n what is a far better military-preparedness situation than their Afghan counterpart, have also failed to end attacks on the Iraqi oil and gas pipelines—a constant target of the Iraqi insurgent groups. Therefore, it is a sound assertion that the Afghan military’s record, even if it is fully supported by the NATO-led forces, will not be any better than its Turkish, Iraqi and American counterparts.
The BTC pipeline, which passes through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey—each having security problems of their own—evinces that pipelines can be built even in territories under the worst security situations. For this reason, the TAPI can be built at a high cost, both in financial terms and in terms measured by the potential loss of human life, if its proponents are prepared to pay these costs. This example also demonstrates that a pipeline can be kept operational, albeit at unjustifiable costs as measured by the loss of human life, debilitation or destruction of physical infrastructure, or even environmental damage and destruction, if the owner/operators are willing to burden these costs. Hence, the TAPI, which will surely become a major target for the Taliban and its allies, could be kept operational to some extent depending on the repair of damage to it following each attack. However, given the worsening security situation in Afghanistan, the TAPI’s realization and operation will be a herculean task surely unachievable without the direct involvement of the NATO-led forces, although even then a better result than that of the Iraqi case cannot be guaranteed. In fact, the reluctance of the NATO countries to significantly expand their presence in Afghanistan and their efforts to decrease their direct engagement in combat missions suggest that the TAPI’s realization and operation will be far more challenging than those of BTC.
Given the TAPI’s presumed high price tag and the predictable uncertainty about its uninterrupted operation once constructed, one wonders why the TAPI is being promoted when an alternative project lacking such security challenges exists (e.g., through Iran). If recent history is any indication, political considerations must be the underlining justification for TAPI construction.
It becomes clear that certain political objectives were behind the December 2010 pipeline agreements. One clear objective is eliminating the possibility of India’s importing gas from Iran through the proposed IPI. After years of negotiations, India withdrew from the project in 2009 for two main reasons. One was from American pressure, as the US government subjected India’s purchase of American nuclear reactors to its opting out of the IPI as part of US policy to weaken the Iranian economy through limiting its oil and gas exports. Another was India’s confidence that it could increase its domestic production to reduce its short-term dependency on imported gas. It would do so by developing its newly discovered offshore gas fields, especially those in the Bay of Bengal, which pushed its reserves up from 0.60 trillion cubic meters (tcm) in 1998 to 1.09 tcm in 2008. However, many Indians now have second thoughts about the wisdom of their withdrawal from the IPI pipeline given India’s long-term need for large gas imports (piped and LNG) and the undeniable importance of Iran as a long-term regional supplier to India. India’s large investment in the Iranian gas industry (e.g., South Pars) despite American objections reflects this reality.
Another objective of the December 2010 pipeline agreements is to discourage Pakistan from implementing the Pakistani section of the IP pipeline, although for the most part Iran’s section is now operational. Of the approximately 1312 mile pipeline, the Iranian share is approximately 690 miles, of which approximately 570 miles was completed by June 2010. Presently under construction, the remainder is scheduled for completion over the next two years, after which it will be connected to the Pakistani section in 2014. Pakistan needs imported gas for power generation other purposes, as its domestic reserves are no lon