e predetermined. This changed dramatically after the end of the Mubarak era. The March Constitutional Proclamation remained quiet on that matter. A number of Egyptian expatriates filled a lawsuit against the SCAF and the Election Commission. The Administrative Court ruled in their favor, mandating voting rights to Egyptians overseas.20 Almost certainly this issue will come up again during the drafting of the Constitution, especially regarding creating "overseas districts" to enable expats to elect their own representatives rather than voting for candidates from their original districts in Egypt.21
The modern Egyptian legal system was established in the 1870s, and modeled on the civil law legal system of continental Europe. Egypt has three different judicial institutions: the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) with the exclusive power of judicial review, the Council of State that deals with administrative disputes where the government or one of its subsidiaries is a party, and lastly the Courts of General Jurisdiction which adjudicates civil, criminal, commercial, and family cases. Historically, the judiciary enjoyed a relatively high degree of institutional independence, which enabled the courts to be the most liberal element of the Egyptian state in the last few decades.22
All political parties are supportive of protecting and expanding the institutional and behavioral independence of the courts. It is safe to assume that the next constitution would further enshrine the independence of the courts and expand their power and prestige. The constitution will also tackle the issues of exceptional courts (state security, military.... etc) that infringed on ordinary courts' jurisdiction and violated citizens' rights and liberties. One issue is likely to generate some intense debate: the selection of Supreme Constitutional Court justices and chief justices. Under Mubarak, the president of the republic had a freehand in appointing the chief justice while justices were appointed by the president from nominations by either the court's general assembly or the chief justice. When the SCC issued a number of liberal rulings that threatened the regime's basic interests, Mubarak used his appointment powers to implement a court-backing plan that changed the court's liberal majority with justices loyal to the regime. Of the 19 justices who currently serve on the SCC, 13 including the chief justice were appointed since late 2001. It was noticeable that one of the first decisions of SCAF was to change the legislation of the court to allow the selection of the chief justice through seniority from within justices currently serving on the court. The generals believe that this provision will function as an insurance policy against the elected governments in the future. It is not farfetched to assume that the parliamentary majority would be interested in having a say in who sits on the high bench. The selection procedures of the SCC are likely to be debated in the constitute assembly.
Anyone who would have argued a year ago that Egyptians would be immersed in these complicated matters of constitutional engineering would have been rejected out of hand as either uninformed or a wishful thinker. Nevertheless, the process of political transition to democracy and the rule of law started and writing a constitution is an integral component of it. Transition is a complicated and even turbulent political process with many setbacks. Egypt's political hangs in the balance at this juncture. Egyptians need to come to terms about the nature of the system in the second republic.
The three issues of civil-military relations, religion and the state, and the nature of political systems are critical to Egypt's political future. As for the role of the army in politics, exempting the generals from all civilian control would undermine the democratic future of the nation. On the other hand, ensuring full civilian control over the armed forces, as the case in established Western democracies, seems difficult at least in the short term. The safer and more realistic route