utsiders, the survivors were understood as strangers, and excluded from privileged discourses of national heroism (gevurah). The Shoah has become gendered as the quintessential representation of Jewish powerlessness, effeminate passivity, and victimization. Powerlessness thus became associated with the memory of the European destruction of Jews, while masculinity defined the very essence of Zionism. The sin of exile exacted a terrible price from the Jewish minority in Europe, and the Zionist leadership vowed to learn the only lesson taught by the catastrophic results of anti-Semitic violence—which was to affirm its commitment to sovereignty and military security. But while the memory of the Shoah was used as a moral justification for Zionist policies of self-defense and preemptive aggression against Palestinian “enemies,” Shoah survivors were constructed as strangers rather than “natives”—as neither insiders nor outsiders, as ambivalent models of a discarded gendered identity. Despite stigmatic representations of cowardice, indolence, and immorality by the Zionist leadership during the first decade of statehood, the historical record shows that Shoah survivors participated in military struggles and were as productive as others in the labor sector. Their story of double victimization has been repressed in the hegemonic national narrative.
Dafna Izraeli’s “Gendering Military Service in the Israel Defense Forces” argues that the military has been, contrary to expectation, a crucial site for producing and reproducing gendered regimes of power in Israeli society. The institution most frequently cited as proof of women’s national partnership in effect serves as a primary agent in the construction of their difference. Though women conscripts do perform crucial work in for the Israel Defense Forces, their contribution is perceived as secondary and expendable. One reason for this public perception is the traditional exclusion of women from combat and reserve duties. Though military conscription is compulsory for both sexes, women serve two years, compared to the men’s three years, and constitute a third of the military force. Thus women are perceived as not fully belonging, and make up the “rear” that requires the protection of an army run by men. The military–industrial sector is intertwined with the state’s economic, political, and social elites, and as a potential employer provides material benefits to men with full military training and experience. It also provides such men with symbolic capital or social resources on which to draw after their release from military duty. Women are usually excluded from decision-making processes regarding their own role and status, and even the highest-ranked women do not participate regularly in the meetings of the general staff. Even women instructors of combat, or women who perform vital intelligence work, and women commanders of male platoons are restricted by formal rules and informal gender norms. Token women in highly prestigious units double their efforts to perform masculinity by mimicking the style, tone, and conduct of male commanders. For the most part women serve by performing a variety of stereotypically feminine functions, such as nurturing, caring, and bringing a civilizing effect or a touch of home and family, and the promise of physical and sexual charm, as prize for male heroes. While women’s accomplishments are belittled so as to aggrandize male achievement, women’s presence and ability to perform similar jobs promotes male competitiveness and provides incentives for achievements. Despite a few legal victories that opened up doors to combat duties and prestigious military units, and despite formal equities, the essay predicts that this course of incremental action will not lead to radical change. Such change may be achieved through a shift to peaceful policies, the creation of a voluntary and professional service that will replace the compulsory draft, and a demilitarization of Israeli society and culture.
Ruth Halperin-Kaddari’s “The Halachic Trap: Marriage and Family Life