thur was unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the U.S. Government in matters pertaining to his official duties. He pointed out that while full debate on matters of national policy was a vital element of any true democracy, military commanders had to be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by U.S. laws and the Constitution.  Hence, General MacArthur's removal from command seems to have stemmed from his official protestations and public expressions of dissatisfaction with United States Far Eastern military and political policies made by him between August 1950 and April 1951.
The first occasion after the outbreak of the Korean War on which General MacArthur ran afoul of President Truman developed not over Korea, but over the general issue of American policy toward Formosa. This problem had been under discussion by officials of the Department of Defense and the Department of State for some time before the Korean situation developed. 
 President Truman later stated that he did not blame General MacArthur for the failure of his November offensive. The President felt that MacArthur was no more to be blamed for the fact that he was outnumbered than was General Eisenhower for his heavy losses in the Battle of the Bulge. The difference, as the President saw it, between Eisenhower in 1944 and MacArthur in 1950 was the manner in which MacArthur tried to excuse his failure. See Truman, Memoirs, II, 381-82.
 During conversations with the author in June 1961, former President Truman declined to elaborate on statements already made in his memoirs as to his reasons for dismissing General MacArthur. He stated that General MacArthur had been, and remained, a "great American and a great general" and that he had no desire to tarnish MacArthur's public image. Truman did, however, assert emphatically that his course of action had been the only one open to him and that, faced again with the same situation, he would do the same thing. To do otherwise would have been to abdicate his great responsibility as Commander in Chief.
 Memo, Burns for Rusk, Asst. Secy. State for Far Eastern Affairs, 29 May 50, sub: Notes on State-Defense Conference Held 25 May 1950, cited in Hoare, The JCS and National Policy, vol. IV. ch. IV, "The Knotty Problem of Formosa."
During the extraordinary conferences at Blair House after the North Korean invasion of South Korea, General Bradley had read to the assembled high officials a memorandum MacArthur had given Secretary of Defense Johnson during the latter's Tokyo visit. This paper, which Secretary Johnson thought brilliant and to the point, set forth in cogent terms the reasons why Formosa should not be allowed to pass to the control of Communist China, but should instead be fully protected by the United States.  President Truman, on 27 June 1950, ordered General MacArthur to deploy the Seventh Fleet to prevent attacks on Formosa by the Chinese Communists and, conversely, attacks by the Formosan garrison on the Chinese mainland.  In a public announcement on the same date, President Truman explained that
 MacArthur Hearings, p. 2579.
 DA, TT 3426, 27 Jun. 50.
he had taken this action because, "the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area." He also fended off any charge that the United States intended to seize the island stronghold by declaring, "The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations." 
When visited by General Collins in mid-July, General MacArthur had told the Army Chief of Staff that as soon as the Korean situation had become sufficiently stabilized he intended to visit Formosa for talks with Chiang Kai-shek. The Joint Chiefs on 28 July 1950 informed MacArthur that the Chinese Communists had announced their intention of capturing Formosa and would probably succeed unless th