” is not simply a British political phenomenon.
Most importantly, the research findings serve to weaken the popular cultural dispositions theory, or the idea that retentionist nations have cultures that are inherently more inclined towards violence and revenge. This theory was informally cited recently in international headlines in September 2011 when the audience of a Republican presidential debate erupted in applause for Governor Rick Perry because he executed 234 people during his time as governor of Texas. However, the interesting implication of the “anti-democratic” phenomenon is that European countries like Great Britain cannot claim to have drastically different cultural dispositions informing their political opinions at the time of abolition. When public support for the death penalty hovered around 80 percent in Great Britain, history demonstrates that abolition was triggered by structure in spite of the country's cultural dispositions. The logical inverse of this finding is that America's retention of the death penalty and current support of 63 percent does not necessarily suggest a country that is culturally more attached to retribution or death as the ultimate sanction. The “anti-democratic” phenomenon found in this comparative historical analysis clarifies that an irreconcilable cultural divide alone does not urge the policy rift to persist between the United States and other European democracies.
Implications for Future Research
The first implication for future research stemming from this study is the examination of the sustainability of death penalty policy as an “anti-democratic” decision in the Western world. Although America's state-by-state abolition process moves slowly alongside local public opinion, moderate change over time may dig a deeper trench in the long run. While the “anti-democratic” decisions to abolish the death penalty in Great Britain and Europe could prove unsustainable and lead to calls for restoration, death penalty abolition in Europe is unique because 21st century international governmental organizations have locked states into this particular policy preference. Even though elected officials once achieved death penalty abolition against the popular will of the people, the state's refusal to execute its own citizens has become a cornerstone of European collective principles on human rights. For example, the European Union makes abolition of the death penalty a requirement for member-states and any candidates that wish to be considered for accession. Additionally, the Thirteenth Protocol of the European Convention ensures that nations in the Council of Europe cannot temporarily suspend their obligation to right to life and restore the death penalty in times of crisis. In this way, Europe has created a supranational structure that severely weakens the chances of any nation restoring the death penalty as a policy based on popular demand. This study puts forth the influence of supranational and international organizations on death penalty abolition as a significant subject for future research.
Social scientists and this comparative analysis have further supported the notion that “successful and sustainable abolition of capital punishment has never been a result of great popular demand" (Zimring and Hawkins 1986, 12). Consequently, what wisdom does this "anti-democratic" phenomenon leave for America and the thirty-two states that continue to retain capital punishment today? If most countries have managed "anti-democratic abolition" and public support for the death penalty has declined in the ensuing years, then America's direct and accessible democracy gives birth to a populist bind in the majority of American states, especially in the South. In the states with highly active death penalty mechanisms, such as Texas, support for the death penalty is still as high as 73% (Ramsey 2012), roughly parallel to "tough on crime" figures in the 1990s. Additionally, though some state legislatures like Delaware are posturing for possible abolition in the future, death penalty repeal by each state may 