rnment …must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of non-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite” (12-13). The eventual ruling of the courts was that the teaching of creationism was judged to be inherently religious and thus violated this principle of neutrality.
This principle of neutrality is what Beckwith considers in his extensive treatment of Edwards v. Aguillard in chapter 2. His strategy is to integrate the basic principles employed in the previous rulings against creationism and apply these same standards for the teaching of ID. In Edwards, the Supreme Court ruled that the teaching of creationism violates the Establishment Clause (unlike the teaching of evolution). The conclusion was based on the examination of legislative history as well as broad judicial history of the creation/evolution conflict. The Court reasoned, “the motivation of the supporter of creationism is sufficient to conclude that the act’s predominant purpose is to advance religion” (56). The Court’s holding has become the standard in which the creationism/evolution argument is addressed.
But Beckwith’s careful examination of evolution reveals is to be a thoroughly naturalistic account of all life. Its claim of neutrality is thus suspect because evolution limits the explanation of the origin of life to strictly naturalistic explanations while at the same time presupposing a metaphysic (materialism).
The courts’ conclusion that evolution is not a theory that provides answers inconsistent with either the existence or non-existence of God overlooks that design and evolution are two metaphysical perspectives of the same subject (origin of life). The courts relied on unchallenged and philosophically controversial premises concerning the nature of metaphysical and theological claims in general, premises that were deeply embedded in public culture and reinforced by previous cases (e.g., Epperson, McLean, Edwards).
For example, one premise is that materialist explanations of the origins of life on earth are the only ones accorded the privilege of being called “knowledge.” Other explanations are pejoratively called “supernatural” or “miraculous” and are never permitted to count against materialist explanations. So to say that belief in a Designer’s existence is not inconsistent with naturalistic evolution is to imply that a Designer (whatever or whoever that may be) is not really an object of knowledge.
In chapter 3, Beckwith presents numerous and diverse aspects of the ID project that test the embedded and largely unchallenged metaphysical claims concerning origins in a highly sophisticated way. For example, Beckwith considers William Dembski’s development of “specified complexity” (SC) as an account of design in nature that is not explicable by naturalism. According to Dembski, SC establishes contingency, complexity and specification. Contingency ensures that an object is not the result of an automatic and therefore unintelligent process. Complexity ensures that the object is not so simple as to be readily explained by chance. Specification ensures that the object exhibits a type of pattern that is the trademark of intelligence.
Beckwith’s aim is to also distinguish ID from creationism in that design theorists defend a perspective that is grounded in arguments that are both empirical and philosophical. Given the court’s’ understanding of creation science, ID clearly is not creation science. He does an excellent job of acquainting the reader with the essential aspects of the ID movement, while assessing whether particular strands of thought on ID are relevant as to whether it would pass constitutional muster. According to Beckwith, “all that is necessary to permit (or require) ID in public school classes is that it does not unconstitutionally advance religion, and its proponents make a reasonable and intellectually respectable case for their position, that the state have a l