losophy and science are mutually implicative endeavors.
What this means, in terms of actual practice, is that the young scientist must conscientiously and critically study that very philosophy which he has been indoctrinated against and to which his group is metaphysically opposed. It goes without saying that these are terrific hurdles. But the fact still remains that knowledge of moral philosophy is a necessary prerequisite to any significant synthesis of purely biological substance with those things that this substance is asserted as having, namely, obligations.
Materialism, alone, has proven to be inadequate—because of its very nature—to handle such questions as morality. But yet, scientists are coming more and more to concern themselves with moral consequences of their behavior. The conclusion of our dilemma would seem to be, therefore, for scientists either to restrict their explanations to purely physicalistic phenomena, or to openly and frankly, and even perhaps as a part of their academic training, make room for some preparation in traditional philosophy. For it is among the traditional philosophers, such as Plato, Maimonides, Aquinas, and Spinoza, that knowledge concerning morality will most likely be learned. And the only suggestion that one might make is that the prospective scientist approach the study of these men with the same intensity for the truth that he exhibits in his analysis of the facts of empirical science.
‘Plato, The Dialogues, tr. by B. Jowett.