sdiction beyond borders to “substantiat[e] a solid foundation for the Rule of Law in Libya,” providing them a broader mandate to assist the Libyan Ministry of Justice and its dependent bodies. The EU has given EUBAM a sixteen-month, $20-million mission in support of the mandate. Additionally, EUBAM has held an Organized Crime Coordination Panel with the Libyan Ministry of Interior to coordinate the fight against serious, organized crimes, including smuggling and trafficking.
Engagement with Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) on smuggling is another facet of international border efforts. The NOC, a powerful stakeholder in Tunisia-Libya relations, has been vocal about the need to clamp down on fuel smuggling—both at the Tunisian border and throughout Libya. According to the NOC’s chairman, Mustafa Sanalla, fuel smuggling costs the Libyan economy over $750 million annually. In February 2018, Ghassan Salame, the UN secretary general’s special representative to Libya and head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), met with Sanalla, agreeing to “work together to combat attempts by armed groups to gain a foothold in the Libyan oil sector and to increase transparency over Libya’s oil revenues.” The meeting was followed in April 2018 by the NOC’s announcement of a major anti-smuggling initiative, which has included marking fuel to provide evidence of smuggling; encouraging international sanctions against, and prosecutions of, smugglers; and promoting reforms of the Libyan subsidy system.
Yet bureaucratic and political fissures have surfaced in this effort: on August 14, a subsidiary of the NOC, the Brega Marketing Company, dissolved a committee that combatted fuel and gas smuggling in western and southern Libya (underway since 2015) and fired its head, Milad al-Hajrasi. This was followed by an announcement that the committee had in fact been an illegal front for smuggling and that al-Hajrasi was now under investigation—a move that provoked a raid by a Tripoli armed group on the Brega company’s offices and threats against the company’s director for his dismissal of al-Hajrasi. Supporters of al-Hajrasi claim this firing was intended to undercut his growing popularity and political assertiveness (especially toward the GNA and NOC) after he declared success in resolving the fuel shortage crisis in western Libya. Other Libyan observers speculate that pressure from Libyan factions involved with smuggling is at work. Regardless, the incident underscores the continued erosion of Libyan state institutions by political and economic fissures—and the growing threat to these institutions by armed groups.
Moving forward, local and international actors must supplement security measures with a greater focus on the informal cross-border economy that continues to support the livelihoods for many in border towns. Without the participation and buy-in of local benefactors of this economy—including the cartels as well as residents—technological and physical solutions are likely to fail. Instead of simply closing the border, local authorities must distinguish between more immediately detrimental phenomena, such as human and weapons trafficking, and the small-scale smuggling of goods, such as fuel and cigarettes.
Moreover, security efforts should be accompanied simultaneously by on-the-ground policies to help relieve the socioeconomic pressure felt on both sides of the border. These efforts could focus on providing alternate sources of income through increasing agricultural competitiveness, reforming land ownership, providing skills training, improving infrastructure, and investing in development projects. International actors can assist these initiatives by specifically designating economic assistance and foreign aid for border regions.
Although large smugglers wield considerable influence, the informal sector lacks channels of representation like unions or trade associations, leaving smaller traders unable to articulate and advocate their political or economic demands to the government. This also leaves governments with little information ab