pacity to fulfill their intended objectives. This implies that conventions serve to guarantee the supremacy of the electorate as a true political sovereign of the state. As a result, the conventions impose some restraints regarding the use of the discretionary Royal Prerogative powers. Because ministers hold some level of accountability to the Parliament, then it can be argued that the absence if legal control associated with conventions offers restraining roles on the use of the Royal Prerogative powers by the executive.
It is a fact that the Parliament has the capacity to override and displace the Royal Prerogative using statutes. In cases where the Crown has been empowered using the statute to make a decision that it could initially do using the provisions of the prerogative. However, the Royal Prerogative to go to war can be preserved expressively using the statute. It is not precise in relation to what happens in cases whereby the Royal Prerogative has been surpasses the statute. In practical scenarios, it is almost impossible, for the government would aim at enforcing a Royal Prerogative instead of an Act of Parliament, with the exception being during emergency situations. In addition, the limitation of the Royal Prerogative is that it can be used in amending the common law. This is of ultimate interest in the context of international treaties. Even though the executive can commit the UK to the obligations under the international law, changes in the domestic law requires the Parliament to enact the appropriate legislation. The Parliament also regulates the use of the Royal Prerogative to go to war via its control of its supply. The Crown and Executive lacks the capacity to act unless it has the capacity to fund the activities. This is stated expressively in the Ram doctrine that states that a Minister of the Crown may use any power vested in the Crown, with the exception that the Minister is barred by the statute. However, the capacity of the Minister to incur the expenditures associated with the exercising of the Royal Prerogative is determined by Parliamentary voting to fund the powers being exercised. The restraining conventions when exercising Royal Prerogative Powers is increased by the fact that the Ministers of the Crown are accountable to the Parliament. Such an approach to accountability indicates the control of the Parliament over the Crown and Executive.
In order to determine whether a convention that restrains the Royal Prerogative to go to war exists or not, it is essential to have a comprehensive overview of the context of war in relation to foreign affairs. Foreign affairs are a differentiated field of execution action that is not easy to control and scrutinize using the available legal and non-legal frameworks. In the context of the United States, it is arguably evident that Congress has the power to exercise any form of control on the presidential decisions and actions when going to war. This implies that restraining the powers of the Prerogative is only attainable using the available constitutional conventions. This is because there is no any other practical mechanism that can be used in controlling actions undertaken by the executive except through the use of constitutional conventions.
In conclusion, it is arguably evident that there are no other feasible legal and non-legal frameworks that can be used to limit the executive use of Royal Prerogative except for parliamentary controls because foreign affairs and war declarations are matters that cannot be decided upon by the electorate. The aspect of personal accountability of the members of Executive serves to impose significant constraints regarding the exercising of the Royal Prerogative.