 Before the morning of 1 September had passed , reports coming in to US 2nd Division headquarters made it clear that North Koreans had penetrated to the north @-@ south Changnyong @-@ Yongsan road and cut the division in two ; the 38th and 23d Infantry Regiments with the bulk of the division artillery in the north were separated from the division headquarters and the 9th Infantry Regiment in the south . Keiser decided that this situation made it advisable to control and direct the divided division as two special forces . Accordingly , he placed the division artillery commander , Brigadier General Loyal M. Haynes , in command of the northern group . Haynes ' command post was 7 miles ( 11 km ) north of Changnyong . Task Force Haynes became operational at 10 : 20 , September 1 . Southward , in the Yongsan area , Keiser placed Brigadier General Joseph S. Bradley , Assistant Division Commander , in charge of the 9th Infantry Regiment , the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion , most of the 72nd Tank Battalion , and other miscellaneous units of the division . This southern grouping was known as Task Force Bradley . 
 Before the morning of 1 September <a href='been_done' title='1'><mark>had</mark></a> passed , reports coming in to US 2nd Division headquarters made it clear that North Koreans <a href='been_done' title='2'><mark>had</mark></a> penetrated to the north @-@ south Changnyong @-@ Yongsan road and cut the division in two ; the 38th and 23d Infantry Regiments with the bulk of the division artillery in the north <a href='uninflect' title='3'><mark>were</mark></a> separated from the division headquarters and the 9th Infantry Regiment in the south . Keiser decided that this situation made it advisable to control and direct the divided division as two special forces . Accordingly , he placed the division artillery commander , Brigadier General Loyal M. Haynes , in command of the northern group . Haynes <a href='null_genetive' title='4'><mark>'</mark></a>command post was 7 miles ( 11 km ) north of Changnyong . Task Force Haynes became operational at 10 : 20 , September 1 . Southward , in the Yongsan area , Keiser placed Brigadier General Joseph S. Bradley , Assistant Division Commander , in charge of the 9th Infantry Regiment , the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion , most of the 72nd Tank Battalion , and other miscellaneous units of the division . This southern grouping was known as Task Force Bradley . 
Before da morning of 1 September done passed , reports commin in to US 2nd Division headquarters made it clear that North Koreans done penetrated to tdanorth @-@ south Changnyong @-@ Yongsan road and cut thdaivision in two ; the 38th and 23d Infantry Regiments w/ thedalk of the daision artillery in the ndah was separated from the division headquarters and the 9tdanfantry Regiment in the south . Keiser decided that this shii made it advisable to control and direct the divdad division as 2 special forces . Accordingly , he placed the division artillery commander , Brigadier General Loyal M. Haynes , in command of the northern group . Haynes  command post was 7 miles ( 11 km ) north of Changnyong . Task Force Haynes became operational at 10 : 20 , September 1 . Southward , in the Yongsan area , Keiser placed Brigadier General Joseph S. Bradley , Assistant Division Commander , in charge of the 9th daantry Regiment , the 2nd Edaneer Combat Battalion , most of the 72nd Tank Battalion , and other miscellaneous units of the division . This southern grouping was known as Task Force Bradley .