l. 50.
 Rad, JCS 87492, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Jul. 50.
 Rad, C 59032, CINCFE to JCS, 30 Jul. 50.
 MacArthur considered his report to be timely. He stated later, "Full reports on the results of the visit were promptly made to Washington." See MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 340.
 (1) Rad, JCS 87878, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Aug. 50. (2) Hoare, The JCS and National Policy, vol. IV, pp. 20-21.
extensive secret agreements between himself and MacArthur.  There was also an erroneous but widespread belief that MacArthur had made the trip to Formosa without the knowledge or approval of the nation's leaders.
Nevertheless, the uninformed speculation in the press and the lack of real knowledge as to what MacArthur had done on Formosa, coming at a time when the United States was trying to convince Communist China that there were no ulterior motives lurking behind President Truman's action toward Formosa, caused the President, in a sternly worded message over Secretary of Defense Johnson's signature, to caution MacArthur. On 4 August, MacArthur was reminded in no uncertain terms, "No one other than the President as Commander-in-Chief has the authority to order or authorize preventive action against concentrations on the mainland. The most vital national interest requires that no action of ours precipitate general war or give excuse to others to do so." 
MacArthur replied the next day that he fully understood and was operating meticulously in accordance with the President's decision of 27 June.  Then, on 7 August, he submitted a full report of his conference with Chiang Kai-shek. He indicated Chiang's willingness to cooperate and that there was a real potential in the armed forces on Formosa, although substantial improvements would be necessary. He explained that he had directed periodic sweeps of the Formosa Strait by elements of the Seventh Fleet, periodic reconnaissance flights over certain of the coastal areas of China, and familiarization flights by small groups of United States aircraft to include temporary and refueling landings on Formosa. 
President Truman subsequently sent Averell Harriman to Tokyo, reputedly to caution MacArthur not only to keep the President better informed, but, on other than military matters, to make recommendations, not decisions. Afterward, Harriman stated that General MacArthur had not overstepped his military bounds in making the trip to Formosa; President Truman announced his satisfaction with General MacArthur's performance; and General MacArthur declared that anyone who hinted of friction between himself and the President was guilty of "sly insinuations, rash speculations and bold misstatements." 
Communist nations made note of President Truman's order neutralizing Formosa and charged that the United States intended to take over and occupy the island. In August, the Peiping regime accused the United States of aggression against Formosa and asked the United Nations Security Council to order the withdrawal of ". . . all of the United States armed invading forces from Taiwan...."  In refutation of this charge, President Truman on 25 August directed United States Ambassador Austin to address the Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, on the matter. Austin sent
 MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3383-84.
 Rad, WAR 88014, JCS to CINCFE, 4 Aug. 50.
 Rad, C 59418, CINCFE to JCS, 5 Aug. 50.
 Rad, C 59569, CINCFE to JCS, 7 Aug. 50.
 (1) Time, August 21, 1950. (2) For Harriman's report to President Truman on this visit, see Truman, Memoirs, II, 349-53; for MacArthur's reaction to Harriman's visit, see MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 341.
 State Dept. Bulletin, XXIII (4 September 1950), p. 396.
Lie a complete account of the official American attitude toward Formosa, including a 19 July statement to the Congress by President Truman in which he declared ". . . that the United States has no territorial ambitions whatever concerning that island, nor do we seek for ourselves any special position or privilege on Formosa." On 28 August, the President sent Austin more ammunition with which to demolish the Communist charges concerning Formosa by telling