pport of North Korea. Chinese forces overran UN forces along the Ch'ongch'on River and forced a withdrawal after the Battle of Chosin Reservoir to South Korea. After the Chinese entered the war, a stalemate generally ensued, resulting in the permanent division of the country into North and South near the 38th parallel. It remains one of the political hot spots in the world, and a dividing line between democracy and the remnants of communism.
The idea to land UN forces at Inchon was proposed by General MacArthur after he visited the Korean battlefield on June 29, 1950, four days after the war began. MacArthur thought that the North Korean army would push the South Korean army back far past Seoul. He decided that the battered, demoralized, and under-equipped South Koreans could not hold off the NKPA's advances even with American reinforcements. MacArthur felt that he could turn the tide if he made a decisive troop movement behind enemy lines. He hoped that a landing near Inchon would allow him to cut off the NKPA and destroy that army as a useful fighting force, thus winning the war.
To accomplish such a large amphibious operation, MacArthur requested the use of United States Marine Corps expeditionary forces, having become familiar with their ability to integrate amphibious operations in the Pacific during World War II. However, the Marines at that point were still recovering from a series of severe program cutbacks instituted by the Truman administration and Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson. Indeed, Johnson had tried to eliminate the Marines entirely and slashed Marine expeditionary forces from a World War II peak of 300,000 men to just over 27,000. Much of the Marines' landing craft and amphibious carriers had been sold off, scrapped, or transferred to the exclusive use of the U.S. Army. After hastily re-equipping Marine forces with aging World War II landing craft, withdrawing Marine units from the Pusan perimeter, and stripping recruitment depots bare of men, Marine commanders were just able to mount a force capable of undertaking offensive operations.
MacArthur decided to use the Joint Strategic and Operations Group (JSPOG) of his Far East Command (FECOM). The initial plan was met with skepticism by the other generals because Inchon's natural and artificial defenses were formidable. The approaches to Inchon were two restricted passages, Flying Fish and Eastern channels, which could be easily blocked by mines. The current of the channels was also dangerously quick—three to eight knots. Finally, the anchorage was small and the harbor surrounded by tall seawalls. Commander Arlie G. Capps noted, "We drew up a list of every natural and geographic handicap—and Inchon had 'em all."
These problems, along with the advancing North Korean army, forced MacArthur to abandon his first plan, Operation Bluehearts, which called for an Inchon landing in July 1950.
Despite these obstacles, in September, MacArthur issued a revised plan of assault on Inchon: Plan 100-B, codenamed Operation Chromite. A briefing led by Admiral James Doyle concluded "the best that I can say is that Inchon is not impossible." Officers at the briefing spent much of their time asking about alternative landing sites, such as Kunsan. MacArthur spent 45 minutes after the briefing explaining his reasons for choosing Inchon. He said that because it was so heavily defended, the enemy would not expect an attack there, that victory at Inchon would avoid a brutal winter campaign, and that, by invading a northern strong point, the UN forces could cut off North Korean lines of communication. Inchon was also chosen because of its proximity to Seoul. Admiral Forrest P. Sherman and General J. Lawton Collins returned to Washington, D.C., and had the invasion approved.
The landing at Inchon was not the first large-scale amphibious operation since World War II. That distinction belonged to the July 18, 1950, landing at Pohang. However, that operation was not made in enemy held territory and was unopposed.
Seven days before the main attack on Inchon, a joint Central Intel