ger sufficient to meet its domestic gas requirements (about 50% of its energy mix). Its only gas-exporting neighbor, Iran, is a natural supplier. Nonetheless, for the same reason mentioned for India, Washington has sought to discourage Islamabad from implementing its section of the pipeline by offering Pakistan financial assistance to build an LNG re-gasification terminal in order to import LNG from suppliers such as Qatar instead of importing directly piped gas from Iran. Moreover, Washington has offered to help Islamabad import electricity from Tajikistan via Afghanistan, a seemingly impossible mission at least in the foreseeable future given the expanding insecurity in Afghanistan and the fact that Tajikistan is suffering from electricity shortages itself. Ironically, Iran is now providing financial and technical assistance to the Tajik government to address this deficiency by expanding its hydropower sector. It is in this context that importing gas from Turkmenistan via the TAPI is meant to end Pakistan’s plan to import gas from Iran.
Yet another objective of the December 2010 pipeline agreements is to remove the possibility of Iranian piped gas exports to China. China has invested over $25 billion since the last decade in various Iranian oil and gas field development projects (e.g., onshore Azadegan and Yadavaran and offshore South Pars) with a clear intention of increasing its oil and gas (LNG initially and eventually piped gas) imports from Iran. Iran is considered a friendly long-term oil/gas exporter by China, and it shares some of China’s grievances about the structure of the international system. On many occasions, China has expressed its clear interest in importing Iranian gas through the IP once it is operational, which is completely feasible given China’s bordering Pakistan. Indeed Pakistan has its own interests in generating transit fees in order to decrease the cost of its gas imports from Iran. By encouraging Pakistan to opt out of the IP pipeline, the December agreements seek to remove this possibility while both the US and the EU are jointly trying to limit Iran’s energy exports for economic and political reasons. Denying China, a rising superpower, a stronger role in the Iranian oil and gas sectors is a side benefit of the December agreements.
Finally, another clear objective of the December 2010 agreements is to seal Iran’s exclusion of Turkmenistan’s gas exports as a transit route, thus shelving forever the 1990s’ plan for constructing the Turkmenistan-Iran pipeline, promoted by Iran and ConocoPhillips. As a neighboring country, Iran is a logical transit route for Turkmen piped gas exports to Turkey, Europe (via Turkey), and the Indian subcontinent, and also for Turkmen LNG exports to the Asia-Pacific region via its Oman Sea ports. This is so for at least two reasons. Iran offers the shortest and the least technically challenging, and thus the least expensive, route given the absence of complicating geological features such as mountains. Yet, political considerations have prevented the realization of this project despite the original interests of an American company (ConocoPhillips) in the project.
Any pipeline project can be undertaken even under the worst case scenario, provided that the owner and operators are willing to pay the price. Under normal circumstances, when economic objectives are the major driving force, a difficult and dangerous pipeline would be shelved. The TAPI would have no chance of realization. However, if political incentives are the main drivers, and, again, if the operators of such a project are willing to pay the price whatever it may be, the TAPI could well become a reality as exemplified by BTC’s construction.
In conclusion, the main incentive for constructing the TAPI seems to be geared towards realizing certain political objectives: slowing down Iran’s rise as a regional power through weakening it politically and economically by denying it gas exports to the Indian subcontinent and China, and by excluding it from Turkmen gas exports. However, certain factors remain obst