(Commentary) – Vadimir Putin’s return as the Russian president has not been discussed seriously in this corner of the world. Like it or not, his third presidential term will impact on the Asia-Pacific region, in particular Asean, more than ever before.
With the regional obsession with rising China and the U.S. pivot to Asia, it is imperative that we do not ignore what Russia has in store for Southeast Asia amid intensified power competition. For China and the U.S., it is about a rebalancing of their power, while for Russia it is about a redistribution of power.
For the past 12 years, Russia has focused successfully on keeping the country together and staying afloat, thanks to the strong-willed Putin’s vision of a united Russia and gigantic revenues from energy exports, especially amid the current high oil prices. Moscow has also maintained its active international profile, as a member of the U.N. Security Council. Although the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, residues of its empire continue to pose security challenges throughout the world, something both Moscow and the international community has to manage.
Throughout Putin’s leadership, including the years under the previous president, Dmitry Medvedev, the Middle East situation has dominated the country’s foreign policy agenda. The Arab Spring has had repercussions for Russia and its people, directly and indirectly. The crisis in Syria and the cooling of Iran’s nuclear ambitions illustrate clearly Russia’s diplomatic weight — playing the good cop/bad cop dichotomy. Without Moscow’s acquiescence, important decisions concerning global peace and stability would be stalled. Southeast Asia is no exception.
When former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev made a major foreign policy announcement on Asia Pacific in 1986 in Vladivostok, no Asean members predicted that it would subsequently lead to a dramatic Soviet pullout from the existing support for Indochinese countries. A year later, during his visit to Bangkok, then foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze reconfirmed the dwindling Soviet presence and economic assistance to the region in order to concentrate on domestic reforms. That laid the groundwork for establishing the present Asean-Russia relations.
In 1991, less than two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Russia was invited along with China as a guest of the Asean chair, Malaysia, to attend the annual foreign ministers meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Thanks to the strong backing from Malaysia, under prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, Russia intensified overall diplomatic engagement with Asean, hoping it would attain a respectable status in the overall scheme of things in the regional grouping. In 1996, Russia became a full dialogue partner of Asean, strengthening the bilateral relations further. The grouping’s desire to counterbalance the influence of the U.S. and China also came into play, but not as intensely and visibly as it is now.
A decade later, Russian President Vladimir Putin was invited by Malaysia to attend the inaugural East Asia Summit in 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, back-to-back with the first Asean-Russia summit. At that time, the U.S. was very hostile to the EAS, assuming the new region-wide framework was an attempt to contain Washington’s sphere of influence. Earlier, the U.S. shot down Mahathir’s much-heralded proposal of East Asian Economic Community. The host’s backing of Russia as a founding member of the EAS failed to materialize, leaving Putin in the cold. Other Asean members argued that Russia did not meet the criteria for membership, which called for substantive links. But the truth was different – taking in Russia as a founding EAS member would break the balance of big powers in the region. That helped explain why even though Asean and Russia signed a 10-year comprehensive action plan (2005-2015) at that time – the only country with which the group did so – to promote their bilateral cooperation, the outcomes have been quite dismal due to a lack of progress.
During their two-decade old relations, Russia has been trying to forge all-around relations, particularly on political and security cooperation, with Asean. But Moscow was not successful, despite its enthusiasm in supporting Asean’s no-nuke zone of peace and security. It was also among the first to express an intention to sign the protocol of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (1995). In 2004, Russia became the second member of the UN Security Council to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, with the U.S. following in 2009. Russia also set up the Asean Center in 2010 at the Moscow State University of International Relations to promote Asean-Russia relations. Interestingly, Moscow has been more enthusiastic than Washington in backing the region-initiated community-building process initiated by Asean. But somehow, Russia’s key policy initiatives often lost out through bureaucratic red tape and lack of follow-up.
At the moment, almost all political and security dialogue and cooperation has been under Asean-led frameworks, such as the Asean Regional Forum, Post Ministerial Meeting and Asean Defence Ministerial Meeting Plus. Throughout the 1990s, Russia did come up with a few ideas of collective security for the Asia-Pacific region with Asean as the centre. But without any follow-up and consultations, these proposals did not go very far. However, both sides managed to sign a joint Declaration on Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism in 2004. But progress has been marginal.
Putin’s presidency also coincides with a series of summits. He will host the Asia Pacific Economic Leaders Meeting later this year in Vladivostok. Putin is scheduled to attend both the ninth Asia Europe Meeting in Vientiane in October and the EAS in Phnom Penh in November. He will make his presence felt with a strong agenda that reflects the country’s Asia-Pacific links as well as its future agenda. At last year’s EAS in Bali, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov replaced the Russian president Dmitry Medvedev at the summit, which was dominated by U.S. President Barack Obama’s participation and policy initiatives on Myanmar.
However, early this year Lavrov offered a glimpse of his country’s new approach to regional security during his visit to Brunei. He reiterated that Russia was keen to take part in the process to develop “a holistic concept of transformation of the regional order and establishing a new security architecture in East Asia.” By this, he meant Russia would intensify both economic and political cooperation, including traditional and non-traditional security ties.
In addition, more focus would be put on efforts to increase bilateral trade and investment. Russia can play a leading role in ensuring energy and food security in the region with its abundant oil and gas, as well as agricultural products.
Trade between Russia and Asean members is small in comparison with China and the U.S. In 2010, overall Asean-Russia trade was a little over US$ 10 billion while investment in Asean up to last year was less than $200 million.
It is an open secret that Russia would like to attract foreign investment, especially from Asean and its dialogue partners, to the country’s remote Siberia and Far East region. Moscow is very interested in the expansion of the Master Plan of Asean Connectivity that would link South Asia through Southeast Asia with Northeast Asia via its vast northern frontier.
Any improvement of transportation and other forms of connections would benefit Russia. This was the focus of its participation in the EAS in Bali.
Putin will have a strong message for the leaders from Asean, ASEM and APEC that Russia is here to stay. Like the U.S., Russia considers itself an Asia-Pacific power with its own version of a pivot toward Asia.
Putin knows Russia needs to be prudent in redistributing its power and influence beyond its immediate neighbouring countries, especially in the region where it once reigned supreme.
– In the May 7 edition of this column, the Philippines was cited as the coordinator of Asean-China ties for 2009-2012. In fact, the coordinated will be Vietnam.