h to the way that the enemy’ attention had been focused on the threat of a break-out near Caen. But the break-out at Avranches, far to the west, carried no such immediate chance of cutting off the German forces. Its prospect depended on making a very rapid sweep eastward, or on the enemy clinging onto his position until he could be trapped.
In the event when the breakout came at Avranches on July 31, only a few scattered German battalions lay in the ninety-mile wide corridor between that point and Loire. So American spearheads could have driven eastwards unopposed. But the Allied High Command threw away the best chance of exploiting this great opportunity by sticking to the outdated pre-invasion programme, in which a westward move to capture the Brittany ports was to be the next step.
Two weeks passed before the American forces pushed eastwards far enough to reach Argentan and come up level with the British left wing—which meanwhile was still held in check just beyond Caen. This caused fresh recriminations. For when Patton was told that he must not drive on northward to close the gap and bar the Germans’ escape route, for fear of a collision with the British, he exclaimed on the telephone: ‘Let me go on to Falaise and we’ll drive the British back into the sea for another Dunkirk.’”