ewing such people.
But the dual response is necessary if we are to do justice to the complexity of the case. It is probably right that we cannot entirely or largely abandon the reactive attitudes, and that life would be impoverished if we could and did. But there is also a determinist thought that should make us a bit uncomfortable with either Aristotelian or Strawsonian commonsense. It is about those of us who do not have personality disorders. Although we shape our own characters by our voluntary actions, there is likely to be some causal explanation of how we come to choose some actions rather than others. And these causal explanations may well often go back ultimately to factors beyond our control: to genes, to what happened in the womb or at birth, or to what happened in our early childhood. As with those with personality disorders, our characteristics are certainly ours, yet are not entirely of our own making. In the long run, the dual response we develop to those with personality disorders may turn out to be what is appropriate for everyone else as well.