n used
(Aircraft flown anyway)
2 Sep Rockets failed to fire
5 Sep Airborne radio failure
20 Sep Bombs fell out of bomb bay when battery switched on
26 Sep Hydraulic line on brakes blew on landing
28 Sep No. 2 engine failed on pull out from bomb drop
30 Sep Brake failure on landing
2 Oct Left magneto failed on run up
7 Oct Hydraulic leak in left wheel well on start up
Right generator out
Right cowl flap inoperable
Only two of eight guns would fire
(Aircraft flown anyway)
8 Oct No.1 engine failed on return from strike; feathered
12 Nov Unsafe gear indicator (bad switch)
To a large extent, these problems were due to the age of the aircraft and the limited rehabilitation given them before being sent to Vietnam. The Invaders had between 1,800 and 4,000 flying hours each, and had been through varied degrees of modification. A report from April 1963, at which point fourteen aircraft were at hand, remarked that, 'none of the B 26s at FARM GATE are configured alike. Each IRAN depot and each work package change within each depot resulted in some variation in electrical wiring, communications equipment, location of cockpit controls, etc. As one result, valid wiring diagrams do not exist for many of the aircraft...Armament switches for the various stores and stations are placed in five separate locations in each of the four different armament switch configurations within the B 26 fleet.'
These variations in aircraft configuration had caused exactly the same problems for the USAF squadrons using the B 26 in Korea. They, too, had received aircraft which had been in storage for several years, and only given a minimum of rehabilitation before being sent to the combat units. Apparently these lessons had been forgotten by the time the Invaders were wheeled out of storage for the second time.
But, all in all, the B 26s were still effective aircraft, and were considered definitely superior to the T 28s. Despite the slow start, Farm Gate had flown a total of 1,135 B 26 combat sorties by the end of 1962, and some crews had completed over 100 missions in less than four months. Four additional B 26Bs had arrived at Bien Hoa during the summer. The first two, ferried in from Kadena on Okinawa in June, were in very poor shape, and both had to limp in to Clark on one engine for emergency repairs before eventually reaching Bien Hoa.
Farm Gate also received four Helio U 10A (formerly L 28A) Super Couriers during the year, and on New Year's Day 1963 the total unit strength stood at twenty-four aircraft, or almost forty per cent of the total number of USAF aircraft in South Vietnam. This total included seven B 26Bs and one RB 26C. Although the whole of South Vietnam could be covered from the base at Bien Hoa, three B 26s were based further north at Pleiku from that day, to improve the response time. From February 1963, the strength of the detachment increased to six B 26s. On occasion, B 26s were also temporarily based at Da Nang.
The military situation had remained fairly stable during 1962, with neither the Viet Cong nor the South Vietnamese forces achieving any decisive victories. If anything, the Viet Cong forces were somewhat worse off than a year earlier. The resentment of the Diem regime had deepened, however, partly as a result of the 'fortified hamlets' concept. Under this scheme, a large part of the rural population was more or less forcibly relocated to newly constructed villages under stricter government control.
A half hearted attack by a South Vietnamese regiment at Ap Bac on 2 January 1963 resulted in several casualties among the participating US advisors, while the Viet Cong troops escaped under cover of darkness. The incident was seen by many as an example of the low morale and general ineptitude of the South Vietnamese forces, and there were calls for increased US control of the war. But even before this battle, President Kennedy had approved a request for Farm Gate reinforcements made the previous September. General Anthis, the US air component commander in Vietnam, had asked for ten more B 26s and five more T 28s and these arrived f