onal structure of a new “rational-legal” authority, observing that rights of control increasingly derived from expertise rather than lineage. He documented the ways in which this development, which he called rationalization, underlay the rise of the modern state bureaucracy. According to Weber, organizations were able to develop unparalleled calculability and efficiency by combining two structures: (1) a system of explicit rules, upheld by clearly marked jurisdictions between offices and by permanent files documenting the processing of cases, and (2) a unique division of labour. The latter structure gave rise to the modern bureaucrat—a person who was required to be an expert in the relevant rules and who had to be shielded from inappropriate influences to guarantee fairness and objectivity. This shift away from tradition and inheritance permanently changed the nature of organizations. Weber thought that these two structures would cause organizations to follow, invariably and automatically, the objectives set down by political authorities.
One of Weber’s contemporaries, the German-born Italian sociologist Robert Michels, vigorously disputed Weber’s claim that organizations would pursue official objectives in machinelike fashion. According to Michels’s “iron law of oligarchy,” the top leaders of organizations—even those that are member-controlled—tend to develop a strong personal interest in maintaining their powers and privileges. Michels held that self-interest prevents such leaders from doing anything that would risk the survival of the organization—even if this means subverting the organization’s original goals and principles. Michels made this claim in an attempt to explain why the leaders of the officially internationalist and antiwar German Social Democratic Party strongly supported Germany’s declaration of war in 1914.
The essential point of the Weber-Michels debate has not been settled; questions persist over the degree to which the pursuit of official goals characterizes organizational action. Does the creation of organizations (such as churches, investment syndicates, or human rights groups) for the achievement of some collective goal subtly shape the agendas that will be pursued? This question—whether official or personal leadership is more influential—has considerable practical significance, because social movements (such as pacifism and environmentalism) almost always take shape as organizational structures in contemporary societies. Organizational analysis identifies ways in which the personal goals of these groups inform their respective organizational structures.
While German scholars were examining the rise of modern organizations within a broad sociological perspective, American engineers and management consultants were initiating the study of the management of work in industrial settings. Close examination of work groups revealed that routine patterns of behaviour (“informal organization”) often did not match the organizational charts or other official depictions of the organization (“formal organization”). These findings led researchers to identify and describe patterns of informal organization. Their investigations, which have become part of the core literature of organizational analysis, demonstrated unequivocally that participation in organizations is influenced strongly by social ties and by unofficial networks of communication. (See collective behaviour.)
As organizational analysis developed into a distinct field of inquiry in the late 1940s, research in the United States progressed in two theoretical directions. One became known as the Carnegie School, because its central figures, the American social scientists Herbert A. Simon and James G. March, taught at the Carnegie Institute of Technology (now Carnegie Mellon University). Their research, published in Organizations (1958), applied general principles of behavioral science to action within organizations, acknowledging that, while humans intend to be rational in their decision making, actual conditions impose a certain amount of subjectivity. Si