 are readily adapted from warfighting. Firepower, which in the warfighting context is severely constrained, in counterinsurgency can be broadened to include evidence gathering, arrest, and legal action; surprise can be achieved, for example, through developing information-gathering technology which is exploited by either covert action or rapid concentration of overt force into a given area.
Tempo and Simultaneity
It has been said that low tempo appears to be a characteristic of many counterinsurgency campaigns. This is to misunderstand the term tempo, which is judged not by the "pace" of operations, but the speed of action and reaction relative to the insurgent. It is true that slow pace is a direct result of the protracted nature of some, though not all, forms of insurgent strategy (the "foco" theory utilized by Che Guevara, Regis Debray, and others being an exception). However, even in a Maoist-style campaign, where the insurgent may not be able to move beyond low-level guerrilla activity for a considerable time, the situation can still change radically. Diplomatic agreement to curtail external support, for example, could test the ability of insurgents to achieve a high tempo of operations. Commanders should be ready and able to adapt quickly to sudden developments, some of which may be outside their control. Certainly the accomplished insurgent commander will rely on an ability to exploit tempo, moving the classic revolutionary phases of an insurgency up where possible, and down when necessary, at such a speed as to make the security force's responses inappropriate and counterproductive.
At the tactical level, tempo is just as applicable. Here a commander can seek to establish his own tempo to seize the initiative in the local area of operations and force an insurgent group into a reactive role. An incident which in conventional war would pass almost unremarked could well attract considerable media attention in a counterinsurgency campaign and thus indirectly raise the tempo of operations. Troops and commanders at all levels should have the mental agility to adapt to rapid, even inexplicable changes in the mood of the population, for example, quicker than the insurgent. High tempo can be enhanced through physical mobility; timely and accurate contact intelligence; coordinated command, control, and communications; and flexible combat support and combat service support systems.
All effective insurgent strategies emphasize simultaneity by creating parallel political and social challenges as well as military ones. In Vietnam, Giap's regular and guerrilla troops worked with political cadres in a complementary fashion to exploit the fragile nature of the Saigon government. If the use of simultaneity is productive for the insurgent, then it is equally applicable for the government side. Tactically it can be achieved through the carefully considered use of a mix of agencies, and by grouping for independent action, such as joint patrols by military and civilian police, with compatible communications, working for a single headquarters. Operationally it is achieved through the development of a harmonized campaign plan along multiple lines of operation, as described previously.
The philosophy behind mission command, once termed directive control, can be expressed as an approach in which the commander gives orders in a manner that enables his subordinates to understand his intentions, their own missions, and, of vital importance, the purpose or intent of those missions in the commander's overall concept of operations. Subordinates are told what effect they are to achieve, and the reason why it needs to be accomplished. They are also allocated the necessary resources and constrained by any particular control measures. Most important, subordinates are not told how they are to achieve their mission. The subordinate commander will decide for himself, within his delegated freedom of action, how best to accomplish his mission.
It has been argued that mission command cannot be applied in counterinsurgency, but this is to misunderstand wh