exclusive license for a geological examination of this peninsula. These exploration rights were expanded into a concession in 1935, and in 1936 were given to IPC under the terms of the Red Line Agreement. BP and Shell, however, were not anxious to develop more production in the Persian Gulf because of the effect this would have upon production in Iran. Although Mobil wanted more crude from the Persian Gulf, drilling did not start until three years and five months after the signing of the geological survey. A productive well was completed in 1939, and a few others were drilled after the war began; but in 1941, an official (Mr. Sellers) wrote: "â€¦.. as there is excess of petroleum products available from AIOC and Cal-Tex in Persian Gulf, it is obvious productive wells in Qatar will not be expedited at present time." Commercial production in substantial quantities did not begin until 1950- eighteen years after the first exploration of the area.
An interesting case of "technical compliance" is provided by IPC's actions concerning a concession in Syria. In 1933, IPC had obtained drilling permits in Syria, and two years later suggested that the Syrian government grant it a blanket concession over a large part of Syria, similar to the Iraq concession. Negotiations were opened for this purpose, but in view of the time which the negotiations would take, the IPC groups "agreed that the Company should drill shallow holes which would constitute technical compliance with Company's obligations, the Syrian government should be informed of the Company's intentions to do so." Negotiations dragged on and the British High Commissioner of Syria suspended the acceptance of any further drilling permits. But IPC was prepared to receive this blow with equanimity; the general manager wrote: "â€¦..we have been steadily complying with the letter of the Mining Law by drilling shallow holes on locations where there was no danger of striking oilâ€¦â€¦." However, when IPC encountered difficulty in getting the Syrian Parliament to ratify the concession, "serious drilling" was recommended by the High Commissioner and by the general manager of IPC. The latter wrote the secretary of IPC: "You should explain to the Groups that neither the High Commissioner, nor myself, are actuated by a hell for leather rush to find oil; we want to set up a convincing window dressing that we are actually working the concessionâ€¦â€¦the High Commissioner can exert far more justifiable pressure in getting our concession ratified by the succeeding ministry than he would be justified in exerting if we merely stood by, content to watch events, doing nothingâ€¦.."
In outlining to the groups the obstacles which stood in the way of obtaining better concession terms from Syria, the general manager of IPC also revealed the government's opinion of IPC: among the obstacles faced by IPC was the "Government's convinction that we did not intend to find oil, and if we found it we would advance a thousand and one reasons for not producing it. In these circumstances my plan was to obtain terms that would be light to bear so long as we explored without result, whilst conceding to Government that if we did find oil, we would produce or pay."
Not surprisingly, IPC's policies of "sitting on" concessions endowed the company with the stigma of restrictionism. In 1936, the question arose as to whether IPC should negotiate directly, or indirectly through an intermediary, for concessions in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen; the general manager of IPC stated that in his opinion:
â€¦..the indirect methodâ€¦..might in the long run produce rather better terms than would be given to a company whose proprietors already hold many oil concessions, who have been identified with a policy of restrictive production, and whose object in obtaining fresh oil territory would not be associated with any irrepressible urge for intensive exploitation.
By 1938, IPC's reputation for obstructionism had become firmly established throughout the Middle East. The general manager of IPC, who had been engaged in discussions on 