e Chinese Nationalists made timely efforts to defend the island. They had recommended to the Secretary of Defense, they stated, that the Nationalists be permitted to break up hostile concentrations through military action, even if it meant attacks on the mainland. 
MacArthur gave full concurrence to this proposal, and informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he and a selected staff would visit Formosa about 31 July to survey the situation.  In reply the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that, pending new instructions on certain policy matters being considered by the Departments of State and Defense, MacArthur might prefer to send a senior officer to Formosa on 31 July, and to proceed later himself. They added, however, that if he felt it necessary, he should feel free to go since the responsibility was his own.  MacArthur chose to make the initial Formosa visit in person so that he could resolve uncertainties arising out of conflicting reports from the island about the status of Chiang's government and its armed forces. 
MacArthur, accompanied by Admiral Struble, flew to Taipeh on 31 July where for two days he conferred with Chiang Kai-shek and his generals. But not until five days after his return to Tokyo did MacArthur report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Meanwhile, press reports speculating that MacArthur had made binding agreements and political promises to Chiang Kai-shek caused Washington officials considerable uneasiness since they could not judge the validity of these reports. In addition, the Department of State heard from its representative in Taipeh that MacArthur was about to transfer fighter squadrons to Formosa, a move not authorized by Washington, and a move which General MacArthur had not actually planned.  Chiang Kai-shek added fuel to the flame by issuing a public statement that could be interpreted as indicating the existence of
 Statement by the President of the United States, 27 Jun. 50, MacArthur Hearings, p. 3369.
 Rad, JCS 87401, JCS to CINCFE, 28 Jul. 50.
 Rad, C 58994, CINCFE to JCS, 29 Jul. 50.
 Rad, JCS 87492, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Jul. 50.
 Rad, C 59032, CINCFE to JCS, 30 Jul. 50.
 MacArthur considered his report to be timely. He stated later, "Full reports on the results of the visit were promptly made to Washington." See MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 340.
 (1) Rad, JCS 87878, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Aug. 50. (2) Hoare, The JCS and National Policy, vol. IV, pp. 20-21.
extensive secret agreements between himself and MacArthur.  There was also an erroneous but widespread belief that MacArthur had made the trip to Formosa without the knowledge or approval of the nation's leaders.
Nevertheless, the uninformed speculation in the press and the lack of real knowledge as to what MacArthur had done on Formosa, coming at a time when the United States was trying to convince Communist China that there were no ulterior motives lurking behind President Truman's action toward Formosa, caused the President, in a sternly worded message over Secretary of Defense Johnson's signature, to caution MacArthur. On 4 August, MacArthur was reminded in no uncertain terms, "No one other than the President as Commander-in-Chief has the authority to order or authorize preventive action against concentrations on the mainland. The most vital national interest requires that no action of ours precipitate general war or give excuse to others to do so." 
MacArthur replied the next day that he fully understood and was operating meticulously in accordance with the President's decision of 27 June.  Then, on 7 August, he submitted a full report of his conference with Chiang Kai-shek. He indicated Chiang's willingness to cooperate and that there was a real potential in the armed forces on Formosa, although substantial improvements would be necessary. He explained that he had directed periodic sweeps of the Formosa Strait by elements of the Seventh Fleet, periodic reconnaissance flights over certain of the coastal areas of China, and familiarization flights by small groups of United States aircraft to include temporary and refueling landings on Fo