dependent upon the understanding.
21. He makes a similar charge elsewhere in the Aesthetic: “For if one regards space and time as properties whose possibility must be found in things in themselves [Sachen an sich], and considers the absurdities in which one is then entangled, in that two infinite things [Dinge], which are not substances nor something actually inhering in substances, must yet exist, nay, must be the necessary condition of the existence of all things, and also must remain even if all existing things are removed,– one cannot blame the good Berkeley if he degraded bodies to mere illusion [bloßem Schein]… (B70-1; cf. Inaugural Dissertation, Ak 2: 403-4).
22. See, e.g., A172-5/B214-17 and Metaphysical Foundations, Ak 4: 534-5, 563-5.
23. Vorländer reprints the review in his edition of the Prolegomena (Kant 1920) at 167-74, along with letters between Garve and Kant from 1783 at 175-88.
24. It is certainly possible to read this passage differently, and to regard Berkeley as a transcendental realist in Kant's schema. If transcendental realism is the view that we can obtain knowledge of things in themselves, and if Berkeley can be understood as arguing that we know things in themselves to be nothing but concatenations of ideas—and the remaining things to be minds, and perhaps God—then he can be understood as a transcendental realist.
25. This seems to be Kant's interpretation of Berkeley, despite some obvious shortcomings. Kant seems to ignore the fact that for Berkeley, the mind—and also God—are independent of intuition, or of sense perception. In other words, Berkeley surely takes God and minds to be real entities in the sense that they, unlike everything else, are not mere congeries of ideas.
26. There is also some contemporary support for reading Leibniz as a kind of idealist—see especially the interpretation in Adams 1994.