nical integrity issues.
Can loss of containment of LNG, LPG, condensates or gas be considered a negligible probability on Prelude?
From all the above loss of containment of hydrocarbons is likely to occur on Prelude during its operational life, either through flaws in the design, human error or failure to inspect and maintain. It’s almost inevitable. It’s only to be hoped that the consequences of these losses never reach their full potential.
In the end, are we confident the Shell board of directors understands fully the risks of FLNG?
In the last analysis, through application of due diligence, Royal Dutch Shell Plc must be satisfied at Board level (otherwise the concept would not have been approved), that the incremental increase in risk to the health and safety of persons on the installations such as Prelude, although higher than for an onshore plant, are still at levels that are tolerable. And that these risk levels, particularly the potential for loss of life is at a level acceptable not only to RDS, its stakeholders, employees, and the industry regulator, but also to Society in general.
This is a bold assumption, but hope as they say, springs eternal.
COMMENT POSTED ON SHELL BLOG BY “dutchdude”: 22 FEB 2014
To Bill C: You wonder if at board level the risks of Prelude are understood? Must be rhetorical, because you know as well as I do that management at the top is mainly by sound bites and assurances by other lower ranking staff members. Each level going up has a benefit in portraying the project in the best possible light. Safety concerns are at best noted down but “extreme views” are never tolerated. The principle of ALARP is one of the most misused safety concepts around. It is fair to assume that many people worked parts of Prelude and that components are reasonably safe. It is also fair to assume that nobody understands the total aggregate risk of all these components together. Irrespective of all the massive QRAs produced. Prelude is a fantastic undertaking, let’s hope it is not a similar tale as Babel tower, overreaching and the end of a huge empire.
Posting on Shell Blog on 22 Feb 2014 by Hans Bouman. Some 32 years in Shell E&P; last two jobs were Head of Production Technology Shell International EP and Manager Asset Groningen, the most valuable asset in Shell and ExxonMobil.
Excellent article which very clearly puts the finger on the sore spot! As a seasoned and most senior HSE auditor you are in the best position to reflect on these points. If I still would be working I would make your article compulsory reading for any HSE or Audit course. Budding HSE and audit professionals can learn from you.
After all my years in Shell, I know of no projects in our business that have not suffered from pinhole leaks, corrosion, faulty software, poor or wrongly executed design and maintenance, etc etc. Any of these occurrences should be de-escalated quickly if the proper systems and processes are in place. Yet, things do go wrong and on a vessel like the Prelude, the potential for rapid escalation of the problem is real.
The PLL appears to have been massaged low enough on paper and so the decision makers can wash their hands in innocence if something goes wrong. With a project of this magnitude and complexity (a Moonshot or an Elephant in Shell speak?), there is only one spot where the ultimate decision to proceed is taken and that is right at the very top.
Shell used to take pride in the fact that if a project did not pass the business principles, it just would not get done. The Prelude project does not involve corrupt governments or pressure from the USA to not get involved. So the top of Shell can relax, nothing stands in the way of their business principles anymore, only some mere technical challenges. However, the business principles cover more than corruption and environmental issues. Health and Safety are also very important matters in these principles.
Perhaps it should have been decided to call this a stranded asset and not book the reserves. But we all know how important booking of reserves is!
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