acles to TAPI construction and its projected future operation. The first and foremost obstacle is insecurity in Afghanistan and across the northern part of Pakistan, through which the TAPI will have to pass on its way to India. All indicators suggest a worsening security situation there and an inability of the respective governments and the NATO-led forces to contain and eventually to end armed conflicts. Secondly, there is no doubt that anti-government (Afghan) armed groups operating in these countries will target the TAPI pipeline if construction begins in 2012. These attacks will prolong the construction process and push the financial and human-related costs of its realization. The Afghan government’s offer to deploy up to 7,000 troops (even with direct military support of NATO-led forces) could not possibly deter attacks, as evident in the expansion of the destructive and violent activities of the Taliban and its allies. Nor will the utilization of “private security contractors” significantly improve the security situation in Afghanistan, as experienced in Iraq. There are additional and serious doubts about Turkmen gas availability to feed the TAPI due to that country’s over-commitment to various other export projects.
The TAPI, if realized, may contribute to regional tensions and will negatively affect Iran. As a gas exporter, Iran seeks to increase its share of the global gas market, as its current share is insignificant relative to its vast reserves. Tensions in Iran’s ties with Afghanistan and Pakistan will also have a negative impact on the region’s security situation, which requires Iran’s cooperation. The saga, as is often the case, is likely to continue. Stay tuned.
Dr. Hooman Peimani is Head of Energy Security & Geopolitics in the Energy Studies Institute based at the National University of Singapore. He is a member of the International Editorial Advisory Board of the Journal of Energy Security.