e Korean Peninsula, North Korea has now reinterpreted the ban to cover only enrichment and reprocessing for military purposes, but not the right to enrich for civilian purposes.
What can be done?
We need to continue to step up international efforts at tightening export controls and nonproliferation efforts, making it more difficult for North Korea to obtain as well as proliferate in nuclear material and technology. We also need to do better in negotiating a comprehensive inspection and verification scheme when the Six Party Process addresses the verification phase. The Agreed Framework had limited the IAEA verification activities to Yongbyon, which gave North Korea the possibility to develop its enrichment and related capabilities elsewhere. That may have proven to be the best compromise at that time. But the consequences have been telling. Given the current nuclear situation in North Korea, a different approach would be needed if we want to progress substantially and significantly on properly safeguarding North Korea’s nuclear program. A full disclosure of the country’s historical and current nuclear activities will be necessary under any new agreement negotiated, alongside robust inspection rights for the IAEA. Avenues must also be sought to restrict and reduce North Korea’s sprint to build up on its nuclear arsenal. Added political will from all involved in the Six Party Talks will be needed to resolve the wider security and stability issue in Northeast Asia.
Engaging North Korea will continue to demand patience, while the possibilities for progress remain uncertain and uneven. But with much at stake, we have no choice but to get the end game right.
 Magnox reactors were designed in the United Kingdom originally to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. The first such graphite moderated gas cooled reactor was built in the mid-1950s to Calder Hall in the UK. Design features of the reactor were subsequently declassified.
 Eurochemic was a research plant dedicated to the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. It was owned by thirteen countries which shared and widely published technologies developed. The plant, located in Dessel, Belgium, operated from 1966 to 1974.
 (Semi)industrial plants are used to demonstrate that the process is working properly to produce enriched uranium before proceeding with a full scale expensive investment. At this stage one can still do adjustments to the process. In chemical the industry, this is often called to a pilot plant. (Semi)industrial plants have customarily about 1000 centrifuges when the full size enrichment plants can have tens of thousands of centrifuges.
 S. Hecker, Redefining Denuclearization in North Korea, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, December 20, 2010.
 North Korean engineers indicated to Dr. Hecker that the capacity of the centrifuges they had built was 4 kgSWU/year.(Separative Work Unit, SWU, is a measure of work expended during enrichment process). The performance of the North Korean centrifuge appears to be lower than 5 kgSWU/year which is often attributed to the Pakistani P-2 centrifuge.