ction at that time. 
General MacArthur's immediate response to the Presidential order was to fire a protest to the Secretary of Defense, claiming that his VFW message had been carefully prepared to support fully the President's policy decision of 27 June with respect to Formosa and pointing out that the subject of Formosa had been freely discussed in all circles, "Govern-
 (1) Ltr., Ambassador Austin to Secy.-Gen. Lie, 25 Aug. 50. (2) Ltr., President Truman to Ambassador Austin, 28 Aug. 50. (3) MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3473-76.
 Quotation in Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History, pp. 378-79.
 MacArthur Hearings, pp. 2586, 3480.
 MacArthur Hearings, pp. 2587, 3665.
mental and private, both at home and abroad." MacArthur obviously felt he could separate his views as a private citizen from those as the commander in chief, United Nations Command. For he observed that the views embodied in his statements to the VFW were "purely my personal ones." Noting that the VFW undoubtedly had given wide distribution to his speech in advance press releases, MacArthur advised Johnson that suppressing his message under these conditions would be a grave mistake.  General MacArthur nevertheless was ordered to withdraw his message to the veterans' group. President Truman later softened the blow to MacArthur's feelings by transmitting to him the text of Austin's message on Formosa to Secretary-General Lie and his own letter to Austin on the same subject with the statement, "I am sure that when you examine this letter . . . you will understand why my action of the 26th in directing the withdrawal of your message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars was necessary." 
Although General MacArthur informed the national commander of the VFW that he had been directed to withdraw his message, MacArthur's statement appeared in print in U.S. News and World Report on 1 September 1950,  and thereby provided excellent grist for the USSR propaganda mill. Andrei Vishinsky, Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations, for instance, twisted MacArthur's comments on Formosa to his own purposes when, in a speech, he stated, "None other than General MacArthur recently informed, with cynical candor, the whole world about the decision of the ruling circles of the United States of America at all costs to turn Taiwan [Formosa] into an American base in the Far East." 
Even so, it is probable that the Formosa incident, had it been the last instance of friction, would have been forgotten, or at least overlooked, by Mr. Truman. But it was to be only the beginning of a series of incidents that progressively weakened President Truman's patience with General MacArthur.
During the first five months of the Korean fighting, General MacArthur did not openly criticize the directives under which he operated in Korea. From time to time he did complain through official channels about shortages of men and equipment. But at the Wake Island Conference, the United Nations commander indicated that he understood the problems Washington faced in supporting him when he told the assembled officials that no commander in the history of war had ever had more complete and adequate support from all the agencies in Washington.  When, in late October, he found the terms of his current directive a little too restrictive, he did not hesitate to ignore it by ordering all his forces north to the border instead of using only ROK forces in that area, as he
 (1) Rad, DEF 89880, DEF to CINCFE, Johnson (Personal) for MacArthur, 26 Aug. 50. (2) Rad, C 61325, CINCFE to DA for Secy. Defense, MacArthur (Personal) for Johnson, 27 Aug. 50. (3) MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 385-86 and 389.
 MacArthur Hearings, p. 3480.
 JSSC Rpt. to JCS, p. 45
 MacArthur Hearings, p. 2002.
 MacArthur Hearings, p. 213.
had been instructed. But he did not openly criticize that directive.
During November, as signs that the Chinese were intervening in Korea began to appear, signs of differences between MacArthur and Washington officials also began to develop. MacArthur's order for bombing the Yalu River bridges on 6 November, for instan