th the actual political situation in Hong Kong in 1997. A great deal of public pressure for direct elections to the Legislative council has arisen. In response the Hong Kong government issued a White Paper in November 1984, stepping up the evolution of the Legislative Council from an appointed to an elected body. Next May the government will release yet another study on political reform in Hong Kong. The people of Ho ng Kong have vacillated from panic to stoic acceptance in their response to the Hong Kong Agreement. Generally, most of them distrust the communists and are skeptical of Hong Kong's chances to continue as it is today. Yet, the consensus is that, for the t i me being at least, people should stay and make as much money as possible. Most business cycles are being planned for about five years between initial investments and profitable returns. Those able to do so are preparing safe havens elsewhere in case of ne ed. A
7. Ibid., p. 6.
8. Asian Wall Strcet journal Dccember 2, 1985, p. 1.- 7 -
Beyond this level of consensus, howeverl there are widely differing points of view. one example is the dispute over the role of the Legislative Council. Many of the rich ta ipans, even those who fled the communist mainland in 1949, prefer a strong executive and appointed legislature after 1997. This is seen as the best way to ensure stability and profits in the future. Many intellectuals, on the other hand, want a strong leg i slature with competing parties to ensure that people's rights don't get abused by the central government in Beijing. Another case in point is the controversy over the proposed nuclear power plant in Daya Bay in Shenzhen. The issue reflects the bitter divi s ions over what the public's role in policy decisions should be after 1997. Outspoken Legislative Council member Martin Lee, who is also a Hong Kong member of the Basic Law Drafting committee appointed by Beijing, has led a populist drive against the power plant. over one million Hong Kong residents have signed a petition against the plant's construction and several independent polls have shown that 70 percent of those asked were opposed to Daya Bay. Lee is ridiculed in some circles as a troublemaker, but t h e issue has become a test case to see how much attention Beijing will pay to Hong Kong public opinion. Thus far, the PRC has shown no intention of halting its construction plans.9 The Hong Kong settlement presented a major challenge to the Republic of Chi n a government. Taipei claims to represent all of China, yet it had no role at all in the negotiations. But the ROC does support the renunciation of all unequal treaties signed by China in the 19th century and supports the recovery of Hong Kong to Chinese ( n ot PRC) sovereignty. A complicating factor is the importance of Hong Kong as Taiwan's third largest trading partner after the U.S. and Japan. The ROC has established special study groups to work out policy regarding trade with Hong Kong after 1997. Taipei does not permit direct trade with the mainland, although roughly $1.5 billion in indirect trade passes through Hong Kong each year. On September 26, 1984, ROC Premier Yu Kuo-hua declared that his country would not recognize the agreement between London an d Beijing, but that the ROC would assist the people of Hong Kong by: o exposing Beijing's conspiratorial activities in Hong Kong; o promoting world support of freedom and prosperity in Hong Kong and helping the people there express their desire for freedom and democracy and opposition to communism;9 . See Far Eastern Economic Review September 4, 1986, pp. 16-17.
8\u239\'95 assisting those who want to remain in Hong Kong and struggle for freedom; \u239\'95 supporting those who want to participate in elections in Hong Kong; \u239\'95 helping those from Hong Kong who wish to settle in Taiwan; \u239\'95 easing entry and exit permits for Hong Kong residents visiting Taiwan; \u239\'95 assisting those who want to invest in Taiwan or who wish to trade with or deposit their money in Taiwan; \u239\'95 assistin Taiwan. Og those who wish to send thei