nal governmental organizations have locked states into this particular policy preference. Even though elected officials once achieved death penalty abolition against the popular will of the people, the state's refusal to execute its own citizens has become a cornerstone of European collective principles on human rights. For example, the European Union makes abolition of the death penalty a requirement for member-states and any candidates that wish to be considered for accession. Additionally, the Thirteenth Protocol of the European Convention ensures that nations in the Council of Europe cannot temporarily suspend their obligation to right to life and restore the death penalty in times of crisis. In this way, Europe has created a supranational structure that severely weakens the chances of any nation restoring the death penalty as a policy based on popular demand. This study puts forth the influence of supranational and international organizations on death penalty abolition as a significant subject for future research.
Social scientists and this comparative analysis have further supported the notion that “successful and sustainable abolition of capital punishment has never been a result of great popular demand" (Zimring and Hawkins 1986, 12). Consequently, what wisdom does this "anti-democratic" phenomenon leave for America and the thirty-two states that continue to retain capital punishment today? If most countries have managed "anti-democratic abolition" and public support for the death penalty has declined in the ensuing years, then America's direct and accessible democracy gives birth to a populist bind in the majority of American states, especially in the South. In the states with highly active death penalty mechanisms, such as Texas, support for the death penalty is still as high as 73% (Ramsey 2012), roughly parallel to "tough on crime" figures in the 1990s. Additionally, though some state legislatures like Delaware are posturing for possible abolition in the future, death penalty repeal by each state may need to pass a public referendum based on different state laws. For example, in November 2012, California put death penalty abolition on the ballot but Proposition 34 was defeated by 52.8% to 47.2% when the public took a direct vote (Mintz 2012). Given these factors, grassroots campaigns have a long journey ahead of them if they hope to galvanize public sentiment towards abolition on a state-by-state basis and overpower the American structural bind that only allows change from the bottom up instead of top down.
Nevertheless, the historical findings of "anti-democratic" abolition in Great Britain do not need to imply that America's populist bind eliminates the chance of an imminent change in death penalty policy. First, the role of bold political leadership is not to be disregarded. Although it is a rarity in American politics, the adoption of a Burkean trustee position has been known to occur in state politics on execution. While few American political representatives are willing to vote against the preferences of their constituents and risk looking “soft on crime,” former New York Governors Hugh Carey and Mario Cuomo and former California Governor Jerry Brown are three exceptions to this rule. These governors vetoed death penalty legislation despite the strong will of their state constituents (Bohm 2003, 28). Most recently, Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley took a substantial political risk with his rumored bid for the 2016 American presidency in order to push death penalty repeal in the Maryland legislature (Jacobs 2013). If the death penalty emerges as a national topic for debate in the 2016 presidential elections, the public discourse and rhetoric surrounding Governor O'Malley's campaign could serve as an excellent case study in the populist politics of death penalty abolition going forward.
Limitations of Study
As in any honest academic inquiry, this study has weaknesses and limitations that could be improved upon in future research. The first limitation concerns technical flaws with examining public polling