forced to confront the fact that, unlike the secure position enjoyed by the Zulu, the circumstances of his fugitive people were mobile and uncertain. His battle formations therefore were leaner, and themselves more mobile and adaptive. One early departure from the strict norm of Zulu warfare was to use the cover of darkness to position his forces for rush dawn attacks that proved time and again to be very successful. It was not only the Zulu that rarely manoeuvred or attacked at night, for neither did most other groups, and this included the Griquas and Boers that suffered their only military defeats at the hands of the amaNdebele when this tactic was employed. For this purpose Mzilikazi deployed a mobile attack/reconnaissance unit along the lines of a home guard that was able to shadow a hostile force or commando for many days before choosing the optimum moment to attack and wipe it out.
Under the leadership of Mzilikazi the maxim of war was very simple. Quarter was neither expected nor given. In battles pitched against a comparable enemy, and among these were only the three battles fought against the Zulu, fighting was brutal and unforgiving, but the rites of victory were denied to either side. Not so however for the day to day business of raiding. This was the bread and butter work of the amaNdebele military, and the dictum of respect for the enemy was applied by degrees in amaNdebele warfare. For those that did not or could not mount a respectable defence contempt was displayed in terrible violence and cruelty. This was the practice that set the tone for amaNdebele conquest in the early days, and although later refined to allow for the induction of likely captives into the productive of the nation, the process of selection was cruel and exacting, and as a consequence there were few who survived that did not possess the qualities of courage, stamina and resourcefulness that alone could mark the path to prosperity in amaNdebele society. It remains, however, the enemy that defines the quality of any fighting force, and once established in Matabeleland the only enemy at hand for the most part were the hapless Mashona upon whom testing battles could hardly be fought. The fact that the amaNdebele from then on enjoyed almost universal tactical superiority in every direction is perhaps not saying a great deal.
When the amaNdebele arrived in what would later become Matabeleland those already resident immediately fled or took refuge. Behind them lay their ripening crops and other resources upon which the incoming refugees survived as they established themselves in an ostensibly strange lands. The landscape was not wholly strange, however, for although most who arrived ahead of Mzilikazi had never been in the country, nor met any of the inhabitants, raids had over recent years been mounted in the region and spoils returned to the Transvaal. Even if the amaNdebele were therefore not altogether familiar with the land and the people, the people were entirely familiar with the amaNdebele, and knew precisely what to expect.
It is also worth remembering that this expectation had already been met, for the Shangaan under their powerful leader Shoshangane had settled some eight years earlier in the highlands east of the mid-Sabi River and had been ranging far west into the central plateau on expeditions of loot and plunder. These followed an identical pattern to the amaNdebele of seizing what and whom was needed and laying to waste to the rest. Thus a powerful force began to emerge that in due course came to occupy the region of Gaza in present day Mozambique. A kind of accommodation of equals was forged between the amaNdebele and Shangaan upon the arrival in the south of the latter, and caught somewhat between a hammer and an anvil the comparatively inoffensive peoples of the central plateau became spear fodder and a general source of sustenance for both.
Added to this the third powerful centrifuge of the great wars fought in Natal too had its claim to lay on the Mashona. Yet another petty chieftain made good, the leader of the Ndwandw