quite plain that no blame should be attached to him or his staff. 
As a result of MacArthur's statements President Truman had sent to the heads of all executive departments his 5 December memorandum ordering government officials to clear all public statements concerning foreign policy with the Department of State and all concerning military affairs with the Department of Defense. Although this memorandum was addressed to all executive branches, it was directed specifically at General MacArthur. 
Meanwhile, MacArthur had proposed to General Collins, then visiting in the Far East, that the United States should carry the war to China, through bombing, blockade, and other measures. Throughout December and January and into February, he insisted upon these measures, always through official media albeit quite forcefully. Not until mid-February did General MacArthur bring his views to the attention of the public. On 13 February, in a statement to the press, he contended that unless he was allowed to reduce materially the superiority of the Chinese, ostensibly through attacks upon their "sanctuary," he could not seriously consider conducting major operations north of the 38th Parallel; and on 7 March, in another such statement, he held that vital decisions, yet to be made, must be provided on the highest international levels. These statements may have been perfectly true, and there is considerable evidence that the latter opinion especially was valid; but both were considered by Washington authorities to be comments affecting both foreign and military policies of the United States Government that were not cleared by the Department of Defense and were, therefore, in violation of the President's directive of 5 December. 
 Hoare, The JCS and National Policy, vol. IV, ch. VII, pp. 32-33.
 Truman, Memoirs, II, 384; see also pp. 444-50.
 Ibid., 382.
 (1) Rad, JCS 98134, JCS to CINCFE, CINCEUR, CINCAL, et al., 6 Dec. 50. (2) MacArthur Hearings, p. 880
 (1) MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3539-40. (2) Ltr., Secy. Marshall to Hon. Richard B. Russell, 17 Aug. 51. (3) MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3665-66.
General Marshall later said that MacArthur's statement of 24 March offering to negotiate with enemy leaders in the field was the culminating factor in President Truman's decision to relieve MacArthur. Marshall charged that this statement contained a thinly veiled hint that the enemy should either negotiate or the war would be carried to the Chinese mainland. He based this view on that portion of MacArthur's statement which said, "The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse." 
The President found this to be a most extraordinary statement for a military commander of the United Nations to issue on his own responsibility. He construed MacArthur's statement as defiance of his orders as Commander in Chief and a challenge to his authority. Additionally MacArthur was, in the President's view, flouting the policy established by the United Nations. By this act General MacArthur had left the President no choice. He felt he could no longer tolerate MacArthur's insubordination.  President Truman nonetheless delayed a final decision; neither the general public nor General MacArthur was aware of President Truman's steadily mounting dissatisfaction.
But the stage had already been set for the final act. On 20 March General MacArthur, in reply to a personal letter from Joseph W. Martin, House of Representatives Minority Leader, sent a relatively mild commentary to the Congressman on American foreign policy. There was nothing new in what he said, nor was it said in a particularly inflammatory manner. MacArthur merely reiterated his views that the Asian theater was fully as important as the European and that the United States must prosecute the Asian war until victory was achieved. MacArthur later testified t