ts trip, the Manned Spacecraft Center was working hard on how to get Apollo to the moon before 197O--only a little more than two years away. On 20 September, Low and others met with top manned space flight officials in Washington to present the center's plan, the key features of which were the need for additional lander and Saturn V V development flights and the incorporation of a lunar orbital flight into the schedule. Owen Maynard presented plans for scheduling seven types of missions that would lead step by step to the ultimate goal. He described these steps, "A" through "G," with G as the lunar landing mission.
Phillips asked that the group consider carefully both the pros and cons of flying an additional Saturn V flight. Wernher von Braun and Low favored the flight--von Braun, because he felt the launch operations people would need the experience, and Low, because he believed that data from several flights would be needed to make certain that the big booster was indeed ready for its flight to the moon. Against these opinions, Phillips cited the tremendous workload an added flight would place on the preflight crews at Kennedy, and Mueller reminded the meeting of the already crowded launch - schedule for 1968. An additional lunar module mission would be flown only if LM-1 were unsuccessful.
Most discussion centered on the insertion of a lunar orbital flight into the schedule. Houston wanted "to evaluate the deep space environment and to develop procedures for the entire lunar landing mission short of LM descent, ascent and surface operations." Mueller remarked that he regarded the lunar orbit mission as just as hazardous as the landing mission. But the Texas group argued that they had no intention of flying the vehicle closer to the moon than 15 000 meters. They pointed out that the crew would not have to train for the actual landing, but it would give them a chance to develop the procedures for getting into lunar orbit and undocking and for the rendezvous that the lunar landing crew would need. Mueller said, "Apollo should not go to the moon to develop procedures." Low reminded him that crew operations would not be the main reason for the trip; there was still a lot to be learned about communications, navigation, and thermal control in the deep space environment. (46) Although a final decision on the lunar orbital mission was not made until later, Maynard's seven-step plan was generally adopted throughout NASA.
possible with non-flammable materials, that non-metallic materials that are used be arranged to maintain fire breaks, that systems for oxygen or liquid combustibles be made fire resistant, and that full flammability tests be conducted with a mockup of the new configuration.
Back-up crew of (L-R) Donn Eisele, Walter Cunningham, and Wally Schirra in their modified G-3C space suits.
Astronauts for the first Apollo Mission (L-R) Roger B. Chaffee, Edward H. White and Virgil I. Grissom practice for the mission in the Apollo Mission Simulator
The Capsule after the tragic fire
Exterior of Apollo/Saturn 204 spacecraft at White Room of Complex 34, Cape Kennedy, Fla
The flag draped coffin of Astronaut Virgil I. Grissom is being escorted at Arlington Cemetery, Va., by his fellow astronauts
Seated at the witness table before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Services on the Apollo 204 Accident are; left to right -- Dr. Robert C. Seamans, NASA, Deputy Administrator, James E. Webb, Administrator, Dr. George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, and Maj. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips, Apollo Program Director