 Several philosophers had strong objections to the claims being made by AI researchers . One of the earliest was John Lucas , who argued that Gödel 's incompleteness theorem showed that a formal system ( such as a computer program ) could never see the truth of certain statements , while a human being could . Hubert Dreyfus ridiculed the broken promises of the 60s and critiqued the assumptions of AI , arguing that human reasoning actually involved very little " symbol processing " and a great deal of embodied , instinctive , unconscious " know how " . John Searle 's Chinese Room argument , presented in 1980 , attempted to show that a program could not be said to " understand " the symbols that it uses ( a quality called " intentionality " ) . If the symbols have no meaning for the machine , Searle argued , then the machine can not be described as " thinking " . 
 Several philosophers had strong objections to the claims being made by AI researchers . One of the earliest was John Lucas , <a href='null_relcl' title='1'><mark>who</mark></a>argued that Gödel <a href='null_genetive' title='2'><mark>'s</mark></a>incompleteness theorem showed that a formal system ( such as a computer program ) could never see <a href='None' title='3'><mark>the</mark></a><a href='negative_concord' title='4'><mark>truth</mark></a> of certain statements , while a human being could . Hubert Dreyfus ridiculed the broken promises of the 60s and critiqued the assumptions of AI , arguing that human reasoning actually involved very little " symbol processing " and a great deal of embodied , instinctive , unconscious " know how " . John Searle <a href='null_genetive' title='5'><mark>'s</mark></a>Chinese Room argument , presented in 1980 , attempted to show that a program could not be said to " understand " the symbols <a href='null_relcl' title='6'><mark>that</mark></a>it <a href='uninflect' title='7'><mark>uses</mark></a> ( a quality called " intentionality " ) . If the symbols <a href='got' title='8'><mark>have</mark></a> no meaning for the machine , Searle argued , then the machine can not be described as " thinking " . 
Several philosophers had strong objections to da claims being made by AI researchers . One of the earliest was John Lucas , argued that Gödel  incompleteness theorem showed that a formal system ( such as a computer program ) could never see no truth of certain statements , while a human being could . Hubert Dreyfus ridiculed the broken promises of tda60s and critiqued the assumptions of AI , arguing that human reasoning actually involved very lil " symbol processing " and a great deal of embodied , instinctive , unconscious " know how " . John Searle  Chinese Room argument , presented in 1980 , attempted to show dat a program could not be said to " kno " the symbols it use ( a quality called " intentionality " ) . If the symbols got no meaning fa the machine , Searle argued , then thdaachine can not b described as " thinking " .