I always read the Pentagon's flag officer announcements, mainly to see if someone I know has gotten an interesting job. (It is nice to see people I knew as majors are now making three and four stars. Unfortunately, it also reminds me that people who joined the military when I started covering the Pentagon are retiring.)
In this case, I don't know Rear Adm. Metts, but I sure found the move of this information warfare specialist interesting. Maybe the U.S. government is going to respond more actively to the stream of Chinese intrusions into American government and business computers:
Rear Adm. (lower half) Willie L. Metts will be assigned as director for intelligence, J2, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii. Metts is currently serving as deputy chief, tailored access operations, S32, National Security Agency, Fort Mead, Md.
And yes, that is the way the press release spelled Fort Meade.
The other day FP carried a standard carriers-are-great piece by a trio of admirals. A friend of mine, appalled at what he regarded as the ostrich-like views of the high-ranking authors, sent a corrective note to me:
Key questions to be considered would be:
- To what degree will China be able to impede our ability to freely use carriers in the Pacific in the future?
- How willing would U.S. political leadership be to commit carriers in a high-threat environment where China would view a negative outcome for them as a threat to the survival of the Party (recognizing that in that culture every defeat, even small ones, are a threat to the survival of the Party)?
- Would POTUS commit a carrier if there was a 10 percent chance it would be hit?
- How about 20 percent, or 30 percent?
- How many of the vertical launch tubes on the destroyers and cruisers are committed to defending the carrier vs. carrying Tomahawks to carry out power-projection missions?
- When does the Navy come in a la Bay of Pigs and say that it can only operate carriers forward to accomplish the mission if it is allowed to hit targets on the mainland, placing CONUS at risk to reprisal, and how does the president respond?
- When does the POTUS realize that for years we have built platforms that we cannot afford to lose, either in monetary cost or the cost of lives? That is the key question. Rule number three of war is never build a weapon that you cannot afford to lose or have defeated. We seem to proceed on an assumption that no one will ever attack our carriers. I think the Chinese will see themselves as being in a position that they cannot afford NOT to attack our carriers.
- How does this all affect our position vis a vis Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and India? All of those relationships will be at risk if we don't have an alternative.
Final thought: The Navy has already accepted that the fleet is going to shrink to 270 ships, and I am here to tell you that it will go smaller than that, probably 230 before this is all done. This is largely because all of those ships that were built by Reagan are all retiring at the same time and we are not building replacements at the same rate right now. That will be the price of maintaining 10-11 supercarriers at $12-13 billion with an annual shipbuilding budget of $15 billion. The price will decrease overall naval presence, and raise questions as to the U.S. commitment to local security concerns.
Navy Capt. Henry Hendrix has just written one of the best papers I've seen in the last several years by an active duty officer. In it, he challenges some of the central beliefs of his service. "After 100 years, the [aircraft] carrier is rapidly approaching the end of its useful life," he asserts.
Hendrix, the current director of naval history, says the current aircraft carrier is too expensive, inefficient, and of doubtful survivability. It is now in danger of becoming, like the battleship during the mid-20th century, "surprisingly irrelevant to the conflicts of the time."
"If the fleet were designed today," he observes, "it likely would look very different from the way it actually looks now -- and from what the United States is planning to buy."
He would like to see unmanned combat aerial vehicles, more than mere drones, capable of flying off both big carriers and the smaller "amphibious" carriers.
What would the equivalent of this paper be in the Army? Has it been written? Any smart colonels out there challenging sacred cows?
By Katherine Kidder
Best Defense office of Communist Chinese capitalist studies
China's growing role in Africa over the past decade-or-so has raised some eyebrows. Questions surrounding China's motives for investment abound: Are they purchasing U.N. votes? Simply extracting natural resources? Expanding the rhetoric of revolution, as it did in the 1960s?
Yet most of these questions presuppose state-led investment in Africa. Xiaofang Shen, a visiting scholar at the Johns Hopkins University SAIS China Studies Program and former investment climate specialist at the World Bank, said in a recent talk at SAIS that the more notable increase over the past decade has been the rise in Chinese private-sector investment on the continent.
Pre-2001, Chinese private investment in Africa was negligible; by the end of 2011, there were 879 private companies and OFDI projects registered with the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. Contrary to the image of state-led extraction, Chinese entrepreneurs focus their energies mainly on manufacturing and service industries. They increasingly are forging relationships with local management, and aware of the value of learning local customs, religions, and languages.
So, what does this mean for the West? Interestingly enough, Chinese private investment in Africa may be a hat tip to Western models of development and governance: Xiaofang Shen's study finds that going overseas to do business was much easier for up-and-coming Chinese entrepreneurs than starting a business in inland China.
Most of China's industry grew up in the 1980s and 1990s, with little-to-no regulation. By contrast, many African laws (at least on paper) were copied and/or imposed by the West through such mechanisms as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). As a result, Chinese entrepreneurs find African processes more conducive to business, from obtaining licenses and navigating the bureaucratic process to trusting that the food they eat for lunch is safe. African governments face higher incentives to improve infrastructure and devote resources to political stability and regulatory efficiency in order to attract capital -- precisely the same goals reflected in SAPs.
By Alexander Sullivan
Best Defense department of psynology
Contrary to some of the more sensationalist appraisals of China's rise in world rankings, David Shambaugh argues in his new book, China Goes Global: The Partial Power, that despite China's undeniable achievements, it has succeeded in becoming a global actor but not a global power. Hence the word "partial."
Shambaugh, a George Washington University political scientist, introduced his book last week in a February 13 talk at Johns Hopkins SAIS. He focused less on China's "vertical" rise -- its skyrocketing GDP and increasing military sophistication -- than on the extent of its "horizontal" expansion of its influence to the rest of the planet. He analyzed China's current global presence along five vectors: diplomacy, global governance, economics, culture, and security.
China has expanded its reach in most of these areas: It is the world's second largest economy and possibly the largest trading nation; it has relations with over 170 countries; it sits at the main table in most global multilateral fora; its official media outlets are opening new bureaus abroad; and it just launched its first aircraft carrier to lead its navy ever farther out in the Western Pacific. But according to Shambaugh, all the government's efforts along these lines have yielded precious little in the way of real power, as understood by people like Joe Nye -- that is, influence exerted to make actor A do thing X.
On the face of it, Shambaugh's conclusions are not unwarranted. China remains a "lonely power" with few genuine friends in the world. Increasing assertiveness in the East and South China Seas has helped roll back diplomatic gains made in its neighborhood since the Asian financial crisis, and even in African and Latin American countries where Chinese investment dollars (untrammeled by governance guarantees) had gained fast new friends, the picture is becoming less rosy.
One of Shambaugh's most interesting arguments is that while China's economic statistics are worthy of admiration, its "multinational" corporations have abysmal international brand recognition and an overall poor track record of breaking into overseas markets, calling into question whether China's corporate sector is really as much of a global business player as it is assumed to be.
He acknowledged that China has tremendous latent potential as a true global power and that its capacities will likely increase. What provoked by far the most interest during the Q&A session was one of his explanations for why China has so far failed to convert its potential into power, namely that Chinese elites are divided over China's identity in the world and the values it should represent. The lack of coherence among decision-makers in China, he said, has been one of the biggest impediments to their effective exercise of power. Absent consensus, the one thread that runs through it all (yi yi guan zhi) is poorly disguised, narrowly defined self-interest, which inevitably provokes counterbalancing by other international actors.
I've long found Paul McHale, a former member of Congress and also a former Pentagon official, a clear thinker. Here he questions the Pentagon's "pivot" to Asia:
"Does it make sense for the United States Army to prepare for a protracted land war against China? . . . Should the Army really be focused on North Korea while paying insufficient attention to Iran? And if a post-2014 civil war in Afghanistan spills over the Durand Line and threatens the stability of Pakistan's government, are there any issues in Myanmar that trump the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Taliban?"
By Jim Gourley
Best Defense commenter of the year
Last week Tom requested suggestions for new blogs to add to his daily reading list. I thought there were some interesting recommendations from readers, but after investigating each one I went back and clicked through the different windows in succession to gain a little more perspective.
Looking at them in aggregate provoked questions. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts, so what world view would the range of sites produce? How does the news feed presented by these sites differ from what Tom is probably already reading? Grouping the sites by their emphasis implies that view would be primarily technology-based, lightly seasoned by some current events in specific regions with dubious commentary. There is very little context. By and large, it lacks breadth and depth. The spectrum of information is narrow and the range of subjects too one-dimensional to provide necessary background.
I read lots of blogs, none of them regularly and not all of them related to defense matters per se, but I tend to see value in unique cultural overlaps. I seek context, perspective, answers. Lately, I find the blogosphere giving me more questions than answers.
Spend enough time
reading the tech blogs and you'll see that there are scores of unmanned weapons
systems in development in the United States and throughout the world. Within
fifteen years we may have a UAV that brings J.J. Abrams' new television series to life, warships with lasers, and bipedal battlefield
terminators assistants. All of these blog posts follow the same thematic
approach. They simply show us the technology. That's valuable information, but
I only need to see it once.
Nowhere can I find answers to the immediate questions I ask upon reading these blogs. Why are we developing these technologies? What existing weapons programs that we're currently shoveling money into will be rendered obsolete by these new weapons? Where does the care and equipping of human service members fit into this? Exactly what threats and enemies are such weapons meant to counter, and what retaliatory developments do we anticipate said enemies to attempt? Do we have a plan or are we just building stuff?
Intelligence and strategy blogs have made the pivot to China well in advance of the defense department, it seems. The American political discourse about the Chinese threat was electrified during the presidential campaign and think tanks are moving apace with speculations of what a conflict with China would look like. But in all the debate over who would do best at "getting tough with China," I didn't hear a compelling argument for getting tough in the first place. Is China really our enemy? Do they have to be our enemy? Is the conventional wisdom more conventional (or perhaps convenient) than it is wise? I have no end of questions about what the American security establishment thinks of China because there is no clear explanation of how it thinks about China. Is there a blog for that?
The defense, intelligence and national law enforcement architectures continue to meld in ways both mysterious and disturbing. The DEA has operated in Afghanistan for a number of years. Predator drones have been used to track cattle rustlers in North Dakota. Part of President Obama's legacy will be a government that can wire-tap my phone without a warrant and assassinate me without due process. I see these developments and I have more questions. Are there still such things as American defense, intelligence and law enforcement establishments, or is it gelling into a monolithic "security establishment?" How long a shadow does it cast and do civil liberties and posse comitatus fall underneath it? Is everyone contributing to this emergent construct actually okay with the potential consequences, or are we just following orders?
Blogs are a relatively new species in the journalism environment, but already the conceptualization of them has become traditional. They were conceived as web-based forums for microbursts of data to help news organizations keep up with the increasing pace of information flow. It was believed that the in-depth analysis would be left to the more substantive print media side of the house. The value of print has already been challenged and found lacking, but so too should the idea that synthesis and analysis can maintain the old pace as developments continue to accelerate. Blogs can't just be places to collate data points any longer. They need to start connecting the dots that are rapidly accumulating. I think 'Best Defense' has succeeded in that endeavor, but Tom depends on good sources of information like any human being. There are more questions than ever. More blogs ought to attempt answering them. Those answers matter now more than ever, because the new pace to which blogs have contributed is not going to wait.
Jim Gourley has been elected to the Best Defense all-star commenter team three years running.
While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns. This originally ran on June 7, 2010.
Interesting comment on U.S.-China relations from Defense Secretary Gates in Singapore over the weekend:
Last fall, President Obama and President Hu made a commitment to advance sustained and reliable military-to-military relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. The key words here are "sustained" and "reliable" -- not a relationship repeatedly interrupted by and subject to the vagaries of political weather.
Regrettably, we have not been able to make progress on this relationship in recent months. Chinese officials have broken off interactions between our militaries, citing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as the rationale. For a variety of reasons, this makes little sense:
First, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are nothing new. They have been a reality for decades and spanned multiple American administrations. Second, the United States has for years demonstrated in a very public way that we do not support independence for Taiwan. Nothing -- I repeat, nothing -- has changed in that stance. Finally, because China's accelerating military buildup is largely focused on Taiwan, U.S. arms sales are an important component of maintaining peace and stability in cross-strait relations and throughout the region."
Zakaria has more on Beijing's new arrogance.
(HT to AD)
While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns. This originally ran on March 26, 2010.
Earlier this week I ran into a friend who offered a correction on my comment that Iran has been the big winner in the Iraq war, gaining much influence inside its western neighbor and indeed across the region.
Yes, he said, Iran has certainly done well, and is more powerful than it was in 2003. But, he continued, the biggest strategic winner in the war so far is China. That's not only because the U.S. government financed the war with borrowings from China, but also because while we were distracted, Beijing has been a busy bee diplomatically, especially in East Asia.
I think my friend is probably right. Thanks a lot, W. (Sarcasm.)
Meanwhile, for all of youse who think this Google thing is just a PR move by that company, chew on this interesting roundup. On the other hand, I hear those who say we are crazy to let software engineers lead the way politically.
While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns. This originally ran on March 13, 2010.
Over the weekend I finished The Vagrants, a terrific novel by Yiyun Li about China in the late 1970s, in the ebb tide period after the Cultural Revolution but before the economic opening. I think this is the richest novel I've read in a year or more. Anyone curious about China at all would enjoy it, as would anyone who simply likes a good novel.
It is perhaps the most scathingly anti-revolutionary book I've ever read, except perhaps for Andrei Platonov's The Foundation Pit. At one point the wisest (and most broken) character in the book asks,
... what is a revolution except a systematic way for one species to eat another alive? Let me tell you -- history is, unlike what they say on the loudspeakers, not driven by revolutionary force but by people's desire to climb up onto someone else's neck and shit and pee as he or she wants.
But it is more than a political novel, it is a great story, beautifully written. It begins in March 21, 1979, with the execution of a young woman who had been a fanatical Red Guard but had lost her faith in Communism and become a determined counterrevolutionary. As she is paraded before being killed, it becomes clear that her vocal cords have been cut, to prevent her from making a final statement. We also learn that one possible reason for her being sentenced to death is that a Party official needs new kidneys, and hers are extracted before she is put to death. It ends about five weeks later, on May Day.
Postscript: Life goes on. After I wrote this item, I went shopping at the Pentagon City Costco. In the cashier's line I stood behind what looked to be a group of visiting Chinese officials, looking very FOB. They were buying tons of bottles of Rogaine and One A Day multivitamins.
By Dean Cheng
Best Defense department of corporate intelligence
This past week, a remarkably disturbing case of arms export control violations came to light, and one which comes at a terrible time for the administration.
From the various accounts, it would appear that a subsidiary of United Technologies Corporation (UTC) was exporting software that was used in China's new Z-10 attack helicopter program. Worse, according to the U.S. Attorney for Connecticut, where the parent company is headquartered, this was not a case of technology diversion by the Chinese, but a case where the company, Pratt and Whitney Canada (PWC), deliberately engaged in violations of the Export Control Act.
The apparently deliberate nature of this violation makes it distinct from something like the Loral-Hughes problems of the late 1990s which led to the Cox Commission report on China-related security issues and the shift of satellites and aerospace technology to the Munitions List for export controls. In the Loral and Hughes cases, the really important technology wasn't even technology, it was "know-how," in the form of failure analysis in the wake of several failed Chinese space launches. The Chinese had very little understanding of how to conduct a proper failure analysis, which involves systems analysis, systems integration (almost in reverse), and a willingness to look objectively at problems, without allowing "guanxi" to divert criticism or blame. (Note that the latter aspect is not necessarily restricted to the Chinese, but they have had far more problems in this regard than we have.)
By contrast, the more recent case was not one of dual-use technologies, but clearly military ones. The Z-10 attack helicopter is patterned on the U.S. AH-64, Russian Mi-28, Eurocopter Tiger model, with a classic two-man fore-and-aft crew disposition. There is no mistaking it for a passenger helicopter. PWC was apparently willing to violate U.S. export control laws, so as to gain access to the large Chinese civilian helicopter market.
For the administration, which has been striving to modify and modernize the U.S. export control regime, the case may raise questions about how carefully this task much be approached. PWC's illegal exports occurred under the current system, one which has been patched and modified but not truly overhauled. Indeed, the administration's proposed changes would rationalize much of the current system, allowing clearer oversight rather than the current patchwork of sometimes contradictory lines of reporting and responsibility.
The UTC case demonstrates the continued need for export controls on advanced, sensitive technology, but it would be unfortunate if it discouraged, rather than encouraged, badly needed reforms to protect that technology better.Dean Cheng is a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation for Chinese political and security affairs.
While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns. This originally ran on March 20, 2009.
In the year 2000, the PLA [People's Liberation Army] had more students in America's graduate schools than the U.S. military, giving the Chinese a growing understanding of America and its military."
(p. 27, 2008 Joint Operating Environment, a study by the U.S. Joint Forces Command)
PETER PARKS/Getty Images
Word arrives from across the wide Pacific that the Chinese military conducted a bridge placement exercise at a Yalu River crossing, a hand grenade's throw from North Korea.
This article speculates that this is a move that signals that the Chinese are worried about refugee flows should Lil Kim's regime collapse. They'd need to bridge to insert troops to create a buffer zone along the border. And maybe also quietly collect those nukes (which is a mission I would support -- better they have them than some nut in NoKo).
Speaking of NoKo, a friend asks how FP can rank it 21st on the list of most failing states. He thinks it should be much higher. I suspect he is correct.
For a security conference focused on the U.S. in Asia, it is amazing how little Taiwan is mentioned. I can remember when it dominated discussions of the American relationship with China. I think this is a sign of progress.
Army Capt. D.J. Skelton in a good Stars & Stripes profile on losing an eye and part of the left side of his head. "So I spend the rest of my life bumping into things on my left . . . So what." He's heading to China as a foreign area officer.
Courtesy of the U.S. Army
Bain Capital, his old outfit and home of some of his money that hasn't moved offshore, is helping the Chinese government with domestic surveillance. Why am I not surprised?
This Tibetan monk doesn't sound like a Romney supporter: "There are video cameras all over our monastery, and their only purpose is to make us feel fear."
Awhile ago one of the more astute grasshoppers recommended watching Red Cliff, a film by John Woo that came out a few years ago. When it arrived from Mr. Netflix I cooked up some chicken Penang curry, cracked open a Rolling Rock, and popped the DVD into the machine. My wife bailed after 10 minutes, but I enjoyed the whole nearly-three-hour shebang. I'd call it a Chinese David Lean's mix of Saving Private Ryan, Gone with the Wind, and Star Wars. Except with more battle scenes -- the last hour was just one big old firefight. (You'll see what I mean.)
I'd thank the grasshopper in question but I can't find the comment.
Just make sure you watch it with subtitles instead of the incompetent dubbing.
By Rebecca Frankel
Best Defense Chief Canine Correspondent
When I came across this photo I was struck by how it so fully captures a necessary growing pain that all handlers experience at one point or another during their careers -- having to part ways with a dog they've grown close to, a dog they love.
"In a picture taken on November 23, 2011, two Chinese paramilitary policemen from the canine unit wipe their tears after they bid farewell to their dogs, as they retire from the unit in Hangzhou, east China's Zhejiang province."
I wasn't at all surprised to see these two men openly wiping tears from their eyes. I've had handlers tell me that the day they were separated from their dog -- whether because of diverging deployment orders or for receiving a promotion that graduated them for their work as handlers -- was one of the worst they can remember. They're not bashful about this emotion either; it just comes with the territory.
I was, however, fairly surprised to see a late-December headline reporting that China currently employs upwards of 10,000 military working dogs in its armed forces. China uses breeds like Labs and Shepherds as well as the Kunming dog for patrol and detection work. According to Wang Han, the quoted official from the Beijing dog breeding and training centre, China's dogs "serve in more than 5,000 army divisions," doing all the things you might expect: "missions like peacekeeping, post-disaster search and rescue and border patrolling."
While overall, not a terribly enlightening story, the high number of China's MWDs is worth noting and keeping an eye trained on the growth of their programs. Otherwise it's just another military catching on to the intrinsic value of these dogs and proof that the handler-dog bond is universal.
In other war dog news: The 673rd Security Forces Sqaudron at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska held a memorial service for not one, but two of its MWDs. RIP Jack and Benjo.
It is always nice to see a RAND document that actually come to some conclusions, however tentative. Maybe they are outgrowing the motto, "RAND -- Providing an intellectual hospice for the conventional wisdom."
By Patrick Cronin
President, Best Defense Academy of Frenemy-American Relations
China appears well on its way to becoming America's next peer competitor. Over the next twenty years, a modernizing People's Liberation Army will challenge regional militaries and better keep foreign powers out of its near seas. As a result, according to a new RAND report, the U.S. Armed Forces will "become increasingly dependent on escalatory options for defense and retaliatory capabilities for deterrence."
In "Conflict with China: Conflict, Consequences and Strategies for Deterrence," James Dobbins, David Gompert, David Shlapak, and Andrew Scobell consider triggers for U.S.-China conflict and their operational and strategic implications.
The paper first examines "occasions for conflict" and includes situations involving the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, cyberspace, the South China Sea, Japan, and India. The scenarios, all judged to be plausible if unlikely, are listed in descending order of probability, with conflict over North Korea thought to contain "significant potential" for escalation.
Similar hazards entail the other potential confrontations considered by the authors. Thus, the discussion on cyberspace suggests how China's putative success in stealing others' electrons could precipitate kinetic action. For instance, a Chinese attempt to disrupt U.S. communications and intelligence could catalyze attacks on satellites and a blockade on China's vital sea lines of communication. The latter refers to an abiding Chinese concern over its so-called "Malacca dilemma," a reference to how closure of the critical Malacca Strait joining the Indian and Pacific oceans might cripple resource-dependent China. Such a scenario could well be casualty-free and yet bring about monumental economic loss and regional upheaval.
The 25-page report's sheer economy of verbiage is one of its strengths. While the authors no doubt could have amplified on the scenarios -- from the East China Sea to the Indian Ocean or Iran to Pakistan -- an exhaustive review of potential conflicts would have added little to the conclusions. Their main interest is to think through operational implications of current trends.
By Peter Bacon
Best Defense Academy of Frenemy-American Relations
At SAIS the other day, the Kettering Foundation and the Institute for American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) held a high-powered conference on the future of U.S.-China relations, featuring pretty much all the big names in the China racket. If you weren't selected to be one of the illuminati, here is what you missed:
--Professor David Lampton of SAIS summed up the conference's assessment of Sino-American relationship as "not in the best of times, but not in the worst of times." Both Professor Lampton and Rear Admiral Eric McVadon both identified believe that the relationship has evolved over the past decades from a one-dimensional, anti-Soviet Cold War partnership to a "three-legged stool," of security, economic, and culture relations. Elites within both countries bolstered this relationship: Tao Wenzhao, a senior fellow at CASS, argued that the recent meetings between elites such as Hu Jintao and President Obama, and between Joe Biden and Hu's putative successor Xi Jinping augured well for future Sino-American relations. Indeed, Wenzhao remarked that one Chinese official observed that "Mr. Jinping [had] never spent so much time with a foreign guest" as he did with Biden. The conference's keynote speaker, former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, similarly identified the Hu-Obama communiqué issued during the two leaders' meeting as "a real blueprint of strategic objectives shared and 34 tangible paragraphs elaborating on them and tasks ahead for the relationship."
--The panelists overall still felt quite uneasy about the future of the Sino-American relationship. Stephen Orlins, President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, memorably remarked on his experience on Chinese television when he was asked by a Chinese audience member "why every U.S. policy was designed to oppose China's rise." Tellingly, Orlins continued, "everyone in the audience [stood] up and [started] to applaud." Brzezinski, similarly, wondered whether the anti-China rhetoric from the field of Republican candidates could engender "a more Manichean vision of the world" within the American government. Panelists on public perceptions of the United States and China confirmed this: Yuan Zheng, a Senior Fellow from CASS, found in studies from 2008 to 2010 that "ordinary Chinese have mixed feelings towards the US, just as [ordinary Americans] with China." Indeed, he continued, "56 percent of those Chinese surveyed felt that American policy was two-sided, geared towards 'cooperation and containment.'" Andrew Kohut, President of the Pew Research Center, also pointed out that 58 percent of Americans felt that the United States needed to get tougher with China on trade, while 56 percent of Americans simultaneously felt that the United States and China needed to build better relations.
--Panelists and speakers at the conference argued that these ambivalent tensions necessitated a global condominium between America and China, or, in the words of Brzezinski, "to act towards each other as though we were part of a G-2 without proclaiming ourselves to be a G-2." This "basic generalization" of Brzezinski followed on statements made by other speakers such as David Lampton and Tom Fingar of Stanford University who both argued that without Sino-American cooperation and leadership, problems of international economic management, collective security, or climate change would not be dealt with. Fingar further argued that each power needed to pursue this cooperative partnership even if we had not reached a state of mutual trust between the two powers. The "very real, very now" nature of issues such as climate change and its impact on national security and ever-changing threats to global security necessitated a partnership even as publics and elites remained distrustful of each other.
I see where a Chinese navy ship tried to confront an Indian navy ship that was steaming off the coast of Vietnam.
Just when you think China is becoming a great power, it starts acting like a chump. Or like an early 19th-century example of unbridled capitalism -- with police beating to death a teenager who was caught near a protest against a land grab involving a Communist Party official who was playing footsie with a real estate developer who was plowing up the graves of locals' ancestors.
And don't forget that Chinese general's 15-year-old son driving a customized BMW without a license.
Annals of the oligarchs. China sure is getting interesting. Funny how it allows its rich and powerful to act like a caricature of capitalism.
The last panel of the day was about China and what it is doing nowadays in East Asia. I haven't paid a lot of attention to China since 9/11 and so felt like I was playing catch-up ball. Here is what intrigued me:
--The Chinese concept of a forward defense line of an "island chain" grows out of an army-like, ground-pounding way of looking at the world, and is just not the way a naval officer thinks, said retired Navy Capt. Bernard "Bud" Cole.
--I thought Douglas Paal, who served on the national security staffs of Presidents Reagan and Bush, was surprisingly supportive of the Obama Administration's handling of China.
--Over the last couple of years, China got a little bit too loud and overconfident in its foreign policy, said my CNAS colleague and office neighbor Patrick Cronin, who is very tolerant of the loud music he sometimes hears through the thin wall separating our workspaces. "I think they did overreach," he said. "They're wondering whether we've reached our high water mark, and many of them think we have."
--Moves by the United States and South Korea to pressure North Korea financially to give up nukes have been undercut by Chinese economic support for Pyongyang, Cronin added. Professor Cole added that the Chinese are more worried about a collapsing North Korea than they are about a nuclear North Korea.
--Water is becoming an issue between China and its southern neighbors, Cole said, because China has serious water shortages in its northeast, so is diverting water out of the Tibetan plateau, the birthplace of the Mekong and several other major Asian rivers.
--Off the books "zombie debt" is a problem to watch in China, Paal warned.
Yesterday was the CNAS annual conference day. Lots of interesting things said, much of it from the platform, some of it in the hallways.
Robert Kaplan, my well-travelled officemate, had several very interesting lines. One was that Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping might be the greatest man of the 20th century, for bringing hundreds of millions of people into a quasi-middle class existence.
He also suggested that Malaysia's shopping malls, with their mixture of Muslims, Indians, Chinese and Malayans, challenge Samuel Huntington's notion of the clash of civilizations.
Half the Audi A6's in the world are now being sold in China. Especially popular are black ones with dark-tinted windows.
But a Chinese journalist who borrowed one to check out the story that women spontaneously hop into them reports that the myth is not true.
CNAS, the little think tank that could, doesn't take corporate stances or insist on agreement, and we have some pretty lively debates. Here's an example: Patrick Cronin, senior director of our Asia-Pacific Security Program, here takes issue with what Abe Denmark, who directs our Asia-Pacific Security Program, asserted here last week, that we shouldn't be worrying about China as a threat because it is gonna get old before it gets rich.
By Patrick Cronin
Best Defense Asia bureau chief
There are good reasons for American national security planners to worry about China's rise. Its rapid growth may make Chinese political and military leaders both more confident and more assertive. Its military forces are moving beyond Taiwan scenarios to wider active defense strategies aimed at neutralizing U.S. power projection. Its diplomatic strategy runs counter to America's regional network of alliances and partnerships. Its quest for comprehensive and asymmetric power is making it a quiet leader in new domains, including cyber space and outer space. And its booming economy and tremendous savings are boosting its clout with regional neighbors and global actors alike.
In the face of these trends, it would be folly for the United States to ignore the potential threat posed by its biggest emerging rival, one governed by the Chinese Communist Party and thus a rival that retains far too much secrecy and too little accountability
Confidence in the continued preeminence of America is a good thing unless it leads us to distort reality. Internationally, U.S. students test low in math and science and rank first in confidence. Similarly, those Americans who would dismiss China's past three decades of accomplishment could be making a similar, but far graver, mistake. If one is looking to confirm a preconceived bias that the Chinese juggernaut cannot long sustain its breathless pace or rocket-like trajectory, it is a simple task to find evidence of: its social and political fragmentation; its failure to segue to a new economic model; its aging society; its resource scarcity; its environmental calamity; its lack of soft power.
Yet China almost surely will become the world's largest economy, and India may well eventually push America to being number three. While none of this guarantees that China can translate its rising wealth into influence, it certainly seems bent on trying to do so. Indeed, one indicator of this is how China has awakened of late to India's rise. Another indicator is its recent assertion of power in the South and East China Seas. Yet another is its return to double digit defense spending increases at the very time when the United States is talking about the need to trim its own defense budget.
Meanwhile, as we wait for myriad challenges to put the brakes on China's reemergence and to satiate its burgeoning appetite for power, we ought to be sure we understand the volatile and inherently renewable nature of U.S. power. This was President Barack Obama's point during his most recent State of the Union speech, when he referenced Chinese economic and technological advances and challenged this generation of Americans to realize its 'Sputnik' moment: the point at which Americans must wake up from their slumber and redouble their efforts to invest in what made America great in the first place. China and India were exceptional in that they suffered only one quarter of economic downturn during the global financial crisis; America continues to slowly try to climb out of its deepest recession, and now it faces uncertainty over oil markets and its key economic partner, Japan, faces its own unprecedented challenges.
China's gains relative to the United States matter because the character of war, though not its raw nature, has changed even during America's relatively brief tenure as a global power. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld boasted of transformation and then proceeded to violate Clausewitz's first axiom and embark on a war that he did not understand. But we can agree with Rumsfeld on the basic point he repeatedly makes in his memoir: weakness invites trouble. The question of how to measure strength and weakness is far more complicated than comparing orders of battle and even the technological advances in major platforms. Writing in the December 2010 issue of Qiushi Journal, the official publication of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, one analyst explained seven strategies to counter U.S. power, and they involved preparing across the full array of economic, information, diplomatic, and military instruments of power. They also involve imponderables such as the element of surprise. So, the character of war keeps changing, but net assessment also requires a frank look at our own vulnerabilities, and there are serious questions about our ability to preserve a vast military, operating globally, while seeking to ensure our own economic foundation, our own secure homeland, our own cyber and space security, and our own alliance and partner relationships.
In short, American confidence is fine provided it doesn't obscure the reality that China is a rival to the United States, at least as much as it is a potential partner. Let there be no doubt that China poses a potential threat to the United States. China will be able to challenge the United States in Asia far before it ever challenges it globally. The political goal should not be to wish away China as a potential threat, but to try to prevent China from becoming an enemy.
Indeed, as Abe Denmark pointed out in recent testimony to the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, American strategies should encourage China to play a more responsible role in the world, but they must also continue to defend U.S. interests and hedge against potential Chinese aggression. It is possible for our technology and our integrated systems to remain a generation ahead of China's and still be vulnerable to a variety of asymmetric approaches that include cyber war, economic assault, and clever political-military maneuvering along China's periphery and far from our shores. Weakness in the face of a rapidly emerging, highly confident, and potentially savvy opponent who resorts to asymmetric and nontraditional means of warfare on his own periphery far from our shores is clearly asking for trouble.
Yesterday I discussed the news that China had surpassed the United States as the world's leading manufacturer, and wondered about the national security implications of this. I also mentioned that my CNAS colleague, the very smart Abe Denmark, counsels not to worry so much. Here he explains why he is cool with it.
By Abe Denmark
Best Defense Beijing bureau chief
China's rising economic power continues to set records. A few weeks after
overtaking Japan as the world's second-largest economy, a report by a U.S.
economics consultancy estimates that China recently overtook the United States
as the world's top manufacturing country by output, ending America's 110- year
dominance. Experts suggest this marks a "fundamental shift in the division
of labor" that is unlikely to change soon.
This frankly comes as no surprise, and was a long time coming. The sheer size and economies of scale (not to mention low wages and lax protections for civil and environmental issues) make China a natural hub for heavy manufacturing. With roughly one-fifth of the entire world's population, it is only natural that China continue to gain a leading economic position as it slowly embraces market-based economic policies.
Yet China's rapid growth is far from assured over the long-term. Due to its one-child policy, China's demographics over the long-term are not promising, and China may very well get old before it gets rich. China is also facing significant internal challenges, born from frustration over rampant corruption, vast economic inequalities, and environmental degradation. Moreover, China's gargantuan population means that every year a new generation of college graduates hits the job market, and high levels of economic growth -- roughly 8 percent annually -- are needed simply to keep unemployment down.
No one is more aware of these challenges than China's leadership. Earlier this week, China concluded a session of its National Congress, passing a new 5-year plan that guides government investments and priorities until 2016. The new plan calls for lower levels of growth and a concerted effort to address economic and social inequalities. China's leaders recognize this will higher unemployment, meaning China may be facing challenges it has not confronted since its economy began to take off, over thirty years ago.
Yet these slower levels of economic growth, targeted to be at 7 percent, are still far beyond the levels of growth likely to come out of the United States and the West. American economists are now looking down the road at when China's economy overtakes that of the United States. Goldman Sachs puts the date at 2027, while a more recent report from CitiGroup puts the date at 2020.
So what are the military implications of a rising Chinese economic power with a higher manufacturing output capacity than that of the United States? This is a bit of a macabre exercise, as a large-scale military confrontation between the United States and China would likely produce a horrific economic and human toll that all should seek to avoid if at all possible. Yet such considerations merit examination; as Tom Ricks pointed out in an email discussion about this report, "the British lost manufacturing dominance in about 1885, didn't realize it, and found out the hard way during World War I." Is America slated to be the next UK, watching the world move on from our outdated economic system?
Only time will tell, but I do not think so. In World War II, the United States demonstrated an incredible ability to surge manufacturing capacity to defense industries should the need arise. Factories that made cars were converted to make tanks and planes, and the United States eventually out-produced its enemies. Personally, I would never bet against the ingenuity of American industry when the need arises.
Moreover, the nature of warfare has likely changed in the past 125 years. In 1885, the United Kingdom lost its manufacturing lead just when manufacturing output capacity was a key determinant of military power in a mass, mechanized age of warfare. Today, if my old boss Secretary Rumsfeld is correct, the key to military power is not only mass manufacturing capacity but rather a military that is quick, maneuverable, coordinated, and precise. These are tasks at which the U.S. military is exquisitely good, and our advantage in this sense is not likely to wane for the foreseeable future. China's defense industry, while improving in quality and technology, seems to still be a few steps behind and is unlikely to catch up any time soon. The key for China's military, therefore, is to use quantity to make up for lower quality.
Let's hope we never have to test these hypotheses. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, it's far better to trade trade than to war war.
This may be the most significant national security news of the day, even bigger than the Japanese meltdowns, but you won't see it in the Early Bird or most other defense-related news discussions.
News vaults over the horizon that China has surpassed the United States in manufacturing volume, ending a 110-year long run by the Americans. My initial thought was to remember that I read a few years ago that Great Britain effectively lost World War I when it was overtaken in goods production in the late 19th century by both Germany and the United States. (I am travelling and so can't look at my World War I shelf to see where I read that -- I want to say Corelli Barnett's The Swordbearers, but that doesn't seem right.)
I asked my CNAS colleague Abe Denmark, who is both very smart and is in China right now, what to think of this, and he wasn't as worried. I hope to have more from him on this tomorrow.
Meanwhile, in other Asia-as-number-one news, I see that India has become the world's largest weapons importer, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
Gen. James Clapper's prediction that Qaddafi probably will prevail in Libya got all the headlines. Less noticed in the director of National Intelligence's appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday (Thursday) was this weird exchange:
SEN. MANCHIN: [Joe Manchin, Democrat of West Virginia] ...Which country represents to you that has the intent to be our greatest adversary, who could do -- you know, has the capabilities -- I know you weren't going to it, but who has the intent?
GEN. CLAPPER: Probably China.
SEN. MANCHIN: China. So Donald Trump's right?
(Response off mic.)
SEN. MANCHIN (?): (Laughs.) If the question is, pick one nation-state that has the intent.
GEN. CLAPPER: No, I said -- well, I -- if we didn't -- we have a treaty with -- you know, new START treaty with the Russians. So I guess I would rank them a little lower because of that, and we don't have such a treaty with the Chinese.
SEN. LEVIN: [Carl Levin, Democrat of Michigan] I'm just as surprised by that answer as I was by your first answer. You're saying that China now has the intent to be a mortal adversary of the United States?
GEN. CLAPPER: Well, the question is who -- from my vantage, you know, who would -- from among the nation-states, who would pose potentially the greatest -- if I have to pick one country, which I'm loath to do because I'm more of a mind to consider their capabilities -- and both Russia and China potentially represent a mortal threat to the United States. I -
SEN. LEVIN: Would you -
GEN. CLAPPER: Now we're getting into gauging intent, which, you know, I really can't do. I don't think either country today has the intent to mortally attack us.
SEN. LEVIN: I just want to be real clear. By that measure, we represent the greatest potential threat to both China and Russia. By that measure.
GEN. CLAPPER: From a capability standpoint.
SEN. LEVIN: Which is the measure you're using.
GEN. CLAPPER: Yes, sir.
SEN. LEVIN: OK. By that measure, we represent the greatest intent -- the greatest threat, by that measure, to both China and Russia.
GEN. CLAPPER: And I don't think our intent is to be -- attack them.
Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.