gulations (e.g., automotive industry)). Nevertheless, data-sharing is not a common practice. For instance, the data portability right (art. 20 GDPR) is still unknown (only 10% of users are aware of such right)  and highly criticized by competition experts (unclear data coverage, a controversial scope, impossibility to share real-time data, the rudimentary definition of the technical formal, and transfer from one provider to another is not mandatory). Accordingly, the right has not been designed to promote competition. So, if data-sharing is already legally possible, why a new regulation?
(data-sharing in practice)
Data-sharing is a matter of trust. One needs a clear framework about how data is shared and how data-sharing is accessible and protected. The DGA establishes this framework. In that end, the regulation creates the following rules: (i) a mechanism for re-using certain categories of protected public sector data; (ii) a mandatory notification regime for data-sharing services providers; and (iii) a voluntary registration regime for entities engaged in data altruism, namely voluntary sharing of personal and non-personal data for purposes of general interest (e.g., scientific research). Both the notification and registration regimes will be monitored and implemented by a competent authority with the power to impose administrative and financial penalties in case of non-compliance with the rules, subject to judicial review. Furthermore, a “European Data Innovation Board” will be created. It will be in charge to advise and assist the Commission in developing best practices, and to facilitate the cooperation between Member States’ authorities.
The regulation is thus expected to provide a greater incentive for data-sharing thanks to greater trust. The regulation will also enable the emergence of data intermediaries such as Personal Information Management Systems (PIMS). The latter are intermediaries for consumer data between consumers and online service providers in which a consumer can already access and manage from a unique interface all her/his data shared with providers such as bank, insurance, energy, internet, and mobile providers. However, the regulation does not specify which data can be shared, but only provides that firms must comply with existing laws, in particular data protection and competition laws. In the absence of clear guidelines, firms might be reluctant to share data to avoid an anti-competitive practice. The Commission is well aware of this problem, and will therefore update the Horizontal Co-operation guidelines to provide more guidance on data-sharing and pooling agreements, as recommended by the Crémer et al report. It is worth noting that the Commission will consider data-access or data-sharing as remedies in case of competition concerns in merger control.
However, one question remains: How the Commission will prevent anticompetitive data-sharing through a private blockchain? Indeed, it will be possible to share data via a technical enabler. The latter allows the data supplier to control the use made of the data shared with data users. It can monitor whether data users respect the provisions of the data transfer agreement by tracking the data usage made by using a private blockchain. It can even sanction data users in case of violation of the data transfer agreement. It will be thus possible to monitor in real-time an agreement and to implement an immediate retaliation in case of deviation. Hence, there will be no incentive to deviate from the collusive outcome. Moreover, thanks to the blockchain, the collusion will be undetectable. In sum, the collusion will be sustainable and undetectable by competition authorities.
To conclude, the DGA is an important pillar to foster data-sharing, but should be first and foremost accompanied by more guidance on data-sharing, and an update of the data portability right (as recommended by the Commission) towards a data interoperability right, which is the right of the data subject to obtain and transfer real-time data from one provider to another or directly fr