January 2015. As of January 2015, the FDA was considering a proposed rule to require disclosure of added sugars on the nutrition facts panel , and SA was opposing it, citing “the lack of science to justify ‘added sugars’ labeling” .
Comparison to the Tobacco Industry
The sugar industry formed SRF in 1943 to fund research that supported the industry position , 11 years before the creation of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC) in 1954 to play a similar role for the tobacco industry . In 1954, the TIRC hired SRF’s first scientific director, Robert Hockett, to serve as the TIRC’s associate scientific director , where he was positioned to help the tobacco industry learn key science manipulation tactics from the sugar industry.
At the same time that the NIDR was planning the NCP, the National Cancer Institute (NCI) was pursuing its Smoking and Health Program [92–94]. Like NCP, which focused on sugar harm reduction strategies, the Smoking and Health Program focused on harm reduction strategies with the primary goal of developing a safe cigarette . The NCI invited tobacco industry representatives to join the NCI’s Tobacco Working Group (TWG), the planning committee for the effort to develop a less hazardous cigarette . The NCI did so on the assumption that tobacco manufacturers were interested in promoting new, safer cigarettes and had product expertise the NCI lacked . The NCI also believed industry participation was advantageous because implementation would fall to tobacco companies and, if approached in a positive way, the companies would agree to collaborate . The willingness of the NIDR leaders to interact with the sugar industry during planning for the NCP may have reflected similar thinking, particularly because responsibility for manufacturing and incorporating additives to reduce the risk of dental caries would fall to food and pharmaceutical industries.
The tobacco industry used its involvement in the TWG to oppose funding of projects, such as smoking cessation programs, that were seen as a threat to industry interests . The tobacco industry also withheld knowledge about the biological effects of cigarette smoke and human smoking behavior, which negatively impacted the NCI’s efforts . Indeed, industry use of the TWG to block effective tobacco control strategies was cited by federal Judge Gladys Kessler in her 2006 ruling that the major cigarette companies and their research and lobbying organizations had formed an illegal enterprise to defraud the public in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act .
Litigation against tobacco companies has been a major factor in achieving meaningful policy change. Successful litigation could not have been achieved without industry documents research illuminating the strategies and tactics of tobacco companies. This analysis demonstrates that sugar industry documents research has the potential to define industry strategies and tactics, which may potentially prove useful in future litigation.
While we were fortunate to discover the Roger Adams papers, we recognize that it provides a narrow window into the activities of just one sugar industry trade association, particularly because other industries had an interest in the outcome of the NCP, including the chocolate and confectionary industries, the pharmaceutical industry, and food companies interested in developing food additives and sugar substitutes. To help compensate for limited access to industry documents, we used other historical materials to cross-validate findings as they emerged throughout the analysis. Another limitation was that we could not interview key actors.
This historical example illustrates how industry protects itself from potentially damaging research, which can inform policy makers today. While it may be valuable in theory for the industry to contribute data about their products to the research community, industry should not have the opportunity to influence public health research priorities . Regulatory science to support sensible and defensible policies to limit added sugar 