ategic application of information warfare is primarily concerned with gaining the command advantage at national level, and the preparation and implementation of a strategic information plan. In the former case, this would involve the protection of government and alliance command centers and the disruption of the equivalent command centers within any insurgent organization; in the latter case, the implementation of the strategic information plan covers the acquisition and control of the information available to an insurgent organization by all national means. The targets of this information war may include political, financial, commercial, and public media sources as well as military resources.
The military part of information warfare is command and control warfare, which integrates all military capabilities including operations security, psychological operations, deception, electronic warfare, and physical destruction. It is supported by all-source intelligence and communications and information systems. Its purpose is to deny information to an adversary, and to influence, degrade, or destroy his command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against similar actions.
These five disciplines can stand alone, but are most effective when integrated to form an overarching command and control warfare strategy. Any command and control warfare cell should be within the G3/J3 operations structure, but its function involves a complex interrelation of all staff areas. There is, however, real potential for mutual interference between the different components of command and control warfare operations, which underscores the need for close coordination at all levels.
The use of electronic warfare and the destruction of command and control sites may not be so applicable in counterinsurgency operations, although this will depend on the nature of the insurgency and the way the insurgents operate. Different counterinsurgency campaigns will have differing calls on the use of information warfare and command and control warfare as the campaign progresses. However, experience shows that little attention has previously been given to the preparation of an overall strategic information plan in counterinsurgency situations, Suez in 1956 being the most glaring example for the British.
Despite the potential difficulties and frustrations involved, a commander could reap handsome military dividends if a sound and properly supported strategic information plan is prepared and subsequent command and control warfare planning is conducted as an integral part of any operational and tactical plans that would be necessary in a counterinsurgency campaign. This could apply equally to campaigns in other types of operations short of war.
Integrating Deep, Close, and Rear Operations
During a counterinsurgency core military functions are applicable, albeit in very specific ways, just as they are in a conventional war. Each of the functions discussed to this point can be tailored to the concepts of the deep, close, and rear battle for purposes of training and operations.
Deep operations at the strategic and operational levels will often tend to be political, diplomatic, and psychological in nature. Military involvement may be through covert and clandestine action by special units. At a tactical level, overt deep operations, such as cross-border cooperation and surveillance of areas where known insurgents live and work, will contribute to fixing. Militarily, deep operations could be decisive at the strategic and operational levels, but rarely so at the tactical level. Until the insurgent is found, he has the initiative and it is impossible to conduct any further deep or subsequent close operations against him. The finding function is a prerequisite to starting any subsequent operations, despite it being often very difficult to identify an insurgent when he can blend himself into society. This prerequisite should also endure throughout the campaign; once lost, the insurgent has regained the initiative. A police or military