ura, Amritsar and other places. More than twenty eight thousand camels worth of loot found its way into Abdali’s hands. Ahmed Shah Abdali’s authority on north India’s politics had been stamped.
At this crucial juncture, Govindpant Bundele implored the Peshwa to journey to Bundelkhand himself or send Sadashivrao Bhau. But, instead, Raghunathrao was sent. With the help of others such as Holkar, Gupte, Manaji Paigude etc., Raghoba scored a series of victories – wresting back Delhi from Afghan hands and leading Maratha conquests all the way to the Indus and beyond – bringing even Attock and Peshawar under his sway. But battlefield prowess came at the cost of huge amounts of debt to the Maratha treasury. Also, his negotiating skills were nowhere close to Nanasaheb Peshwa and Sadashivrao Bhau. The importance of his Punjab conquest remained symbolic, nothing more.
Eventually in 1757, Govindpant Bundele himself went to Pune and met the Peshwa and Sadashivrao Bhau. Doubts were raised over the tribute he had submitted and Bundele promised to set the record straight by appointing two persons – Kanitkar and Erande to resolve the matter. Rajwade believes that a high degree of corruption was present in Govindpant Bundele’s work, but his actions and constant support for swarajya suggest otherwise, as is brought out by Sardesai.
By the time Govidpant Bundele returned north, Abdali’s armies had begun making forays into the Punjab and stitching alliances with various chieftains. Even Bundelkhand, taking advantage of the general collapse of Maratha authority all around, was becoming very difficult to manage. It was soon next to impossible to rely on it for regular supplies. It was to prevent this very eventuality that Govindpant Bundele had asked for a permanent garrison of twenty thousand!
It must always be borne in mind that Govindpant Bundele was merely a revenue collector, and never a seasoned general. Not having a strong military commander in the Bundelkhand region was a big drawback, which showed itself in January 1761.
Sadashivrao Bhau, Malharrao Holkar, Shinde, Gaikwad and many others started the journey to north in 1759 to finish Abdali and bring north India under their strong control. The events of the next two years are too numerous to be recounted here. To cut a long story short, Sadashivrao Bhau reached Panipat and Abdali was somewhere to the south. Bundelkhand was beyond Abdali. But there was a crucial difference – the Marathas were short of supplies or even a reliable region from where they could get supplies if needed. On the other hand, Abdali was getting plenty of provisions from various Rohilla chieftains. But, now sandwiched between Govindpant Bundele and Sadashivrao Bhau, the Marathas assumed that Abdali would be easily defeated if a pincer attack was mounted.
Sadashivrao bhau goaded Govindpant Bundele to attack Abdali from the rear. It would have the double effect of harassing Abdali and cutting off his food supplies. Abdali would have to force his way north into the Punjab, where the grand Maratha army under Sadashivrao Bhau was waiting. It was a huge task for a kamavisdar. Abdali was no pushover. The attack by Govindpant Bundele was brave, although rather futile. The brave Bundele died fighting, against a hopelessly more powerful enemy (Dec 1760). The importance of Bundelkhand was never more evident for the Marathas!
Much can and has been said about Bhau’s decision to hand Govindpant such a crucial duty, which was well beyond his ken. It was one of the faults which led to Panipat.
Eventually, on the 30th of December 1760, Abdali completely closed the road leading south. The Marathas, waiting for Abdali to attack their entrenched and strong positions all this while, now found themselves in the reverse situation. Food was running out, supplies were scarce.
On the morning of the 14th of January 1761, Sadashivrao Bhau decided to break through Abdali’s defences – to hand him a defeat and place Vishwasrao on Delhi’s throne. The ensuing grand confrontation is today better known as the Third Battle of Panipat.
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