America’s war in Afghanistan is winding down, but the U.S. must worry about conflict elsewhere. Once viewed as inconceivable, war between China and Japan now looks possible, though thankfully still unlikely. Tokyo should get serious about its own defense.
The U.S. used its power as occupier after World War II to impose a constitution on Japan which forbade possession of a military. But America lost its enthusiasm for that arrangement early during the Cold War. When Washington subsequently pushed Tokyo to rearm, the latter hid behind its constitution.
Japan’s neighbors also opposed a Japanese military revival, preferring to rely on America for defense. Moreover, there were political points to be scored from attacking Tokyo. And Japan made itself an easy target when officials refused to apologize for their nation’s previous misbehavior.
But the world is changing. World War II is long past. Most Japanese citizens seem prepared for their nation to become like other ones. So does their new prime minister, Shinzo Abe. And that means defending themselves in a more dangerous world.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is building missiles and testing nuclear weapons. The People’s Republic of China is expanding its military and growing more assertive internationally.
Moreover, America no longer can afford to protect most of the known world from any and all threats. Despite the so-called “pivot” to Asia, U.S. forces will not remain forever. In fact, Prime Minister Abe publicly worried: “With the U.S. defense budget facing big cuts, a collapse of the military balance of power in Asia could create instability.”
Tokyo’s first duty is to protect Japan. Although the PRC is unlikely to attempt to swallow Japan, there is no more vital task than protecting one’s homeland against any exigency.
Moreover, the Japanese government should promote regional security, cooperating closely with other democratic countries in East Asia. Tokyo also should work with less democratic states to maintain a balance of power in the region, and especially to help ensure that China’s rise remains peaceful.
Of particular importance for Japan is keeping sea lanes open and protecting international commerce. China’s expanding navy, which launched its first aircraft carrier last year, has raised concerns throughout East Asia. Japan no longer should rely on America to guarantee the former’s economic interests.
Moreover, Tokyo requires the means to enforce its sovereignty claims. China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, South Korea, and Vietnam all join Japan in claiming to own various islands, islets, and rocks, control of which yields ownership of surrounding fishing grounds and energy fields. Exactly who owns what depends on international treaty and law, control and occupation, and historical connection. Good lawyers make good arguments, but good militaries are even more important.
For years Tokyo’s defense spending only averaged one percent of the GDP—and has not increased since 2002. Still, Japan has created a capable “Self Defense Force.” And Tokyo doesn’t need a large army, which would worry its neighbors. Most helpful would be missiles and missile defenses, as well as additional air and naval assets.
These issues have taken on new urgency in light of East Asia’s burgeoning territorial disputes. Japan is squabbling with South Korea over the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands and with Russia over the Northern Territories/Kurile Islands. In both cases Tokyo is contesting the status quo. The disputes are bitter, but unlikely to turn violent.
More dangerous is Beijing’s challenge to Japanese control over the Senkaku (called Diaoyu in China) Islands. These five islets have sparked naval clashes, aerial chases, activist flotillas, and domestic protests. Prime Minister Abe declared that the Senkakus are “Japan’s inherent territory” so “There is no room for diplomatic negotiations over this issue.” Indeed, he added, the solution necessitated, “if I may say at the risk of being misunderstood—physical force.”
Although Beijing has perhaps the better claim to the islands, there’s nothing in principle wrong with Japan taking such a hard-line position—so long as Tokyo bears the cost of giving 1.3 billion Chinese the diplomatic equivalent of the finger. (In late January the prime minister sent an envoy to Beijing with a conciliatory letter to incoming Chinese President Xi Jinping.)
Alas, Japan would not have an easy time if the two navies engaged. Reported Michael Auslin of the American Enterprise Institute: “Japan may have a qualitative edge, but that would be worn down by China’s ability to flood a combat zone with ships, subs and planes. Tokyo would be forced to turn to the United States for support under the mutual security treaty.”
Which is why in November then-Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto proposed updating the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines to include the Senkakus. He cited “the problem of China’s increasing maritime activities” and expressed his desire “to start a revision of the present state of the U.S.-Japan alliance.” Former Vice Defense Minister Akihisa Nagashima explained: “As we witness China’s spectacular rise, Japan and the U.S. must together consider hedging against the fallout.”
Discussions will begin soon. The outcome seems foregone. In 2010 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton refused to take any position on territorial sovereignty, but explained: “we have made it very clear that the islands are part of our mutual treaty obligations, and the obligation to defend Japan.” More recently unnamed State Department officials stated that the defense treaty applied.
Unfortunately, issuing blank checks for the defense of weaker allies rarely turns out well. Doing so encourages the latter to behave irresponsibly, as, in fact, has Tokyo. The Japanese government refuses to negotiate after politicizing the issue by purchasing three of the rocks. Moreover, Japan has done little to prepare for a military confrontation, instead relying on Washington to take up the slack.