and a House of Representatives. The constitution adopted the principle of equal competences for the two houses with a few exceptions. These bicameral arrangements lasted until the July 1952 Revolution. Nasser moved Egypt again into a unicameral legislature. The 1971 Constitution maintained the same practice entrusting the People's Assembly with the sole legislative authority. This lasted until 1980 when Sadat amended the constitution and enshrined the Shura Council.15
The constitutional amendments and the constitutional proclamations in 2011 continued this practice of bicameral legislature, even though many intellectuals and politicians advocated the amputation of the Shura Council. While this issue was not highly visible during the transition process it will resurface during the process of constitutional drafting. It could be argued that the FJP is in favor of a unicameral legislature to decrease the fragmentation of the political process and ensure the ability of parliamentary majority to swiftly draft and implement legislation. On the other hand, minority parties might see advantage in a bicameral legislature that restrain the majority in the lower house. While it is too early to predict, it seems reasonable to forecast that the new constitution will continue the practice of bicameral legislature, albeit with structural changes to the composition and progratives of the Shura counciL The 198° Constitutional Amendments and the 2011 Constitutional Proclamation gave the president of the republic the authority to appoint a third of the members. This practice is likely to be met with opposition from many political forces in Egypt. Furthermore, if not abolished, the powers of the upper house could be expected to grow from the modest generally advisory role to the position of a junior partner in the legislative process.
The election processes for the parliament is also debatable. Egypt's electoral procedures have witnessed many twists and turns in recent history. In the 1980s, Egypt experimented with proportional representation for all or part of the seats on the People's Assembly and the Shura Council. However, successive SCC rulings rendered this unconstitutional. All elections in the 1990s and 2000s were conducted via a first-past-the-post system with a second-round run-off to secure the majority of the votes. The first post-Mubarak election is conducted through a mixed electoral system that is comprised of individual candidates in majoritarian two-member districts (one-third of the total seats) and proportional representation of closed party lists (two third of the total seats). These complex electoral rules are likely to be revisited during the process of constitutional drafting. Any proportional representation needs to be constitutionally mandated as the established jurisprudence of the ruled such provisions tional on the ground it against individual candidates.
Another bone of contention ters on the unusual stipulation 50% occupational quota for farmers and workers. In the height of Nasser's socialist policies in the 1960s, this quota for "workers and farmers" serving in the parliament was constitutionally mandated.16 The logic was to ensure enough participation from the majority of Egyptians who were manual workers. In practice, this provision was continuously distorted to favor ruling party candidates and genuine farmers and workers seldom ran or got elected.17
The SCAF preferred to postpone this predicament and kept the quota for the parliamentary elections. Many want Egypt's incoming constitution to abolish this practice altogether allowing citizens to compete on equal footing for parliamentary seats. Advocates of such an opinion argue that this quota is undemocratic and outdated.18 Leftists, however, agree that the application of this quota has been lacking but seek to amend it to guarantee the genuine representation of farmers and workers in parliament. While the jury is still out about this quota, it seems that even the backers of this provision admit it needs to be modified.
Female representation is another iss