igration from China, Vietnam and, possibly, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.
Such a significant increase in the number of foreigners in Russia will inevitably lead to growing social pressure in the country, given the relatively nationalistic tone in official Russian rhetoric in recent years. According to Levada-center polls, more than 75 percent of Russians support the introduction of migration limits (up from less than 50 percent in 2002) while the number of those who believe migration may benefit Russia has declined from 44 percent to 16 percent .
Decline in labor force quality
The forecast also provides an estimate for labor-force growth (population of the working age), which is important for assessing the long-term economic prospects of the country. Here, the forecast looks even worse, because the share of Russia’s working age population is declining by about the same magnitude in all scenarios—from 60 percent to less than 50 percent. This decline takes place in two waves: an initial labor force decline by 8-12 percent (medium and low scenarios) between 2015 and 2020, and then by another 10-20 percent after 2030 (Chart 3).
Chart 3. Working Age Population of Russia: Three Scenarios
But, again, it is important not to forget about the migration effect. Rosstat does not provide such data in its forecast, but if we use the actual share of the working age population in the total number of migrants from CIS countries (90 percent) the result is predictable—in the more optimistic scenario the number of working age population is higher, but so too is Russia’s dependence on labor migrants.
Because of the growing share of migrants in the working age population in any scenario, the Russian economy will be faced with a rapid decline in the average quality of the labor force (measured by education and professional skills). Russia is unlikely to invest in education systems in neighbor countries while they themselves have no resources for such investment.
Pressure on the pension system
These demographic forecasts also provide a good indication of the challenges that will face the Russian pension system. The chart below shows the dynamics of the upcoming changes in the ratio of those who pay pension contributions to the pension system (people of working age ) and those who receive pensions. In various scenarios, this ratio decreases equally from the level of 2.5 today to around 2 by 2022, where it should remain for about 10 years, before dropping further to about 1.6 by 2045 (Chart 4).
Chart 4. Working Age to Above Working Age Population Ratio in Russia: Three Scenarios
This data shows that the expenditure pressure of the distribution pension system will increase and will require Russian authorities to accept either an increase in payroll taxes, an increase in federal subsidies to the pension fund, an increase in the retirement age, or a decrease in the real size of pensions, or some combination of all of these measures.
As with many economic processes, it is not possible to change direction or speed overnight. Demography is one of the most inertial factors—the number of people born in a certain period cannot increase during the life of the generation—that makes demographic forecasts more reliable than any others. Rosstat’s forecasts demonstrate that, regardless of who leads the country, Russian economic policy will face the very serious threat of rapid depopulation in the coming decades. To maintain the current population of the country (the “current-level” scenario), Russia needs to encourage a large-scale immigration influx, more than 12 percent of the current population. But even this will not entirely offset a rapidly ageing population and growing fiscal pressure on the pension system. All that will make the Russian economy less competitive and less attractive, and if Russia continues to follow an isolationist policy, it may face its own, labor-based, secular stagnation.
 During World War II, the Soviet Union lost 26.6 million people—13.7 percent of the population—while a decline in fertility during the war demographic may led to