g such security challenges exists (e.g., through Iran). If recent history is any indication, political considerations must be the underlining justification for TAPI construction.
It becomes clear that certain political objectives were behind the December 2010 pipeline agreements. One clear objective is eliminating the possibility of India’s importing gas from Iran through the proposed IPI. After years of negotiations, India withdrew from the project in 2009 for two main reasons. One was from American pressure, as the US government subjected India’s purchase of American nuclear reactors to its opting out of the IPI as part of US policy to weaken the Iranian economy through limiting its oil and gas exports. Another was India’s confidence that it could increase its domestic production to reduce its short-term dependency on imported gas. It would do so by developing its newly discovered offshore gas fields, especially those in the Bay of Bengal, which pushed its reserves up from 0.60 trillion cubic meters (tcm) in 1998 to 1.09 tcm in 2008. However, many Indians now have second thoughts about the wisdom of their withdrawal from the IPI pipeline given India’s long-term need for large gas imports (piped and LNG) and the undeniable importance of Iran as a long-term regional supplier to India. India’s large investment in the Iranian gas industry (e.g., South Pars) despite American objections reflects this reality.
Another objective of the December 2010 pipeline agreements is to discourage Pakistan from implementing the Pakistani section of the IP pipeline, although for the most part Iran’s section is now operational. Of the approximately 1312 mile pipeline, the Iranian share is approximately 690 miles, of which approximately 570 miles was completed by June 2010. Presently under construction, the remainder is scheduled for completion over the next two years, after which it will be connected to the Pakistani section in 2014. Pakistan needs imported gas for power generation other purposes, as its domestic reserves are no longer sufficient to meet its domestic gas requirements (about 50% of its energy mix). Its only gas-exporting neighbor, Iran, is a natural supplier. Nonetheless, for the same reason mentioned for India, Washington has sought to discourage Islamabad from implementing its section of the pipeline by offering Pakistan financial assistance to build an LNG re-gasification terminal in order to import LNG from suppliers such as Qatar instead of importing directly piped gas from Iran. Moreover, Washington has offered to help Islamabad import electricity from Tajikistan via Afghanistan, a seemingly impossible mission at least in the foreseeable future given the expanding insecurity in Afghanistan and the fact that Tajikistan is suffering from electricity shortages itself. Ironically, Iran is now providing financial and technical assistance to the Tajik government to address this deficiency by expanding its hydropower sector. It is in this context that importing gas from Turkmenistan via the TAPI is meant to end Pakistan’s plan to import gas from Iran.
Yet another objective of the December 2010 pipeline agreements is to remove the possibility of Iranian piped gas exports to China. China has invested over $25 billion since the last decade in various Iranian oil and gas field development projects (e.g., onshore Azadegan and Yadavaran and offshore South Pars) with a clear intention of increasing its oil and gas (LNG initially and eventually piped gas) imports from Iran. Iran is considered a friendly long-term oil/gas exporter by China, and it shares some of China’s grievances about the structure of the international system. On many occasions, China has expressed its clear interest in importing Iranian gas through the IP once it is operational, which is completely feasible given China’s bordering Pakistan. Indeed Pakistan has its own interests in generating transit fees in order to decrease the cost of its gas imports from Iran. By encouraging Pakistan to opt out of the IP pipeline, the December agreements seek to remove this poss