Now how is the value of a commodity expressed ? Thus how does it acquire a form of appearance of its own ? Through the relation of different commodities. In order correctly to analyse the form contained in such a relation we must proceed from the simplest, most undeveloped shape (Gestalt). The simplest relation of the commodity is obviously its relation to a single other commodity, no matter which one. Hence the relation of two commodities furnishes the simplest value-expression for a commodity. 20 yards of linen = 1 coat or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat The secret of the entire value-form (aller Wertform) must be hidden in this simple value-form. Hence its analysis offers the real difficulty. Without analysing the matter more deeply, the following points are clear from the start: Certainly the expression: 20 yards of linen = 1 coat or 20 yards of linen are worth one coat also includes the converse: 1 coat = 20 yards of linen or 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen . But in doing this I must reverse the equation, in order to express the value of the coat relatively, and once I do this the linen becomes the equivalent instead of the coat. The same commodity therefore cannot make its appearance in the same expression of value at the same time in both forms. Rather, these exclude one another in a polar manner. Let us consider exchange between linen-producer A and coat-producer B. Before they come to terms, A says: 20 yards of linen are worth 2 coats (20 yards of linen = 2 coats), But B responds: 1 coat is worth 22 yards of linen (1 coat = 22 yards of linen). Finally, after they have haggled for a long time they agree: Here both, linen and coat, are at the same time in relative value-form and in equivalent form. But, nota bene, for two different persons and in two different expressions of value, which simply occur (ins Leben treten) at the same time. For A his linen is in relative value-form because for him the initiative proceeds from his commodity and the commodity of the other person, the coat, is in equivalent form. Conversely from the standpoint of B. Thus one and the same commodity never possess, even in this case, the two forms at the same time in the same expression of value. are not at all different. As regards the form, they are not only different but opposed. In expression 1 the value of the linen is expressed relatively. Hence it is in the relative value-form whilst at the same time the value of the coat is expressed as equivalent. Hence it is in the equivalent form. Now if I turn the expression 1 round I obtain expression 2. The commodities change positions and right away the coat is in the relative value-form, the linen in equivalent form. Because they have changed their respective positions in the same expression of value, they have changed value-form (die Wertform gewechselt). Since it is the linen which is to express its value, the initiative proceeds from it. It enters into a relation with the coat, i.e. with some other commodity different from itself. This relation is a relation of equalisation (Gleichsetzung). The basis of the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat is in fact: linen = coat, which expressed in words simply means: the commodity-type coat is of the same nature (ist gleicher Natur), the same substance as the linen, a type of commodity different from it . We overlook that for the most part, because attention is absorbed by the quantitative relation, i.e. by the definite proportion, in which the one type of commodity is equated to the other. We forget that the magnitudes of different things are only quantitatively comparable after their reduction to the same unit. Only as expressions of the same unit are magnitudes with the same denominator (gleichnamige) and hence commensurable. In the above expression the linen thus relates to the coat as something of its own kind, or the coat is related to the linen as a thing of the same substance, as the same in essence (Wesensgleiches). The one is therefore quantitatively equated to the other. The coat is only the same as the linen to the extent that both are values. Thus that the linen is related to the coat as to something of its own kind or that the coat as a thing of the same substance is equated to linen, expresses the fact that the coat counts in this relation as value. It is equated to the linen insofar as the latter is value as well. The relation of equality is thus a value-relation, but the value-relation is above all the expression of the value or the existence as value of the commodity which expresses its value. As use-value, or body of the commodity (Warenk rper), the linen is distinguished from the coat. But its existence as value comes to light, is expressed in a relation, in which another commodity-type, the coat, is equated to it or counts as the same in essence. The coat is value only to the extent that it is the expression, in the form of a thing, of the human labour-power expended in its production and thus insofar as it is a jelly of abstract human labour abstract labour, because abstraction is made from the definite useful concrete character of the labour contained in it, human labour, because the labour counts here only as expenditure of human labour-power as such. Thus the linen cannot relate (sich verhalten) to the coat as a thing having value, or cannot be related (bezogen werden) to the coat as value, without relating (bezogen werden) to it as a body whose sole substance consists in human labour. But as value this linen is a jelly of this same human labour. Within this relation the coat as a thing (K rper) thus represents the substances of value which it has in common with linen, i.e. human labour. Within this relation the coat thus counts only as shape of value (Gestalt von Wert), hence also as the form of the value (Wertgestalt) of the linen, as the sensible form of appearance of the value of the linen. Thus by means of the value-relation the value of the commodity is expressed in the use-value of another commodity, i.e. in the body of another commodity different from itself. The 20 yards of linen are, however, not only value as such, i.e. a jelly of human labour, but value of a definite magnitude, i.e. a definite quantity of human labour is objectified in them. In the value relation of the linen to the coat the commodity-type coat is hence not only quantitatively equated to the linen as bodily form of value (Wertk rper) as such, i.e. as embodiment of human labour, but a definite quantity of this bodily form of value, 1 coat, not 1 dozen, etc., insofar as in 1 coat there is hidden precisely as much value-substance of human labour as in 20 yards of linen. Thus through the relative value-expression the value of the commodity acquires, first, a form different from its own use-value. The use-form of this commodity is, e.g. linen. But it possesses its value-form in its relation of equality with the coat. Through this relation of equality the body of another commodity, sensibly different from it, becomes the mirror of its own existence as value (Wertsein), of its own character as value (Wertgestalt). In this way it gains an independent and separate value-form, different from its natural form. But second, as a value of definite magnitude, it is quantitatively measured by the quantitatively definite relation or the proportion in which it is equated to the body of the other commodity. As values all commodities are expressions of the same unit, of human labour, which count equally and are replaceable or substitutable for one another. Hence a commodity is only exchangeable with another commodity insofar as it possesses a form in which it appears as value. A body of the commodity is immediately exchangeable with another commodity insofar as its immediate form i.e. its own bodily or natural form, represents (vorstellt) value with regard to another commodity or counts as value-form (Wertgestalt). This property is possessed by the coat in the value-relation of the linen to the coat. The value of the linen would otherwise not be expressible in the thing which is the coat. Therefore that a commodity has equivalent form at all, means just this. Through its place in the value-expression its own natural form counts as the value-form for another commodity or it possesses the form of immediate exchangeability with another commodity. Therefore it does not need to take on (annehmen) a form different from its immediate natural form in order to appear as value for another commodity, to count as value and to act on it as value (auf sie als Wert zu wirken). That a thing which has the form of a coat is immediately exchangeable with linen, or a thing which has the form of gold is immediately exchangeable with all other commodities this equivalent form of a thing contains absolutely no quantitative definiteness. The opposed erroneous view springs from the following causes: First, the commodity coat , for example, which serves as material for the expression of value of linen is, within such an expression, also always quantitatively definite, like 1 coat and not 12 coats , etc. But why? Because the 20 yards of linen are expressed in their relative value expression of value not only as value as such, but at the same time are measured as a definite quantity of value. But that 1 coat and not 12 coats contains as much labour as 20 yards of linen and hence is equated with 20 yards of linen has absolutely nothing to do with this characteristic property of the commodity-type coat of being immediately exchangeable with the commodity-type linen. Second, if 20 yards of linen as value of a definite magnitude are expressed in 1 coat , then conversely the magnitude of value of 1 coat is also expressed in 20 yards of linen , and thus similarly quantitatively measured, but only indirectly, through reversal of the expression, not insofar as the coat plays the role of the equivalent but rather insofar as it represents its own value relatively in the linen. Third, we can also express the formula 20 yards of linen = 1 coat or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat in the following way: 20 yards of linen and 1 coat are equivalents, or both are values of equal magnitude . Here we do not express the value of either of the two commodities in the use-value of the other. Neither of the two commodities is hence set up in equivalent-form. Equivalent means here only something equal in magnitude, both things having been silently reduced in our heads to the abstraction value. The natural form of the commodity becomes the value-form. But, nota bene, this quid pro quo occurs for a commodity B (coat or wheat or iron, etc.) only within the value-relation to it, into which any other commodity A (linen, etc.) enters, and only within this relation. In itself, considered in isolation, the coat, e.g., is only a useful thing, a use-value, just like the linen, and hence its coat-form is only the form of use-value (ist nur Form von Gebrauchswert) or natural form of a definite type of commodity. But since no commodity can relate to itself as equivalent and therefore also cannot make its own natural hide an expression of its own value, it must relate itself to another commodity as equivalent or make the natural hide of the body of another commodity its own value-form. This may be illustrated by the example of a measure, which is predicable of the bodies of commodities as bodies (den Warenk rpern als Warenk rpern zukommt) i.e. as use-values. A sugar-loaf, qua body (weil K rper), is heavy and hence has weight, but one cannot tell the weight of a sugar-loaf by looking or feeling (man kann keinen Zuckerhut seine Schwere ansehn oder anf hlen). Now we take different pieces of iron whose weight has been previously determined. The bodily form of the iron considered in itself is just as little the form of appearance of weight as that of the sugar-loaf. However in order to express the sugar-loaf as heaviness or weight, we put it into a weight-relation with iron. In this relation the iron counts as a body, which represents nothing but heaviness or weight. Hence quantities of iron serve as the measure of the weight of sugar and represent, with regard to the body of sugar, merely the form of heaviness (blosse Schweregestalt), form of appearance of heaviness. Iron plays this role only within the relation in which the sugar, or some other body whose weight is to be found, enters. Were both things not heavy they could not enter into this relation and hence the one could not serve as the expression of the weight of the other. If we throw both on the scale pan, we see in fact that they are, as weight, the same and hence in a definite proportion also of the same weight. Just as here the body of the iron represents, with regard to the sugar-loaf, simply heaviness, so in our expression of value the body of the coat represents, with regard to the linen, simply value. The coat counts in the expression of the value of the linen as the value-body, hence its bodily or natural form as value-form, i.e. therefore as embodiment of undifferentiated human labour, human labour as such (schlechthin). But the labour by which the useful thing which is the coat is made and by which it acquires a definite form, is not abstract human labour, human labour as such, but a definite useful, concrete type of labour the labour of tailoring. The simple relative value-form requires (erheischt) that the value of a commodity, linen, for example, is expressed only in one single other type of commodity. Which the other type of commodity is, is however, for the simple value-form, completely irrelevant. Instead of the commodity-type coat the value of the linen could have been expressed in wheat, or instead of wheat, in iron, etc. But whether in coat, wheat or iron, in every case the equivalent of linen counts as the body of value with regard to the linen, hence as embodiment of human labour as such. And in every case the definite bodily form of the equivalent, whether coat or wheat or iron, remains embodiment not of abstract human labour, but of a definite concrete useful type of labour, be it the labour of tailoring or of farming or of mining. The definite concrete useful labour, which produces the body of the commodity which is the equivalent must therefore, in the expression of value, always necessarily count as a definite form of realisation or form of appearance, i.e. of abstract human labour. The coat, for example, can only count as the body of value, hence as embodiment of human labour as such, in so far as the labour of tailoring counts as a definite form, in which human labour-power is expended or in which abstract human labour is realised. Within the value-relation and the value expression included in it, the abstractly general counts not as a property of the concrete, sensibly real; but on the contrary the sensibly-concrete counts as the mere form of appearance or definite form of realisation of the abstractly general. The labour of tailoring, which, for example, hides in the equivalent coat , does not possess, within the value-expression of the linen, the general property of also being human labour. On the contrary. Being human labour counts as its essence (Wesen), being the labour of tailoring counts only as the form of appearance (Erscheinungsform) or definite form of realisation of this its essence. This quid pro quo is unavoidable because the labour represented in the product of labour only goes to create value insofar as it is undifferentiated human labour, so that the labour objectified in the value of the product is in no way distinguished from the labour objectified in the value of a different product. This inversion (Verkehrung) by which the sensibly-concrete counts only as the form of appearance of the abstractly general and not, on the contrary, the abstractly general as property of the concrete, characterises the expression of value. At the same time, it makes understanding it difficult. If I say: Roman Law and German Law are both laws, that is obvious. But if I say: Law (Das Recht), this abstraction (Abstraktum) realises itself in Roman Law and in German Law, in these concrete laws, the interconnection becoming mystical. Products of labour would not become commodities, were they not products of separate private labours carried on independently of one another. The social interconnection of these private labours exists materially, insofar as they are members of a naturally evolved social division of labour and hence, through their products, satisfy wants of different kinds, in the totality (Gesamtheit) of which the similarly naturally evolved system of social wants (naturw chsiges System der gesellschaftlichen Bed rfnisse) consists. This material social interconnection of private labours carried on independently of one another is however only mediated and hence is realised only through the exchange of their products. The product of private labour hence only has social form insofar as it has value-form and hence the form of exchangeability with other products of labour. It has immediately social form insofar as its own bodily or natural form is at the same time the form of its exchangeability with other commodities or counts as value-form for another commodity (anderer Ware). However, as we have seen, this only takes place for a product of labour when, through the value relation of other commodities to it, it is in equivalent-form or, with respect to other commodities, plays the role of equivalent. The equivalent has immediately social form insofar as it has the form of immediate exchangeability with another commodity, and it has this form of immediate exchangeability insofar as it counts for another commodity as the body of value, hence as equal (als Gleiches). Therefore the definite useful labour contained in it also counts as labour in immediately social form, i.e. as labour which possesses the form of equality with the labour contained in another commodity. A definite, concrete labour like the labour of tailoring can only possess the form of equality with the labour of a different type contained in a commodity of a different kind, for example the linen, insofar as its definite form counts as the expression of something which really constitutes the equality of labours of different sorts or what is equal in those labours. But they are only equal insofar as they are human labour as such, abstract human labour, i.e. expenditure of human labour-power. Thus, as has already been shown, because the definite concrete labour contained in the equivalent counts as the definite form of realisation or form of appearance of abstract human labour, it possesses the form of equality with other labour, and hence, although it is private labour, like all other labour which produces commodities, it is nevertheless labour in immediately social form. Precisely because of this it is represented in a product that is immediately exchangeable with the other commodities. The last two peculiarities of the equivalent-form set out in and become still more comprehensible when we recur to the great theorist (Forscher) who for the first time analysed the value-form, like so many forms of thought, forms of society and forms of nature, and for the most part more happily than his modern successors, I mean Aristotle. Aristotle clearly formulates first of all the fact that the money-form of the commodity is only the further developed shape (Gestalt) of the simple value-form, i.e. of the expression of value of a commodity in any other commodity, for he says: He sees further that the value-relation, in which this expression of value hides, determines, for its part, the fact that the house is qualitatively equated with the bed and that these sensibly different things would not be able to be related to one another as commensurable magnitudes without such essential equality. Exchange , he says, cannot take place without equality, and equality cannot occur without commensurability ( ). But at this he pulls up short and ceases the further analysis of the value-form, But it is in truth impossible ( ) that things of such different sorts should be commensurable , i.e. qualitatively equal. This equalisation can only be something which is alien to the true nature of things, and therefore only a makeshift for practical purposes . [c] Aristotle thus tells us himself just where his further analysis suffers shipwreck, namely, on the lack of the concept of value. What is that which is equal, i.e. the common substance, which the house represents for the bed in the expression of the value of the bed? Such a thing cannot in truth exist , says Aristotle. Why? With respect to the bed the house represents something which is equal (stellt ein Gleiches vor) insofar as it represents what in both, the bed and the house, is really equal. And that is human labour. But the fact that in the form of commodity-values all labours are expressed as equal human labour and hence as counting equally (als gleichgeseltend) could not be read out of the value-form of commodities by Aristotle, because Greek society rested on slave labour and hence had the inequality of people and their labours as a natural basis. The secret of the expression of value, the equality of all labours and the fact that all labours count equally because and insofar as they are human labour as such can only be deciphered when the concept of human equality already possesses the fixity of a popular prejudice. But that is only possible in a society in which the commodity-form is the general form of the product of labour and thus also the relation of people to one another as possessors of commodities is the ruling social relation. The genius of Aristotle shines precisely in the fact that he discovers in the expression of value of commodities a relation of equality. Only the historical limit of the society in which he lived prevents him from finding out what, in truth , this relation of equality consists in. The fact that the products of labour such useful things as coat, linen, wheat, iron, etc. are values, definite magnitudes of value and in general commodities, are properties which naturally pertain to them only in our practical interrelations (in unsrem Verkehr) and not by nature like, for example, the property of being heavy or being warming or nourishing. But within our practical interrelations, these things relate to one another as commodities. They are values, they are measurable as magnitudes of value, and their common property of being values puts them into a value-relation to one another. Now the fact that, for example, 20 yards of linen = 1 coat or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat only expresses the fact that: It is a definite social relation of the producers in which they equate (gleichsetzen) their different types of labour as human labour. It is not less a definite social relation of producers, in which they measure the magnitude of their labours by the duration of expenditure of human labour-power. But within our practical interrelations these social characters of their own labours appear to them as social properties pertaining to them by nature, as objective determinations (gegenst ndliche Bestimmungen) of the products of labour themselves, the equality of human labours as a value-property of the products of labour, the measure of the labour by the socially necessary labour-time as the magnitude of value of the products of labour, and finally the social relations of the producers through their labours appear as a value-relation or social relation of these things, the products of labour. Precisely because of this the products of labour appear to them as commodities, sensible-supersensible (sinnlich bersinnliche) or social things. Thus the impression on the optic nerve brought about by the light (Lichteindruck auf den Sehnerv) from something is represented, not as a subjective stimulation of the optic nerve itself, but as the objective form of a thing outside the eye. But in the case of seeing, light from a thing, from the external object, is in fact thrown upon another thing, the eye. It is a physical relation between physical things. As opposed to that the commodity-form and the value-relation of products of labour have absolutely nothing to do with their physical nature and the relations between things which springs from this. It is only the definite social relation of people (der Menschen) itself which here takes on for them the phantasmagoric form of a relation of things. Hence in order to find an analogy for this we must take flight into the cloudy region of the religious world. Here the products of the human head appear as independent figures (Gestalten) endowed with a life of their own and standing in a relation to one another and to people. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of the human hand. This I call the fetishism which clings to the products of labour as soon as they are produced as commodities and which is therefore inseparable from commodity-production. Now this fetish-character emerges more strikingly in the equivalent-form than in the relative value-form. The relative value-form of a commodity is mediated, namely by its relation to another commodity. Through this value-form the value of the commodity is expressed as something completely distinct from its own sensible existence. At the same time it is inherent in this that existence as value (Wertsein) is a relation which is alien to the thing itself and hence that its value-relation to another thing can only be the form of appearance of a social relation hidden behind it. Conversely with the equivalent-form. It consists precisely in the fact that the bodily or natural form of a commodity counts immediately as the social form, as the value-form for another commodity. Therefore, within our practical interrelations, to possess the equivalent-form appears as the social natural property (gesellschaftliche Natureigenschaft) of a thing, as a property pertaining to it by nature, so that hence it appears to be immediately exchangeable with other things just as it exists for the senses (so wie es sinnlich da ist). But because within the value-expression of commodity A the equivalent-form pertains by nature to the commodity B it seems also to belong to the latter by nature outside of this relation. Hence, for example, the riddle (das R tselhafte) of gold, that seems to possess, by nature, apart from its other natural properties, its colour, its specific weight, its non-oxydisability in air, etc., also the equivalent-form, or the social quality of being immediately exchangeable with all other commodities. The expression of value has two poles, relative value-form and equivalent-form. To start with, what concerns the commodity functioning as equivalent is that it counts for another commodity as the shape of value (Wertgestalt), a body in immediately exchangeable form exchange-value. But the commodity whose value is expressed relatively, possesses the form of exchange-value in that: The exchange-value is hence the independent form of appearance of commodity-value. If I say: As a commodity the linen is use-value and exchange-value, this is my judgement about the nature of the commodity gained by analysis. As opposed to this, in the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat the linen itself says that it 20 yards of linen = 1 coat or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat by the form: 20 yards of linen = 2 Pounds Sterling or 20 yards of linen are worth 2 Pounds Sterling then it becomes obvious at first glance that the money-form in nothing but the further development of the simple value-form of the commodity, and therefore of the simple commodity-form of the labour-product. Because the money-form is only the developed commodity-form it obviously springs from the simple commodity-form. Hence as soon as the latter is understood it only remains to consider the series of metamorphoses through which the simple commodity form 20 yards of linen = 1 coat must run in order to take on the shape (Gestalt annehmen) 20 yards of linen = 2 Pounds Sterling . 20 yards of linen = 1 coat or = 10 pounds of tea or = 40 pounds of coffee or = 1 quarter of wheat or = 2 ounces of gold or = ton of iron or = etc. This series of simple relative expressions of value is in its nature constantly extendible or never concludes. For there constantly occur new types of commodities and each new type of commodity forms the material of a new expression of value. 20 yards of linen = 1 coat 20 yards of linen = 10 pounds of tea, etc.. But each of these equations contains, conversely, also the identical equation: 1 coat = 20 yards of linen 10 pounds of tea = 20 yards of linen, etc.. In fact, if the possessor of the linen exchanges his commodity with many other commodities and hence expresses the value of his commodity in a series of other commodities, then necessarily the many other possessors of commodities must also exchange their commodities with linen and hence express the values of their different commodities in the same third commodity, the linen. Therefore, if we reverse the series 20 yards of linen = 1 coat or 10 pounds of tea or = etc. , i.e. if we express the converse relation which is already contained in itself (an sich), implicitly in the series, we obtain: The relative value-form now possesses a completely changed shape. All commodities express their value: Their value-form is simple and common, i.e. general. The linen now counts for the bodies of all the different sorts of commodities as their common and general shape of value. The value-form of a commodity, i.e. the expression of its value in linen, now distinguishes the commodity not only as value from its own existence (Dasein) as a useful object, i.e. from its own natural form, but at the same time relates it as value to all other commodities, to all commodities as equal to it (als ihresgleichen). Hence in this value-form it possesses general social form. Only through this general character does the value-form correspond to the concept of value (entspricht dem Wertbegriff). The value-form had to be a form in which commodities appear for one another as a mere jelly of undifferentiated, homogenous human labour, i.e. as expressions in the form of things of the same labour-substance. This is now attained. For they are all material expressions (Materiatur) of the same labour, of the labour contained in the linen or as the same material expression of labour, namely as linen. Thus they are qualitatively equated. At the same time they are quantitatively compared or represented as definite magnitudes of value for one another (f r einander dargestellt), i.e.: 10 pounds of tea = 20 yards of linen and 40 pounds of coffee = 20 yards of linen Therefore 10 pounds of tea = 40 pounds of coffee. Or in 1 pound of coffee there hides only a quarter as much of the substance of value, labour, as in 1 pound of tea. For all other commodities, although they are products of the most different sorts of labour, the linen counts as the form of appearance of the labours contained in them, hence as the embodiment of homogenous undifferentiated human labour. Weaving this particular concrete type of labour counts now by virtue of the value-relation of the world of commodities to linen as the general and immediately exhaustive form of realisation of abstract human labour, i.e. of the expenditure of human labour-power as such. For precisely this reason the private labour contained in linen also counts as labour which is immediately in general social form or in the form of equality with all other labours. If a commodity thus possesses the general equivalent-form or functions as general equivalent, its natural or bodily form counts as the visible incarnation, the general social chrysalis of all human labour. The simple relative value-form expresses the value of a commodity only in a single other type of commodity, no matter in which. The commodity thus only acquires value-form in distinction from its own use-value form or natural form. Its equivalent also acquires only the singular equivalent-form. The expanded relative value-form expresses the value of a commodity in all other commodities. Hence the latter acquire the form of many particular equivalents or particular equivalent-form. Finally, the world of commodities gives itself a unified, general, relative value-form, by excluding from itself one single type of commodity in which all other commodities express their value in common. Thereby the excluded commodity becomes general equivalent or the equivalent-form becomes the general equivalent-form. Now this polar opposition of the two moments (Momente) of the expression of value develops and hardens (entwickelt und verh rtet sich) in the same measure as the value-form as such is developed or built up (ausgebildet). In form I the two forms already exclude one another, but only formally (formell). According to whether the same equation is read forwards or backwards, each of the two commodities in the extreme positions (Warenextreme) like linen and coat, are similarly now in the relative value-form, now in the equivalent. At this point it still takes some effort to hold fast to the polar opposition. In form II only one type of commodity at a time can totally expand its relative value, i.e. it itself possesses expanded relative value-form only because and insofar as all other commodities are in the equivalent-form with regard to it. Finally, in form III the world of commodities possesses general social relative value-form only because and insofar as all the commodities belonging to it are excluded from the equivalent-form or the form of immediate exchangeability. Conversely, the commodity which is in the general equivalent form or figures as general equivalent is excluded from the unified and hence general relative value-form of the world of commodities. If the linen i.e. any commodity in general equivalent-form were also to participate at the same time in the general relative value-form, then it would have had to have been related to itself as equivalent. We then obtain: 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen a tautology in which neither value nor magnitude of value is expressed. In order to express the relative value of the general equivalent, we must reverse form III. It does not possess any relative value-form in common with other commodities; rather, its value expresses itself relatively in the endless series of the bodies of all other commodities. Thus the expanded relative value-form or form II now appears as the specific relative value-form of the commodity which plays the role of the general equivalent. However the mere distinction in form between form II and form III already points to something peculiar, which does not distinguish forms I and II. This is that in the expanded value-form (form II) one commodity excludes all the others in order to express its own value in them. This exclusion can be a purely subjective process, for example a process traced out by the possessor of linen (z.B. ein Prozess des Leinwandbesitzers) who assesses the value of his own commodity in many other commodities. As opposed to this a commodity is in general equivalent-form (form III) only because and insofar as it itself is excluded as equivalent by all other commodities. The exclusion is here an objective (objektiver) process independent of the excluded commodity. Hence in the historical development of the value-form the general equivalent-form may pertain now to this now to that commodity in turn. But a commodity never functions in fact (wirklich) as general equivalent except insofar as its exclusion and hence its equivalent-form is a result of an objective social process. The general value-form is the developed value-form and hence the developed commodity-form. The materially quite different products of labour cannot possess the finished commodity-form, and hence also cannot function in the process of exchange as a commodity, without being represented as expressions in the form of things (dingliche Ausdr che) of the same equal human labour. That means that in order to acquire the finished commodity-form they must acquire the unified general relative value-form. But they can only acquire this unified relative value-form by excluding from its own series a definite type of commodity as general equivalent. And it is only from the moment when this exclusion is definitely limited to a specific type of commodity that the unified relative value-form has won objective stability and general social validity. Now the specific type of commodity with whose natural form the equivalent form coalesces (verw chst) socially becomes the money-commodity or functions as money. Its specific social function and hence its social monopoly becomes the playing of the role of general equivalent within the world of commodities. A definite commodity, gold, has historically conquered this privileged place amongst the commodities which figure in form II as particular equivalents of linen and in form III express commonly (gemeinsam ausdr cken) their relative value in linen. Hence, if we put in form III the commodity gold in the place of the commodity linen, we obtain: 20 yards of linen = 1 coat or x commodity A = y commodity B. Now if we know what use-value and exchange-value are, then we find out that this form I is the simplest, most undeveloped manner of representing any product of labour, like linen for example, as a commodity, i.e. as a unity of the opposites use-value and exchange-value. At the same time we easily find the series of metamorphoses which the simplest commodity-form 20 yards of linen = 1 coat must run through in order to win its finished shape 20 yards of linen = 2 Pounds Sterling i.e. the money-form.
Economic Manuscripts: The Value-Form by Karl Marx