 were used extensively, was an attempt to control this form of warfare. But it forbids neither the production, stockpiling, nor use of such weapons, though use is permitted only in retaliation against those who use them first. During the Nixon administration, negotiators were able to split off biological weapons from the comprehensive chemical weapons domain, and since the Soviets shared our perception that there could be no possible rationale for such weapons, an agreement was quickly achieved.
A complete ban on chemical weapons production, stockpiling, and use has been actively sought since 1972. Under the rubric of the Committee on Disarmament, a 40-member group of nations loosely affiliated with the United Nations, talks in Geneva have resolved many technical obstacles to effective chemical weapons control. But progress has been slow. Reports of Soviet ''yellow rain'' activities in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan have made the search for verification provisions more arduous. And nonaligned nations have avoided anything that might trap them in a superpower propaganda whirlpool.
The source of our current optimism is a document submitted Feb. 10, 1983, by US negotiator Louis G. Fields that for the first time spells out in detail US views on the necessary contents of a chemical weapons ban. Happily, its submission broke a long lull in US activism. The document reflects a careful review of the achievements of the many working groups over the years. It attempts to resolve the longstanding stumbling block - verification - by proposing a mix of systematic and ad hoc international on-site inspections.
There have been recent indications that the USSR is moving toward acceptance of this idea. But whatever optimism this initiative engenders must be tempered by the lessons of the past.
First, progress in the multilateral talks historically has been dependent upon bilateral US-USSR talks, but these have been held in abeyance by the US since the election of the Reagan administration. The intended effect, to help the world community perceive more clearly Soviet recalcitrance and manipulation, has been realized. But without US-USSR bilateral agreement, there is no chance for an effective ban. Is the US prepared to gamble by returning to the bilateral talks?
Second, bureaucratic ineptitude and un-clear lines of authority have frustrated the talks from the start. Soviet delegates last summer tabled a document similar in purpose to Fields', but when pressed to explain positions on verification, they were apparently unable to gain Moscow's clearance. Let us hope that the current malaise at our own Arms Control and Disarmament Agency does not paralyze our efforts.
Third, there is a real question of the negotiating sincerity of both superpowers. The Soviets have been astute propagandists, and their intense focus on temporary, tactical advantage raises questions about their commitment to the broader arms control goal. But our own record is not as good as we might wish, and many abroad question our intent. US prestige has been tarnished by the 50 years it took us to accede to the Geneva Protocol and by the five years it took us to sit down to bilateral talks on chemical weapons after they were first proposed by President Nixon in 1969.
Washington's reluctance to return to bilateral talks is increasingly perceived as a sign of US insincerity about chemical weapons arms control, as is the administration's dual-track, ''carrot and stick'' approach to arms control and modernization. Further doubts are instilled by our policy, only just overturned, to deny a negotiating mandate to our representatives in Geneva (without which they can only talk in a noncommittal way).
Success now in these talks could rid the world of the specter of one of the most horrid of man's inventions. It could also create an atmosphere conducive to arms control successes on other fronts. Failure could precipitate dangerous proliferation, extensive troubles for NATO, and a further erosion of US prestige abroad. Our commitment must be unflagging.