previous cases (e.g., Epperson, McLean, Edwards).
For example, one premise is that materialist explanations of the origins of life on earth are the only ones accorded the privilege of being called “knowledge.” Other explanations are pejoratively called “supernatural” or “miraculous” and are never permitted to count against materialist explanations. So to say that belief in a Designer’s existence is not inconsistent with naturalistic evolution is to imply that a Designer (whatever or whoever that may be) is not really an object of knowledge.
In chapter 3, Beckwith presents numerous and diverse aspects of the ID project that test the embedded and largely unchallenged metaphysical claims concerning origins in a highly sophisticated way. For example, Beckwith considers William Dembski’s development of “specified complexity” (SC) as an account of design in nature that is not explicable by naturalism. According to Dembski, SC establishes contingency, complexity and specification. Contingency ensures that an object is not the result of an automatic and therefore unintelligent process. Complexity ensures that the object is not so simple as to be readily explained by chance. Specification ensures that the object exhibits a type of pattern that is the trademark of intelligence.
Beckwith’s aim is to also distinguish ID from creationism in that design theorists defend a perspective that is grounded in arguments that are both empirical and philosophical. Given the court’s’ understanding of creation science, ID clearly is not creation science. He does an excellent job of acquainting the reader with the essential aspects of the ID movement, while assessing whether particular strands of thought on ID are relevant as to whether it would pass constitutional muster. According to Beckwith, “all that is necessary to permit (or require) ID in public school classes is that it does not unconstitutionally advance religion, and its proponents make a reasonable and intellectually respectable case for their position, that the state have a legitimate interest in exposing students and faculty to ID, and that the state have legitimate means by which to accomplish this” (92). Beckwith concludes by arguing that prohibiting ID from public schools would undermine the nature of education, which involves freedom of thought.
The book culminates in chapter 4, where Beckwith considers whether teaching ID in public schools would violate the Establishment Clause. Beckwith effectively argues on the legal principles concerning the definition of religion, examining if ID conforms to such a definition. Compared to previous rulings on creationism, it is clear that ID is not a conventional religious system, and its purpose is to provide answers to some of the questions for which the evolutionary paradigm fails to provide. ID should thus not be disqualified from being taught in public schools as long as it exposes students to new and important scholarship and furthers and protects academic freedom.
Although the book contains numerous references to legal problems and judicial reasoning, Beckwith steadily maneuvers through difficult legal problems and critically evaluates the strength of the courts position. The book is well documented and is extremely thorough. Beckwith's strength is his understanding of constitutional law and his astute philosophical insights. He is thus able to build his case logically and does so with fair treatments of both sides of the issue. This important book is a must for all those who are interested in law, philosophy and religion, and for those who engage in the debate of ID in public schools.