ry agencies and in academic research, as a basis for distinguishing cariogenic from non-cariogenic snacks” . While research on an animal model was initiated at the NIDR , the bulk of the research was conducted outside the NIDR, largely funded by the American Dental Association Health Foundation . Based on the promise of the development of a standardized model to identify harmful foods, in 1978 the US Federal Trade Commission proposed restrictions on advertising cariogenic products to children . The first US Department of Health and Human Services Healthy People objectives, issued in 1980, proposed banning cariogenic products from schools as a means to control dental caries . While lobbying efforts of the food, advertising, and broadcasting industries were a major reason for the failure of the FDA, Federal Trade Commission, and Healthy People proposals, another common factor cited for these policy failures is the lack of a standardized model to identify foods harmful to teeth [78,81,83].
With industry input, consensus was finally achieved on a standard method to screen foods for cariogenicity at a conference sponsored by the Foods, Nutrition and Dental Health Program of the American Dental Association in 1985, but only to support claims that food products were safe for teeth . In 1996, the FDA began allowing health claims (i.e., “does not promote tooth decay”) on food products containing sugar substitutes based on a standard screening method for cariogenicity . The FDA did not, however, require disclosure or labeling of harmful foods. In 1999, a group of clinicians and dental scientists updated the methodology agreed upon in 1985 with the aim of identifying which methods were “suitable as research tools but also for regulatory assessments” . However, the use of these methods to identify foods harmful to teeth remained controversial .
With the implementation of the nutrition facts panel on packaged food products in 1993, the FDA required the declaration of total sugars , a requirement that remained unchanged as of January 2015. As of January 2015, the FDA was considering a proposed rule to require disclosure of added sugars on the nutrition facts panel , and SA was opposing it, citing “the lack of science to justify ‘added sugars’ labeling” .
Comparison to the Tobacco Industry
The sugar industry formed SRF in 1943 to fund research that supported the industry position , 11 years before the creation of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC) in 1954 to play a similar role for the tobacco industry . In 1954, the TIRC hired SRF’s first scientific director, Robert Hockett, to serve as the TIRC’s associate scientific director , where he was positioned to help the tobacco industry learn key science manipulation tactics from the sugar industry.
At the same time that the NIDR was planning the NCP, the National Cancer Institute (NCI) was pursuing its Smoking and Health Program [92–94]. Like NCP, which focused on sugar harm reduction strategies, the Smoking and Health Program focused on harm reduction strategies with the primary goal of developing a safe cigarette . The NCI invited tobacco industry representatives to join the NCI’s Tobacco Working Group (TWG), the planning committee for the effort to develop a less hazardous cigarette . The NCI did so on the assumption that tobacco manufacturers were interested in promoting new, safer cigarettes and had product expertise the NCI lacked . The NCI also believed industry participation was advantageous because implementation would fall to tobacco companies and, if approached in a positive way, the companies would agree to collaborate . The willingness of the NIDR leaders to interact with the sugar industry during planning for the NCP may have reflected similar thinking, particularly because responsibility for manufacturing and incorporating additives to reduce the risk of dental caries would fall to food and pharmaceutical industries.
The tobacco industry used its involvement in the TWG to oppose funding of projects, such as smoking cessation programs, that were seen as a threat t