the class. The proposed class consisted of \"all individuals detained at MPC who have been diagnosed with or are receiving treatment for an enumerated list of medical conditions... and/or who are over the age of 50.\" The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on May 1 on the basis that the plaintiffs' claims were mooted after each was either transferred or released. On May 1 and 4, the plaintiffs moved to expedite discovery and to expedite relief. In the meantime, at least six detainees and five MPC staff members had tested positive for COVID-19. On May 25, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss because the plaintiff that secured release through the April 17 preliminary injunction still had standing to amend the complaint since her claims had not been finally adjudicated. The court also ordered that plaintiffs submit supplemental information on the proposed class certification before the court rule on the other outstanding motions. 2020 WL 2617939. Defendants filed another motion to dismiss the amended complaint on June 5. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order on June 7 which was denied as moot on June 23. Several detainees filed an emergency motion to intervene on July 30 which was granted on August 31. The court found that the intervenors met the requirements for permissive intervention, but not intervention as of right. The intervenors filed a complaint, adopting the prior allegations and making additional allegations, and a motion for a temporary restraining order on September 4. On September 10, the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss and on September 21, the court declined to grant provisional class certification, but granted in part plaintiffs' motion for expedited relief and outlined a process for the parties to proceed with individualized bail hearings for plaintiffs with high risk medical conditions that did not have violent and felonious criminal histories. 2020 WL 5646138. The court noted that by July 29, the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases among detainees at MPC was reported to be 206. By August 11, defendants reported zero active cases and deaths, but the court noted that it \"lack[ed] confidence in these numbers.\" The court also noted that \"the timeline of events at MPC demonstrates that, despite the measures [d]efendants allegedly implemented, the detention facility nonetheless experienced a significant outbreak of COVID-19 while those measures were already in place.\" In October, the court granted bail for three detainees and denied bail for one detainee. 2020 WL 6130717. On November 20, the defendants appealed the bail determinations and the court's September 21 order granting the plaintiffs' motion for individualized bail hearings. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "This is a habeas action filed by four immigrants held at the Montgomery Processing Center, seeking release in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs alleged that they were particularly vulnerable to the virus due to their medical conditions. The court issued a temporary restraining order that provided for the release of one of the individual plaintiffs. In September, the court entered an order granting the plaintiffs' motion for individualized bail hearings and three detainees were ordered to be released in October. The defendants appealed in November. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On September 13, 2018, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The plaintiff, an author of a Pulitzer-prize winning book about the Attica Prison uprising, wished for her book to be made available to prisoners who are under the authority of the Illinois Department of Correction (IDOC). Her complaint alleged that the defendants, employees of IDOC, improperly censored her book by preventing it from being distributed in some of the prisons in the state. The complaint further alleged a violation of the plaintiff's free speech and due process rights, because there was no process available to challenge the censorship. The case was assigned to Judge Sue E. Myerscough. The Uptown People's Law Center represent the plaintiff. The most recent amended complaint was filed by the plaintiff on April 30, 2019. The defendants filed their answer on June 4, 2019. The parties continued discovery through the spring and summer of 2020; they also considered mediation. Subsequently, on September 29, 2020, the plaintiff filed for partial summary judgment and the defendants filed a separate motion for summary judgment one day later. In late October, the parties filed their respective response motions. The court granted a joint motion to continue the trial date pending the cross-motions for summary judgment, which had originally been scheduled for February 16, 2021. As of March 30, 2021, the case is ongoing and the dates have not yet been rescheduled.", "summary": "On September 13, 2018, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging violations of the 1st and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution. The plaintiff, an author of a Pulitzer-prize winning book about the Attica Prison uprising, wished for her book to be made available to prisoners who are under the authority of the Illinois Department of Correction [IDOC]. Her complaint alleged that the defendants, employees of IDOC, improperly censored her book by preventing it from being distributed in some of the prisons in the state. The complaint further alleged a violation of the plaintiff's free speech and due process rights, because there was no process available to challenge the censorship. The case is currently ongoing."}
{"article": "In 2008 and 2009, the California Legislature passed three statutes modifying the State's Medicaid plan, reducing payments made to health providers. Under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1396 et seq. (The Medicaid Act), such modifications must be approved by the federal Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) prior to being put in place. In September and December 2008, California submitted amendment proposals to CMS that incorporated most of the rate reductions the Legislature had already included in the three statutes. This suit, and several others seeking injunctions to prevent the rate reductions, was filed before CMS had completed its review of the amendments. The Independent Living Center of Southern California (a disability advocacy group), two branches of the Gray Panthers (a healthcare and anti-ageism advocacy organization), individual Medicaid benefit recipients, and several pharmacies and pharmacists (collectively, \"the petitioners\") filed this suit as a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the State of California not to implement the reductions to its Medicaid program (\"Medi-Cal\"). The providers argued that if the cutbacks were approved, the state would not provide the level of care required under Medicaid. The case was originally filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court on April 22, 2008, but was removed to federal U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on May 19, 2008. The defendants had requested the removal to federal court; the removal was granted because the case involved questions of federal law. According to the plaintiffs' Petition for Mandamus, prior to the rate reduction, California Medicaid rates for physicians were 61% or less of what Medicare paid for the same services. The plaintiffs claimed that \"as a result of the low Medi-Cal rates, only 55% of primary care physicians and less than 50% of specialists [were] willing to participate in the Medi-Cal program.\" They argued that a ten percent reduction in the fee-for-service rate would reduce physician participation to even lower levels. The plaintiffs alleged that the rate reductions violated the Medicaid Act, because they had not been approved by CMS and because the State had failed to study the potential effects of the rate reductions on the quality of and level of access to care available to Medi-Cal recipients. Plaintiffs argued that California had not shown that, were the rate reductions to go into effect, the State would be able to enlist enough providers as to make Medi-Cal services sufficiently available to benefit recipients, as required by 42 U. S. C. \u00a71396a(a)(30)(A). The plaintiffs alleged that because these rate reductions violated the Medicaid Act, they were therefore preempted by federal law due to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asking the court to find that the rate reduction was a violation of federal law and to prevent its enforcement. They also maintained that the rate reduction was prohibited by the Americans with Disabilities Act (\u201cADA\u201d). On May 30, 2008, the petitioners filed a motion for a preliminary injunction that would prevent the rate reductions from coming into effect until further review by the District Court. On June 25th, the Court (Judge Christina A. Snyder) denied this motion, finding that the petitioners\u2019 case had no likelihood of succeeding because the Medicaid Act did not expressly create an individual right that could be the basis of a cause of action and therefore the petitioners probably did not have standing to bring their suit. Independent Living Center of Southern California v. Shewry, 2008 WL 4298223 (C.D. Cal. 2008). The petitioners appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which vacated the lower court's decision on July 11, 2008, finding that the Supremacy Clause could serve as the basis for their action. Independent Living Center of Southern California v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2008). In light of the Ninth Circuit's order, on August 18, 2008, District Judge Snyder granted in part and denied in part the petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that their Supremacy Clause case was likely to succeed on its merits. The Court therefore issued a preliminary injunction against the implementation of the Medi-Cal fee-for-service rate reductions for physicians, dentists, pharmacies, adult day health care centers, clinics, and health systems for services provided on or after July 1, 2008. Independent Living Center of Southern California v. Shewry, 2008 WL 3891211 (C.D. Cal. 2008). On August 27, 2008, the Court issued an order modifying this injunction, so that it did not retroactively apply to the period between July 1 and August 18, 2008. On November 17, 2008, Judge Snyder granted the petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction against the rate reductions for non-emergency medical transportation services and for in-home health services. On July 9, 2009, the Ninth Circuit (Judge Milan D. Smith Jr.) affirmed the ruling establishing the injunction, and reversed the modification. Independent Living Center of Southern California v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009). Back in the district court, on March 26, 2010, Judge Snyder granted a motion to allow several outside groups to join the case as intervenor plaintiffs, who raised issues similar to those of the original petitioners. Independent Living Center of Southern California v. Shewry, 2010 WL 1235762 (C.D. Cal. 2010). On February 10, 2010, the defendants sought review in the United States Supreme Court of the decision of the Ninth Circuit holding that the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution could serve as a basis for a cause of action in this case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review on January 18, 2011, consolidating this case with four others that raised the same issue, 131 S.Ct. 992 (2011). These four cases were California Pharmacists Association v. Maxwell-Jolly (Clearinghouse case code PB-CA-0020), Managed Pharmacy Care v. Maxwell-Jolly (PB-CA-0019), Dominguez v. Schwarzenegger (DR-CA-0031), and Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital v. Shewry (Docket #: 3:08-cv-05173-SC). On June 1, 2011, Judge Snyder issued an order removing this action from the list of active District Court cases pending the decision of the Supreme Court. Oral argument before the Supreme Court took place on October 3, 2011. After oral argument, while the cases were pending in the Supreme Court, CMS approved California's amendments to its Medicaid plan. In light of this, on February 22, 2012, the Supreme Court declined to issue a ruling on whether the Supremacy Clause could serve as a basis for a private suit to enforce Title XIX against a state. Instead, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit Court's decision and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, with instructions to take into account CMS's approval of the amendments. Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012). On April 12, 2012, the petitioners moved to have the stay lifted in the District Court. The Court denied this motion because issues that would be determinative of the outcome of the case were still awaiting adjudication at the Ninth Circuit Court. Independent Living Center of Southern California v. Douglas, 2012 WL 1622346 (C.D. Cal. 2012). Following the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling, the parties entered into mediation efforts. On May 22, 2012, the parties' unanimous joint motion to enter mediation, and to stay the supplemental briefing schedule during the pendancy of mediation was granted by the Ninth Circuit. The District Court directed the parties to submit a joint status report, which was filed on July 23, 2013. On November 5, 2013, the District Court reviewed the parties' positions from the joint status report, as well as issues presented in a certiorari petition pending in the United States Supreme Court in a totally different case (brought by other parties against the same defendant, involving some but not all the same issues)(Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, S.Ct. Docket 13-253). In this and another 19 similar cases, the District Court stayed or continued an existing stay of the proceedings. The parties then settled, and filed a joint request for dismissal of several appeals in the Ninth Circuit; this was granted on May 28, 2014. Back in the district court, on August 14, 2014 the parties filed a Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement; Judge Snyder granted the motion on September 22, 2014. In the settlement, all parties agreed to dismiss any remaining pending appeals pursuant to the original preliminary injunction. The petitioners also agreed to dismiss the entire case with prejudice. The District Court retained jurisdiction to decide the plaintiffs\u2019 motions for attorneys' fees, and also to determine any of the plaintiffs\u2019 motions to enforce the Agreement up to January 1, 2016. Each side would bear its own costs, outside of any plaintiffs\u2019 attorneys\u2019 fees that the District Court decided to award. Since fee-for-service delivery systems are where health care providers are paid for each service, the preliminary injunction against rate reductions for Medi-Cal cost the defendants money. Due to this, the defendants had filed claims against Medi-Cal providers in order to recoup these funds. In the Settlement Agreement, the defendants agreed to forego these claims outside of a few specified exceptions. The plaintiffs also agreed to release state and federal entities from liability for claims concerning payment reductions, unless the claims related to the accuracy of reimbursement. In return, the defendants agreed to release the plaintiff from liability for claims of \u201cexcess payment\u201d, including payments made while the preliminary injunction was in effect, but where the rate reductions ultimately received federal approval. After the Settlement Agreement was approved, pursuant to its terms, on April 22, 2015, the petitioners and intervenors filed to dismiss the case and made a motion for attorneys\u2019 fees and costs as the prevailing party. They also brought three other motions for attorneys\u2019 fees and costs the next day. On April 23, 2015, Judge Snyder, considering application, ordered that this case be dismissed with prejudice, and that each party bear its own costs in accordance with the Settlement Agreement. Judge Snyder declined to grant any attorneys' fees. On July 24 and 28, 2015, the plaintiff and intervenors appealed to the Ninth Circuit this order denying fees. On November 21, 2018, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded this case to the district court to determine whether the appellants (plaintiff and intervenors) should recover attorneys\u2019 fees, and, if so, the amount of the award. The court also remanded for a determination of whether appellants can recover any fees from the relief obtained in 2010. Judge Milan Smith Jr., writing for the majority, found that the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion to set aside funds for attorneys\u2019 fees following the decision permitting retroactive monetary relief from the Medi-Cal reimbursement reduction. On January 14, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court also denied the plaintiff and intervenors' petition for rehearing en banc. The case is still ongoing in the district court to determine the payment of attorney's fees. On April 10, 2019 the plaintiffs and the intervenors filed motions for attorney's fees. The defendants opposed these motions. A hearing on the motion for attorney's fees was held on June 24, 2019. On August 6, 2019, the court denied the motion. The court ordered additional briefing on the issue, which was submitted by both parties in August and September 2019. Oral argument was held on January 13, 2020. On January 24, 2020, Judge Snyder granted the motion for attorney's fees. The court awarded the intervenor's counsel $4,254,713.88, and awarded the plaintiff's counsel $2,731,800. 2020 WL 418947. The plaintiff's appealed the decision on attorney's fees to the Ninth Circuit (Appeal Docket No. 20-55193 ) on February 21, 2020. The plaintiff-appellants filed their opening briefs on June 30, 2020. The defendant-appelles have not yet filed a brief in opposition. As of July 2020, the Ninth Circuit appeal remains ongoing.", "summary": "A disability advocacy group, an anti-ageism advocacy organization, several individual Medicaid benefit recipients, and several pharmacies and pharmacists (\"the Petitioners\") filed this suit as a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the State of California not to implement the Medicaid reductions. The case was originally filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court on April 22, 2008, but was removed to federal U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on May 19, 2008. The plaintiffs alleged that the rate reductions violated the Medicaid Act, because they had not been approved by CMS and because the State had failed to study the potential effects of the rate reductions on the quality of and level of access to care available to Medi-Cal recipients. After California's amended its amendment proposals were approved by the Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the two parties reached a settlement agreement. The district court awarded attorneys fees, and the plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit. The appeal is ongoing."}
{"article": "On July 27, 2010, four students with disabilities and the Hawaii Disability Rights Center filed this class action against the Hawaii Department of Education seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs, represented by Hawaii Disability Rights Center, contended that the Department was failing to comply with its obligations to provide a Free Accessible Public Education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and their right to a discrimination-free education under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The case was assigned to District Judge Susan Oki Mollway. At the time the complaint was filed, the disabled individuals who brought the suit were over twenty but under twenty-two years old and had previously received a FAPE under the IDEA. However, following the establishment of a new Hawaii Law, Act 163, these individuals were denied a FAPE because they were over twenty years of age. The plaintiffs moved for class certification and a preliminary injunction. District Judge David Alan Ezra signed an order granting in part and denying in part the motion for class certification on March 15, 2011. 272 F.R.D. 541. The judge also issued an order denying plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. 2011 WL 2746800. Defendants then moved for a motion to dismiss or in the alternative, for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs renewed their motion for a preliminary injunction and moved for summary judgment. Judge Ezra then issued an order denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, granting in part and denying in part the defendant's motion to dismiss, and denying plaintiff's renewed motion for preliminary relief. 817 F.Supp.2d 1182. In 2012, the case went to a bench trial. Judge Alan Ezra held that the plaintiffs failed to prove the Hawaii Department of Education violated the IDEA, ACA, and Rehabilitation Act and entered judgment for the defendants. 2012 WL 1082250. The case was then appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On August 28, 2013, the Ninth Circuit announced its conclusion, affirming in part and reversing in part. 728 F.3d 982. The court found that the State of Hawaii offered public education to nondisabled students between the ages of 20 and 22 through its Community Schools for Adults. The court held that so long as the State continued to provide such an education to nondisabled students under 22, it was required under IDEA to provide a FAPE to disabled students in the same age bracket. The court reversed and remanded the case on the IDEA count. The court affirmed the district court's finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the Department was required to make such changes as a \"reasonable accommodation.\" Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower court's judgement in favor of the Department on the ACA and Rehabilitation Act claims. The court also awarded costs on appeal to the Plaintiffs. After being remanded to district court, and after the case was reassigned to Judge Susan Oki Mollway, the class was recertified. Subsequently, the parties began settlement conferences. On December 8, 2017, Judge Oki Mollway issued an order approving settlement for class members. As part of the settlement, the Department of Education agreed to fund the requisite services and pay $8.2 million dollars to class members, $1.5 million for attorneys' fees, and up to $250,000 to class counsel for future services rendered in relation to the administration of the settlement. The administration of the settlement continues. The case remains open.", "summary": "In this class action suit, four students with disabilities and the Hawaii Disability Rights Center sued the Hawaii Department of Education for allegedly violating the IDEA, ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act. After seven years of litigation, Judge Oki Mollway approved the settlement for class members. Under the settlement agreement, the Department of Education agreed to pay $8.2 million dollars to class members, $1.5 million for attorneys' fees, and up to $250,000 for class counsel for future services. The administration of the settlement continues."}
{"article": "On December 31, 1996 a law student who used a wheelchair for mobility sued the University of Denver in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, Chief Judge Richard P. Matsch. The Plaintiff claimed that numerous architectural and other barriers to accessibility prevented him from full participation as a student in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794; and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12181 et seq. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that he encountered automatic doors which did not open, elevators that did not work, transportation available to students but without disabled access, and classroom configurations that segregated him in the back of the room. He sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. On July 21, 1998, the court granted a stipulated motion to dismiss with prejudice, with each party bearing its own costs and attorneys' fees. There is no settlement agreement or other similar document available in this case.", "summary": "A disabled law student sued his school for numerous architectural and other barriers to accessibility that prevented him from full participation as a student. It appears the parties settled, although no settlement documents are publicly available."}
{"article": "On November 15, 2007, an individual who was strip searched after being charged with a petty crime filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Represented by the Texas Civil Rights Project and private counsel, the plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, challenging as unconstitutional Bexar County Detention Center's policy or custom of strip searching misdemeanant arrestees even where they were not suspected of concealing weapons or contraband. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that she was arrested for an outstanding traffic warrant and taken to the Bexar County Detention Center, where she was subjected to a strip search upon admission. The plaintiff further alleged that, after being held for two days, she and 25 other pretrial detainees were ordered to change into jail-issued uniforms, at which time she was again strip searched. The plaintiffs allege that detainees were told to manipulate genitalia and sometimes \"squat and cough\" regardless of whether there was reasonable suspicion of contraband or weapons. The plaintiff claimed that the strip searches violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in that they were conducted in the absence of any reasonable suspicion that she was hiding weapons or contraband. To remedy the alleged constitutional violation, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. On April 2, 2009, both parties agreed to a consent decree that would provide permanent injunctive relief without further litigation. The decree dictated that the County Detention Center would no longer, absent reasonable suspicion that someone is concealing contraband, engage in the practice of strip searching or visual cavity searching those in their custody who are charged with misdemeanors. The County Detention Center also had to provide the court with an annual report regarding the implementation of the consent decree. Nothing in the consent decree addressed the plaintiff's request for compensatory and punitive damages. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the decree. The decree was signed by Judge Fred Biery of the Western District of Texas. On November 16, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. The parties continued to engage in discovery and settlement talks to resolve the damages claims. On August 26, 2010, the plaintiffs' submitted a motion of preliminary approval of the class-action settlement. The court preliminarily approved the settlement on October 13, 2010. After a fairness hearing, a final order of approval was granted on January 12, 2011. The settlement agreement certified a class of plaintiffs composed of all detainees of Bexar County Detention Center between November 2005 and April 2009 who were subjected to strip searches and booked on misdemeanor or other minor charges. Those with felonies were not included. The class also had two subclasses. Subclass I was composed of all detainees not in subclass II, and subclass II included detainees booked on narcotics, shoplifting, and weapons-violation misdemeanors. All members of the class were to receive a pro rata share of the settlement after administrative expenses, attorneys' fees, and other expenses are counted for. Attorneys' fees were $900,000 for this case. The court found this reasonable considering the amount of time put in and the complexity of the case. The settlement included $395,000 for the claim administrator, and $15,000 was given to the three class representatives for their work in the lawsuit. The fund was then be used to pay class members. Class members in subclass I could receive up to $1,000, and members of subclass II can receive up to $100. Class members could pay off court fines and fees in Bexar County with their settlement funds, but this was capped at $500 and $50 for the subclasses respectively. On January 28, 2013, however, the district court dismissed this case, thus vacating and revoking the settlement agreement. In 2012, the Supreme Court decided <i>Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington</i>, holding that jail administrators may require all arrestees committed to the general population of the jail to undergo a no-touch visual strip search, even if the detainees is booked for a minor offense or reasonable suspicion is absent. The plaintiffs, their attorneys, and class members were not required to pay back any fees or funds they were awarded, but the County no longer needed to abide by the consent decree from April 9, 2009, that details how their strip search policy is to be conducted. They were now guided by the decision in <i>Florence</i>.", "summary": "In 2007, an individual who was strip searched after being charged with a petty crime, represented by the Texas Civil Rights Project and private counsel, filed a 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, challenging as unconstitutional Bexar County Detention Center's policy or custom of strip searching misdemeanant arrestees even where they were not suspected of concealing weapons or contraband. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that she was arrested for an outstanding traffic warrant and taken to the Bexar County Detention Center, where she was subjected to a strip search upon admission.Plaintiff claimed that the strip searches violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in that they were conducted in the absence of any reasonable suspicion that she was hiding weapons or contraband. To remedy the alleged constitutional violation, Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. On April 2nd, 2009 both parties agreed to a consent decree that dictated that the Bexar County Detention Center would no longer, absent reasonably suspicion, engaged in strip searching of those in custody who are charged with misdemeanors. The Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint later that year, and the two parties engaged in settlement discussions. A settlement was preliminarily approved on October 13th, and officially approved on January 12th, 2011. The Agreement certified the class of petitioners, and required the County to create a $3.5 million fund. The fund paid for $900,00 in attorneys' fees, $395,000 for administrative costs, and $15,000 fees to each of the three class representatives. It also paid for damages to be paid to class members. ON January 28th, 2013 the consent decree and the settlement agreement were vacated because of a Supreme Court decisions from 2012 holding that jail administrators could conduct no-touch visual strip searches of detainees, without reasonable suspicion that they detainee has contraband. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On April 1, 2005, a pretrial detainee filed this 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 action against Will County and a Will County Sheriff in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for damages, claiming that the police and prosecutors of Will County had fabricated charges against him in order to extend his detention, violating his Fourth Amendment rights, and constituting malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that a Will County Sheriff had entered his cell while the plaintiff was detained here, and struck him in the face without provocation. Defendants countered with a claim against the plaintiff for aggravated battery. The plaintiff was successful in defending against the aggravated battery charge at trial, and filed this action. The Court (Judge David Coar) entered an order on July 17, 2006 dismissing the case because the plaintiff had informed the Court that the case had been settled. We have no further information about this case.", "summary": "Plaintiff was an inmate in the Will County jail. A Will County corrections officer had entered his cell and struck plaintiff in the face, then claimed the officer had been assaulted by the inmate. Plaintiff was exonerated in the criminal aggravated battery case, and brought this action, which the county settled."}
{"article": "On October 20, 2016, Color of Change and Center for Constitutional Rights, nonprofit civil rights advocacy and communications organizations, brought this action under the Freedom of Information Act (\"FOIA\") in the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by an attorney from the Milton Kramer Law Clinic at Case Western, an attorney from the Center for Constitutional Rights, and an attorney for Clifford Chance, sued the U.S. Department of Homeland security (\"DHS\") and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (\"FBI\"), seeking declaratory, injunctive, and other appropriate relief to compel the defendants to produce records related to federal government surveillance and monitoring of protest activities related to the Movement for Black Lives (\"MBL\"). Following the shooting of 18-year-old Michael Brown by a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, MBL gained national scope and influence, drawing public attention to police violence and advocating for police reform and racial justice. The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that government documents, news reports, and first-hand accounts demonstrated that the defendants, and state and local law enforcement agencies, had engaged in surveillance and monitoring of MBL demonstrations and individual activists aligned with the movement, using tactics and measures commonly reserved for counterterrorism and national security related purposes. They further alleged that this monitoring of legitimate protest activities undermined the First Amendment's protection of political speech, and would chill valuable public debate about police violence, including use of deadly force, criminal justice, and racial inequities. On July 5 2016, the plaintiffs submitted their FOIA request to DHS and the FBI: <b>DHS</b> On July 18, 2016, DHS's privacy office sent a letter to the plaintiffs acknowledging receipt of the request. DHS denied the plaintiffs' request for expedited processing and a fee waiver, which the plaintiffs appealed. On August 29, 2016, DHS acknowledged that it had received the appeal, but never responded to it. On September 27, 2016, the plaintiffs received a response from the Office of Intelligence & Analysis, a component of DHS, claiming that a search of its files revealed no records responsive to the plaintiffs' request. The plaintiffs appealed that decision based on the Office of Intelligence and Analysis' failure to perform an adequate search for records and its improper reliance on FOIA exemptions to avoid searching for, or producing, responsive records. On October 20, the plaintiffs received an acknowledgment from DHS regarding the appeal, but did not receive any other response or correspondence. <b>FBI</b> On July 28, 2016, the FBI sent a letter acknowledging receipt of the plaintiffs' request. Unlike DHS, the FBI granted the plaintiffs' request for expedited processing, however, it did not indicate whether processing had begun or when it would be complete. On September 20, 2016, the plaintiffs sent the FBI a letter requesting that the FBI notify them of when to expect to receive documents responsive to their request, but the FBI never responded. An initial pretrial conference was originally set for January 20, 2017, before U.S. District Court Judge William H. Pauley III. After several motions to push back the date of the initial pretrial conference, the conference was held on February 24, 2017. Another status conference was held on April 21, 2017. During this conference, the parties agreed to the discovery schedule of 500 pages per month of responsive documents. During discovery, both parties narrowed the requested documents, and prepared to file motions to contest or uphold exemptions. In line with timelines set in a February 9, 2018 scheduling conference, both parties filed motions for partial summary judgment surrounding release of a non-finalized intelligence assessment titled \"(U\\\\FOUO) Growing Frequency of Race-Related Domestic Terrorist Violence.\" On July 9, 2018, Judge William Pauley ruled in favor of the defendants, saying that this document falls under FOIA's exemption 5 for process-related documents. He wrote that, because this document was written by an analyst and an intern, it revealed the processes of how DHS assesses and analyzes intelligence. With this motion for summary judgment decided and the cooperation of the parties outside of the contested DHS memo, all issues in the case were settled outside of the allocation of attorney fees. With this in mind, after an August 7, 2018 status report, Judge Pauley filed an order to partially dismiss the case, closing all claims outside of attorney fees. The case was briefly stayed in late 2018 and early 2019 due to the U.S. federal government shutdown. On March 12, 2019, Judge Pauley received a status report indicating that the parties reached a settlement on attorney fees. He ordered dismissal on April 11 and published the terms of the agreement; the FBI would pay $12,527.11, the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) would pay $1,742.81, the Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) would pay $11,655.40, and DHS Intelligence and Analysis would pay $11,655.40 to the plaintiffs. The case is closed.", "summary": "After filing a FOIA request with the defendants, Color of Change and Center for Constitutional Rights, a nonprofit civil rights advocacy and communications organization, brought this action under the Freedom of Information Act (\"FOIA\") in the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of Homeland security (\"DHS\") and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (\"FBI\"), seeking declaratory, injunctive, and other appropriate relief to compel the defendants to produce records related to federal government surveillance and monitoring of protest activities related to the Movement for Black Lives (\"MBL\"). Specifically, the plaintiffs sought documents regarding surveillance of MBL demonstrations and individual activists aligned with the movement, which they argued undermines the First Amendment's protection of political speech. After discovery, the parties determined releasable documents among themselves except for one DHS Intelligence and Analysis document, which Judge William H. Pauley III protected under FOIA. The parties settled attorney fees in 2019 and the case is now closed."}
{"article": "On July 13, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a female employee at a distributor of fruits and vegetables (plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the Western District Court of Pennsylvania, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Tom Lange Company, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant subjected the plaintiff-intervenor to a sexually hostile work environment and retaliated against her after she complained about sexual harassment. On July 26, 2005, the plaintiff-intervenor filed a complaint alleging the same as the plaintiff above but adding state claims against her supervisors. On September 20, 2005, the District Court (Judge Terrence F. McVerry) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $100,000, and pay plaintiff-intervenor's counsel $50,000 in attorneys' fees.", "summary": "On July 13, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a female employee at a distributor of fruits and vegetables (plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the Western District Court of Pennsylvania, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Tom Lange Company, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant subjected the plaintiff-intervenor to a sexually hostile work environment and retaliated against her after she complained about sexual harassment. On September 20, 2005, the District Court (Judge Terrence F. McVerry) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $100,000, and pay plaintiff-intervenor's counsel $50,000 in attorneys' fees."}
{"article": "In June 2006, the Phoenix District Office and Denver Field Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against distribution center operators Albertson's, Inc., Albertson's LLC, Supervalu, Inc. and Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging discrimination based on race, color, and/or national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendants maintained a hostile work environment and subjected the complaining parties to other adverse terms and conditions of employment. The plaintiffs alleged long-term, continuing, and pervasive harassment and discrimination by supervisors and co-workers, including offensive and disparaging racial comments and graffiti, assignment of minorities to harder and less desirable duties, favoring of non-minorities in promotions, disciplining minorities more harshly, and Albertson\u2019s failure to take appropriate, timely, and effective remedial action. Supervalu, Inc. and Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. were dismissed from the lawsuit in October 2006. The parties engaged in discovery from 2006 through 2009. On December 3, 2007, the Court (Judge Wiley Y. Daniel) granted motions to allow four plaintiff intervenors to intervene, and the four plaintiff intervenors filed complaints that day. On April 28, 2008, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The case was reassigned to Judge Christine M. Arguello on October 22, 2008. Proceedings were stayed beginning in February, 2009 pending negotiation and finalization of a consent decree. At the time the consent decree was developed, Albertsons had represented that it planned to close its Colorado distribution center in late fall 2009 for business reasons unrelated to the action. On December 11, 2009, the parties made a joint motion to consolidate this lawsuit with two other EEOC proceedings involving the Aurora, Colorado Albertson's distribution center. Judge Arguello granted the motion on December 14, 2009, and entered the consent decree that day. The consent decree included provisions against retaliation, a neutral reference for complaining parties, an equal employment opportunity training for supervisory and management employees, and certain terms should Albertson's open or reopen a distribution center in Colorado during the time of the consent decree. The consent decree also provided that Albertson's pay $8,900,000.00 to a class settlement fund to be distributed as determined by the EEOC. The consent decree remained in effect for four years, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "In June 2006, the EEOC filed this lawsuit against Albertson's, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging discrimination based on race, color, and/or national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the plaintiff brought claims of hostile work environment and disparate treatment with respect to terms and conditions of employment. After years of discovery, the parties entered a consent decree on December 14, 2009. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "This is one of four ongoing cases challenging the constitutionality of the New York Police Department's \"Stop and Frisk\" program. See: Floyd v. City of New York (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12021\">PN-NY-0009</a>); Daniels v. City of New York (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12023\">PN-NY-0010</a>); and Davis v. City of New York (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12494\">PN-NY-0013</a>). On March 28, 2012, twelve New York City residents and one former New York City resident filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York and the New York City Police Department (NYPD) on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals. They challenged the city's \"Operation Clean Halls\" initiative (later renamed the \"Trespass Affidavit Program\"), which allowed police officers to patrol in and around private residential apartment buildings, and allegedly resulted in thousands of illegal stops, searches, summons (citations), and arrests. The plaintiffs were represented by a group of public interest lawyers from the New York Civil Liberties Union, Bronx Defenders and LatinoJustice. They filed the lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act and state law, alleging violations of the Federal and State Constitutions. The plaintiffs asked for a declaration that the NYPD's practices were unlawful and an injunction against those practices. Operation Clean Halls had the stated purpose of combating illegal activity in apartment buildings with records of high crime. In Manhattan alone, there were at least 3,895 Clean Halls buildings. Searches and seizures occurred in public areas such as courtyards, lobbies, and sidewalks, and NYPD officers engaged in vertical patrols (floor-by-floor sweeps), much like those that were challenged in litigation surrounding New York City Housing Authority residences. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been stopped without suspicion of unlawful behavior, and that they had been arrested or issued summons (citations) without probable cause. In multiple instances, plaintiffs were arrested for trespassing despite having another resident vouch for them. The plaintiffs alleged that these incidents were part of a larger pattern and practice in buildings enrolled in Operation Clean Halls, without meaningful correlations to actual crime levels. The residents of Clean Hall buildings were disproportionately Black and Latino. The plaintiffs also alleged that the City had been deliberately indifferent to these violations in their failure to train and supervise the NYPD. The plaintiffs asked for a class certification for all residents of Clean Hall buildings and their families, guests, and visitors and for all individuals who had been or were likely to be unlawfully stopped or arrested for being in or around buildings in the Operation Clean Halls initiative. The plaintiffs claimed violations of the Fourth Amendment; First and Fourteenth Amendments (free association and due process); the Fair Housing Act (discriminatory implementation); the New York Constitution; and New York Common Law (false arrest and malicious prosecution). The plaintiffs asked for a declaration that these laws had been violated. The plaintiffs also demanded an injunction that required the defendants to refrain from these violations, to establish citywide standards regarding Operation Clean Halls, to establish a system for tracking and monitoring NYPD practices (with care paid to tracking race, national origin, and geography), develop appropriate training for NYPD officers; and report to the plaintiffs and the court about the steps taken to cure the violations. The plaintiffs also asked for compensatory damages and attorneys' fees and costs. On June 12, 2012, the Court (Shira A. Scheindlin, J.) issued a memorandum opinion and order. Ligon v. City of New York, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81526, 2012 WL 2125989 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2012). The defendants wanted access to paperwork on the plaintiffs' prior arrests, even if they were terminated in the plaintiffs' favor and were now sealed pursuant to state law. Judge Scheindlin ruled that there was no legitimate reason for the defendants to access those files unless they were for charges of trespass or related crimes in the past ten years. The Court also ruled that the plaintiffs must make other disclosures about the length of time they were incarcerated and any injuries they suffered as a result of prior arrests, but that that could be done by sworn affidavit. On August 21, 2012, Judge Scheindlin issued an opinion and order allowing the plaintiffs' evidentiary hearing to proceed, regarding their request for a preliminary injunction. Ligon v. City of New York, 2012 WL 3597066 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2012). The defendants had asked the Court to deny the plaintiffs' motion summarily, prior to a hearing. The defendants had argued (among other reasons) that there was overlap in the plaintiff classes between this case and <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12021\">Floyd</a>, so there was a risk of inconsistent adjudications. The Court pointed out that both matters were assigned to the same judge and gave the defendants a choice: they could cease delaying <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12021\">Floyd</a> with interlocutory appeals or they could agree to let these plaintiffs pursue preliminary injunctive relief. The Court wrote: \"the City cannot have it both ways.\" This case went forward with the preliminary injunction proceedings. The preliminary injunction hearing took place in October and November 2012. On January 8, 2013, Judge Scheindlin ruled for the plaintiffs, finding that they had demonstrated the likelihood that they would prevail on the merits, and proved the city's deliberate indifference toward a widespread practice of unconstitutional trespass stops by the NYPD outside TAP buildings in the Bronx. Judge Scheindlin summarized that her conclusion was based on five categories of evidence: (1) the testimony of a Bronx Assistant District Attorney that the NYPD frequently made trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx for no reason other than that the officer had seen someone enter and exit or exit the building; (2) a sample of \"decline to prosecute\" forms prepared by the Bronx District Attorneys' Office, which revealed the alarming frequency of unlawful trespass stops in the vicinity of TAP buildings in the Bronx; (3) the testimony of eight plaintiffs and a non-party witness, who described remarkably similar encounters with the police when stopped in the vicinity of TAP buildings in the Bronx; (4) the analysis by Dr. Jeffrey Fagan, plaintiffs' expert, of an NYPD database of recorded stops, which provided further evidence of the frequency of apparently unlawful trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx; and (5) NYPD training materials that misstated the minimal constitutional standards for making stops. The Court issued a preliminary injunction, ordering the NYPD to immediately cease performing trespass stops (in which a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the encounter) outside TAP buildings in the Bronx without reasonable suspicion of trespass. In addition, Judge Scheindlin set out proposed relief, and consolidated a hearing on it with the already-scheduled remedial hearing in the related <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12021\">Floyd</a> litigation. The proposed relief included requirements to develop constitutionally adequate policy guidance on stops, to collect data on each such stop, and to improve supervision and training. Ligon v. City of New York, 2013 WL 71800 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2013). On January 11, 2013, the defendants appealed the preliminary injunction decision to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. On January 22, 2013, District Judge Scheindlin granted the defendants' stay of relief, pending their appeal in the circuit court. On February 11, 2013, Judge Scheindlin granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification solely for the purpose of preliminary injunctive relief. The class included \"all individuals who have been or are at risk of being stopped outdoors without legal justification by NYPD officers on suspicion of trespassing in Bronx apartment buildings enrolled in the NYPD's Trespass Affidavit Program (commonly referred to as \"Operation Clean Halls\"). Ligon v. City of New York, 2013 WL 500272 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2013). After a nine-week bench trial, on August 12, 2013, Judge Scheindlin issued an order in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12021\">Floyd</a>, finding that the City had violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by acting with \u201cdeliberate indifference\u201d toward the NYPD's practice of making suspicion-less \u201cstops\u201d and \u201cfrisks\u201d and by adopting \u201ca policy of indirect racial profiling by targeting racially defined groups\u201d for \u201cstops\u201d and \u201cfrisks.\u201d That same day, Judge Scheindlin issued an order imposing remedies in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12021\">Floyd</a> and Ligon in the form of various \u201creforms\u201d to the NYPD's \u201cstop and frisk\u201d practices to be overseen by a court-appointed monitor. The Court appointed Peter Zimroth, former New York Corporation Counsel and former First Assistant District Attorney in Manhattan, to oversee the implementation of the relief. With respect to specific remedies, the Court ordered the NYPD to adopt a written policy spelling out the specific circumstances where stopping a person suspected of trespass outside a TAP building is legal. Additionally, the Court ordered the city (1) to develop procedures to ensure proper paperwork is completed for each stop outside a Bronx TAP building; (2) to develop and adopt a system for reviewing the legality of stops outside Bronx TAP buildings; and (3) to revise the NYPD's training materials and training programs to enter conformity with the law. Additionally, the Court ordered that attorney's fees and costs be rewarded on appropriate application. The City appealed in both cases and sought a stay. In September 2013, four police unions filed notices of appeal and motions to intervene in the District Court. Three of the unions moved to intervene in both Floyd and Ligon. One union only moved to intervene in Floyd. On October 31, 2013, the Second Circuit granted the City\u2019s motion for a stay and ordered that the cases be reassigned from Judge Scheindlin to another district judge. The Second Circuit wrote that the \"District Judge ran afoul of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges\" in (a) speaking to the press and (b) encouraging the plaintiffs' counsel in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12023\">Daniels</a> to file the <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12021\">Floyd</a> litigation, separately, rather than litigating racial profiling as part of <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12023\">Daniels</a> -- particularly in stating that she would treat the new case as related. 538 F. App'x 101 (2d Cir. 2013). After the Second Circuit ruled, both <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12021\">Floyd</a> and Ligon were reassigned (as related) to District Judge Analisa Torres. On November 13, 2013, the Court of Appeals rejected Judge Scheindlin's motion asking to be heard on the disqualification issue and clarified the reason for reassigning the case. The Second Circuit held that the rationale for the reassignment was an appearance of impropriety, not its actual presence. 736 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013). In the meantime, NYC Mayor Bill de Blasio was elected, and took a very different approach to these cases. The city moved for limited remand from the Second Circuit to the district court for the purpose of exploring settlement. On February 21, 2014, the Second Circuit granted the City\u2019s motion to remand to the district court to explore settlement for 45 days. The Second Circuit declined to decide the police unions' motion to intervene, preferring to let the district court decide that motion first. 743 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2014). On March 4, 2014, the parties informed Judge Torres that they had \u201creached an agreement in principle for resolving the City's appeals in both Floyd and Ligon. The City agreed to substantially comply with the injunctive relief set forth in Judge Scheindlin's August 12, 2013, remedial order, subject to the parties' application to Judge Torres to limit the term of the court-appointed monitor to three years. When the monitor\u2019s term ended, the City agreed to authorize the Inspector General of the NYPD to take over monitoring and reporting responsibilities. The parties agreed that the agreement could be terminated once the City has maintained compliance for two years. On July 30, 2014, Judge Torres granted the parties' joint motion to modify the remedial order and to enter it as an embodiment of their agreements. On July 30, 2014, Judge Torres also issued an order denying the police unions' motions to intervene, finding, inter alia, that the motions were untimely and that the police unions did not assert a legally protectable interest. 302 F.R.D. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The police unions appealed. However, on August 6, 2014, with the consent of the plaintiffs in Floyd and Ligon, the City moved to voluntarily dismiss its remaining appeals, with prejudice, stating that the parties had reached an agreement that resolved all the issues raised by the City's appeals in both Floyd and Ligon, and cleared the way for the parties to begin the remedial process and settlement negotiations. On October 31, 2014, the Second Circuit granted the City\u2019s request to voluntarily dismiss all appeals, with prejudice. In addition, the Second Circuit held that the unions\u2019 motions to intervene were untimely and that the unions failed to establish legally protectable interests, as required to allow intervention. 770 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 2014). The parties continued to work with the monitor on developing appropriate reforms. On February 3, 2015, Judge Torres issued an order regarding the procedure for the monitor to develop and the City to implement the reforms of NYPD\u2019s stop-and-frisk activities. The monitor would consult with the parties to create a final recommendations for the implementation of remedies. Then, the court would approve or deny the final recommendations. First, on February 23, 2015, the monitor submitted and Judge Torres approved, a memo that was read by the NYPD at 10 consecutive roll calls in all precincts detailing the reforms ordered by Judge Scheindlin in Floyd. The memo was also posted in police stations and provided to all officers. The document detailed the constitutional standards governing stop and frisks, explicitly prohibited racial profiling by police, ordered officers to include a narrative explanation for stops in their UF250 forms, and ordered the start of a pilot program outfitting police officers with body cameras. Meanwhile, on March 18, 2015, the City suggested a way for all five police unions to participate in the remedial process. Under the City's approach, the City would share proposals with the unions before providing them to the monitor and the plaintiffs. The unions could then offer their comments, which the City would convey to the monitor. This approach would afford the unions an opportunity to inform the monitor of their viewpoints before the monitor reached conclusions and submitted the final recommendations to the Court. On March 19, 2015, Judge Torres issued an order approving this framework. On August 7, 2015, the monitor submitted his final recommendations for reforms on racial profiling and street encounters. The new racial profiling policy imposed a categorical prohibition on racial and national origin profiling; it also prohibited other forms of biased policing not covered in the NYPD\u2019s current policy, such as profiling on the basis of religion, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, and housing status. The new street encounters policy regarding placed clearer legal limits on stops and frisks. It required supervisory review of officer conduct to ensure compliance with the Constitution. On August 24, 2015, Judge Torres approved the final recommendations. On December 8, 2015, Judge Torres issued an order modifying the remedial order\u2019s requirement that NYPD institute a pilot project in which body-worn cameras would be used for a one-year period. Judge Torres modified the order so that the NYPD would use a randomized experimental design for the body-worn camera pilot program. By February 2017, the parties had a settlement agreement and began the formal process for court approval of a class-action settlement. Judge Torres approved the stipulation of settlement on July 19, 2017. The settlement includes payment to the named plaintiffs totaling $235,000 and attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses totaling $2,640,533. The stipulation also articulates specific standards for stopping, frisking, searching, arresting, and issuing summonses in and around TAP buildings and requires the NYPD to implement and consistently adhere to those standards. In addition to the specific reforms outlined in the settlement, it provides that further reforms will be developed as part of the remedial process described in the August 2013 Floyd/Ligon joint remedial order. While the settlement of the claims in this case was being negotiated, the joint remedial process, part of the 2013 remedial order, included a comprehensive input process regarding recommended reforms. The input process concluded in April 2017, and in January 2018 the plaintiffs, describing the parties' impasse regarding the remedial process, requested that the facilitator issue a report and the parties hold a status conference. In an order of January 29, 2018, Judge Torres provided a schedule for the parties to work with the facilitator regarding reforms under the joint remedial process. Monitoring is ongoing in this case; see Floyd (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12021\">PN-NY-0009</a>) for the implementation and monitoring proceedings of the settlement agreements. In February of 2018, the monitor filed proposed training materials for newly promoted lieutenants and sergeants. The materials involved guidebooks and powerpoint presentations that would be used during a four week training course (for lieutenants) and a six week training course (for sergeants). The next month, Judge Torres approved the materials. In June 2018, the monitor filed additional training materials regarding In-Service Stop and Frisks by Patrol Officers, which were approved by Judge Torres the next month. On July 19, 2018, Judge Torres issued an order about the recommendation to document police-citizen encounters. The order stated that by September 13, 2018, the parties must submit a joint proposal for a pilot program to study the electronic recording of first- and second-level police-citizen encounters, to be overseen by the monitor. The proposal shall consider social science best practices. In developing the proposal, the parties shall consult with experts and the monitor. The monitor shall report to the Court whether the benefits of recording lower-level encounters outweigh the financial, administrative, and other costs, and whether the program should be expanded or terminated. On July 27, 2018, the monitor filed a report on the use of body cameras by NYPD officers that outlines how the data from the pilot program will be used to analyze police/civilian interactions, police activity, and police lawfulness. On August 13, 2018, Judge Torres approved a stipulation of fees for the time period of July 1, 2016 through December 31, 2017. The City agreed to pay fees of $275,149.00 to the New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation. In December of 2018, the monitor issued a report recommending the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) Guide on Processing and Investigating Complaints of Profiling and Bias-Based Policing Patrol, and two Internal Investigations courses on profiling and police bias as training materials. Judge Torres granted these recommendations in January 2019. On May 9, 2019, Judge Torres approved a stipulation of fees for the time period of January 1, 2018 through December 31, 2018. The City agreed to pay fees of $85,352.00 to the New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation. On May 28, 2019, the monitor made a recommendation regarding training materials for Housing Bureau members, including housing one-day training scenarios on lobby trespass, stairwell trespass, shots fired interior patrol, and roof trespass, which the Judge granted the next day. Judge Torres approved a proposed confidentiality order regarding the pilot study, which severely restricted public access to data collected on police encounters with civilians. The confidentiality order will protect the information that is obtained and created by trained observers studying officer behavior in the NYPD pilot study from disclosure to anyone other than the monitor and his team. In the related <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12021\">Floyd</a> case, the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the confidentiality order, and Judge Torres denied this motion on October 25, 2019. Floyd v. City of New York, 2019 WL 5537875 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2019). On June 2, 2020, Judge Torres issued an order instructing the NYPD to systematically obtain and report various categories of information. This information included declinations of prosecutions by district attorneys in New York, suppression decisions by courts excluding evidence as a result of unlawful stops and searches, court findings of incredible testimony by police officers, denials of indemnification and/or representation of police officers by the New York City Law Department, and judgments and settlements against police officers in civil cases where, in the opinion of the New York City Law Department, there exists evidence of police malfeasance. This information will be compiled regularly by the NYPD and sent to a committee, who will review the information and make assessments of individual officers, as well as the extent and manner of the intervention to be applied. This committee will also track metrics to evaluate the efficacy of the program. The committee, in conjunction with the monitor, will also develop a program for receiving and assessing information regarding adverse conduct of police officers, and this information will be provided to the Police Commissioner. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, on June 2, 2020 the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the defendants to produce information about the NYPD's use of investigative encounters and social distancing enforcement practices. The city has filed its opposition brief in response to this motion, and the monitor filed a letter opposing the plaintiffs' motion. On June 12, Judge Torres denied the plaintiffs' motion. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2012, twelve New York City residents and one former New York City resident filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York and the New York City Police Department (NYPD). They challenged the City's \"Operation Clean Halls\" initiative, which allowed police officers to patrol in and around private residential apartment buildings, and allegedly resulted in thousands of illegal stops, searches, summons (citations), and arrests. In 2013, the court entered a preliminary injunction ordering remedies addressing unlawful enforcement practices by the NYPD. The parties reached court-approved settlement in 2017, which included ongoing court-ordered monitoring of changes to NYPD practices, policies, training, and supervision. Monitoring is ongoing in this case, and as of June 2020, the case remains open."}
{"article": "On February 28, 2006, Al-Haramain Oregon (a non-profit organization) and two of its attorneys filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1801-1812 against the U.S. Government. The plaintiffs asked the court for injunctive relief and damages, claiming that the government violated FISA by conducting warrantless electronic surveillance of their communications. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the government's actions violated the separation of powers, the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. On September 7, 2006, Judge Garr M. King denied the government's motion to dismiss but granted its motion to prevent access to a sealed classified document that had been inadvertently released to plaintiffs. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Or. 2006). The plaintiffs appealed. In January, 2007, the Multi District Litigation (MDL) Panel transferred the case to the Northern District of California, as part of a multi-district litigation consolidation, In Re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13881\">NS-CA-11</a>, in this Clearinghouse. On April 30, 2007, the Ninth Circuit officially consolidated the plaintiffs' appeal with with Hepting v. AT & T, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12825\">NS-CA-0004</a>, in this Clearinghouse. However, on November 16, 2007, the Ninth Circuit severed the two cases from each other and ordered that the cases would no longer be consolidated for any purpose. Hepting v. AT & T, 508 F.3d 898, 899 (9th Cir. 2007). On November 16, 2007, the Ninth Circuit issued a second opinion specifically addressing the appeal from this case, reversing and remanding the district court's order. Judge McKeown held that (1) state secrets privilege did not protect the subject matter of the plaintiffs' challenge; but (2) that privilege protected the sealed document the plaintiffs relied on; (3) the district court should not have permitted in camera review of affidavits attesting to the plaintiffs' attorneys' memories of the document; and (4) the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge without the sealed document. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007). Meanwhile, in January, 2007, the case was transferred to the Northern District of California, as part of a multi-district litigation consolidation. On July 2, 2008, Judge Vaughn Walker of the Northern District of California held that FISA preempted the state secrets privilege with respect to foreign telecommunications surveillance. Judge Walker also held that the plaintiffs could not use a sealed classified document to establish their status as \"aggrieved persons\" within the meaning of FISA, but he also granted them leave to amend the complaint, which the plaintiffs did. In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecommunications Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2008). On January 5, 2009, Judge Walker denied government motions to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims. In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecommunications Records Litig., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2009). On May 22, 2009, Judge Walker denied the government's third motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiffs' motion for discovery pursuant to 50 U.S.C. \u00a7 1806(f). The order provided for plaintiffs' counsel to obtain top secret/sensitive compartmented information security clearances and ordered the government to review its classified submissions in this case and determine whether any could be declassified. In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecommunications Records Litig., MDL. 06-1791VRW, 2009 WL 1468792 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2009). On March 31, 2010, Judge Walker ordered entry of a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Judge Walker held that (1) the private remedy provision of FISA implicitly waived the government's sovereign immunity; (2) the prior mandate did not preclude plaintiffs from attempting to establish standing under FISA; (3) the defendants were equitably estopped from arguing that a valid FISA warrant existed; (4) the defendants violated FISA; and (5) the FBI director was not liable in his official capacity. In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecommunications Records Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2010). On December 22, 2010, Judge Walker awarded the plaintiffs about $2.5 million in attorneys' fees and about $41,000 to two of the three plaintiffs in liquidated damages. The defendants appealed. On December 5, 2012, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge McKeown held that (1) the government did not waive sovereign immunity under the civil liability provision of FISA, reversing the district court's order, and (2) the FBI director was not liable, affirming the district court's order. As a result, the Ninth Circuit dismissed all of the claims, ending the case. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Obama, 705 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2012). This opinion amended and superseded the opinion from August 7, 2012, 690 F.3d 1089, which is almost identical to the amended opinion. The amended opinion simply omits a more detailed explanation of the procedures Congress required for certain sections of FISA (Section 2712(b)) where there was a waiver of sovereign immunity.", "summary": "In 2006, an Islamic non-profit in Oregon and two of its attorneys filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1801-1812 against the U.S. Government. The plaintiffs asked the court for injunctive relief and damages, claiming that the government violated FISA by conducting warrantless electronic surveillance of their communications. The claims were dismissed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2012."}
{"article": "The plaintiff in this case is a transgender female. She was denied medically necessary healthcare and suffered repeated sexual assault and harassment throughout her incarceration. The plaintiff suffered from gender dysphoria and\u2014despite her feminine appearance\u2014the defendant assigned her to a maximum-security male prison. In these facilities, transgender inmates often face the highest risk of sexual violence. The plaintiff brought this action in the Middle District of Georgia on February 19, 2015 under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the defendant staff at the Georgia Department of Corrections, Rutledge State Prison, and Valdosta State prison. The plaintiff claimed deliberate indifference to her medical needs in denying medically necessary treatment for gender dysphoria, violations of her Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment, failure of guards to protect her from serious sexual assault, and failure to train prison personnel regarding transgender inmates' health and safety. Represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and private counsel, the plaintiff requested declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys\u2019 fees, and a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring the Georgia Department of Corrections to adhere to professional standards of care in treating inmates that suffer from gender dysphoria. The plaintiff was first imprisoned in 2012. Within the first month of her imprisonment, the plaintiff was sexually assaulted by six gang members. The plaintiff was sexually assaulted by other inmates more than half a dozen times throughout her three-year incarceration. The defendants also denied her medically necessary hormone treatment. But the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for the plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to state a claim. They also asserted qualified immunity defenses. In the meantime, the court denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion for a temporary restraining order, on April 20, 2015. At this hearing, the court put consideration of her preliminary injunction on hold to investigate new policies that the Georgia Department of Corrections had implemented since the beginning of the suit. 131 F. Supp. 3d 1353. Less than five months later, the plaintiff was released from prison. She was only three years into an eight year sentence on August 31, 2015. The court then ruled on the defendants' various motions to dismiss on September 14, 2015. First, the plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were mooted and dismissed without prejudice as a result of her release from prison. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim and failure-to-protect claim because the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Further, the court held that defendant prison personnel were not entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiff's deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim and that the defendant medical director was not entitled to qualified immunity on the failure-to-protect claim. Finally, the court held that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded that defendant medical director failed to train subordinates regarding the safety of transgender inmates and that this failure resulted in deliberate indifference to Diamond\u2019s constitutional right to reasonable protection\u2014the defendant medical director was not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. The parties reached an undisclosed monetary settlement and filed a stipulated dismissal on February 11, 2016. As a result of the lawsuit, the Georgia Department of Corrections no longer uses the \u201cfreeze frame\u201d policy that prohibited transgender inmates from receiving treatment or updating treatment plans as needed. Many transgender inmates in Georgia now receive hormone therapy. Moreover, the defendants have adopted a sexual assault prevention policy that adheres to federal standards. These prevention policies are supplemented by training programs for prison staffers that address the unique needs of transgender inmates. The case is now closed.", "summary": "The plaintiff in this action, a transgender female inmate, suffered repeated sexual assault during her incarceration. Additionally, the Georgia Department of Corrections denied her medically necessary treatment for her gender dysphoria. She reached a settlement agreement on her monetary damages claims, and had her injunctive and declaratory relief claims mooted when she was released from prison before the court decided her case. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On December 3, 2018, a U.S. citizen detainee filed this lawsuit under \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida to challenge his unlawful arrest and detention by the Monroe County Sheriff's Office. The plaintiff alleged that the Sheriff's Office carelessly and aggressively arrested him for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under a Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) between the two agencies, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and his right to be free from false imprisonment under Florida law. The BOA scheme provided the Sheriff with $50 per arrest for detaining individuals arrested for ICE. The plaintiff claimed that despite his repeated protests to multiple jail officers and his offer to produce proof of his U.S. citizenship, the Sheriff\u2019s Office held him so that ICE could deport him to Jamaica. The plaintiff would have been deported to Jamaica but-for a last-minute intervention in which a friend sent a copy of the plaintiff's birth certificate to an ICE agent. The plaintiff sought declaratory and compensatory damages, as well as attorney\u2019s fees. Chief Judge K. Michael Moore was assigned to the case, but was reassigned to Judge Kathleen M. Williams. On February 11, 2019, Judge Williams set a jury trial on February 3, 2020. In the meantime, the parties engaged in negotiations with a mediator. Ultimately, the parties failed to reach a settlement agreement. The trial date was reset for July 20, 2020, and discovery continued. On February 18, 2020, both the plaintiff and defendants filed for summary judgment. The case was stayed for a few months in mid-2020, in part due to interruptions caused by COVID-19. In the ensuing months, the parties jointly asked for multiple stays for trial proceedings. Currently, the parties are supposed to file their motions in limine by May 17, 2021 and their pretrial stipulation and deposition designations by June 7, 2021. The case remains ongoing.", "summary": "On December 3, 2018, a U.S. citizen detainee filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida to challenge his unlawful arrest and detention by the Monroe County Sheriff's Office. He alleged that the defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights and his right to be free from false imprisonment under Florida law. After multiple stays due to COVID-19, the case remains ongoing."}
{"article": "This class action, filed Jan. 28, 2017, challenged President Trump\u2019s Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order (EO) ban on admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. It was filed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (to seek immediate release of plaintiffs from detention) and a civil complaint, on behalf of two individuals and the class of \"all individuals with refugee applications approved by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services as part of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, holders of valid immigrant and non-immigrant visas, and other individuals from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen legally authorized to enter the United States, but who have been or will be denied entry to the United States on the basis of the January 27, 2017 Executive Order.\" Counsel for plaintiffs were the American Civil Liberties Union, the International Refugee Assistance Project at the Urban Justice Center, the National Immigration Law Center, Yale Law School\u2019s Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization and the firm Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton. They filed the case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, along with a motion for class certification; it was initially assigned to Obama appointee Judge Ann Donnelly, who was on duty for any emergencies that weekend. The lead plaintiffs were detained at JFK Airport by U.S. Customs and Border Protection and threatened with deportation even though they had valid visas to enter the United States. One plaintiff, Hameed Darweesh, had worked for the U.S. military in Iraq; his life was in danger in Iraq due to that relationship. The other plaintiff\u2019s wife and son were threatened because of their perceived ties to the United States. The complaint argued that their continued detention based solely on the EO violated their Fifth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights, and exceeded the government's authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The EO's singling out of seven majority-Muslim nations for disfavored treatment unconstitutionally discriminated against Muslims, it said. At 7:30 pm the day the matter was filed, Judge Donnelly heard an emergency motion to stay all removals (that is, deportations) under the order; after a hearing, she granted a nationwide stay of removals to all members of the class. At the hearing, Judge Donnelly further required the defendants to provide a list of all individuals detained as a result of the EO. The next day, on Jan. 29, 2017, plaintiffs filed a motion asking the Court to \"immediately clarify that its Jan. 28th Order is nationwide and order Respondents to enforce the stay of removal.\" They explained that they had received information that members of the class were continuing to be deported, in other states. Later that day, the plaintiffs filed a \"notice\" that said that the U.S. had \"acknowledge[d] that the Order does in fact apply nationwide.\" The notice explained, \"Petitioners continue to monitor reports of noncompliance and are working with Respondents\u2019 counsel to attempt to resolve them. Petitioners will update the Court as to any issues of noncompliance should further clarification or enforcement be necessary.\" In addition, on Jan. 29, 2017, a member of the class filed an emergency motion with the court seeking declaratory relief to clarify that she will not be detained or deported. The class member is an Iranian national and lawful permanent resident of the U.S. with a visa. Her husband, a U.S. citizen, sponsored her for permanent residence in the U.S. The initial assignment had been for emergency purposes over the weekend; on Monday, Jan. 30, 2017, the case was randomly reassigned to Judge Carol Bagley Amon. On Feb. 2, J 2017, udge Amon extended the TRO to Feb. 21, 2017 for good cause shown. In addition, the New York State Office of the Attorney General filed a Motion to Intervene, which was granted on Feb. 10. On Feb. 6, 2017, the government filed a notice of supplemental authority which noted the Feb. 3 letter written by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services at the Department of State. This Feb. 3 letter reversed the provisional revocation of all visas previously issued by the Deputy Assistant Secretary. On Feb. 7, 2017, the petitioners moved for the court to enforce its Jan. 28, 2017 order. The Jan. 28, 2017 order had directed the government to provide the plaintiffs' counsel with a list of all individuals detained pursuant to President Trump's Jan. 27, 2017 EO, including individuals previously released or removed. On Feb. 8, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' petition and complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The defendants' motion also opposed the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Additionally, the court issued a Feb. 8 2017, order instructing the parties to submit memos and a briefing schedule in preparation for a hearing originally scheduled on Feb. 24. After the parties requested an expedited hearing on the stay motion and the motion to dismiss, because the government would not consent to an extension of the stay beyond Feb. 21, the court agreed to hold a hearing on Feb. 21, 2017. From Feb. 13-16, 2017, numerous organizations filed amicus briefs, including the Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program, the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, several members of Congress (represented by the Constitutional Accountability Center), the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, seventeen universities (Brown, Carnegie Mellon, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, Duke, Emory, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, MIT, Northwestern, Princeton, Stanford, University of Chicago, University of Pennsylvania, Vanderbilt, and Yale), and many others. On Feb. 16, 2017, 167 members of Congress filed an amicus brief arguing, among other things, that the EO is irreconcilable with Congress's clearly expressed intent in the Immigration and Nationality Act. On Feb. 16, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the government's motion to dismiss the preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs argued that though the named plaintiffs had been admitted to the U.S., the case was not moot because: 1) the relief that the named plaintiffs received represented only a voluntary cessation of the challenged policy; 2) the case's class claims were inherently transitory; and 3) there were still individuals who, pursuant to the EO, had been unconstitutionally denied entry or admission into the US. In the meantime, in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15606\"><i>Washington v. Trump</i></a>, in the Western District of Washington and then the Ninth Circuit, the EO had also been enjoined, and a stay of proceedings denied on Feb. 9 2017, ; on Feb. 16, 2017, the Trump administration announced that rather than continuing to litigate the EO's lawfulness, it would rescind the order and soon replace it with a revised version. The parties in this case therefore jointly requested on Feb. 17, 2017, that the court stay proceedings related to the petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction and the government's motion to dismiss. The parties also requested that the court cancel the Feb. 21, 2017, hearing that was to be set on these motions. The court granted the parties' joint motion, and further determined that the injunction issued in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15606\"><i>Washington v. Trump</i></a> provided sufficient protection so as to not require that the Jan. 28, 2017 injunction be extended beyond Feb. 21 2017. However, should the Washington injunction be vacated while the EO was in effect, the Jan. 28, 2017, injunction would be reinstated and the court would schedule a prompt hearing on whether the Jan. 28 2017 injunction should be extended further. The plaintiffs then on Feb. 20, 2017, filed a reply in support of their Feb. 7, 2017, motion for the court to enforce its Jan. 28, 2017, order directing the government to provide the plaintiffs' counsel with a list of all individuals detained pursuant to the EO. In the reply, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants should release the names of \"all individuals excluded on the basis of the EO\" after this action was filed, and not just those individuals which the plaintiff's counsel identified. Judge Amon on Feb. 21, 2017, granted the plaintiffs' Feb. 7, 2017 motion in part. She read Judge Donnelly's Jan. 28, 2017, order as requiring defendants \"to provide a single list of putative class members being held pursuant to the EO at any time from the signing of the order and for a reasonable period thereafter, which would include through the following day.\" Judge Amon also interpreted Judge Donnelly's use of \"the term 'detained' \"to be in the everyday sense, meaning those being held for questioning pursuant to the terms of the EO, as distinguished from individuals formally placed in removal proceedings.\" The plaintiffs in this case specifically, noted Judge Amon, were not placed in removal proceedings but were nonetheless \"detained.\" Accordingly, Judge Amon ordered defendants by Feb. 23, 2017, to provide plaintiffs with a list of all individuals with approved refugee applications, valid immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, or other legal authorization to enter the United States, from the seven banned countries, who were held, including being processed, by CBP pursuant to the EO from Jan. 28, 2017, at 9:37pm (when Judge Donnelly ordered defendants to produce the list) through Jan. 29, 2017, at 11:59pm. The government filed two status reports on Feb. 23, 2017. The first status report informed the court that the government had prepared the list as ordered by Judge Amon on Feb. 21 (\"putative class members being held pursuant to the EO at any time from the signing of the order and for a reasonable period thereafter\"), and that the parties were working through the last-minute terms of the protective order. The second status report informed the court that the parties had agreed to a protective order covering the list containing the names of all individuals processed at any time from 9:27 PM on Jan. 28 to 11:59 PM on Jan. 29 pursuant to the Jan. 27 EO, including those previously released or removed, and that the government had provided the list to the petitioners. The petitioners reserved the right to challenge the government's designation of any information in the list for being overbroad. That same day, the parties filed a joint motion for an order protecting the confidentiality of the individuals named in the list, which the court granted. The parties appeared for oral argument on Feb. 24, 2017, before Judge Amon. During oral argument, the government stated that they would inform the petitioners as to which individuals on the Feb. 23, 2017, list were ultimately admitted into the U.S. The petitioners stated that they would provide the government with the names of individuals who they believed were not included on the list, but who should have been, so that the government may investigate accordingly. Also during oral argument on Feb. 24, 2017, the parties requested to adjourn the present briefing schedule regarding a potential motion to dismiss the Intervenor Plaintiff, the New York State Office of the Attorney General. The request was granted and the parties agreed to submit a new briefing schedule, if necessary, within seven days after a new EO is issued. Many religious organizations filed an appearance on Feb. 27 2017. On Mar. 6, 2017, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 EO and replaced it with a narrower one, <a href=\"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/03/09/2017-04837/protecting-the-nation-from-foreign-terrorist-entry-into-the-united-states\">Executive Order 13780</a>. On the same day, defendants filed a notice about the release of this new EO to take effect on Mar. 16, revoking and replacing the previous one. Defendants argued that the new EO differed substantially from the previous one and thus would not be affected by Judge Amon's TRO. Specifically, defendants noted that the new EO did not ban Iraqi nationals. Defendants stated that they would, as previously agreed, file a proposed joint scheduling order by Mar. 13. Following this, the New York State Attorney General sent a Mar. 9, 2017, letter to the court, specifying that in light of the new EO, the AG would not pursue the case and would not file its proposed Feb. 2 Complaint in Intervention. On Mar. 13, 2017, the parties then submitted a letter to Judge Amon, indicating that they were in settlement discussions and requesting a stay. Judge Amon granted such stays repeatedly for two and three weeks at a time. On May 1, 2017, both plaintiff and defendants wrote separately to Judge Amon, informing her that the parties were unable to reach a settlement. After several conferences in May, the court re-scheduled the follow-up conference several times, as defendants twice requested an adjournment. (Judge Amon on May 31 mentioned that \"[t]he Court is not pleased with respondents' request.\") Conferences, follow-ups, and extensions continued over the next few months. In the meantime, Judge Amon on Aug. 15 stayed sua sponte a ruling on plaintiff's Jan. 28 class certification motion, while settlement discussions proceeded. Judge Amon held a settlement conference on Aug. 28, 2017, and a follow-up telephone conference the next day. The parties stated that they had reached a settlement in principle. Judge Amon asked them to confirm the details in the next settlement conference on Aug. 31, 2017. They did so, and entered the terms of the settlement agreement on the record. The parties then on Sept. 1, 2017, filed the settlement agreement and stipulation of dismissal. According to the settlement agreement, defendants would within 14 days notify all persons barred from entering the U.S. under the Jan. 27 EO, and who were still outside the U.S., that they could re-apply for a visa. The letter would include a list of free legal services providers. The parties agreed that no applicants would be automatically entitled to a visa just by re-applying. After completing this notification, defendants would notify plaintiffs of their compliance, and plaintiffs would then file a stipulated dismissal of all claims, relief, damages, and jurisdiction for this matter. The docket reflects that the court closed this case on Sept. 21, 2017. Additional information may be available at the <a href=\"https://www.aclu.org/cases/darweesh-v-trump\">ACLU</a> or the <a href=\"https://www.law.yale.edu/studying-law-yale/clinical-and-experiential-learning/our-clinics/worker-and-immigrant-rights-advocacy-clinic/darweesh-et-al-v-trump-et-al\">Yale Law School Clinic</a> pages for this case.", "summary": "This class action, filed Jan. 28, 2017 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, challenged President Trump\u2019s Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order ban on admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. It was filed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (to seek immediate release of plaintiffs from detention) and a civil complaint, on behalf of two individuals and the class of \"all individuals with refugee applications approved by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services as part of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, holders of valid immigrant and non-immigrant visas, and other individuals from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen legally authorized to enter the United States, but who have been or will be denied entry to the United States on the basis of the January 27, 2017 Executive Order.\" The complaint argued that their continued detention based solely on the executive order violated their Fifth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights, and exceeded the government's authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act. At 7:30 pm the day the matter was filed, Judge Donnelly heard an emergency motion to stay all removals (that is, deportations) under the order. After a hearing, she granted a nationwide stay of removals to all members of the class. Judge Donnelly also required the defendants to provide a list of all individuals detained as a result of the EO. The case was randomly reassigned to Judge Carol Bagley Amon on January 30, 2017. On Feb. 2, Judge Amon extended the TRO to Feb. 21, 2017 for good cause shown. On Feb. 7, the plaintiffs moved for the court to enforce its Jan. 28 order, which had directed the government to provide the plaintiffs' counsel with a list of all individuals detained pursuant to the EO, including individuals previously released or removed. On Feb. 8, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' petition and complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The defendants' motion also opposed the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Although a hearing on the stay motion and the motion to dismiss was scheduled for Feb. 21, it was cancelled after the court determined that the injunction issued in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15606\"><i>Washington v. Trump</i></a> provided sufficient protection. On Feb. 21, Judge Amon granted plaintiffs' Feb. 7 motion to enforce the Jan. 28 order in part. Judge Amon ordered defendants by Feb. 23 to provide plaintiffs with a list of all individuals with approved refugee applications, valid immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, or other legal authorization to enter the United States, from the seven banned countries, who were held, including being processed, by CBP pursuant to the EO from Jan. 28 at 9:37pm (when Judge Donnelly ordered defendants to produce the list) through Jan. 29 at 11:59pm. On Mar. 6, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 EO and replaced it with a narrower one, <a href=\"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/03/09/2017-04837/protecting-the-nation-from-foreign-terrorist-entry-into-the-united-states\">Executive Order 13780</a>. On Mar. 13, the parties submitted a letter to Judge Amon, indicating that they were in settlement discussions and requesting a stay, which was granted repeatedly. The parties reached a settlement agreement and filed a stipulation of dismissal on Sept. 1, 2017. According to the settlement agreement, defendants would notify all persons barred from entering the U.S. under the Jan. 27 EO, and who were still outside the U.S., that they could re-apply for a visa and would provide a list of free legal services providers. This case is now closed."}
{"article": "On August 18, 2009, the plaintiff, a high school student verbally and physically harassed due to his sex and sexual orientation brought suit against Mohawk Central School District in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York (The Honorable David N. Hurd). The plaintiff, represented by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the New York Civil Liberties Union, alleged denial of equal protection on the basis of sex and sexual orientation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983; discrimination based on sex and sexual orientation and negligent supervision under New York state law; and sex discrimination in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1681 et seq. Based on these claims, the plaintiff requested a declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs, and compensatory, punitive, and statutory damages. The plaintiff claimed that from 2007 to 2009, he suffered physical and emotional harms due to the defendant's deliberate indifference to a pattern of severe, persistent, and violent harassment of the plaintiff at the hands of fellow students based on his sex and sexual orientation. These physical and emotional harms also affected the plaintiff's ability to learn and caused him to leave school for two weeks at the end of the 2009 school year. The plaintiff and his parents informed school administrators and teachers of the harassment on many separate occasions, but no effective measures were taken by the school to remedy the situation. On August 19, 2009, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction. The Court issued a consent order granting the preliminary injunction on August 27, ordering the defendant to immediately put in place a number of safeguards to protect the plaintiff and to comply with school sexual harassment policies. The United States (U.S. Attorney's Office) moved to intervene on behalf of the plaintiff in the action on January 14, 2010. The court denied the motion on March 29, 2010 as it granted the parties' stipulation and settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the defendant was required to pay the plaintiff $50,000 in addition to attorney's fees and costs ($25,000) and the cost of obtaining counseling services up until June 30, 2013. The agreement also required that the defendant retain an expert to review the defendant's policies and practices regarding discrimination and harassment, to review these procedures themselves, and to record compliance with harassment and discrimination complaints. The case was dismissed with prejudice on April 27, 2010.", "summary": "A high school student who was verbally and physically harassed based on his sexual orientation and sex brought suit against his school district, claiming that school officials were deliberately indifferent to his harassment. On March 29, 2010, the court approved a settlement agreement between the parties. The plaintiff was awarded $50,000, the cost of three years of counseling, and $25,000 in attorneys' fees. The agreement also required that the defendant retain an expert to review the defendant's policies and practices regarding discrimination and harassment, to review these procedures themselves, and to record compliance with harassment and discrimination complaints."}
{"article": "On August 30th, 2018, several student groups filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Plaintiffs sued the Michigan Secretary of State, Ruth Johnson, and the Director of the Michigan Bureau of Elections, Sally Williams under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 and \u00a71988 for alleged constitutional violations of the First, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. The plaintiffs, represented by a combination of public interest and private attorneys, sought declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the State from enforcing Public Act 118, also known as Roger\u2019s Law, which plaintiffs alleged put significant barriers in place for college aged students who wanted to vote. The case was assigned to District Judge Robert H. Cleland. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that Roger\u2019s Law placed two major barriers in the way of students seeking to vote: Strict matching requirements and requirement that a person first vote in person. The strict matching requirement prohibited college students, who had their home address listed on state identification, from using said identification to register to vote in their college town. The in-person voting requirement prohibited college students, who would need to return to their permanent addresses to vote, from voting if they were far from home. Plaintiff claimed that these laws were driven to enactment by discriminatory intent, as shown through the explicit statement by the legislation\u2019s drafter that he didn\u2019t care if college-aged students couldn\u2019t vote. The complaint was later amended on September 7th, 2018, to add new plaintiffs, specifically more student groups. On September 8th, 2018, a motion for preliminary injunction was filed, but stayed while the parties negotiated a potential settlement. Along with the motion, the plaintiffs filed an expert report from Stanford Political Science Professor Jonathan Rodden supporting their arguments. 2018 WL 10072776. On September 25, the plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew their preliminary injunction. They did this because of their preparations for the 2018 midterm elections, and the potential impact that the elections would have on the outcome of the case. Status updates were moved to January 9, 2019. Status updates were further delayed as the Whitmer administration was sworn in and implemented policies that expanded access to vote-by-mail programs. The plaintiffs submitted a motion to voluntarily dismiss the case on June 5, 2019, perhaps because of progress toward the plaintiff's asks by the Whitmer administration. Judge Cleland dismissed the case on June 11; the case is closed.", "summary": "On August 30th, 2018, several student groups filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Plaintiffs sued Michigan Secretary of State, Ruth Johnson, and Director of the Michigan Bureau of Elections, Sally Williams under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 and \u00a71988 for alleged constitutional violations of the First, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the State from enforcing Public Act 118, also known as Roger\u2019s Law, which plaintiffs alleged put significant barriers in place for college aged students who wanted to vote. After the 2018 midterm election brought a Democratic administration to Lansing, the plaintiffs stayed settlement negotiations and eventually withdrew the lawsuit, perhaps due to progress made in expanded vote-by-mail programs."}
{"article": "On February 14, 2014, the ACLU of Rhode Island and several citizens of the City of Cranston filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island. The plaintiffs sued the City of Cranston under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Prison Policy Initiative, the ACLU, and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs claim that the 2012 Redistricting Plan violated the rights of the plaintiffs to equal representation under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the inclusion of the prison population of Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI), located in Ward 6, inflated the actual voting population of ward 6. As a result, every three citizens of Ward 6 represent the same voting power as four citizens of the other five wards. On March 13, 2014, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. On September 8, 2014, Judge Ronald R. Lagueux denied the motion, holding that the court could not say that the 2012 Redistricting Plan was constitutional as a matter of law. 42 F.Supp. 3d 325 (D.R.I. 2014). The court scheduled discovery for the next nine months. On July 9, 2015, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On August 6, 2016, a cross-motion for summary judgment was filed by the plaintiffs. On May 24, 2016, Judge Lagueux granted plaintiffs\u2019 summary judgment and denied defendants'. 188 F.Supp.3d 146. The court entered declaratory judgment for the plaintiffs and enjoined the defendants from holding any new elections under the current 2012 Redistricting Plan. Furthermore, the defendants were required to come up with a new redistricting plan within 30 days. Judge Lagueux determined that while districts are generally divided according to equal populations, the prison inmates at ACI were not engaged in the civil process like other non-voters. Therefore, to include them in the total population of Ward 6 would an unconstitutional dilution of Ward\u2019s 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5\u2019s voting power. On May 31, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to appeal. On September 21, 2016, Judge Sandra Lea Lynch of the First Circuit Court of Appeals entered judgment in favor of the defendants. 837 F.3d 135. Judge Lynch held, following the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in <i>Evenwel v. Abbott</i>, that in the absence of discriminatory intent, the courts should defer to local election authorities and the political process. Accordingly, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Sept. 26, 2016. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On February 14, 2014, ACLU chapter of Rhode Island and four citizens filed suit in the U.S. District Court of R.I. under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. They sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the inclusion of a prison in one county ward, thus creating an unconstitutional dilution of their voting power under the 14th amendment. The court found for the plaintiffs and ordered a new redistricting plan, but the defendants appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals granted judgment for the defendants, holding that the courts should defer to local election authorities."}
{"article": "On June 16, 2009, the United States filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 3612, against the owners and managers of a 98-lot mobile home park located in Gulfport, Mississippi. The defendants leased lots to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to house persons displaced by Hurricane Katrina. The U.S. claimed, based on evidence from particular complainants and witnesses and on fair housing testing, that the site's management applied various park rules more harshly against African American tenants and members of interracial households, openly made racial slurs, declared that they didn't want any African American residents living at the park, and generally harassed and intimidated black tenants. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, as well as civil penalties. The case was assigned to Judge Louis Guirola. On November 15, 2010, the Court denied defendants' motions for summary judgment; the court found that the U.S. had produced sufficient evidence of discriminatory rule enforcement, racial bias, and harassment. Though the case was scheduled for trial, shortly before that date arrived, the parties agreed to a three-year settlement on January 7, 2011. The agreement included a standard prohibition against discrimination, but it also included restrictions on the defendant manager in any future involvements in the rental real estate business. These restrictions included regulating the conduct of the defendant-owner in the event it re-entered the rental real estate business, including notice to the plaintiff, fair housing training, notice provisions, non-discrimination policies, detailed reporting and recordkeeping requirements to allow plaintiff to monitor its compliance, and consent to periodic compliance testing. Defendants agreed to pay $45,000 in monetary damages to twelve named aggrieved persons, $45,000 to the United States, and a $5,000 civil penalty. The case closed on January 18, 2011.", "summary": "This fair housing case in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi was brought in June 2009 by the United States, against the owner and managers of a 98-lot mobile home park located in Gulfport, Mississpppi. The defendants had leased lots to the the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to house persons displaced by Hurricane Katrina. The plaintiff claimed that the site's management applied various park rules more harshly against African-American tenants, openly made racial slurs, declared that they didn't want any African-American residents living at the park, and generally harassed and intimidated black tenants. After District Judge Louis Guirola denied defendants' motions for summary judgment, the parties agreed to a three-year settlement. The agreement contained detailed provisions regulating the conduct of the defendant owner in the event it re-entered the rental real estate business, including notice to the Plaintiff, fair housing training, notice provisions, non-discrimination policies, detailed reporting and recordkeeping requirements to allow the plaintiff to monitor its compliance, and consent to periodic compliance testing. The agreement also awarded $45,000 in monetary damages to 12 named aggrieved persons, $45,000 to the plaintiff, and a $5,000 civil penalty. The case closed on January 18, 2011."}
{"article": "On July 27, 1995 Colorado inmates incarcerated at Bowie County Correctional Facility (BCCF) in Texas filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Plaintiffs were represented by the American Civil Liberties Union and private attorneys. Plaintiffs' complaint, filed in November of 1995, alleged an abusive, overcrowded, unsanitary, and unhealthful environment at BCCF. It alleged forced idleness, fire danger, deficient medical care, and lack of access to the courts due to an inadequate law library. In addition, plaintiffs claimed that BCCF violated the Establishment Clause by paying inmates to attend a Bible study class when there was little or no paid work available to other inmates and no other religious activities. Defendants moved for transfer and change of venue. The district court (Judge John L. Kane, Jr.) denied these motions. Knapp v. Romer, 909 F.Supp. 810 (D. Colo. 1995). A number of lawsuits were filed in the District of Colorado regarding conditions at BCCF. The cases were consolidated until September 30, 1997, when Judge Kane issued an order ending consolidation and certifying the case as a class action to be represented by counsel for one of the claims, Leggions, et al v. CO Dept. Corrections, et al. Litigation continued, with the court granting many plaintiffs' motions for exclusion from class representation and several motions for joinder. The PACER docket for this case ends on February 25, 1999 so no information regarding further proceedings is available.", "summary": "On July 27, 1995 Colorado inmates incarcerated at Bowie County Correctional Facility (BCCF) in Texas filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Plaintiffs were represented by the American Civil Liberties Union and private attorneys. Plaintiffs' complaint, filed in November of 1995, alleged an abusive, overcrowded, unsanitary, and unhealthful environment at BCCF. It alleged forced idleness, fire danger, deficient medical care, and lack of access to the courts due to an inadequate law library. In addition, plaintiffs claimed that BCCF violated the Establishment Clause by paying inmates to attend a Bible study class when there was little or no paid work available to other inmates and no other religious activities. A number of lawsuits were filed in the District of Colorado regarding conditions at BCCF. The cases were consolidated and many plaintiffs moved for exclusion from the class or for joinder. The PACER docket for this case ends on February 25, 1999 so no information regarding further proceedings is available."}
{"article": "On December 3, 2014, three women with relatives buried in a mass grave of more than one million deceased individuals on New York City\u2019s Hart Island filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation, the plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Sections 3, 6, and 8 of Article I of the New York State Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that New York City\u2019s policy barred people from visiting the graves of relatives buried on the island, only allowing them to visit a \u201cgazebo\u201d on the edge of Hart Island. The \u201cgazebo\u201d is out of sight of the graves and visitors were not permitted to leave sentimental items like flowers. The case was assigned to District Judge Vernon S. Broderick. On September 28, 2015, the court granted class certification, defining the class as: \"All parents, step-parents, children (biological or adopted), stepchildren, spouses, siblings, step-siblings, half-siblings, grandparents, grandchildren, uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, first cousins, second cousins, legal guardians of deceased individuals buried on Hart Island; wards of deceased guardians buried on Hart Island; and domestic partners of deceased individuals buried on Hart Island, who wish to visit the gravesites of said deceased individuals.\" On February 19, 2016, the parties agreed to a settlement. The City of New York agreed to provide the plaintiff class with ferry transportation to and from Hart Island, and access to the gravesites of their family members, on at least one weekend day per month. Visitors to the gravesite would be allowed to leave certain sentimental items, like flowers, small stuffed animals, and photographs, at the grave site. The City of New York also agreed to pay the plaintiff attorneys\u2019 fees and costs totalling $58,645.00. In December 2016, the parties met and conferred regarding the settlement and agreed to increase the maximum number of visitors able to visit the gravesites during each visitation period from 25 to 35. The court approved the amended stipulation on January 24, 2017. The court continued to retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement until December 1, 2018. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In December 2014, three women with relatives buried in a mass grave on New York City\u2019s Hart Island filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that New York City\u2019s policy barred people from visiting the graves of relatives buried on the island and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. In 2016, the parties agreed to a settlement that allows a class of all individuals with familial or marital ties to the deceased individuals buried on Hart Island to visit the gravesites on at least one weekend day per month."}
{"article": "This case is one of several federal cases challenging the Trump Administration\u2019s ongoing attempts to reduce Medicaid eligibility under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The case arose from federal and state efforts to limit the ACA\u2019s Medicaid expansion. Medicaid, established under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, requires states to cover all individuals of a mandatory covered population group and prohibits states from imposing additional eligibility requirements. However, Section 1115 of the Social Security Act allows DHHS to waive certain federal Medicaid requirements when necessary to allow a state to carry out an experimental project that is likely to promote the Act\u2019s objectives. In 2010, the ACA expanded Medicaid coverage to include adults with household incomes less than 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL). Michigan passed legislation authorizing the Medicaid expansion but sought a waiver under Section 1115 to require new enrollees to pay premiums and copayments that could be reduced by the individual\u2019s engagement in certain \u201chealthy behaviors.\u201d For enrollees with incomes above the FPL, the monthly premium was set at two percent of the individual\u2019s income. DHHS granted the waiver application, effective through December 31, 2018, but specified that no individual may lose or be denied Medicaid eligibility for failure to pay premiums or copayments. In January 2018, DHHS issued a letter to state Medicaid directors announcing its intention to approve Medicaid waiver applications containing work requirements. This action was consistent with President Trump's January 20, 2017 executive order instructing federal agencies to scale back the ACA \u201c[t]o the maximum extent permitted by law.\" In response, Michigan submitted a Section 1115 waiver application that would add mandatory work requirements. The work requirements consisted of 80 hours of specified work or work-related activities per month and mandatory monthly reporting of work activities, with the loss of coverage for enrollees who do not report the required hours for three months in a 12-month period. The application also included mandatory healthy behaviors and heightened, mandatory premiums for enrollees with incomes above the FPL who received coverage for 48 cumulative months. Failure to pay a premium within 60 days after the invoice date would result in termination of coverage. Enrollees in the same subgroup also had to complete a health risk assessment or specified healthy behaviors in the 12 months before their annual redetermination to remain eligible. DHHS approved these three HMP waivers, effective January 1, 2019 through December 31, 2023, and granted Michigan permission to implement the measures starting January 1, 2020. The work requirements went into effect on January 1, 2020. The state deferred the implementation of the healthy behavior requirements and new premium requirements until October 1, 2020. The plaintiffs, all members of Michigan\u2019s Medicaid program, filed this class-action lawsuit on November 22, 2019 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The plaintiffs challenged amendments to the Healthy Michigan Plan (HMP), including work requirements that would result in the loss of health coverage for 61,000 to 183,000 individuals. Represented by the National Health Law Program, the Center for Civil Justice, and the Michigan Poverty Law Program, the plaintiffs requested an injunction against the defendants\u2019 implementation of Michigan\u2019s amended HMP eligibility requirements and declaratory relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants failed to undergo the required rule-making process in issuing a new policy on Medicaid waivers and acted outside the scope of their waiver authority under Section 1115 of the Social Security Act in approving Michigan\u2019s application that imposed additional Medicaid eligibility requirements. According to the plaintiffs, these actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 551 <i>et seq.</i>), the Social Security Act, and the Take Care Clause in Article II, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs sued on their behalf and on behalf of all Michigan residents enrolled in the HMP on or after January 1, 2019. On February 19, 2020 the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) filed an unopposed motion to intervene, which was granted the next day. On February 25, 2020, MDHHS filed a motion for partial summary judgment solely on the issue of whether the federal approval of the work and community-engagement requirements in the HMP section 1115 demonstration project was lawful. In light of the D.C. Circuit Court\u2019s decision in <i>Gresham v. Azar</i>, striking down the work requirements of the Arkansas Medicaid program under the Section 115 waiver, Judge Boasberg granted MDHHS\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment. The December 21, 2018 approval of the work and community engagement requirements in the Healthy Michigan Plan Amended Demonstration Extension Application by the defendant, Secretary Azar, was vacated. Michigan could not enforce the Medicaid work or community engagement requirements that went into effect on January 1, 2020. On April 2, 2020, MDHHS filed a motion to stay in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The same day, the court granted the motion and the case is stayed until the earlier of 1) the end of the COVID-19 public health emergency, or 2) 45 days before the date Michigan begins to implement the premiums that are conditions of continued Medicaid eligibility or the healthy behavior requirements that are conditions of continued Medicaid eligibility. As of June 2020, the Medicaid work and community engagement requirements cannot be enforced. The plaintiffs challenged the payment of premium and cost sharing, community engagement, and healthy behavior components of the HMP. The plaintiffs did not specifically challenge the rest of the waiver, but the complaint asked the court to permanently enjoin the entire HMP. When the case resumes, the court will need to decide on the appropriate remedy, whether to disband the entire HMP, or to only vacate some or all of the specifically challenged portions. <b>Background</b> Medicaid beneficiaries in four other states have filed similar suits challenging the Administration's use of Section 1115 waiver authority. See <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16440\"><i>Stewart v. Azar</i></a> (Kentucky), <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17162\"><i>Gresham v. Azar</i></a> (Arkansas), <i>Philbrick v. Azar</i> (New Hampshire), and <i>Rose v. Azar</i> (Indiana). In <i>Stewart v. Azar</i>, the court struck down Kentucky's waiver, which included work requirements, on the basis that the agency failed to sufficiently consider the impact of the proposed project on Medicaid coverage. Similarly, in <i>Gresham v. Azar</i>, the court found that the agency failed to adequately consider how the imposition of work requirements in Arkansas's program would lead to loss of coverage for a substantial number of beneficiaries including the needy, a core group under Medicaid.", "summary": "This is one of a series of cases challenging the Trump Administration's decision to allow states to impose eligibility requirements on Medicaid beneficiaries. A group of Michigan Medicaid beneficiaries sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to block its decision to allow Michigan to impose work requirements and payment obligations on them. The plaintiffs claimed that DHHS' actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Social Security Act, and the Constitution. The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services intervened, and filed a motion for partial summary judgment on federal approval of the work and community-engagement requirements of the Healthy Michigan Plan. The court granted this motion, declaring federal approval of these provisions unlawful. Michigan cannot enforce the Medicaid work and community engagement requirements. As of May 2020, due to COVID-19, the case is stayed."}
{"article": "On February 29, 2016, a U.S. Army Captain and member of the Sikh faith filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the United States Department of Defense and the Army, among others, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The plaintiff, represented by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, the Sikh Coalition, and private counsel, asked the court for injunctive relief prohibiting the U.S. Army from forcing him to compromise his religious exercise. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the U.S. Army violated his First Amendment right to free expression of his religion. The defendants had required him to undergo extensive and repetitive testing to confirm that he could properly wear a combat helmet and a safety mask, while other soldiers with long hair and beards had not been subjected to the same testing. Prior to this action, the plaintiff was given temporary accommodations to keep his hair and beard unshorn and to wear a turban. However, these accommodations were set to expire on March 31. On February 29, the plaintiff filed a temporary restraining order preventing the defendants from subjecting him to non-standard or discriminatory testing. On March 3, Judge Beryl A. Howard granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion and enjoined the defendants from subjecting the plaintiff to any such testing during the pendency of the litigation. 168 F.Supp.3d 216. The plaintiff also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on February 29, requesting that the U.S. Army grant him a permanent religious accommodation for his beard, hair, and turban. Judge Howell denied this motion on May 6, 2016, partially because the preliminary injunction would essentially encompass the relief sought in the underlying complaint. In the same memorandum opinion, Judge Howell also denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion to consolidate his case with another Sikh accommodation case because the plaintiffs in that case were reservists awaiting training rather than a West Point graduate on active duty as in this case. Additionally, the plaintiffs in the second case had not been forced to undergo the same testing that this plaintiff had objected to. 185 F. Supp. 3d 11. On March 31, 2016, the defendants filed a notice that they had extended the plaintiff\u2019s temporary accommodation to one year, or less in the event that military necessity assigned the plaintiff to another unit. In response, on May 23, 2016, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint stating that the extension did not negate the Army\u2019s discriminatory regulations and practices. On June 20, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On July 4, 2016, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice. In his filing, the plaintiff\u2019s dismissal was made with the expectation that Sikh Americans would be successfully integrated into the U.S. military outside the context of this legal proceeding. This conclusion was supported by the following facts: (1) the defendants granted the plaintiff a \u2018long-term accommodation\u2019 which extended his earlier accommodation for at least one year from March 31, 2016; (2) the defendants had repeatedly written assurances that the plaintiff would not be subject to heightened, individualized testing concerning his helmet and safety mask; (3) while the Assistant Secretary of the Army intended to re-evaluate the plaintiff\u2019s accommodation the following year, the plaintiff would not need to submit a new accommodation request; (4) the defendants planned to develop uniform standards for religious accommodations; (5) the plaintiff was not required to submit a new accommodation request with every new assignment, transfer of duty station, etc.; (6) no change would be made to the plaintiff\u2019s accommodation without the evaluation being expeditiously forwarded to the Assistant Secretary; and (7) that a modification that substantially burdened the plaintiff\u2019s religious exercise would only be permissible where the defendants could prove that they had a compelling interest to require modification, that modification was in furtherance of that interest, and that there was no less restrictive means of furthering that interest. These facts indicated that the plaintiff would not be subjected to adverse treatment by virtue of his faith for at least one year, by which time the plaintiff expected that the army would have legally sufficient accommodation guidelines in place. On July 5, 2016, the case was dismissed without prejudice and signed by Judge Beryl A. Howell. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On February 29, 2016, a U.S. Army Captain and member of the Sikh faith filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the United States Department of Defense and the Army, asking the court to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the grooming regulations as it pertained to his religious exercise. The defendants extended his temporary accommodations, but still required the extensive and repetitive testing of helmet and gas mask fit that they did not require of others who had been given exemptions. On July 4, 2016, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice, based upon written assurances by the defendant that he would not be subjected to adverse treatment by virtue of his faith for at least one year, by which time the plaintiff expected that the army would have legally sufficient accommodation guidelines in place. The case was dismissed on July 5, 2016, and there are no updates as to whether the defendant has developed further guidelines."}
{"article": "On January 25, 2018, SurvJustice, Equal Rights Advocates, and Victim Rights Law Center filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. These three nonprofit organizations sued the U.S. Department of Education under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by Democracy Forward, the National Center for Youth Law, and the National Women\u2019s Law Center, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys\u2019 fees. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the Department of Education\u2019s decision to rescind sexual violence guidance documents issued in 2011 and 2014 created educational access disparities on the basis of sex and hampered the plaintiffs' ability to do their jobs. The complaint argued that the new policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It further argued that the decision had been made without the proper procedures, in violation of the APA. On February 21, 2018, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, including several new factual allegations regarding accusations of sexual assault against top government officials and adverse changes to universities\u2019 policies as a result of the Title IX guidance. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and that the plaintiffs failed to plead that the Department of Justice had a discriminatory purpose on May 2, 2018. On August 31, 2018, non-profit organizations Women\u2019s and Children\u2019s Advocacy Project, Equal Means Equal, National Coalition Against Violent Athletes, Allies Reaching for Equality, Women Matter, and We are Women filed a motion for leave to intervene as plaintiffs. These organizations argued that the parties and court did not address the issues raised in the organizations\u2019 amicus curiae briefs as the plaintiffs did not amend the complaint to argue in favor of the right to equal treatment. Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley granted the May 2, 2018 motion to dismiss on October 1, 2018 because the allegations were insufficient to show standing to bring an equal protection claim; the 2017 Guidance was not a final agency action for purposes of an APA claim; and the allegations did not plausibly suggest that the defendants acted outside their authority for the ultra vires claim. 2018 WL 4770741. The first and third claims were dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend, while the APA claim was dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 31, 2018 and the organizations refiled a motion for leave to intervene as plaintiffs on November 20, 2018. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on December 14, 2018. On February 19, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the APA claim. On March 29, 2019, Judge Corley denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of Article III standing but granted their motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' equal protection and ultra vires claims. 2019 WL 143141. On that same day, Judge Scott granted the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, finding that a recent Ninth Circuit decision warranted reconsidering the plaintiffs' APA claim. 2019 WL 1434144. Finally, Judge Corley denied the motion to intervene, finding that the motion was untimely, that the intervenors failed to establish Article III standing, and that the intervenors' interests were adequately represented by the existing plaintiffs. 2019 WL 1427447. On April 18, 2019, the plaintiffs submitted a Third Amended Complaint, removing the ultra vires and equal protection claims and reinserting the APA claim. The plaintiffs and defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On November 1, 2019, Judge Corley denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants' motion. 2019 WL 5684522. She agreed with the defendants' argument that the challenged agency action was not \"final\" for purposes of judicial review under the APA. The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit. The appeal is pending.", "summary": "In January 2018, SurvJustice, Equal Rights Advocates, and Victim Rights Law Center filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Education, alleging that the 2017 Title IX guidance created educational access disparities on the basis of sex and hampered the plaintiffs\u2019 ability to do their jobs. The court ultimately granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit and the appeal is pending."}
{"article": "During 2003, a law professor residing in Illinois developed a mental illness. Due to this illness, a state court appointed the Office of State Guardian as guardian of his person and, in 2004, of his estate. He moved to Missouri, where a petition was soon filed to appoint a guardian for him. The guardianship in Illinois did not affect his eligibility to vote while residing there, but the guardianship adjudication had a different, prohibitive impact on his voting rights in Missouri. Thus, in October 2004, the former professor, as plaintiff and by the Office of State Guardian, filed a civil complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri, naming as defendants Missouri's governor, attorney general, and several city election officials. The plaintiff alleged that, previously, he had been adjudged mentally incapacitated and appointed a guardian and, presently, would like to register to vote for, and to vote in, upcoming elections. Missouri, however, had a constitutional provision and a statute that barred incapacitated persons and those under guardianship from registering to vote and from voting. Alleging that these state laws denied him his fundamental right to vote and violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses, as well as statutory (and related regulatory) rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C \u00a7 12131 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys fees and costs. Numerous attorneys represented the plaintiff, including those from Illinois' Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, the ACLU National Voting Rights Project, and the ACLU of Eastern Missouri. The plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction was denied in an unpublished opinion by District Judge Ortrie Smith on October 26, 2004. The judge ruled that it would be inappropriate to issue injunctive relief when the plaintiff had other means of protecting his voting rights, such as seeking in state court proceedings that any guardianship order applicable to him be limited in a way that allowed for him to vote. In December 2004, an amended complaint was filed. It made essentially the same attacks upon the state's limitations on voting eligibility, but added two additional individual plaintiffs under guardianship orders and one associational plaintiff, the Missouri Protection and Advocacy Services, Inc. (\"MOPAS\"). It also added another federal constitutional claim, alleging that the full faith and credit clause was violated by Missouri's law, since deprivation of voting rights occurred in Missouri based upon an Illinois adjudication that did not expressly deprive one of voting rights. Also in December 2004, the Missouri probate court acted upon the petition for appointment of a guardian for the original plaintiff. In an unpublished ruling, Circuit Judge Joan Moriarty found that the Illinois guardianship order had no extraterritorial effect and that the Illinois guardian had exceeded its authority in moving the plaintiff to a Missouri psychiatric facility. The judge directed that the Illinois guardian move the plaintiff to an Illinois facility. The probate court's ruling, however, was reversed on appeal eight months later. Appellate Judge Gary M. Gaertner, Sr., writing for a panel of the Missouri Court of Appeals, found that the Illinois guardianship order was entitled to recognition and enforcement under the federal constitution's full faith and credit clause, particularly given Missouri statutes that reflected a willingness to recognize guardianship judgments without regard to the location of the guardian or the ward. Thus, the Illinois guardian had acted appropriately in moving the plaintiff to Missouri. That the ward had been moved back to Illinois did not fully moot the case, according to the appellate panel, due to the significance of the lower court's erroneous ruling. In re Prye, 168 S.W.3d 116 (Mo. App. 2005). The federal case proceeded, in the meantime, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. These were ruled upon by Judge Smith on July 7, 2006, in an unpublished order. By this time, two of the individual plaintiffs had been dismissed from the case at their request (including the original plaintiff), leaving MOPAS and a plaintiff under a Missouri guardianship order as the challengers to the Missouri laws. Judge Smith first decided that the election board's recent issuance of a voter registration card to the individual plaintiff did not moot the case, because the defendants had not met their burden of showing the permanence of their voluntary cessation of the alleged wrongful conduct. Next, he ruled that the state's use of a guardianship scheme that required individualized determination of a person's abilities and limitations sufficiently allowed for differentiating those who are qualified to vote from those who are not and, so, did not violate the federal constitution or statutes. Additionally, the opportunity for review and modification of state guardianship orders gave wards recourse to protect their interests in voting. Accordingly, Judge Smith granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. On August 23, 2007, that court affirmed the district court, although on somewhat different grounds. In an opinion by Circuit Judge James B. Loken, the court rejected the state's assertion of the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to suit against the state officials, since the named state defendants had \"some connection\" to enforcement of the allegedly unconstitutional law. The state's arguments fared better, however, on the merits. Judge Loken noted that the state guardianship scheme did not categorically disenfranchise persons under full guardianship, since the state's courts retained authority to preserve a ward's right to vote in accordance with the state's statutory mandate to minimize deprivation of a ward's liberty. Thus, the state law did not deny equal protection or federal statutory rights, given the law's lack of a categorical bar to voting. Further, the court ruled that the advocacy group plaintiff (MOPAS) lacked standing to bring suit on behalf of mere constituents, who lacked the active relationship to the organization that exists when membership exists. Without participation by a ward who had been denied the right to vote because a guardian was appointed for reasons other than mental incapacity, MOPAS' assertion of the rights of such a hypothetical plaintiff was \"too abstract,\" according to Judge Loken, who saw MOPAS as asking for an impermissible advisory opinion. Missouri Protection and Advocacy Services, Inc., v. Carnahan, 499 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 2007). Likewise, the remaining individual plaintiff could not prevail, since his local election board had denied him the right to vote in error, not noting that his guardianship order expressly allowed him to retain that right. The board, noting the error after he had been added to the case as a plaintiff, issued him a voter registration card. This made his pending claim for injunctive relief moot, as there was no reasonable expectation that the earlier error would be repeated. Further, he had no standing to assert the rights of others and had not been injured by the alleged flaws in the Missouri voting laws, since his voting rights had been preserved in the guardianship order. Id. Efforts to seek rehearing and rehearing en banc were denied on October 18, 2007. After the appellate ruling in favor of the defendants became final, no further material activity occurred in this case. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Several Missouri residents with adjudged mental incapacities and appointed guardianship were barred from registering to vote and voting in elections in the state of Missouri. The individuals filed a civil suit in the Western District of Missouri against Missouri's governor, attorney general, and several election officials for violating their fundamental right to vote. The Federal District Court granted the defendant's motion for summary on the grounds that, because the state's guardianship scheme required individualized determination of a person's abilities and qualifications to vote, it did not violate the federal constitution or statutes. On plaintiff's appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit for several reasons, including a similar reason to the District Court that the state guardianship scheme did not categorically disenfranchise all persons under full guardianship, and for the remaining plaintiffs' lack of standing."}
{"article": "On January 13, 2006, Illinois parolees who were re-arrested for alleged parole violations filed this class action complaint under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sued the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) arguing that they had been unconstitutionally denied a timely parole revocation hearing. For violations of their constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the plaintiffs asked the Court for preliminary and permanent injunctions. On May 8, 2006, the court (Judge Robert W. Gettleman) certified a class consisting of individuals held for more than 10 business days without a preliminary parole revocation hearing. The court also granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the parolees had a constitutional right to a prompt, preliminary parole revocation hearing and a limited constitutional right to confront and cross examine persons who had provided testimony or evidence which could be used to revoke parole. On November 2, 2006, the parties reached a settlement and submitted the proposed agreement to the court, which approved the consent decree on January 26, 2007. The consent decree set specific timelines, notice provisions, and guidelines for inspections for revocation hearings. It prohibited the assignment of any DOC employee or agent from serving as Hearing Officers. The Court also appointed a monitor to assess progress for one year after entry of the consent decree, to be paid for his services by the defendant. On January 23, 2008, the monitor reported that the defendants had achieved substantial compliance with the provisions of the consent decree. The Court approved the final report and discharged the monitor. In 2012, new lawyers appeared for the plaintiff class, from the Roderick Macarthur Justice Center, at Northwestern University law school, and the Uptown People's Law Center. On November 30, 2012, the plaintiffs moved for a rule to show cause alleging that the defendants were no longer complying with the consent decree. On October 30 and 31, 2013, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the allegations. After the hearing, the parties stated they wanted to resolve the matter via settlement, so the court reserved ruling on the motion to show cause. The parties did reach a second settlement agreement, and on April 24, 2014, the court approved an amended consent decree. For one year and 90 days following the entry of the amended consent decree, the plaintiffs' counsel had the opportunity to observe 15 parole hearings. The parties reserved the determination of attorneys' fees and costs for the Court. After proceedings regarding attorneys' fees and costs, the court awarded the plaintiffs $140,000 for attorneys' fees and costs on October 31, 2014. The case is closed.", "summary": "In 2006, Illinois parolees who were re-arrested for alleged parole violations filed a class action complaint under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs sued the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) arguing that they had been unconstitutionally denied a timely parole revocation hearing. The parties settled in 2006 and entered a consent decree, which the court terminated in 2008 because the defendants had reached compliance. However, the case was reopened in 2013 when the plaintiffs reported the defendants noncompliance, and the parties entered an amended consent decree in 2014."}
{"article": "On March 14, 2013, the United States Department of Justice filed this complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The United States sued a Marion County-owned skilled nursing facility, the operation of which was largely funded through Medicaid, under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (\u201cCRIPA\u201d) and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (\u201cADA\u201d), alleging that the Defendant had a practice of violating the constitutional and statutory rights of residents at the nursing home. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant deliberately disregarded known harm or serious risks of harm to residents, and that its actions and failures to act caused harm to residents, including unnecessary segregation, and physical, mental and psychological harm. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant was violating the ADA by failing to serve individuals in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs, by not taking sufficient steps to assess, identify, and prepare individuals for discharge from the facility to programs in the community. The Plaintiff also alleged the Defendant failed to adequately screen individuals who are required by federal law to be screened before admission, resulting in individuals being served in a more restrictive setting than appropriate to their needs. The Plaintiff also alleged that the Defendant\u2019s healthcare services \u201csubstantially depart from professional standards,\u201d and thus failed to provide adequate healthcare, a constitutionally protected right. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant failed to monitor, evaluate, update, or review individual\u2019s care plans, despite new diagnoses or changes in conditions. For example, the Plaintiff alleged that on multiple occasions, residents showing symptoms of a stroke or began to foam at the mouth sometimes waited hours before nursing staff noticed or notified a physician. These failures allegedly resulted in unnecessary harm, including hospitalization, preventable falls, and a decline in functional abilities. Concurrently with the Complaint, the United States filed a settlement agreement, which it had already negotiated with the Defendant. The settlement involved a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment, and mandated improvements in three areas: (1) placement in the most integrated settings, (2) conditions of care and treatment, and (3) protection from harm. On March 22, 2013, Judge Charles A. Shaw for the United States District for the Eastern District of Missouri issued an order entering the settlement agreement as an order of the court. The Agreement provided for a third party to serve as the Monitor of compliance with the Agreement. The Agreement provided that it should terminate when the Defendant achieved substantial compliance with each provision of the Agreement and has maintained substantial compliance with the Agreement for a period of two years. First, to ensure placement in the most integrated settings, the Agreement required the Defendant to conduct adequate pre-admission evaluations to ensure that individuals were not inappropriately admitted to the facility. The Defendant was also required to implement a discharge and transition process to ensure that individuals who could be served in more integrated settings were identified and that such individuals would be part of a robust and individualized discharge planning process and implementation. The Agreement also provided for \u201cin-reach\u201d by community service providers to residents to actively support them in moving to more integrated settings. The Agreement established specific requirements for the \u201ccare plan,\u201d or formal written individualized plan of treatment, required for each individual living at the nursing home and those at risk of being institutionalized there. The Defendant was required to implement a quality assurance process to oversee the discharge and transition process. It was required to review this information on a quarterly basis, and on an annual basis, create a report summarizing its quality assurance activities, findings, and recommendations, and evaluate whether it had been effective in addressing the barriers preventing individuals from receiving services in the most integrated, appropriate settings. Second, to improve the Defendant's conditions of care and treatment, the Agreement required the Defendant to provide individuals at Maple Lawn with adequate and appropriate protections, treatment, supports, and services to meet the individualized needs of the individuals and that are consistent with generally accepted professional standards. This involved the following: improving health care assessments and care plans, establishing an effective infection control program to minimize the spread of infections or communicable diseases, ensuring that nutrition and hydration services as well as aspiration prevention care were sufficient, improving its psychiatric and psychosocial services, specifically its policies about psychotropic medication, improving pressure sore prevention and treatment policies, providing adequate pain management services, mortality reviews for individuals who die at the Defendant\u2019s facility or at an acute-care facility after being transferred from the Defendant\u2019s facility, and annual quality assurance reporting. Third, the Defendant was required to provide individuals with a safe and secure environment and ensure protection from harm. The Agreement mandated improvements in the Defendant's fall prevention and reporting policies, adequate reporting and investigation of all incidents where individuals sustain injuries, and annual quality assurance reporting. The Agreement provided for a third party to serve as the Monitor of compliance with the Agreement. The Agreement provided that it should terminate when the Defendant achieved substantial compliance with each provision of the Agreement and has maintained substantial compliance with the Agreement for a period of two years. The Monitor\u2019s first Semi-Annual Compliance Report was adopted by the Defendant and filed with the court on September 19, 2013. On January 30, 2014, the Plaintiff and Defendant filed a joint statement regarding Defendant\u2019s compliance with the settlement agreement, informing the court that they both agreed with the Monitor\u2019s finding that as of January 15, 2014, the Defendant had achieved substantial compliance with the terms of the Agreement. For the next two years, the Monitor and Defendant filed semi-annual reports on compliance with the settlement agreement. On April 15, 2016, the Plaintiff and Defendant filed a joint stipulation and motion for dismissal, in which they agreed and stipulated that the Defendant achieved substantial compliance on January 15, 2014 and remained in substantial compliance at all times through January 15, 2016. The parties jointly stipulated to the dismissal of the action, and each paid its own costs. District Judge Rodney W. Sippel dismissed the case, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "The United States sued a Marion County-owned skilled nursing facility under the ADA and CRIPA for alleged violations of the residents' constitutional and statutory rights. Concurrently with the complaint, the parties submitted a settlement agreement, requiring the Defendant to meet certain requirements related to terms of placement in the most integrated settings, conditions of care and treatment, and protection from harm. The District Judge issued an order entering the settlement agreement as an order of the court. After the parties agreed that the Defendant had met the Agreement's requirement of two years of substantial compliance, the parties filed a joint stipulation and motion for dismissal, and the case was dismissed."}
{"article": "On 06/28/1993, inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility filed a Section 1983 class action suit, pro se, in the Southern District of Ohio against officials in Youngstown, Ohio of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. Plaintiffs' claims were related to the treatment of prisoners during the prison riot that occurred in April 1993. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants locked as many as ten inmates in a cell, failed to protect them from violence, did not provide them with water or working toilets, used excessive force, destroyed personal property, and denied medical care. In December 1993, Magistrate Judge Robert A. Steinberg appointed several private lawyers and certified the class. By the summer of 1994, counsel, along with their expert Steven Martin, negotiated an end to the post-riot lockdown of general population inmates. By February 1995, counsel negotiated with Defendants for a special Rules Infraction Board to handle the cases of inmates against whom administrative charges for riot-related, violent misconduct were filed. Following extensive discovery, the parties reached an agreement and signed the Class Action Memorandum of Understanding in January 1997. The settlement included two major parts. First, the settlement established terms to improve the \"\"quality of life\"\" including: single-celling maximum security inmates; modifying the inmate classification system; improving racial and cultural relations; securing at least forty hours of out-of-cell time per week; and instituting new state-wide directives on religious practices. Second, the settlement established a $4.1 million fund, from which inmate damage claims, attorneys' fees and expenses would be paid. The case was dismissed conditional on completion of the reforms specified in the settlement agreement. Following a fairness hearing, the District Court (Judge S. Arthur Spiegel) approved the settlement in April 1997. Michael R. Barrett was named Special Master and has filed several status reports regarding the distribution of the fund. However, extensive litigation continued regarding the distribution of the fund and attorneys' fees. On December 12, 1999, the District Court (Judge Spiegel) approved a recommendation by the claims administrator that the two class representatives be paid $7,500 apiece. The stated basis for these awards was that \"the class representatives performed important work on behalf of the other members of class and class counsel,\" serving as a \"crucial link for class members and counsel throughout the proceedings\" and keeping the \"class members generally informed in the progress of the case and relay[ing] information back to class counsel.\" In a subsequent order, the district court stayed its grant of incentive awards pending appeal. In 2001, the Sixth Circuit (Judge David A. Nelson) reversed the district court's decision to grant incentive awards to the two named plaintiffs and place all inmates' claim determinations under protective order. In re Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, 2001 WL 1667267 (6th Cir. 2001). On November 4, 2002, Judge Spiegel entered an order granting class counsel's request for an order increasing the awards to class members pro rata and ordering the settlement master/trustee to distribute $500,000 to be awarded on a pro rata basis on each claimant's previous award totals. In 2004, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's disbursement of unassigned funds to certain prisoner-class members. The court held that the settlement agreement did not authorize the district court to make a pro rata distribution of the remaining settlement funds. Morris v. Voinovich, 2004 WL 1745781 (6th Cir. 2004). On January 20, 2005, Judge Spiegel approved the joint motion of the parties to distribute the remainder of the settlement fund. The remaining funds are to be used to support two re-entry caseworkers who will work with the class members to help them succeed on release. The court also acknowledged that sufficient effort had been made to attempt to track down all members of the class, and that the funds allocated to the former inmates who could not be traced were returned to the general pool. A second order on the same day awarded attorney\u2019s fees to counsel representing the class. Funds were distributed between 2005 and 2007. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In June 1993 inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility filed a civil rights class action for injunctive relief and damages for deprivations of rights based on the events and conditions of confinement after the April 1993 prison riot at the same facility. The court certified the class and the parties entered into a memorandum of understanding to settle the case. The memorandum of understanding outlined the steps Defendant would take to improve conditions of confinement and to address the deprivations of rights that occurred after the 1993 prison riot. The first component of the settlement agreement provides for an agreement on 11 issues aimed to improve the quality of inmate life. Among there are initiatives to review the housing and transfer policies and to improve racial, cultural, and religious relations. The second component of the settlement agreement established a $4.1 million fund, from which claims and attorneys fees would be paid. Claims were to be paid at the recommendation of the claims administrator, with any residual amounts to be used for inmate programming. There was further litigation concerning the right of two named plaintiffs to receive incentive awards. The district court granted incentive awards, but the decision was ultimately overturned by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit."}
{"article": "On August 29, 2014 Ada County and the Ada County Coroner filed a complaint in the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho. They sued Disability Rights Idaho (\u201cDRI\u201d) under Idaho Code \u00a7 10-1201 et seq., (Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act), and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57. At the request of the defendant, Disability Rights Idaho, Inc. (DRI), the case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Idaho on September 8, 2014. On September 18, 2014 DRI filed a counterclaim under the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (PAIMI), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 10801 et seq. and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. DRI sought injunctive and declaratory relief to challenge the refusal of the Coroner to provide timely access to the records sought. Ada County filed a motion to remand the case, but the motion was denied by Judge Edward J. Lodge on April 29, 2015. 2015 WL 1944003. Disability Rights Idaho (DRI) is a non-profit corporation that has been designated by Idaho to protect and advocate on behalf of people with mental illness, as defined in the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 10801 et. seq. (\u201cPAIMI\u201d). (PAIMI is a federal mandate that gives authority to investigate complaints of abuse, neglect, due process and rights violations in public and private facilities that provide overnight mental health treatment.) The dispute arose when the Ada County Coroner refused to provide its investigatory records relating to a suicide death of an individual, who had been residing in an inpatient behavioral health unit of an Ada County hospital. The Coroner denied DRI\u2019s request for non-public records and initiated this declaratory judgment action in State court in response to DRI\u2019s letter that stated they would initiate a federal lawsuit if necessary. DRI submitted an answer to the Coroner\u2019s complaint and a counterclaim. On June 15, 2015 both parties submitted Motions for Summary Judgment. In addition, DRI submitted a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Ada County Coroner argued that regardless of PAIMI, DRI did not have the right to access the Coroner\u2019s records of its death investigation, because the Coroner was not an \u201cagency\u201d as defined by PAIMI. The Coroner had also cited federal and state privacy concerns and questioned DRI\u2019s probable cause to investigate the death. On July 20, 2015, the Department of Justice (DOJ) submitted a statement of interest stating that federal law was clear that P&A\u2019s had broad access to investigatory records relating to mental health treatment facilities. The DOJ also stated that the Coroner\u2019s office was an \u201cagency charged with investigating,\u201d as stated in PAIMI, because it was a division of the Ada County government that was responsible for investigating deaths. On March 7, 2016, Judge Edward J. Lodge entered a judgment in favor of DRI. The court held that the Coroner was an \u201cagency charged with investigating\u201d reports of incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury under PAIMI and that the Coroner needed to release the records to DRI. 168 F.Supp.3d 1282. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Disability Rights Idaho (DRI) sought records pertaining to the death of an individual, who had been residing in an inpatient behavioral health unit of an Ada County hospital. The Ada County Coroner refused to provide the documents and DRI counterclaimed that the Coroner was obligated to provide the documents due to the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of 1986 (PAIMI). Judge Edward J. Lodge entered a judgment in favor of DRI instructing the Coroner to release the records."}
{"article": "In September 2006, the EEOC brought this suit against AutoZone, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, under title VII of 42 U.S.C \u00a7 2000e. In this case, it is alleged that Autozone discharged an employee who worked in a store because he opposed discriminatory conduct of his supervisor (store manager) on the basis of race and sex. The EEOC asked for (a) a permanent injunction enjoining AutoZone from engaging in retaliating or any other employment discrimination practice on the basis of race, sex or retaliation; (b) an order for AutoZone to institute and carry out policies, practices and programs which provide equal employment opportunities; (c) an order for AutoZone to provide backpay and compensate to a discharged employee; and (d) punitive damages. In 2003, the employee recognized that his supervisor's conduct and statements towards employees and customers were racially and sexually derogatory and harassing in nature. The employee suggested his supervisor refrain from such behavior, wrote a letter to AutoZone's district manager about the supervisor's behavior, and visited AutoZone's regional human resources manager to report harassment by the supervisor. Autozone did not take any action about the reported behavior. The employee was then discharged by AutoZone in 2004. On October 30, 2007, the District Court (Judge Kristi DuBose) granted AutoZone's motion for summary judgment stating that (1) AutoZone's discharge of him did not constitute retaliation against him after the involvement of EEOC; and (2) the supervisor's actions did not rise to the standard of racial harassment and sexual harassment, which are requirement of protection under title VII. The District Court entered judgment for AutoZone and dismissed the EEOC's claim with prejudice .", "summary": "In September 2006, the EEOC brought this suit against Autozone for discharging its employee who opposed discriminatory conduct of his supervisor on the basis of race and sex. The court dismissed the claim on 10/30/2007."}
{"article": "On April 13, 2010, a group of children in foster care in Clark County (Las Vegas), Nevada filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. The plaintiffs sued the Nevada Department of Health and Human Services, the Nevada Division of Child and Family Services, Clark County, and lark County Department of Family Services under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law. (Previously, NCYL had filed a similar suit on behalf of another group of children, <i>Clark K. v. Willden</i>, in August 2006, but voluntarily dismissed it after the judge decided against certification of the class and all the plaintiffs had either aged out of the system or been adopted. That case can be found at <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14916\">CW-NV-0002</a> in this Clearinghouse.) Back in this case, the plaintiffs alleged that County and State officials failed to protect the health and safety of children in foster care. According to the complaint, foster children in the county were denied stability, health care, and, in many cases, even the most minimal level of safety. Many children were taken from their homes only to be subjected to physical, sexual, or psychological abuse while in the county's custody. For example, child welfare officials placed an infant and her older brother in a foster home where the baby was locked in a closet, and her brother was beaten when he tried to help her. Another plaintiff was shuttled through 40 placements in the 15 years she was in foster care. Another child was hospitalized twice in the ICU for near organ failure after being given an overdose of psychotropic drugs. The plaintiffs sought money damages for thirteen children named in the lawsuit, and systematic improvements for several classes of children that represent more than half of the 3,600 children in foster care in the county. The suit also sought improvements for children who had not had guardians <i>ad litem</i> appointed to represent them in court, children who had not been provided early intervention services, and children who were sent to foster parents without case plans that contain the information needed to properly care for them. In May 2010, the defendants moved to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim. After extensive hearings and related motions, on Oct. 26, 2010, U.S. District Judge Robert C. Jones dismissed the action, holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiffs failed to assert a clearly established constitutional right. 2010 WL 4362809 (D. Nev. Oct. 26, 2010). The plaintiffs, however, then appealed. On May 4, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that foster children have a clearly established constitutional right to safety and adequate medical care. 678 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2012) (Fletcher, J.). On remand, the district court ordered the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint and the defendants to respond. On July 20, 2012, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, and in August 2012, the defendants moved to dismiss. Because of the delay that caused by the appeal, however, the plaintiffs had aged out of foster care, moved home with their families, or had been adopted. As a result of the plaintiffs exiting foster care, the district court on remand ruled on February 27, 2013 that only relief in the form of money damages would be available to them, except for the two plaintiffs that remained in the foster care system. 2013 WL 759479 (D. Nev. Feb. 27, 2013). Later, on January 10, 2014, the court further ruled that the two remaining plaintiffs also lacked standing to seek injunctive relief unless the plaintiffs filed a more definite statement supporting their claims as to the nature of the children's case plan deficiencies under 45 C.F.R. \u00a7 1356.21(g). 2014 WL 117562 (D. Nev. Jan. 10, 2014). In the spring of 2014, in the midst of trial preparation and shortly after the plaintiffs served their expert witness reports, the parties entered into settlement talks. The talks resulted in a settlement agreement of $2.075 million dollars in damages, approved on November 18, 2014 and entered on January 9, 2015. About $1.6 million directly benefited the seven former foster children, while $500,000 covered attorney fees and costs for the plaintiffs\u2019 attorneys. On November 12, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation to close the case, and the district court granted the stipulation on November 16, 2015, closing the case.", "summary": "On April 13, 2010, a group of foster children, foster parents, relatives, and advocates set out to reform the child welfare system in Clark County, Nevada. Two lawsuits later, the District Court approved a settlement agreement on January 9, 2015 for the amount of $2.075 Million. Each of the seven remaining plaintiffs received damages awards ranging from $100,000 to $350,000 for the many harms they experienced while in the Clark County foster care system. The money was placed either in trust or in annuities that will pay out over time."}
{"article": "On September 30, 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the Wichita U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas against O'Reilly Automotive, Inc., (doing business as O'Reilly Auto Parts) on behalf of a female employee. According to the EEOC, O'Reilly Automotive violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, by forcing the pregnant employee, an assistant manager whose doctor had imposed a 30-pound lifting restriction, to take unpaid leave and subsequently firing her. The EEOC sought its costs and monetary and injunctive relief for the employee, including policy reform, backpay, reinstatement, medical expenses, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages. The parties reached a settlement, which the Court (Judge Wesley E. Brown) entered as a consent decree on June 17, 2004. The 2-year decree provided $50,000 in monetary relief ($15,000 in lost wages and $35,000 in compensatory damages), subject to execution of a release of claims. The decree also provided for up to $200 for the employee to consult an attorney before signing the release. Under the injunctive provisions of the decree, O'Reilly Automotive was required to provide a positive reference, to adopt and distribute anti-pregnancy-discrimination policies to managers and supervisors, to provide equal employment training to all managers and supervisors, to post a pregnancy discrimination notice, and to report to the EEOC every 6 months about employees who took pregnancy-related leave, including whether the leave was voluntary, whether the employee was terminated, and why. The parties bore their own costs. No further court activity appears on the docket and the case is now closed.", "summary": "On September 30, 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the Wichita U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas against O'Reilly Automotive, Inc., (doing business as O'Reilly Auto Parts) on behalf of a female employee. According to the EEOC, O'Reilly Automotive violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, by forcing the pregnant employee, an assistant manager whose doctor had imposed a 30-pound lifting restriction, to take unpaid leave and subsequently firing her. The parties entered into a 2-year consent decree, which provided the employee with $50,000 ($15,000 in lost wages and $35,000 in compensatory damages) and subjected O'Reilly Automotive to an array of injunctive provisions. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On July 16, 2010, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 3601-3631, against the owners, operators and managers of a 268-unit apartment complex located in Renton Washington. The U.S. claimed that Defendants engaged in a pattern and practice of intentional discrimination against African Americans, Hispanics, people from India, and families with children by instructing staff not to show newly renovated apartments to them, steering them to less desirable buildings, demanding proof of citizenship, asking them not to speak to one another in their first language, requiring stricter application requirements, and refusing services. These behaviors were confirmed by testing conducted by the Fair Housing Council of Washington. The case proceeded towards trial, but then settled on March 7, 2011, when the Court (Judge James Robart) approved a jointly submitted Consent Decree. Besides general non-discrimination provisions, the Decree prohibited the defendant owner from employing its manager in any position in connection with housing rentals. It also required adoption, implementation, and notification to tenants of a Uniform Nondiscriminatory Procedure, and employee training on Fair Housing Act requirements. In included provisions on recordkeeping, monitoring, and reporting, to facilitate compliance. Finally, the defendants agreed to pay $85,000 for the establishment of a settlement fund for victims of the Defendants' discrimination and a $25,000 civil penalty to be paid to the United States. The consent decree terminated in 2014, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "This fair housing litigation was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, by the U.S., which accused the owners, operators, and managers of a 268-unit apartment complex in Renton Washington of a pattern and practice of intentional discrimination against African Americans, Hispanics, people from India, and families with children. The Complaint accused the defendants of instructing staff not to show newly renovated apartments to minority and family tenants, steering them to less desirable buildings, demanding proof of citizenship, asking them not to speak to one another in their first language, requiring stricter application requirements, and refusing services. These behaviors were confirmed by testing conducted by the Fair Housing Council of Washington. The case settled in March 2011, with a detailed consent decree setting out requirements for uniform and nondiscriminatory procedures, as well as other policy, training, and compliance mechanisms. The defendants also agreed to pay $85,000 for the establishment of a settlement fund for victims of the Defendants' discrimination and a $25,000 civil penalty to be paid to the United States."}
{"article": "This is a constitutional challenge to the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. \u00a7 7, as it applies to the immigration rights of lesbian and gay bi-national couples. It was filed on April 2, 2012, by five such couples, each lawfully married in South Africa, Vermont, New York, or Connecticut, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Represented by Immigration Equality and private pro bono counsel, plaintiffs sued the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS -- a component agency of DHS), seeking to compel recognition of their same-sex marriages and non-discriminatory adjudication of marriage-based immigrant benefits. Under DOMA, marriage \"means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.\" 1 U.S.C. \u00a7 7. In each of the plaintiff couples, one spouse is American and the other foreign; if the marriage were not same-sex, the American spouse could petition for an immigrant visa for the foreign spouse and place the foreign spouse on the path to lawful permanent residence and citizenship. However, following DOMA's direction, USCIS has denied plaintiffs those immigration benefits. Plaintiffs argue that this denial is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, constituting discrimination on account of both sexual orientation and sex. The Obama administration has announced that in its view, DOMA is unconstitutional and has therefore declined to defend it in court (although the federal government continues to enforce the statute). Accordingly, a \"Bipartizan Legal Advisory Group\" (BLAG) has been appointed by the (Republican) House of Representatives to appear in cases like this one and defend the constitutionality of DOMA. BLAG filed papers in this case on May 31, 2012. On July 25, 2012, the district court (Judge Amon) stayed proceedings in the case--including immigration enforcement against any of the plaintiffs--pending the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Windsor v. United States, No. 12 CV 2335 (2d Cir), a case already pending on appeal similarly challenging the constitutionality of DOMA. (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12113\">PB-NY-0017</a> in the Clearinghouse.) Since the government had declined to stay immigration enforcement, this was reported as a small victory by the plaintiffs. On July 8, 2013, following the Supreme Court's decision in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12113\">Windsor</a>, BLAG withdrew as intevenor-defendant. On August 26, 2013, after the Plaintiffs' notice of voluntary dismissal, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice.", "summary": "This is a constitutional challenge to the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. \u00a7 7, as it applies to the immigration rights of lesbian and gay bi-national couples. It was filed on April 2, 2012, by five such couples, each lawfully married in South Africa, Vermont, New York, or Connecticut, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. On July 25, the district court (Judge Amon) stayed proceedings in the case--including immigration enforcement against any of the plaintiffs--pending the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Windsor v. United States, No. 12 CV 2335 (2d Cir), a case already pending on appeal similarly challenging the constitutionality of DOMA. Since the government had declined to stay immigration enforcement, this was reported as a small victory by the plaintiffs. The case was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs in August 2013."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a hybrid putative class action and habeas action filed by a group of medically vulnerable individuals being held in civil detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at York County Prison and Pike County Correctional Facility. The plaintiffs seek safety remedies and release from detention in light of COVID-19. The court granted the plaintiffs\u2019 temporary restraining order on April 7, 2020. Defendants appealed. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded the decision for a temporary restraining order on August 25, 2020. The case is ongoing. <hr> A group of 22 medically vulnerable plaintiffs in civil detention facing potential deportation filed a hybrid putative class action and habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania asking for release in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 3, 2020, represented by the ACLU of Pennsylvania and the law firm Dechert LLP, the plaintiffs asked for a temporary restraining order against the detention centers and their wardens, including Mr. Clair Doll in his official capacity as the warden of the York County Prison, Craig A. Lowe as Warden of Pike County Correctional Facility, Simona Flores-Lund as Field Office Director, Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Matthew Albence as Acting Director of ICE, and Chad Wolf as Acting Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The plaintiffs based their request to the court on the defendants\u2019 alleged failures to adequately protect high-risk detainees from contracting COVID-19. Since March 31, 2020, the conditions at the facilities had deteriorated, with cramped, overcrowded facilities hindering social distancing, increased numbers of positive COVID-19 test results, and the rising necessity of quarantining. They based their claim for relief on the similarities between this case and Thakker v. Doll (found <a href=\"https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17460\">here</a> in the Clearinghouse), where the court found that the ICE detention centers could not provide adequately safe conditions for the detainees and thereby ordered their release. On April 7, 2020, Judge John E. Jones III of the federal district court issued a temporary restraining order and granted the immediate release of the 22 plaintiffs. On April 10, the defendants\u2019 Application to Stay all Proceedings Pending Appeal was denied. The case was appealed to the the Third Circuit, which vacated and remanded the the decision for a temporary restraining order on August 25, 2020. See Hope v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 26968. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a putative habeas action filed by a group of medically vulnerable individuals being held in civil detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at York County Prison and Pike County Correctional Facility. The plaintiffs seek safety remedies and release from detention in light of COVID-19. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded the decision for a temporary restraining order on August, 25, 2020. The case is ongoing. <hr>"}
{"article": "This lawsuit, brought in the the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, was filed on June 3, 2020. The plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from the ACLU of Southern California. This lawsuit followed nation-wide protests that occurred in response to the killing of George Floyd by a police officer in Minneapolis. While most protests were peaceful, some ended in violence, property destruction, rioting, and looting. Many cities, including Los Angeles and San Bernardino, issued curfews in an attempt to quell these riots. This action challenged these curfews as violations of free speech and assembly, free movement, due process, and challenged the San Bernardino curfew as a violation of the establishment clause (the San Bernardino curfew included a provision that exempted attendants of religious meetings from the curfew.) The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief that would void the curfew and prohibit the cities from enforcing them. The following day, June 4th, 2020, the case was assigned to District Judge Philip S. Gutierre and to Magistrate Judge Pedro V. Castillo. Judge Gutierrez informed the parties that he was part of a mandatory alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program and asked the parties to try to form an agreement before going to trial. On July 7, 2020, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the complaint, citing that fact that the city had rescinded the curfews already and not attempted to reinstate them. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This case challenged curfews in Los Angeles and San Bernardino, California. The curfews were issued in response to the nationwide protests following the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis. The complaint argued that these curfews were violations of the free speech and free assembly, free movement, and Due Process. It also argued that the San Bernardino curfew violated the Establishment Clause. The complaint sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case on July 7, 2020, because the city had rescinded the curfews and not attempted to reinstate them."}
{"article": "By filing a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas on February 6, 2008, which they amended on April 7, 2008, and again on September 16, 2008, nine named plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit naming, as defendants, the U.S. State Department and the United States. The plaintiffs alleged that each had been born in the U.S. years earlier, with the births occurring not in a medical facility but typically attended by a midwife who, for some, registered the birth as occurring in the U.S. Recently, each plaintiff had applied for a U.S. passport. Rather than adjudicate their applications by granting or denying each a passport, the State Department requested additional proof of U.S. citizenship from each. After supplying additional proof, the plaintiffs alleged that, usually, the agency did not acknowledge its receipt and, instead, advised the plaintiffs that their applications would be filed \"without further action.\" To the plaintiffs, this kind of stalling non-decision was how the agency avoided legal formalities and approvals required to actually deny a passport application and constituted, effectively, denial. The plaintiffs' U.S. citizenship assertions were often complicated by their having also been registered in Mexico as having been born there. Bogus Mexican birth registrations, filed by their parents, typically made the plaintiffs eligible for health benefits or school in that country when, at times, the parents resided there. Represented by the ACLU and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought to represent a national class consisting of \"all persons who have filed or will in the future file applications for United States passports, in whose cases, on or after April 8, 2003, the defendants did, or will in the future, 'file' or 'close' their applications without formally adjudicating them.\" The plaintiffs alleged that their inability to travel freely, resulting from the effective denial of their passport applications, significantly and unlawfully restricted their liberty. They sought a declaratory judgment under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1503 that the named plaintiffs were, in fact, U.S. citizens; a class-wide declaratory judgment that defendants had violated due process by failing to adjudicate and otherwise obstructing the class's applications, and corresponding injunctive relief; a class-wide declaratory judgment that defendants had violated equal protection by treating the class differently from similarly situated U.S. citizens of different race, ethnicity or ancestry, and corresponding injunctive relief; a class-wide declaration that defendants had violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 703, by acting arbitrarily and capriciously, and corresponding injunctive relief; a writ of mandamus compelling the defendants to actually adjudicate the applications and issue the passports; and attorneys' fees and costs. Plaintiffs also initially sought habeas relief, but dropped this cause of action in their second amended complaint. On October 15, 2008, the defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Over the course of the following six months, several individual plaintiffs obtained their passports and voluntarily dismissed their claims. On June 26, 2009, the parties informed the District Court that they had come to a agreement. Under the terms of their proposed settlement, the defendants agreed to re-adjudicate the applications of the class without denying them solely because an applicant had been birthed by a midwife on defendants' list of suspected or known birth certificate forgers, and to waive fees if the class member made a request by June 1, 2010. Defendants also agreed to train their employees on re-adjudication under the terms of the settlement, to give notice to the class, and to pay attorneys' fees of $150,000. The Court was to retain only contingent jurisdiction to mediate disputes over the settlement should the other dispute resolution mechanisms listed be exhausted, and the settlement was to last for two years and eleven months. The parties moved for preliminary approval and class certification for settlement purposes, and the Court (Judge Randy Crane) granted their motion on July 7, 2009. After hearing objections from individuals who wanted to be covered by the settlement but who had been denied passports and were thus not part of the class, and responses from the parties, who pointed out that the objectors were not bound by the settlement and could thus still bring their own claims, the Court (Judge Crane) gave its final approval to the settlement on August 14, 2009. (Note that on July 2, 2009, the Court approved the motion of three plaintiffs to sever their individual claims under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1503 for declarations that they were U.S. citizens, and created the separate case of Castelano v. Rice, No. 7:09-cv-00177, to address these claims. By October 25, 2010, all three plaintiffs had received their passports and dismissed their claims, reserving the right to file future 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1503 claims should the need arise.)", "summary": "This is a class action suit for declaratory, injunctive and mandamus relief brought by nine individuals against the U.S. State Department. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had illegally put their applications for passports on hold, effectively denying them, because their registration of birth in the United States had been filed by a midwife who appeared on list of known or suspected birth certificate forgers. A class settlement was reached in 2009 that allowed plaintiffs and other similarly situated individuals to have their applications for passports re-adjudicated without paying an additional fee and required defendants not to deny or shelve applications solely because an applicant was birthed by a midwife on the list."}
{"article": "On May 28, 2002, Disability Advocates, Inc., along with other public interest groups, filed a civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of state prisoners with mental illness. The complaint alleged that the New York State Office of Mental Health [OMH] and the New York State Department of Correctional Services [DOCS] were deliberately indifferent to the serious mental health needs of state prisoners with mental illness, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that a cycle of torment existed within the New York state prison system: a lack of adequate mental health care resulted in the placement of prisoners with mental illness in isolated confinement, which in turn caused greater psychiatric harm to those prisoners. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Defendants filed a motion to transfer the case which was denied by the District Court (Judge Gerard E. Lynch) on October 31, 2002. Thereafter, the parties conducted discovery through 2006. In April 2007, the parties reached a settlement, which Judge Lynch approved on April 27, 2007. The settlement requires that prisoners with serious mental illness confined in Special Housing Units (\"SHU\") will now receive a minimum of 2 hours per day of out of cell treatment and that prisoners in the RMHU receive as many as 4 hours, in addition to an hour of recreation. The settlement also provides: <ul><li>Multiple reviews of disciplinary sentences for prisoners with mental illness for the purpose of removing prisoners with serious mental illness from isolated confinement. <li>Residential programs for 405 prisoners with serious mental illness. <li>215 Transitional Intermediate Care Program beds for prisoners with mental illness in general population. <li>90 additional Intermediate Care Program beds for prisoners with mental illness who cannot tolerate the prison general population. <li>A 100 bed Residential Mental Health Unit (\"RMHU\") which will provide 4 hours per day of out-of-cell programming for prisoners with serious mental illness who would otherwise be in SHU. <li>The above are in addition to 310 residential mental health programs beds which the state instituted after the litigation commenced. <li>An additional 20 psychiatric hospital beds for prisoners in need of acute care. <li>Universal and improved mental health screening of all prisoners at admission to prison. <li>Improved suicide prevention assessments, now required upon admission to SHU. <li>Improved treatment and conditions for prisoners in psychiatric crisis in observation cells. <li>Limits on the use of observation cells, where prisoners in psychiatric crisis are deprived of most possessions and clothing. <li>Limits on punishment of prisoners with mental illness who hurt themselves because of their illness. <li>Limits on the use of the punitive 'restricted diet' (a loaf made from bread and cabbage) as a punishment for misconduct by prisoners with serious mental illness. <li>Elimination of isolated confinement of prisoners with serious mental illness in cells that have solid steel doors that severely isolate and restrict communication. </ul>The new state budget provides monies to carry out the State's commitments in the settlement agreement. These funds approximate over $50 million in capital construction costs; $2 million for additional OMH staffing for the 2007-2008 year to grow to $9 million when construction is complete; and nearly $2 million for additional DOCS staffing for the 2007-2008 fiscal year.", "summary": "On May 28, 2002, various public interest groups filed this \u00a7 1983 action in the Southern District of New York against the state's Mental Health office and Department of Correctional Services on behalf of state prisoners with mental illness. The plaintiffs claimed that the state's prisons' lack of adequate mental health care increased psychiatric harm in those prisoners. The parties settled in April 2007. The settlement required better mental health treatment and more recreational time for the prisoners."}
{"article": "On July 12, 2012, three African-American former store-management employees of Wet Seal who had been terminated filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs were represented the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and private counsel, and alleged that Wet Seal, Inc., and related corporations, which sell women's clothing in Wet Seal and Arden B. retail stores., had engaged in racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981. The plaintiffs filed the retaliation claims on their own behalf and the discrimination claims as a class action on behalf of black current or former store-management employees. The complaint sought injunctive relief, including reinstatement and monetary relief in the form of back pay, front pay, attorneys' fees, punitive damages, and compensation for emotional distress. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant discriminated against black employees in hiring, pay, promotion, and discipline, in comparison to similarly situated white employees. Plaintiffs further argued that senior level company management discriminated against black employees by firing them on account of their race and without cause. Senior-level management had pursued a racially discriminatory brand image of white women, preferably with blond hair and blue eyes, especially in markets with a greater percentage of white clientele, by instructing various levels of management to \"diversify\" stores with largely black employees by hiring more white employees and firing black employees. The plaintiffs claimed that their difficulty in obtaining subsequent employment was due to retaliation for resisting the defendant's discriminatory policies, alleging that the defendant had failed to provide fair references, and in one case, even failed to verify employment. On Jan. 9, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, that among other amendments, added another named plaintiff and new claims: a claim for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e) and claims for retaliation and hostile work environment under Title VII on behalf of individual plaintiffs. On May 8, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement, preliminary approval of settlement class, appointment of plaintiffs' counsel as class counsel, approval of notice plan and distribution of notice, and setting schedule for final approval. The settlement addressed both the class action and individual claims. The terms of the proposed settlement provided for a payment of $7.5 million, which included up to $1.8 million for attorney's fees and costs and $120,000 for administration of claims. The proposed settlement included injunctive relief, including diversity, nondiscrimination, and investigation training; development of fair job-related evaluation criteria; and a dedicated phone line for verifying employment. On June 10, 2013, a motion hearing was held before District Judge Andrew J. Guilford. The court granted class certification, appointed the plaintiffs' counsel as class counsel, and preliminarily approved the Settlement Agreement, and stayed all further litigation not related to the settlement approval process. Regarding the notice plan and distribution of notice, the court suggested several changes at the hearing that the parties adopted. On June 12, 2013, Judge Guilford signed the order, which included the following deadlines: class counsel was to file a motion for final approval of the settlement and Settlement Agreement by Oct. 18, 2013, and class counsel was to file a reply to any objection from class members no later than Nov. 11, 2013. On Nov. 18, 2013, a final approval hearing was held. On Dec. 9, 2013, the court issued an order granting final approval of the settlement. The court awarded a total of $1,729,037.80 to class counsel, which included attorneys' fees and reasonable costs for work performed to date as well as future monitoring and enforcement through the three-year term of the settlement. The court also granted in part the fee application by the plaintiffs' original attorney - who had been terminated from the plaintiffs' litigation team on July 3, 2012, and had disputed the terms of the settlement agreement - and found that she was entitled to a total fee award of $70,962.20. Over the 36 months of monitoring required by the settlement, the defendant filed periodic Monitor's Certificates of Compliance, in which the Monitor, the defendant's Vice President and Corporate Controller, certified to the court the status of the defendant's implementation of its programmatic initiatives with the Settlement Agreement. In the Dec. 11, 2014, Certificate of Compliance, the Monitor stated that it was satisfied that the defendant was complying with the Settlement Agreement. The case is now closed.", "summary": "The plaintiffs, African-Americans who had been terminated as store-management-level employees of Wet Seal, brought suit individually and as a class action for discriminatory practices regarding the pay, promotion, discipline, and firing of black store-management-level employees under 42 U.S.C . \u00a7 1981. Plaintiffs further alleged that the defendant retaliated against them by hindering their search for subsequent employment with unfair references or refusal to verify employment. Similar claims were later added under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e). The parties reached a class settlement to handle the class and individual claims of the case. The settlement provided for up to a total of $7.5 million in payments, including attorneys' fees, and a wide range of injunctive relief. The class settlement has not yet been approved by the court, so the case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On July 25, 2007, the parents of a young woman arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the County and City of Denver against the City and County of Denver, Colorado, Denver Department of Health and Hospitals. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel asked the court for declaratory relief, economic losses. compensatory and consequential damages, and punitive damages claiming under Title 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the defendants failed to provide medical care and treatments as well as failure to properly train and supervise. On the morning of February 18, 2006, Emily Rice was involved in a non-fatal car collision in which her car was destroyed and she suffered life-threatening injuries. After being transported by paramedics to the local hospital Denver Health, operated by the Defendant, she complained of shoulder and abdomen pain. She was booked at the Denver Health as a detainee. The only test performed on Rice was a breathalyzer to determine her blood alcohol which was determined to be .12. Rice was given ibuprofen and then released to the Denver Sheriffs for detention at the Denver County Jail. She was placed in an isolation cell for several hours. Rice continued to complain and was briefly seen by a nurse who told Rice to sleep the pain off. Rice fainted during the intake process. She was not treated by the jail nurse. The Denver Jail staff pulled Rice to her feet and continued the intake process. Rice began to complain of numbness in her feet which had turned cold and grey. The jail doctor was informed of Rice's condition and diagnosed her with drunkenness for which she needed to get sleep. Throughout the night Rice and other inmates yelled for help for which there was no reply from the guards. Eventually Rice complained of numbness is her legs and that was unable to move them. The on-staff nurse was informed of Rice's condition; she never visited to Rice to treat her. Approximately 24-hours after Rice's car collision, she died in her jail cell. The official medical report stated that the cause of death was a ruptured spleen. On December 2, 2008, settlement was reached for a non-disclosed amount. Media reports stated the amount was approximately $4 million. On December 17, 2008, Judge Marcia Krieger dismissed the case in light of the settlement.", "summary": "On July 25, 2007, the parents of a young woman arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the County and City of Denver against the City and County of Denver, Colorado, Denver Department of Health and Hospitals, claiming under Title 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the defendants failed to provide medical care and treatments as well as failure to properly train and supervise. On December 2, 2008, settlement was reached for a non-disclosed amount. Media reports stated the amount was approximately $4 million."}
{"article": "On January 8, 2016, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover property seized by the NYPD after an arrest. The case was assigned to Judge Denise L. Cote. The individual plaintiff was arrested in November 2014, and his iPhone and $1,399 in wages were seized by police. In his criminal case, which was dismissed in May 2015, he was represented by the Bronx Defenders, who are the second plaintiff to this lawsuit. The Bronx Defenders, a non-profit organization that provides criminal defense and civil legal services to law-income people in the Bronx, also assists hundreds of clients every year who are attempting to retrieve property seized pursuant to an arrest. Together they brought this lawsuit against the City of New York under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging that the city violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory damages for the individual plaintiff for the monies seized from him at his arrest, the replacement costs for his iPhone, and all applicable interest. According to the complaint, after a person is arrested, the NYPD routinely seized his or her personal property and recorded it in a computerized invoice system that tracked and categorized it. Once the criminal case against that individual was terminated, and the time to appeal had lapsed, the U.S. Constitution mandated that the government demonstrate a new legal basis to retain the property. But in practice, the NYPD often retained property and refused to release it until claimants obtained a \"DA Release,\" even where all charges had been dismissed and sealed. In the Bronx, the District Attorney's Office frequently failed to respond to requests for DA Releases, and the City did not provide an alternate recourse or assistance. The plaintiffs here alleged in the complaint that they tried numerous times - via voicemails, letters, and in-person requests - to obtain the property seized by the NYPD with no success. They subsequently filed this complaint against the city. The proposed class would consist of \"all individuals who have been or will be unable to secure the release from the NYPD Property Clerk of Personal Property seized in connection with an arrest where (i) the individual named on the voucher for the property can no longer be tried on any charge that was the original basis for the arrest, and (ii) the City has made no showing of any continued basis to retain the property.\" On May 17, 2016, Judge Cote signed an order referring this case to a magistrate judge for settlement, and the settlement discussions were to take place in June. However, on June 3, 2016, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, which added two additional individual plaintiffs who experienced similar property loss by the NYPD and provided more facts as to the NYPD's process of returning property seized after an arrest. Five days later, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. On July 25, 2016, the parties agreed to stay all proceedings through February 28, 2017 to work toward a possible settlement. Accordingly, on the same day, Judge Cote ordered that the plaintiffs' motion for class certification be denied without prejudice to renewal upon the expiration of the six-month stay. On March 1, 2017, the parties agreed to extend the stay, and at the parties\u2019 consent, Judge Cote referred the case to Magistrate Judge James Francis for further settlement discussions. On June 22, 2017, after nearly a year of unsuccessful settlement negotiations, the court lifted the stay, and litigation continued. Despite this, the parties did eventually reach a settlement agreement on February 9, 2018. The court ordered the settlement agreement into effect three days later. This settlement agreement required the city to pay the plaintiffs a total of $10,000 in damages and create a committee to assess its compliance over the two years that the agreement would be in effect. The Bronx DA was also required to reform its policies to make it easier for arrestees to recover their seized property in a timely fashion. The parties agreed to resolve their dispute over attorneys\u2019 fees at a later date. On August 15, 2018, the parties agreed that defendants would pay $675,000 to cover all costs and attorneys\u2019 fees. In an order issued on February 19, 2020, the obligations of the settlement were extended for the City of New York until June 30, 2020. The Bronx DA was released from its settlement obligations on February 12, 2020. As of May 27, 2020, there are no further entries in the docket, and the case is ongoing for enforcement.", "summary": "In January 2016, an individual and the Bronx Defenders, which had represented the individual during his criminal case, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover property seized by the NYPD after his arrest. The case settled in February 2018. The settlement required the city to pay $10,000 in damages and reform its arrest policies."}
{"article": "On November 3, 2016, a female prisoner in the custody of the Denver Women\u2019s Correctional Facility filed this pro se lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiff sued the State of Colorado, the Colorado Department of Corrections, and the Warden of the Denver Women\u2019s Correctional Facility under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, seeking damages. She claimed that defendants violated the ADA as well as her constitutional rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged she was denied a Sorenson Video Phone (SVP) after she placed multiple requests with the Department of Corrections to provide one so that she could communicate with her parents, who were deaf. The SVP offers a service for the deaf community paid for by the government for those who qualify under the ADA. Although the plaintiff originally struggled to meet the court\u2019s pleading standards, once she obtained counsel from the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center on March 31, 2017, she filed a third amended complaint on June 15, 2017, adding three new plaintiffs. The new complaint also added claims under the Rehabilitation Act and replaced allegations of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations with claims of First Amendment violations. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Gordon P. Gallagher and then later reassigned to Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak. On June 30, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the third amended complaint, claiming that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert her claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act and that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court disagreed with the defendants\u2019 arguments and on September 29, 2017, denied the motion to dismiss. The court found that the plaintiff had standing to assert her ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, that the plaintiff pleaded sufficiently plausible claims for relief. On January 22, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint, adding two plaintiffs and removing the Fourteenth Amendment claim. The defendants filed an answer to this complaint on February 5, 2018. The plaintiffs dismissed an additional defendant on October 25, 2018 without explanation. Four days later, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the Colorado Department of Corrections could not prove that the TTY phones it had were as effective as videophones and that CDOC provided no affirmative defenses under the Effective Communication Claim. In response, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on October 29, 2018, arguing in part that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies through the prison grievance system. The plaintiffs joined their case with <i>Rabinkov v. Colorado Department of Corrections</i>, another federal case against the CDOC regarding the provision (or lack thereof) of videophones to deaf prisoners or relatives of deaf individuals on November 20, 2018. On December 27, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class of similarly-situated deaf prisoners; however, the motion was withdrawn less than a month later. On January 14, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and on January 17, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On January 25, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 claim for failure to state a claim; this was dismissed by Judge Varholak on April 9, 2019. Defendants then moved for summary judgment and for dismissal on mootness grounds on May 6, and June 21, respectively. On September 18, 2019, Judge Varholak ruled on several outstanding motions: the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, filed on June 21, 2019, one plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment, filed on January 17, 2019, and the defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment, filed on May 6, 2019. Judge Varholak denied the June 21 motion (finding that the defendants had not met the burden to show that the plaintiffs\u2019 claims were moot), granted the January 17 motion (one plaintiff\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment on ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims), and granted in part and denied in part the May 6 motion (finding that two out of three plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies but denying the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss regarding the remaining plaintiff\u2019s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, First Amendment claims, and claims for compensatory damages). Finally, Judge Varholak ordered the Colorado Department of Corrections to make videophones available and to adopt effective and comprehensive policies relating to videophones. 2019 WL 4464036. On October 4, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a joint motion for referral to a settlement conference, and Magistrate Judge N. Reid Neureiter was assigned to conduct a settlement conference. The parties gave no reason for the sudden change in tactic. Currently, the conference is scheduled for October 28, 2019. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "This 2016 lawsuit was brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado by a female prisoner of the Denver Women\u2019s Correctional Facility who had been denied the use of a Sorenson Video Phone to communicate with her parents, who were deaf. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants had violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and her First Amendment rights. Currently, the case is scheduled for a settlement conference in October 2019."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: Twelve particularly vulnerable immigration detainees filed this habeas petition and complaint on March 24, 2020. The Court granted release on March 31, holding that their ongoing detention was unlawfully punitive given the grave threat posed by congregate detention during the coronavirus pandemic. On April 17, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, seeking class certification for all civil immigrant detainees in the Middle District of PA over the age of 45 or with underlying health conditions. On April 27, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, ruling that the plaintiffs who were detained at Pike County Correctional Facility could remain free, but those who were detained at York County Prison and at Clinton County Correctional Facility were to return to detention. Based on evidence of a plaintiff contracting COVID-19, the court granted in part plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, allowing the plaintiffs who are sick to remain free but ordering those who are asymptomatic to return to detention. A motion for classwide preliminary injunction is currently pending before the court. <hr> On March 24, 2020, twelve civil immigration detainees held by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at York County Prison (YCF), Clinton County Correctional Facility (CCCF), and Pike County Correctional Facility (PCCF) -- who because of their age or underlying medical conditions were particularly susceptible to serious illness or death in the event of a COVID-19 infection -- filed this habeas petition and complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Represented by the ACLU National Prison Project, ACLU Immigrants\u2019 Rights Project, ACLU of Pennsylvania, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued the warden of the above-named detention facilities, the acting directors of ICE and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the director of ICE's Philadelphia Field Office. The plaintiffs alleged that the harm posed by continued detention in conditions insufficient to prevent the rapid transmission of COVID-19 violated their substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. They sought a writ of habeas corpus ordering their immediate release or, in the alternative, injunctive relief ordering ICE to release them. The plaintiffs also sought attorney\u2019s fees and cost and declaratory relief that \"continued detention in civil immigration custody of individuals at increased risk for severe illness, including all people over ages forty-five and older and persons of any age with underlying medical conditions that may increase the risk of serious COVID-19, violates the Due Process Clause.\" The case was assigned to Judge John E. Jones. This complaint was filed in response to the COVID-19 outbreak in the U.S., which caused the state of Pennsylvania to declare a state of emergency. The outbreak resulted in unprecedented public health measures emphasizing and enforcing social distancing throughout the area, including the closure of non-essential businesses and a stay-at-home order for Philadelphia and surrounding counties. However, immigration detention facilities are \u201ccongregate environments,\u201d or places where people live and sleep in close proximity and, thus, cannot practice recommended social distancing and good hygiene measures. Given the crowding and lack of adequate medical infrastructure, if COVID-19 were introduced into the detention facilities it would spread easily. The spread of COVID-19 (for which there is no vaccine, known treatment, or cure) would be especially dangerous for detainees over the age of 45 or those with certain underlying health conditions such as lung, heart, and kidney disease--characteristics that the plaintiffs possess. The plaintiffs asserted that \"there is growing recognition among courts and even prison systems that release from detention is the only way to protect vulnerable detainees from COVID-19.\" The plaintiffs asserted that the Fifth Amendment guarantees that civil detainees, including immigrant detainees with criminal backgrounds, may not be subjected to conditions that amount to punishment. The plaintiffs claimed that continued detention in the face of a potential COVID-19 outbreak in the facilities amounts to punishment because it serves no legitimate purpose, is not \"rationally related to the enforcement of immigration laws,\" and \"because their conditions of confinement place them at serious risk of being infected with COVID- 19 and Defendants are being deliberately indifferent to this critical safety concern.\" The plaintiffs argued that ICE has the authority to exercise discretion in releasing vulnerable civil immigrant detainees like the plaintiffs and ensure adequate conditions for their release. Lastly, plaintiffs contended that the \"only course of action that can remedy these unlawful conditions is release from the detention centers where risk mitigation is impossible.\" On the same day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a preliminary injunction (PI) to enjoin \"Defendants from continuing to detain Plaintiffs in violation of their constitutional rights.\" The plaintiffs argued that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claim, that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a TRO/PI, and that the public interest weighs heavily in favor of a TRO/PI. On March 27, the plaintiffs filed a factual update, informing the court that two of the plaintiffs had been released from PCCF. On March 29, the defendants filed a response and opposition to the plaintiffs' petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion for TRO and/or PI. The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs lack standing, as the \"Petitioners have not alleged that COVID-19 has affirmatively spread to the Pike, York, or Clinton county facilities.\" The defendants further argued that a \"petition for habeas relief seeking immediate release is inappropriate in the context of a conditions of confinement claim.\" Finally, the defendants asserted that a TRO/PI is inappropriate because the plaintiffs did not establish that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claim and that they did not demonstrate irreparable harm. On March 31, Judge James issued a memorandum and order granting the plaintiffs' motion for TRO and directing defendants to immediately release plaintiffs that same day. Judge Jones also ordered that by April 7, 2020, the defendants show cause why the TRO should not be converted into a PI. In finding that a TRO was appropriate, Judge James concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims despite no confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the facilities; \"'since '[a] remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event,' it is evident that the Petitioners have standing in this matter.\" Judge Jones further found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated irreparable injury, as they \"have shown that adequate measures are not in place and cannot be taken to protect them from COVID-19 in the detention facilities, and that catastrophic results may ensue, both to Petitioners and to the communities surrounding the Facilities.\" Judge Jones held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their due process claim; \"[c]onsidering the Facility conditions previously discussed, we can see no rational relationship between a legitimate government objective and keeping Petitioners detained in unsanitary, tightly-packed environments\u2014doing so would constitute a punishment to Petitioners.\" On April 7, the defendants filed their response to the court's order to show cause. The defendants contended that a habeas petition was not appropriate in this case, as the plaintiffs challenged their conditions of confinement, not the validity of their confinement. The defendants also proclaimed that the evidence demonstrates that \"the Government has taken steps to protect the Petitioners\u2019 safety and the safety of other detainees from prevention, uncontrollable spread, diagnoses, and treatment of COVID-19.\" Lastly, the defendants asserted that the balance of equities and public interest favored denying injunctive relief because release is not appropriate due to the plaintiffs' criminal or immigration backgrounds. On April 13, Judge Jones issued an order extending the TRO until April 27. Judge Jones stated that this extension was warranted given the worsening situation of the COVID-19 pandemic and to give \"both parties ample opportunity to augment the record before us prior to our decision on the issuance of a preliminary injunction.\" A few days later, on April 17, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, requesting that the Court \"certify a class of noncitizens at elevated risk of suffering severe health consequences or dying if they contract COVID-19, and to issue expedited relief.\" The plainitffs' proposed class was defined as: \"all noncitizens who are now, or will in the future be, detained in ICE custody in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and who have been diagnosed with, or are receiving treatment for, a preexisting medical condition and/or are over the age of 45.\" The plaintiffs asserted that, upon information and belief, \"there are dozens more who are detained at the three ICE facilities who fit the class definition. The class is also fluid as individuals are regularly brought into the facilities as detainees.\" The amended complaint also added 11 civil immigrant detainees, who because of their age or underlying health conditions are at a high risk of severe illness or death if they were to contract COVID-19, as plaintiffs. On April 27, Judge Jones issued a memorandum and order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion to convert the TRO to a preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction required that three of the named plaintiffs from Pike County Correctional Facility (PCCF) remain released until the end of the COVID-19 State of Emergency in Pennsylvania or social distancing guidelines are lifted. Judge Jones declined to grant the preliminary injunction with regard to plaintiffs from CCCF and YCP and required that they \"voluntarily surrender themselves to the institution from which they were released.\" As an initial matter, Judge Jones concluded that the plaintiffs could challenge their conditions of confinement through habeas and that the plaintiffs had standing, despite no named plaintiffs having contracted COVID-19. Furthermore, Judge Jones held because the conditions of confinement varied across facilities, only the plaintiffs held at PCCF were likely to succeed on the merits of their due process claim. Judge Jones also found that conditions at YCP and CCCF \"had been adequately improved such that the Petitioners previously housed therein were no longer at risk of irreparable harm resulting from COVID-19.\" As of the filing of that order, there had been only one confirmed case between YCP and CCCF. 2020 WL 2025384. The next day, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for stay and reconsideration. The plaintiffs presented evidence that one of the plaintiffs who had been ordered to return to detention had been in the hospital for weeks, likely due to contracting COVID-19. The plaintiffs argued that \"the timing of events makes it nearly certain that he contracted the virus while at CCCF.\" The same day, Judge Jones granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. Judge Jones vacated the April 27 order and permitted the continued release for two of the named plaintiffs based on the evidence that they had contracted COVID-19. Judge Jones ordered that those plaintiffs who are asymptomatic return to detention Later that day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for an emergency stay in the Third Circuit (No. 20-01906) and, in the district court, an emergency motion to stay pending appeal. The plaintiffs argued that the district court had reached an erroneous decision, \"based on an incomplete record, a misunderstanding of the science behind the disease, and legal errors.\" The plaintiffs further asserted that the facilities had not conducted an adequate amount of tests to conclude that it was safe to return the plaintiffs to detention. The next day, a Third Circuit panel denied the plaintiffs' motion for an emergency stay. The panel did not provide an explanation for its decision. On May 1, the plaintiffs filed a motion for classwide preliminary injunction. The defendant's filed a motion in opposition on May 22. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or to strike on June 15, requesting the court dispose of the 6 individual claims brought based on <i>Zadvydas v. Davis</i>. The plaintiffs filed a motion in opposition to this motion on June 22. The Clearinghouse does not have access to these documents, or many of the following documents. On June 29, Judge Jones granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the individual claims under <i>Zadvydas</i>, stating that the plaintiffs could separately file individual habeas actions under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241. On July 8, the plaintiffs filed an Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction Enjoining Transfers of individual plaintiffs and a corresponding Brief of Support. Defendants moved for a Protective Order on July 13, which was granted in part and denied in part. On July 14, the court issued an Order Referring Motion, where the defendants agreed to provide prior notice to plaintiffs' counsel before the transfer of any named class representative or putative class member. The plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction Enjoining Transfers was referred to Magistrate Judge Martin Carlson for any appropriate proceedings, if necessary. On July 21, the plaintiffs filed an Emergency Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should not be Held in Contempt of Court for Violating Order Regarding Transfers. The next day, the court ordered defendants to arrange for direct communication with plaintiffs' counsel within 24 hours regarding transfers without prior notice in violation of the July 14 order. On July 29, the plaintiffs filed a Brief in Support of Classwide Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification. On August 3, the defendants filed a Brief in Opposition to the plaintiffs' July 21 Emergency Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should not be Held in Contempt of Court for Violating Order Regarding Transfers. On August 4, the defendants filed a Reply Brief to the plaintiffs' July 8 Motion for Preliminary Injunction Enjoining Transfers. As of October 7, 2020, this case is ongoing.", "summary": "In March 2020, during the outbreak of COVID-19 in the United States, persons critically vulnerable to the infectious disease and held in an immigration detention facilities near Philadelphia filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs filed a habeas petition, suing ICE, its directors, and the wardens of three detention facilities for violation of their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs argued that continued detention in the face of a potential outbreak in the detention facility, which would expose the plaintiffs to substantial harm, amounted to punishment, in violation of the Due Process Clause. On March 31, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order and directed ICE to release the plaintiffs immediately. This TRO has been extended to April 27. On April 17, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint seeking class certification of all civil immigrant detainees in the Middle District of PA over the age of 45 and/or with underlying conditions. On April 28, the court granted in part the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, holding that plaintiffs from Pike County Correctional Facility could remain released. The next day, the court ordered the continued release of two plaintiffs who were suspected of contracting COVID-19. The plaintiffs filed a motion for classwide preliminary injunction, which is currently pending before the court."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: Three residents of Michigan sued Governor Whitmer, challenging that an Executive Order issued to combat the spread of COVID-19, which required residents to stay home and suspend non-essential activity and business, violated their Equal Protection, Due Process, and First and Second Amendment constitutional rights. On April 24, the defendant issued an executive order permitting the activities that the plaintiffs alleged were unconstitutionally prohibited. The motion for preliminary injunction was dismissed as moot, however, the plaintiffs filed an amended motion on April 28. <hr> On April 15, 2020, three Michigan residents, two owning cottages in the state and one owning a landscaping business, filed this complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Governor of the State of Michigan and three county prosecuting attorneys, in their official capacities, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and Michigan state law. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Freedom Law Center, challenged Michigan's Executive Order 2020-42, which ordered all people in Michigan to stay home and suspended activities deemed unnecessary to sustain or protect life. The plaintiffs sought relief declaring that the enactment and enforcement of Executive Order 2020-42 violated \"their fundamental liberties and rights secured by the United States and Michigan Constitutions and an order enjoining the same.\" The plaintiffs also sought attorneys' fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Paul L. Maloney. On April 9, 2020, Executive Order 2020-42 was enacted in response to the outbreak of COVID-19 in Michigan; as of April 8, Michigan reported 20,346 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 959 deaths from it. The order directed all Michigan residents to stay home, subject to exceptions for exercise and obtaining services or supplies, prohibited \"all public and private gatherings of any number of people occurring among persons not part of a single household,\" and required that \"no person or entity shall operate a business or conduct operations that require workers to leave their homes or places of residence except to the extent that those workers are necessary to sustain or protect life or to conduct minimum basic operations.\" The order was put in place with the goal of suppressing the spread of COVID-19, preventing the state's health care system from being overwhelmed, and allowing time for the production of test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment. It was set to stay in effect until April 30, 2020. The plaintiffs claimed that the Executive Order violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing it lacked any rational basis and deprived plaintiffs of their \"fundamental rights and freedom,\" such as the right to travel to their cottages, conduct landscaping business, and travel to purchase ammunition, \"yet the order provides exceptions for other activity and conduct that is similar in its impact and effects.\" Moreover, the plaintiffs asserted that the Executive Order violated their right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment, as it deprived plaintiffs of \"the use and enjoyment of their property without due process\" and because \"it broadly prohibits Plaintiffs . . . from traveling through public spaces and roadways to their cottages, and yet the executive order permits other travel with the same impact and effect of Plaintiffs\u2019 forbidden travel.\" Furthermore, the plaintiffs asserted that the Executive Order violated their \"right to contract without government interference,\" their right to keep and bear arms, and their right to \"associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.\" On April 20, the plaintiffs sought a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and asked for an order temporarily enjoining enforcement of Executive Order 2020-42 pending a hearing on whether a preliminary injunction should issue. On April 24, 2020, the defendant issued Executive Order 2020-59, which permits: individuals to travel between their own residences and cottages within the State of Michigan, the operation of landscaping businesses within the State of Michigan, outdoor activities that include using boats with motors for recreational purposes, the sale of guns from any store via remote order and curbside pick-up, and the sale of guns in-store from stores that sell necessary supplies as well as guns in their normal course of business, and exempts from penalty religious gatherings at private residences. On April 26, the plaintiffs stated that the requested relief is no longer necessary because the stipulation rendered the TRO and PI motion is moot. The next day, the court dismissed the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. On April 28, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, claiming that while stipulation remedied the immediate harm, it did not resolve the constitutional issues presented. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on May 20, arguing that the plaintiffs' claims had become moot due to the series of executive orders that permitted the activities that the amended complaint alleged were prohibited. They further argued that the State had the broad authority to implement emergency measures during an emergency. The case is ongoing but with little activity since the summer.", "summary": "In April 2020, three residents of Michigan sued the Governor of Michigan and three county prosecuting attorneys in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The plaintiffs challenged Executive Order 2020-42, which was enacted to combat the spread of COVID-19 in Michigan and required residents to stay at home and suspend all non-essential activities. The plaintiffs claimed that the challenged measures of the Executive Order violated their constitutional rights, lacked a rational basis, and had no real or substantial relation to the objectives of the order. On April 24, the defendant issued an executive order permitting the activities that the plaintiffs alleged were unconstitutionally prohibited. The motion for preliminary injunction was dismissed as moot, however, the plaintiffs filed an amended motion on April 28. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On November 2, 2020, asylum seekers with disabilities and health conditions filed this putative class-action suit against the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Customs and Border Protection in the Southern District of California. The suit alleged that defendants violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by forcibly returning plaintiffs to Mexico under the Migrant Protection Protocols (the \u201cMPP\u201d). Under the MPP, asylum seekers entering the United States from Mexico were returned to Mexico and waited outside the U.S. for the duration of their immigration proceedings. The plaintiffs stated that MPP conflicted with CBP\u2019s own procedure at the time that asylum seekers with \u201cknown physical or mental health issues\u201d cannot be sent to Mexico. They alleged that DHS failed to put in place effective methods to ensure that people with known physical or mental health conditions were exempt from MPP and to identify and assess, for accommodations, immigrants with disabilities. The plaintiffs sought an order enjoining the defendants from continuing forcible removal of class members under MPP and requiring the defendants to put in place practices and procedures in compliance with Section 504. They also requested attorneys\u2019 fees. The plaintiffs were represented by the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Texas Civil Rights Project, and private counsel. The case was assigned to Judge Todd W. Robinson and Magistrate Judge Bernard G. Skomal. On November 3, 2020, the case was related to Doe v. McAleenan, docket number 3:19-cv-2119, (<a href =\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17356\">IM-CA-0152</a> in the Clearinghouse). This case similarly challenged deportation under MPP. On December 22, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to stay pending the appeal of a separate case. The judge denied the motion on February 19, 2021. There were joint motions to continue on March 2, 2021. On December 23, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. They requested that defendants stop subjecting members of the putative class to the MPP. They further requested that defendants put in place mechanisms ensuring CBP\u2019s protocols of exempting those with known physical or mental health issues was being carried out, that family members of the putative class were also excluded pursuant to the Family Unit Policy, and that defendants put in place practices and policies to identify immigrants with disabilities and provide accommodations necessary for those with disabilities to prepare for their asylum proceedings. On the same day, the plaintiffs also filed a motion requesting class certification for asylum seekers with disabilities and their family members. On February 22, 2021, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. As of March 12, 2021, there has not been a ruling on the motion. This summary is up-to-date as of March 12, 2021 and the case is ongoing.", "summary": "On November 2, 2020 asylum seekers with disabilities and health conditions filed a putative class-action suit against the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Customs and Border Protection in the Southern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that defendant's violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction and an order enjoining defendants from subjecting members of the putative class to removal protocols and attorney's fees. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "Plaintiffs, foreign nationals, filed suit in May 2007 in United States District Court for the Northern District of California against Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc., a subsidiary of Boeing Company, for its participation in a U.S. extraordinary rendition program operated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that apprehended, transported, imprisoned, interrogated, and, in some instances, tortured the plaintiffs. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, plaintiffs brought action under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1350, alleging that Jeppesen provided flight planning and logistical support of the extraordinary rendition of plaintiffs, with knowledge that its involvement would lead to unlawful apprehension, detention, and possible torture. In October 2007, the United States moved to intervene and moved to dismiss the case, asserting the \"states secret\" privilege. Then-director of the CIA, General Michael Hayden, filed declarations in support of the motion to dismiss, asserting that disclosure of information could cause serious or grave damage to national security. After conducting a hearing, the district court granted the motion to intervene and to dismiss. Mohamed v. Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Plaintiffs immediately appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case, ruling that the states secret privilege in this context operated only as an evidentiary privilege, the exact parameters of which were indeterminate until plaintiffs made an actual request for discovery of specific evidence. Mohamed v. Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc., 563 F. 3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), amended by 579 F. 3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009). Meanwhile, Barack Obama succeeded George W. Bush as President of the United States. His administration announced new policies for invoking the states secrets privilege and reviewed the assertion of privilege in this case. Government then requested the Ninth Circuit for a rehearing en banc, which the court granted. Mohamed v. Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc., 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2009). Upon rehearing, an eleven judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court order of dismissal. Even though plaintiff's prima facie case and Jeppesen's defenses may not have depended on privileged evidence, the court found that \"the facts underlying plaintiffs' claims are so infused with state secrets, \" there was \"no feasible way to litigate Jeppesen's alleged liability without creating an unjustifiable risk of divulging state secrets.\" Mohamed v. Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1088, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit then noted possible nonjudicial relief, including government-provided reparations, a Congressional investigation and legislation restraining the executive branch, Congressional legislation enacting a private bill, and Congressional legislation enacting remedial schemes to address claims like plaintffs'. Id. at 1091-92. Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which denied certiorari in May 2011.", "summary": "Plaintiffs, foreign nationals, filed suit in May 2007 in United States District Court for the Northern District of California against Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc., a subsidiary of Boeing Company, for its participation in a U.S. extraordinary rendition program operated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, plaintiffs brought action under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1350. Following motions to intervene and to dismiss by the United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case due to invocation of states secrets privilege. Mohamed v. Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1088, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010)."}
{"article": "On September 29, 2006, the Los Angeles District Office of the EEOC brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Guam. The plaintiff sued Leo Palace Resort under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff, representing female employees of Leo Palace Resort, asked the court for permanent injunctive relief, a requirement of policy changes at defendant's company, and monetary damages. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant engaged in unlawful employment practices by subjecting female employees to sexual harassment and by retaliating against employees for complaining of discrimination. Specifically, three female employees alleged that they experienced frequent sexual harassment from a coworker in the form of physical touching, requests for sex, and inappropriate gestures. When the employees complained the defendant employer retaliated by reducing their hours, taking disciplinary action, and failing to keep their complaints confidential. Two employees were constructively discharged as a result. The complainants intervened in the EEOC's suit and the defendant moved to dismiss their claims and moved for summary judgment. The summary judgment motion was denied and the motion to dismiss was denied as premature. The parties engaged in discovery for the next year, and agreed to have a hearing date without oral argument. On September 10, 2007, the defendants again filed for partial summary judgment, arguing that this was only a question of negligence on behalf of the company in response to complaints of its employee, and not a sexual harassment suit. On March 13, 2008, before the court had heard the motion for partial summary judgment, the parties parties jointly submitted a consent decree. On March 21, 2008 Judge Frances M. Tydingco-Gatewood approved the consent decree. The agreement required the defendant to pay the complainants a total of $243,000. It also required the defendant to create an anti-discrimination policy; institute a complaint procedure; hire an outside consultant to ensure compliance with the decree; post and distribute a notice of equal opportunity employment rights; and conduct annual training for all employees. On May 8, 2008 the case was dismissed with prejudice.", "summary": "On September 29, 2006, the Los Angeles District Office of the EEOC brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Guam. The plaintiff sued Leo Palace Resort under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant engaged in unlawful employment practices by subjecting female employees to sexual harassment and by retaliating against employees for complaining of discrimination. On March 21, 2008 Judge Frances M. Tydingco-Gatewood approved a consent decree between the two parties. The consent decree required the defendant to pay the complainants a total of $243,000. It also required the defendant to create an anti-discrimination policy; institute a complaint procedure; hire an outside consultant to ensure compliance with the decree; post and distribute a notice of equal opportunity employment rights; and conduct annual training for all employees."}
{"article": "Two refugees whose families fled Cambodia in the 1970s filed this class action lawsuit, challenging U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for arbitrarily and unlawfully detaining them. The plaintiffs represented other Cambodian refugees living in the U.S. since escaping the violence of the Khmer Rouge regime. The plaintiffs argued that ICE violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by unlawfully revoking their release from its custody and detaining them when removal was not reasonably foreseeable and without individualized determinations of danger and flight risk. The plaintiffs sought habeas, declaratory, and injunctive relief. Represented by Asian Americans Advancing Justice and a private law firm, the plaintiffs filed this case on October 27, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The complaint sought to declare a class of approximately 1,900 individuals. The plaintiffs stated that all class members escaped the Khmer Rouge regime and its \"campaign of mass murder and torture\" in Cambodia in the 1970s when they were young children. They had lived in the United States ever since, growing up \"in communities in crisis...struggl[ing] with unaddressed trauma, poverty, and violence-ridden neighborhoods, with almost no culturally competent resources to address their needs.\" Class members \"made mistakes in their youth,\" which led to involvement in the criminal justice system, loss of their Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) status, and removal proceedings. However, ICE subsequently released the class members after Cambodia disallowed repatriation. ICE allowed the class members to return to their communities but required them to regularly report back to demonstrate they were complying with the conditions of their release. Many of these class members established families in the U.S. The complaint stated that, as of October 2016, Cambodia suspended a 2002 repatriation agreement with the U.S. A year later, following a U.S. government freeze on further tourist visas to Cambodians until Cambodia agreed to aid the U.S. in removing Cambodian refugees, ICE began raiding Cambodian refugee homes and workplaces. The plaintiffs asserted that ICE conducted these raids \"without cause and without providing procedural protections required by law . . . [and] without any evidence that Cambodia would now accept their repatriation.\" Further, the plaintiffs argued that they \"received no adequate explanation of the reasons for detention, no opportunity to be heard regarding any purported reasons for detention, and no individualized consideration before a neutral decisionmaker regarding whether they pose a danger or flight risk that could warrant detention.\" On October 30, the case was assigned to Judge Cormac J. Carney. On December 12, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. They also filed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) as to the removal of plaintiffs scheduled to begin on December 18, arguing that because they only had learned that removal proceedings were to commence on December 7, they needed the TRO so that they could have an opportunity to reopen and challenge their orders of removal. These documents are not publicly available. Judge Carney granted the TRO on December 14. While the amended complaint is not publicly available, it appears that the complaint sought to define a class \"on behalf of approximately 1,900 individuals who received orders of removal to Cambodia but were subsequently released from custody and have since been living in the United States.\" Judge Carney granted a preliminary injunction on January 25, 2018. 306 F. Supp. 3d 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2018). He enjoined the government from executing final removal orders as to the plaintiffs and a subclass of 92 putative class members who received or were being considered for travel papers. The injunction prevented final removal orders until February 5, 2018. Judge Carney held that denying an injunction \"amounts to a denial of due process\" because while removal orders for many of the plaintiffs have been dormant for over a decade, \"[c]ircumstances have changed in the interim that may allow Petitioners to raise serious questions regarding the validity of their underlying convictions and removal orders.\" On February 8, the government moved to dismiss the case; the plaintiffs responded on March 2, and the government replied on March 12. On February 23, the plaintiffs moved to relate this case to <i><a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16464\">Trinh v. Homan</a></i>, a case challenging ICE's detention of Vietnamese refugees stripped of their LPR status due to criminal convictions. On March 14, Judge Carney granted plaintiffs' motion to relate the cases. On March 19, the plaintiffs moved for another preliminary injunction and class certification. Meanwhile, the defendants appealed Judge Carney's January 25 preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit, which opened a new docket (No. 18-55389). After a March 26 hearing, Judge Carney denied the government's motion to dismiss, and granted the plaintiffs' habeas claim. 2018 WL 1941756 (C.D. Cal.). First, Judge Carney held that the Court had jurisdiction over the habeas petition and due process claim, because plaintiffs challenged not the removal order itself but the legality of the detention. Judge Carney then ordered plaintiff released from ICE custody, finding his arrest, detention, and threatened deportation unlawful. Judge Carney wrote: <blockquote>Chhoeun poses no danger to the community. Prior to ICE\u2019s wrongful re-detention of him, he was living peaceably in the community for the past fourteen years. He was gainfully employed. He had built strong ties to his family and his community. The Government simply had no justification to take away, without due process, Chhoeun\u2019s liberty to carry out his life. . . . The Government\u2019s argument [that an person subject to an order of removal lacks due process rights] trivializes, indeed ignores, fundamental principles of liberty and due process embedded in our Constitution. . . . And due process demands that the Government consider the totality of an individual\u2019s circumstances before taking away his or her liberty. <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16434\">Ragbir v. Sessions</a>. . . . The Government\u2019s position, which would do away with any individualized consideration before taking away someone\u2019s liberty, is repugnant to due process.</blockquote> On April 12, Judge Carney rejected the proposed class definition because a class consisting of 13 members was not numerous enough. On May 11, 2018, certain defendants moved for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. On June 4, 2018, Judge Carney denied the motion without prejudice. On May 24, 2018, the government appealed the March 26 order denying their motion to dismiss. On July 2, 2018, the plaintiffs again moved to certify the class, which the district court approved on August 14, 2018. Judge Carney certified the following class: \"All Cambodian nationals in the United States who received final orders of deportation or removal, and were subsequently released from ICE custody, and have not subsequently violated any criminal laws or conditions of their release, and have been or may be re-detained for removal by ICE.\" Back at the Ninth Circuit, on December 7, 2018, the government moved to voluntarily dismiss their March 23 appeal of Judge Carney\u2019s preliminary injunction. Voluntary dismissal of this appeal was granted on December 11, 2018. 2018 Us App Lexis 34850 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 2018). On December 31, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order, enjoining the government from re-detaining any class member without notice. The plaintiffs alleged that the government had conducted two raids since the raid involving the plaintiffs, detaining many class members in the process. They had received credible information suggesting that another raid was forthcoming and had requested the government to provide class members with notice, which it refused to do without a court order. Judge Carney granted the TRO on January 3, 2019, requiring the government to give at least fourteen days\u2019 notice before re-detaining any class member. Judge Carney also ordered the government to show cause as to why a preliminary injunction should not issue in light of the TRO. The government then successfully requested an extended period of time to file its opening brief in its second appeal, that of Judge Carney\u2019s March 26 denial of the government\u2019s motion to dismiss. However, shortly thereafter, the government similarly moved to voluntarily dismiss this appeal. The Ninth Circuit granted that dismissal. 2019 Us App Lexis 9447 (9th Cir. Mar. 29, 2019). Back in the district court, on April 10, 2019, Judge Carney vacated the order to show cause in light of the parties\u2019 stipulation. He ordered the parties to make a good faith effort to settle the case before proceeding with their respective motions for summary judgment, but set a briefing schedule in the event that they do not. Deadlines for briefing were set for September through November of 2019. To effectuate a settlement, the court assigned a mediator on October 15, 2019. However, the parties did not reach a settlement and proceeded to summary judgment. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on October 23, 2019. The defendants likewise filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on January 9, 2020. On March 4, 2020, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment. 442 F. Supp. 3d 1233. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs held a compelling liberty interest in remaining in the United States where they had lives and families; that there would be a high risk of erroneous deprivation of that liberty interest and thus a high value in giving notice to the potential detainee; and that there were few burdens or interests that supported not giving notice before re-detaining the plaintiffs. Thus, the court concluded that notice was fundamental to protecting the plaintiffs' due process rights. The court on March 20, 2020, ordered the parties to file a joint permanent injunction proposal. On April 27, 2020, the court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and further ordered a permanent injunction that enjoined ICE from re-detaining any member of the class without first giving two weeks' written notice. The defendants appealed the district court's ruling on summary judgment and its order for a permanent injunction to the Ninth Circuit, docket number 20-55665, on June 25, 2020. As of April 16, 2021, the parties have engaged in mediation within the Ninth Circuit.", "summary": "Two Cambodian refugees filed this class action suit, on behalf of Cambodian refugees living in the U.S. since the 1970s, challenging ICE for arbitrarily and unlawfully detaining them in 2017. The Court granted a TRO in Dec. 2017 and a PI in Jan. 2018, preventing the government from executing final removal orders before plaintiffs could challenge their removal. The Court granted plaintiffs' habeas claim in Mar. 2018."}
{"article": "On March 30, 2017, an organization called Tent City Alternative to LSD Viaducts and a community resident activist submitted a Notification of Public Assembly to the City of Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings. They requested a permit to erect tents on behalf of the homeless population, who would be displaced by construction. The City granted a permit as to the location for the duration sought, but without a provision that would allow the erection of tents. On May 17, the plaintiffs responded by filing a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cook County. On June 15, 2017, the defendant City of Chicago removed the action to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The case was assigned to Judge Sidney Schenkier. In September, the court granted a motion to change the name of the plaintiffs to The Uptown Tent City Organizers. The Uptown Tent City Organizers is an unincorporated association of community members, some of whom reside in tents under the viaducts near Lake Shore Drive. On August 1, the plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2201 and 2202 against the Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings, Chicago Department of Transportation, and City of Chicago. The first amended complaint claimed that denial of the permit to erect tents violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to public assembly, Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment, and rights under state law. The plaintiffs sought a reversal of the city's decision to deny the permit (granting the application for an assembly permit to run for a period of six months), declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs. On August 27, the plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction to prevent the construction work from occurring that would displace the homeless community. On September 15, Judge Sidney I. Schenkier denied the motion on the basis that the government did not have the constitutional obligation to provide individuals with a place to live and the community did not have a contractual right to live under the viaducts. On November 7, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint to add federal constitutional violations under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and a state claim of violation of the Illinois Homeless Act. The amended complaint included details of events that precipitated in September between the plaintiffs and local law enforcement. The plaintiffs again sought a reversal of the administrative hearing decision to deny the permits, declaratory relief, a permanent injunction, and attorney's fees and costs. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on January 19, 2018. Judge Schenkier granted this motion and dismissed the case with prejudice on June 5, 2018. The court held that the organization lacked standing because it failed to allege that any of its members would be personally harmed by the City's conduct. And the court dismissed the individual plaintiff's First Amendment claim because the plaintiff had not alleged that the proposed conduct would be expressive. Finally, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 2018 WL 2709431. The case is ongoing", "summary": "A community organization challenged a decision made by the City of Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings to deny a permit to erect tents on behalf of the homeless population in the area. The plaintiffs brought federal claims for violations of First, Eighth, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment in addition to state law claims, and the case was removed to federal court. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' state law claims."}
{"article": "On December 5, 2005, a convicted murderer on parole in Texas filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and the Texas Board of Pardons and Parole. The plaintiff is represented by both public and private counsel. The plaintiff asked the court for a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages. The plaintiff asked the court to permanently enjoin the defendants from: imposing the sex-offender label on him without a hearing that met due process requirements; subjecting the plaintiff to conditions that were different than similar supervisees; and failing to accommodate his religious exercise. The plaintiff also alleged that he has not had the same opportunities as other supervisees to acquire a job, obtain a driver's license, or receive education. On June 25 2007, Judge Lee Yeakel dismissed the plaintiff's claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000. The plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 were allowed to proceed. The decision allowing the claims to proceed under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 was appealed. On June 23, 2008, the US Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, affirmed the decision of the district court. On March 24, 2009, Judge Lee Yeakel ordered that the defendants must afford the plaintiff due process of law, and dismissed, without prejudice, all of his other claims. This judgment was appealed. On May 20, 2010, The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, ruled mostly for the plaintiff, slightly modifying the amount of due process that the plaintiff must be afforded. On March 30, 2011, the district court (Judge Lee Yeakel) granted the plaintiff's motion for the enforcement of the March 24, 2009 judgment as confirmed by the court of appeals, and ordered that the determination of whether the plaintiff should be considered a sex offender should conform with the plaintiff's due process rights. On August 24, 2011, the district court (Judge Lee Yeakel) denied the plaintiff's second motion for enforcement of the judgment, ruling that the defendant's actions after the March 30, 2011 order had sufficiently complied with the March 24, 2009 judgment. The plaintiff's original sentence for murder ended in 2012. He will remain under mandatory supervision for possessing a weapon in prison in 1989 until 2016. On September 20, 2013, the court granted a stipulation of dismissal for the Texas Department of Pardons and Parole, and dismissed the claim with prejudice. It appears that the plaintiff settled with the Texas Department of Pardons and Parole. On December 12, 2013, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as moot since they did not have the ability to grant the relief that the plaintiff was asking for. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice stated that only the Texas Board of Pardons and Parole had this power, and they had been dismissed from the complaint. On March 13, 2014, the plaintiff filed a fifth amended complaint based on the defendant's motion to dismiss for mootness. On July 29, 2014, the plaintiff filed a sixth amended complaint alleging that the plaintiff was unable to move into suitable housing and denied employment due to the defendant's actions. Not much activity appears on the docket thereafter. On Jan. 20, 2015, the parties filed a stipulation to dismiss the case. The court issued its final judgment the next day, granting the motion. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On December 5, 2005, a convicted murder on parole in Texas filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Texas department of Criminal Justice and the Texas Board of Pardons and Parole. The plaintiff asked the court to permanently enjoin the defendants from failing imposing the sex-offender label to him without a hearing that met due process requirements, subjecting the plaintiff to conditions that were different than similar supervisees, and failing to accommodate his religious exercise. The plaintiff also alleged that he has not had the same opportunities as other supervisees to acquire a job, obtain a driver's license, or receive education. The claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 were dismissed, but the claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 were allowed to proceed. The court granted the Plaintiff a ruling that required the Defendant to give the Plaintiff a hearing on his sex-offender status that complied with due process requirements, which was upheld by the Court of Appeals. The Defendants complied with this ruling. The plaintiff's original sentence for murder ended in 2012. He will remain under mandatory supervision for possessing a weapon in prison in 1989 until 2016. On September 20, 2013, the court granted a stipulation of dismissal for the Texas Department of Pardons and Parole, and dismissed the claim with prejudice. It appears that the plaintiff settled with the Texas Department of Pardons and Parole. The case is still ongoing against the Texas Board of Pardons and Parole."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: On April 17, 2020, individuals detained in the Plymouth County Correctional Facility (PCCF) filed this putative class action complaint addressing safety concerns posed by COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought emergency risk-mitigation procedures and release measures to reduce the population at the PCCF. On May 18, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs filed a voluntary dismissal on October 8, 2020. <hr> On April 17, 2020, federal detainees at the Plymouth County Correctional Facility (PCCF) filed this putative class action complaint at the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, addressing safety concerns posed by COVID-19. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs brought this lawsuit as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241 and as an injunctive and declaratory action under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that conditions of confinement lacked reasonable preventative measures in response to the heightened health risks from COVID-19, in violation of their Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights. They pointed to ongoing failures by the defendant to comply with basic safety measures under the interim guidelines provided for correctional facilities by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, including its social distancing requirement. The plaintiffs sought a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), declaratory and injunctive relief, and a writ of habeas corpus ordering immediate action to reduce the population at the PCCF and institute proper hygienic measures, with an independent monitor to ensure compliance. Concurrently, the plaintiffs filed a motion requesting that all federal detainees held or to be held by the PCCF be granted class certification. The case was assigned to Judge Leo T. Sorokin. On April 20, the defendants filed an emergency motion to stay the consideration of the proposed class certification, or a two-week extension to file a response to the motion for class certification in the alternative. The court granted the motion on the same day. The next day, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, as there were no cases of COVID-19 in PCCF in the detainee population as of April 20, and the petitioners did not have underlying medical conditions. A second motion was filed on April 24, further submitting that the requested remedies by the plaintiffs involved a challenge to the fact or duration of their confinement, outside of the writ of habeas. The defendant submitted a status report confirming three cases of COVID-19 among employees on April 29. A hearing was held the next day. On May 1, the court ordered the defendant to answer a list of questions addressing disputed factual questions and unclear matters by May 6. Questions include housing arrangements of the proposed class, policies governing face masks, testing capacity in the PCCF, as well as the respondents\u2019 response to the three confirmed cases of COVID-19. The defendants submitted a status report confirming two additional cases of COVID-19 among employees on May 5, and report of one additional case on May 12. On May 18, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs' claims fell within the scope of a habeas petition and that the plaintiffs\u2019 failure to satisfy the PLRA\u2019s exhaustion requirement is not grounds for dismissal. The court also denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction because they failed to meet their burden of establishing that they were likely to succeed in showing that the defendant had been deliberately indifferent to the risk of COVID-19. The court further ordered that the parties file a joint status report regarding how the matter should proceed, and ordered the defendant to file a status report explaining whether and how PCCF is expanding its testing in line with the institution-wide testing occurring in DOC facilities and its reasoning by May 27. On May 27, the defendants reported that they did not plan to institute institution-wide testing occurring in DOC facilities because it was the medical opinion of PCCF\u2019s medical director that such measures were not warranted at PCCF in the present circumstances. According to the latest status report on June 2, one employee at PCCF tested positive. 28 detainees were tested with two results coming back positive. According to the June 24 status report, 53 individuals at PCCF were tested, with two positive results from pretrial detainees and one from a former detainee who tested positive following his release. The plaintiffs filed a voluntary dismissal on October 8, 2020.", "summary": "On April 17, 2020, detainees of the Plymouth County Correctional Facility (PCCF) filed this putative class action addressing safety concerns posed by COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought risk-mitigations procedures and release measures to reduce the population at the PCCF. On May 18, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The parties entered discovery, filed status reports, and on October 8, the plaintiffs filed a voluntary dismissal."}
{"article": "On December 13, 2005, a group of battered immigrant wives and children of lawful U.S. residents filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, challenging the denial of food stamps, Medicaid, and other public assistance benefits to certain categories of immigrants. The plaintiffs alleged that they applied for public benefits at New York City Job Centers, but were improperly denied those benefits in violation of state and federal law. They sought emergency injunctive relief and class certification. The defendants denied the allegations and sought to disqualify plaintiffs' counsel from handling the case. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' attorneys had submitted affidavits in support of a preliminary injunction and were therefore witnesses. The district court (Judge Jed Rakoff) denied the request to disqualify. 414 F. Supp. 2d 469. On February 16, 2006, the district court entered a partial preliminary injunction that required certain immediate corrections to New York City and State public assistance agency systems relative to applications for public benefits by noncitizens. It then conducted a nine-day evidentiary hearing to further assess the case and determine whether additional preliminary injunctive relief and/or class certification were warranted. On August 29, 2006, Judge Rakoff certified the class and expanded the preliminary injunction. Judge Rakoff found that there were a substantial likelihood plaintiffs would prevail given evidence of numerous instances of wrongful denials with respect to battered aliens who were eligible for benefits, due to inadequately trained state and City personnel and faulty training materials and policy directives. 445 F.Supp.2d 400. The defendants' motion for reconsideration was denied. M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81704. Shortly thereafter, the parties reached a tentative settlement. Following a fairness hearing on May 24, 2007, the court approved the settlement agreement by order dated June 26, 2007. Under the agreement, many class members would receive \"automatic\" case reviews to determine whether they were entitled to retroactive public benefits. The City agreed to train 150 immigrant liaisons to review and handle the case reviews of class members and process future applications by immigrants for public benefits. The City also agreed to refrain from denying, discontinuing, or reducing public benefits based on immigration status to eligible class members. The informal relief system created by the court's preliminary injunction would be continued and quality assurance audits would be conducted every six months. The court retained jurisdiction for four years to monitor compliance with the terms of the agreement. On July 16, 2007, the court entered judgment on a settlement agreement regarding attorney's fees in which the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys $2.85 million. On September 29, 2011, the court ordered an extension of the settlement agreement through February 15, 2013. Minor adjustments were made to account for problems with statutes of limitations. The defendants appealed the court's order to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The appeal was withdrawn, however, on April 9, 2012. On July 3, 2013, the court again extended the term of the settlement, as well as the monitoring of compliance, for two additional cycles to August 15, 2014. On August 8, 2014, the court issued a final stipulation and order under which the City of New York and the State of New York agreed to pay $217,500 and $147,500, respectively, to plaintiff\u2019s attorneys within 90 days. The settlement expired on August 15, 2014. There have been no further updates to this case, and there is no reason to believe it is ongoing.", "summary": "This class action 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 lawsuit was filed on December 13, 2005 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The Plaintiffs, a group of battered immigrant wives and children of lawful U.S. residents, challenged the denial of public benefits that they applied for at New York City Job Centers. On May 24, 2007, the parties reached a Settlement Agreement in which certain class members would receive automatic case reviews in order to obtain the public benefits they sought. The Defendants also agreed to hire more employees in order to properly review the Plaintiffs' cases. Finally, the Settlement Agreement required the Defendants to pay $2,850,000 in attorney's fees and costs. The Court originally retained jurisdiction for 4 years, however, this was extended through February 13, 2012 by a court order dated September 29, 2011. Defendants appealed this order, however, they withdrew their appeal on April 9, 2012. On August 8,2014, the court issued another stipulation and order in which the City of New York and the State of New York would pay $217,500 and $147,500 respectively, to plaintiff's attorneys (The Legal Aid Society). As of this writing, the Court continues to monitor the case."}
{"article": "This federal lawsuit, filed by the cities of Chelsea and Lawrence, Massachusetts, on Feb. 8, 2017, challenged President Trump\u2019s Jan. 25, 2017 <a href=\"https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-01-30/pdf/2017-02102.pdf\">Executive Order 13768</a>, dealing with immigration enforcement, which threatened to withhold federal funds from \"sanctuary jurisdictions\" and take enforcement action against any locality that impedes the federal government's immigration law. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Boston Lawyers\u2019 Committee for Civil Rights and Economic Justice, filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs alleged that the Executive Order violated the Tenth Amendment by coercing cities to choose between losing federal funding and losing control of their municipal self-governance. The Executive Order does not include a clear definition of what it means to be a \"sanctuary\" jurisdiction, apart from referencing 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1373, which provides that a local government entity cannot prohibit or restrict communication between government entities or officials and federal immigration authorities. The plaintiffs alleged their own compliance with \u00a7 1373, but complained first that \u00a7 1373 is unconstitutional, and second, that Executive Order threatened their funding without advance notice by unclearly extending beyond \u00a7 1373. The plaintiffs alleged that the U.S. had begun to designate certain cities as \"sanctuary jurisdictions\" and that Chelsea and Lawrence stood to be designated as such. In order to improve cooperation between immigrant residents and municipal police, Chelsea designated itself a \"sanctuary city\" and Lawrence took similar actions. The plaintiffs explained that they therefore feared being labeled \"sanctuary jurisdictions\" under the Executive Order and thus losing federal grants. As small cities with large working-class immigrant populations, the plaintiffs feared the implications of such a loss of key funding for their municipal budgets, including for public services that have nothing to do with immigration. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked for a declaration that Chelsea and Lawrence comply with 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1373, that \u00a7 1373 is an unconstitutional infringement on municipal and state self-government authority, and that the Executive Order violates the Tenth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. In addition, they claimed that the Executive Order violates the separation of powers by penalizing \u00a7 1373 violations without Congressional approval. The case was assigned to Judge George A. O'Toole Jr. On Apr. 10, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The defendants argued that they have taken no action against the cities pursuant to the executive order and that the cities cannot show they have been injured by the existence of the EO. Meanwhile, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on April 25, 2017, granted a nationwide preliminary injunction against operation of the Executive Order. See <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15608\">San Francisco v. Trump</a> for details. On May 2, the plaintiffs moved to stay the proceedings in light of the nationwide preliminary injunction, and the court entered a stay on May 4. The case is marked \"administratively closed,\" which just means that it is on hold. The parties can inform the Court if they wish to resume litigation.", "summary": "This federal lawsuit, filed by the cities of Chelsea and Lawrence, Massachusetts, on Feb. 8, 2017, challenged President Trump\u2019s Jan. 25, 2017 Executive Order dealing with immigration enforcement, which threatened to withhold federal funds from \"sanctuary jurisdictions\" and take enforcement action against any locality that impedes the federal government's immigration law. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked for a declaration that Chelsea and Lawrence comply with 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1373, that \u00a7 1373 is an unconstitutional infringement on municipal and state self-government authority, and that the Executive Order violates the Tenth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. In addition, they claimed that the Executive Order violates the separation of powers by penalizing \u00a7 1373 violations without Congressional approval. On April 25, 2017 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted a nationwide preliminary injunction against operation of the Executive Order. See the case San Francisco v. Trump (3:17-cv-00485-WHO) for more details. On May 2, the plaintiffs moved to stay the proceedings in light of the nationwide preliminary injunction, and the court entered the stay. On Dec. 29, 2017, the case was administratively closed. The case remains closed."}
{"article": "On May 8, 2006, twelve deaf Utah State University students filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, against Utah State and its Board of Regents. The case was brought under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, with the Plaintiffs alleging that the Defendants had discriminated against them in many ways, including: denying them access to the full benefit of the University's programs, services, and activities; failing to provide for effective communication through the use of auxiliary aids and services; failing or refusing to provide timely accommodations; utilizing discriminatory policies, practices and procedures that tend to screen out students who are deaf; and failing to meet the ADA's mandate to provide services in the most integrated setting. The students were represented by private counsel. Factual allegations included: that the University failed to provide accommodations for the use of American Sign Language, by providing unqualified or under-qualified interpreters -- the University allegedly justified this by claiming that it could not find qualified interpreters, but declined to hire such qualified interpreters when students presented them the opportunity; that the University's program for providing notes to deaf students was inadequate to the point that notes were often provided to students only long after the tests or exams for which they were relevant had already occurred; that students were sometimes required to attend classes where no interpreters were provided; that in some such classes the University's proposed solution was to have students make audio recordings of classes and them have them transcribed later, forcing students to sit through classes they could not understand or participate in, and then review transcripts during their free time. There were further examples of similar alleged violations. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment an injunction requiring Utah State to adopt written policies and training programs to correct the alleged violations and to require them to provide appropriate auxiliary aids, services, and accommodations. The plaintiffs also sought attorneys' fees and damages for financial loss and emotional distress. On April 17, 2007, the parties entered a Stipulation and Joint Motion for Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice, requesting the court dismiss the case, which it did the following day. The parties had reached a settlement, the terms of which were not included in the Court record. According to news reports, the school promised to employ one full-time staff interpreter for every two deaf students who needed those services, with the interpreters to be available to students to interpret during classes, on-campus meetings and on-campus extracurricular activities. Transcript service and note-taking services would continue, and if students felt they were behind they could receive tutoring.", "summary": "On May 8, 2006, twelve deaf students filed a class action lawsuit against Utah State University and its Board of Regents, alleging extensive discriminatory practices in violation of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The parties agreed to dismiss the case on April 17 2007, having reached a settlement."}
{"article": "NOTE: There are two separate cases, in two separate districts, under the caption Hadix. This summary and documents are for the Eastern District of Michigan case, 2:80-cv-73581-JF, filed in 1980. As explained below, in 1992, the Eastern District judge, John Feikens, split that case in two, and sent part of it (the part relating to medical and mental health care, and eventually fire safety) to the Western District, where it received the docket number 4:92-CV-110. The Western District case is included in the Clearinghouse as PC-MI-19. On September 18, 1980, prisoners at the State Prison of Southern Michigan filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Michigan Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging that their rights had been violated by unconstitutional conditions at the prison. The plaintiffs complained that the prison was overcrowded, infested with cockroaches, plagued by flying and nesting birds, full of bird droppings and feces, non-ventilated, smelly, and unsanitary. The prisoners also complained of deficiencies in the areas of plumbing, security, grievance procedures, work opportunities for prisoners, physical protection of prisoners, recreation, mental health, classification procedures, lighting, insulation, health care, noise level, staff training, food availability and preservation procedures, mail handling, visitation, fire safety, rehabilitation programs, parole procedures, educational opportunities, library services, clothing allowance, and dental care. On February 13, 1985, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Judge John Feikens) entered a consent decree in the case, settling the issues of sanitation, safety, health care, fire safety, overcrowding, security, food service, management and operations, and mail. The decree stated that the remaining issues (access to courts, classification procedures, grievance procedures, and visitation) were to be resolved by the court after a hearing on the merits. In June 1986, a member of the plaintiff class asked the district court to hold the defendants in contempt of the decree for depriving him of property without a hearing. On July 1, 1986, the court (Judge Feikens) ordered the defendants to return the prisoner's property and to hold an administrative hearing before taking any of his property away from him. The defendants appealed. On March 17, 1988, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Judges Albert Joseph Engel, Robert B. Krupansky, and David A. Nelson) issued a per curiam opinion reversing the district court's decision and remanding the case for further consideration. Hadix v. Johnson, No. 86-1701, 1988 WL 24204 (6th Cir. March 17, 1988). On July 1, 1988, following a bench trial, the district court (Judge Feikens) held that the inmates had been unconstitutionally denied access to courts, ordering the prison to modify its library, legal services, and administrative grievance programs. The court further held that plaintiffs' right of access to the courts necessitated the presence of Prison Legal Services (PLS) inside the walls of the prison. Hadix v. Johnson, 694 F.Supp. 259 (E.D.Mich. 1988). Following this order, the plaintiffs asked the district court for a temporary injunction to prevent the defendants from searching the PLS offices inside the prison. On November 10, 1987, the district court (Judge Feikens) issued the temporary order, enjoining the defendants from searching the PLS offices without PLS civilian personnel being present unless they gave two hours' notice of the search. The defendants appealed. On March 30, 1989, the Sixth Circuit (Judges Nelson, George Clifton Edwards, and Danny Julian Boggs) issued a per curiam opinion affirming the district court's order. Hadix v. Johnson, No. 88-1144, 1989 WL 27984 (6th Cir. March 30, 1989). Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff class asked the district court to clarify a section of the consent decree dealing with the handling of a prisoner's legal materials. On April 21, 1989, the district court (Judge Feikens) held that the consent decree was not violated by the prison's rule limiting the amount of legal materials that a prisoner could posses to that which could be contained in one footlocker. The court also held that the prison was required to hold administrative hearings on excess legal materials within thirty days of seizure. Hadix v. Johnson, 712 F.Supp. 550 (E.D.Mich. 1989). The plaintiffs asked the district court to award them attorneys' fees. On June 22, 1990, the court (Judge Feikens) ordered the defendants to pay the full amount of the plaintiffs' attorney fees, less telephone costs. Hadix v. Johnson, 740 F.Supp. 433 (E.D.Mich. 1990). The defendants appealed. On August 29, 1991, the Sixth Circuit (Judges Boyce F. Martin, Jr., Nelson, and Harry Walker Wellford) issued a per curiam opinion vacating the district court's fee award and remanding the case for further consideration on the issue of whether the plaintiffs were the prevailing party in the lawsuit. Hadix v. Johnson, No. 90-1810, 1991 WL 165653 (6th Cir. Aug. 29, 1991). On remand, the district court made further findings of fact and again held that the plaintiffs were the prevailing party. The defendants appealed. On January 23, 1995, the Sixth Circuit (Judges Nelson, Alan Eugene Norris, and Martha Craig Daughtrey) issued a per curiam opinion affirming the district court's decision. Hadix v. Johnson, No. 94-1158, 1995 WL 25416 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 1995). On April 21, 1992, the defendants asked the district court to relinquish control and supervision of the mental health provisions of the consent decree; the plaintiffs asked the court to adopt the mental health orders entered in USA v. Michigan (No. 1:84-CV-63) (PC-MI-0007) by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan (Judge Richard A. Enslen). On May 15, 1992, the district court (Judge Feikens) denied both requests. On further consideration, however, on June 5, 1992, the district court relinquished control and supervision of the provisions governing mental health care and medical care, transferring them to the Western District, Judge Enslen, for further proceedings as he deemed appropriate. Hadix v. Johnson, 792 F.Supp. 527 (E.D.Mich. 1992). Sometime in 1994, a class of inmates at five different correctional institutions in Michigan asked both district courts for injunctive relief against the defendants, alleging that the defendants had violated their constitutional right of access to the courts. The matter was dealt with in the Western District case. On March 31, 1994, the defendants asked the Eastern District Court to modify the consent decree's requirements for out-of-cell activities. On March 14, 1995, the district court (Judge Feikens) held that none of the defendants asserted reasons warranted modification of the decree and denied the request. Hadix v. Johnson, 879 F.Supp. 743 (E.D.Mich. 1995). The defendants appealed. On September 20, 1995, the Sixth Circuit (Judges Nelson, Norris, and Daughtrey) issued a per curiam opinion vacating the district court's order and remanding the case so that the district court could clarify the reasons for its denial of the defendants' request. Hadix v. Johnson, Nos. 93-1551, 93-1555, 93-1559, 93-1642, 93-1643, 1995 WL 559372 (6th Cir.(Mich.) Sept. 20, 1995. On June 10, 1996, the defendants asked both the district court and the Sixth Circuit to terminate the consent decree pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). On July 2, 1996, the Sixth Circuit issued an unsigned opinion denying the motion for immediate termination and remanding the issue back to the district court. Hadix v. Johnson, Nos. 94-2008, 96-1422, 1996 WL 370152 (6th Cir. July 2, 1996). on July 5, 1996, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Judge Feikens) denied the request for immediate termination of the consent decree. Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F.Supp. 1360 (E.D.Mich. 1996). On September 10, 1996, the United States Department of Justice asked the Eastern District Court for leave to intervene in the case for purposes of defending the constitutionality of the PLRA, and on September 16, 1996, the district court (Judge Feikens) granted the motion to intervene. The defendants renewed their motion to terminate relief under the automatic stay provision of the PLRA. On November 1, 1996, the district court (Judge Feikens) denied the motion to terminate, holding that the sections of the PLRA in question were an unconstitutional violation of the principle of separation of powers. Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F.Supp. 1100 (E.D.Mich. 1996). The defendants appealed. On May 20, 1998, the Sixth Circuit (Judge Karen Nelson Moore) held that the automatic stay provision was constitutional and remanded the case back to the district court. Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 1998). The plaintiffs sought Supreme Court review, but the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case. Hadix v. McGinnis, 524 U.S. 952 (1998). The plaintiffs asked both district courts to grant them attorneys fees for their counsels' unpaid work up to this point in the litigation, and the defendants argued that the PLRA's cap on attorneys fees should apply to any fee award that the judge made. On December 4, 1996, the Eastern District Court (Judge Feikens) awarded the requested fees, holding that the PLRA's cap on attorneys fees applied only to work performed after the Act's effective date. Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F.Supp. 1113 (E.D.Mich. 1996). (Likewise, on May 23, 1997, the Western District Court (Judge Enslen) awarded the requested fees.) Hadix v. Johnson, 965 F.Supp. 996 (W.D.Mich. 1997). The defendants appealed both decisions. On April 17, 1998, the Sixth Circuit (Justice Cornelia Groefsema Kennedy) held that the fee cap imposed by the PLRA did not apply to fee petitions, regardless of whether the work was performed before of after the PLRA's enactment date. The court then partially upheld and partially reversed the fee award, remanding the appeals back to the district courts for further consideration. Hadix v. Johnson, 143 F.3d 246 (6th Cir. 1998). The defendants sought and obtained Supreme Court review. On June 21, 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court (Justice Sandra Day O'Connor) held that the PLRA limits attorney fees for postjudgment monitoring services performed after the PLRA's effective date, but does not limit fees for monitoring performed before that date. Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999). On March 18, 1999, the district court (Judge Feikens) transferred several additional components of the original Consent Decree (regarding water temperatures, housing temperatures and ventilation in the Southern Michigan Correctional Facility, and some issues relating to housing in the Egeler Correctional Facility) to the Western District. The Eastern District explained that the rationale for transfer was that health care was implicated in these provisions. The court then terminated the part of the consent decree requiring supervision of facilities, and informed the defendants that he would terminate the consent decree entirely if they could demonstrate substantial compliance. Hadix v. Johnson, 45 F.2d 584 (E.D.Mich. 1999). Both parties appealed. On October 5, 2000, the Sixth Circuit (Judge Moore) reversed, holding that the district court had not made the necessary findings, and remanded the case back to the district court, ordering that the prisoners must be given an opportunity to submit additional evidence of ongoing violations. Hadix v. Johnson, 228 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2000). On November 15, 2000, the Eastern District transferred to the Western District some additional fire safety issues. On June 27, 2001, the Eastern District issued its Order of Termination, terminating its jurisdiction over all sections of the Consent Decree remaining in the Eastern District.) An inmate named Pepper Moore asked the district court to award him money for his costs as well as an incentive award for his role as a class representative. The district court denied those requests, and he appealed. On March 10, 2003, the Sixth Circuit (Judge Moore) affirmed the district court's decision. Hadix v. Johnson, 322 F.3d 895 (6th Cir. 2003). On October 6, 2003, the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari, thus closing the case. Moore v. Johnson, 540 U.S. 941 (2003).", "summary": "This 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 lawsuit was filed on September 18, 1980 by a class of prisoners against the Michigan Department of Corrections in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The prisoners complained that the prison was overcrowded, infested with cockroaches, full of bird feces, and was non-ventilated, smelly, and unsanitary, among other general complaints about the poor living conditions at the prison, including lack of access to legal materials. On February 13, 1985, the Court signed off on a Consent Decree regarding the issues of sanitation, safety, health care, fire safety, overcrowding, security, food service, management and operations, and mail. The decree stated that the remaining issues were to be resolved by the court after a hearing on the merits. On July 1, 1988, following a bench trial, the district court (Judge Feikens) held that the prisoners had been unconstitutionally denied access to courts, ordering the prison to modify its library, legal services, and administrative grievance programs. The plaintiffs then moved for attorney's fees, which were awarded by the District Court initially, and again after the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals remanded back to the District Court for further consideration. On June 10, 1986, the Defendants moved to terminate the Consent Decree pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, however, the District Court denied this motion, eventually declaring the PLRA unconstitutional. After extensive litigation going all the way to the Supreme Court, the Plaintiffs were eventually awarded attorneys fees for all of their counsel's legal work through 1996. On November 15, 2000 the Eastern District terminated its jurisdiction over the case and transferred the remaining issues to the Western District case over the same matter."}
{"article": "On June 27, 2002, Barrier Busters (a disability advocacy group) and a class of disabled individuals filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the City of Erie, PA. The Plaintiffs alleged that the city of Erie had frequently failed to install mandatory curb cuts and to otherwise comply with the accessibility mandates of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12111 et seq., when it performed road and sidewalk construction and alterations since the ADA was passed in 1992. The parties entered a court-approved Partial Consent Decree on March 18, 2003. On September 16, 2003, the parties entered a Second Partial Consent Decree and Partial Settlement; a third consent decree was entered on April 1, 2004, and a fourth on February 2, 2005. The Clearinghouse has not obtained these consent decrees, but it is clear from later documents that Erie made substantial commitments to both ensure adherence to the ADA curb cut requirements for new roads and future resurfacing projects, and to retrofit with curb cuts all areas where roads were built or resurfaced after the January 26, 1992 effective date of the ADA. Erie committed to make annual reports showing where new road work had taken place and where new curb cuts were built. The consent agreements also recognized that Erie was not responsible for the non-compliance of state roads and highways in Erie that were resurfaced by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. In 2006, a separate case was filed against PennDOT, addressing the issues of ADA compliance and curb cuts on state roads in Erie. See <i>Voices for Independence v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation</i> in related cases. The plaintiffs in <i>Voices for Independence</i> were represented by the same attorneys as the plaintiffs in this case. In 2010, the Plaintiffs observed that the City of Erie's street resurfacing in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 should have triggered the construction of ADA-compliant curb cuts, but none were built, contrary to the earlier agreements. On September 27, 2011, the court entered a stipulated order under which Erie agreed to retrofit these sites with curb cuts and to pay Plaintiffs $31,000 in attorneys' fees and costs for the period from March 11, 2011, to August 26, 2011. This stipulated order did not abrogate the earlier Consent Agreements. Nevertheless, Erie failed to install curb cuts. In an attempt to correct the problem, the parties agreed to a second stipulated order on August 31, 2012. The city promised to take remedial action to install these curb cuts and agreed to pay an unspecified amount to the plaintiffs for attorneys' fees and costs. On April 18, 2013, the Third Stipulated Order was entered, which changed Erie's reporting obligations to the plaintiffs to make the process more efficient. Erie agreed to pay an unspecified amount to the Plaintiffs for attorneys' fees and costs. The Third Stipulated Order was amended on May 22, 2014, to mandate that construction work performed on or before August 5 must include curb ramps within the same construction season. The City also committed to use \u201cbest efforts\u201d to complete 70% of curb ramps within the same calendar year for construction performed after August 5; plaintiffs agreed that, when necessary, construction could be delayed until June 30 of the next calendar year. On March 11, 2015, plaintiffs moved to enforce the consent decrees. They alleged that the City violated the consent decrees for \u201can unspecified number of years\u201d by installing fewer than six curb ramps at \u201cT\u201d-shaped intersections and fewer than eight curb ramps at \u201c+\u201d-shaped intersections. After discussions between the parties, Judge Baxter approved a fifth consent decree on May 27, 2015. The Fifth Consent Decree required the City to install 6 or 8 ramps, as appropriate, in all future construction. It also required the City to add ramps across the \u201cleg\u201d of the T in \u201cT\u201d-shaped intersections missing them at a rate of at least 75 ramps per year and included associated reporting requirements. Three years later, a new disagreement emerged about what kinds of intersections had to be retrofitted with curb ramps. Plaintiffs asserted that adding a thin layer of asphalt to a concrete intersection was an \u201calteration\u201d under the ADA that required installation curb ramps. Erie disagreed. It argued that it is only required to add curb ramps when replacing old asphalt with new asphalt at asphalt intersections. On September 26, 2018, the court entered the Fourth Stipulated Order, which adopted plaintiffs\u2019 view based on June, 2013 U.S. Department of Transportation guidelines. The Order required: <ul> <li>Installation of curb ramps at previously altered asphalt intersections at a rate of at least 125 ramps per year, estimated to finish by the end of 2024. <li> Installation of at least 125 curb ramps at previously altered concrete intersections by the end of 2025. </ul> However, the parties could not reach an agreement on whether there was a legal requirement to install curb ramps at concrete intersections altered prior to July, 2013. Erie preserved its right to litigate this issue in the Fourth Stipulated Order. As of March 29, 2021, the consent decrees and stipulated orders remain in effect. The defendants continue to file annual status reports. The most recent status report was filed on February 2, 2021 and the case is ongoing.", "summary": "On January 27, 2002, Barrier Busters, a disability advocacy group, filed a lawsuit in federal court against the City of Erie, PA. The Plaintiffs alleged that Erie's road resurfacing from 1992 onward lacked curb cuts mandated by the Americans with Disabilities Act. The parties entered a series of consent decrees, in which Erie committed to retrofit the roads and intersections and to comply with ADA requirements on all future resurfacing projects."}
{"article": "On July 31, 2017, plaintiff, the Democracy Project, Inc., filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief against defendants Department of State, Department of Defense, and the Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552. The plaintiff is a nonpartisan nonprofit organization whose focus is on informing the public of operations and activities of the government by gathering and disseminating information likely to contribute significantly to the public understanding of executive branch operations and activities. On April 6, 2017, President Trump ordered Tomahawk cruise missile strikes against a Syrian-government airbase without obtaining prior authorization from Congress (a Syrian-based policy promised by former President Barack Obama) and without articulating the legal justification for the strikes. The plaintiff submitted FOIA requests to the defendants the following day for all records \u201creflecting, discussing, or otherwise relating\u201d to the strike \u201cand/or the President\u2019s legal authority to launch such a strike\u201d. The plaintiff asked for these requests to be processed on an expedited basis. About one month later, having received none of the requested documents and having two of its expedited processing requests denied, the plaintiff brought this suit and filed a motion for preliminary injunction to have the documents produced by a date certain. On July 13, 2017, U.S. District Judge Christopher R. Cooper granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff\u2019s motion for preliminary injunction, directing the defendants to process the FOIA requests on an expedited basis, but not by a certain date, and to limit the request to documents specifically related to the legal justifications for the April 6, 2017 Syria Strikes. 263 F.Supp.3d 293. On September 8, 2017, the defendants made a production pursuant to the FOIA requests, but the plaintiff contested that the production was too heavily redacted and insufficient. On November 17, 2017, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, with the plaintiff filing a cross-motion for summary judgment on December 8, 2017, on the question of whether the defendants\u2019 withholding of some documents was justified under various FOIA exemptions. On April 25, 2018, Judge Cooper, in reviewing the parties\u2019 cross-motions, determined that he needed to also review the documents before it could resolve the dispute, and he ordered that the defendants produce documents that it had claimed were exempted under FOIA for an in-camera review by the court. On May 4, 2018, the defendants complied with the order and delivered the documents to the court. On August 21, 2018, Judge Cooper granted in part and denied in part each party\u2019s motion for summary judgment. 320 F.Supp.3d 162. He found that, for the most part, the defendants\u2019 withholdings were justified; however, he also found that some information in the documents had already been officially acknowledged, so that the defendants could not withhold that information. As of March 23, 2019, there has been no further filings or movement in the case, and the case appears to be closed.", "summary": "Plaintiff, The Democracy Project, Inc., filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking injunctive relief against Defendants Department of State, Department of Defense, and the Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552. The Court granted a preliminary injunction for the production of all documents related to President Trump's legal justifications for his order of the April 6, 2017 Tomahawk cruise missile strikes against a Syrian-government airbase. The Plaintiff contested the sufficiency of this production, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On August 21, 2018, Judge Cooper granted in part and denied in part each party\u2019s motion for summary judgment. He found that, for the most part, the defendants\u2019 withholdings were justified; however, he also found that some information in the documents had already been officially acknowledged, so that the defendants could not withhold that information. As of March 23, 2019, there has been no further filings or movement in the case, and the case appears to be closed."}
{"article": "On November 1, 2006, Aaron Lee Jones filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the state of Alabama from using its lethal injection procedure against him. The complaint alleged that the procedure was not medically approved and would result in extreme pain in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. The plaintiff was represented by private attorneys. On April 17, 2007, the district court (Judge Myron H. Thompson) denied the plaintiff's motion to stay his execution pending his challenge of the lethal injection procedure. His execution was scheduled for May 3, 2007. On April 27, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Judge Joel Fredrick Dubina) affirmed. Both courts found that Jones delayed in bringing these constitutional claims. Aaron Lee Jones was executed on May 3, 2007 by lethal injection. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Aaron Lee Jones filed a lawsuit in the US District Court for the Middle District of Alabama seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the state of Alabama from using lethal injection procedure against him, in violation of the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments. His claim was denied, and the US Eleventh Circuit of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision. He was executed on May 3, 2007."}
{"article": "This lawsuit was filed on August 31, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs included Detroit Will Breathe (DWB) and fourteen individuals. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel on behalf of the National Lawyers Guild, sued the city of Detroit, Mayor Michael Duggan, Police Chief James Craig, and over one hundred Detroit Police Department (DPD) officers. Between May 29, 2020 and August 22, 2020, the plaintiffs participated in protests across Detroit calling for the end of police brutality and racial injustice. The plaintiffs stated that the DPD used excessive force on multiple occasions during the approximately 90 protests that the plaintiffs engaged in during this time period. These instances of excessive force included police driving cars into protest leaders on June 28; using dangerous chokeholds and teargas on peaceful protesters on July 10; and using additional pepper spray, teargas, and chokeholds on protestors on August 22. The plaintiffs also alleged alleged that a curfew imposed by the defendants was only enforced against protesters. The plaintiffs alleged that these actions violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly, and also violated their Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force, arrest without probable cause, and false imprisonment. They also alleged that defendants' actions represented retaliation forbidden under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 and contended that the city of Detroit was liable under the <i>Monell</i> theory of liability. The plaintiffs requested injunctive, monetary, and declaratory relief, including punitive damages, and asked for attorneys' fees and costs. The same day that they filed their complaint, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which would prohibit the DPD from using weapons against peaceful protesters or arresting protesters without probable cause. The plaintiffs also sought basic amenities, such as access to water and the provision of necessary medical attention, be for any protesters that were arrested. The case was originally assigned to District Judge Robert H. Cleland and Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti, but was then reassigned to District Judge Laurie J. Michelson and Magistrate Judge David R. Grand on September 1, 2020. On September 4, 2020, the court partially granted the request for a temporary restraining order (TRO). 2020 WL 5269789. Judge Michelson enjoined the defendants from using weapons against peaceful protesters, from placing individuals in choke-holds or hitting them with vehicles, from using zip ties or handcuffs in a way that causes injury, and arresting demonstrators without probable cause. The order was to last 14 days. However, the defendants thought that the order was one-sided. They submitted a motion to modify the TRO on the grounds that it would allow protesters to break the law without repercussions. Judge Michelson disagreed. On September 16, Judge Michelson issued an order denying the defendants' request to modify the TRO, holding that the TRO in no way allowed plaintiffs or other protesters to break the law without legal consequences -- DPD was still allowed to arrest those that sought to break the law. 2020 WL 8575150. The parties jointly agreed that police officers would refrain from using weapons (batons, shield, etc.), chemical agents, or chokeholds against protestors, and also agreed not to arrest demonstrators en masse without probable cause. The defendants answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim on September 25, alleging that the plaintiffs engaged in a civil conspiracy. The defendants sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. The defendants also sought declaratory judgment stating that the plaintiffs defamed Mayor Michael Duggan and multiple police officers. After the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the defendants' counterclaim, the counterclaim was dismissed on March 10, 2021. Judge Michelson found that the city did not allege that the plaintiffs committed an underlying tort to support the conspiracy allegation, nor did the city allege sufficient factual allegations to sustain a conspiracy charge even if it could proceed without an underlying tort. The case remains ongoing.", "summary": "Plaintiffs, an activist organization and several individuals, brought this suit against Detroit and members of the DPD, arguing that they used excessive force and abridged their freedom of speech and freedom of assembly on various occasions throughout the summer of 2020. The plaintiffs engaged in numerous protests after the police killing of George Floyd. They sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. On September 4, 2020, the court granted their request for a temporary restraining order. The case is ongoing as of September 12, 2020."}
{"article": "On May 15, 2015, the mother of a deceased prison inmate filed this lawsuit against the San Juan County Detention Center, the San Juan County Regional Medical Center, and San Juan County in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought damages and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, alleging wrongful death and violations of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12131-12134. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants\u2019 actions and policies constituted severe and deliberate indifference to the medical needs of her son, who suffered injuries and death as a result of receiving insufficient medical care while incarcerated. The plaintiff\u2019s claims were consolidated with those of three other plaintiffs suing the San Juan County Detention Center, for the pretrial and discovery purposes, although the parties agreed that each case was to be tried separately. Two other individual plaintiffs had filed complaints alleging Eighth Amendment violations, ADA violations, negligence, and wrongful death in June 2015. On July 28, 2015, twenty-seven plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint in the District of New Mexico in <i>Burkee v. San Juan</i>. The <i>Burkee</i> plaintiffs asserted causes of action for Eighth Amendment violations, negligence, ADA violations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). On August 24, 2015, the consolidated case was assigned to Judge James O. Browning. On September 28, the plaintiffs moved for injunctive relief, requesting either that the court order the defendants to provide emergency medical care to the plaintiffs, or appoint an independent medical overseer for the facility. On November 17, the court dismissed all federal claims against the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint did not meet the requisite pleading standards. On January 15, 2016, the court denied the motion for preliminary injunction on the grounds that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim. The plaintiffs each filed an amended complaint on February 29, 2016, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as state tort claims. The lead plaintiff in this case entered into a settlement agreement with the defendants, which was approved by the District Court on September 19, 2016. The details of the settlement were not made publicly available. On September 20, 2016, the court dismissed all claims under the A.D.A. and state law. On September 30, 2016, the court entered its final judgment, dismissing the lead plaintiff\u2019s claims against the defendants with prejudice. Salazar v. San Juan Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. CIV 15-0417 JB/LF, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141408, at *41 (D.N.M. Sep. 30, 2016). The case of one of the other individual wrongful death plaintiffs was also dismissed on September 30, 2016. Following settlement and dismissal of the lead plaintiff's case, proceedings in two of the other consolidated cases continued. In the other individual wrongful death plaintiff's case, claims against the San Juan County Detention Center were dismissed on December 12, 2016. The claims against San Juan Regional Medical Center and its employees and agents on July 31, 2017. In the <i>Burkee</i> case, the San Juan County Detention Center, its administrator, and San Juan County moved to dismiss the A.D.A. and state law claims, and Judge Browning granted the motion on September 20, 2016. On March 31, 2017, Judge Browning denied the San Juan Regional Medical Center's motion to dismiss the nine remaining plaintiffs' IIED claims and motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' state law claims. Judge Browning also granted the plaintiffs' August 15, 2016 motion to remand to state court. The court found that the remaining plaintiffs' federal claims had already been dismissed, and it declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, remanding the case to the Eleventh Judicial District Court, San Juan County, New Mexico. The court explained its rationale in an October 13, 2017 memorandum opinion. 301 F.Supp.3d 992 (D.N.M. 2017). Judge Browning issued a final judgment in the case on October 27, 2017. After discovery in the district court, the case was dismissed in the state court on June 12, 2018.", "summary": "On May 15, 2015, the mother of a deceased prison inmate sued the San Juan County Detention Center in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, alleging that the decedent's death was caused by the defendant's severe and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The plaintiffs filed for injunctive relief against the defendants, which the District Court denied on January 15, 2016. On September 19, 2016, the court approved a settlement agreement between the parties."}
{"article": "<b>NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see <a href=\"https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/\"> their tracker</a>.</b> COVID 19 Summary: The League of Women Voters of Virginia and three individual voters filed a suit against the Virginia State Board of Elections to remove Virginia\u2019s witness requirement. The parties reached a partial agreement, which the court approved in a consent decree, to remove the requirement for the June 23, 2020 elections. On August 5, the parties came to an agreement to stop enforcement of the witness requirement for the November 3 General Election and collectively sought approval of a partial consent judgment, which the court approved on August 21. The case is ongoing. <hr> On April 17, 2020, the League of Women Voters of Virginia and three individual voters filed a complaint against the Virginia State Board of Elections to remove Virginia\u2019s witness requirement in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and ACLU of Virginia, the plaintiffs brought this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1983 and 1988, 52 U.S.C. \u00a7 10302 and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2201-02, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Specifically, they alleged that requiring absentee ballots to be marked in the presence of a witness was contrary to social distancing guidelines and that forcing voters to comply amid the COVID-19 pandemic unduly burdened the fundamental right to vote by forcing voters to choose between their safety and right to vote. Additionally, they alleged that the requirement disproportionately discriminated against elderly voters, African American voters, and voters with disabilities who face a heightened risk of illness from COVID-19. The case was assigned to Judge Norman K. Moon. On April 21, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction that would: (1) prohibit the defendants from enforcing the witness requirement for the June 23 primary and all subsequent elections; (2) order the defendants to issue guidance instructing city and county election officials to count otherwise validly cast absentee ballots that are missing a witness signature for the June 23 primary election; (3) order the defendants to conduct a public campaign informing Virginia voters about the elimination of the requirement. On April 23, a group of three individuals filed a motion to intervene as defendants. The next day, the Republican Party of Virginia (RPV) and another group of three voters also filed a motion to intervene. The following day, all of the individuals' requests to intervene were denied because they would unnecessarily expand the scope of the litigation and detract from timely resolution. 2020 WL 2090679. However, the RPV\u2019s motion to intervene was granted. 2020 WL 2090678. On April 27, the parties filed a joint motion for a partial consent decree, agreeing to withdraw the preliminary injunction motion in exchange for the defendant\u2019s agreement to forego enforcement of the witness requirement for the June Primary. On May 5, Judge Moon approved the partial consent decree. 2020 WL 2158249. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Robert S. Ballou for all nondispositive pretrial motions and issues. On June 19, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with one of the named plaintiffs removed. On July 17, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint with three additional plaintiffs who were at higher risk from COVID-19 due to underlying medical conditions. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction for the upcoming November 3 election and other subsequent elections affected by COVID-19 on July 23. On August 5, the parties came to an agreement to stop enforcement of the witness requirement for the November 3 General Election and collectively sought approval of a partial consent judgment. The district court approved the second consent judgment and decree on August 21, finding that the same reasons for the previous consent decree carried even more force, as the pandemic has resurged. 2020 WL 4927524. A bench trial is scheduled for May 19-21, 2021. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On April 17, 2020, the League of Women Voters of Virginia and three individual voters filed a complaint against the Virginia State Board of Elections to remove Virginia\u2019s witness requirement at the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia. The plaintiffs alleged that the enforcement of the witness requirement violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as requiring the absentee ballot to be marked in the presence of a witness, was contrary to social distancing guidelines by risking voter health if forced to comply amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs further alleged that the requirement unduly burdened their fundamental right to vote by forcing voters to choose between their safety and right to vote. Additionally, they alleged that the requirement disproportionately discriminated against elderly voters, African American voters, and voters with disabilities who face a heightened risk of illness from COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunction to enjoin Virginia\u2019s witness requirement for the upcoming June and subsequent elections, to count otherwise valid ballots missing witness signatures for the June elections, and to conduct a public information campaign informing voters on the elimination of the witness requirement. Ahead of the June 23 election, both parties filed a joint motion for a partial consent decree agreeing to withdraw the preliminary injunction motion in exchange for the defendant\u2019s agreement to forego enforcement of the witness requirement for the June Primary. On May 5, the joint motion for the consent judgment and decree was approved. On August 5, the parties came to an agreement to stop enforcement of the witness requirement for the November 3 General Election and collectively sought approval of a partial consent judgment, which was approved on August 21. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On January 31, 2017, two F1 student visa holders, represented by the NYU Law School Immigrant Rights Clinic, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, after being detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) upon their arrival at the Buffalo Port of Entry on the evening of January 31, 2017. Petitioners are Muslim Iranian F1 student visa holders who attend the New York University Tandon School of Engineering. The complaint alleged that CBP detained the plaintiffs solely pursuant to an executive order issued by President Donald Trump on January 27, 2017 suspending entry into the United States of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The complaint further alleged that this executive order was being enforced against them contrary to nationwide federal court stays, including the ones issued in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15590>Darweesh v. Trump</a> and portions of <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15591\">Louhghalem/Tootkaboni v. Trump</a>. Petitioners claimed that their continued detention and bar to entry based solely on the executive order violated their Fifth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights, violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause, violated the Administrative Procedure Act, violated Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and was ultra vires under the immigration statutes. The complaint was filed as a writ of habeas corpus (to seek immediate release of plaintiffs from detention), and as a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On February 1, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. It seems likely the plaintiffs were released from detention. On February 2, 2017, the case was terminated. No judge was assigned. This case is closed.", "summary": "Two Iranian F1 student visa holders filed a writ of habeas corpus and civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief after being detained pursuant to President Donald Trump's January 31, 2017 executive order (and contrary to nationwide federal court stays of that order). Petitioners voluntarily dismissed this case the day after filing."}
{"article": "On November 17, 2011, several couples who reside in Alabama filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Middle District of Alabama against the State of Alabama, alleging violations of the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and private counsel, sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees, alleging that the defendants' policies discriminated against non-U.S. citizens trying to obtain a marriage license in Alabama. In Alabama, no person may marry without a marriage license. One of a probate judge's ministerial jobs is to issue marriage licenses to those couples that meet the requirements. Alabama law states that the parties issuing the marriage license must obtain the Social Security Number of the individuals getting married and have it appear in the marriage license and certificate. In 2008, the Alabama Attorney General, issued a statement saying that a Social Security Number or other proofs of citizenship were not required to obtain a marriage license. The Attorney General ordered the probate offices to instead allow people trying to get married the opportunity to submit an affidavit saying they do not have a Social Security Number. On September 13, 2012, the District Court (Judge William Keith Watkins) denied Defendant Probate Judge McKinney, Jr.'s (Probate Judge Reed's predecessor) motion to dismiss. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing since they did not apply for a marriage license and thus did not suffer any type of injury. However, the District Court (Judge Watkins) did not buy this argument since Judge McKinney, Jr. had a clear policy of requiring non-citizens who wanted to get a marriage license to provide proof of legal status. The District Court (Judge Watkins) thus found that the plaintiffs were effectively barred from applying for a marriage license and that applying for it would have been futile. On September 25, 2012, the District Court (Judge Watkins) denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification so on December 7, 2012, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint. On June 3, 2013, the District Court (Judge William Keith Watkins) entered a protective order assuring the confidentiality of certain information disclosed by both parties. On June 11, 2013, the District Court (Judge Watkins) granted Defendant Probate Judge Reed's motion to dismiss any claims against him. Judge Reed argued that his probate office did not require proof of citizenship prior to issuing marriage licenses, and that he was actually willing to give the plaintiffs their marriage licenses if they had applied for it. Judge McKinney, Jr.'s prior policy was repealed and so the District Court (Judge Watkins) found that the plaintiffs no longer had standing. On August 19, 2013, the District Court (Judge William Keith Watkins) approved the parties' joint stipulation of dismissal. As part of the agreement, the official Probate County's marriage policy was amended and published so that it was clear that there were no citizenship requirements, including a Social Security Number, to obtaining a marriage license.", "summary": "On November 17, 2011, several couples who reside in Alabama filed a class action lawsuit in the Middle District of Alabama against the State of Alabama, under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and private counsel, sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees, alleging that the defendants' policies discriminated against non-U.S. citizens trying to obtain a marriage license in Alabama. On August 19, 2013, the District Court (Judge William Keith Watkins) approved the parties' joint stipulation of dismissal. As part of the agreement, the official Probate County's marriage policy was amended and published so that it was clear that there were no citizenship requirements, including a Social Security Number, to obtaining a marriage license."}
{"article": "On March 15, 2011, a group of Hispanic farmers and ranchers brought suit against the United States and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, were potential claimants in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12757\">the proposed settlement agreement in <i>Garcia v. Vilsack</i></a>, an earlier case in which a group of Hispanic farmers and ranchers filed suit against the USDA, claiming that the USDA had systematically denied Hispanics farmers and ranchers loans and loan servicing in the 1990s. In this case, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had violated their Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights by offering a settlement agreement unequal to the settlement agreement offered to <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12515\">African American</a>, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12657\">Native American</a>, and women farmers and ranchers who had previously sued the USDA over similar discrimination. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the proposed settlement agreement was unequal in comparison to the other discrimination settlements because it did not provide judicial supervision (leading to deficient notice and defective claims processes); did not provide assistance of class counsel; provided disproportionate monetary relief (only $1.33 billion, compared to the $2.23 billion in the African American discrimination case, despite Hispanic farmers outnumbering African American farmers 12 to 1); required additional proof elements in the claims process; and did not propose compensation for non-credit farm benefits. The plaintiff filed under the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Administrative Procedures Act. They sought a declaration that this settlement proposal violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights and a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from engaging in racially discriminatory treatment of Hispanic farmers by treating them differently in comparison to African American, Native American, and women farmers with similar complaints. On March 25, 2011, the plaintiffs filed papers for a putative class of plaintiffs in the <i>Garcia</i> case, who allegedly \"were subjected to, and continue to be subject to, USDA discrimination in its farm benefit programs\" and who \"are potential claimants\" under the defendants' administrative claim process for Hispanic farmers. On May 11, 2011, the US moved to dismiss the case, denying any unlawful conduct and stating that the plaintiffs lacked standing, were attempting improper claim splitting, and were time barred. The plaintiffs moved to certify the class on June 11, 2011, and the defendant moved on June 14 to stay the certification motion pending adjudication of the motion to dismiss. On November 11, 2011, Judge Reggie B. Walton entered an order asking parties to clarify whether the plaintiffs' claims were ripe, given that the settlement agreement in <i>Garcia</i> had not been formally proposed. On December 21, 2011, Judge Walton entered an order denying all extant motions without prejudice, and holding the case in abeyance pending an announcement of the final version of Defendants' ADR program, because this suit would be unripe until the settlement agreement was formally proposed. On January 20, 2012, the defendants in the <i>Garcia</i> case submitted the proposed framework for the settlement agreement. Based on the proposal, the plaintiffs in this case submitted a first amended complaint on April 13, 2012, and Judge Walton lifted the stay on the case on August 24, 2012. The defendant then moved to dismiss the amended complaint on September 24, 2012. On December 11, 2012, Judge Walton granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, ruling that there was no injury because participation in the administrative claims process was optional, and that the suit lacked redressability because the court had no way of compelling the government to propose a specific settlement agreement. 908 F. Supp. 2d 146. On February 15, 2013, the plaintiffs entered a notice of appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (docket no. 13-05044). The Circuit court heard oral arguments from the parties more than a year later on May 7, 2014. In its opinion, the appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs' prayer for relief overreached because the court could not coerce a party, especially an Executive Branch agency, to settle in a case. Therefore, the district court correctly held that it lacked authority to enjoin the government to offer class settlement such as in previous cases. However, the appeals court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case on May 27, 2014 because the district court could have granted relief in the form of an injunction ordering the government not to act on unlawful racial grounds toward Hispanic and female farmers. While the parties litigated the case in district court on remand, the defendant filed a new motion on November 25, 2014 to dismiss on the grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the complaint failed to state a valid claim. In response to the defendant's motion, the district court officially reopened the case on May 14, 2015. On October 26, 2015, the defendant filed a status report regarding the voluntary alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program established for farmers alleging discrimination against Hispanic and female individuals in making or servicing farm loans. The Claims Adjudicator approved a total of 3,210 claims in the ADR program. On October 23, 2015, USDA reported as a total of 2,847 of the approved claims had been paid by the Judgment Fund, and another 126 claims were in process. Months later, Judge Walton granted the defendant's renewed motion to dismiss the case. When the defendant moved to dismiss in November 2014, Judge Walton found that in light of the appeals court's agreement that a court cannot order a party to settle, only the plaintiffs' equal protection claim remained. Judge Walton reasoned that the plaintiffs' other claims related to specific terms of the ADR and therefore the court did not have the authority to adjudicate those issues. In relation to plaintiffs' equal protection claim, the defendant contended that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim because the complaint did not allege facts showing that the defendant had a discriminatory purpose in settling claims brought by hispanic or female farmers. Judge Walton agreed with the defendant and dismissed the case in March 2016, closing the case.", "summary": "On March 15, 2011, a group of Hispanic farmers and ranchers brought suit against the United States and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (\"USDA\") in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that they were being treated unequally compared to other minority and women farmers who have settled with the USDA regarding discriminatory lending practices. In December 2012, the District Court dismissed the case for lack of ripeness and redressability. The plaintiffs appealed the judgment on February 15, 2013 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on the grounds that while the court could not compel settlement, the district court could have issued an injunction ordering the defendant to not act on unlawful racial grounds. On remand, the defendant filed a status report in October 2015 regarding the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program established for the parties to work out settlement terms. While the ADR resulted in a vast majority of claims being paid, around 130 were processing. In addition, the defendant filed a renewed motion to dismiss the case in November 2015. Judge Walton granted the motion on March 1, 2016. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "This lawsuit, filed on July 21, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, was brought by the Western State Center (a public benefit corporation), the First Unitarian Church of Portland, a private individual, and two Oregon State Representatives. Represented by private attorneys, they sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Federal Protective Service, and the U.S. Marshal Service over the defendants' presence and role in quelling protests that ensued after the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. The complaint alleged violation of the First and Tenth Amendments. The First Amendment claim was brought by First Unitarian Church and argued that the defendants' arrests of protesters were in violation of the First Amendment right to protest, but also in violation of the Free Exercise clause, as protest was an integral part of the church's philosophy. The Tenth Amendment claim, brought by all plaintiffs, claimed that the federal agencies' enforcement of law on Portland property (and not just federal property) amounted to an unconstitutional violation of the principles of federalism. Plaintiffs requested declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Michael W. Mosman and Magistrate Judge Jolie A. Russo. However, on July 27, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint. The amended complaint retained the arguments about free speech, free exercise, and principles of federalism, but added other claims regarding the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the federal agents were arresting Portland residents without probable cause, adding that some of these arrests were caught on video. Protesters were taken off the street by non-uniformed federal officers and hauled into unmarked vans. Two days later the plaintiffs submitted a motion for a temporary restraining order with an expedited hearing and a motion for a preliminary injunction. However, on August 4 the court granted an email request to withdraw the motion for a temporary restraining order as moot. This is probably because the court had already granted a TRO against against federal agents in Portland in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17707&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7CIndex%20Newspapers%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B><i>Index Newspapers</i></a> earlier in the week. The plaintiffs continued to seek a preliminary injunction. On October 22 and 30, the court held oral argument on the motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge Mosman granted the preliminary injunction with respect to the First Amendment claims, but denied the preliminary injunction with respect to the Tenth Amendment claim. 2020 WL 6555054. While Judge Mosman found no showing that the federal agents acted with retaliatory motive, he found that the President and Acting Secretary Chad Wolf expressed such a motivation and the plaintiffs were entitled to some form of injunctive relief. Under the preliminary injunction, Judge Mosman limited the defendants from engaging in crowd control beyond an extended city block around the U.S. Courthouse. The defendants promptly appealed to the Ninth Circuit (docket no. 20-35959) and requested a stay pending appeal. The Ninth Circuit denied the defendants' emergency motion for a stay pending appeal without prejudice to renewal after the district court ruled on the motion to stay pending appeal. Then on November 9, 2020, the court held a status conference and vacated the order for the preliminary injunction as no longer necessary. The defendants subsequently dismissed the appeal. On December 4, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. They argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing because the plaintiffs did not attend the protest and the feared injuries were not injuries in fact or traceable to federal agents' conduct. In addition, they argued that the First Amendment allegations were actually weaker than what was considered in the preliminary injunction motion. The defendants also requested a stay of discovery. The parties then consented to proceed before Magistrate Judge Jolie A. Russo. Magistrate Judge Russo extended the discovery deadline to November 30, 2021. As of December 30, 2020, the motions to dismiss and stay discovery remained pending. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "This case was filed on July 21, 2020. Plaintiffs included Western States Center (a public benefit corporation), the First Unitarian Church of Portland, and three individuals (including two state representatives). They sued the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, the Federal Protective Service, and the U.S. Marshals for their presence and role in quelling protests that ensued after the police killing of George Floyd. The complaint alleged violations of the First and Tenth Amendment, and plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The court granted the preliminary injunction with respect to the First Amendment claims, but denied the preliminary injunction with respect to the Tenth Amendment claim on October 30, 2020. A week later though, the court vacated the preliminary injunction as no longer necessary. On December 4, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. They also requested a stay of discovery. As of December 30, 2020, the motions to dismiss and stay discovery remained pending. This case is ongoing."}
{"article": "This case is one of several brought nationwide by States, counties, and nonprofit organizations challenging the Trump administration's revised, final public charge rule, which expands the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. In the fall of 2019, district court judges from across the country granted preliminary injunctions enjoining the government from implementing the public charge rule. But after multiple Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court issued stays of these injunctions, the public charge rule was implemented by the government on February 24, 2020. The District Court in this case issued a judgment vacating the public charge rule. The Seventh Circuit stayed the order pending appeal and petition for certiorari. In addition, on February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. A little over a month later on March 9, 2021, DHS officially abandoned the rule and the petitions for certiorari were voluntarily dismissed by the government. <u>Cook County Sues Over the Public Charge Rule</u> On September 23, 2019, Cook County, Illinois, and the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, Inc., represented by private counsel, filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its acting secretary in his official capacity, and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and its acting secretary in his official capacity, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs sought relief to declare the Department of Homeland Security\u2019s Final Rule (\"the Rule\") unlawful and invalid due to violations of the APA and unconstitutional due to violations of the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs also sought to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Rule from being enforced in the state of Illinois. On August 14, 2019, the DHS published a <a href=\"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/08/14/2019-17142/inadmissibility-on-public-charge-grounds\">revised, final public charge rule</a>, which defines personal circumstances that affect the ability of individuals and their families to successfully enter the U.S. or acquire legal permanent resident status (i.e., get a green card). The final rule increases the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that if an immigration officer finds that a person seeking a visa is likely to become a public charge, that person is \u201cinadmissible.\u201d Thus, an immigrant who uses non-cash benefits such as food stamps or Medicaid may be found more likely to be a public charge and inadmissible for purposes of a visa or green card application. The plaintiffs asserted that the effect of this Rule would be to force immigrant families to choose between using these benefits or risk failing to gain permanent resident status. The plaintiffs contended that the defendants violated the APA in exceeding their statutory authority by redefining the term \"public charge\" and contravened existing law by considering public benefits that have been explicitly and repeatedly excluded from public charge determinations. Furthermore, the plaintiffs claimed that that Rule was arbitrary and capricious because defendants failed to justify their departure from settled practice, failed to adequately consider the Rule's varied and extensive harms, and because the Rule's complex rules will lead to arbitrary enforcement. The plaintiffs also argued that the Rule violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by discriminating against people with disabilities and that the Rule violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Additionally, the plaintiffs asserted that the Rule would have a chilling effect on immigrant communities, \"causing individuals to forgo critical public benefits\u2014an impact that will cause devastating, irreparable harm to children, families, and public health in Cook County and throughout Illinois.\" The plaintiffs argued that immigrant families will disenroll in federal health and assistance programs, leading to adverse health, economic, and productivity results, and placing a heavy burden and strain on County agencies and programs. <u>The Plaintiffs Seek a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction</u> On September 25, 2019, after originally being assigned to Judge John Robert Blakey, the case was reassigned to Judge Gary Feinerman. On the same day, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction (PI) or stay. With the Rule set to go in effect on October 15, 2019, the plaintiffs sought immediate injunctive relief or a stay enjoining the defendants from implementing the Rule. The plaintiffs claimed that they were likely to succeed on their claim under the APA, that they would suffer irreparable harm absent immediate injunctive relief, and that the balance of equities and public interest weighed strongly in favor of an immediate injunction or stay to maintain the status quo. On October 8, 2019, the defendants filed an opposition to the plaintiffs' emergency motion. The defendants argued that the court should deny the motion because the plaintiffs were a governmental entity and a group of organizations serving immigrants, rather than persons actually affected by the rule, and thus cannot meet jurisdictional requirements. The defendants also asserted that the plaintiffs' claims were meritless, that \"the Rule accords with the longstanding meaning of 'public charge' and complies with the APA\" and that plaintiffs' \"disagreements are ultimately with the wisdom of the policy, a judgment allocated to the political branches.\" A few days later the defendants filed a supplemental memorandum in opposition to the plaintiffs' emergency motion. On October 11, orders by the United States District Courts for the Southern District of New York and Eastern District of Washington preliminarily enjoined the defendants from implementing the Rule nationwide, including Illinois. The defendants asserted that the plaintiffs could no longer claim that they will suffer irreparable harm absent a PI and thus a PI at this time is inappropriate. <u>District Court Grants a Preliminary Injunction</u> Notwithstanding these nationwide PIs, on October 14, 2019, Judge Feinerman granted the plaintiffs' motion and enjoined the defendants from implementing the Rule in the State of Illinois. Judge Feinerman concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the Rule conflicts with the Supreme Court\u2019s formulation of public charge, in violation of the APA. Judge Feinerman further concluded that the plaintiffs have demonstrated irreparable harm in the absence of a PI and that the balance of harms favors the plaintiffs. 417 F.Supp.3d 1008. Soon after, on October 25, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to stay the PI pending appeal. The defendants argued that they were likely to succeed on appeal and that they would suffer irreparable harm absent a stay from being compelled to grant lawful permanent residence to persons who would likely become a public charge under the Rule. The defendants appealed the PI to the Seventh Circuit on October 30, 2019. Judge Feinerman denied the defendants' motion on November 14, 2019. On December 23, 2019, a Seventh Circuit panel denied the defendants' motion to stay the PI pending appeal. The Seventh Circuit's decision was in contrast to a Ninth Circuit order staying a nationwide PI, which also enjoined the implementation of the Rule, pending appeal. <u>Defendants' Motion to Dismiss</u> Back in the district court, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on January 16, 2020. The defendants argued that in light of a Ninth Circuit opinion concluding that the Rule falls within the defendants' discretion to interpret and implement the meaning of public charge and that the Supreme Court has not set a fixed definition of public charge, the plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed. Plaintiffs, in opposition to the motion, maintained that the Rule \"is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statutory text, and DHS does not, and cannot, offer justification for this transformation of well-settled law\" and will impose significant costs on the plaintiffs. <u>The Supreme Court Stays All Nationwide Injunctions Enjoining Implementation of the Public Charge Rule, but Not Illinois' Injunction</u> The Supreme Court weighed in to provide clarity to the several, overlapping PIs enjoining the implementation of the Rule that had been issued across the country. On January 27, 2020, ruling in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17287\">State of New York v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security</a>, Justice Gorsuch stayed the Southern District of New York's nationwide PI regarding the Rule, concluding that the \"routine issuance of universal injunctions is patently unworkable, sowing chaos for litigants, the government, courts, and all those affected by these conflicting decisions.\" However, the Supreme Court declined to stay the Northern District of Illinois' PI because it applied only to the state of Illinois. 140 S. Ct. 599. <u>Defendants Renew Efforts to Seek a Stay of the Injunction</u> Following the Supreme Court's order to stay the nationwide PI, on January 28, 2020, the defendants filed a renewed motion to the Seventh Circuit to stay the district court's PI. The defendants argued that \"in light of the Supreme Court's decision holding that a stay pending appeal of injunctions against enforcement of this Rule is appropriate,\" the Seventh Circuit should issue a stay pending appeal to allow the Rule to go into effect in Illinois. A Seventh Circuit panel denied the renewed motion for stay on February 10, 2020, without issuing an opinion or explanation for its conclusion. Instead, the Seventh Circuit issued an expedited briefing schedule to ensure prompt consideration of the PI. On February 13, 2020, the defendants filed an application to the Supreme Court for a stay pending appeal. The defendants contended that the Seventh Circuit \"stands alone in finding a stay unwarranted;\" the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, along with the Supreme Court in an appeal pending in the Second Circuit, stayed \"materially identical\" PIs. The defendants further asserted that, even though the PI here was distinguishable because it was not nationwide, the Supreme Court indicated in its January 27 order that \"challenges to the Rule will be unsuccessful and that even a more limited injunction would impose irreparable harm on the government.\" <u>The Supreme Court Stays Illinois' Injunction Pending the Seventh Circuit Ruling and a Writ of Certiorari</u> On February 21, 2020, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, granted the defendants' application for stay and issued an order staying the district court's PI pending disposition of the appeal in the Seventh Circuit and disposition on defendants' timely petition for a writ of certiorari. The majority did not file an opinion in support of its decision. Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, concluded that \"the Government\u2019s only claimed hardship is that it must enforce an existing interpretation of an immigration rule in one State\u2014just as it has done for the past 20 years\u2014while an updated version of the rule takes effect in the remaining 49,\" which was not enough to satisfy its \"especially heavy burden.\" 140 S. Ct. 681. <u>The District Court Denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss</u> On May 19, Judge Feinerman issued a memorandum opinion and order denying defendants' motion to dismiss and concluding that plaintiffs are entitled to discovery on its equal protection claim. First, Judge Feinerman denied defendants' claims that plaintiffs \"lack standing or fall outside the pertinent zone of interests, that this suit is not ripe, or that the APA claims fail as a matter of law,\" as the court already addressed those issues in its preliminary injunction opinion. Moreover, Judge Feinerman found that plaintiffs' equal protection claim survived dismissal, as the allegation \"that the Final Rule\u2019s disproportionate impact on nonwhite immigrants motivated its promulgation is eminently plausible.\" Judge Feinerman further concluded that extra-record discovery on plaintiffs' equal protection claim was justified because plaintiffs' made a \"strong showing that the Rule was developed and promulgated 'at least in part because of' a substantial and impermissible reason not reflected in the administrative record\u2014the Rule\u2019s disproportionate 'adverse effects upon' nonwhite immigrants.\" <u>The Seventh Circuit Affirms the Preliminary Injunction</u> On June 10, a Seventh Circuit panel (Circuit Judges Diane Wood, Ilana Rovner, and Amy Coney Barrett) issued a ruling affirming the preliminary injunction. 962 F.3d 208. Writing for a 2-1 majority, Judge Wood held that (1) the county had standing to sue; (2) DHS's interpretation of the rule fell outside the boundaries set by the statute; and (3) the public charge rule was likely to be arbitrary and capricious. Judge Barrett dissented, writing that DHS's interpretation of the public charge rule did not fall outside the boundaries set by the statute. She did not comment on the rule being likely to fail the arbitrary and capricious standard, however, because the district court didn't address it and plaintiffs barely briefed it. The stay remained, however, as defendants still had the chance to file a petition for a writ of certiorari. <u>Defendants' Appeal is Denied, as is their Petition to Rehear</u> In response to the ruling on the motion to dismiss, defendants asked the district court to certify for interlocutory appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss on June 10. Defendants argued that dismissal of plaintiffs' equal protection claim would avoid difficult issues of executive privilege arising from plaintiff's extra-record discovery. On July 14, Judge Feinerman declined to certify the order for interlocutory appeal. He found that, even if plaintiffs' equal protection claim were dismissed, plaintiffs would still be entitled to the same discovery from their APA claims. On July 27, defendants filed a petition for the Seventh Circuit to rehear their appeal of the preliminary injunction <i>en banc</i>. The Seventh Circuit denied their petition on August 12. On October 7, 2020, defendants filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. <u>Public Charge Rule is Vacated Following Plaintiffs' Successful Motion for Summary Judgment on APA Claim</u> On August 31, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the APA claim. Relying on the Seventh Circuit's affirmance of the preliminary injunction, they argued that they should win on the APA claim while the equal protection claim proceeds in court. They further argued that the public charge rule should be vacated as a result. Defendants conceded that plaintiffs were likely to win on the APA claim, but argued that the injunction should only be lifted for the State of Illinois. On November 2, Judge Feinerman issued an order granting plaintiffs' motion and vacating the public charge rule nationwide. He agreed that the Seventh Circuit had effectively argued the merits of the APA claim, and held vacatur to be an appropriate remedy for a rule that violated the APA. <u>Order Vacating the Rule is Stayed Pending Appeal and Petition for Certiorari</u> Immediately after the ruling, defendants moved to stay the district court's vacatur of the public charge rule pending appeal. The Seventh Circuit granted defendants' motion on November 3. On November 19, the Seventh Circuit further ordered that the appeal of the order would be suspended pending the Supreme Court's resolution of defendants' petition for a writ of certiorari on the preliminary injunction. <u>The Rule is Officially Abandoned and Vacated</u> On January 22, 2021, two days after President Biden's inauguration, Judge Feinerman requested a status report from the new defendants addressing whether they plan to pursue their Seventh Circuit appeal or petition for certiorari. The status hearing was originally set for February 8, but was moved to February 26. On February 2, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. On March 9, 2021, <a href=\"https://www.dhs.gov/news/2021/03/09/dhs-secretary-statement-2019-public-charge-rule\">DHS formally abandoned the rule</a>. The government voluntarily dismissed its appeal to the Seventh Circuit, lifting the stay of the November 2, 2020 decision vacating the Public Charge Final Rule nationwide. That same day, at all parties' requests, the Supreme Court dismissed the pending petition from this case, as well as a similar petition for the Second Circuit (<a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17287\"><i>New York v. DHS</i></a>) and the Ninth Circuit (<a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17409\"><i>San Francisco v. USCIS</i></a>). On March 10, eleven state attorneys general, led by Ken Paxton of Texas, moved to intervene as defendants in the Seventh Circuit. They filed similar motions in the Ninth and Fourth Circuits, and a day later on March 11, they filed an <a href=\"https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/20/20A150/172422/20210319132528733_20A__%20Application.pdf\">emergency application</a> to the Supreme Court to intervene on behalf of the government and stay the judgment from <i>Cook County</i>. Despite the motion to intervene in the Seventh Circuit, on March 12, Judge Feinerman approved a stipulation by both parties to voluntarily dismiss the lawsuit, closing the civil case. The Seventh Circuit then went on to deny the states' motion to intervene 3 days later, on March 15. As of April 15, 2021, the Public Charge Final Rule has been abandoned and vacated nationwide. The case has been closed in the district court. However, the application by the states to intervene in the Supreme Court remains open.", "summary": "On September 23, 2019, Cook County, Illinois and the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, Inc. filed this suit the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security's Final Public Charge Rule (the Rule), which added non-cash benefits to the factors considered in determining whether a person applying for legal permanent residence is likely to become a public charge. The plaintiffs alleged that the Government violated the Administrative Procedure Act by exceeding its statutory authority and claimed that the Rule was \"arbitrary and capricious.\" In October 2019 the district court ordered a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from implementing and enforcing the Rule in Illinois. The defendants appealed this order to the Seventh Circuit, where a panel declined to issue a stay of the district court's preliminary injunction. In February 2020 the Supreme Court granted the defendants' stay of the preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction in June, 2020. The rule was subsequently vacated altogether by the district court in November, 2020, but the order was immediately stayed by the Seventh Circuit. However, the Rule was abandoned by DHS on March 9, 2021 and the Seventh Circuit subsequently lifted its stay, vacating the Rule nationwide. The case was closed in the District Court on March 12, 2021."}
{"article": "On September 25, 2019, the State of New York and the Kings County District Attorney filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs challenged the federal government\u2019s new directive authorizing civil immigration arrests in and around New York State courthouses (\u201cthe Directive\u201d). The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the Directive violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Tenth Amendment. The case was assigned to Judge Jed S. Rakoff. In their complaint, the plaintiffs stated that prior to a January 2018 ICE directive addressing \u201cCivil Immigration Enforcement Actions Inside Courthouses,\u201d there was a longstanding practice of avoiding civil immigration arrests in and around state courthouses. And, because New York recognizes a common-law privilege against civil arrests in, or while traveling to or from, courthouses, the plaintiffs argued that the Directive, which generally authorizes such arrests, violates the APA by exceeding ICE\u2019s statutory authority. The plaintiffs also claimed that the Directive is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA because it was issued absent adequate justification or explanation. Next, the plaintiffs alleged that implementation of the Directive disrupts the effective functioning of the State\u2019s court system, deters victims and witnesses from assisting law enforcement and vindicating their rights, hinders criminal prosecution, and undermines public safety. The plaintiffs also noted that ICE enforcement actions at New York State courthouses had \u201cskyrocketed\u201d since the Directive was issued, and that such enforcement had significantly chilled participation in the courts. Thus, the plaintiffs argued that the Directive violates the Tenth Amendment by impermissibly interfering with New York\u2019s right to form its own government by disrupting state court operations and impeding criminal prosecutions. On October 23, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The defendants claimed that the Directive is unreviewable under the APA, there is no federal common-law immunity from immigration enforcement for those who are subject to ICE arrest, and that the Directive does not implicate the Tenth Amendment because it does not command or compel state actors to take any action. On December 19, 2019, the district court denied the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss with respect to all of the plaintiffs\u2019 claims for relief. First, Judge Rakoff found that the Directive was final agency action subject to judicial review. Next, he held that the common-law privilege against civil courthouse arrests applies to immigration arrests, and has not been displaced by federal immigration law. Finally, he found that the facts presented demonstrate that ICE has commandeered state and local judges and court officials not to take action in response to ICE courthouse arrests, even when such arrests cause great disruption and state agents would therefore normally intervene. 431 F.Supp.3d 377. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on March 13, 2020. The motion was accompanied by three amicus briefs: one from former nominee to be U.S. Attorney General for Civil Rights and Commissioner of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Debo Adegbile, another from Harvard Law Professor Nikolas Bowie, and a third from the New York Bar Association. Judge Rakoff granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on June 10, 2020. He held that the Immigration and Nationality Act incorporated the English common law rule preventing service and arrest on people in or traveling to a courthouse. He also ruled that the policy change violated the APA's arbitrary and capricious review standard. He was not persuaded by the defendants' arguments that executive orders and policy directives from DHS effectively mandated that arrests must be carried out in courthouses because the orders mandated no such thing. In granting the summary judgment motion, Judge Rakoff also granted the motion for declaratory and injunctive relief and enjoined ICE from carrying out any civil arrests in New York courthouses. 2020 WL 3067715. On August 7, 2020, the defendants appealed to the Second Circuit. As of December 23, 2020, the appeal is pending.", "summary": "The State of New York and the Kings County District Attorney filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on September 25, 2019, challenging a new directive issued by ICE generally authorizing civil immigration arrests in and around New York State courthouses. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the directive violates the APA and the Tenth Amendment. On March 10, 2020, Judge Jed Rakoff granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted the plaintiff's motion for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, enjoining ICE from conducting civil arrests on the grounds of New York courthouses. On August 7, 2020, the defendants appealed to the Second Circuit. As of December 23, 2020, the appeal is pending."}
{"article": "On January 13, 2012, the Prison Legal News (PLN) filed a civil rights lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Oregon under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Columbia County. The plaintiff, represented by Human Rights Defense Center and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, claiming that the defendants' \"postcard only\" and \"no magazine\" policies for inmate mail violated the plaintiff's First Amendment rights, as well as the First Amendment rights of inmates at the Jail and their correspondents. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the policy resulted in the unlawful censorship of PLN's books and magazines, which are sent to individual subscribers in custody at the Columbia County Jail. The plaintiff claimed that these mailings were protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiff also alleged the defendants' \"notice and appeal\" policy for rejected inmate mail violated the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights and the procedural due process rights of inmates and their correspondents. On May 29, 2012, Judge Michael H. Simon granted the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction in part, holding that the jail's policy likely violated the First Amendment. Judge Simon ordered the defendants to stop restricting all incoming and outgoing inmate personal mail to postcards only and to stop refusing to deliver or process inmate mail solely on the grounds that it is not on a postcard. Prison Legal News v. Columbia Cnty., 2012 WL 1936108 (D. Or. May 29, 2012). Judge Simon rejected the jail's arguments that the policy was rationally related to both safety and the efficient use of the jail's limited resources. On September 13, 2012, PLN moved for partial summary judgment on the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and on the defendants' affirmative defense of failure to mitigate damages. These issues went to two separate trials in 2013: a bench trial and a jury trial. From February 5 to February 8 the parties argued before Judge Simon in the bench trial. The defendants argued that the rationale behind the policy was preventing the introduction of contraband and saving time during mail inspection. Following the trial, Judge Simon found that this rationale was not supported by the evidence. This was the first time a postcard-only policy went to trial, so it is the first available legal precedent that can be used in future litigation against postcard-only policies. On February 8, after the bench trial, Judge Simon asked the parties to submit post-trial briefing on several issues relating to the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief, including: the legal criteria for a permanent injunction; the application of the trial evidence to the legal standard; whether the Sheriff's credibility and limited political term impact the Court's analysis; and whether the injunction should be permanent or a limited term. On April 24, 2013, Judge Simon held that the jail's policy was unconstitutional. Judge Simon issued a Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and entered the Final Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against all defendants on May 28, 2013. Judge Simon permanently enjoined the defendants from restricting incoming and outgoing inmate personal mail to postcards only. Judge Simon also declared that inmates have a First Amendment right to receive magazines, and publishers have a First Amendment right to send magazines to inmates and have their magazines delivered. As such, the defendants' policy and custom of prohibiting magazines violated the First Amendment. Judge Simon also declared that that inmates and their unincarcerated correspondents have a Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process when the defendants reject their mail and that the defendants must notify an inmate and the unincarcerated correspondent when the defendants reject correspondence written by or addressed to the inmate, including a description of the rejected mail and the basis for the rejection. Prison Legal News v. Columbia Cnty., 942 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (D. Or. 2013). Subsequently, the plaintiffs moved to recover attorney fees and costs. On June 25, 2013, the defendants moved for the court to amend its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as well as for relief from the judgment. They claimed that the plaintiffs lacked standing for the claims, that the claims were moot based off of corrective actions taken, and that the postcard policy is not a violation of the First Amendment. They sought to have the declaratory judgment removed and claimed that the preliminary injunction should be found an unnecessary remedy by the court. On July 31, 2013, the court denied the motions and the findings and conclusions were left in place. The defendants appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit in August 2013. While the appeal was pending, the court sent the parties to mediation. On March 24, 2014, Judge Simon in the district court granted the plaintiff's motion for attorney fees in part, awarding the plaintiff a total of $802,176.46 in attorney fees and expenses. 2014 WL 1225100 (D. Or. 2014). The appellate court then stayed its proceedings in order to give the defendants time to appeal the attorney fees decision. The defendants filed the second appeal in April 2014 and in June 2014, the appeals were consolidated. However, the defendants subsequently moved, unopposed, to dismiss the appeal. The parties may have engaged in settlement talks, but it is unclear why the defendants sought voluntary dismissal. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal with prejudice on July 1, 2014 and the case is now closed. Each party paid its own costs for the appeal.", "summary": "On January 13, 2012, the Prison Legal News filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Oregon under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Columbia County. After a bench trial, the Court ordered the defendants to stop restricting all mail that was not on a postcard and to implement a notification process when mail is denied, and awarded the plaintiffs $802,176.46 in attorney fees and expenses."}
{"article": "On Jan. 20, 2017, an individual who participated in a protest in Washington D.C., on President Trump's Inauguration Day, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued John Doe D.C. Metropolitan Police Officers, John Doe U.S. Park Police Officers, and the Interim Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department, all in their individual capacities. Represented by private counsel, plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and Bivens for alleged violations of Fourth Amendment protections from false arrest and excessive force. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants used a \"kettle\" tactic to confine him and other demonstrators to a small area, and then deployed chemical irritants and flash-bang grenades against the members of the putative plaintiff class, as well as striking them with batons. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants then made numerous arrests without probable cause. The plaintiff sued on his own behalf and on behalf of a putative class, estimated to encompass at least thirty people, described as individuals who were subjected to the same police action as the plaintiff. The plaintiff asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Specifically, the plaintiff asked the court to declare defendants' conduct unlawful, order the expungement of class-members' arrest records, and for compensatory and punitive damages. On April 18, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion to stay the case during the resolution of his criminal felony charges related to the incident in the District of Columbia Superior Court. On April 24, 2017, Senior Judge Richard J. Leon granted the plaintiff's motion. On June 12, 2017, the plaintiff provided notice of voluntary dismissal of the case without prejudice. As of Mar. 20, 2018, the case appears to be closed.", "summary": "On Jan. 20, 2017, an individual who participated in protests in Washington D.C. during Donald Trump's inauguration sued police on behalf of a putative class of demonstrators, who allegedly were confined to a small area and unnecessarily subdued by chemical irritants, flash-bang grenades, and batons in violation of their protections against false arrest and excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. The case was stayed while criminal charges against the plaintiff related to the same events were resolved, and then the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case."}
{"article": "On March 14, 2017, a female prisoner who was forced to receive prenatal care, give birth, and undergo post-partum treatment while shackled, filed a putative class-action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The plaintiff sued the County of Milwaukee under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought compensatory damages and attorneys\u2019 fees. The plaintiff alleged that in being shackled in accordance with the Milwaukee County Jail\u2019s (MCJ) policy, her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process had been violated. The case was originally assigned to Magistrate Judge David E. Jones. Due to non-consent to jurisdiction on the part of the plaintiff, however, the case was reassigned to Judge Lynn Adelman. On April 11, 2017, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint that contained minor rewordings of the factual allegations without significantly altering the claims for relief. On October 17, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion to certify class. The proposed class definition included \u201cAll persons who, while incarcerated by Milwaukee County Jail, were hospitalized for labor, delivery, or to receive post-partum treatment at any time from February 1, 2010-present.\u201d This definition differed from the one originally proposed in the complaint in that it did not include \u201cprenatal\u201d care. Judge Adelman denied this motion on May 23, 2018. Litigation continued after the order denying class certification until April 8, 2019, when the parties informed the court that they had reached a private settlement agreement. The contents of this agreement was not made public. The plaintiff stipulated to dismissal on June 18, 2019. This case is now closed.", "summary": "This 2017 class action lawsuit was brought by a female inmate in the U.S. District for the Eastern District of Wisconsin who was forced to undergo prenatal care, labor, and give birth while shackled. The parties reached a private settlement agreement on April 8, 2019 and the case was dismissed shortly after. This case is now closed."}
{"article": "On January 15, 2015, the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center (CREEC), along with two individuals requiring wheelchairs for mobility, brought this class action against Ashford Hospitality Trust, Inc., in the US District Court for the Northern District of California. Ashford operated 15 hotels in California and others throughout the United States. In October 2014, the two plaintiffs had separately asked if the Courtyard Oakland Airport hotel and the Embassy Suites Walnut Creek hotel provided wheelchair-accessible shuttle services. Both locations informed the plaintiffs that they did not. The plaintiffs alleged that Ashford violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act by failing to provide wheelchair accessible vehicles at its hotels. The plaintiffs requested declaratory relief and a permanent injunction requiring Ashford to comply with state statutes and the ADA. The plaintiffs filed for class certification of individuals who rely on wheelchairs or scooters for mobility and have been or would be denied full and equal enjoyment of Ashford's services because of the lack of accessible transportation services at Ashford's hotels. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu. On March 25, 2015, the plaintiffs filed to consolidate and/or relate this case to two other cases for pre-trial purposes, because the defendants were publicly traded real estate investment trusts that own and operate hotels in the U.S. and the plaintiff was similarly-situated and seeking class certification. The judge rejected the argument that these similarities warranted case consolidation, and denied this motion on May 6, 2015. On August 27, CREEC filed a stipulated dismissal of all claims, with prejudice, of one of the plaintiffs. In an amended complaint filed on August 31, that plaintiff was removed and a new one was added. Meanwhile the court had granted the defendant's request for private alternative dispute resolution and the parties began settlement discussions before Magistrate Judge James Larson. These proceedings concluded with a settlement agreement reached on October 2, 2015. On November 5, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to certify the class and for preliminary approval of the settlement. The judge granted both motions on December 18, 2015. The Settlement Agreement required all Ashford-owned and operated hotels to come into compliance with ADA regulations by providing hotels that offer transportation services with equivalent transportation services for people who used wheelchairs or scooters. The Agreement explicitly required that Ashford provide accurate information to potential hotel guests so that no guests would be erroneously deterred. Ashford agreed to pay fees and costs of monitoring and the agreement authorized class counsel to seek an award of attorney's fees. The proposed Settlement Agreement was sent to hundreds of disability organizations as well as individuals who had communicated with CREEC about problems with Ashford's transportation. The plaintiffs sent class notice by email to 655 organizations and 43 individuals on December 21, 2015, and received no objections to the proposed settlement. On March 22, 2016, the court approved the final certification of the settlement class. In a final judgment on March 29, 2016, the Court approved the Settlement and announced that it would retain continuing jurisdiction over the parties, the lawsuit, and the settlement for purposes of enforcing the settlement and resolving disputes under the Settlement Agreement. The case was closed.", "summary": "Two individual plaintiffs, both of whom required wheelchairs for mobility, as well as the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center brought this action for injunctive and declaratory relief against Ashford Hospitality Trust, Inc., an operator of hotels. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the ADA and the case settled with a requirement that the defendant hotels provide wheelchair-accessible shuttle services."}
{"article": "This is a case about the unfair business practices of Global Tel*Link, a private company with a state granted monopoly on telephone services in New Jersey's prison systems. On August 20, 2013 the plaintiffs, people incarcerated in New Jersey prisons and people who created accounts with Global Tel*Link to receive calls from New Jersey prisoners, filed this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, where it was assigned to United States District Judge William J. Martini. The plaintiffs sued Global Tel*Link and several associated companies, alleging violations of New Jersey's Consumer Fraud and Public Utilities statutes, the Federal Communications Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 201), the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, and the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201). They plaintiffs also brought a common law unjust enrichment claim. In their \u00a7 1983 count, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, acting on behalf of the State of New Jersey, imposed unconscionable fees and rates on plaintiffs, which amounted to a violation of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on the taking of property without just compensation. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought compensatory damages, disgorgment, restitution, and prejudgment interest, as well as injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. Specifically, they claimed that the defendant's billing policies were \"abusive, discriminatory, and unreasonable.\" In 2006, Global Tel*Link, an Alabama company that provides telecommunications services and surveillance technology to correctional institutions, bought the contractual right to be the sole provider of telecommunications for prisons and many county jails in New Jersey. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that Global Tel*Link abused its monopoly power by charging plaintiffs exorbitant rates, forcing friends and family of incarcerated people to create prepaid accounts with minimum payments of $25 to receive calls from their loved ones, forfeiting money from prepaid accounts when they went unused for 90 days, and failing to disclose rates, fees, and billing practices. The defendants paid commissions, sometimes exceeding 50% of their revenue, to the correctional agency they contracted with. To turn a profit the defendants charged exceedingly high rates for calls and imposed numerous fees, such a 19% fee on deposits to the prepaid accounts. On November 22, 2013, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that it should have been brought as a complaint to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) instead. At that time, the FCC had been in the process of determining whether the defendants' business practices were violations of the Federal Communications Act, as alleged in this lawsuit. On September 8, 2014, the court issued an opinion denying the motion to dismiss, but staying the case until the conclusion of the FCC's proceedings. The plaintiffs responded on September 19, 2014 by withdrawing their Federal Communications Act claim, as well as their claim under New Jersey Public Utilities Statutes. After close to a year of discovery disputes, on August 7, 2015, the defendants moved to compel arbitration based on arbitration clauses in their products' terms of use. On February 11, 2016, Judge Martini denied the motion with respect to all but one of the plaintiffs. He found that the recorded message notifying Global Tel*Link users of its terms of use, including the arbitration provision, did not inform most of the plaintiffs that they would have to abide by Global Tel*link's terms of use to use its services. Consequently, the court held the plaintiffs did not enter into a legally enforceable contract with the defendants. One of the named plaintiffs who created their account through the defendants' website, which used a different system, was forced to arbitrate their claim. On June 15, 2016, the defendants filed a motion with the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation to consolidate this case with several others on which prisoners and their families were suing Global Tel*Link. The Panel denied that request in an October 13, 2015 order, docketed as JPML No. 2651, Entry 23. The defendants appealed Judge Martini's arbitration decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on March 9, 2016. On March 29, 2017, the Third Circuit affirmed Judge Martini's ruling in an opinion by Judge Thomas M. Hardiman. James v. Global Tel*Link Corp. 852 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2017). The Circuit agreed with Judge Martini that because the plaintiffs did not receive the defendants' terms of use or were informed that use of the defendants' services constituted assent to the terms, the plaintiffs were not bound by them or the arbitration clause they contained. While the appeal was pending, the case lay mostly dormant in the district court. The litigation continued to move slowly until the plaintiffs moved for class certification on their New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and \u00a7 1983 Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claims on February 27, 2018. On August 6, 2018, Judge Martini granted that motion and certified a class consisting of all people incarcerated in New Jersey prisons or correctional institutions who used a phone system provided by the defendants and people who received calls from a person incarcerated in New Jersey or established an advance pay account to receive calls from such a person from 2006 to June 2011 (with the exception of people calling from or to Essex County). On March 27, 2018 the defendants moved for summary judgment and on May 4, the plaintiffs filed a cross-motion on their \u00a7 1983 Takings claim. Judge Martini denied both motions on August 6 in a separate opinion from the one addressing the class certification question.The court rejected several of the defendants' legal claims, including the assertion that they were not state actors amenable to suit under \u00a7 1983 and finding issues of material fact for others. On April 2, 2018, Judge Martini referred the case to mediation and took the step of scheduling a settlement conference on December 10, 2019. However, the parties were unable to reach an agreement and the case was scheduled for trial in March of 2020. On January 24, 2020, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings and to decertify the plaintiffs' class. Judge Martini granted the defendants' motion and dismissed plaintiffs' Fifth Amendments Takings claims on March 2, 2020. He found that denying the plaintiffs reasonably priced calling options did not amount to a taking as it lacked legal compulsion. The court did not resolve the decertification motion. This case was scheduled to go to trial on March 16, 2020. However, in a March 3 settlement conference the parties reached an agreement on the broad terms of a settlement and the trial was canceled. After more negotiation, the plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval of a proposed settlement on May 28, 2020, which Judge Martini granted on July 15, 2020. The settlement provided that the defendants would pay $25 million to a settlement fund. That money would be distributed to members of the plaintiffs' class based on the amount each member spent on the defendants' services, with a maximum recovery of $5,000 per account. While the class certified by the court included people who used the defendants' services in New Jersey after 2006, the settlement only allowed for payment to class members who used the defendants' services from 2006 to 2016. The settlement also allowed the plaintiffs to apply for a maximum of $8,332,500 in attorneys' fees. It also provided that class members who were still incarcerated in New Jersey would receive their payments in the form of credits on the phone accounts without filing a proof of claim. However, the settlement did not enjoin the defendants from continuing to engage in unfair business practices, as the plaintiffs had requested in their complaint. After the proposed settlement was filed, on September 21, 2020, several plaintiffs from a separate class action against the defendants in the Northern District of Georgia moved to intervene in this case. The plaintiffs in the Georgia case also challenged some of the defendants' business practices, but on behalf of a putative class of individuals across the country who used the defendants' services. On October 22, 2020, Judge Martini denied this motion, finding that the Georgia plaintiffs did not have a sufficient direct interest in this case to intervene, but allowing them to appear as amicus curiae at the fairness hearing. That hearing happened on October 15, 2020 and a week on October 22, 2020 later Judge Martini issued an opinion approving the settlement. He found that the settlement met all the relevant tests for approval and that he could not address the Georgia plaintiffs' concerns about the settlement, as their class had not yet been certified. The case was closed the day of the order approving the settlement, though the settlement provides that the court will retain jurisdiction over the settlement and its enforcement. The is case ongoing as of November 2020 for settlement enforcement purposes.", "summary": "In 2013 New Jersey prisoners and their loved ones filed this class action complaint against Global Tel*Link, a major prison telecommunications provider, in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants high billing rates and unjust billing practices violated New Jersey law, the Federal Communications act, and the Fifth Amendment's Takings clause through 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. In October of 2020, the parties reached a settlement in which the defendants agreed to pay $25 million to the plaintiffs and other class members. This case remains open for settlement enforcement purposes."}
{"article": "On October 28, 2008, an African-American man filed this class-action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Oakland, California Police Department and one of its officers. The suit was filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, requested injunctive relief and monetary damages, alleging that the City unlawfully targeted citizens on the basis of race, violating the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that officers of the police department had issued warrants based on intentionally false or misleading information, subjecting him to unreasonable search and seizure, arresting him without probable cause, and maliciously prosecuting him. On October 6, 2008, the charges against the plaintiff were dismissed when the Alameda County District Attorney's Office discovered that the warrant had been illegally obtained. Although the charges were dismissed, the plaintiff alleged that as a result of the unreasonable search and seizure, he was unable to work causing a loss of income and suffered damages for pain and emotional distress. On February 9, 2009, a second amended complaint was filed. This complaint added plaintiffs, including African American and Hispanic men and women, who were allegedly subjected to unreasonable search and seizure stemming from illegally obtained warrants and many of whom had been subsequently arrested. On August 5, 2010, the plaintiffs submitted a stipulated motion for approval of settlement. The United States District Court Northern District of California (Judge Thelton E. Henderson) granted the motion where the City offered to settle the monetary relief claims of the 104 individual plaintiffs and putative class members for total gross settlement sum of $6,500.00 inclusive of all attorney fees and costs. After reaching this agreement, the parties continued with settlement discussions on non-monetary relief claims. Their discussions focused on specific reforms intended to remedy the kind of police misconduct that occurred in this case that would be of substantial benefit to the putative class. On February 14, 2011, the parties reached a non-monetary settlement agreement. The settlement set out specific procedures for the Oakland Police Department to obtain affidavits and warrants. The parties also agreed to set of protocols for drug evidence testing. The Court retained jurisdiction for two years from the settlement date so that the parties could petition for redress pertaining to compliance with their agreement. There is nothing substantive in the docket sheet following settlement. Presumably the matter is closed.", "summary": "In late 2008, an African-American man filed a class action lawsuit against the City of Oakland Police Department and one individual officer, alleging the officers issued warrants based on intentionally false or misleading information, subjecting him to unreasonable search and seizure, arresting him without probable cause, and maliciously prosecuting him. The complaint was later amended to include named plaintiffs, all black or Hispanic. The parties settled the case by agreeing to monetary-relief on August 5, 2010, and non-monetary relief on February 14, 2011."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: Over a dozen non-citizens detained in immigration detention facilities, who had underlying medical conditions rendering them particularly susceptible to COVID-19 complications, filed this suit on April 3, 2020 against U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Atlanta, GA, seeking immediate release. The court granted a motion to dismiss and terminated the case on April 7, 2020. <hr> On April 3, 2020, the Southern Poverty Law Center, Asian Americans Advancing Justice, and private counsel filed suit on behalf of thirteen individuals detained in three U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention or processing centers in Georgia. The plaintiffs named as defendants ICE, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and various officers of those departments. The plaintiffs asked the court to issue a writ of habeas corpus, or in the alternative, issue injunctive relief ordering the immediate release of the plaintiffs. In addition, the plaintiffs sought a declaration stating that the continued detention of individuals at increased risk for severe illness including COVID-19, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Further, the plaintiffs asked for an award of attorneys' fees. The complaint alleged that the medical conditions or underlying diseases of these detained individuals, like diabetes and hypertension, made them particularly vulnerable to COVID-19. The facilities where ICE has detained the plaintiffs lacked access to critical care necessary for treating serious cases of COVID-19. According to the complaint, imprisoned populations, including those in ICE detention facilities, pose a higher risk for the spread of infectious disease. The plaintiffs stated that in March 2020, over 3,000 medical professionals across the United States urged ICE to release individuals and families to prevent the spread of COVID-19 among detainees as well as facility staff. The complaint also explained that social distancing measures and large-scale quarantines as recommended by the Center for Disease Control are \"nearly impossible\" in immigration detention due to overcrowding, poor availability of hygiene products, and lack of access to adequate medical services. In addition to the complaint, plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order as well as an emergency writ of habeas corpus and requested an immediate hearing given the time-sensitive nature of the case. The plaintiffs alleged that because the government knew or should have known of the substantial risk to the plaintiffs, the continued detention of these individuals demonstrated deliberate indifference, thereby violating the plaintiffs' right to Due Process under the Fifth Amendment. On April 6, 2020 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or in the alternative, a transfer of venue. Additionally, the defendants asked the court to sever the plaintiffs' claims by facility. The plaintiffs, in response, filed a motion for voluntary dismissal on April 6, 2020. The motion, without conceding that this court lacked jurisdiction, gave notice of the dismissal in the interest of expediting emergency relief. The motion stated that the plaintiffs would seek relief in other federal district courts. <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17609\"> <i>Martinez v. Donahue</i></a> was filed on April 7 in the Middle District of Georgia, and <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17608\"> <i>Benavides v. Donahue</i></a> was filed on April 8 in the Southern District of Georgia. The court granted the motion to dismiss and terminated the case on April 7, 2020.", "summary": "Individuals with underlying conditions detained in immigration detention facilities filed this suit on April 3, 2020 against the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Atlanta, GA. The plaintiffs asked the court to issue a writ of habeas corpus or issue an injunction requiring the immediate release of the plaintiffs during the COVID-19 pandemic in addition to declaratory judgment and attorneys' fees. After the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case in the interest of expediting emergency relief and stated their intention to refile in the district courts for the Middle District and Southern District of Georgia."}
{"article": "On May 12, 2005, male arrestees at the Baltimore Central Booking and Intake Center filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs sued the warden of Central Booking, the Baltimore Police Department, the City of Baltimore, and other state officials under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for injunctive relief, compensatory and consequential damages, and attorneys fees and costs. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they engaged in unconstitutional strip searches of the plaintiffs and detained the plaintiffs for unreasonable lengths of time. This case was one of three cases alleging mistreatment of persons arrested and taken to Central Booking for booking and processing. The other cases were JC-MD-0008: Maryland NAACP v. Baltimore City Police Department, 1:06-cv-01863-CCB (D. Md. 2006) and JC-MD-0011: Rodney v. Murphy, 24-C-05004405, filed in Maryland state court. Plaintiffs sought certification for five classes. First, the suspicionless strip search class which consisted of those who had been or would be arrested for crimes not involving weapons, drugs, or felony violence, who were strip searched by Central Booking employees without any individualized finding that they were harboring weapons, drugs, or other contraband. Second, the non-private strip search class was composed of those who had been or would be subjected to strip searches at Central Booking with other arrestees present. Third, the equal protection strip search class consisted of male arrestees strip searched at Central Booking while similarly-situated female arrestees were not. Fourth, the underwear strip search class was made up of male arrestees subjected to an underwear strip search while similarly-situated female arrestees were not. Fifth, the over-detention class consisted of those arrested without warrants who had been or would be detained for an unreasonable length of time (more than 48 hours) before presentment to a judicial officer for a determination of probable cause. The defendants moved to dismiss the third amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The District Court (District Judge Catherine C. Blake) granted the motion in part and dismissed all claims against the City and the Police Department, rejecting the theory of \"entrustment liability.\" Claims against the state defendants survived, with the exception of individual claims against the current warden. 470 F.Supp.2d 537 (D. Md. Jan 04, 2007). On July 11, 2008, the district court (Judge Blake) issued a memorandum on the issue of whether the gender-differentiated search policy violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue and denied the defendants' motion. On March 19, 2009, the district court partially granted the plaintiffs' motion to certify a class. Specifically, the court certified the following subclasses: 1) those people detained for more than 48 hours without having been brought before a commissioner, and 2) those people arrested for minor, nondrug, nonviolent offenses and strip-searched before they were brought before a commissioner. The court declined to certify the following subclasses: 1) those people who weren't strip-searched privately, and 2) male arrestees who were searched to their underwear when female detainees were not. For the next two years, discovery motions were exchanged, until the defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment on January 14, 2011. On March 5th, 2013 Judge Blake issued a memorandum and an order granting the motion for partial summary judgment. The court granted the motion under the doctrine of qualified immunity. The plaintiffs filed an appeal on August of 2013. A panel of three judges rendered a decision on November 11, 2014. 771 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2014). The Circuit Court (Circuit Judge James Harvie Wilkinson III) affirmed the district court's decision to grant partial summary judgment for the defendants. The court noted that several police officers and guards testified that they found illegal contraband from these searches. And the searchers were being conducted in a private room. On the issue of qualified immunity, the court noted that the right to not be subjected to a strip search was not clearly established at the time of the searches. A Supreme Court decision was filed in 2012, settling aspects of the issue after the fact, but before this, officers who were conducting searches, could not reasonably tell if the searches were violating a constitutional right. The court found the defense of qualified immunity acceptable here, and determined that the motion for partial summary judgment was properly granted. Circuit Judge James Andrew Wynn Jr. filed a concurring opinion in which he pointed out that the Supreme Court intimated in the <i>Florence</i> decision that there may be exceptions to the rule. That detainees not being admitted into the general population should not have to be stripped searched. The complexities of the exceptions had not been explored by the courts, and Judge Wynn noted that there needed to be more elaboration on this topic, so public officials would know how to act accordingly. However, the merits of the case were not be reached because of the granting of summary judgment. On February 24, 2015 Judge Blake filed a memo regarding the January 31, 2011 motion for partial summary judgment. 2015 WL 790334. The motion was made by the warden-defendant, over the class of Plaintiffs claiming that Central Booking practiced \"over-detention.\" The court held that the plaintiffs' theory of supervisor liability was defective because there was no evidence that the warden-defendant was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional injury of the Plaintiffs. The warden-defendant did not deny that there were detainees held longer than 48 hours, which was past what was constitutionally acceptable, but she argued that it was caused by factors outside of her control. The court agreed that the delays in presenting detainees before a court commissioner was the fault of the Baltimore police, the state's attorneys office, and court officials. Furthermore, the court argued that the warden had made several efforts to remedy the problem, and that the plaintiffs' complaint that it was not fast enough or proactive enough did not prove deliberate indifference. Finally, the court also granted the summary judgment motion on the theory of qualified immunity, so the defendant had no fair warning that her conduct was unconstitutional. A few months later on June 15, 2015 the Court entered final judgment and closed the case.", "summary": "This class action lawsuit was filed on May 12, 2005 by two male arrestees in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs alleged that they and all male arrestees taken to Central Booking were subjected to unconstitutional strip searches and many were subjected to \"over detentions\" in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983."}
{"article": "On August 14, 2018, two children with mental health disabilities in the District of Columbia and University Legal Services, Inc. filed this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and a class of children with mental health disabilities, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the District of Columbia under:<ul><li>The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12111 <i>et seq.</i>;</li><li>Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794;</li><li>The Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights program, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794;</li><li>Title XIX of the Social Security Act (Medicaid Act), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396; and</li><li>42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983.</li></ul>The plaintiffs, represented by the National Center for Youth Law, the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, in-house counsel, and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief together with costs and attorney\u2019s fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the District of Columbia failed to comply with mandates of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Medicaid Act. Specifically, they claimed that the District of Columbia failed to provide medically necessary intensive community-based services (ICBS) to children with mental health disabilities. Intensive community-based services consist of three components: <ol><li><i>Intensive care coordination</i> (ICC): designing and supervising a plan to provide and coordinate services to children that includes the child, the child\u2019s family, and service providers;</li><li><i>Intensive behavior support services</i>: individual therapy provided to the child where they live; and</li><li><i>Mobile crisis services</i>: crisis response services that can provide care in a child\u2019s home, school, or community.</li></ol>In their complaint, the plaintiffs acknowledged that the District of Columbia provides some components of ICBS. For example, the District offers the \u201chigh fidelity wraparound\u201d ICC program, \u201ccommunity-based intervention\u201d services, and the Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) intensive support program. But the plaintiffs alleged that the District\u2019s existing services \u201cfail[] to provide medically necessary ICBS\u201d for many children who need them. The complaint did not name the putative class representatives. Instead, the plaintiffs moved that the minor plaintiffs be allowed to proceed anonymously. Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell granted this motion on August 14, 2018. Judge Howell determined that the plaintiffs have a \u201cstrong interest\u201d in protecting \u201chighly sensitive details\u201d about their mental health that would be revealed in the litigation that outweighs the government defendants\u2019 \u201cminimal\u201d interest in disclosure. The District moved to dismiss the case on October 3. First, it argued that the two individual plaintiffs lack standing. The District claimed that the first individual plaintiff refused to use the District\u2019s existing wraparound services, that the second would not be eligible for ICBS because she is in the custody of the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services, and that the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to support a claim by University Legal Services alone. Second, it argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act because the plaintiffs\u2019 allegations involve the adequacy of care rather than where the District provides services. Finally, the District argued that the plaintiffs\u2019 allegations that it violated Medicaid requirements were \u201cthreadbare . . . conclusory statements\u201d that could not support a claim under the pleading standard set in <i>Ashcroft v. Iqbal</i>. On July 25, 2019, the court (now Judge Emmet G. Sullivan) denied the motion to dismiss holding that the individual plaintiffs had standing to bring the suit, had sufficiently stated a claim under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and had sufficiently alleged a \u00a7 1983 claim. 401 F.Supp.3d 1. As of July 2020, discovery is ongoing.", "summary": "On August 14, 2018, two children with mental health disabilities and University Legal Services, Inc. filed this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and a class of children with mental health disabilities in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the District of Columbia under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act, Title XIX of the Social Security Act, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the National Center for Youth Law, the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, in-house counsel, and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief together with costs and attorney\u2019s fees. They claimed that the District of Columbia failed to comply with mandates of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Medicaid Act by failing to provide medically necessary intensive community-based services (ICBS) to children with mental health disabilities. The parties are currently engaged in discovery."}
{"article": "On October 18, 2006, several then and former employees of the defendant's Albertville, Alabama facility filed a lawsuit against the defendant under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 201 et seq. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Middle Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, brought this class action seeking damages and injunctive relief for violations of the FLSA. Specifically, plaintiffs claim the company failed to account for all compensable time of its employees, including time spent clearing security and time walking to and from security to donning and doffing areas. On June 7, 2007, the District Court (Judge R. David Proctor) ordered the case stayed because the court had received Defendant's Notice of Motion to Transfer and Consolidate for Pretrial Proceedings to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. On November 5, 2007, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered that the case be transferred to the Southern District of Mississippi. The following development is included in our database at <a href=https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11466>EE-MS-0060</a>.", "summary": "This case was brought by several then and former employees of the defendant againt the defendant Wayne Farms LLC., seeking damages. The case was transferred to the Southern District of Mississippi. (See EE-MS-0060)."}
{"article": "On February 28, 2014, a same-sex couple married outside of the state of Florida filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida against the state of Florida. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, declaratory judgment, and costs. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed the state ban against same-sex marriage violated their rights under the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment (right to associate), and violated the Supremacy Clause and the Establishment Clause. This case was captioned as <i>Brenner v. Scott</i>. On March 12, 2014, several same-sex couples married outside of the state of Florida, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, filed essentially an identical lawsuit, also in the Northern District of Florida. This case was captioned as <i>Grimsley v. Scott</i>. On April 21, 2014, the Court (Judge Robert L. Hinkle), upon a joint motion, consolidated the two cases for case management purposes. Both cases are addressed in this summary and Clearinghouse case record. On April 24, 2014, Judge Hinkle denied permission to Florida Family Action, a \"cultural action organization\" that opposes same-sex marriage, to intervene as a party. FFA was permitted, however, to file amicus briefs. 298 F.R.D. 689 (N.D. Fla. 2014). On August 21, 2014, Judge Hinkle issued a preliminary injunction, finding Florida's ban on same-sex marriage a violation of plaintiffs' fundamental right to marry under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses (using strict scrutiny in the analysis). The court stayed the preliminary injunction in these cases until ninety-one days after similar stays were denied or lifted in three cases pending in the Fourth and Tenth Circuit Courts\u2014<i>Bostic v. Schaefer</i>, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. July 28, 2014); <i>Bishop v. Smith</i>, 2014 WL 3537847 (10th Cir. July 18, 2014); and <i>Kitchen v. Herbert</i>, 2014 WL 2868044 (10th Cir. June 25, 2014). Brenner v. Scott, -- F.Supp.2d --, 2014 WL 4113100 (N.D. Fla. 2014). On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States held, in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12787\">Obergefell v. Hodges</a>, that the right to marry was fundamental. In the opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that it demeans gay and lesbian couples to deprive them of access to marriage. The Fourteenth Amendment thus did not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. Kennedy was joined without further writing by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor. Each of the four dissenters\u2014Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito\u2014wrote a dissent. On August 4, 2015, the <i>Grimsley</i> plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The defendants opposed, arguing that the court should not grant summary judgment but rather dismiss the case as moot. Meanwhile, the defendants moved for voluntarily dismissal of the appeal at the Eleventh Circuit. On October 19, 2015, the Eleventh Circuit granted the voluntary dismissal transferred consideration of attorney's fees to the district court. On January 12, 2016, the issue of appellate's attorney's fees was also transferred to the district court for consideration. On March 2, 2016, the <i>Brenner</i> plaintiffs filed a separate motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs asked that the court not dismiss this case as moot because the same-sex marriage ban was not repealed and Florida's Surgeon General persisted in refusing to issue birth certificates to the children of same-sex couples. On March 30, 2016, Judge Hinkle granted the plaintiffs summary judgment and declared the Florida Constitution, Article I, \u00a7 27 as well as Florida Statutes \u00a7 741.212 and \u00a7741.04(1) as unconstitutional. Judge Hinkle also issued an injunction to prohibit the defendants from enforcing or applying the Florida provisions that were declared unconstitutional. The court granted and denied in part the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss as moot; it dismissed the claims against the Clerk of Court as moot but not the claims against the Surgeon General and Secretary. Subsequently, the court entered judgment for the plaintiffs against the Secretary of the Department of Management Services and the Surgeon General, but the court dismissed without prejudice the claims against all other defendants. On April 13, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion for entitlement to attorneys\u2019 fees and costs, which the court granted and determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to a fee award. The parties, however, then filed a joint notice of settlement on attorney\u2019s fees and costs. (The amount that the parties settled on is not publicly available.) On June 16, 2016, the plaintiffs officially withdrew their fee petition and notified the court that they received their settlement funds. This case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2014, several same-sex couples who were married outside the state of Florida but who wanted their marriages recognized in the state of Florida sued in the Northern District of Florida to have the state's ban on same-sex marriage declared unconstitutional. In August of 2014, Judge Robert Hinkle entered a preliminary injunction in the plaintiffs' favor, but immediately stayed it, pending resolution of similar cases in the 4th and 10th Circuits. After the decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which legalized same-sex marriage across the United States, the defendant's appeal was dismissed. In March 2016, the plaintiffs filed a separate motion for summary judgment which the court granted and declared Florida's Constitution and Statutes that banned same-sex marriage as unconstitutional. It also entered judgment for the plaintiffs against the Secretary and Surgeon General and dismissed without prejudice the claims against all other defendants. The parties settled the attorney's fees and costs in June 2016 and the case closed."}
{"article": "On April 14, 2019, several pre-trial detainees in Wayne County Jail filed this class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the 36th District Court in Detroit, the Wayne County Sheriff's Office (WCSO), the Chief Judge, and five Magistrates of the 26th District Court in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and the Sixth Amendment's Right to Counsel. The case was assigned to Judge Laurie J. Michelson. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants unconstitutionally detained them in Wayne County Jail because they were unable to pay for their release and that the defendants' current arraignment policies created a wealth-based detention system that kept the plaintiffs in jail for their inability to afford bail. All of the plaintiffs included in the complaints were arrested and had their arraignment hearings held in the 36th District Court in Detroit. The plaintiffs were not provided attorneys during their arraignments and in each instance, the plaintiffs were ordered to pay cash bail amounts beyond their financial abilities. The arraignment policies provided two different condition forms: (1) 10% bail condition, which required the plaintiff to pay 10% or the real estate equivalent of their bail amount in order to be released; or (2) full cash bail condition, which required the plaintiff to pay the full amount. The magistrate judges that set the plaintiffs' bail amounts did not inquire whether the plaintiffs could afford their set bail amounts. When plaintiffs notified the court that they were unable to pay bail, they were sent to Wayne County Jail. The plaintiffs also sought class certification of all pre-trial detainees that had their bail set during arraignment hearings held in the 36th District Court and as a result of the court's bail policies were detained because they could not afford their imposed cash bail conditions. On June 10, 2019, WCSO moved to dismiss the complaint. They alleged that the plaintiffs could not seek injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 because: they were an entity entitled to quasi-judicial immunity where declaratory relief was available; under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for municipal liability because obeying court orders is not considered a policy of the municipality; and the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that clearly established law would have put WCSO on notice that obeying a court order for pretrial incarceration would expose it to liability under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. On June 19, 2019, the Chief Judge moved to dismiss plaintiffs' class action complaint. A stipulated stay order was entered on August 23, 2019 to allow time for discussions between the parties as to resolution of the matter. Meanwhile, the Detroit News <a href=https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2020/04/01/former-detroit-magistrate-whistleblower-lawsuit/5103584002/>reported</a> that a former Detroit magistrate judge filed a federal whistleblower lawsuit alleging that she had been fired after raising concerns about violations of defendants' rights in the 36th District Court. As of April 12, 2021, the case remains stayed. However, the court has held telephone status conferences, and the case remains ongoing.", "summary": "In 2019, pre-trial detainees of Wayne County Jail filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Plaintiffs alleged that the policy and practice of detaining individuals in jail following their arraignment hearing because they were unable to afford imposed cash bail conditions violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights. The case was stayed in August 2019 and remains stayed as of April 2021."}
{"article": "This is a class action filed in the Western District of Missouri, in which the plaintiffs are seeking to prevent the state from disenrolling recipients in Missouri's State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) who fail to meet their premium requirements without first notifying them of their right to appeal and to continue to receive program benefits pending the outcome of the appeal. The defendants are the Missouri Department of Social Services, and the interim directors of the state Family Support Division and the state Division of Medical Services. According to the named plaintiff, Julia M., Missouri terminated the benefits of her minor child, when, after a series of bank errors, the monthly premium was not deducted from Julia M.'s account in a timely fashion. Julie M. received the notice after the benefits already had been terminated. While the notice indicated a right to appeal, it did not indicate a right to continue benefits pending the outcome of the appeal or that the state had conducted any evaluation to determine eligibility for other benefits. On June 25, 2007, the District Court (Judge Nanette K. Laughrey) certified the class, defining it as \"[a]ll children residing in Missouri and who are receiving or who will receive [Missouri SCHIP] health coverage and are required to pay a premium under [state law].\" Judge Laughrey, however, did not immediately rule on the request of the representative plaintiff, identified as Julia M., to issue a preliminary injunction requiring the Missouri Department of Social Services to provide recipients with sufficient notice of disenrollment and continued benefits pending any appeal. On February 2, 2008, the parties signed a Consent Decree in which the Defendants agreed to notify participants in SCHIP who have fallen behind in their payments. The notification must tell the participant that he/she has a right to appeal, and that during the appeals process he/she is entitled to continued benefits until the matter is resolved. Defendants also agreed to pay the plaintiffs over $165,000 in attorneys fees and expenses. The Court was to retain jurisdiction until October 15, 2008 in order to monitor the execution of the Consent Decree.", "summary": "This class action lawsuit was filed on February 15, 2007 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri against the Missouri Department of Social Services. The Plaintiff class alleged that they were wrongly disenrolled from the Missouri State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) because they were not properly notified of deficiencies in their payments. On February 2, 2008 the parties signed a Consent Decree which required the Defendants to notify SCHIP participants of deficiencies in their payments, and also provided for court monitoring of the notification process. The Court was to retain jurisdiction until October 15, 2008 in order to monitor the execution of the Consent Decree."}
{"article": "On September 5, 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a female employee, filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of Wisconsin, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Mount Carmel, LLC. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant discharged the plaintiff-intervenor in retaliation for her opposition to sexual harassment and her participation in an investigation of sexual harassment claims. On February 12, 2004, the plaintiff-intervenor filed a complaint against the defendant. On October 7, 2004, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Aaron E. Goodstein) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $257,500 for past and future lost payroll income, other forms of alleged damages, including emotional distress and reputation damages, and attorneys' fees.", "summary": "On September 5, 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a female employee, filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of Wisconsin, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Mount Carmel, LLC. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant discharged the plaintiff-intervenor in retaliation for her opposition to sexual harassment and her participation in an investigation of sexual harassment claims. On October 7, 2004, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Aaron E. Goodstein) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $257,500."}
{"article": "This is one of several federal lawsuits addressing North Carolina Session Law 2016-3, House Bill 2 (HB2), which was passed on March 23, 2016. For the others, see the <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?saveRef=pl&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BspecialCollection%7C43%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B\">case collection.</a> On February 22, 2016, the Charlotte City Council passed Ordinance 7056, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity in public accommodations, passenger vehicle for hire, and city contractors. The city ordinance was set to take effect on April 1, 2016. In response, on March 23, 2016, the North Carolina legislature held a special session and passed House Bill 2; it was signed that same day by North Carolina Governor Pat McCrory. HB2 prohibited municipalities in North Carolina from enacting anti-discrimination policies and removed the statutory and common-law private right of action to enforce state anti-discrimination statutes in state courts. It also required that individuals only be permitted to use bathrooms and changing facilities that correspond to the sex on their birth certificates while in government buildings. For many transgender people, this prevented them from using the restroom consistent with their gender identity (in North Carolina, only people who undergo sex reassignment surgery can change the sex on their birth certificates; some other jurisdictions have even more restrictive rules). In addition, the legislation changed the definition of sex in the state's anti-discrimination law to \"the physical condition of being male or female, which is stated on a person's birth certificate,\u201d which prevented discrimination against transgender people from being classified as a type of sex discrimination. On May 4, in a letter to Governor Pat McCrory, the Justice Department informed him that the U.S. had concluded that HB2 violated federal law. The DOJ <a href=\"http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/north-carolina-hb2/481347/\">asked</a> the Governor to respond by close of business on May 9, and that he remedy the violations, \"including by confirming that the State will not comply with or implement H.B. 2.\" Instead of providing the demanded assurances, the Governor sued the United States on the morning of May 9, in the Eastern District of North Carolina, seeking a declaratory judgment that HB2 did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e et seq.), or the Violence Against Woman Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 13925(b)(13)). That case is in the Clearinghouse as <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15316\">PA-NC-0003</a>, and is described there. A few hours later, the U.S. filed this lawsuit, seeking to enjoin operation of HB2, in the U.S District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. The DOJ sued the State of North Carolina under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e et seq.), under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (20 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1681 et seq.), and under the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 13925(b)(13)). The DOJ sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the U.S. asked the Court to find that HB 2\u2019s Part I\u2014the part that instructs public agencies to deny transgender individuals access to multiple-occupancy bathrooms and changing facilities consistent with their gender identity--violated federal law, and to issue an injunction ordering the state to stop violating the federal laws in question. North Carolina\u2019s former Attorney General, Roy Cooper, had <a href=\" http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article68780957.html\">said</a> that he agreed that HB2 is illegal, and declined to defend it against this and the other lawsuits challenging it. On June 10, 2016 the United States and the Defendants issued a joint motion to enjoin automatic suspension of funds received under the Violence Against Women Act that prohibits recipients of federal funds administered by the Department of Justice\u2019s Office on Violence Against Women (\u201cOVW\u201d) from engaging in discrimination based on sex and gender identity. The United States and the Defendants agreed that the suspension of funds would on balance harm the public interest. On June 23, 2016, Judge Thomas D. Schroeder granted the parties' joint motion to enjoin the United States from automatically withholding funds. 192 F.Supp.3d 620. On June 29, 2016, Judge Thomas D. Schroeder granted Phil Berger, President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate, and Tim Moore, Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, the right to permissively intervene as defendants in the case. Several other private individuals requested to intervene on either side of the case and their motions were denied. On July 14, 2016, Judge Thomas D. Schroeder ordered that parties in the four related cases of HB2 file a short joint notice identifying any agreements reached and explaining their respective positions. On July 25, 2016, the Court consolidated this case with <i>Carca\u00f1o v. McCrory</i>(1:16CV236), <i>Berger v. United States</i> (1:16CV844), and <i>North Carolinians for Privacy v. United States</i> (1:16CV845) for discovery purposes only. After this consolidation, the Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed <i>Berger v. United States</i> on July 28, 2016, and <i>North Carolinians for Privacy v. United States</i> on August 31, 2016. On August 12, 2016, the Defendants submitted motions to stay the proceedings in light of the Supreme Court hearing the <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14977\">G.G.</a> case regarding similar issues. Ten days later, the United States submitted a response in opposition to the Defendants' request to stay the proceedings. The United States stated that the Defendants were violating federal laws and that the proceedings should not be delayed in anticipation of a change in the law. On December 16, 2016, upon the joint motion of the parties and in the interest of judicial economy, the court stayed the proceedings in the case and in the related case of <i>Carcano v. McCrory</i> (1:16CV236) pending disposition in the Supreme Court of Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., No. 16- 273 (S. Ct.). At the United States\u2019 request, the court did not include the United States\u2019 pending motion for preliminary injunction in the stay. On January 1, 2017, Roy Cooper, who opposed HB2 as NC Attorney General, took office as Governor of North Carolina, changing the Governor\u2019s position. On February 22, 2017, the Department of Justice and the Department of Education, under President Trump, withdrew and rescinded their earlier guidance documents, changing the federal government\u2019s position. On March 2, 2017, the Plaintiff submitted a request to expand the stay (granted on December 16, 2016) to include the preliminary injunction request, on the grounds that the United States had withdrawn two guidance documents upon which the motion was based. On March 28, 2017, the Plaintiff submitted a joint status report with the Carca\u00f1o Plaintiffs, UNC Defendants, Legislative Defendants, and the State Defendants. The United States aligned itself with the UNC and Legislative Defendants requesting that the court leave the stay entered on December 16, 2016, until resolution of the pending appeals in <i>G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board</i> (4th Cir. No. 15-2056) and <i>Carca\u00f1o v. Cooper</i> (4th Cir. No. 16-1989). The Carca\u00f1o Plaintiffs and the State Defendants requested that the stay be lifted so that parties could confer about a new discovery plan. On March 30, 2017, the North Carolina Legislature, and the newly appointed Governor enacted House Bill 142 which, among other things, repealed HB2. The repeal included a compromise that left many on both sides unhappy. The compromise prevented municipalities from passing anti-discrimination laws until December 2020, and the legislature still had the ability to regulate bathrooms. On April 14, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal stating that in light of the passage of House Bill 142, the claims and causes of actions against the Defendants would be dismissed with prejudice, which closed the case.", "summary": "On May 5, 2016, the U.S Department of Justice sued the State of North Carolina based on a law denying transgender people access to multiple-access bathrooms that match their gender identities. On March 2, 2017, the United States reversed its earlier position regarding two guidance documents and later dismissed the case in light of the passage of House Bill 142, which repealed HB2. The repeal included a compromise that left many on both sides unhappy. The compromise prevented municipalities from passing anti-discrimination laws until December 2020, and the legislature still had the ability to regulate bathrooms."}
{"article": "On February 21, 2007, employees of S.C.C.P Painting Contractors Inc. filed this class action lawsuit against it under the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 201-219), the Maryland Wage and Hour Law, the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, the D.C. Minimum Wage Law, the D.C. payment and Collection of Wages Law, and the Maryland and District of Columbia Common Law in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. Plaintiffs alleged that S.C.C.P. (1) failed to pay wages for work performed, (2) failed to pay for work that employers were required to perform \"off the clock\", (3) failed to pay employees overtime compensation, (4) and unlawfully deducted amounts from their employee's paychecks. Plaintiffs were represented by the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs and sought injunctive and monetary relief in the form of reimbursement for all withheld and unpaid wages. The Court (Judge Catherine C. Blake) conditionally certified a class of \"all individuals who are or have been employed by Defendants as non-exempt, hourly-paid employees for the three years immediately prior to the date of conditional certification\" on February 26, 2008. 2008 WL 554114. On December 16, 2008, the Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, holding that Plaintiffs were covered FLSA employees when they worked for Defendant, and that as a result Defendant would be liable to Plaintiffs for underpayment of overtime wages. 589 F. Supp. 2d 569. On March 19, 2009, the Court entered a consent decree awarding Plaintiffs a total of $200,000. This case is closed.", "summary": "Employees of S.C.C.P. Painting Contractors Inc. filed a class action lawsuit against their employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Maryland Wage and Hour Law, the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, the D.C. Minimum Wage Law, the D.C. Payment and Collection of Wages Law, and the Maryland and District of Columbia Common Law. After Plaintiffs were granted Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of Defendant's liability for unpaid wages, a Consent Decree was entered awarding Plaintiffs a total of $200,000."}
{"article": "<b>NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see <a href=\"https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/\"> their tracker</a>.</b> COVID-19 Summary: On May 11, 2020, the Texas State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Texas Alliance for Retired Americans, and six individuals filed this lawsuit against the Texas Secretary of State, challenging the constitutionality of the laws restricting vote by mail. No outcome yet. <hr> On May 11, 2020, the Texas State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Texas Alliance for Retired Americans, and six individuals filed this lawsuit against the Texas Secretary of State, challenging the constitutionality of the laws restricting vote by mail. The plaintiffs brought this lawsuit as a declaratory action under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2201-02, and as an injunctive action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging that the current vote by mail system was in violation of the plaintiffs' First, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the requirement that voters pay for the postage to return their early voting ballots by mail, the postmark requirements for the ballots, the requirement that voters must submit two handwriting samples that \u201cmatch\u201d in order to have their early voting ballots counted, and the criminalization of a person assisting a voter in returning a marked mail ballot denied the plaintiffs equal protection and procedural due process, and violated the prohibition on poll tax. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief requiring the defendants to provide prepaid postage on the ballot carrier envelopes used to return the marked mail-in ballots to the counties and enjoining them from rejecting vote-by-mail ballots if those ballots were postmarked by 7:00 p.m. on election day and received by the county election administrator before it canvased the election and from implementing, enforcing, or giving any effect to the Voter Assistance Ban. They further sought to enjoin the defendants from rejecting mail-in ballots on signature verification grounds, and sought an injunction requiring the defendants to provide voters the opportunity to cure any issues with signature verification before their ballots are rejected. This lawsuit was filed at the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, and assigned to Judge Orlando L. Garcia. The plaintiffs were represented by private attorneys. The defendants moved to dismiss the case on June 3, arguing that the sovereign immunity bars plaintiffs\u2019 claims, that the plaintiffs lack standing and that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On May 11, 2020, the Texas State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Texas Alliance for Retired Americans, and six individuals filed this lawsuit against the Texas Secretary of State, challenging the constitutionality of the laws restricting vote by mail. No outcome yet."}
{"article": "Two minors and their mother and their mother sued the Colorado Department of Motor Vehicles. Colorado law required that a teenager log a certain amount of hours driving under the supervision of a licensed parent or guardian. Because the mother is blind, she was unable to supervise her daughters' driving. The girls' father did not have custody and lived out of state, leaving no qualified adult to supervise them in completeing the requirements for a driver's license. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to make a reasonable modification of Colorado law, which violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the defendants had violated the federal statutes, an injunction against the defendants' further discrimination, monetary compensation, attorney's fees and costs, and other equitable relief. Under Colorado law, individuals who are 16 can apply for a minor's driver's license provided they have logged 50 hours of driving experience with their learner's permit, under the supervision of a qualified adult. C.R.S. \u00a7\u00a7 42-2-104(1)(c) & 106(1)(a). Another statute, C.R.S. \u00a7 42-2-106(b) (2004), restricts minors with learners' permits to driving under the supervision of \"a parent, stepparent, or guardian with a valid driver's license.\" On May 27, 2005, the legislature amended \u00a7 42-2-106(b) (2004) to include grandparents with powers of attorney as acceptable supervisory drivers, but the mother stated she would not relinquish her parental rights to her daughters' grandfather. Thus again, under the amended statute there was no eligible driver for supervision. On August 10, 2005 the DMV allowed the mother to sign a \"designation\" giving the grandfather permission to supervise but indicating that she was \"in no way relinquishing any parental rights.\" On October 17, 2005, in an unpublished order, the District Court dismissed the individual claims of the minor named plaintiffs because they were not themselves disabled. Although they had an association with their mother, who is disabled, there was no employment relationship with the defendant, which is required for \"associational disability\" claims. The court permitted the organizational plaintiffs and the mother to continue the lawsuit. On January 04, 2006, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider its previous opinion and reinstated the minors as named plaintiffs. The court held that a party, although not herself disabled, may assert claims under Title II of the ADA and under the Rehabilitation Act for discrimination against a disabled person that directly injures that party. The older daughter obtained her driver's license on November 14, 2005, two months after she turned 16. She claimed compensatory damages because of the two-month delay and because she had not been able to experience driving under different road conditions over the previous year, having compressed her entire learning experience into two months. On July 1, 2006, the legislature further amended the statute to allow the appointment of an alternate permit supervisor who holds a valid Colorado driver's license and is twenty-one years or older, without any relinquishing of parental rights or power of attorney over the child. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs continued the lawsuit. On May 14, 2007, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in an unpublished opinion, 2007 WL 1430103. The court found that after the amended statute mooted the claims for equitable relief, the only remaining claim was for compensatory damages under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794. However, because the plaintiffs could not prove that the defendants acted intentionally -- i.e. with \"deliberate indifference to the strong likelihood that pursuit of its questioned policies will likely result in a violation of federally protected rights,\" they could not sustain a claim for damages. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider in an unpublished opinion on June 21, 2007. <b>Appeal</b> In a published opinion on April 15, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court order granting summary judgment to the defendants. Barber v. Colorado, Dept. of Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs failed to prove intent as the Rehabilitation Act required. Especially relevant were the facts that the DMV offered reasonable accommodation by allowing the mother to designate the grandfather as a supervisor and that the DMV was aware the state legislature was progressing towards amendment. The Court of Appeals' mandate on is the final entry on the district court docket, on May 7, 2009.", "summary": "Colorado law required minors to log 50 hours driving under the supervision of a licensed \"adult, stepparent, or guardian\" before they could obtain a driver's license. Plaintiffs were blind mother and her sighted daughters. The father lived out of state. The daughters could not log hours because their mother was not eligible for a driver's license. <br /><br> <br />The state amended the statute during the litigation, allowing the mother to appoint children's grandfather as supervisor for logging hours. This rendered equitable claims moot. The district court ruled that no claim for compensatory damages could stand for the delay in obtaining license because defendants did not act intentionally. The Court of Appeals affirmed."}
{"article": "On August 10, 1998, two named plaintiffs, both of whom had paraplegia and used wheelchairs, filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, against the State of Tennessee and 25 Tennessee counties. The plaintiffs alleged past and ongoing violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a712131-12165. The plaintiffs claimed that they had been denied access to the Tennessee state court system because of their disabilities. One plaintiff alleged that when he was ordered to appear at a county courthouse whose courtroom was on the second floor without elevator access, he had to crawl up two flights of stairs to reach the courtroom. When he next returned to the courthouse he refused to pull himself up the stairs again and for safety reasons declined being carried up by security personnel. As a result he was arrested and jailed for failure to appear. The other plaintiff was a certified court reporter who alleged that because she was not able to access many Tennessee county courthouses she lost work opportunities and was denied the opportunity to participate in the judicial process. The plaintiffs sought money damages and injunctive relief to modify the inaccessible courthouses. On October 5, 1998, Tennessee moved to have the case dismissed on Eleventh Amendment Grounds, arguing that Title II of the ADA was invalid to the extent that it authorized private parties to file federal lawsuits for money damages against states. On November 10, 1998, the District Court denied this motion. Tennessee appealed to the federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and proceedings in the district court were stayed while this appeal was pending. On July 16, 2002, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's denial of the motion to dismiss (Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr writing for a three-judge panel). Lane v. Tennessee, 40 Fed.Appx. 911 (2012). The Court of Appeals granted a rehearing on the issue before the same three-judge panel, and on January 10, 2003 it issued an Amended Judgment, wherein the Court (Judge Martin) again affirmed the lower court's decision and explained that, because the Plaintiffs were \"seeking to vindicate\" their due process \"right of access to the courts,\" the action was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680 (2003). Tennessee petitioned for certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. At this point the United States of America, represented by attorneys from Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, joined the Plaintiffs as respondents. On May 17, 2004, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens, upheld the constitutionality of the ADA's application against states. The Court found that Congress had abundant evidence that the states frequently denied people with disabilities fundamental rights protected by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the right to access courts. Further, the remedy Congress enacted was congruent and proportional, because the \"reasonable accommodations\" mandated by the ADA were not unduly burdensome and disproportionate to the harm. Garrett, the Court said, covered only Equal Protection claims, not Due Process claims. Therefore the law was constitutional. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). On August 17, 2004, the District Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion to certify the class, finding that the question of whether each particular member of the proposed class was discriminated against because of their disability would need to be determined on an individual basis, considering the conditions of the particular courthouses, and that therefore class action was inappropriate. Shortly thereafter the parties began negotiating settlements. In February and March of 2005, the Plaintiffs entered separate settlements with the State of Tennessee and with each of the defendant counties. Tennessee agreed to pay the Plaintiffs $905,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. Tennessee also agreed to recommend to the Tennessee Supreme Court that it implement a comprehensive policy ensuring ADA compliance at state and county courthouses. Each of the counties agreed to make modifications to their courthouses to make them accessible to wheelchair users and other people with mobility impairments. The Defendants agreed to cooperate in the appointment of ninety-five Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinators. Each county agreed to pay $2,680, totaling $67,000, in attorneys' fees and costs. The Plaintiffs did not receive money damages.", "summary": "On August 10, 1998, two paraplegic wheelchair users filed a class action suit in federal court against the State of Tennessee and several of its counties. The Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had unlawfully discriminated against them by failing to make county courthouses physically accessible to individuals with mobility impairments, in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Tennessee motioned to have the case dismissed, arguing the Title II of the ADA violated the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution. The court denied this motion, and Tennessee appealed. The appeal eventually reached the Supreme Court, which on May 17, 2004, upheld the lower court's decision to deny the motion to dismiss. Shortly after the Supreme Court decision, the District Court denied the plaintiffs motion to certify the class. The case proceeded with the named plaintiffs only. In February and March of 2005, the Plaintiffs entered separate settlements with Tennessee and each of the defendant counties, wherein the defendants agreed to physically modify the courthouses and to appoint a total of 95 Judicial Program ADA Coordinators to ensure ADA compliance. The defendants also agreed to pay the Plaintiffs a total of $972,000 in legal fees."}
{"article": "On January 22, 2013, private individual filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 40127(a). The plaintiff sued the US and Frontier Airlines. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel and the ACLU, asked the court for compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and any other relief the Court may deem appropriate. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated her right to be free of discrimination as a passenger, as well as her right to equal protection and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. On September 11, 2011, the plaintiff was on a flight from Denver to Detroit. She was seated next to two men described as being of South Asian descent. The plaintiff did not know the men or communicate with them in any way throughout the flight. During the flight, the men began to exhibit suspicious behavior and Frontier Airlines was accordingly notified of a potential threat. In reporting this threat, the plaintiff was identified as part of the threat under the suspicion that she may have been traveling with the two men. When the plane landed, armed guards forcefully arrested the plaintiff and moved her to a detention facility in Wayne County, where she was held and searched for approximately four hours. The plaintiff alleged that since the police and TSA officers had no facts connecting her to criminal activity, they must have acted on the perceived ethnicity, national origin, or race of the plaintiff's name. The plaintiff was released without any charges. On May 20, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the equal protection claims against the named federal individuals. The Court (Judge Terrence Berg) held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity and denied the motion to dismiss. On March 21, 2014, a motion to dismiss Count IV was brought by Defendants Robert Ball, John Brand, Paul Brumley, Nathaniel Devins, and David Lakatos, all of whom are federal law enforcement officials or agents (\"Federal Agent Defendants\"), and a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings to dismiss Count IV brought by Defendants Jeremy Bohn, Corporal Bradley, Lieutenant M. Wasiukanis, Captain Patrick Driscoll, Mark DeBeau, Officer Grant,Toya Parker, Detective Carmona, and Officer Johnson, who are law enforcement officers of the Wayne County Airport Authority (\"WCAA Defendants\"). The motions are brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(c), respectively, and both assert that the individual law enforcement defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's claims that her arrest and detention on September 11, 2011, was in violation of her rights to Equal Protection. The court denied the motion. (Hebshi v. United States, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1036 (E.D. Mich. 2014)) On July 18, 2014, the court denied a motion submitted by the individual plaintiffs for partial summary judgment as to Counts V and VI. The motion is brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), asserting that the WCAA Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's claim that her arrest, detention, and search were in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The court dismissed the motion. (Hebshi v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 3d 834 (E.D. Mich. 2014), appeal dismissed (Feb. 6, 2015)) Throughout the November and December 2014, several settlement conferences were held between the remaining defendants and the plaintiff--wherein a settlement was reached between the parties. Under the settlement terms that have been disclosed, the plaintiff will receive $40,000 from the federal government to compensate her for the severe humiliation she suffered. Additionally, under the settlement, Frontier has agreed to amend its employee handbook to more clearly state its zero-tolerance policy on discrimination and to provide all new employees with training on that revision. Frontier also will amend its customer complaint policy to ensure allegations of discrimination are given the appropriate attention. Source: https://www.aclu.org/news/mom-arrested-and-strip-searched-after-911-flight-settles-lawsuit The federal government provided sworn statements promising that this incident did not land Hebshi on any federal terrorism watch lists. The airport police have similarly provided assurances that no record of the arrest remains. During the course of litigation, the Wayne County Airport Authority independently implemented changes to its police policies and training that address many of Hebshi's concerns. (https://www.aclu.org/cases/hebshi-v-united-states?redirect=racial-justice/hebshi-v-united-states)", "summary": "On September 11, 2011, the plaintiff, Hebshi, was detained without cause on a flight landing at Detroit, MI--she was held in prison for several hours after the arrest and strip searched. The plaintiff claims that she was illegally detained and searched because of her Saudi Arabian last name and heritage. The plaintiff filed suit against several government agencies and individuals, and private organizations and individuals, claiming that they had violated her right to equal protection and due process under the Constitution, as well as 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 40127(a). The defendant and the plaintiff settled for $40,000 in compensatory and punitive damages."}
{"article": "This case, filed in federal court in 2011 and settled in 2012, addressed the Adams County Sheriff\u2019s Department and its communication with deaf inmates of its jail. The case\u2019s complaint described an incident in May 2010 in which law enforcement was called on two individuals engaged in an argument. Neither of the two--who became the case\u2019s individual plaintiffs--could speak, write, or read effectively in English. As a result, when Sheriff\u2019s deputies arrived, the plaintiffs were not able to communicate or explain what had happened. Nonetheless, the complaint alleged that the deputies failed to provide a sign language interpreter or any other effective auxiliary aid. Instead, one of the individuals was arrested for allegedly hitting the second individual, despite the attempts by both to explain that no violence had occurred. While in custody, the arrestee was required to sign several forms that he did not understand, including a Miranda form acknowledging that he knew his rights. Throughout his 25-day detention at the Adams County Detention Facility, staff failed to provide him with appropriate auxiliary aids or services. He was unable to call anyone, to communicate during his medical intake, or understand why he was being detained. This lawsuit followed. It was filed November 23, 2011 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. by the Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition the two deaf individuals just described. The plaintiffs sued the Sheriff of Adams County in his official capacity under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Represented by the Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition Legal Program, they sought declaratory and monetary relief, and an injunction requiring the defendant to provide qualified sign language interpreters or other appropriate auxiliary aids or services to ensure effective communication with deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. On January 26, 2012, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that added two additional individual plaintiffs. One was another deaf individual who communicated only through American Sign Language. He was detained at the Adams County Detention Facility for six days and unable to communicate during his detention. The other plaintiff was his aunt. The amended complaint also added the Colorado Association of the Deaf as a plaintiff. On March 13, 2012, District Judge John L. Kane referred the case to Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland. The parties then spent the next several months engaging in settlement conversations. On September 25, they moved to dismiss the case because they had reached a settlement agreement. The agreement required the defendant to change jail policies to ensure that detained individuals who required sign language interpretation knew how to request it. The settlement also required the defendants to provide training for staff, verify and monitor compliance with the agreement, and pay $100,000 to the Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition Legal Program. On September 27, 2012, Judge Kane granted the parties\u2019 motion to dismiss the case and retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement for two years. There are no further docket entries. The enforcement period was scheduled to end in 2014, so the case is now closed.", "summary": "Four individuals and two disability rights groups sued the Sheriff of Adams County for its alleged failure to provide interpreters or other auxiliary aids to deaf individuals in its jail. The lawsuit ended in a two year settlement. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "This lawsuit was filed in the Central District of California on July 18, 2002, by the class of children and young adults who (a) are in the custody of Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services; (b) have a behavioral, emotional, or psychiatric impairment; and (c) need individualized mental health services. The suit is against County and State agencies for neglecting their responsibilities to provide mental health care services to foster children in California. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the State and Los Angeles County under provisions of the Medicaid Act, Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Treatment (EPSDT), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396; the Substantive Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; Article I, section 7(a) of the California Constitution; the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12132; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 701; and California Government Code \u00a7 11135. Plaintiffs are represented by the ACLU of Southern California, Center for Public Interest, Western Center for Law and Poverty, Protection & Advocacy, Inc., Youth Law Center, and Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law. In March 2003, Plaintiffs and L.A. County began settlement negotiations. On June 19, 2003, United States District Judge A. Howard Matz certified class status, and on July 16, 2003, the Court approved a jointly submitted settlement agreement as fair, reasonable, and adequate. The settlement agreement has four objectives: (1) to facilitate a provision of services delivered in a coordinated, comprehensive, community-based fashion; (2) to support the development and delivery of a service structure and fiscal system that supports core practices and services model; (3) to support an effective and sustainable solution that will involve standards and methods to achieve quality-based oversight; and (4) to address the need for certain class members with more intensive needs to receive medically necessary mental health services in their own home, a family settings, or the most homelike setting appropriate to their needs, in order to facilitate reunification, and to meet their needs for safety, permanence, and well-being. Pursuant to the Agreement, the parties to the settlement appointed a six-member expert advisory panel to determine whether the County met the objectives set forth and implemented the plans. The Panel was required to make regular written reports to the parties and Court of its findings and recommendations. In August 2005, the Panel issued a two-year report finding that the County had not complied with the terms of the Agreement. Because the state agencies did not participate in the settlement, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction against them on September 15, 2005. Judge Matz granted the motion on March 14, 2006, ordering the State to provide \"wraparound services\" and \"therapeutic foster care,\" to thousands of Medi-Cal eligible children who are in foster care or at risk of foster care placement. There are approximately 85,000 children in foster care in California and an even greater number of children served by the child welfare system in their own homes. The court's order extends to both groups of children. (In the meantime, on February 16, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Compliance with the Settlement Agreement against LA County. In November 2006, Judge Matz ordered the County to address deficiencies in its implementation plan.) The State of California appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On March 23, 2007, the Ninth Circuit vacated the March 14th, 2006, preliminary injunction, holding that Judge Matz had erroneously interpreted the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) provisions of the Medicaid Act by not \"explor[ing] the possibility that the State might only have an obligation to fund the component services of wraparound and TFC, rather than to offer the coordinated complex of services in a single package.\" Katie A. v. Bonta, 481 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2007). After further discovery, Plaintiffs filed another Motion for Preliminary Injunction against the state defendants on January 11, 2008. In response, the Court ruled that wraparound services are Medi-Cal eligible and ordered the parties to address how to provide and bill for those services. A Special Master was appointed in March 2009 to facilitate a settlement between the parties. The parties reached a settlement agreement in December 2011, which included the development of an Implementation Plan to be evaluated by the Special Master. The agreement included a payment of $3.75 million in attorneys' fees, including costs and expenses, to plaintiffs' counsel. The parties developed a two-phase Implementation Plan. On August 28, 2012, the Special Master informed the District Court that he found the Implementation Plan reasonably and sufficiently calculated to meet the objectives of the agreement, and the Court accepted his recommendations on September 13, 2012. The Special Master and Advisory Panel continued to monitor and report on the completion of the Implementation Plan. In light of the fact that the District Court's jurisdiction was scheduled to end in December 2014, the Special Master put forth a set of recommendations in his report on September 26, 2014 to sustain the growth in the development and delivery of the intensive services agreed to by the parties. The Special Master submitted a final report to the Court on November 20, 2014. The report identified areas of progress and growth, but also found that there remained significant unfinished deliverables from the settlement agreement and identified the key activities the State should begin or continue implementing. A status conference was held on November 24, 2014. Judge John A. Kronstadt determined that there was no need for the court to extend its jurisdiction at that time. Subsequently, in August of 2015, Judge Kronstadt issued a minute order stating that while the parties should continue to file reports consistent with the implementation of the settlement, the matter was considered closed. As of October 19, 2017, the parties had stipulated, with approval from the court, that the Panel monitoring L.A. County's progress toward implementation of the settlement agreement should continue to operate through December 31, 2018. On December 21, 2018, the Panel issued its report for 2017. The plaintiff then filed this report with the court on January 23, 2019. The 2017 report identified major continuing concerns regarding the County's slow progress in implementing the settlement and uncertainty that County strategies would succeed in implementing the Shared Core Practice Model, which the report identified as a key strategy for compliance. The Panel noted its hope that the County's work would have developed data indicators that reflected progress towards full implementation, but because the County has concluded its data systems will not support those tasks, other strategies would be needed to improve performance. Among other things, the report was particularly troubled by the County's decision to change from using an Immersion Process, in which the Shared Core Practice Model would be fully implanted in only a few offices every eighteen months, to instead deciding to use a countywide approach in an attempt to reform all 19 offices and 3 specialized units simultaneously. The Panel report expressed doubt that this approach would bring the County any closer to full implementation of the Shared Core Practice Model, and disapproved of the County's decision to make this change without first notifying the parties or Panel, both of which had treated the immersion approach as a part of the strategic plan. According to Bloomberg, the case is now closed.", "summary": "Children in foster care and at risk of foster care in California brought suit in 2002 against the State and Los Angeles County to reform provision of mental health services to foster care children. The parties reached a settlement agreement in December 2011 that implements community-based mental health services and makes wraparound and therapeutic foster care available. A Special Master and Advisory Committee monitored the progress of the parties' implementation of the settlement agreement from 2012 to 2014. The Special Master submitted a final report to the Court on November 20, 2014. The report identified areas of progress and growth, but also found that there remained significant unfinished deliverables from the settlement agreement and identified key activities the State should begin or continue implementing. A final status conference was held on November 24, 2014. However, the Panel monitoring L.A. County's progress toward implementation will continue to operate through December 31, 2018."}
{"article": "On June 9, 2014, a complaint was filed by the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) against the National Security Agency (NSA) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for failing to fulfill two Freedom of Information Act requests for records pertaining to the conduct of the EPA. The case was filed after the NSA issued a Glomar response, in which it declined to provide the requested information, and instead refused to confirm or deny that it possessed the request records. According to the complaint, this lawsuit stems from repeated incidents of the EPA circumventing federal recordkeeping laws by using personal devices, including email accounts and text messages, to conduct work-related correspondence and otherwise federal business. As revealed by its Inspect General, NSA is known to have a program to collect metadata from telephone, text message and email records from certain telephony carriers including Verizon. CEI requested the copies of all text message data, and particularly all metadata of text messaging activity using Verizon voice and/or data accounts in NSA\u2019s possession. On September 5, 2014, defendant filed for summary judgment. In response, the plaintiffs argued that NSA has waived its right to issue such a response by its previous official acknowledgment that it has the records they seek. The judge found that despite their FOIA requests for email and text records, the plaintiffs failed to identify any evidence showing that the NSA actually collects this information on a widespread basis. On January 13, 2015, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The court stated that plaintiffs failed to point to concrete evidence showing that the NSA has actually admitted this fact. The court entered a judgment for the defendant on the same day. The case is closed.", "summary": "A complaint was filed by the Competitive Enterprise Institute against the National Security Agency in the federal court for the District of Columbia for failing to fulfill two Freedom of Information Act requests for records pertaining to the conduct of the EPA. However, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant."}
{"article": "On March 3, 2003, Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania (DIA) brought this action against the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) alleging that SEPTA violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12101 (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794 (RA) after it completed two construction projects on its public transit facilities in Philadelphia and did not make the facilities sufficiently accessible to people with disabilities. DIA, represented by attorneys from the Disability Law Project and a private disability rights firm, asked the court for injunctive relief requiring SEPTA to make the stations accessible to persons who use wheelchairs by constructing elevators at the City Hall Station and the 15th Street Courtyard, which provides access to the 15th Street Station. Specifically, DIA alleged that SEPTA replaced an existing stairway at the 15th Street Courtyard without making the entrance accessible to persons in wheelchairs, and that SEPTA replaced an existing escalator at the City Hall Station Broad Street entrance but did not make the entrance accessible to persons using wheelchairs. DIA's fourth amended complaint alleged that SEPTA violated the ADA and RA by making \"alterations\" to the 15th Street Courtyard and the City Hall Station without also making the affected portions of the facilities accessible to individuals with disabilities. Additionally, DIA alleged that the 15th Street Station and City Hall Station were \"key stations\" under the ADA and RA. Therefore, SEPTA was required to make those stations handicapped accessible. On May 15, 2003, the United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Judge Clifford Scott Green) granted SEPTA's motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure R. 19(b) for DIA's failure to join the City of Philadelphia as a defendant. SEPTA argued that joinder of the City of Philadelphia was required, because the property at issue was owned by the City. On June 4, 2003 the District Court (Judge Green) granted DIA's motion vacating the May 15, 2003 order granting dismissal. On June 12, 2003, DIA filed an amended complaint, which included the City of Philadelphia as a defendant. DIA reached a settlement agreement with the City of Philadelphia on August 16, 2004. The terms of the agreement provided that the City encouraged and would permit SEPTA to construct ADA-compliant elevators at the City Hall Station and the 15th Street Courtyard. On August 19, 2004, the case was reassigned and on November 30, 2004, the Court (Judge Gene E.K. Pratter) granted DIA's motion to dismiss the City of Philadelphia pursuant to the settlement agreement. On January 7, 2004, DIA filed its third amended complaint, adding the \"key station\" claim. On December 23, 2004, the District Court (Judge Pratter) granted in part and denied in part SEPTA's motion to dismiss and motion to strike portions of DIA's third amended complaint. Specifically, the District Court (Judge Pratter) denied SEPTA's motion to strike DIA's allegations that SEPTA violated the \"key station\" provisions of Title II of the ADA, but DIA was ordered to strike allegations relating to an alleged agreement SEPTA made to construct elevators at City Hall in lieu of construction of an elevator at the 15th Street Station. On February 15, 2005, DIA filed a fourth amended complaint, and alleged that SEPTA's renovations to both the 15th Street Courtyard and City Hall Station constituted \"alterations\" that triggered ADA and RA accessibility obligations. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on April 5, 2006. On November 17, 2006, the Court (Judge Pratter) granted SEPTA's motion for summary judgment regarding all of DIA's claims. Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 03-CV-1577, 2006 WL 3392733 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2006). The Court (Judge Pratter) held that DIA's claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations, because the claims accrued when DIA knew, or had reason to know, that SEPTA's renovations would not include elevators. DIA filed its claims more than two years after those dates. DIA subsequently appealed. On March 27, 2007, the United States filed an amicus curiae brief in support of DIA urging a reversal of the Court's summary judgment in favor of SEPTA. On August 19, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Judge Michael D. Fisher; Judge Thomas M. Hardiman, Judge Walter King Stapleton) reversed the District Court and remanded the case. Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199 (3rd Cir. 2008). The Third Circuit (Judges Fisher, Hardiman, Stapleton) held that the accrual date of a discrimination claim depends on when the discrimination occurred and that discrimination did not occur until the construction was completed. Therefore, DIA's claims were not barred by the statute of limitations. On November 04, 2008, DIA filed its motion for summary judgment. On January 16, 2009, SEPTA filed its motion for summary judgment. On September 11, 2009, the United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Judge Pratter) granted DIA's motion for summary judgment. Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 655 F. Supp. 2d 553 (E.D.Pa. 2009). The Court (Judge Pratter) held that SEPTA's construction work at both the 15th Street Courtyard and City Hall Station were \"alterations\" under the ADA and RA. Therefore, the ADA and RA required SEPTA to make both locations readily accessible to individuals with disabilities. SEPTA appealed the District Court decision. On February 16, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Judge Julio M. Fuentes, Judge Kent A. Jordan, Judge Anthony Joseph Scirica) affirmed the District Court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of DIA Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 09-3964, 2011 WL 522947 (3rd Cir. Feb. 16, 2011). The Third Circuit held that the ADA must be interpreted liberally to provide equal access for disabled persons to public facilities. The court concluded that the City Hall Station and 15th Street Courtyard construction projects were \"alterations\" under the ADA, even though they were not \"major structural alterations.\" Additionally, the court held that the ADA required SEPTA to make the alterations \"to the maximum extent feasible\" regardless of their cost, because \"feasible\" referred to technical matters and not economic costs. Furthermore, the court held that the 15th Street and the City Hall stations were not already \"readily accessible\" merely because there were disabled accessible elevators at other portions of the underground concourse connecting the 15th Street, City Hall, and Suburban Station. On remand, the case finally settled; a consent decree was entered September 16, 2011, approved by Judge Pratter. The decree provided that SEPTA would install several elevators at the relevant stations, make fare lines accessible, and pay attorneys fees of about $500,000. It also required SEPTA to provide status reports to plaintiffs counsel, quarterly. The agreement lasted until 2013. The case is now closed.", "summary": "After years of litigation, the Third Circuit found in 2011 that SEPTA (Southeastern Pennsylvania Tranportation Authority) had violated the ADA by failing to make several subway stations accessible for people with disabilities, including those who use wheelchairs. The parties settled a few months later for a consent decree that provided that SEPTA would install several elevators at the relevant stations, make fare lines accessible, and pay attorneys fees of about $500,000. It also required SEPTA to provide status reports to plaintiffs counsel, quarterly."}
{"article": "The plaintiff was a naturalized U.S. Citizen denied boarding to a flight from Kuwait to the United States because of his alleged inclusion on the No Fly List. On January 18, 2011, he filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against the Department of Homeland Security (\"DHS\"), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (\"FBI\"), the Transportation and Security Administration (\"TSA\"), and the Terrorist Screening Center (\"TSC\"), which created and maintained the No Fly List. The plaintiff, represented by the Council on American Islamic Relations, alleged that his placement on the No Fly List constituted: (1) a violation of his right as a United States citizen to reside in the United States and re-enter it from abroad; (2) unlawful agency action in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act; and (3) a denial of procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief requiring defendants to remove him from the No-Fly List; inform him of the grounds for his inclusion on the No-Fly List; and provide him with an opportunity to rebut his inclusion. The plaintiff also sought monetary damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and a declaration that the defendants violated his rights. The case was assigned to Judge Anthony J. Trenga. Contemporaneously with the complaint, the plaintiff also filed an emergency motion with respect to his alleged inability to return to the U.S. from Kuwait. The relief requested in the motion became moot, however, when the plaintiff was permitted to return to the U.S. on January 21, 2011. On June 3, 2011, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff\u2019s claims lies exclusively in the U.S. Court of Appeals under 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 46110, which gave the U.S. Court of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to certain orders of the TSA. Judge Trenga agreed and held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff's challenge to past or future restrictions on his ability to travel because such claims are \"inescapably intertwined\" with the review of TSA orders. 2011 WL 3820711. Instead of dismissing the plaintiff's claims, however, the court transferred the plaintiff's claims to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiff contended that the district court did have jurisdiction, and thus, requested that his claims be remanded. On May 28, 2013, the Fourth Circuit agreed. In an order signed by the Court's clerk, the Fourth Circuit explained that 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 46110 did not evidence Congress' intent to exclude the plaintiff's challenge to past and future restricts on his ability to travel from consideration in the district court. On remand, the defendants again filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the plaintiff's claims must be dismissed because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies, that he lacked standing, that his claims were not ripe for adjudication, and that he failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted. On January 22, 2014, Judge Trenga granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion. 2014 WL 243115. The Court held that the plaintiff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies, had standing, and that his claims were ripe. The Court then dismissed a portion of the plaintiff's first claim for relief, concluding that four to five day delay that the the plaintiff experienced in his ability to reenter the U.S. did not unduly burden his rights such that it constituted a constitutional deprivation. The court, however, found that the plaintiff's broader allegations in his first claim for relief of present and future harms from his inability to fly were sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss. The court also held that plaintiff's procedural due process claim was sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss as the plaintiff did not receive any notice of his inclusion or reasons for his inclusion. The parties then engaged in discovery for the next year. On December 9, 2014, the plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment as to his procedural due process claim. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants failed to provide him with a meaningful opportunity to challenge his inclusion on the No Fly List, either before or after his inclusion, depriving him of various liberty interests. The defendants contended that the redress process established through the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (\"TRIP\") was constitutionally sufficient. On July 16, 2015, the court issued an order partially granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the court concluded that the plaintiff was denied his Fifth Amendment right to an adequate opportunity to challenge his inclusion on the No Fly List. On April 13, 2015, the defendants filed a notice stating the government's new redress procedures for claims submitted through DHS regarding denial of boarding on a covered aircraft, and that these new procedures would be available to the plaintiff should he wish to use them. The plaintiff filed a fifth amended complaint on December 28, 2015. On March 3, 2016, using arguments that are unavailable on the docket, the defendants moved for summary judgment of the plaintiff\u2019s substantive due process and non-delegation claims of the fifth amended complaint. That same day, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment of those same claims, arguing that the No Fly List interfered with his fundamental right of movement and was not narrowly tailored and that the No Fly List was operating in the absence, and in some ways against, the wishes of Congress. On July 20, 2017, Judge Trenga granted the defendants\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment and denied the plaintiff\u2019s. The court concluded that the No Fly List was not unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds because it was not unlawful under the non-delegation doctrine nor did it exceed agency authority. As such, the court entered judgment in favor of the United States and against the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Not long after, however, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed this appeal and the Fourth Circuit obliged on December 21, 2017. There are no pending motions or appeals so the case is presumably closed.", "summary": "The plaintiff, a citizen and resident of the U.S. who was denied boarding a flight from Kuwait to the U.S., filed a lawsuit against the federal government, alleging that his inclusion on the No Fly List constitutes various constitutional violations and unlawful agency action. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia initially concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. On remand, the federal government moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claims on various grounds, which the District Court largely rejected. On June 20, 2017, the court entered judgment in favor of the United States and against the plaintiff. The case is closed."}
{"article": "On Oct. 7, 2004, the St. Louis District office of the EEOC brought this suit against Allstate Insurance Company, a major insurance provider, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The complaint alleged that Allstate's rehire policy disproportionately and adversely impacted workers over the age of 40, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The EEOC also brought a disparate treatment claim, alleging that Allstate refused to rehire certain former employees because of their age. The EEOC sought to permanently enjoin Allstate from discriminating on the basis age against individuals 40 years of age and older. The EEOC also wanted the court to order that Allstate implement policies, practices, and programs providing equal employment opportunities for individuals 40 years of age and older. Finally, the EEOC sought back wages and liquidated damages for adversely affected employees. In 1999, Allstate implemented a Reorganization Plan, which eliminated all employee-agent positions and terminated the employment contracts of its employee-agents. In connection with the Reorganization Plan, Allstate implemented a rehire moratorium policy in 2000. Under the policy, former employee-agents who were subject to the Reorganization Plan were ineligible for rehire in non-agent positions for a period of one year after their termination, or after all severance benefits had been received. The EEOC alleged that the rehire moratorium policy had disparate impact on former employee-agents who were members of the protected age group and that Allstate engaged in disparate treatment of such members of the protected age group. Both sides filed motions for partial summary judgment in June 2006, and in October 2006 District Judge E. Richard Webber denied Allstate's motion but granted in part the EEOC's motion. The court held that although no material issue of fact existed as to the EEOC's prima face case of disparate impact, Allstate had provided sufficient evidence that the challenged employment policy was adopted based on reasonable factors other than age. Since the EEOC had the ultimate burden of showing that Allstate's reasons for the policy were unreasonable, and had provided sufficient evidence of unreasonableness, the court held that question was not appropriate for summary judgment. 458 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Mo. 2006). In Jan. 2007, Allstate was given leave in the district court to file an interlocutory appeal, at which point the case was stayed pending the result of that appeal. No. 4:04CV01359 ERW, 2007 WL 38675 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 4, 2007). Allstate appealed on two questions of law: (1) whether Allstate\u2019s rehire policy is an \u201cemployment policy\u201d which can be challenged under a disparate impact theory of discrimination; and (2) whether the statistics proffered by the EEOC and adopted by the district court establish disparate impact as a matter of law. On June 10, 2008, Eighth Circuit Judge Myron H. Bright answered both questions in the affirmative, holding that Allstate's rehire policy could be challenged under ADEA and that the EEOC's statistical evidence established a prima facie case that the rehire policy had a disparate impact. 528 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2008). However, on September 8, 2008, the Eighth Circuit granted Allstate's Petition for Rehearing En Banc and vacated the June 10, 2008 judgment. That same day, the Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and the case went back to district court. After proceedings resumed in the district court, there was additional discovery. On Sept. 11, 2009, the parties filed a joint motion to approve the parties' proposed Stipulated Order resolving all claims in this action. On Sept. 14, 2009, District Judge Webber issued a Stipulated Order containing the terms of the parties' settlement agreement. With respect to injunctive relief, Allstate agreed that before adopting any new policy limiting the re-employment of former employees whose employment was terminated involuntarily as part of a reorganization or reduction-in-force, it will determine whether such a policy disproportionately affects individuals who are age 40 and above. If the policy does disproportionately impact those 40 or older, Allstate agreed to refrain from implementing the policy until it gives the EEOC 14 days written notice of its implementation, provides a list of reasons for the policy, and gives reasonable opportunity to meet and discuss with the EEOC. Additionally, Allstate agreed that any new policy would comply with the requirements of the ADEA. However, there was no admission of liability by Allstate. With respect to monetary damages, Allstate agreed to pay a total of $4.5 million to individuals affected by the rehire policy. The settlement agreement required that the EEOC provide notice to all eligible claimants, giving them a chance to comment on or object to the methodology for allocating the $4.5 million settlement fund. The agreement specified that the court would retain jurisdiction over the case for three years. Following the notice and comment period, Judge Webber issued a Settlement Allocation Order on Dec. 15, 2009. The Settlement Allocation Order approved of the proposed Distribution Plan, stating that it was a fair and reasonable allocation of the monetary relief provided under the Stipulated Order, and rejected all of the claimants' objections. On Jan. 14, 2010, Judge Webber finalized the settlement. The three year period of the court's jurisdiction passed without further litigation, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2004, the EEOC filed a complaint against Allstate Insurance Company in the Eastern District of Missouri. Plaintiffs allege that Allstate's rehire policy disproportionately and adversely impacted workers over the age of 40, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In 2009, the parties reached a settlement that required Allstate to conduct a disparate impact analysis on its rehire policies and in the event that there is a disparate impact on those 40 or older, required Allstate to coordinate with the EEOC before implementing the policy. The settlement also awarded monetary damages to adversely impacted claimants. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On July 12, 1999, several medical, dental, and child advocacy organizations, along with several individuals, filed this class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the directors of the Michigan Department of Health, the Medical Services Administration, the Michigan Medical Services Administration, and the Michigan Department of Community Health under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by The Public Interest Law Center, in collaboration with Dechert LLP, Michigan Legal Services, the National Health Law Project, and the Michigan Association for Children with Emotional Disorders, sought injunctive relief to prevent state officials from violating the Medicaid law, claiming violations of federal Medicaid laws. The plaintiffs alleged that the state of Michigan failed to provide essential dental and medical services, known as Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment Services (\u201cEPSDT services\u201d) required by the Medicaid program to eligible minors. The plaintiffs alleged that Michigan\u2019s Medicaid system paid doctors and dentists too little to ensure that they would be willing to treat patients on Medicaid, such that low-income families faced a dangerous shortage of essential care for their children. The case was assigned to Judge Robert H. Cleland. On October 14, 1999, the plaintiffs filed a motion seeking class certification of children eligible for EPSDT services. On November 9, 1999, the defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Clearinghouse does not have access to this document so it is unclear by what reasoning the defendants sought judgment. On December 28, 1999, Judge Robert H. Cleland granted in part and denied in part the defendants\u2019 motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Clearinghouse does not have access to this document so it is unclear which parts were granted or denied. On March 26, 2001, Judge Cleland entered an order denying the plaintiffs\u2019 motion to certify the class and granting the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. Judge Cleland held that the substantive defendant, in this case, was the state of Michigan and that Ex parte Young was inapplicable, meaning state sovereign immunity doctrine barred this type suit against the state. While the Constitution says that federal statutes are the \u201csupreme law of the land,\u201d Judge Cleland ruled that because the Medicaid program was enacted under Congress\u2019 spending power and is a consensual, contractual agreement between the states and Congress, it is not encompassed by the supremacy clause. Thus, Congress cannot compel states to participate in the program and individual state actors, indistinguishable from the state, retain \u201cconstitutional sovereignty from the suit.\u201d 133 F.Supp.2d 549. Judge Cleland also held that even if there were no immunity from these suits, Section 1983 did not authorize suits against states or state officials for failure to carry out the terms of a federal grant program like Medicaid. The Supreme Court has required a historical statutory construction when construing Section 1983 and Judge Cleland found \u201cno such clear, unambiguous intent to subject States to private suit.\u201d 133 F.Supp.2d 549. On April 4, 2001, the plaintiffs appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit (Circuit Judges Merritt, Boggs, and Moore) delivered its opinion on May 15, 2002, in which it reversed the district court\u2019s decision on all issues presented. The court held that conditions imposed by the federal government upon states participating in Medicaid do not arise out of a contractual agreement; they are federal laws. The court also ruled, in line with \u201cwell-established precedent,\u201d that laws passed by Congress under its spending powers are supreme law of the land. Furthermore, while the district court ruled that Ex parte Young was unavailable to the plaintiffs, the Sixth Circuit held that because the plaintiffs sought relief from state officials for those officials\u2019 alleged violations of federal law, this case was squarely within Ex parte Young and thus allowed to proceed. Lastly, the court held that the plaintiffs did have a cause of action under Section 1983. The case was remanded back to the district court. 289 F.3d 852. With the case back in the district court, the plaintiffs moved for class certification on October 14, 2015, and filed an amended complaint on October 18, 2015. The Clearinghouse does not have access to these documents so it is unclear what was different in the amended complaint. Accordingly, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment on November 29, 2004. On April 22, 2005, Judge Cleland granted in part and denied in part the defendants\u2019 2004 motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. Judge Cleland addressed the plaintiffs\u2019 claim that the defendants failed to provide EPSDT services to all eligible children by holding that plaintiffs stated a cause of action to the extent that they alleged that the state of Michigan has a policy or practice of not providing the EPSDT services to eligible children who have requested them. Addressing the plaintiffs\u2019 second claim, Judge Cleland held that the plaintiffs lacked a cause of action because the Medicaid statute did not \u201cunambiguously confer rights enforceable under Section 1983.\u201d Finally, Judge Cleland denied the plaintiffs\u2019 final claim that the defendants failed to adequately inform eligible individuals of programs and services available through Medicare, holding that it was not their duty to inform all potentially eligible children of EPSDT services. 368 F.Supp.2d 740. On May 17, 2005, the district court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification and entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed this judgment the next day. On July 7, 2006, the Sixth Circuit (again before Judges Merritt, Moore, and now Chief Judge Boggs) affirmed in part the district court\u2019s dismissal of the claims under the Medicaid statutory provisions but reversed the holding that there was no cause of action for failing to inform all potentially eligible children of EPSDT services. The appeals court also modified the district court\u2019s order to reflect a dismissal without prejudice, which allowed the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint to allege that Michigan's inadequate payment system effectively denied many eligible children the right to medical assistance. The case was remanded back to the district court. 454 F.3d 532. On October 11, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint in the district court. The complaint alleged that the reimbursement rates provided by the defendants were so low that an insufficient number of providers were willing to care for children who were enrolled in Medicaid. The plaintiffs further claimed that these inadequate payments effectively denied the plaintiffs and the class of minors eligible for Medicaid represented in the suit the right to medical assistance. On August 7, 2007, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement that resulted in the case being dismissed without prejudice. The settlement preserved significant expansions of the state\u2019s program and major increases in rates paid to doctors and dentists for treating Medicaid patients. The settlement also required the state to monitor children\u2019s access to care, which it had never done before the settlement. Finally, the settlement provided for ongoing oversight of the state\u2019s program by representatives of the plaintiffs. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This class-action suit was filed in 1999 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs, representing a class of one million low-income children, alleged that the state of Michigan's Medicaid system reimbursed doctors and dentists too little to ensure that they would be willing to treat patients on Medicaid. After two amended complaints and two appeals to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the parties agreed to a settlement in 2007. The agreement preserved significant expansions of the state\u2019s program and major increases in rates paid to doctors and dentists for treating Medicaid patients, required the state to monitor children\u2019s access to care, and provided for ongoing oversight of the state\u2019s program by representatives of the plaintiffs. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "This federal class action lawsuit sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief for over 60 immigrant women who were detained in ICE custody at the Irwin County Detention Center in Ocilla, Georgia. The plaintiffs claimed that they were subjected to medical abuse while in ICE custody including nonconsensual hysterectomies, overly aggressive gynecological care, and medically unnecessary procedures. In addition to the medical abuse itself, the plaintiffs sought relief against federal officials and the local employees of the ICE jail who, the plaintiffs claimed, engaged in a widespread conspiracy to silence the detainees from sharing their abuse with the public and retaliated against women who spoke out about the conditions at the detention center. <i>Procedural Background: </i> This federal class action lawsuit commenced on November 9, 2020, with a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order filed by Yanira Oldaker in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia (in Valdosta). At the time of the initial filing, Yanira Oldaker was a detainee of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at Irwin County Detention Center (ICDC also referred to below as \u201cthe ICE jail\u201d) in Ocilla, Georgia. The November 9 motion named ICE, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) as defendants. On November 16 and 17, 2020, two other women detained at ICDC filed separate habeas petitions in the same district court. (Trial dockets 7:20-cv-00231 and 7:20-cv-00237). On November 18, 2020, District Judge W. Louis Sands ordered the two new habeas petitions to be consolidated into the Oldaker case which had been referred to Magistrate Judge Stephen Hyles. A fourth ICDC detainee joined the consolidated action on November 23, 2020, also seeking a writ of habeas corpus. On November 25, 2020, the district court granted a consent motion to revise a scheduling order agreed to by the four plaintiffs and the defendants who now included ICE, DHS, DOJ, and ICDC. In the revised scheduling order, the government agreed to not deport any of the four plaintiffs or any other ICDC detainees who wished to file similar habeas petitions or motions for temporary restraining orders at least until a hearing on the motions for temporary restraining orders was held. The plaintiffs agreed to file a consolidated habeas petition and consolidated motion for temporary restraining order for all individuals at ICDC with substantially similar factual allegations as themselves by December 21, 2020. <i>The Amended Habeas Petition/Class Action Complaint, and the Amended Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order:</i> The plaintiffs met the deadline they agreed to and submitted an amended habeas petition together with a class action complaint (the complaint) and an updated emergency motion for a temporary restraining order on December 21, 2020. Represented by the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, Morningside Heights Legal Services, Project South, a small Atlanta based law firm, and law school clinics from Boston University, Harvard, Texas A&M, and the University of Georgia as counsel, the plaintiffs sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. In the complaint, the plaintiffs described themselves as current or former ICDC detainees who were each subjected to \u201cnon-consensual, medically unindicated, and/or invasive gynecological procedures\u201d by the physician assigned to the ICE jail. The complaint set out three main categories of plaintiffs: 1) a group of nine women who were detained at ICDC at the time the complaint was filed, 2) four women previously detained at ICDC who had been either deported from the U.S. or released from the ICE jail at the time the complaint was filed, 3) a putative class of at least 60 women who were subjected to similar medical abuse at ICDC as the named plaintiffs. The list of defendants was extensive and includes federal agencies, federal officials, employees at ICDC, the corporate defendant LaSalle Southeast, LLC which owned and operated ICDC at the time of the complaint, and the Hospital Authority of Irwin County which employed the defendant physician Mahendra Amin. The complaint included 21 claims for relief. The first was a habeas claim for the release of the nine detained plaintiffs from unlawful detention under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a72241, 2243 and the common law to remedy the \u201cegregious and systematic retaliatory behavior\u201d of the defendants. In claims two through four, the plaintiffs sought a remedy for violations of their First Amendment Rights. The second claim alleged retaliatory conduct by federal respondents against ICDC detainees in violation of the First Amendment rights of speech and petition. The plaintiffs claimed that their testimony to federal investigators and communications to the press regarding medical abuse was met by adverse actions by federal respondents including deportations and attempted deportations of individual plaintiffs and putative class members, use of force, solitary confinement, and denial of privileges at the ICDC. The plaintiffs claimed that their exercise of free speech was \u201cchilled\u201d and that they suffered physical and/or psychological harm. The second claim sought damages against federal respondents pursuant to Bivens, declaratory relief finding their actions in violation of the First Amendment, and injunctive relief prohibiting further retaliation by federal officials against the exercise by plaintiffs of First Amendment protected conduct. The third claim is similar to the second but described the retaliation committed by ICDC, LaSalle, and their employees/officials including the defendant physician and is based on the incorporation of the First Amendment in the Fourteenth Amendment as a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. The retaliatory conduct committed by these non-federal actors included the placement of plaintiffs in solitary confinement, cell restriction, physical assault, assault of handcuffed detainees, threats of deprivation of property and commissary to hunger strikers, denial of access to the law library, monitoring of phone calls, destruction of outgoing correspondence, and the making of false claims to congressional investigators. Plaintiffs sought the same injunctive and declaratory relief against state officials as they did against the federal respondents and ask for both compensatory and punitive damages. As an alternative to the third claim, claim four restates the allegations of retaliation committed by the non-federal respondents but argued that if claim three failed, the court should find that the ICDC and LaSalle employees/officials were acting under color of federal authority and can be sued for damages pursuant to Bivens. In the fifth, sixth, and seventh claims of the complaint, the plaintiffs sought relief for violations of their Fifth Amendment rights. The fifth claim sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against federal officials with the damages claim based on Bivens. The plaintiffs alleged that the federal officials who facilitated their confinement at ICDC were either motivated by evil intent or callously/recklessly indifferent to the medical abuse they endured in violation of the Fifth Amendment\u2019s guarantee of reasonable safety and freedom from punitive confinement for people in civil immigration detention. The sixth claim sought the same type of relief as the fifth but is against the ICDC respondents and was based on the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process and 42 U.S.C \u00a71983. Like the fourth claim\u2019s alternative theory for damages under Bivens, the seventh claim similarly argued that if the court finds that the ICDC respondents were operating solely under color of federal law, they should still be liable for damages for violating the plaintiffs\u2019 rights to substantive due process. The eighth claim sought declaratory and injunctive relief against all defendants in their official capacities for violating Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act with regards to the detained plaintiffs. The plaintiffs alleged that the detained plaintiffs (all of whom have underlying medical conditions which qualify as disabilities under the Rehab Act) were excluded and/or denied benefits of the \u201cservices, programs, and activities\u201d within ICDC. The plaintiffs argued that the only \u201creasonable accommodation\u201d that would have mitigated their disabilities would have been released from detention and that because they were still detained at ICDC at the time the complaint was filed, their ongoing detention violated the Rehab Act. The ninth claim was against the federal defendants for violations of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The plaintiffs claimed that the deportation of two of the detainees who provided information about medical abuse to a <a href= https://projectsouth.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/OIG-ICDC-Complaint-1.pdf> whistleblower</a> ICDC employee was a violation of ICE\u2019s own policy (ICE Policy Number 10076.1) to not remove individuals from the U.S. \u201cin the midst of a legitimate effort to protect their civil rights or civil liberties.\u201d This disregard of its own policy by ICE amounted to a violation of the APA\u2019s guarantee of judicial review for persons who suffer a legal wrong because of an agency action and also violated regulations promulgated under the INA which prohibit the deportation of individuals needed in the US for any investigation \u201cbeing, or soon to be, conducted by any official executive, legislative, or judicial agency\u2026\u201d. 8 C.F.R. \u00a7215.3(h). The tenth claim was also based in APA violations by federal officials. Plaintiffs alleged that federal defendants failed to follow the Performance Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS) requirements with regards to the medical care at ICDC amounting to an unlawful agency action under the APA. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy the violations alleged in their ninth and tenth claims. In the eleventh claim, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. \u00a71985 by 1) conspiring to deter detainees from attending/testifying in a pending federal court proceeding and 2) conspiring to retaliate against witnesses/participants in federal court proceedings. The plaintiffs supported these conspiracy claims with extensive allegations including examples of expedited deportations, forced transfers of detainees out of the main ICDC facility during a September 2020 visit by a Congressional delegation, and phone call monitoring all of which commenced after ICDC received notice in mid-September 2020 that federal agencies were investigating it for medical abuse. The plaintiffs sought damages, injunctive, and declaratory relief to remedy these claims. In the twelfth claim, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against federal defendants for violating the Fifth Amendment prohibition on deportation of essential witnesses in civil proceedings. The thirteenth claim requested a grant of bail to the plaintiffs who were petitioning for habeas. The fourteenth claim is for breach of contract. Here, the plaintiffs argued that both the federal and ICDC defendants breached the terms of the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) established for the administration of the ICE jail by failing to abide by the terms of the PBNDS, not providing appropriate medical care, providing medical treatment without informed consent, and by not providing language accessibility during medical care to detainees who did not speak English. The plaintiffs claimed that they were the intended third-party beneficiaries of the IGA and that they were owed damages to remedy the breach as well as injunctive relief to enforce the contract. Counts fifteen through twenty were tort claims, listed as follows; 15) negligent hiring or retention against ICDC, LaSalle, and Irwin County Hospital; 16) gross negligence against ICDC and its officials; 17) medical battery against the defendant physician and Irwin County Hospital; 18) medical malpractice against the defendant physician and Irwin County Hospital; 19) intentional infliction of emotional distress against ICDC and its officials; 20) negligent infliction of emotional distress against ICDC and its officials. The twenty-first claim was for attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. It was brought under Georgia law against all ICDC defendants who committed intentional torts. In addition to the complaint, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and petition for writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum. The temporary restraining order sought by the plaintiffs would have enjoined retaliation against them by federal and ICDC officials including use of force, solitary confinement, denial of privileges, and deportation. If granted by the court, the habeas writs sought in the emergency motion would have ordered the defendants to make the plaintiffs available for any hearings deemed necessary by the court. In the emergency motion, the plaintiffs also asked for the release from ICDC of all detained plaintiffs and members of the putative class as an alternative to not granting the temporary restraining order and habeas petition. <i>Proceedings and Factual Changes Since the December 2020 Filings:</i> No district court rulings had been made on the merits of any of the plaintiffs\u2019 claims as of June 8, 2021. Only the corporate defendant, LaSalle, has filed an answer to the complaint (submitted April 15, 2021). On June 8, the government submitted a notice of new facts in opposition to the December 21, 2020, emergency motion for temporary restraining order. Though this document is not available for purchase on PACER, it likely has to do with DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas\u2019 <a href= https://www.dhs.gov/news/2021/05/20/ice-close-two-detention-centers> announcement </a> of the end of ICE\u2019s contract with ICDC on May 20, 2021. Interestingly, according to a June 3, 2021, report by <a href= https://theintercept.com/2021/06/03/ice-irwin-closing-open-detainees> the Intercept, </a> at least 34 ICE detainees were transferred to ICDC the week after DHS claimed to have terminated the contract. As for the status of the plaintiffs in this case, the National Immigration Project of the NLG <a href= https://nipnlg.org/pr/2021_22Jan_oldaker-v-giles.html> reported </a> that all of the women who claimed medical abuse by the defendant physician had been released from ICDC as early as January 22, 2021. This claim is further corroborated by a <a href= https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/pressroom/releases/2021/after-years-advocacy-no-immigrant-women-are-currently-detained-irwin-county> press release </a> from Detention Watch Network that announced that no women were being detained at ICDC as of April 29, 2021. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2020, women who were detainees at Irwin County Detention Center (an ICE Jail in Ocilla County, Georgia) filed a class action complaint, habeas petition, and emergency motion for a temporary restraining order in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia (in Valdosta). The plaintiffs alleged that they were medically abused while in ICE custody and that federal and jail officials retaliated against them when they attempted to inform the public about the conditions of their confinement. The plaintiffs claim that these actions violated the First, Fifth and Fourteenth amendments, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and other federal and state laws. ICE moved all women detainees out of ICDC by late April 2021 and the Department of Homeland Security announced the end of its contract with the detention center in May 2021. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On December 18, 2013, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of a Muslim crew person, filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of California under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 against McDonald's Corporation. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and prejudgment interest, claiming that the defendant discriminated against one if its employees based on his religion, Islam, when it refused to accommodate the employee's religious belief to wear a beard at work, resulting in the employee's constructive discharge. The employee began working as a crew person for the defendant in around 2001 and was promoted to Crew Trainer in 2003. In July and August 2005, the employee informed the defendant of his religious belief of wearing a beard at work. The defendant allegedly did not allow him to wear a beard and so the employee was constructively discharged. On December 19, 2013, the EEOC filed an amended complaint. Also, on the same day, the District Court (Judge Anthony W. Ishii) issued a consent decree for two years. Among other things, the defendant agreed to pay the employee $50,000, which was characterized as non-wage compensation for emotional distress. The decree was entered in December 2013 and scheduled to last until December 2015. No further docket entries exist, so the case is closed.", "summary": "On December 18, 2013, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, on behalf of a Muslim crew person, filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of California under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 against McDonald's Corporation. The EEOC alleged that the defendant discriminated against one if its employees based on his religion, Islam, when it refused to accommodate the employee's religious belief to wear a beard at work, resulting in the employee's constructive discharge. On December 19, 2013, the District Court issued a consent decree for two years where, among other things, the defendant agreed to pay the employee $50,000."}
{"article": "The Plaintiff in this case has been paralyzed from the chest down ever since an accident in 2007. She has limited mobility and manual dexterity, and thus requires some assistance in caring for herself carrying out daily activities. After her accident, she placed herself on the waitlist for Florida Medicaid's Traumatic Brain Injury/Spinal Cord (TBI/SC) Waiver Program. In early 2010, Plaintiff's husband and primary caregiver left her home following a divorce. She then contacted the state in the hope of receiving Waiver services but was told she would need to spend 60 days in an institution to then be eligible for community-based services to meet her needs. She then filed this lawsuit on May 13, 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida challenging this condition for receipt of services as a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. She filed a concurrent complaint and motion for preliminary injunction, asking the court to order the state to immediately provide services that will allow her to remain in the community. The U.S. Department of Justice filed a Statement of Interest supporting the Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. At a June 15, 2010 hearing, the Plaintiff's counsel informed the court that the Plaintiff had been hospitalized due to an unrelated issue, but that she would not be able to return home without the services that the TBI/SC waiver provides. After additional briefing, the District Court (Judge Marcia Morales Howard) granted the motion for preliminary injunction and ordered that the Plaintiff begin to receive services on June 23, 2010 so that she could be discharged from the hospital. The court issued its full analysis in granting the preliminary injunction on July 9, 2010. In March 2011, the court denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the Plaintiff had stated a claim under the ADA. At this time, the Plaintiff had been enrolled in the waiver program for several months. Thus, the parties stipulated to settle the claims with no further obligations for the Defendants. After some dispute over attorney's fees, the parties agreed to dismiss the matter on April 19, 2011.", "summary": "In 2010, Michele Haddad challenged the State of Florida's refusal to provide her with necessary home-based services pursuant to a Medicaid waiver program and its apparent condition that she reside in an institution for a limited period of time before receiving such services. The plaintiff prevailed on a motion for preliminary injunction on June 23, 2010, and the state began to provide Waiver services to her soon after. After the court denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss in March 2011, the parties stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice. Plaintiff was receiving services at that time."}
{"article": "On December 23, 2015, the plaintiff, a prisoner in the Cook County jail, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff later amended the complaint twice, adding two plaintiffs and to seeking class-action certification. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sued both the Sheriff of Cook County in his official capacity and Cook County itself for damages under Section 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12132; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794(a); and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that the Cook County Jail's policy of forced tapering of inmates participating in opioid antagonist therapy caused them great physical pain and thereby deprived them of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs sought class-action certification and compensatory damages for their pain and suffering. The case was assigned to Judge Edmond E. Chang. The named plaintiffs all entered the Cook County Jail between late 2013 to early 2014. During that time, the plaintiffs informed intake personnel of their enrollment in opioid antagonist therapy. Each experienced extremely painful withdrawal symptoms after administration of their prescribed medical treatment was delayed. One entered the jail on January 20, 2014, and did not receive treatment until January 26, 2014. The second entered the jail on December 23, 2013, and did not receive treatment until December 25, 2013. The third entered the jail on September 12, 2013, and did not receive treatment until September 20, 2013. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claims, but Judge Chang denied the motion on June 27, 2016. Judge Chang noted that the plaintiffs may face difficulty in proving their claim, but declined to evaluate the facts at that stage of the litigation. On November 29, 2020, the court granted class certification for the plaintiffs\u2019 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims and denied class certification for the plaintiffs\u2019 Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act claims. 2020 WL 7027556. The court held that the plaintiffs\u2019 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims raised \u201cquestions that are necessarily common to all class members,\u201d such as Cook County Jail officials\u2019 state of mind when developing the tapering policy, whereas the plaintiffs\u2019 ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims required individualized determinations. The court divided the class it into two classes: \u201cPre-trial Detainees\u201d consisted of all pre-trial detainees who entered the Cook County Jail between December 23, 2013 and October 7, 2019 and who were lawfully taking an opioid antagonist when they entered. ; \u201cPost-sentence Prisoners\u201d consisted of all post-sentencing prisoners who were lawfully taking an opioid antagonist when they entered the Cook County Jail between the same time period. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "Three prisoners sued the Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County on behalf of themselves and all prisoners who were forced to taper from opioid antagonist therapy while in custody. On November 29, 2020, the court granted class certification for the plaintiffs\u2019 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims and denied class certification for the plaintiffs\u2019 Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act claims, finding that common questions predominate over the former but not the latter. This case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On February 8, 1971, inmates at the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman, Mississippi filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1994, against the Penitentiary, the Mississippi Penitentiary Board and the Governor in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, Greenville Division. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU National Prison Project and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that conditions and practices in the maintenance, operation and administration of the Parchman facility violated their First, Eighth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Further, the plaintiffs alleged that black inmates were segregated and discriminated against on the basis of their race. On August 23, 1971, the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division was allowed to intervene. In its complaint, the government alleged that the defendants maintained a system of prison facilities segregated by race, and additionally failed to provide inmates with adequate housing, medical care, and protection from other inmates, that conditions of the sewage disposal and water systems created an immediate health hazard, and that prison officials permitted the custodial staff, including inadequately trained armed trustees, to inflict cruel and unusual punishment upon inmates. After a full evidentiary hearing on May 15, 1972, on September 13, 1972, the District Court (Judge William Colbert Keady) issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972). The court found the defendants practiced racial discrimination, provided inadequate physical facilities, medical facilities and protection of inmates, inadequate training to trustees, excessive disciplinary rules, punishment without adequate procedure, and unconstitutional censure of mail. The court found conditions violative of inmates' First, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and issued an injunctive order providing immediate, intermediate and long-range relief. The defendants appealed the Court's award of attorneys' fees as well as the Court's ruling on the merits of the case. On December 5, 1973, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Elbert Tuttle) affirmed the District Court's order. Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973). On September 9, 1974, the Fifth Circuit denied the defendants' petition for a rehearing. Gates v. Collier, 500 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1974). On September 20, 1974, the Fifth Circuit (Judge Tuttle) affirmed the District Court's ruling on the merits. Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974). The Court held that jurisdiction was proper and that conditions that deprived inmates of basic hygiene and adequate medical treatment, including solitary confinement, as well as failure to protect inmates from violence by other inmates and mail censorship, were unconstitutional. The plaintiffs moved for further relief, alleging the defendants failed to comply with the Court's order and, on January 31, 1975, the District Court (Judge Keady) granted in part and denied in part injunctive relief. Gates v. Collier, 390 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Miss. 1975). The Court denied some relief, holding that opening and inspecting, but not reading, inmates' mail was constitutional and that racial discrimination at the penitentiary had been mostly eliminated, but granted some relief, holding that the state's continuing failure to provide for inmates' physical health and well-being, and for adequate facilities, contravened the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiffs appealed. On January 8, 1976, the Fifth Circuit held that the District Court's refusal to modify the previous injunctive order with respect to racial discrimination and training and its modification of the order with respect to mail regulations was not an abuse of discretion. Gates v. Collier, 525 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1976). On November 19, 1976, the District Court (Judge Keady) issued a temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of various provisions of the Mississippi Corrections Act. Gates v. Collier, 423 F. Supp 732 (N.D. Miss. 1976). The Court further requested the convening of a three-judge court to consider a more permanent injunction concerning inmate housing units that were unfit for human habitation and constitutionally condemned, as well as a ceiling on inmate population of the remaining housing units to avoid unconstitutionally intolerable overcrowding of inmates. The defendants appealed. On March 18, 1977, the Fifth Circuit (per curiam) affirmed and remanded the case to the District Court to continue the implementation of conversion to a constitutionally permissible penal system. Gates v. Collier, 548 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1977). After the defendants moved for adoption of revised disciplinary rules, on June 30, 1978, the District Court (Judge Keady) held that revising the disciplinary rules was permissible so long as they did not infringe on the inmates' constitutional rights, and entered a modified version of the defendants' proposed revisions. Gates v. Collier, 454 F. Supp 579 (N.D. Miss. 1978). Of note, the Court held that allowing a classification officer to also serve as a disciplinary hearing officer violated the inmates' due process rights. The plaintiffs appealed. On November 8, 1979, the Fifth Circuit (Judge Joseph Woodrow Hatchett) affirmed the District Court's adoption of the revised rules. Gates v. Collier, 606 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1979). On January 6, 1983, the District Court (Judge Keady) awarded the plaintiffs attorneys' fees for class representation. Subsequent litigation by HIV+ inmates was consolidated into this case. In that litigation, male HIV+ prisoners housed at Unit 28 of the maximum-security state prison at Parchman, Mississippi, and female HIV+ prisoners housed at the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility in Rankin County, filed a lawsuit on May 29, 1990, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Mississippi Department of Corrections in the US District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, Greenville Division. The plaintiffs in that case, represented by the ACLU National Prison Project, alleged that all HIV+ prisoners, regardless of their offense or other classification factors, were housed at the same facility by gender, not allowed to participate in vocational and educational programs, and that living conditions and medical care were inadequate in these HIV+ segregated units. That case was consolidated with this one for having some similar questions of law. For more information on that case, see <ahref=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=798\"> Moore v. Fordice</a>, PC-MS-0002, on the Clearinghouse. According to the 5th Circuit in a different case, Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, in 1998, the District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi finally dismissed the action from its inactive docket as to state-owned, state-operated, and private-company-contracted facilities (not county facilities). The court also stated that it would continue to forward prisoner petitions relating to defendants' facilities to plaintiffs' class counsel. However, litigation continued regarding compliance with court orders and issues in consolidated cases. Over the next few years, inmates were moved around to various jails and units while repairs to the Mississippi State Penitentiary were being made. The Court denied many inmates that were moved to become class members, but granted plaintiffs several post-judgment attorney fees awards over the next years. The Moore class (of HIV+ inmates) moved to intervene in this case to challenge adequacy of class representation, but the Court denied the class's motion. The class moved the court for a preliminary injunction to provide HIV+ prisoners with adequate medical care. On July 19, 1999, the court granted this motion, requiring defendants to provide HIV+ prisoners with constitutionally adequate medical care and testing, and requiring progress reports on the implementation of the changes (the order and opinion are not available on PACER). After alleging noncompliance with prior orders, the plaintiffs moved to supersede previous orders to allow greater inmate access to courts. The court denied this motion, but no available documents provide the court's reasoning. The ACLU National Prison Project moved to substitute as class counsel for this litigation, though the court ordered that they could not contact inmates until it ruled on their motion. On February 2, 2000, the Court denied the ACLU National Prison Project's motion to represent the interest of HIV+ inmates at Parchman and denied plaintiff's motion to sanction the ACLU. Later, class members appealed the order prohibiting contact by the ACLU National Prison Project; during appeal, the ACLU was allowed to contact inmates only to prosecute its appeal. On February 19, 2000, the Court granted appellants' motion to stay the enforcement of the \"no contact\" order pending appeal. On April 30, 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated in part and reversed in part the February 2, 2000, decision. However, the details of the decision are not available. In May of 2000, and for many years following, a number of jails were approved to house additional state inmates. In June of 2000, the Court granted in part a motion for writ of execution to collect contempt fines against the defendants. In the same month, the Court also granted a motion that required inmates to stay in one of the approved jails for at least 30 days to be counted in the jail's population. In September of 2000, the Court ordered the state to pay $1.8 million into the Court's account, and the Court would return $100,000 for each month that the state complied with prior orders. From October of 2000 to February of 2000, the state complied with Court orders and the Court denied plaintiffs' motion for contempt and for an order enforcing the Court's mandate, and granted defendants' motion for the return of $500,000 of the $1.8 million for compliance ($100,000 for each month). On March 30, 2001, the Court ordered the return of the remaining $1.3 million to the state, but retained the interest from the amount with the intention to use it for the plaintiffs' benefit. This case was consolidated with a few other cases with similar issues whose dockets are not available, and on July 18, 2001, with the <a href=\" http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=5491 \">Givhan v. Puckett</a> (PC-MS-0004), a case involving a class of Muslim inmates who sought religious freedom in prisons. Over the next few months, many filings were made in the consolidated cases, though the documents and details are not available. On November 22, 2002, and on May 15, 2003, the court granted plaintiff's motions for modification of prior jail orders, but the details of the modification are not available. The following year, the court also ordered defendants to provide the appropriate amount of space for inmates as required by previous orders. On May 21, 2003, the court ordered the defendants to remedy Eighth Amendment violations and report progress by July 7, 2003 (part of a consolidated case). Over the next year, the defendants submitted status reports to the court, and the court required the defendants not to discriminate against HIV+ inmates when deciding community work center placement; the Court also required the defendants to report inmate capacity to the Court following a June 4, 2004 status conference. On November 12, 2004, the Court denied a number of motions by class members, warning them that any further filings that are deemed frivolous by the court will count as strikes for the purpose of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). On March 31, 2005, the court dismissed the consolidated Moore case (4:90-cv-125), finding that both the PLRA and the compliance with previous orders had provided sufficient relief for the class. Inmates who were HIV+ had been integrated into the general prison population except for housing, and discrimination with respect to services and privileges had been addressed by the defendants. On March 6, 2006, the Court issued an order to update the April 1997 order to require facilities to more promptly respond to notices of noncompliance from the Court. Under the order, noncompliance after two notices automatically disapproved a jail for incarceration until they were reapproved for compliance. Over the next couple of years, the jails were monitored for compliance and disapproved when not in compliance. The jail order was modified again on September 26 and November 5 of 2007, the first modification required jails to obtain periodic approval from plaintiffs' counsel, and the second required jails to provide evidence of compliance whenever plaintiffs' counsel gave notice of noncompliance. On September 9, 2008, the order was modified to require defendants to pay a flat fee in advance of jail inspections to prevent manipulation by either side. On March 10, 2011, the Court dismissed the consolidated Stevenson and Givhan cases and the portions of this case related to the state-owned and contractor facilities. The order held that county defendants would be dismissed when the state removed all state prisoners from county jails, or on July 1, 2015, whichever came first. The case was then assigned to Magistrate Judge David A. Sanders for post-judgment proceedings. On May 29, 2012, the parties submitted a joint stipulation of dismissal without prejudice. Since then, the court has granted roughly 300 orders approving jails or prisons for housing state inmates. The most recent order granting approval occurred in 2017. On February 25, 2018, a petitioner motioned to reinstate the class action, but it was denied on February 28, 2018. The petitioner appealed this decision and which was then denied by the U.S. Court of Appeals on September 20, 2018. There has been no further action on the docket.", "summary": "On February 8, 1971, inmates at the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman, Mississippi filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1994, against the state of Mississippi. Plaintiffs alleged that conditions of confinement were unconstitutional and that black inmates faced discrimination, violating First, Eighth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs were granted preliminary and permanent injunctive relief as well as attorney fees. Lengthy and complex litigation regarding different classes of inmates and enforcement of Court orders has been consolidated into this case. On May 29, 2012, parties submitted a joint motion for dismissal and the case has since been closed, however, from 2012-2017 the court has been granting approval to various prisons and jails involved in the case the ability to house state inmates."}
{"article": "The New Orleans (along with the Houston) office of the EEOC brought this ADA suit against Ampace Freightlines, Inc. d/b/a Merchants Dutch Express, in May 1999, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The complaint alleged that the defendant discharged the charging party because he was regarded as having a disability. More specifically, the defendant allegedly discharged the defendant from his job as a truck driver because he had \"lazy eye.\" The parties settled and the court entered judgment dismissing the matter in June 2000. No information from the settlement was made available.", "summary": "EEOC brought ADA suit against Ampace Freightlines in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The parties settled and judgment was dismissed in June 2000. No information from the settlement was made available."}
{"article": "On May 8, 2018, Speech First, a nationwide membership organization of students, alumni, and others concerned with preserving the protections of the First Amendment, filed this lawsuit, on behalf of members attending the University of Michigan, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiff sued the University of Michigan under 42 U.S.C.\u00a7 1983 and 1988. Represented by private counsel, Speech First sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys\u2019 fees, claiming violations of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause. The plaintiff alleged that the University of Michigan\u2019s policies and enforcement of those policies chilled the speech and expression of student claimants. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that University\u2019s policies on \u201charassment\u201d and \u201cbullying\u201d were unconstitutionally overbroad and void for vagueness. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged that the policies provided no notice to students on what would constitute \u201charassment\u201d or \u201cbullying,\u201d and enforcement of the policies were implemented arbitrarily. 2018 WL 2123702. This case was assigned to Judge Elizabeth Stafford. On May 11, 2018, Speech First moved for preliminary injunctions against the defendant. The plaintiff sought to prohibit the defendant from: \u201c(1) taking any actions to investigate, threaten, or punish students for violations of the prohibitions on \u201charassment,\u201d \u201cbullying,\u201d and \u201cbias-related misconduct\u201d set forth in the University\u2019s Statement of Student Rights and Responsibilities; and (2) using the Bias Response Team to investigate, threaten, or punish students (including informal punishments such as restorative justice or individual education) for bias incidents. On June 11, 2018, the United States filed a statement of interest in support of the plaintiff\u2019s motion for preliminary injunction. In response, the defendant moved for a stay on its obligation to respond to the plaintiff\u2019s complaint. The defendant argued that the University\u2019s answer should be stayed until the court made a decision on the plaintiff\u2019s preliminary injunction. Although the court noted that the defendant\u2019s request served the interest of efficiency, it did not stay the defendant's answer. Instead, on June 19, 2018, the court extended the deadline until twenty-one (21) days from the date the court ruled on the plaintiff\u2019s motion for preliminary injunction. The court held a hearing on Speech First's motion for preliminary injunction on July 31, 2018. On August 6, the court denied the plaintiff's motion, holding that the Bias Response Team did not pose a concrete threat to the plaintiffs; that Speech First's constitutional challenge to the University's definitions of \"bullying\" and \"harassment\" had become moot after the University changed the definitions; and that there was no threat of irreparable harm to the plaintiffs. The district determined that Speech First was not likely to succeed on the merits of its claims because it lacked standing to assert that claim. The plaintiff appealed to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals on August 13, 2018. The Appeals Court found that Speech First had associational standing to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the students of the University. The Appeals Court also found that the claims were not moot, as the University\u2019s voluntary cessation would not preclude them from reverting back to the prior definitions of \"bullying\" and \"harassment.\" The Court vacated and remanded the District\u2019s Court decision, determining that the District Court was in a better position to assess the facts. 939 F.3d 756 (6th Cir. 2019). The parties agreed to settle the dispute, and each bore their own costs. The University agreed not to reinstate the Bias Response team or the prior definitions of bullying and harassment and to maintain the published definitions on the website as they were at the time of settlement. On October 28, 2019, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. Judge Linda Parker order the dismissal with prejudice. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In May 2018, Speech First filed this lawsuit on behalf of members attending the University of Michigan. The plaintiff sued the University of Michigan under 42 U.S.C.\u00a7 1983 and 1988, alleging that the University of Michigan\u2019s policies and enforcement of those policies violated the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause. After the plaintiff\u2019s initial motion for injunctive relief was denied by the District Court, the plaintiff appealed to the 6th Circuit Court. The Circuit Court vacated the lower court\u2019s decision and remanded the proceedings, but the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the claim soon after. The case is now closed"}
{"article": "On August 22, 2007, individuals with disabilities filed a lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Social Security Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Nursing Care Reform Act, against various Illinois state officials in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiffs, represented by private and public interest counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that they were institutionalized in a nursing facility even though they were capable of living in a more community-integrated setting with appropriate services. Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants conditioned receipt of long-term care on remaining in an institutionalized setting, even though it would be less expensive for Plaintiffs to receive appropriate care in the community. The Court (Judge Joan H. Lefkow) certified a class as: \"all Medicaid-eligible adults with disabilities in Cook County, Illinois, who are being, or may in the future be, unnecessarily confined to nursing facilities and who, with appropriate supports and services, may be able to live in a community setting.\" 71 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1089. At a status hearing on January 7, 2011, the parties advised Magistrate Judge Maria Valdez that they could conclude settlement discussions without further assistance from the court. On Aug. 29, 2011, the parties jointly moved for the court to approve the consent decree they had agreed upon. The court held a fairness hearing on Dec. 20, 2011, and ultimately accepted the decree. The consent decree established benchmarks for moving specific numbers of class members out of nursing facilities and into community-based settings. Over the course of the first two-and-a-half years, the decree compelled the state to move 1,100 class members into the community. It also required the state to provide up to $10 million in housing assistance to support the first group of transitioned adults. The decree also compelled the state to develop services needed to adequately support class members who choose to live in the community. It established a monitor to ensure compliance with the decree, and granted $1.2 million in attorneys' fees. The court approved an updated plan following the parties' cross-motion to enter into a cost-neutral plan and supplement and amend the December 2011 consent decree on November 16, 2016. The plan included the transition of class members into community-based settings, and continued evaluations and service plans for the class members. The court retained jurisdiction to oversee the full implementation of the plan. The court approved an updated plan on April 5, 2018. Monitoring by the court appointed monitor (Gail P. Hutchings) is ongoing as of May 20, 2020.", "summary": "This case was brought by individuals with disabilities against various Illinois state officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that they were inappropriately institutionalized when they could have received care and services in an integrated community setting. In August 2011, the parties entered a consent decree that compelled the state to transition members of the class from nursing facilities to community-based settings over the course of a number of years. The transition plan was updated in April 2018, and monitoring is ongoing as of November 2018."}
{"article": "On October 6, 2009, two individuals who had their DNA collected pursuant to a California statute filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Plaintiffs challenged a provision of California law which mandates the DNA collection of any individual arrested for or charged with a felony. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and claimed that the practice violates substantive and procedural Due Process, as well as the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the practice infringes on rights guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution because it mandates the DNA collection of all persons <i>arrested</i> for a felony--without requiring a warrant or that the individual actually be charged with or convicted of a felony. In 2004, California passed Proposition 69, which expanded the scope of the state's mandatory DNA collection laws, Cal. Penal Code. \u00a7\u00a7 295 et seq. Prior to the enactment of Proposition 69, California law provided that only persons convicted of certain felonies were subject to the mandatory DNA testing program. Under the revised statute, which took effect on January 1, 2009, any individual arrested for a felony must provide their DNA for analysis and storage in a national database accessible by federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. Proposition 69 also eliminated language in the statute which provided for the automatic expungement of a person's DNA samples and database entries if that individual's conviction was reversed. On December 1, 2009, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that added two more plaintiffs, bringing the total plaintiffs to four. None of the plaintiffs were convicted of charges related to the arrests which led to the collection of their DNA; three never had charges filed, and one had his case dismissed. On December 23, 2009, the District Court (Judge Charles R. Breyer) denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0023-0003.pdf\"><i>Haskell v. Brown</i>, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2009), <i>aff'd sub nom. Haskell v. Harris</i>, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012)</a>. The court found that although the plaintiffs had established that arrestees have greater privacy interests than convicted felons, they had failed to show that this interest outweighs the government's compelling interest in using arrestees' DNA to solve past crimes. The court reasoned that as a result, the plaintiffs had failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits or that the balance of equities tipped in their favor. On January 29, 2010--shortly after denying the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction--the District Court granted the motion for class certification. <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0023-0006.pdf\">Minute Entry Granting Mot. for Class Certification</a>. In doing so, the court adopted plaintiffs' proposed class description. This class description is \"all persons who have been, are, or will be, compelled to submit to the search and seizure of their body tissue and DNA pursuant to California Penal Code \u00a7 296(a)(2)(C) solely because they have been arrested for, or charged with, a felony offense.\" Proposed Order Granting Mot. for Class Certification. The plaintiffs appealed the District Court's denial of the preliminary injunction, but on February 23, 2012, a divided three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit (Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr. writing for the majority) affirmed the District Court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0023-0005.pdf\"><i>Haskell v. Harris</i>, 669 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012)</a>. The majority applied a \"totality of the circumstances\" test, balancing arrestees' privacy interests against the government's need for their DNA samples. The court concluded that \"the Government's compelling interests far outweigh arrestees' privacy concerns,\" and affirmed on that basis. <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0023-0005.pdf\"><i>Id.</i></a> Judge William A. Fletcher filed a dissenting opinion, in which he analogized the collection of arrestees' DNA to taking their fingerprints. Judge Fletcher argued that because in the absence of a warrant or reasonable suspicion an arrestee's fingerprints may only be taken for identification purposes--and not solely for an investigative purpose--the same logic applied to the collection of an arrestee's DNA. <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0023-0005.pdf\"><i>Id.</i> at 1066</a>. Judge Fletcher felt that this made Proposition 69 unconstitutional, rendering the majority's \"totality of the circumstances\" test irrelevant. <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0023-0005.pdf\"><i>Id.</i> at 1080</a>. However, he also noted that if he were to apply that test, he would find the \"strength of plaintiffs' privacy interests much stronger.\" <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0023-0005.pdf\"><i>Id.</i></a> After the Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the District Court's decision, the plaintiffs petitioned the Ninth Circuit to rehear the appeal en banc. On July 25, 2012, the Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc. <i>Haskell v. Harris</i>, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). After oral argument on the rehearing, the Ninth Circuit issued an order stating that it would not rule on the appeal until the U.S. Supreme Court decided a related issue in <i>Maryland v. King</i>. In that case, Maryland's DNA collection laws were being challenged. In June 2013, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 5-4, held that Maryland's DNA collection laws were constitutional. The Ninth Circuit subsequently ordered both sides to submit supplemental briefs and scheduled additional oral argument for December 2013. <i>Haskell v. Harris</i>, 727 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2013). On March 20, 2014, the en banc court affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction. In a per curiam opinion, the appeals court held that after <i>Maryland v. King</i>, California's DNA collection scheme was constitutional. Further, the appeals court declined the plaintiffs' request to enter a preliminary injunction applicable to only a smaller class consisting of individuals arrested for certain felonies not covered by <i>King</i>. <i>Haskell v. Harris</i>, 745 F.3d 1269 (9th Cir. 2014). On July 18, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion to create subclasses. Proposed subclass A would include all persons arrested on suspicion of a felony but never charged with a crime. Proposed subclass B would include only persons arrested for non-serious, non-violent felonies who were not actually charged. On that same date, the state filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that because California's DNA collection law was materially indistinguishable from the Maryland law upheld in <i>King</i>, neither the plaintiffs nor any possible class fell outside the wide parameters of <i>King</i> and the case was therefore over. On December 3, 2014, however, the district court stayed the case pending final resolution of a similar challenge to California's DNA Act in state court. In April 2018, the California Supreme Court upheld the state's DNA Act under both federal and California law as to the felony arrestee in that case. <i>People v. Buza</i>, 4 Cal. 5th 658 (2018). On June 22, 2018, Judge Breyer granted the state's motion for judgment on the pleadings and entered judgment for the state. <i>Haskell v. Brown</i>, 317 F. Supp. 3d 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2018). The court rejected the plaintiffs' proposed \"rule\" that would allow law enforcement to seize samples from all felony arrestees, but that would prevent law enforcement from analyzing those samples until a prosecutor has filed charges. Further, the court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments distinguishing <i>King</i>. First, the court explained that the plaintiffs understated the state's interests in taking, analyzing, and retaining DNA from people who are not charged with any offense or are discharged for lack of probable cause. Specifically, the court held that the state has a significant interest in the identification of arrestees, in accurately assessing the danger an arrestee poses to the public, and in exoneration. Second, the court noted that the individual interest was no different than that in <i>King</i>. Thus, in weighing the state's significant interest against the individual's modest interest, the court deemed the searches reasonable. Finally, the plaintiffs attempted to distinguish <i>King</i> based on three differences between the California and Maryland laws: (1) arrestee DNA samples are analyzed before arraignment in California; (2) more crimes qualify for mandatory DNA analysis in California; (3) records and samples are not automatically expunged in California. The court held that none of these three differences were constitutionally significant. The case is now closed.", "summary": "Four individuals who had their DNA collected upon arrest pursuant to a California statute filed a class action against the Attorney General of California and the California Department of Justice, alleging that a provision of the state's mandatory DNA collection law is unconstitutional. The District Court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision. Following the Supreme Court's decision in <i>Maryland v. King</i>, the en banc court affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction. On June 22, 2018, the District Court granted the state's motion for judgment on the pleadings and entered judgment for the state. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On January 7, 1999 several individuals eligible to participate in Medicaid because of disabilities and an advocacy organization for disabled individuals filed suit against New Mexico, the New Mexico Department of Health, and the New Mexico Department of Human Services in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. They alleged that the defendants had violated 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Medicaid Act, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically they claimed that the defendants provided community-based treatment to individuals with disabilities authorized as waiver services in a way that prevented disabled individuals from receiving these services in a reasonably prompt manner. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On April 24, 2000 the district court (Judge Martha Alicia Vazquez) granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants appealed the ruling denying their sovereign immunity claims but on August 16, 2001 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges Tacha, Pulitz, and Lucero) affirmed the district court. On November 5, 2002 the district court granted the defendants summary judgment as to claims by plaintiffs who had since received the desired services or were deceased but denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the claim of the advocacy organization for lack of standing. Discovery proceeded until the district court (Judge Vazquez) granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on two counts and the defendants summary judgment on one count on August 5, 2003. On February 4, 2004 the district court (Judge Vazquez) entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the defendants to evaluate applicants for waiver services within 90 days and then provide them with such services when appropriate within 90 days. The district court (Judge Vazquez) denied the plaintiffs motion to find the defendants in contempt on September 7, 2005 and found the defendants to be in compliance with the judgment on October 21, 2005.", "summary": "On January 7, 1999 several disabled individuals eligible to participate in Medicaid and an advocacy organization for disabled individuals filed suit against New Mexico and two state agencies in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. They alleged that the defendants had failed to provide community-based services to disabled individuals in a reasonably prompt manner. On April 24, 2000 the district court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss and on August 16, 2001 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. The district court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on two counts and the defendants summary judgment on one count on August 5, 2003 and on February 4, 2004 entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the defendants to provide the services in a timely manner. On October 21, 2005 the district court found the defendants to be in compliance with the judgment."}
{"article": "<i>Turkmen v. Ashcroft</i>, also known as <i>Ziglar v. Abbasi</i>, is one of two related actions filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York by plaintiffs who were investigated and detained for suspected terrorist ties in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. It was filed on April 17, 2002 as a class-action lawsuit, but the class was never certified. The case was assigned to Judge John Gleeson. (The related case, <i>Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft</i> (later <i>Ashcroft v. Iqbal</i>), was also assigned to Judge Gleeson, and was settled following the Supreme Court's ruling in that case, 556 U.S. 662.) This case was reassigned to Judge Dora Irizarry on March 9, 2016, when Judge Gleeson resigned from the bench to return to private practice. The plaintiffs in this case were men of Middle Eastern and South Asian descent who were arrested by the FBI and the INS in immigration raids following the September 11 attacks. They were held for months in the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn as the FBI investigated potential links to terrorism, but they were never charged with a crime. Some of the plaintiffs alleged that they were kept in solitary confinement, barred from communication with attorneys, family, and friends, subjected to physical and verbal abuse, and obstructed in their efforts to practice their religion. They sued the U.S. Attorney General, the FBI Director, the INS Commissioner, and employees of the Metropolitan Detention Center, alleging violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, international human rights law, the Civil Rights Act, and the Alien Tort Statute, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Factually, the plaintiffs alleged that notices to appear in court were delayed in reaching them, that they were subject to a blanket no-bond policy, and that they were arbitrarily classified as \"of high interest.\" They claimed that they were subjected to strip searches, sleep deprivation, effective denial of exercise, denial of hygiene items and adequate food, inadequate medical attention, deliberate interference with religious rights, communications blackouts, interference with access to counsel, and denial of consular rights. The plaintiffs further alleged that they were subjected to these harsh conditions because of their religion or ethnicity, and that their continued detention under these conditions stemmed from a discriminatory policy created by high-level officials in the Bush Administration. The plaintiffs later amended their complaint in light of reports published by the Office of the Inspector General in April and December 2003. The amended complaints added new allegations, claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, one additional plaintiff, and 28 Metropolitan Detention Center employees as defendants. Four plaintiffs who had been deported were paroled into the U.S. for deposition. This was the first time that non-citizens barred from re-entering the U.S. were allowed to enter for the purpose of pursuing a civil case. While in the country they were under the strict custody of the U.S. Marshals Service. In 2007, the Department of Justice indicted eleven current and former Metropolitan Detention Center employees, including three <i>Turkmen</i> defendants. Ten of the eleven were convicted of physical attacks against detainees at the Center; those convictions did not involve attacks against the plaintiffs in this case. Following the 2009 Supreme Court ruling in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9788\"><i>Ashcroft v. Iqbal</i></a>, six of the plaintiffs settled their claims for $1.26 million. The remaining plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint on September 13, 2010, adding six new plaintiffs and attempting to meet the pleading standard set in <i>Iqbal</i>, so as to maintain claims against Ashcroft and other high-ranking officials. On January 15, 2013, the district court dismissed all claims against the Attorney General, the FBI Director, and the INS Commissioner (the \"DOJ defendants\"), and also dismissed two of the claims against the Metropolitan Detention Center employees (the \"MDC defendants\"). Those two claims, based on alleged communications blackouts and interference with counsel, were dismissed on the grounds of qualified immunity. The plaintiffs collectively and the MDC defendants individually appealed the ruling to the Second Circuit. The appeals were consolidated as Case No. 13-1662; the consolidated appeal was heard on May 1, 2014. More than a year later, on June 17, 2015, the appeals court reinstated the plaintiffs' claims under the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Fourth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a71985, against the DOJ defendants and the MDC defendants. The court upheld the dismissal, however, of the plaintiffs' claims under the Free Exercise Clause. In reinstating the claims against the Attorney General and the FBI Director for their post-September 11 policy decisions, the court was extending the application of <i>Bivens</i> into \"a context not previously recognized by the Supreme Court or Second Circuit precedent.\" 789 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2015). It was also an innovation for the court to hold that officials were not protected by qualified immunity for punitive and discriminatory confinement and unreasonable strip searches that they imposed on detainees after learning that those detainees were being held with no individualized suspicion of terrorist connections. The defendants' petition for rehearing en banc was denied; they subsequently sought a 90-day stay of the mandate while the Solicitor General determined whether to appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeals court granted the stay, and the Supreme Court ultimately heard the appeal and issued a decision on June 19, 2017. Titling the case <i>Ziglar v. Abbasi</i>, the Supreme Court held that the Second Circuit should not have extended <i>Bivens</i> liability to the DOJ defendants, emphasizing that \"Congress, not the courts, should decide whether a damages action should be allowed.\" 137 S.Ct. 1843. It held that the plaintiffs' abuse allegations against the MDC defendants did state a plausible claim for relief under the Fifth Amendment, and remanded to the Second Circuit to determine whether a <i>Bivens</i> damages remedy would be appropriate. Finally, the Court dismissed the 42 U.S.C. \u00a71985 conspiracy claims, ruling that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court for additional proceedings. On February 27, 2018, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against the DOJ defendants and referred the remainder of their claims to a magistrate judge. In light of the Supreme Court's ruling, the remaining (MDC) defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. On August 13, 2018, the magistrate judge issued a report, recommending that the plaintiffs' claims against the MDC defendants be dismissed. The magistrate judge concluded that Congress was in \"the best position to weight the costs and benefits of allowing a [<i>Bivens</i>] cause of action to proceed\" in the context of prisoner abuse claims such as those brought in this case. The plaintiffs have since filed objections to the report. As of July 2, 2020, the report and the plaintiffs' objections to it are pending before the district court.", "summary": "Turkmen v. Ashcroft is one of two related actions, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, by plaintiffs who were investigated and detained for suspected terrorist ties in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The U.S. Attorney General, the FBI Director, and the INS Commissioner were named as defendants, but after a Supreme Court ruling in 2017, they were dismissed as defendants. The plaintiffs' remaining claims, against staff of the Metropolitan Detention Center in New York City, are before the district court on remand. A magistrate judge has recommended that the claims be dismissed."}
{"article": "Between November 18, 2005 and November 16, 2006, current and former African-American financial advisor employees and trainees filed a lawsuit against their employer, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of Illinois under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for both monetary damages and injunctive relief, alleging the defendant engaged in race discrimination in terms of hiring, retention, promotion, pay, resource allocation and more. The plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on July 19, 2006. On November 8, 2008 the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. On August 9, 2010, the District Court (Judge Robert W. Gettleman) issued an amended order denying the plaintiffs' motion for class certification on the ground that commonality was not satisfied because the putative class members were supervised by hundreds of different people and had a wide variety of salary levels and positions. 2010 WL 3087483. On February 14, 2011, Judge Gettleman denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration for class certification and their request to narrow the class definition. Judge Gettleman held that the plaintiffs' disparate impact claim was not sufficient to satisfy the commonality requirement for class certification and that their class as proposed failed to satisfy either category of class certification because the individual questions of law and claims to relief predominated over those of the class. 2011 WL 658155. The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the U.S Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. (Judges Richard Posner, Diane Wood, and David Hamilton), which denied the request based on an untimely appeal. The plaintiffs filed an amended motion for class certification in July 2011, shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. Judge Gettlman denied their motion on September 19, 2011, once again on commonality grounds. 2011 WL 4471028. The employees filed an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. On February 24, 2012, the Seventh Circuit (Judges Posner, Wood, and Hamilton) reversed the District Court decision. The Circuit Court held that the issue of whether Merrill Lynch's policies had a disparate impact on African-American employees was appropriate for class-wide treatment because each of the plaintiffs' claims had the common question of whether Merrill Lynch \"violated the antidiscrimination statutes.\" 672 F.3d 482. Merrill Lynch's motion for rehearing en banc was denied by the Seventh Circuit on March 27, 2012. Its subsequent appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied on October 1, 2012. On July 13, 2012, the District Court issued certification of the disparate impact class, according to the Seventh Circuit's order. On December 6, 2013, the District Court (Judge Gettleman) approved a settlement agreement on all claims proposed by the parties. Pursuant to the agreement, Merrill Lynch would allocate $160 million in a settlement fund, $25 million of which would be designated for extraordinary claims. The District Court also approved service awards of $250,000 for each Class Representative and $75,000 for each member of the Steering Committee. In regards to attorney's fees, the District Court approved the plaintiff's requested attorney's fees of 21.25% (20% of the first 100 million of the settlement fund and 15% of the remainder). The programmatic relief granted by the settlement consisted of several changes to company policies, including changes to the distribution of accounts, as well as the establishment of coaching for African American financial advisors and a diversity fund to assist African Americans in funding business development events. This portion of the settlement lasted for 3 years. On December 16, 2014, a named plaintiff filed a motion to appeal the District Court's final approval of the class action settlement, but the Seventh Circuit (Diane P. Wood, Richard D. Cudahy, and Diane S. Sykes) denied the appeal based on an untimely request. The settlement how now run its course and there has been no further litigation. The case is now closed.", "summary": "After African-American financial advisor employees and trainees of Merrill Lynch & Co, Inc. obtained class certification from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, they settled their claims of race discrimination with their employer for $160 million. The District Court granted approval of their agreement on December 6, 2013. The programmatic relief portion of the settlement ended after three years. This case is now closed."}
{"article": "On July 19, 2011, the state of Texas filed suit against the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The state asked for a declaratory judgment, alleging that the Department of Justice inappropriately declared Texas's new districting plan to be retrogressive (that is, discriminatory, because it diluted minority voting power). Arguments focused primarily on the demographics of the state of Texas and its new districting map. On November 8, 2011, the District Court (Judge Thomas Griffith) denied Texas's motion for summary judgment, holding that Texas improperly relied solely on demographic data in formulating its plans and that there were genuine issues of material fact. 831 F. Supp. 2d 244. On August 28, 2012, the District Court held that Texas had not met its burden of showing that the new U.S. Congressional and State House plans were not retrogressive or its burden of proving that its U.S. Congressional and State Senate plans were not enacted with a discriminatory purpose, and therefore denied declaratory judgment. 887 F. Supp. 2d 133. Texas sought review in the Supreme Court, and the case was held while the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act was under review in <I>Shelby County v. Holder</I>. On June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court held in the <I>Shelby County</I> case that the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional in part, striking down Section 4 of the Act, the \"coverage\" provision, which controlled which jurisdictions were obligated to seek DOJ preclearance of voting-related changes. 570 U.S. 529. The next day, the Court vacated the opinion in this case and remanded the case to the District Court for the District of Columbia. 570 U.S. 928. On July 3, 2013, Texas moved to dismiss as moot all claims brought in its original complaint. It advanced two arguments in support of dismissal. First, on June 23, 2013, while Texas's appeal was pending and before the Supreme Court had announced its decision in <i>Shelby County</i>, the Texas legislature adopted a new set of redistricting plans that replaced those challenged in this case. Second, <i>Shelby County</i> (which held the VRA's coverage formula unconstitutional) had removed Texas from the preclearance regime of Section 5. Texas argued that these two factors had mooted it claims. On December 3, 2013, a three-judge panel for the District Court for the District of Columbia (Judge Thomas B. Griffith writing for the Court) agreed that the controversy had been mooted, and dismissed all claims. <a href=\"http://clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/VR-DC-1168-0012.pdf\">Mem. & Order, Dec. 3, 2013</a>. On December 17, 2013, several parties (individual voters, elected state representatives, and civil rights advocacy groups) who had intervened as defendants earlier in the litigation moved for attorney fees and costs totaling $1,096,770.01. The intervenors argued that they were prevailing parties and thus entitled to fees and costs under the VRA-specifically, under \u00a7 1973l(e) of the VRA, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1973l(e), and subsection (b) of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988. These sections allow courts to, at their discretion, award the prevailing party reasonable fees and costs if the underlying action was to enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. On June 18, 2014, the District Court (Judge Rosemary M. Collyer) granted the intervenors' motion for attorney fees and costs in full. <a href=\"http://clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/VR-DC-1168-0013.pdf\"><i>Texas v. United States</i>, Civil Action No. 11-1303 (RMC), 2014 WL 2758597, at *11 (D.D.C. June 18, 2014)</a>. Describing the issue as a \"case study in how not to respond to a motion for attorney fees and costs,\" <i>id.</i> at *1, Judge Rosemary chastised Texas for failing to respond (other than by means of a three-page \"Advisory\" filing) to the intervenors' motion. Finding that Texas's \"Advisory\" filing presented no substantive legal opposition, the Court thus granted the motion. On July 16, 2014, Texas appealed the order granting attorney fees to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The June 18 order was stayed pending this appeal. On August 18, 2015, the Judge Patricia A. Millett of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued an opinion affirming the District Court\u2019s fee award. Judge Millett found that Texas failed to follow the District Court\u2019s rules for responding to motions for attorneys\u2019 fees and did not challenge the District Court\u2019s use of its rules on appeal. Judge Millett proceeded to identify numerous flaws in Texas\u2019 argument that the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in <i>Shelby County</i> made the intervenors ineligible for attorneys\u2019 fees. Concluding that \u201cTexas gets no second bite at the apple now\u201d after its procedural missteps, Judge Millett affirmed the District Court\u2019s fee award. 798 F.3d 1108. After the Court of Appeals issued its opinion, the intervenors moved for additional attorneys\u2019 fees to cover the costs of appeal, and Texas failed to secure Supreme Court review. 136 S. Ct. 981. On March 17, 2016, the Court of Appeals remanded the intervenor\u2019s motion for additional attorneys\u2019 fees, now augmented by the costs of opposing Supreme Court review, to the District Court for fact-finding. After almost a year of litigation over the additional attorneys\u2019 fees, Judge Collyer issued an order and opinion granting the intervenors most of their requested fees on March 30, 2017. Judge Collyer noted that prevailing parties challenging voting plans or procedures are entitled to attorneys\u2019 fees under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988(b). The parties disputed whether undetermined fees should be calculated using the intervenors\u2019 attorneys\u2019 rates from private practice or the more conservative Laffey Matrix, a \u201ccommonly used\u201d tool in the D.C. Circuit. Judge Collyer selected a generous form of the Laffey Matrix as most appropriate given the skill of the intervenors\u2019 attorneys and the complexity of the litigation but reduced one fee award by 7.6 hours for work on a motion that was never filed. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On July 19, 2011, the state of Texas filed suit against the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The state asked for a declaratory judgment, alleging that the Department of Justice inappropriately declared Texas's new districting plan to be retrogressive. On August 28, 2012, the District Court held that Texas had not met its burden of showing that the new U.S. Congressional and state House plans were not retrogressive or its burden of proving that its U.S. Congressional and state Senate plans were not enacted with a discriminatory purpose, and therefore denied declaratory judgment. However, following the Court's opinion in Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded the case to the District Court. The District Court dismissed the case as moot and the case is now closed."}
{"article": "On Jan. 25, 2018, the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild (NIPNLG) and a law professor brought this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), as well as the U.S. Department of State (DOS). The plaintiffs sought to shed light on the government's decision to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitian nationals, including its justification and legality. This case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and assigned to Judge Ronnie Abrams on Jan. 29, 2018. NIPNLG is a nonprofit organization that provides legal assistance to immigrants and advocacy on behalf of noncitizens. The other plaintiff is a professor at the New York University School of Law, where she works on human rights issues and in particular Haiti and Haitian immigrants in the United States. The plaintiffs sought records related to the government's determination to terminate TPS for Haitian nationals. The plaintiffs argued that \"[t]imely disclosure of these records is critically important because of the looming termination of legal immigration status for tens of thousands of Haitian nationals living in the United States.\" The complaint explained that TPS status protected foreign nationals from deportation and allowed them to access work authorization. To get TPS, the individual's country of origin must be designated as warranting TPS and the individual must apply and be approved for the status. The plaintiffs argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) required a factual inquiry to terminate TPS for a particular country after the designation had been granted; it could not be terminated without reason. According to the complaint, DHS most recently designated Haiti for TPS in 2015 and then extended the designation by six months in May 2017 in light of extensive hurricane damage. DHS terminated TPS for Haiti on Nov. 20, 2017\u2014according to the plaintiffs, without justification\u2014leaving 58,000 Haitian nationals in the U.S. at the risk of deportation and loss of work authorization. On Feb. 15, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, noting that DOS had issued a travel warning for Haiti. The plaintiffs also added as a defendant U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which they alleged had not substantively responded to a Nov. 2017 FOIA request. On March 16, 2018, the defendants wrote to the Court arguing that the plaintiffs did not qualify for expedited processing and that plaintiffs' proposed production schedule was not practicable. The defendants requested additional time to process. On Mar. 23, 2018, the plaintiffs opposed this request. By April 4, 2018 the parties had agreed on a proposed briefing schedule, which Judge Abrams approved, specifying that each agency was required to produce 1500 pages monthly of the requested documents. The defendants moved for summary judgment on April 27, 2018, and the plaintiffs moved for summary judgement on May 18, 2018. While the court considered the motions, similar cases involving the termination of Haiti's TPS were litigated, most notably Ramos v. Nielsen, et al., 3:18-cv-01554 (N.D. Cal.) and Saget v. Trump, et al., 1:18-cv-01599 (E.D.N.Y.). The documents submitted for discovery in these cases were re-released to the plaintiffs in this case. These releases occurred on March 27, 2019 and April 10, 2019. Following the release of this additional information, and due to parallel injunctive litigation, the plaintiffs agreed to voluntarily dismiss their case on April 23, 2019. This case is now closed.", "summary": "On Jan. 25, 2018, the NIPNLG and a professor sued DHS under FOIA, seeking materials on the government's Nov. 2017 decision to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitian nationals. Due to parallel injunctive litigation and receiving the desired documents the plaintiffs agreed to voluntarily dismiss on April 23, 2019."}
{"article": "Plaintiff, the editor of a local newspaper, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts against the Newark Police Department on January 23, 2008 under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and N.J.S.A. 10:6-1. Plaintiff, represented by attorneys from Seton Hall University School of Law and the ACLU of New Jersey, sought damages, alleging that police officers violated his First Amendment right to receive and record information for later dissemination, Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures, corresponding provisions in the New Jersey State Constitution, and the New Jersey Reporter Shield Law. Specifically, plaintiff's allegations revolved around an August 4, 2007 incident in which Newark Police Department officers confiscated a photographer's camera and detained plaintiff under threat of arrest until he agreed to turn over all copies of photographs related to a murder in a rash of violence in the city described as an embarrassment to local law enforcement. On December 23, 2009, plaintiff petitioned for judgment after agreeing with the Newark Police Department to settle the case in the amount of $55,000. On the same day, plaintiff also filed a Request to File an Application for Attorneys' Fees. In entering judgment on February 22, 2010, the District Court (Judge Faith S. Hochberg) granted the judgment in the amount of $55,000 and denied plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees on the grounds that the settlement agreement included all attorneys' fees. Plaintiff appealed that decision to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on March 9, 2010. On July 19, 2011, the Court of Appeals (Judge Thomas M. Hardiman) reversed the District Court and held that, since the offer of settlement did not explicitly reference the inclusion of fees, attorneys' fees were not included in the settlement. The case was remanded to the District Court to determine reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988. On October 13, 2011, the parties settled the remaining attorneys' fees claim. On October 24, 2011, the District Court (Judge Faith S. Hochberg) ordered the case closed. Plaintiff entered a notice that the judgment of $55,000, and additional attorneys' fees, had been paid in full on October 23, 2012.", "summary": "Plaintiff, the editor of a local newspaper, filed a lawsuit against the Newark Police Department alleging that his First and Fourth Amendment rights were violated when defendant seized a camera and detained him until he agreed to turn over or destroy all copies of photographs depicting a potentially embarrassing crime. Plaintiff ultimately agreed to settle the case for $55,000. There was a dispute as to whether the settlement agreement included attorneys' fees. The District Court, in entering judgment in the amount of $55,000, held that it did not. Plaintiff appealed that decision. The Appeals Court sided with plaintiff, remanding the case to the District Court to determine reasonable attorneys' fees. The parties ultimately settled on the issue of attorneys' fees and as of October 23, 2012, defendant had paid in full the judgment, including attorneys fees."}
{"article": "On January 30, 2017, a lawful permanent resident (LPR) of the United States, represented by private counsel, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff was held for questioning at Atlanta International Airport as he was trying to return to his home to Atlanta, solely due to the Executive Order issued by President Donald Trump on January 27, 2017 suspending entry into the United States of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The complaint further alleged that the defendants, in denying an LPR re-entry after a brief visit abroad, violated Fifth Amendment procedural due process rights, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The complaint was filed as a petition for mandamus (directing inspection of returning LPRs under the INA rather than under the Executive Order) and a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff was an Iraqi refugee who has worked for CNN since 2004 and currently is an International Desk Producer. He was based at CNN's Atlanta bureau and travels to the Middle East regularly for his reporting work. On January 29, 2017, after returning to the US from a trip to Iraq, he was detained and questioned at Atlanta International Airport, before being released. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff alleged that he was therefore uncertain whether he may leave and re-enter the United States in the future, and that this is a substantial problem, because he travels often for his work. The case was assigned to Judge Timothy Batten. On February 1, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion to expedite proceedings, arguing that the issues raised in the complaint are of immediate importance and could evade review if not expedited. On February 2, the court ordered the defendants to respond by February 8 to the plaintiff's emergency motion. On February 7, the government filed a motion to dismiss and on February 8 they filed a response in opposition to the plaintiff's emergency motion. On February 9, the plaintiffs filed an answer to the government's response, and on February 10 Judge Batten denied the motion to expedite proceedings. On February 17, the plaintiffs filed a motion to extend the response timeline to the government's motion to dismiss. On February 21, Judge Batten granted plaintiffs' motion for an extension through February 28. On Feb. 27, the plaintiffs filed a response to the government's motion to dismiss the complaint as moot. The plaintiffs argued that executive documents issued to clarify the EO do not change the clear text of the EO, which is still binding and still purports to exclude all \"immigrants\" - including LPRs like the named plaintiff - despite the government's clarifying documents indicating otherwise. The plaintiffs further argued that, as the EO remains in effect and the defendants have therefore not yet established full voluntary cessation of their conduct, the EO falls under a mootness exception for conduct \"capable of repetition yet evading review.\" Prompted by adverse developments in the Ninth Circuit in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15606\">Washington v. Trump</a>, another litigation challenging the Executive Order, on Mar. 6, 2017, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, <a href=\"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/03/09/2017-04837/protecting-the-nation-from-foreign-terrorist-entry-into-the-united-states\">Executive Order 13780</a>. On Mar. 9, the parties filed a joint motion to extend the reply and pretrial discovery timeline. The court granted this motion on Mar. 13. The parties now have until Mar. 23 to file a discovery plan and for the defendants to respond on their Feb. 7 motion to dismiss the complaint as moot. On Mar. 21, the parties filed a joint motion to extend the reply timeline. On Mar. 22, the court granted the motion, giving plaintiff through Mar. 23 to file an amended complaint and giving the government 30 days from the plaintiff's filing date to respond. The court additionally allowed the government to withdraw its Feb. 7 motion to dismiss the complaint. On Mar. 23, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint challenging Section 1(g) (which applied greater scrutiny to Iraqi nationals during the visa issuance/U.S. admissions process) and Section 4 (which provides that applications for visa/admissions/any immigration benefit by Iraqi nationals should be \"subjected to thorough review\") of the second EO. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that no section of the EO removes Iraqi LPR's from the \"additional scrutiny\" and \"thorough review\" requirements, in violation of the INA, APA, and Fifth Amendment due process rights. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as a writ of mandamus instructing DHS to instruct its employees inspecting aliens at U.S. points of entry to exclude returning Iraqi resident immigrants from the new screening terms under the EO. On Apr. 24, the government filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The parties filed a joint preliminary report and discovery plan on July 7. Later in July, the parties noted their disagreement over the discovery deadlines, and discovery was stayed pending the district court's ruling on the Apr. 24 motion to dismiss. On Aug. 11, Judge Batten granted the defendants' Apr. 24 motion to dismiss the amended complaint, finding that Tawfeeq lacked standing to challenge sections 2 (which does not apply to Iraqi nationals such as Tawfeeq), 1(g) (which the plaintiffs acknowledge would only apply to Tawfeeq if erroneously implemented, and the court will not presume that the law would be erroneously implemented), and 4 (which the court determined was too speculative to grant standing). Finally, the court determined that the revocation of the January EO rendered moot Tawfeeq's claims challenging its application to lawful permanent residents. This case is now closed.", "summary": "An Iraqi refugee and LPR was held and questioned at Atlanta International Airport on January 29, 2017, following the Executive Order of January 27, 2017, suspending entry into the United States of nationals of Iraq and other countries. The plaintiff is a CNN journalist who travels frequently between his home in Atlanta and the Middle East. He feared he would be unable to re-enter the United States if he leaves, due to his difficulties returning from Iraq on January 29. On January 30, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging violations of his Fifth Amendment procedural due process rights, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. On February 1, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion to expedite proceedings. Prompted by adverse developments in the Ninth Circuit in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15606\">Washington v. Trump</a>, another litigation challenging the Executive Order, on Mar. 6, 2017, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, <a href=\"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/03/09/2017-04837/protecting-the-nation-from-foreign-terrorist-entry-into-the-united-states\">Executive Order 13780</a>. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint challenging the new order, and the defendants moved to dismiss. On August 11, 2017, the Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and entered judgment for the defendants. This case is now closed."}
{"article": "On June 29, 2017, the James Madison Project, Noah Shachtman, and Betsy Woodruff sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The James Madison Project (JMP) is an organization established in 1998 \"to promote government accountability and the reduction of secrecy, as well as [to educate] the public on issues relating to intelligence and national security.\" Noah Schactman is the current Editor-in-Chief (previously the Executive Editor) of The Daily Beast, and Betsy Woodruff was a politics reporter for the publication at the time. Private counsel represented plaintiffs, who filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs sought disclosure of agency records by DHS and its subordinate entities: the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Specifically, plaintiffs sought the disclosure of records clarifying the extent to which U.S. lawful permanent residents (LPRs) were coerced into surrendering their residency statuses, once DHS began implementing President Trump's Jan. 27 <a href=\"https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-02-01/pdf/2017-02281.pdf\">Executive Order 13769</a> but before DHS stopped enforcing it on Feb. 4. According to plaintiffs, lawyers for some travelers affected by the EO claimed their clients were, during this implementation period, pressured to sign I-407 forms surrendering their LPR status. The complaint alleged that on Mar. 3, 2017, plaintiffs submitted a FOIA request to the defendant federal agencies seeking copies of records memorializing: 1. Instructions or guidelines \u2013 including verbal instructions memorialized in writing \u2013 provided to CBP officials with respect to agency practice for presenting I-407 forms to individuals impacted by the EO; 2. Communications between CBP officials \u2013 including verbal communications memorialized in writing \u2013 mentioning I-407 forms between Jan. 27 and Feb. 5; 3. Any documentation tabulating or calculating the number of individuals who signed I-407 forms between Jan. 27 and Feb. 5; 4. Copies of the actual I-407 forms signed between Jan. 27 and Feb. 5. The complaint further alleged that, to date, the plaintiffs had not received a substantive response from any of the defendant agencies, and that the plaintiffs had constructively exhausted all required administrative remedies. The plaintiffs sought a disclosure order under FOIA, legal fees, and expedited action. (Plaintiff James Madison Project also has two similar FOIA cases in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, summarized in this Clearinghouse: one by the Daily Beast against the Department of Justice (<a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15676\">NS-DC-0106</a>) and one by Politico against DHS (<a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15678\">NS-DC-0107</a>). On June 29, the case was assigned to Judge James E. Boasberg. On Sept. 7, the parties reported that USCIS and CBP were searching for records responsive to plaintiff's request and needed another month to prepare a list. On Oct. 10, the parties reported the following: TSA had located no responsive documents; USCIS had located no responsive records for some requests and had withheld responsive records for other requests due to privacy; and CBP had located a few responsive records. Judge Boasberg then ordered defendant (USCIS and CBP) to provide its first production of non-exempt portions of responsive records by Nov. 6 and its second production by Dec. 7. On Nov. 6, the parties reported that defendants were following the schedule ordered by Judge Boasberg. The following status report, of Jan. 5, 2018, noted that USCIS and CBP had both produced more responsive non-exempt records and informed plaintiff that the search was completed. The parties agreed to meet to confer on next steps. The Feb. 1 status report stated that the parties needed more time to discuss search declarations, before deciding whether to brief motions. A status report filed on Apr. 13 informed the Court that plaintiffs accepted TSA's productions and the sufficiency of USCIS's and CBP's searches, but would challenge denials and redactions of some of USCIS's and CBP's productions. Status reports filed October through December indicated the production was ongoing. Though the documents released by the government are not available online, <a href=\"https://www.thedailybeast.com/border-patrol-ordered-to-block-congressmen-during-travel-ban\">this news article</a> references some of their contents. On June 15, 2018, the defendants submitted a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the I-407 forms in question were exempt and properly withheld. The plaintiffs responded to the motion on July 16, claiming that the categorical refusal to produce the I-407 forms was improper and that their redactions were unjustified. After a conference call on October 3, the defendant submitted a status report on October 5, with the defendant\u2019s agreement to respond to the plaintiff\u2019s FOIA requests and a proposed schedule. The court, as agreed in the report, ordered the defendant to provide rolling productions every 60 days of the I-407 forms and a joint status report every 45 days. Production followed the next few months. On December 26, 2018, the defendant moved for a stay of production schedule due to lapse of appropriations, which resulted in a temporary prohibition of DOJ\u2019s work. Two days later, the court granted the motion. According to the February 1, 2019 status report, the funding was restored and the defendants had completed their required production on December 18, 2018. The parties then continued to provide status reports regarding attorney fees. On April 19, 2019, the plaintiffs submitted a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice, and the court ordered dismissal the same day. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On June 29, 2017, the James Madison Project and journalists at the Daily Beast sued DHS under FOIA, seeking disclosure of records clarifying the extent to which LPRs were coerced into surrendering their residency statuses, once DHS began implementing President Trump's Jan. 27 EO but before DHS stopped enforcing it on Feb. 4. The defendants completed the FOIA productions and the case is now dismissed."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This case was initially filed in February 2020 to address the absence of bond hearings for ICE detainees in New York. Then on March 16, 2020, in light of the grave threat posed by congregate detention during the coronavirus pandemic, plaintiffs sought emergency relief: individualized determinations assessing whether detention is necessary in light of flight risk/public safety, and releases where it is not. On March 31, the Court issued an order granting this relief and enjoining the government's \"No-Release Policy.\" On December 18, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the preliminary inunction and the case was referred to a Magistrate Judge for settlement proceedings. <hr> On February 28, 2020, a noncitizen placed in a federal immigration detention facility and denied bond or release while awaiting immigration hearings filed this class-action suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Represented by the New York Civil Liberties Foundation and the Bronx Defenders, the petitioner sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and individual agency officials; he filed a habeas petition to challenge that the absence of an adequate individual custody determination, which led to him being denied bond or release violated his statutory, regulatory, and constitutional rights. He sought declaratory relief that the ICE's practices were unlawful and an injunction ordering the government to conduct adequate individualized custody determinations for members of the proposed classes. The policy challenged by the petitioner is referred to in the complaint as the \"No-Release Policy.\" It is ICE's alleged policy of denying release and bond to <i>all</i> immigrant detainees arrested in the New York City area. The complaint asserted that the No-Release Policy violated federal law which requires that, within 48 hours of their arrest, many immigrant detainees get an individualized determination of whether they can be released while immigration proceedings go forward. According to data obtained by the petitioner's counsel under the Freedom of Information Act, \"from 2013 to June 2017, approximately 47% of those deemed to be low risk by the government were granted release. From June 2017 to September 2019, that figure plummeted to 3%.\" Furthermore, the complaint alleged that in mid-2017, ICE had modified its risk-assessment tool's algorithm to prevent it from recommending that noncitizens be released--the tool was only able to recommend further detention. The petitioner claimed that the No-Release Policy resulted in thousands of detainees being denied individualized custody determinations and remaining in detention facilities \"under harsh conditions of confinement akin to criminal incarceration.\" The petitioner asserted four causes of action; violations of \"the Immigration and Nationality Act and its implementing regulations, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Rehabilitation Act.\" The two classes proposed by the petitioner were: (1) The Petitioner Class: All individuals eligible to be considered for bond or release on recognizance under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226(a)(1)-(2) by ICE\u2019s New York Field Office who have been or will be detained without bond; and (2) the Rehabilitation Act Subclass: All individuals with a disability, as defined by the Rehabilitation Act and its implementing regulations, who are eligible to be considered for bond or release on recognizance under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226(a)(1)-(2) by ICE\u2019s New York Field Office and who have been or will be detained without bond. The case was assigned to Judge Hellerstein. The petitioner's motion for class certification is pending before the district court and the government has yet to file a response to the complaint. On March 16, 2020, the petitioner filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which argued: <blockquote>This illegal practice of mass detention causes enormous and unnecessary irreparable harm, separating people from their families, jobs, and communities and exposing them to serious health risks without any individualized determination of whether the ongoing denial of liberty is justified. Exacerbating these harms\u2014and increasing the urgency of the petitioners\u2019 request for relief\u2014is the threat posed by COVID-19, the pandemic experts predict will spread to New York City area immigration detention centers in a matter of days, bringing with it the threat of infection, pneumonia, sepsis, or even death.</blockquote> The motion sought prompt provide individualized determinations for class members assessing \"whether detention is necessary based on individualized assessments of the petitioners\u2019 flight risk, danger to the community, and disability and issue class-wide preliminary declaratory relief ordering the same. Pursuant to its habeas jurisdiction, the Court should order release in the event of noncompliance with this procedural remedy.\" In opposition to the motion for PI, defendants offered \"a single core argument upon which most of its other contentions rely: The No-Release Policy does not exist.\" Instead, defendants claim that they are exercising discretion in the making of each individual custody determination. As their secondary argument, defendants asserted that \"review is unavailable under the APA because Plaintiffs have not exhausted administrative remedies and because Plaintiffs do not challenge 'final agency action.'\" Following expedited briefing and a telephonic hearing, on March 31, Judge Hellerstein issued an order granting the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction (PI). The order enjoined ICE's New York Field Office Director from following the No-Release Policy and to return to its pre-June 2017 practice of making individualized assessments about whether detention is justified by flight risk or danger. The defendants are required to file a report by April 17, 2020, identifying \"all persons thus arrested by or under the authority of ICE's New York City Field Office and, of such persons, all such persons who have had their bond or recognizance application heard by an immigration judge.\" <a href=\"https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/nyclu-and-bronx-defenders-statement-preliminary-injunction-no-release-lawsuit\">According to the NYCLU</a>, \"as a result of this ruling, many class members who are in ICE detention must be promptly evaluated for release. This expedited decision provides much-needed relief for people in detention who are exposed to the increasing threat of coronavirus spreading through crowded jails.\" In issuing the order, Judge Hellerstein did not provide a statement of its reasoning due to the expedited circumstances; however, \"the Court, in due course, intends to deliver a more fulsome statement of its reasoning.\" On April 27, plaintiffs filed a letter addressed to Judge Hellerstein requesting information regarding defendants' compliance with the PI. The defendants responded to the plaintiffs' letter on May 1. The Clearinghouse does not have access to these filings, so the extent to which the defendants have complied with the PI is unclear. On May 4, Judge Hellerstein issued \"a formal opinion explaining more fully the Court's reasoning for its oral ruling granting Plaintiffs' motion\" for a PI. Judge Hellerstein concluded that \"[p]laintiffs have established a clear and substantial likelihood of being able to demonstrate that the No-Release Policy exists . . . and that none of the procedural hurdles identified by Defendants preclude my awarding injunctive relief in Plaintiffs' favor.\" In concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to demonstrate that the No-Release Policy exists, Judge Hellerstein was persuaded by data provided by the plaintiff showing a \"substantial increase in detention rates for final decisions in the New York Field Office beginning in 2017.\" Moreover, defendants acknowledged that a No-Release Policy \"is inconsistent with the INA and regulations passed thereunder, at least without notice-and-comment rule making.\" Because \"the Court ha[d] already found that Plaintiffs have shown they will suffer irreparable harm without relief and that the equities tilt in Plaintiffs' favor, injunctive relief is called for here.\" 2020 WL 2114984. (S.D.N.Y. May 04, 2020). Judge Hellerstein stated at the end of this opinion that the parties had disagreements regarding the implementation of the PI and that these disagreements \"culminated in the government's filing of a motion to clarify and/or amend the injunction\" on May 1. After expedited briefing and hearing, Judge Hellerstein issued an order on May 15 denying the defendants' motion to clarify/amend the PI. Judge Hellerstein stated that <blockquote>Defendants were required to: 1. Apply the injunction to all persons who were detained as of April 10, 2020 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226(a), except those persons already given an individualized custody determination by an immigration judge, and expeditiously determine, or redetermine, their custody status consistent with the injunction; and to 2. Report to the court on May 22, 2020, and weekly thereafter, as to the progress made, which shall be steady and expeditious. All custody determinations and redeterminations must be completed by June 5, 2020. If extensions are required, Defendants may make an application therefore, showing good cause.</blockquote> Judge Hellerstein followed up his May 15 order, giving further explanation of his decision to deny the motion to amend or modify. On July 1, the parties filed a stipulated protective order. On July 6, the defendants filed a notice of interlocutory appeal. The appeal was assigned USCA Case No. 20-2153. The appeal was withdrawn on October 13. 2020 WL 7973940. On September 21, the district court filed an order directing the parties how to proceed. The court granted the Plaintiffs' request to conduct a deposition pertaining to training received by ICE personnel with respect to the court's earlier injunction. On December 18, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the preliminary injunction and the defendants filed their opposition on January 6, 2021, however, the Clearinghouse does not have access to these documents. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Katherine H. Parker for settlement discussions, and the case remains ongoing.", "summary": "In February 2020, a person arrested by ICE and denied bond or release while his immigration proceedings continued filed this class-action against the Department of Homeland Security and several of its constituent agencies in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The petitioner filed a habeas petition, alleging that the New York City-area immigration officials' policy of denying release and bond to persons in immigration detention facilities violated his statutory, regulatory, and constitutional rights. As of March 31, 2020, the petitioner's motion for class certification is pending in the district court. On March 16, in response to the risk posed by the outbreak of COVID-19, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking relief in the form of individualized assessments about whether detention is justified by flight risk or danger. On March 31 the Court issued an order granting this relief. On December 18, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the preliminary inunction and oral arguments are scheduled for March 17, 2021. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On May 27, 1994, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated an investigation into the conditions of confinement at the Crane Correctional Facility in Coldwater, Michigan and the Scott Correctional Facility in Plymouth, Michigan (medium security prisons for women) pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997. The state refused to allow the DOJ access to the prisons to conduct an investigation, and declined to negotiate with the DOJ or resolve the allegations. On March 27, 1995, the DOJ issued a findings letter regarding the results of the CRIPA investigation, which was conducted solely through prisoner interviews during visiting hours, as the DOJ had not been allowed access to the physical facilities. The letter detailed findings of sexual abuse of female inmates by guards (including rapes), lack of adequate medical care, lack of mental health services, grossly deficient sanitation, crowding, and other threats to the physical safety and well-being of inmates in violation of their constitutional rights. On March 10, 1997, the DOJ filed a lawsuit against the state of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Flint office, alleging that the state had violated the rights of women prisoners at Scott and Crane to be free from sexual misconduct and unlawful invasions of privacy, and to receive appropriate medical and mental health care. The medical and mental health care claims were later withdrawn. The case had received the docket number 97-40053 in Flint, but it was quickly transferred to Detroit and given a new docket number (97-71514). It was consolidated for discovery purposes with another case brought by women prisoners, Nunn v. Mich. Dept. of Corrections, 2:96-cv-71416, (E.D. Mich) (PC-MI-0017). After considerable discovery, the state and the federal government (but not the private plaintiffs in Nunn) entered into a Settlement Agreement on May 25, 1999. The District Court (Judge John Corbett O'Meara) approved the settlement agreement as a court order on September 30, 1999. The agreement provided for considerable changes to Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) policies and procedures relating to sexual misconduct. Among other things, the agreement included: preemployment screenings, staff trainings, inmate education, facilitation of inmate and staff reporting of sexual misconduct allegations, investigation of sexual misconduct allegations, approach and response to misconduct, monitoring of inmate bathroom, dressing and shower areas, pat-down searches, and inmate screenings. It further set forth terms for quality assurance and for DOJ monitoring for compliance with the terms of the agreement. Following execution of this settlement agreement, the case was conditionally dismissed by Judge O'Meara on September 28, 1999, pending Michigan's compliance with the terms of the agreement. The case was placed on the court's inactive docket during this time, and the parties agreed upon an expert, Patrick McManus, to assess Michigan's compliance with the settlement agreement three and six months after its execution. The U.S. filed a memo in support of its stipulation to conditionally dismiss the case in March 2000 indicating that the expert had found Michigan to be in substantial compliance with the terms of the settlement. The court entered an order of conditional dismissal of the case on August 17, 2000. As part of its subsequent compliance efforts, the Michigan Department of Corrections established a policy barring men from serving as resident officers in housing units in women's prisons, and began the process of replacing those positions with female officers. After the directive to staff housing units with female officers, male corrections officers filed a separate lawsuit alleging gender discrimination. (Everson v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 391 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2004). In December 2002, the compliance expert filed a final report concluding that defendants were in substantial compliance with much of the agreement, but because of Michigan's ongoing efforts to staff housing units with female officers, that portion of the settlement would be subject to additional monitoring. Judge O'Meara granted the parties' stipulation for Partial Unconditional Dismissal of the case in February 2003, agreeing to up to one year of continued monitoring only on the issue of female housing guards, given a pending appeal in the Everson case (the district court in that case had found the Department of Corrections could not designate such positions as \"female-only\" - that issue was being contested on appeal). In October 2004, the defendants sought full unconditional dismissal of the case, given that the timeline for continued monitoring of the housing situation had expired (even though the Everson decision remained pending). The 6th Circuit finally issued its ruling in Everson in December 2004 (391 F.3d 737, 6th Cir. 2004), concluding that female gender was a bonafide occupational qualification for housing unit guards in women's prisons. Rehearing en banc in the Everson case was denied in March 2005. Subsequently, on September 29, 2005, the Defendants withdrew their Motion for full unconditional dismissal of this action. Thus, all that was left of the case was the issue of the staffing of housing units by women. That issue was finally dismissed on April 25, 2007, after the state apparently attested that only female officers were assigned to housing units in all facilities covered by the settlement agreement.", "summary": "On May 27, 1994, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated an investigation into the conditions of confinement at the Crane Correctional Facility in Coldwater, Michigan and the Scott Correctional Facility in Plymouth, Michigan, both medium security prisons for women, pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997. DOJ issued a letter, detailing findings of sexual abuse of female inmates by guards, lack of adequate medical care, and grossly deficient sanitation, inter alia. In March 1997, DOJ filed a lawsuit against the state of Michigan for violating the rights of the women prisoners. In May 1999, the parties entered a settlement agreement meant to address these issues and in 1999 the court conditionally dismissed the case, pending Michigan's compliance. Monitoring continued in various forms until the cases was entirely dismissed in April 2007."}
{"article": "On September 30, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan against the Magna Donnelly Corp., Inc., a for profit corporation, under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The EEOC claimed that the corporation had failed to reasonably accommodate a woman who was able to perform the essential functions of the position yet suffered from disabilities, including multiple sclerosis. The EEOC asked the court to permanently enjoin the corporation from engaging in unlawful employment practice as well as grant relief to those employees against whom the discrimination had occurred. Over the course of the next year, a number of settlement conferences were scheduled between the parties to take place before Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmod. And on October 26, 2005, Magistrate Judge Carmod granted plaintiffs' unopposed motion to consolidate the case with the ongoing litigation in EEOC. v Magna Donnelly Corporation, Inc., <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=8474\">EE-MI-0047</a>. Both cases had been brought under the ADA, and dealt with the same corporation's employment discrimination practices and policies. Settlement conferences continued between the parties, and a proposed consent decree was submitted to the court on November 28, 2006. On December 15, 2006, United States District Judge Richard A. Enslen approved the consent decree and dismissed the case with prejudice and without costs to either party. The decree included monetary compensation for back pay to the injured employees, totaling $100,000. The corporation also agreed to provide ADA training in the normal course to managers, supervisors, and human resources staff according to a training program developed by defense counsel that had been reviewed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The decree also included a retaliatory prohibition. The decree would remain in effect for one year and include reporting to the EEOC to ensure compliance.", "summary": "On September 30, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on behalf of one or more workers, filed a lawsuit against the Magna Donnelly Corp., Inc., a for profit corporation, under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The EEC claimed that the corporation had failed to reasonably accommodate persons who were able to perform the essential functions of the position yet suffered from disabilities. On December 15, 2006 the District Court approved a consent decree that required the defendant to pay $100,000 in backpay to the complainants, post notice, provide ADA training, refrain from discrimination and retaliation, and send compliance reports to the EEOC."}
{"article": "On May 16, 2006 a juvenile detainee filed a class action civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, challenging the strip search policy of the Dona Ana County Juvenile Detention Center. Plaintiff alleged that the County and officials in charge of Juvenile Detention Center had a blanket policy of strip searching all pre-arraignment detainees upon their arrival at the Juvenile Detention Center, regardless of the offense charged, or whether there was any suspicion that the detainee possessed weapons or contraband. The plaintiff, who was strip searched pursuant to this policy, alleged that that the policy violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. The County and Detention Center officials generally denied the allegations. Shortly after the suit was filed, the District Court (Judge Judith C. Herrera) stayed the proceedings at the request of the parties so that they could pursue settlement negotiations. Plaintiff's attorney had filed a similar class action on behalf of adult detainees that were strip searched at the Dona Ana County. See JC-NM-0004: Lira v. Dona Ana County. Negotiations were conducted on both the adult and juvenile cases. On November 21, 2007, Judge William Johnson consolidated both cases, designating Lira as the lead case. Shortly after the consolidation, the parties filed an Amended Stipulation of Settlement, under which the Defendants agreed to pay $5.3 million to resolve all class claims. The stipulated Adult Settlement Class included all detainees who were strip searched between March 7, 2003 and March 7, 2006 at the Dona Ana County Jail prior to arraignment. The stipulated Juvenile Settlement class included all detainees who were strip searched between May 16, 2003 and May 16, 2006 at the Dona Ana Juvenile Detention Center. It was estimated that there were approximately 11,000 class members. Individual claims were to be paid per an agreed upon distribution formula, with the range of expected pay-outs per individual claimant was estimated at $1,200 to $2,400. Representative plaintiffs would receive a total $200,000 or $25,000 per class representative. $1,666,667 of the settlement fund was allocated for attorneys' fees. Judge Johnson preliminarily approved the settlement on December 20, 2007. On May 20, 2008, the district court (Judge Johnson) issued a final approval of the settlement and a final judgment of dismissal in the case. In 2011, the parties filed a Joint Motion to allow disbursement of remaining funds to two non-profit entities. Although most of the funds had been successfully distributed, about $22,000 remained for claimants the administrator could not reach. The court granted the motion.", "summary": "On May 16, 2006 a juvenile detainee filed a class action civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, challenging the strip search policy of the Dona Ana County Juvenile Detention Center. This case was consolidated with a similar class action on behalf of adult detainees at Dona Ana County, see JC-NM-0004: Lira v. Dona Ana County. Shortly after the consolidation, the parties filed an Amended Stipulation of Settlement, under which the Defendants agreed to pay $5.3 million to resolve all class claims. In 2008, the district court (Judge Johnson) issued a final approval of the settlement and a final judgment of dismissal in the case."}
{"article": "On May 21, 2011, plaintiffs, two men of color, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 and state law against the City of New York in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Foley Square. The plaintiffs, represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union, asked the court for injunction and compensatory relief, claiming that their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the New York City Police Department (NYPD) had violated their rights by unreasonably searching them during routine livery cab stops. On September 3, 2010, at 11:30 P.M., one plaintiff, a lawyer in the Bronx, was leaving work and chose to use a livery cab. The cab was enrolled in the Taxi/Livery Robbery Inspection Program (TRIP), which gave consent for the cab to be stopped and inspected by the NYPD. The cab displayed a decal that indicated enrollment in TRIP. The NYPD stopped the livery cab, and ordered the plaintiff out of the vehicle. The plaintiff protested the search without reasonable suspicion, but the police indicated that enrollment in the TRIP program gave them the right to search passengers in the livery cab. Nothing was found. On October 30, 2010, at 3:00 A.M., the second plaintiff, who was a manager at a popular radio station and a comedian, was returning to his home in Brooklyn in a livery cab. This cab was also enrolled in TRIP. The car was stopped and the plaintiff ordered to exit the vehicle, at which point the plaintiff's person and belongings were searched. Again, nothing was found. The plaintiffs' case was accepted by the NYCLU and the New York University School of Law Civil Rights Clinic, and a complaint was filed alleging that the search of passengers in livery cabs without reasonable suspicion was unconstitutional. On May 14, 2012, the Court (Judge Richard M. Berman) entered a stipulation and order of dismissal, because the case had settled. The Settlement contained $10,000 relief for each plaintiff ($20,000 total), $38,000 in attorney's fees, and injunctive-like provisions. The NYPD agreed to suspend its routine searching of passengers of vehicles that were pulled over as part of the TRIPS program. The NYPD further agreed that it would only search passengers when reasonable suspicion of a violent crime existed. Furthermore, the NYPD provided information that it was amending its training manual, informing officers at roll-call citywide (repeating it for 10 day periods, for three times over the next year), and issuing an operations order communicating the order to not search passengers absent reasonable suspicion of a violent crime during a TRIP stop. The case was dismissed with the approval of the settlement.", "summary": "The plaintiffs, men of color who were stopped and searched while riding in livery cabs without any reasonable suspicion, sued the City of New York, alleging that searching of livery passengers during routine stops was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs settled with the City. The City agreed to suspend the practice of searching passengers of livery and taxi cabs absent reasonable suspicion of a violent crime."}
{"article": "On July 19, 2010, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act of 1988, \u00a742 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a73601-3631 against the owner and manager of a four-unit apartment building in Monroe, New Hampshire. The plaintiff brought the suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire, on behalf of a mixed-national origin and race family, claiming the Defendant engaged in discriminatory housing practices. The complaint sets out allegations involving ethnic slurs and other bad treatment of the complainant family, including incidents that led to the arrest of the landlord and state court orders against him. The U.S. sought to enjoin further discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin and asked for compensatory and punitive damages to the complainants. The complainants intervened in the suit a few months later. On April 7, 2011, the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire (Judge Landya McCafferty) approved a consent decree. The decree enjoined the defendant and its employees from making statements with respect to the rental of a dwelling that indicated a preference, limitation or discrimination based on race, color, or national origin; or coercing, threatening, intimidating, or interfering with any tenant's exercised or enjoyed rights. The defendant was required to get tenants' permission prior to entering units, except to make emergency repairs. In addition, the defendant agreed to undertake fair housing training of all employees, and a set of recordkeeping and reporting requirements. Finally, the defendant agreed to pay the complainants $15,000 in compensatory damages. The consent order was set to last two years, unless the defendant retained any direct or indirect ownership, management, or other financial interest in any residential rental property, in which case the consent order was to remain in effect for three years. The consent decree terminated without any further litigation, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "This fair housing litigation was brought in July 2010 by the United States Department of Justice against the owner and manager of a four-unit apartment building in Monroe, New Hampshire. It came after a series of racial incidents involving a mixed race/ethnicity tenant family. A consent decree was entered by District Judge Landya McCafferty in April 2011. The decree enjoined discrimination, required fair housing training and recordkeeping, and was scheduled to remain in effect for two years (three years if the defendant retained any ownership, management, or other financial interest in any residential rental property)."}
{"article": "On July 28, 2005 a death-sentenced inmate of the Potosi Correctional Center in Washington County, Missouri, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Missouri Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri. He claimed that there was a 43% chance that the defendants' planned lethal injection procedure would torture him and cause him unnecessary pain. He argued that this violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. He also argued that the infliction of the death penalty, and specifically the use of a form of execution more painful than necessary to bring about the death involved, violated the Thirteenth Amendment because it was a relict, vestige, and badge of slavery. Specifically, he was concerned that that the use of the femoral vein for the administration of the lethal injection would require a painful \"cut-down\" procedure, and that the anesthetic used (thiopental) would wear off too soon, allowing him to be conscious during the administration of potassium chloride, which causes a painful burning sensation throughout the body. In addition, the plaintiff argued that the Missouri physicians who were involved in administering the lethal injections were violating their ethical obligations. The defendants asked the court to dismiss the case, claiming that the plaintiff had to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing the case in District Court. On December 28, 2005, the District Court (Judge Scott O. Wright) denied their request, finding that the plaintiff did not have to exhaust his administrative remedies because if the defendants had wanted to change the method of execution due to the pain it inflicted, they would have already done so. On January 18, 2006, the plaintiff asked the District Court to order the defendants not to execute him until the court had held a hearing and decided how to resolve the issues in the case. The next day, the District Court (Judge Wright) granted his request and ordered the defendants not to execute the plaintiff until the court told them that they could do so. The defendants appealed. On January 29, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Judges William J. Riley, Clarence Arlen Beam, and David Rasmussen Hansen) vacated the stay and ordered the District Court to hold a hearing before noon on February 1, 2006. They also held that the execution should be stayed until midnight on February 3, 2006. According to the Eighth Circuit's order, the District Court held a hearing to decide the merits of the case on January 31, 2006. After the hearing, Court (Judge Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr.) found that neither the chemicals used by the State of Missouri for lethal injection nor the procedure employed to administer these injections constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Court reasoned that while the plaintiff suggested a different approach to lethal injection, he did not prove that the current method used by Missouri violated the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court also said that it was not persuaded that the use of the femoral vein for the administration of the lethal injection violated applicable standards of the Eighth Amendment, and it did not believe that the Missouri physicians who were involved in administering the lethal injections were violating their ethical obligations. Finally, the Court said that the lethal injection procedure did not violate the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery. The plaintiff appealed. On April 27, 2006, the Eighth Circuit (Judges Riley, Beam, and Hansen) issued a per curiam opinion vacating the District Court's decision and remanding the case so that the lower court could hold a more thorough hearing and expand the record. The Eighth Circuit decided to do this because they felt that the time constraints that they had imposed on the lower court had been unreasonable, and they wished to allow the parties more time to present their cases. Taylor v. Crawford, 445 F.3d 1095 (8th Cir. 2006). After holding a more extensive hearing, the District Court ruled on June 26, 2006, amended its earlier decision, ordering the defendants to prepare a written protocol for lethal injections that included the following changes: 1) a board certified anesthesiologist must be responsible for the mixing and administering of all drugs used during the lethal injection, 2) at least 5 grams of thiopental must be administered and the anesthesiologist must certify that the thiopental has rendered the plaintiff unconscious, 3) the state must purchase any equipment necessary to allow the anesthesiologist to monitor the depth of the anesthetic, in order to insure that the plaintiff will not feel any pain, 4) the state must have a contingency plan in place in case problems develop during the execution procedure, 5) an auditing process must be in place to ensure that all individuals involved in the lethal injection process are correctly following the protocol, and 6) after the Court approves the lethal injection protocol, it must not be changed without the prior approval of the Court. The District Court then sent this ruling up to the Eighth Circuit for their consideration and approval. Taylor v. Crawford, 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D.Mo. June 26, 2006). On July 24, 2006, the defendants filed a revised protocol for use in carrying out the inmate's death sentence in the District Court, and the Eighth Circuit remanded their jurisdiction back to the lower court so that the new protocol could be considered. On September 12, 2006, the District Court (Judge Gaitan) rejected the defendants' revised protocol, saying that even though it was an improvement, it was not enough to meet the standards of the Constitution because it lacked a provision for purchase of equipment that allows monitoring of anesthetic depth. The Court ordered the defendants to submit a revised protocol to the Court by October 27, 2006. The defendants asked the District Court to reconsider their rejection of the revised protocol, and on October 16, 2006, the District Court (Judge Gaitan) refused to reconsider the decision. The defendants appealed that refusal, and on June 4, 2007, the Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision, holding that the defendants' proposed revisions of the protocol were sufficient to get rid of any Constitutional problems. They also vacated the District Court's injunction that had forbidden the defendants from executing the plaintiff. The plaintiff asked the Eighth Circuit to rehear the case en banc, and on August 8, 2007, the Eighth Circuit declined to do so. The plaintiff filed a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court declined to hear the case. Missouri Gov. Jay Nixon denied the inmate's request for clemency and he was executed on February 25, 2014.", "summary": "On July 28, 2005, Michael Anthony Taylor, a death-sentenced inmate of the Potosi Correctional Center in Washington County, Missouri, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Missouri Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri. He claimed that there was a 43% chance that the defendants' planned lethal injection procedure would torture him and cause him unnecessary pain. He argued that this violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. On July 24, 2006, the Court ordered the defendants to submit a revised protocol to the Court. The defendants appealed, and on June 4, 2007, the Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision, holding that the defendants' proposed revisions of the protocol were sufficient to get rid of any Constitutional problems. They also vacated the District Court's injunction that had forbidden the defendants from executing the plaintiff. The plaintiff asked the Eighth Circuit to rehear the case en banc, and on August 8, 2007, the Eighth Circuit declined to do so. The plaintiff filed a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court declined to hear the case, and unfortunately the inmate was executed on February 25, 2014."}
{"article": "Plaintiffs, minor students, filed this class action lawsuit on March 27, 2006, against Winner School District and three of its administrators in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota. Plaintiffs, who were Native American, alleged that employees of the School District engaged in a pattern or practice of intentional racial discrimination with the purpose of pushing Native American students out of the school system. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the School District disciplinary practices targeted Native American students by disciplining them more often and more harshly than other students, referring them to law enforcement for minor infractions, and coercing criminal confessions out of them. They also alleged that teachers and administrators tolerated and fostered a racially hostile school environment by allowing racial name-calling and bullying to occur and treating Native American parents with disrespect. As a result, Native American students were less likely to complete high school and felt demoralized at school. Represented by the ACLU and the Rosebud Sioux Attorney General's Office, plaintiffs brought claims under the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. Plaintiffs also asked the court to certify as a class all Native American students who were or would be enrolled in Winner School District's middle and high schools. On April 28, 2006, plaintiffs submitted a motion for class certification. The parties began the discovery process in June. On October 20, 2006, Judge Charles B. Kornmann issued an order granting class certification. After a series of mediation sessions, the parties settled and filed a proposed Settlement Agreement on May 30, 2007. A court-enforceable Consent Decree was entered by Judge Kornmann on December 10, 2007. The terms of the Consent Decree prohibited defendants from requiring any student to make a written statement (\"affidavit\") that could be used against him or her in legal proceedings. The Decree also required defendants to immediately notify parents after deciding to refer a student to law enforcement and to notify students of their legal right to remain silent in such a case; train School District employees on proper disciplinary procedures and the constitutional rights of students; obtain an independent expert to assist with the development of disciplinary matrices; keep accurate records of disciplinary incidents; conduct evaluations of students subjected to discipline three or more times over the course of a year; hire a Native American ombudsperson; train teachers on American Indian education and educational equity; increase its number of Native American employees; and take several other measures designed to eliminate racial discimination and create an inclusive environment for Native American students and families. Defendants were also ordered to find and appoint a Monitor to oversee and report on the implementation of the Consent Decree. The court maintained jurisdiction for enforcement purposes. The Decree was to stay in effect until defendants had achieved and maintained compliance for four years. Finally, it awarded plaintiffs $100,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. The first and second progress reports, filed in June and September 2008, indicated that defendants had made progress in all areas. Among other things, they had hired more Native American staff members, developed anti-bullying programming, and developed a disciplinary matrix. On January 8, 2014, the parties proposed an Amended Consent Decree. The court granted the Amended Decree on April 28, 2014. The new agreement was very similar to the original, but required that, if the School District reached all outcome measures within the following two years, it would be released from the Agreement. If some measures were not reached within that time, the District would be formally released from having to reach those outcomes but would be required to continue a good-faith effort to do so for the following two years. On May 31, 2017, the parties jointly filed a motion to terminate the Consent Decree after finding that defendants had met all of their obligations. Judge Kornmann formally terminated the Decree on June 6, 2017.", "summary": "A group of Native American students filed this \u00a71983 lawsuit on March 27, 2006, against Winner School District in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota. The students alleged that the District engaged in intentional racial discrimination by disproportionately disciplining Native American middle and high school students and tolerating racial bullying in the schools. Plaintiffs brought claims under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The case settled, and the court entered a Consent Decree on December 10, 2007. The Consent Decree remained in force until June of 2017, when it was dismissed because the parties agreed that defendants had complied with all terms of the Decree."}
{"article": "On August 17, 2018, 29 parents who were forcibly separated from their children by the federal government filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court of District Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Justice for violating the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1101 <i>et seq.</i>), the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 701), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 551 <i>et seq.</i>), and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Plaintiffs, represented by Muslim Advocates as well as the Legal Aid Justice Center and the law firm of Eversheds & Sunderland, LLP, sought an order compelling the defendants to vacate the results of credible fear interviews, which had found them eligible for removal, as well as the resulting orders of removal. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and new credible fear interviews. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that under DOJ policy, parents were forced to undergo credible fear interviews while they were suffering from emotional and psychological trauma from being separated from their children. Credible fear interviews determine whether an asylum seeker faces a credible fear of persecution or torture when returned to their home country. Unable to articulate their experiences due to trauma, the plaintiffs received negative credible fear determinations and faced immediate deportation. This case was assigned to Judge Paul L. Friedman. On August 17, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion to proceed under pseudonyms and a redacted complaint. The defendant filed a motion to extend time to file an answer on October 22, 2018. On December 31, 2018, the defendant again filed such a motion. Along with two related cases, MMM v. Sessions and Ms. L v. ICE, this case settled. On November 15, 2018, Judge Dana M. Sabraw (the judge assigned in Ms. L. v. ICE) issued a final approval of the settlement. According to this settlement, the government committed to conducting a good faith review of the plaintiff\u2019s prior credible fear findings to determine if reconsideration would be appropriate. However, the government refused to return any parent who had already been deported. On February 5, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. This case is now closed, but the court in Ms. L v. ICE retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. For more information on that case, including disputes that have developed over the settlement's terms, see <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16620\">here</a>.", "summary": "On August 17, 2018, 29 parents, who underwent credible fear interviews while suffering from trauma due to recent family separation, sued the Department of Justice in the U.S. District Court of District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that the DOJ violated the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act, among other laws. On November 15, 2018, a judge in a related case approved a settlement in which the government committed to conducting a good faith review of the plaintiffs' interviews. On February 5, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal."}
{"article": "On February 13, 2012, the plaintiff filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this \u00a71983 class habeas action against the Connecticut Department of Corrections. The petition was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut and assigned to Judge Janet Bond Arteton. The plaintiffs were detainees in Connecticut Department of Corrections (CDOC) facilities who, after the expiration of the state-law basis of their detention, remained in state custody solely due to an administrative \"immigration detainer\" placed by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Represented by the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization at Yale Law School, the plaintiffs sought a writ of habeas corpus requiring the state to release them, an injunction against detaining future individuals based solely on an immigration detainer, and declaratory judgment invalidating such detention. Detainers issued by ICE request state and local law enforcement officials to hold individuals in custody, without any basis in state law, for up to 48 hours, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. \u00a7287.7. The named plaintiff's state-based detention ended on February 10, 2012; he filed the petition on February 13, 2012 when his subsequent detention continued for more than 48 hours. On the same day, the plaintiff requested class certification of detainees similarly situated in CDOC facilities. Claiming they were detained without probable cause hearings,and that the detainer is an invalid commandeering of state officials, the plaintiff alleged violation of Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure. Additionally, the plaintiff asserted that Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process rights were violated because the state lacked a compelling interest to continue detention. On February 19, 2013, the parties entered a proposed settlement agreement based on the newly enacted state regulations. The settlement agreement states that if an ICE immigration detainer is placed on a detainee, he or she will be notified by the CDOC as soon as practicable. If the detainee's state-based detention has expired and the detainee does not have a prior order of removal or meet certain \"dangerousness criteria\" set forth in the statute, the detainee shall not be held. The statute allowed for only rare occasions where CDOC could use its discretion to continue detention. The court approved the settlement agreement on March 5, 2013. The settlement agreement was set to expire on February 2, 2017. On February 2, 2017, the parties jointly moved to extend the termination date of the settlement agreement from February 2, 2017 to February 2, 2018. The court ordered the modification of the settlement agreement to reflect the extension that day, and the settlement agreement remained otherwise unchanged. On January 19, 2018, the parties moved to extend the settlement agreement for another year, and on January 26, 2018, the court modified the agreement with a new termination date of February 2, 2019. As of April 14, 2020, there are no further entries in the docket and the settlement is presumed to have lapsed.", "summary": "Plaintiffs filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus and suit against the Connecticut Department of Corrections for their continued detention due solely to an \"immigration detainer\" placed by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in 2012. A settlement agreement laying out the criteria for release and/or continued detention was approved on March 5, 2013, and was set to expire on February 2, 2017. The settlement agreement has been subsequently extended and is now set to expire on February 2, 2019."}
{"article": "This class action brought by children placed in Connecticut's Department of Children and Youth Services (DCYS) was filed on December 19, 1989, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiffs were represented by the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation and the American Civil Liberties Union. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the state to redress deficiencies in the child welfare system, claiming that the state violated the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, and the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint alleged that the defendants failed to: <ul> <li>provide adequate protective services to abused, neglected, or at risk children; <li>provide adequate medical care, mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, sexual abuse treatment to children in DCYS care; <li>ensure that all children in DCYS care receive appropriate and least restrictive placements; <li>ensure that all reports regarding these children are investigated and responded to promptly by caseworkers; <li>provide sufficient and trained staff; <li>provide adequate records and information systems; <li>make reasonable efforts to keep families together by providing threatened families with reasonable and appropriate services to prevent placement into out-of-home care; <li>provide minimally adequate and appropriate care to all of the children, placed by DCYS, into foster homes or similar settings; <li>move children into adoptive or other permanent homes when reunification is impossible; and <li>develop and implement appropriate case plans that will assure permanent placements for all children in their custody.</ul> On January 7, 1991, the parties reached a settlement agreement mandating broad scale reform. The Court entered a consent decree reflecting their agreement and requiring the defendants to: <ul><li>establish a training academy and statewide computerized data system; <li>appoint an advisory board; <li>design and implement a management structure that delineates reporting relationships; <li>establish a health management unit for children under the supervision, care or custody of the department; <li>increase staff by hiring qualified and experienced individuals; <li>establish comprehensive guidelines and regulations to facilitate the uniform intake and investigation of reports of suspected child abuse or neglect; <li>institute standards for treatment, case management, and family training, <li>implement objectives and goals for adoptions, <li>establish regional resource groups for consultations and evaluations; <li>develop procedures to complete Probate Court Ordered Studies within the timeframes specified by state law; and <li>establish a DCYS Monitoring Panel to determine, promulgate, or approve standards and procedures to fulfill the mandates of the Consent Decree, to implement reasonable timetables, and to establish mandatory funding amounts to ensure compliance.</ul> The Consent Decree could be modified, amended, or changed by the trial judge, but only upon the filing of an appropriate motion by a party or the DCYS Monitoring Panel. On December 19, 1996, the plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt. The defendants admitted to noncompliance and after extended negotiations the defendants agreed in October 2003 to: require the monitor to develop a definitive exit plan with specific outcomes; establish a Transition Task Force to assume all decisionmaking authority having substantial impact on the plaintiffs' safety and welfare; establish funds of $1 million for meeting emergency needs of class members; and to ensure that the governor would not replace the Commissioner during the term of this order without consulting the monitor first. Shortly thereafter, the monitor developed an exit plan detailing the necessary reforms and benchmarks that the defendants would have to meet. This plan was entered as a court order on December 23, 2003. It was modified three years later. Despite some improvements made by the defendants, the plaintiffs formally reported noncompliance again on May 5, 2008. Two months later, the plaintiffs withdrew their assertions of noncompliance pursuant to another stipulated agreement in which the defendant's agreed to comply with the foster-care recruitment and retention plans, administrative case reviews and treatment planning conferences plans, and health-care requirements. In December 2009, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction to prevent the defendants from suspending new intakes to one of their programs, the Voluntary Services Program. The defendants responded by arguing that the children receiving treatment or assistance in that program were not members of the plaintiff class. A year later, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, stating that children in the Voluntary Services Program were indeed members of the class. On August 17, 2010, the court granted in part and denied in part the motion for preliminary injunction and motion for permanent injunction. The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration on August 31, 2010, but the court denied the motion four months later. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135238; 2010 WL 5376224. In the meantime, while that motion for injunctive relief was pending, on April 13, 2010, the defendants sought to vacate the Consent Decree and Exit Plan, claiming that the objectives of the Consent Decree and Exit Plan had been achieved and that factual and legal changes would make continued enforcement unfair. The court denied the defendant\u2019s motion to vacate on September 22, 2010. The court also directed the parties to meet immediately with the court monitor to discuss new methods of evaluating the state's performance. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99455; 2010 WL 5590094. For the next seven years, the monitor periodically provided the court with revised exit plan quarterly reports. The most recent exit plan was submitted by the court monitor's office on May 1, 2017. The parties were then given an opportunity to respond to the recommended exit plan, and when both did, the court scheduled settlement talks with Magistrate Judge Holly B. Fitzsimmons for later that year. It's not clear if the parties agreed on a revised exit plan or if the court adopted one on its own, but on December 13, 2017, the Court entered a 2017 Revised Exit Plan and it appears that since then the case has continued by reference to compliance with that. That exit plan identified 14 relevant outcome measures. The plan also required the Court Monitor to conduct what it referred to as \"Certification\" reviews to ensure that defendants were in compliance with all of the outcome measures, and in sustained compliance with all of the outcome measures for at least two quarters prior to asserting compliance. The Court Monitor would then conduct a review of a statistically significant valid sample of cases to determined whether the defendants were in compliance. The parties and Court Monitor later created a \"Pre-Certification\" review process. This intended to obviate the need to implement the full certification review for certain outcome measures after sustained compliance had been achieved for all outcome measures. Under this process, if DCF achieved sustained compliance for at least two consecutive quarters, the Court Monitor could, in his discretion, conduct a pre-certification review. The purpose of this review was to identify and provide a prompt and timely opportunity to remedy any problem areas. In February of 2019, the Court Monitor released the Revised Exit Plan Status Report, covering the period from April 1, 2018, to September 30, 2018. It found that of the ten remaining outcome measures, there were five that had not been pre-certified. A year later, in February of 2020, the Court Monitor released another Exit Plan Status Report, covering the period from April 1, 2019 to September 30, 2019. The monitor found one more of the outstanding outcome measures, relating to the caseloads of DCF social workers, had been pre-certified, leaving four outcome measures awaiting pre-certification. As of October 7, 2020, the Court Monitor has continued to assess compliance under the 2017 Revised Exit Plan, and the litigation is ongoing, presumably until the outcome measures required by the exit plan are met.", "summary": "The plaintiffs, children placed in the custody, care, or supervision of the defendant Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Children and Youth Services, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the state failed to redress deficiencies in the child welfare system. The case was filed in 1989 and the parties agreed upon and filed a Consent Decree in 1991. In 2010, the state sought to vacate the Consent Decree but the motion was denied by the court. As of October 2020, the parties are continuing to work with the Court Monitor to assess compliance according to the terms of the 2017 Revised Exit Plan."}
{"article": "On March 11, 2004, the City of Detroit removed a state court lawsuit to the United States Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The lawsuit was filed under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the City of Detroit and Wayne County, as well as the Detroit Psychiatric Institute. The plaintiff's estate, represented by the Innocence Project, asked the Court for compensatory and punitive damages, claiming that the defendants violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the The Rehabilitation Act and also claimed violations of the state constitution. Specifically, the plaintiff's estate claimed that the plaintiff's wrongful conviction was the product of malicious police tactics that coerced a false confession from a mentally ill and hospitalized man. In 1984, a 16-year-old girl named Michelle Jackson was found dead in a warehouse in Detroit. She had been sodomized and killed. Her death was part of a string of 47 rapes and disappearances between September 1983 and 1984. The plaintiff, a man declared legally mentally incompetent, had a habit of calling the police and offering to help them solve rapes and murders. When the police approached the plaintiff in 1984, officers convinced him that his confession would lure the real killer out into the open. The plaintiff confessed under this delusional belief, was convicted, sentenced to life in prison. He remained in prison for 17 years. The plaintiff's appellate attorney, Robert Slameka, refused to communicate with the plaintiff. When the plaintiff filed a grievance against Mr. Slameka, he responded that the plaintiff's \"claim of my wrongdoing is frivolous, just as his existence. Both should be terminated.\" The plaintiff was exonerated by DNA evidence in 2002. The plaintiff filed this action alleging that the detectives concealed evidence in bad faith, that his trial and appellate attorneys were ineffective, and that the result was false imprisonment in violation of the Constitution. He also alleged that the Detroit Psychiatric Institute cooperated with the police in prolonging his hospitalization and coercing his confession. The plaintiff died while the lawsuit was pending, in 2005. The plaintiff's estate filed an Amended Complaint on May 10, 2005. On May 5, 2006, the parties settled the case. The Court (Judge Gerald Rosen) entered a Consent Judgment. The Consent Judgment required the City of Detroit to pay the plaintiff's estate 3.25 million dollars. In addition, there was a side agreement, provided as an exhibit to the Consent Judgment, under which the City agreed to make a good-faith effort to implement video recording by January 1, 2007, and to to submit bi-monthly reports on its progress to the Plaintiff's estate. A Satisfaction of Judgment was entered on July 10, 2007, and the case was closed. We have no further information about the City's compliance with the Consent Judgment.", "summary": "A man who was the victim of a coerced confession was convicted of murder in 1985, and was exonerated by the Innocence Project in 2002. He filed this action against the City of Detroit in 2004. The plaintiff died while the action was pending, but in 2006 his estate settled the case for 3.25 million dollars and an agreement to begin recording interrogations by the Detroit Police Department."}
{"article": "This case was filed by the Chicago office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in June 2001 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The EEOC alleged that the defendant, a telemarketer of small business consulting packages based in Buffalo Grove, IL, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by carrying out a pattern or practice of discrimination by subjecting female employees to sexual harassment. EEOC also alleged the defendant made favorable employment actions contingent upon the performance of sexual favors. The case was before Judge Joan B. Gottschall. Two of the employees allegedly harassed filed related suits (see related cases EE\u2212IL\u22120307 and EE-IL-0308), and two other employees intervened in the EEOC's suit. The discovery stage of this litigation was protracted, with several dozen discovery motions being filed over the course of a five-year period. On October 23, 2007, the court divided the case into two phases to be tried before one jury. 2007 WL 3120067. In phase I, the EEOC had to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the sexual harassment that occurred at the defendant business during the relevant time period, taken as a whole, was so severe or pervasive that a reasonable woman would find the work environment to be hostile or abusive. EEOC also had to establish that the defendant knew, or should have known, that systematic sexual harassment was occurring in its offices but did not take adequate steps to address the problem. In Phase II, the EEOC had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that each individual claimant seeking monetary damages experienced sex-based harassment that an objectively reasonable woman would find severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment and demonstrate that each claimant subjectively perceived the harassment she experienced to be hostile or abusive. The defendant sought summary judgment on the individual claims in this case in a series of motions spanning from 2006 to 2009. For the purpose of resolving the summary judgment motions, the court assumed that the EEOC had prevailed in their required showings at Phase I. The court entered orders on July 14, 2008, July 7, 2009, and August 13, 2009. Within these orders, the court granted and denied in part the defendant's summary judgment, finding the harassment was not sufficiently severe for all claimants and dismissing those claimants. 2008 WL 4876860; 654 F. Supp. 2d 767; 647 F. Supp. 2d 951. In 2004, before the filing of the summary judgment motions as to individual claimants began, there were approximately 121 claimants. By 2010, IPA obtained rulings dismissing 40 of those claimants based on summary judgment and statutes of limitations. 81 triable complaints proceeded. On October 9, 2009, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the EEOC\u2019s \u201cpattern or practice\u201d claim. The court considered only the defendant\u2019s statistical arguments (the defendants claimed that the number of individual claimants was too statistically insignificant to present a triable claim for a \u201cpattern or practice\u201d), and did not consider the defendant's other arguments. The court found that the statistics alone did not entitle the defendant to judgment as a matter of law, and denied the motion on March 31, 2010. 2010 WL 1416153. On April 9, 2010, the defendant requested that the court certify its March 31, 2010 order for interlocutory appeal. The court declined to do so on April 16, 2010. On June 14, 2010, the court found, upon the consent of the defendant, that an unlawful pattern or practice of tolerating sexual harassment existed at the business from November 25, 1997 to February 14, 2005. With the order entered on Phase I, the case proceeded toward trial on Phase II. On June 16, 2010, the defendant moved to sever the individual claims for compensatory and punitive damages for the eighty-one remaining claimants, or, in the alternative, for separate trials. The court denied the motion on June 29, 2010. Trial began in the case on July 6, 2010. After the start of jury selection, the parties reached a tentative settlement agreement, and the court stayed the trial. At that point, the parties began to work to finalize a consent decree. On February 9, 2011, the court entered an order granting the parties\u2019 joint motion to enforce the settlement agreement reached in court on July 6, 2010. The court entered the consent decree on March 2, 2011. The consent decree included injunctive provisions enjoining the defendant and its employees from retaliation and from discrimination against women on the basis of sex by sexually harassing female employees, harassing female employees on account of their sex, and/or creating, facilitating, or permitting the existence of a hostile work environment. The consent decree also required the defendant to implement and maintain compliance with a \u201cstatement of intolerance of sexual harassment,\u201d establish a sexual harassment policy and complaint procedure, and provide training regarding sexual harassment. The defendant paid eight million dollars to a settlement fund to be distributed as compensatory damages to the eligible claimants, including the intervenors. The settlement fund also paid attorney\u2019s fees and costs in the amount of $431,667 to attorneys for the plaintiff-intervenors. The consent decree appointed Nancy B. Kreiter and George F. Galland as Decree Monitors to oversee IPA\u2019s implementation of the decree\u2019s terms. The court retained jurisdiction over the consent decree for three years. After the entry of the consent decree, the parties' outstanding motions were denied as moot on March 24, 2011. The Monitors\u2019 reports of February 23, 2012 and March 4, 2013 both found the defendant in compliance with the consent decree and made certain recommendations, mostly concerning profanity, enforcement of the dress code, and restructuring of Human Resources. On May 14, 2013, the plaintiffs moved to amend the consent decree. The motion, to which the defendants agreed, proposed an amendment to the payment schedule in the consent decree. Under the consent decree, the defendants were responsible for annual payments to a settlement account, but had not made its annual payments on time, and claimed financial hardship, so the parties agreed to allow weekly payments to ensure that final payment was fully and timely made in March 2014. Judge Gotschall granted the motion on May 22, 2013. The defendants submitted their final payment into the settlement fund on March 3, 2014, and the Monitors submitted their final report on March 10, 2014, finding that the IPA complied fully with the decree. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This case was filed by the Chicago office of the EEOC in June 2001 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The EEOC alleged that the defendant, International Profit Associates, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by carrying out a pattern or practice of discrimination by subjecting female employees to sexual harassment, and by making favorable employment actions contingent upon the performance of sexual favors. After extensive discovery and litigation of summary judgment motions as to each of the individual claimants in the case, the parties settled and a consent decree, providing for monetary and injunctive relief, was entered on March 2, 2011."}
{"article": "This lawsuit was filed on July 24, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The suit was brought by the Texas Civil Rights Project as next friend for one hundred unaccompanied migrant children who had been arrested by Customs and Border Protection. The plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union Immigration Rights Project, the ACLU Foundation of Texas, Oxfam America, the Center for Gender and Refugees Studies, and the ACLU of D.C.. They sued the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Chad Wolf, Acting Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection Mark Morgan, Chief of U.S. Border Patrol Rodney Scott, Director of Immigration Customs and Enforcement Matthew Albence, Secretary of HHS Alex Azar, and CDC Director Robert Redfield. The complaint contended that the federal government had implemented a new process of removing immigrant children without providing for adequate protections, especially by holding those children away from their families or other sponsors and by not providing counsel. This process was instituted over a series of regulations, orders, and agency memos that the complaint calls the \"Title 42 Process.\" The complaint argued that this Title 42 Process violated the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (FARRA), and that agencies exceed the power granted to them under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. They requested declaratory relief and injunctive relief that would prohibit the defendants from enforcing the Title 42 Process, stay their removal, grant them counsel, and grant the children TVPRA protections. The case was assigned to Judge Beryl A. Howell. A few weeks later, on August 6, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case, even before defendants responded -- they did not give an explanation as to why they dismissed the case. In a minute order on August 10, Judge Howell dismissed the case without prejudice and closed the case.", "summary": "This case was brought by Texas Civil Rights Project as next friend for one hundred unaccompanied migrant children against top executives of the Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the CDC, and the HHS. They argued that a group of regulations, orders, and memos made up a process called \"Title 42 Process,\" which skirted statutory law requiring certain safeguards on the removal of unaccompanied immigrant minors. While the process was created in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the plaintiffs argued that the process was an illegal expansion of executive authority. However, a few weeks later, before defendants responded, the plaintiffs withdrew the complaint without explaining why. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "Disabled prisoners incarcerated at the Denver County Jail sued the city and county, alleging it had discriminated against them by segregating them from the general population, denying access to activities and services, and failing to accommodate their basic needs. The plaintiffs filed their complaint on April 13, 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs were inmates at the Denver County Jail. Both have spinal cord injuries and use wheelchairs. The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs were segregated in the medical ward, despite no medical necessity, denied recreational and other activities because of their disabilities, denied access to religious facilities, the library, education, counseling, and other services and activities, and that the jail lacked accessible showers and other basic necessities. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. On March 3, 2011, the parties reached a settlement, the terms of which are not available. On May 31, 2011, the case was dismissed with prejudice. This case is closed.", "summary": "Disabled prisoners in the Denver County Jail sued the city and county, alleging it had discriminated against them by segregating them from the general population, denying access to activities and services, and failing to accommodate basic needs. The parties reached a settlement whose terms are not available."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This class action lawsuit was filed on June 16, 2020 by detainees in the Maricopa County Jail system in Arizona, who sought extra protections from COVID-19 and, in some cases, release. The Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on August 14, 2020.<hr>This is a lawsuit challenging the Maricopa County Sheriff's response to COVID-19 in its jails and requesting the release of detainees and prisoners. On June 16, 2020, nine named plaintiffs and the immigrants' rights non-profit Puente Human Rights Movement filed this class action law suit and habeas petition in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued Maricopa County and its Sheriff under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12131), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794) and petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241. Represented by the national and Arizona ACLUs, as well as several law firms working pro bono, the plaintiffs sought to certify several classes of detainees and prisoners, the release of certain individuals at high risk of developing serious illness from COVID-19, and injunctions governing the Sheriff's response to COVID-19 in Maricopa County's jails, as well as attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs claimed that their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, were violated by the Sheriff's response to COVID-19. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants placed them in danger of contracting COVID-19 by continuing to book new detainees in the jail without quarantining them from the existing population, as well as a host of other unsafe practices, including a lack of masks and cleaning supplies, little testing for individuals held in the jail or jail staff, and crowded conditions that prevented social distancing. According to the complaint, the pretrial detainees' Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the conditions of their confinement, which amounted to deliberate indifference and unconstitutional punishment prior to conviction. The convicted prisoners made a similar Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. Additionally, the subclasses of prisoners with disabilities claimed that their rights under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act to equal access to jail programming were violated by the defendants' COVID-19 response. Finally, the plaintiffs requested that the court release medically vulnerable pretrial detainees. The case was assigned to United States District Judge Steven P. Logan. On June 29, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order against the defendants, ordering them to improve COVID-19 safety protocols and begin releasing medically vulnerable pretrial detainees. Judge Logan denied the plaintiffs' ex parte request, but set a briefing schedule to determine whether to grant a similar preliminary injunction on July 2, 2020. The defendants then moved to dismiss the case on July 20, 2020. Judge Logan resolved both of these motions in an August 14, 2020 opinion. He denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. He also granted the defendants' motion to dismiss some of the plaintiffs' municipal liability claims against the Sheriff, but not the County. Shortly after the filing of the lawsuit, back on June 29, 2020, the plaintiffs had moved for class certification. Judge Logan granted that motion in a November 13, 2020 opinion and certified two classes, one of detainees incarcerated pending trial and one of convicted prisoners, and four subclasses (two within each class) of medically vulnerable individuals and individuals with disabilities. After class certification was granted, the parties began the discovery process. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2020, individuals held in Maricopa County's jails filed this class action lawsuit and habeas petition to challenge the jails' response to COVID-19. The plaintiffs alleged that their constitutional rights and statutory rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act were violated by the defendants' lack of action to protect them from COVID-19. They requested the certification of several classes, which was granted, and a preliminary injunction, including the release of medically vulnerable individuals, which was not. The case is ongoing"}
{"article": "This lawsuit was the result of an investigation launched by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) in 2009 into the alleged targeting and unconstitutional treatment of Latinos by the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office. (The DOJ's initial inquiry apparently started in 2008, but the formal investigation opened with notice to the Sheriff's Office in March 2009.) The Sheriff's Office declined to cooperate in the investigation, leading the DOJ to file a a related lawsuit in September 2010 against Maricopa County under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, seeking to compel the Sheriff's Office to provide the requested information. See <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12019\">PN-AZ-0002 in this Clearinghouse</a>). Maricopa County settled that lawsuit in June 2011, and agreed to cooperate. (Also, prior to this case, in 2007, a group of plaintiffs had filed a lawsuit, Melendres v. Arpaio, against the County of Maricopa, the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, and Sheriff Joe Arpaio. (<a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12282\">PN-AZ-0003 in this Clearinghouse</a>). In 2013, the Melendres Court found the MCSO in violation of the Constitution, and entered a permanent injunction forbidding racial profiling.) In this matter, DOJ released its findings letter reporting the results of the investigation on December 15, 2011. The letter reported that the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) was engaged in an unconstitutional pattern of policing. The DOJ found that the MSCO profiled Latinos, and unlawfully stoped, detained, and arrested Latinos. The DOJ also found that services in the Maricopa County Jail for people of limited English proficiency were insufficient or nonexistent. The DOJ found that a lack of policy to ensure constitutional policing underscored these problems. On May 10, 2012, the DOJ filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14141 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Maricopa County and the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. Specifically, the DOJ's complaint alleged that: <ul><li>(1) the MSCO's policies and practices discriminated against Latino persons;<li>(2) the MSCO targeted Latino workers while enforcing state identity theft laws, resulting in the seizure of Latinos at worksites without reasonable suspicion;<li>(3) the MSCO's discriminatory law enforcements practices violated Title VI;<li>(4) the County's jails discriminated against limited English proficiency Latino prisoners in violation of Title VI; <li>(5) the County and MSCO were violating their Title VI contractual assurances; and <li>(6) the County and MSCO retaliated against persons in Maricopa County on the basis of their protected speech.</li></ul> The DOJ requested injunctive and declaratory relief to stop Maricopa County's alleged practice of depriving Latino persons of their constitutional rights and to stop discrimination against Latinos in violation of Title VI. The case was assigned to Chief Judge Roslyn O. Silver. On December 12, 2012, she denied Defendants' motion to dismiss the case, but granted the motion to dismiss the MCSO from the case, ruling the MCSO was not an entity that could sue or be sued. On September 4, 2014, after lengthy discovery, proceedings were held before Judge Silver in which both parties informed the court that they would file dispositive motions. On October 27, the DOJ filed its motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Defendants were precluded by collateral estoppel from re-litigating the issue of whether the MSCO's traffic stops constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The DOJ claimed that the issue had already been decided against the MSCO in <i>Melendres v. Arpaio</i>, where the MCSO was a defendant. 989 F. Supp. 2d 822 (D. Ariz. 2013) (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12282\">PN-AZ-0003 in this Clearinghouse</a>). On the same day, the Defendants made a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that neither Title VI nor \u00a7 14141 authorized this suit against Maricopa County. On June 15, 2015, Judge Silver granted the DOJ's motion with respect to the traffic stops and denied the Defendants' motion. On July 15, 2015, Judge Silver ordered the parties to file a joint statement setting forth what issues remained for trial. In response, on July 17, the parties filed a joint motion to approve a settlement agreement regarding the second, fourth, and sixth claims for relief from the DOJ's complaint. The MSCO agreed to stop unconstitutionally enforcing state identity theft laws and to develop an anti-retaliation policy. On July 20, the DOJ moved to stay this action until the court in <i>Melendres</i> (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12282\">PN-AZ-0003 in this Clearinghouse</a>), in which the DOJ had recently intervened, found that the Defendants had maintained compliance with an injunction for three years. However, the Defendants argued this was inappropriate because when the DOJ moved to intervene in <i>Melendres</i>, it had represented that it would terminate the overlapping parts of this case if the intervention motion was granted. On September 2, 2015, Judge Silver granted the parties' joint motion to approve the settlement agreement with respect to the issues not covered by <i>Melendres</i>--worksite operations and retaliation--but otherwise dismissed the matter. On December 30, 2015, Maricopa County appealed this case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Over the next two years, little happened in the case as the parties awaited a decision from the appellate court. On May 7, 2018, the Court issued an opinion affirming the judgment. Judge Paul J. Watford held that sheriffs act as final policymakers for their respective counties on law-enforcement matters. Moreover, U.S.C. \u00a712601 imposed liability on a governmental authority whose own official policy caused it to engage in \u201ca pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers\u201d that deprived persons of federally protected rights. Because sheriffs are final policymakers for their counties, the policies they adopt are, in fact, the counties' policies. For this reason, Maricopa County should be held liable for their sheriffs' acts. On June 21, 2018, Maricopa County filed a petition for panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing <i>en banc</i>, but the request was denied. On October 15, 2018, Maricopa County filed a petition for a <i>writ of certiorari</i> in the United States Supreme Court. Certiorari was denied on March 25, 2019. 139 S.Ct. 1373. The parties jointly moved to terminate the settlement on May 9, 2019. The court ordered this termination on May 14, and the case has since been closed.", "summary": "As a result of an investigation conducted by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice in 2009, the DOJ filed this lawsuit against Maricopa County, Arizona for a pattern of unconstitutional action as well as discrimination against Latinos. The district court granted summary judgment with respect to some of the DOJ's claims in June 2015. In July 2015, the parties settled some of the remaining claims, and the court entered judgment in favor of the DOJ for the remaining claims, with the understanding that the DOJ would pursue further relief in <i>Melendres v. Arpaio</i>. Maricopa Couty appealed arguing it could not be held liable for its sheriffs' acts, but the Court affirmed the judgement on May 7, 2018. Maricopa Couty is now seeking for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court."}
{"article": "On July 20, 2005, two death-sentenced inmates of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary in McAlester, Oklahoma, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Oklahoma Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. Anderson and Taylor complained to the Court that the lethal injection procedure used by the defendants during executions violated the Constitution by inflicting enormous amounts of pain on the executed prisoner. Specifically, they claimed that the defendants 1) violated medically approved procedures by failing to employ properly trained people to inject the anesthesia, 2) arbitrarily and unnecessarily used drugs and drug dosages that created significant risks that the condemned prisoner would suffer unnecessary pain, 3) used a sequence of drug administration that delays administration of the anesthetic until after the prisoner is dead, 4) delivered the drugs through alternating IV lines, impairing control over the timing and sequence of drug delivery and increasing the risk of drug administration failure. Due to these concerns, the plaintiffs asked the Court to stay their executions and to enjoin the defendants from using the lethal injection procedure that they normally used. On August 15, 2005, the case was referred to Magistrage Judge Bacharach. On September 6, 2005, the defendants asked the Court to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, arguing that the Anderson and Taylor had failed to show any likelihood that their claim would succeed at trial. On December 20, 2005, Judge Bacharach filed a report stating that the plaintiffs had demonstrated that they had a viable claim and recommending that the District Court should overrule the defendants' motion to dismiss. On January 11, 2006, the District Court (Judge Stephen P. Friot) adopted the Magistrate's recommendation and overruled the motion to dismiss. Anderson v. Evans, 2006 WL 83093 (W.D.Okla. Jan. 11, 2006). On December 19, 2006, the parties initiated a settlement conference and sought asistance from the court. On February 22, 2007, the parties held their settlement conference with Magistrate Judge Doyle Argo. On March 6, 2007, the parties entered a joint motion asking the District Court to stay the case and place it in abeyance for a period of one year. We're not sure exactly why the defendants agreed to put off the case for a year, but their motion mentions \"recent developments in Plaintiff Anderson's habeas case\" and states that neither of the plaintiffs would \"face execution during the abeyance period, or for some time thereafter.\" The District Court agreed to place the lawsuit on hold for a year. On June 19, 2007, Plaintiff Anderson asked the Court to allow him to withdraw from the case. Apparently, he had been re-sentenced to life in prison without parole, so he was no longer facing execution. On July 10, 2007, the District Court (Judge Friot) allowed Anderson to withdraw from the case, and the case was renamed \"Taylor v. Jones.\" On June 8, 2009 the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma dismissed the case without prejudice because the remaining named defendant lacked standing. The District Court held that \"the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's denial of the plaintiff's writ of habeas corpus and remanded with instructions to grant the writ as to his conviction and execution subject to the State's right to re-try the case within a reasonable time.\" Accordingly, the District Court found that the issue was moot as to Plaintiff Taylor, which called for a dismissal of the case. The Docket shows that the case was terminated as of June 8, 2009.", "summary": "In this death penalty case challenging the Oklahoma Department of Corrections lethal injection procedure, two death-sentenced inmates sought a stay of their executions. One Plaintiff's claims became moot when his sentence was commuted to life without parole, and the second Plaintiff's case was dismissed when the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court's denial of his writ of habeas corpus and remanded with instuctions to grant the writ, subect to the State's right to re-try the case within a reasonable time. <br /> <br />Other than the District Court's early finding that the Plaintiffs had a reasonable liklihood of success on their claims challenging the lethal injection procedure, the case failed to reach any conclusion as to the legality of the procedure."}
{"article": "On December 3, 2013, the University of Notre Dame, a religious nonprofit university, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Notre Dame alleged that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate, even with the accommodation for nonprofit religious organizations, violated the Establishment Clause and Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Notre Dame sought preliminary and permanent injunctions barring the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate to avoid a violation of Notre Dame's deeply held religious beliefs. On December 20, 2013, the District Court (Judge Philip P. Simon) denied Notre Dame's motion for preliminary injunction. The Court found that the ACA's insurance accommodation, which allowed the head of an eligible organization to provide self-certification which in turn triggered a third-party administrator to provide contraception coverage to the organization's employees, did not impose a substantial burden on the free exercise of the religion. University of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 988 F.Supp.2d 912 (N.D. IN. 2013) The same day, Notre Dame filed an interlocutory appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (No. 13-3853) and a motion for preliminary injunction with the District Court pending their appeal. On December 23, 2013, the District Court denied the plaintiff's motion for injunction pending appeal and on December 30, 2013, the Seventh Circuit denied the plaintiff's emergency motion for injunction pending appeal. On February 21, 2014, the Seventh Circuit (Judge Richard Posner) affirmed the District Court's denial of preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals found that the ACA's insurance accommodation was consistent with the balancing act required by RFRA and therefore it did not substantially burden the free exercise of plaintiffs. University of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547 (N.D. IN. 2014). On May 7, 2014, the Seventh Circuit denied plaintiffs' April 4, 2014, motion for rehearing. Notre Dame sought review in the Supreme Court, and on March 9, 2015, the Court granted the writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit for further consideration in light of its decision (after the Seventh Circuit's decision) in <i>Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.</i>, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). University of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 135 U.S. 1258 (2015) (cert. granted). In <i>Hobby Lobby</i>, the Supreme Court had held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA, when applied to closely held for-profit corporations. The Court emphasized, however, that alternative methods for meeting the government's asserted interest were available. On remand, after hearing oral arguments on April 22, 2015, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of preliminary injunction on May 19, 2015, holding that Notre Dame had still not met its burden of establishing an entitlement to a preliminary injunction. University of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2015). Notre Dame sought a rehearing en banc on July 2, 2015. The Seventh Circuit denied the request on July 24, 2015. On June 17, 2016, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Seventh Circuit in light of the per curiam decision in <i>Zubik v. Burwell</i>, 136 S.Ct. 1557 (2016) (Clearinghouse summary available <a href=\u201d https://www.clearinghouse.net/featuredCase.php?id=36\u201d>here</a>). In <i>Zubik</i>, the Supreme Court vacated a series of Court of Appeals decisions that concerned religious exemptions to the contraception mandate in the ACA and remanded those cases back to the lower courts to \u201cafford an opportunity\u201d for the parties and the Court of Appeals to further consider the burden imposed in requiring non-profit religious organizations (\u201cchallengers\u201d) to fill out a form notifying the government that they objected to providing contraceptive coverage, and to arrive at an approach that would, going forward, accommodate challengers\u2019 religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by the challengers\u2019 health plans receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage. As it appeared that proceedings in the Seventh Circuit would continue for some time, the case was statistically closed in the district court on March 2, 2017, until the appellate proceedings concluded. The case remains ongoing in the Seventh Circuit.", "summary": "Plaintiffs, a Catholic University located in South Bend, Indiana, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against the Federal Government challenging the Contraception mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedures Act. The case was dismissed on December 31, 2012, for lack of standing and ripeness."}
{"article": "On November 7, 2017, a former pretrial detainee who was incarcerated for several weeks in the El Paso County Colorado Jail filed suit against that county in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU Foundation of Colorado, sought compensatory damages and attorney\u2019s fees, claiming violations of the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The plaintiff claimed that El Paso County had an official policy and actual practice of denying pretrial liberty to defendants granted a personal recognizance (PR) bond by a state court judge, solely for their inability to pay a $55 pretrial service fee to the county. While incarcerated, the plaintiff was separated from her newborn child when child custody proceedings were initiated against her that she was unable to competently contest while she was in jail. The plaintiff also claimed that state court judges in the county believed that they could not waive this fee without express permission from a bond commissioner of El Paso County Pretrial Services; they argued that employees of that agency were disincentivized from doing so because the $55 fee is chargeable before release funded the county\u2019s pretrial supervision program. A little over a week after the complaint was filed, the Denver Channel reported that Chief Judge William Bain of the Fourth Judicial Circuit of Colorado, which includes all state courts in El Paso County, had ordered that detainees granted a personal recognizance bond but unable to pay the $55 pretrial services fee must be released from jail that same day. On December 28, 2017, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint with an expanded fact section, emphasizing that El Paso County, through its sheriff, was the sole party blocking the release of detainees unable to pay the $55 fee to the county under the former policy. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on January 11, 2018. The county alleged that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Specifically, the county argued that the plaintiff could not demonstrate that there was such a county policy or that the county was the \u201cmoving force\u201d of the policy as described. Before Judge Wiley Young Daniel could make a decision on this motion, the parties informed him that they were working on a private settlement. Over the next several months the judge extended several deadlines for the parties to allow them to continue exploring a private settlement. According to the ACLU\u2019s <a href=\"https://www.aclu.org/news/el-paso-county-agrees-pay-190k-nearly-200-individuals-who-were-jailed-because-they-could-not\">website</a>, the parties agreed to settle out of court for $190,000 on August 13, 2018. According to the <a href=\"https://gazette.com/news/el-paso-county-agrees-to-pay-up-to-to-settle/article_6de96e20-a00d-11e8-908c-1fe35bfd4cf4.html\">Gazette</a>, the agreement was finalized once it was approved by the El Paso County Board of County Commissioners on August 14, 2018. The settlement provided $60,000 to compensate the plaintiff for her incarceration and for attorney costs. The remaining $130,000 was allocated for 183 other individuals who the parties identified who had been held in the El Paso County Jail solely for inability to pay the $55 fee. Each of them are eligible for compensation based on $125 per day of incarceration. The parties eligible for this compensation must contact the county within two years to recover these funds. On August 17, 2018, Judge Daniel dismissed the lawsuit with consent of the parties. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2017, a former pretrial detainee in El Paso County, Colorado sued the county in the U.S. District Court of Colorado. Plaintiff alleged that the policy of detaining citizens granted a personal recognizance bond by a state court judge, solely for their inability to pay a $55 pretrial services fee to the county, violated their Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Equal Protection and Due Process. Shortly after the filing of the complaint, the chief judge of state courts in El Paso County, Colorado ended this practice. In 2018, the parties reached a settlement to compensate the Plaintiff and 183 other inmates who had been held according to the policy and for attorney fees. The cases concluded in August 2018."}
{"article": "On July 18, 2007, attorneys for the ACLU of Kentucky Foundation, Inc. and private counsel filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 on behalf of a lawful permanent resident living in Kentucky, challenging a Kentucky statute, \u00a71 KRS 237.110, which barred resident aliens from obtaining licenses to carry a concealed deadly weapon. Plaintiff alleged that the U.S. citizenship requirement of the concealed carry law violated equal protection. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. Shortly after filing suit, plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction, which the court granted on March 13, 2008. The following month, the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the action was moot because the law had been amended to remove the citizenship requirement. On June 16, 2008, the court entered an order converting the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction. The parties then disagreed about the awarding of attorney fees and costs. In March 2009, the court granted attorneys fees and costs to the plaintiffs, but did reduce the amount requested. This case was closed in May 2009.", "summary": "This 2007 case was a challenge to Kentucky's concealed deadly weapon's statute which barred non-U.S. citizens from obtaining licenses to carry. The court granted a permanent injunction against that requirement, although in the meantime, Kentucky amended the law to remove the citizenship requirement. This case was closed in 2009."}
{"article": "On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court upheld the 9th Circuit's decision in this case that the Trump Administration acted unlawfully when it rescinded DACA, because its reasons for rescission were insufficient. <hr> The Regents of the University of California (UC) and Janet Napolitano, in her official capacity as President of the University of California, filed this lawsuit challenging the Department of Homeland Security\u2019s (DHS) revocation of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA). The complaint was filed on September 8, 2017 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. According to the complaint, DACA has benefited approximately 800,000 individuals brought to the U.S. as children \u201cthrough no choice of their own.\u201d Under DACA, applicants who met certain criteria were eligible for deferred immigration action for two-year periods, pending approval of their applications. As the complaint stated, \u201cDACA allowed these individuals to live, study, and work in the United States without fear that they could be arrested and deported at any time,\u201d and so they \u201cwere able to pursue opportunities in higher education, to more readily obtain driver\u2019s licenses and access lines of credit, to obtain jobs and access to certain Social Security and Medicare benefits, and to contribute to their communities and American society.\u201d The plaintiffs stated that these individuals - known as Dreamers - have enabled the nation and UC to greatly benefit from their presence as students and employees at the university. The plaintiffs stated the Dreamers contribute significantly to UC life, \u201cexpanding the intellectual vitality of the school, filling crucial roles as medical residents, research assistants, and student government leaders, and increasing the diversity of the community.\u201d Plaintiff Janet Napolitano was the Secretary of Homeland Security who designed and implemented DACA in 2012. But the revocation of DACA, the plaintiffs argued, threatened the Dreamers with \u201cexpulsion from the only country that they call home.\u201d Moreover, the plaintiffs argued, DHS did not offer any \u201creasoned basis\u201d for revoking DACA and did so in violation of legally required procedures. The plaintiffs argued that DHS\u2019s justification for revocation is that a related but ultimately separate program - Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) - is illegal. The plaintiffs asserted that this justification is based on \u201can incorrect legal premise\u201d as the two programs \u201cwere governed by different sets of rules, applied to different individuals, and conferred different benefits\u201d and that \u201cno court has held that DACA is unlawful.\u201d Further, the plaintiffs argued that in not accounting for the Dreamers' strong reliance on DACA, DHS violated Supreme Court precedent requiring agencies to provide \u201cmore substantial justification\u201d for policy changes when there is significant reliance on the preexisting policy. The plaintiffs argued that DHS\u2019s revocation of DACA violated the Fifth Amendment\u2019s due process clause and the Administrative Procedure Act. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley on Sept. 8, but then reassigned to Judge Hon. William Alsup on Sept. 12. On Sept. 18, the court related this case to <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16144\"><i>State of California v. Department of Homeland Security</i></a>, Case No. 17-cv-05235. Two days later, the court related two more cases to this one: <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16160\"><i>Garcia v. United States of America</i></a>, No. 17-cv-05380, and <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16156\"><i>City of San Jose v. Trump</i></a>, No. 17-cv-05329. On Oct. 16, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16220\"><i>County of Santa Clara v. Trump</i></a>, No. 17-cv-05813, was added as a related case. All are summarized in this Clearinghouse. On Oct. 6, the defendants filed the administrative record, available <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-NY-0051-0008.pdf\">here</a>, which included a series of government documents pertaining to DACA from its inception to the decision to rescind it. On Oct. 17, after the plaintiffs moved to compel the defendants to complete the administrative record, the court ordered them to do so. The court found that the defendants did not produce all documents leading to the rescission, specifically related documents that Acting Secretary Duke did not directly review. The defendants moved to stay further proceedings at this court on Oct. 18 in light of their intent to appeal this ruling to the Ninth Circuit. The court denied staying proceedings on Oct. 19, and the defendants appealed the next day by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus to the district court and emergency motion for stay. On Oct. 23, the district court replied to the Ninth Circuit's invitation to answer the government's petition stating it would not stay proceedings in light of the narrow window of time until DACA would end on March 5, 2018. On Nov. 1, in the district court, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants from rescinding DACA, arguing that the rescission \"violate[d] the fundamental prohibition on arbitrary agency action imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act\" by not providing a reasoned basis for it. That same day, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the rescission is an enforcement action \"presumed immune from judicial review\" and that the government provided ample explanation for the rescission based on DAPA's enjoinment. On Nov. 16, the Ninth Circuit denied the defendants' motion for a writ of mandamus and vacated the stay of discovery and record expansion that had been entered. The District Court immediately ordered the federal government to file an augmented administrative record by Nov 22. 875 F.3d 1200. On Nov. 17, the federal government filed an emergency motion noting that it intended to file an application for mandamus with the Supreme Court no later than Nov. 20, and requesting that the Ninth Circuit stay its order pending the Supreme Court's resolution of the forthcoming petition. On Nov. 21, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the federal government's motion, noting that jurisdiction currently lies with the district court and instructing the federal government that further relief must be sought in a new petition for mandamus. 875 F.3d 1177. Meanwhile, in the District Court, Judge Alsup on Nov. 20 agreed to stay all discovery until Dec. 22, at which point the augmented administrative record was due. On Dec. 1, 2017, the government filed notice that they appealed the Ninth's Circuit denial of mandamus relief and applied for a stay to the Supreme Court. On Dec. 21 in a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's denial and remanded the case, arguing that the district court should have stayed implementation of the Oct. 17 order compelling the government to complete the administrative record. The Supreme Court stated that the lower court should have \"first resolved the Government\u2019s threshold arguments (that the Acting Secretary\u2019s determination to rescind DACA is unreviewable because it is \u201ccommitted to agency discretion,\u201d 5 U. S. C. \u00a7701(a)(2), and that the Immigration and Nationality Act deprives the District Court of jurisdiction). Either of those arguments, if accepted, likely would eliminate the need for the District Court to examine a complete administrative record.\" 138 S.Ct. 443. The same day, the district court stayed the order compelling the government to complete the administrative record. On Jan. 9, 2018, the court denied the government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction from Nov. 1, 2017 and provided provisional relief to the plaintiffs. 877 F.3d 1080. The order indicated the court would separately dismiss the government's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court entered a nationwide preliminary injunction, ordering that DACA remain in effect on the same terms and conditions that existed prior to the recession. However, the government did not need to process new applications from individuals who never before received deferred action. The court then granted in part and denied in part the government's motion to dismiss on Jan. 12, dismissing the plaintiffs' Regulatory Flexibility Act and equitable estoppel claims as well the individual plaintiffs' declaratory relief claims. 298 F.Supp.3d 1304. The court sustained the plaintiffs' APA, due process, and equal protection claims (with a few exceptions from the various complaints of the related cases). The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit on Jan. 16, 2018. The government also sought certiorari from the Supreme Court on Jan. 18 while the Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, arguing that the Supreme Court's immediate review was warranted because of how long the appeal would take in the Ninth Circuit and how time sensitive the issue was. The Supreme Court denied cert without prejudice on Feb. 26, 2018, indicating the justices assume \"that the Court of Appeals will proceed expeditiously to decide this case.\" 138 S.Ct. 1182. The related cases were consolidated in the Ninth Circuit for the purposes of appeal. From February through April 2018, the parties filed their briefs. Meanwhile, the following entities filed amicus briefs in support of the plaintiffs: historians, the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, Service Employees International Union, American Federation of Teachers, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Communications Workers of America, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, International Union of Painters and Allied Traders, United Farm Workers of America, United We Dream, public education groups, current and former prosecutors and law enforcement leaders, over 100 religious organizations, higher education institutions, over 100 companies and associations, the Bar Association of San Francisco, former federal immigration and homeland security officials, law professors and scholars, the Institute for Policy Integrity at NYU School of Law, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Anti-Defamation League, social justice organizations, legal services organizations, American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children, California Professional Society on the Abuse of Children, Partnership for Educational Justice, DelawareCAN, HawaiiKidsCAN, NewMexicoKidsCAN, Virginia Excels, various cities and counties, the National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, various ACLU branches. The defendants petitioned the Supreme Court of the U.S. for a writ of certiorari on Nov. 5, 2018. Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings on Nov. 8, 2018. 908 F.3d 476. The panel held that the government's decision to rescind DACA was reviewable because it was based on a belief that law foreclosed any alternative because the agency lacked authority rather than on exercise of discretion. The panel further concluded the decision was reviewable because the government based rescission only on the belief that DACA went beyond DHS' authority and so the APA's bar did not apply, and the decision did not fall within the three discrete occasions when the INA bars judicial review of DHS decisions. As to the merits of the preliminary injunction, the panel held that \"DACA was a permissible exercise of executive discretion\" and the government's belief that DACA was illegal was wrong. Thus, the panel concluded the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits in showing that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The panel also held that a nationwide injunction was appropriate because it \"promotes uniformity in immigration enforcement, and is necessary to provide the plaintiffs here with complete redress.\" Id. In November 2018, while the appeal was pending, the Government simultaneously filed three petitions for certiorari before judgment, in this case, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16162\"><i>National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Trump</i></a>, and <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15462\"><i>Vidal v. Nielsen</i></a>, also challenging the DACA rescission. In both this case and <i>Vidal v. Nielsen</i>, the district courts had granted a nationwide injunction to maintain the DACA program. In <i>NAACP v. Trump</i>, the district court also found that the vacatur of rescission was proper, but later granted a limited stay for certain DACA applications pending appeal. All three cases were appealed to the Circuit courts as well. On June 28, 2019, after the Ninth Circuit affirmed the nationwide injunction (on Nov. 8 the previous year), but before rulings from the other two Circuits, the Supreme Court granted the petitions and consolidated the cases for argument. 908 F.3d 476; 139 S.Ct. 2779. The case was argued at the U.S. Supreme Court on November 12, 2019. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants did not follow proper APA procedures. On June 18, 2020, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor), the Court held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA, that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program, and that the rescission was unlawful, arbitrary, and capricious in violation of the APA. 140 S. Ct. 1891. Following the Supreme Court's decision, in another case challenging the DACA recession, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16202\"><i>Casa De Maryland v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security</i></a>, the Fourth Circuit issued a mandate to reinstate DACA and set aside the recession memo on a nationwide basis on June 30, 2020. On July 17, 2020, the District Court of Maryland ordered DHS to reinstate DACA as it existed before the issuance of the recession memo and ordered DHS to resume accepting initial DACA applications. However, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad Wolf instead issued a memorandum entitled \"Reconsideration of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled 'Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children\" on July 28, 2020 (\"Wolf Memorandum\"). In this memo, Acting Secretary Wolf stated that he would reconsider DACA's future in light of the Supreme Court's decision. In the interim, the memo instructed USCIS to reject all initial requests for DACA, to only grant advance parole to current DACA beneficiaries in exceptional circumstances, and grant DACA renewals for only one-year, rather than two-year, periods. Later in August, Deputy Director for Policy for USCIS Joseph Edlow issued a memorandum implementing the Wolf Memorandum. On August 4, 2020, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further action consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. In response to the Wolf Memorandum, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 3, 2020. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs substituted some of the defendants to reflect new individuals occupying the relevant roles and to add additional responsible officials, including Deputy Director for Policy Edlow. The amended complaint argued that the Acting Secretary Wolf actions were invalid under the Federal Vacancies Reform Action, Homeland Security Act, and the Appointments Clause of the Constitution because he lacked proper authority to issue the Wolf Memorandum. In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the Wolf Memorandum and Edlow Memorandum violated the APA because Wolf and Edlow acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and an injunction preventing the defendants from altering or limiting DACA program and vacating the Wolf and Edlow Memoranda. The parties agreed to a briefing schedule on forthcoming motions for summary judgment. Though the parties in this case have yet to file motions for summary judgment and the court has yet to rule on the plaintiffs' amended complaint, on December 4, the court in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15462\"><i>Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen</i></a> and <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16130\"><i>State of New York v. Trump</i></a> ordered DHS to fully reinstate DACA as it existed prior to the attempted recession in September 2017 after it found that Acting Secretary Wolf was not lawfully serving as Acting Secretary. The order required DHS to accept initial DACA applications, accept advance parole applications, and grant DACA renewals for two-years. On December 7, 2020 <a href = \"https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole/consideration-of-deferred-action-for-childhood-arrivals-daca\">USCIS</a> updated their website and indicated that effective that day, USCIS would accept initial applications, extend one-year DACA renewals to two-years, and accept applications for advance parole. Then, in early 2021, President Biden took office. On the day of his inauguration (January 20, 2021), President Biden signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General \u201cto preserve and fortify DACA.\u201d In light of potential additional agency action to implement the memorandum, the parties filed a joint stipulation to stay further proceedings and vacate pending deadlines on March 22, 2021. They agreed to provide the court with status updates every 60 days. The first is due May 24, 2021. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "The Regents of the University of California filed this lawsuit challenging DHS's revocation of DACA on September 8, 2017 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs stated that DACA recipients have enabled the nation and the university to greatly benefit from their presence as students and employees at the university. The plaintiffs argued that DHS\u2019 revocation of DACA violates the Fifth Amendment\u2019s Due Process clause and the Administrative Procedure Act. On Jan. 9, 2018, the court ordered a nationwide preliminary injunction, ordering that DACA remain in effect on the same terms and conditions that existed prior to the recession. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings on Nov. 8, 2018. The defendants petitioned the Supreme Court of the U.S. for a writ of certiorari on Nov. 5 which was granted on July 3, 2019. On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA and that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further action consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. DHS then issued a memorandum on July 28, 2020, stating that Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf would reconsider DACA's future and in the interim, instructed USCIS to reject all initial requests for DACA, to only grant advance parole to current DACA beneficiaries in exceptional circumstances, and grant DACA renewals for only one-year, rather than two-year, periods. In response to the Wolf Memorandum, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, arguing that Wold did not have the authority to issue the memo and that Wolf's actions were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. Though the parties in this case have yet to file motions for summary judgment and the court has yet to rule on the plaintiffs' amended complaint, on December 4, the court in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15462\"><i>Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen</i></a> and <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16130\"><i>State of New York v. Trump</i></a> ordered DHS to fully reinstate DACA as it existed prior to the attempted recession in September 2017. On December 7, 2020, USCIS updated its website to indicate that effective that day it would accept initial DACA applications, extend renewals to two years, and accept applications for advance parole. On January 20, 2021, President Biden took office and signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General \u201cto preserve and fortify DACA.\u201d The parties agreed to stay the proceedings pending the implementation of this memorandum. As of May 14, 2021, this case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On August 11, 1980, several inmates filed <i>pro se</i> complaints in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the Tennessee Attorney General. The cases were consolidated despite abstention issues and in light of the 6th Circuit's decision <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=366\"><i>Hanna v. Toner</i></a>. Attorneys were appointed to represent plaintiffs, including Legal Services of Middle Tennessee, Legal Services of South Central Tennessee, National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union, Rural Legal Services of Tennessee, and Legal Aid in Nashville. The plaintiff prisoners alleged that the conditions of confinement and practices in Tennessee's adult penal institutions amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the state's constitution. The amended complaint also resulted in certification of the plaintiffs as a class of all present and future adult male inmates committed to the Tennessee Department of Correction. The complaint challenged living conditions in Tennessee's prisons, ranging from overcrowding and sanitation to medical care and violence. Such \"wanton infliction of unnecessary pain and suffering,\" the plaintiffs alleged, amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. In August of 1982, the district court (Judge Leland Clure Morton) found that the conditions within Tennessee's adult penal institutions were unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment and ordered the defendants to establish remedies and submit them to the court. Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F.Supp. 1052 (M.D.Tenn. 1982). The court found specific facilities--but not all in the system--were inadequate to accommodate a growing prison population, and mandated that the prisons cease double celling in those units. While the court noted significant concern with prison conditions, including serious fire hazards and sanitation issues, it found them constitutionally adequate. Other sanitation issues, such as drinking water sanitation and absence of bedding cleaning procedure, were not found to rise to the level of unconstitutionality. However, the court did find that the constitution did require a level of hygiene in food preparation and kitchen sanitation that the prisons did not meet. The defendants would be required to implement a procedure to ensure basic sanitation practices. Issues of violence were found \"endemic\" to the system and warranting attention, but also \"inevitable\" and not unconstitutional. Similarly, it found the healthcare provided to inmates to be constitutionally adequate. The court mandated that the defendants design a plan to address the constitutionally inadequate conditions and appoint a special master to evaluate the defendants' plan. Other remedial orders were issued by the court in this case, such as enjoining defendants from keeping prisoners in confinement without physical exercise for longer than one week. The defendants appointed Patrick D. McManus. In 1987, the court ordered the plans to be completed by 1992. In a separate litigation concerning inmate populations at Tennessee penal institutions governed by the Grubbs population orders, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges Merritt, Nelson, and Lievely), remanded the case to the judge presiding over the Grubbs decree to oversee proceedings in that case consistent with the Grubbs order. Roberts v. Tennessee Department of Correction, 887 F.2d 1281. The Sixth Circuit noted that the Grubbs court should have jurisdiction of all matters pertaining to population limits and other matters of the Grubbs decree, and transferred the case to that judge. On May 14, 1993, the matter came before the court regarding terminating the class action. The court (Judge Thomas A. Higgins) determined that conditions within Tennessee prisons had improved sufficiently to warrant the almost complete termination of court supervision, vacating and dissolving the injunction. Grubbs v. Bradley, 821 F.Supp. 496 (M.D.Tenn. 1993). The court retained jurisdiction in one area to ensure the defendants created a health care quality-assurance program. The court also awarded the plaintiffs' side attorney's fees and costs. The plaintiffs had moved to hold the defendants in contempt for violation of the injunction and the court denied without prejudice in 1999. The PACER docket indicates that defendants complied with this order and the docket ends on October 13, 2000 after several years of compliance review.", "summary": "Tennessee inmates filed <i>pro se<i> to challenge the constitutionality of the conditions within the state's adult penal institutions. They were appointed counsel and granted class status. The court found the conditions appalling; however, not all rose to the level of unconstitutionality sufficient to find a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Those that did were mandated to be addressed in a statewide plan to address those conditions, including overcrowding and food sanitation. Over a decade later, the state was found in compliance and the injunction was dissolved."}
{"article": "On April 27, 2006, the United States government filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi against First National Bank of Pontotoc (the \"Bank\") and its former Vice-President, under Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). The U.S. sought damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants engaged in a practice or pattern of gender discrimination against female borrowers, female applicants for credit, and female account holders. Specifically, the U.S. alleged that the Vice-President sexually harassed the aforementioned women, and the Bank was liable for his actions. According to the DOJ press release, the Vice-President's actions included offensive comments, unwanted sexual touching, and demanding sexual favors from female customers over a period of years until his employment ended in May of 2004. On July 6, 2006, the Vice-President filed a motion to dismiss. On November 3, 2006, the Court (Judge Glen H. Davidson) dismissed the motion. On July 11, 2007, the U.S. filed an amended complaint, adding allegations of gender discrimination under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 3601 et seq. In other respects, the complaint reiterated the original allegations. On July 25, 2007, the Bank filed a cross-claim against its former Vice-President, denying liability for the latter's actions and seeking compensation from him to the Bank for any liability imposed on the Bank. The parties entered into settlement negotiations and reached an agreement. On November 7, 2007, the Court entered the parties' consent decree. The decree contained general injunctions on gender discrimination in: 1) application for credit: 2) residential real-estate related transaction; 3) terms or conditions of residential real-estate transactions. If the Vice-President resumed engagement in residential real-estate transaction, he had to provide notice to the plaintiff and go through a fair lending laws training, with focus on sex discrimination and harassment. The Bank agreed to institute anti-discrimination policies, including posting notices in media, and a complaints procedure for sexual harassment. The Bank also agreed to provide fair lending training to its present and future employees, focused on sexual harassment. The Bank agreed to pay $130,000.00 in damages to victims of sexual harassment and the Vice-President agreed to pay $120,000.00, with up to $50,000.00 for additional victims. The Bank had to pay $5,000.00 and the Vice-President $45,000.00 in civil penalty to the United States. The Bank also agreed to provide reports to the plaintiff pertaining to the consent decree. The decree remained in effect for five years and the Court retained jurisdiction over the decree for its duration. On September 24, 2008, the Court (Judge Michael P. Mills) approved the joint stipulation of parties on disbursement of funds, and ordered payment of $50,000.00 by the Bank to 29 women with varying amounts.", "summary": "On April 27, 2006, the United States government filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi against First National Bank of Pontotoc (the \"Bank\") and its former Vice-President, under Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1691. The plaintiff sought damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the former Vice-President sexually harassed female customers, and the Bank was liable for his actions. The parties settled and the Court entered the consent decree on November 7, 2007. The defendants had to pay $250,000.00 to victims and $50,000.00 in civil penalty to the United States. The bank also agreed to institute anti-discrimination policies, a complaint procedure for sexual harassment, and provide fair lending training."}
{"article": "This is a case about the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) failing to provide accommodations for nursing employees. On November 26, 2019, a female PPD employee filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff sued the City of Philadelphia under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 201 <i>et seq.</i>, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e <i>et seq.</i>, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief, damages, and attorneys' fees. She sought a proposed class of all female police officers who had worked for the Philadelphia Police Department during the preceding three years. The plaintiff claimed that the PPD had failed to provide nursing female police officers with appropriate accommodations and had engaged in sex and pregnancy discrimination. Specifically, she alleged that the PPD had failed to comply with the Break Time for Nursing Mothers provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by not providing break times or a private location for expressing breast milk (collecting and storing breast milk for use later). The plaintiff also alleged that the PPD had violated the Equal Protection Clause in creating a hostile work environment where the plaintiff class suffered from disparate treatment as a result of their sex and pregnancy status, and the PPD had violated the plaintiff class's First Amendment right to petition by retaliating against them when they tried to assert their rights. The case was assigned to Judge Michael M. Baylson. On February 3, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on February 17, 2020. The changes included explaining more specifically why declaratory and injunctive relief would be appropriate through adding new sections and more citations to case law. The amended complaint also highlighted more explicitly that the plaintiff had to pump at irregular times and in unsanitary bathrooms, or sometimes not at all, as a result of the defendant's actions. More details about the defendant's retaliatory actions were added, including dates that the plaintiff had been forced to work from home without pay. Information about the benefits of breastfeeding infants and statistics regarding breastfeeding mothers in the U.S. was also added to the factual background. On March 2, 2020, the court denied the initial motion to dismiss as moot, and the defendant filed a new motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On March 16, the plaintiff moved to file a supplemental complaint, and the court granted this motion on March 25. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the court also granted additional briefing time. On August 21, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for the supplemental complaint. On November 12, 2020, the court denied the motion to dismiss for two counts: the violations of FLSA protection and Title VII disparate treatment claims. For the other six counts, the court granted the motion to dismiss. In its opinion, the court explained that the plaintiff did not establish enough of a causal connection between the plaintiff's conduct and the defendant's adverse action for FLSA and Title VII retaliation claims. For the Title VII and \u00a7 1983 hostile work environment claims, the plaintiff did not establish \"severe or pervasive conduct\" or \"intentional discrimination.\" For the \u00a7 1983 disparate treatment claim, the plaintiff did not sufficiently allege any policy or custom that caused the disparate treatment. Lastly, for the First Amendment claim regarding the right to petition, the court held that the plaintiff was not speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, so the First Amendment did not apply. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on December 12, 2020. The amended complaint added Pennsylvania state law to the causes of action. It added four new counts under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act and the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance; it also removed four of the six counts that the court had dismissed: Title VII hostile work environment, \u00a7 1983 hostile work environment, \u00a7 1983 disparate treatment, and First Amendment right to petition. For the other two dismissed counts, FLSA and Title VII retaliation, specific acts from the defendant were added to the claims to establish more of a causal connection. On December 24, 2020, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. As of March 13, 2021, this case is ongoing.", "summary": "This is a case about the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) failing to provide accommodations for nursing employees. On November 26, 2019, a female PPD employee filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff sued the City of Philadelphia under the Fair Labor Standards Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief, damages, and attorneys' fees. The plaintiff claimed that the PPD had failed to provide nursing female police officers with appropriate accommodations, engaged in sex and pregnancy discrimination, and violated the First Amendment right to petition. On November 12, 2020, court granted a motion to dismiss for six of the eight counts, holding that the plaintiff did not have enough of a factual basis to allege claims of retaliation, a hostile work environment, or \u00a7 1983 disparate treatment. In addition, the First Amendment protection did not apply. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on December 12, 2020, which the defendant has moved to dismiss. This case is ongoing."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a lawsuit brought by the state of Washington regarding the July 2020 release of ICE regulations which, in effect, meant that students on F-1 visas would risk deportation if their school shifted to online learning. On July 15, in a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same July directive, plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the regulations rescinded. In order to effectuate the rescission, ICE removed the guidance from its website and replaced it with the previous guidance which exempted students from the limitation on online learning credits in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. On October 6, the court granted the parties stipulated request for a dismissal. <hr> <b>Background</b> Generally speaking, F-1 visas (colloquially \"student visas\") can be granted to international students who attend American universities. However, regulations on the granting of these visas limit the amount of online or distance learning the student can engage in. According to these regulations, an international student can engage in only one such class or three credits of that class per semester. 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 214.2(f)(6)(i)(G). The COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020 made this regulation untenable, as schools and universities had to shift to online learning systems. In response, defendant ICE issued an exemption on March 13, 2020, affirming that international students would be permitted to continue distance learning in the United States under their F-1 visas. The exemption would apply until the end of the emergency. However, on July 6, 2020, ICE issued a new directive stating that it would rescind that exemption. This directive would then mean that international students at schools that would still be fully online would have to either transfer to other schools that were at least partially in-person, go back to their countries voluntarily, or risk deportation. The directive also ordered schools that had gone fully online or had simply decided not to have classes to submit an \"operational change plan\" within nine days, and ordered schools that would have a hybrid system to certify each F-1 student to make sure that they were not taking entirely online courses. <b>The Lawsuit</b> This lawsuit was filed on July 10, 2020, four days after the directive was issued. The State of Washington was the plaintiff. Defendants were the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Washington claimed that the new directive violated the Administrative Procedure Act in six ways: 1) the directive was arbitrary and capricious in that it set up implausible deadlines for institutions to decide whether to be fully online or not; 2) the directive was arbitrary and capricious in that it reversed a prior policy without detailing any change in facts; 3) the directive was arbitrary and capricious in that the defendants entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem; 4) the directive was arbitrary and capricious in that defendants did not offer any cogent explanation for the change in policy; and 5) defendants did not engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking when issuing the new policy. Finally, Washington also argued that the directive violated the APA because it was issued in excess of ICE's statutory authority and encroached on the state's ability to exercise police powers regarding public health. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order as well as preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the agencies from enforcing the new directive. Plaintiffs also requested that the court vacate and set aside the new directive, in addition to attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Ricardo S. Martinez. On July 13, the plaintiff requested an emergency temporary restraining order, asking that the court enjoin the defendants from enforcing the directives for at least two weeks. Meanwhile, in a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same directive, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17677&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7CHarvard%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B\"><i>President and Fellows of Harvard College</i></a>, the parties conferred and the defendants agreed to rescind their implementation of the directive and to return to the March policy. On July 16, the parties filed a joint stipulation stating that the defendants' rescission of the directive mooted the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and that the parties agreed to withdraw the motion without prejudice. On October 6, 2020, the court granted the parties' stipulated request for a dismissal.", "summary": "The state of Washington sued the Department of Homeland Security and ICE following the July 6, 2020 directive that would effectively require international students to take in-person classes or be subject to deportation. Washington argued that this violated several provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and sought injunctive relief and a court order vacating the directive. On July 15, in a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same July directive, plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the regulations rescinded. Washington voluntarily dismissed its claims on October 6, 2020."}
{"article": "On March 8th, 2016, two Genesee County Jail detainees filed this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and other detainees in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Sheriff of Genesee County under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Civil Rights Clinic of Michigan State University, sought class certification, declaratory relief, injunctive relief requiring the Genesee County Jail to provide safe and clean water to all detainees, and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The plaintiffs claimed that the Genesee County Jail provided detainees with toxic water for consumption, bathing, and food preparation in violation of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant did not provide safe and clean water to detainees, impacting their health. The plaintiffs alleged that the Sheriff had overwhelming evidence that the water was unsafe to drink and caused lead poisoning after Genesee County officials declared a public health emergency on October, 1, 2015. The health concerns relating to the toxic water of Flint included hypertension, autoimmune disorders, neurological disorders, and psychological disorders. After providing only a nine day supply of bottled water to detainees, the Jail required that detainees return to drinking, bathing, and cooking with the toxic tap water. The plaintiffs alleged that the Sheriff made the decision to return to using toxic tap water for fiscal reasons. The plaintiffs estimated that 500 individuals were detained at any one time in Jail, and thus subjected to toxic water. This is one of many cases that arose from the Flint Water Crisis. Many cases relating to this crisis were condensed into one class action lawsuit, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16508\"><i>Waid v. Snyder</i></a>. This case proceeded independently. For another suit involving the Genesee County Jail but seeking damages, please see <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17174\"><i>Hatcher v. Genesee County</i></a>. On April 6, 2016, the complaint was amended to include an additional plaintiff (another detainee) and an additional defendant (the Captain in charge of the internal workings of the Jail). On June 23, 2016, the lawsuit was resolved via a consent decree approved by District Judge Avern Cohn. In the decree, the defendants maintained that detainees had not consumed toxic water. The decree required defendants to provide detainees with water that is not contaminated by lead for drinking and cooking, meaning the water contains less than fifteen parts per billion of lead contaminants. Additionally, the decree required defendants to test the water in five locations within the Jail every fourteen days for an eight week period, sending copies to the plaintiffs\u2019 counsel. If the tests showed that the lead levels were safe, the defendants were allowed to supply water from the Flint water system to detainees for all uses. The consent decree was set to last for one year and enforceable by the court. (The decree would also terminate if Michigan or the Genesee County Health Department declared Flint\u2019s water safe). There was no additional docket activity during the term of the consent decree, and the case is now closed.", "summary": "On March 8th, 2016, two Genesee County Jail detainees, on behalf of themselves and other detainees, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court in the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Sheriff of Genesee County Jail under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs sought class certification, declaratory relief, injunctive relief requiring the Genesee County Jail to provide safe and clean water to all detainees, and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The plaintiffs claimed that the Genesee County Jail provided detainees with toxic water for consumption, bathing, and food preparation in violation of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. On June 23, 2016, the lawsuit was resolved via a consent decree. The decree required defendants to test the water in five locations within the Jail every fourteen days for an eight week period, sending copies to the plaintiffs\u2019 counsel. If the tests showed that the lead levels were safe, the defendants were allowed to supply water from the Flint water system to detainees for all uses. The consent decree lasted for one year."}
{"article": "On January 16, 2009, a group of California pharmacies participating in the Medi-Cal fee-for-service program filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, against the California Department of Health Care Services. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for preliminary injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and costs claiming that Assembly Bill 1183 (\"AB 1183\") was preempted by \u00a7 30(A) of the Medicaid Act (hereinafter referred to as \"\u00a7 30(A)\"). Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the 5% reduction in Medi-Cal fee-for-service payments to pharmacies would cause the denial of services to Medi-Cal patients, or result in a reduction in services to Medi-Cal patients, or the closure of pharmacies serving Medi-Cal patients in violation of the quality and equal access clauses of \u00a7 30(A). The complaint explained that on September 15, 2008, the California Legislature amended AB 1883, originally a hazardous material bill, to include measures designed to reduce government expenditures in line with the provisions of the earlier 2008-2009 Budget Bill. There were no committee hearings on the amended portions of the bill and the Legislature passed the bill within twenty-four hours, even though, according to the plaintiffs, it contained changes to hundreds of health-care related subjects. The plaintiffs therefore alleged that the California Legislature did not have time to consider whether a 5% rate reduction was consistent with providing quality services and maintaining equal access to services as required under \u00a7 30(A), or time to evaluate the costs to providers of performing services and procedures as also required under \u00a7 30(A). The 5% rate reduction was therefore preempted by \u00a7 30(A), they argued. On February 27, 2009, the District Court (Judge Christina A. Snyder) granted plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and ordered the State to refrain from implementing the 5% payment reduction to pharmacies for prescription drugs provided under the Medi-Cal fee-for-service program. <a href=\"http://clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/DR-CA-0030-0006.pdf\">Managed Pharmacy Care v. Maxwell-Jolly, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (C.D. Cal. 2009)</a>. Shortly after, on March 13, 2009, the State filed a motion to alter or amend and clarify the preliminary injunctive ruling that the District Court denied on April 3, 2009. <a href=\"http://clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/DR-CA-0030-0012.pdf\">Managed Pharmacy Care v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. CV 09-382 CAS (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009)</a>. The State appealed the ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and on March 25, 2010, the Ninth Circuit upheld the decision of the District Court. <a href=\"http://clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/DR-CA-0030-0016.pdf\">Independent Living Center v. Maxwell-Jolly, 374 Fed. Appx. 690 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 2010)</a>. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling that the California Legislature was required to study the impact of the five percent rate reduction on the statutory factors of efficiency, economy, quality, and access to care, prior to enacting AB 1183, and that the legislature had not adequately done so. It also upheld the lower court's finding of irreparable harm, noting that many brand name and generic drugs would be reimbursed at a level below costs, thereby limiting access to Medi-Cal patients. The State appealed the Ninth Circuit ruling to the Supreme Court, and on January 18, 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari review in this case and two related cases. Maxwell-Jolly v. Cal. Pharmacists Assoc., 131 S.Ct. 992 (2011). Oral argument took place on October 3, 2011. While the cases were pending in the Supreme Court, the HHS Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) determined that the rate reductions complied with the Medicaid statute and approved a limited retroactive implementation of the rate reductions. Consequently, the Supreme Court (Justice Stephen Breyer) found that the posture of the case had changed from the Supremacy Clause to the Administrative Procedure Act, introducing a new issue not briefed to the Court or in earlier proceedings, and therefore it vacated the decision of the Ninth Circuit and remanded for reconsideration. 132 S.Ct. 1204 (2012). On remand, the parties agreed to enter settlement mediation overseen by the Ninth Circuit. A settlement agreement was executed in April 2014 and submitted to the district court for approval on August 19, 2014. In the agreement the parties dismissed their appeals from the preliminary injunctions issued in the cases, and the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the pending actions with prejudice, subject to the Court retaining continuing jurisdiction to determine (1) motions for attorneys\u2019 fees by counsel for Plaintiffs, and (2) motions or proceedings by Plaintiffs to enforce the Agreement through January 1, 2016. In return, under the settlement, the defendant agreed \u2013 either by release or by agreement \u2013 to forgo recoupment of any amounts paid out by the Department to Medi-Cal providers, pursuant to the preliminary injunctions previously issued by the Court, except with respect to \u201copt-out providers.\u201d In other words, when the settlement became effective, Plaintiffs gave up their right to seek any further relief, and the defendant gave up its right to seek recoupment of funds that have already been paid pursuant to the preliminary injunctions. The plaintiffs reserved the right to submit a claim for attorney\u2019s fees. In order to acquire attorneys\u2019 fees from the defendants, on July 24 and 28th, 2015 the plaintiffs and intervenors filed additional appeals in the Ninth Circuit to Judge Snyder's order denying fees. However, during a settlement conference on November 16, 2015, the motion for attorneys\u2019 fees was settled, though the terms are not available.", "summary": "On January 16, 2009, a group of California pharmacies participating in the Medi-Cal fee-for-service program filed suit against the California Department of Health Care Services in federal court. Plaintiffs claimed that the rate reductions included in Assembly Bill (\"AB\") 1183 were preempted by the federal Medicaid law. The district court granted the plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunction, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed this ruling. After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case, the HHS Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) approved the rate reductions included in AB 1183. Consequently, the Supreme Court (Justice Stephen Breyer) concluded that the case presented issues not briefed in earlier proceedings and vacated the Ninth Circuit decision. On September 22, 2014, the district court approved the settlement agreement that required the plaintiffs to give up their right to seek further relief and the defendant agreed to give up its right to seek recoupment of funds paid in pursuance of the preliminary injunctions"}
{"article": "On July 18, 2018, the City of New York filed a complaint against the Attorney General of the U.S. and the Department of the Justice in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The City alleged that the defendants imposed new immigration-related conditions on the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Spending Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and separation of powers. The City, represented by private counsel, sought to enjoin defendants from imposing new conditions on congressionally approved federal funding for the JAG program because these conditions are arbitrary and capricious. The City further sought a declaration that Section 1373 of Title 8 of the United States Code (\"Section 1373\") is unconstitutional, or, to the extent that Section 1373 lawfully applies to the JAG program, a declaration that the City's laws and policies comply with Section 1373. A couple of days later, on July 20, 2018, DOJ released the FY 2018 JAG award solicitation and sought to impose new immigration-related conditions on grantees in addition to those imposed on FY 2017 grantees. Any recipient that accepts the FY 2018 award would also need to certify that it would not violate 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1644, a federal statute prohibiting restrictions on sharing information about an individual\u2019s immigration status with federal authorities. In light of this, the City filed an amended complaint on August 6 to seek additional relief. On August 17, the City filed a motion for partial summary judgment. On September 14, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively, motion for partial summary judgment. On November 30, Judge Edgardo Ramos granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment and denied the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and motion for partial summary judgment. The court held that the conditions were not in accordance with the APA, violated the anticommandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment, and violated the constitutional separation of powers. However, the motion for summary judgment with respect to the Spending Clause was denied as moot. The defendants were enjoined from imposing or enforcing the conditions. On January 28, 2019, the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Back in district court, the City again filed a motion for partial summary judgment. These competing motions remained in limbo for nearly a year until, in February 2020, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's initial finding and directed it to enter partial summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Attorney General and the Department of Justice. However, before the case was concluded, the Biden administration took over and reversed course. The case was stayed on March 19, 2021, and in the following month, on April 30, 2021, the case was voluntarily dismissed by both parties. This case is now closed.", "summary": "On July 18, 2018, the City of New York filed a complaint against the Attorney General of the U.S. and the Department of the Justice in the Southern District of New York. The City alleged that the defendants imposed new immigration-related conditions on the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, the Spending Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and separation of powers. The City sought to enjoin defendants from imposing new conditions on congressionally approved federal funding for the JAG program because these conditions are arbitrary and capricious. On November 30, Judge Edgardo Ramos granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment, but on appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the District Court's finding. When the new Biden administration took over in the following year, however, the case was voluntarily dismissed by both parties."}
{"article": "On May 3, 2017, Jewish prisoners at the Idaho Department of Corrections (IDOC) filed a putative class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho. The plaintiffs sued the Director of the Idaho Department of Corrections and several agents of the IDOC under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and state law, namely, the Free Exercise of Religion Protected Act. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief as well as attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Candy W. Dale. The plaintiffs alleged that, in refusing to offer Kosher meals to prisoners, the defendants had imposed a substantial burden on the plaintiffs\u2019 religious practice. Specifically, they alleged that the defendants had violated RLUIPA, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth amendment and the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. On May 4, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking to require the defendants to provide a kosher diet option without charge for prisoners at all Idaho Department of Correction facilities. On July 11, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or, alternatively, for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs\u2019 state law claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and that their state law claims for monetary relief were barred for the failure to file a notice of tort claim. After reaching a partial settlement, the parties jointly filed a motion for entry of an order dismissing all of the plaintiffs\u2019 class action claims. The parties also posed a joint stipulation of their settlement agreement to create a new kosher diet system. Entitled the Common Fare No Touch menu, this diet system consisted of a majority of meals that were pre-packaged or double-sealed frozen meals that were kosher certified. The parties also agreed that the plaintiffs\u2019 counsel would monitor compliance for at least six months. On August 17, 2017, Judge Dale entered an order adopting the stipulation, dismissing the claims and deeming as moot the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for preliminary injunction. The court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. In October 2017, the plaintiffs agreed to allow judgment to be taken against them in exchange for the sum of $93,000, including all accrued costs and attorney\u2019s fees. The court entered such judgment. On December 26, 2017, the defendants agreed that the monitoring period of the new diet system would end on June 1, 2018. As of October 23, 2018, there are no new entries on the docket that would suggest noncompliance. The case is presumably closed.", "summary": "This 2017 class action lawsuit was filed by Jewish prisoners in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho. The plaintiffs alleged that, in refusing to offer Kosher meals to prisoners, the defendants had imposed a substantial burden on the plaintiffs\u2019 religious practice. In October 2017, the parties reached a settlement where the defendant would provide kosher meals to Jewish prisoners and award $93,000 in damages and attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs. The case is presumably closed."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a suit brought by several Michigan businesses against the State of Michigan's executive orders requiring non-critical businesses to stop operating during the outbreak of COVID-19. The plaintiffs alleged that Michigan's orders arbitrarily discriminated against their businesses, in violation of several constitutional clauses and state law. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss after Governor Whitmer lifted the restrictions on businesses. <hr> The executive orders issued by Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer in response to the outbreak of COVID-19 prohibited activities and business \"not necessary to sustain or protect life.\" Seven Michigan businesses that were required to stop operating alleged that the executive orders violated their constitutional rights and state law. Represented by private counsel, plaintiffs brought this Section 1983 suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan against Governor Whitmer and the Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services on April 28, 2020. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the executive orders were arbitrary and discriminated against their businesses by treating them differently than other similarly situated businesses. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees. The case was assigned to Judge Paul L. Maloney. Plaintiffs asserted that the executive orders forced them to \"close or significantly restrict their businesses, depriving them of their liberty and property interests without due process,\" while allowing other businesses deemed 'critical' to stay open, even though: 'critical' businesses must adhere to guidance from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention on 'social distancing'; and Plaintiffs are fully capable of adhering to those same guide-lines if allowed to reopen.\" Moreover, plaintiffs argued that the measures taken by defendants to \"flatten the curve\" and stop the spread of COVID-19 in Michigan were unnecessary and excessive. Plaintiffs claimed that the executive orders requiring them to close their businesses violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, their Procedural and Substantive Due Process rights, the Equal Protection Clause, and that the orders were unconstitutionally vague. Plaintiffs also contended that executive orders violated the state's separation of powers clause and the Emergency Powers Act. 2020 WL 2079549. On May 11, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and removed their claims that the executive orders violated state law. On May 29, the United States Department of Justice filed a statement of interest explaining that the alleged facts suggest that the executive orders violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Commerce Clause. The DOJ stated that \"Plaintiffs have made an initial showing that the Orders arbitrarily and oppressively limit their business operations by prohibiting and restricting Plaintiffs\u2019 business operations while permitting similarly situated businesses to continue to operate, or to operate with lesser restrictions, and permitting social gatherings of as many as ten people.\" The DOJ also concluded that plaintiffs were likely to establish that the executive orders unduly burdened interstate commerce, in violation of the Commerce Clause. On June 8, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs' claims were moot, that plaintiffs lacked standing, and that plaintiffs failed to adequately state a claim concerning their federal constitutional challenges. Defendants asserted that the restrictions challenged by plaintiffs had been lifted as the \"curve of the virus's spread . . . flatten[ed],\" rendering the plaintiffs' claims moot. Furthermore, defendants argued that plaintiffs' claims lacked merit because the executive orders were \"a proper exercise of the authority given to the States to combat a public health crisis\" and \"necessary to meet the demands of these extraordinary times.\" On June 12, the Michigan Epidemiologists sought to file an amicus brief in support of the defendants' motion to dismiss. The case appears ongoing, but with minimal docket entries.", "summary": "On April 28, 2020, several Michigan businesses that were required to close during the outbreak of COVID-19 filed this suit against Governor Whitmer in the U.S. District Court for the District of Western Michigan. Plaintiffs challenged Michigan's executive orders, which required businesses deemed non-critical to close, alleging that the orders arbitrarily discriminated against their businesses. The Department of Justice filed a statement of interest suggesting that the executive orders likely violated the Equal Protection and the Commerce Clauses. After the Governor lifted the restrictions on plaintiffs, defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "In December 2013, the EEOC brought this suit against the County of Maui Police Department in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) (29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 621 et seq.). The EEOC alleged that the County of Maui Police Department did not hire a candidate because of his age (45). The EEOC asked for (a) a permanent injunction enjoining the police from engaging in any employment practices which resulted in discrimination on the basis of age; (b) an order that the police institute and carry out policies, practices and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for persons forty (40) years of age and older; (c) an order that the police provide wages and benefits to the candidate; and (d) an order that the police provide rightful-place reinstatement with seniority restored or front pay. In 2009, the candidate applied to the County of Maui Police Department. He met all minimum qualifications for training and experience, and he passed the initial written civil service exam with a high score above 90 points. Then he was scheduled for an oral interview. During the interview, the panel made age-based remarks including \"I doubt someone your age could handle the stress of training\" in addition to whether he could perform the physical holds required due to his age, and whether someone his age could take directives from a younger person. They decided not to hire the candidate. During the hiring period of January through October 2009, at least 28 applicants were hired who were younger than the candidate and were less qualified for the position than the candidate on the basis of their education, experience and civil service written exam scores. On May 6, 2016, the parties entered into a three-year consent decree that required the defendant to pay the charging party $24,000 in unclassified damages and required the defendant to modify its anti-discrimination policy, establish record-keeping procedures, improve its compliance efforts, provide anti-discrimination training to employees to prevent future discrimination including providing training to employees, and report to an independent monitor. There has been no activity on the docket since May 2016, and the case is thus presumed to be closed.", "summary": "In December 2013, the EEOC brought this suit against the County of Maui Police Department for engaging in age discrimination in its hiring practices. In May 2016, the parties entered into a 3-year consent decree which required the defendant to pay damages to the charging party, revise its anti-discrimination policy, provide employee training, and comply with other reporting and monitoring requirements. There has been no activity on the docket since May 2016, and the case is thus presumed to be closed."}
{"article": "On December 20, 2011, Charlie Savage, Scott Shane, and the New York Times (NYT) filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). There had been controversy and questions surrounding the legality of targeted killings since October 2001, when the Bush Administration had first contemplated whether covert lethal force could be used against people deemed to be al-Qaeda operatives. The debate rekindled when an Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen, was killed in Yemen on September 29, 2011. On September 30, 2011, the Washington Post had reported that the government had produced a \u201csecret memorandum authorizing the legal targeting\u201d of al-Awlaki. Both before and after the death of al-Awlaki, the NYT had filed FOIA requests seeking records regarding the government\u2019s use of targeted lethal force. On June 11, 2010, Mr. Shane had submitted a FOIA request to DOJ seeking a copy of \u201call Office of Legal Counsel opinions or memoranda since 2001 that addresses the legal status of targeted killings, assassination, or killing of people suspected of ties to Al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups by employees or contractors of the United States government.\u201d However, the DOJ had denied the FOIA request, maintaining that all responsive records were being withheld pursuant to FOIA exemptions. On October 7, 2011, Mr. Savage submitted a similar FOIA request and were denied for similar reasons. In their complaint, the plaintiffs requested that the records requested by the NYT be declared public, or that the court conduct an in camera review to determine whether any parts of the memoranda are properly public under FOIA; that the DOJ provide the records; and that the court award the NYT attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. On June 20, 2012, the DOJ filed a motion for summary judgment, and on July 18, 2012, the NYT filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On January 2, 2013, District Judge Colleen McMahon granted the DOJ\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denied the NYT\u2019s cross-motion (the court filed a corrected opinion on January 22, 2013 that corrected several grammatical and typographical errors; however, the corrected opinion was substantively identical to the original opinion). Judge McMahon stated that she found herself in a \u201ca veritable Catch-22\u201d and that she could not find any way \u201caround the ticket of laws and precedents that effectively allow the Executive Branch of our Government to proclaim as perfectly lawful certain actions that seem on their face incompatible with our Constitution and laws, while keeping the reasons for its conclusion a secret.\u201d However, under the law, Judge McMahon found that the DOJ had not violated FOIA by refusing to turn over the documents sought in the FOIA requests and that their motion for summary judgment had to be granted. Nearly all of the documents located in response to the plaintiffs\u2019 FOIA requests were classified, and the appropriate authorities from each of the responding agencies had filed affidavits; Judge McMahon found that there was no evidence suggesting that the proper procedures were not followed when these documents were classified. She noted that the DOJ had submitted additional material to the court for ex parte and for in camera review in support of its position; however, due to their classified nature, she filed a separate, classified appendix to her opinion, which was filed under seal and was not made available to the plaintiffs. 915 F.Supp.2d 508. On January 31, 2013, the plaintiffs appealed Judge McMahon\u2019s grant of summary judgment to the DOJ to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On April 21, 2014, the appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. In particular, it found that the DOJ had improperly submitted a \u201cno number, no list\u201d response, which acknowledges the existence of documents responsive to a FOIA request but does not identify nor number them, to the NYT\u2019s first FOIA request instead of submitting the usual \u201cVaughn index,\u201d which numbers and identifies by title and description documents that are being withheld and specifies the FOIA exemptions asserted. Additionally, the appeals court found that the DOJ had insufficiently justified submitted a \u201cGlomar response,\u201d which neither confirms nor denies the existence of documents responsive to a FOIA request, in response to NYT\u2019s second FOIA request. Therefore, the appeals court ordered that the DOJ submit a redacted version of a classified Vaughn index. 752 F.3d 123. On June 23, 2014, the appeals court ordered that the DOJ disclose a 2010 document known as the \u201cOLC-DOD Memorandum,\u201d which was a legal opinion prepared by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the DOJ advising as to the legality of targeted drone attacks. The appeals court had found that prior disclosures by senior officials of the government had resulted in waiver of all applicable exemptions for protection of the OLC-DOD memorandum. 756 F.3d 100. On October 22, 2015, the appeals court ruled that the DOJ did not have to disclose other documents. 806 F.3d 682. On February 29, 2016, the parties stipulated that the DOJ would pay the plaintiffs $100,000 in attorneys\u2019 fees and litigation costs. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On December 20, 2011, Charlie Savage, Scott Shane, and the New York Times (NYT) filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). The plaintiffs had previously submitted multiple FOIA requests to the DOJ seeking a copy of \u201call Office of Legal Counsel opinions or memoranda since 2001 that addresses the legal status of targeted killings, assassination, or killing of people suspected of ties to Al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups by employees or contractors of the United States government.\u201d However, the DOJ had denied the FOIA requests, maintaining that all responsive records were being withheld pursuant to FOIA exemptions. On June 23, 2014, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ordered that the DOJ disclose a 2010 document known as the \u201cOLC-DOD Memorandum,\u201d which was a legal opinion prepared by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the DOJ advising as to the legality of targeted drone attacks. The appeals court had found that prior disclosures by senior officials of the government had resulted in waiver of all applicable exemptions for protection of the OLC-DOD memorandum. On October 22, 2015, the appeals court ruled that the DOJ did not have to disclose other documents. On February 29, 2016, the parties stipulated that the DOJ would pay the plaintiffs $100,000 in attorneys\u2019 fees and litigation costs. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On November 22, 2013, a man that had been in custody for twenty-five years for a crime committed when he was sixteen filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The plaintiff sued the Iowa Board of Parole and the Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiff, represented by the University of Iowa Law School Clinic, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the parole board\u2019s actions and policies violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was being denied the opportunity for meaningful release while he was being detained under a mandatory adult life sentence for the crime he committed when he was sixteen. The plaintiff was not attempting to invalidate his life sentence, rather he was requesting a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on his youth at the time the crime was committed combined with his demonstrated rehabilitation and maturity during the time he had already spent in prison. In <i>Graham v. Florida</i>, the Supreme Court stated that \u201cConstitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide\u201d and to sentence otherwise was cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). Under <i>Graham</i>, the State is required to give juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide a meaningful opportunity to obtain release. The plaintiff had previously filed a motion to correct his illegal sentence on October 15, 2010 in a separate lawsuit, filed in Iowa State Court. The motion was granted by Judge Carroll, who resentenced the plaintiff to life with eligibility for parole. The amended sentence established that the plaintiff was then eligible for parole as he had served past the statutory minimum of twenty-five years. The plaintiff applied for parole several times and was summarily denied based on the grounds of the seriousness of the offense he committed. No other grounds, such as the fact that he was an exemplary inmate for nearly thirty years and had only one minor infraction during that time, were considered during the parole review. In addition to the policies that failed to take into account the plaintiff\u2019s youth at the time and demonstrated maturity over the course of imprisonment, the parole board also required that the plaintiff take sex offender courses due to the nature of his crime. The plaintiff attempted to enroll in these courses, but was denied because of the Department of Corrections\u2019 enrollment policy. Under IDOC policy, an inmate was only eligible to take the course if there were within two years of their date of discharge. Since inmates serving a life sentence lack a date of discharge, they are permanently unable to enroll in the classes required by the parole board. As a result, the plaintiff claimed that the IDOC had failed to implement any policies that would give the plaintiff a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on rehabilitation and demonstrated maturity. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on February 7, 2014. On January 15, 2015, the court (Judge Robert Pratt) denied the defendant\u2019s motion. The court found that the plaintiff did, in fact, state a plausible claim that the defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying him a meaningful opportunity to obtain release, denying the motion in its entirety. 79 F.Supp.3d 933. The parties then engaged in discovery for more than two years. According to a status report filed on June 15, 2017, the plaintiff was granted work release status. On October 3, 2017, the parties filed stipulation of dismissal of all claims without prejudice, which the court granted the next day. No reasons were provided. The case is now closed.", "summary": "This case was filed on November 23, 2013 and alleges that the Iowa Department of Corrections violated an inmate\u2019s right to due process and protection from cruel and unusual punishment by denying him a meaningful opportunity for parole. The inmate was a juvenile offender, but was sentenced to a mandatory adult life sentence without parole. The Supreme Court eventually deemed it unconstitutional to give juveniles life sentences without parole, so the plaintiff was resentenced to life with parole and was applying to be released based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. The case is still ongoing."}
{"article": "On April 15, 1992, the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty and ten parents of homeless, school-age children filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the District of D.C., seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty and private counsel, sued the District of Columbia and D.C. Public Schools under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging violations of the McKinney Act and the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. The case was assigned to Judge Royce Lamberth. The McKinney Act was passed in 1987 to assure that homeless children had equal access to free education and to improve the educational experience of homeless children. The Act required state plans that required the state educational agency to make determinations about which school each homeless child should attend based on their best interest, and to provide the child with services comparable to the services offered to other students - including transportation services, programs for vocational education, and school meal programs. The plaintiffs alleged that the District of Columbia violated the Act because it had:<blockquote> (1) Failed to implement a best interest standard in placing homeless children in schools; (2) failed to ensure transportation to and from the school that [was] in the best interest of homeless children to attend; (3) failed to coordinate social services and public education for homeless children, and to ensure access to comparable educational services and school meal programs; and (4) failed to provide access to free, appropriate public education for homeless children.</blockquote> The plaintiffs also alleged that the District of Columbia had violated their Equal Protection rights by providing transportation assistance to handicapped children but not providing transportation to homeless children, despite the two groups of children being similarly situated. The plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction concurrently with the complaint. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that there was no private right of action under the McKinney Act and that the plaintiffs had not stated a valid Equal Protection claim. On June 9, 1992, Judge Lamberth granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction as moot. 1992 WL 151813. He held that the McKinney Act did not have a private right of action and that Equal Protection claims failed because the defendants had a rational basis for treating homeless children and handicapped children differently with respect to transportation assistance. After plaintiffs appealled, on August 22, 1994, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. The court held that the McKinney Act did confer enforceable rights on its beneficiaries, so the plaintiffs could bring a \u00a7 1983 claim. 27 F.3d 605. The defendants sought review by the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari on November 28, 1994. 115 S. Ct. 578. On remand, the plaintiffs renewed their motion for preliminary injunction on September 12, 1994, and filed an amended complaint on September 21. On November 18, 1994, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on November 21, 1994. On March 7, 1995, Judge Lamberth granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the defendants had violated the McKinney Act by failing to address the educational needs of homeless children and by failing to provide adequate transportation. 879 F. Supp. 116. The court entered an injunction, requiring defendants to identify homeless children the first time they reported to the intake center and arrange for appropriate educational services at that time. The court also required the defendants to either offer bus tokens to homeless children who traveled over 1.5 miles to attend school or implement a bus service dedicated to transporting homeless children to and from school. Following this judgment, the District of Columbia passed emergency legislation and withdrew from the McKinney Act programs. On March 21, 1995, the defendants separate motions to stay or vacate the March 7 order. The motion to stay was denied on March 25, and the defendants took steps to comply with the injunction while awaiting a decision on their motion to vacate. On May 4, 1995, Judge Lamberth denied the motion to vacate, but dissolved the injunction because D.C. no longer was a part of the grant program under the McKinney Act. 886 F. Supp. 56. The plaintiffs petitioned for attorneys fees on May 31, 1995; the parties settled this issue in October 1995. The case is closed.", "summary": "Parents of homeless children sued D.C. to provide transportation and better identification of the needs of homeless children attending public schools in compliance with the McKinney Act. The court initially dismissed the case, but the decision was remanded by the D.C. Court of Appeals. On remand, the court entered an injunction, requiring better identification and transportation. However, D.C. withdrew from the McKinney Act and the injunction was dissolved."}
{"article": "On February 27, 2013, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) filed this lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for failure to release information in response to EPIC's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The FOIA request was filed on July 10, 2012 regarding the disclosure of a communication shutdown procedure approved by DHS. EPIC claimed that DHS's failure to respond to an administrative appeal violated the statutory deadline imposed by FOIA. Additionally, EPIC claims that DHS failed to make a reasonable effort to search for the documents requested and that DHS was unlawfully withholding said documents. The EPIC requested injunctive relief from the court to compel immediate disclosure of the relevant records. The FOIA request was for disclosure of records related to a communication shutdown procedure called Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 303 described in the <a href=\"https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2006-2007%20NSTAC%20Issue%20Review_0.pdf\">2006-07 DHS Issue Review </a> as codifying a \"shutdown and restoration process for use by commercial and private wireless networks during national crises\" to prevent the remote detonation of bombs. On July 11, 2011 a Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) officer in San Francisco shot and killed a homeless man. He later alleged that the homeless man had a knife and that the officer had shot him in self defense. This resulted in a major protest against BART. The second protest on August 12, 2011 was cut short when BART supposedly used the SOP 303 communication shutdown procedure to shut off all cellular service in several of its transit stations for three hours. DHS responded to EPIC's FOIA request on August 21, 2012 notifying EPIC that DHS was unable to locate or identify the records requested. EPIC administratively appealed this response on September 13, 2012. DHS, which was statutorily required by FOIA to respond to an administrative appeal within 20 days, did not submit a timely response. On May 20, 2013, Judge James E. Boasberg ordered the disclosure of any segregable portions of SOP 303. On June 28, 2013, DHS disclosed the document, but withheld portions under FOIA exemptions 6 and 7(C), 7(E), and 7(D) on the grounds that they included personal information of DHS officials, techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or endangered the life of any individual. At the same time, DHS moved for summary judgment and EPIC made a cross-motion for summary judgment. On November 12, 2013 Judge James E. Boasberg granted EPIC's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that DHS's invocation of exemptions 7(E) and 7(D) were improper, and stayed the order pending the defendant's appeal to the DC Circuit Court. On June 1, 2015, The DC Circuit Court reversed and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether any segregable portions of SOP 303 could be disclosed. On July 10, 2015, DHS submitted a redacted version of SOP 303 to Judge Boasberg, who decided consistent with the court of appeals' decision that DHS did not need to disclose any further information and entered judgment in favor DHS. Afterwards, the parties litigated regarding DHS's payment of EPIC's attorney's fees. On July 18, 2016, the judge granted in part the motion for attorney's fees totaling $20,145.04. The case is now closed.", "summary": "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) adopted a communication shutdown procedure (SOP 303) intended to prevent the remote detonation of bombs without publicly disclosing the content of the procedure. The Electronic Privacy and Information Center (EPIC) filed a FOIA request in July 2012 for SOP 303, and the DHS was reluctant to disclose it. It responded to EPIC's FOIA request by saying the document could not be located, and did not respond timely to EPIC's administrative appeal of that response. EPIC filed this law suit on February 27, 2013 for injunctive relief to compel DHS to disclose the entirety of SOP 303. On May 20, 2013, the judge ordered the disclosure of any segregable portions of SOP 303. On June 28, 2013, DHS disclosed portions of the document and withheld other based on FOIA exemptions DHS believed applied to the procedure. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Judge Boasberg granted the EPIC's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that DHS did not properly apply the exemptions. The DC Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case to determine whether there were segregable portions of SOP 303 that could be disclosed. DHS then submitted a redacted version of SOP 303 to Judge Boasberg, who decided that the document was disclosed liberally enough and granted judgment in favor of DHS."}
{"article": "On May 27, 2003, the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh offices of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a lawsuit under Title VII against PJAX, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The EEOC alleged that the defendants, an interstate trucking and freight firm, had violated Title VII by subjecting their female employees to sexual harassment in the workplace. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendants created a hostile work environment and failed to promote qualified females. On October 6, 2003, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The court never ruled on that motion because on November 24, 2003, the parties filed a consent decree, which the court approved two days later. This consent decree has an effective period of two years and required the defendant to pay $300,000.00 in compensatory damages to the complainant and $200,000.00 in compensatory damages to four other complainants, to be distributed pro-rata. It also states that the defendants were enjoined from discriminating or retaliating against any of their employees on the basis of sex. They agreed to revise their anti-discrimination policy, and to provide their employees with equal employment opportunity training. Additionally, the defendants were required to distribute their revised policies and to post notice of EEO rights.", "summary": "This case was brought in 2003 by the EEOC against PJAX, a trucking firm, for sexual harassment and sex discrimination. The case settled for $500,000 and injunctive relief. See EE-MD-0093 for a related case settled simultaneously."}
{"article": "On July 11, 2006, the Montana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, other civil rights organizations, and state legislators filed a lawsuit in the Supreme Court of Montana, seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions banning all executions in the state. The complaint alleged that the state did not provide standards for the use of lethal injections in executions to ensure constitutional protections. The Supreme Court of Montana dismissed or denied all claims. The court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction because the only prisoner scheduled to be executed, David Dawson, did not wish to appeal his death sentence and there were no other emergency circumstances warranting injunctive relief. On August 4, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint and motion for preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the District of Montana seeking to litigate the issue of whether the procedure for administering lethal injections in Montana was constitutional. On August 7, 2006, the court (Judge Donald W. Molley) dismissed the case for lack of standing. The plaintiffs appealed the same day. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling and dismissed the appeal on Aug. 10. Court documents explaining the court's reasoning are not publicly available. The case is closed.", "summary": "On July 11, 2006, the Montana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, other civil rights organizations, and state legislators filed a lawsuit in the Supreme Court of Montana, seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions banning all executions in the state. The complaint alleged that the state did not provide standards for the use of lethal injections in executions to ensure constitutional protections. The court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction because the only prisoner scheduled to be executed did not wish to appeal his death sentence and there were no other emergency circumstances warranting injunctive relief. On August 4, 2006, the plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Montana seeking to litigate the issue of whether the procedure for administering lethal injections in Montana was constitutional. On August 7, 2006, the court dismissed the case for lack of standing. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The case is closed."}
{"article": "On August 8, 2013, detainees of the Costa County Juvenile Hall filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against Contra Costa County, California. The plaintiffs, represented by counsel from the Disability Rights Advocates, alleged that defendants discriminated against disabled youth in the Contra Costa County Juvenile Hall. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that because Contra Costa County denied the plaintiffs special education and related services, the plaintiffs misbehaved and were punished; during punishment, the plaintiffs were placed in solitary confinement for at least 22 hours per day, which made their disabilities worse and made the plaintiffs more likely to misbehave again. The plaintiffs alleged that the solitary confinement, denial of rehabilitative services while in solitary confinement, and denial of special education and other services even while out of solitary confinement violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEA), the American Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and three state anti-discrimination laws. Plaintiffs sought class certification, declaratory judgment, injunctive relief with monitoring by a special master, and attorney fees. The case was assigned to Judge Saundra B. Armstrong. Over the next year, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, and the plaintiffs moved for class certification. The plaintiffs amended their complaint to drop all defendants except Contra Costa County and Contra Costa County Office of Education. As a result, Judge Armstrong denied as moot the motions for dismissal and class certification, and both parties refiled their motions to include the updated parties and proceedings. On January 16, 2014, the County filed three separate suits in this same Court, one against each plaintiff, arguing that the underlying Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for California improperly found that the County's Probation Department could be sued under the IDEA. The County requested attorney fees for the appeal and that the Court set aside the OAH findings. The plaintiffs moved to consolidate their action with the County's three suits, but the Court deferred litigation on the County's claims until a decision was made on its motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims. On February 13, 2014, the United States filed a Statement of Interest concerning protection of detained youth, especially when solitary confinement was involved. The U.S. explained that it had an interest in the case because of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, which allows the U.S. to investigate juvenile detention facilities for unlawful detention practices. The U.S. argued that the County had a duty to provide services, activities and programs to qualified youth, and that the law does not allow discrimination based on disabilities. For that reason, the U.S. requested that the Court consider the Statement of Interest and deny defendants' motion to dismiss. Following extensive negotiations, the plaintiffs reached settlement agreements with both Contra Costa County and the Contra Costa County Office of Education. On November 25, 2015, the court (Judge Maria-Elena James) approved the settlement agreements. 2015 WL 7571789. Under the settlement agreement with Contra Costa County, the County would no longer use solitary confinement for discipline, punishment, administrative convenience, retaliation, staffing shortages, or reasons other than a temporary response to behavior that threatens immediate harm to the youth or others. In line with national standards, the County could segregate a youth in his or her room for no more than four hours but only if the youth\u2019s behavior risked immediate harm to themselves or others. After four hours, the Probation Department had to remove the youth from confinement, develop specialized individualized programming for the youth, or assess whether the youth should be transported to a mental health facility. Under the settlement agreement with the Contra Costa County Office of Education, the County Office of Education would retain an outside expert to evaluate its compliance with federal and state special education laws and to ensure that the students with disabilities in Juvenile Hall would receive the special education that they need. The expert would make recommended revisions to policies, procedures and practices as they relate to Child Find, development and implementation of individualized education plans, and discipline, which the County\u2019s Board of Education will adopt. The defendants also agreed to pay $1,340,000 in attorneys' fees. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreements, which were scheduled to last for four years. On December 18, 2015, the court approved the parties' motion to modify the settlement agreements' procedures for choosing experts to monitor implementation. On July 13, 2016, the court approved the parties' second request for modification of the settlement agreement, which increased the time period during which the parties could raise challenges to the export report required by the settlement agreement. On September 28, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for administrative relief, seeking referral to Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero for a status conference to discuss disputes between the parties regarding implementation of the settlement agreement. The motion for administrative relief was granted the next day, and the parties held status conferences before Magistrate Judge Spero on October 17 and November 10, 2016. As of April 18, 2020, the court retains jurisdiction over the settlement agreements.", "summary": "In 2013, Disability Rights Advocates in partnership with Public Counsel filed this lawsuit because Contra Costa County Juvenile Hall had a policy and practice of locking young people with disabilities in solitary confinement for up to 23 hours a day and depriving them of education. They filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against Contra Costa County, California. The parties settled in 2015."}
{"article": "On January 13, 2011, New York wheelchair users and several disability rights organizations filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the the New York Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the New York City Human Rights Law. Represented by Disabilities Right Advocates, the plaintiffs claimed the TLC failed to give meaningful access to persons with disabilities when issuing its regulations for the design of the next generation of NYC taxicabs. According to the complaint, only 1.8% of taxis were accessible to persons with mobility disabilities, which deprived them of meaningful access to New York City without using more expensive alternatives. In addition, the Taxi & Limousine Commission had recently approved of specific Nissan models of SUVs and hybrid automobiles for the next generation of NYC taxicabs. The complaint alleged that the SUVs were too high for wheelchair access and that the hybrids' trunk space could not accommodate a wheelchair, including the folding model. The TLC responded in early March by filing a motion to dismiss. Judge George B. Daniels held an oral argument over the motion and denied the TLC's motion, as well as their motion for interlocutory appeal. The case proceeded with discovery and, on August 10, 2011, Judge Daniels granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment, and several interested parties filed Amicus Curiae briefs in response to the motion. On December 23, 2011, Judge Daniels entered partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding the defendants liable under Title II of the ADA, and granted plaintiffs a temporary restraining order. The order required all new taxi medallions and livery services to be limited to accessible vehicles until TLC came up with a plan for meaningful access to persons who use wheelchairs. 837 F.Supp.2d 268. The defendants filed another interlocutory appeal, which was granted. The injunction was stayed pending the appeal. On June 28, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated both the temporary restraining order and the partial summary judgment. The Court concluded that although the TLC exercised \"pervasive control\" over the taxi industry in New York City, it was not mandated by Title II to provide meaningful access to taxis. 687 F.3d 63. The case was remanded to determine the plaintiffs' claims under Title II(B) (which governs public transportation), the Rehab Act, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and another motion for partial summary judgment. The district court heard oral arguments on the motion for summary judgment on October 11, 2013. The parties entered settlement discussions shortly thereafter, and as a result the court did not make a formal ruling on the matter. Instead, on February 18, 2014, the court terminated the summary judgment motion as moot due to settlement, which was approved by Judge Daniels on June 10, 2014. In the settlement, TLC agreed that at least 50% of the new taxicab vehicles put into circulation from the time of the settlement until the year 2020 would be wheelchair accessible, with the goal of having 50% of the fleet accessible by 2020. The defendants also agreed to regularly report their progress to the plaintiffs. The parties did not agree on attorneys fees in the settlement, and the matter was subsequently referred to the court-annexed mediation program by Judge Daniels. Before the completion of the mediation, however, the parties reached a private agreement on fees, and the case was closed.", "summary": "After the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ordered New York City's Taxi and Limousine Commission to make all new taxis wheelchair accessible, the TLC appealed to the Court of Appeals. On June 28, 2012, it reversed. It concluded that although the TLC exercises \"pervasive control\" over the taxi industry in New York City, it is not required by the ADA's Title II(A) to use its regulatory apparatus to ensure that private taxi companies provide meaningful access to taxis. The case was remanded to the district court, where the parties entered in a court-approved settlement agreement. In it, the Taxi & Limousine Commission agreed to that 50% of new vehicles added to the streets of NYC would be wheelchair accessible, with the goal of reaching 50% total accessibility by 2020."}
{"article": "On October 11, 2005, students from various district of California public schools filed this class action suit, in conjunction with the American Diabetes Association, in the United States District Court of the Northern District of California. The suit was filed under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act against the California Department of Education and various school districts throughout California. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel as well as the Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, asked the court for class action certification and an injunction compelling districts to provide all children with diabetes care to enable them to access education. The plaintiffs claimed that the school districts, often not having a full-time nurse on duty, were not providing appropriate care and management of diabetes for students with the disease. The students, who often cannot administer or monitor their own glucose levels, were either made to change their physician-mandated medical plans due to the schools' lack of resources, miss large amounts of class time while waiting in the office for a family member to come to school to administer an insulin shot, or to miss school due to lack of resources for monitoring blood sugar and administering insulin shots, among other consequences. The plaintiffs claim that this denies them a free and appropriate education in the least restrictive environment possible due to a physical disability, violating the above statutes. By August 2007, the plaintiffs had reached settlement agreements with various parties and had dismissed the complaints against the defendants. A 2007 Legal Advisory of the California Department of Education states that the settlement agreement, among other things, requires California public schools to provide management of diabetes and administer insulin in accordance with the child's physician's management plan. The 2007 Legal Advisory also notes that school placement cannot be based on the unwillingness of a school to provide for a child with diabetes and that plans must be individualized. In an offshoot of this litigation, American Nurses Assn. v. Torlakson <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12801\">(ED-CA-0009)</a>, a group of nurses challenged the 2007 Legal Advisory as in violation of state law. A trial and appellate court agreed, but the California Supreme Court reversed, explaining that \"California law does permit trained, unlicensed school personnel to administer prescription medications, including insulin, in accordance with written statements of individual students' treating physicians, with parental consent (Ed. Code \u00a7\u00a7 49423, 49423.6; tit. 5 \u00a7\u00a7 600-611.)...\" American Nurses Association v. Tom Torlakson, 57 Cal.4th 570 (2013), 591. The settlement therefore survived that state court challenge. On April 20, 2012, the District Court (Judge Maxime M. Chesney) denied a motion by the plaintiff for attorney's fees and expenses for ongoing monitoring of defendants' compliance on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction. 2012 WL 1380243. That decision was overturned by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in an opinion by Judge Nguyen on August 11, 2014, which affirmed the District Court's jurisdiction over the matter and remanded to the District Court to decide whether or not to award attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs. 762 F.3d 963. On remand, on March 20, 2015, Judge Chesney held that attorneys fees were appropriate; the parties then settled the fee issues and the case was dismissed on July 1, 2015.", "summary": "In 2005 students in California public schools requested an injunction requiring schools to monitor blood sugar levels and administer insulin shots to diabetic students. The students and schools reached a settlement agreement in 2007, but the settlement agreement is now complicated by an ongoing case that found it permissible for trained unlicensed personnel to administer insulin shots."}
{"article": "On August 4, 2014, advocates for A.B. and other legally incompetent criminal defendants in county jails in Washington State filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs sued the Washington Department of Social and Health Services under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983; the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C \u00a7\u00a7 12111 et seq.; and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201. They sought both injunctive and declaratory relief. The plaintiffs alleged that the rights of A.B. and similarly situated persons were violated by the delay between being deemed legally incompetent and being transferred to a mental health facility. In response to a prior order for immediate transfer of A.B. to a mental health facility, the State explained that the state-run facility that they ordinarily utilized for legally incompetent defendants such as A.B. did not have enough physical bed space to promptly treat every patient. The State argued it was under no deadline to transport legally incompetent defendants for treatment. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that the State's failure to adhere to a seven-day deadline imposed by Washington law, RCWA 10.77.220, constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act. On September 12, 2014, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, added three additional named plaintiffs, and sought class certification. The court granted the class certification. On November 6, 2014, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and a declaration that the defendants' conduct had violated the due process rights of the named plaintiffs and class members. On December 22, 2014, the court declared: <blockquote> The Due Process Clause protects the liberty interests of individuals to be free from incarceration absent a criminal conviction, and to receive restorative treatment when they are being incarcerated due to mental incompetence. Defendants' failure to provide timely services to these detainees has caused them to be incarcerated, sometimes for months, in conditions that erode their mental health, causing harm and making it even less likely that they will eventually be able to stand trial. Because this failure violates the due process rights of criminal defendants who are mentally ill or suspected to be mentally ill, the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion and declares that Defendants have violated their constitutional rights.</blockquote> 2014 WL 7338747 at *1. There was a seven-day bench trial in March 2015. The court heard facts to determine what amount of time legally incompetent detainees could be made to wait for transfer to a mental health facility without experiencing a violation of their due process rights. On April 2, 2015, the court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and ordered the defendants to stop violating the class members' constitutional rights by providing timely competency evaluation and restoration services. The court also entered a permanent injunction requiring the provision of competency services within seven days. The court appointed a monitor to ensure that progress toward the timely provision of services was being made. 101 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (W.D. Wash. 2015). Subsequently, the defendants asked the court to modify the permanent injunction in four ways. On May 6, 2015, the court modified the permanent injunction to allow for a good cause exception to the seven-day timeframe for class members ordered to receive competency services at state hospitals where a class member\u2019s health prevented them from being medically cleared to be transported, despite the defendants\u2019 good faith efforts. The court denied the defendants\u2019 other requests for modification. On June 22, 2015, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs. The court awarded $1,303,169 in fees and costs. The defendants also appealed this decision. The defendants appealed the December 2014 grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs, the court's judgment, the permanent injunction, and the denial of the defendants' motion to modify the injunction. While the appeal was pending, the defendants again asked the district court to modify the permanent injunction. On February 8, 2016, the district court modified the permanent injunction and extended the defendants\u2019 compliance deadline to May 27, 2016, along with other minor changes. At two different points, the plaintiffs moved for temporary restraining orders due to safety issues at two different facilities: Yakima Competency Restoration Center and Maple Lane Competency Restoration Program. First, on March 17, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for an order temporarily restraining the defendant from assigning class members to receive restoration treatment at the Yakima Competency Restoration Center. They claimed that the partially renovated jail was unsafe and violated the court\u2019s orders, as the class members are to be provided services in a state psychiatric hospital or a facility that is therapeutically comparable to the hospital. After considering the motion, defendants\u2019 response, the plaintiffs\u2019 subsequent reply, oral arguments, and findings from a court visit to the facility, on April 12, 2016, the court granted in part plaintiffs\u2019 motion. The court found that there were unacceptable risks of irreparable harm to class members and staff posed by the facility\u2019s staircase and its seclusion and restraint room. The court explained that these spaces presented an opportunity for suicide, especially given that the facility did not have a clear policy on the use of seclusion and restraint. However, the court agreed with the defendants that immediately closing the Yakima program would not be in the best interest of the class members or the public. Thus, the court issued a modified temporary restraining order prohibiting use of the facility\u2019s second floor and seclusion and restraint room unless and until the risks presented are remediated. Per the plaintiffs\u2019 subsequent motions, the court extended the temporary restraining order twice (April 24 and May 10, 2016), leaving it in effect until May 20, 2016. On May 20, 2016, the court lifted the portion of the order restricting use of the seclusion and restraint room. On June 29, 2016, the parties entered a stipulated agreement regarding use of the facility, specifying that the facility had been modified consistently with the court order. On June 30, 2016, the court issued an order stating that the court agrees that there is no further restriction on the use of the stairwell, and that the stairwell and second floor of the facility may be used freely. Second, on May 19, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order enjoining DSHA and its Maple Lane contractors from exposing plaintiffs to an unsafe stairwell at the Maple Lane facility. On June 6, 2016, the court granted the motion with some modification. The court ordered that no members may access the second floor until the staircase risks have been remediated, except for in one wing of the facility in which remediation efforts were completed. On June 7, 2016, the defendants submitted proof of compliance at the facility; they explained that remediation efforts for the rest of the staircases had been completed. On June 10, 2016, the court lifted the temporary restraining order. Meanwhile, the issue of timeframe for conducting evaluations was being considered on appeal. On May 6, 2016, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion regarding the timeframe for conducting competency evaluations. 822 F.3d 1037. The court agreed with the district court that DSHS must conduct the evaluations \u201cwithin a reasonable time following a court\u2019s order,\u201d but found that the seven-day mandate \u201cimposes a temporal obligation beyond what the Constitution requires.\u201d The court therefore vacated the injunction with respect to the seven-day requirement and remanded to the district court to amend the injunction. The plaintiffs moved the court several times to find the defendants in civil contempt of its prior court orders. On May 10, 2016, the plaintiffs withdrew a previous civil contempt motion (dated May 5) and made a new motion. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to meet important compliance deadlines and were not on track to meet the court\u2019s amended compliance deadline of May 27, 2016. Despite court orders, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to provide timely competency services. On May 26, 2016, the plaintiffs moved the court to find the defendants in contempt for failing to comply with the court\u2019s order to admit class members to state hospitals for competency evaluations within seven days of a court order. On June 2 the plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the scope of the injunction regarding in-jail evaluations. The plaintiffs claimed that a 10-day requirement for completing jail-based competency requirements serves all legitimate state interests regarding timely completion. On June 30, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to reconsider the scope of the injunction regarding timing of services and inpatient evaluations. On July 7, 2016, the court issued an order of civil contempt. The court imposed monetary sanctions on the defendants, to be continued until the defendants complied by providing timely services. The court issued many money judgments regarding the civil contempt payments throughout the litigation. On December 20, 2016, the court granted the parties\u2019 joint motion to amend the monetary fines imposed as contempt sanctions, ordering a single judgment for $7,486,500 in sanctions to date. After this date, the court made more money judgments. On August 15, 2016, the court issued an order modifying the permanent injunction as to in-jail competency evaluations. The court considered this matter on remand from the Ninth Circuit. The court modified the injunction to require in-jail competency evaluations to be completed within fourteen days of the signing of a court order. On August 17, 2016, the court issued an order denying defendants\u2019 motion to reconsider the order of civil contempt in all respects except with regard to a transcription error. On August 19, 2016, the court issued an order denying the defendants\u2019 motion to reconsider the injunction regarding timing of services and inpatient evaluations. On September 14, 2016, the defendants appealed the judgment and order modifying the permanent injunction as to in jail competency evaluations, and the order denying their motion to reconsider the injunction regarding timing of services and inpatient evaluations. On October 13, 2016, the court granted plaintiffs\u2019 second motion for attorney\u2019s fees and costs, awarding plaintiffs $1,267,769.10 in attorneys fees, and $35,400.38 in litigation costs (subject to reductions previously detailed in the original order on attorneys\u2019 fees). On November 14, 2016, the defendants appealed this order. On February 1, 2017, at the direction of the court, the defendants submitted a proposed compliance plan. The plan details how DSHS would admit class members to receive competency evaluations, treatment services, and in-custody evaluation services. The plan includes proposals to increase competency evaluation capacity, expand bed capacity for inpatient competency services, and diversion and triage, and it also addresses various recommendations that had been made by the plaintiffs. On February 21, 2017, the court issued an order expanding the court monitor\u2019s authority and responsibilities. Meanwhile, the parties had been engaging in mediation regarding the issues on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. On February 15, 2017, the parties informed the Ninth Circuit that they resolved the matter contingent on district court approval of their settlement. On February 23, 2017, the appeal was remanded to the district court for consideration of the settlement. On March 17, 2017, the parties made a joint motion to adopt the mediated settlement agreement. The parties\u2019 agreement includes the following principles: the parties will jointly generate outreach documents to inform courts of their obligations regarding timing of services; DSHS shall complete in-jail competency evaluations within either 14 days from receipt of order (or 21 days from signature or order); DSHS shall admit class members for inpatient competency evaluation or restoration within 7 days from receipt of order (or 14 days from signature of order); orders will be deemed received as of the time they are electronically transmitted; the defendants will continue to track the data. On April 26, 2017, the court partially adopted the parties' mediated settlement agreement. Specifically, the court adopted the provisions of the proposed settlement agreement concerning outreach, the deadline for in-jail competency evaluations, the deadline for in-patient evaluation and restoration services, receipt of order, the trigger point for notice to plaintiffs' counsel, and the defendants' data collection. Additionally, the court modified the prior orders of the court in order to conform with this new agreement. On August 30, 2017, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' third motion for attorney\u2019s fees and costs, awarding plaintiffs $1,108,351.50 in attorneys fees, and $8,270.45 in litigation costs. The defendants appealed this order on September 27, 2017. On October 19, 2017, the court issued an order on the plaintiffs' second motion for civil contempt. The court found that the defendants were in contempt of court, as they had failed to: comply with the court\u2019s orders requiring the timely completion of in-jail competency evaluations, take all reasonable steps to reduce wait times for in-jail competency evaluations, hire sufficient staff to timely respond to the demand for in-jail competency services, diversify the types of medical professionals serving class members, and secure sufficient temporary contracted staff to respond to unanticipated increases in evaluation orders. The court noted that it would continue to impose monetary sanctions, as well as a reporting requirement in order to facilitate payment of the contempt fines. In December 2017, the defendants voluntarily dismissed their appeals of the court's attorney\u2019s fees and costs awards. On January 12, 2018, the parties submitted an agreement resolving the pending motions and setting up a settlement negotiation process. Throughout 2017 and 2018, the court continued to issue many money judgments regarding the civil contempt payments. On March 28, 2018, the court granted the parties' stipulated motion for attorneys' fees and costs, awarding the plaintiffs $444,473.46 in total. The court awarded an additional $263,006.60 in attorneys' fees and $3,571.80 in costs on October 4, 2018, as well as an additional $290,181.00 in attorneys' fees and $763.21 in costs on January 3, 2019. After filing a motion for preliminary approval of a settlement agreement on August 16, 2018, the parties filed an amended settlement agreement on October 25, 2018. The agreement covered the substantive areas of competency evaluation; competency restoration; crisis triage and diversion supports; education and training; and workforce development. The agreement required the State to support and work to achieve legislative changes to reduce the number of people ordered into competency evaluation and restoration, and to use community-based restoration services. The agreement contained three implementation phases, focusing on various regions. Additionally, the defendants agreed to use a sustainable oversight structure to inform and provide supervision for high-level policymaking, planning, and decision-making on targeted issues. The parties also asked the court to suspend the entry of judgments for continuing contempt fines beginning December 1, 2018 (except those fines accumulated under the court's order regarding jail-based evaluations). Finally, the agreement's terms would remain in effect until the defendants achieve substantial compliance with its various requirements. On November 1, the court issued its order for preliminary approval of the settlement agreement. Following a fairness hearing on December 11, the court issued its final approval of the settlement agreement. The court directed the parties to submit quarterly reports on the implementation beginning in April 2019. On March 11, 2019, the parties filed with the court a preliminary implementation plan for the settlement agreement. This preliminary plan will be subject to refinement and will eventually result in a final implementation plan. The April 2019 implementation report noted the passage of several legislative enactments that would create greater diversion opportunities for class members and reduce the number of individuals ordered into competency evaluation and restoration services. The report also noted that the State had created several work groups and committees to implement the agreement. There were no overdue or incomplete action steps within the preliminary implementation plan. Finally, the report noted that implementation efforts will expand substantially during the second half of 2019. As of August 13, 2020, the court is holding periodic status conferences, the State is continuing to report compliance data, monitoring is ongoing, and the court continues to issue monthly monetary contempt judgments against the defendants.", "summary": "In 2014, advocates for a class of legally incompetent criminal defendants in Washington filed suit against the Washington Department of Social and Health Services seeking both injunctive and declaratory relief for the cruel and unusual punishment, violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and violation of due process rights that stem from prolonged in-jail detention prior to transfer to a mental health facility. After a bench trial, the court issued a permanent injunction requiring the provision of competency services within seven days. The defendants appealed the injunction. During the litigation, the court considered restraining orders due to safety issues at two facilities - the safety issues were later resolved. On July 7, 2016, the court issued an order of civil contempt. The court imposed monetary sanctions on the defendants, to be continued until the defendants complied by providing timely services. As for the issue on appeal, the parties reached a settlement, which was partially adopted by the court on April 26, 2017. In October 2018, the court approved the parties' settlement agreement, which sought to bring the defendants' into substantial compliance with the court's orders. The parties must submit quarterly reports on the agreement's implementation and the first report was submitted in April 2019. As of May 27, 2019, the court is holding periodic status conferences, the State is continuing to report compliance data, monitoring is ongoing, and the court continues to issue monthly monetary contempt judgments against the defendants."}
{"article": "On December 19, 2005 the Department of Justice (DOJ), Civil Rights Division, initiated an investigation into the conditions and practices at the Connecticut Valley Hospital (CVH), the largest of five state-run psychiatric hospitals in the State of Connecticut, pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997 (CRIPA). A report of findings was submitted to the governor of Connecticut on August 6, 2007. The DOJ\u2019s investigation found that CVH regularly failed to: (1) adequately protect patients from harm and undue restraints; (2) provide adequate psychiatric and psychological services; and (3) ensure adequate discharge planning and placement in the most integrated setting appropriate to each patient\u2019s individualized needs. The report formally put CVH on notice that failure to improve conditions would result in a lawsuit. On January 20, 2009, the Department of Justice filed suit against the state of Connecticut and its Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services in U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut for the aforementioned pattern of practices at CVH, that violated the constitutional and federal statutory rights of patients under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997 (CRIPA). The lawsuit was filed along with a settlement agreement and joint motion to dismiss. Judge Alvin W. Thompson approved the settlement on July 8, 2009 and conditionally dismissed the suit. In the settlement, Connecticut agreed to a wide variety of practice changes and a period of supervised operation. The state agreed to provide care and treatment \u201cbased on professional standards of practice that shall seek to: A. ameliorate symptoms such that a less restrictive locus of treatment may safely be employed; B. strengthen and support individuals\u2019 rehabilitation and recovery; and C. enable individuals and grow and develop in ways benefiting their health and well-being.\u201d The settlement called for an environment that maximizes safety and is predicated on respect between the staff and those whom they serve. In addition, it mandated implementation of integrated treatment plans and interdisciplinary staff teams to increase the efficacy of treatment provided. Furthermore, the settlement outlined extensive changes in the psychiatric and psychological care provided in order to increase the safety and wellbeing of patients while also reducing the risk of harm and suicide that was extensive at CVH. Across the board, the settlement emphasized that care provided be consistent with generally accepted professional standards of care and that the environment at CVH be sufficiently humane to reduce the risk of harm. The settlement outlined a 48-month period of supervised implementation after which the agreement would terminate provided that CVH had demonstrated substantial compliance with the terms. On September 25, 2013, the Court approved a notice of substantial compliance with certain terms of the settlement agreement and extension of termination that was filed by the State. On May 22, 2015, the Court approved the State\u2019s notice of substantial compliance and motion to terminate the settlement agreement, effectively terminating the Court\u2019s ability to enforce the agreement. Although the notice of substantial compliance and motion to terminate was accepted and granted, news suggests that as late as mid-2017, patients at the Connecticut Valley Hospital continued to suffer from widespread abuse. On September 6, 2017, the <a href=\"http://www.ct.gov/despp/cwp/view.asp?Q=596030&A=4226\">Connecticut State Police announced the arrests</a> of nine CVH employees on charges on cruelty to persons and disorderly conduct. <a href=\"https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/connecticut/articles/2017-09-17/abuse-allegations-arrests-mount-at-state-mental-hospital\">Reports from the Associated Press</a> and <a href=\"http://www.wfsb.com/story/36533905/arrest-warrants-detail-abuse-scandal-at-connecticut-valley-hospital\">Channel 3 Eyewitness News</a> (the New Haven area CBS news affiliate) detail violence, humiliation, and sexual harassment suffered by inmates at the hands of CVH employees.", "summary": "On January 20, 2009, the Department of Justice filed and settled a lawsuit with the State of Connecticut for practices at the Connecticut Valley Hospital, a state-run psychiatric facility, that violated the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997 (CRIPA). In the settlement, Connecticut agreed to a wide variety of practice changes and a period of supervised operation. On May 22, 2015, the Court approved the State\u2019s notice of substantial compliance and motion to terminate the settlement agreement, however, news suggests that as late as mid-2017, patients at the Connecticut Valley Hospital continued to suffer from widespread abuse."}
{"article": "On December 12, 2007, a group of plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the County of Maricopa and the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO), as well as Sheriff Joe Arpaio. The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of Latino persons who have been or will be stopped, detained, interrogated, or searched by the Sheriff or his agents in moving or parked vehicles in Maricopa County. They alleged claims under the Fourth Amendment (search and seizure) and Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection) to the U.S. Constitution; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and the Arizona state constitution. The plaintiffs were represented by private pro bono attorneys, the American Civil Liberties Union (both local and national), and the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund. The United States Department of Justice (Civil Rights Division and local U.S. Attorneys) appeared in the case as amicus, explaining that they had a sharp interest in the matter because of its separate civil rights lawsuit against the County, United States v. Maricopa County, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12282\">PN-AZ-0001</a> in this Clearinghouse. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants, claiming that defendants have engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of racial profiling and racially or ethnically discriminatory treatment in \"enforcing\" federal immigration laws against Latino persons without regard for actual citizenship or immigration status. The plaintiffs alleged that defendants have launched a series of \"crime suppression sweeps\" to target Latino persons for investigation of immigration status, using pretextual and unfounded stops, racially motivated questioning, searches, and/or baseless arrests. These sweeps include a volunteer \"posse\" that help to carry out defendants' policies and practices. Defendants had claimed authority under a limited agreement with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). However, plaintiffs allege that the ICE agreement prohibits these practices, because the agreement only allows for questioning of immigration status once someone is suspected of violating a state or federal law more severe than a traffic offense. The plaintiffs further allege that defendants' pattern and practice of racial profiling goes beyond these \"sweeps\" to include widespread, everyday targeting and mistreatment of drivers and passengers in Maricopa County who appear to be Latino. The plaintiffs allege that Latino drivers and passengers are stopped at higher rates, treated more intrusively, and detained longer than similarly situated Caucasian drivers and passengers (even within the same vehicle). The plaintiffs also allege that defendants have set up a \"hotline\" for \"tips\" on illegal immigrants, which they allege invites individuals to equate race with immigration status. Finally, the plaintiffs allege a failure to train personnel and volunteers adequately and to promulgate appropriate policies to prevent infringement of plaintiffs' rights. Allegedly, the Sheriff made many public statements about his intent to \"go after illegals\" and said publicly that physical appearance was basis to question someone about their immigration status. On July 15, 2009, the court (Judge Mary H. Murgia) granted the defendants' motion for recusal. The defendants claimed that only the day after Judge Murgia ruled against them did they become aware that Judge Murgia's (identical twin) sister was the President and CEO of the National Council of La Raza (NCLR); they argued that accordingly, Judge Murgia must recuse herself. On the one hand, the court found that the motion was untimely, that the defendants had not shown any evidence of the court's bias, and that her sister's position was not enough to compel recusal. On the other, however, the court found that NCLR's \"Stop the Hate\" online campaign, which contains articles that are highly disparaging of these defendants and which takes a strong stand on disputed legal and factual matters in this case (and which contain pictures of the judge's identical twin sister) might lead the public to question Judge Murgia's impartiality, and that she should recuse herself in this close call. Melendres v. Arpaio, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65069, 2009 WL 2132693 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2009). The case was reassigned to Judge G. Murray Snow. On August 13, 2009, Judge Snow denied the County's motion to stay proceedings pending DOJ investigations. Melendres v. Maricopa County, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75364, 2009 WL 2515618 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2009). On October 13, 2009, the court approved a joint motion and stipulation of plaintiffs and defendant Maricopa County to dismiss Maricopa County without prejudice. On December 23, 2011, the court issued an order denying summary judgment and sending the case to trial in large part. Based on the few statistical sheets that were available, the court held that the finder of fact may draw the following inferences from the statistic sheets that MCSO shredded: that they would have suggested officers involved in special operations did not follow a \"zero tolerance\" policy requiring them to stop all traffic offenders; that they would have included a significantly higher number of arrests in the categories \"Illegal Alien turned over to ICE/LEAR\" and/or \"Suspected Illegal Alien arrested on state charges\" than records documenting ordinary patrol activity. Based on the recovered emails, the court found that the finder of fact could draw the following inferences from emails that MCSO irretrievably purged: that MCSO maintained a file of citizen complaints making requests for special operations; that MCSO conducted operations in areas named in the complaints; and that at least some of the citizen communications complained about \"Mexicans,\" \"day laborers,\" or \"illegal immigrants\" but did not provide a description of any criminal activity. Melendres v. Arpaio, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148187 (D. Ariz. Dec. 23, 2011). On the same day, the court certified the class of \"all Latino persons who, since January 2007, have been or will be in the future, stopped, detained, questioned, or searched by MCSO agents while driving or sitting in a vehicle on a public roadway or parking area in Maricopa County, Arizona.\" The court also enjoined MCSO and its officers from detaining any person only because they believe or know that the person is unlawfully present in the United States. Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (D. Ariz. 2011). The Maricopa County Sheriff's Office filed an interlocutory appeal with the Ninth Circuit. Later, on September 25, 2012, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District court's order. De Jesus Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. Ariz. 2012). In the meantime, the matter proceeded to a bench trial, held in July and August 2012. On May 24, 2013, Judge Snow issued a 142-page decision finding for the plaintiffs. The court found the plaintiffs entitled to injunctive relief to remedy the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations caused by the Sheriff's Office past and continuing operations, and entered a permanent injunction forbidding the MCSO from: <li>detaining, holding or arresting Latino occupants of vehicles in Maricopa County based on a reasonable belief, without more, that such persons are in the country without authorization; <li>following or enforcing its LEAR policy against any Latino occupant of a vehicle in Maricopa County; <li>using race or Latino ancestry as a factor in determining to stop any vehicle in Maricopa County with a Latino occupant; <li>using race or Latino ancestry as a factor in making law enforcement decisions with respect to whether any Latino occupant of a vehicle in Maricopa County may be in the country without authorization; <li>detaining Latino occupants of vehicles stopped for traffic violations for a period longer than reasonably necessary to resolve the traffic violation in the absence of reasonable suspicion that any of them have committed or are committing a violation of federal or state criminal law; <li>detaining, holding or arresting Latino occupants of a vehicle in Maricopa County for violations of the Arizona Human Smuggling Act without a reasonable basis for believing that, under all the circumstances, the necessary elements of the crime are present; and<li>detaining, arresting or holding persons based on a reasonable suspicion that they are conspiring with their employer to violate the Arizona Employer Sanctions Act.</li>The defendant appealed this decision, along with the denial of their initial motion to dismiss (Docket No. 13-16285). The parties negotiated a consent decree to ensure the Maricopa Sheriff's Office complied with the court's findings of facts for the plaintiffs. On October 2, 2013, after hearing the terms on which the parties could and could not agree, the court (Judge Snow) issued an order making the previous injunctions permanent and establishing the methods for compliance. The order required the Sheriff's Office to create a unit to aid in compliance and a system for identifying problematic behavior and provided for an independent monitor to ensure compliance. It further demanded that all of the Sheriff's policies and procedures conform to the US and AZ constitutions and laws, that the monitor review any of the Sheriff's immigration-related policies and practices, that all officers receive training on nondiscriminatory policing, that the Sheriffs create an accountable system for documenting traffic stops including dash-cam recording, that all complaints are brought forward and addressed, and that the Sheriffs get involved in the community to rebuild public trust. The Sheriffs appealed this order as well (Docket No. 13-17238), and it was consolidated with their previous appeal. On April 4, and October 10, 2014, the court issued orders amending the permanent injunction, giving the Monitor, rather than the Sheriff's Office, the community outreach responsibility to serve as a liaison between the public and the Sheriff's Office. The second of the orders amended the injunction to allow for body-mounted cameras as opposed to dash mounted cameras, for the purpose of recording traffic stops. On September 11, 2014, the court (Judge Snow) awarded attorneys' fees and costs to the plaintiffs, as the prevailing party in a civil rights case, totaling $4,439,241.66. The court retained jurisdiction of this action for all purposes until such time as the defendants have achieved full and effective Compliance and maintained such compliance for no less than three years. On February 12, 2015, Judge Snow entered an order for an evidentiary hearing to address whether MCSO committed contempt of the court. This order was in response to a 2013 video released of Sheriff Arpaio telling his officers to disregard the court's order requiring them to track the race and ethnicity of the individuals they stopped. Further videos were retrieved showing officers had detained people against the court's earlier orders and that these officers had been unlawfully taking detainees possessions. On April 15, 2015, Justice John Wallace for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded Judge Snow's May 24, 2013 permanent injunction. He held that the the named plaintiffs were adequate class representatives and the district court had not abused its discretion. He found the requirement within the permanent injunction that monitors consider \"disciplinary outcomes for any violation of department policy\" and assess whether deputies should be subject to \"civil suits or criminal charges for off-duty conduct\" was overbroad. 784 F.3d 1254 The United States moved to intervene based on the \"general public importance\" of the matter. Judge Snow granted the motion on August 13, 2015. The United States's intervenor complaint cited violations of 42 USC \u00a7 14141(b) and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It sought equitable and injunctive relief. On August 26, 2015, Judge Snow issued an order amending the supplemental permanent injunction. In response to the defendants' appeal of the initial supplemental permanent injunction, the Ninth Circuit affirmed all provisions except for those allowing the Monitor to consider MCSO's discipline for \"any violations of department policy\" and whether any deputies were repeatedly party to any \"complaints, civil suits, or criminal charges, including for off-duty conduct.\" After the Ninth Circuit's ruling, Judge Snow narrowed the Monitor's considerations to only include violations pursuant to this particular case and injunction. Meanwhile, in a related case filed by the Department of Justice in 2012, Judge Silver for the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, settled certain issues but required the DOJ to pursue further relief within this case. (<a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12017\">PN-AZ-0001 in this Clearinghouse</a>). The parties then litigated evidentiary issues for several months. On May 13, 2016, Judge Snow issued a Finding of Fact holding defendants in civil contempt of the court and setting a hearing date for May 31, 2016. 2016 WL 2783715. Based on the Finding of Fact, the court found that the defendants' had failed to implement the court's preliminary injunction, failed to disclose thousands of relevant discovery items, and deliberately violated court orders. These actions harmed the plaintiff class, impeded litigation, and led to a trial that did not adequately address plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Judge Snow therefore issued an amended supplemental permanent injunction on July 22, 2016. The Injunction required MCSO to investigate all allegations of employee misconduct related to the issues in this case; implement misconduct related training, develop a civilian complaint intake, implement transparency measures, and ensure document preservation and production. It further demanded that all policies, procedures, protocols, training materials, and other relevant materials remain subject to review and comment by the compliance Monitor implemented in the first supplemental permanent injunction. 2016 WL 3965949. In November 2016, Paul Penzone defeated Joe Arpaio in the Arizona election for Sheriff. On January 13, 2017, the court replaced Penzone as the named defendant for the case. Prior to the change in defendant, Judge Snow issued an order on August 19, 2016 referring Sheriff Arpaio to a randomly selected judge for criminal proceedings to determine whether he should be held in criminal contempt for:<li>Violation of the court's December 23, 2011, preliminary injunction; <li>failure to disclose all relevant materials for the investigation; and <li>his intentional failure to preserve and produce required records as directed in the court's April 23, 2015, order.</li>The criminal proceedings continued separately to this case. On July 31, 2017, District Judge Susan R. Bolton issued an order finding Sheriff Arpaio guilty of criminal contempt. 2017 WL 3268180. The court found that Judge Snow\u2019s preliminary injunction was clear and spelled out that detaining persons past the time sufficient to conduct a criminal investigation was a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights and that Sheriff Arpaio had to cease the practice immediately. Further, the court found that Sheriff Arpaio had the requisite knowledge of the order and that, based on public statements demonstrating flagrant disregard for the order, he had willfully violated the preliminary injunction order. On August 14, 2017, Sheriff Arpaio filed a motion for a new trial, and/or that the verdict be vacated, arguing that he was wrongfully denied a trial by jury. On that same date, he also filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal. After President Trump issued an Executive grant of clemency to Joe Arpaio on August 28, 2017, he filed an additional motion to vacate the verdict. Subsequently, the court dismissed the first two motions with prejudice, reserving only the motion to vacate the verdict. On October 19, 2017, Judge Bolton denied Sheriff Arpaio's motion to vacate the verdict, insofar as it sought relief beyond dismissal with prejudice. 2017 WL 4839072. The court held that although the presidential pardon spared Sheriff Arpaio from any punishment that otherwise might have been imposed, it did not \"revise the historical facts\" of the case. Thus, the judgment of conviction was maintained. Sheriff Arpaio appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit. On April 17, 2018, the Ninth Circuit issued an order appointing a special prosecutor to defend the district court\u2019s decision. United States v. Arpaio, 887 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2018). The role of the \u201cspecial prosecutor\u201d under the order was limited to providing briefing and argument to the merits panel. A judge of the appeals court sua sponte called for a vote on whether to rehear en banc the order appointing a special prosecutor. Rehearing en banc was denied. On October 25, 2018, the Court stayed briefing in this case to allow the Solicitor General to consider whether to file certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. On January 1, 2019, the Solicitor General determined that the government would not seek certiorari in the Supreme Court and the appeals court reinstated a briefing schedule. Thus, the appeal in the contempt proceedings is still pending. Meanwhile, in the district court, the parties continued litigating over legal fees. Although they went to mediation, this was unsuccessful. On March 3, 2017, the Ninth Circuit ordered Maricopa County to pay $400,395.55 to the plaintiffs to cover legal fees. On March 1, 2018, the Ninth Circuit ordered that an employee of Maricopa County pay the plaintiffs $52,877.42 in additional attorneys' fees for work performed on a motion to dismiss the employee's appeal of the district court's order finding that he had committed civil contempt for violating the injunction. In 2017, the Monitor noted that MCSO had completed the delivery of misconduct investigations training. As of November 2018, the Monitor noted steady improvement in the quality of internal investigations, particularly since completion of the training. On May 24, 2018, MCSO published its Third Traffic Stop Annual Report. The Monitor noted issues with the underlying data due to a lack of quality control procedures with MCSO\u2019s contracted vendor responsible for the various analyses. MCSO has since contracted with a new vendor. Despite the Monitor's concerns with the data, the Report found that the issue of racial differences in post-stop outcomes is systemic and cannot be attributed only to a small number of deputies. The Report did, however, identify several deputies which were outliers when compared to their geographic peers and MCSO is working to address those outliers. The Monitor continues to oversee the MCSO's compliance with the multiple supplemental injunctive relief orders entered. The plaintiffs have filed a supplemental motion for attorneys' fees incurred from June 1, 2016, through August 31, 2017, in the total amount of $1,237,192.10. On April 12th, 2019 the court granted plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of $747,836.24. In mid-June of 2019, the Independent Investigator, assigned in the Second Amended Second Permanent Injunction/Judgment Order, announced that he had completed his duties and that he was no longer needed to investigate MCSO affairs. In January of 2020 he submitted a letter to the judge charting the work he did and notifying him that he would be available to the court if he was required to testify. The Maricopa County Sheriff continues to submit reports to the court and the case is ongoing as of June 8th, 2020.", "summary": "On December 12, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the County of Maricopa and the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office. They claimed that defendants have engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of racial profiling and racially or ethnically discriminatory treatment against Latino persons in an attempt to find people who are in the United States illegally. Plaintiffs allege that defendants' pattern and practice of racial profiling goes beyond unlawful \"sweeps\" to include widespread, everyday targeting and mistreatment of drivers and passengers in Maricopa County who appear to be Latino. The Court certified the class as \"all Latino persons who, since January, 2007, have been or will be in the future, stopped, detained, questioned or searched by MCSO agents while driving or sitting in a vehicle on a public roadway or parking area in Maricopa County, Arizona.\" In May 2013, the Court found the MCSO in violation of the Constitution, and entered a permanent injunction forbidding racial profiling. The Court made the previous injunctions permanent and entered judgment for the plaintiffs. The Court retains jurisdiction until the Sheriff has fully complied with the Court's order, pending the result of the Sheriff's appeal. In July 2016 the Court found that the defendants' had failed to comply with many components of the injunction. Judge Snow therefore issued an Amended Second Supplemental Permanent Injunction that required MCSO to investigate all allegations of employee misconduct related to the issues in this case; implement misconduct related training, develop a civilian complaint intake, implement transparency measures, and ensure document preservation and production. On August 19, 2016 the Court ordered Sheriff Arpaio to a randomly-selected judge for criminal proceedings to determine whether he should be held in criminal contempt for failure to comply with court orders. On July 31, 2017, the Court found Sheriff Arpaio guilty of criminal contempt. Sheriff Arpaio's appeal of the District Court's denial of his motion to vacate the verdict was denied by the 9th Circuit in February of 2020. In November 2016, Sheriff Arpaio was replaced by Sheriff Penzone. In 2019, the Independent Investigator that was assigned in the Second Amended Second Permanent Injunction/Judgment Order resigned, saying that he was no longer needed to investigate MSCO affairs. The case continues as the Court Monitor continues to oversee the MCSO's compliance with the multiple supplemental injunctive relief orders entered."}
{"article": "On June 29, 2007, the EEOC filed this race discrimination case against Family Dollar Stores of Arkansas. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, on behalf of a former employee who claimed she was denied promotion opportunities and constructively discharged because of her race (black.) There was no discovery and the case was settled when a three-year Consent Decree was entered on June 30, 2008 by U.S. District Court Judge J. Leon Holmes. The Decree prevents the employer from denying promotions to black employees based on their race and prohibits retaliation against any employee or applicant. The Decree also requires non-discrimination awareness training for mangers and supervisors, EEO policy posting and $25,000.00 in damages to the claimant. The decree stayed in effect for three years from its entry on June 30, 2008. As of 2019, there have been no further entries on the docket, and the case decree presumably expired on June 30, 2011.", "summary": "This race discrimination case was brought by the EEOC against Family Dollar Stores of Arkansas on behalf of a black former employee who claimed she was denied promotion and constructively discharged from her job based on her race. With almost no litigation, the case was settled with a three-year Consent Decree which requires the employer to stop denying promotions on the basis of race, to conduct non-discrimination training, post policies and not to retaliate against any employee or applicant. The employer agreed to pay $25,000.00 in damages to the claimant. This Decree is in effect until June 30, 2011; three years from its entry."}
{"article": "On February 12, 2015, the National Association of the Deaf (NAD), on behalf of its members (including three named in the complaint) and a proposed class, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the plaintiffs sued Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from the Disability Law Center, Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, the National Association of the Deaf Law and Advocacy Center, and private counsel. The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction that would require MIT to provide accurate captioning on its online content. The plaintiffs claimed that MIT willfully violated the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act by not providing captioned video and audio content on its platforms and therefore excluded deaf and hard of hearing individuals from benefiting from said content. The plaintiffs alleged that based on information and belief, MIT did not have administrative procedures or policies in place to ensure that its online content had accurate captioning, whether or not that content had been created or produced by MIT itself. This issue extended back to 2010, when the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Education issued a joint letter to university colleges and presidents to make clear that the requirements of \u00a7 504 and ADA include technological devices when used by places of public accommodation. The following year, the Department of Education released an FAQ explaining that letter, indicating that its contents were predicated on legal precedents and that the letter would apply to all forms of emerging technology, including online content. Additionally, MIT has stated on its website how important captioning is to deaf and hard of hearing individuals. Despite all this and repeated requests from the NAD, MIT has yet to accurately caption much of its online content. After the initial filing of the complaint on February 12, 2015, MIT filed a motion to dismiss on May 11, 2015, citing issues of jurisdiction and a failure to state a cause of action. There were a number of responses on MIT's motion, including the filing of an Amicus Brief by a representative from the U.S. Department of Justice. While not directly involved in the case, the DOJ was an interested party and appeared to agree with the plaintiffs on this issue. On September 10, 2015, there was a hearing on the motion to dismiss held before the Magistrate Judge Katherine A. Robertson. On February 9, 2016, Judge Robertson issued a report and recommended that the motion be denied in its entirety, for reasons identical to those in the related case the NAD filed at the same time against Harvard University. <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14352\">National Association of the Deaf v. Harvard University</a>. Judge Mark Mastroianni adopted Judge Robertson\u2019s reasoning and denied the motion to dismiss on November 4, 2016. On May 10, 2017, the parties agreed to try to settle the dispute using a private mediator. The parties met with a mediator over the course of several months but were ultimately unable to reach an agreement, and initial pretrial deadlines were set on July 23, 2018. On August 24, 2018, MIT filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings to all claims. On March 28, 2019, Judge Katherine A. Robertson denied the motion in part, but granted it in part, for the same reasons under which a similar motion was granted in part in the lawsuit involving Harvard; MIT was entitled to immunity under the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (477 U.S.C. \u00a7230) when publishing third-party's content, but not content created in whole or in part by MIT or by someone associated with it. Judge Robertson referred the case to mediation on August 23, 2019. After several rounds of mediation, the parties reached a consent decree, and Judge Robertson granted preliminary approval of the decree on March 27, 2020 (2020 WL 1495903, D. Mass.). The plaintiffs only sought injunctive relief to make MIT's online content in line with national standards for disability accessibility. The parties are notifying members of the class. Final approval of the settlement agreement is pending.", "summary": "In February 2015, the National Association of the Deaf filed a proposed class action complaint against Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Filed under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the complaint claimed that MIT harmed the plaintiffs and other deaf and hard of hearing individuals by not providing accurate captioning on much of its online audio and video content. The parties reached an initial settlement on March 27, 2020. Notification of class members is ongoing."}
{"article": "On May 7, 2014, a same-sex couple, who were legally married in California, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, against the state of Alabama. One plaintiff had given birth to a child, whom the other plaintiff wanted to adopt. Under Alabama law, non-biological parents may adopt their \"spouse's child.\" The plaintiffs were not considered spouses, however, because the state did not recognize same-sex marriages. As a result, their adoption petition was denied and the couple filed suit. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to declare Alabama's same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional, under the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Full Faith and Credit Clauses. They also asked for an injunction, ordering the defendants to recognize same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions and to grant the plaintiffs' adoption petition. On June 12, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. The next day, the District Court for the Southern District of Alabama (Judge Callie V. S. Granade) found the motion to be premature. On August 20, 2014, Judge Granade adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and granted several parties' motions to dismiss: the Alabama Attorney General was now the only defendant. On January 23, 2015, Judge Granade granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, finding that Alabama's same-sex marriage ban violated the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses and enjoining the state attorney general from enforcing that ban. The freedom to marry was a fundamental right, the court held, protected by the Constitution. In order for Alabama to restrict that right, its same-sex marriage ban had to be narrowly tailored and it had to serve a compelling state interest. The court rejected the state's purported interests as either not compelling or overly broad. Thus, the ban was unconstitutional. Two days later, the district court stayed its injunction until February 9, giving the defendant time to seek a further stay pending appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. On January 28, at plaintiffs' request, Judge Granade clarified her order. The Alabama Probate Judges Association had stated to the press that, despite the ruling, they were bound by Alabama law and could not issue same-sex marriage licenses. The Court stated that because the judgment was stayed, the Alabama probate courts were not required to follow the judgment. However, if the stay were lifted, the U.S. Constitution would require the probate judges to issue same-sex marriage licenses, because the court's order had found that Alabama's marriage laws were unconstitutional. On February 3, 2015, the Eleventh Circuit <i>sua sponte</i> consolidated the appeals in this case and in Strawser v. Strange (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14439\">PB-AL-0010</a> in this Clearinghouse), and denied the Alabama Attorney General's motions for a stay pending appeal. In response, the Attorney General filed an application for a stay with U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, the Circuit Justice for the Eleventh Circuit. That same day, the District Court denied plaintiffs' request to lift the stay. Late on February 8, 2015, with the district court's stay set to expire, the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, Roy Moore, sent an order to probate judges and state employees, threatening them with legal action by the governor if they issued or recognized same-sex marriage licenses. The chief justice claimed that the district court orders bound only the Alabama Attorney General and his employees and not Alabama's probate judges. On February 9, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the application for stay, with Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting from the denial. <i>Strange v. Searcy</i>, 135 S. Ct. 940 (2015). As a result, Judge Granade's orders took effect: the ban on same-sex marriage was now illegal in Alabama, at least according to the federal courts. Alabama's probate judges faced competing orders: the district court's would allow same-sex marriage, but Chief Justice Moore's would not. The result was legal chaos. Some probate judges followed the federal court order and issued same-sex marriage licenses but most probate judges refused and many ceased issuing marriage licenses entirely. In the plaintiffs' county, Mobile County Probate Judge Don Davis refused to issue any licenses that day. Plaintiffs responded by filing a motion to hold him in contempt, which Judge Granade rejected because the probate judge was not a party to the case. That same day the plaintiffs re-filed their adoption petition. Mobile County Probate Judge Don Davis issued an initial adoption decree but he added language saying \"that this Decree is qualified in nature, and the Court will not issue a final adoption order until a final ruling is issued in the United States Supreme Court on the Marriage Act cases before it.\" The non-biological parent brought a new lawsuit against the probate judge for including this language. Searcy v. Davis (<a href=\" http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14445\">PB-AL-0011</a> in this Clearinghouse) Probate Judge Davis eventually removed the qualified wording from the adoption petition and the court dismissed that suit. In this case, Searcy v. Bentley, the only remaining issue involves attorneys' fees. On February 12, 2015, Judge Granade granted the plaintiffs' motion extending the time to file a petition for attorneys' fees until 30 days after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12787\">PB-OH-0003</a> in this Clearinghouse). Plaintiffs moved for attorneys' fees on August 31, 2015. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part on May 27, 2016, awarding attorneys' fees of $126,206.66 and allowing plaintiffs to file further documentation in support of the remainder of their costs. The court additionally granted plaintiffs $500.98 in costs on June 28, 2016. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On May 7, 2014, a same-sex couple from Alabama, who were married in California, filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Alabama U.S. District Court under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the state of Alabama. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that Alabama's ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional, recognize same-sex marriages entered into outside of Alabama, enjoin Alabama from enforcing the marriage ban, and grant the plaintiffs' adoption petition. They alleged that Alabama's ban on same-sex marriage violated their rights under the Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Full Faith and Credit Clause. Summary judgment was granted on behalf of the plaintiffs but the district court stayed the order's execution until February 9, 2015. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court denied the defendant's requests to extend the stay. And so, the order went into effect. A probate judge issued the plaintiffs an adoption decree. The court granted plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On July 21, 2005, fifteen named indigent plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of a putative class, filed this suit in in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law against the City of Gulfport, Mississippi. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/CJ-MS-0001-0001.pdf\">asked the court</a> for class certification and injunctive relief, claiming that various city policies and practices related to the processing, fining, and jailing of indigent accused and convicted misdemeanor offenders violated the First, Sixth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and Mississippi state law. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the following policies and practices were illegal: incarcerating indigent debtors for failure to pay court-imposed fines and fees; denying accused misdemeanants the right to counsel at hearings where the accused faced incarceration; and effectively denying indigent persons access to public court records by levying unreasonably high record retrieval fees. On August 9, 2005, the plaintiffs filed an <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/CJ-MS-0001-0002.pdf\">amended complaint</a>, adding three more named plaintiffs to the suit. Seven months later, the defendants filed a motion to quash and dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs' service of the complaint was improper and insufficient to confer jurisdiction. The District Court (Judge Louis Guirola) <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/CJ-MS-0001-0003.pdf\">denied</a> the motion on August 23, 2006. On September 27, 2006, the District Court stayed the case for 120 days pending settlement discussions. Following these discussions, the parties jointly filed a stipulation of dismissal on January 31, 2007, and the court closed the case. According to a February 1, 2007 <a href=\"https://www.schr.org/node/111\">article</a> in Mississippi's Sun Herald newspaper, the plaintiffs agreed to the dismissal after the city: created a program allowing indigent debtors to perform community service in lieu of paying fines; granted temporary amnesty to debtors with overdue fines; implemented a new court document filing and retrieval system; and doubled its budget for public defenders.", "summary": "In July 2005, indigent plaintiffs filed this class-action suit against the City of Gulfport, MS in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, alleging that various city policies and practices concerning the processing, fining, and jailing of indigent accused and convicted offenders violated both the U.S. Constitution and state law. In January 2007, the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the suit after the defendants amended their policies and practices to cure the alleged violations."}
{"article": "On September 29, 2006, the Detroit field office of the EEOC brought this suit against Rocket Enterprise, Inc. in the Eastern District of Michigan. The EEOC alleged that the defendant violated Title VII by allowing a co-worker of the complainant to sexually harass her and that the defendant retaliated against the complainant by terminating her after she complained about the harassment. EEOC sought permanent injunctive relief, monetary relief, and punitive damages. The case was assigned to Sean F. Cox. On July 18, 2007, the court referred the parties to mediation, which was unsuccessful. On August 13, 2007, the defendant moved for summary judgement, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the plaintiff's claims. The defendant's motion was denied on November 19, 2007 because there was no genuine issue of material fact (Judge Sean F. Cox.). On January 18, 2008, the parties agreed to dismiss the plaintiff's claims of sexual harassment and hostile work environment, leaving the retaliation claim alone. It is unclear from the docket why the parties came to this agreement. The case moved to a trial on the retaliation claim, which led to a jury verdict for the defendant on February 7, 2008. The EEOC moved for a new trial in February of 2008, alleging an erroneous verdict. EEOC's motion was denied on March 18, 2008. The EEOC then appealed in May 2008. It later voluntarily dismissed the appeal on February 3, 2009. The case is closed.", "summary": "The EEOC brought this suit in September of 2006, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation for complaining about the sexual harassment. The suit went to trial, where a jury found for the defendant in February of 2008. The EEOC voluntarily dismissed the suit on appeal and the case is now closed."}
{"article": "On September 29, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada against GNLV, Corp., d/b/a Golden Nugget Hotel and Casino along with several individual employers under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, modification of defendants\u2019 policies, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. This case was originally assigned to Judge Brian Sandoval and referred to Magistrate Judge Peggy A. Leen. After Judge Sandoval resigned, the case was reassigned to Chief Judge Jones on September 16, 2009. The EEOC claimed that because of the defendants\u2019 actions, claimants were exposed to a hostile work environment based on being black, female, or both. Specifically, the claimants alleged that the defendants subjected them to intimidation, threats of physical force, and racial slurs by co-workers, supervisors, and third parties. When the claimants attempted to report such offenses, the defendants allegedly retaliated by issuing verbal or written warnings or suspending the women from work. On February 15, 2007, the parties began settlement negotiations and were referred to Magistrate Judge George Foley for early neutral evaluation. However, no settlement was reached and parties began the process of litigation in March 2007. On October 28, 2008, the defendant\u2019s motion to preclude the EEOC from adding additional class members was granted. On December 12, 2008, the defendants filed for summary judgement on the EEOC\u2019s claim that they had employed discriminatory procedures, on their request for punitive damages, and on the merits of the individual class members\u2019 claims. On June 2, 2009, the court granted summary judgement regarding the EEOC\u2019s pattern or practice claim. 2009 WL 10679135. Based on this ruling, the six individual employees\u2019 claims became moot. On June 12, 2009, the court issued a judgment in favor of the defendants. The court ordered the EEOC to pay $14,681.25. The EEOC objected to these costs. On August 3, 2009, the EEOC appealed to the Ninth Circuit from the final judgement entered in favor of the defendants. Specifically, they appealed the district court\u2019s dismissal of the six individual employees\u2019 employment discrimination claims and the district court\u2019s order precluding additional class members from being added to the suit. Oral arguments were heard on February 14, 2011. On April 19, 2011 the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the six individual employees\u2019 claims. The Circuit Court stated that judgment in favor of the defendant on the classwide discrimination claim did not prevent the individual employees from bringing forward their claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court barring additional class members from joining the suit. 2011 WL 1461444. On December 18, 2014, on remand, the district court granted the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment for three of the individual employees\u2019 claims and granted and denied in part for the remaining claims. For the three claimants whose claims survived summary judgment in part, two had summary judgement granted on their claims for hostile work environment, one had summary judgement granted on her disparate treatment claim, and one had summary judgment granted towards her retaliation claim. The court denied summary judgment on two of the claims of retaliation and one claim of hostile work environment. 2014 WL 7365871. On June 1, 2015, the court granted and denied in part the EEOC\u2019s motion for summary judgment on the defendant\u2019s affirmative defenses initially filed on December 15, 2008. Of the defendant\u2019s 21 affirmative defenses, the court granted summary judgement for failure to state a claim and punitive damages to the extent that those were defenses going to the sufficiency of the pleading; failure to exhaust administrative remedies to the extent they alleged administrative deficiencies to two of the individual employees\u2019 claims; statute of limitations to the extent the defendant claimed the EEOC\u2019s Title VII action was barred by the statute of limitations; lack of jurisdiction towards two of the individual employees\u2019 claims; and unnamed defenses. The court denied summary judgement to the affirmative defenses of failure to state a claim and punitive damages to the extent those defenses raised substantive issues; failure to exhaust administrative remedies to the extent they related to one of the individual employee\u2019s retaliation claim; statute of limitations to the extent the defense applied to any state tort claim being raised by the EEOC; lack of jurisdiction towards one of the individual employee\u2019s claims; non-discriminatory reasons; privilege of an employer; failure to mitigate; laches; and the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act. 2015 WL 3467092. On June 11, 2015, the EEOC filed a motion to amend the court\u2019s June 1, 2015 opinion. The EEOC argued that the court should have granted summary judgment in its favor on more of the defendant\u2019s affirmative defenses. On July 6, 2015, the court denied this motion towards the defendant\u2019s affirmative defenses of privilege of employer, mitigation of damages, and proximate cause. The court granted summary judgement on the defendant\u2019s affirmative defense of state law. 2015 WL 13505878. On August 7, 2015, the parties proposed a pretrial order and scheduled a jury trial for April 4, 2016. But on February 17, 2016, the parties reached a settlement that was formally approved on March 1, 2016. Under the settlement, the defendants agreed to comply with the Civil Rights Act, to post a notice on the employee bulletin board regarding employment discrimination until February 2018, and to hold trainings in 2016 and 2017 for all employees concerning the discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII. The defendants also agreed to pay the three remaining claimants a total of $30,000. Each party agreed to pay its own attorney fees and costs. The defendants denied all wrongdoing in agreeing to this settlement. This case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2006, employees of GNLV, Corp. filed this lawsuit through the EEOC, which alleged that the defendants discriminated and retaliated against their employees based on being black and/or female. In 2009, the court granted summary judgement to the defendant. The EEOC appealed and in 2011 the Ninth circuit reversed the motion for summary judgment. On remand in 2014, summary judgment was granted on three of the employees\u2019 claims and granted and denied in part for the remaining three. Summary judgement was then granted and denied in part on the defendant\u2019s affirmative defenses. In 2016, the parties reached a settlement as to the remaining claims, which required the defendants to pay monetary damages, comply with the Civil Rights Act, post a notice regarding employment discrimination, and hold employee training regarding discrimination and retaliation. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On February 22, 2018, four Vietnamese refugees filed this habeas petition and class action lawsuit challenging U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for allegedly arbitrarily and unlawfully detaining them. In January 2008, the United States and Vietnam entered an agreement governing the repatriation of Vietnamese nationals facing final orders of removal to Vietnam. One limit made part of the agreement was Vietnam's decision not to agree to repatriation of any national who had arrived in the United States before July 12, 1995. As a result, from 2008-2016, ICE maintained a policy of releasing Vietnamese nationals facing final orders of removal from ICE custody, given the impracticability of their deportation. However, in 2016, ICE reversed its policy, detaining Vietnamese nationals with final orders of removal indefinitely. In the original complaint, the petitioners argued that this change in policy violated 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1231, which prescribes a 90-day \"removal period\" in which to remove the detainee. Petitioners relied heavily upon the Supreme Court's 2001 opinion in <i>Zadvydas v. Davis</i> (533 U.S. 678), which held that Due Process precludes the United States from indefinitely detaining immigrants for whom it is not \"reasonably foreseeable\" that deportation can occur. In addition, petitioners argued that failing to provide an individualized assessment as to whether or not detention is even necessary, due to danger or flight risk, also violated 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1231 and Due Process. Petitioners sought habeas, declaratory, and injunctive relief. Represented by Asian Americans Advancing Justice and the private law firms Reed Smith and Davis Adams, the habeas petition was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (in Santa Ana). The petition proposed three classes of Vietnamese refugees held after receiving final orders of removal: those detained for more than 90 days (90-day class), those detained for more than 180 days (180-day class), and those detained for longer than 180 days without an individualized hearing to assess whether detention is necessary based on danger or flight risk (prolonged detention class). All class members arrived in the U.S. before 1995 and had lived in the United States as legal permanent residents (LPR) ever since. Class members faced removal proceedings after becoming involved with the criminal justice system and losing their LPR status. The case was initially assigned to Judge John A. Kronstadt. However, the plaintiffs in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16243\"><i>Chhoeun v. Marin</i></a>, a case challenging ICE's detention of Cambodian refugees stripped of their legal permanent resident status due to criminal convictions, moved to relate this case to that one. On March 14, 2018, the motion was granted, and both cases were assigned to Judge Cormac J. Carney. On April 25, 2018, the petitioners moved for a preliminary injunction to secure the release of the named defendants. However, soon thereafter, ICE released them from detention, mooting the motion. At this point, the government moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that its claims were now moot. Petitioners responded by filing an amended complaint, acknowledging that the original named petitioners had been released from ICE custody and adding new named petitioners who were in ICE detention at the time of filing. In light of the amended complaint, Judge Cormac J. Carney dismissed the motion for a preliminary injunction on May 23, 2018, simply noting that the injunction was superseded by the new complaint and that the need for release no longer applied to the named petitioners in the original complaint. 2018 WL 3357577. Judge Carney denied the government\u2019s motion to dismiss on September 6, 2018. 333 F. Supp. 3d 984. The court held that the petitioners' claims were not moot because, although the named petitioners were released from detention, they could still be re-detained at any time and therefore still had a live habeas relief interest. The court also held that the petitioners had successfully pleaded claims upon which relief could be granted as to their assertions that their post-removal order detention was unlawful when removal was not likely in the foreseeable future and that detentions over six months without individualized bond hearings are unlawful. On October 18, 2018, Judge Carney granted in part and denied in part class certification, granting certification to the 90-day and 180-day classes only as to the declaratory \"issues of whether the Class has overcome the six month presumption of reasonableness and met its burden under <i>Zadvydas</i> [<i>v. Davis</i> (533 U.S. 678)],\" declining to certify on the injunctive issue that would have limited the government's authority to detain immigrants past 180 days. The court furthermore certified the prolonged detention class, seeking injunctive relief to compel bond hearings for the detainees. 2018 WL 11184556. After a year and a half of discovery, the petitioners moved for summary judgment on March 6, 2020, and the government cross-filed a month later on April 10. On June 11, 2020, the government's motion was granted in substantial part, settling all of the declaratory issues in favor of the government. Judge Carney's opinion repeatedly noted the validity of the petitioners' arguments, writing that \"many class members may be able to show that there is 'good reason to believe' their removal is unlikely\" but concluded that sweeping declarations as such would be inappropriate where individualized, fact-intensive review is the norm, noting that <i>Zadvydas</i> claims are usually made in individual habeas hearings. Following this ruling, the petitioners moved to reconsider but then withdrew their motion. From there, the case went silent until May 5, 2021 when Judge Carney ordered the parties to show cause as to why the case should not be dismissed and closed. The petitioners have since responded to that order; however the contents of their response have been sealed for reasons unknown. It is unclear how the change from the Trump presidential administration to the Biden administration has affected this case. Under the Biden administration, on March 15, 2021, 33 Vietnamese nationals, including at least one who arrived in the United States before 1995, <a href=\"https://www.latimes.com/socal/daily-pilot/entertainment/story/2021-03-18/o-c-organizers-urge-biden-administration-to-stop-deportation-of-vietnamese-refugees\">were deported to Vietnam</a>. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "Four refugees filed this class action suit in the U.S. Central District of California on behalf of Vietnamese immigrants facing orders of removal and indefinite detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), despite the fact that Vietnam has stated that it will not repatriate nationals who arrived in the U.S. before 1995. Judge Cormac J. Carney certified three classes of Vietnamese immigrants held in ICE detention in 2018 but subsequently dismissed their claims for declaratory relief in 2020 on the basis that it was inappropriate to grant sweeping declarations where individual review is required. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On November 10, 2011, nine African-American voters in Maryland filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against Maryland, under Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked for both declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that Maryland intentionally violated minority rights after the 2010 Census by only creating two minority-majority districts (out of eight total) despite 40% of the population being a minority. The plaintiffs argued that Maryland's approach to census data that required prisoners to be considered at their last known address, rather than at their correctional facility (and eliminating any prisoners whose last known address was outside the state from consideration) violated the Voting Rights Act, as well as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Over 70% of those not considered were black. The District Court (Judge Roger Titus) granted a motion allowing for a three-judge panel to hear the case (2011 WL 5854636) and later denied a motion to intervene by six additional Maryland residents (2011 WL 6097770). On December 23, 2011, the three-judge panel (opinion written by Judge Paul Niemeyer) granted Maryland's motion for summary judgment because states are allowed to tinker with census data as long as their method was not haphazard, inconsistent, or conjectural (831 F.Supp.2d 887). The Supreme Court summarily affirmed (without opinion) on June 25, 2012, 133 S.Ct. 29.", "summary": "The plaintiffs, nine African-American voters in Maryland, claimed that Maryland's redistricting intentionally violated minority rights because there are only two minority-majority districts (out of eight total,) despite 40% of population being minority. Maryland law took an approach to census data that required prisoners to be considered at their last known address, rather than at their correctional facility (and eliminating any prisoners whose last known address was outside the state from consideration.) Over 70% of those removed consideration were black. The three-judge panel ruled against plaintiffs because states are allowed to tinker with census data as long as it was not haphazard, inconsistent, or conjectural. The Supreme Court denied certiorari."}
{"article": "On September 21, 2011, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against Bass Pro Outdoor World in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiff brought the lawsuit for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the EEOC alleged that since November of 2005 Bass Pro engaged in a nationwide pattern or practice of denying employment to qualified Black and Hispanic applicants for hourly and salaried positions and that it retaliated against employees who opposed actions they perceived as unlawful or who otherwise complained or reported such incidents (including but not limited to sexual harassment and gender discrimination). The EEOC also alleged that Bass Pro destroyed or failed to preserve relevant records in violation of Section 709(c) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-8(c), such as employment applications, personnel files, tests, lists of job candidates, and efforts to contact the corporate complaint center. The EEOC sought back pay, economic compensation, compensation for emotional suffering, punitive damages, and reinstatement of behalf of those affected. It also sought injunctions to end the allegedly discriminatory and retaliatory practices and to create and preserve records in compliance with the Civil Rights Act. Unusually, for the EEOC, the lawsuit was based on a \"Commissioner's Charge\" rather than a complaint by an employee. The case was assigned to Judge Keith Ellison. Bass Pro responded to the EEOC's 9-page complaint on January 5, 2012 with a motion to dismiss complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On January 26, 2012, the EEOC filed a 12-page amended complaint giving more factual detail for its allegations, such as statistics on the number of Black and Hispanic managers and another instance of retaliation. In this complaint the EEOC also added Bass Pro, Inc. (BPI), and Tracker Marine, LLC (Tracker), as defendants. Because the EEOC had filed a new complaint, Judge Ellison denied Bass Pro's motion to dismiss the original complaint as moot. On March 5, 2012, Bass Pro filed a new motion to dismiss seeking, among other things, not only dismissal of all claims based on a failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, but also to have the claims against Tracker and Bass Pro, Inc. dismissed on jurisdictional and procedural grounds. On May 31, 2012, the court granted Bass Pro's motion in part, giving the EEOC leave to amend the complaint. 884 F.Supp.2d 499 (S.D. Tex. 2012). The court found that the EEOC had made sufficient allegations to state the recordkeeping claim. Because the EEOC had not identified even one particular individual for its retaliation claim, that claim was dismissed with leave to amend. The court ruled that the 300-day limitation (barring suits for conduct that occurred more than 300 days before a charge is filed with the EEOC) applied to both claims under \u00a7 706 and claims under \u00a7 707 (pattern or practice). The court also ruled that the EEOC could not proceed on a hybrid \u00a7 706 and \u00a7 707 claim--pattern or practice claims could not be brought under \u00a7 706, and the EEOC had to provide sufficient allegations for each type of claim. For those reasons the court restricted the EEOC's claims to those that fell within February 2007 and April 2010 and dismissed the EEOC's discriminatory hiring claims because the statistics on managers did not plausibly suggest a pattern or practice of hiring discrimination for the wider category of salaried and hourly positions, as opposed to just manager positions. The EEOC filed a 247-page second amended complaint on July 20, 2012. The complaint greatly elaborated the factual details of the claims. The most notable additions were as follows: connecting the behavior of store lower-level management to a profile allegedly established by the owner of the companies at a meeting of Store General Managers, listing a total of 201 individuals (184 Black and 18 Hispanic) covering a range of states who were denied employment with details of their application efforts, identifying 5 targets of retaliation and narrating their attempts to complain about or correct unlawful activity, and providing statistic data from 24 stores across the country on the number of total Black and Hispanic employees as well as store-specific comparisons of percentages of Black and Hispanic Bass Pro employees to the percentage of Black and Hispanic employees in the county respectively (the comparisons involved manager and non-manager positions). The complaint did not explicitly differentiate \u00a7706 claims from \u00a7707 claims. The complaint also addressed jurisdictional issues. Bass Pro filed another motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on August 24, 2012. On October 25, 2012, the court dismissed the claims against BPI for lack of jurisdiction but deferred deciding jurisdiction over Tracker because Bass Pro had misidentified Tracker Marine Retail, LLC, as Tracker Marine and the EEOC hadn't had a full opportunity for discovery to establish jurisdiction. 2012 WL 13040407. On March 18, 2013, the court granted Bass Pro's motion to dismiss in part, with leave to amend. Noting that the allegations did not constitute a prima facie case of discriminatory hiring under \u00a7 706, the court found them sufficient to state the claim. The court held the combination of statistics and anecdotes to be sufficient to state a \u00a7707 pattern or practice claim. The court dismissed retaliation claims for 2 of the 5 individuals. The record-keeping claim was still valid. 2013 WL 1124063. The EEOC filed a third amended complaint on April 15, 2013 adding details for the retaliation claims that had been dismissed. On May 15, 2013, Bass Pro filed its response and a motion for summary judgment. The EEOC subsequently filed a motion for partial summary in its own favor, arguing that it had satisfied its duty to engage in conciliation before bringing a suit and that the court should not rule on that issue. On October 2, 2013, the court denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the issue was reviewable. 2013 WL 5515345. On June 13, 2014, the EEOC filed its fourth amended complaint, correcting the name of one of the defendants. Because this was the only change, the parties agreed that the fourth amended complaint did not render Bass Pro\u2019s motion for summary judgment moot. On July 30, 2014, the court denied this motion, reconsidering its denial of the EEOC\u2019s motion for summary judgment and finding that the EEOC did meet the statutory requirements of conciliation. 35 F.Supp.3d 836. On November 17, 2014, the court allowed Bass Pro to file an interlocutory appeal. 2014 WL 6453606. Bass Pro appealed the July 30 order to the U.S. Appellate Court for the Fifth Circuit on February 10, 2015. The district court chose not to stay discovery pending the appeal. On May 8, 2017, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision to deny Bass Pro\u2019s motion for summary judgment. 826 F.3d 791. The panel was made up of Judge Patrick Higginbotham, Judge Stephen Higginson, and Judge Leslie Southwick. On July 24, 2017, the parties reached a settlement agreement, and the court entered a consent decree the next day. The consent decree required Bass Pro to reform its recruitment and hiring practices, provide anti-discrimination training, create an Office of Diversity and Inclusion, and pay a total of $10,500,000.00 to be distributed among the qualified Black and Hispanic applicants who had been denied employment at any of its stores nationwide. Pro Bass also had to report back to the EEOC. The consent decree was to be in effect for forty-two months (or three and a half years) after its date of entry, during which the court would retain jurisdiction. In September 2017, the court granted a motion to extend the deadlines for Bass Pro having to complete certain tasks. As of April 20, 2020, there are no further entries in the docket since then, which suggests that the parties have been compliant with the consent decree so far. The court will presumably continue to retain jurisdiction until January 2021, when the consent decree expires.", "summary": "The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the EEOC alleged that since November of 2005 Bass Pro engaged in a nationwide pattern or practice of denying employment to qualified black and Hispanic applicants and that it retaliated against employees who opposed actions they perceived as unlawful. The case settled in July 2017. Bass Pro paid a total of $10.5 million in damages to be distributed among qualified Black and Hispanic applicants who were denied employment between February 2007 and April 2010. Bass Pro was also required to reform many of its hiring and conduct policies. The retains jurisdiction over this case until January 2021."}
{"article": "On October 15, 2008, African-American employees at the freight transportation company Yellow Transportation, Inc. (\"Yellow\") filed a class action lawsuit against their employer in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981. The plaintiffs, represented by an attorney from the Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic and private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief as well as class certification. They alleged that Yellow created a racially hostile work environment for African-American employees working at Yellow's facility in Chicago Ridge, IL, from October 15, 2004 to the present. They also claimed that Yellow subjected those employees to disparate treatment and retaliated against them when they complained about the discriminatory practice. The named plaintiffs also brought their individual claims against the employer. The parties started the discovery process with regard to the issue of class certification. During March and June 2009, Yellow served 19 subpoenas on the plaintiffs' former employers, requesting various information regarding their previous employment. Yellow claimed that some of the plaintiffs failed to disclose their claims against it in their filings of bankruptcy proceedings despite their knowledge of the claims, and that some failed to disclose criminal convictions on their job applications with Yellow. The plaintiffs moved to quash subpoenas and for protective order. The District Court (Magistrate Judge Nan R. Nolan) granted the plaintiffs' motion on October 9. 2009. 2009 WL 3270791 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2009). Yellow then moved for leave to amend its answer and add the affirmative defenses of judicial estoppel and after-acquired evidence. The Court (Judge Joan B. Gottschall) granted the motion on January 14, 2010. 2010 WL 152000 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2010). In the meantime, in or about March 2009, YRC, Inc. (\"YRC\"), Yellow's parent company, merged Yellow with another YRC company, Roadway Express, Inc. (\"Roadway\"). In December 2009, the plaintiffs and the proposed class who were still on the job were transferred to a former Roadway facility in Chicago Heights, IL. In the same month, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\") started its own lawsuit against Yellow and YRC, <i>EEOC v. Yellow Transportation, Inc. and YRC, Inc.</i>, linked below as a related case (Clearinghouse code: EE-IL-0330). It was filed in the same district court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (\"Title VII\"), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e, et seq., and the plaintiffs in this case later joined that one, too, as intervenor plaintiffs. Back in this case, on April 12, 2010, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding YRC as a co-defendant and an individual as a named plaintiff. They also redefined the hostile work environment class to include individuals working at both the Chicago Ridge and Chicago Heights facilities. This modification was in light of a then ongoing case filed by the EEOC originally against Roadway <i>EEOC v. Roadway Express, Inc.</i>, linked below (Clearinghouse code: EE-IL-0189). The action was brought on behalf of African-American employees working at the Roadway facility in Chicago Heights for race discrimination. Yellow opposed to this last change, arguing that the class definition was too broad. The plaintiffs then moved to withdraw the amended complaint and to file a new one, with a hostile work environment class including only former Chicago Ridge employees. The Court (Magistrate Judge Nolan) granted the motion on July 26, 2010, reasoning that it was not clear yet to the Court that both Yellow and Roadway employees were complaining of the same events. Brown v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 08 C 5908, 2010 WL 2911786 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2010). The corrected amended complaint was filed the next day. Subsequently, the plaintiffs moved to certify class and the defendants filed their opposition. On May 11, 2011, the Court (Judge Gottschall) granted the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class. 2011 WL 1838741 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2011). The defendants filed a petition for permission to appeal to the appellate court, but it was denied on July 1, 2011. On June 27, 2012, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox, upon both parties' consent, for settlement proceedings. Negotiations were successful, and this Brown case and the EEOC case were consolidated for the purpose of a consent decree, which Magistrate Judge Cox signed on September 25, 2012. In the decree, the defendants agreed to pay $11,000,000 to the plaintiff class; the EEOC was placed in charge of allocating the award to eligible individuals. No injunction was issued, since the Chicago Ridge facility was closed and the Chicago Heights facility was already subject to a consent decree issued in <i>EEOC v. Roadway Express, Inc.</i> After some court proceedings regarding award allocation, the case ended.", "summary": "On October 15, 2008, African-American employees at the freight transportation company Yellow Transportation, Inc. (\"Yellow\") filed a class action lawsuit against their employer in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The lawsuit was brought on behalf of African-American employees working at Yellow's facility in Chicago Ridge, IL, from October 15, 2004 to the present. They alleged that Yellow created a racially hostile work environment, subjected them to disparate treatment and retaliated against them when they complained about the discriminatory practice. In the meantime, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\") started its own lawsuit against Yellow and YRC, Yellow's parent company. After some disputes regarding the scope of the class, the District Court certified the class on May 11, 2011. This case and the EEOC case were eventually consolidated for the sake of a consent decree, filed by the Court on September 25, 2012. In the decree, the defendants shall pay $11,000,000 to the plaintiff class. This ended the case."}
{"article": "On July 10, 2014, five U.S. citizens who had their information entered into counterterrorism databases and were subjected to law enforcement scrutiny and interrogation, filed this lawsuit against the Department of Justice (\"DOJ\") and the Program Manager of the Information Sharing Environment (\"PM-ISE\"). Plaintiffs challenged the legality of a domestic surveillance program, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, under the Administrative Procedure Act (\"APA\") and the Declaratory Judgment Act. Plaintiffs were represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (\"ACLU\"), the ACLU of California, and Asian Americans Advancing Justice-Asian Law Caucus. The case was assigned to Judge Richard Seeborg. Through the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiatives (\"NSI\"), the federal government encourages state and local law enforcement agencies and private actors to collect and report information that has a potential nexus to terrorism through Special Activity Reports. Plaintiffs were reported as having engaged in \"suspicious activities\" under DOJ and PM-ISE standards when engaged in actions such as taking pictures, buying computers, and standing in a train station. As a consequence of being reported through SARs, plaintiffs were subject to law enforcement scrutiny and interrogation. Plaintiffs claimed that the DOJ and PM-ISE Standards for SARs are invalid because they violate federal statutory requirements that agencies observe certain procedures and not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Specifically, plaintiffs contended that defendants' standards conflict with a DOJ regulation (28 C.F.R. \u00a7 23) (hereinafter Part 23) that prohibits the collection, maintenance, and dissemination of criminal intelligence information unless there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and that defendants' standards were not promulgated in accordance with the notice and comment requirements of the APA. Plaintiffs claimed that the PM-ISE adopted a \u201cFunctional Standard\u201d that utilises overly broad criteria to define the types of activities deemed as having a potential nexus to terrorism. The government moved to dismiss the case on October 16, 2014. First, defendants claimed that plaintiffs lacked standing because 1) they had not alleged a nexus between their injuries and the guidance provided by defendants, and 2) their allegations of future law enforcement scrutiny were too speculative to satisfy the requirement of imminent future harm to warrant prospective relief. Second, defendants claimed that plaintiffs failed to plead an action that could proceed under the APA because alternative remedies were available to plaintiffs and the guidance provided by defendants in connection with the NSI did not create binding legal obligations remediable under the APA. Finally, defendants argued that plaintiffs' claims were improperly joined and should be severed. Plaintiffs filed a response to the motion to dismiss on November 20, 2014. On February 20, 2015, Judge Richard Seeborg denied a motion to dismiss, holding that the defendants\u2019 contentions as to causality and redressability both fail, as the plaintiffs are claiming injury from what happens after the encounters law enforcement or private security officers. Consequently, the plaintiffs are not challenging the conduct of law enforcement or private security officers during the alleged encounters, but rather, they are seeking to remedy harms that arise directly from the existence of the defendants\u2019 Standards. The court also accepted that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the case, and that the APA claims are not subject to dismissal on grounds that plaintiffs have adequate remedies elsewhere. On September 3, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint, which claimed that the defendants violated the APA in two ways. First, plaintiffs argue the Functional Standard was adopted without complying with the APA\u2019s requirement that the public be provided a notice and comment period prior to adoption of \u201clegislative rules.\u201d While defendants acknowledge no such notice and comment procedure was utilised, they argued that the Functional Standard is not a \u201clegislative rule\u201d subject to the requirement, or that even if it were, the violation was harmless because the Functional Standard was adopted through a collaborative process that included public input. Second, plaintiffs claimed that adoption of the Functional Standard was \u201carbitrary and capricious\u201d because of the alleged conflict with Part 23. Defendants argued there is no conflict that renders adoption of the Functional Standard improper. On September 8, 2015, the case was referred to Magistrate Kandis A. Westmore for discovery. On December 18, 2015, the Magistrate held that defendants are to revisit their compilation of the administrative record to ensure that it includes all documents and materials considered by the agency in deciding (1) to adopt a standard that is broader than Part 23 and authorizes the collection, maintenance, and dissemination of information even in the absence of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, in conflict with 28 CFR Part 23 and (2) to promulgate such a standard without public notice and comment. On March 27, 2017, Judge Richard Seeborg issued an Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. In this Order, the court noted that the crux of the dispute lay in the distinction between the \u201creasonably indicative\u201d standard, and the \u201creasonable suspicion\u201d standard. This distinction was raised when the Plaintiffs argued that the Functional Standard conflicted with a duly-promulgated DOJ regulation, Part 23, which they asserted was adopted to protect constitutional and privacy rights by prohibiting the collection of \u201ccriminal intelligence\u201d unless supported by \u201creasonable suspicion.\u201d The Functional Standard, in contrast, called for sharing of SARs whenever they reflect \u201cobserved behaviour\u201d that was \u201creasonably indicative of pre-operational planning associated with terrorism or other criminal activity.\u201d Both sides had agreed that \u201creasonably indicative\u201d is a lesser standard which calls for dissemination of SARs even in the absence of \u201creasonable suspicion.\u201d The question before the court was therefore whether defendants failed to comply with the APA in adopting the \u201creasonably indicative\u201d standard. The court held that the defendants were able to show that the adoption of the Functional Standard did not violate the APA. First, the court held that the Functional Standard was fundamentally a policy guidance statement, and that it was not subject to a notice-and-comment requirement. Second, the court accepted the defendants\u2019 argument that the Functional Standard was developed to address data collection and dissemination issues not already within the scope of Part 23, and while they could have adopted the same standard, the record revealed no \u201cclear error of judgment\u201d or \u201cfailure to consider an important aspect of the problem\u201d or such a counter-factual or implausible explanation as to permit the court to substitute its judgment of what a better rule might be. In a footnote, the court observed that Plaintiffs offered policy arguments as to why, in their view, the \u201creasonably indicative\u201d standard draws a poor balance between individual rights and public safety; however, in an action under the APA, something more must be shown. Judgment was entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs on March 29, 2017. On May 28, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed an appeal to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. On November 3, 2017, the Appellants filed an Opening Brief. They argued that the (1) Functional Standard is a substantive rule that is subject to notice and comment as required by the APA, and that the Functional Standard created a binding norm and constituted final agency action. They also argued that (2) the Defendants\u2019 rationales for adopting the \u2018reasonably indicative\u2019 standard were arbitrary and capricious if the agency failed to consider an important aspect of the problem or offered an implausible explanation, the defendants initially failed to address Part 23 at all, the rationale for rejecting Part 23 is contrary to the purpose of the Functional Standard, and the post hoc rationales are meritless. The Appellees responded on February 16, 2018. 2018 WL 948517. Appellants\u2019 Reply Brief was submitted on March 30, 2018. 2018 WL 1583408. A Ninth Circuit panel of Circuit Judges Milan D. Smith Jr. and Andrew D. Hurwitz and Circuit Judge Richard K. Eaton agreed with the district court's decision in a January 29, 2019 opinion. It held that the Functional Standard was a final agency outcome that was still legislative in nature, since it influenced internal filing behavior while agency officials had to decide whether to pursue an SAR further. As for Arbitrary and Capricious review, the panel highlighted that while the line between criminal intelligence and SARs was murky, the fact that more investigation is needed for a criminal intelligence investigation than an SAR, which can be as simple as a notification for further review. They believed that this distinction was enough to demonstrate that the SAR process was intentionally crafted with enough consideration to withstand Arbitrary and Capricious review. 913 F.3d 1179. The plaintiffs did not appeal the decision; the case is now closed.", "summary": "On July 10, 2014, five U.S. citizens who had their information entered into counterterrorism databases and were subjected to law enforcement scrutiny and interrogation, filed suit against the Department of Justice (\"DOJ\"), the U.S. Attorney General, and the Program Manager of the Information Sharing Environment (\"PM-ISE\"). Plaintiffs challenged the legality of a domestic surveillance program, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (\"APA\")(5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706 (2)(A), (D)) and the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201). Plaintiffs were represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (\"ACLU\"), the ACLU of California, and Asian Americans Advancing Justice-Asian Law Caucus. Plaintiffs claim that certain DOJ standards encouraging state and local law enforcement and private actors to report activities potentially related to terrorism are invalid. Defendants moved to dismiss the case on October 16, 2014, and plaintiffs filed a response on November 20, 2014. A judgment was entered in favour of defendants and against plaintiffs on March 29, 2017. The Ninth Circuit supported the district court's decision on appeal. The plaintiffs did not appeal the decision; the case is now closed."}
{"article": "On December 10, 2014, two student-athletes brought this discrimination action against Pepperdine University in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles. The plaintiffs alleged that the university administration, athletic department, and women\u2019s basketball coach coordinated to discriminate against them because of their same-sex relationship, resulting in dismissal from the basketball team and loss of athletic scholarships, which forced them to leave school. The plaintiffs\u2019 complaint asserted state claims for violation of rights under the California Constitution and California state law and federal claims for violation of Title IX. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought monetary damages. On January 14, 2015, the defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs then amended the complaint on February 5, 2015. Two weeks later, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On April 16, 2015, Federal District Judge Dean D. Pregerson issued an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. Specifically, the court denied the motion to dismiss the invasion of privacy claim as to the plaintiffs' sexual orientation and the violations of California\u2019s Educational Code or invasion of privacy via medical records. Further, since the plaintiffs did not contest Pepperdine\u2019s assertion that Title IX does not cover sexual orientation discrimination, the court dismissed Title IX claims with leave to amend. 100 F. Supp. 3d 927. On June 9, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, claiming that Title IX covered gender stereotype discrimination. That same day, the defendants again filed a motion to dismiss the Title IX claim, claiming the statute's prohibition on the \"basis of sex\" did not cover sexual orientation. On December 15, 2015, Judge Pregerson denied the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, finding \u201cthe distinction is illusory and artificial, and that sexual orientation discrimination is not a category distinct from sex or gender discrimination\u201d, and that \u201cclaims of sexual orientation discrimination are gender stereotype or sex discrimination claims.\u201d 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151. The parties proceeded with discovery from March 2016 to August 2017. Trial was held from July 18, 2017 to August 11, 2017. On August 11, 2017, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant on all claims. The court entered a judgement based on the verdict on September 11, 2017. The plaintiffs filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (No. 17-56548) on October 12, 2017. A mediation conference was scheduled for November 28, 2017 and on December 15, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a joint motion to dismiss the appeal. There were no further developments in the District Court and the case is closed.", "summary": "On December 10, 2014, two student-athletes brought a discrimination action against Pepperdine University alleging that the university discriminated against them because of their same-sex relationship. They were dismissed from the basketball team and lost their athletic scholarships, which forced them to leave school. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the university on August 11, 2017. The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit but later dismissed their appeal and the case is now closed."}
{"article": "On September 13, 2017 ten U.S. citizens and a lawful permanent resident filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs sued the United States Customs and Border Protection (\u201cCBP\u201d) and the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (\u201cICE\u201d) under 28 U.S.C. \u00a72201 for a declaration that the defendants had violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights and to enjoin defendants from searching or confiscating electronic devices without probable cause and expunge all collected information from plaintiffs' devices. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants seized and then searched their electronic devices, containing expressive content and associational content, at the United States border without a warrant demonstrating probable cause that these devices contained contraband or evidence of a violation of immigration or customs laws and without describing the information to be searched. On December 15, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for a lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. On September 13, 2017, District Judge Denise J. Casper denied the motion to dismiss finding that plaintiffs had standing to sue and pled plausible Fourth and First Amendment claims. On April 30, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims. On June 6, 2019, the defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment. On November 12, 2019, District Judge Denise J. Casper granted the plaintiffs' motion in part and denied the defendants' motion. On the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims, Judge Casper denied the plaintiff's argument that a warrant was required to search their devices at the border, but Judge Casper found that the defendants' advanced searches of the plaintiffs' devices violated the Fourth Amendment because the policy would have required a reasonable suspicion that the devices contained contraband. Judge Casper also granted summary judgment for certain plaintiffs who argued that the government required probable cause for searches of devices kept by the defendants after the plaintiffs left the border. Judge Casper denied both parties' motions for summary judgment regarding plaintiff's First Amendment claims. Both parties have appealed to the First Circuit in January 2020. The appeals were docketed as 20-01081 and 20-01077. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On September 13, 2017 ten U.S. citizens and a lawful permanent resident filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs sued the United States Customs and Border Protection (\u201cCBP\u201d) and the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement under 28 U.S.C. \u00a72201 for a declaration that defendants had violated their the First and Fourth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants seized and searched their electronic devices at the United States border without probable cause that the devices contained contraband or evidence of a violation of immigration or customs laws and without describing the information to be searched. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On January 16, 2007, two recipients of federal benefits under the Section 8 Housing Voucher Program and a non-profit advocacy organization filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff sued the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The case was assigned to Judge George H. Wu. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, claimed that the Authority had violated due process by altering housing benefits to voucher recipients without adequate notice. The plaintiff claimed that HACLA violated six due process and federal regulations by failing to provide proper notice of Section 8 rent increases, which would affect approximately 22,000 tenants receiving federal benefits. The Section 8 Housing Voucher Program was designed to aid low-income families in acquiring housing by subsidizing private landlords who rented to low-income tenants. In 2004, the defendant proposed cutting back on these federal subsidies in order to meet a federally-set budget. The changes were announced publicly, and would not take effect until April 2005. Individual tenants would not be subject to new regulations until their next annual evaluation, unless they moved before that time. In November 2007, the court granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss. 2007 WL 9658205. Plaintiffs then filed a First Amended Complaint alleging violations of (1) due process of law under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, (2) rights created by 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1437f, the Fair Housing Act (FHA), (3) Cal. Gov. Code \u00a7 815.6, (4) due process of law under Art. 1, \u00a7 7 of the California Constitution, and (5) negligence. The court dismissed the second and fifth claims and later granted defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims. 2009 WL 10678033. Plaintiffs appealed and Judge Percy Anderson of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the fifth claim and the grant of summary judgment on the first, third, and fourth claims. 425 Fed.Appx. 539. On remand, the district court granted HACLA\u2019s renewed motion for summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit again reversed, holding that the flyer sent by HACLA did not provide sufficient notice of the voucher program change. Specifically, the court held that this \u201cfailure violated both the requirements of the Voucher Program and regulations and the requirements of procedural due process.\u201d 806 F. 3d 1178. The matter was remanded but included instructions to the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the matters of federal and state law at issue on appeal. In November 2015, HACLA petitioned the Ninth Circuit for rehearing en banc which the court denied in January 2016. 806 F. 3d 1178. HACLA subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari which was denied in October 2016. 137 S.Ct. 52. Following remand, the court certified two classes: (1) an injunctive relief class and (2) a damages class. The Injunctive Relief Class consisted of all Section 8 voucher recipients whose benefits were administered by HACLA and who in the past received, or in the future may receive, notice of decreased benefits. The Damages Class consisted of HACLA Section 8 tenants, between June 1, 2005 and September 30, 2006, whose rental contribution was greater than it would have been if not for HACLA\u2019s 2004 decrease in benefits. The Damages Class consisted of 11,870 tenants. In February 2017, the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment as to remedies. Before the court ruled on these motions, the parties filed a stipulation for settlement. On February 15, 2018, the court granted final approval of the settlement agreement. 2018 WL 1659984. The settlement included attorneys\u2019 fees and other fees (approximately $3.5 million total), a $6 million fund for the damages class, a three-year injunction that required HACLA to: <ul> <li>Notify all Section 8 tenants in plain language of a known, likely, or potential reduction in benefits</li> <li>Notify Class Counsel of any reduction in benefits</li> <li>Communicate with all Section 8 tenants in plain language regarding anything related to the Settlement Agreement</li></ul> In return for the injunction and monetary award, the plaintiffs agreed to release the defendant from all claims potentially arising out of the facts alleged in the complaint. The district court will retain jurisdiction over the settlement until 2021. As of May 26, 2020, there has been no further docket activity.", "summary": "In 2007, two recipients of federal benefits under the Section 8 Housing Voucher Program and a non-profit advocacy organization filed a class action lawsuit against the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA), claiming that the Authority was cutting back federal housing subsidies without due notice. In 2015, following years of litigation, appeals, and remand, the district court granted class certification to plaintiffs. The parties finally reached a settlement agreement in 2017 which the district court approved. The settlement included a class award of approximately $9.5 million (including attorneys' fees) and a three-year injunction requiring HACLA to clearly communicate any future reduction of benefits in plain language to all voucher recipients and class counsel. The district court will retain jurisdiction over the case until February 2021."}
{"article": "This lawsuit, filed by the General Assembly of Tennessee \"General Assembly,\" a state senator, and state representative on their own behalf and on additionally on the behalf of the state of Tennessee, challenged the U.S. Department of State's (DOS) ability to use state funds to resettle refugees within the United States through the Refugee Act (\"the Act\") and the Office of Refugee Resettlement (\"ORR\") within the Department of Health and Human Services (\"HHS\"). On March 13, 2017, the General Assembly Tennessee filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that provisions of the Refugee Resettlement Act (\"the Act\") and Refugee Medical Assistance Program violated the Spending Clause and the Tenth Amendment through enacting and implementing certain statutes that require states to provide Medicaid coverage to eligible refugees. The General Assembly argued that the intent behind the Act was to avoid taxing states for what was ultimately a federal effort. Since the Act's passage in 1980, the General Assembly of Tennessee alleged that the burden on states to fund the program had increased. Moreover, the complaint argued, the state was further burdened by a requirement to cover medical costs for refugees until the state of Tennessee itself determines that a refugee is ineligible for the state Medicaid program. The state of Tennessee withdrew its participation from the refugee resettlement program in 2007. The complaint argued that the federal government nevertheless \"coerced the state to continue funding\" the program by threatening to withdraw federal Medicaid funding, which would amount to a 20% loss of its budget. The complaint further asserted that in establishing a private agency, Catholic Charities of Tennessee, to assume control and of the program in the state, \"the federal government nullified the decision of the people of Tennessee to withdraw from an ostensibly voluntary federal program and thereby commandeered state funds to support a federal initiative.\" The case was reassigned to Judge S. Thomas Anderson on March 24, 2017. DOS moved to dismiss the case on June 1, 2017. DOS argued that \"the refugee-coverage provision does not compel States to expend Medicaid funds for refugees; it conserves State funds by limiting to seven years the obligation the States would otherwise incur, under the Equal Protection Clause, to provide coverage to refugees on the same terms as they do U.S. citizens.\" Meanwhile, on June 2, 2017, the Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee Rights Coalition, Bridge Refugees Services, and the Nashville Intentional Center for Empowerment moved to intervene as defendants. Both the General Assembly and DOS filed responses in opposition to that motion to intervene. On March 19, 2018, Judge Anderson granted DOS's motion to dismiss for lack of standing on the alleged injury. 329 F.Supp.3d 597, 2018 WL 1386845. The General Assembly of Tennessee failed to establish that it has the authority on behalf of the state of Tennessee. The court also denied the intervenors' motions as moot. In his opinion, Judge Anderson held, first, that the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. The General Assembly of Tennessee, specifically its legislators, legislature, and Attorney General, lacked standing. The claim was not ripe because the federal government had not yet denied Medicaid funds to Tennessee and no such enforcement was imminent. Further, the Medicaid Act, which required an administrative process followed by appellate court review, precluded the claim from review in a district court. Next, Judge Anderson held that the General Assembly of Tennessee had failed to state a claim for relief under the Spending Clause or Tenth Amendment. Congress had broad powers over immigration and naturalization, including refugees' eligibility for participation in federal benefits programs. Congress had, thus, acted within its authority to set funding conditions for the States in the relevant statutes. These conditions were neither coercive nor new. The federal government had not threatened to deny funding to Tennessee. The State had, for over four decades, accepted federal Medicaid funds on the condition that it had to cover lawfully-present noncitizens, so the requirement to provide state funding for refugees in exchange for federal Medicaid funds was not a new condition. Nor should the General Assembly of Tennessee be surprised by recent fluctuations in the number of admitted refugees -- a recurring situation that the Refugee Act of 1980 anticipates. On May 10, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an appeal to the Sixth Circuit, docket #18-5478, regarding the March 19, 2018 judgement dismissing the case and denying the motion to intervene as moot. On July 24th, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision stating that the General Assembly was without subject-matter jurisdiction, 931 F.3d 499, 2019 WL 3310332. The Sixth Circuit held that the General Assembly had not identified an injury that it suffered, such as disruption of the legislative process, a usurpation of its authority, or nullification of anything it has done. The lower court's decision that the General Assembly was without standing to bring a case was affirmed on the basis that an alleged injury was insufficient. Therefore, the individual legislators' standing was also denied. Finally, the General Assembly did not have the authority to bring a suit in the name of the state of Tennessee. The case was closed October 24, 2019.", "summary": "This lawsuit, brought by the General Assembly of Tennessee in their own interests and on behalf of the state of Tennessee, challenged DOS's ability to use state funds to resettle refugees within the U.S. Tennessee maintained that provisions of the Refugee Resettlement Act and Refugee Medical Assistance Program violated the Spending Clause and 10th Amendment. In Mar. 2018, the court granted DOS' motion to dismiss and closed the case. On July 24th, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit filled their mandate to issue stating that the General Assembly was without subject-matter jurisdiction, affirming the lower court's decision."}
{"article": "On November 11, 2015, a Medicaid recipient with Hepatitis C filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The case was assigned to District Judge Sarah Evans Barker. The plaintiff sued the Secretary of the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration (\u201cthe agency\u201d) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU of Indiana and the Health and Human Rights Clinic at Indiana University\u2019s McKinney School of Law, sought injunctive and monetary relief, claiming violation of federal Medicaid law. The plaintiff alleged that the Agency had a formal policy of denying Medicaid recipients with Hepatitis C \u201cmedically necessary\u201d drugs. Specifically, they alleged that the agency denied Medicaid recipients with Hepatitis C direct-acting antiviral medications (specifically Harvoni) unless and until absolutely necessary. Despite these practices, medical professional agreed that early administration of the medication was \u201cmedically necessary\u201d to prevent liver damage and other serious conditions. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on January 15, 2016. They alleged that the plaintiff had failed to state claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for which relief could be granted. On April 12, 2016, Judge Barker denied defendants\u2019 motion. She held that the plaintiff had sufficiently pled a claim, so she denied the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss the complaint. The original plaintiff was provided with Harvoni by the agency, and consequently a new plaintiff intervened in the suit on January 3, 2017. Discovery and negotiations lasted through the remainder of 2017 and into 2018. On November 8, 2018, the parties settled the case. The settlement, contingent on the Court\u2019s certification of the class, involved injunctive relief and attorneys\u2019 fees for the plaintiff. As part of the settlement, the agency agreed to eliminate its policy of restricting Medicaid reimbursement for Harvoni to only those Medicaid recipients with advanced Hepatitis C or those who were co-infected with HIV or AIDS or were post-liver transplant. The defendants had to implement this policy by July 1, 2019. The defendants also agreed that they would pay the plaintiffs\u2019 counsel $117,500 in attorneys\u2019 fees. The agreement stated that the plaintiffs could enforce it through a breach of contract claim - meaning that the Court did not maintain jurisdiction to enforce it. Judge Barker approved class-certification on November 9, 2018. The Court defined the certified class as: Any and all adult Medicaid recipients in Indiana, current and future, with a diagnosis of chronic Hepatitis C, genotype 1, who have been prescribed one of the direct-acting antiviral medications enumerated in the 2016 Policy or 2018 Policy, by or in consultation with an Infectious Disease or GI specialist, but do not meet the medical requirements of such policy to receive Medicaid reimbursement for that prescribed medication. On November 26, 2018, Judge Barker approved the parties\u2019 joint motion regarding the manner and form of notice to the class. A class-action fairness hearing was held on February 5, 2019. At this hearing, the court approved the settlement agreement and the attorney fee request. One week later, the court issued a written order confirming the oral order from the hearing where the court approved the settlement agreement, and found that it was a fair, reasonable, and adequate resolution of the cause. With the settlement agreement approved, on February 20, 2019, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal. Six days later, the court dismissed the case pursuant to Rule 41(a) (1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2015, a Medicaid recipient with Hepatitis C filed this class action complaint alleging that his rights were violated when the state refused to reimburse him for antiviral medications until late stages in his disease. The parties reached a settlement agreement whereby the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration agreed to eliminate its policy of restricting Medicaid reimbursement for Harvoni to only those Medicaid recipients with advanced Hepatitis C or those who were co-infected with HIV or AIDS or were post-liver transplant. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On September 28, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The EEOC sued Hannabery Electric, Inc., doing business as Hannabery HVAC, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The EEOC sought injunctive relief and back pay on behalf of Hannabery employees alleging that the defendant violated the ADEA by subjecting older workers to disparate terms and conditions of employment, including discharge, loss of raises, benefits and bonuses, negative performance evaluations, and excess scrutiny of their job performances. The case was assigned to Judge Thomas M. Golden. On March 15, 2007, the EEOC filed an amended complaint. The complaint additionally sought nonpecuniary and punitive damages. On October 20, 2006, three Hannabery employees filed a motion to intervene. On April 9, 2007, District Judge Thomas M. Golden denied their motion. In response, on July 30, 2007, those three employees and one other brought their own suit before Judge Golden against their employer. The plaintiffs made the same allegations as the EEOC did in its complaint against Hannabery (Morrone v. Hall et al, EE-PA-0216). On November 15, 2007, Judge Golden consolidated the employees\u2019 suit with the EEOC\u2019s. On December 21, 2007, the parties submitted a consent decree. The defendant did not admit liability, but agreed to pay a total of $156,700 to the five complainants. The defendant was enjoined from engaging in discriminatory and retaliatory employment practices. The defendant agreed to post notice of its anti-discrimination policy, provide ADEA training to all supervisory and management employees, and report to the EEOC verifying that training was conducted, a list of training attendees, and the duration of training. The consent decree had an initial period of five years. On January 8, 2008, Judge Golden entered the agreement. On April 7, 2008, the EEOC filed a motion to enforce the consent decree and impose sanctions. The EEOC alleged that the defendant willingly failed to comply with the agreement to pay three of the complainants. However, on June 10, 2008, Judge Golden denied the motion as moot after the EEOC advised that the defendant was in compliance with the terms of the settlement. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The EEOC alleged that the defendant had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) by subjecting older workers to disparate terms and conditions of employment, including discharge, loss of raises, benefits and bonuses, negative performance evaluations, and excess scrutiny of their job performances. In 2008, the defendant entered a five-year consent decree that enjoined the defendant from engaging in discriminatory and retaliatory employment practices; required the defendant to post notice of its anti-discrimination policy, provide ADEA training to all supervisory and management employees, and report to the EEOC verifying that training was conducted, a list of training attendees, and the duration of trainin; and awarded monetary demages to complainants. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On March 9, 2016, the Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights (GLAHR) and students within the University System of Georgia filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs sued the members of the Board of Regents for the University System of Georgia for denying in-state tuition to undocumented students who had received deferred immigration action under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. They argued that the students were lawful residents of Georgia and that, as such, the state had created an unconstitutional two-tiered residency classification system. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, claiming violations of the Supremacy Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on April 7, 2016. They argued that GLAHR lacked standing; the plaintiff\u2019s official capacity claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983; plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and the defendants had qualified immunity. In response, the plaintiffs amended their complaint on April 21, 2016, adding both plaintiffs and defendants to the lawsuit and maintaining their original causes of action. They also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on May 3, 2016, seeking enjoinment of the University System\u2019s classification system that had been classifying deferred action recipients as not lawfully present. The plaintiffs alleged that this system was irreparably harming the educational opportunities and career prospects of the deferred action students. The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint two days later. Judge William C. O\u2019Kelley heard oral arguments regarding the motion to dismiss on August 25, 2016. On February 10, 2017, defendants motioned to stay proceedings given a parallel proceeding in <i>Dean Alford v. Rigoberto Rivera Hernandez</i>. In that case, plaintiffs brought suit in state court against the University System of Georgia Board of Regents, arguing their denial of in-state tuition to DACA recipients violated the Board of Regents\u2019 own policies and state statutory law concerning residency status. As that case had moved to the Georgia Supreme Court, defendants argued proceedings in this case should be stayed pending the outcome of that case. On February 16, 2017, Judge William C. O\u2019Kelley granted defendant\u2019s motion to stay proceedings and denied without prejudice the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for preliminary injunction and the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. He explained both the parallel litigation in <i>Dean Alford v. Rigoberto Rivera Hernandez</i> and President Trump\u2019s stated opposition to the DACA program justified the stay. Following the stay, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint on May 1, 2017. The plaintiffs filed another motion for a preliminary injunction on May 31, 2017. Defendants responded in opposition on June 13, 2017. Subsequent to Judge O\u2019Kelley\u2019s decision, the Trump Administration announced its decision to rescind the DACA program. On March 28, 2018, the District Court dismissed without prejudice the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court stayed the case pending a decision from the Eleventh Circuit in <i>Estrada v. Becker</i>. In <i>Estrada</i>, students qualified to attend Georgia\u2019s selective schools challenged the Georgia Board of Regents\u2019 policy requiring Georgia\u2019s three most selective universities to verify the \u201clawful presence\u201d of students admitted. Under the challenged policy, applicants with DACA could not attend schools that did not admit all academically qualified applicants for the two most recent years. The District Court in <i>Estrada</i> had dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 challenges that the policy violated the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. On March 6, 2019, the Eleventh Circuit issued its decision in <i>Estrada</i> and affirmed the District Court. 917 F.3d 1298. It found the policy did not violate the Supremacy Clause because it was not an unconstitutional regulation of immigration and the policy was not preempted. Regarding the Equal Protection claim, it agreed with the District Court that the students were not similarly situated to other noncitizens permitted to attend because unlike the other noncitizens the DACA recipients did not have lawful status. Following the decision in <i>Estrada</i>, Judge Richard W. Story issued an order to show cause on March 12, 2019, asking the plaintiffs to demonstrate why <i>GLAHR v. Alford</i> should not be dismissed. In response, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. The case was closed on March 28, 2019.", "summary": "On March 9, 2016, the Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights (GLAHR) and students within the University System of Georgia filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. They alleged the students, who had been granted legal status under the federal Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, were entitled to in-state tuition, and that the defendants had created an unconstitutional two-tiered system of residency in violation of the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. The proceedings were largely stayed as parallel suits also involving challenges to the University System of Georgia's policies relating to DACA recipients progressed in the Georgia Supreme Court (<i>Dean Alford v. Rigoberto Rivera Hernandez</i>) and the Eleventh Circuit (<i>Estrada v. Becker</i>). After the Eleventh Circuit issued its decision in <i>Estrada</i> affirming the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims challenging the University System of Georgia's policies treating DACA recipients differently, the Court in <i>GLAHR v. Alford</i> issued an order to show cause for why this case should not be dismissed. In response, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. The case was closed on March 28, 2019."}
{"article": "On July 14, 2015, a female Walmart employee filed this class action lawsuit against Wal-Mart in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Represented by the Washington Lawyers\u2019 Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs and the Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, the plaintiff alleged that Wal-Mart had intentionally deprived her of employment-based spousal health insurance benefits because the plaintiff and her wife were the same sex. This, she alleged, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal Equal Pay Act, and the Massachusetts Fair Employment Practices Law. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, as well as class certification. This case was assigned to District Judge William G. Young. Discovery and settlement negotiations proceeded, and were successful: in December 2016, the parties proposed a class-wide settlement. The class was specified as all current and former Walmart employees who were married to \u201clegal same-sex spouse\u201d between January 1, 2011 and December 31, 2013, would have been eligible to receive spousal health insurance benefits from Wal-Mart if they had been married to a person of the opposite sex, but did not receive those benefits. The remedy included a payment of $7.5 million\u2014which covered reasonable attorneys fees to be determined by the Court (but not to exceed $1.875 million), a $25,000 \u201cservice payment\u201d to the named plaintiff, all notice and administrative costs of the settlement (not to exceed $110,000), and damages paid to class members. Class members were able to submit proof of actual medical expenses, which received priority. Whatever money was left after those were paid was to be distributed pro rata to all the other class members, with a cap of $5,000 per year for each class member. The settlement agreement set up a claims process to manage the distribution of these funds. Class members had the ability to \u201copt out\u201d of the settlement, in which case they would receive no money, but retain their right to sue separately. In addition, the settlement had a paragraph on \u201cprogrammatic relief,\u201d in which Wal-Mart \u201ccommit[ed] to treating same-sex and opposite-sex spouses or couples equally in the provision of health insurance benefits, so long as to do so is consistent with applicable law.\u201d On December 16, 2016, Judge Young granted the parties\u2019 motion for preliminary approval of the settlement. Wal-Mart was required to notify the members of the class and to give them the chance to object to the settlement if they chose to do so. The fairness hearing took place on May 15, 2017. Judge Young issued a final order approving the settlement the following day. He approved Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees, and awarded counsel $1.875 million in fees and $25,285.04 in litigation expenses. The court retained jurisdiction over the case either for a period of six months after the Settlement Effective Date, or for a period of one month after all Settlement Class Members received their final payments and any remaining funds had been distributed cypres--whichever was longer. As of March 2019, nearly two years after the settlement agreement was entered, there has been no further litigation. The case is presumed closed.", "summary": "In 2015, a female Wal-Mart employee filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiff alleged that Wal-Mart had intentionally deprived the plaintiff's wife of employment-based spousal health insurance benefits because the plaintiff and her wife were of the same sex and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. A settlement was reached and the Court issued a final order approving the settlement on May 16, 2017."}
{"article": "On January 23, 2019, six indigent prison inmates with mental illness whom the defendants held in secure prisons past their release dates filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on behalf of other prisoners in similar situations. The plaintiffs sued the Governor of New York, the New York State Office of Mental Health, Commissioner, Associate Commissioner, and the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (\"DOCCS\"), alleging that the defendants failed to make available community-based housing and supportive services that the plaintiffs require upon release. As a result, plaintiffs were allegedly held in state prison past their lawful release dates (in some cases over a year). The plaintiffs also alleged that during this prolonged time in prison, the defendants subjected them to solitary confinement and even revoked the approved release status of the inmates in response to the inmates' reporting of violations. The plaintiffs sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12132, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C \u00a7 794, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Represented by the Legal Aid Society and Disability Rights New York, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief for the alleged unconstitutional and discriminatory practices to which the defendants subjected them. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked that the defendants make release possible by developing the community-based mental health housing programs that the defendants have imposed as a precondition for the plaintiff's discharge from prison, and by creating an effective plan for community integration. The case was assigned to Judge Cathy Seibel. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 3, 2019. After some discovery, defendant Cuomo filed a motion to dismiss the entire action against him on December 16, 2019. The motion alleged that all claims against him should be dismissed as moot because he had no direct involvement in securing housing or community-based services for the plaintiffs. The motion further alleges that all claims from five of the six plaintiffs should be dismissed as moot because they had since been released to community residences. Defendant Cuomo claimed sovereign immunity regarding the claims of the remaining one plaintiff not yet released. On August 10, 2020, before a ruling on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs requested leave to amend their complaint, which was granted by Magistrate Judge Lisa M. Smith on August 26. The second amended complaint was filed on August 27, 2020. Judge Seibel issued a bench ruling on the earlier motion to dismiss on September 25, 2020, granting the motion to dismiss as to the substantive due process claim, but otherwise denying the motion. Additionally, Judge Seibel found that the PLRA and its exhaustion requirements did not apply to the Residential Treatment Facility subclass, which includes those who were incarcerated past the maximum expiration dates of their court-imposed prison sentences. 2020 WL 5038525. The court also dismissed Governor Cuomo as a defendant. Judge Seibel ordered the defendants to submit their pre-motion letter or answer as to the second amended complaint by October 16, 2020. As of October 14, 2020, the defendants have yet to file an answer or motion in response to the second amended complaint and the case remains ongoing.", "summary": "In 2019, six indigent prison inmates with mental illness whom the defendants held in secure prisons past their release dates filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on behalf of other prisoners in similar situations. The plaintiffs alleged that the New York State and its Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) failed to make available community-based housing and supportive services that the plaintiffs require upon release, thereby holding the plaintiffs in state prison past their lawful release dates. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "Plaintiffs, individuals who allege they were stopped and interrogated by U.S. Border Patrol agents in the Olympic Peninsula without reasonable suspicion, filed suit under the Administrative Procedures Act against the Border Patrol on April 26, 2012 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Claiming that the patrol officers were stopping vehicles solely due to the race/ethnicity of the occupants, Plaintiffs asserted that their Fourth Amendment rights were being violated, and that the officers were acting in excess of their authority under 8 U.S.C. \u00a71357 and 8 C.F.R. \u00a7287.8(b)(2) (generally requiring officers to have a reasonable suspicion that an occupant of the vehicle is illegally present in the United States in order to stop the vehicle). The Plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Washington and the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (NIRP), asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs requested that patrol officers be trained on what \"reasonable suspicion\" entails, and that the patrol office keep complete and accurate records of officer training and testing, as well as every vehicle stop. Plaintiffs also requested a master to oversee the implementation of these policies. Class certification is still pending. In challenging the Border Patrol's interrogations of Plaintiffs without reasonable suspicion, Plaintiffs cite <a href=http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=10217>Nicacio v. INS (IM-WA-0011)</a>, in which the court stated it was unlawful for INS to stop vehicles occupied by persons of \"Hispanic appearance\" without particularized reasonable suspicion based on specific articulable documented facts. 595 F. Supp. 19, 26 (E.D. Wash. 1984). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on July 12, 2012. Defendants asserted that Plaintiff did not have standing and that there was no private cause of action under 8 U.S.C. \u00a71357. Judge Benjamin H. Settle of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington denied this motion on August 27, 2012, stating that Plaintiffs were likely to suffer substantial and immediate irreparable injury (further stops without reason), and that Plaintiffs properly made a claim under the APA, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 551, which provides a private cause of action. Sanchez v. U.S. Office of Border Patrol, No. 12-5378 BHS, 2012 WL 3715719 (W.D. Wash. 2012). The parties then began settlement negotiations, and reached a settlement in September 2013. The case was voluntarily dismissed. The settlement agreement provided: 1) Border Patrol issued a letter to the ACLU of Washington and the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project acknowledging that reasonable suspicion is required for investigative stops, including near the border, and that Border Patrol is \"committed to [comply] with applicable Department of Homeland Security guidance, including with respect to the use of race or ethnicity in law enforcement activities.\" (Oddly, the letter referenced 2004 guidance, rather than <a href=\"http://dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/secretary-memo-race-neutrality-2013_0.pdf\">stricter 2013 guidance</a>. 2) One refresher training session for Border Patrol personnel on the Fourth Amendment. 3) Every six months for eighteen months, CBP agreed to produce to plaintiffs' counsel Field Contact Data Sheets issued by agents at the Port Angeles, Washington Station, redacted to protect personal information.", "summary": "Plaintiffs, individuals stopped by Border Patrol in the Olympic Peninsula in Washington without reasonable suspicion other than their Hispanic appearance, filed suit in 2012 against the U.S. Border Patrol, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Plaintiffs sought a requirement that Border Patrol document all stops, as well as training and testing of officers as to what \"reasonable suspicion\" entails. The litigation settled for modest training requirements in 2013."}
{"article": "On September 9, 2008, in response to charges filed by 18 women, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against Sterling Jewelers, alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 based on discriminatory employment practices. Specifically, the EEOC claimed that Sterling Jewelers intentionally discriminated against female sales employees by maintaining a system of excessively subjective promotion and compensation decisions and thereby permitting or encouraging managers to deny equal access to promotion and compensation to female employees. The EEOC claimed in the alternative that Sterling Jewelers maintained an excessively subjective system that had an illegal disparate impact on female retail sales employees. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief, including back pay, promotion, compensation for lost benefits and emotional suffering, and development of policies and programs to provide equal opportunities to women and eliminate the effects of past discrimination. The EEOC also sought to recoup the cost of its litigation. The litigation was brought on behalf of the 18 charging parties and all other similarly situated female employees. The progress of the case has been slow because of numerous disputes over procedure and discovery. On January 6, 2010, the Court (Judge Richard J. Arcara) denied Sterling's motion to dismiss all claims for conduct preceding the statute of limitations period for the first party to file charges with the EEOC, holding that the EEOC was not bound by the statute of limitations, which applied only to individuals. 2010 WL 86376 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) On July 15, 2010, the Court (Magistrate Judge Jeremiah J. McCarthy), among other things, allowed the charging parties to intervene in the proceedings to participate in argument over the scope of a protective order. 2010 WL 2803017 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). For contractual reasons the charging parties were pursuing their claims separately in a class-action arbitration and wanted to be able to receive discovery information from the EEOC, though they were prohibited from sharing information with the EEOC. See <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11066\">Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc.</a>. The protective order was issued on July 23, 2011. On April 25, 2011, the Court (Judge Richard J. Arcara) bifurcated the trial and discovery into two phases, liability (Stage I) and damages (Stage II). Stage I generally covered the issue of whether there was a disparate impact on female retail employees at Sterling to establish a pattern or practice of discrimination, while Stage II would occur only if the EEOC prevailed at phase I and covered the individual aspects of each employee's case along with whether there was a legitimate business reason for the disparity. The EEOC sought to have the punitive damages determination included in phase I, but the Court rejected that approach. 788 F.Supp.2d 83 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). The bifurcation was followed by extensive discovery disputes from 2011 to 2012. On September 25, 2013, Sterling moved for partial summary judgment on the grounds that the EEOC failed to satisfy its obligation to conduct an adequate, nationwide investigation of Sterling's employment practices. To this, the EEOC stated that courts need not inquire into the sufficiency of the investigation itself. On March 10, 2014, the Court adopted the Magistrate Judge\u2019s Report and Recommendation, which granted in part and denied in part the motion for summary judgment. The court granted partial summary judgment on the claim that the EEOC failed to prove that it satisfied its statutory obligation to conduct a pre-suit investigation, and it denied Sterling\u2019s motion to strike portions of the EEOC\u2019s Statement of Facts for the reason that it contained \u201cstatement[s] that rely on an admissible evidence not in the record, as well as legal argument and generalized conclusory statements.\u201d 3 F.Supp.3d 57 On May 15, 2014, the EEOC filed an appeal, arguing that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because the magistrate judge improperly reviewed the sufficiency of the EEOC's investigation, rather than whether there was an investigation or not. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and decided on September 9, 2015, to vacate the district court's summary judgment order, thus remanding the case for further proceedings. 801 F.3d 96 On May 4, 2017, the EEOC and Sterling entered into a consent decree. The court maintained jurisdiction for a period of three years and three months. Provisions included enjoining Sterling's conduct, the appointment of an employment practice expert to oversee and recommend changes within Sterling, training, and further additional internal procedures for implementing equal employment practices. While there was no award of attorney's fees, Sterling agreed to bear all expenses that it would incur to implement the provisions of the consent decree. In 2018, a dispute arose between Sterling and the EEOC regarding Sterling's rejection of a merit pay program that the EEOC had proposed pursuant to the consent decree. The EEOC claimed that Sterling had not provided a legitimate business reason for rejecting the proposal. The parties submitted the issue to Fred Alvarez through their mutually agreed upon dispute resolution mechanism. Mr. Alvarez issued a decision on June 19, 2019, holding that Sterling had not demonstrated that its alternative merit pay program would be less adversely impactful to their female retail sales employees than the EEOC's proposal. After the EEOC sought relief from Sterling, the parties agreed to extend the term of the decree for 15 months until November of 2021 in order to verify Sterling's implementation of the new merit pay compensation program. On March 11, 2020, Judge Arcara granted the extension. The consent decree remains in force.", "summary": "On September 9, 2008, in response to charges filed by 18 women, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against Sterling Jewelers, Inc., alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 through sex-discriminatory employment practices. The EEOC alleged that Sterling's system of promotion and compensation decisions was excessively subjective, which intentionally facilitated or encouraged discrimination and, in addition, that the decisions had a disparate impact on female sales employees. The EEOC sought injunctive relief and monetary relief for the class of female sales employees and to recover its costs. The progress of the case has been slow because of numerous disputes over procedure and discovery. On April 25, 2011, the Court (Richard J. Arcara) bifurcated trial and discovery into two phases, liability (Stage I) and damages (Stage II). The bifurcation was followed by extensive discovery disputes. The court initially granted summary judgment in favor of Sterling on the grounds that the EEOC failed to satisfy its obligation to conduct a nationwide investigation of Sterling's employment practices. The EEOC appealed, and the Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The EEOC and Sterling the entered into a consent decree. The court maintained jurisdiction, and provisions included changes in employment practices and the appointment of an employment practice expert. The consent decree remains in force"}
{"article": "On September 25, 2013, Feltl and Company, Inc., a privately held, for-profit securities brokerage and investment banking company subject to the employer mandate under the Affordable Care Act, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Minnesota. The plaintiff sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Administrative Procedures Act. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the U.S. Department of Labor, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and the Internal Revenue Service. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for a declaratory injunction that the contraceptive services mandate violated the above statutes. The plaintiffs also requested a declaratory judgment that the mandate is generally invalid, a permanent injunction against HHS, Treasury, and the IRS from enforcing the mandate against the Feltls and their company, and a declaratory judgment that group health plans excluding contraception do not violated the Affordable Care Act. The plaintiffs further requested reasonable attorneys fees and a jury trial. This lawsuit claims that the contraceptive services mandate was improperly promulgated under the Administrative Procedures Act, and that being required to provide a health plan to their employees that includes contraceptive services violates the Feltls' freedom of religion and First and Fifth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that distinguishing between religious employers and private companies in exemptions for the contraceptive services mandate constitutes establishing religion, and that purchasing or providing coverage for contraception, sterilization, and abortifactant drugs through their employee group health plan violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. Following the U.S. Supreme Court's June 2014 decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., courts have granted similar closely-held, private, for profit companies injunctions protecting them from enforcement of the contraceptive services mandate. On November 5, 2013, Judge Donovan W. Frank ordered a preliminary injunction staying HHS's ability to enforce the mandate against Feltl and Company. On November 26, 2014, Judge Frank issued an order for injunction and judgment that enjoined HHS or other agencies from taking any action to enforce the contraceptive services mandate or attendant penalties against the plaintiffs. The court found that the contraceptive services mandate violated the plaintiff's rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and awarded attorneys fees. The injunction excluded future changes in statute or regulation. The plaintiff was given time to file for attorneys fees, but nothing shows that it did, so either it didn't claim them, or that part of the matter was settled out of court.", "summary": "In 2013, Feltl and Company, Inc., a privately held, company subject to the employer mandate under the Affordable Care Act, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Minnesota against federal agencies involved in enforcing the ACA. The plaintiff alleged that the contraceptive services mandate violated its freedom of religion. The Court enjoined HHS and related agencies from enforcing the mandate or related penalties against the Feltls, and found that the mandate violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in their case."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This lawsuit was filed on behalf on an unaccompanied minor subject to deportation, alleging that the Trump administrations' system of authorizing the summary removal of persons to prevent the introduction of COVID-19 bypassed procedural protections otherwise granted to minor children. On June 24, the court granted a TRO. On June 29, the defendants notified the court that they have exempted the plaintiff from processing under Title 42. On August 6, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. <hr> On June 9, 2020, a 16-year-old migrant filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP Office of Field Operations, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Office of Refugee Resettlement, against the Trump administration\u2019s system which authorizes deportation from the United States even without any signs of COVID-19. The plaintiff brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from enforcing the order under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, the Public Health Services Act of 1944, and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2201-2202. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the new system for restricting immigration along the borders (collectively referred to as \u201cTitle 42 Process\u201d) which authorizes the summary removal of unaccompanied children without any due process is an unlawful invocation of Title 42 of the U.S. Code. The plaintiff was represented by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Immigrants Rights Project, ACLU District of Columbia, ACLU Texas, Oxfam America, and the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies. The case was assigned to Judge Carl K. Nichols. On May 19, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) <a href=\"https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/order-suspending-introduction-certain-persons.html\">issued an order</a> suspending \u201cthe introduction into the United States of persons from designated foreign countries or places\u201d to prevent the introduction of COVID-19 under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 265 (Title 42). The CDC interpreted the authority expansively to cover not only those entering the U.S but also those who have already crossed the border. The Title 42 Process was amended on May 20 to take effect indefinitely until the CDC determined it was no longer necessary. The plaintiff, an unaccompanied minor, fled persecution from Honduras and was apprehended by CBP upon entry. Under the Title 42 Process, he was subject to summary expulsion and was scheduled to be deported to Honduras on June 10. The plaintiff alleged that the Title 42 Process bypassed statutory and procedural protections otherwise granted to unaccompanied minor children. While the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) already authorized the rapid removal of noncitizens who entered the U.S. illegally, unaccompanied children were not subject to expedited removal unlike the May 19 order which did not exempt minors. Prior to implementation of the Title 42 Process, the plaintiff would have been entitled to a full hearing and appeals process to determine his right to remain in the U.S. The plaintiff also alleged that while the Title 42 Process authorized the defendant for testing and quarantine as a health directive, the expulsion of children seeking protection from persecution violated the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The plaintiff also filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) staying his expulsion scheduled for June 10, pending the hearing on the authority of Title 42. The plaintiff also sought an order staying his expulsion under the protection of the INA and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act. The same day the complaint was filed, the parties agreed that the government will not move the plaintiff until June 10. On June 10, a hearing was held regarding the TRO. On June 15, an amicus brief was submitted by the International Refugee Assistance Project in support of the plaintiff\u2019s emergency TRO motion. On June 17, the defendants submitted an opposition to the TRO, contending that public health concerns justified the CDC order. The following day, the Scholars or Refugee and Immigration Law sought to submit an amicus brief in support of the plaintiff. On June 24, the TRO was granted pending the plaintiff\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction. On June 29, the defendants notified the court that they had transferred the custody of the plaintiff to the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), Department of Health and Human Services, for immigration processing under Title 8 of the U.S. Code, which exempted the plaintiff from processing under Title 42. The defendants argued that since the plaintiff would no longer be subject to the challenged CDC Order, the case was moot. On July 2, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding another minor child as an additional plaintiff. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on July 23, arguing lack of jurisdiction. They argued that the case is moot, since both plaintiffs are now excepted from the order, and therefore, there is no actual ongoing controversy. On August 6, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case.", "summary": "This suit was filed on June 9 by an unaccompanied minor subject to deportation from the United States against various government entities. The plaintiff alleged that the Trump administration\u2019s system which authorizes the summary removal of persons to prevent the introduction of COVID-19 bypassed statutory procedural protections otherwise granted to unaccompanied minor children. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from enforcing the new system, and a temporary restraining order (TRO) staying his expulsion scheduled on June 10. On June 24, the TRO was granted pending the plaintiff\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction. On June 29, the defendants notified the court that they have exempted the plaintiff from processing under Title 42. On August 6, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a lawsuit brought by Harvard and MIT regarding the July 2020 release of ICE regulations which, in effect, meant that students on F-1 visas would risk deportation if their school shifted to online learning. On July 14, the parties informed the court that the government agreed to rescind the July 6 directive, as well as the associated FAQ on the ICE website, and also agreed to rescind the implementation of the directive. Instead, the government said it would return to the March policy. As a result, the court mooted the preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order motions and in October 2020, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. <hr> <b>Background</b> Generally speaking, F-1 visas (colloquially \"student visas\") can be granted to international students who attend American universities. However, regulations on the granting of these visas limit the amount of online or distance learning the student can engage in. According to these regulations, an international student can engage in only one such class or three credits of that class per semester. 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 214.2(f)(6)(i)(G). The COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020 made this regulation untenable, as schools and universities had to shift to online learning systems. In response, defendant ICE issued an exemption on March 13, 2020, affirming that international students would be permitted to continue distance learning in the United States under their F-1 visas. The exemption would apply until the end of the emergency. However, on July 6, 2020, ICE issued a new directive stating that it would rescind that exemption. This directive would then mean that international students at schools that would still be fully online would have to either transfer to other schools that were at least partially in-person, go back to their countries voluntarily, or risk deportation. The directive also ordered schools that had gone fully online or had simply decided not to have classes to submit an \"operational change plan\" within nine days, and ordered schools that would have a hybrid system to certify each F-1 student to make sure that they were not taking entirely online courses. <b>The Lawsuit</b> This lawsuit was filed on July 8, 2020, two days after the directive was issued. Plaintiffs were the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and were represented by private counsel. Defendants were the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The universities claimed that the new directive violated the Administrative Procedure Act in three ways: 1) the directive was arbitrary and capricious in that it failed to address the reliance interests of both universities that had already engaged in extensive planning and international students expectations of their immigration status; 2) the directive was arbitrary and capricious in that it failed to offer a reasoned basis to justify the policy; and 3) defendants failed to comply with notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures in issuing this directive. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order as well as preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the agencies from enforcing the new directive. Plaintiffs also requested that the court vacate and set aside the directive in addition to declaratory relief and attorney's fees and costs. The case was originally assigned to Judge Douglas P. Woodlock but he immediately recused himself and it was reassigned to Judge Allison D. Borroughs. Fifteen parties filed amicus briefs in support of the universities motion, representing the interests of dozens of higher education institutions, education nonprofits, labor unions, and tech corporations. On July 14, the parties informed the court that the government agreed to rescind the July 6 directive, as well as the associated FAQ on the ICE website, and also agreed to rescind the implementation of the directive. Instead, the government said it would return to the March policy. As a result, the court mooted the preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order motions. On October 6, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal.", "summary": "This lawsuit was filed in response to a July 6, 2020 ICE directive that would effectively force out of the country many international students studying remotely during the 2020 coronavirus pandemic. Harvard and MIT filed suit claiming that the directive was in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting defendants from enforcing the directive, and an order vacating and setting aside the policy. They also sought declarative relief and attorney's fees. On July 14, the parties informed the court that the government agreed to rescind the July 6 directive, as well as the associated FAQ on the ICE website, and also agreed to rescind the implementation of the directive. Instead, the government said it would return to the March policy. As a result, the court mooted the preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order motions. On October 6, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal."}
{"article": "On May 23, 2013, prisoners and recently released prisoners from Monterey County Jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the County of Monterey and the California Forensic Medical Group (CFMG) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Northern California, the ACLU National Prison Project, the Monterey Public Defender, and private attorneys, asked for declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the conditions in the Monterey County Jail (the \"Jail\") violated federal and state law due to failures to protect prisoners from violence, provide adequate medical and mental health care, and provide reasonable accommodations to prisoners with disabilities. On April 25, 2015, the County and Sheriff's Office filed a motion to dismiss, and the CFMG filed a motion to dismiss on May 2, 2014. The District Court (Magistrate Judge Paul Singh Grewal) denied both motions on September 29, 2014. 2014 WL 4843945 (N.D. Cal. 2014). First, the Court found that the plaintiffs had standing even if they were no longer incarcerated, due to the short average length of stay of prisoners in the putative class and the slow speed of legal action. Second, the Court addressed the issue of whether a private provider of jail medical facilities are \"services\" that can face scrutiny under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The Court found that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that CFMG was subject to Title III of the ADA because it operates a \"professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment\" within the jail. The Court further explained that, although the \"place\" of a jail fell under Title II of the ADA as a public entity, courts had consistently found that Title III applied to \"places of public accommodation\" within places that normally don't fit under Title III either because they are owned by or operated for other purposes by a public entity. On April 29, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion seeking certification of a prisoner class consisting of all current and future prisoners in the jail, and a subclass of prisoners with disabilities, consisting of all current and future prisoners who have a qualifying disability. Then, on August 26, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, requesting that the Court order defendants to fix six of the conditions at the Jail that placed the plaintiffs and class members at risk of serious injury and death. On January 29, 2015, Magistrate Judge Grewal certified the class. 2015 WL 399975 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Then on April 14, 2015, Magistrate Judge Grewal also granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. On May 11, 2015, the parties settled the case. The jail agreed to set new standards for the medical and mental health care provided to inmates and to expand accessibility for prisoners with disabilities. The parties agreed to retain experts as neutral monitors for a limited term of oversight. The parties planned for the jail to come into compliance with the Settlement Agreement within five years, unless they moved for an extension. The court was to retain jurisdiction over the settlement for this five year period. On August 18, 2015, Magistrate Judge Grewal approved the settlement. Litigation continued over attorneys' fees as the settlement agreement only set upper limits for attorneys' fees of $4.8 million. On November 6, the parties stipulated to an agreement of how they would address the issue of interest on attorneys' fees. The parties then litigated the implementation plan. After briefing and hearings, the court approved an implementation plan on May 27, 2016. On June 6, 2016, the case was reassigned to Judge Beth Labson Freeman. In 2017 and 2018, there was some litigation over compliance issues. On March 19, 2018, the plaintiffs proposed an order regarding the use of telepsychiatry by the defendants, as per the settlement agreement. The court had instructed the parties that the defendants needed to have standards for when they could deviate from the typical in-person encounter and instead use \u201ctelemedicine or telepsychiatry.\u201d After counsel met and decided on these issues, plaintiffs\u2019 proposed order was signed and ordered by the judge on March 22, 2018. (ECF 632). Over the following months, parties handled various settlement agreement enforcement issues, such as attorneys fees and costs, the production of medical records, and neutral monitors. The docket remains active with these issues as of March 6, 2020.", "summary": "In 2013, prisoners from the Monterey County Jail filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the County and the California Forensic Medical Group. The plaintiffs claimed that the conditions in the Jail failed to protect prisoners from violence, provide adequate medical and mental health care, and provide reasonable accommodations to prisoners with disabilities. In 2015, the parties settled the case, favoring the plaintiff. Litigation regarding attorneys' fees and settlement enforcement is ongoing."}
{"article": "On Aug. 11, 2014, four individuals filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued the City of Philadelphia, the Philadelphia District Attorney\u2019s Office, and the Commissioner of the Philadelphia Police Department under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for alleged violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988, and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on Nov. 17, 2014. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Institute for Justice, alleged the defendants\u2019 policies and practices with regard to civil forfeitures: (1) violated the plaintiffs\u2019 rights to notice or a hearing prior to the seizure, (2) compelled the plaintiffs to give up constitutional and statutory rights, (3) prevented the plaintiffs from receiving a timely hearing, (4) required the plaintiffs to return to court multiple times by re-listing the property in question, (5) inserted an institutional and personal interest in forfeiture proceedings by allowing the defendants to retain the property\u2019s proceeds, and (6) violated due process by allowing the defendants to run the forfeiture courtroom proceedings. The plaintiffs sought an injunction and declaratory judgment on these six claims. Under Pennsylvania law, law enforcement can confiscate real and personal property if it is associated with a crime, even if the owner of the property is not associated with the crime. Commonly, property was seized in connection with a controlled substance violation pursuant to the Controlled Substance Forfeiture Act. Once seized, the property owner must prove the innocence of the property to get it back. Otherwise, the District Attorney\u2019s Office (DA) keeps the property or proceeds from its sale. The plaintiffs alleged that by using forms copied from civil forfeiture petitions and courtroom proceedings run by DA prosecutors, the DA generates a substantially high volume of cases that account for almost 20% of its general budget. Moreover, after the initial hearing, prosecutors sometimes decided to re-list the case multiple times before it concluded, compelling the plaintiffs to return to court each time if they wished to contest the forfeiture. After seizing the property, the defendants required the plaintiffs to agree to particular conditions before regaining their property, including waiving the right to an innocent-owner defense should the defendants seize the property in the future or waiving the defense that the forfeiture is disproportionate to the offense. The plaintiffs sought class certification, and the defendants sought to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Following Senior Judge Eduardo Robreno\u2019s May 12, 2015, denial of the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, 103 F. Supp. 3d 694, the parties entered into settlement discussions. On Nov. 4, 2015, after a fairness hearing, the Judge Robreno ordered approval of a settlement and class certification only with regard to the first two claims. 2015 WL 12806512 (E.D. Penn. Nov. 4, 2015). Per the order, the class for the first claim of relief was \u201call persons holding legal title to or otherwise having a legal interest in real property against which an ex parte 'seize and seal' order is presently in effect, or will in the future be in effect.\u201d The class for the second claim of relief was \u201call persons holding legal title to or otherwise having a legal interest in real or personal property against which a civil-forfeiture petition has been filed, or will in the future be filed, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County and who entered into an unsealing agreement or a settlement agreement.\u201d Per the settlement agreement, the defendants were prohibited from seeking <i>ex parte</i> \u201cseize and seal\u201d orders under the Controlled Substances Forfeiture Act unless the application was previously approved, there are facts to establish the existence of exigent circumstances connected to the property, and there are facts to establish that less restrictive measures would not be sufficient. Additionally, any existing <i>ex parte</i> \u201cseize and seal\u201d orders were to be removed. The settlement also provided that notice would be given to civil forfeiture respondents that entered into unsealing or settlement agreements that specific conditions of their agreements are now void. Litigation continued regarding the outstanding claims for relief. On Sept. 7, 2016, the court denied the defendants' joint motion for reconsideration. 2016 WL 7219641. On Aug. 1, 2016, the plaintiffs had filed a motion to join defendant state court administrators, file a second amended complaint, and sever plaintiffs' fifth claim for relief. In an order dated Sept. 14, 2016 and filed on Sept. 15, 2016, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion. 2016 WL 7203707. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint the same day, requesting relief on the remaining claims. For the next several months, procedural developments continued, including the defendants filing two motions to dismiss on Sept. 19, 2016, and again on Nov. 29, 2016. Then, on Feb. 23, 2017, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' request for class certification as to their fifth claim. 320 F.R.D. 12. The court granted certification \"with respect to Plaintiffs\u2019 requests for (1) a declaration that the City and D.A. Defendants\u2019 policy and practice of retaining forfeited property and its proceeds is unconstitutional, and (2) an injunction enjoining that policy and practice.\" It denied certification with respect to \"entry of judgment requiring the return of property.\" A month later, on March 30, 2017, in a written memorandum, the court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss. 246 F.Supp.3d 1058. The defendants filed a motion for a permanent injunction on July 21, 2017. They argued that, despite offering the plaintiffs \"a settlement agreement whereby the Philadelphia Police Department and District Attorney\u2019s Office would no longer receive any forfeiture proceeds\" two months prior, the plaintiffs had not accepted the offer. In an effort to end the litigation, the defendants asked the court to issue an injunction against themselves. On Aug. 4, 2017, the plaintiffs responded to the defendants' motion, alleging that the defendants were attempting to \"moot\" the plaintiffs' claims in order to avoid a ruling on the merits of the constitutionality of their policy of using forfeiture proceeds. The plaintiffs asked the court to defer ruling on the defendants' motion and hold it in abeyance until after the parties completed discovery and summary judgment briefing had been completed. On Aug. 18, 2017, the court ordered the parties to submit a list of proposed facilitators to mediate settlement of the courtroom claims by Sept. 7, 2017. On Nov. 27, 2017, the court ordered that the case be suspended pending the parties' settlement negotiations and the appointment of a mediator. On May 22, 2018, the court appointed Mark A. Aronchick as a facilitator to promote settlement of all matters. His appointment was extended until November 9, 2018. In September 2018, the parties reached an agreement and the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of class certification and a consent decree on their fifth and sixth claims. The parties agreed to create a Restitutionary Class under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3). The class consisted of \"[a]ll persons who held or hold legal title to, or otherwise had or have a legal interest in property against which a Statutory or Common Law civil-forfeiture petition (i) was pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County as of August 11, 2012; or (ii) was filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on or after August 11, 2012 until the date the Court grants preliminary approval.\" The defendants agreed to make a payment of $3,000,000 to the Restitutionary Fund in order to compensate people whose property was wrongly confiscated. Additionally, as part of the proposed consent decree, the defendants agreed to a set of reforms that have the goal of ending abusive civil-forfeiture practices in Philadelphia. The defendants were to be permanently enjoined from using forfeiture proceeds to fund the District Attorney\u2019s Office, the Philadelphia Police Department, or any law enforcement purpose. On October 16, 2018, the court held a hearing on the motion for preliminary approval of class certification and the consent decree. The court requested that parties submit a revised version, which they did on March 26, 2019. On April 30, 2019, the court granted class certification and the consent decree, scheduling a final fairness hearing on November 1, 2019. The date of this hearing was later pushed back to August 3, 2020. Between the order approving the class certification and consent decree and the final fairness hearing, several class members filed objections, including one group that filed a motion for reconsideration. On January 27, 2021, the court simultaneously ruled on two separate consent decrees between the parties - one governing a settlement as to the third, fourth, and seventh claims for relief and one concerning the fifth and sixth. The court granted the first consent decree and class certification and granted in part the second while still granting class certification. Broadly, the court approved of safeguards that allow individuals to more easily contest and prevent property seizure and relisting while limiting forfeiture. The court further approved a permanent injunction against the defendants' financial interest in forfeiture proceedings. However, the court rejected the settlement fund distribution proposal, noting that too high a proportion, 27%, of the settlement fund was left for the residual, cy pres purpose of a charitable donation. The court thus instructed the parties to redetermine a reasonable settlement fund distribution plan that awarded a greater amount of the settlement's $3 million to the members of the plaintiff classes. On February 17, 2021, following an addendum by the parties that increased the amounts awarded to members of the classes, the court approved of the consent decree as to the fifth and sixth claims for relief and ordered the case closed.", "summary": "On Aug. 11, 2014, four individuals sued the City of Philadelphia, the Mayor, the Philadelphia District Attorney\u2019s Office, the District Attorney, and the Commissioner of the Philadelphia Police Department, alleging that the defendants\u2019 policies and practices with regard to civil forfeitures violated due process. Following settlement negotiations, the parties reached a set of consent decrees as to the claims for relief."}
{"article": "On April 12, 2017, the ACLU of Michigan filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of more than a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump's Jan. 27 and Mar. 6 Executive Orders (EO) banning admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, plaintiffs sought information \"concerning CBP\u2019s local implementation of President Trump\u2019s January 27, 2017 Executive Order...as well as any other judicial order or executive directive issued regarding Executive Order No. 1, including President Trump\u2019s March 6, 2017 Executive Order.\" The request concerned implementation at international airports within the purview of CBP's Detroit Field Office. The request also concerned the number of individuals who were detained or subjected to secondary screening, extended questioning, enforcement examination, or consideration for a waiver at the aforementioned airports pursuant to the EO. In the complaint, the plaintiffs argued that the requested records \"would facilitate the public\u2019s understanding of how Defendants implemented and enforced the Executive Orders through the Detroit Field Office\" and that \"[s]uch information is critical to the public\u2019s ability to hold the government accountable.\" The complaint stated that \"Michigan residents were among those most severely impacted by the Executive Orders...Of the major metropolitan areas in the United States, Detroit has the highest number of residents per capita from the seven countries barred under Executive Order No. 1.\" On May 8, the government filed a motion to treat all of these FOIA cases as \"multidistrict litigation\" effectively consolidating them before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. For the transfer motion see <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15719\">this case</a>. The ACLU filed their opposition to the motion to transfer on May 30, arguing that \"[g]ranting consolidation and transfer would promote forum-shopping and delay, not justice.\" On August 3, the U.S. District Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied the government's transfer motion. In its order, the Panel found that, although the thirteen FOIA cases shared \"a limited number of factual issues,\" these issues \"appear[ed] relatively straightforward and unlikely to entail extensive pretrial proceedings.\" On Oct. 26, 2017, the court ordered the government to review the first 820 pages of records it had identified as potentially responsive to the FOIA request, and produce responsive records from that batch, by Nov. 27. The court also ordered the government to repeat this process monthly. A joint status report filed on April 27, 2018 indicated that the production was complete and the ACLU was in the process of reviewing the government's production. The report indicated further litigation may be possible in light of disagreement over search terms between the parties. A subsequent August status report indicated the parties were attempting to negotiate a resolution and avoid further litigation. On August 20, 2019, the parties informed the court that they had reached a settlement agreement. On September 16, 2019, the parties stipulated dismissal of claims against the defendants, with prejudice, and the court dismissed the case.", "summary": "On April 12, 2017, the ACLU of Michigan filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump's January 27 and March 6 Executive Orders that ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The parties reached a settlement agreement, and the case was dismissed on September 16, 2019."}
{"article": "On April 23, 2014, hunger-strike protesters at a family detention center filed this class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Department of Homeland Security and the GEO Group, Inc, a subcontractor of the Karnes County Residential Center in Karnes City, Texas. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, claim that the defendants violated their First Amendment Right to freedom of expression by discriminating against them. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they suffered and continue to suffer injury, including chilling effects, as a result of the defendants' interrogation and isolation the plaintiffs because of their participation in various hunger strikes protesting their detention. In March 2014, eighty mothers awaiting asylum proceedings with their children protested the inadequate and intolerable living conditions of the detention center by participating in a hunger strike. The mothers continued feeding their children. Many of the participants, along with their children, were subsequently isolated and interrogated by ICE officials and GEO agents. Many were fired from their jobs in the detention center which had previously allowed them to pay for food from the commissary to continue feeding their children. ICE officials did not respond to the signed petition and many of the participants discontinued their protest as a result of these actions described. The plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction on April 29, 2015, but the court denied their motion on May 8, 2015. On June 1, 2015 the District Court (Judge Xavier Rodriguez) scheduled a bench trial for June 6, 2016. Subsequently, the defendants moved for dismissal on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. However, on September 9, 2015, the plaintiffs informed the court that they were voluntarily dismissing the case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). This case is now closed.", "summary": "Immigrant mothers signed a petition and organized a hunger strike protesting the conditions of a private prison while awaiting asylum proceedings. The participants were interrogated, isolated, and threatened with deportation in retaliation. They were fired from their jobs in the detention center which had previously given them access to food from the commissary to continue feeding their children. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief but voluntarily dismissed their claim on September 9, 2015."}
{"article": "On November 7, 2005, Freedom from Religious Foundation, Inc., along with several individual members of the organization who were New Mexico taxpayers, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico against the New Mexico Corrections Department and Correction Corporation of America, a private contractor paid to run the New Mexico Women's Correctional Facility (NMWCF) in Grants County. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging that the CCA's use of Christian faith-based programming in NMWCF constituted an endorsement of religion and violated the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. On January 31, 2007, the Court (Magistrate Judge Richard L. Puglisi) denied a variety of motions for summary judgement regarding whether Plaintiffs had stated a valid claim, whether Plaintiffs' taxpayer status gave them standing to sue, and whether the Christian program at NMWCF violated the Establishment Clause. On June 26, 2007, the Court notified the parties of its intention to withdraw its decisions on the summary judgement motions and to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice or grant summary judgement for Defendants on the issue of taxpayer standing. The Court asked the parties to submit arguments about the proposed action. Instead, on July 6, 2007, the parties moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, which the Court did the same day. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On November 7, 2005, Freedom from Religious Foundation, Inc., along with several individual members of the organization who were New Mexico taxpayers, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico against the New Mexico Corrections Department and Correction Corporation of America, a private contractor paid to run the New Mexico Women's Correctional Facility (NMWCF) in Grants County.The plaintiffs alleged that the CCA's use of Christian faith-based programming in NMWCF constituted an endorsement of religion and violated the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Despite initially ruling in response to summary judgement motions that Plaintiffs had taxpayer standing to sue, the Court notified that parties that it had reversed course and intended to rule in favor of Defendants on the issue of standing. The parties subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: In this case filed on April 23, 2020 by an Illinois State Representative, an Illinois Circuit Court judge issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Governor of Illinois from enforcing the state's stay at home order against the plaintiff. Later, the judge declared that both the Governor's extension of the stay at home order and the order itself exceeded his authority. The Illinois Supreme Court transferred this case to consolidate it with other COVID-19-related litigation, and the Governor is seeking to vacate the original judge's declaratory judgment.<hr> On April 23, 2020, an Illinois State Representative filed this lawsuit suit in the Clay County Circuit Court. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sued the Governor of Illinois under state law, asserting that the governor lacked authority under the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act (the Act) to extend the state's stay at home order through the end of April. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the extended stay at home order was \"in excess of the authority granted . . . under the act.\" The plaintiff also sought to enjoin the Governor from enforcing the extended stay at home order against the plaintiff. This case arose from Illinois' response to the COVID-19 pandemic. On March 9, 2020, the Governor issued a proclamation under the Act declaring that the COVID-19 pandemic was a public health emergency rising to the level of a disaster. The Act conferred on the Governor emergency powers for 30 days following the declaration. Under his emergency powers, the Governor issued an executive order on March 20 requiring that Illinois residents only leave their home for essential activities or business. This executive order was effective until April 8. On April 1, the Governor declared that the COVID-19 pandemic was a \"continuing public health emergency\" and issued an executive order extending the stay at home requirement until April 30. The plaintiff asserted that under the Act, the Governor lacked the authority to extend the March 20 executive order beyond April 8, which was 30 days after the initial disaster declaration. The plaintiff further alleged that the executive order \"limit[ed] [the plaintiff's] constitutionally protected freedoms in that it ordered him to stay at home, or at his place of residence, as well as limited his ability to travel within the state.\" The plaintiff also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), asserting that the executive order was causing irreparable harm by ordering him to stay at home and avoid travel. The same day, Judge Michael McHaney granted the the plaintiff's motion for a TRO and enjoined the Governor from enforcing the stay at home order against the plaintiff. Judge McHaney found that the plaintiff \"has a clearly ascertainable right in need of immediate protection, namely his liberty interest to be free from [defendant's] executive order of quarantine in his own home.\" Judge McHaney also concluded that the plaintiff had a reasonable likelihood of succeeding on the merits, would suffer irreparable harm if a TRO were not issued, and had no adequate remedy at law. The Governor immediately appealed to the Fifth District Appellate Court and filed an emergency motion for direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. Before the appellate court could rule, the plaintiff consented to the vacating of the TRO, and the matter was remanded to the circuit court on May 1. On May 13, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The plaintiff maintained his argument that the Governor exceeded his authority in extending the stay at home order. In addition, the plaintiff asserted that the April 30 disaster proclamation was void because the continuing public health emergency failed to meet the statutory definition of a disaster. The plaintiff further argued that the governor \"had no Illinois constitutional authority to restrict citizen's movement or activities and/or forcibly close the business premises\" and that this authority was delegated to the Department of Health. On May 18, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. On May 21, the Governor removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. He asserted that the district court had federal question jurisdiction because the \"action seeks redress for alleged deprivations of [plaintiff's] federal constitutional rights caused by actions taken under color of state law.\" He asserted that the action sought to redress the \"alleged deprivation of [plaintiff's] . . . First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process, his right to interstate travel, and the right to a Republican Form of Government conferred by Article IV, Section 4 of the United States Constitution.\" The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Gilbert C. Sison. Later that day, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion to remand the case. The plaintiff argued that the matter raised \"nothing but questions concerning Defendant's authority under certain Illinois statutes\" and asserted that the defendant was \"intent on forum shopping and want[ed] nothing more than to derail state court proceedings.\" Plaintiff further contended that \"Whether or not Defendant\u2019s actions infringe on rights existing under the United States Constitution is irrelevant to and mentioned nowhere in Plaintiff\u2019s complaint or first amended complaint\" and that \"the core of Plaintiff\u2019s causes of action, is not 'capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance.'\u201d Plaintiff additionally sought expedited relief and attorneys' fees. A day later, on May 22, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a statement of interest supporting the plaintiff's motion \"because the plaintiff makes no federal claim.\" First, the DOJ asserted that the defendant misread the amended complaint and that \"plaintiff has elected to proceed on only state law claims, and removal is thus improper.\" Moreover, the DOJ contended that the Governor exceeded his authority when issuing the executive orders. Lastly, the DOJ argued that while the case had federal implications, these implications were not sufficient to support removal. On June 29, 2020, Judge Sison remanded the case. While calling the decision \"a close call,\" Judge Sison reasoned that the \"most straightforward reading\" of the amended complaint was that the plaintiff sued under the Illinois declaratory judgment statute seeking resolution of state-law questions about the extent of the Governor's power; any implicit federal constitutional issues were \"not central\" to the case. Judge Sison also rejected the Governor's argument that 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343(a)(3) (a largely defunct statute that allows civil rights plaintiffs to sue in federal court regardless of the amount in controversy, useful decades ago when 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1331 had an amount in controversy requirement) conferred broader jurisdiction than \u00a7 1331. However, Judge Sison rejected the plaintiff's motion for fees, finding that removal was non-frivolous since the complaint referred to constitutional rights. 2020 WL 3498428. Three days later, Judge McHaney granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiff. Judge McHaney declared that the Governor's second and third disaster proclamations were void because they arose from the same \"occurrence or threat\" that gave rise to the first proclamation yet extended beyond the Act's 30-day limit. Judge McHaney also declared that the proclamations' substantive provisions were invalid because the Act did not give the Governor \"any authority to restrict a citizen's movement or activities.\" In addition, Judge McHaney held that the decision applied to all citizens of Illinois. But he declined to issue an injunction and denied summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims that COVID-19 did not meet the Act's definition of a disaster. On July 7, the Governor moved to dismiss the plaintiff's remaining claim that COVID-19 was not a disaster under the Act. Meanwhile, the plaintiff felt that the Governor had not complied with the circuit court's summary judgment ruling. So, he filed a motion to hold the Governor in civil contempt on August 5, 2020. In response, the circuit court on August 7 issued the Governor a show cause order. The Governor sought a supervisory order from the Illinois Supreme Court, which stayed the contempt hearing on August 11 but refused to issue a supervisory order. Instead, the Court ordered this case consolidated with <i>Craig v. Pritzker</i>, No. 20 MR 589, in the Sangamon County Circuit Court before Judge Raylene D. Grischow. After consolidation, the Governor promptly filed a motion to vacate the Clay County Circuit Court's July 2 summary judgement decision for lack of jurisdiction. That motion is pending as of October 12, 2020; the case is ongoing.", "summary": "On April 23, 2020, an Illinois State Representative filed this suit against the Governor of Illinois in Illinois circuit court, asserting that the governor exceeded his authority under state law by extending a stay at home order for more than 30 days in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The circuit court granted a temporary restraining order for plaintiff, but during an appeal, the plaintiff agreed to have it vacated. On May 21, defendant removed the matter to the U.S. District Court for the District of Southern Illinois, and the federal court remanded the case on June 29. The Illinois circuit court declared the extension of the stay at home order invalid on July 2 but denied injunctive relief. After the plaintiff tried to have the Governor held in contempt, the Illinois Supreme Court transferred and consolidated the case with other ongoing COVID-19 litigation."}
{"article": "This suit challenged Texas's \"Sanctuary City\" legislation, Senate Bill 4 (SB4), which required local Texas law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration officials and punished them if they did not. Unlike the <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=46\">other suits in this special collection</a>, this suit did not challenge President Trump's \"Sanctuary City\" Executive Order. At the time of this writing, there were three other cases addressing SB4 (in addition to this one). This case was before Judge Orlando L. Garcia, as was El Paso County v. Texas, No. 17-cv-00459 (W.D. Tex.), <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15831\">IM-TX-0046</a>, and City of San Antonio, Texas v. State of Texas, No. 17-cv-00489 (W.D. Tex.), <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15852\">IM-TX-0047</a>. The final case, Texas v. Travis County, No. 17-cv-00425 (W.D. Tex.), <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15767\">IM-TX-0044</a>, was before Judge Sparks. The three cases pending before Judge Garcia were brought by pro-immigration cities and counties seeking an injunction barring implementation of SB4. The other case was brought by Texas, which sought a declaratory judgment to uphold SB4 against pro-immigration cities and counties. On June 6, Judge Garcia ordered a consolidation of this case with the San Antonio and El Paso cases, with this case becoming the lead case in the consolidation. The Travis County case, however, remained separate. On this case: On May 8, 2017, the City of El Cenizo filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. 2017 WL 1950681 (W.D.Tex.). The suit alleged that SB4 violated the 10th Amendment by commandeering local government and that it was preempted under federal immigration law. The City also complained that SB4's \u201cendorse\u201d prohibition violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, that its ICE-detainer mandate violated the Fourth Amendment, and that its \u201cmaterially limits\u201d phrase was unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Numerous procedural developments took place over the summer as the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction. The defendants sought to dismiss the cases and numerous entities sought to intervene. The plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint on May 18. 2017 WL 10900157. And they filed a second amended complaint on June 8 once the claims were consolidated. 2017 WL 9362206. The plaintiffs moved again for a preliminary injunction on June 5, 2017. The defendants moved to dismiss the consolidated case. The court allowed the City of Austin to intervene on June 12, 2017 and Austin filed an intervenor complaint that day. The plaintiffs filed another amended complaint on June 19, 2017. The same day, the plaintiffs and intervenors issued four separate motions for preliminary injunction. On June 21, 2017, Texas moved to dismiss the City of Austin\u2019s complaint in intervention and El Paso County\u2019s first amended complaint. Later that week, Judge Garcia granted two motions to intervene: to Travis County and the City of Dallas. On June 28 and 29, 2017, the state of Texas filed a series of motions to dismiss. The court allowed the City of Houston and the Texas Association of Hispanic County Judges and County Commissioners to intervene on June 30, 2017. On July 14, 2017, the defendants filed motions to dismiss two complaints on intervention (the City of Houston and the Texas Association of Hispanic County Judges & County Commissioners). The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on July 20, 2017, to which the defendants responded with a motion to dismiss. The court dismissed Texas' motion to dismiss El Paso County's complaint on August 15, 2017. SB4 was set to go into effect on September 1, 2017, however on August 30 Judge Garcia granted a preliminary injunction enjoining Texas from enforcing certain provisions of the law that were preempted by federal law. 264 F. Supp. 3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017). In particular, Judge Garcia blocked the portion of SB4 that stated that local government officials may not \"adopt, enforce, or endorse a policy under which the entity or department prohibits or materially limits the enforcement of immigration laws.\" The following day, the defendants appealed that injunction and filed a motion to stay pending the appeal. The motion to stay was denied. Meanwhile, the following entities submitted briefs in support of the motion for a preliminary injunction: El Paso County, Travis County, the City of Austin, the City of San Antonio, the City of Dallas, the City of Houston, the City of San Marcos, the El Cenzino plaintiffs, the Anti-Defamation League, the Harris County attorney at the time, Major Cities Chiefs Association, Police Executive Research Forum, the United States Conference of Mayors, the National Human Rights Commission of Mexico, and a Houston-based law firm specializing in immigration law. At the appeals court, on September 25, 2017, the Fifth Circuit denied in part and granted in part the defendants' motion to stay the preliminary injunction while appeal was pending. 2017 WL 4250186. The court granted stay for the injunction on the enforcement of an SB4 provision that local entities could not \"prohibit\" immigration law enforcement by inhibiting cooperation with federal immigration officers. The court also stayed the injunction on the provision requiring enforcement agencies to comply with detainer requests issued by ICE. The plaintiffs then appealed to the Fifth Circuit on September 29 from the denial of their relief in the preliminary injunction order. Oral argument was held on November 7, 2017. The Fifth Circuit reversed the injunction on March 13, 2018, holding that SB4 did not violate the constitution with the exception of the prohibition on \"endors[ing] a policy under which the entity or department prohibits or materially limits the enforcement of immigration laws.\" 885 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2018). The court struck down that part of the statute, finding that it violated the First Amendment and lacked a limiting principle. As to upholding the remainder of the statute, the court did not find that SB4 conflicted with federal law so as to warrant preemption, nor did it find that the remainder of the statute violated the constitution. The court found that the law's mandate that local law enforcement was to comply with ICE detainer requests did not facially violate the Fourth Amendment, though it left the door open for an as-applied challenge should violations occur or ICE policy change. The court found that the provision forbidding policies or practices that \"materially limit[]\" the enforcement of immigration laws was not facially vague. The court also remanded the case. The plaintiffs petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a rehearing en banc, which was granted. Many amici were represented at this stage, including the states of West Virginia, Louisiana, Alabama, and many others in support of Texas. Amici in support of the plaintiffs included the Major Cities Chiefs Association, U.S. Conference of Mayors, Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights, Texas Senate Hispanic Caucus, Mexican American Legislative Caucus, Interfaith Coalition of Clergy and Religious Organizations, and many others. On May 8, 2018, the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc upheld SB4 in its entirety, with the exception of the application of the \"endorsement\" prohibition of Tex. Gov't Code \u00a7 752.053(a)(1) to Texas officials, in an opinion which withdrew and superseded its March opinion. 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018). The case was ordered remanded to the district court to vacate the remaining injunction provisions that had halted full implementation of SB4. The court held that Texas law was not preempted by federal law in this case, because while federal law regulates how local entities may cooperate in immigration enforcement, SB4 specifies whether they cooperate. It confirmed that the endorsement prohibition could not pass muster under the First Amendment. Most critically, the court found that the immigration detainer provision was not facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, and that the Constitution does not require probable cause of criminality to detain in the immigration context. The phrase \u201cmaterially limits\u201d in the provision forbidding any policy or pattern or practice that prohibits or materially limits the enforcement of the immigration laws, was not unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment; and the Texas constitution did not prevent Texas from preempting cities' home-rule authority in passing SB4. According to the ACLU, this meant that local officials were free to speak out against laws like SB4 that would require cooperation with federal immigration enforcement. For example, sheriffs and police chiefs can continue to speak publicly about why asking about immigration status is a poor police practice that harms public safety. However, because of the Fifth Circuit's May 2018 decision, local Texas officials were obligated under SB4 to assist in federal immigration enforcement, and could face penalties for declining requests to assist with federal immigration agents. However, the preliminary injunction had not covered the statute in its entirety. On April 22, 2019, the court stated as much in an order requesting an update from the parties as to the status of the litigation. The court reiterated that after the appeal, neither of the parties had continued to litigate though live claims still remained. On September 12, 2019, the El Cenizo and Travis County plaintiffs and the cities of Houston and Dallas filed to voluntarily dismiss their remaining claims with prejudice. In light of the failure of the facial challenge to SB4 and the Fifth Circuit's opinion, these plaintiffs no longer wanted to pursue the remaining as-applied claims. But on December 13, 2019, the City of Austin filed an amended complaint. It sought a declaratory judgment that SB4 violated the First Amendment because it penalized city officials for protected speech that \"endorsed\" policies contradicting SB4. It also sought an injunction against its enforcement. The city of El Paso and its official in their official capacity, along with Project Education Fund and MOVE Texas, also filed an amended complaint on December 13. They alleged that SB4 imposed unconstitutional mandates on local governments, facilitated discriminatory policing, chilled protected speech, and was pretext for discriminatory intent. They claimed that the ordinance violated Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and the First Amendment. They sought declaratory relief and an injunction against SB4's enforcement, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "This suit challenges Texas's \"Sanctuary City\" legislation, Senate Bill 4 (SB4), which requires local Texas law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration officials and punishes them if they do not. Unlike the <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=46\">other suits in this special collection</a>, this suit does not challenge President Trump's \"Sanctuary City\" Executive Order. In this consolidated action, the district court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting SB4 from going into effect on its projected start date. The Fifth Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction and affirmed in a rehearing en banc, stating that the ordinance was facially constitutional. Some of the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims on remand. Others filed amended complaints in December 2019 and the case is alive again."}
{"article": "On January 25, 2012, this class action was brought by individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities (I/DD) and the United Cerebral Palsy Association of Oregon and Southwest Washington, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The plaintiffs claimed that the State of Oregon and its Offices of Developmental Disability Services and Vocational Rehabilitation Services, along with other state agencies, violated the Americans With Disabilities Act (\"ADA\") and the Rehabilitation Act by operating an employment services program that unnecessarily separated disabled participants from nondisabled participants. The plaintiffs claimed these segregated settings deprived members of the plaintiff class (more than 2,300 people in the state) of supported employment services, the opportunity to work alongside nondisabled persons, and the ability to compete for higher-paying jobs. They claimed the state's policy discriminated against them based on disability. The plaintiffs sought certification of their proposed class, declaratory relief, and a permanent injunction to limit unnecessary segregation in the defendants' employment services program and to provide an adequate array of integrated employment and supported employment services. On April 3, 2012, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs were attempting to create \"a new cause of action\" by extending the ADA's integration mandate beyond the requirement to provide community and home-based services (which were designed to prevent unnecessary institutionalization) to also include employment services. The defendants argued that (1) employment claims were not covered by Title II of the ADA; (2) the integration mandate did not apply because a denial of employment services did not place any plaintiff at risk of institutionalization; (3) the plaintiffs' claims sought to require the defendants to provide a service that the state did not and could not provide; and (4) the plaintiffs' claims improperly imposed a certain standard of care on the state's provision of employment services. At the core of the defendants' argument was the notion that the integration mandate of the ADA applied only to a person's place of residency and not place of employment. On April 20, 2012, the United States submitted a statement of interest regarding the motion to dismiss. It cited that contrary to defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, Title II of the ADA forms a clear and comprehensive mandate to end the segregation of persons with disabilities in virtually all aspects of American life. On May 17, 2012, Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart held that the integration mandate applies equally to employment-related services and to services allowing persons to live outside institutions. 841 F.Supp.2d 1199. The court did, however, find that the plaintiffs sought \"the forbidden remedy\" of requiring defendants to provide an adequate level of employment services to enable plaintiffs to obtain a competitive job in their initial complaint. The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend. On May 29, 2012, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with changes made to correct errors identified by the court. The court then addressed the question of class certification. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class consisting of \"all individuals in Oregon with intellectual or developmental disabilities who are in, or who have been referred to, sheltered workshops\" and \"who are qualified for supported employment services.\" The plaintiffs argued that the evidence needed to resolve the common questions of law and fact was the same for all class members. On August 6, 2012, the court granted class certification. 283 F.R.D. 587. On May 24, 2014, the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division filed an intervenor complaint on behalf of the United States, which included evidence of a nine-month investigation into Oregon\u2019s failure to comply with the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Some individual members of the class viewed sheltered work as equally valuable as integrated work and moved to intervene on the concern that their ability to choose sheltered work would be curtailed. But on June 20, 2014, Magistrate Judge Stewart denied the motion. 2014 WL 2807701. On September 8, 2015, the parties submitted a proposed settlement agreement and on January 17, 2016, the court approved it. 166 F.Supp.3d 1180. In the settlement, the defendant committed to assisting 1,115 working-age individuals who receive or have received sheltered workshop services to obtain integrated employment in competitive-wage jobs and to reducing the number of adults with I/DD in sheltered workshops from 1,926 to no more than 1,530. The state also committed to end funding for sheltered workshop placements for youth newly eligible for state-funded employment, to provide at least 4,900 youth with employment services to help them access integrated employment, and to work with the state Department of Human Services in seeking financial incentives for providers to hire individuals with I/DD and in obtaining integrated employment. The parties agreed the settlement would terminate no later than July 1, 2022. On February 11, 2016, the court granted an award of $5,250,000.00 in attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. 2016 WL 589684. As part of the settlement, the state's efforts are being monitored by an independent reviewer who will issue annual reports until the settlement's termination date. Since the case settled, two annual reports have been filed, one on March 2, 2017 and one on March 23, 2018. Because the settlement continues to be monitored and the plaintiffs may reopen litigation if defendants fail to comply, this case is ongoing as of May 22, 2020.", "summary": "This is a case filed in 2012 by persons with disabilities who qualify for the state of Oregon's supported employment services, and were not given meaningful opportunity to work in community settings, violating the ADA. The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon held that the plaintiffs' claims were cognizable under the ADA, and that they could be brought as a class action, distinguishing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes. A class action settlement was approved on February 11, 2016. As part of the settlement, Oregon agreed to a sustained commitment to improve employment offerings for about 7,000 people between 2015-2022. Their progress is being monitored by an independent review and will be reported on annually until the settlement agreement ends on July 1, 2022."}
{"article": "This group of 1,704 plaintiffs, led by a Flint homeowner, sued the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Federal Tort Claims Act in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in connection with the Flint water crisis on April 18, 2017. This lawsuit is distinct from the Flint water cases in front of Judge Judith Levy, which were filed against various state actors. The plaintiffs were represented by a variety of Michigan-based small private law firms. They sought $722.4 million dollars in personal and property damages. An FTCA complaint must allege the ways in which employees of the federal government are liable to plaintiffs under state tort law. Here, the plaintiffs alleged that the EPA was liable for negligence in two instances related to statutory duties: first, because it failed to bring a Section 1431 Emergency Action under the Safe Drinking Water Act until 2016, despite being on notice as early as October 2014 that there was a potential problem of toxic water in Flint; second, because the EPA failed to provide advice and technical assistance to states and local providers which are not in compliance with the requirements of the Safe Water Drinking Act. They also alleged that the EPA was negligent in not warning the public of potential risks to public health due to the contamination of Flint's water, and that they were negligent in undertaking a timely investigation of the situation in Flint. <b>Procedural background</b> The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 2, 2018. In response to the complaint, the government filed a motion to dismiss on March 2, 2018. Mediation proceedings were ongoing for about a year, and the plaintffs filed a second amended complaint on February 8, 2019. On April 18, 2019, Judge Linda V. Walker issued an order and opinion denying the government's motion to dismiss. She also held that the discretionary function exception to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act did not apply in this case, and that plaintiffs' suit could move forward. 375 F.Supp.3d 796. On June 7, 2019, the government filed a motion to certify interlocutory appeal, seeking to immediately bring the case in front of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. This motion was denied by Judge Walker on September 27, 2019. 2019 WL 4734686. <b>Current status</b> The government filed an answer to the second amended complaint on December 6, 2019. The case was consolidated with several others in an order entered on March 3, 2020. The consolidated cases represent 7,535 plaintiffs in total. Judge Walker appointed Deborah Greenspan, a partner in Blank Rome's Washington, DC office, as a special master for the now-consolidated action <i>In re FTCA Flint Water Cases</i> on March 25, 2020. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "A group of over 1700 plaintiffs led by a Flint homeowner filed a Federal Tort Claims Act action against the EPA in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on April 18, 2017. Judge Linda V. Walker found that the EPA's actions and lack of actions taken during the Flint Water Crisis did not fall under the discretionary function exception to liability of the FTCA, and issued an opinion on April 18, 2019 ordering that the case move forward. After consolidating this case with several others in March 2020, Judge Walker appointed Deborah Greenspan as a special master for the consolidated cases. The plaintiffs seek $722.4 million dollars in personal and property damages. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "In May of 2002, the EEOC's Chicago District Office filed suit in U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, against Custom Companies Inc., a trucking company, and related corporate entities. The suit alleged sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII. The charging parties intervened as plaintiffs. In July of 2003, the case was consolidated with a separate action brought by the EEOC against Custom Companies (1:03-cv-02293). The defendants made multiple motions for summary judgment; one was granted in part, the others were denied. After a prologued series of discovery disputes, the case went to trial in November of 2006. On November 17, 2006, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding over $2 million in punitive damages and over $300,000 in compensatory damages. In March of 2007, the award was halved pursuant to statutory caps, and the court entered the judgment against the defendants. Both parties moved to amend the judgment. In June of 2007, the defendants appealed the judgment. In December of 2007, the parties came to terms, and the Court of Appeals remanded the case so that the district court could amend the judgment to reflect the settlement. After some disputes regarding withholding, a final order was entered in March of 2008 granting $452,800 in compensatory and punitive damages and $900,000 in attorney fees. Custom Companies was also ordered to conduct annual anti-discrimination training for its employees, and to report any future complaints of sexual harassment to the EEOC. On June 19, 2008, Judge Harry Leinenweber signed an order indicating that the plaintiffs, plaintiff-intervenors, and counsel had all been paid in full, and the matter appears to have been resolved.", "summary": "In May of 2002, the EEOC's Chicago District Office filed this Title VII sexual-harassment and retaliation suit against Custom Companies Inc., a trucking company, and related corporate entities. The charging parties intervened as plaintiffs, and the case was consolidated with a separate action brought by the EEOC against Custom Companies (1:03-cv-02293). At trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding over $2 million in punitive damages and over $300,000 in compensatory damages. The award was halved pursuant to statutory caps, and the court entered the judgment against the defendants. Both parties moved to amend the judgment. The defendants appealed the judgment. The parties eventually settled, and the Court of Appeals remanded the case so that the district court could amend the judgment to reflect the settlement. The matter appears to be closed."}
{"article": "This case was filed on July 21, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The lawsuit was brought by a single private individual against President Donald Trump, Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Chad Wolf, and John Does 1-100, all of whom were unnamed federal agents. The plaintiff was represented by private counsel and attorneys from People's Law Project. The complaint alleged that the unnamed federal agents, at the direction of defendant Wolf, beat the plaintiff while they were peacefully protesting to carry out defendant Trump's political agenda. The lawsuit argued that the defendants were in violation of the U.S. Constitution and federal civil rights law. The complaint first alleged violations, both actual and threatened, of the plaintiff's First Amendment to free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition the government. The complaint also alleged violations, actual and threatened, of the Fourth Amendment, specifically through the use of excessive force. The complaint alleged that defendants employed chemical agents, batons, and shields to remove protesters. Finally, the complaint alleged that defendants violated 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1985 and 1986 for conspiracy to deprive rights and failure to prevent conspiracy to deprive rights. The plaintiff requested declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and monetary damages, in addition to attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Stacie F. Beckerman. For the next few months, there was no activity in the case until the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice on October 21, 2020. The Clearinghouse does not have access to why the plaintiff dismissed the claim. This case is closed", "summary": "This case deals with President Trump's deployment of federal law enforcement officers to Portland, Oregon in response to the protests that took place there after the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. The complaint was filed on July 21, 2020, and alleged that the federal officers used excessive force against protesters and violated the protesters First Amendment rights of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom to petition the government. It also alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. Sections 1985 and 1986. The plaintiff, a private individual, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. For the next few months, there was no activity in the case until the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice on October 21, 2020. The Clearinghouse does not have access to why the plaintiff dismissed the claim. This case is closed The case is ongoing as of August 6, 2020."}
{"article": "This lawsuit was filed on October 6, 2017 over Section 2 of President Trump\u2019s Sep. 24, 2017 Proclamation (\"Executive Order #3\" or \"EO-3\") barring travel to the United States from six Muslim-majority countries. The plaintiffs were U.S. citizens or permanent residents who would not be able to reunite with their family members or who otherwise claimed injury as a direct result of EO-3. Specifically, the plaintiffs were a Syrian national and U.S. lawful permanent resident (\"LPR\"), a U.S. citizen of Syrian descent with a Syrian national sister currently outside of the U.S., an American citizen of Yemeni descent with a Yemeni national wife currently outside of the U.S., a U.S. citizen with a Syrian national wife currently outside of the U.S., an American citizen of Syrian descent with a Syrian national father currently outside of the U.S., and an American citizen with a Somali national fianc\u00e9 currently outside of the U.S.. The plaintiffs, represented by the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the Brennan Center, and private counsel, filed a concurrent complaint and motion for a preliminary injunction in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The complaint alleged that EO-3 violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the defendants nationwide from enforcing Section 2 of EO-3 across the nation. On October 12, the government responded to the motion for a preliminary injunction, and the plaintiffs replied on October 14. The case was assigned to Judge Theodore D. Chuang, who was also presiding over <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15637\">IRAP v. Trump</a>. He held a hearing on the Preliminary Injunction motion on October 16. The following day, Judge Chuang granted the motion in part, enjoining all defendants, with the exception of the President of the United States, from enforcing Section 2 of EO-3 nationwide. On October 20, the defendants appealed Judge Chuang's decision to the Fourth Circuit (docket no. 17-2233) and requested that the Fourth Circuit stay the injunction pending resolution of the appeal. The defendants also requested accelerated processing of the appellate case, which the plaintiffs opposed the following day. Also on October 20, the Fourth Circuit consolidated this case with <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15637\">IRAP v. Trump</a> and <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16193\">Iranian Alliances Across Borders v. Trump</a>. From October 20 through October 25, the parties continued to file responses regarding the motion to accelerate processing of the case. On October 24, the States of Texas, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and West Virginia filed an amicus brief in support of the government's motion to stay the district court's injunction. On October 27, the Iranian Alliances Across Borders and IRAP plaintiffs responded to the government's motion to stay the injunction pending appeal. Also on October 27, the government requested that the Court schedule oral argument for December 8, immediately after the current Ninth Circuit oral argument in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15626\">Hawaii v. Trump</a>. On October 31, the Court granted this request. On October 30, the Department of Justice (\"DOJ\") responded to the plaintiffs' motion to stay. On November 1, the DOJ submitted its opening brief, arguing that the plaintiffs' claims were not justiciable and that EO-3 fell well within the President's constitutional and statutory authority. Also on November 1, amici began filing briefs with the Court. On November 15, the plaintiffs filed their opening/response brief. The DOJ responded on November 22. On November 22, the court submitted a letter requesting that the DOJ supplement the record with two reports referenced in both the DOJ's opening brief and EO-3: a report submitted to the President on July 9, 2017, identifying \"16 countries as having 'inadequate' information sharing practices and risk factors, and another 31 countries as 'at risk' of becoming inadequate,\" and a report submitted to the President on September 15, 2017, recommending that the President impose entry restrictions on certain nationals from seven of the countries determined to have inadequate information sharing practices and risk factors. On November 24, the DOJ responded, noting that the requested reports contain classified information and requesting that any reviewing of the reports take place in camera and ex parte. This case is ongoing. Oral argument on the government's motion to stay the district court's injunction pending appeal is scheduled for December 8, and will be held en banc. Because this case was consolidated with <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16193\">Iranian Alliances Across Borders v. Trump</a> into <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15637\">IRAP v. Trump</a> on October 20, 2017, further updates on activity within this case can be found at <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15637\">IRAP v. Trump</a>.", "summary": "This is a lawsuit filed against Section 2 of President Trump\u2019s Sep. 24, 2017 Proclamation (\"Executive Order #3\" or \"EO-3\") barring travel to the United States from six Muslim-majority countries. The plaintiffs are US citizens or permanent residents who will not be able to reunite with their family members or who otherwise claim injury as a direct result of EO-3. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief: they asked the court to enjoin defendants nationwide from enforcing Section 2 of EO-3 across the nation."}
{"article": "The plaintiffs in this case are three individuals with dual diagnoses of mental illness and intellectual disability. They receive services and support in order to remain in the community through Pennsylvania Medicaid's Consolidated Waiver program. After each plaintiff experienced a change in his/her condition (i.e. a specific episode caused by mental illness that necessitated increased care), the plaintiffs were briefly institutionalized in psychiatric hospitals. The disruption in services created a range problems when the plaintiffs sought to resume waiver services. The level of care offered under the waiver was allegedly insufficient, which put the plaintiffs at risk of future institutionalization. In addition, the plaintiffs faced numerous administrative challenges in securing services. One of the plaintiffs could not be discharged from an institutionalization without a promise of more extensive services than could be put in place under the waiver. The plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on May 20, 2011. The complaint alleged that the state placed the plaintiffs at risk of unnecessary institutionalization in violation of the ADA under the Supreme Court precedent Olmstead v. L.C. The complaint also alleged violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and that the insufficient waiver services amount to violations of the Medicaid Act. Although the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, the case was resolved before any decision was necessary. Two of the three plaintiffs were moved to community placements with sufficient support services, while the state had taken some steps to ensure that the third plaintiff would be moved in a timely fashion. Judge Joel H. Slomsky approved the parties' stipulation of dismissal and settlement on October 18, 2011.", "summary": "This was a challenge to the insufficiency of Pennsylvania Medicaid's Consolidated Waiver program for individuals with both mental illness and intellectual disabilities. The case was dismissed after each of the three plaintiffs began to receive adequate services in the community."}
{"article": "On July 8, 2009, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201, against the federal government. The plaintiff asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging an overreaching of federal authority into an exclusive sphere of the states. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the federal Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. \u00a7 7, violates the Tenth Amendment, exceeds Congress's Article I powers, and runs afoul of the Constitution's principles of federalism by creating an extensive federal regulatory scheme that interferes with and undermines the Commonwealth's sovereign authority to define marriage and to regulate the marital status of its citizens. On July 8, 2010, the Court (Judge Joseph L. Tauro), substantially agreeing with the Commonwealth's characterization of DOMA, granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and enjoined the federal government from enforcing DOMA against Massachusetts or its agencies. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, 698 F.Supp.2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010). (The decision was issued the same day as Judge Tauro's decision striking down DOMA on equal protection grounds, in Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, 699 F.Supp.2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010), PB-MA-0006, and the two cases were consolidated on appeal.) The defendants appealed and moved for a stay of the injunction pending their appeal, and the Court (Judge Tauro) granted their motion. On February 24, 2011, the Department of Justice indicated to the Court of Appeals that it had come to the conclusion that DOMA is unconstitutional and would cease defending it. (It would later file a brief in support of the plaintiffs' case on September 22.) In response, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives intervened to defend the act. On August 23, 2011, the plaintiff moved for an initial en banc hearing to expedite the case, but despite a supporting brief from the Department of Justice, the Court of Appeals (Chief Judge Sandra L. Lynch) denied the motion. After hearing arguments on April 4, 2012, on May 31 a three-judge panel of the First Circuit (Chief Judge Lynch, Judge Michael Boudin, and Judge Juan R. Torruella) unanimously affirmed the District Court's judgment in an opinion by Judge Boudin. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, No. 10-2204, 2012 WL 1948017 (1st Cir. May 31, 2012). While the Court of Appeals refrained from applying heightened scrutiny, it also declined to employ hyper-deferential rational basis review; instead, the Court held that Supreme Court precedent in cases implicating the interests of historically disadvantaged minority groups (e.g. United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)) and cases considering federal action in areas of traditional state concern (e.g. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)) suggested a more searching form of rational basis inquiry (so-called 'rational basis with bite'), and that the rationales given for DOMA did not hold up under this closer scrutiny. Injunctive relief was stayed pending the possibility of review by the Supreme Court; the Department of Justice sought review on July 3, 2012. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 27, 2013.", "summary": "On July 8, 2009, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, against the federal government , claiming that the federal Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. \u00a7 7, violates the Tenth Amendment, exceeds Congress's Article I powers, and runs afoul of the Constitution's principles of federalism by creating an extensive federal regulatory scheme that interferes with and undermines the Commonwealth's sovereign authority to define marriage and to regulate the marital status of its citizens. On July 8, 2010, the Court (Judge Joseph L. Tauro), substantially agreeing with the Commonwealth's characterization of DOMA, granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and enjoined the federal government from enforcing DOMA against Massachusetts or its agencies. (The decision was issued the same day as Judge Tauro's decision striking down DOMA on equal protection grounds, in Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F.Supp.2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010), PB-MA-0006.) The defendants appealed and moved for a stay of the injunction pending their appeal, and the Court (Judge Tauro) granted their motion. On February 24, 2011, the Department of Justice indicated to the court that it had come to the conclusion that DOMA is unconstitutional and would cease defending it. In response, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives intervened to defend the act. The case was argued before a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on April 4, 2012, and on May 31, 2012, the Court affirmed the District Court's judgment. Injunctive relief has been stayed pending the possibility of review by the Supreme Court; the Department of Justice sought review on July 3, 2012. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 27, 2013."}
{"article": "On July 10, 2017, five residents of Florida, the ACLU of Florida, and the Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc. filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The case was assigned to Judge Marcia G. Cooke and Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman. The plaintiffs sued the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity (Commission), the Executive Office of the President of the United States, the Executive Office of the Vice President of the United States, and several agents of the executive branch, all under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), and the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). The plaintiffs also sued the Florida Secretary of State under state law, namely Florida Statute \u00a7 97.0585: Information Regarding Voters and Voter Registration Confidentiality. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and other public interest counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. This complaint, brought on behalf of Florida voters, challenged the legality of the actions of the Commission and the legality of its directive requesting voter registration information of state-registered voters in Florida and throughout the United States. The plaintiffs sought to prevent the unauthorized collection of state voter information data and to prohibit the Florida Secretary of State and other similarly situated officials of other states from providing state voter data to the Commission. The plaintiffs claimed that the actions of the Commission and other defendants constituted an unjustified invasion of privacy in violation of the constitutional separation of powers, Article II, and voters\u2019 First Amendment rights. On July 13, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order, asking the court to prohibit the defendants from collecting every American voter\u2019s personal data to create a national, centralized database, to prohibit the defendants from running all business until fully complying with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and to restrain the Florida Secretary of State from submitting to the Commission any voter data in violation of Fla. Stat. \u00a7 97.0585 and Florida\u2019s Right to Privacy. The court held a hearing on July 18, 2017, regarding this motion. Unfortunately, the details of this hearing are not available on the docket. On July 20, 2017, deferring to the conclusions made during the hearing, Judge Marcia Cooke denied without prejudice the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a temporary restraining order. 2017 WL 3113486. On August 14, 2017, the defendant Florida Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, because the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action. The following month, the Secretary filed a motion to stay the filing of the joint scheduling report until the court resolved this motion to dismiss. The court denied this motion to stay, finding that if there were a stay and the court ultimately denied the motion, this case would have been significantly behind schedule. On October 20, 2017, the federal defendants moved to dismiss this action, arguing that the case lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs failed to establish standing. In December 2017, the federal defendants moved for a protective order staying discovery until the court ruled on the federal defendants\u2019 pending motion to dismiss. On December 29, 2017, however, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, removing a claim that the federal defendants had exceeded the authority of Executive Order 13799. As such, the court denied as moot both the motions to dismiss as they were regarding the initial complaint. On January 5, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs filed this motion because on January 3, 2018, President Trump issued an Executive Order terminating the Commission after the defendants and other had successfully worked together to transfer private, protected voter data to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The plaintiffs claimed that, in using Commission data, the Federal Defendants sought to \u201cStop Aliens From Voting,\u201d without complying with FACA and argued that injunctive relief was appropriate to compel government compliance with FACA. The court referred this motion to Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman. 2018 WL 333821. On February 6, 2018, Judge Goodman issued a report and recommendation regarding the plaintiffs\u2019 emergency motion. Judge Goodman recommended that the plaintiffs\u2019 motion be denied because Plaintiffs had not established a substantial threat of irreparable injury. 2018 WL 1863751. Agreeing with the report, Judge Cooke denied the motion on March 19, 2018. In light of the dissolution of the Commission, the defendant Secretary and the federal defendants filed new motions to dismiss, arguing that without the Commission, the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On May 30, 2018, Judge Cooke entered an order granting both motions to dismiss and dismissed the case. The court granted the defendant Secretary\u2019s motion because Florida had already provided the Commission with the publicly available information, and the Commission had been disbanded. As such, there was no continuing case or controversy with respect to the Secretary. The court granted the federal defendants\u2019 motion for similar reasons. The Commission ceased to exist and, while Judge Cooke agreed with the plaintiffs that simply because a commission ceased to exist does not necessarily render a case moot, the court found that the instant case had indeed become moot as to the remaining federal defendants. The case is presumably closed.", "summary": "This 2017 lawsuit was brought by five residents of Florida, the ACLU of Florida, and the Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity engaged in an unauthorized collection of state voter information data that violated the APA, FACA, the PRA, and the First Amendment rights of voters. After the dissolution of the Commission in January 2018, the court dismissed the case as moot."}
{"article": "On February 18, 2016, a group of Flint, Michigan residents filed this class action lawsuit in the Michigan Circuit Court for the County of Genesee. The plaintiffs sued Lockwood, Andrews & Newnam, P.C. and a related corporate entity under state law. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that Lockwood, a company that helped Flint switch its water source from Lake Huron to the Flint River, negligently caused Flint residents to be supplied with water contaminated by lead and other biological and chemical agents and failed to warn residents about the health risks. The plaintiffs claimed that they sustained serious bodily injury, property damage, depreciation of property value, and emotional harm and resulting stress-related physical symptoms as a result. The plaintiffs sought compensatory damages and attorney\u2019s fees. The defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on February 23, 2016, which the plaintiffs opposed. On May 11, 2016, the district court (Judge John Corbett O\u2019Meara) remanded the case to state court. In Judge O\u2019Meara\u2019s view, the dispute was \u201ca truly local controversy\u201d ill-suited to a federal forum. Judge O\u2019Meara noted that the plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims did not involve a substantial federal question and that the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) could not support federal jurisdiction because CAFA\u2019s local controversy exception applied: there was a significant local defendant, more than two-thirds of the proposed class were Michiganders, the injuries happened in Michigan, and there was no similar class action against any of the defendants. The defendants appealed. On November 16, 2016, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court\u2019s decision. Judge Richard A. Griffin (joined by Judge Bernice B. Donald) wrote that the case \u201cexemplifies the quintessential local controversy\u201d and found that CAFA\u2019s local controversy exception applied. Judge Raymond M. Kethledge dissented, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to adduce sufficient proof that at least two-thirds of the members of the putative class were Michiganders or that the conduct of a Michigan defendant formed a significant basis for the claim. The case is now ongoing in Michigan state court. As of November 19, 2019, the parties are engaged in discovery.", "summary": "A group of Flint, Michigan residents sued companies involved in switching Flint's water supply to the Flint river, thereby causing the Flint water crisis, for negligence in state court. The defendants attempted to remove the action to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), but both the district court and Sixth Circuit found that CAFA's local controversy exception applied. The case is now proceeding in state court."}
{"article": "On June 8, 2011, several veterans, on behalf of all homeless veterans suffering from disabilities caused by their military service, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against the Department of Veterans' Affairs alleging violations of state law and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest and private counsel, asked the court for an injunction requiring the defendants to provide the plaintiff class with permanent supportive housing that accommodates their disabilities so that they can access the VHA benefits for which they are eligible. They also requested that the court enjoin defendants from using the West Los Angeles Medical Center & Community Living Center campus (WLA Campus) for any purpose that is not directly related to housing veterans with disabilities and to require an accounting of profits of all money received for land use agreements for the WLA campus. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that the design and implementation of the VHA benefits program was discriminatory and that plaintiffs were being denied meaningful access to benefits by defendants because of their disabilities. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the WLA campus was intended, under the grant that established it, to provide housing and services for veterans with disabilities. By entering into land use agreements with commercial and non-DVA entities, defendants violated the grant, which plaintiffs argued was a charitable trust. Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that there was never a public accounting of the transactions. Plaintiffs claimed that this lack of housing prevented the plaintiffs from meaningfully accessing the veterans' benefits to which they were entitled. An amended complaint filed Aug. 12, 2011 added claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 551 et seq.). On Mar. 16, 2012, the court (Judge S. James Otero) dismissed in part the plaintiff's claims. 860 F. Supp. 2d 1079. After the Ninth Circuit vacated <i>Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki</i>, 644 F.3d 845, on which the court had relied, it reconsidered the Mar. 16 ruling. Eventually, the en banc Ninth Circuit issued <i>Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki</i>, 678 F.3d 1013. Based on that decision, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' Rehabilitation Act claims because resolving the claims would require the court to second-guess the government's determination about what benefits specific veterans were entitled to. But the court let the plaintiffs' Administrative Procedure Act claims proceed because they did not turn on questions about specific veterans' benefits. 2012 WL 12882704. Mediation was attempted during the course of proceedings, but it proved unsuccessful. Following the mediation, both parties moved for summary judgment. On Aug. 29, 2013, the court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, declaring the land use agreements that defendant had with non-healthcare organizations were unauthorized by law and therefore void. 2013 WL 12121981. The defendants moved to vacate the judgment, which was denied on Oct. 21, 2013, and then appealed to the Ninth Circuit on Oct. 24. Meanwhile, the parties continued to attempt to find resolution outside of the courtroom, and filed notice of their decision to end litigation on Jan. 28, 2015. The parties stated that they would work together to create a strategy and action plan for veteran homelessness in Greater LA. The final plan was to address chronic homelessness through evidence-based methods and with input from all stakeholders. The VA would address various issues related to creating a plan for the WLA Campus, including bridge housing, permanent supportive housing, and land use agreements. On Feb. 17, 2015, pursuant to a joint motion to vacate, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment. The parties filed joint stipulation to dismiss the case on Mar. 26, 2015. The Clearinghouse does not know whether the parties agreed to a final plan after the case was dismissed or what changes, if any, occurred at the WLA Campus because of this suit.", "summary": "On June 8, 2011, several veterans, on behalf of all homeless veterans suffering from disabilities caused by their military service, filed a lawsuit against the Department of Veterans' Affairs for misuse of the WLA campus which prevented them from meaningfully accessing the veterans' benefits to which they are entitled.On August 29, 2013, the District Court (Judge S. James Otero) entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, declaring the land use agreements that defendant had with non-healthcare organizations were unauthorized by law and therefore void. On August 29, 2013, the District Court (Judge Otero) entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, declaring the land use agreements that defendant had with non-healthcare organizations were unauthorized by law and therefore void. The case is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals."}
{"article": "On February 8, 2017, three organizations\u2014Public Citizen, Inc., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and Communications Workers of America\u2014filed this lawsuit against the United States of America, President Donald Trump, and 14 federal agencies, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The case was assigned to Judge Randolph D. Moss. One week prior, on January 30, President Trump had signed Executive Order 13771.The order instructed federal agencies to rescind at least two existing regulations for every new regulation issued, and to ensure that the costs of new regulations were offset by the rescinded regulations. All regulations promulgated during fiscal year 2017 were required to have net costs of $0, regardless of benefits. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that Executive Order 13771 violated the Take Care Clause, exceeded Article II presidential power, and infringed on legislative authority, and was therefore invalid. They sought a declaration that the agencies could not lawfully implement or comply with the order, and sought an injunction preventing them from complying with the order. They argued that the order\u2019s requirements would harm the people of the United States, and that the decision-making process required by this order was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. On April 21, 2017 the plaintiffs amended their complaint. The government filed a motion to dismiss on May 12, and on May 15 the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. On February 26, 2018 the court granted the government\u2019s motion to dismiss, denying the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment. 297 F. Supp. 3d 6. It found that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of establishing standing to sue: they had failed to allege that the order would \u201csubstantially increase the risk\u201d of harm to any of their members. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint two months later on April 20, 2018. On June 4, California and Oregon intervened as plaintiffs, arguing that they had \u201cunique interests in the health and well-being of their citizens, natural resources, infrastructure, institutions, and economies\u201d which could not be adequately represented by the non-governmental plaintiffs in the case. The following year, on February 8, 2019, the court denied the government\u2019s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint: the plaintiffs had demonstrated standing to sue, sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 361 F. Supp. 3d 60. However, the court simultaneously denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment: they had \u201cdone enough to stay afloat but not enough to move forward.\u201d Because there was still doubt as to standing, and therefore as to the court\u2019s jurisdiction, the court denied the states\u2019 motion to intervene as premature, indicating that they could renew their motion if the court ultimately found it had jurisdiction. But on December 20, 2019 the court granted the government\u2019s summary judgment motion, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately establish standing. It found that although the court had previously \u201cprovided Plaintiffs with three opportunities to meet this burden and, most recently, allowed Plaintiffs to take focused discovery in aid of establishing jurisdiction,\u201d the plaintiffs had still \u201cfailed to carry their burden.\u201d 435 F. Supp. 3d 144. The plaintiffs did not appeal the court\u2019s decision; the case is now closed.", "summary": "The plaintiffs in this case sought declaratory and injunctive relief with regard to President Trump\u2019s Executive Order 13771 (on Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs). This case was filed on February 8, 2017 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. On December 20, 2019, the court granted the government\u2019s motion for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately establish standing. The plaintiffs did not appeal; the case is now closed."}
{"article": "This case arose from the Flint water crisis, a public health emergency in which the city of Flint, Michigan supplied water that contained elevated levels of lead to the public. On April 6, 2016, fifteen residents of Flint, Michigan filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Governor of Michigan, his chief of staff, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), several other government agencies, the City of Flint, and three corporations under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C \u00a7 1964), and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged that defendants\u2019 involvement in the supply of lead-contaminated drinking water violated their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection rights, RICO, and state law. Flint had purchased water from the high quality Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) for roughly half a century before the crisis. But in 2014, led by an Emergency Manager, Flint switched its water source to the Flint River as a way to address the city\u2019s financial problems. The plaintiffs alleged that, because the Flint River was only a temporary solution until the City could be connected to the Karegnondi Water Authority, the state knew that the Flint River was low quality even before connecting the City to the source. The plaintiffs claimed that by continuing to charge the residents of Flint the same amount for water despite the significantly lower quality, the defendants were fraudulently engaged in a RICO scheme by selling unsafe water. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that this deprived them of both contractually guaranteed property and bodily integrity rights protected under a substantive due process framework. Further, the plaintiffs alleged that their Fourteenth Amendment right to Equal Protection was violated because the switch from the DWSD to the Flint River was motivated by racism. The plaintiffs\u2019 evidence of racial discrimination was the fact that, of the six municipalities that bought water from DWSD through which the Flint River flowed, only the predominantly Black City of Flint was switched to the Flint River source. Because this case appeared to be a companion case to <i>Mays v. Snyder</i> (Case No. 15-14002), on April 20, 2016, this case was reassigned to District Judge John Corbertt O\u2019Meara and Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub in Ann Arbor. On June 30, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding a jury demand and several additional defendants in their official capacities at all times relevant to the complaint, some of which included the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS), the former treasurer of the State of Michigan, all four emergency managers assigned to the city of Flint, the elected mayor of the City of Flint, and the directors and managers of several city and state health programs and water treatment plants. Another amended complaint was filed by the plaintiffs on August 12, 2016. On October 6, 2016, the State of Michigan, the Governor, MDEQ, MDHHS, and several individual government employees being sued in their official capacity filed a motion to dismiss. Another group of defendants\u2014the Emergency Managers and City Officials of the City of Flint named in their official capacity as defendants in the suit\u2014also filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint for similar reasoning as the other defendants. Additional motions to dismiss were filed on October 21st, 28th, and 31st. Although filed separately, all of the motions argued primarily the same reasons for dismissing the plaintiffs\u2019 suit: the state defendants were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and the Court had already declared that the only federal remedy available for the plaintiffs\u2019 grievances is the Safe Drinking Water Act. Meanwhile, two cases with similar claims had recently been decided and were consolidated on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit: <a href=https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17168><i>Mays v. Snyder</i></a> (Case No. 15-14002) and <i>Boler v. Earley</i> (Case No. 16-10323). On April 18, 2017, the parties in this case stipulated, and Judge John Corbett O\u2019Meara granted, a stay on all aspects of this case, pending the consolidated appeals of these two cases. On July 27, 2017, this case, along with seven other cases litigating the Flint Water Crisis, were consolidated with <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16508\"><i>Waid v. Snyder</i></a>, PB-MI-0014 in this Clearinghouse. All motions pending in this case were denied without prejudice. See the Clearinghouse record for <i>Waid</i> for all subsequent litigation.", "summary": "On April 6, 2016, fifteen residents of Flint, Michigan filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Governor of Michigan, his chief of staff, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), several other government agencies, the City of Flint, and three corporations under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, RICO, and state law. In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that their Fourteenth Amendment rights to Equal Protection and Due Process were violated when the State of Michigan and the City of Flint switched the City's water source from Detroit to the Flint River. Because several cases with similar claims were filed throughout the state, this case was ultimately consolidated with <i>Waid v. Snyder</i> on July 27, 2017."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This lawsuit was filed against the state of Michigan by 22 individual companies operating fitness businesses in Michigan and an organization representing over 150 fitness facilities in the state to enjoin executive orders that caused their facilities to remain closed. The court granted a preliminary injunction on June 19. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit stayed the lower court's injunction on June 24. <hr> On May 22, 2020, owners and operators of Michigan\u2019s indoor fitness facilities filed a suit against the Governor of the State of Michigan and the Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services to enjoin orders that required the plaintiffs to keep their facilities closed. The plaintiffs brought this lawsuit as a declaratory and injunctive action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2201\u20132202, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1651. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violated the Constitution, an order enjoining the state from enforcing the lockdown orders, and a prohibition form issuing further orders that would require the plaintiffs to keep their businesses closed. The case filed in the U.S District Court for the Western District of Michigan and assigned to District Judge Paul L Maloney. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, were comprised of 22 individual companies operating fitness businesses in Michigan, as well as the League of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers (LIFFT), an organization representing over 150 fitness facilities in the state. On March 16, Governor Whitmer issued temporary restrictions on the uses of public facilities, which included gymnasiums, fitness centers, recreation centers, and indoor sports facilities. Throughout June, the defendant incrementally re-opened sectors of the economy with Michigan Executive order 2020-110 and 2020-115. The orders lifted certain restrictions on facilities such as restaurants, bowling, and climbing facilities subject to capacity restrictions, but left indoor fitness facilities remained completely closed. The plaintiffs alleged that the differential treatment of indoor fitness facilities violated substantive and procedural due process and equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Emergency Management Act. Further, the plaintiffs alleged that the order was void for vagueness as the defendant did not identify the criteria for which businesses were allowed to operate during the pandemic. They also alleged that the defendant exceeded the Governor\u2019s authority in violation of the separation of powers doctrine in the Michigan constitution. The complaint was amended on June 1 to add 15 additional plaintiffs. On June 8, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the orders. On June 12, the defendants filed a response to the plaintiff\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendants contended that the plaintiff LIFFT lacked organizational standing as it failed to establish injury-in-fact for the pre-enforcement claim, and therefore, should be dismissed. Oral argument was held on June 17. On the same day, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. On June 19, the preliminary injunction was granted. 2020 WL 3421229. The court found that while the state was empowered to address emergencies like pandemics largely without interference from the courts, it was subject to constitutional limitations. Because the court found that the defendant was unable to state a rational basis to support the continued closure of indoor gyms, it did not survive deferential review. On the same day, the defendant filed an appeal to the Sixth Circuit, and also an emergency motion for a stay pending appeal filed at the district court. On June 22, the plaintiffs filed a motion in opposition to the stay pending appeal. The same day, the district court denied the defendants\u2019 emergency motion to stay. 2020 WL 3422586. On June 24, the Sixth Circuit granted the defendant\u2019s motion for an emergency stay, contending that the public interest of combatting COVID-19 outweighed the plaintiffs\u2019 in favor of the stay. 2020 WL 3468281. The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court on whether the State demonstrated a rational basis to justify the plaintiffs\u2019 continued closure, therefore surviving deferential review. The plaintiffs filed a motion asking the Sixth Circuit to reconsider the order, but the Sixth Circuit denied the motion on July 7. Back in the district court, the plaintiffs responded to the defendants motion to dismiss on July 16, 2020. As of October 17, the case is still ongoing.", "summary": "This lawsuit was filed against the state of Michigan by 22 individual companies operating fitness businesses in Michigan and an organization representing over 150 fitness facilities in the state. The suit was filed to enjoin orders that required the plaintiffs to keep their facilities closed. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction which was granted on June 19. The defendants filed an appeal to the Sixth Circuit, with a motion for a stay pending appeal. The district court denied the stay on June 22 but the Sixth CIrcuit granted the stay pending appeal on June 24. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "This is one of many lawsuits brought challenging the Obama administration's 2012 Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate requiring employers to pay for employees' contraception and abortifacients via medical insurance coverage. Many religious hospitals, charities, universities, and other enterprises owned or controlled by religious organizations or individuals who opposed contraception on doctrinal grounds, argued the mandate violated their religious beliefs. For a full list of these cases please see our collection of the Contraception Insurance Mandate cases <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=12\">here</a>. On October 22, 2013, a for-profit company filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of D.C. under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the First Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff, represented in part by the public interest firm American Center for Law and Justice, asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that providing insurance coverage of contraception would violate the deeply held religious beliefs of the corporation's owners. On November 27, 2013, United States District Court (Judge Reggie B. Walton) granted the plaintiff's unopposed motion for preliminary injunction and stayed the case. The Court ordered the defendant not to enforce the ACA insurance mandate regarding contraception against the plaintiff until 30 days after the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12714&\">Gilardi v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services </a>, which involved similar legal issues and the same defendant as this case. On November 1, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled in <i>Gilardi</i> that the ACA's contraception insurance mandate likely violated the free exercise clause of the Constitution. It therefore reversed the District Court's denial of a preliminary injunction against the defendant in that case. On November 6, 2013, a petition for certiorari was filed in the <i>Gilardi</i> case. The Supreme Court docketed the case on January 30, 2014. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court released its decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 134 S. Ct.2751 (2014) (<a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12661\">FA-OK-0001</a> in this Clearinghouse), a case with substantially similar facts. There, the Court held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) permits for-profit corporations that are closely held (e.g., owned by a family or family trust) to refuse, on religious grounds, to pay for legally mandated coverage of certain contraceptive drugs and devices in their employees\u2019 health insurance plans. In light of the <i>Hobby Lobby</i> decision, on October 24, 2014, the parties submitted a joint motion to the District Court. They agreed that judgment should be entered in favor of plaintiff on their Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim, that a permanent injunction should be entered, and that all other claims against the defendant should be dismissed. They also agreed that the issue of plaintiff's attorneys\u2019 fees and costs would be resolved after the judgement was entered. The court adopted the parties' proposed permanent injunction on November 3, 2014. The defendant was enjoined from enforcing the \u201cContraceptive Coverage Requirement,\u201d that required the plaintiff to provide its employees with health coverage for contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and related patient education and counseling to which the plaintiff objected on religious grounds. It also barred defendant from taking any actions against plaintiff for noncompliance with the \"Contraception Coverage Requirement.\" The only issue left open was attorneys' fees. The parties reached an undisclosed agreement regarding attorneys' fees on March 17, 2015, and asked the court to close the case. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On October 22, 2013, a for-profit company filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of D.C. under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Administrative Procedure Act and the First Amendment against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. On November 27, 2013, the Court granted the plaintiff's unopposed motion for preliminary injunction and stayed the case. During the stay, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby was decided. In light of the Hobby Lobby decision, the parties agreed to a permanent injunction barring defendant from enforcing the \"Contraceptive Coverage Requirement\" against plaintiff, and taking any adverse action against plaintiff for noncompliance with that requirement. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On October 15, 2008, inmates of the Becker County Jail, represented by private counsel, filed this civil rights class action against Becker County, Minnesota and several law enforcement officials in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota for interfering with their communications with their attorneys. Plaintiffs claim that Becker County failed to train its jail perosnel, and did not inform the inmates that phone calls between inmates and their attorneys were supposed to be private. County employees monitored and recorded privileged telephone calls between detainees/inmates of the jail and their attorneys. The plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs moved for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). On December 12, 2008, the Court (Judge Ann D. Montgomery) denied the motion, finding that the plaintiffs were unable to make a showing that the recording of their phone calls was so severe a constitutional violation to warrant a TRO. On September 28, 2009, in cross-motions for Summary Judgment, the Court (Judge Montgomery) granted in part, the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and denied the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiffs' First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims were dismissed, along with state law and federal common law claims. The plaintiffs claims of violations federal wiretapping statutes survived. On January 11, 2010, the parties received a settlement. Defendants agreed to pay $104,000 in damages. The case was closed thereafter.", "summary": "Inmate plaintiffs reached a settlement agreement with defendant County Jail for the recording of private conversations between the inmates and their attorneys after all constitutional claims had been dismissed, and only violation of federal wiretapping laws remained. Plaintiffs received $104,000 divided among them."}
{"article": "On November 9, 2010, several citizens of Connecticut, Vermont and New Hampshire who were or had been married to partners of the same sex under the law of their states filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut against the Office of Personnel Management, the Social Security Administration, the U.S. Postal Service, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Labor, the Department of Justice, and the United States. The plaintiffs, represented by Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) and by private counsel, sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201, alleging a violation of equal protection. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that operation of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. \u00a7 7, to deny them a variety of state and federal benefits that would be available to similarly situated individuals with spouses of the opposite sex violated the equal protection component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. On February 25, 2011, the Department of Justice, representing the defendants, notified the court that it had come to the conclusion that DOMA is unconstitutional and that it would thus cease defending it. In response, on April 26 the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives (BLAG) moved to intervene in defense of the act, and the Court (Judge Vanessa L. Bryant) granted its motion on May 27. <i>Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.</i>, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155323 (D. Conn. 2011). On July 15, 2011, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, and on August 15, BLAG moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint. Briefing on both motions continued over the course of the following year. On June 20, 2012, BLAG moved to stay the proceedings pending the decision of the Second Circuit in <i>Windsor v. United States</i>, No. 10-cv-08435 (S.D.N.Y.) [<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12113\">PB-NY-0017</a>]. The District Court (Judge Bryant) denied BLAG's motion on July 4, finding BLAG's assertion that the Second Circuit's decision would be dispositive in the case to be speculative. On July 31, 2012, the Court (Judge Bryant) issued an order denying BLAG's motion to dismiss and granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. <i>Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.</i>, 2012 WL 3113883, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106713 (D. Conn. 2012). The Court found that \"homosexuals display all the traditional indicia of suspectness and therefore statutory classifications based on sexual orientation are entitled to a heightened form of judicial scrutiny,\" but also found that application of heightened scrutiny was unnecessary to resolve the case, as Section 3 of DOMA failed to pass muster even under rational basis review. BLAG filed notice of appeal with the Second Circuit on September 26, 2012. On August 17, 2012, plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari before judgment under the Supreme Court Rule that permits deviation from normal appellate practice \"upon a showing that the case is of such imperative public importance as to...require immediate determination in [the Supreme] Court.\" Sup. Ct. R. 11. On June 26, 2013 the Supreme Court held Section 3 of DOMA to be unconstitutional in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12113\">Windsor v. United States</a> and denied certiorari in this case the next day, June 27, 2013. On July 23, 2013, parties agreed to withdraw appeals before the Second Circuit in this case.", "summary": "On November 9, 2010, several citizens of Connecticut, Vermont and New Hampshire (who were or had been married to same-sex partners under the law of their states) filed suit against the federal government, claiming that the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) denied same-sex spouses a variety of state and federal benefits in violation of equal protection. On July 31, 2012, Judge Bryant of the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Following a similar holding by the United States Supreme Court (striking down Section 3 of DOMA in Windsor v. United States), parties in this case withdrew appeals on July 7, 2013."}
{"article": "This case is about discrimination that students with disabilities face in the Oregon Public School system. On January 22, 2019, plaintiffs brought a class-action suit against the Oregon Department of Education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs sought to address the long-standing problem in Oregon of denying students with disabilities the ability to attend a full-day of school or in some cases, the chance to attend school at all. J.N., the lead plaintiff, was a 6-year-old public school student. He had a disability and was eligible for special education and related services under the IDEA. Due to behaviors related to his disability, J.N. had been subjected to a shortened school day. When he was in kindergarten, J.N. was forced to attend a truncated form of school for the entire 2017-2018 school year. For a few months, this meant that J.N.'s entire day of schooling was only an hour. Other plaintiffs also were subject to shortened school days, including schooling under an hour a day, as a result of their disability. The plaintiffs argued that the discriminatory consequences of the shortened school day policy violated the IDEA, the ADA, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Under the IDEA, every state has to \"ensure\" that it provides \"special education\" and \"related services\" to all children with disabilities aged 3 to 21 who reside in the state. The IDEA also requires that every child be provided a free appropriate public education (FAPE). Under Title II of the ADA, individuals with disabilities cannot be excluded from participating in, excluded from the benefits of, or be discriminated against in public school. Title II also requires that all students regardless of disability status be provided with an equal education. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires that institutions receiving federal funding provide assistance and benefits to individuals with disabilities. In the complaint, the plaintiffs requested the following relief: a permanent enjoinder of defendants from subjecting the plaintiffs to policies that violate the IDEA, the ADA, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; an order requiring defendants to create and implement new policies that would ensure compliance with FAPE standards; and an order demanding that defendants develop and maintain policies and practices to ensure that the State of Oregon and individual Oregon school districts do not discriminate against students with disabilities, including exclusion of students with disabilities from a full school day. The case was assigned to Judge Ann L. Aiken. On April 19, 2019, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs responded to this motion, but both parties began to participate in settlement talks in October 2019. However, the no settlement agreement was reached, and on February 3, 2020, the plaintiffs motioned to certify the class. On September 1, 2020, Judge Aiken denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs had standing to proceed. 2020 WL 5209846. The defendants filed their answer to the complaint shortly thereafter. As of November 1, 2020, the case remains open.", "summary": "In this case, a 6-year-old plaintiff brought a class action suit against the Oregon Department of Education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs had been deprived of their right to a free appropriate public education and had been subject to shortened school days, which hindered their learning and social relationships. After the filing of the initial complaint, the parties participated in settlement talks; however, they did not reach an agreement. In September 2020, the presiding Judge Ann L. Aiken denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged standing. Oral argument regarding the motion to certify the class and memorandum in support is set for November 15, 2020. The case remains open."}
{"article": "On August 10, 2010, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky against owners, designers, builders and managers of an apartment complex, claiming the multifamily dwellings built for first occupancy after March 13, 1991 were not accessible to persons with disabilities in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a73601-3619. The plaintiff sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that, among other things, the public use portions of the dwellings were unusable to persons with disabilities; that doors on ground floor units are not wide enought to allow passage by persons using wheelchairs, that the interior of the dwellings do not contain required features of adaptive design, such as accessible routes, light switches, electrical outlets, or useable batrooms and kitchens. Further, Plaintiff claimed that exterior areas including parking lots have excessive abrupt level changes, excessive running slopes, and cross slopes that make maneuvering wheelchairs and other mobility aids dangerous. On December 8, 2011, the Court approved a three-year Consent Decree agreed to by the parties. Besides a general injunction against discrimination on the basis of disability, the decree required, among other things, specific retrofits to be made and reviewed by a neutral inspector, recordkeeping and release of information concering any new construction, training of employees as to the requirements of the decree, and a total payment of $275,000 to identified aggrieved persons. On December 15, 2014, the Court (Judge Charles R. Simpson, III) entered an order upon the expiration of the Consent Decree. The United States did not move to extend the decree. The case was dismissed with prejudice.", "summary": "This 2010 fair housing case was brought by the United States in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, challenging the failure of the owners, operators, designers, and builders of a multi-family apartment complex to make the public use spaces and the apartments themselves accessible to persons with disabilities. The case was resolved in 2011 with a three year consent decree that, in addition to general anti discrimination provisions, included specific requirements for retrofitting non-compliant areas of the complex, and payment of $275,000 to persons damaged by the violations."}
{"article": "This is a case about racial discrimination in hiring practices with background checks. On July 8, 2020, an African-American individual who had his job offer from Sallie Mae Bank rescinded filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. He sued Sallie Mae Bank for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought damages, declaratory relief, and attorney fees as a result of Sallie Mae Bank's actions, claiming that the defendant's policy and practice of rescinding or terminating employment based on background history has a disparate impact on African-American applicants that is in violation of Title VII. The case was assigned to Judge Leonard P. Stark. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2020, an African-American individual who had his job offer from Sallie Mae Bank rescinded filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. The plaintiff alleged that Sallie Mae Bank's policy and practice of rescinding or terminating employment based on background history is in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On February 26, 2013, the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division sent notice to the Alabama Department of Corrections that it would be conducting an investigation of the Julia Tutwiler Prison. The investigation sought to address allegations that prisoners were subjected to sexual abuse by prison staff in violation of their constitutional rights; allegations that the prison failed to report and prevent sexual abuse; and allegations that the prison failed to provide adequate mental health and medical care to victims of sexual abuse. On January 17, 2014, the DOJ issued a findings letter. The department's findings detailed unconstitutional conditions that subjected women prisoners to a substantial risk of harm. These conditions included staff sexual abuse and sexual harassment of prisoners, prison officials' failure to adequately respond to and investigate allegations of sexual abuse and harassment, and systemic deficiencies that directly contributed to staff and prisoner sexual abuse and staff sexual harassment. On May 28, 2015, the DOJ Civil Rights Division filed this lawsuit against the state of Alabama and its Department of Corrections (ADOC) under CRIPA for the heinous sexual abuse committed by the ADOC's male officers at Tutwiler. And the parties had reached a settlement agreement and subsequently submitted a motion for its approval, which Judge Myron Thompson accepted on June 18, 2015. The court issued a consent decree and designated an independent monitor. The settlement required the ADOC and Tutwiler to make recommended changes and file compliance reports every six months. The substantive part of the settlement agreement contained sections on General Policies and Procedures, staffing and training, risk assessment and education, rights to privacy and reporting, and response and investigation procedures to reports of sexual assault. The policy section of the agreement required ADOC and Tutwiler to: <ul> <li> Develop, submit to the Monitor and DOJ for review, and implement policies and procedures regarding the management of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, and gender nonconforming prisoners; <li> Comply with its policy ensuring women receive essential supplies; <li> Develop and implement policies and procedures that incorporate gender-responsive strategies, including policies and procedures governing the use of force against women prisoners and other disciplinary actions; <li> Develop, submit to the Monitor and DOJ for review and implement facility-specific policies and operational practices specific to Tutwiler' s population regarding the supervision and monitoring necessary to prevent inmates from being exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm from sexual abuse and harassment; and <li> Revise and/or develop and implemen any other policies, practices, procedures, protocols, training curricula, and other written documents as necessary, including but not limited to, screening tools, logs, handbooks, manuals, and forms. </ul> The consent decree was set to be in effect until ADOC was found in substantial compliance in three consecutive compliance reports. The monitor filed the first report on February 26, 2016 on the assessment period for May\u2013Dec. 2015. The monitor noted positive progress and granted a 3-month extension for compliance on the general policies and procedures and training. From February 2016 through August 2019, the monitor filed a total of eight reports indicating steady progress. In the eighth and most recent report, the monitor noted that Tutwiler and the ADOC achieved \"substantial compliance\" with 41 sections of the settlement agreement and \"partial compliance\" with two sections of the agreement. As of August 2019, Tutwiler's and the ADOC's general policies continued to work toward preventing sexual abuse and harassment. The monitor noted that staff exhibited knowledge of procedures related to reporting sexual harassment, safety for inmates, and investigative processes. In addition, the monitor found that Tutwiler and the ADOC fully implemented the required Behavior Intervention & Discipline Policy and Disciplinary Segregation policies. Tutwiler's and the ADOC's use of camera recording also satisfied the monitor, although the monitor found that audio capabilities would further surveillance efforts. Further, the ADOC's and Tutwiler's inmate education program communicating the right to be free from sexual abuse and harassment and right to privacy satisfied their duties as outlined in the agreement. The monitor found some challenges still exist at the Tutwiler facility. Specifically, staffing vacancies could impact safety and security at the facility. Additionally, recruitment and retention problems with women candidates do not allow for a finding of substantial compliance with terms in the agreement. As of November 2019, the monitor will conduct further research on compliance and submit a ninth report to the court in December. The case is ongoing. (There were also two earlier CRIPA matters involving Tutwiler. The first was in the mid 1980s. For information, see <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=550\">PC-AL-0023</a>. The second was in the mid 1990s. See <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=534\">PC-AL-0006</a>.)", "summary": "In 2013, the DOJ Civil Rights Division investigated the Julia Tutwiler Prison in Alabama. After sending the state Department of Corrections a findings letter in January 2014, the DOJ filed this suit against the state of Alabama and Department of Corrections in 2015 for heinous sexual abuse committed by the ADOC's male officers the prison. The parties reached a settlement agreement approved by the court in an enforceable consent decree, which required the ADOC and Tutwiler to make recommended changes and file compliance reports every six months. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "<b>NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see <a href=\"https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/\"> their tracker</a>.</b> <b>NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see <a href=\"https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/\"> their tracker</a>.</b><hr>COVID-19 Summary: This is an action brought by South Carolina voters, candidates, and democratic organizations, seeking to enjoin various voting restrictions in the South Carolina law. Some of their claims were mooted as to the June elections as South Carolina legislation passed on May 12 allowed voters to vote by absentee ballot. On May 25, the court partially granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining the witness requirement for the June 2020 primaries. <hr> On May 1, 2020 several South Carolina political candidates and voters, as well as the South Carolina Democratic Party, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, seeking relief from five voting provisions in the state law: <blockquote>(1) the \"Absentee Ballot Age Restriction,\" which prohibited all voters under 65 from casting mail-in ballots unless they are disabled or confined in jail; (2) the \"Postage Tax,\" which required voters to pay postage for their absentee ballot if they wished to vote; (3) the \"Election Day Cutoff,\" which rejected ballots not received by 7 pm on election day; (4) the \"Absentee Assistance Ban,\" which prohibited candidates or paid campaign staff from assisting absentee voters; and (5) the \"Witness Requirement,\" which required a witness to sign the absentee ballot in order for the vote to be counted. </blockquote>The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sued the South Carolina State Election Commission and the Election Commissioner. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2201-02 for violations of the First, Fourteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, as well as the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 10301-02. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that South Carolina's laws surrounding absentee voting unconstitutionally burdened the rights of some voters, especially in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The case was assigned to Judge Michelle Childs. On May 7, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction to stop the defendants from enforcing the Absentee Ballot Age Restriction, the Witness Requirement, and the Election Day Cutoff. They also requested the court to consolidate the motion hearing with <a href=\"https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17521\"> another action</a> where the plaintiffs had filed a motion for preliminary injunction against the same defendants. The South Carolina Republican Party moved to intervene on May 11, which was granted on May 12. Additionally, on May 12, the South Carolina General Assembly passed legislation allowing all qualified South Carolina voters to vote by absentee ballot for the June 9 primary and the June 23 runoff election. These legislative changes mooted the plaintiffs' requests as to the Excuse Requirement and the Absentee Ballot Age Requirement for the June primaries. In light of the hearing scheduled for May 15, the plaintiffs attempted to extend their request for relief beyond the June primaries. The court limited the issues for the hearing, stating that the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction clearly sought only relief for June, and as such, the defendants had not been given proper notice. The defendants and intervenors filed oppositions to the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction on May 14. On May 25, the court granted the motion for preliminary injunction in part, enjoining the defendants from enforcing the Witness Requirement for the June 2020 primaries. The defendants were also ordered to immediately and publicly inform South Carolina voters of the elimination of the witness requirement. 2020 WL 2617329. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On May 1, voters and candidates in South Carolina, as well as local and national Democratic organizations filed this lawsuit to enjoin absentee ballot voting restrictions in South Carolina in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. They obtained relief in the form of an partial grant of their requested injunction as to the witness signature requirement on May 26."}
{"article": "On October 11, 2006, individuals with disabilities in need of long-term care filed a lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and California law in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Plaintiffs, represented by public interest and private counsel, claimed that Defendant failed to provide them with services in the most integrated setting appropriate. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants' policies and practices resulted in Plaintiffs' unnecessary isolation at Laguna Honda Hospital and Rehabilitation Center (Laguna Honda). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to compel Defendants to provide them with timely access to home and community-based long-term care services. Named Plaintiffs were a number of current adult residents of Laguna Honda who had disabilities but had been recommended for discharge or who had been identified as being able to live in the community with appropriate service provision. At the time of filing, Laguna Honda housed more than 1,000 individuals. It had been repeatedly cited for standard of care deficiencies, and CMS had threatened to withdraw federal funding from the hospital. In 2003, the Department of Justice issued a letter of findings against Defendant for violations of the ADA with respect to Laguna Honda. The DOJ ordered Defendant to implement certain remedial measures, but they had not been implemented at the time Plaintiffs filed their complaint. On January 30, 2007, the court (Judge William Alsup) denied the parties' joint request to stay litigation for the purposes of settlement. The court granted Plaintiffs' motion for class certification on July 12, 2007. Defendants had filed a statement of non-opposition. The class was defined as: \"All adult Medi-Cal beneficiaries who are: (1) residents of Laguna Honda Hospital and Rehabilitation Center; (2) on waiting lists for Laguna Honda Hospital and Rehabilitation Center; (3) within two year post-discharge from Laguna Honda Hospital and Rehabilitation Center; or (4) patients at San Francisco General Hospital or other hospitals owned or controlled by the City and County of San Francisco, who are eligible for discharge to Laguna Honda Hospital and Rehabilitation Center.\" On November 16, 2007, the court issued an order regarding preliminary approval of the settlement agreement. The court ordered the parties to meet with Judge Alsup to consider preliminary approval of the settlement agreement before ruling on the request for administrative relief. On November 26, 2007, the court issued an order regarding the request for administrative relief. The parties had agreed that no individual claims for damages by class members were waived under the settlement agreement. The parties also jointly recommended a $300,000 fee award to class counsel for fees and costs, and $200,000 for compliance oversight. In light of the agreement, the Court approved the parties' joint request for administrative relief. The parties signed a settlement agreement in December 2007. The parties agreed as follows: the parties would assess the services and housing being provided to named Plaintiffs who had been discharged from Laguna Honda; San Francisco would provide a rental subsidy for independent housing for named Plaintiffs where appropriate; Defendant would alter or begin certain practices to maximize opportunities for class members to access home and community-based services through the Nursing Facility/Acute Hospital Waiver; Defendant would make a Diversion and Community Integration Program fully operational; Defendant would provide case management and wrap-around services; Defendant would preserve, provide, and monitor community-based housing for appropriate class members; Defendant would enhance mental health and substance abuse services at Laguna Honda; and Defendant would limit the capacity of Laguna Honda. The settlement agreement also established grievance procedures for class members and data collection and reporting obligations. The agreement was scheduled to terminate three years from the date of final approval by the Court. On September 18, 2008, the Court granted final approval of the settlement agreement. The Court entered judgment, awarded attorney fees and costs as agreed by the parties, and retained jurisdiction for the purpose of assuring compliance. The parties filed a series of joint case management statements from 2009 through 2011 detailing the status of the implementation of the settlement agreement. On Feb. 7, 2011, the court issued an order stating that its jurisdiction would end on Sept. 18, 2011 \"as to all rights and obligations of the parties except with regard to the Laguna Honda Hospital Rent Subsidy Program,\" and on Sept. 18, 2013 \"as to all other rights and obligations of the parties.\" On Sept. 3, 2013, the court issued an order indicating that the defendants had complied with the last of the Settlement terms. In the order, the court modified a Settlement term requiring the defendants to subsidize 500 rental homes for Laguna Honda residents down to 270 homes due to significantly lower demand for such homes. There has been no further litigation, and it appears to be closed.", "summary": "This case was brought by adult individuals with disabilities who were in need of long-term services against the City and County of San Francisco seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel Defendants to provide services in the most integrated setting appropriate. The case was settled in September 2008, resulting in injunctive relief for Plaintiffs, as well as attorneys' fees and costs."}
{"article": "On December 17, 2012, a group of disabled persons filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the New York Department of Human Resources and its director in his official capacity under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2020(e)(2)(b)(i) and (e)(11), and New York State and City Statutes. Plaintiffs alleged that D-SNAP, an emergency food stamp program implemented after Hurricane Sandy, discriminated against disabled persons by having only one application center and an in-person registration requirement. Both of the limited availability of registration centers and the requirement for in-person registration were absent from the defendant's standard food stamps program precisely because, as the plaintiffs argued, they discriminate against persons with disabilities who may not be able to travel to the registration center. The plaintiffs, represented by the Legal Aid Society of New York, asked the court for a preliminary injunction, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. On March 18, 2013, the District Court (Judge Katherine B. Forrest) denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction as the plaintiffs failed to prove that irreparable harm would result if the injunction was not granted. Judge Forrest also dismissed plaintiffs' complaint finding that the plaintiffs needed to sue the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture in his official capacity in order to properly bring the suit as they authorized the D-SNAP plan and also paid part of the liabilities under D-SNAP. On March 29, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that added the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture in his official capacity and the U.S. Department of Agriculture as defendants. The new complaint also added a claim for retroactive award of D-SNAP benefits to those who were excluded from the program due to the alleged discriminatory practices. On September 16, 2013, the District Court certified two subclasses: (1) \"disabled individuals who were eligible to apply for benefits from the Sandy D-SNAP Program,\" and (2) \"individuals who may be eligible to apply for benefits from a future D-SNAP program and who will need reasonable accommodations because of a disability (or disabilities).\" 2013 WL 5295221. On November 14, 2013, the District Court dismissed plaintiffs' claims against the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture for lack of subject matter jurisdiction primarily on two grounds: (1) the Department of Agriculture assured the District Court that if the other defendants were found liable, then the federal government would pay its share of the D-SNAP benefits, and (2) plaintiffs cannot sue the Department of Agriculture because there is no clear cause of action concerned that if it were to recognize a cause of action against a government agency for providing emergency support to local governments then federal agencies would be more reluctant to lend help and advice during future emergencies. 2013 WL 6057949. On January 22, 2014, the court referred the action to Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck for settlement discussions. The parties proceeded with settlement negotiations and periodic status conferences, and filed a joint motion for approval of class-action settlement on March 30, 2015. The settlement provided for retrospective relief ensuring that D-SNAP benefits were distributed in accordance with waiver requests, and prospective relief ensuring the administration of future D-SNAP benefits would comply with laws prohibiting disability discrimination. On March 31, 2015, Judge Forrest granted preliminary approval of the proposed settlement. Following a June 25, 2015 fairness hearing, Judge Forrest entered final judgment approving the class action settlement and dismissing the case on July 7, 2015. On December 28, 2015, Judge Forrest approved the stipulation and order of settlement of attorney's fees, which provided that the State of New York would pay $180,000 in fees and the City of New York $270,000 in fees. Pursuant to the settlement, the court was to retain jurisdiction over the action for 24 months, or 12 months if the city defendants appointed and convened a Disability Advisory Community Panel. The defendants notified the court that they had convened the panel by letter dated May 9, 2016. On August 9, 2016, Judge Forrest terminated the court's jurisdiction over the settlement and the case is now closed.", "summary": "On December 17, 2012, a group of disabled persons filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the New York Department of Human Resources under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and state law. Plaintiffs alleged that D-SNAP, an emergency food stamp program implemented after Hurricane Sandy, discriminated against disabled persons by having only one application center and an in-person registration requirement. The parties settled the case in 2015."}
{"article": "On July 27, 2018, a group of parents (filing under pseudonyms) filed this class action lawsuit on behalf of their minor migrant children in the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) concerning the defendants\u2019 alleged denial of mandatory asylum procedures to minor migrant children such as the plaintiffs, who had been forcibly separated from their parents. Based on the preliminary injunction issued in a related case, <a href=\"https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16620\">Ms. L v. ICE</a>, children and parents who had been separated would be reunified but would then be subject to the defendants\u2019 policy of immediate deportation following reunification. The plaintiffs alleged this immediate removal would deprive these children of their individual rights to seek asylum prior to repatriation and thus violated their due process rights. The plaintiffs in this case, represented by private counsel, sued under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the Mandamus Act. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief in the form of an order ending the defendants\u2019 policy to remove families before granting minor migrant children access to asylum procedures they were entitled to by law. The case was assigned to Judge Paul L. Friedman. On July 27, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent children from being removed before permitting them the opportunity to exercise their right to seek asylum. The plaintiffs sought class certification to represent all non-citizens under the age of 18 who were separated from their parents or guardians on or after entry into the United States and who are, have, been, or will be detained by the US government any time since January 1, 2018. Specifically, the plaintiffs in this lawsuit were six minor children under the age of 13 whose native language was Spanish, represented by their parents. All were seeking asylum in the United States from Honduras and Guatemala. All were forcibly separated upon arriving in the United States under the US government\u2019s \u201czero tolerance policy\u201d initiated in early 2018, under which migrant children who had crossed the border from Mexico with their families were separated and transferred to the custody of ORR to be detained. Following the injunction in the <i>Ms. L</i> case, all were reunited with their parents. However, while they were separated or immediately following reunification, these children\u2019s parents, who had final removal orders, alleged that they were coerced into waiving their children's right to removal proceedings under the INA. Parents were offered the choice between reunification for the purpose of repatriation or repatriation without reunification, ignoring the children\u2019s independent rights to seek asylum and implying that the only opportunity for family reunification was through repatriation. As a result, many parents chose to waive their children\u2019s rights in order to be reunited with them, but once families were reunited, the US government further refused asylum procedures to these children, depriving them of their right to seek asylum separate from their parents\u2019 requests. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that these forms were only offered in English to parents who did not speak English and did not understand what they were signing. The plaintiffs alleged they were also denied a separate alternative asylum procedure, the \u201ccredible fear\u201d interview. But for the separation policy, the plaintiffs would have been subject to \u201cexpedited removal proceedings\u201d requiring referral to an asylum officer for a \u201ccredible fear\u201d interview if a migrant indicated fear of persecution. If a child migrant demonstrated \u201ccredible fear,\u201d the finding normally would have extended to the parents. The same was true for parents who expressed \u201ccredible fear\u201d on behalf of their children. All six children expressed fear at being returned to their respective countries of origin for fear of violence against themselves or their parents. However, the defendants\u2019 separation policy prevented these children from receiving these interviews or having their parents\u2019 \u201ccredible fear\u201d extended to them. Instead, the defendants transferred the children to ORR custody, treating them as \u201cunaccompanied minors\u201d and placing them in separate immigration proceedings. Post-reunification, they were not able to seek \u201ccredible fear\u201d interviews in cases where they had been denied to the children who would otherwise have relied on their parents to seek asylum on their behalf, or where parents had first received a negative decision owing to being too distraught to meaningfully participate in their own interviews after separation from their children. On July 30, the defendants responded to the complaint and requested to transfer venue to the Southern District of California, where the <i>Ms. L</i> case was being heard. Arguments for the temporary restraining order were heard on July 31. On August 3, Judge Friedman transferred the case to Judge Dana M. Sabraw in the Southern District of California. 319 F.Supp.3d 290. Judge Sabraw granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a temporary restraining order on August 16, 2018. 347 F.Supp.3d 526. On October 5, the plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval of a proposed settlement, preliminary certification of the settlement class, and approval of class notice. This motion was unopposed and was granted on October 9th. The plaintiffs in this case and the <i>Ms. L</i> case were named as settlement class representatives and the settlement was approved pending a notice and fairness hearing. The settlement included a parent class and a child class. Both classes included individuals who were separated from their parent or child and had been or would be reunified with their parent or child under the preliminary injunction issued in <i>Ms. L</i>. The settlement required that parents who initially received negative credible fear findings and had final orders of removal receive a good faith review of those findings, including a meeting with an asylum officer to present additional information. Children who had been issued their own Notice to Appear or were in independent removal proceedings would instead join their parents\u2019 proceedings, and could be given their own credible fear interviews if those children also expressed fear of return. If the parent received a positive credible fear finding, their children would join their asylum proceedings in immigration court; if the parent received a negative finding, the children would be entitled to their own interview and if their finding was positive, they could pursue asylum in immigration court. The settlement did not provide any monetary relief for its members. On October 10th, the plaintiffs moved for an emergency order requiring implementation of the settlement. The plaintiffs stated that, under the settlement, 60 class members currently in detention were due to have their asylum procedures immediately. These proceedings had not yet occurred because the defendants informed the plaintiffs that proceedings would not begin until the settlement was finally approved by the court. Judge Sabraw granted the motion on October 18th, pointing to the agreement itself that indicated that the process detailed in the settlement agreement was to start \u201cno later than 3 days\u201d following the execution of documents requesting a credible fear interview, and that this portion of the agreement was not dependent on court approval. Over their objections, the defendants were ordered to begin the agreed-upon asylum process for those 60 members in detention who had executed the proper forms. Judge Sabraw granted final approval of the settlement on Nov. 15, 2018, finding it to be fair, reasonable, and adequate. The court certified two settlement classes. The court designated the parent class as:<blockquote>\"All adult alien parents who entered the United States at or between designated ports of entry with their child(ren), and who, on or before the effective date of this agreement: (1) were detained in immigration custody by the DHS; (2) have a child who was or is separated from them by DHS and, on or after June 26, 2018, was housed in ORR custody, ORR foster care, or DHS custody, absent a determination that the parent is unfit or presents a danger to the child; and (3) have been (and whose child(ren) have been) continuously physically present within the United States since June 26, 2018, whether in detention or released. The class does not include alien parents with criminal histories or a communicable disease, or those encountered in the interior of the United States.\"</blockquote> The court designated the children class as: <blockquote>\"All alien children who are under the age of 18 on the effective date of this agreement who: (1) entered the United States at or between designated ports of entry with an alien parent, and who were separated from their parents, on or before the effective date of this settlement agreement; (2) have been or will be reunified with that parent pursuant to the preliminary injunction issued by the Court in Ms. L v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. 18-428 (S.D. Cal. June 26, 2018); and (3) have been continuously physically present in the United States since June 26, 2018.\"</blockquote> On February 22, 2019, pursuant to the plaintiffs' earlier motion to enforce the settlement, Judge Sabraw ordered defense counsel to advise ICE that class members subject to the settlement may not be removed without first providing them with notice of the settlement and an opportunity to decide whether they wish to take advantage of the settlement procedures or waive them. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "Parents of minor child migrants sued on behalf of their children, saying the US government was depriving the children of their independent right to seek asylum by coercing parents into waiving their children's right to removal proceedings and by denying those children credible fear interviews or the ability to be included in their parents' credible fear interviews. The court certified a settlement class with a parent and child class in October 2018. The settlement required that the government provide certain asylum procedures to class members."}
{"article": "On November 17, 2014, Students for Fair Admissions Inc. filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a72000d against Harvard College. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit the consideration of race in college admissions, claiming that Harvard's admissions policy discriminated against Asian American applicants. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that Harvard's admissions policy held Asian American students to a higher standard based on their race and intentionally limited the number of Asian Americans admitted each year. Moreover, the plaintiff claimed that Harvard generally considered race to an impermissible degree in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI of The Civil Rights Act by engaging in a prohibited form of racial balancing, not limiting its consideration of an applicant's race to \"merely a plus factor,\" and not using an available, racially neutral alternative that would achieve the same goals of diversity. As evidence of this, the plaintiff pointed to admissions data that showed a disparity between acceptance for Asian American students at Harvard and at other schools\u2014for example, the University of California, which does not employ racial considerations in its admissions process. Additionally, the plaintiff pointed to the stagnant acceptance rates for Asian American students, despite increases in application rates and qualifications of Asian American applicants. According to the plaintiff, this was evidence of a policy indistinguishable from racially based quotas for admissions. The plaintiff also pointed to Harvard's long history of admissions discrimination, which suggested that their current policy had similar aims. After Harvard denied the allegations, the two parties proceeded with discovery. Other proposed defendant intervenors, including nine potential Harvard minority applicants and five current Harvard minority students, moved to intervene in the lawsuit in defense of Harvard's admissions policy on April 29, 2015. Judge Allison D. Burroughs denied their motion to intervene on June 15, 2015. 91 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1962. The proposed defendant-intervenors appealed this decision on July 13, 2015. Judge Burroughs ruled that the nine potential Harvard minority applicants did not have a direct, protectable interest in the lawsuit since none of them had yet submitted a pending application, therefore making their interests too removed and speculative to justify intervention. As for the current Harvard students, Judge Burroughs ruled that, because these students had already been admitted and were enrolled at Harvard, they no longer had a remaining interest in Harvard's use of race in its admissions policies. Though the students claimed that they had a personal interest in Harvard continuing to have a racially diverse student body, the judge held that this was not a significantly protectable interest to justify intervention. On July 6, 2015, Harvard moved to stay the proceeding pending the Supreme Court's resolution of <i>Fisher v. University of Texas</i>. On August 5, 2015, the proposed defendant-intervenors also moved to stay the proceeding pending their appeal to the First Circuit on whether they were rightful intervenors in the lawsuit. Meanwhile, the two parties disputed over the scope of discovery. On July 16, 2017, the plaintiff submitted a motion to compel production of Harvard's admissions files. They claimed that Harvard had agreed to submit a statistically significant sample of their files, which the plaintiff had proposed as 400 completed application files from each of the largest racial categories from each of the past four years, split evenly between admitted and denied. However, Harvard only agreed to produce 160 completed files from the past four years, half of which they proposed to hand pick, claiming that the plaintiff could perform their proposed statistical analysis from the Admissions Office database without the complete application files and that the discovery request was too burdensome. The parties also disputed over whether Harvard should have to produce information connected to its alumni interviewer program and about its use of race in transfer admissions. On October 9, 2015, Judge Burroughs granted the proposed-defendant-intervenors motion to stay in part and denied it in part. She decided to stay the action until the Court of Appeals decided whether the proposed defendant-intervenors had a right to intervene, but ordered Harvard to continue producing the documents that the original two parties had agreed to during their July 12, 2015 status conference. Specifically, Harvard had to continue producing information pertaining to its admissions policies and procedures, information pertaining to its alumni interviewer program, training manuals, and electronic admissions data from its database from the past two admissions cycles. On December 9, 2015, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment to deny the proposed defendant-intervenors' motion to intervene. 93 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 792. Subsequently, on March 11, 2016, Judge Burroughs ordered a further partial stay on the action until the resolution of the Supreme Court case <i>Fisher v. University of Texas</i>. Some discovery was allowed to continue during the stay, but the parties were barred from taking depositions, requesting information pertaining to alumni interviewers, requesting discovery from third parties, and generally requesting any large scale electronic discovery. However, the parties were allowed to file proposals as to what other additional discovery should go forward during the stay. The Supreme Court decided <i>Fisher</i> on June 23, 2016, which held that the University of Texas at Austin's undergraduate race-conscious admissions program was lawful under the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, on September 7, 2016, Judge Burroughs issued an order on the parties' scope of discovery going forward. Specifically, she ruled that Harvard should produce comprehensive data from its admissions database from the past six full admissions cycles from 2009\u20132015 as well as limited admissions data for the 2007\u20132009 cycles. Harvard did not have to produce information from past alleged discriminatory policies towards Jewish-Americans or about its matriculated students' academic performance-however, it did have to produce information about aggregate graduation data from 2007\u20132015 and anything pertaining to prior investigations or reports related to Asian American discrimination. Finally, Judge Burroughs limited the plaintiff to 20 depositions, 15 of which could be witnesses from Harvard. On September 23, 2016, the defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on two of the plaintiff's causes of action as well as a motion to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Harvard argued for judgment on the claims that 1) Harvard violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act because it was not using race merely to fill the last few places in its entering freshman class and 2) that all past Supreme Court decisions upholding the consideration of race in admissions were wrongly decided, and that the Supreme Court should now hold that diversity \"is not an interest that could ever justify any consideration of race.\" On the first count, Harvard claimed that the plaintiff's Title VI violation allegation was not grounded in substantive law, and indeed was contradicted by Supreme Court precedent affirming the use of holistic, individualized review that includes race. On the second count, Harvard claimed that the plaintiff did not have the power to call for overruling Supreme Court precedent. Finally, in its motion to dismiss, Harvard argued that the plaintiff did not have the standing to sue on behalf of its constituents because it lacked the characteristics of a genuine membership organization, such as members having control over leadership, power to influence conduct, and financing or participating in its activities. On June 2, 2017, Judge Burroughs denied Harvard's motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiff was a genuine membership organization with standing to sue on behalf of its constituents. 2017 WL 2407255. However, she granted Harvard's motion for partial judgment on the two counts, ruling that the plaintiff cannot overrule Supreme Court precedent and that its allegation that admissions offices can only use race-conscious admissions for the last few places in its entering class was unsupported by law. 2017 WL 2407254. Discovery in the case closed on August 4, 2017. On June 15, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that \"no rational factfinder could reasonably conclude\" that Harvard complies with Title VI because Harvard intentionally discriminates against Asian American applicants, engages in racial balancing, and failed to give \"good faith\" consideration to other workable alternatives to achieve its claimed interest in diversity. That same day, Harvard also filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff lacked standing and that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that Harvard does not discriminate against applicants of any race. On July 24, 2018, Judge Burroughs granted leave for any interested party to file an amicus brief on the pending dispositive motions. Several amicus briefs have been filed. Multiple universities (Yale, Columbia, Stanford, Princeton, etc.), the American Council on Education, and the American Civil Liberties, among others, filed amici briefs in support of defendants. The United States, among others, filed amicus briefs in support of the plaintiff. On September 28, 2018, after several interested non-parties appeared as amici regarding the summary judgment motions, Judge Burroughs denied the cross-motions for summary judgment on all counts without prejudice to the parties reasserting their arguments at trial. 346 F. Supp. 3d 174. The case proceeded to trial. A fifteen-day bench trial took place from October 15 to November 2, 2018. On September 30, 2019 and in a 130-page findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court held that Harvard's race-conscious admissions process was fair and does not discriminate against Asian American applicants. The court detailed the importance of diversity in educational settings and that ensuring diversity \"relies, in part, on race conscious admissions.\" This interest was sufficient to provide a compelling interest that could withstand strict scrutiny. The opinion summarized and acknowledged the statistical evidence presented by the parties, and concluded later in its analysis that the program was narrowly tailored to meet that compelling interest without unduly burdening Asian American applicants. On the contrary, the court posited that removing race consideration would significantly burden some Asian American applicants. The court also found that Harvard did not engage in racial balancing, which would constitute an impermissible and unconstitutional quota. The court agreed with Harvard that race-neutral alternatives would not suffice. And though the court acknowledged that Harvard could benefit from implicit bias trainings for its officers or more clear guidelines, statistics alone were not enough to demonstrate that Harvard engaged in intentional discrimination. 397 F. Supp. 3d 126. The plaintiffs appealed (Docket No. 19-2005). The Department of Justice filed an amicus brief stating that Harvard\u2019s expansive use of race in its admissions process violates federal civil-rights law and Supreme Court precedent. The brief specifically argued that the evidence from trial showed that Harvard engages in unconstitutional racial balancing, which particularly affects Asian Americans. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On November 17, 2014, Students for Fair Admissions Inc. filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts under The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a72000d against Harvard College. Plaintiff asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit the consideration of race in college admissions, claiming that Harvard's current admissions policy discriminated against Asian American applicants. The two parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which the district court denied in September 2018. After a 15-day bench trial, the court issued an opinion on September 30, 2019 that Harvard did not intentionally discriminate on the basis of race. The case is ongoing on appeal."}
{"article": "On August 3, 2020, the National Association for the Deaf and five plaintiffs who are deaf and use American Sign Language (ASL) as their primary and preferred language brought this action against President Trump and other members of the White House staff (ECF 1). Following the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, the White House began holding televised briefings with the White House Coronavirus Task Force. The briefings did not include in-frame ASL interpretation, the approach adopted by many governors in their own Covid-19 briefings. The plaintiffs sued President Trump and other members of the White House alleging that the defendants' failure to provide in-frame ASL interpretation constituted a violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the First Amendment. The plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and declaratory relief. The case was assigned to Judge James E. Boasberg of the District Court for the District of Columbia. On September 9, 2020, Judge Boasberg signed an order granting the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary relief. 2020 WL 5411171. The order was stayed until the parties conferred regarding the proper remedy. The parties reached general agreement on the conditions of the injunction, and on September 23, 2020, Judge Boasberg issued an order defining the scope of the preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 5757463. Under the preliminary injunction, defendants were required to include a qualified ASL interpreter in the White House Communications Agency feed for all White House Coronavirus briefings. The interpretation was required to either take the form of an in-frame interpretation by an interpreter near the speaker or a simultaneous stream with an interpreter from a remote location in a picture-in-picture format (PIP). If Defendants used the PIP approach, they were required to make that video feed available to television networks so that they can use the ASL interpretation in their own broadcasts. Following the court's order of a preliminary injunction, the defendants appealed to the DC Circuit and moved to stay District Court proceedings until the appeal was resolved. Judge Boasberg ordered a stay on all further proceedings pending the resolution of Defendants' appeal. The case remains open.", "summary": "On August 3, 2020, the National Association for the Deaf and five deaf plaintiffs who use ASL as their primary language sued President Donald Trump and other White House officials for injunctive and declaratory relief. The plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants' failure to provide in-frame ASL interpretation at White House Coronavirus Briefings violated their rights under the Rehabilitation Act and the First Amendment. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, which Judge James E. Boasberg granted on September 9, 2020. Under the preliminary injunction, the defendants are required to provide in-frame interpretation at all White House Coronavirus Briefings, either in the form of live ASL interpretation from the location of the briefing or live interpretation from a remote location in picture-in-picture format. The Defendants appealed the district court's order granting the preliminary injunction to the DC Circuit. The case is currently stayed in district court pending the resolution of the appeal."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: Four incarcerated individuals filed this class-action lawsuit against the Clayton County Jail based on conditions-of-confinement claims, as well as a habeas claim, a Rehabilitation Act claim, and an ADA claim. The suit remains ongoing. <hr> Four individuals incarcerated in the Clayton County Jail filed this complaint against the Clayton County Sheriff, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, on July 1, 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic was sweeping through jails and prisons across the country, and the plaintiffs alleged that the jail was ignoring the health and safety of its inmates. Instead of decreasing its population, like jails and prisons across the country and across Georgia, the jail was increasing its population. The jail was infested with mold, mildew, cockroaches, and rodents, inmates were told to use underwear for face coverings, and many were forced to sleep on the floor next to open toilets. Social distancing was nonexistent, jail staff did not educate inmates about COVID-19 risks or prevention, and inmates who became ill were waiting up to a week to be treated by medical staff. Represented by the ACLU, the ACLU of Georgia, and the Southern Center for Human Rights, the plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Because their incarceration was unconstitutional, they argued, the court should issue a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a72241 and 2243. They also brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, and sought a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. \u00a72201-2202. The petition was assigned to Judge Eleanor L. Ross, but she later recused herself and the case was reassigned to Judge J. P. Boulee. The plaintiffs sought certification of two classes, each with two subclasses:<ol>the Pretrial Class, composed of all inmates who were at the jail awaiting trial, including:<ul><li>a Medically Vulnerable Subclass (inmates with medical conditions which placed them at higher risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19), and<li>a Disabilities Subclass (inmates whose medical conditions also qualified as disabilities under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act); and</li></ol><ol>the Post-Adjudication Class, composed of all inmates who were serving time in the prison following conviction of a crime, including:<ul><li>a Medically Vulnerable Subclass (inmates with medical conditions which placed them at higher risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19), and<li>a Disabilities Subclass (inmates whose medical conditions also qualified as disabilities under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act).</ol>They sought release or transfer for all members of the Medically Vulnerable and Disabilities Subclasses; an injunction requiring the jail to adopt measures to mitigate the risk of COVID-19 infection for the remaining inmates (including social distancing and personal protective equipment); a writ of habeas corpus directing the immediate transfer or release of the Medically Vulnerable and Disability Subclasses; and attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The court denied the request for preliminary injunctive relief on July 9, 2020, stating that such a request must be made by separate motion, not in the complaint. The plaintiffs filed a separate motion for a preliminary injunction on July 27, 2020. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims on August 3. The defendants argued that they were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and that the plaintiffs failed to state both a habeas claim and an ADA claim. Before ruling on the motion, the Court granted the plaintiffs motion for an expedited discovery. On September 16, 2020, Magistrate Judge Christopher Bly recommended that one plaintiffs claims be dismissed as he had been released from jail, but advised that the other claims should proceed. As of October 30, Judge Boulee had not granted or denied the motion and the case remains ongoing.", "summary": "Inmates at the Clayton County Jail sued the Sheriff of Clayton County, alleging that the jail was not sufficiently protecting its inmates against the threat of the COVID-19 pandemic. They alleged that the jail was infested with mold, cockroaches, and rodents, inmates were given insufficient personal protective equipment, social distancing was impossible, and many prisoners were forced to sleep on the floor next to open toilets. They brought this petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, seeking, on behalf of a class, an order requiring the jail to immediately release prisoners in an effort to de-densify, and to take other precautions against a possible outbreak of COVID-19."}
{"article": "On August 30, 2004 the plaintiff filed a complaint in the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia alleging racial discrimination against herself and others similarly situated by her direct employer, Protiva, Inc., individuals who managed that company, and Texaco, Inc. and Shell Oil Company, the owners of the gas station where she worked. Specifically she alleged that she had been unlawfully demoted from her position as store manager in violation of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 and Title VII because she was Caucasian and defendant operators wished to only employ managers of their racial descent, South Asian. Each party filed a motion for summary judgment as discovery proceeded. On September 21, 2006 the Magistrate Judge submitted a report recommending that the defendants' motions be granted. On March 28, 2007, however, the district court (Judge Carnes) granted the defendants' motions regarding belatedly raised retaliation claims but denied the other motions for summary judgment on the basis that the defendants had failed to demonstrate that they either were not the plaintiff's joint employer (in the case of Shell and Texaco) or that the stated reasons for demoting the plaintiff were not a mere pretext (in the case of Protiva). The parties reached a settlement awarding the plaintiff unspecified monetary damages on August 9, 2007.", "summary": "On August 30, 2004 the plaintiff filed a complaint in the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia alleging racial discrimination against her by her direct employer, Protiva, Inc., individuals who managed that company, and Texaco, Inc. and Shell Oil Company, the owners of the gas station where she worked. Specifically she alleged that she had been unlawfully demoted from her position as store manager in because she was Caucasian. On March 28, 2007 the district court (Judge Carnes) granted the defendants' motions regarding the belatedly raised retaliation claims but denied the other motions for summary judgment. The parties reached a settlement awarding the plaintiff unspecified monetary damages on August 9, 2007."}
{"article": "On September 17, 2012, the College of the Ozarks filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Missouri against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2)), and the First and Fifth Amendments. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Specifically, the plaintiffs believed that the Contraceptive Mandate violated its sincerely-held religious beliefs by requiring that the College\u2019s health insurance plan contain coverage or access to coverage for elective abortion services, certain FDA-approved abortifacient drugs, and related education and counseling. The Mandate exposed the College to substantial fines for the exercise of its religious beliefs. This violated the College\u2019s rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the Mandate\u2019s requirements compelled the College to operate in a manner contrary to its religious beliefs, thus violating the guarantee of free speech as set out in the First Amendment. The plaintiffs sent a notice of voluntary dismissal on January 14, 2013. Judge Wimes thus ordered the dismissal without prejudice on January 16, 2013. This case was likely closed due to a private settlement, but we don't have any further information.", "summary": "On September 17, 2012, the College of the Ozarks filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Missouri against the Federal Government, seeking to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs were granted voluntary dismissal of the case on January 16, 2013."}
{"article": "On October 30, 2008, a pre-trial detainee of the Los Angeles City Central Jail filed a pro se complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against Los Angeles County officials, the Los Angeles County Sheriff, and a medical doctor that served the jail. The plaintiff alleged that the conditions of confinement, specifically lack of a bed and infestation, violated his constitutional rights. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged he was denied prompt medical care when the defendant doctor failed to supply prescribed medication for 43 days. The plaintiff sought compensatory damages in the amount of $33,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $333,000. The plaintiff had entered jail custody in July 2006, and as he was being processed, there was a string of racially charged violent disturbances at several jail facilities. Officials locked down multiple facilities, which delayed in-processing. As a result, the plaintiff was held at a facility without sufficient bench space for sleeping, and no beds or mattresses. He slept on the floor. On November 9, 2009, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, which the Magistrate Judge Alicia G. Rosenberg recommended be granted in part and denied in part. On June 6, 2010, the District Court (Judge John F. Walter) adopted the Magistrate Judge's report and dismissed all claims except the claim against the Sheriff in his individual and official capacities for failure to provide adequate sleeping accommodations. On September 14, 2010, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint against the Los Angeles County Sheriff in his official and individual capacities, alleging substantively the same claims for conditions of confinement. In response to the defendants' motion to dismiss the Second Amended complaint, the District Court dismissed all claims except the claim against the Sheriff in his individual capacity for failure to provide adequate sleeping conditions. On April 30, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining claim. A magistrate judge found that the newly supplemented record demonstrated that the Los Angeles County jail had faced difficult exigent circumstances in the aftermath of the disturbances and lockdown, and that this meant there had been no constitutional violation. The District Court agreed, dismissing the case on July 18, 2013. 2013 WL 3791419. Plaintiff appealed, and On July 30, 2013, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit. After appointing counsel to represent the plaintiff pro bono, on January 11, 2019, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an opinion by Judge Consuelo Callahan. Olivier v. Baca, 913 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2019). In light of the exigent circumstances, the opinion explained, there was no constitutional violation, and the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On October 30, 2008, a pre-trial detainee at the Los Angeles City Central Jail, filed a complaint alleging that the jail violated his constitutional rights when he was forced to sleep on a concrete floor, forced into a room infested with rats and lice, and not given prescribed medication for his health. The District Court dismissed all claims in light of the exigent circumstances caused by a series of violent disturbances at LA County jail facilities. The Court of Appeals affirmed in 2019."}
{"article": "On June 30, 2018, eight Hurricane Maria evacuees from Puerto Rico who were receiving Transitional Shelter Assistance from Federal Emergency Management Agency (\u201cFEMA\u201d) filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The case was assigned to District Judge Timothy S. Hillman. The plaintiffs sued FEMA under the Administrative Procedures Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The plaintiffs, represented by LatinoJustice PRLDEF (Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund), Hector E. Pineiro, and Manatt Phelps and Phillips, LLP, sought injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming that FEMA was planning to unlawfully terminate the TSA program which provided direct funding to hotels and motels that served as shelters for Puerto Ricans who evacuated the territory due to Hurricane Maria. The plaintiffs specifically alleged that FEMA was planning to terminate its TSA program for Puerto Rican evacuees, without any plan to transition the evacuees into longer-term housing. The plaintiffs argued that this was in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedures Act, and the Stafford Act that require nondiscrimination in disaster assistance. In their motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff\u2019s sought to extend the provision of the TSA program until all eligible individuals either received temporary housing or found permanent housing. On June 30, 2018, the same day the complaint was filed, Judge Leo T. Sorokin entered a Temporary Restraining Order (\u201cTRO\u201d), enjoining FEMA from terminating the TSA program until at least midnight July 3, 2018, enabling Plaintiffs and the class to remain in transitional shelters until checkout time on July 4, 2018. Right as the initial TRO was set to end, Judge Hillman extended it until at least midnight July 23, 2018. Judge Hillman extended the TRO to give the parties an opportunity to fully brief the important and complex issues raised by plaintiffs\u2019 complaint and their corresponding motion for preliminary injunction. Judge Hillman subsequently extended the TRO on two more occasions: July 19, 2018 (extending it until August 7, 2018) and on August 22, 2018 (extending it until August 31, 2018). In plaintiffs' first amended complaint, filed on July 12, six named plaintiffs were dropped from the suit and two additional plaintiffs were added. Plaintiffs also asserted new claims for violation of their equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment. Presumably because the plaintiffs had already received several extensions granting them access to temporary housing, on August 30, 2018, Judge Hillman denied plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court found that the plaintiffs did not have a high likelihood of success on the merits - the touchstone of the preliminary injunction inquiry. Judge Hillman ordered the defendants to refrain from terminating the program that provided the payment for shelter for the plaintiffs (including the class) until midnight September 13, 2018, in order to give the evacuees time to make alternative housing arrangements. On September 20, 2018, Judge Hillman granted defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss the case entirely. The contents of this order are unavailable to us at this time. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On June 30, 2018, eight Hurricane Maria evacuees from Puerto Rico who were receiving Transitional Shelter Assistance from Federal Emergency Management Agency (\u201cFEMA\u201d) filed a class-action lawsuit, requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. Judge Hillman, of the District of Massachusetts, initially issued multiple Temporary Restraining Orders, but ultimately dismissed the case."}
{"article": "On June 13, 2000, thirty-one minor children in the legal custody of the Florida Department of Children and Families (\"DCAF\") filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The named plaintiffs were represented by the advocacy organization Children's Rights and by private counsel. Plaintiffs sought certification of a class of all children who are or will be in the legal custody of DCAF as an alleged or adjudicated dependent child; plaintiffs also sought certification of a subclass of all children who are black or perceived by DCAF as black. They asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging that systemic deficiencies in the operation of DCAF subjected children in the state's care to harm or an unreasonable risk of harm. The alleged problems included: overuse of shelters; failing to comply with permanency plans; keeping siblings apart; overcrowding of residential facilities; overworking of caseworkers; denying children safe and permanent homes; overmedicating children; using non-least restrictive placements; failure to provide for foster children's education; operating a foster care system for \"financial benefit\"; and discriminating on the basis of race and ethnicity, particularly against black children. On August 30, 2000, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding new claims, including challenges brought under the Adoption and Safe Families Act; Early Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Treatment; and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. On September 11, 2000, plaintiffs moved to certify the class. On October 27, 2000, defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Both motions were referred to Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube. On April 20, 2001, Magistrate Judge Dube issued a Report and Recommendation largely denying the defendants' motion to dismiss. The Magistrate denied defendants' motion with respect to all counts, except for the EPSDT claims, for which the Magistrate dismissed certain of the named plaintiffs. Bonnie L. ex rel. Hadsock v. Bush, No. 00-2116-CIV-Moreno Dube, 2001 WL 1840843 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2001). Defendants subsequently filed objections to the R&R. On May 10, 2001, Magistrate Judge Dube issued a Report and Recommendation largely granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The Magistrate certified plaintiffs' proposed class and subclass, but excluded certain groups because they had been members of prior classes. Specifically, the Magistrate excluded the following from the class and subclass: (a) children who reside in Broward/District 10; (b) children who were in the custody of DCAF prior to July 24, 1995, but only for claims which arose prior to that date; and (c) any claims for the failure to provide mental health and/or developmental services. Bonnie L. ex rel. Hadsock v. Bush, No. 00-2116-CIV, 2001 WL 1400051 (S.D. Fla. May 10, 2001). Defendants filed objections to this R&R. In the meantime, on March 23, 2001, plaintiff Leslie F. moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin defendants from terminating her foster care services. Leslie F. had turned eighteen but was still enrolled in high school. On April 30, 2001, the Court (District Judge Federico A. Moreno) denied the requested preliminary injunction. The Court held that, inter alia, Leslie F. lacked standing because she had not yet had her benefits terminated (and thus had not suffered an injury in fact), and that her claims were not yet ripe. Plaintiff appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, while also seeking a temporary injunction from the District Court pending appeal. The Court (Judge Moreno) again denied plaintiff's request, noting that defendants had agreed to continue to provide services for 45 days or until the Eleventh Circuit ruled. Bonnie L. ex rel. Hadsock v. Bush, No. 00-2116-CIV-MORENO, 2001 WL 1840845 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2001). Plaintiff subsequently appealed this ruling as well. The two appeals were consolidated by the Eleventh Circuit. On October 15, 2001, the defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. The defendants argued that the action was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and that the Court must abstain under the Younger v. Harris doctrine. At this time, the defendants' objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation denying defendants' motion to dismiss was still under consideration by the Court. On December 4, 2001, the District Court (Judge Moreno) granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The Court held that plaintiffs' claims under the ASFA were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), and that certain of plaintiffs' Title VI claims were barred by Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) and Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that, by reading Sandoval in pari materia with Harris, the disparate impact regulations do not contain a substantive private right under disparate impact regulations). The Court also abstained under Younger from considering plaintiffs' substantive and procedural due process claims, as well as plaintiffs' claims under the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments for plaintiffs not in extended foster care. And while the Court did not dismiss all claims with respect to those plaintiffs, the Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice due to plaintiffs' failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. The Court also set a deadline within which plaintiffs could file a second amended complaint. Bonnie L. ex rel. Hadsock v. Bush, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2001). Plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Eleventh Circuit. On February 14, 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed plaintiffs' appeal regarding the preliminary injunction because the parties had reached a partial settlement agreement. Per the terms of the settlement agreement, certain of the named plaintiffs released defendants from all claims, while others released defendants only from their EPSDT and Title VI claims. Those plaintiffs continued to press their constitutional and ASFA claims by appealing the District Court's December 4 dismissal to the Eleventh Circuit. On May 8, 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the District Court's order granting defendants' motion to dismiss. The Eleventh Circuit (Judge Carnes) held that (1) certain named plaintiffs' claims had become moot; (2) the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' statutory claims, as those statutes do not give rise to enforceable rights; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in abstaining under Younger. The Eleventh Circuit only vacated the district court's opinion and remanded with instructions regarding certain named plaintiffs, whose claims were moot or who lacked standing. Thus, this appeal affirmed the district court in all substantive respects and ended the case. 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 984.", "summary": "On June 13, 2000, thirty-one minor children in the legal custody of the Florida Department of Children and Families (\"DCAF\") filed this putative class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs brought an array of systemic challenges to the operation of Florida's foster care system. On December 4, 2001, the District Court (Judge Federico A. Moreno) granted defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that certain claims were barred and abstaining under Younger v. Harris from hearing other claims. On May 8, 2003, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims."}
{"article": "On September 29, 2010, a class of male employees 50 years of age or older filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\"ADEA\"), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621, against Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for lost compensation in front pay and back pay, attorneys' fees and costs, declaratory and injunctive relief, lost pension benefits, and liquidated damages, claiming that they were abruptly terminated without explanation. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that their employment was terminated because of their age in violation of the ADEA. On November 29, 2010, the defendant moved to dismiss Count III of the complaint for failure to state a claim because plaintiffs were not employees of defendant at the time of the alleged retaliation. On December 22, 2010, the plaintiffs moved to dismissed the defendant's counterclaim for breach of contract, alleging that the ADEA waiver in its releases was invalid and unenforceable. On May 9, 2012, the Court (Judge Nora Barry Fischer) granted plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification because all members of the proposed class were over age 50 when they were terminated, all of their terminations were in the course of a single, company-wide reduction in force, and the plaintiffs relied on common evidence to prove their alleged discrimination. On July 20, 2012, the Court denied the defendant's motion for interlocutory appeal because the Court's decision regarding certification was merely conditional and therefore not a final ruling. In February and August 2013, five plaintiffs dismissed their claims with prejudice. In 2016, after trial, the court ruled in favor of plaintiffs for $922,060.", "summary": "In September 2010, a class of male employees over the age of 50 filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against their employer, alleging age discrimination after their employment was terminated. As of December 20, 2013, this case is still ongoing."}
{"article": "On June 20, 2011, Philadelphia school children with autism filed a class action lawsuit against the School District of Philadelphia in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) and relevant state law. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the District's Automatic Autism Transfer Policy was illegal under the IDEA, Section 504 and the ADA. The challenged policy routinely transferred students with autism from school to school at a certain age solely because they were disabled as a result of autism. On October 31, 2011, the District Court (Judge Legrome D. Davis) denied the defendant's motion to strike class action allegations and motion to dismiss the suit. P.V. ex rel. Valentin v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 2011 WL 5127850 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2011). On February 19, 2013, Judge Davis granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment in part and denied in part. P.V. ex rel. Valentin v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 2013 WL 618540 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2013). The Court concluded that the policy violated the IDEA, but that it did not violate Section 504 or the ADA. The Court ordered the school district to alter its policy to meet the procedural requirements under the IDEA and provide parents the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the educational placement of their autistic children. In addition, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. P.V. ex rel. Valentin v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 289 F.R.D. 227, 228 (E.D. Pa. 2013). The class included all children with autism in the School District of Philadelphia in grades Kindergarten through eight who had been transferred, were in the process of being transferred, or were at risk of being transferred, as a result of the School District's upper-leveling process; the parents and guardians of those children; and future members of the class. The parties entered into settlement negotiations in May 2013. The parties filed their preliminary settlement agreement on April 15, 2014. The proposed class settlement: (1) required the district to publish a list of all of its schools with autistic-support classrooms and provide notice of these schools in two separate letters to the parents of children with autism, (2) allowed class members to retain their individual rights to challenge the circumstances of their particular transfers, and (3) provided for the court to retain jurisdiction over the agreement's settlement through Jan. 2, 2017, though the agreement was to remain enforceable after this time. The parties also agreed to $325,000 in attorneys\u2019 fees and costs. The court granted final approval of the agreement on June 4, 2014. The settlement ended in 2017 without any further litigation. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On June 20, 2011, Philadelphia school children with autism filed a class action lawsuit against the School District of Philadelphia in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant's Automatic Autism Transfer policy violated the IDEA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the American with Disabilities Act and relevant state law. The parties settled on June 4, 2014 in an agreement that (1) required the district to publish a list of all of its schools with autistic support classrooms and provide notice of these schools in two separate letters to the parents of children with autism, (2) allowed class members to retain their individual rights to challenge the circumstances of their particular transfers, and (3) provided for the court to retain jurisdiction over the agreement's settlement through Jan. 2, 2017 though the agreement was to remain enforceable after this time. The parties also agreed to $325,000 in attorneys\u2019 fees and costs."}
{"article": "In December 2001, a federal grand jury returned a 36-count indictment against Tyson Foods, Inc., the world's largest poultry processor, and several individuals, charging the defendants with conspiring to smuggle undocumented aliens into the U.S. and employing them at Tyson's chicken processing plants throughout the country. Shortly after the criminal indictment, plaintiffs filed a nationwide class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee against Tyson and several of its top management personnel, alleging civil violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (\"RICO\"), 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1961 et seq., and the Immigration Reform and Control Act (\"IRCA\"), 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1324(a), et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that Tyson engaged in a massive scheme to hire undocumented immigrants for the express purpose of depressing employee wages. The scheme allegedly involved the use of temporary employment agencies to recruit and lure undocumented immigrants from Mexico to work in its chicken plants. Plaintiffs further alleged that the scheme consisted of what plaintiffs termed a \"willful blindness policy,\" which included management turning a blind eye to obviously fake work papers and ignoring other factors that suggested that the workers it hired were not legally entitled to work in the U.S. The civil case was initially assigned to Judge R. Allan Edgar. Tyson and its officers responded by moving to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that plaintiffs' RICO claims were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. Tyson also asserted that plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim, in that employee wages were the product of Union collective bargaining and therefore could not have resulted from the hiring of undocumented workers. The District Court (Chief Judge Edgar) granted the motion and dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. <i>Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc.</i>, 214 F. Supp. 2d 840 (E.D. Tenn. 2002) Plaintiffs appealed, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. <i>Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc.</i>, 370 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2004). On remand, Tyson moved for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds as to two of the plaintiffs. That motion was denied. <i>Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc.</i>, 2006 WL 319022, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17448 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 8, 2006). Tyson also filed a second motion to dismiss the case on the pleadings, and that motion, too, was denied on September 18, 2006. The District Court (Chief Judge Curtis L. Collier) also denied defendants' request to certify its ruling for purposes of immediate appeal. <i>Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc.</i>, 2006 WL 2868980, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71500 (E.D. Tenn. Sep. 29, 2006). Shortly thereafter, the District Court (Chief Judge Collier) granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification. <i>Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc.</i>, 2006 WL 2924938, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74114 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 2006). A case management conference was held in January 2007 and the Court entered a discovery schedule and set the case for trial on March 3, 2008. In 2007, the District Court issued a series of rulings on a variety of discovery and procedural issues. See <i>Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc.</i>, 2007 WL 951869, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23329 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 28, 2007) (ordering defendants not to redact certain portions of Tyson company minutes submitted for <i>in camera</i> review); <i>Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc.</i>, 2007 WL 1091217, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26611 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 10, 2007) (ruling that defendants are not entitled to affirmative defenses of estoppel and statute of limitations); <i>Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc.</i>, 2007 WL 1574275, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38882(E.D. Tenn. May 29, 2007) (denying Tyson's motion to dismiss); <i>Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc.</i>, 2007 WL 3231793 (E.D. Tenn. Oct 30, 2007) (denying motion to continue an expert witness hearing and the trial date); <i>Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc.</i>, 2007 WL 4260817, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88866 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 3, 2007) (approving class notice as modified by order). See also <i>McGrew v. Trollinger</i>, No. 4:02-cv-00023, 2007 WL 4106067 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 16, 2007) (ruling that witnesses in Arkansas that were subpoenaed for depositions had to appear.). On February 13, 2008, the District Court (Chief Judge Collier) entered an order granting summary judgment for the defendants and dismissing the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. <i>Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc.</i>, 543 F. Supp. 2d 842 (E.D. Tenn. 2008). The Court found that plaintiffs had failed to produce evidence demonstrating the presence of at least ten unauthorized employees at any given Tyson facility; it further found that plaintiffs' evidence only demonstrated that Tyson was harboring or concealing undocumented aliens at all at one facility, and that this evidence was insufficient to show proximate causation of any injuries. The Court (Chief Judge Collier) denied a motion for reconsideration on May 2, <i>Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc.</i>, 2008 WL 1984264, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33101 (E.D. Tenn. May 2, 2008), and the case was closed.", "summary": "This is a nationwide class action case filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee against Tyson Foods, Inc., claiming that Tyson had engaged in a massive scheme of hiring undocumented immigrants for the express purpose of depressing employee wages. The District Court originally dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, but was reversed by the Sixth Circuit. It went on to certify a class action, but ultimately granted summary judgment to defendants on February 13, 2008. Plaintiffs' request for reconsideration was denied and the case was closed."}
{"article": "<b>NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see <a href=\"https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/\"> their tracker</a>.</b> COVID-19 summary: This case sought emergency voting measures related to COVID-19 for the Florida presidential primary on March 17, 2020. These were denied, but a motion for measures relating to future elections remains pending. <hr> The Florida presidential primary occurred on March 17, 2020. At that time, Florida had reported 149 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and the State of Florida had taken numerous restrictions in response to COVID-19. Universities sent students home, Supervisors of Elections closed or moved numerous polling stations, and numerous individuals were in quarantine. Concerned about the potential large-scale voter disenfranchisement due to COVID-19 restrictions, on March 16, 2020, Dream Defenders, the New Florida Majority Education Fund, Organize Florida, and several individuals prevented from voting due to COVID-19 restrictions, filed this lawsuit against the Governor of Florida in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiffs sought emergency injunctive and declaratory relief that would order the state to implement additional voting measures and enjoin it from enforcing the existing voting deadlines. They alleged that the State of Florida \u201cfailed to take reasonable emergency measures\u201d for voter participation, such as extending deadlines for absentee ballots and expanding vote-by-mail options. Represented by the National Center for Law and Economic Justice, DEMOS, and LatinoJustice PRLDEF, the plaintiffs brought this lawsuit under \u00a7 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, they alleged that the defendants deprived the plaintiffs of their opportunity to vote in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendment and failed to provide reasonable accommodations as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Immediately, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. They asked the court to order the state to expand access to vote-by-mail options, extend deadlines, permit curbside voting, and communicate these changes to Floridians. The defendants did not respond to the emergency motion; however, noting that the temporary restraining order had been filed at 11:16 pm on the eve of the primary, Judge Robert Hinkle denied the motion on March 17, 2020, stating that granting the order would be \u201cadverse to the public interest.\u201d The plaintiffs renewed their request later that day, discarding the request for curbside voting, but continuing to request extended access to vote-by-mail and absentee options. On March 18, 2020 Judge Hinkle denied this motion with respect to the March 17 primary. He noted it \u201cwould be adverse to the public interest to enter a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction blocking the Secretary of State and Supervisors of Elections from processing the results of the March 17 presidential primary in accordance with the governing Florida statutes.\u201d The motion for a preliminary injunction with respect to future elections remained pending. On March 18, 2020, the Court set the schedule for briefing on the remaining part of the preliminary-injunction motion: the defendants response is due on April 20, 2020, the discovery deadline is June 5, 2020, and a consolidated hearing on the preliminary injunction will occur during the two weeks after July 20, 2020. On April 20, plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint, and by mid-May they requested leave to file a second amended complaint.", "summary": "Florida voting rights organizations tried unsuccessfully to institute emergency measures before the Florida Presidential Primary after emergency measures initiated in response to COVID-19 kept Floridians from requesting absentee ballots in time or travelling to the polls."}
{"article": "On Apr. 6, 2016, two noncitizens\u2014a Mexican citizen and an asylum-seeking Honduran national, both detained pending immigration removal hearings\u2014brought this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Represented by private counsel and the ACLU, the plaintiffs sued the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging violations of 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226(a) and the Fifth and Eighth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that they were kept in detention pending removal proceedings, despite having been granted release on bond after having been found not to pose any significant flight risk or danger to the community, because they could not afford to pay the cash bond. The plaintiffs\u2019 class-action complaint challenged the federal practice of detaining noncitizens for failure to post cash bond without considering the noncitizen\u2019s financial resources, or the availability of alternative forms of bond or other conditions of supervision which would enable the detainee\u2019s release. The plaintiffs moved for class certification on Apr. 22, 2016. The proposed class was specified as all individuals detained under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226(a), on a bond set by an ICE officer or an Immigration Judge in the Central District of California. The case was assigned to Judge Jesus G. Bernal. On June 10, 2016, the defendants moved to dismiss this case. On Nov. 20, 2016, Judge Bernal denied the defendants\u2019 motion and granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motions for class certification and class-wide preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of their claim. The preliminary injunction order required that the defendants develop and apply guidelines requiring officers to Immigration Judges to take into account a noncitizen detainee\u2019s financial ability to pay a bond, to refrain from setting cash bonds at amounts greater than what was required to ensure appearance, and to consider alternative forms of supervision when determining conditions of release. 2016 WL 7116611 (C.D. Cal. 2016). On Dec. 12, 2016, the defendants appealed the District Court\u2019s preliminary injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On the same day, the defendants moved ex parte to stay proceedings related to the preliminary injunction pending resolution of the appeal. On Dec. 28, 2016, Judge Bernal denied the motion to stay. On Jan. 4, 2017, however, the Ninth Circuit granted the defendants\u2019 motion to stay the District Court\u2019s order pending appeal. The defendants then filed their opening brief in the Ninth Circuit on Feb. 1, 2017. They argued that the District Court had erred in issuing the preliminary injunction because federal courts lacked jurisdiction (under federal statutes and because the plaintiffs had not exhausted administrative remedies); because the plaintiffs' statutory and constitutional claims were unlikely to succeed (because ability to pay is not a primary factor in determining bond); and because current bond determination proceedings did not violate noncitizens' constitutional rights (because they received full and fair hearings, and because the primary purpose of bond was to ensure that the noncitizen had an incentive to appear at future removal proceedings rather than abscond). The plaintiffs answered in the Ninth Circuit on Mar. 1, 2017. They argued that federal courts had jurisdiction; that the preliminary injunction applied only to individuals already found eligible for release, whose bond was to be determined, and that the INA should be construed to prevent the defendants' bond-setting policies from violating the Constitution; and that the plaintiffs continued to suffer irreparable harm from their detention. Also in Mar. 2017 in the Ninth Circuit, several amici briefs were filed on behalf of the plaintiffs, including by retired Board of Immigration Appeals members and Immigration Judges, and by the American Bar Association. On June 30, 2017, the District Court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, and consolidated this case with another, <i>Marvin Rodriguez Aroche v. Jason Park</i>, No. 8:17-cv-00367 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2017). The Ninth Circuit held oral argument on July 11, 2017 and issued a decision on Oct. 2, 2017, affirming the District Court's class-wide preliminary injunction. 872 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2017). In the opinion, the Court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by requiring immigration officials making bond decisions to consider, inter alia, detainees' financial ability to obtain bond and alternative conditions of release. The plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their Fifth Amendment Due Process claim, because \"[s]etting a bond amount without considering financial circumstances or alternative conditions of release undermines the connection between the bond and the legitimate purpose of ensuring the non-citizen\u2019s presence at future hearings.\" The plaintiffs had established a likelihood of irreparable harm because \"they are likely to be unconstitutionally detained for an indeterminate period of time.\" Finally, the balance of equities and the public interest favored the plaintiffs because \"any additional administrative costs to the government are far outweighed by the considerable harm to Plaintiffs\u2019 constitutional rights in the absence of the injunction\" and because \"[t]he public interest benefits from an injunction that ensures that individuals are not deprived of their liberty and held in immigration detention because of bonds established by a likely unconstitutional process.\" The Ninth Circuit also lifted the stay of the District Court's preliminary injunction pending appeal. The defendants were given until Jan. 2, 2018 to petition the Ninth Circuit for a panel or en banc rehearing, but they filed no petition. In the District Court on Nov. 21, 2017, Judge Bernal approved the parties' joint stipulation for an extension of time to implement the part of his Nov. 10, 2016 order granting a class-wide preliminary injunction. The defendants were required to update the plaintiffs by Feb. 16, 2018 about their progress in meeting the injunction requirements. On Dec. 1, 2017, Magistrate Judge Kenly Kato granted the plaintiffs' motion to compel production of documents and to obtain fees. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198255 (C.D. Cal. 2017). On Jan. 3, 2018, Magistrate Judge Kato granted $22,820 in fees regarding this motion. As discovery got underway, Magistrate Judge Kato decided that a Special Master should be appointed to consider the parties' discovery disputes and facilitate the timely production of documents. Rosalyn Chapman was appointed Special Master on May 23, 2018. The parties then engaged in extensive discovery over the next year. On May 16, 2019, the parties made a joint request to the District Court, asking for this case to be referred for a settlement conference. Judge Bernal granted the request on May 21 and referred the case to Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2016, noncitizens detained pending immigration removal proceedings brought this class action, alleging a federal practice of detaining noncitizens solely on the basis of indigence, by failing to take into account their ability to pay bond or to consider alternative means of supervision to ensure appearance. The District Court granted plaintiffs' request for a PI, and the 9th Circuit affirmed. The parties have since engaged in extensive discovery, but jointly requested to be referred for a settlement conference in May 2019. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "A trans woman housed in a mens' prison in Texas filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas on June 8, 2015 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff represented herself in the trial court, and she was represented on appeal by Stephen Braga, a law professor at the University of Virginia. The case was assigned to Judge Robert Pitman. The plaintiff alleged that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's blanket ban on gender affirmation surgery violated the Eighth Amendment because it amounted to deliberate indifference to her medical needs. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that, while incarcerated, her primary care physician was not adequately trained on transgender care and failed to provide her with treatment consistent with the WPATH standards of care. He refused to provide her with an individualized assessment or treatment plan, which denied her access to various forms of treatment that may have been medically necessary. The plaintiff had on several occasions used the prison's formal grievance system to protest this lack of care as well as the blanket policy to no avail. The defendants named in this case were the TDCJ Director, the primary care physician who refused to provide the plaintiff with treatment for her gender dysphoria, and and unknown University of Texas Medical Branch official. The Director moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim. On June 8, 2015, the district court granted this motion, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. The plaintiff filed an appeal in the Fifth Circuit pro se on September 16, 2016. On October 10, 2017, Professor Stephen Bega began representing her. Judges Smith, Ho and Barksdale heard the case and released an opinion on March 29, 2019 (920 F.3d 212). The majority opinion, written by Judge Ho, held that there had been no Eighth Amendment violation, characterizing the WPATH standards as simply one side of a contested debate rather than the widely accepted standard in the medical field. Judge Ho held that because the doctor and prison administration had merely chosen a side, they were not demonstrating the malicious intent necessary to make out a claim of deliberate indifference. Judge Barksdale's dissent, on the other hand, took issue with both the summary judgment procedure used by the lower court and the majority's assessment of the merits. Specifically, he disagreed with the majority's characterization of WPATH, noting that it had become a widely accepted norm that had been acknowledged as such in both the Fourth and Seventh Circuits. Judge Barksdale also questioned whether authorities cited by the majority supported its use of he/him/his pronouns to refer to the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a petition for certiorari (an appeal) in the Supreme Court of the United States on July 1, 2019. The Supreme Court announced on December 9, 2019 that they had declined to hear the case (140 S. Ct. 653). The case is now closed. While this case was still ongoing, the plaintiff filed another lawsuit alleging retaliation in response to pursuing these claims. For more information, see <i>Gibson v. Jean-Baptiste</i>, No. 6:17-cv-00042 (W.D. Tex.)", "summary": "A trans woman incarcerated in a men's prison in Texas filed a pro se suit against the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and her primary care physician in the prison. She filed her complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas on June 8, 2015. She alleged that TDCJ blanket policy refusing to provide gender affirming surgery and the doctor's refusal to give her an individualized assessment regarding her gender identity disorder violated the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and a law professor from the University of Virginia began representing her. The Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the defendants on the merits, with a dissenting opinion from Judge Barksdale. The plaintiff unsuccessfully sought Supreme Court review, and the case is now closed."}
{"article": "On November 18, 2002, HIV positive inmates at the Limestone Correctional Facility in Capshaw, Alabama filed a class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court Northern District of Alabama to challenge their treatment and conditions of confinement. Plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights and private civil rights attorneys, alleged that they were denied adequate medical treatment and were subjected to deplorable living conditions. Defendants included officials of the Alabama Department of Corrections [DOC] and NaphCare, Inc., a private health care company that contracted with the DOC to provide healthcare services at Limestone. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. Following plaintiffs' lawsuit, an audit report addressing the medical treatment provided to HIV positive inmates confined at Limestone was prepared by Moore and Associates, an independent entity that was hired to assess the performance of NaphCare under its contract with the DOC. The audit report noted many deficiencies in the care provided and found that the number of AIDS related deaths at Limestone (reportedly 36 deaths from 1992 to 2002) was remarkably high compared to averages reported by other correctional institutions. Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on April 2, 2003, which cited various findings and the conclusion reported by Moore and Associates in its audit report. NaphCare moved to dismiss. The District Court Judge Karon O. Bowdre certified the case as a class action on January 27, 2004. NaphCare was dismissed from the case without prejudice, with the dismissal contingent on NaphCare complying with all standing discovery orders. The case was then referred to mediation. The parties eventually arrived at a settlement. On May 6, 2004, the parties filed a joint motion to approve the Settlement Agreement. A fairness hearing was held on May 26, 2004 before Magistrate Judge John E. Ott. Judge Ott issued a report and recommendation that the Court adopt the Settlement Agreement. The District Court issued a memorandum opinion and order approving the Settlement Agreement on June 24, 2004. The Settlement Agreement specified numerous changes to be made by the DOC relative to the delivery of health care at Limestone, including the hiring of an HIV Specialist to provide treatment to HIV infected prisoners and a full time registered nurse to serve as the \"HIV Coordinator\" in charge of infection control. An additional medical doctor was to be hired to treat non-HIV positive inmates. The Agreement was set to terminate two years after its final approval. The District Court retained jurisdiction over the case to enforce the agreement and appointed Magistrate Judge Ott as Special Master to oversee the remedial phase. Dr. Joseph Bick was appointed as the independent medical consultant. By separate agreement of the parties, attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $410,000.00 were awarded to class counsel. During the remediation phase, plaintiffs moved for an order of contempt for the DOC's alleged non-compliance with the Settlement Agreement. In January 2006, The District Court (Judge Bowdre) denied the motion as moot and ordered Dr. Bick to conduct an audit at Limestone in November 2006 and to issue a written report on his findings. The parties were advised to file any motions to terminate or extend the Settlement Agreement within 30 days of its June 26, 2006 termination date. On April 5, 2006 Judge Ott issued an order preserving the confidentiality of all medical records incorporated in \"mortality reviews\"provided to Dr. Bick and extended the confidentiality requirements in perpetuity. On April 26, 2007 the State of Alabama was ordered to pay Dr. Bick $4,000 for his last quarterly evaluation. There have been no updates as of October 7, 2018, and the case is now closed. Additional case information can be accessed at the website of the Southern Center for Human Rights (http://www.schr.org/).", "summary": "On November 18, 2002, HIV positive inmates at the Limestone Correctional Facility in Capshaw, Alabama filed a class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 in the U.S. District Court Northern District of Alabama to challenge their treatment and conditions of confinement. Plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights and private civil rights attorneys, alleged that they were denied adequate medical treatment and were subjected to deplorable living conditions. Defendants included officials of the Alabama Department of Corrections [DOC] and NaphCare, Inc., a private health care company that contracted with the DOC to provide healthcare services at Limestone. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. On May 6, 2004, the parties filed a joint motion to approve the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement specified numerous changes to be made by the DOC relative to the delivery of health care at Limestone, including the hiring of an HIV Specialist to provide treatment to HIV infected prisoners and a full time registered nurse to serve as the \"HIV Coordinator\" in charge of infection control. An additional medical doctor was to be hired to treat non-HIV positive inmates. The Agreement was set to terminate two years after its final approval."}
{"article": "On June 5, 2017, a male Louisiana detainee filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. He had been arrested and detained after being charged with felony theft and was unable to post the $375 bond to a for-profit bonding agent to clear his $3000 bail. The plaintiff sued the Sheriff, County Commissioner, and Chief Judge for the 15th Judicial District of Louisiana under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201. Represented by Civil Rights Corps, MacArthur Justice Center, and Loyola University School of Law, the plaintiff sought to represent a class of all arrestees who were or would be detained in that state district--which covered Acadia, Lafayette, and Vermillon Parishes--for any amount of time after an arrest because they were unable to pay money bail. He claimed that the district scheme of setting bail amounts without further inquiry into a person's ability to pay violated his Due Process and Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He sought an injunction, declaratory relief, and attorney's fees and costs. This case was referred to Magistrate Judge Patrick Hanna and Judge Robert G. James. Judge James recused himself and the case was reassigned to Judge Elizabeth E. Foote. The defendants filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. They also argued that the claim was moot because the plaintiff was no longer in jail. On July 20, the case was stayed as the parties engaged in settlement talks under Judge Hanna's orders. After several months of unsuccessful settlement talks, the stay was lifted even though settlement discussions continued. The defendants claimed there was nothing to settle and the plaintiff claimed irreparable harm was ongoing. On December 6, 2017, Judge Hanna filed a Report and Recommendation in response to the Commissioner's motion to dismiss. The report recommended that the motion should be granted with respect to plaintiff's equal protection claims and due process claims against the County Judge. The Judge also recommended that the motion be denied to the extent that it requested dismissal of due process claims against the Commissioner. On December 11, 2017, Judge Hanna filed a second Report and Recommendation in response to the Sheriff's motion to dismiss. The report recommended the motion be denied with respect to subject matter jurisdiction claims because the claim was not moot and Younger abstention did not apply. However, the plaintiff had requested relief that could not be granted, and so Judge Hanna recommended dismissal. The plaintiff objected to both of these reports and sought oral argument before Judge Foote. On January 12, 2018, Judge Foote granted a hearing. On February 14, 2018, the plaintiff and an intervenor filed a motion to intervene or to consolidate the case with the intervenor's individual case, 6:18-cv-00159, with this case. On February 26, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint with opposition, which was granted later by Judge Foote. Judge Foote adopted partially the second Report and Recommendations and denied the Sheriff\u2019s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on March 6, 2018. 2018 WL 1188077. On March 8, Judge Hanna denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion to certify class without prejudice. 2018 WL 1221119. On March 9, the plaintiff filed the first supplemental class-action complaint to allege material facts that have arisen since the original complaint on June 5, 2017. Specifically, the Sheriff revised his policies and procedures governing the Sheriff\u2019s Tracking Offender Program (S.T.O.P), which determines a detainee\u2019s eligibility for these programs. On March 27, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the supplemental complaint and original complaint for failure to state a claim. Discovery then followed. On April 12, Judge Foote granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion to intervene and denied the motion to consolidate cases. On June 28, 2018, the defendant filed a motion for sanction regarding the plaintiff\u2019s supplemental complaint. On August 28, 2018, Judge Hanna filed a Report and Recommendations. She recommended that the Sheriff\u2019s motion to dismiss filed on March 27 should be granted in part and denied in part, and that the re-urged first motion to dismiss the original complaint should be granted. 2018 WL 6036911. The next day, Judge Hanna filed an additional Report and Recommendations, recommending that the motion for sanctions be denied. 2018 WL 6028683. On October 26, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment against the Sheriff but later withdrew this motion. On the same day, the defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 claims. The plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment again on October 30. On November 9, this case was reassigned to Judge Terry A. Doughty. On November 14, Judge Doughty adopted the Report and Recommendation of Judge Hanna, granting the motion to dismiss the supplemental complaint and original complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). The plaintiffs\u2019 claims against the Sheriff were dismissed without prejudice. 2018 WL 5993879. Furthermore, Judge Doughty adopted the second Report and Recommendation and denied the motion for sanctions. 2018 WL 5987022. On December 3, 2018, Judge Doughty denied both the plaintiffs\u2019 and defendants\u2019 motions for summary judgment and the parties were required to file pre-trial memoranda. 2018 WL 6314730. Bench trial was held on August 6, 2019 and the parties were asked to file post-trial briefs. The plaintiffs filed their brief on September 20 and the defendants filed their brief on December 3. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "The plaintiff filed a class action on behalf of all arrestees who are or will be detained for any amount of time after an arrest because they are unable to pay money bail. Under a \u00a7 1983 action, he claimed that a wealth-based post-arrest detention policy violates equal protection and due process under the 14th amendment by jailing the poor for no reason other than their poverty."}
{"article": "On June 27, 2017, pre-trial detainees at the Orleans Parish Sheriff\u2019s office filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 against the magistrate judge of the Criminal District Court alleging unlawful bail setting practices. Plaintiffs claimed that defendant violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause by keeping them in jail post-arrest when they could not afford the bail set by defendant. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant\u2019s practice of regularly setting a $2,500 minimum financial condition, without considering arrestees' inability to pay or other non-financial alternatives, violated plaintiffs\u2019 fundamental rights. Plaintiffs further claimed that defendant violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause by holding a dual role of determining pre-trial release conditions and managing the court's finances, thereby creating an institutional conflict of interest and depriving plaintiffs of a neutral tribunal. By requiring detainees pay their bail amounts as a commercial surety instead of in cash, plaintiffs allege that defendant enforced a mechanism whereby bail payments generated revenue for the court and directly benefited defendant\u2019s office. Plaintiffs sought declaratory judgement. The next day, plaintiffs moved to certify their class for all similarly situated detainees who were unable to pay the financial condition imposed by defendant as a requirement for their immediate release. In July 2017, defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for two reasons. First, the defendant claimed that that putative class members whose criminal proceedings had ended no longer had standing and were therefore unlikely to be injured. Secondly, the defendant claimed that because there were ongoing state court criminal proceedings against named plaintiffs and other class members, a federal proceeding would interfere with the state court\u2019s ability to handle these proceedings. On August 25, 2017, Judge Eldon E. Fallon denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, reasoning that there were still named and proposed class members with ongoing criminal cases who had ongoing and actual injuries. The court also found that the plaintiffs did not have an adequate opportunity to raise issues of bond policies in the relevant state courts, and so the issue of federal proceedings interfering with state court did not apply. On November 7, 2017, the defendant again moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the defendant magistrate judge was not the proper defendant on plaintiffs\u2019 claim of unconstitutionality. Over the next several months, the parties engaged in settlement talks but did not reach an agreement. The court denied the defendant's second motion to dismiss in December, 2017. On March 16, 2018, the Court granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The class was certified as: \"all presumptively innocent arrestees who are now before or will come before Defendant Magistrate Judge of Orleans Parish Criminal District Court for proceedings concerning pretrial release or detention and who are unable to pay the financial condition that Defendant imposes as a requirement for their immediate release.\" 2018 WL 1365809. On August 06, 2018, Judge Eldon E. Fallon granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and provided the declaratory relief requested. The Court stated that the defendant's bail procedures had not provided notice of the importance of the issue of the criminal defendant\u2019s ability to pay, and consideration of alternative conditions of release, or application of a legal standard in the determination of the necessity of pretrial detention. Hence, these procedures violated plaintiffs\u2019 procedural due process rights. On August 14, 2018, Judge Fallon issued an order granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and providing declaratory relief as follows: (i) in the context of hearings to determine pretrial detention Due Process requires: (a) an inquiry into the arrestee\u2019s ability to pay, including notice of the importance of this issue and the ability to be heard on this issue; (b) consideration of alternative conditions of release, including findings on the record applying the clear and convincing standard and explaining why an arrestee does not qualify for alternative conditions of release; and (c) representative counsel; (ii) defendant's institutional incentives created a substantial and unconstitutional conflict of interest when he determined their ability to pay bail and set the amount of that bail. The defendant filed a notice of appeal on August 21, 2018, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. (Docket No. 18-30954). The defendant appealed only the determination that his setting of bonds that help fund his court violated due process. On June 13, 2019, Judge Fallon entered an Order governing the protocol that the defendant will use in determining the conditions of pre-trial release for arrestees. The order directed the defendant to consider the need for pre-trial release or detention based on the flight risk and/or danger posed by the arrestee. The defendant must also consider whether there are any nonfinancial conditions of release that would satisfy concerns of public safety and/or future appearances at court. The order also instructed that if a financial condition for release is set and the arrestee cannot meet it, the court must provide clear and convincing evidence that the financial condition is necessary to guard against risks of flight and danger to public safety. On August 29, 2019, the appeals court affirmed the decision of the district court (Circuit Judges Patrick Higginbotham, Edith Jones, and Gregg Costa). See 937 F.3d 525 (2019). The appeals court concluded that the defendant had a direct and personal interest in maintaining the fiscal health of his court through the generation of bonds fees. The defendant also held a dual role because he generated and appropriated funds for the court through his bail procedures. The appeals court found that the combination of the dual role and personal interest in benefitting from bond fees \u201cmay make the magistrate \u2018partisan to maintain the high level of contribution\u2019,\u201d thus violating due process. On September 12, 2019, the defendant filed a motion for rehearing en banc in the appeals court. This motion was denied by the appeals court on October 1, 2019. This case is now closed.", "summary": "On June 27, 2017, pre-trial detainees at the Orleans Parish Sheriff\u2019s office filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the magistrate judge of the Criminal District Court alleging unlawful bail setting practices. Plaintiffs claimed that defendant violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause by keeping them in jail post-arrest when they cannot afford the bail set by defendant. Plaintiffs further claimed that defendant violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause by holding a dual role of determining pre-trial release conditions and managing the courts finances, thereby creating an institutional conflict of interest and depriving plaintiffs of a neutral tribunal. The Court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and provided the requested declaratory relief, stating that, in the context of hearings to determine pretrial detention, Due Process requires (a) an inquiry into the arrestee\u2019s ability to pay, including notice of the importance of this issue and the ability to be heard on this issue; (b) consideration of alternative conditions of release, including findings on the record applying the clear and convincing standard and explaining why an arrestee does not qualify for alternative conditions of release; and (c) representative counsel. The Court also declared that defendant's institutional incentives created a substantial and unconstitutional conflict of interest when he determined plaintiffs' ability to pay bail and set the amount of that bail. On August 29, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appeals court held that the defendants' dual role in generating and appropriating court funds through bond fees, along with benefitting personally from these fees, violated due process."}
{"article": "On June 26, 2020, three individuals filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The suit arose out of the protests that swept the nation following the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. The suit alleged that Fort Wayne Police Officers used chemical weapons, flash bang grenades, and rubber bullets on individuals peacefully protesting. They brought suit against the City of Fort Wayne and the Allen County Sheriff, arguing that these actions constituted a violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that these actions were violations of the First Amendment's guarantees of free speech, free assembly, and free petition. They also argued that the defendants used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. They sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and money damages, as well as attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiffs were represented by counsel from the ACLU of Indiana. The case was assigned to Judge Holly A. Brady and Magistrate Judge Susan L. Collins on June 29. However, that same day Judge Brady recused herself and the case was reassigned to Judge Damon R. Leichty. On July 2, 2020, plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief which added several individuals as plaintiffs along with two organizations: Black and Brown Liberation and the ACLU of Indiana. The legal claims and sought-after relief remained the same. That same day, plaintiffs submitted a motion for a preliminary injunction. The parties began to engage in preliminary discovery related to the motion for a preliminary injunction. The court set a hearing for October 15-16. The plaintiffs amended the complaint again on August 28, 2020. They voluntarily dismissed one of the individual plaintiffs and also dismissed the Allen Country Sheriff as a defendant. The defendants agreed to the dismissal, and the parties stipulated that the City of Fort Wayne did not need to file an additional answer to the amended complaint. As the hearing on the preliminary injunction neared, the plaintiffs then filed a motion to withdraw the motion for a preliminary injunction and to vacate the hearing on October 1, 2020. The court granted the motion the next day. As of December 30, 2020, the case is ongoing.", "summary": "This case arose out of the protests that followed the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. The plaintiffs in this case allege that police used illegal tactics in order to quell the protests, thereby violating their constitutional rights under the First and Fourth Amendments. Plaintiffs were several individuals and, later, two organizations. Defendants were the City of Fort Wayne and the Allen County Sheriff. Plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The case is ongoing as of August 4, 2020."}
{"article": "In September 2006, the San Francisco District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit against Trimbco, doing business as Sharp Precision Manufacturing, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging discrimination on the basis of gender (female) and national origin (Hispanic) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendant subjected the complaining party, and similarly situated employees, to a hostile work environment based upon gender and national origin. An unknown portion of the allegations were settled through mediation. On June 24, 2008, the defendant's counsel withdrew, and the defendants did not notify the court of its new counsel. The EEOC moved for a default judgment, which was granted and entered on March 17, 2009. The judgment required the defendant to pay $50,000 in compensatory and punitive damages to six claimants. Additionally, the judgment enjoined the defendants from further engaging in discrimination on the basis of sex or national origin, required the defendants to institute policies and programs to ensure equal opportunities for employees. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In September 2006, the San Francisco District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit against Trimbco, Inc., doing business as Sharp Precision Manufacturing, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging discrimination on the basis of gender, female, and national origin, Hispanic. The case ended with a default judgment against defendants entered on March 17, 2009. The judgment required Defendant to pay $50,000 in compensatory and punitive damages to each of the six complainants. Additionally, the judgment enjoined defendants from further engaging in discrimination on the basis of sex or national origin, required defendants to institute policies and programs to ensure equal opportunities for employees."}
{"article": "On April 29, 2019, the Middlesex County District Attorney, Suffolk County District Attorney, Committee for Public Counsel Services (\u201cCPCS\u201d), and the Chelsea Collaborative, Inc., filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs sued U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (\u201cICE\u201d), U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and several officials under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2)(C), and the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1226(a), 1357(a). The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming violations of common-law privilege against civil arrests in courthouses and the Tenth Amendment. The plaintiffs alleged that in 2017, ICE authorized a nationwide campaign to target state courthouses as sites for civil-immigration enforcement. The plaintiffs further alleged that this policy undermined the administration of justice in Massachusetts, as many permanent residents refused to appear in court out of fear of ICE interference. On April 29, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction that sought to enjoin ICE from authorizing and conducting civil arrests on parties, witnesses, and others attending Massachusetts courthouses on official business. The plaintiffs alleged that by authorizing civil arrests in courthouses, ICE ignored the well-settled common-law privilege against such civil arrests and exceeded its statutory jurisdiction under the Immigrant and Nationality Act. Thus, the practice is unlawful and should be set aside under the Administrative Procedure Act. While the motion included other claims, the plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctive relief only on this claim. On May 15, 2019, the defendants filed an Opposition to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. In the Opposition, the defendants disputed the existence of a common-law privilege against civil arrest in courthouses. Furthermore, the defendants argued that even if the common-law privilege existed, Congress erased the privilege when it passed the INA. On June 20, 2019, Judge Indira Talwani granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion for preliminary injunction and issued a memorandum. See 382 F. Supp. 3d 142 (2019). Judge Talwani found that plaintiffs had standing to bring the suit, were likely to succeed on the merits of their Administrative Procedure Act claim, and the injunction was of public interest. Thus, the defendants were enjoined from implementing the Courthouse Civil Arrest Directive and from civilly arresting parties, witnesses, and others attending Massachusetts courthouses on official business while they are going to, attending, or leaving the courthouse. Defendants appealed; the appeal is pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.", "summary": "In April 2019, two District Attorneys in Massachusetts and two public interest organizations filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs alleged that ICE's practice of conducting civil arrests inside state courthouses violated their common-law privilege against such arrests and Tenth Amendment Rights. In June 2019, Judge Indira Talwani granted the plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and enjoined ICE from continuing with this practice. The order for Preliminary Injunction is currently pending appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit."}
{"article": "On June 12, 1968 the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama against the State of Alabama under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e. et seq. (Title VII). The DOJ asked the court for injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant had violated Title VII by discriminating against applicants for employment on the basis of race by bypassing higher ranked African-American applicants in favor of lower ranked white applicants. The complaint alleged that the Alabama Personnel Department discriminated on the basis of race by hiring lower ranked white applicants over higher ranked African-American applicants. A no-bypass rule was instituted by the Alabama Personnel Department. On July 28, 1970, United States brought this action to enforce the federal requirement that state personnel engaged in administration of federally financed grant-in-aid programs be recruited, hired and promoted or demoted on merit basis, without discrimination on the grounds of race or color (317 F.Supp 1079, D.C.Ala. 1970). The District Court (Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr.) ordered: that the affected African-American applicants be offered the first available position with the rate of pay he would have and seniority rights; that African-American applicants be appointed to positions other than custodial, domestic, laborer or laboratory aide, unless another position is filled; that the defendants not appoint or offer a position to a lower-ranking white applicant over a higher-ranking available African-American applicant. In May of 2002, in order to determine whether the no-bypass rule was still necessary, the state defendants hired statistical experts to examine the racial composition of the Alabama workforce as well as the racial patterns of recent selections in the workforce. On February 11, 2003, a white employee of the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADC) who had claimed that he had been denied a promotion because of the no-bypass rule, moved to intervene. He alleged, among other things, that the no-bypass rule was unconstitutional and must be modified or ended. On February 11, 2003, the United States and the state defendants began discussions on the results of the statistical analysis and proposed to terminate the no-bypass rule, as the problems, aimed at by the no-bypass rule, were remedied. On March 20, 2003, the United States and the state defendants entered a joint motion to terminate the no-bypass rule. On May 22, 2003, representatives of African-American employees of the State of Alabama moved to intervene to oppose termination or modification of the no-bypass rule and to otherwise enforce it. On January 20, 2004, the Court (Judge Myron Thompson) granted both the white employee of ADC and the African-American employees the right to intervene under the permissive intervention rule. On February 28, 2004, the ADC employee filed a motion to terminate the no-bypass rule. On April 21, 2004, the white employee of the ADC filed a motion to certify class. On the same day, non-black employees filed a motion to intervene. On March 28, 2005, the Court (Judge Myron Thompson) denied both motions conditionally until after the court determined the scope of discovery and the scope of its inquiry into the joint motion to terminate the no-bypass rule. On May 9, 2005, the white employee moved for preliminary injunction. On May 20, 2005, the Court (Judge Myron Thompson) issued an order, treating the joint motion to terminate the no-bypass rule as a motion for preliminary injunction, and granted both the motion as well as ADC employee's preliminary injunction motion. The court suspended the no-bypass rule effective no later than June 20, 2005, pending final resolution of the challenges to the rule. The court reasoned that the special change in circumstances warranted the suspension of the rule. On June 1, 2005 the ADC employee filed a motion for interim award of attorneys' fees. On September 09, 2005 the white employee filed a motion for summary judgment. On the same day, the state defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the joint motion to terminate no-bypass rule. On June 30, 2006, the Court (Judge Myron Thompson) issued a judgment, permanently terminating the no-bypass rule. The court reasoned that the no-bypass rule was no longer an appropriate tool, and that there was no longer a fit between the practices and the rule. United States v. Director Alabama Personnel Department, 444 F.Supp.2d 1192 (M.D. Ala. 2006). On September 17, 2007, the Court granted the plaintiff-intervenor's motion for attorney's fees to the extent that plaintiff-intervenor recovered $61,499.70 for fees and expenses. The state defendants filed an appeal against the order granting attorney's fees to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. On July 1, 2008, the plaintiff-intervenor filed a motion for attorney's fees on appeal, which was denied without prejudice on the same day. On August 19, 2008, the Eleventh Circuit issued a judgment per curiam, affirming the District Court's grant of attorney's fees to the plaintiff-intervenor. United States v. Director Alabama Personnel Department, 281 Fed.Appx. 960 (11th Cir. 2008). On November 30, 2012, the Court (Judge Myron Thompson) issued an order terminating and dissolving all outstanding injunctions and orders issued in this case, with the last of them terminating on December 31, 2014.", "summary": "On June 12, 1968 the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e. et seq. (Title VII) in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama against the State of Alabama, alleging that the defendant had violated Title VII by bypassing higher ranked African-American applicants in favor of lower ranked white applicants. The Alabama Personnel Department instituted a no-bypass rule and the District Court ordered injunctive relief. In May of 2002, the state defendants hired statistical experts to determine whether the no-bypass rule was still necessary. On March 20, 2003 the United States and the state defendants moved to terminate the no-bypass rule. A white employee and several black employees moved to intervene. On May 20, 2005, the court suspended the no-bypass rule pending final resolution of the challenges to the rule. On June 30, 2006, the court permanently terminated the no-bypass rule. On September 17, 2007, the court granted the white employee attorney's fees of $61,499.70, which were affirmed on the appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. The case has effectively ended, with the last order of the court terminating on December 31, 2014."}
{"article": "On August 8, 2015, same-sex couples seeking to adopt in Mississippi and civil rights organizations filed this lawsuit in the U.S District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued, at various times, the Mississippi Department of Human Services, the Governor of Mississippi, the Mississippi DOJ, and the Mississippi judiciary under 42 U.S \u00a7 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs asked for injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming that enforcement of the Mississippi statuary ban on same-sex adoptions violated the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s equal protection and due process clauses in light of the Supreme Court\u2019s recent decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. The case was assigned to Judge Daniel P. Jordan. In his words, the state presented a tepid defense of the ban's constitutionality, focusing on procedural rather than substantive questions. Judge Jordan ultimately dismissed the lawsuits against all defendants but the Mississippi Department of Human Services on procedural grounds, but granted full preliminary injunctive relief to plaintiffs against the Mississippi Department of Human Services on May 13, 2016, 2016 WL 1306202, and converted the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction two months later. (The state apparently agreed to the permanent injunction--submitting it for the court's approval. We don't know whether that was because the state had conceded, or whether it was facilitating entry of a final order to allow immediate appeal.)", "summary": "Same-sex couples and advocate organizations brought lawsuit against the Mississippi Department of Human Services, the Governor of Mississippi, the Mississippi DOJ, and the Mississippi judiciary under 42 U.S \u00a7 1983 challenging the constitutionality of the Mississippi ban on same-sex adoptions in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell. The district judge issued preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against the Mississippi Department of Human services and affirmed plaintiff's contention that the ban was unconstitutional."}
{"article": "On February 16, 2007, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e, et seq. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against City of Hayti Heights, Missouri. The DOJ asked the court for injunctive and compensatory relief, alleging that the defendant had violated Title VII by discriminating against a \"patrolman\" on the basis of sex. The complaint alleges that the defendant discriminated on the basis of sex by: (1) terminating the plaintiff's employment with the City on the basis of her sex and (2) failing or refusing to take appropriate action to remedy the effects of the discriminatory treatment of the plaintiff. Afterwards, the parties went into alternative dispute resolution processes. They reached a settlement, and filed a joint motion to approve consent judgment on October 25, 2007. The Court (Judge Rodney W. Sippel) issued a consent judgment on October 30, 2007. Under the consent decree, the parties were not making any admissions. The decree included following general injunctions: 1) prohibition against gender discrimination; 2) prohibition against retaliation or any acts adversely affecting the conditions of employment. Subject to the approval of the United States, the City agreed to modify its policies and procedures prohibiting gender discrimination in the following ways: 1) prohibition of discrimination in any conditions of employment, including hiring and termination; 2) implementing procedures for complaints and redress; 3) notice of new policies through posting in public places, including Internet; 4) providing antidiscrimination training; 5) designating a special person to monitor compliance with the decree; 6) retaining records pertinent to new policies. The individual and the City agreed to her reinstatement with the seniority date of July 9, 2004 and requirement of at least a 32 hours work week. The individual also receive $1,000.00 in backpay. The Court retained jurisdiction over the implementation of the decree. The decree was to dissolve within two years of its entry. On December 27, 2007, the Court granted the defendant's motion to withdraw.", "summary": "On February 16, 2007, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e, et seq. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against City of Hayti Heights, Missouri. The DOJ asked the court for injunctive and compensatory relief, alleging gender discrimination in termination and subsequent lack of remedy involving a female \"patrolman\". The parties settled and the consent judgment was entered by the Court on October 30, 2007. The consent decree included several general injunctions against gender discrimination with new policies to be implemented to battle such discrimination. The individual received reinstatement and monetary relief."}
{"article": "This case was severed from <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15529\">West v. City of Hitchcock</a>, 3:16-cv-00309 (S.D. Tex.). The case originally pursued claims against the Cities of Hitchcock and Santa Fe at the same time, but the court severed the two on September 19, 2018. The original complaint, filed on November 3, 2016 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, involved three individuals under threat of being jailed for failure to pay fines to the City of Santa Fe. The plaintiffs sued the City of Santa Fe, the Municipal Judge, and the Chief of Police under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging that the defendants run a modern-day debtors' prison to raise revenue for the City. They claimed that city officials have colluded on an unconstitutional two-tiered system of justice by which the City and Municipal Judge agreed to raise the costs of the traffic and other misdemeanor fines to boost revenue and the City extracts payments from local residents. Police officers regularly jail people who fail to pay their fines without giving them access to a lawyer or the chance to mount a legal defense, nor are they given the opportunity to see a judge for the constitutionally mandated hearing on their ability to pay. Moreover, the police chief makes jail intolerable, giving detainees too little food to eat and depriving them of medical care. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Texas, the plaintiffs asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, damages, and attorneys fees. They also sought class certification. The plaintiffs alleged that the revenue-generating scheme begins with Municipal Court proceedings, which its jurisdiction is limited to tickets for class C misdemeanors. These offenses are defined by Texas law as \"nonjailable,\" \"fine only\" offenses, punishable by a fine up to $500. For an individual unable to make timely payments in full, the Municipal Court issues a \"capias pro fine\" warrant for failure to pay a fine. Individuals who have a capias pro fine have two options: pay in full or turn themselves in to the police. Police also search for people subject to capias pro fine warrants, sometimes arresting people at their homes in front of family, friends, and neighbors. Though police have the option of taking such individuals before a court, they do not. Instead, they transfer them to the police chief and book them into jail where they will be held until they pay their debt in full or satisfy the fines with \"jail credit.\" Once in jail, the allegations continued, individuals are subjected to unsafe conditions without proper food. The complaint terms this the \"Hungry Man policy,\" and alleges that jailed individuals are fed one Pop Tart for breakfast, one Pop Tart for lunch, and a frozen meal, such as a Hungry Man meal, for dinner. This amounts to only about 750 calories a day, which is less than half of the calories the average sedentary adult requires, and less than a third of the calories sedentary young men require. Judge George C Hanks, Jr. denied class certification without prejudice on September 18, 2017, without providing a detailed reason in the order. On October 11, 2017, one of the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed his claims. The other two plaintiffs continued with the same case at this point in time. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 23, 2017, adding a magistrate judge, in his individual capacity, and the Chief of Police, in his official capacity, as defendants. The case was temporarily assigned to Magistrate Judge Andrew Edison on June 1, 2018. The Magistrate Judge provided a recommendation against granting the defendant's various motions to dismiss, saying that all plaintiffs in the case had standing and that the injuries alleged in the case amounted to civil rights violations. Though he did not explicitly recommend severing the claims against Hitchcock and Santa Fe at this point, the Magistrate Judge discussed each plaintiff's claims against their respective cities separately. This likely influenced Judge Hanks's decision to sever the two cases when he adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation on September 19. Discovery continued on the case in 2018 and 2019. In May and June of 2019, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff filed a motion opposing it. Judge Hanks scheduled a jury trial for August 26, 2019, and the parties submitted witness and exhibit lists in anticipation of the hearing. However, on August 2, the plaintiff moved for court-ordered mediation, which the Judge granted on August 5. Magistrate Judge Andrew Edison oversaw the mediation, which occurred on August 13, 2019. The following day, the parties entered into a settlement agreement; the terms of the agreement were not publicly disclosed. The order dismissing the case from August 14 noted that if either party filed a motion before September 13, 2019 saying that the agreement could not be implemented, the case would close. No motions were filed, and the case closed on that date.", "summary": "This case, severed from <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15529\">West v. City of Hitchcock</a>, involved individuals jailed for an inability to pay fines suing two cities in south Texas under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. They described the situation as a \"modern day debtor's prison\" and added allegations that they were being underfed in the jail once they entered. Despite almost going to trial, the parties settled the dispute in mediation. The case is closed."}
{"article": "On January 28, 2019, several arrestees from St. Louis filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. None of the four named plaintiffs could afford to pay their monetary release conditions, which ranged from $10,000 to $30,000, and were thus incarcerated at one of the City\u2019s two detention centers without access to showers or medical care and forced to endure allegedly unconscionable conditions, including extreme heat and cold, rat and cockroach infestations, mold, and abuse by guards. The Plaintiffs sued the City of St. Louis, its officers, and judges responsible for setting release conditions in the 22nd Judicial Circuit Court of Missouri under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The Plaintiffs alleged violations of their Equal Protection and Due Process rights through the Defendants\u2019 policy of setting arbitrary monetary release conditions that exceeded an individual\u2019s ability to pay and by detaining the Plaintiffs solely on their inability to pay. They claimed that holding the Plaintiffs in pretrial detention violated their Substantive Due Process rights by failing to consider each detainee\u2019s particular likelihood to appear and their threats of danger to the community. Finally, they claimed that the Defendants violated the Plaintiffs\u2019 Procedural Due Process rights by detaining them for weeks before giving them a hearing or opportunity to challenge or modify their release conditions. Represented by a collection of public interest organizations including ArchCity Defenders, the Advancement Project, Civil Rights Corps, and the Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection, the Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to permanently enjoin the Defendants from implementing a wealth-based pretrial detention system. They sought class certification as \u201call arrestees who are or will be detained in the Medium Security Institution (referred to as \u2018the Workhouse\u2019) or the City Justice Center (\u2018CJC\u2019), operated by the City of St. Louis, post-arrest because they are unable to afford to pay a monetary release condition.\u201d In addition, the Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order requiring the Sheriff and Commissioner of Corrections to release the Plaintiffs unless they were provided a hearing. The case was ultimately assigned to Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. On January 30, 2019, the parties reached a Stipulation Agreement (which obviated the Plaintiffs\u2019 need for a hearing on the request for a temporary restraining order). The Agreement provided that a Judge of the 22nd Judicial Circuit would hold a hearing for each Named Plaintiff regarding his conditions of release before the end of the day on January 31, 2019. The Agreement also provided that the Defendant Judges would comply with the Missouri Supreme Court Rules regarding the conditions of release, as well as a number of procedural requirements, including (1) allowing Plaintiffs to present evidence and contest evidence, (2) having the hearings on the record in open court, and (3) maintaining and making the records available for review. The next day, the Defendant Judges held bond hearings for the named Plaintiffs. Two were released without bond, with other conditions. Two did not receive a reduction in bond. Plaintiff\u2019s counsel posted bail for the two detained Plaintiffs, and on February 5, 2019, they were also released. On February 21, 2019, the Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the Defendant Jail Commissioner from enforcing any bail order that operated as a de facto detention order due to an arrestee\u2019s inability to pay (unless accompanied by a determination that there are no less restrictive alternatives to ensure the arrestee\u2019s future court appearance and public safety). Specifically, the Plaintiffs sought the following procedural protections: <blockquote>1. notice of the nature and significance of the financial information required, 2. a prompt hearing, on the record, regarding the person\u2019s inability to pay, 3. legal counsel at such hearings, 4. findings on the record as to whether the person has the ability to pay, and 5. clear and convincing evidence supporting the necessity of detention. </blockquote>Shortly after, the City Defendants and the Defendant Judges separately filed motions to dismiss the case on March 1, 2019. The City Defendants asserted that they had no authority to establish bail conditions and no policy or custom of silencing arrestees in initial appearances. The Defendant Judges asserted theories of immunity and abstention. On June 11, 2019, the Court issued an opinion granting class certification, denying the Defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss, and granting the Plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction. 2019 WL 2437026. With regard to class certification, the Court decided that the class met all the requirements under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; furthermore, the Court held that although the named Plaintiffs had received bond hearings and were no longer detained, this did not moot the claims of the unnamed members of the class. The class was certified as \u201call arrestees who are or will be detained in the Medium Security Institution (the Workhouse) or the City Justice Center (CJC), operated by the City of St. Louis, post-arrest because they are unable to afford to pay a monetary release condition,\u201d and the Plaintiffs\u2019 counsel was appointed counsel for the class. With regard to the Defendant Judges\u2019 motion to dismiss, the Court found that the Plaintiffs could seek a declaratory judgment against a judge in his or her official capacity under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and that the Plaintiffs could seek injunctive relief because they did not necessarily have an adequate remedy at law. With regard to the City\u2019s motion to dismiss, the Court found that the Plaintiffs had successfully stated a claim for municipal liability under <i>Monell</i> by alleging facts to draw an inference that the constitutional violation occurred as a result of the City\u2019s alleged policy or custom to inform detained individuals that they are not allowed to speak during their initial appearances. Finally, with regard to the Plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court concluded that the motion was meritorious, finding that the Plaintiffs had a high probability of success on their claim and the prolonged incarceration would result in irreparable harm to the Plaintiff class. Both the City Defendants and the Defendant Judges separately appealed the preliminary injunction order to the Eighth Circuit on June 13, 2019, and the docket numbers 19-2251 and 19-2254 were assigned. The Defendants also moved to stay the preliminary injunction pending the appeal. On June 17, 2019, the District Court denied the motion to stay the preliminary injunction. 2019 WL 2509792. However, the District Court granted a limited extension of time to conduct hearings for the approximately 700 arrestees already in detention. The parties were to confer and submit a joint plan for hearings for the backlog detainees. In the meantime, Judge Fleissig ordered the Defendant Judges to conduct 30 hearings a day, Monday through Wednesday. Two days later, both the City Defendants and the Defendant Judges filed motions in the Eighth Circuit to stay the injunction pending the appeal. On July 3, 2019, the Eighth Circuit granted the Defendants' motion for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending the outcome of the appeal. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting preliminary injunction on February 28, 2020. The court (Judges Ralph R. Erickson, Michael J. Melloy, and Jonathan A. Kobes) found, among other things, that in granting preliminary injunction, \"district court resorted to the \u201cextraordinary remedy\u201d of a preliminary injunction without giving adequate consideration to the new rules and their implementation.\" In so doing, \"it interjected the power of the federal government into the Missouri Supreme Court\u2019s attempt to police its own lower courts, without contemplating what this would mean for federal-state relations.\" 950 F.3d 1052. In light of the opinion, the plaintiffs filed a motion for renewed preliminary injunction on April 13, 2020. On May 22, 2020, the defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion to decertify the class. The motions are pending as of August 18, 2020; the case is ongoing.", "summary": "In 2019, several arrestees in St. Louis who were incarcerated because they could not afford to pay their monetary release conditions filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs alleged that the City's policy of detaining arrestees for weeks before they were given a hearing or opportunity to contest the monetary release condition violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, while the Defendants moved to dismiss the case. In June 2019, the Court granted class certification and issued a preliminary injunction requiring a prompt hearing for each plaintiff, ensuring procedural safeguards, and preventing the City from enforcing any bail order that operated as a de facto detention order due to an arrestee\u2019s inability to pay. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "This is a federal criminal case where the government attempted to introduce evidence obtained through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). On August 14, 2018, two operators of a Detroit gas station were indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for the crime of defrauding the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). The defendants allegedly bought SNAP funds from recipients with cash at a discounted price, then fraudulently billed the government for the total value. They were charged with 14 counts of wire fraud (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343). The case was assigned to United States District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. On September 12, 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice notified the criminal defendants in this case that some of the evidence the government intended to use against them was obtained from a FISA warrant obtained under 50 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1801-1812. Both men were released on bail after their arraignment on August 16, 2018. One defendant, represented by a federal public defender, pleaded guilty to a single count of wire fraud on December 6, 2018, prior to filing any pretrial motions. He was sentenced to a year and a day in federal prison on April 18, 2019. The other defendant, represented by private counsel, filed several pretrial motions relating to the FISA evidence. On February 8, 2019, he moved for discovery of the evidence obtained under FISA, as well as the application and order that allowed the government to collect it. The government opposed this motion. On June 6, 2019, it filed a declaration from Attorney General William P. Barr claiming that an adversarial hearing would endanger national security and asking the court to conduct an <i>ex parte</i> and <i>in camera</i> review of the relevant documents. This process is set out in 50 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1806(f) and 1825(g). Later on September 19, 2019, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment against him, claiming that the use of FISA material in this prosecution was improper because he was charged with a domestic criminal offense with no relationship to the normal subjects of FISA: foreign powers or their agents. Judge Edmunds denied both of the defendants' motions in a December 24, 2020 order. After reviewing the FISA warrant and application materials <i>ex parte</i> and <i>in camera</i> she found that they complied with the relevant statutory standards. In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, she also found that FISA materials could be used in cases without a national security connection when the original surveillance was designed to obtain foreign intelligence information. 2020 WL 7664789. As of March 3, 2021, the remaining defendant's case is set for trial on April 13, 2021.", "summary": "This is a federal criminal case about SNAP fraud where the U.S. government moved to introduce evidence obtained using a FISA warrant. In 2018, the two defendants in this case were charged with multiple counts of wire fraud in connection with a scheme to defraud the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. One defendant pleaded guilty before filing any pretrial motions, but the other litigated the use of FISA evidence in a domestic criminal case. The court refused to dismiss the case due to the introduction of FISA evidence. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On September 29, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of an African American employee (plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Maryland, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Hensley Enterprises, Inc. and Mid-Atlantic Lubes, LLC. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, reinstatement of the plaintiff-intervenor, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendants subjected the plaintiff-intervenor to a racially hostile work environment and, in retaliation for plaintiff-intervenor's complaints of racial discrimination, reduced his hours, denied him training, and discharged him. On February 25, 2005, the complainant filed a motion to intervene and a complaint as plaintiff-intervenor; however, the court ruled it as moot due to the consent decree. On April 7, 2005, the District Court (Judge William M. Nickerson) entered a consent decree where the defendants, among other things, agreed to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $30,000.", "summary": "On September 29, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of an African American employee (plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Maryland, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Hensley Enterprises, Inc. and Mid-Atlantic Lubes, LLC. The EEOC alleged that the defendants subjected the plaintiff-intervenor to a racially hostile work environment and, in retaliation for plaintiff-intervenor's complaints of racial discrimination, reduced his hours, denied him training, and discharged him. The parties entered into a consent decree where the defendants, among other things, agreed to pay $30,000."}
{"article": "On January 22, 2018, a mother and her minor son filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of State (DOS) for not granting U.S. citizenship to the child plaintiff because he was born outside of the U.S. to a same-sex dual-nationality couple. Represented by the nonprofit organization Immigration Equality and the private law firm Sullivan & Cromwell (who also represented plaintiffs in <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16417\">a similar lawsuit</a> filed the same day), the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief granting birthright U.S. citizenship to the child. The adult plaintiff, a natural-born U.S. citizen, entered into a civil partnership with her Italian partner in England in 2009. (The partnership was later converted into a marriage after the legalization of same-sex marriage in England in 2015.) While living in England, both women each gave birth to one son, with sperm from a donor. Both the children's birth certificates listed only the names of the two mothers as parents. However, when the mothers applied for U.S. citizenship for the two sons, DOS only recognized the citizenship of the son born to the U.S. citizen, under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) \u00a7 301(g) (8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1401(g)) (governing derivation of U.S. citizenship for a child born abroad to a U.S. citizen). DOS did not recognize U.S. citizenship of the child plaintiff born to the Italian woman because he lacked a biological or adoptive relationship to the U.S. citizen adult plaintiff. According to the plaintiffs, DOS erroneously considered this child born \"out of wedlock\" and not entitled to U.S. citizenship at birth under INA \u00a7 309 (8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1409). The plaintiffs asserted that DOS had a policy of discrimination against the children of same-sex couples. Any child born to a U.S. citizen woman married to a man was born \"in wedlock.\" But a child of a U.S. citizen who was not the biological or adoptive parent, but instead whose spouse conceived through reproductive technology, could be considered born \"out of wedlock.\" The plaintiffs argued that this policy, which largely burdened same-sex couples, was unsupported by the INA's text and intent to keep families together, as well as case law supporting the rights of same-sex married couples. The plaintiffs alleged that DOS's policy and its application to plaintiffs violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) as arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the INA. The case was assigned to Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell, and then reassigned to Judge Emmet G. Sullivan. Status reports filed in May, July, and August 2018 indicated that the parties were continuing to try to resolve the matter without resorting to litigation. On September 3, 2018, the DOS filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. With respect to the constitutional claims, the DOS argued that the plaintiffs failed to state an Equal Protection claim because a legal and biological relationship was required for a child to acquire citizenship from a parent, regardless of sex or sexual orientation of the parent. The DOS argued that the substantive due process right must also fail because the plaintiffs failed to state a fundamental right upon which the government has infringed. The DOS further argued that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not provide a cause of action, and that the plaintiffs APA claim must fail because there is an adequate remedy at law and the Department\u2019s interpretation of \u201cparent\u201d as requiring both a legal and biological relationship was reasonable. On February 25, 2019, the Court ordered both parties to submit supplemental briefs concerning the DOS\u2019s motion to dismiss, in light of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California\u2019s recent ruling in Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo, 2019 BL 63916 (C.D. Cal.), a summary of which can be <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16417\">found here</a>. On March 19, 2019, the parties filed their supplemental memorandum. While the DOS found aspects of that ruling to be flawed, it encouraged the court in the present case to strongly consider the court\u2019s ruling insofar as it dismissed those plaintiffs\u2019 APA and Declaratory Judgment Act claims. The plaintiffs, for their part, distinguished the dismissal of the APA claim in Dvash-Banks from the present case, and argued that the central holding from the Dvash-Banks court supports their argument that the child plaintiff acquired citizenship at birth. In late 2019, the plaintiffs relocated from London to New Jersey. The parties subsequently filed a joint motion to transfer the case from the District Court of D.C. to the District Court of New Jersey. The motion was granted, and the case was transferred on February 14, 2020. The case was assigned to Judge Kevin McNulty and Magistrate Judge James B. Clark. On July 14, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint which added as a cause of action 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1503(a), a provision of the INA that authorizes courts to make de novo determinations and judgments of citizenship. Accordingly, the plaintiffs eliminated their APA claim and instead claimed that the Court can and should use its independent authority under the INA to declare the child plaintiff a U.S. citizen. A pretrial conference was held on September 14, 2020. Three days later, the Court ordered the parties to serve amended disclosures by September 28, 2020; to file a stipulation of agreed facts by September 28, 2020; to file motions for summary judgment by November 18, 2020; to file oppositions to such motions by January 4, 2021; and to file replies by February 4, 2021. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "On Jan. 22, 2018, a mother and her minor son sued DOS for not granting U.S. citizenship to the child plaintiff, because he was born outside of the U.S. to a same-sex dual-nationality couple via reproductive technology. Plaintiffs asserted that DOS had an unconstitutional policy of discrimination against the children of same-sex couples. This case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On July 1, 2013, a lawful permanent resident held in immigration detention in Massachusetts for eight months filed a federal habeas petition under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241, and a class-action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, contending that the prolonged detention of himself and others similarly situated without an individualized bond hearing violated the Immigration & Nationality Act (INA), the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Bail Clause. The plaintiff was represented by Yale's Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization, the ACLU, and private attorneys. The defendants included several Massachusetts sheriffs, the Franklin County Jail, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). District Court Judge Michael A. Ponsor was assigned to the case. While living in the U.S., the plaintiff had been convicted of a number of crimes, including selling an illegal drug, third degree burglary, and failure to appear. As a result of those convictions, he was sentenced in Connecticut state court to twelve years in prison, to be suspended after five. After serving two years, he was paroled on November 13, 2012. On that same day, ICE took the plaintiff into custody and immediately took action to deport him to Jamaica. In removal proceedings, the plaintiff sought relief against deportation under the Convention Against Torture, and on the ground that his removal would be disproportionate to any underlying misconduct. The Immigration Judge denied relief, and after the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded, the Immigration Judge denied relief a second time. On December 29, 2014, the BIA found error and remanded the case once more. On January 9, 2014, the District Court granted the plaintiff's habeas petition and ordered ICE to provide the plaintiff with a bond hearing. The Court determined that 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226(c), the statute governing the detention of noncitizens who have committed certain crimes and are in removal proceedings, imposed a \"reasonableness limit on the length of time an individual can be detained in immigration custody without an individual bond hearing.\" 991 F.Supp.2d 275. The Court held that detention beyond six months, absent an individualized assessment of flight risk or dangerousness, was presumptively unreasonable. In the alternative, the Court found that the individualized circumstances of the plaintiff's case rendered his continued detention unreasonable. The plaintiff also argued in District Court that he had been needlessly shackled in Hartford Immigration Court. On March 6, 2014, the District Court held that ICE's nationwide policy of shackling detainees without an individualized finding of dangerousness violates the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. However, the Judge found that the claim of Mr. Reid himself was moot because he had been released on bond as a result of his successful habeas petition. Finally, because ICE had repeatedly and unlawfully held detainees like the plaintiff for months or years without a bond hearing, the plaintiff had moved to represent a class of similarly situated detainees in Massachusetts (where ICE confines most Connecticut residents). The District Court granted the motion for class certification, defining the class as: all individuals who are or will be detained within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226(c) for over six months and have not been afforded an individualized bond hearing. On May 27, 2014, the District Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff class and ordered class-wide relief. The Court held that the defendants must: (1) cease and desist subjecting all current and future class members to mandatory detention; (2) immediately determine the custody of every current class member under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226(a) and timely provide a bond hearing to every class member that seeks a redetermination of his or her custody by an Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1003.19; (3) determine the custody of every future class member under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226(a), and provide a bond hearing to every class member that seeks a redetermination of his or her custody by an Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1003.19 & 1236.1(d); (4) provide class counsel with a list of identified class members, including their names and alien numbers, and the facility in which they are detained; and (5) submit to the Court a report detailing custody determinations, bond hearing information, etc. The defendants appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals. On April 13, 2016, the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment with respect to the plaintiff, but vacated the judgment as to the class members, and remanded the class action for reconsideration of the class certification. The Court disagreed with the District Court's adoption of the six-month bright line rule regarding detention under \u00a7 1226(c), preferring instead an individualized approach. And while it agreed that in the plaintiff's particular case his prolonged detention had become unreasonable, it determined that the adoption of the six-month rule was \"an essential predicate to class certification\" in the case, and by removing that predicate the class's legitimacy was called into question. 819 F.3d 486. On February 10, 2017, the defendants moved to decertify the class. The District Court denied the request on March 23. On January 2, 2018, the case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but on April 16, the Supreme Court declined to hear the case. On May 11, 2018, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in <i>Jennings v. Rodriguez</i> (<a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12492\">summarized here</a>), where the Court reversed the six-month detention rule that had been adopted by the Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit withdrew its 2016 opinion and vacated the judgment. The District Court\u2019s judgment as to the plaintiff was again affirmed but vacated as to the class members. The class action was remanded for reconsideration of the certification order. On May 30, 2018, the case was reassigned to Chief Judge Patti B. Saris. On June 26, 2018, the defendants again moved to decertify the class. On October 23, 2018, the District Court denied the defendants' motion to decertify the class, and certified the following class: All individuals who are or will be detained within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts or the State of New Hampshire pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226(c) for over six months and have not been afforded an individualized bond or reasonableness hearing. On October 24, 2018, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, including new class representatives and expanding the class to include detainees at an additional county jail in New Hampshire. On January 16, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the individual habeas claims of the newly added named plaintiffs. However, this motion was denied as moot in February as those plaintiffs were no longer in detention. On April 15, 2019, the plaintiffs filed another motion for summary judgment, this time renewing their constitutional claims, which the District Court had not reached in its prior decision. The defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the same day. On July 9, 2019, Judge Saris granted in part and denied in part the parties' motions. 390 F.Supp.3d 201. First, the court agreed that mandatory detention without a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226(c) violates due process when circumstances render the detention unreasonably prolonged in relation to its purpose (ensuring removal of criminal noncitizens). Second, it held that the determination of whether mandatory detention without a bond hearing has become unreasonably prolonged is a fact-specific analysis, rejecting the plaintiffs' request for a bright-line six-month rule. Third, it found that when such detention lasts for more than one year (excluding any delay attributable to the noncitizen), the delay is likely to be unreasonable. Fourth, it held that noncitizens subject to such detention without a bond hearing under \u00a7 1226(c) must bring a habeas petition in federal court to challenge the detention as unreasonably prolonged (if the court agrees, they are entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge where the government carries the burden of proving dangerousness or risk of flight). And fifth, it declared that in making release determinations, immigration courts may not impose excessive bail, must evaluate the individual's ability to pay bond, and must consider alternative conditions of release (e.g., GPS monitoring). The court issued a permanent injunction to enforce its holdings related to the burden at bond hearings and bail setting by immigration courts. On August 6, 2019, the plaintiffs appealed the decision to the First Circuit. The defendants filed a cross-appeal on September 6. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In ruling on the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by a lawful permanent resident and veteran held in immigration detention in Massachusetts, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that prolonged detention without an individualized bond hearing violates immigration statutes and the Constitution and that ICE's nationwide policy of shackling detainees without an individualized finding of dangerousness violates the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, and ordered relief for all ICE detainees in Massachusetts. On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment with respect to the plaintiff, but vacated the judgment as to the class members. After the Supreme Court's decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, the First Circuit withdrew its opinion and vacated the judgment (still affirming the judgment as to the original plaintiff), remanding for reconsideration of the class certification. The class was upheld and the District Court ruled on the plaintiffs' constitutional claims in July 2019, granting a permanent injunction and declaratory relief, but rejecting the request for a bright-line six-month rule for when prolonged detention becomes unconstitutional. Both parties appealed to the First Circuit. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On November 7, 2017, the League of United Latin American Citizens of Arizona (LULAC-Arizona) and the Arizona Students\u2019 Association (ASA) filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued the Secretary of State of Arizona (the Secretary) and the Maricopa County Recorder (the County Recorder) under the National Voter Registration Act and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Campaign Legal Center and the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, sought a declaration that the policies of the Secretary violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs wanted the Secretary to (1) register voters to vote in federal elections regardless of whether they provide documentary proof of citizenship (DPOC); (2) match voters\u2019 data with driving records to verify citizenship before rejecting voters for state and local elections; (3) refrain from requiring voters to re-submit DPOC when they moved counties, and subsequently to re-register; and (4) notify potential voters that they can register to vote in federal elections without DPOC. The plaintiffs claimed that there was undue burden on their right to vote and equal protection. Specifically, LULAC-Arizona and ASA alleged that Arizona treated voter registration applicants differently depending on whether they used Arizona\u2019s state registration form (the \u201cState Form\u201d) or the national registration form (the \u201cFederal Form\u201d), and that Arizona\u2019s arbitrary dual voter registration policies irrationally disenfranchised thousands of eligible Arizona voters and furthered no legitimate state interests. On December 29, 2017, the Secretary responded to the plaintiffs\u2019 claims and denied that Arizona\u2019s voter registration policies violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments or were otherwise illegal under state or federal law. The Secretary asserted that Federal and State Form applicants were not similarly situated for equal protection purposes. The Secretary asserted that Arizona was constitutionally permitted to require those applying to register to vote using the State Form to personally provide DPOC at the time that they submitted their State Form. The Secretary further asserted that there was no constitutional or statutory requirement that Arizona election officials register applicants for federal elections when they had chosen to use the State Form to register to vote rather than the Federal Form. On January 29, 2018, the Court ordered a settlement conference to take place before Judge Eileen S. Willett. According to the later filed Consent Decree, after reviewing the applicable law, the Secretary and County Recorder concluded that current technology can treat State Form applications the same as Federal Form applications, which would make it easier for Arizona\u2019s citizens to register to vote while also providing important safeguards to prevent unlawful voter registration. On 8 February 2018, the Secretary and County Recorder notified LULAC-Arizona and ASA that they wanted to get to an agreement that would resolve the underlying litigation and also benefit Arizona\u2019s citizens. On June 4, 2018, the parties jointly filed a Consent Decree. They agreed that within thirty days after the entry of the Consent Decree, the Secretary was to revise the Procedures Manual to incorporate the terms of the Consent Decree, to provide guidance to the County Recorders to accept State Form applications submitted without DPOC, to enter all such applications in the Database, to immediately register the applicants for federal elections, and to check all State Form applications submitted without DPOC against the driving database. The Secretary was also to make reasonable efforts to better educate the citizens of Arizona concerning their opportunities to register to vote, and to update their website to explain that: (1) the State Form requires valid DPOC for state elections only; (2) submission of a sufficiently complete State Form with valid DPOC will make the applicant a Full Ballot Voter; (3) submission of a sufficiently complete State Form without DPOC will make the applicant a Federal Only Voter; (4) the Federal Form does not require DPOC; (5) submission of the Federal Form without valid DPOC will make the applicant a Federal Only Voter; and (6) submission of the Federal Form with valid DPOC will make the applicant a Full Ballot Voter. On June 18 2018, Judge David G. Campbell approved the consent decree and retained jurisdiction over the case until December 31, 2020 to ensure the decree\u2019s terms were followed. The plaintiffs filed a motion to compel compliance with consent decree on November 9, 2018 and a second motion to compel compliance on November 12, 2018. Both motions requested expedited rulings. Two days later, on November 14, the court denied the motions. As of April 21, 2020, there has been no substantial action in the docket since then. This case remains open for enforcement purposes until the consent decree expires.", "summary": "In November 2017, the League of United Latin American Citizens of Arizona (LULAC-Arizona) and the Arizona Students\u2019 Association (ASA) filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs claimed that there was undue burden on the right to vote and a violation of Equal Protection. In June 2018, the parties reached an agreement that made it less difficult for voters to register. The count continues to monitor implementation of the consent decree."}
{"article": "On July 13, 2017, elderly and dependent residents with physical or cognitive impairments who lived in assisted living facilities, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (\"ADA\") and state law against the corporation that owned the facilities. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's California facilities and services failed to meet accessibility and usability requirements of persons with disabilities. The plaintiffs also asserted that the California facilities are understaffed, which resulted in insufficient care and services. On August 25, 2017, the complaint was amended to include additional plaintiffs. On September 28, 2017, the defendant filed motions to dismiss, strike, and compel arbitration. Among other things, the motions requested that the Court (Judge James Donato) dismiss any claims against communities operated by the defendant in which the plaintiffs had never lived. The defendant also claimed that their residential communities were not covered under Title III of ADA, and thus the plaintiffs' claims failed as a matter of law. If not dismissed, the defendant requested language regarding the understaffing allegations be stricken as the understaffing did not suggest discrimination under ADA. The defendant sought that class allegations be stricken due to a lack of factual allegations, and alternatively sought limitations to the class definition. Additionally, the defendant sought compelled arbitration of various plaintiffs based on arbitration agreements signed by the plaintiffs or their legal representatives. On March 29, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. The amended complaint limited the scope of the injunctions sought to residents with mobility or visual disabilities class, and to residents with disabilities class. On April 16, 2018, the case was reassigned to Judge Haywood Gilliam. On April 19, 2018, the defendants\u2019 renewed their motion to compel arbitration and motioned to dismiss/strike portions of the plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint. On January 25, 2019, the court denied the defendants\u2019 motion to compel arbitration, but partially granted their motion to dismiss, which compelled the plaintiffs to submit a third amended complaint on February 15, 2019 (ECF #90). The defendants moved for an interlocutory appeal concerning the decision to deny arbitration to the 9th Circuit. On March 7, 2019, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Beeler for discovery purposes. On May 2, 2019, the defendants moved for a protective order, which was granted. The court denied the defendants\u2019 motion for an interlocutory appeal on June 5, 2019. Since July 25, 2019 discovery has been ongoing and the case has continued.", "summary": "On July 13, 2017, plaintiffs, elderly or dependent residents with physical or cognitive impairments who lived in the defendant's assisted living facilities, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (\"ADA\") and state law against the corporation that owned the facilities. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's California facilities and services fail to meet accessibility and usability requirements of persons with disabilities. The plaintiffs also asserted that the California facilities are understaffed, which resulted in insufficient care and services. Currently, the case has been in discovery since July 25, 2019 ad the case has continued."}
{"article": "On March 25, 2009, the United States Department of Justice filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Virginia on behalf of African-American applicants to entry-level firefighter positions. The plaintiff alleged that, from 2004-2008, the City of Portsmouth fire department's practice of requiring applicants to pass an examination in order to be considered for an entry-level firefighter positions had a disparate impact on the hiring of African-Americans, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. They sought injunctive relief to stop the defendant's discriminatory hiring practices, and damages for those who have been impacted by them. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that, since 2004, the city has administered a standardized test that applicants must pass with a minimum score of 70%, in order to be considered for hire into entry-level firefighter positions. The results of the test are then combined with scores from a personal interview to rank candidates for selection. The test passage rate of white test-takers was twice that of African Americans. The test is not essential to the job of firefighting and it prematurely eliminated 86 African Americans from the application process. On July 23, 2009, following a hearing on the matter, the District Court (Judge Mark S. Davis) ruled that a joint settlement agreement was fair and that the court would enforce it. The agreement held that the city could not use any selection method for entry-level firefighting positions that had a disparate impact on African Americans or was not job related (preferably both). It could, however, use the 2008 test to fill essential vacancies as long as they did not do so in a way that maintained the discriminatory impact. After these essential hires the city must use a new selection method. Both of these conditions were subject to either US or court approval. According to the settlement agreement, the city must also pay out a total of $145,000 to African-American applicants who failed the test between 2004 and 2008, but who did well on the reading comprehension part of the test. The city had to notify these former applicants and they, in turn, had to make a claim for an award out of the $145,000. Following a second fairness hearing, on April 29, 2010, the District Court (Judge Davis) set the final list of people eligible for this relief. The city also had to make ten priority hires of African Americans who were discriminatorily eliminated from the application process, based on the list of people eligible for monetary relief. These applicants must finish all of the nondiscriminatory parts of the application to be hired, but once hired they would receive retroactive seniority regarding pay and benefits. On January 29, 2013, the District Court (Judge Davis) terminated the consent decree because the city had implemented a nondiscriminatory hiring practice with US approval, and they had met all of their obligations to individuals by either paying them their damage award or hiring them with the full benefits of retroactive seniority.", "summary": "On March 25, 2009, the United States Department of Justice filed a complaint alleging that from 2004-2008, the City of Portsmouth, VA fire department's practice of requiring applicants to pass an examination in order to be considered for an entry-level firefighter positions had a disparate impact on the hiring of African-Americans, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The parties entered a joint settlement requiring the city to implement nondiscriminatory hiring practice with US approval, and they had to pay damages to or hire these former applicants. On January 29, 2013, the court terminated the consent decree because the parties fulfilled their obligations."}
{"article": "On January 24, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\"), on behalf of female social workers, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District Court of Indiana, under the Equal Pay Act as incorporated into the Fair Labor Standards Act, against School City of Hammond. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, liquidated damages, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant paid its female social workers at a rate less than that paid to similarly situated males. On October 26, 2005, the District Court (Judge Philip P. Simon) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the two female complainants a total of $27,000.", "summary": "On January 24, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, on behalf of female social workers, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District Court of Indiana, under the Equal Pay Act against School City of Hammond. The EEOC claimed that the defendant paid its female social workers at a rate less than that paid to similarly situated males. The parties entered into a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the two female complainants a total of $27,000."}
{"article": "On April 13, 2010, rejected U.S. Census Bureau job applicants filed an employment discrimination class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by a coalition of public interest attorney organizations and private counsel, alleged that Census hiring procedures, which pre-screened all applicants with arrest records, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The Census screened out applicants whose names turn up in an FBI database, indicating an arrest record regardless of whether the arrest led to a criminal conviction or to any action at all. Applicants were required to provide the Census with official documents from any criminal case that shows up on their record within 30 days of their application. The plaintiffs claimed the 30-day letter requirement was unduly burdensome - if not impossible - to comply with since the documentation requested may have been sealed, expunged, lost, or destroyed due to age. Because African Americans and Latinos were more likely to have arrest records than whites, the plaintiffs claimed the hiring policies discriminated against people of color in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. This was supported by a letter the EEOC sent the Census in 2009 criticizing the policy, warning that it may be in violation of Title VII. The plaintiffs also claimed that the compliance procedures did not distinguish among applicants with recent, serious convictions and those with records of long-ago, minor - often non-criminal - conduct, and that the requirement therefore had no job-related relevance. The plaintiffs requested injunctive relief to alter the Census hiring practices, eliminating the 30-day letter requirement and other modifications to comply with the Uniform Guidelines for Employee Selection Procedures and related EEOC Guidance. They also requested that the defendant eradicate the effects of past and present unlawful employment practices by providing back pay and equal employment opportunities for all Class members. The plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on June 28, 2013. On December 16, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. On July 1, 2014, the District Court for the Southern District of New York (Magistrate Judge Frank Maas) issued an order with respect to both motions. Judge Maas granted the defendant's motion in part and denied in part. Three named plaintiffs were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Maas granted in part and denied in part motion for class certification. He certified the class, consisting only of African-Americans, who sought temporary employment during the 2010 census and alleged harm suffered from the 30-day letter. However, since two of the three plaintiffs Judge Maas dismissed were the only Latino applicants, he did not include Latinos in the class certification originally. The class was certified for the purposes of determining liability and affording injunctive relief, but not for resolving damages. On October 2, 2014, Judge Maas re-instated one of the Latino plaintiffs, and certified the class as representing all African American and Latino candidates who applied for temporary employment to the 2010 Decennial Census and claim they were harmed by the 30-day requirement, adjudication criteria, or both. Subsequent to the Court's order, the parties entered into negotiations in the hopes of reaching a settlement. On February 8, 2016, the parties filed a joint letter with the Court stating they had concluded negotiations and reached an agreement that was subject to the Department of Justice's approval. In April 2016 the parties submitted the settlement agreement to the Court and Judge Maas issued a preliminary approval on April 19, 2016. Judge Maas ordered a final approval of the settlement on September 20, 2016. In the settlement, the Defendant agreed to pay 15 million dollars in damages and attorneys fees. In addition, the parties jointly selected independent organizations to work together as independent consultants to Census relative to the selection and hiring of temporary employees for the 2020 decennial census.", "summary": "On April 13, 2010, rejected U.S. Census Bureau (Census) job applicants filed an employment discrimination class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of African American and Latino applicants to the Census. The plaintiffs alleged that the Census unlawfully screens out applicants who have arrest records, regardless of whether the arrest led to a criminal conviction or to any action at all. On September 20, 2016, the Court certified the parties' Settlement Agreement in which the Defendant agreed to pay 15 million dollars in damages and alter their hiring procedures."}
{"article": "On June 20, 2005, the San Francisco District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought this action in the Northern District of California under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Amelco Electric S.F., Inc. and Amelco Corporation. The EEOC, who brought suit on behalf of a male electrician and other similarly situated employees who worked for Amelco, asked the court for injunctive relief and monetary damages, claiming that Amelco had subjected its employees to disparate treatment, a hostile work environment, and termination because of their sex, race, national origin, and religion. The EEOC further alleged that Amelco retaliated against an employee and fired him for his complaints of discrimination. The EEOC filed a similar action on behalf of different Amelco employees on May 4, 2006 (see EEOC v. Amelco Electric Company, Inc, EE-CA-0013 on this site). Though the cases were not consolidated, the parties agreed to settle both matters simultaneously. The Settlement Agreement, which took effect on August 28, 2006, bound Amelco to not retaliate against the individuals who complained of discrimination the EEOC, and awarded the plaintiffs $125,000.", "summary": "In June 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this suit in the Northern District of California under Title VII against Amelco Electric S.F., Inc. and Amelco Corporation, claiming Amelco had discriminated against its employees because of the sex, race, national origin, and religion. The parties settled on August 28, 2006, and plaintiffs were awarded $125,000."}
{"article": "On February 10, 2011, the United States Department of Justice (Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section) released a letter of findings detailing the results of its investigation into the institutionalization of individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities in Virginia. The investigation focused specifically on the Central Virginia Training Center (CVTC), an intermediate care facility for persons with developmental disabilities (ICF/DD), but also considered the statewide institutionalization of this population (DOJ's involvement began as an investigation of CVTC pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act but later expanded to include the statewide system's compliance with the ADA). The DOJ concluded that Virginia was systematically violating the Americans with Disabilities Act under the 1999 Supreme Court precedent, <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11643\">Olmstead v. LC</a>, in forcing the unnecessary institutionalization of people with disabilities. The DOJ found a lack of sufficient community-based services available to this population, an unreasonably long waiting list for Medicaid waiver services, inadequate discharge planning at CVTC, and other deficiencies. According to the DOJ, these policies lead to a situation in which individuals with developmental disabilities were housed unnecessarily in institutions and were unable to either remain in the community or transition from an institution to a community placement. Nearly one year later, the DOJ and Virginia entered into a settlement agreement to remedy the deficiencies outlined in the findings letter. The DOJ filed a complaint and settlement agreement in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on January 26, 2012. The court (Judge John A. Gibney, Jr.) gave preliminary approval to the agreement and allowed interested parties to submit letters and amici curiae briefs to the court in advance of the final approval of the settlement. On March 2, 2012, several individuals then living in institutions filed a motion to intervene in the litigation, claiming that they wished to remain in institutions and that the proposed settlement would force the closing of their institutions. The court found that they had adequately demonstrated that they stood to be affected by the outcome of the litigation and granted their intervention in the case on May 9, 2012. 282 F.R.D. 403. The intervenors then filed a motion to dismiss, challenging the United States' authority to bring the claim to enforce the ADA. On June 5, 2012, the court denied the intervenors' motion to dismiss, finding that DOJ's ADA enforcement authority included the ability to investigate and file suit in federal court as had occurred here, and that the government had followed all necessary procedures. On August 23, 2012, the court finalized its approval of the settlement between the United States and Virginia. Under the settlement, Virginia agreed to increase its community-based services for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities. The goal of the agreement was to prevent individuals living in their communities from being forced into institutions, and to allow those living in institutions to transition to their communities. Virginia agreed to create additional slots on its Home and Community Based Services Medicaid waiver programs and to allow those on the waitlist to begin receiving services. The state also agreed to provide crisis services and employment training. Reports from the independent reviewer over the next three years noted significant progress in certain areas, including the discharge of adults from institutions and development of adult crisis services. However, in other areas, progress lagged. On September 23, 2015, the DOJ submitted a motion for a court-ordered schedule of implementation. Shortly afterward, the Intervenors filed a statement of interest asking that the court suspend the closure of remaining institutions until the State could show that adequate financial and community support structures were in place. Before the court made a determination on the DOJ's schedule motion, the parties negotiated and agreed on specific implementation schedules. The DOJ subsequently withdrew its motion in January 2016. On August 4, 2017, the Intervenors filed a motion for injunctive relief. The Intervenors alleged that several former residents who had never voluntarily consented to a move from the State Training Centers were coerced by the State into transitioning into the community. They asked that the court permanently enjoin the State from forcibly removing residents from Training Centers and that it issue a declaratory judgment stating that the State had acted in violation of state laws. A hearing on the motion took place on November 6, 2017. On February 2, 2018, the court (Judge Gibney) denied the Intervenors' motion. The court found that though the Intervenors had standing to pursue their motion for injunctive relief, the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the motion because the Intervenors' claims did not form part of the same case or controversy as the DOJ's ADA claims and, further, because Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity prevents federal courts from enjoining states based on state law claims. Even if it had jurisdiction, the court found that the Intervenors did not meet the standard for an award of injunctive relief. The court began the process of terminating the case in 2019. After a hearing on April 23, 2019, however, Judge Gibney found that the defendants had not complied with the terms of the consent decree, and that monitoring should continue. As of April 14, 2020, this case is ongoing and the independent reviewer continues to submit reports on compliance with the settlement agreement.", "summary": "The United States Department of Justice conducted an investigation pursuant to CRIPA and the ADA into the institutionalization of individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities in Virginia. After finding systemic ADA violations, DOJ and Virginia entered into a settlement agreement to increase community-based services and ultimately prevent unnecessary institutionalization. Monitoring of the settlement continues."}
{"article": "This civil rights class action challenges the burden of proof and other procedural issues within immigration court bond hearings. In 2019, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested the named plaintiffs in this case and initiated deportation proceedings. ICE placed each one in immigration detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226(a), so they were eligible for release on bond. (Under a different statutory provision, 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), applicable based on criminal history or national security grounds, some noncitizens facing deportation are categorically ineligible for bond.) The government\u2019s bond hearings under \u00a7 1226(a) placed the burden of proof regarding flight risks or dangers to the community on the detained person, not the government. Some of the named plaintiffs had not been afforded a bond hearing yet; others had been denied bond. This case was filed on June 13, 2019, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts as a habeas corpus petition and putative class action complaint against the Department of Justice, which is responsible for operating the immigration courts. Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of detainees detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226(a), \u201ceither within Massachusetts or otherwise within the jurisdiction of the Boston Immigration Court.\u201d The case was assigned to Chief Judge Patti Saris. Plaintiffs\u2019 lawyers included a private firm, the ACLU National Prison Project, and two state ACLU affiliates (New Hampshire and Massachusetts). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They argued that the burden of proof in immigration bond properly lays not on the detainee but on the government. Second, they sought implementation of a \u201cclear and convincing evidence\u201d standard; that is, they argued that bond should be granted unless there was clear and convincing evidence of a safety or flight risk need for ongoing detention. Third, they claimed that alternative conditions of release must be considered by immigration courts. Finally, they claimed that immigration courts must consider detainees\u2019 ability to pay when they set bond. On August 6, 2019, the court certified two classes, each for detainees held under \u00a71226(a)--one for those who had not yet received a bond hearing and the other for those who had received a hearing but had been denied bond. 395 F.Supp.3d 135. On November 27, 2019, Judge Saris ruled on the request for an injunction, granting it in part and denying it in part. First, the Court agreed with the plaintiffs that the burden of proof should be placed on the government to prove that the detainee was dangerous or a flight risk. Second, it held that immigration courts must evaluate detainees' ability to pay. Third, immigration courts must consider alternative conditions of release including GPS monitoring. However, the Court rejected the plaintiffs\u2019 \"clear and convincing evidence\" proposal, instead of holding that the \u201cpreponderance of evidence\u201d standard would apply. The Court rejected plaintiffs\u2019 request for re-dos on all the bond hearings members of the post-hearing class that had lost but ordered the government to report various facts to class counsel including whether a new bond hearing was held under the injunction\u2019s rules. 415 F.Supp.3d 258. Both sides appealed. Plaintiffs sought review of the District Court\u2019s \u201cpreponderance of evidence\u201d ruling. The government challenged the rest of the decision. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "In this class action covering the Boston Immigration Court (which covers immigration detainees in Massachusetts and other parts of New England), the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts ordered numerous procedural changes to immigration court bond hearings. First, the Court put the burden on the government, not the detainee, to prove a flight risk or danger to the public. Second, immigration courts must consider the detainee's ability to pay. Finally, immigration courts must consider alternative conditions of release. Appeal is pending."}
{"article": "On December 4, 2014, eight female inmates of Muskegon County Jail (MCJ) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Muskegon County, Michigan. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Michigan and private counsel, sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages, claiming that the conditions of confinement at the MCJ were inhumane and unconstitutional. The plaintiffs brought the case as a class action; it was assigned to Judge Janet T. Neff. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that, in addition to being exposed to unsafe physical conditions, male guards at the prison are permitted to watch female inmates while they change clothes, shower, and use the bathroom. The plaintiff also alleged they were referred to by slurs and often denied clean underwear and basic sanitary items such as toilet paper and feminine hygiene products. These conditions, the plaintiffs contended, violated the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and the prohibition against punishment of pretrial detainees under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On the same day the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction and to certify the class. The plaintiffs sought an order requiring the defendants to take immediate measures to repair broken and backed-up plumbing and other failures of basic infrastructure, treat and exterminate infestations of mold and vermin, and implement a regular system of inspection, maintenance and repair to prevent these and related conditions. The plaintiffs also sought for the defendants to provide female prisoners with privacy from being routinely viewed by male prison staff, to provide women with reasonable access to toilet paper, feminine hygiene products, clean undergarments, etc., and to provide these prisoners with out-of-cell exercise opportunities for at least one hour per day. The motion for class certification consisted of four classes: (1) all current and future inmates at the Muskegon County Jail (\u201cMCJ\u201d), represented by plaintiff Stashia Collins, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from unconstitutional conditions of confinement that affect all inmates (Overcrowding Injunctive Class); (2) all current and future female inmates at MCJ, represented by Ms. Collins, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from unconstitutional conditions of confinement specific to female inmates (Female Injunctive Class); (3) all inmates incarcerated at MCJ within three years prior to the filing of the complaint in this case, represented by the plaintiffs, seeking damages for harm suffered as a result of unconstitutional conditions of confinement that affect all inmates (Overcrowding Damages Class); and (4) all female inmates incarcerated at MCJ within three years prior to the filing of the complaint in this case, represented by the plaintiffs, seeking damages for harm suffered as a result of unconstitutional conditions of confinement specific to female inmates (Female Damages Class). On February 6, 2015, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding three additional named plaintiffs. On July 1, 2015, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the amended complaint, arguing that it failed to state any plausible Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claims. On September 11, 2015, Judge Neff granted in part and denied in part the defendant\u2019s motion. 2015 WL 9906265. The court dismissed Count III (Denial of Access to Feminine Hygiene Products, Toilet Paper and Adequate Underwear and Other Clothing) and Count IV (Severe Overcrowding and Other Abysmal Conditions) but retained Count I (Violation of Privacy and Bodily Integrity) and Count II (Denial of Exercise). In the same order, Judge Neff denied without prejudice the plaintiffs\u2019 pending motions for class certification, a preliminary injunction, and expert testimony in support of a preliminary injunction but left the plaintiffs opportunity to re-file to conform to the court\u2019s standards. The plaintiffs appealed this order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit insofar as the district court\u2019s order denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction, granted the defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment with respect to Count III, and denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for class certification. On May 12, 2016, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal as it pertained to the motion for summary judgment and the motion for class certification but the appeal was allowed to proceed as it related to the denial of preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of this decision but the motion was denied on December 12, 2016. On March 31, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for joinder of four new plaintiffs and partial renewal of class certification. Specifically, the plaintiffs requested certification of a class of all current and future female inmates at the Muskegon County Jail (MCJ) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On February 7, 2017, the court entered an order holding these motions in abeyance. On October 19, 2016, the parties agreed to dismiss Count V of the complaint and filed an order of dismissal. The court granted this motion that same day. The following year, the parties were able to come to a settlement agreement. On May 31, 2017, the parties had a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody, where the parties reviewed their settlement. The agreement, consisted of monetary and injunctive relief. Each plaintiff was to be paid damages in the amount of $20,000 and the defendants were required to change policies regarding dispersal of medication, hygiene products, exercise, and cross-gender viewing. The agreement dictated that, pending final approval by the court, this case would be dismissed with prejudice and the appeal and the motion for class certification would be withdrawn. Having settled, the parties filed a proposed stipulation and order of dismissal with prejudice which the court granted on July 24, 2017. The district court did not retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement due to it being a private settlement agreement. That same day, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal. There has been no other activity on the docket as of June 27, 2018.", "summary": "In December 2014, eight female inmates of Muskegon County Jail filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against Muskegon County, Michigan. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Michigan and private counsel, sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages, claiming that the conditions of confinement at the jail are inhumane and unconstitutional. In June 2017, the parties settled and voluntarily dismissed the case with prejudice."}
{"article": "The Department of Justice filed suit on May 7, 1996, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against a mortgage company subsidiary of Fleet Mortgage Financial Group alleging that the company engaged in discriminatory lending practices. The Department of Justice specifically argued that the defendant charged African American and Hispanic borrowers higher prices for home mortgage loans than comparatively qualified white borrowers by requiring African American and Hispanic borrowers to pay higher interest rates or upfront fees. These allegations surfaced after the Federal Reserve completed a routine compliance check with two of Fleet Mortgage Financial Group's branches in Westbury, New York and Woodbridge, New Jersey. The parties settled the case on June 24, 1996, which was approved by the court. Under the settlement agreement, the defendant was required to establish a four million dollar settlement fund to compensate minority borrowers who the parties agreed had paid higher prices for loans between August 1993 and June 1994. The fund was also to contribute to a fair lending outreach campaign. In addition, the defendant was permanently enjoined from continuing such discriminatory practices. The case is now closed.", "summary": "The Department of Justice filed suit on May 7, 1996, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against a mortgage company subsidiary of Fleet Mortgage Financial Group alleging that it engaged in discriminatory lending practices. The case settled."}
{"article": "On August 22, 2012, two individuals incarcerated by the Illinois Department of Corrections filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under the 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201, et seq., against the State of Illinois. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Uptown People's Law Center, alleged that prison employees confiscated several items of personal property from their cells. They asked the Court for a judgment declaring that the confiscation constituted a taking without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment and the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and directing the defendant to either return or provide just compensation for the confiscated property. The plaintiffs, incarcerated at the Stateville Correctional Center (\"Stateville\") purchased several items from the prison commissary, including a typewriter and multiple fans, that had been approved for prisoner use. In July 2012, the Warden of Stateville reversed course and mandated the confiscation of all typewriters and any fan in excess of one per inmate. On October 3, 2013, the District Court (Judge Thomas Durkin) granted the defendant's Motion to Dismiss and dismissed all counts with prejudice. 2013 WL 5497244. The Court found that the removal of the items from plaintiffs' cells did not constitute a taking. It determined there was no deprivation of property since incarceration entails limitations upon certain rights, including the right to possess property. The Court also found that the plaintiffs did not enter into a contract with the state when they purchased their items from the prison commissary. On October 29, 2013, plaintiffs appealed their case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Oral arguments were heard on September 10, 2014 before Judges Easterbrook, Tinder, and Wood. On February 17, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that the District Court was correct in dismissing the action, but the dismissal should have been without prejudice.", "summary": "In August 2012, prisoners at the Stateville Correctional Center filed a lawsuit against the Illinois Department of Corrections, alleging that prison officials had confiscated their property in violation of the Takings Clause and Contract Clause of the Constitution. In October 2013, the Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss all counts. Plaintiffs' appealed and to Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed the District Court's decision."}
{"article": "On February 7, 2013, four immigrants born in Mexico with prior arrests for alleged violations of an Alabama state law prohibiting fishing without a license filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The plaintiffs sued the Alabama Department of Homeland Security (\"ADHS\") and Alabama's Administrative Office of the Court (\"AOC\") under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, SPLC, NILC, and private counsel, challenged enforcement of HB 658 \u00a7 5, which required the AOC to compile the names and identifying information of undocumented immigrants who had been detained for any violation of state law and ADHS to post that information for the public on its website. They sought a declaratory judgment that the enforcement of HB 658 \u00a7 5 violated the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution and the Due Process Clause of Amendment XIV of the U.S. Constitution and to enjoin the defendants from enforcing HB 658 \u00a7 5. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Section 5 of H.B. 658 Act No. 2012-491, which is codified as Ala. Code \u00a7 31-13-32, was preempted by federal law in violation of the Supremacy Clause, and also violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 of HB 658 required the AOC to compile, and the ADHS post on its public website, the names and other identifying information of \"unlawfully present alien[s]\" who were detained for any violation of state law and who then appeared in a state court. The four plaintiffs feared that their prior arrests and scheduled appearance in court for fishing without a license would enable the defendants to publicize their names on this list that would result in various consequences such as the denial of bail, denial of employment opportunities, and a significant loss of privacy. The proposed class certification was: \"All persons who are or will be subject to Section 5 of HB 658, Ala. Code \u00a7 31-13-32\". On February 8, 2013, the case was reassigned from District Court Judge W. Harold Albritton, III to U.S. District Judge William Keith Watkins. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Charles S. Coody. On July 31, 2013, the defendants' motion to dismiss was granted by Judge Watkins. The court identified the following impediments to the plaintiffs\u2019 standing: (1) the plaintiffs failed to allege that they were \"unlawfully present aliens\" subject to the consequences prescribed by Ala. Code \u00a7 31-13-32, the state law which they challenged as unconstitutional; and (2) the plaintiffs failed to allege that they were \"unlawfully present aliens\" at the crucial times identified by the law \u2013 i.e., when they were detained by law enforcement and when they appeared in court for a violation of state law. Without asserting they were unlawfully present aliens, the plaintiffs could not show that they faced the threat of imminent injury. The court afforded the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to cure these impediments to standing. The plaintiffs did not amend their complaint, but filed a motion requesting that the court reconsider and vacate its July 31, 2013 opinion and order. On January 6, 2014, the motion for reconsideration was granted and the order of July 31, 2013 was vacated as the plaintiffs should not have been required to plead that they were in fact \"unlawfully present aliens.\" On May 4, 2014, Judge Watkins granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of standing because the plaintiffs failed to allege that they were unlawfully present aliens. The plaintiffs requested reconsideration of that ruling. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider, reinstated the previously pending motions, and directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing. On May 20, 2014, Judge Watkins granted the plaintiffs' request to withhold their identities from the public but not from the defendants. On July 3, 2014, Judge Watkins denied the class certification without prejudice with leave to refile on or before September 5, 2014. The parties began mediation proceedings on September 11, 2014, and they eventually reached a private settlement agreement. Under the settlement, the AOC agreed not to forward information it collected under \u00a7 31-13-32 to other government agencies except the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency; in turn, the Agency promised not to publish the \u00a7 31-13-32 information it received from the AOC. On October 10, 2014, the judge dismissed the case but retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement's terms. The agreement was to be in effect for 5 years (from October 2014 until October 2019), and there has been no further activity on the docket since October 2014. Because the agreement expired in 2019, the case is presumably now closed.", "summary": "Four immigrants born in Mexico with prior arrests for alleged violation of an Alabama state law filed a class action lawsuit alleging that that their prior arrests and scheduled appearances in court would enable defendants to publicize the plaintiffs' names on the online list pursuant to Alabama's legislation of HB 658 \u00a75 of \"unlawfully present aliens\". The parties entered a settlement agreement set to end in 2019."}
{"article": "On November 23, 2015, five Texas Planned Parenthoods (provider plaintiffs) and ten Medicaid patients of Planned Parenthood (patient plaintiffs) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued the Executive Commissioner and the Inspector General of the Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC) under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, asked the court for class action certification; declaratory judgments; temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctions; and attorney's fees. The plaintiffs claimed that HHSC had violated the Medicaid Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by barring the provider plaintiffs from the Medicaid program. Specifically, the plaintiffs explained that on October 21, 2015, the HHSC notified the provider plaintiffs that HHSC would soon terminate the Provider Plaintiffs' Medicaid Provider Agreement. The HHSC justified the termination using false allegations, which were primarily based on misleading videos leaked by anti-choice activists. The HHSC claimed that the case was premature because they had not yet terminated the provider plaintiffs' Medicaid Provider Agreement. On January 27, 2016, U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks stayed the case pending a final termination letter. For nearly a year, the case lay relatively dormant. In this time, Texas and the U.S. Congress conducted separate investigations into the allegations against Planned Parenthood raised by the misleading videos. Planned Parenthood was repeatedly found free of wrongdoing. Nonetheless, on December 20, 2016, HHSC sent a final Notice of Termination to each provider plaintiff. On January 17, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint outlining the events since the order to stay the case. That day the court held a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent termination. On January 19, 2017, Judge Sparks entered an order temporarily enjoining the defendants from terminating the provider plaintiffs' Medicaid Provider Agreements until February 21, 2017. On February 21, 2017, Judge Sparks granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the defendants from terminating the Provider Plaintiffs' Medicaid Provider Agreements. The defendants appealed the preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs then moved to withdraw their motion for class certification, which the court granted without prejudice on March 24, 2017. On March 30, 2017, the defendants submitted an appeal regarding the order granting the plaintiff\u2019s preliminary motion to the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court on January 17, 2019. 913 F.3d 551. The panel determined that while the individual plaintiffs had a private right of action, the district court erred by failing to defer to agency's findings, by accepting evidence beyond agency record and by conducting de novo review. Judge Jones wrote a concurrence urging a rehearing en banc to reconsider whether the individual plaintiffs did have a private right of action on behalf of Medicaid patients to challenge the termination of their providers\u2019 contracts. The defendants filed a petition for rehearing en banc on January 31, 2019. The next day, the defendants filed a petition to stay the district court\u2019s preliminary injunction pending the rehearing, which was granted on February 4, 2019. 914 F.3d 994. On February 4, 2019, the en banc court granted rehearing on the court\u2019s own motion, therefore appellants\u2019 petition for rehearing en banc filed on January 31, 2019, was denied as moot. 914 F.3d 994. The same day, the plaintiffs submitted an opposition to the defendants' stay application. In the alternative, the plaintiffs requested to defer the effective date in order to seek a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. On Feb 15, 2019, the appellant\u2019s motion to stay the district court\u2019s injunction pending the en banc consideration was ordered to be carried by the Fifth Circuit on behalf of the en banc court. The en banc oral argument was held on May 14, 2019. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On November 23, 2015, five Texas Planned Parenthoods and ten Medicaid patients of Planned Parenthood filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued the Executive Commissioner and the Inspector General of the Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC), claiming violations of the Medicaid Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by barring Planned Parenthood from the Medicaid program. On February 21, 2017, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, but the Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court on January 17, 2019. The defendants petitioned for rehearing and to stay the preliminary injunction pending the rehearing. On February 4, 2019, the en banc court granted rehearing on the court\u2019s own motion and granted the stay. The en banc oral argument was held on May 14, 2019. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On Feb. 22, 2018, eight Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients from El Salvador and Haiti, as well as the Massachusetts immigrants' rights organization Centro Presente, filed this lawsuit. Represented by the Lawyers\u2019 Committee for Civil Rights and Economic Justice, the plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s recent revocation of TPS for Salvadorians and Haitians living in the United States. The plaintiffs alleged that DHS violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking mandamus (for DHS to carry out the INA's procedures for reviewing TPS), injunctive relief, and a declaratory judgment. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Secretary of Homeland Security may find that a country's conditions temporarily prevent its nationals from returning safely, or that the country is unable to adequately handle the return of nationals. In such a situation, the Secretary may grant TPS to these nationals for six to eighteen months, with a possible extension following a review of country conditions. TPS allows recipients to remain and work legally in the United States. DHS had initiated TPS for Salvadorians and for Haitians following devastating earthquakes in those countries in 2001 and 2010 respectively. After each 18-month period since then, DHS had reviewed the program, determined that the nationals could not yet return safely to their countries (due to severe safety, health, housing, and infrastructure problems, exacerbated by subsequent natural disasters), and extended the program. This policy, however, ended with DHS's announcement that it would soon terminate TPS for Haitians (effective July 2019) and for Salvadorians (effective Sept. 2019). The plaintiffs argued that DHS's decision to end the program was based not on a change in conditions in El Salvador or Haiti, but rather on invidious discrimination toward black and Latino immigrants on the basis of race, ethnicity, and/or national origin. This racial animus allegedly appeared in President Trump's public remarks disparaging Haitians and Latin American immigrants. This case was assigned to Judge Denise J. Casper. On May 9, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding additional claims that the government violated the APA. The government moved to dismissed the complaint, the court (Judge Casper) granted it in part and denied in part on July 23, 2018. 332 F.Supp.3d 393. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' mandamus claim because they had not yet exhausted all other avenues of relief. Otherwise, the court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that it had subject matter jurisdiction and that President Trump did not have to be dismissed as a defendant at this stage. The court also held that the government had not proven elements to show its changed policy will survive review under the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard, including displaying awareness of its changed position, demonstrating good reasons for the new policy, and displaying awareness of the reliance upon the longstanding prior policy. The court also held that the plaintiffs' constitutional claims should not be dismissed, finding \"that the combination of a disparate impact on particular racial groups, statements of animus by people plausibly alleged to be involved in the decision-making process, and an allegedly unreasoned shift in policy\" were sufficient to suggest the policy shift was motivated by discriminatory purposes. With the government shutdown, the defendants filed a motion to stay all proceedings. The plaintiffs took no position on the request for a limited stay, noting that the <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16815 \">Ramos v. Nielsen</a> preliminary injunction offered some protection with a Ninth Circuit appeal pending. The court granted the limited stay on January, 17, 2019 and a joint motion to extend discovery. Since then, the parties have vigorously pursued discovery; this case is ongoing.", "summary": "On Feb. 22, 2018, eight Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients from El Salvador and Haiti, as well as the Massachusetts immigrants' rights organization Centro Presente, filed this lawsuit. Represented by the Lawyers\u2019 Committee for Civil Rights and Economic Justice, the plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s recent revocation of TPS for Salvadorians and Haitians living in the United States. The plaintiffs alleged that DHS violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking mandamus (for DHS to carry out the INA's procedures for reviewing TPS), injunctive relief, and a declaratory judgment. The government moved to dismissed the complaint, the court (Judge Casper) granted it in part and denied in part on July 23, 2018. 332 F.Supp.3d 393. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' mandamus claim because they had not yet exhausted all other avenues of relief. Otherwise, the court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that it had subject matter jurisdiction and that President Trump did not have to be dismissed as a defendant at this stage."}
{"article": "On December 21, 2016, after a two-year investigation, the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division released its findings that Louisiana unnecessarily relied on nursing facilities to service people with mental disabilities in violation of the community integration mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as well as the Supreme Court ruling in Olmstead v. L.C. The investigation focused on Louisiana residents with serious mental disabilities who received care and services in nursing facilities. The DOJ found that individuals who needed to obtain health services from the state for serious mental disabilities were forced to live in nursing facilities to receive proper care. This system isolated these individuals from their communities when they could live in an integrated setting if given access to adequate evidence-based community services. The DOJ found that around 4,000 residents with serious mental disabilities were housed in nursing facilities in Louisiana each year. These residents were generally younger, had less nursing needs and lived in the facilities longer than a typical nursing home resident. Further, the report alleged that Louisiana could likely serve these individuals more effectively and for less money in their communities. The findings letter emphasized four key conclusions: <li>That individuals with serious mental disabilities are confined to nursing home care in Louisiana because the state does not adequately arrange community-based services or properly identify those who would benefit from such services.</li><li>That individuals who would benefit from community-based services don\u2019t know these services are available because the state has not told them.</li><li>That many of the individuals receiving service in nursing facilities can successfully live in the community rather than institutions.</li><li>And that other states successfully provide these services without unnecessarily relying on nursing facilities and the Louisiana already provides many of the necessary services and could serve more people by expanding pre-existing programs. </li> The DOJ and Louisiana reached a settlement to address the findings in the DOJ's report Louisiana agreed to review and augment its current policies for the seriously mentally ill. The DOJ then filed this lawsuit alleging that Louisiana failed to serve people with serious mental illnesses in the most integrated situation appropriate to their needs in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana on June 6, 2018, and immediately moved to dismiss due to the settlement. Specifically, the settlement agreement focused on diversion and screening for the target population of Medicaid-eligible individuals over the age of 18 with serious mental disabilities who either reside in nursing facilities or who have been referred for review for placement in nursing facilities. The state agreed to design and implement a system designed to quickly identify individuals under review for nursing home care who would benefit from community-based services and divert them away from institutionalization. The state also agreed to screen all individuals in the target population currently in nursing home care to determine whether they should be allowed to return to the community. The screening process starts with the assumption that all individuals with serious mental disabilities in nursing homes would benefit more from community-based services. The agreement also called for specific elements of the plan such as outreach to affected individuals, transition support committees, post-discharge case management and tracking. It also required the expansion of community-based service programs. These included mandatory crisis support services including a 24/7 emergency hotline, intensive community support services such as psychiatric treatment and housing and tenancy support. In addition, the agreement stipulated that the state had to implement a quality assurance program to make sure individuals in the target population received proper care. The state also agreed to retain a subject matter expert, John O\u2019Brien, who will provide technical expertise to help the state fully comply with the agreement and produce a report every six months on the quality and progress of the plan. The agreement called for an initial plan to be submitted by the Louisiana Department of Health immediately that laid out the goals and details of the first 18 months. After 18 months, the LDH must produce a yearly report detailing goals for the coming year. The agreement was set to expire in five years provided the parties agree that the state has established compliance with the agreement and maintained compliance for one year. Under the settlement, the court retained jurisdiction and DOJ could reinstate the suit at any time to remedy a breach of the settlement as long as it first followed the dispute resolution laid out in the agreement. The case is ongoing for compliance with the settlement agreement.", "summary": "The Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against Louisiana alleging that their policies of institutionalizing individuals with serious mental illnesses was operated in a manner that too often resulted in unnecessary admission to nursing facilties when community-based services would be more appropriate. The US alleged that this violated Title II of the American's with Disabilities Act which requires that states serve individuals with disabilities in the least segregated manner appropriate to their needs. Louisiana reached a settlement agreement with the US the same day the lawsuit was filed. The state agreed to review its nursing facilities and new referrals for admission to determine whether seriously mentally ill residents would be better served in their communities. They also agreed to expand community-based services for the mentally ill."}
{"article": "On August 14, 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida on behalf of Jewish prisoners under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000cc-2(f) and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2201 and 2202 against the Florida Department of Corrections. The DOJ asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that defendant violated religious freedoms granted by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the Florida Department of Corrections violated RLIUPA and substantially burdened the prisoners' religious exercise by not offering kosher meals to inmates. On May 15, 2013, Muslim prisoners filed a motion to intervene, seeking halal, or in the alternative, kosher meals for Muslim prisoners who observed halal dietary laws. Judge Patricia A. Seitz denied the motion on September 6, 2013. 2013 WL 4786829. The court issued a preliminary injunction on December 6, 2013. It required the defendants to provide a kosher diet program to all prisoners with a sincere religious belief by July 2014. It also enjoined three of the state\u2019s methods for issuing a religious diet program: 1) the Orthodox sincerity test, 2) the \u201cten-percent rule,\u201d which removed a prisoner from the Religious Diet Program for missing ten percent of meals within a month, and 3) a zero tolerance rule that suspended the kosher diet for prisoners who were caught eating non-kosher once, without opportunity to contest suspension. The defendants filed motions for a stay of the preliminary injunction both to the Eleventh Circuit and the district court. The motions contested the enjoining of the three \u201ctests\u201d for granting a kosher diet as well as the July 2014 deadline for compliance. The Eleventh Circuit denied the motion for a stay in May 2014. The district then denied the motion for stay in June 2014. On June 27, 2014, the Circuit remanded to the district court to alter the July deadline. On February 27, 2015, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the defendant's remaining appeals of the preliminary injunction because of mootness. It ruled that under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which governs all RLUIPA challenges, a preliminary injunction would expire automatically after 90 days unless the court \u201cmakes the findings required under subsection (a)(1) for the entry of prospective relief. . .\u201d and \u201cmakes the order final before the expiration of the 90-day period.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3626(a)(2). The district court made neither finding, so the preliminary injunction expired in March 2014. Judge Seitz ruled on the summary judgment motions for declaratory relief and permanent injunctions on April 30, 2015. 2015 WL 1977795. Declaratory relief was granted to the plaintiffs for three claims. The court held that the defendant violated RLUIPA through 1) denial of a kosher diet to sincere prisoners, 2) its \u201cten-percent rule\u201d, and 3) its zero tolerance rule. Summary judgment was also granted to the defendants on two claims, declaring that 1) the doctrinal sincerity test for a special diet did not violate RLUIPA as long as it was not unduly weighted in determining sincerity, and 2) an anti-bartering policy did not violate RLUIPA. The court then issued its final ruling on a permanent injunction on August 12, 2015. 2015 WL 4768247. The injunction ordered the defendants to 1) offer a kosher diet to all prisoners with a sincere religious basis for keeping kosher, 2) end the ten percent rule, and 3) stop enforcement of the zero tolerance rule without an opportunity for prisoners to contest their removal or suspension. The court then furthered ordered that the defendants create auditing and training procedures, produce both monthly and quarterly reports, and open access of their facilities to the Federal Dept. of Corrections. It provided a thirty day period to cure the failures in the kosher diet program. On September 11, 2015, the defendants appealed the order. On July 14, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit (Judges William Pryor, Jill Pryor, Richard Story) denied the appeal, holding that the defendants had not proved a compelling governmental interest for not providing kosher meals to the inmates. Moreover, the court stated that even if the defendants had a compelling governmental interest, there was no proof that denying kosher meals was the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Over the following months, the court continued to receive reports on compliance with the order and also fielded grievances from prisoners denied entry into the kosher diet program (though none received an additional hearing). A hearing was held on October 23, 2018, when the parties discussed the quarterly and monthly reports, the auditing process and filing a joint motion to terminate the injunction. The the joint motion to terminate the injunction and declaratory judgement was filed on December 5, 2018. On January 9, 2019, the court ordered the motion to terminate the injunction to be granted following two years without evidence of violation. However, the court denied the motion to terminate the declaratory judgement to ensure the Department of Corrections continues to have a legal responsibility to meet religious dietary preferences. During April and May, prisoners mailed motions requesting enforced relief and inquiring into updates in the proceedings. On May 22, 2019, the court denied the motion to enforce relief from the previously entered permanent injunction. However, the permanent injunction was dissolved on January 9, 2019, and there was no injunction to enforce. As of October 31, 2019, the declaratory judgement remains in effect ensuring the Department of Corrections to meet the religious dietary preferences of prisoners.", "summary": "The U.S Department of Justice, on behalf of Jewish prisoners in Southern Florida's Correctional Facilities, filed suit against the Florida Department of Corrections for failing to offer kosher meal options. The court issued a permanent injunction ordering the defendants to offer a kosher died to all prisoners with a sincere religious basis on August 12, 2015. On January 9, 2019, the court ordered the motion to terminate the injunction to be granted following two years without evidence of violation. However, the court denied the motion to terminate the declaratory judgement to ensure the Department of Corrections continues to have a legal responsibility to meet religious dietary preferences."}
{"article": "On February 3, 2015, an advocacy organization for women in military service, Service Women\u2019s Action Network, filed this lawsuit under Freedom of Information Act (\u201cFOIA\u201d) against the United States Department of Defense (\u201cDOD\u201d) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The Act requires government organizations to conduct a reasonable search or to provide the records when requested by the public. The plaintiffs argued that DOD, however, did not comply to the plaintiffs\u2019 request to gather information from the US Military Academies about the policies and practices that lead to women\u2019s under-representation in the Academies in violation of FOIA. Represented by ACLU and ACLU of Connecticut, the plaintiffs asked for declaratory relief, and for the court to compel a reasonable search for records and timely production of records on the discrimination faced by women who aspire to be military officers due to the defendants' admissions policies. On June 23 and July 23, 2015, the defendant filed two status reports to report on the actions taken by the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the U.S. Air Force Academy, and the U.S. Naval Academy in response to the plaintiffs\u2019 FOIA requests. These Academies has completed reasonable searches designed to find all information in its possession responsive to the plaintiffs\u2019 request, with some exceptions. On June 17, 2016, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal informing the court that this case had been settled between the parties and agreed to a stipulated dismissal with prejudice. The case is now closed.", "summary": "In 2015, an advocacy organization for women in military service filed this lawsuit against the United States Department of Defense (\u201cDOD\u201d) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiffs sued under Freedom of Information Act alleging that the defendant refused to provide requested documents. On June 17, 2016, the parties settled and agreed to have this case dismissed with prejudice."}
{"article": "<b>NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see <a href=\"https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/\"> their tracker</a>.</b> COVID-19 Summary: This is a lawsuit about election procedures in light of the coronavirus pandemic. The district court ordered the extension of the deadline to return absentee ballots, but ultimately, the evening before the election, the Supreme Court stayed the order, which required all absentee ballots to be returned the next day. The Wisconsin Elections Committee moved to dismiss the case based on mootness since the Spring Election had passed, but the court denied the motion on June 9. On September 21, the court granted a preliminary injunction, extending the ballot deadline. The defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit. <hr> In the midst of the COVID-19 crisis, states all around the country attempted to conduct presidential primary elections. Simultaneously, Americans were practicing \u201csocial distancing,\u201d sheltering in place, and avoiding going out in public and interacting with others as much as possible. Individuals, especially those over the age of sixty and those with preexisting conditions like asthma and autoimmune disorders, were encouraged to stay home as much as possible. Schools and daycares closed across the country, \u201cnon-essential\u201d businesses were shuttered, and Americans went into lockdown to try to slow the spread of the disease. As of March 18, 2020, Wisconsin had reported 72 cases of the novel coronavirus, although a substantially larger number has likely already contracted it. The state had also received an unprecedented number of absentee ballots for its April 7, 2020 election, but with electronic and by-mail registration ending on March 18, the Democratic Party of Wisconsin and the Democratic National Convention filed this lawsuit in U.S. federal court for the Western District of Wisconsin that day. They sought an extension of that deadline and suspension of other normal voting requirements, such as the requirement to provide proof of residence. \u201cAbsent intervention by the Court,\u201d the complaint alleged, \u201cthe electronic and by-mail registration deadline of today will pass, and the safety risks of COVID-19 will prevent countless eligible Wisconsinites from registering and voting altogether.\u201d The plaintiffs brought this suit against the Wisconsin Elections Commissioners under \u00a7 1983, alleging that Wisconsin voting laws would prevent many Wisconsites from voting in the election, or would require them to vote in person at great risk to themselves and others. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged laws that established the electronic and by-mail registration deadline, that required proof of residence and scans or copies of photo ID to accompany remote registration, and the deadline of 8:00 pm on April 7 for absentee ballots to be received by polling places. The complaint alleged undue burdens on the constitutional right to vote, invoking the First and Fourteenth Amendment, and denial of procedural due process. The plaintiffs sought an emergency temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction extending the March 18 deadline to April 3 and suspending the proof-of-residence and photo ID requirements. Represented by private counsel, they also sought declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney\u2019s fees. The case was assigned to Judge William M. Conley. On March 19, the court received notice of the Wisconsin State Legislature\u2019s intent to intervene, and the court conducted a telephone conference with the parties to discuss the proposed intervenor. On March 20, the Wisconsin State Legislature moved to intervene as a defendant, and submitted a proposed motion to dismiss. The legislature expressed doubt that the Wisconsin Attorney General would adequately defend the constitutionality of the state\u2019s laws, and asked leave to intervene solely for the purpose of filing an appeal from any court order blocking its laws. The legislature argued that it had a strong interest in ensuring that the election was conducted in an orderly fashion and that this proposed injunction would disrupt that process. The same day, Judge Conley issued an order granting in part and denying in part the emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Noting the \u201cnear certainty\u201d of increased barriers to in-person voting on April 7, Judge Conley ordered the extension of the deadline for electronic voter registration to March 30. He denied the remainder of the plaintiffs\u2019 requests. 2020 WL 1320819. The court left open the question of whether the deadline for absentee ballots to be received could be extended, and invited the plaintiffs to present sufficient evidence to support that motion. On March 22, the Republican National Committee and the Republican Party of Wisconsin filed a motion to intervene as defendants, arguing that the plaintiffs\u2019 request would \u201cconfuse voters and undermine confidence in the election process.\u201d A response to this motion is due by March 30, 2020. On March 26, in light of Governor Evers' \"Stay-at-Home\" order, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, declaring that Wisconsites, now mandated to stay at home, would rely on absentee ballots more than ever. The next day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction and reconsideration of the court's ruling on the aspects of the prayer for relief that had been denied in the court's March 20 order. The plaintiffs again requested that the court extend the March 18 deadline for by-mail registration and asked the court to suspend the witness requirement of the absentee ballot procedure, since many voters would be unable to obtain a witness while sheltering in place. Multiple parties requested to intervene, and on March 28, Judge Conley granted the motion of the Republican National Committee and the Republican Party of Wisconsin to intervene, but denied the Wisconsin Legislature's motion to intervene. 2020 WL 1505640. Not to be dissuaded, the legislature immediately filed a motion for leave to file an amicus brief. Judge Conley, the same day, consolidated this case with two other cases, Gear v. Bostelmann (3:20-cv-00278) and Lewis v. Bostelmann (3:20-cv-00284), since all three cases concerned elections issues in light of the COVID-19 crisis. On March 30, 2020, the defendants filed declarations and a brief in reply to the plaintiffs' motions. By March 30, 2020, the following parties had requested to intervene or to submit amicus briefs in support of the plaintiffs: City of Milwaukee, Honest Elections Project, City of Green Bay, Disability Rights Wisconsin, ACLU of Wisconsin, Wisconsin Conservation Voices, and the City of Racine. On April 1, Judge Conley denied the Wisconsin Legislature's renewed motion to intervene as a defendant, but granted it leave to file an amicus brief. Judge Conley scheduled a videoconference on March 31, 2020, and held an evidentiary hearing on April 1, 2020. On April 2, 2020, Judge Conley ordered that the deadline for receipt of absentee ballots be extended from 8:00 PM on election day to April 13, 2020 at 4:00 PM. He also ordered that the defendants be prevented from enforcing Wis. Stat. \u00a7 6.87(2) as to absentee voters who have provided a written affirmation or other statement that they were unable to safely obtain a witness certification despite reasonable efforts to do so, provided that the ballots are otherwise valid. The court subsequently made two minor amendments to the order. The Wisconsin State Legislature filed an emergency notice of appeal to the Seventh Circuit of the order denying intervention, docketed as 20-1539, and the preliminary injunction, docketed as 20-1545. The Republican National Committee also appealed the preliminary injunction order and the amended order, docketed as 20-1538 and 20-1546. The next day, on April 3, the Seventh Circuit declined to stay the extension of the deadline for returning absentee ballots but stayed the portion of the order enjoining the defendants from enforcing Wis. Stat. \u00a7 6.87(2). 2020 WL 1638374. In addition, they held that the district court erred in refusing to let the Wisconsin State Legislature intervene. After the appeal, the Wisconsin State Legislature filed a renewed motion to intervene and the district court granted the motion. The defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States seeking a stay of the modified absentee-ballot deadline. For a short time on April 6, it appeared the that Supreme Court involvement was unnecessary as Wisconsin Governor Tony Evers issued an executive order suspending the in-person voting scheduled for April 7 until June 9. However, the state's legislature asked the Wisconsin Supreme Court to overturn the order, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court blocked the Governor's order. Later that day, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the defendant's request in a 5-4 decision. The Supreme Court stayed the preliminary injunction \"to the extent it requires the State to count absentee ballots postmarked after April 7, 2020.\" 140 S.Ct. 1205. The majority stressed that the \u201cquestion before the Court is a narrow, technical question about the absentee ballot process\u201d and that \"lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.\u201d In the dissent, Justice Ginsburg expressed concern that the stay would \"result in massive disenfranchisement.\" On April 16, the Wisconsin State Legislature filed a motion to dismiss based on mootness, since the April 7 Spring Election has passed. In response, the plaintiffs argued that their original and amended complaints clearly asked for injunctive relief both with respect to the April 7 election and for \u201cany election that occurs while this crisis continues.\u201d They proposed an amended complaint clarifying this matter on April 30. On May 18, the defendants filed a reply brief, claiming that any relief for the August and November elections should be dismissed as unripe. On May 21, the plaintiffs from the consolidated case, Lewis v. Bostelmann (3:20-cv-00284), moved to voluntarily dismiss their claims, which had been rendered moot as they only sought injunctive relief regarding the April 7 election. The defendants then argued that the Lewis plaintiffs should not be awarded costs or attorney\u2019s fees. The Seventh Circuit ordered the appeals be dismissed as moot on June 5. 2020 WL 3077047. Back in the district court, the defendant's motion to dismiss was denied on June 9. 2020 WL 3077047. On June 25, the WEC defendants submitted a status report detailing their COVID-19 related measures for the August and November Elections, including absentee ballot preparations, sanitation measures, increased funding for increased election costs due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a new Clerk Advisory Committee dedicated to Vote by Mail, testing, staff training, as well as voter and public health outreach. The same day, the WEC defendants and the Gear plaintiffs met and conferred. On June 26, they jointly stipulated to a proposed amended complaint in which the plaintiffs sought additional relief that would permit certain voters to electronically access and download a mail-in absentee ballot, reducing the administrative burden on municipal clerks\u2019 offices. They further agreed to abandon their respective positions with respect to the pending motion to dismiss the Gear Plaintiffs\u2019 original Complaint. On July 2, the Lewis plaintiffs sought to recover attorneys' fees and costs. On July 8, the plaintiffs moved for a renewed preliminary injunction for the November General and Presidential Election. They noted that nearly 62 percent of Wisconsin\u2019s electorate chose to vote by mail in the April 7 election and that the pandemic continues to worsen. The Wisconsin Legislature opposed and sought to dismiss the complaints by the Gear and Swenson plaintiffs, arguing that unlike the April Election, Wisconsin voters have months to register to vote and to request an absentee ballot in advance of the November Election. On July 20, the Republican National Committee and the Republican Party of Wisconsin also joined in opposition of the preliminary injunction. On September 21, the court granted preliminary injunction and extended the mail-in ballot deadline, finding that: \"(1) an unprecedented number of absentee ballots, which turned the predominance of in-person voting on its head in April, will again overwhelm the WEC and local officials despite their best efforts to prepare; (2) but for an extension of the deadlines for registering to vote electronically and for receipt of absentee ballots, tens of thousands of Wisconsin voters would have been disenfranchised in April; and (3) absent similar relief, will be again in November.\" 2020 WL 5627186. However, the court stayed the order for seven days to provide defendants the opportunity to seek an emergency appeal. Two days later, the defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit. 2020 WL 5652436. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On March 18, 2020, the Democratic Party of Wisconsin and Democratic National Committee filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin against the state Elections Commission calling for changes to Wisconsin election laws amid the COVID-19 pandemic, including extensions to online voter registration and mail-in ballot return deadlines. On March 20, Judge Conley issued an order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The order was appealed, and the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the preliminary injunction. The Wisconsin State moved to dismiss the case based on mootness since the Spring Election had passed, and the plaintiffs from the consolidated Lewis case voluntarily dismissed their claims. On September 21, the court granted a preliminary injunction, extending the ballot deadline. The defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On April 30, 2019, an anonymous plaintiff filed a civil suit against Fairfax Behavior Health (\u201cFairfax\u201d) under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act and state statutes. Seven additional anonymous plaintiffs joined this suit via amended complaints, all represented by Disability Rights Washington, a public interest organization, and private counsel. They filed suit in the Western District of Washington seeking damages for pain and suffering, compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys\u2019 fees. The plaintiffs were individuals with unspecified mental illnesses admitted to Fairfax for treatment. They alleged that Fairfax has an indiscriminate policy of requiring all adult and teen patients to submit to random strip and cavity searches, a policy not shared by any other psychiatric hospital in Washington State. This process was also video recorded by Fairfax in violation of patients\u2019 privacy. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that this practice is substantially motivated by discriminatory animus towards people with serious mental health conditions requiring inpatient treatment, inhibiting those patients\u2019 ability to receive the treatment they need. The plaintiffs sought to bring a class action on behalf of all persons who were admitted to Fairfax between April 30, 2016 and the date of class certification. The court denied class certification in an order from Judge Thomas S. Zilly dated August 10, 2020. 2020 WL 4584228. Certification was denied because the court found that the allegedly common questions among the class were unrelated to the ADA and state law claims and because the class was defined too broadly. The case is ongoing.", "summary": "In April 2019, former mental health patients at Fairfax Behavioral Medicine in Washington State sued Fairfax under Title III of the Americans with Disability Act and state statues. The plaintiffs alleged that Fairfax has an indiscriminate policy of requiring all adult and teen patients to submit to random, video-recorded strip and cavity searches. The plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of all persons admitted to Fairfax between April 30, 2016 and the date of class certification, but certification was denied in August 2020. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On April 17, 2018, three current or former detained immigrants filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The plaintiffs sued CoreCivic, Inc., a private prison corporation that owns and operates the Stewart Detention Center (\u201cStewart\u201d), under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1589, 1594, and 1595. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and private counsel, alleged that the defendant operated a deprivation scheme intended to force detained immigrants to work nearly for free for the detention facility, resulting in a forced labor scheme and an economic windfall for the defendant. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant deprived detainees of basic necessities so that they were forced to work to purchase those items and threatened those who refused to work with serious harm, such as deprivation of privacy, criminal prosecution, or solitary confinement. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages. They claimed violations of the TVPA and unjust enrichment under state common law. The plaintiffs sought certification of the following two classes: (1) all civil immigration detainees who performed work for CoreCivic at Stewart in the \u201cVolunteer Work Program\u201d within the past ten years, up to the date the class is certified (\u201cForced Labor Class\u201d); and (2) all civil immigration detainees who performed work for CoreCivic at Stewart in the \u201cVolunteer Work Program\u201d within the past four years, up to the date the class is certified (\u201cUnjust Enrichment Class\u201d). The case was assigned to Judge Clay D. Land. On June 21, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 entire complaint for failure to state a claim under the TVPA, arguing that Congress did not intend the TVPA to apply to alien detainees in the lawful custody of the U.S. Government or to private contractors operating immigration detention facilities. On August 17, 2018, Judge Land denied the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss and found that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to support both their TVPA claim and their unjust enrichment claim. Most significantly, the court found that the TVPA does apply to work programs in federal immigration detention facilities operated by private for-profit contractors. However, Judge Land certified the issue for immediate interlocutory appeal given the substantial ground for difference of opinion on this issue. 332 F.Supp.3d 1305. The defendant appealed the district court\u2019s denial of its motion to dismiss to the Eleventh Circuit on December 12, 2018. After holding oral argument in January 2020, an Eleventh Circuit panel (Circuit Judges Frank Hull and Stanley Marcus and District Court Judge Barbara Rothstein) issued an opinion on February 28, 2020, concluding that \"the TVPA covers the conduct of private contractors operating federal immigration detention facilities.\" 2020 WL 964358. The Eleventh Circuit further concluded that the TVPA does not bar private contractors from operating voluntary work programs for persons held in immigration detention facilities but that private contractors who operate such programs \"may be liable if they knowingly obtain or procure the labor or services of a program participant through the illegal coercive means explicitly listed in the TVPA.\" The Eleventh Circuit's review was limited only to the legal question of whether the TVPA applies to private contractors operating immigration detention facilities, so it did not address whether the plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently stated a claim under the TVPA. As of March 3, 2020, this case is ongoing in the district court.", "summary": "On April 17, 2018, three current or former detained immigrants filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The plaintiffs sued CoreCivic, Inc., a private prison corporation that owns and operates the Stewart Detention Center (\u201cStewart\u201d), under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant operated a deprivation scheme intended to force detained immigrants to work nearly for free for the detention facility, resulting in a forced labor scheme and an economic windfall for the defendant. Judge Clay D. Land denied the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss and found that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to support both their TVPA claim and their unjust enrichment claim. The district court certified the issue of whether the TVPA applies to work programs in federal immigration detention facilities operated by private for-profit contractors for interlocutory appeal. An Eleventh Circuit panel concluded in February 2020 that the TVPA applies to the conduct of private contractors operating federal immigration detention facilities. The case is ongoing in the district court."}
{"article": "Thousands of United States Sailors and Marines are deployed to combat zones across the globe, and return home suffering from the invisible wounds of war, such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or traumatic brain injury (TBI). Sometimes these mental health issues indirectly lead to less-than-Honorable discharges, resulting in permanent stigma and preventing veterans from accessing essential benefits like the GI bill and much-needed mental health care. The Naval Discharge Review Board adjudicates discharge upgrade applications from veterans seeking an appeal of their less-than-Honorable discharge. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel directed these boards to consider PTSD and related conditions as \u201cpotential mitigating factors in the misconduct that caused the under-other-than-honorable-conditions characterization of service.\u201d This Hagel Memo was codified by Congress in 2016, statutorily requiring Discharge Review Boards to grant \u201cliberal consideration\u201d to the discharge upgrade applications of veterans with symptoms related to PTSD or TBI. 10 U.S.C. \u00a71553(d)(3)(A)(ii). On March 2, 2018, Tyson Manker and the National Veterans Council for Legal Redress (NVCLR), represented by the Veterans Legal Services Clinic at Yale Law School and private counsel, filed a class-action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut on behalf of a class of Navy and Marine Corps veterans. The complaint was filed against the Secretary of the Navy. According to the plaintiffs, the Naval Discharge Review Board rejected almost 90% of discharge upgrade applications based on credible claims of service-connected PTSD, without clearly explaining what a veteran must show to prevail, and without applying the proper legal standards. The plaintiffs alleged that the Board violated the Administrative Procedure Act by issuing arbitrary and capricious decisions that were inconsistent with relevant statutory law, and deprived applicants of their Fifth Amendment rights to due process of law. They argued that the Board\u2019s actions, in violation of binding Department of Defense guidance, evidenced an unconstitutional secret policy against granting discharge upgrades: the Board had set an unachievable and sometimes unknown evidentiary burden for applicants alleging PTSD as a basis for a discharge upgrade. The plaintiffs requested that the Court set aside and hold unlawful the Board\u2019s improper denials of veterans\u2019 discharge upgrade applications, order the applications' approval, and issue injunctive relief to ensure that all Navy and Marine Corps veterans had their discharge upgrade applications considered according to the Constitution and as intended by Congress. The case was assigned to Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr. On November 15 2018, the court granted a motion to certify a class of veterans who served during the Iraq and Afghanistan Era (between October 7, 2001, and the present) and who: <ol type = \"a\"> <li>were discharged from the Navy, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps, or Marine Corps Reserve with less-than-Honorable statuses, including General and Other-than-Honorable discharges but excluding Bad Conduct or Dishonorable discharges; <li>have not received upgrades of their discharge statuses to Honorable from the NDRB; and <li>have diagnoses of PTSD, TBI, or other related mental health conditions, or records documenting one or more symptoms of PTSD, TBI, or other related mental health conditions at the time of discharge, attributable to their military service under the Hagel Memo standards of liberal or special consideration. </li> </ol> On December 27, 2018, the Court ordered a scheduling conference to resolve the issue of whether the federal and local rules of civil procedure exempt this case from the usual discovery procedures, the scope of discovery, and discovery deadlines. On July 26, 2019, the Navy sought to dismiss the case, claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction and that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The court denied the motion on November 7, 2019, holding that in order for the motion to dismiss to prevail, the defendant \u201cmust demonstrate that as a matter of law this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over each and every claim plausibly pleaded in the Complaint on behalf of Manker, Doe, or any member of the certified Plaintiff class.\" The court found that the Navy failed to so demonstrate, also stating that whether \u201cthe [Board] regarded itself as required to act in accordance with the Hagel Memo\u2019s guidance is at the very least a factual issue that can be explored in discovery.\u201d 2019 WL 5846828. Following this order, the parties held telephonic settlement conferences on April 14, 2020 and May 7, 2020; this case is ongoing.", "summary": "Former US Navy and Marine veterans claim that the Naval Discharge Review Board failed to consider the effect of PTSD when reviewing their less-than-Honorable discharge upgrade applications. Upon returning to civilian life, veterans struggled to address PTSD and other mental health issues, which in some cases had lead to their less-than-Honorable discharge. This caused permanent stigma and prevented veterans from accessing essential benefits like the GI bill and much-needed mental health care. The Board was directed by former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel to consider PTSD and related conditions as \u201cpotential mitigating factors\" in veterans' discharges. The plaintiffs claimed that the Board had rejected most such applications in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment. As of June 2020, the case is in discovery."}
{"article": "On March 28, 2002, the plaintiffs, the American Friends Service Committee, along with the ACLU and other activist organizations, filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, and under federal regulations in the United States Court for the District of Colorado, Denver Division against the City and County of Denver. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming that their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated, as well as violations of federal regulations and the state constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the maintenance of \"Spy Files\" on leftist groups in Colorado for lawful, peaceful, non-criminal activities and falsely labeling the groups \"criminal extremist\" was a violation of the constitutional rights of its members to petition the government for redress of grievances, the freedom of association, and a misappropriation of federal funds in electronically storing this information. On March 11, 2002, the ACLU published the partial contents of leaked \"Spy Files\" that the Denver police had been maintaining on several organizations and individuals. The ACLU petitioned the Mayor of Denver to investigate take four specific actions to stem the dissemination and expunge the Spy Files. The Mayor held a news conference in which he claimed that the Spy Files resulted from an overly broad interpretation of the City's policy on the maintenance of criminal intelligence. The city's policy mirrored a federal regulation (28 C.F.R \u00a7 23.20) that prohibited the police from maintaining criminal intelligence electronic records that would violate citizens' constitutional rights, absent (1) a direct relationship to criminal conduct, and (2) a reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal activity. The disclosed records detailed the protest activities of individuals not only in Colorado, but lists of protest and political beliefs of persons from outside the state. The Spy Files also labeled several organizations as criminal extremists (notably including the American Friends Service Committee, which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1947). The plaintiffs alleged that this information was false, that the organizations were not criminally extremist, and that there were statements of the political beliefs of the members that the City had misconstrued were defamatory. Most importantly, the plaintiffs claimed that criminal intelligence files were being maintained on them for lawful activity that was not connected to criminal conduct. Defendantes moved and were permitted to remove the case to the United State District Court for the District of Coloradoon April 16, 2002. Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which was denied by the Court (Magistrate Judge Craig Shaffer) on October 17, 2002. On April 17, 2003, the case was settled without class certification being determined. In the settlement agreement, the City of Denver agreed to adopt a more specific and detailed policy (included in the Clearinghouse collection as Appendix to Settlement Agreement), and to review and purge all criminal intelligence files in violation of the new policy. The city also agreed to furnish copies to all individuals and organizations on which the city maintained criminal intelligence files. Lastly, the city agreed to contact entities to which it had distributed copies of the criminal intelligence files and notify them of the purge. Compliance of the agreement was subject to an audit for a two-year period. On August 05, 2004, the Court (Judge Edward Nottingham) ordered that the City pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees in the amount of $469,018.63. The case was dismissed with prejudice thereafter.", "summary": "In 2002, the American Friends Service Committee and other leftist political organizations filed suit, represented by the ACLU, against the City and County of Denver in federal court. The Denver police had maintained criminal intelligence records on the plaintiffs for constitutionally-protected, lawful activity. The case settled, and the City of Denver agreed to purge the files, notify organizations to which it had distributed the files, and adopt a new policy that clarified the acceptable uses in the police training program and manual."}
{"article": "On May 24, 1998, a group of individuals confined to Florida's four Developmental State Institutions for Persons with Developmental Disabilities (\"DSIs\") filed suit against the state of Florida and relevant state officials alleging that defendants failed to take appropriate measures to habilitate the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs suffered grave harm as a result. They asserted claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12101 et seq. (\"ADA\") and its regulations; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; 29 U .S.C. \u00a7 794; the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1396 et seq . and its regulations; and 42 U .S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging Due Process and Equal Protection violations. Represented by Florida's Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities, the plaintiffs asked the U.S District Court for the Southern District of Florida for declaratory and injunctive relief. In May 1998, defendants filed a motion to dismiss based, among other things, on lack of standing and failure to state a claim under the ADA. Defendants also argued that plaintiffs were barred from bringing suit against the State because the State was immune from suit by private citizens under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In July 1998, the United States Department of Justice filed a motion to intervene in the case and included a memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss. The DOJ also filed for leave to address as amicus curiae the proper construction of the ADA as it related to this case. In its memo on the motion to dismiss, the DOJ argued that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act were valid examples of Congress's power to abrogate, or abolish, the states' immunity from suit by private citizens. It also argued that both the ADA and the integration mandate established by the Supreme Court in L.C. v. Olmstead in 1998 provided a cause of action under which plaintiffs could challenge unnecessary institutionalization of mentally ill persons. On October 15, 1998, Judge Ferguson granted the DOJ's motion to intervene in the motion to dismiss and denied its motion to participate as amicus curiae. On March 31, 1999, Judge Ferguson denied defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. On March 10, 1999, the Court (Judge Wilkie D. Ferguson) entered an order certifying a class. Defendants appealed the order to the Eleventh Circuit and on February 3, 2000, the Eleventh Circuit issued an opinion reversing and vacating the class certification order and remanding the matter back to the Court for further action with instructions to certify the class as instructed. On February 11, 2000, the Court (Judge Ferguson) issued a Revised Order certifying a class. After lengthy mediation and negotiations, the parties reached a Settlement Agreement on May 11, 2004, which was filed with the Court on May 21, 2004. On June 16, 2004, the parties submitted an amended Agreement, according to which defendants agreed to utilize both the Supported Living Home and Community-Based Services Waiver and the Developmental Disabilities Home and Community-Based Services Waiver to serve clients residing in the DSIs. Defendants also agreed to close one DSI no later than June 30, 2005 and another no later than July 1, 2010. On August 11, 2005, the Court (Judge Jose E. Martinez) approved the Amended Settlement Agreement. On July 2, 2007, Judge Martinez granted the parties' Joint Motion to Dismiss Case After Substantial Compliance with Amended Settlement Agreement and closed the case.", "summary": "This case was brought in 1998 by the class of individuals confined to Florida's four state institutions for people with developmental disabilities, alleging failure to habilitate. The parties reached an agreement involving provision of community based services and closure of at least two residential facilities in 2003. On July 2, 2007, the case was dismissed on joing motion in which the parties agreed that the state had substantially complied with the Settlement Agreement."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This lawsuit was filed by four medical providers and an individual seeking medical services to challenge the state\u2019s executive orders related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On May 28, the court filed a notice of hearing regarding certification of issues to the Michigan Supreme Court. On June 16 the court stayed the case until the Michigan Supreme Court resolved the state law questions. On June 25, the defendants appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the Governor's executive orders exceeded her authority on October 2, 2020. The case is ongoing. <hr> On May 12, 2020, four medical providers and an individual seeking medical services filed a suit against Michigan\u2019s Attorney General, Governor, and Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services to challenge the state\u2019s executive orders related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that executive orders 2020-17 and 2020-77 violated the Michigan Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, or, alternatively, that the plaintiffs were permitted to continue their business operations. They also sought injunctive relief preventing the defendants from enforcing the orders against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also sought attorneys' fees and monetary damages, and they were represented by the Mackinac Center Legal Foundation and private attorneys. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, and assigned to District Judge Paul L. Maloney. On March 11, The Governor of Michigan proclaimed a state of emergency under both the Emergency Management Act and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945 (the Emergency Powers Act). Under the initial announcement, the Governor issued various stay at home orders and restrictions, including order 2020-17, which prohibited any bariatric or joint replacement surgeries except for emergencies starting March 21. On May 7, the Governor issued order 2020-77, which continued the restrictions of the previous stay at home orders with limited exceptions to \u201ccritical infrastructure workers,\u201d defined as those \u201cnecessary to sustain or protect life.\u201d The plaintiffs argued that the Governor did not have the authority to issue executive orders 2020-17 and 2020-77 under the Emergency Powers Act and the Emergency Management Act beyond the 28 days after the announcement of the state of emergency without the approval of the Michigan Legislature. The plaintiffs also claimed that the Emergency Powers Act violated the Separation of Powers and the nondelegation clauses of the Michigan Constitution. The plaintiffs also alleged that the executive orders violated due process and were void for vagueness. The plaintiffs argued that executive order 2020-17 did not give the plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, as the assessment of which medical treatments are deemed essential are largely left to the discretion of healthcare providers. Additionally, they alleged that order 2020-77 did not provide any explicit standards for determining whether particular operations were \u201ccritical infrastructure\u201d activity. Lastly, the plaintiffs alleged that the executive orders violated the Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause under the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendants from enforcing order 2020-17 and 2020-77 on May 18, which was dismissed on May 27. On May 28, the court filed a notice of hearing regarding certification of issues to the Michigan Supreme Court. The district court noted that parts of the plaintiff\u2019s complaint presented questions that required interpretation by the Michigan Supreme Court since they had never been considered by the Michigan Court of Appeals or the Michigan Supreme Court before. The following questions were at issue: (1) whether the Governor of Michigan had the authority to renew executive orders related to the pandemic under the Emergency Powers Act and Emergency Management Act; and, (2) whether the Emergency Powers Act violated the separation of powers or nondelegation clauses under the Michigan Constitution? Michigan\u2019s Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss on June 2, and the Governor of Michigan and Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services also filed a motion to dismiss on June 5. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the public health benefits of the executive orders outweighed the burden to the plaintiffs. The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a dormant Commerce Clause claim. In response to the district court\u2019s notice of hearing regarding certification of issues, the plaintiffs submitted a brief requesting the two questions to be taken to the Michigan Supreme Court. The defendants also filed a brief requesting the court to either dismiss the questions as moot, decline jurisdiction of the issues as state law claims, or hold the questions in abeyance pending resolution. A hearing was held on the issue on June 10. On June 11, the defendants filed a motion opposing certification. The defendants asked the court to dismiss the questions as state law claims, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment. The request was denied on June 16; instead, the district court certified the two questions. 2020 WL 3248785. The same day, the court stayed the case until the Michigan Supreme Court resolved the state law questions. On June 25, the defendants appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit (No. 20-1650). On June 30, the Michigan Supreme Court scheduled an oral argument on the two questions for September 2. 2020 WL 3571909. The Michigan Supreme Court held on October 2, 2020 that (1) the Governor lacked authority under the Emergency Management Act to issue or renew any executive orders related to COVID-19 after her first order expired on April 30, 2020; and (2) the Emergency Powers Act violated the Michigan Constitution's nondelegation clause. The Court's decision as to the Emergency Management Act was unanimous. Justice Stephen J. Markman explained that the Act's requirement that \"[a]fter 28 days, the governor shall issue an executive order or proclamation declaring the state of disaster terminated, unless a request by the governor for an extension . . . is approved by resolution of both houses of the legislature\" implied that the Governor could not bypass the legislature by issuing an executive order terminating a state of emergency and then immediately declaring a new state of emergency for \"identical reasons.\" The Court produced several opinions about the Emergency Powers Act. Justice Markman, joined by Justices Brian K. Zahra and Elizabeth T. Clement, wrote that the Act authorized emergency action by the Governor because the phrase \"public emergency\" included the COVID-19 pandemic. But he held that the Act violated the Michigan Constitution's nondelegation clause because it allowed the Governor to exercise \"a substantial part of the entire police power of the state\" for an \"indefinite duration\" subject only to the constraints that the governor's actions be \"reasonable\" and \"necessary,\" which failed to supply \"genuine guidance to the Governor as to how to exercise the authority delegated [or] constrain[] . . . in any meaningful manner.\" Justice David F. Viviano concurred. He noted that the Emergency Powers Act only allowed the Governor to declare emergencies \"when public safety is imperiled\" and argued that public health emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic did not imperil public safety. Chief Justice Bridget M. McCormack argued that the Emergency Powers Act was constitutional. She noted that the Act allowed only \"reasonable\" and \"necessary\" actions to protect public safety during emergencies, so it supplied an intelligible principle for the Governor as federal nondelegation precedent required. Justices Richard Bernstein and Megan K. Cavanagh agreed; Justice Bernstein also wrote a concurrence expressing similar themes. 2020 WL 5877599. The appeal before the Sixth Circuit is pending as of October 5, 2020, and the case is ongoing.", "summary": "This lawsuit was filed by four medical providers and an individual seeking medical services to challenge the state\u2019s executive orders related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On June 16, 2020, the court stayed the case until the Michigan Supreme Court resolved the state law questions. On June 25, the defendants appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the Governor lacked the authority to extend her emergency powers beyond the 28 days provided by Michigan law or exercise emergency powers under the Emergency Powers Act on October 2, 2020. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On October 31, 2013, two same-sex couples who wished to have a state-recognized marriage, filed a lawsuit against the state of Texas in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to declare that Texas laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, to declare that Texas must recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states, to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the ban on same-sex marriage, and to award the plaintiffs costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the Texas laws prohibiting same-sex marriage violated their rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. They further claimed that the ban interfered with their ability to be recognized as a family and obstructed the social and administrative benefits of marriage. The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certification on February 28, 2014. They wished to form a Plaintiff Class consisting of all Texans who -- though they met all other necessary qualifications -- were denied the right to marry a member of the same sex. On March 12, 2014, the defendants filed a Motion to Stay Case pending an interlocutory appeal in <a href=\"https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13395\">De Leon v. Perry</a>. On September 10, 2014, Judge Sam Sparks dismissed the Motion for Class Certification and granted the Motion to Stay the Case pending the interlocutory appeal in <i>De Leon v. Perry</i>. The stay was lifted and action on the case began again on February 19, 2015. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court ruled on a different case challenging a same-sex marriage ban, <a href=\"http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12787\">Obergefell v Hodges</a>, on June 26, 2015. The Court held in this case that marriage is a fundamental right protected by the 14th Amendment, therefore a state cannot ban same-sex marriage. Back in the Western District of Texas, this ruling in Obergefell led the plaintiff to file a Motion for Summary Judgment on July 20, 2015 and the defendant to file a Motion to Dismiss as Moot two days later. Judge Sam Sparks held a hearing on August 21, 2015 to hear all of these matters pending in the case, but a Stipulation of Dismissal by and among the parties was filed on September 4, 2015. On September 22, 2015 Judge Sam Sparks granted the Stipulation and dismissed the case with prejudice.", "summary": "On October 31, 2013, two same-sex couples who wished to have a state recognized marriage filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the state of Texas. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that Texas laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, to declare that Texas must recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states, to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the ban on same-sex marriage, and to award the plaintiffs costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. On September 22, 2015 Judge Sam Sparks granted the Stipulation of Dismissal by and among the parties and dismissed the case with prejudice."}
{"article": "In August 2012, a 28 year old female plaintiff, a naturalized United State citizen of Moroccan origin and an adherent of the Muslim faith, brought this suit against Walt Disney Company in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The suit was brought under title VII of 42 U.S.C \u00a7 2000e (discrimination and harassment in employment on the basis of religion, national origin and color and failure to remedy and prevent harassment), and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, etc. In this case, it is alleged that Disney discharged the plaintiff who worked as a hostess at a cafe in a complex operated by Disney because she complained about repeated ethnic and religious slurs from her colleagues and also wore a hijab for her sincere religious faith. The plaintiff asked for: (a) a declaration that Disney's actions constitute illegal harassment and discrimination; (b) an order enjoining Disney from enforcing its policy or practice of prohibiting employees who are adherents of the Muslim faith from wearing hijab while in positions involving interaction with customers unless such hijabs are concealed by a hat or other object; (c) training of Disney employees and managers regarding harassment and discrimination; and (d) damages. The allegation states that the plaintiff began working as a hostess at the Storytellers Cafe in the Grand Californian Hotel and Spa, a part of Walt Disney complex in Anaheim, California. During her work, she suffered from repeated slurs, e.g. \"terrorist\", \"camel\", and \"Kunta Kinte,\" the slave from the famous book Roots by Alex Haley. Her co-workers also mocked her by stating that Arabs are terrorists, that she speaks the terrorist language and that she was trained to make bombs. She repeatedly reported the harassment to her managers but they never took action. In 2010, after two years of working at Disney, she began wearing a hijab permanently in accord with her religious beliefs. She asked her supervisors for permission, but they denied it since it would violate Disney's \"look\" policy. Disney suggested that she either (1) work in the rear of the restaurant where she would not be exposed to customers, or (2) wear several hats on top of her hijab. She refused and Disney discharged her from further employment. On March 3, 2014, the parties submitted a joint stipulation to dismiss the case, and the court issued an order granting a stipulation to dismiss the case with prejudice.", "summary": "In August 2012, a female plaintiff, naturalized United State citizen of Moroccan origin and an adherent of the Muslim faith, brought this suit against Walt Disney Company for harassment, discrimination and discharging based on her ethnic origin and religious appearance. The court dismissed the case by a joint stipulation to dismiss case submitted by Disney on 03/03/2014."}
{"article": "On December 15, 2010, the United States, on behalf of several Asian-American students who were allegedly discriminated against based on their race, color, and/or national origin, brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, against the School District of Philadelphia. The plaintiff, represented by the U.S. Attorney's Office and the U.S. Department of Justice, asked the Court for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief under Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000c-6, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant unlawfully discriminated against Asian-American students based on their race, color, and/or national origin through their deliberate indifference to severe and pervasive harassment of this group of students at South Philadelphia High School (SPHS). The plaintiff claimed that this indifference to harassment also resulted in a denial of equal access to educational opportunities, as these actions resulted in interference with the students' ability to attend school without fear for their safety. This harassment allegedly took place over the course of several years, and consisted of verbal and physical abuse based on the students' race, color, and/or national origin on school grounds. On December 3, 2009, dozens of Asian students were repeatedly attacked on and near school grounds. On December 22, 2010, the Court (Judge Stewart Dalzell) approved the parties' settlement agreement. The agreement remained in effect until June 30, 2013, and required the school district, monitored by the United States, to develop an action plan that involved introduction of training guidelines, reporting requirements, and revision of district policies in order to combat and prevent harassment of students. The agreement also provided for alternative dispute resolution procedures to be utilized by the parties. The last action in the case was on May 11, 2011. The case is now closed.", "summary": "The United States brought suit under Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause against a school district on behalf of Asian-American students discriminated based on their race, color, and/or national origin. The discrimination, enabled by the defendant's policies and indifference, took place over the course of several years in the form of physical and verbal harassment based on the students' race, color, and/or national origin. On December 22, 2010, the court approved a settlement agreement between the parties that required the school district, monitored by the United States, to develop an action plan that involved introduction of training guidelines, reporting requirements, and revision of district policies in order to combat and prevent harassment of students. The agreement also provided for alternative dispute resolution procedures to be utilized by the parties."}
{"article": "On November 24, 2008, several Lawful Permanent Residents (\"LPRs\") who reside in Tennessee filed a class action lawsuit in the Middle District of Tennessee against the Tennessee Department of Safety, under the right to freedom of association under the First Amendment, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to freedom of travel under Article IV, Section II of the U.S. Constitution, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees, alleging that the defendant unlawfully withheld and confiscated the plaintiffs' green cards while the plaintiffs applied for a driver license or driver license renewal. The plaintiffs pointed to two statutes passed in 2007 that demonstrated Tennessee's history of discriminatory treatment of foreign-born residents of Tennessee who are legally present in the U.S. The issue at hand here was with regards to Tennessee Department of Safety employees withholding or confiscating the green cards of LPRs without following the multi-step process already set in place by the agency. The plaintiffs alleged that there was no reason for their green cards to be confiscated. Since plaintiffs did not have their green cards, they were unable to obtain a driver license, unable to travel around or outside of the U.S., were at risk of violating a federal law requiring them to always have their green cards in their possession, and suffered other forms of emotional distress. On March 26, 2009, the District Court (Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant) granted the plaintiffs' notice of voluntary dismissal.", "summary": "On November 24, 2008, several Lawful Permanent Residents (\"LPR's\") who reside in Tennessee filed a class action lawsuit in the Middle District of Tennessee against the Tennessee Department of Safety, under the right to freedom of association under the First Amendment, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to freedom of travel under Article IV, Section II of the U.S. Constitution, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees, alleging that the defendant unlawfully withheld and confiscated the plaintiffs' \"green cards\" while the plaintiffs applied for a driver license or driver license renewal. On March 26, 2009, the District Court (Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant) granted the plaintiffs' notice of voluntary dismissal."}
{"article": "On January 6, 2004, current and former employees of Mohawk Industries Inc., a giant carpet and rug manufacturer, filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court Northern District of Georgia, alleging that Mohawk engaged in a massive scheme to hire undocumented immigrants for the express purpose of depressing employee wages. In furtherance of their scheme, defendants were alleged to have: traveled to border towns to recruit undocumented immigrants to work in their plants, provided transportation and temporary housing to undocumented workers, turned a blind eye to obviously fake work papers, assisted undocumented workers in evading detection by law enforcement, hid workers during immigration enforcement raids, \"recycled workers\" (rehired workers under a different name that had previously been fired after being \"discovered\" to be illegal and unauthorized to work), and concealed the scheme by destroying documents. The plaintiff alleged that defendants' scheme violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (\"RICO\"), 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1961 <i>et seq.</i>, and the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1324(a) <i>et seq.</i> The plaintiff was represented by private counsel. Mohawk moved to dismiss the case. The district court (Judge Harold L. Murphy) denied the motion with respect to the plaintiffs' RICO claims and the claim that the defendant was unjustly enriched by paying wages less than it would have been forced to pay, had it not hired undocumented workers. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim with respect to having fewer workers' compensation claims on account of undocumented workers. Accordingly, the defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed the decision with respect to the RICO claims, but held that all unjust enrichment claims should have been dismissed. <i>Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc.</i>, 411 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005). Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the opinion and remanded the case to the 11th Circuit for further consideration in light of <i>Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.</i>, 126 S.Ct. 1991, 164 L.Ed.2d 720 (2006). <i>Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Williams</i>, 126 S.Ct. 2016 (2006). On remand from the Supreme Court, the 11th Circuit restated its prior opinion, with a slight modification. <i>Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc.</i>, 465 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2006). Further review by the Supreme Court was denied. On December 19, 2007, the plaintiffs moved to certify the following class: \"All persons legally authorized to be employed in the United States who are or have been employed in hourly positions by Mohawk Industries, Inc., its subsidiaries or affiliates in Georgia at any time from January 5, 1999, to the present, other than Excluded Employees,\" where \"Excluded Employees\" were employees whose time at Mohawk had been limited to a specific list of facilities. The district court denied the motion on March 3, 2008, holding that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Mohawk's operations, including its use of temporary employment agencies and wage-setting practices, were decentralized; rather than decisions being made on the corporate level, operations were conducted on a facility-by-facility basis, and so the plaintiff class lacked commonality. For typicality, some of the named plaintiffs did not work at facilities using temporary employment agencies, did not work at all of the facilities listed in the class definition, or lacked standing for injunctive relief. The district court also concluded that the proposed class would be unmanageable. The plaintiffs appealed in March 2008 to the Eleventh Circuit, which vacated the district court's decision to deny the class certification on May 28, 2009. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs' complaint did raise questions common to all members of the class and that the \"atypical\" plaintiffs' claims were based on the same legal theory. Because of the district court's conclusion about commonality, it erroneously concluded that the proposed class would be unmanageable. The appeals court remanded the case, instructing the trial court to consider \"whether the common issues predominated over individual issues and whether a class action was superior to individual actions.\" <i>Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc.</i>, 568 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2009). The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied the petition for cert on November 2, 2009. On April 9, 2010, the parties proposed a settlement agreement to the district court. The agreement included a commitment from the defendants to conduct training regarding verification of employment eligibility and a settlement fund. The latter would start with an initial deposit of $12 million, and go up to $18 million as necessary. In addition to paying the named plaintiffs and individual class members (based on length of employment at Mohawk), the settlement fund would also be used to pay for settlement administration costs and attorneys' fees. The proposed settlement class was all employees who worked at Mohawk between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 2009. The district court granted final approval of the settlement on July 22, 2010, and entered judgment on August 19, 2010. The case subsequently closed.", "summary": "On January 6, 2004, current and former employees of Mohawk Industries Inc., a giant carpet and rug manufacturer, filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court Northern District of Georgia, alleging that Mohawk engaged in a massive scheme to hire undocumented immigrants for the express purpose of depressing employee wages. Plaintiff alleged that defendants' scheme violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (\"RICO\"), 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1961 <i>et seq.</i>, and the Immigration and Nationality Act. On July 22, 2010, the District Court approved a settlement between the parties, which included an $18 million settlement fund and a commitment from the defendants to conduct training regarding verification of employment eligibility. This case has finished."}
{"article": "This case deals with the legality of seizing the property of unhoused individuals by the city of Seattle, Washington without adequate notice. The plaintiffs - initially consisting of two individuals, the Episcopal Diocese of Olympia, and the organization Real Change - filed this lawsuit on January 19, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Represented by the ACLU of Washington and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued the City of Seattle, the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT), and the Secretary of Transportation for WSDOT under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, Article 1, \u00a7 7 and Article 1, \u00a7 3 of the Washington Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, on their policy of \u201csweeping.\u201d The City rules governing the sweeps were promulgated as the Multi-Departmental Administrative Rules 08-01 (MDARs), while WSDOT adopted the Guidelines to Address Illegal Encampments. The plaintiffs claimed that the practice of sweeping seized or destroyed their property without adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard, or a meaningful remedy to reclaim undestroyed property. The plaintiffs sought class certification, declaratory relief that federal and state constitutions forbid the policies of defendants, injunctive relief forbidding sweeps until constitutionally respective procedures are adopted, and attorney fees. The District Court assigned the case to Judge Ricardo Martinez. In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the policies of the City violated protections from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to protection from invasion of home under the Washington State Constitution, and the right to due process under the Washington State Constitution. The City viewed the policies themselves, also referred to as \u201ccleanups,\u201d as necessary for public health and safety. In contrast, the plaintiffs contended that the policy of the City violated constitutional notice requirements for the residents of these encampments and others who lacked a permanent home. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that items the City of Seattle viewed as \u201cgarbage\u201d were in fact constitutionally protected property, thus requiring both due process protections and recovery protections. A day after filing the complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. The proposed class included all unhoused persons who lived outside within the City of Seattle and who keep their belongings on public property. On February 6, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the practice of sweeping. Judge Martinez denied the motion for the TRO on February 14, 2017, finding that the plaintiffs inadequately satisfied their burdens of success on the merits and irreparable harm, but allowed the plaintiffs' concurrent but unfiled motion for a preliminary injunction to proceed. 2017 WL 591112. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 2, 2017, adding another individual and the Trinity Parish of Seattle as plaintiffs. In response, the City of Seattle filed a counterclaim on March 16, 2017, seeking a declaratory judgment that the City\u2019s newly adopted MDARs was sufficiently constitutional. The new MDARs was set to go into effect on April 2, 2017. The plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint on May 23, 2017, adding an additional individual plaintiff. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on June 14, 2017. Reviewing the motions for preliminary injunction and class certification in tandem, Judge Martinez denied both motions on October 4, 2017. 2017 WL 4410029. Judge Martinez denied the class certification because the plaintiffs failed to establish commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Judge Martinez denied the preliminary injunction because he found plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm because speculative injuries are not immediate, threatened injury. Judge Martinez found that the balance of equities and the validity of the public interest weighed in favor of defendants because the speculative claims of plaintiffs did not outweigh the defendants' interest in maintaining public property free of items that may pose a threat to citizens. On January 23, 2018, the plaintiffs appealed the denial of the class certification to the Ninth Circuit. Judge Sandra Ikuta, Judge Morgan Christen, and Judge Jennifer Choe-Groves heard the case. The panel affirmed the denial of class certification on November 29, 2019, finding the lack of sufficient evidence and commonality dispositive enough to warrant the District Court\u2019s denial of the class certification. 943 F.3d 882. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Christen found that the plaintiffs presented distinct facial challenges to the cleanup policies. With the Ninth Circuit finding no abuse of discretion by the District Court, the City of Seattle filed a motion to convert the preliminary injunction into a final judgment on the merits on March 5, 2020. The plaintiffs responded on March 12, 2020, by filing a motion to voluntarily dismiss their claims and the City\u2019s counterclaim. On June 11, 2020, Judge Martinez denied the City\u2019s motion for conversion and granted the plaintiff\u2019s motion to dismiss without prejudice. 2020 WL 3100855. This case is closed.", "summary": "In 2017, the plaintiffs, consisting of unhoused individuals in Seattle, Washington and local organizations, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington against the City of Seattle and the Washington State Department of Transportation under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from the \"sweeping\" policy and practices committed by the City. They alleged the City's policy violated their protections from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to protection from invasion of home under the Washington State Constitution, and the right to due process under the Washington State Constitution. Additionally, the plaintiffs sought class certification. The City of Seattle counterclaimed and sought a declaratory judgment affirming the constitutional validity of their policies. The court denied the plaintiffs' motions for class certification and preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs' appealed the denial of class certification to the Ninth Circuit, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of class certification. Consequently, the plaintiffs moved for and were granted dismissal of all claims without prejudice on June 11, 2020. The case is closed. closed."}
{"article": "On September 1, 2000, the mother of a physically and developmentally disabled individual filed a lawsuit under \u00a7 1983 against the Director of Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The Plaintiff, represented by Prairie State Legal Services, alleged that a reduction in the level of private-duty nursing provided to her son at home would violate the federal Medicaid statute and deprive her son of due process of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Plaintiff's son was diagnosed with brain cancer as a child; as a result of the cancer, a stroke, and subsequent treatment, he presented a very complex medical case requiring round-the-clock care and about 25 medications per day. From the time between when the Plaintiff's private medical insurance terminated and the time her son turned twenty-one, the Plaintiff's son received sixteen hours of in-home nursing per day under the Medicaid Program for Medically Fragile, Technology Dependent Children (MFTDC program). After he turned twenty-one, the Department of Healthcare and Family Services (HFS) reduced this to five hours of in-home nursing per day. The Plaintiff desired community-based treatment, and state treatment professionals found that it was appropriate. The cost of care for the Plaintiff's son in a hospital ($29,000 per month) would exceed the cost of care in his home ($20,000 per month). On September 1, 2000, the district court (Judge James B. Zagel) granted the Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order, requiring IDPA to continue funding at-home care. However, on November 6, 2000 the court denied the Plaintiff\u2019s request for a preliminary injunction, holding that her complaint did not state a viable federal claim. The Plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, also requesting an injunction pending appeal. However, in February 2001, amendments to the Illinois State Medicaid Plan eliminated private duty nursing care as a service provided under the state plan. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit ordered the District Court to vacate its judgment on the merits and dismiss all previous orders as moot. On December 1, 2001, the Plaintiff again filed suit against IDPA, this time in the Circuit Court of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, DuPage County, Illinois. The original claim alleged violations of various Illinois state laws. After adding claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (\"ADA\") and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (\"RA\"), the Plaintiff moved the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on December 14, 2001. On April 30, 2002, the Court (Judge John W. Darrah) granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion to remand to state court. The Court remanded Plaintiffs' state law claims and retained jurisdiction of Plaintiffs' federal law claims. The Federal Court granted Defendants' motion for judging on the pleadings on September 10, 2002. The Court held that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344 (7th Cir. 2000), required that Plaintiffs' ADA claim under Title II fail. The Court also dismissed Plaintiffs' RA claims, holding that the RA does not require the State to create and fund a program that does not already exist; instead, the RA requires even-handed treatment of developmentally and physically disabled persons relative to persons who do not have disabilities. On September 8, 2004, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Ilana Rovner) reversed the District Court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Radaszewski v. Garner, 383 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 2004). First, the Court recognized that the Supreme Court's holding in Board of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) recognized the right of a private plaintiff to assert an ADA claim for injunctive relief against a state official in federal court. The Court then proceeded to the merits of Plaintiff's claim and concluded that the Court held that the District Court erred in entering judgment on the pleadings in Defendants' favor. On March 29, 2006, the District Court found that there was no final enforceable settlement agreement between the parties. Radaszewski v. Maram, 2006 WL 861243 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2006). The parties had exchanged numerous settlement offers, both written and verbal, and had submitted memoranda regarding the status of the settlement proceedings. The parties had disagreed about whether an enforceable settlement agreement had been reached. There was a bench trial beginning September 10, 2007. At the time of trial, the Plaintiff's son was receiving 16 hours of private-duty nursing per day pursuant to the injunction entered by the state court. The Court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law after the bench trial on March 26, 2008. Radaszewski v. Maram, 2008 WL 2097382 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2008). The Court held that Plaintiff had sufficiently stated and proved a claim under the ADA and RA. The Court entered judgment in Plaintiff's favor; the parties were ordered to meet, confer, and submit a proposed order setting forth appropriate relief consistent with the Court's opinion. On May 9, 2008, the Court issued a permanent injunction. The order enjoined the Defendant from reducing coverage for Plaintiff's son to fewer than sixteen hours per day of skilled nursing services at his parents' home. Plaintiff was also awarded costs and fees, and the Court retained jurisdiction for purposes of enforcing the injunction. The case is now closed, and there has been no further litigation.", "summary": "This case was brought on behalf of a developmentally and physically disabled individual against various Illinois state officials alleging that his rights were violated when in-home nursing services were greatly reduced when he turned twenty-one. The Court entered judgment for Plaintiff in March 2008, resulting in a permanent injunction."}
{"article": "This is a class action lawsuit about the legality of the policies and practices of the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). On January 14, 2020, an individual detained by USMS filed this lawsuit in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Marshal for the District of Columbia Superior Court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 551 et seq.) and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241. Represented by a public defender, the plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and habeas relief. The case was assigned to Judge Royce C. Lamberth. The plaintiff alleged that USMS officers exceeded their statutory authority by unlawfully detaining individuals, who were ordered to be released by a Superior Court judge or whose cases the U.S. Attorney\u2019s Office declined to prosecute, on the grounds that they violated civil immigration statutes. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), only certain law enforcement agencies with expertise in immigration law, not including USMS, can enforce civil immigration law, such as by making warrantless arrests and detaining individuals suspected of civil immigration violations. USMS was limited to obeying, executing, and enforcing all orders of the courts, including the U.S District Courts. On the date of the filing of the lawsuit, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction and to certify a class. On March 26, 2020, the National Immigrant Justice Center and the District of Columbia entered amicus briefs on behalf of the plaintiff. On May 7, 2020, the court preliminarily enjoined USMS from seizing individuals for suspected civil immigration violations, and certified the plaintiff class as \u201call indigent criminal defendants in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia: (1) who were, are, or will be detained by officers of the United States Marshals Service for suspected civil immigration violations, and (2) as to whom Immigration and Customs Enforcement has not effectuated a warrant of removal/deportation (a form I-205) and/or has not obtained an order of deportation or removal.\u201d 335 F.R.D 337. On June 4, 2020, USMS moved for reconsideration of the opinion, citing for the first time a nonpublic, unpublished 2002 Order of the Attorney General that purportedly authorized USMS to carry out civil immigration arrests. On July 24, 2020, the court denied USMS\u2019 request for reconsideration, stating that USMS failed to provide the 2002 order at the appropriate time and that the order was facially invalid under the APA. 2020 WL 4260739. On September 28, 2020, the plaintiffs moved to clarify the order granting a preliminary injunction and certifying the class. USMS responded to the motion on October 23, 2020, and the plaintiff\u2019s response is due by November 6, 2020. This case is ongoing.", "summary": "In January 2020, an individual detained by the U.S. Marshals Services (USMS) sued the U.S. Marshal for the District of Columbia Superior Court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Represented by a public defender, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff alleged that the USMS lacked authority to enforce immigration law. On May 7, 2020, the court preliminarily enjoined the USMS from seizing individuals for suspected civil immigration violations and certified a class of indigent criminal defendants detained by the USMS. This case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On February 22, 2007, plaintiffs filed this class action seeking prospective declaratory and injunctive relief in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, basing their lawsuit upon alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12101 et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794; 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983; and federal common law. They also claimed violations of numerous state constitution provisions, statutes, and regulations governing services for handicapped persons, public accommodations, public assistance programs, health care, and due process. The plaintiffs, also seeking an award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses, were represented by private counsel and attorneys from The Legal Aid Society (New York City) and the Urban Justice Center. The plaintiffs, indigent New York City residents with psychiatric disabilities who are under the supervision of the New York State Division of Parole (\"DOP\"), or who are soon to be released to New York City from a New York State prison under DOP supervision, alleged that their psychiatric disabilities' symptoms interfere with major life activities such as thinking, concentrating, interacting with others, caring for oneself, working, and remembering and processing information. Qualified to participate in the parole, conditional release or post-release supervision programs (collectively referred to as \"the parole program\"), the plaintiffs asserted that they require disability accommodations in the form of pre-release planning and appropriate transitional services in order to be successful in the parole program and have access to the services it offers. Due to their lack of financial resources, the plaintiffs qualified for one or more public benefits programs, but stated that they required accommodations for their disability in the form of assistance with pre-release applications and post-release services to obtain and maintain access to these benefits programs. The defendants consisted of the DOP, additional state agencies responsible for mental health and benefits programs, and various state officials administering these agencies. The plaintiffs alleged that the release from prison of members of their class without having been provided appropriate pre-release planning services results in a \"revolving door\" system in which they are likely return to prison because they fail while on parole supervision, the state not having accommodated their disabilities. In this regard, plaintiffs stated that adequate pre-release planning for prisoners with psychiatric disabilities includes assisting them in completing, submitting, and monitoring the processing of applications for public benefits such as Medicaid, Social Security disability benefits, Family Assistance and Safety Net Assistance (collectively referred to as \"Temporary Assistance\"), and Food Stamps, such that those benefits are available to the prisoners promptly upon their release from prison into the Parole Program. Adequate pre-release planning also, they alleged, includes helping prisoners secure community mental health services, supportive housing, and enrollment in vocational, educational and/or substance abuse programs. Their complaint added that parolees with psychiatric disabilities also need continued assistance throughout their time in the parole program with securing benefits, programs and services not secured prior to release, with implementing a coordinated plan of mental health care, and with addressing additional needs or problems that arise while on parole. The case was assigned to District Judge Miriam Goldman Cedarbaum. On several occasions in the ensuing months, she extended the period of time for the defendants to file answers and motions in response to the complaint. The PACER docket entries for the case reflect that these extensions result from settlement discussions between the parties. Also, due to the settlement negotiations, the plaintiffs withdrew on April 23, 2007, their motion for class certification without prejudice to the right to re-file it, should no settlement occur. On February 14, 2011, after many years of extensions on the defendants' time to answer the complaint, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice.", "summary": "On February 22, 2007, plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit challenging the lack of pre-release services, also known as discharge planning, for people with psychiatric disabilities being released from New York State prisons. This case was voluntarily dismissed on February 14, 2011."}
{"article": "City Attorneys from the City and County of San Francisco (the City) filed this suit on April 5, 2018, challenging the Department of Justice's (DOJ) bulk rescission of documents that provided guidance of the DOJ's interpretation of laws protecting various groups of people. In so doing, the City argued that the DOJ undermined civil rights protections for marginalized communities and undermined regulated entities like the City from being able to effectively comply with federal law. The City argued that the DOJ did not provide a meaningful reason for the rescission, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The City sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California and assigned to Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu. The City argued that these documents provided guidance to various regulated entities and \"helped to protect civil rights of marginalized individuals,\" including \"immigrants, the poor, people of color, and people with disabilities.\" The City argued that the reason given for the rescission was a press release that merely stated the documents were \"unnecessary, inconsistent with existing law, or otherwise improper.\" The City argued this reasoning was conclusory and lacked particularized justifications for specific documents. While some parts of the DOJ website explain the withdrawal of particular documents, the City argued that the DOJ did not provide justification for withdrawing six particularly important documents. These six documents included guidance for state and local governments regarding removing unlawful juvenile offender fees, discrimination protection for disabled individuals, and discrimination protection under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The complaint highlighted that this rescission occurred in the context of a DOJ guided under Attorney Jefferson Sessions that \"has shown a shocking disregard for protecting the rights of vulnerable communities, rolling back civil rights initiatives in a wide variety of areas.\" The case has been assigned to Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu. It was reassigned to Judge Jon S. Tigar on June 14, 2018. The Justice Department filed a motion to dismiss on June 18, 2018, but Judge Tiger determined this motion to be moot on August 1, 2018, when the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. This new complaint maintained the APA causes of action from the first complaint, but added an additional rescission of DOJ documents in July 2018 to the facts of the case and modified the plaintiff's argument for standing. After the plaintiffs filed the amended complaint, the DOJ filed an additional motion to dismiss on September 27, 2018. Judge Tigar granted the motion to dismiss on December 10, 2018. He wrote that the plaintiffs did not plead a particularized enough injury in order to have standing under the APA, and that municipalities are not subject to reduced pleading requirements like states are in APA claims. He added that regulatory or economic uncertainty was not enough for a municipality to have standing; the injury must be imminent or the municipality must have a plan or process in place to violate the new rule in order for it to have standing. The plaintiffs did not appeal the ruling, and the case closed.", "summary": "The City and County of San Francisco (the City) filed this suit on April 5, 2018, challenging the Department of Justice's (DOJ) bulk rescission of documents that provided guidance of the DOJ's interpretation of laws protecting various groups of people. In so doing, the City argued that the DOJ undermined civil rights protections for marginalized communities and undermined regulated entities like the City from being able to effectively comply with federal law. The City argued that the DOJ did not provide a meaningful reason for the rescission, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The City sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Judge Jon S. Tigar granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing."}
{"article": "On April 28, 2005, Brenda Jean Clustka died by suicide while inside her cell at the Washoe County jail. On November 3, 2005, her daughter and administrator of the estate, represented by two civil rights lawyers, brought a complaint in the District of Nevada (Judge Howard D. McKibben) against the City of Reno, Nevada and two officers of the Reno Police Department. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants performed, participated, aided and/or abetted in acts that led to the death of Ms. Clutska. The plaintiff alleged that the police officers escorting Ms. Clutska to the jail did not report her apparent earlier attempt to commit suicide while in the back of their police van. The plaintiff brought this action against the police officers for not putting Ms. Clutska on suicide watch and against the City of Reno for not properly training its police officers to deal with this type of situation. The plaintiff alleged a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 on the part of the police officers for abridging Ms. Clutska's right to be free from deliberate indifference to risk of suicide. The plaintiff also brought a separate cause of action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the City of Reno for failing to properly train its police officers with respect to their obligation to report suicide attempts by detainees. Plaintiff sought declaratory that these acts were illegal and unconstitutional, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages for these alleged violations. A First Amended Complaint, filed on December 12, 2005, added the estate and Clustka's son as plaintiffs in addition to the daughter. On August 29, 2006 the defendants, moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs could not establish a \u00a71983 claim because they could not show that Ms. Clustka was an objectively serious suicide risk while in custody and that the officers failed to take appropriate steps to protect her. The court agreed that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Clustka's serious medical needs, or that the conduct of the defendants was the actual cause of Clutska's harm sufficient to constitute liability under \u00a71983. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment and awarded judgment in favor of the defendants on March 8, 2007. The plaintiffs then appealed to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. On July 24, 2009 the 9th Circuit reversed and remanded the case. Conn v. City of Reno, 572 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2009). The 9th Circuit (Judge Stephen Reinhardt, Judge Mary M Schroeder, and Judge Dorothy W. Nelson) held that a reasonable jury could find that the police officers were liable under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 for their deliberate indifference to Clustka's serious medical need, and that their actions were a cause in fact and a proximate cause of her suicide. The defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. In their May 6, 2010 petition, the defendants argued that the Ninth Circuit's decision exacerbated a circuit split over \u00a71983 municipal liability for not training law-enforcement officers to diagnose suicide risk, and that the Ninth Circuit created a new circuit split by erroneously imposing on officers a constitutional duty to diagnose and report suicidal tendencies. On April 4, 2011 the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of <i>Connick v. Thompson</i>, 131 S.Ct. 1350 (2011). In <i>Connick</i>, the Supreme Court addressed the liability of a district attorney's office for its prosecutors on a failure-to-train theory under \u00a7 1983. On remand and in consideration of <i>Connick</i>, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court had been correct to hold that the municipality was not liable. On September 6, 2011, the Ninth Circuit reinstated its original opinion except for the part on municipal liability. Conn v. City of Reno, 658 F.3d 897 (D. Nev. 2011). On the district court level, the case then proceeded to trial against the two police officers only. After a six-day jury trial, with proceedings beginning March 7, 2012, the jury found in favor of the officers. On March 13, 2012, the plaintiffs had objected to the qualified immunity jury instruction:<blockquote>The jury instruction objected to asks \"whether the officers reasonably misapprehended how the law would govern their situation.'' This is a legal question and one the Ninth Circuit has decided. Should the jury find that the officers were indeed deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of Brenda Clustka, then there can be no qualified immunity because the Ninth Circuit found that law clearly established, and the officers cannot have reasonably misapprehended it.</blockquote>The court denied the objection during the trial proceedings that day. On March 14, 2012, the jury deliberated for approximately three hours before returning a verdict in favor of the defendants. Judgment was entered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs. A small amount of litigation occurred after trial over the defendants' awards for costs. In an order of September 19, 2012, the court found that as the defendants prevailed on all claims, they were entitled to an award of all allowable costs. In response to the plaintiffs' argument that the court should deny costs because of the plaintiffs' indigency and the the fact that it was a case of substantial public importance, effecting an immediate change in the way suicide threats were handled locally. Considering these circumstances, the court adjusted the costs to reflect the plaintiffs' economic circumstances and the desire not to chill future plaintiffs from bringing actions raising substantial constitutional issues, reducing the costs awarded to the defendants by fifty percent. The case is now closed.", "summary": "On April 28, 2005, Brenda Jean Clustka committed suicide while inside her cell at the Washoe County jail after making an unreported attempt in a police vehicle two days earlier. On November 3, 2005, her daughter and administer of the estate, represented by two civil rights lawyers, brought a complaint in the District of Nevada against the city of Reno and two officers of the Reno Police Department. The plaintiff alleged a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the police officers for deliberate indifference to the mother's risk of suicide and against the city for failing to train its police officers to report suicide attempts. After several rounds of appeals of summary judgement, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's grant of summary judgement for the city but denied summary judgement with respect to the police officers. The case then proceeded to trial against the two police officers only. The jury found in favor of the officers. The case is now closed."}
{"article": "On November 18, 2014, the plaintiffs, persons with disabilities that require the use of a wheelchair, brought this class action lawsuit against the defendant, Colorado's Regional Transportation District (RTD). The plaintiffs were represented by the Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition Legal Program and the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center. The plaintiffs alleged disability discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Judge Christine Arguello presided over this case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants did not make their transportation services readily accessible for persons using wheelchairs and in that light rail operators repeatedly denied persons who require the use of wheelchairs access to the light rail. The plaintiffs, in particular, alleged that the defendant discriminated in two ways. Firstly, the walkways within their light rail vehicles had narrow walkways that restricted the mobility of persons using wheelchairs. This equated to the vehicles not being readily accessible for wheelchairs which was required under the ADA. And Secondly, despite RTD designating seating locations for persons using wheelchairs, in practice, those locations were often unavailable. Oftentimes, the light rail operators would allow non-disabled persons that had either a stroller or bicycle to occupy designated wheelchair seating location. And if a person with a stroller or bicycle occupied those areas, the light rail operator sometimes denied transportation services to a person using a wheelchair. Instead of giving priority to persons using wheelchairs--as required by their own policies-- the operator would often refuse access to the person with the wheelchair if someone onboard with a stroller or bicycle already occupied that space. The plaintiffs sought class certification, attorney fees and costs, declaratory relief, and an injunction. After a period of discovery and the like, the parties settled. Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for certification of the class for settlement purposes, and for approval of the preliminary settlement on November 14, 2016. The Court agreed on April 3, 2017. After a hearing on the settlement, the court finally approved it, along with attorneys fees, on July 11, 2017. The settlement agreement had three terms. Firstly, the agreement called for 172 of the light rails vehicles to be retrofitted to accommodate persons that use wheelchairs. The retrofit would make it so that persons using wheelchairs have more mobility within the transportation vehicles. This would allow for wheelchair users to not obstruct other passengers, and that at least two people with wheelchairs can board the vehicles. Secondly, the settlement agreement required policies that both direct light rail operators to not discriminate against persons with disability the use of a wheelchair, and to train/retrain these operators to ensure that these anti-discriminatory measures are upheld. And thirdly, the agreement required that the defendant pay the plaintiffs\u2019 attorney fees and costs. The court approved the agreed amount of $ 375,000 for attorney fees and costs. The court maintains limited jurisdiction over the case for five years to resolve disputes that require court intervention as set forth in the settlement agreement.", "summary": "Individuals requiring the use of a wheelchair brought a class action lawsuit against Denver\u2019s Regional Transportation District (RTD) for violating the American with Disabilities Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. RTD did not provide readily accessible transportation services for persons using wheelchairs. RTD agreed to a settlement that requires them to make their transportation vehicles more readily accessible for persons with vehicles, and to train their light rail operators to promote non-discriminatory policies, practices, and procedures going forward."}
{"article": "Summary posted to the Clearinghouse on August 4, 2020: On May 26, 2011, an agnostic graduating senior at Medina Valley High School, his older brother (a former student at the school), and their parents filed suit against the Medina Valley Independent School District in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Represented by Americans United for Separation of Church and State and by private counsel, the plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, nominal damages, and attorneys\u2019 fees, alleging that the School District had violated their First Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the school district, was in violation of the Establishment Clause by engaging in a course of conduct that included \u201cpresenting, sponsoring, encouraging, inviting, or coercing prayers at school and school-sponsored activities and events; displaying and permitting the display of crosses and other religious icons; and retaliating against students who complain[ed] about the unlawful promotion of religion or who decline[d] to participate in religious prayers, practices, or rituals.\u201d The plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on the same day that they filed their complaint, hoping to enjoin the school district from featuring prayer at the upcoming high school graduation ceremony scheduled for June 4, 2011, two weeks after the complaint was filed. After a hearing on May 31, the District Court (Judge Fred Biery) granted their motion on June 1, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits and that failing to issue an injunction would result in irreparable harm to the plaintiffs. It ordered the terms \u201cinvocation\u201d and \u201cbenediction\u201d stricken and any official group prayer removed from the graduation program. The school district made an emergency interlocutory appeal to the Fifth Circuit, and on June 3, 2011, a three-judge panel (Judges W. Eugene Davis, Jerry E. Smith and Leslie H. Southwick) issued a per curiam opinion granting the motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The panel stated that they were not persuaded that the plaintiffs were \u201csubstantially likely to prevail on the merits, particularly on the issue that the individual prayers or other remarks to be given by students at graduation were, in fact, school-sponsored.\u201d The injunction was dissolved, and although the terms \u201cinvocation\u201d and \u201cbenediction\u201d had already been removed from the printed program, the graduation ceremony the following day included prayer as originally planned. On July 11, 2011, the district court urged the parties to attempt to settle rather than engage in protracted litigation, and the parties agreed to try mediation. At the end of the summer, however, they reported that they had been unable to reach an agreement. On September 6, 2011, the school district moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. This motion was mooted by the plaintiffs\u2019 submission of an amended complaint on November 2, but the school district submitted a second motion to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction on December 9, 2011. A month later, the district moved for summary judgment. The plaintiffs subsequently moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of school prayer. The court never ruled on any of these motions, however, because the parties were able to settle their dispute in February 2012. On February 8, they submitted a joint motion to approve a proposed agreement. Under the terms of the settlement, the school district agreed to stop initiating, soliciting, or directing prayers at school events, displaying religious symbols and texts at schools, and inviting religious speakers to proselytize, or to play any part in writing or editing student graduation speeches. It further agreed to train its staff in how to comply with the agreement, educate students on religious diversity, and refrain from retaliating against or disparaging the plaintiffs. The agreement allowed student-led prayer at events. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement for ten years. On February 9, 2012, the court entered a consent decree approving the settlement. The following month, the court was called upon to enforce it\u2014the school superintendent and the high school band director each made statements that could be construed as disparaging of the plaintiffs (the former referring to the lawsuit as a \u201cwitch hunt\u201d and the latter calling the plaintiffs liars) shortly after the settlement was approved. On March 19, 2012, the court issued an order requiring the district to apologize, and requiring the plaintiffs to accept the apology. Both did so. As of August 4, 2020, the case is inactive, but the court retains jurisdiction through February 2022.", "summary": "On May 26, 2011, an agnostic graduating senior at Medina Valley High School, his older brother (a former student), and their agnostic parents filed suit against the Medina Valley Independent School District, alleging that the district was violating the Establishment Clause by inciting and soliciting official group prayer at school events, displaying religious icons and texts at school, and retaliating against students who complained about their endorsement of religion. The parties came to a settlement on February 8, 2012, under which the school district agreed not to engage in any of the above activity. The case is open for enforcement of the settlement until February 2022."}
{"article": "COVID-19 Summary: This is a suit brought by a church against the State of Colorado's enforcement of stay-at-home orders, including the policy prohibiting in-person religious activities. Following a Supreme Court decision denying a similar application for injunctive relief, plaintiffs withdrew their request for injunctive relief. They later filed an amended complaint and a renewed motion for TRO and preliminary injunction, which was denied on June 16. <hr> The \"safer at home\" executive orders issued by Colorado Governor Jared Polis in response to the outbreak of COVID-19 prohibited religious gatherings of over 10 people. High Plains Harvest Church, a small, rural church, and one of its pastors alleged that the orders violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Represented by private counsel, plaintiffs sued Governor Polis and the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under 42 U.S.C.\u00a7 1983 on May 25, 2020. The plaintiffs, who simultaneously filed a motion for temporary restraining order (TRO), sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' costs and fees. The case was assigned to Judge Raymond P. Moore and Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty. The plaintiffs alleged that the executive orders were unconstitutional both facially and as-applied, violating their freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and equal protection rights. The plaintiffs asserted that the orders burdened their sincerely held religious beliefs by \"permit[ing] other similarly situated businesses or non-religious entities to continue while prohibiting faith-based gatherings.\" Moreover, the plaintiffs claimed that the orders violated their \"freedom of speech by prohibiting them from engaging in religious speech through their church services.\" Finally, plaintiffs contended that the orders, which permitted \"critical businesses\" such as grocery, gun, and hardware stores to remain open, violated their equal protection rights by \"impermissibly discriminat[ing[ between certain non-religious gatherings and religious or faith-based gatherings.\" Plaintiffs sought an injunction or TRO enjoining defendants from enforcing the executive orders against plaintiffs and an order declaring the orders unconstitutional. 2020 WL 2630282. In their May 28 response to the motion for TRO, defendants asserted that \"the purpose of these orders is to protect the public from the COVID-19 pandemic,\" not to target or discriminate against plaintiffs' first amendment rights. Defendants argued that the plaintiffs had \"no reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their claims\" because the orders were enacted in good faith and in furtherance of public safety. The next day, the United States Department of Justice filed a statement of interest, stating that \"The Court should grant the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a temporary restraining order, and Plaintiffs\u2019 group prayer should be allowed to proceed without fear of prosecution.\" The DOJ explained \"that because Colorado appears to be treating similarly situated non-religious activity, such as in-person dining in restaurants, better than places of worship these actions may constitute a violation of the church\u2019s constitutional right to the free exercise of religion.\" That same day, the Supreme Court, in <a href=\"https://clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17575\">South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom</a>, denied an application for injunctive relief similar to the relief sought in this case. There, the Supreme Court stated that the \"restrictions [on places of worship] appear consistent with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.\" On May 30, in light of the Supreme Court's decision, the plaintiffs withdrew the request for preliminary relief. On June 1, the defendants filed a status report containing draft guidelines for restrictions on places of worship. The guidelines suggested an indoor capacity of no more than 50% or 50 people, along with social distancing, masks, and sanitation measures. In the next few days, thousands of people protested police violence. On June 10, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, alleging that the defendants \u201cpermitted and encouraged these protest gatherings while continuing to impose draconian restrictions on religious gatherings.\u201d Concurrently, they filed a renewed motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The court denied the motion on June 16, stating that the \"notion that the non-enforcement of social distancing during a protest means that the State is engaged in a variety of constitutional misconduct directed at religious institutions is far from apparent\" and that \"the assertion that Defendants are treating Plaintiffs differently from comparable secular gatherings is 'improbable.'\" The case is ongoing.", "summary": "On May 25, 2020, a small church and its pastor filed this suit against Governor Palis and a Colorado public health official in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. Plaintiffs challenged Colorado's \"safer at home\" executive orders, which prohibited religious gatherings of more than 10 people, alleging that the orders violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Department of Justice filed a statement of interest suggesting that the executive orders likely violated plaintiffs' right to the free exercise of religion. Plaintiffs withdrew their request for injunctive relief after the Supreme Court denied an application for similar injunctive relief, and filed an amended complaint on June 10. They also filed a renewed motion for TRO and preliminary injunction, which was denied on June 16. The case is ongoing."}
{"article": "On October 29, 2007, attorneys with the ACLU of Washington, the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project and private counsel filed a class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington on behalf of lawful permanent residents of the United States whose naturalization applications had been pending for over two years with the U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (\"CIS\"), awaiting the results of a FBI \"name check.\" Plaintiffs asserted that the unreasonable delays caused by the FBI \"name check\" process violated the Administration Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 701, et seq. Plaintiffs requested that the Court grant plaintiffs' naturalization applications pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1447(b), or in the alternative, compel the government to render decisions on them. Plaintiffs sought additional declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. Plaintiffs proposed certification of a class consisting of all persons residing in the Western District of Washington who have submitted naturalization applications to CIS and whose naturalization applications are not adjudicated within 120 days of the date of their initial exam due to pendency of a \"name check.\" On April 25, 2008, the District Court (Judge Marsha J. Pechman) certified the proposed class. <i>Roshandel v. Chertoff</i>, 554 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (W.D. Wash. 2008). The Court granted a joint motion by the parties to amend the class definition on June 3, clarifying the class's temporal and geographic scope. <i>Roshandel v. Chertoff</i>, No. 2:07-cv-01739, 2008 WL 2275558 (W.D. Wash. June 3, 2008). Meanwhile, on January 8, 2008, the defendants had filed a motion to dismiss or remand to CIS for adjudication. The Court (Judge Pechman) denied this motion on May 5, striking some aspects of the motion to dismiss as outside of the complaint, finding the others to be without merit, and finding the arguments for remand to be inapplicable in light of class certification and the addition of more named plaintiffs to the amended complaint. <i>Roshandel v. Chertoff</i>, No. 2:07-cv-01739, 2008 WL 1969646, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90899 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2008). On May 29, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of the class members' right to a judicial determination of application for naturalization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1447(b). The Court never ruled on the motion, however, as the parties came to a settlement on August 11. The agreement set out a timeline for adjudication of class members' applications and subsequent naturalization proceedings, and gave the Court continued jurisdiction to enforce its terms. It also required defendants to pay plaintiffs' counsel $185,000 in fees and costs. The Court approved the settlement on August 25, 2008, and remanded to CIS to adjudicate the class members' claims. By November 20, 2008, all claims had been adjudicated, and thus the settlement agreement was terminated and the case was dismissed.", "summary": "This is a class action suit filed by attorneys with the ACLU of Washington, the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project and private counsel in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington on behalf of lawful permanent residents of the United States whose naturalization applications had been pending for over two years with the U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (\"CIS\"), awaiting the results of a FBI \"name check.\" The parties came to a settlement in August of 2008, and the applications of all class members were adjudicated by November of the same year."}