ues? What do you think?
Cle. Decidedly not.
Ath. They rank under the opposite class?
Ath. And their opposites, therefore, would fall under the opposite class?
Ath. But are we to suppose that one who possesses all these good qualities will be luxurious and heedless and idle, like those whom the poet compares to stingless drones?
Cle. And the comparison is a most just one.
Ath. Surely God must not be supposed to have a nature which he himself hates?-he who dares to say this sort of thing must not be tolerated for a moment.
Cle. Of course not. How could he have?
Ath. Should we not on any principle be entirely mistaken in praising any one who has some special business entrusted to him, if he have a mind which takes care of great matters and no care of small ones? Reflect; he who acts in this way, whether he be God or man, must act from one of two principles.
Cle. What are they?
Ath. Either he must think that the neglect of the small matters is of no consequence to the whole, or if he knows that they are of consequence, and he neglects them, his neglect must be attributed to carelessness and indolence. Is there any other way in which his neglect can be explained? For surely, when it is impossible for him to take care of all, he is not negligent if he fails to attend to these things great or small, which a God or some inferior being might be wanting in strength or capacity to manage?
Cle. Certainly not.
Ath. Now, then, let us examine the offenders, who both alike confess that there are Gods, but with a difference-the one saying that they may be appeased, and the other that they have no care of small matters: there are three of us and two of them, and we will say to them-In the first place, you both acknowledge that the Gods hear and see and know all things, and that nothing can escape them which is matter of sense and knowledge:-do you admit this?
Ath. And do you admit also that they have all power which mortals and immortals can have?
Cle. They will, of course, admit this also.
Ath. And surely we three and they two-five in all-have acknowledged that they are good and perfect?
Ath. But, if they are such as we conceive them to be, can we possibly suppose that they ever act in the spirit of carelessness and indolence? For in us inactivity is the child of cowardice, and carelessness of inactivity and indolence.
Cle. Most true.
Ath. Then not from inactivity and carelessness is any God ever negligent; for there is no cowardice in them.
Cle. That is very true.
Ath. Then the alternative which remains is, that if the Gods neglect the lighter and lesser concerns of the universe, they neglect them because they know that they ought not to care about such matters-what other alternative is there but the opposite of their knowing?
Cle. There is none.
Ath. And, O most excellent and best of men, do I understand you to mean that they are careless because they are ignorant, and do not know that they ought to take care, or that they know, and yet like the meanest sort of men, knowing the better, choose the worse because they are overcome by pleasures and pains?
Ath. Do not all human things partake of the nature of soul? And is not man the most religious of all animals?
Cle. That is not to be denied.
Ath. And we acknowledge that all mortal creatures are the property of the Gods, to whom also the whole of heaven belongs?
Ath. And, therefore, whether a person says that these things are to the Gods great or small-in either case it would not be natural for the Gods who own us, and who are the most careful and the best of owners to neglect us.-There is also a further consideration.
Cle. What is it?
Ath. Sensation and power are in an inverse ratio to each other in respect to their case and difficulty.
Cle. What do you mean?
Ath. I mean that there is greater difficulty in seeing and hearing the small than the great, but more facility in moving and controlling and taking care of and unimportant things than of their opposites.
Cle. Far more.
Ath. Suppose the case of a physician who is willing and able to cure some living thing as a whole-how will the whol