"Iran's role is likely to be even more probleamtic. A
return to a pro-Western posture would certainly facilitate the
stabilization and consolidation the regand it is therefore strategically
desirable for America to en, nurage such a return in Iran is (onduct.
But until that happens, Iran is likely to play a negative role."
Zbigniew Zbrezinski- The Grand Chessboar
It has been over 100 days since Seyyed Mohammad Khatami took office
as the new president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the United
States and other democratic nations, assessments of the newly
elected leaders and legislatures have been part of the democratic
process of communicating with the public. Therefore, it should
not be seen as inappropriate to place the spotlight on the newly
elected government in Tehran. This new government's progress,
or lack thereof, must be made manifest to the Iranians who brought
it into power. It is thus responsible and answerable for its shortcomings
and failures to the same people.
Focus on Iran, in its assessment of the "first 100 days",
has highlighted 10 specific shortcomings or indeed failures of
the newly elected Khatami govemment.
1- NO CHANGE IN OVERALL DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY
For public welfare, economic reform, freedom of press, active
political parties and combating corruption, nothing has been done.
Repression, political persecution, torture and gross violation
of human rights, especially rights of women, continue. The shortcomings
and failures of the Khatami government's domestic policies will
be discussed in greater detail in the future issues of Focus on
Iran. In the international relations and foreign policy there
appears to be no discernible change from the negative aspects
of the former administration, namely that of Rafsanjani's. Specifically,
Iran finds itself viewed as a "pariah" nuclear weapons
and their means of delivery. Furthermore, it is important to note
that neither President Khatami, nor his foreign minister, have
presented a statement or agenda for the direction of their foreign
policy or, order of priorities/ imperatives for future initiatives.
The failure of the Khatami administration to make its foreign
policy program and priorities unambiguous to the international
community reduces its credibility, raises suspicion as to its
intentions and most importantly, could result in detrimental effects
on the security and stability of the Iranian people in the long
term. If Iran wishes to be a major player in the international
arena it must be trusted, it must achieve respect and credibility
which its former presidents have failed to gain. To date, this
administration is failing to do so.
2- FAILURE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
Closely related to (1) above, but more to the point, Khatami's
administration has shown no inclination towards even taking the
first step for normalization of relations with the United States.
Nonetheless, the United States has placed the anti-regime Mojahedeen-e-Khalgh
(operating from Iraq) on its State Department terrorist list.
To date, the current government has failed to acknowledge or respond
to American initiative and good will gesture. As mentioned in
(1) above, Iran's support of terrorism, acquisition of weapons
of mass destruction, and destabilization efforts, are the main
issues of contention between the United States and Iran over the
past decade. Islamic Republic's response so far has been the continuation
of its long-standing antiAmerican propaganda program for both
domestic and international consumption.
The failure of Khatami and his predecessors to appreciate the
importance and good will of the United States in the international
community prove their neglect of national security and economic
interests of Iran and their lack of understanding for political
realities. This is especially true in the area of international
finance and trade. Much of the
Islamic Republic's financial difficulties and failures to improve
its industrial and commercial infrastructure can be traced to
its poor standing and credibility in the international financial
community. Failure of the Islamic Republic to receive American
support in its financial negotiations has virtually closed the
door to acquiring any relief for its economy's distress.
3-THE INITIATIVE UNDERTAKEN TO ACQUIRE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Within the past five years or so, the Rafsanjani and, now the
new Khatami administration have pursued a program of acquiring
weapons of mass destruction. The putative source for materials
and weapons of mass destruction, have been identified as the Peoples
Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea), the Peoples Republic
of China, and Russia. As much as it could now be ascertained,
the desired weapons of mass destruction, under past and present
pursuit, are focused on nuclear materials, fabricated detonators
and warheads and missile delivery means, notably the NODANG medium
range missile from North Korea. It should be mentioned that President
Jiang Zemin in his recent visit to the United States declared
that China would no longer provide Iran with materials which could
be used for mass destruction purposes. Nevertheless, it can be
expected that the Khatami government will continue its pursuit
of nuclear weapon materials from other willing sources.
The activities of the Tehran regime herein discussed is not only
dangerous to the security of the Middle East region, but to the
people of Iran. The main issue here, more than anything else,
is the irresponsibility of this theocratic regime and the vile
strategy that it follows. From a national strategic security perspective,
Iran faces no threat from any source that justifies a nuclear
(biological, or chemical) weapons arsenal. This assessment includes
past, present and future security threats to Iran. For the Iranian
people, this pursuit means loss of hard currency and earnings
vital for its financial improvement, if not survival. Far more
dangerous to the Iranian people is the likely possibility of inviting
preemptive strikes at identified and verified sites of facilities
or deployment of weapons of mass production. In this event, collateral
human casualties and material destruction is highly probable.
If there is any new program which the Khatami administration could
undertake to improve the status of the state and the security
of its people it would be to cease the irrational and dangerous
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. If it does nothing else,
abandoning this pursuit, will win the gratitude and admiration
of the Iranian people along with the international community.
4- FAILURE FOR A TIMELY IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN
The Fatwa of Ayatollah Khomeini for Salman Rushdie's head still
remains in force. The recent "guilty of murder" verdict
against the Tehran political leadership is an indictment if not
proof, of the clerical regime's support for terrorism. In this
instance, the victims of state sponsored terrorism were 4 leaders
of the Kurdish opposition. Its ineptness and failure to deal with
the embarrassment has resulted in a near break with German government.
The clerical regime's support for terrorism and the verdict of
Berlin court caused a diplomatic crises between Tehran and European
governments and because of that the European ambassadors were
recalled to their countries for consultation, lasting several
months, and have only recently returned to Tehran. The repercussions
of this series of events has further discredited the Tehran regime
in the eyes of European governments and the people. The result
of the testimony and the verdict in Berlin is to affirm Islamic
Republic's participation if not indictment of State-sponsored
terrorism. The Khatami administration made little effort, to ameliorate
this diplomatic crisis with Germany and European Governments.
5- DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN
Since its independence, Pakistan has developed a very close relationship
with Iran. The relationship was based
on political, strategic cultural and economic factors. After the
Revolution, the clerics paid far less attention to those important
factors and instead tried to proselytize their brand of Shia ideology
in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan. At the same time, Pakistan
supported the Sunni fundamentalist Taliban in Afghanistan, and
thus rivalry and competition replaced cooperation. Irrespective
of the factional forces and their international supporters, the
fact remains that this internal struggle in Afghanistan should
not be the focus of outside powers. Mr. Khatami would be well
advised to cut its loses and remove itself from the Afghan quagmire
lest Iran put itself exposing lives in an insoluble conflict with
no foreseeable end. Furthermore, Iran's diplomatic isolation does
not need yet another adversary across its south-eastern border.
Pakistan for years has been a friend of Iran; it would be a folly
to bring about the enmity of Pakistan for questionable gain in
Afghanistan for promotion of religious ideology.
6- IRAN AND TURKEY: Need for skillful diplomatic and political
Iran's relation with Turkey is quite important for its economic
and strategic security, even more so than with any of its bordering
states. Firstly, Turkey is the transit route for Iran to Europe.
Secondly, Turkey offers the means for Iran to transport its petroleum
and natural gas pipe through that country to the Mediterranean
port of Alexandretta (Iskenderun). The economic ties that the
pipeline offers has political and strategic benefits for Iran's
future status not only in the region, but in the international
economic environment. The problem facing the Tehran leadership,
especially President Khatami and his foreign policy (if indeed
he controls it), is the inability to reconcile its militant and
strident Islamic fundamentalism, and its promotion in Turkey,
and the anti-Israeli attitudes. This reconciliation needs to be
accomplished by an extremely adept and far-sighted foreign policy
and leadership in the face of a Turkish secular government and
the latter's growing military and strategic relationship with
Israel. Added to the above critical differences between the two
countries, is the persistent issue of the Kurds on their mutual
frontiers which has a potential danger for each of them. It appears
that Mr. Khatami will have no power to deal effectively with this
complex relationships. To this date, Khatami has given no reason
for optimism for a beneficial solution.
7- THE INABILITY OF TEHRAN TO UNDERSTAND THE UNITED STATES'
OBJECTIVES, INTENTIONS OR SIGNALS
This discussion concerning Iran-U.S. relations is closely related
to the discussion in (2) above. In this instance, it is certain
that the Tehran leadership has failed to comprehend, and appreciate
the United States' strong position concerning Islamic Republic's
lack of respect for human rights and democracy, its belligerent
strategic and ideological policy in the Middle East and its support
of worldwide terrorism. Furthermore, the clerical regime has failed
to understand American public opinion against the revolutionary
government resulting from the 444 days of Americans held captive
in its Embassy. As a result of this failure, Tehran has, since
1979 made no effort or even attempt to understand the U.S. political,
emotional and strategic interests. In short, it appears that the
Khatami government's apparent policy, its blindness towards the
United States, will persist, even if in the long run, it would
prove harmful to the national interest of Iran.
8-CONFUSING AND AMBIGUOUS RELATIONSHIP WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN"S
Ever since the end of the bloody and destructive war with Iraq,
the Tehran leadership has conducted an extraordinary ambiguous
if not strange relationship with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. No clear
inter-state policy has been enunciated from Tehran in the past
nor is it likely to do so in the near future. During the Persian
Gulf pre-war and war crisis, the Tehran government chose to remain
virtually silent in the face of obvious aggression and threats
to its neighbors.
The clerical regime of Tehran missed
a great opportunity to join the international community in opposing
Iraqi aggression, and achieving a degree of responsibility and
credibility. Since the end of the war, there have been numerous
visits by important Iraqi and Iranian officials to and from Baghdad
and Tehran. Only recently Iran's Minister of Health, Dr. Marandi
visited Baghdad and invited Saddam Hussein to visit Tehran in
December '97 to attend the International Islamic Conference. It
should be noted that this seemingly friendly gesture to Baghdad
is done in the face of Iraq's support of the anti-Tehran Mojahedeen-e
Khalgh (based in Iraq) and the opposition of the Iranian public,
military establishment and the Revolutionary Guards. The minimal
requirement for public and military support for friendly relations
with Iraq would be the latter's adherence to the agreements for
the return of the POW's and the payment of reparations and restitution.
How could anyone with a minimal knowledge of Saddam Hussein's
credibility and rationality expect otherwise? Future relations
with Baghdad may very well be President Khatami's greatest challenge.
We believe that in the context of the present crisis between Baghdad
and the United Nations, Tehran has an excellent opportunity to
exercise regional leadership in opposing the threat to the international
community. By exerting its leadership in concert with the U.N.,
Tehran can re-establish its credibility for future negotiations
with Baghdad over reparation and other unsettled differences resulting
from Saddam's aggression against Iran and the war which lasted
for 8 years.
In order to achieve this leadership status and international
respect, the current administration must make greater effort to
control and guide the nation, however, there seems to be little
indication that Mr. Khatami can benefit from this opportunity
and thus it is unlikely that he will bring about any rational
change in the Tehran's long-standing confused and ambiguous relations
9- THE DANGEROUS AND DESTRUCTIVE OPPOSITION TO THE MIDDLE EAST
The continuing opposition to the U.S. backed Middle East peace
plan stems from Tehran's immovable position towards the United
State and Israel. In reality, this position does little to enhance
Iran's stature and respect in the international community. Iran
has found itself supporting the Hezballah and Hamas terrorist
groups, not to mention Syria, in this anti-peace effort. This
policy of Tehran's leadership finds its roots in the Islamic Fundamentalist
ambition to "liberate" Jerusalem in the name of Islam
- probably under Shia leadership. The irrationality of this political-religious
ambition is obvious. The obviousness is based on the fact that
such a realization of the clerical ambitions could not be achieved
without a Middle East war. More over, it does not have the support
of the totality of the Islamic world which is predominantly Sunni.
Furthermore, the long-term resolution of the Israeli-Syrian hostility
may rest on a quid pro quo, i.e. Syria receives the Golan Heights
for Damascus abandoning the Hezballah and recognition of Israel.
In that event, Tehran could find itself as "odd man out"
once more in the international arena. Furthermore, Tehran's support
for Hamas does not accord with Yassir Arafat's program for the
Palestine Authority's Leadership. The survival of the Palestinian
state very much depends on a peaceful settlement of the Middle
East crises. The prospects for Khatami changing this "ill-advised
policy" of the Islamic Republic is most probably nil.
10- THE NEGATIVE ASPECT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC'S RECENT OIL
The recent oil deals between Tehran on one side and Russia, Malaysia,
and France on the other, may very well have detrimental long-run
effects. This assessment, perhaps not currently obvious may have
its negative consequences in the future. Among the negative considerations
is the likely prospect of U.S. sanctions against those states
dealing with Iran, the association of those states with an acknowledged
state supporting terrorism, and unreliability and dangerous course
of Tehran's foreign relations endeavors. Simply put, the Mullah's
confused and self-defeating foreign policy may come to naught.
Moreover, the Iranian public is little aware of the "deal"
nor has all the costs-benefits been made public. There is a strong
likelihood that the benefits for Iran, especially from a financially
Russia, may be minimal despite present day appearance.
Much of the negative assessment of recently elected President
Mohammad Khatami's administration has its basis not in a dislike
or distrust in the President. Rather, it is founded on the fact
that Khatami is not the muster of his own political agenda or
program. Though relatively "moderate" when compared
to other candidates in the last presidential elections, he is
far from being a moderate in the context of democratic political
standards. In actuality, Khatami serves at the convenience and
more importantly, the approval of the absolute leader Ayatollah
Khamenei, who has no respect for democracy, human rights and freedom
in Iran. Furthermore, this bodes pessimism for any hope that Khatami
can achieve necessary vital domestic and foreign initiatives.
Mr. Khatami, thus faces the powerful opposition of the Supreme
leader, former president Rafsanjani and radical clerics as well.
Mr. Rafsanjani who has been responsible for the misery of Iranian
people for 18 years and is one of the architects of international
terrorism now controls the Council For Expediency for Discernment
(the new politburo of Islamic Republic), continues to act as if
he is still the real president of Iran .
It is now obvious that a contest of power is taking place within
the clerical leadership; the outcome of that internecine conflict
may indeed be beneficial to the Iranians and the country. The
near term likely prospects for change under Khatami's administration
is stalemated until the "dust has settled". Certainly,
Khatami will take a wait and see attitude, thus increasing his
prospects for more than 100 days to reach a valid assessment of
his total political effectiveness. The people of Iran who voted
for Mr. Khatami are indeed watching him and the ruling clerics
quite carefully. If he fails to deliver his promises to the People
and remains subservient to the Supreme leader, Iranians will decide
and find a truly independent national leader who could commit
himself to liberation and freedom of the people, to tranquility
in Iran and peace and stability in the region.