efore a major challenge for constructing the TAPI.
Additionally, there are serious doubts about the availability of enough gas to feed the TAPI, as Turkmenistan seems to have over-committed itself to various gas export projects. Apart from its gas exports via Russia and supplying gas to Kazakhstan, it is now committed to export annually 30 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas to China via the Central Asian Gas Pipeline, whose first phase went online in December 2009. As well, the inauguration of the second Turkmen-Iranian gas pipeline (Dolatabad-Sarakhs-Khangiran) in January 2010 provided for increasing its gas exports to Iran from 8 bcm to 20 bcm, to be realized when the second pipeline reaches it maximum capacity. Iran imports gas because, despite having the world’s second largest gas reserves, Iran’s gas consumption (the third largest in the world) outpaces its production (the fourth largest producer in the world) (2008 figure). Finally, Turkmenistan has committed itself to large gas exports to the EU through the proposed Nabucco pipeline. Given Turkmenistan’s large export obligations, it is doubtful whether it can possibly supply the other three TAPI countries even if all its gas field development plans (ongoing and envisaged) are fully realized, itself a doubtful scenario in the near future. It is within this context that the December 2010 agreements should be analyzed.
Four-sided agreement of December 11, 2010
Last December the Afghan (Hamid Karzai), Turkmen (Kurbanguly Berdymukhamedov) and Pakistani (Asif Ali Zardari) presidents and India's energy minister (Murli Deora) signed the framework Intergovernmental Agreement and the Gas Pipeline Transmission Agreement in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan’s capital. The agreements provide for constructing the TAPI to supply Afghanistan, Pakistan and India with 33 bcm of Turkmen gas annually. The pipeline’s construction is planned to start in 2012 and to be completed in 2014. The actual cost is unknown—estimates range between $3.5 and $10 billion. Starting from Turkmenistan’s Dauletabad gas field, the proposed route for the pipeline (about 1060 miles) provides for its passing through Herat and Kandahar (Afghanistan), Quetta (capital of Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province) and Multan (Pakistan) to connect to the Fazilka region (India) on the Indian-Pakistani border.
As reported, the agreements do not deal with security and funding issues. Nevertheless, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is known to have undertaken its financing, which is by no means a guarantee. Funding for constructing the TAPI can only begin when the pipeline’s route is secured. This is the December agreements’ major weakness, acknowledged by all concerned parties including the Afghan government. The day after the signing ceremony, Wahidullah Shahrani, Afghanistan’s Minister of Mines and Industries, announced his government’s plan to deploy up to 7,000 troops to secure the pipeline. Revealing the recognition of the security challenge facing the pipeline’s construction and its normal operation, the announcement cannot possibly be equated to settling the security problem for a number of reasons. Chief among them is the Afghan military’s numerous weaknesses arising from various factors. Despite about a decade of training, the Afghan military has proven to be no match for the Taliban and its allies, leaving the army incapable of carrying out its major missions without the NATO-led military forces’ support.
Another observation has been the difficulty of protecting pipelines, the white-elephants of the infrastructure world, through conflict-affected regions. The well-known examples include the Turkish military’s failure to end frequent attacks by the Kurdish separatist armed group (PKK) on a section of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline (BTC) passing through southern Turkey, resulting in numerous closures of the pipeline since its launch in 2006. It is noteworthy that Turkey’s military enjoys NATO status as the Alliance’s second largest military force. To the south of Turkey, the US-led coalition forces and the Iraqi military, i