hat the letter to Congressman Martin was, in his mind, so trifling a matter that he could scarcely recall it.  But it was no trifling matter to President Truman; and when Martin chose to make public the contents of the letter on 5 April 1951, the President reacted strongly and quickly. On 6 April, he called together his special assistant, Averell Harriman, Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of Defense Marshall, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley, and put the matter squarely before them. What should be done with General MacArthur? Harriman told Truman that MacArthur should have been fired two years ago.  But Secretary Marshall appreciated the possible repercussions that
 (1) Ltr., Secy. Marshall to Sen. Russell, 17 Aug. 51, in MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3655-66. (2) Statement of Gen. MacArthur, 24 Mar. 51, in MacArthur Hearings, p. 3541.
 Truman, Memoirs, II, 441-42.
 (1) MacArthur Hearings, p. 113. (2) See also MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 385-86 and 389.
 Harriman was referring to MacArthur's plea in 1949 that he was too busy when requested to return to the United States to discuss matters concerning the occupation of Japan, and to subsequent difficulty in convincing MacArthur to withhold approval from a bill of the Japanese Diet which was contrary to the approved economic policy for the occupation. See Truman, Memoirs, II, 447.
might come with MacArthur's dismissal and advised caution. He observed that if the President relieved General MacArthur it might be difficult to get pending military appropriations through Congress. General Bradley approached the question from the point of view of military discipline. He believed that MacArthur had acted in an insubordinate manner and that, consequently, he deserved to be relieved of his command. But he told Truman that he wished to talk with General Collins before making a final recommendation. Secretary Acheson believed that MacArthur should be relieved, but only after a unanimous decision to do so by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
President Truman had already decided to relieve General MacArthur but he kept this decision to himself for the time being. He asked all four of his advisers to return again the next day for more discussion, and directed Secretary Marshall to restudy all messages exchanged with General MacArthur in the past two years. The next morning, 7 April, the same group met again in President Truman's office. Secretary Marshall told the President that after
reading all the messages he agreed with Harriman that MacArthur should have been relieved two years earlier. Before this brief meeting ended, President Truman directed General Bradley to obtain the views of the remaining Joint Chiefs of Staff and to be prepared to make a final recommendation on 9 April. 
General Bradley, General Collins, General Vandenberg, and Admiral Sherman met on the afternoon of 8 April in the Pentagon and discussed the military aspects of MacArthur's relief thoroughly. At the conclusion of this conference, these officers conferred briefly with Secretary Marshall. All of the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that from the military viewpoint the relief of General MacArthur should be carried out. General Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, later testified that he based his belief on two principal factors: first, he was convinced that General MacArthur was not in sympathy with the basic policies governing the operation of United Nations forces in Korea. "I felt," Collins stated, "that the President, as our Commander in Chief, was entitled to have as a commander in the field a man who was more in sympathy with the basic policies and more responsive to the will of the President as Commander in Chief." Collins felt, secondly, that MacArthur had failed to comply with the instructions given him directing him to clear any public statement that he made which involved matters of policy, particularly of foreign policy. 
After receiving the views of his principal advisers on 9 April, President Truman announced his decision to relieve General MacArthur of his commands in the Far Eas