ning the Common Market he said there would be no loss of sovereignty. In fact the civil service had briefed the Cabinet differently – Heath lied. 
Disdain & Contempt Like Heath, the EU’s founders and current leaders hold the citizens of Europe in disdain and their elected, national governments in contempt for being elected, and therefore impermanent. They think what is needed is a unified, supra-national entity, a federal government, which has the powers to override the decisions of the governments of its member states.
There is not enough achievement to recommend the EU to its citizens; it follows that they must be persuaded to accept it by propaganda, threats or coercion. 
Breaking EU Rules We are expected to believe that the EU adopts practices that are consistent with its own principles and rules, but it doesn’t; when it feels it is necessary, the EU ignores its own rules.
For example, the principle of subsidiarity conflicts with the ideology of the EU, which requires authority to be centralised. In EU practice powers move only in one direction, ‘upwards’ as they see it, from member states; powers may go up but are not allowed to come down. 
Fear & Fragility The growth of populism is alarming EU’s mandarins, who see it as a threat to their project. Some populist national governments challenge the EU’s declared fundamental values. If the EU does not take action against governments that attack democratic rights and processes it will encourage other member states to go their own ways, putting further integration at risk. If it does take firm action against miscreants then it risks rebellion against the federal centre. This fragility arises because the EU is not itself democratic. 
Politics The true aim of the EU, to become a super-state governing its member states, is not one that many citizens would support. People are willing to believe in the declared goal, of economic growth benefiting all, and choose not to notice that the EU is not achieving this but is progressing fitfully towards its real goal. 
Draft Withdrawal Agreement What has been agreed, between the EU and the UK Government, and then dismissed by the UK Parliament, is known as the Draft Withdrawal Agreement (DWA).
By this DWA the previous UK government agreed that it will not introduce legislation that is incompatible with EU law but also that it will modify any existing rules that the EU deems to be “inconsistent or incompatible”. The Joint Committee will have to refer many issues to the ECJ for resolution. The ECJ is the legal instrument and protector of the ideology and the ambition; judgements are based on treaties not on precedent, unlike in the UK.
The EU refuses to discuss a future relationship between the parties until the ‘divorce’ agreement is settled. This WDA proposes neither a proper withdrawal from the EU nor a satisfactory legal basis for a transition to an unspecified future relationship between the UK and the EU. A major problem is the impositions this withdrawal agreement makes on any such future relationship; it indicates clearly the EU’s intentions.
If this Agreement, or a similar one, is ratified, the UK will remain a semi-detached, ex-member state with many responsibilities and few rights. In summary, under this DWA the United Kingdom will not exit the European Union but will move to a new, and inferior, status under the thumb of the Union. 
Is There a Future for This EU? The clearest outlines of its leaders’ expectations for the future of the European Union can be found in the report of the five presidents (June 2015) and, more speculatively, in their White Paper of March 2017.
So far their record on growth and prosperity is not good, and there is little reason to believe that the self-selected leaders of the EU will do much better in future. The gaps in the Project will become more evident, because the project won’t deliver the promised economic, democratic or social developments.
The White Paper offers five different ‘scenarios’ outlining possible futures for the EU. The tone in which each scenario was written emphasises the Commis