t in a large-scale war with Communist China made his pronouncements especially regrettable. Too, his insistence on blaming operational restrictions for the situation in Korea was taken in Washington as a reflection on the judgment of the man who had decided to impose those restrictions. This inference was unfortunate, even if not intended as such, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that MacArthur was partly responsible for his own predicament. They had been persuaded to approve his plans for the No-
 Rad, C 68572, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 9 Nov. 50.
 Rad, C 69808, MacArthur to DA for JCS, 25 Nov. 50.
 (1) Statement, Gen. MacArthur (in reply to question from Arthur Krock), New York Times, December 1, 1950. (2) MacArthur Hearings, p. 3496.
 (1) Statements, Gen. MacArthur, 2 Dec. 50, in U.S. News and World Report, December 8, 195O, pp. 16-22, and in the New York Times, December 2, 1950. (2) MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3532-34.
vember advance by his great confidence that the Chinese either would not, or could not, intervene effectively. 
President Truman found MacArthur's statements at this time particularly objectionable. He was irked by MacArthur's publicizing the fact that because Washington had not let him do things his own way his 24 November attack had been defeated and the Chinese had intervened. President Truman charged that he should have relieved MacArthur at that point. He had not done so because he did not wish it to appear that he was being relieved because the offensive had failed. Truman had never gone back on people when luck was against them and he did not intend to do so in this case. 
Commenting later, President Truman stated that there was no excuse for the way in which MacArthur began to publicize his views following the failure of his offensive. Within four days, in four different ways, according to President Truman, MacArthur blamed his troubles publicly on Washington's order to limit the hostilities in Korea. He spoke of extraordinary inhibitions without precedent in military history and made it quite plain that no blame should be attached to him or his staff. 
As a result of MacArthur's statements President Truman had sent to the heads of all executive departments his 5 December memorandum ordering government officials to clear all public statements concerning foreign policy with the Department of State and all concerning military affairs with the Department of Defense. Although this memorandum was addressed to all executive branches, it was directed specifically at General MacArthur. 
Meanwhile, MacArthur had proposed to General Collins, then visiting in the Far East, that the United States should carry the war to China, through bombing, blockade, and other measures. Throughout December and January and into February, he insisted upon these measures, always through official media albeit quite forcefully. Not until mid-February did General MacArthur bring his views to the attention of the public. On 13 February, in a statement to the press, he contended that unless he was allowed to reduce materially the superiority of the Chinese, ostensibly through attacks upon their "sanctuary," he could not seriously consider conducting major operations north of the 38th Parallel; and on 7 March, in another such statement, he held that vital decisions, yet to be made, must be provided on the highest international levels. These statements may have been perfectly true, and there is considerable evidence that the latter opinion especially was valid; but both were considered by Washington authorities to be comments affecting both foreign and military policies of the United States Government that were not cleared by the Department of Defense and were, therefore, in violation of the President's directive of 5 December. 
 Hoare, The JCS and National Policy, vol. IV, ch. VII, pp. 32-33.
 Truman, Memoirs, II, 384; see also pp. 444-50.
 Ibid., 382.
 (1) Rad, JCS 98134, JCS to CINCFE, CINCEUR, CINCAL, et al., 6 Dec. 50. (2) MacArthur Hearings, p. 880
 (1) MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3539-40. (2) Ltr., Secy. Marshall to Hon. Richard