int on the dominant political line of operation); the military commander concludes that he can best exploit this advantage by reducing the flow of arms and munitions into a particular area (a military decisive point). This entails a shift of main effort, and tactical success in the border zone leads to a fall in the level of terrorist violence in the hinterland. This in turn creates a brief opportunity for a change in police tactics (a police decisive point), which improves relationships with the local community, and so forth. An example of this measured use of military power was offensive cross-border operations during the confrontation with Indonesia. Decisions regarding individual company ambushes were taken at a high level and closely controlled to complement the prevailing political tempo. In contrast, although French operations in Algeria were undertaken in accordance with a sound analysis of where the military decisive points lay, they were never properly harmonized and integrated with an effective overall strategy, and therefore missed the center of gravity.
Success in Operations
In counterinsurgency physical destruction of the enemy still has an important role to play. A degree of attrition will be necessary, but the number of insurgents killed should be no more than is absolutely necessary to achieve success. Commanders should seek "soft" methods of destroying the enemy; by arrest, physical isolation, or subversion, for example. The use of the minimum necessary force is a well-proven counterinsurgency lesson. In an era of intense media intrusiveness--one in which legality, from domestic and international viewpoints, will become ever more important--sound judgment and close control will need to be exercised over the degree of physical destruction which it is possible, necessary, or desirable to inflict. For example, the killing of a teenage gunman could be justifiable in military terms, but its possible effect on his community could jeopardize a potentially far more significant though less spectacular Hearts and Minds operation.
Success does not necessarily go to the side which possesses the best weapons or even uses them most effectively. Seeking to destroy the enemy by physical attrition will also expose members of the government force to greater risk of casualties, and as the Tet offensive in Vietnam during 1968 demonstrated, counterinsurgency campaigns can be lost despite military success. In that instance the American strategic center of gravity, public opinion in the United States, became vulnerable once the perceived costs of involvement escalated. This does not mean that risk should be avoided or the tactical initiative handed to the insurgents, merely that the wider implications of any course of action should be carefully weighed.
Attacking the insurgent's will, the strength from which he draws his cohesion, is likely to be more productive, particularly in the early stages of a counterinsurgency campaign before an insurgency can be consolidated. A sophisticated attack on the insurgent's will strikes at the center of his philosophy. This should be undertaken as part of a deliberate Hearts and Minds campaign. Although this is a somewhat dated term, it still encapsulates what is needed. It should incorporate Civil Affairs activity, psychological operations, effective use of the media, and troop information. These are separate functions, but they have a common theme and are best utilized in a complementary manner. In practice the scope for such action will depend upon the way in which a particular campaign is carried out at the highest level and the freedom of action which is delegated to military commanders. Given the political authority, an approach that attacks the insurgent's will demands imagination and a responsive decisionmaking organization which has the ability to seize fleeting opportunities.
Maneuver warfare theory would indicate that it is preferable to shatter the enemy's moral and physical cohesion rather than seek his wholesale destruction. The means of attacking cohesion in counterinsurgency