ive or unified governing structure in 2014. The National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, or Etilaf, was formed in 2012 to act as the international representative body of the revolution. Comprised of delegates from opposition groups in exile, it has been recognized as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people by the Arab League, the United States, and many European countries. Etilaf has undergone several changes of leadership through internal elections; in July 2014, delegates meeting in Istanbul chose Hadi al-Bahra, a businessman with ties to Saudi Arabia, as president. These elections are competitive to an extent, but heavily influenced by the coalition’s foreign backers. Moreover, Etilaf’s links to local leaders and fighters inside Syria remain tenuous, casting serious doubt on the degree to which it is genuinely representative of civilians or fighters in the country.
Provisional local councils in certain rebel-held areas have organized rudimentary elections, and some appear to have been fairly contested and even impartially monitored. However, such experiments in civilian self-government remain vulnerable to derailment by hostile insurgent groups, constant bombardment and occasional siege by regime forces, and chronic resource shortages.
B. Political Pluralism and Participation: 0 / 16
Formally, the state forbids parties based on religious, tribal, or regional affiliation. Until a 2011 decree allowed the formation of new parties, the only legal factions were the Baath Party and its several small coalition partners. Independent candidates are heavily vetted and closely allied with the regime. The 2012 constitutional reforms relaxed rules regarding the participation of non-Baathist parties, but the government maintains a powerful intelligence and security apparatus to monitor and punish opposition political activity in practice.
Within the progovernment camp, politics and decision making are completely dominated by Assad, his extended family, and a close circle of business and security allies. The president’s relatives control key elements of the security forces. Although the government is often described as an Alawite regime and a protector of religious minorities, it is not an authentic vehicle for these groups’ political interests. Political access is a function not of sect, but of proximity and loyalty to Assad and his associates. The political elite is not exclusively Alawite and indeed includes members of the majority Sunni sect, which also makes up most of the rebel movement; meanwhile, Alawites, Christians, and Druze outside Assad’s inner circle are just as politically disenfranchised as the broader Sunni population. Foreign actors including Iran, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shiite militias also exert heavy influence over the regime due to their critical contribution to the war effort.
Political activity in rebel-held areas is more vigorous than in regime areas, but it is still seriously constrained, and in some places nonexistent. Civilians’ political aspirations are often subordinated to whatever armed group controls a given area. Opposition territory is divided among a multitude of armed factions, including moderate, Islamist, radical jihadist, and autonomous Kurdish units, with varying implications for local political life. Local councils are often sponsored or appointed by prominent families and armed groups, and overwhelmed by addressing humanitarian needs and delivering basic services. They must also contend with the rising power of jihadist groups including Jabhat al-Nusra and IS, the latter of which tolerates no political activity. Nevertheless, even this limited level of local political participation is nearly unprecedented in Syria, made possible by the collapse of regime authority and the decentralized politics of many opposition-held areas.
C. Functioning of Government: 0 / 12
Government institutions lacked public accountability and were plagued by corruption even before the armed conflict. Those who question state policies or actions face harassment, censorship, imprison