f the protection of minorities. The pre-war fate of Romanian Jews had a decisive effect on the diplomatic steps and steadfastness of the American peace delegation. Several members of the delegation were among the supporters of the initiative of the East European and American Jews. The proposals focused on the guaranteeing of individual and collective minority rights, and national autonomy. In the background, it was also to be acknowledged that the states of Central and East Europe were multinational formations. However, the ideal and model of a homogeneous nation-state left its mark on the negotiations and prevented the advancement of the above-mentioned more liberal and realistic conceptions, which were struck off from the agenda in the end. According to one of the most frequently mentioned, characteristically nation-state arguments that ran counter to the autonomy-concepts, it was a threat that "a state within a state" could eventually evolve. Similarly, it was the preservation of the fiction of the nation-state to guide the great powers at the conference - less the Americans, more the English, and even more so the French representatives - when, based on the proposals prepared by Jewish organisations, they decided on the elaboration of minority protection that would fall under international guarantees. It was not really the objective of positive minority protection that the decisive politicians of the era sought. They focused instead on the possibility originating from the treaties that would prepare the way towards comprehensive national assimilation. Renowned politicians of the Allies expressed these expectations but explicitly and implicitly through the interpretation of certain expressions and concepts in 1919 and thereafter.
When the draft provisions of the minorities treaties were ready in May 1919, further problems emerged. The great powers encountered instinctive and conscious resistance on the part of the countries concerned. They perceived the undertaking of minority protection commitments as constraints on their sovereignty and an intrusion into their internal affairs, and, therefore, brushed it aside. Every Central and East European state concerned set forth reservations to the drafts and expressed their worries. The great powers managed to put off the resistance, the small-scale "rebellion" that broke out on 31 May 1919, and persuade the states concerned to sign the minorities treaties elaborated for them.
Among the issues that emerged during the dispute of the Central and Eastern European and Western powers, we encounter the question as to what the reason of the relentless and rather dismissive behaviour of the Central and Eastern European states was: did they not want to sign the treaties at all or, in case they did, would they not want to fulfil their obligations deriving from the treaties? This problem, which, unfortunately, gained significance later on, seemed to be the key issue of the entire minority protection system. It became perceptible that the realisation of the hopes attached to the implementation and effectiveness of minority protection obligations at the time of their formulation, would always depend exclusively on the actual political atmosphere. It was not evident at the end of 1919 whether the system of the evolving regulations of minority law would be enough; what effect would the policies of the new states and the behaviour of the minorities in concern would produce; whether this system would be able to have the ideals of national tolerance and national equality accepted along or counter to the victory of the ideal of the nation-state.
2. Substantive Minority Legislation Adopted with the Assistance of the League of Nations
2.1. Categorisation of Legislation on the Protection of Minorities Adopted Under the Aegis of the League of Nations
The sources of itemised international minority law under the protection of the League of Nations include for the most part bi- or multilateral agreements, certain contractual provisions and declarations. According to several authors, for example Ernő Fl