hen the Taliban’s major offensive to control the Afghan territory bordering Turkmenistan (then under the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance) failed. This failure and the continued Afghan civil war turned the TAPI into a pipe dream with no chance of realization in the foreseeable future.
The Taliban’s fall in November 2001 created the hope for an end to Afghanistan’s instability and thus helped revive the project, leading to the conclusion of an agreement for its construction in December 2002 by Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Nevertheless, despite the backing of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the project has remained a pipe dream in the absence of the single major prerequisite for its realization: security. Contrary to initial hopes, the Taliban's fall did not end the civil war in Afghanistan; it only changed its protagonists. The Taliban and like-minded extremist armed groups (Hezbi Islami) allied with Al Qaida have since challenged the power and authority of the Afghan government and its supporters, the US and the members of the International Security Assistance Force, in a bloody war which has denied peace and stability to a large and growing part of Afghanistan. For all practical purposes, the Afghan government and its foreign allies have lost control of Pashtun-dominated eastern and southern Afghanistan to the Taliban and its allies, which control these regions in one form or another. With a high degree of success, these destructive groups have sought to expand their power to other parts of the country or to destabilize them through numerous violent acts. Consequently, many other parts of the country, with the partial exception of the three Tajik-dominated Afghan provinces bordering Iran, have become the scene of fierce armed conflicts.
To have a clear understanding of the TAPI’s transit route to India, add to the above the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan’s territories that neighbor Afghanistan, namely Baluchistan Province and North West Frontier Province (NWFP). In particular, the NWFP has been the scene of an expanding war between the Pakistani security forces and the Pakistani tribal forces supporting the Taliban. The Pakistani government has unsuccessfully sought since 2009 to extend its control over the area, while the Taliban and its tribal support have expanded their operations to parts of Baluchistan Province through which the TAPI would have to pass. Given this extensive and growing insecurity, the TAPI was practically shelved after the 2002 agreement’s conclusion only to re-emerge in December 2010.
Factors challenging the realization of the TAPI
Despite efforts on the part of the Afghan government and the NATO-led forces, there are no grounds to expect an end to the ongoing Afghan civil war in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, evidence suggests its expansion and thus a worsening of the security situation. Continued rampant poverty, extensive unemployment and low income have resulted in the failure of the Afghan government and its supporters failure to revitalize the Afghan economy. The latter is overshadowed by the informal economy dominated by the production and trafficking of narcotics (mainly opium and its derivatives such as heroin) and associated illegal activities. Against the background of poor infrastructure, the absence of a vibrant and robust economy, the extensive documented human rights abuses by the Afghan government and its rampant corruption have helped delegitimize the Afghan government and lend legitimacy to its armed opponents. Many operational mistakes by the NATO-led forces, leading to the destruction of property and the loss of life for many non-combatant Afghans, have further delegitimized the Afghan government. Under such circumstances, the Taliban and its allies have found a suitable ground for recruitment from among many disillusioned and poverty-ridden Afghans. In the absence of any evidence to expect a major change for the better in Afghanistan, the end of the current civil war and insecurity is simply inconceivable in the predictable future and is ther