ue.
We had had experiences of this kind before with other tactical objectives. Picked troops which had displayed their resolution and revealed their powers at the Roten-Tunn Pass, and in the fighting in the mountains of Transylvania, Serbian Albania and the Alps of Upper Italy, might once more make possible the seemingly impossible.
A condition precedent to the success of our further attacks in Flanders was that the French High Command should be compelled to leave the burden of the defence in that region to their English Allies.
We therefore first renewed our attacks at Villers-Bretonneux on April 24th, hoping that the French commander's anxiety about Amiens would take precedence of the necessity to help the hard-pressed English friends in Flanders.
Unfortunately this new attack failed. On the other hand, on April 25th the English defence on Mount Kemmel collapsed at the first blow. The loss of this pillar of the defence shook the whole enemy front in Flanders.
Our adversary began to withdraw from the Ypres salient which he had pushed out in months of fighting in 1917. Yet to the last Flemish city he clung as if to a jewel which he was unwilling to lose for political reasons.
But the decision in Flanders was not to be sought at Ypres, but by attacking in the direction of Cassel. If we managed to make progress in that quarter, the whole Anglo-Belgian front in Flanders would have to be withdrawn to the west.
Just as our thoughts had soared beyond Amiens in the previous month, our hopes now soared to the Channel Coast. I seemed to feel how all England followed the course of the battle in Flanders with bated breath.
After that giant bastion, Mount Kemmel, had fallen, we had no reason to flinch from the difficulties of further attacks. We must have Cassel at least! From that vantage point the long-range fire of our heaviest guns could reach Boulogne and Calais.
Both towns were crammed full with English supplies, and were also the principal points of debarkation of the English armies. The English army had failed in the most surprising fashion in the fight for Ketnmel. If we succeeded in getting it to ourselves at this point, we should have a certain prospect of a great victory.
If no French help arrived, England would probably be lost in Flanders. Yet in England's dire need this help was once more at hand. French troops came up with bitter anger against the friend who had surrendered Kemmel, and attempted to recover this key position from us. It was in vain.
But our own last great onslaught on the new Anglo-French line at the end of April made no headway.
On May 1st we adopted the defensive in Flanders, or rather, as we then hoped, passed to the defensive for the time being.
Twice had England been saved by France at a moment of extreme crisis. Perhaps the third time we should succeed. If we reached the Channel Coast we should lay hands directly on England's vital arteries.
In so doing we should not only be in the most favourable position conceivable for interrupting her maritime communications, but our heaviest artillery would be able to get a portion of the South Coast of Britain under fire.
The mysterious marvel of technical science, which was even now sending its shells into the French capital from the region of Laon, could be employed against England also.
Source: Source Records of the Great War, Vol. VI, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 1923
A cartwheel was a particular type of aerial manoeuvre.
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