 counterinsurgency "and acknowledges that Operations Other Than War will be governed by tight political control." Nevertheless, because counterinsurgency involves using a degree of military force, its conduct has parallels with combat in general war. The British army has adopted a seamless doctrinal approach to the conduct of operations which is applicable at all levels of conflict. It places due emphasis on the intellectual and psychological aspects of operations, not simply the material. It emphasizes the focus on people and ideas, not only on ground. Insurgent cohesion is identified and attacked by applying concentrated yet discrete force against critical weaknesses. Surprise, tempo, and simultaneity are used to overwhelm and unhinge the insurgent, bringing about a complete collapse of will and ultimately helping to create the conditions for his political defeat. As in warfighting, force is applied selectively and its use is carefully measured and controlled; destruction is a means, not an end. The doctrine eschews accepting battle for battle's sake and aims to create the conditions for government success by the application of the appropriate forces in a timely manner. All of this is directly applicable in counterinsurgency: a subtle approach to a subtle problem.
There are, however, differences of emphasis and interpretation. First, counterinsurgency operations do not readily lend themselves to neat division into discrete levels of conflict. An action at the lowest tactical level can have far-reaching operational and even strategic consequences. Indeed, if the test of whether there is a political dimension is rigidly applied, every patrol is potentially conducted at the "operational" level because the conduct of an individual soldier, amplified by the media, can become an international issue very quickly.
In general war, soldiers tend to expect that once broad political parameters have been established they will be left to decide the best way to achieve tactical goals; this is not necessarily the case in counterinsurgency, and this has important implications. While being prepared to work and offer advice at the highest levels, military commanders are unlikely to enjoy even tactical autonomy over matters that otherwise would be considered a service preserve. This is due to the relationship between "success" and the center of gravity in counterinsurgency operations.
Success is defined by the state of affairs which needs to be achieved by the end of a campaign. Since insurgency is principally a political struggle, it may be that the desired aim of the government falls short of victory in a strictly military context and setting. This is not to say that tactical defeats are acceptable, merely to acknowledge that there may be significant restrictions on the degree of military success which is both achievable and compatible with the overall political aim. In counterinsurgency, "success" may equate to handing over an internal security problem to the civil police, or simply not losing.
If, for example, the intention of committing troops is to buy time in which to address particular grievances (which need not necessarily mean making concessions), then dramatic tactical military success may in fact be counterproductive. Nor may it be possible to predict how long involvement may last, so the campaign may not be planned in the decisive, coherent fashion to which military commanders aspire. Counterinsurgency operations are often protracted, and as the nature of the task may evolve or even change radically long after troops are deployed, the political aim may likewise change over time. It is thus vital that politicians and commanders seek to identify where in the overall spectrum of government activity the military contribution lies, its relationship to the other aspects of policy, and its relative importance at any particular stage of the counterinsurgency campaign. This will vary over time and even in different geographical areas at the same time. Troops should be aware of their military role, and commanders should select accurate