Conceptual Problems in Cosmology
  In this essay a critical review of present conceptual problems in current
cosmology is provided from a more philosophical point of view. In essence, a
digression on how could philosophy help cosmologists in what is strictly their
fundamental endeavor is presented. We start by recalling some examples of
enduring confrontations among philosophers and physicists on what could be
contributed by the formers to the day-time striving of the second ones. Then, a
short review of the standard model Friedmann-Lema\^itre-Robertson-Walter (FLRW)
of cosmology is given. It seems apparent that cosmology is living a golden age
with the advent of observations of high precision. Nonetheless, a critical
revisiting of the direction in which it should go on appears also needed, for
misconcepts like "quantum backgrounds for cosmological classical settings" and
"quantum gravity unification" have not been properly constructed up-to-date.
Thus, knowledge-building in cosmology, more than in any other field, should
begin with visions of the reality, then taking technical form whenever concepts
and relations inbetween are translated into a mathematical structure. It is
mandatory, therefore, that the meaning of such concepts be the same for all
cosmologists, and that any relationship among all them be tested both logically
as well as mathematically. In other words, the notorius feature of
improbability of our universe, as is well-known, assures to cosmologists a
priviledged degree of freedom for formulating interpretations and theories.
However, at the same time, it demands for their formulations and conclusions to
be considered in the light of data taken from astrophysical observations.
