 himself.
So there is absolute faith in the benevolence of the ruler, the notion of benevolent despotism. The benevolent despot does not use his power in a tyrannical or dictatorial manner. It is tempered by certain qualities of mercy and of gentleness. But those qualities are not enjoyed upon the ruler by any external norms. Those are internal restraints. That to my mind is the significance of the fundamental contrast.
Modern jurisprudence believes in the restriction of governmental power by invoking external norms. The separation of powers, the restriction of the powers of the President or of Parliament, justifiable fundamental rights, which are incorporated in constitutional instruments. These are all external forms. But traditional values of indigenous people emphasise the internal content of those restraints rather than the external levers.
So these are some of the contrasts between modern attitudes to justice, to government, to tenure of land on the one hand and the aspirations of indigenous peoples. Now one matter that we should always be suspicious of, I think a safeguard that is very essential, is to refrain from endeavouring to incorporate these values mechanically into a modern system. We must not feel the aboriginals, the indigenous people, have their own values. There is some value in those, there is some merit in those. Our system is different.
We have therefore to carve out some sort of niche in our own system to accommodate them. That is we seek to accommodate them in a periphery of our own system. I don't think that is a helpful premise. This has been very much the approach in countries like New Zealand, where the Maoris, for example, had had certain rights conceded to them and a sustained attempt has been made to bring them into the system, for example by means of quotas. That is very much a part of governmental policy in New Zealand at the present time. Then it comes to admission of children to schools or to universities, recruitment to the public service, and other such benefits. There is a certain quota of places that tend to be reserved for Maoris.
Now the assumption that this is a form of reverse discrimination or 'affirmative action' as it is called in American jurisprudence. The assumption is that these are people who have not had the benefits and the advantages that are available to the rest of the population. So you must not judge them by the same standard. You have to recognise that they have a special claim because of the historical injustice that they have suffered.
Now that is, I think, a self-defeating point of view. In the first place it smacks of condescension. You are not good enough, but we will make room for you because we recognise that we owe you something. You have suffered so much in the past and to allow you, to enable you, to better your own condition in life, we will make these facilities available to you, although you are not in a position to compete with the other sections of society on the basis of equality. It cannot be achieved, it cannot be accomplished on the basic of quality, but we will make special concessions to you and we will accommodate you although, in fact, you are found to be lacking.
Now I think that is destructive. It erodes self-confidence and self-esteem and for that reason I think quotas are not really acceptable from the standpoint of policy.
There are other objections to a system of quotas. As the Maoris begin to be educated, it may well be that the time will come they can gain for themselves more than the allotted places, the number of places you that allot in terms of the quotas that you determine as being appropriate to fulfill their needs. So the quota system, although intended to benefit them originally, may in the fullness of time actually operate to their disadvantage.
So there are many reasons why the quota system cannot be really be commended in terms of policy. But again the whole approach that is reflected in the quota system is open to cogent criticism on the basis that the objective of that method is to bring these people into our system. Th