sh and policy, but peace and democracy cannot be realised through our efforts only. Although we will do all in our power to contribute to the peace and stability of Somalia, as it is in our interest to do so, the responsibility to establish peace in that country principally rests on the Somali people and the political forces there. In addition to this, those external forces which can influence events should see to it that they use their authority to contribute to bringing about peace and democracy in Somalia.
The events of the last ten years in Somalia have not been encouraging, but we should not give up hope that peace and democracy will eventually come to Somalia. The country has disintegrated into different areas, and while some are comparatively, calm others are in continuous turmoil. Those who reap benefits from the absence of authority – a number of Somali groups, some traders, religious extremists, and their foreign friends – are bent on sabotaging in one way or another any effort aimed at bringing about peace in Somalia. Although the Somali people long for peace, they have not been able to break out of the web of obstruction put in place by those who oppose peace and change. Although the international community wishes to bring about peace in Somalia, it is evidently not ready to exert all its efforts to realise this. Thus, it appears to us that the condition of instability in Somalia is likely to persist for some time. Therefore, our policy should not be limited to contributing to the emergence of peace and democracy only and, based on that, to forging strong ties; rather, it should also address what we should do if instability and turmoil persist.
Our fundamental policy remains to persistently work towards the birth of a peaceful and democratic Somalia. But in light of the continuing instability, the policy we pursue should essentially be a damage-limitation policy to ensure that the instability does not further harm our country, the region and the people of Somalia. If the instability is not stopped, th