rce to that date, historian Noel Mostert has noted that it "was a battle that, with posterity, somehow lost rank and significance against the greater and more romantically glorious events that followed". Nevertheless, the effects of the action on the wider war were hugely important. The losses suffered by the Dutch Navy in ships, men and morale gave the Royal Navy superiority in the North Sea, a position enhanced by the disruption the battle caused to French negotiations for an alliance with what historian Edward Pelham Brenton describes as the "Northern Powers" of Scandinavia. The destruction of the Dutch fleet at Camperdown was also a serious blow to French ambitions to invade Ireland, and denied their Atlantic fleet of essential reinforcements; it may even have played a part in Napoleon Bonaparte's decision to abandon efforts to attack Britain directly early in 1798. In 1799, a significant British and Russian expeditionary force landed in the Netherlands supported by a large fleet under Lord Duncan. Assailed from both sea and land, the remainder of the Dutch Navy under Admiral Story capitulated without a fight: in what became known as the Vlieter Incident, the political divisions between the officers and seamen resulted in a mutiny during which the Dutch sailors threw their ammunition overboard. In Britain, the public relief at the restoration of the Navy's authority in the aftermath of the spring mutinies was enormous and helped steady the wavering British government in their pursuit of the war by restoring confidence in British naval supremacy in home waters. Christopher Lloyd notes that the events of 1797 led to "a new and blatant patriotism . . . [which] was centred on the achievements of 'our gallant tars'." A popular rhyme of the time reflected public feeling:
"St Vincent drubbed the Dons, Earl Howe he drubbed Monsieur,
And gallant Duncan now has soundly drubbed Mynheer;
The Spanish, French and Dutch, tho' all united by,
Fear not Britannia cries, My Tars can beat all three.
Monsieurs, Mynheers and Dons, your country's empty boast,
Our tars can beat all three, each on his native coast."—Quoted in Christopher Lloyd, St Vincent and Camperdown, 1963, 
Although Duncan's initial tactics at the battle were reminiscent of those of Howe at the Glorious First of June, and his eventual attack has been compared to Nelson's tactics at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, Duncan credited the tactical work Essay on Naval Tactics by John Clerk of Eldin for inspiring his decisions on the day. Duncan was subsequently indirectly criticised some years after the battle by his colleague Earl St Vincent, who had won the Battle of Cape St Vincent over a Spanish fleet nine months before Camperdown. In a letter complaining of Clerk's assertion that he had been responsible for all of the major naval victories of the war, St Vincent wrote that Duncan "was a brave officer, little versed in the subtleties of naval tactics, and who would have been quickly embarrassed by them. When he saw the enemy, he rushed upon him without thinking of such and such and order of battle. To conquer he calculated upon the brave example he set his captains, and the event justified his expectation." This assessment was refuted by Captain Hotham, who publicly responded that "the advanced season of the year and the close proximity of the enemy's coast all made what, upon another occasion, might have appeared haste imperatively necessary, for it was the prompt decision of the Admiral that occasioned the result". Some modern historians, such as Peter Padfield, have agreed with Hotham's assertion, with the added suggestion that Duncan's tactics during the battle might have had an influence on the newly promoted Rear-Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson, who was in England recovering from the loss of his right arm at the Battle of Santa Cruz de Tenerife at the time of Camperdown. Duncan himself felt that he could have done more, noting that "We were obliged ... to be rather rash in our attack. Had we been ten leagues at sea none would have escaped." but some of the highest praise c