New remarks on the Cosmological Argument
  We present a formal analysis of the Cosmological Argument in its two main
forms: that due to Aquinas, and the revised version of the Kalam Cosmological
Argument more recently advocated by William Lane Craig. We formulate these two
arguments in such a way that each conclusion follows in first-order logic from
the corresponding assumptions. Our analysis shows that the conclusion which
follows for Aquinas is considerably weaker than what his aims demand. With
formalizations that are logically valid in hand, we reinterpret the natural
language versions of the premises and conclusions in terms of concepts of
causality consistent with (and used in) recent work in cosmology done by
physicists. In brief: the Kalam argument commits the fallacy of equivocation in
a way that seems beyond repair; two of the premises adopted by Aquinas seem
dubious when the terms `cause' and `causality' are interpreted in the context
of contemporary empirical science. Thus, while there are no problems with
whether the conclusions follow logically from their assumptions, the Kalam
argument is not viable, and the Aquinas argument does not imply a caused
origination of the universe. The assumptions of the latter are at best less
than obvious relative to recent work in the sciences. We conclude with mention
of a new argument that makes some positive modifications to an alternative
variation on Aquinas by Le Poidevin, which nonetheless seems rather weak.
