1948 to 1960) the British were often able to achieve a force ratio of 20:1, and used their military superiority in numbers and firepower as a means to drive Chin Peng's communists into remote parts of the country, where they were then hunted down remorselessly. More important, the close political control which was exercised over military power throughout that campaign led directly to the successful and surgical application of attrition to military advantage.
It is necessary to appreciate that although, at times, military forces combined with a policy of attrition of insurgents may have a crucial role to play in restoring and maintaining government control, military force is not an end in itself, but always a means to achieve a wider political purpose. This implies that the military commander will have a far from free hand. Indeed, in a well-designed counterinsurgency strategy, a military commander is unlikely to direct the overall campaign. Acceptance of this fact has far-reaching implications for the doctrinal approach to a given situation and for the part that military forces will be given (and should seek) to play in any counterinsurgency campaign.
The Maneuver Theory
Insurgency can be seen as an ancient form of maneuver warfare. In Vietnam, for example, it was being practiced against foreign invaders 2000 years before Ho Chi Minh and Giap turned their attention to the Japanese, the French, and then the Americans. The insurgent uses politico-military skills to turn the government's apparent strengths against itself. This can involve a relatively low level of military activity, such as in the Malayan campaign, or one which is virtually indistinguishable from conventional war, as the French discovered at Dien Bien Phu. It would therefore be an error to conclude that military operations in an insurgency are "low intensity," and the phrase is no longer in general military use.
The British army doctrinal publication Operations explains that "some elements of conventional warfighting wisdom may become irrelevant" in counterinsurgency "and acknowledges that Operations Other Than War will be governed by tight political control." Nevertheless, because counterinsurgency involves using a degree of military force, its conduct has parallels with combat in general war. The British army has adopted a seamless doctrinal approach to the conduct of operations which is applicable at all levels of conflict. It places due emphasis on the intellectual and psychological aspects of operations, not simply the material. It emphasizes the focus on people and ideas, not only on ground. Insurgent cohesion is identified and attacked by applying concentrated yet discrete force against critical weaknesses. Surprise, tempo, and simultaneity are used to overwhelm and unhinge the insurgent, bringing about a complete collapse of will and ultimately helping to create the conditions for his political defeat. As in warfighting, force is applied selectively and its use is carefully measured and controlled; destruction is a means, not an end. The doctrine eschews accepting battle for battle's sake and aims to create the conditions for government success by the application of the appropriate forces in a timely manner. All of this is directly applicable in counterinsurgency: a subtle approach to a subtle problem.
There are, however, differences of emphasis and interpretation. First, counterinsurgency operations do not readily lend themselves to neat division into discrete levels of conflict. An action at the lowest tactical level can have far-reaching operational and even strategic consequences. Indeed, if the test of whether there is a political dimension is rigidly applied, every patrol is potentially conducted at the "operational" level because the conduct of an individual soldier, amplified by the media, can become an international issue very quickly.
In general war, soldiers tend to expect that once broad political parameters have been established they will be left to decide the best way to achieve tactical goals; this is not necessarily the case in count