me up to be accepted, without question by military chroniclers. Yet it did not tally with the racy note of the codename given to this attack—‘Operation Goodwood’, after the English racecourse. Nor with the term ‘broke through’ that Montgomery first used in his first announcement of the attack on the 18th. Moreover his remark that he was ‘well satisfied with the progress made’ on the first day seemed hard to reconcile with the absence of a renewed effort of similar scale on the second day. That infuriated the air chiefs, who would not have agreed to divert the heavy bomber armada to the aid of a ground operation had they not believed that the aim of ‘Goodwood’ was a mass break-out. Montgomery’s later assertion was a half-truth, and did himself an injustice. He had not planned to break-out on this flank, and was not banking on it. But he would have been foolish not to reckon with the possibility of a German collapse, under this massive blow, and exploit it if it occurred.
Dempsey, who commanded the Second Army, thought a speedy collapse was likely, and had up himself to the armoured corps H.Q. so as to be ready to exploit it: ’What I had in mind was to seize all the crossings of the Orne from Caen to Argentan’—that would establish a barricade across the German’s rear and trap them more effectively than any American break-out on the Western flank could do. Dempsey’s hope of a complete break-through was very close to fulfilment at midday on July 18. In view of his revelation of what he had in mind, it is amusing to note the many assertions that there was no idea of trying to reach Falaise—for Argentan, his prospective goal, was nearly twice as far. Dempsey, too, was shrewd enough to realise that the disappointment of his hopes might be turned to compensating advantage. When one of his staff urged him to protest against press criticism of the failure of ‘Goodwood’, he replied: ’Don’t worry—it will aid our purpose, and act as the best possible cover-plan.’ The American break-out on the opposite flank certainly owed much to the way that the enemy’ attention had been focused on the threat of a break-out near Caen. But the break-out at Avranches, far to the west, carried no such immediate chance of cutting off the German forces. Its prospect depended on making a very rapid sweep eastward, or on the enemy clinging onto his position until he could be trapped.
In the event when the breakout came at Avranches on July 31, only a few scattered German battalions lay in the ninety-mile wide corridor between that point and Loire. So American spearheads could have driven eastwards unopposed. But the Allied High Command threw away the best chance of exploiting this great opportunity by sticking to the outdated pre-invasion programme, in which a westward move to capture the Brittany ports was to be the next step.
Two weeks passed before the American forces pushed eastwards far enough to reach Argentan and come up level with the British left wing—which meanwhile was still held in check just beyond Caen. This caused fresh recriminations. For when Patton was told that he must not drive on northward to close the gap and bar the Germans’ escape route, for fear of a collision with the British, he exclaimed on the telephone: ‘Let me go on to Falaise and we’ll drive the British back into the sea for another Dunkirk.’”