mmunity perceive more clearly Soviet recalcitrance and manipulation, has been realized. But without US-USSR bilateral agreement, there is no chance for an effective ban. Is the US prepared to gamble by returning to the bilateral talks?
Second, bureaucratic ineptitude and un-clear lines of authority have frustrated the talks from the start. Soviet delegates last summer tabled a document similar in purpose to Fields', but when pressed to explain positions on verification, they were apparently unable to gain Moscow's clearance. Let us hope that the current malaise at our own Arms Control and Disarmament Agency does not paralyze our efforts.
Third, there is a real question of the negotiating sincerity of both superpowers. The Soviets have been astute propagandists, and their intense focus on temporary, tactical advantage raises questions about their commitment to the broader arms control goal. But our own record is not as good as we might wish, and many abroad question our intent. US prestige has been tarnished by the 50 years it took us to accede to the Geneva Protocol and by the five years it took us to sit down to bilateral talks on chemical weapons after they were first proposed by President Nixon in 1969.
Washington's reluctance to return to bilateral talks is increasingly perceived as a sign of US insincerity about chemical weapons arms control, as is the administration's dual-track, ''carrot and stick'' approach to arms control and modernization. Further doubts are instilled by our policy, only just overturned, to deny a negotiating mandate to our representatives in Geneva (without which they can only talk in a noncommittal way).
Success now in these talks could rid the world of the specter of one of the most horrid of man's inventions. It could also create an atmosphere conducive to arms control successes on other fronts. Failure could precipitate dangerous proliferation, extensive troubles for NATO, and a further erosion of US prestige abroad. Our commitment must be unflagging.