nian, Berlin and Bremen authorities have announced potential consequences under criminal law for the public use of the “Z” symbol, deserves approval. Likewise, the German Interior Ministry has declared that displaying the “Z” symbol may be punishable as public endorsement of Russia’s war against Ukraine according to Section 140 of the German Criminal Code.
Ukrainian Warnings and European Silence
Another precondition for the Russian invasion was the European silence on constant Ukrainian appeals and warnings. They have been communicated to Western governments since 2014, the occupation of Crimea and the concealed invasion of Donbas. The Ukrainian authorities called for strengthening Ukraine’s integration both in the fields of economy and military security. At the outset, Ukraine appealed to all core European actors, foremost to Germany, on the necessity to impose on Russia not only economic sanctions, but also more active security policy measures. The subsequently imposed economic sanctions did not have the desired effects; to the contrary, Russia even intensified its military build-up. The continuation of the conflict in Donbas and the occupation of Crimea did not prevent strengthened economic cooperation with the Russian autocratic regime. The Nord Stream II project, used primarily for political purposes by the Russian regime and supported by German authorities, developed rapidly and even reached the stage of certification. The German government has chosen a relatively neutral containment strategy vis-à-vis Russia. The culmination of Ukraine’s appeals was President Zelensky’s speech at the Munich Security Conference five days before the Russian invasion. Germany’s passive policy, favoring its economic interests over the interests of European regional security and common values, has strikingly failed.
How not to step on a Russian rake twice
First of all, in contrast to European transparency and commitment to taken obligations, Russia’s official positions and assurances do not deserve trust. Russia’s calls for a further peaceful resolution of the conflict and the maintenance of peaceful coexistence must be perceived as deceptive and covert preparation for further aggression. This is confirmed by the experience of the implementation of the Minsk agreements and the assurances of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Lavrov, about the impossibility of armed aggression just a month before the start of the military invasion.
Second, the European policy of deterring a potential aggressor by only reacting to already committed violations and realized threats should be changed from passive reaction to a proactive position which would stop gross violation of international humanitarian law and prevent further aggressions and crimes. The recent events such as the Bucha massacre committed by the Russian military, as well as the mass homicide of civilians in Mariupol, require Ukraine to take active steps to swift deocupation of territories and cities for further saving of civilian lives. Liberation of occupied territories and cities is impossible through the use of defensive weapons and requires the use of offensive ones. The international partners’ support in the supply of offensive weapons is vital for saving civilian lives and further deoccupation.
Third, the easing of economic sanctions against the Russian regime, as confirmed by previous experience, will not lead to the desired results. To the contrary, it will be seen by the Russian regime as a manifestation of weakness and inconsistency. Regardless of the further development of the military situation in Ukraine and pretended peaceful intentions, economic sanctions must continue to be strengthened, comprehensively and in long-term perspective.
Fourth, the Russian government views the multilevel bureaucratic infrastructure and constitutional plurality in Europe as a sign of weakness and abuses it for its own interests. Europe’s bureaucracy and decision-making procedures, especially on security issues, should be improved to enable rapid and coherent decision-making on security