levance of a structural variable that transcends the influence of other variables effecting a Western democracy's abolition or retention of the death penalty. In the case of the United States, a comparative historical analysis reveals that, at a decisive turning point, “more democratic” institutions and practices hindered the country on the path to death penalty abolition. The U.S. emerged from the 1970s re-affirming the moral legitimacy of capital punishment because American institutions, including the independent Supreme Court, were structurally influenced by a change in public opinion. As public support for the death penalty peaked in the 1990s with the advent of “tough on crime” agenda, death penalty retention was further entrenched by American political leaders who echoed popular sentiment to score well in their campaigns. In a broad sense, the death penalty debate at these two junctures in history serve as a perfect example of the functioning of the quintessential American democracy, in institutional make-up and decision-making practices. At the political tipping point for the nation on the death penalty issue in the 1970s, it was America's direct democratic institutions that held the country back from abolishing the death penalty at the Supreme Court level or gaining momentum in the state legislatures.
In the case of Great Britain, a comparative historical analysis reveals that, at a decisive turning point, “less democratic” institutions and practices spurred the nation forward on the path to death penalty abolition. The distanced political system allowed British politicians to make the initial leap of abolishing the death penalty in the 1960s through the Murder Act despite the fact that 80 percent of constituents supported the mechanism. The British Parliament exercised accepted practices of Burkean trusteeship, a theory of political representation that allowed them to gamble on the fact that general support for the death penalty would decrease after the public saw the criminal justice system functioning without this ultimate sanction. History followed course, as the British public's support for restoration of the death penalty declined substantially from the original 80% to 50% today. At a ripe time in history, it was Great Britain's flexible democratic structure that allowed the abolition of the death penalty as an “anti-democratic” decision. If the British political structure had been structured like the United States, this comparative historical analysis suggests that this variable would have resulted in death penalty retention in Great Britain in the 1960s.
While there is a lot of focus on moving American public opinion towards death penalty abolition in the United States, a comparative historical analysis of the United States and Great Britain makes a preliminary suggestion that abolition of the death penalty has been an “anti-democratic” phenomenon historically. Furthermore, the historical case study of Great Britain proposes that abolishing the death penalty as an “anti-democratic” decision can precipitate a drastic fall in public support for the death penalty. This supports the findings of other social scientists, such as Sarat and Martschukat, who suggest that many European democracies have only accomplished solidified abolition by taking a step ahead of public opinion. For example, Germany abolished the death penalty as early as 1949 and attempts in the 1950s to reinstitute the practice based on public support were continually rejected by the political elite (Demleitner 2008, 150). When France abolished capital punishment in 1981, the French public consistently polled at a 60 to 65 percent majority in favor of capital punishment (Hammel 2011, 193). Nonetheless, a couple decades later, public support for capital punishment has dwindled considerably to 35 percent in Germany and 45 percent in France (Ipsos MORI 2007). While a blanket statement about these different European nations must be corroborated with further analysis, a preliminary review does suggest that this process of “anti-democratic abolition