thdrawal Agreement What has been agreed, between the EU and the UK Government, and then dismissed by the UK Parliament, is known as the Draft Withdrawal Agreement (DWA).
By this DWA the previous UK government agreed that it will not introduce legislation that is incompatible with EU law but also that it will modify any existing rules that the EU deems to be “inconsistent or incompatible”. The Joint Committee will have to refer many issues to the ECJ for resolution. The ECJ is the legal instrument and protector of the ideology and the ambition; judgements are based on treaties not on precedent, unlike in the UK.
The EU refuses to discuss a future relationship between the parties until the ‘divorce’ agreement is settled. This WDA proposes neither a proper withdrawal from the EU nor a satisfactory legal basis for a transition to an unspecified future relationship between the UK and the EU. A major problem is the impositions this withdrawal agreement makes on any such future relationship; it indicates clearly the EU’s intentions.
If this Agreement, or a similar one, is ratified, the UK will remain a semi-detached, ex-member state with many responsibilities and few rights. In summary, under this DWA the United Kingdom will not exit the European Union but will move to a new, and inferior, status under the thumb of the Union. 
Is There a Future for This EU? The clearest outlines of its leaders’ expectations for the future of the European Union can be found in the report of the five presidents (June 2015) and, more speculatively, in their White Paper of March 2017.
So far their record on growth and prosperity is not good, and there is little reason to believe that the self-selected leaders of the EU will do much better in future. The gaps in the Project will become more evident, because the project won’t deliver the promised economic, democratic or social developments.
The White Paper offers five different ‘scenarios’ outlining possible futures for the EU. The tone in which each scenario was written emphasises the Commission’s wish to preserve the Union much as it is.
There is no reason to believe the EU’s malaise is temporary since the dangers are plain to see. Economic divergence among members of the monetary union is growing. Realistically, the divergence is unlikely to be narrowed—imagine the Greeks behaving like Germans, or vice-versa. With low or negative growth, imaginary money and enormous debts everyone is going be unhappy as citizens discover that their hard-earned saving are not protected. Political instability will quickly follow economic instability. 
Conclusion Three risky characteristics of the EU are: it’s central ambition (from the ideology underpinning the project); the determined efforts of its leading figures to dissemble and lie to hide this central ambition; and the deep conviction that permeates everything it does that the peoples of Europe and their elected governments are of no account. These three themes will clearly affect the continuing progress of the EU project itself.
The distance between its true objectives and its declared ones characterizes the EU, as does the distance between its peoples and its leaders. European hearts and minds are being lost despite the propaganda, specious claims and lies.
Each of the themes touched on in this Summary is covered in more detail in one or more of our ‘theme’ posts; each such post links to multiple individual posts that touch on the theme. Other posts expand on our themes.
Other Relevant Posts