tion see Hungdah Chiu, "The Hong Kong Agreement and American Foreign Policy," Issues and Studies, June 1986, pp. 76-91. 12. "U.K. and China Reach Agreement on Hong Kong," Dwartment of State Bulleti n, November 1984, p. 56.
10By examining the Hong Kong Agreement and the various reactions to it, several observations can be made regarding the impact of the Hong Kong settlement on the U.S.-PRC-ROC triangular relationship, particularly as it relates t o the reunification issue. First, the agreement was one of practical necessity for London, for there was no way Great Britain could have extended its lease on the New Territories. The very survival of Hong Kong depended on PRC acquiescence. By contrast, t h ere is no practical necessity for Taiwan to reunify with the mainland at any time in the foreseeable future. As long as Taiwan has an adequate deterrence and maintains its will to survive as an independent entity, the PRC cannot force Taiwan into negotiat i ons. Nor, arguably, can the United States. Taipei enjoys a privileged position in which it can either accept or reject Beijing's formulas for reunification. Questions of ideology aside, the ROC can evaluate PRC offers from the point of view of the attract i veness of the proposals. Thus far, Taipei has not seen much from Beijing that the ROC does not already have. Second, it appears as if the PRC wants Hong Kong to continue pretty much the way it is now. This is because of Hong Kong's great contribution to C h ina's modernization in terms of foreign exchange earnings, the introduction of technology and investments, and managerial skills. Also, a successful Hong Kong settlement would add enormously to the international prestige of Beijing and demonstrate that th e PRC indeed may have peaceful, noninterventionist intentions toward Taiwan. 'Although the PRC probably wants Hong Kong to remain prosperous because China benefits directly thereby, that incentive is not obvious in the case of Taiwan. Taiwan does not earn f oreign exchange for.the PRC, nor is it a source of investment or managerial talent. Nonetheless, it is true that the resolution of the Taiwan issue would contribute to the prestige and perceived national power of Beijing. Third, there was very little the U .S. dbluld do to influence the outcome of the Hong Kong settlement. The only practical U.S. policy was to encourage London and Beijing in their negotiations and to support the Agreement once it became apparent that it was the best possible under the circu m stances. However, the U.S. could play a major role in Taiwan's reunification. official U.S. policy is noninvolvement, except to express an interest in the peaceful resolution of the issue. But the fact that the U.S. is critically important to Taiwan's pro s perity and security and fundamental to China's modernization makes being evenhanded difficult for the United States. The tightrope the U.S. walks in arms sales to both the ROC and PRC is a case in point. Fourth, expectations about the future of Hong Kong a re heavily laden with subjective factors. opinions as to the trustworthiness of the communists, theoretical concerns about having two economic systems operating in one country, the durability of Deng Xiaoping's reforms on the mainland, and the ability of even well-meaning Chinese government
officials to keep from meddling in Hong Kong's freewheeling style predetermine to a great extent whether one believes the future of Hong Kong will be bright or bleak. Similarly, conclusions about the possibility of a Just settlement between Beijing and Ta i pei and whether the U.S. can play a constructive role in reunification are heavily influenced by subjective considerations., Complicating factors are the highly personalized style of leadership both on the mainland and in Taiwan, the intense sixty-year ri v alry between the Kuomintang and the communists, and the failure of U.S. efforts to play a mediator's role between the two parties in 1945 to 1950. 1 Fifth, in the negotiations the PRC was very firm on principles, but relatively pragmatic on details. Howev e r, 