ria has sometimes been conditioned by the political climate of the moment.
Each major moment has also been transmuted into historical memory in complex ways, even if we restrict our discussion just to Northern Nigeria. Some Northerners remember the jihad of Sheikh Uthman dan Fodio as the glorious triumph of “true” Islam over the “insincere” Islam of “semi-pagan” kings. In this telling, dan Fodio’s implementation of shari’a symbolizes the victory of “true” Islam. Others understand the jihad as a form of ethnic warfare, or they see the Sokoto Caliphate’s practice of “shari’a” as one that failed to live up to the ideal.
The Settlement of 1960, meanwhile, is remembered in some circles as a sage compromise Northern elites made to secure independence for their country and autonomy for their region. Yet some Muslims see it as a moment when elites “sold out” Islam, and the historical heritage of the North, for the sake of political expediency.
Finally, for some, the re-implementation of shari’a after 1999 connotes the restoration of the glory of the Caliphate, and the revival of true Islam; for others it has failed to live up to expectations, and has not addressed core governance issues in Nigeria such as corruption, transparency, and accountability. Boko Haram’s members seem to feel that whatever was restored thirteen years ago, it was not “true” shari’a and did not go far enough, either geographically or politically.
Violent Dissent, Intra-Muslim Struggles, and Political Crisis in Northern Nigeria
Political struggles in Northern Nigeria have often been religious struggles as well. New leaders have often sought political and religious authority simultaneously. Dan Fodio’s claims to leadership derived from his personal piety and his stature as an Islamic scholar, as did those of his rival and contemporary Muhammad al Amin al Kanemi, a leader of Kanem-Bornu. Even the British, who worked closely with the aristocracy of the Sokoto Caliphate during colonial rule, partly based their authority on their willingness to “partner” with Islam. Ahmadu Bello, a descendant of dan Fodio and premier of Northern Nigeria from 1954 to 1966, was an elected politician but also an Islamic leader who led conversion campaigns inside Nigeria and helped found the Muslim World League. Today, the heirs of the Sokoto Caliphate and Kanem-Bornu continue to exercise both political and religious influence, while some elected politicians, like former Governor Ibrahim Shekarau of Kano State, have explicitly brought their Islamic values into policymaking.
The longstanding Islamization of politics in Northern Nigeria has meant that many movements of dissent articulate visions of Islam that are politically and theologically radical. These movements of dissent have been diverse, but one feature they share is that they have often surfaced at times of crisis. The British conquest of Sokoto was followed by a series of rebellions led by men who claimed to be the “Mahdi” – an Islamic eschatological figure who, it is said, will return near the end of time. In the 1980s, political and economic turbulence in Nigeria was a factor in the emergence of the “Yan Tatsine,” followers of a preacher who relied solely on his interpretation of the Qur’an and who banned the use of some modern technologies, such as bicycles. The 1980s also saw the appearance of the “Muslim Brothers,” who drew inspiration from the Iranian Revolution and called for an Islamic state in Nigeria. Both groups felt persecuted by authorities, leading to cycles of violence. The Yan Tatsine – whose adherents included a number of down-and-out youth – have been cited as a forerunner of Boko Haram, which seems to have a similar recruiting pool.
Boko Haram’s rise taps into major trends in Northern Nigerian history. Their radical theological and political stances and their use of violence hearken back to other groups that rejected the authority of government and the legitimacy of traditional Islamic rulers at moments when everything – politics, the economy, spirituality – seemed uncertain. Their desires for a strengthe