arized 12 different models to identify the cariogenicity of foods, ranging from “acid production from foods incubated in saliva” to the production of caries in rats, monkeys, and pigs . During the discussion of Bibby’s presentation, Caries Task Force members established that “a quick screening method was needed to provide presumptive evidence of the potential cariogenicity of accepted foods and new products that appear almost daily on the shelves of food markets,” although there were differences of opinion on what the best model would be to screen for cariogenicity . No one argued that the NIDR not pursue standardization of a test that would rank foods on their potential for tooth decay .
Comparison of ISRF and the NIDR Research Priorities
Soon after Nixon’s February 1970 endorsement of the NCP, Scherp began operational planning for program implementation at the NIDR . Research priorities were first published in an omnibus request for contracts (RFC)  titled Opportunities for Participation in the National Caries Program  in early 1971. The NIDR received 112 proposals and funded 17 contracts  totaling US$3 million (US$18.3 million in 2014 dollars) out of the NCP’s budget of US$6 million (US$36.7 million in 2014 dollars) . While the 1971 NCP RFC was the first of several RFCs , it established the NIDR’s research priorities for years .
The research priorities in the 1971 NCP RFC largely reflected the research priorities identified at the October 1969 NIDR Caries Task Force Steering Committee meeting (compare columns C and G in Table 3). Despite being published nearly a year after the NIDR Caries Task Force Role of Human Foodstuffs in Caries Workshop Conference (Table 1), the 1971 NIDR RFC omitted developing a standardized model to identify the cariogenicity of foods as a research priority.
Comparison of the research priorities identified by ISRF and submitted to the NIDR in 1969 (Table 3, column E) with those published by the NIDR in its 1971 NCP RFC (column G) shows that ISRF and the NIDR research priorities were largely aligned. Indeed, a side-by-side comparison of overlapping text from the ISRF submission to the NIDR, Dental Caries Research—1969 , and the 1971 NCP RFC, Opportunities for Participation in the National Caries Program , reveals that 78% of the ISRF submission to the NIDR was directly incorporated into the 1971 NCP RFC. (S1 Table provides the actual text from the ISRF submission and 1971 NCP RFC.) Of the 274 total lines in the 1971 NCP RFC describing research priorities, 110 lines, or 40%, were taken verbatim or closely paraphrased from the ISRF submission. Of these 110 lines, 34% were copied verbatim from the ISRF report, and 66% were paraphrased.
This study analyzes a series of papers discussing previously undocumented cane and beet sugar industry activities between 1959 and 1971 regarding strategies to influence the research priorities of the NIDR’s 1971 NCP. The documents show that the sugar industry knew that sugar caused dental caries as early as 1950 and did not attempt to deny the causative role of sucrose in tooth decay. Instead, through trade associations, the sugar industry adopted a strategy to deflect attention to public health interventions that would reduce the harm of sugar consumption, rather than restricting intake.
After the NIDR announced it was considering a research program to eradicate dental caries in 1966, the sugar industry used tactics designed to protect sucrose sales. In collaboration with the chocolate and confectionary industries, SRF funded research that supported the idea that enzymes and a tooth decay vaccine could be developed that could eradicate dental decay without requiring sugar restrictions. ISRF conducted reviews of the dental caries literature to identify potential interventions that might reduce the health harms of sugar consumption other than by restricting sugar intake. ISRF cultivated relationships with the NIDR leadership through meetings with the Caries Task Force chairman and through a consultation with members of the NCP steering committee charged with selecti