Can Russia play an active part in the Pacific game?
Valdaiclub.com interview with Alexei Fenenko, Leading Research Fellow, Institute of International Security Studies of RAS, Russian Academy of Sciences.
How is Russia’s Asian policy seen abroad, in particular in Asia and the West?
Russian society was traditionally divided into Slavophiles and Westernizers. There has never been a strong “Pacific” party in the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union or Russia. In Soviet and Russian analytical thought, the Soviet Union/Russia was never considered as part of the Pacific system of relations. Developments beyond the Urals were seen in St. Petersburg and Moscow as secondary to what happened in the Euro-Atlantic region.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia positioned itself as a European country. The Kremlin paid less attention to events in the Pacific region than to Euro-Atlantic issues. APEC is the only regional organization in which Russia is a member. Russia has no free trade agreements with any of the Pacific countries. Asian-Pacific countries view Russia as a geographic part of the region. East Asian colleagues often say on the sidelines of conferences: “You have been saying for years that Russia is a European country. This is why it is not considered to be an Asian country.” Some consider this statement as too harsh, but it is also largely correct. Most decisions on Pacific issues are still taken without Moscow’s contribution.
The West is showing considerable interest in Russia’s Pacific policy. But Western experts see the Far East as a region that is different from other parts of Russia.
More research papers probably have been written about Russia’s Pacific problems in the United States than in Russia. U.S. historians emphasize that Russia controlled its own Far East only after it completed the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1903. This backs up the claim by U.S. political analysts Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy that a connection between Russia’s eastern and western regions has developed only recently. Studies of the Far Eastern Republic (1920-1922) are very popular in the United States. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, U.S. analysts focused on new problems:
Might Russian Far East become part of China’s geo-economic space?
Can Russia’s potential be used to deter China?
Can Russia’s Far Eastern regions join Pacific integration associations separately from Russia?
EU experts are split on Russia’s Pacific policy. Back in 1964, French President Charles de Gaulle proposed the idea of a “common European home from the Atlantic to the Urals,” but not to Kamchatka. Modern EU experts wonder if Moscow can maintain control over the country’s Asian regions. French analyst Anne de Tinguy wrote in 2005: “The declining Siberian population is weakening the connection between the two parts of Russia, which has preserved its Asian furnace only thanks to its huge size.” Moscow fears that Russia’s European choice is seen in Brussels as the weakening of the connection between its European part and the Far Eastern regions.
What elements of the Pacific policy is Russia keeping away from? Should it take part in them?
Over the past 20 years, two integration projects have competed in the Pacific region. The first stipulates regional integration in East Asia through the rapprochement of China and ASEAN. That trend strengthened after the Asian financial crisis of 1997, which weakened the positions of key U.S. allies – Japan and South Korea. Three systems of ASEAN’s privileged consultations with partners developed after the crisis: ASEAN+1 (China), ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and ASEAN+6 (China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand). Japanese Prime Ministers Taro Aso and Yukio Hatoyama supported the policy of regional integration. In accordance with their concept of an East Asian Community, Japan should ease its pro-U.S. orientation in favor of developing relations with neighboring countries.
That trend worried Washington. In 1989, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker warned that it would be a strategic mistake for the United States to allow “a line to be drawn down the middle of the Pacific with the United States on one side and Asian nations on the other.” This is why the Bush administration proposed the idea of a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to incorporate all Pacific nations. The new association was to be based on APEC, which was established in 1989 at the initiative of U.S. allies – Australia and New Zealand. During the APEC forum in Bogor in 1994, the Clinton administration ensured the adoption of the targets that became known as the Bogor Goals, which stipulate free and open trade and investment among industrialized members of the Pacific by 2010, and among developing members by 2020. But their achievement was hindered by the Asian crisis of 1997 and the unyielding stance of the U.S. Congress.
By the early 2010s, rivalry among projects intensified and the East Asian project grew stronger. In 2005, the ASEAN+6 member countries established the East Asia Summit. In 2007, ASEAN adopted its charter and became a full-fledged organization. On December 1, 2009, China abandoned the idea of the Group of Two (G2), which stipulated special relations between China and the United States and reaffirmed its adherence to the concept of a multipolar world. The China-ASEAN free trade area (CAFTA) was established in 2010.
In response, the United States started renewing its strategy to deter China. The Obama administration reactivated the ANZUS military political bloc which was put on the backburner in 1987. Washington expanded its military presence in Asian-Pacific countries by building a naval base in Singapore and establishing military-political partnership with Vietnam. In 2009, it signed a series of agreements on military-technical partnership with India. The United States has taken Vietnam’s side in its disputes with China in the South China Sea. The Trans-Pacific Partnership concept, devised as an alternative to ASEAN, has a special role to play in U.S. policy in the region.
How do you evaluate the future of the TPP? Could it polarize the world by pitting the United States and Japan against China and Russia?
The United States is trying to direct regional processes in a direction that would benefit it most. The TPP is an opportunity to resolve a series of issues.
First, the TPP is creating an economic connection between the two Pacific coasts. The Trans-Pacific Partnership was initiated in 2005 by two Asian-Pacific countries (Singapore and Brunei), New Zealand and a Latin American country (Chile). If the United States, Peru, Malaysia, Australia, Japan and Vietnam join the project, it would institutionalize the “Pacific community.” The TPP is actually aimed at achieving a goal that the Clinton administration failed to achieve within the framework of the Bogor Goals.
Second, the TPP is objectively weakening ASEAN, which has been operating at the level of two-tier consultations since 1967 – adopting a common decision and then upholding it jointly in other international organizations. This mechanism is being eroded due to the fact that some ASEAN members are joining the TPP.
Third, the TPP is undermining the China-ASEAN free trade area (CAFTA) established in 2010. Several ASEAN members have signed free trade agreements with the countries that are not members of the CAFTA. The TPP membership of the United States and Japan will enable them to dampen China’s economic influence in Southeast Asia and to erode the CAFTA mechanisms in the future.
Fourth, the TPP is eroding the system of political consultations under the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 formulas, and also the East Asia Summit. Australia, New Zealand and Japan prefer to attend consultations that involve the United States, which is possible within the TPP format. The participation of Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and Brunei in the TPP is creating a system of consultations that acts as an alternative to ASEAN.
And fifth, the TPP is creating a new context of relations in the Pacific region as a trans-Pacific association led by the United States and based on three pillars of the U.S. presence in the Pacific: 1) the U.S.-Japanese alliance; 2) the revived ANZUS; and 3) U.S.-friendly Latin American countries (Chile and Peru). ASEAN is being divided into TPP members and non-members. China is therefore facing the task of finding a place in the new system of relations in the Pacific region. The only option is confrontation with nearly all Pacific countries.
How can the TPP influence Russia?
Russia was not an active player in the Pacific region and hence has not been as seriously impacted by the TPP as China. But the growing U.S. presence in Asia-Pacific is strengthening the Pacific countries’ dependence on Washington and undermining the resources of Russian diplomacy.
This has complicated Russia’s presidency of the APEC forum, which will culminate in Leaders’ Week in Vladivostok in September 2012. Russia proposed focusing on energy security in Asia-Pacific, but the forum will now have to highlight the establishment of the TPP and its possible relations with CAFTA, ASEAN and China. Officially, the TPP is a partnership of countries established to achieve the Bogor Goals. Does this mean that countries that are not TPP members (including Russia) will not contribute to the Bogor Goals? It appears that it is Washington, not Moscow, that is formulating the agenda of the APEC meeting in Vladivostok.
Russia’s relations with ASEAN and the TPP cannot be described as easy. Over the past ten year, Russia made a number of declarations but failed to develop a system of strategic partnership with ASEAN. On the other hand, it is negotiating the establishment of a free trade area with New Zealand. The signing of an FTA agreement with New Zealand would make Russia a partner of the TPP, not ASEAN, and would further strengthen China’s mistrust of Russia’s policy.
The format of Russia’s future relations with the TPP is unclear. What will be the focus of Russia-New Zealand trade if they sign the agreement? New Zealand is working on a space program and has shown interest in Russian space technology. Cooperation with it in this sphere would benefit Russia commercially but could deepen China’s mistrust. This is likely, considering China’s concern over the Russian-Japanese agreement of partnership in space exploration and peaceful uses of outer space signed in 1993. The United States could promote the use of Russian space and missile technology in ASEAN countries, Australia and New Zealand to foster mistrust between Russia and China.
Will we see a regrouping of forces in Asia soon, for example between Russia and China, or between Japan, the United States and South Korea, or in South Asia? Will new regional associations be established?
The regrouping is already underway. It began in the middle of 2010, when the Obama administration started developing a new system to deter China. The establishment of the TPP only accelerated these processes.
Japan is becoming the key country in the region. The Japanese elite is discussing the merits of joining the TPP. Its industrial sector is advocating the idea because accession promises new markets. But the agricultural lobby is against joining the TPP as it fears competition from Southeast Asian and Latin American countries. If Japan joins the TPP, this would destroy the East Asia Summit and disrupt Japan’s policy of forging closer ties with its East Asian neighbors.
If Japan refuses to join the TPP, this would come as a serious blow to U.S. interests in the Pacific region.
The struggle for South Korea is becoming more intense. The United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) entered into force a month ago, creating the foundation for South Korea’s accession to the TPP and destroying the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 systems of consultations. China will consider diplomatic tools for influencing Seoul, but its resources are limited.
The alignment of forces in Southeast Asia is changing. Washington used the territorial dispute between Vietnam and China in the South China Sea in spring 2010 to its benefit. Over the past two years, it developed a system of military-political consultations with Vietnam. The establishment of a U.S. naval base in Singapore will promote this process. The United States is strengthening its presence in the Strait of Malacca, which is a major hydrocarbon shipping lane for China and Japan. This will prevent the development of a CAFTA-based security zone.
The revival of ANZUS has changed the situation in the South Pacific. The accession of Australia and New Zealand to the TPP has added an economic dimension to the process and changed the diplomatic role of New Zealand in East Asia. Since the mid-1980s, New Zealand has been positioning itself as an independent player (opposed to Australia) and as an intermediary between the countries of Oceania, Australia, ASEAN and the United States. Currently, New Zealand is coordinating its actions with the United States again. The “window of opportunity” in the form of New Zealand’s mediation is closing.
But the biggest new element is the change in China’s stance. Approximately four years ago the United States feared that China was building its own system of relations in East Asia through ASEAN+3, CAFTA and the East Asia Summit. But now it is the United States that is building new relations in the Pacific region, which could lead to China’s isolation and provoke Beijing into making tough moves such as provoking a new Taiwanese crisis or increasing pressure on ASEAN.
What can Russia do to strengthen its standing in the region? What practical actions should the government take in addition to abstract statements on the need to develop Siberia and the Far Eastern regions?
Russia is facing a difficult choice. In the early 1990s, it opted for strategic partnership with China and now has a number of bilateral obligations within the framework of the 2001 Russian-Chinese Treaty of Friendship. It stipulates, in part, regular political consultations on key international issues.
At the same time, Russia has been trying to balance the excessive influence of Chinese business in the Russian Far East. The Russian government came to the conclusion that Chinese business will not invest in the development of Russia’s Far Eastern regions. China views Russian regions primarily as a source of raw materials. Most importantly, China is not creating anything new but is only imitating Western technologies. Russia has been trying to diversify its relations in the Pacific region. Over the past 20 years, it has been trying to develop relations with Japan, South Korea, ASEAN, New Zealand and the United States.
So far, its attempts to find “an additional partner” in the Asian-Pacific region have not succeeded. Japan, South Korea and ASEAN nations have not agreed to promote partnership with Moscow. There is an idea of promoting U.S.-Russian partnership based on the Northern Alternative to ASEAN, proposed by the Brookings Institution in 2010, which stipulates economic cooperation between the Pacific region of the United States, the Pacific region of Canada, the Russian Far East, South Korea and possibly Japan. Theoretically, it could provide an institutional basis for attracting investment in the economy of the Russian Far East, in particular in the construction of railroads and ports.
But the word “alternative” is ambiguous. How would China view this change in Russia’s policy? How would ASEAN nations interpret it? There is the risk that Russia’s choice of a promise of U.S. or Canadian investment would undermine its friendship treaty with China. Another consideration is U.S. discussions about the possible participation of the Russian Far East in Pacific organizations independently of Russia.
Russia faces a choice. It can play an active part in the Pacific game in order to attract investment in its Far Eastern regions, which could be dangerous in the polarized region because it could lead to confrontation with the United States, Japan or China. Or it could gradually strengthen its resources in the Pacific region by exporting its energy resources and space technology.
The strategic task of the United States is to weaken Russian-Chinese cooperation and, ideally, to undermine their 2001 friendship treaty. This will force Russia to choose between maintaining partnership with China and developing relations with U.S. allies.
Is the idea of creating a state corporation for the development of Siberia and the Far East, proposed by Sergei Shoigu, feasible? What do you think about his idea of moving the Russian capital to Siberia, advanced on April 6? Is this at all possible, even if in the long run?
This is not a new idea at all. Back in 1993, Russian political scientist Vadim Tsymbursky advanced the idea of “a trans-Ural St. Petersburg,” i.e., a major city that would take over part of Moscow’s functions. In my opinion, this project is fraught with considerable dangers.
The first danger lies in the transfer of part of the capital city’s functions to a city located in Asia. This will increase the number of Russian capital cities to three (the first two are Moscow and St. Petersburg) and will entail giving the regions more independence. Some regional elites could be tempted to change the Russian federation into a confederation. It is also unclear how the European part of Russia – in particular Moscow and St. Petersburg, where a minor part of governing institutions are being transferred – would react. The situation could become volatile if the project receives external support, for example through the admission of the Russian Far East into APEC or the hypothetical Northern Alternative to ASEAN.
Another relevant issue concerns infrastructure. Moscow is the largest railroad hub in Russia connected to all Russian regions. A “Siberian capital” would be connected only to the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Baikal-Amur Mainline. The network of highways in Russia’s Asian regions is not sufficiently developed, with highways running mostly horizontally. This means that an additional transportation hub would have to be created in the Urals. Russia cannot follow the experience of Kazakhstan and Brazil, whose new capitals are not surrounded by territories with negative average annual temperatures and permafrost. In my view, it would be better to invest in modernizing the infrastructure of the Far East.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.