rmosa. 
President Truman subsequently sent Averell Harriman to Tokyo, reputedly to caution MacArthur not only to keep the President better informed, but, on other than military matters, to make recommendations, not decisions. Afterward, Harriman stated that General MacArthur had not overstepped his military bounds in making the trip to Formosa; President Truman announced his satisfaction with General MacArthur's performance; and General MacArthur declared that anyone who hinted of friction between himself and the President was guilty of "sly insinuations, rash speculations and bold misstatements." 
Communist nations made note of President Truman's order neutralizing Formosa and charged that the United States intended to take over and occupy the island. In August, the Peiping regime accused the United States of aggression against Formosa and asked the United Nations Security Council to order the withdrawal of ". . . all of the United States armed invading forces from Taiwan...."  In refutation of this charge, President Truman on 25 August directed United States Ambassador Austin to address the Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, on the matter. Austin sent
 MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3383-84.
 Rad, WAR 88014, JCS to CINCFE, 4 Aug. 50.
 Rad, C 59418, CINCFE to JCS, 5 Aug. 50.
 Rad, C 59569, CINCFE to JCS, 7 Aug. 50.
 (1) Time, August 21, 1950. (2) For Harriman's report to President Truman on this visit, see Truman, Memoirs, II, 349-53; for MacArthur's reaction to Harriman's visit, see MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 341.
 State Dept. Bulletin, XXIII (4 September 1950), p. 396.
Lie a complete account of the official American attitude toward Formosa, including a 19 July statement to the Congress by President Truman in which he declared ". . . that the United States has no territorial ambitions whatever concerning that island, nor do we seek for ourselves any special position or privilege on Formosa." On 28 August, the President sent Austin more ammunition with which to demolish the Communist charges concerning Formosa by telling him that the United States would welcome United Nations consideration of the case of Formosa. 
A week earlier, General MacArthur, who had been invited to speak at the Fifty-First National Encampment of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) in Chicago, sent instead a paper which he proposed be read at the meeting. In this paper, MacArthur stressed the strategic importance of Formosa and insisted that the United States must, at any cost, retain control of that island. He strongly hinted that the United States would be able to use Formosa as a base in any future operations against the Asiatic mainland. He pointed out also that Formosa would be a formidable threat to American security if controlled by an unfriendly power, terming it an "unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender." "Nothing could be more fallacious," he charged, "than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia. Those who speak thus do not understand the Orient." 
This strong statement evoked an equally strong reaction from President Truman when he was informed of it by Harriman on 26 August before its publication. The President read MacArthur's paper to Harriman, General Bradley, and Secretary Johnson, then directed that MacArthur withdraw the statement. Secretary Johnson immediately cabled MacArthur that the President directed him to withdraw the message ". . . because various features with respect to Formosa are in conflict with the policy of the United States and its position in the United Nations." 
According to Johnson, when the President learned that MacArthur's rather lengthy statement to the VFW had been transmitted through Army communications facilities from Japan, he was particularly indignant. Johnson testified before the Senate committee, later investigating the relief of General MacArthur, that on 26 August President Truman discussed with him the advisability of relieving MacArthur as the commander in Korea, but decided to take no such a