ding to the flow of water measured at Lee’s Ferry, Arizona. 34 Las Vegas prided itself on being the nation’s fastest-growing city, and, at about 660 liters per day, its per capita water consumption mirrored this. 35 Thus the Colorado River’s finite capacity has triggered the search for new sources. These include a regional groundwater aquifer extending from Salt Lake City, Utah, to Death Valley, California, that would provide almost 250 million cubic meters of water annually; it would also deplete the groundwater in at least 78 basins over nearly 90,000 square miles, greatly impacting a fragile ecosystem and adversely affecting twenty federally listed species and 137 other water-dependent species, as well as thousands of rural domestic and agricultural water users in the region. 36 Nonetheless, the Southern Nevada Water Authority plans to tap the aquifers of northern Nevada to allow Las Vegas to continue its profligate growth, a plan some compare with the historic Owens Valley water grab in California. 37 And in a still more aggressive proposal, the Authority has proposed damming floodwaters in the Midwest to supply greater Las Vegas. 38 Even if this wins local support, the likelihood of implementing such extravagant plans in a time of scarcity is doubtful.
When we started our research in 2005, it would have been difficult to imagine the changes occurring in the Las Vegas Valley in the short period since. Boom has turned into bust, repeating a time-proven cycle in the American West. Boosters insist this is just a bump in the road. Others are less sanguine, and the local press is filled with commentaries marked by bitterness and betrayal.
On the Strip, 2008 began with the foreclosure of developer Ian Bruce Eichner’s $3.9-billion Cosmopolitan, upscale twin towers designed by Arquitectonica. In August, Boyd Gaming halted construction on the $4.8-billion Echelon resort, located on the site of the former Stardust. Two weeks later construction was delayed until “sometime in 2009″ on the $5-billion Las Vegas Plaza, a resort on the New Frontier site; having paid $1.24 billion for the site in 2007, the Israeli-based Elad IDB Las Vegas LLC saw their property devalued to $652 million by fall 2008. In 2009 the downward drift continues on. The $2.9-billion Fountainbleu, 70 percent complete, is mired in litigation. More striking was the near failure in the spring of the Strip’s flagship CityCenter project; although failure was ultimately averted, one of its towers, designed by Norman Foster, was capped at half its original height.
Residential properties, whether in the high-rise towers along the Strip or in the vast low-rise subdivisions surrounding it, have been pummeled. Hit by waves of foreclosures, the median price of existing homes has fallen from a high of $289,500 in June 2006 to $122,000 in May 2009 — a 58% decline. New home sales declined even more dramatically: 38,755 were sold in 2005 but it is doubtful that more than 5,000 will be sold in 2009. 39 It is no surprise that many developments are on hold or have been foreclosed on. These include the 14,000-home, 1,700-acre Kyle Canyon development; sited near the Mount Charleston recreation area, this greenfield community was touted as exemplary in the city’s “Sustainable Las Vegas” campaign of 2006. Similarly, a 2000-acre “new urbanist” community at the opposite end of Mount Charleston is facing litigation as its builders default.
Lake Las Vegas, once the flagship of the southern valley’s move toward upscale resort living, has become its poster child for failure, as the master developer and several sub-entities seek bankruptcy protection. Two of its three completed golf courses have closed; land was graded for a fourth course that remains unfinished; and the lake itself narrowly escaped draining into Lake Mead due to structural damage. Beyond the valley, Coyote Springs has postponed its grand opening. Casinos have closed in towns like Jean and Mesquite, and smaller boomtowns like St. George are sponsoring foreclosure tours. Ironically, lands that had been in private hands since