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How to cite this entry. Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society. Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers, with links to its database.
- Hackl, Martin, 1998, manuscript, “On the Semantics of Ability Attributions”.
I am very grateful to the many people who have provided feedback on this entry since its initial publication in 2009. I would like to particularly thank the editors of this entry for their work: Luca Ferrero (2020), and John Martin Fischer (2009, 2014). For additional feedback on the most recent revision (2020), I would like to thank: Vanessa Carr, Romy Jaster, Simon Kittle, and Barbara Vetter. I unfortunately do not have a comprehensive record of people who provided thoughts on earlier versions, but they include: John Bengson, Helen Steward, Kadri Vihvelin, and Ann Whittle. Thanks finally to the SEP Editors and Michael Nelson for their assistance.