 was immense. Likewise, Govindpant Bundele wanted the province to be periodically overseen by the Peshwa or his cousin Sadashivrao Bhau, rather than lesser chieftains or even his younger brother Raghunathrao. The strategic importance of Bundelkhand and its unique geographical location with relation to the whole of north India was not lost on Govindpant Bundele. In fact, he makes this amply clear in a letter to Sadashivrao Bhau (1755), where he makes a case for a powerful Maratha garrison to be permanently stationed in the north. A rough translation of the letter in Marathi, given by Sardesai:
“Hindustan requires a strong, permanent Maratha army. Only then can order be maintained. The whole area from Bundelkhand to Antarved must be strongly secured. Delhi is a chaotic place, all powers that be have their eyes on it. Maratha sardars and subhedars come north but then return with their armies. But for maintaining peace in Bundelkhand and our grip on Hindustan, an army of twenty thousand is needed at all times. These shall be well trained and regular soldiers under our pay, not irregular troops living by looting the land. Only then can peace be maintained for a long time and tribute obtained peacefully.”
This letter goes to show that not only did Govindpant Bundele have a good grasp of the location he was in , but also the fact that to control Hindustan, the Marathas would need to have a very strong presence to north of Gwalior as well. If his advice had been followed, perhaps the events of later years may not have happened. It is pertinent to note that Govindpant Bundele had joined the administration as a mere kamavisdar, and it was solely his experience of many years that was speaking.
Events leading to Panipat
The events which would eventually culminate in the Third Battle of Panipat (Jan 1761) were set in motion around 1755/56 with the Afghan invasion of Delhi, which ended with Najib ud Daulah being appointed the Amir ul Umrah at the Mughal court by Ahmed Shah Abdali. Large scale massacres were carried out in Mathura, Amritsar and other places. More than twenty eight thousand camels worth of loot found its way into Abdali’s hands. Ahmed Shah Abdali’s authority on north India’s politics had been stamped.
At this crucial juncture, Govindpant Bundele implored the Peshwa to journey to Bundelkhand himself or send Sadashivrao Bhau. But, instead, Raghunathrao was sent. With the help of others such as Holkar, Gupte, Manaji Paigude etc., Raghoba scored a series of victories – wresting back Delhi from Afghan hands and leading Maratha conquests all the way to the Indus and beyond – bringing even Attock and Peshawar under his sway. But battlefield prowess came at the cost of huge amounts of debt to the Maratha treasury. Also, his negotiating skills were nowhere close to Nanasaheb Peshwa and Sadashivrao Bhau. The importance of his Punjab conquest remained symbolic, nothing more.
Eventually in 1757, Govindpant Bundele himself went to Pune and met the Peshwa and Sadashivrao Bhau. Doubts were raised over the tribute he had submitted and Bundele promised to set the record straight by appointing two persons – Kanitkar and Erande to resolve the matter. Rajwade believes that a high degree of corruption was present in Govindpant Bundele’s work, but his actions and constant support for swarajya suggest otherwise, as is brought out by Sardesai.
By the time Govidpant Bundele returned north, Abdali’s armies had begun making forays into the Punjab and stitching alliances with various chieftains. Even Bundelkhand, taking advantage of the general collapse of Maratha authority all around, was becoming very difficult to manage. It was soon next to impossible to rely on it for regular supplies. It was to prevent this very eventuality that Govindpant Bundele had asked for a permanent garrison of twenty thousand!
It must always be borne in mind that Govindpant Bundele was merely a revenue collector, and never a seasoned general. Not having a strong military commander in the Bundelkhand region was a big drawback, which showed itself in January 1761.
Sadas