The Tunisian-Libyan border has long been a thoroughfare for the illicit movement of material and people. To bolster efforts to secure the border, the U.S. Department of Defense is spending nearly $20 million on advanced, high-tech sensors and cameras, drawing from a joint fund it created with Germany in September 2017. Yet, like all efforts to date, this new endeavor is unlikely to address the entrenched permeability of the frontier and eliminate the underlying causes of border insecurity. A singular focus on hardening the border runs up against deep-rooted socioeconomic realities in the region, where cross-border traffic continues to be a way of life and a substantial source of livelihood. A lasting solution will require a broader approach that includes reforming institutions, pursuing alternative development opportunities, tackling corruption, and improving bilateral trade policy.
Tunisian and Libyan Border Dynamics
In both countries, informal activities represent a significant portion of the national economy. The Tunisian government—now a fledgling, semi-functioning democracy—has a strong incentive to capture that income by preventing cross-border smuggling and hardening the border. However, in Libya, there is less incentive and capacity due to a lack of political unity; weak institutions; and rival, often predatory, militias jockeying for power to control the border and profit from informal trade. In fact, official and semi-official security actors are sometimes complicit in the smuggling. Overall, because of the countries’ contrasting political and security landscapes, bilateral efforts to secure the border have been disjointed and piecemeal at best—with each side even deliberately resistant at times.
According to various reports, Tunisia’s informal economy accounts for between 39 and 50 percent of its GDP. And potentially more than half of the money circulating in Libya is in the informal sector. It is therefore not surprising that bilateral informal trade is significant for both countries. The World Bank estimated it to be valued around $498 million in 2015, including approximately $200 million for cigarettes, $148 million for fuel, and $150 million for other goods. While the smuggling of certain consumer goods (electronics, clothing, home appliances) decreased from 2013 to 2015, there was a dramatic increase in the smuggling of tobacco and fuel during that same period. The markets for both are estimated to be large. For example, 40 percent of the 380 million contraband cigarette packs consumed annually in Tunisia originate from Libya. Contraband fuel traded at the border accounted for 17 percent of Tunisian consumption in 2014.
While the World Bank attributes the decrease in trade of certain illicit goods to border enforcement, other Tunisian policies have instead led to an increase in trade of contraband items. Also complicating the situation is a reported lack of communication between Tunisian security forces and the military; the army has reportedly been reluctant to share its equipment and information (procured through foreign aid) with other Tunisian security forces, encumbering border patrol operations. Further impeding the Tunisian government’s efforts are Libyan militias, who often directly profit from illicit trade.
Since 2011, rival militias operating along the border in Libya (estimated to number around fifteen) have thwarted expanded border security efforts, and competition over smuggling profits has increased in the absence of a unified Libyan government response. Most recently, militias from the nearby Libyan towns of Zuwara and Zawiya have been repeatedly clashing over control of a vital border crossing in Ras Jedir. The growing influence of Salafi groups in this border dispute mirrors the expansion of like-minded groups across Libya’s policing sector and adds another complicating factor to the border security landscape.
Another skirmish—Libyan Major General Usama Juwaili’s offensive on Abu Khammash, a Libyan town near Ras Jedir—caused the border crossing to close in January 2018 for at least twent