ligious, tribal, or regional affiliation. Until a 2011 decree allowed the formation of new parties, the only legal factions were the Baath Party and its several small coalition partners. Independent candidates are heavily vetted and closely allied with the regime. The 2012 constitutional reforms relaxed rules regarding the participation of non-Baathist parties, but the government maintains a powerful intelligence and security apparatus to monitor and punish opposition political activity in practice.
Within the domestic progovernment camp, politics and decision making are completely dominated by Assad, his extended family, and a close circle of business and security allies. The president’s relatives control key elements of the security forces. Although the government is often described as an Alawite regime and a protector of religious minorities, it is not an authentic vehicle for these groups’ political interests. Political access is a function not primarily of sect, but of proximity and loyalty to Assad and his associates. The political elite is not exclusively Alawite and indeed includes members of the majority Sunni sect, which also makes up most of the rebel movement; meanwhile, Alawites, Christians, and Druze outside Assad’s inner circle are just as politically disenfranchised as the broader Sunni population. Foreign actors including Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia also exert heavy influence over the regime due to their critical contribution to the war effort.
Political activity in rebel-held areas is more vigorous than in regime areas, but it is still seriously constrained, and in some places nonexistent. Civilians’ political aspirations are often subordinated to whatever armed group controls a given area. Opposition territory is divided among a multitude of armed factions, including moderate, Islamist, and radical jihadist units, with varying implications for local political life. Local councils are often sponsored or appointed by prominent families and armed groups, and overwhelmed by addressing humanitarian needs and delivering basic services.
In the Kurdish region, the decentralized governance structure allows for the participation of most citizens in political life, including ethnic and religious minorities. However, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the most powerful Syrian Kurdish group, dominates political life in practice and controls most of the Kurdish area’s armed forces. It has been accused of arbitrarily detaining perceived opponents.
No political activity is permitted in IS-controlled territory. Those who oppose IS rule must either refrain from expressing their views openly or flee to other areas, as dissent is severely punished.
C. Functioning of Government: 0 / 12
Government institutions lacked public accountability and were plagued by corruption even before the armed conflict. Those who question state policies or use of public funds face harassment, imprisonment, or death. Members of the ruling family and their inner circle are said to own or control much of the Syrian economy. The civil war has created new opportunities for corruption within the government and its relations with the private sector. The regime has regularly distributed patronage in the form of public resources, and implemented policies to benefit favored industries and companies, to shore up its base of support. Government contracts and trade deals have also been awarded to allies like Iran as compensation for political and military aid. Even basic state services are extended or withheld based on a community’s demonstrated political loyalty to the Assad regime, providing additional leverage for bribe-seeking officials. Syria was ranked 154 out of 168 countries and territories surveyed in Transparency International’s 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index.
The government’s lack of public accountability has been exacerbated during the civil war by the rise of militias that are nominally loyal to the regime but increasingly autonomous and free to exploit the population in regime-held areas. They have reportedly engaged in abuses including loo