warfare and command and control warfare as the campaign progresses. However, experience shows that little attention has previously been given to the preparation of an overall strategic information plan in counterinsurgency situations, Suez in 1956 being the most glaring example for the British.
Despite the potential difficulties and frustrations involved, a commander could reap handsome military dividends if a sound and properly supported strategic information plan is prepared and subsequent command and control warfare planning is conducted as an integral part of any operational and tactical plans that would be necessary in a counterinsurgency campaign. This could apply equally to campaigns in other types of operations short of war.
Integrating Deep, Close, and Rear Operations
During a counterinsurgency core military functions are applicable, albeit in very specific ways, just as they are in a conventional war. Each of the functions discussed to this point can be tailored to the concepts of the deep, close, and rear battle for purposes of training and operations.
Deep operations at the strategic and operational levels will often tend to be political, diplomatic, and psychological in nature. Military involvement may be through covert and clandestine action by special units. At a tactical level, overt deep operations, such as cross-border cooperation and surveillance of areas where known insurgents live and work, will contribute to fixing. Militarily, deep operations could be decisive at the strategic and operational levels, but rarely so at the tactical level. Until the insurgent is found, he has the initiative and it is impossible to conduct any further deep or subsequent close operations against him. The finding function is a prerequisite to starting any subsequent operations, despite it being often very difficult to identify an insurgent when he can blend himself into society. This prerequisite should also endure throughout the campaign; once lost, the insurgent has regained the initiative. A police or military unit (covert or overt) tasked with conducting deep operations may be given a variety of surveillance or disruptive tasks, such as infiltrating the financial dealings of an insurgency, or conducting overt checks to break up or expose an insurgent's patterns of behavior and lines of communications.
Close operations normally take place at the tactical level in counterinsurgency operations. Those operations involving fixing tasks should normally be aimed to reassure the general public and foster improved community relations. Where close operations involve striking against the insurgency, it is essential that the deep operation has already found and fixed the insurgent group. In this manner the initiative is retained. Often, however, close operations are reactive to an insurgent group's activities and there is no time for a planned deep operation. On these occasions the fixing has to be carried out as part of the close operation. The key to success is to wrest the initiative from the insurgent as quickly as possible in order that military forces can maneuver to a position from which they can then strike.
Rear operations in counterinsurgency should attract a higher priority than they generally do in offensive operations in war, and may need a commensurately greater priority in terms of operational planning, staff effort, and resources. The aim is not simply physical protection of the force, but also securing political and public support, from which all government freedom of action flows. An insurgent commander may have identified as government vulnerabilities certain nonmilitary targets, such as VIPs or economic assets, and selected them as decisive points in his campaign. That being the case, government forces are likely to become more heavily committed to protective duties than they would wish. While the aim will always be to secure and hold the initiative by means of aggressive action, significant numbers of troops are likely to be needed until locally recruited militias can be organized to take their place and tec