s against the company’s director for his dismissal of al-Hajrasi. Supporters of al-Hajrasi claim this firing was intended to undercut his growing popularity and political assertiveness (especially toward the GNA and NOC) after he declared success in resolving the fuel shortage crisis in western Libya. Other Libyan observers speculate that pressure from Libyan factions involved with smuggling is at work. Regardless, the incident underscores the continued erosion of Libyan state institutions by political and economic fissures—and the growing threat to these institutions by armed groups.
Moving forward, local and international actors must supplement security measures with a greater focus on the informal cross-border economy that continues to support the livelihoods for many in border towns. Without the participation and buy-in of local benefactors of this economy—including the cartels as well as residents—technological and physical solutions are likely to fail. Instead of simply closing the border, local authorities must distinguish between more immediately detrimental phenomena, such as human and weapons trafficking, and the small-scale smuggling of goods, such as fuel and cigarettes.
Moreover, security efforts should be accompanied simultaneously by on-the-ground policies to help relieve the socioeconomic pressure felt on both sides of the border. These efforts could focus on providing alternate sources of income through increasing agricultural competitiveness, reforming land ownership, providing skills training, improving infrastructure, and investing in development projects. International actors can assist these initiatives by specifically designating economic assistance and foreign aid for border regions.
Although large smugglers wield considerable influence, the informal sector lacks channels of representation like unions or trade associations, leaving smaller traders unable to articulate and advocate their political or economic demands to the government. This also leaves governments with little information about the informal sector. To correct this, border policies should focus more on promoting associations that support those actively participating in the informal sector.
Restoring bilateral economic relations will also be crucial. Some movement on this front has already been made. A Tunisian-Libyan business council was formed in April 2018 to further support and restore bilateral economic relations, and Tunisian Foreign Minister Khemaies Jhinaoui and Libyan Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj recently announced their intention to resume direct flights and normalize bilateral trade. Tunisia’s 2016 Finance Law simplified and lowered tariffs on many products, but some imported goods can still be subject to tariff rates as high as 200 percent—a factor that likely incentivizes cross-border smuggling. More broadly, asymmetric subsidy and tariff policies in Tunisia and Libya must be addressed through increased bilateral economic cooperation that ensures the two nations work in tandem to improve the border situation. Policy recommendations range from coordinating tariffs and taxes, to encouraging bilateral investment deals, and even to creating a regional free-trade zone.
Overall, much remains to be done in both the security and economic domains. Securitization alone will not only fail to curtail smuggling and trafficking but will have deleterious ripple effects on the livelihoods of border citizens. And this could ultimately threaten regional stability as a result of increased competition among militias, violent protests, and even a resurgence of jihadism due to a lack of other economic opportunities. International security assistance must be accompanied by a broader socioeconomic strategy and pay greater attention to reforming security institutions, tackling corruption, and, in the case of Libya, supporting national political reconciliation.
Katherine Pollock was a 2017–2018 junior fellow at Carnegie.