abrication plants have been found in North Korea, its existence at undisclosed sites(s) has been traced as far as back in year 2000, when subsequent investigations revealed that North Korea had shipped UF6 to Libya. What this also means is that North Korea’s UF6 production was conducted in violation of the Agreed Framework and Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement that were in force during at that time.
Implications and Consequences
On March 22, 2011, North Korea’s official news agency, KCNA, portrayed Libya’s decision to give up its nuclear weapons as a mistake that opened the country to NATO intervention following its domestic Arab Spring uprising. Such conclusions drawn by North Korea make an already difficult case to engage North Korea to give up its nuclear weapon deterrence that much harder. At the same time, the alternative of disengagement will in all likelihood bring about greater problems.
In engaging North Korea, several key hurdles have to be tackled. First, North Korea shows a poor proliferation record. It was the suspected supply source of UF6 to Libya via the A.Q. Khan network. There is also mounting evidence that North Korea was involved in the construction of a secret nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour in Syria that was subsequently destroyed in 2007. It is plausible that North Korean personnel assisted Syria in building the reactor. There are also allegations of North Korean assistance provided to Myanmar’s emerging nuclear activities, which makes the point of proliferation of North Korean human expertise and know-how an added concern.
Second, North Korea has demonstrated its capability and intent to further develop the full range of its nuclear arsenal including: missiles, precision machining, working with high strength raw materials, and boosting uranium enrichment. Third, with North Korea publicly embarking on uranium enrichment, the prospect of achieving a denuclearized Korean Peninsula has dimmed even further. In contrast to the 1991 Joint Statement that denounced enrichment and reprocessing on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea has now reinterpreted the ban to cover only enrichment and reprocessing for military purposes, but not the right to enrich for civilian purposes.
What can be done?
We need to continue to step up international efforts at tightening export controls and nonproliferation efforts, making it more difficult for North Korea to obtain as well as proliferate in nuclear material and technology. We also need to do better in negotiating a comprehensive inspection and verification scheme when the Six Party Process addresses the verification phase. The Agreed Framework had limited the IAEA verification activities to Yongbyon, which gave North Korea the possibility to develop its enrichment and related capabilities elsewhere. That may have proven to be the best compromise at that time. But the consequences have been telling. Given the current nuclear situation in North Korea, a different approach would be needed if we want to progress substantially and significantly on properly safeguarding North Korea’s nuclear program. A full disclosure of the country’s historical and current nuclear activities will be necessary under any new agreement negotiated, alongside robust inspection rights for the IAEA. Avenues must also be sought to restrict and reduce North Korea’s sprint to build up on its nuclear arsenal. Added political will from all involved in the Six Party Talks will be needed to resolve the wider security and stability issue in Northeast Asia.
Engaging North Korea will continue to demand patience, while the possibilities for progress remain uncertain and uneven. But with much at stake, we have no choice but to get the end game right.
 Magnox reactors were designed in the United Kingdom originally to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. The first such graphite moderated gas cooled reactor was built in the mid-1950s to Calder Hall in the UK. Design features of the reactor were subsequently declassified.
 Eurochemic was a research plant dedicated to the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. It was