Throughout Asia there are terrorist
organizations, insurgencies, and revolutionaries of all kinds.
However, what sets terrorist groups operating in Southeast Asia
apart is the intimate nature of cooperation among groups. Although
insurgent groups in Southeast Asia's terrorist brotherhood do not
share the same goals, their cooperation across national boundaries
creates an economy of scale for logistics, training, and safe
havens. For example, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Free Aceh
Movement (GAM) have trained with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) in camps in the southern Philippines; GAM smuggles weapons
with the Thai terrorist group Pattani United Liberation
Organization (PULO), and many terrorists use regional connections
to move from country to country.
groups in Southeast Asia's terrorist brotherhood, such as GAM,
PULO, Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP), Kampulan Militan
Malaysia (KMM), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Laskar Jihad,
Indonesian Islamic Liberation Front (IILF) and the MILF, do not
appear on the U.S. State Department's or the United Nations' list
of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO). This oversight has
implications for the effectiveness of anti-terrorist strategies in
the region because current policies attack only a portion of the
Countries in Southeast Asia and the
broader international community must identify the full magnitude of
the terrorist system and apply anti-terrorist policies toward
destroying the entire network. The U.S. government should correct
this oversight by updating the FTO to include all of Southeast
Asia's terrorist groups and indicating the close links between
The Terrorist Bond
Originally there were little or no
connections between Southeast Asia's terrorist organizations.
Therefore, the roots of these groups are varied. The Indonesian
founders of JI, for instance, were inspired by anti-government
rebellions in the 1950s. GAM began its insurgency against Jakarta
in 1976. Both Abu Sayyaf and MILF originated from Moro groups that
fought in the Philippines during the days of Spanish colonialism.
The Pattani United Liberation Organization traces its history to
Pattani, an independent Malay kingdom that Thailand conquered and
occupied in the 17th century.
senior members of today's Southeast Asian terrorist groups were
introduced and formed an alliance during the Afghan war against
Soviet occupation. The camaraderie militants formed during battles
against the Soviet Union still infuses their relationships today.
After defeating the Soviet Union, many militants returned to
Southeast Asia inspired by the success of their struggle--and
motivated to bring jihad home to Southeast Asia. These radical
leaders maintained their relationships through communicative
channels (such as al-Qaeda) and freely trained members of their
militant groups in Afghanistan until the American occupation in
Following Afghanistan, the second most
important jihad bond for Southeast Asian terrorists was the battle
against Christians in the Moluccas islands of Indonesia. Although
the islands were evenly divided between Christians and Muslims, in
1999 sectarian violence exploded, sparking nearly three years of
vicious fighting. By the time peace was re-established in 2003,
more than 5,000 people had died and another 350,000 people were
displaced. The sectarian conflict attracted Islamic extremist
groups from across Southeast Asia, including Kumpulan Militan
Malaysia, Laskar Jihad, and Jemaah Islamiyah. The fight against the
Moluccas Christians gained many new recruits and produced a new
generation of regional leaders with shared combat experience.
Another unifying element was the
government of Libya, which trained and financed many of Southeast
Asia's terrorists. For example, between 1986 and 1989, GAM sent an
estimated 5,000 military cadres to train in terrorist camps in
Libya. There they associated with a wide cross-section of
international terrorist groups. Libya also acted as a conduit for
ransom payments and "aid" money (sometimes called "livelihood
projects") for Abu Sayyaf and other Filipino Muslim groups.
Additionally, there was an indigenous
effort to assemble various Islamic terrorist groups in the region.
At the International Islamic University in Malaysia in 1999, Abu
Bakar Bashir organized a meeting to establish the Mujahidin
Coalition, which brought together the MILF and JI, as well as other
groups from across the region. The Mujahidin Coalition has met at
least three times since then and its existence is an indicator of
the intimacy of the regional relationships.
Lastly, the composition of Southeast
Asia's terrorist groups is multi-national, but the members share
the same religion and Indo-Malay language family. Pattani Thais
speak a Malay dialect, as do most of the terrorist groups across
the archipelago. In the Philippines the MILF and Abu Sayyaf speak a
language related to Malay (which is not to say that they are
groups' affiliation with Islam, however, is the most unifying
element. The clearest example of religion uniting the groups can be
seen in MILF cooperation with GAM--a Muslim organization in
Indonesia that has a liberation agenda completely unrelated to
Southeast Asia's terrorist participation
in the September 11 attacks was limited to serving as a venue for
pre-attack meetings among the 9/11 hijackers and their
interlocutors. Nevertheless, when the United States declared war on
terrorism, Southeast Asia's terrorist brotherhood was already
trained, equipped, and prepared for the global struggle. Southeast
Asia's terrorists eagerly allied themselves with al-Qaeda and
adopted the United States as a new enemy.
The Case Against GAM and MILF
Southeast Asia has many terrorist groups,
but GAM and MILF are the largest and most sophisticated of the
groups not on the FTO list. Al-Qaeda's contact with MILF and GAM is
limited by the groups' divergent goals. GAM and MILF are
independence movements, while al-Qaeda and its Southeast Asian
affiliate organization Jemaah Islamiyah, want to create a
pan-Islamic state. This difference of opinion is the reason why
most countries do not associate al-Qaeda with either GAM or MILF
and why Western countries have ignored GAM and MILF separatist
activities. Nevertheless, GAM and MILF behave like terrorist
organizations at home and, although they generally avoid attacks
against Americans, they do cooperate with other terrorist groups in
the region that wish to attack the United States.
State Department's 2003 Human Rights report for Indonesia
specifically criticized GAM, stating that "GAM rebels also carried
out grave abuses including murder, kidnapping and extortion." The State Department's
reports on MILF in the Philippines detail many of the same crimes
as GAM--such as murder, kidnapping, and extortion. Despite American
acknowledgment of GAM and MILF terrorist activities, the U.S. State
Department classifies the two organizations as separatist groups
rather than as terrorist organizations. Consequently, neither GAM
nor MILF is on the State Department's Foreign Terrorist
Organizations list, even though their activities meet all three
criteria for inclusion. These criteria are:
- The organization is foreign;
- The organization engages in terrorist
- The terrorist activity threatens the
security of the United States citizens or the national security of
the United States.
Aceh, approximately 10,000-20,000 people, mostly civilians, have
perished since the Free Aceh Movement began its struggle for
independence in 1976. Although the Indonesian armed forces'
activities account for many civilian casualties, GAM has also
committed violence directed against civilians, including murder,
arson, and intimidation. Between the years 2000 and 2002 alone, an
estimated 50,000 civilians were forced from their homes in Aceh by
GAM. Additionally, GAM is notorious for burning schools. Since
1989, GAM has burned over 1,000 state schools and killed more than
American interests and American citizens
have been targeted by these organizations. GAM has targeted
Exxon-Mobil's Arun natural gas facilities and is allegedly
responsible for firing at Exxon-Mobil aircraft, hijacking their
trucks, burning buses, and planting landmines along roads to
disrupt oil transport.
Expanding its terrorist portfolio, GAM is
frequently linked with acts of maritime piracy against
international shipping in the Strait of Malacca. To date, GAM
pirate attacks appear to be economically motivated, but GAM pirates
are better armed and organized than their criminal counterparts.
Stealing ships' stores and kidnapping crews for ransom is GAM's
most frequent offense. Among their victims are the numerous oil and
gas tankers that sail through the straits.
biggest fear in the region is that GAM may choose to make a
political statement or assist another group in the terrorist
brotherhood--such as Jemaah Islamiyah--by setting fire to or
detonating an oil or liquefied natural gas tanker in a port or
heavily trafficked portion of the Malacca Strait. Because of its
considerable length and narrow breadth, an attack could temporarily
close the strait or important adjacent ports, such as Singapore.
Closing the Malacca Strait, even briefly, would substantially
affect the American economy. Fifty thousand ships sail through the
Malacca Strait every year, moving about 30 percent of the world's
trade goods and 80 percent of Japan's oil.
Although GAM generally limits its
terrorist activities to Aceh and its adjacent waters, it is an
active link in the worldwide terrorist underground. GAM sent
fighters to Libya to train in Muammar Qadhafi's terrorist camps; it
smuggles weapons together with Thai terrorist groups; GAM leaders
have met with al-Qaeda and JI leaders; and GAM recruits train in
Moro Islamic Liberation Front camps in the Philippines. Although
GAM's political agenda is domestic, it is a terrorist organization
with global ties.
Moro Islamic Liberation Front has enjoyed immunity from the
terrorist label and from government assault because of its unique
political situation. The Philippine government seeks to find a
political solution to chronic insurgency. To further that goal,
Manila has participated in negotiations with MILF since 1996. In
2000, the government and MILF signed a safety and security
agreement that gives almost complete freedom of action to MILF,
while preventing attacks from the Philippine security forces.
Despite its participation in "peace
talks," MILF has continued its terrorist activities and has become
a crucial training ground for terrorists in Southeast Asia. This
group attacks civilians. It has burned more than a thousand houses
in central Mindanao since 2000 and launched a bombing campaign at
shopping malls, airports and inter-island ferries, killing hundreds
of innocent people.
important to the international community is MILF's substantial and
intimate relationship with international terrorists. MILF operates
training camps in the southern Philippines that train members of
Jemaah Islamiyah, GAM, Abu Sayyaf, and other terrorist groups. The
camps include permanent structures and six-month-long courses that
include weapons training and bomb making. Ever since the fall of
Afghanistan and the post-Bali arrests of many JI leaders, MILF
terrorist training facilities have become critical to the continued
effectiveness of Islamic terrorists and the creation of a new
leadership to carry on terrorism in the region.
Direct MILF links to attacks on Americans
and U.S. interests are not strong. Nevertheless, MILF's continued
training of active terrorist groups in Southeast Asia and the
unsanctioned participation of MILF members in terrorist attacks and
maritime piracy, make it both a key member of the terrorist
brotherhood and one of the most important targets for
anti-terrorist operations in Southeast Asia.
Implications for Regional Anti-Terrorist
Recent developments in the war on
terrorism have made Asia--and in particular Southeast Asia--central
to U.S. strategy to defeat terrorism. National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice described Southeast Asia as "a very important
front" in the war on terrorism, because it poses a serious threat
to economic prosperity, and stability as well.
Unfortunately, although terrorists in
Southeast Asia work closely together, regional governments do not.
Several countries in Southeast Asia have made considerable
individual progress combating terrorism, yet cooperation and
coordination among Southeast Asian states is generally sporadic.
The terrorist brotherhood continues to take advantage of the poor
inter-regional cooperation to hide from authorities simply by
moving to the country next door.
Terrorist groups have exploited this
weakness, seeking refuge where local authorities are least
committed to countering terrorism--notably in Indonesia and the
Philippines. Although Indonesian officials argue that there is
enough political will to crack down on Jemaah Islamiyah, Southeast
Asia's major Islamist terror network, convicted terrorists have
received light sentences. Former Indonesian President Megawati
Sukarnoputri did not deal with the militant Islamic religious
schools that have been a major source of JI recruitment. The newly
elected President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, has yet to declare JI
a terrorist group. The weak legal system in Indonesia worsens the
Filipino government may be the weakest link in Southeast Asia's
anti-terrorist efforts. Although there have been hundreds of
terrorist arrests since the Bali bombing, disproportionately few
have occurred in the Philippines. There is almost no mechanism to
effectively enforce the law because there are more soldiers in that
country than police. Furthermore, there is no coast guard or
maritime police in place to control borders that are weakened by
corruption. Finally, the continuing existence of a terrorist haven
in Mindanao in the southern Philippines, unmolested by government
security forces, permits Southeast Asia's terrorist brotherhood to
plan and train for their next attacks.
Continued effort, commitment, and
vigilance against terrorism by Southeast Asian governments are
necessary for peace and prosperity to endure. To better contain the
Southeast Asian brotherhood of terrorism, the international
- Initiate the
process to place all of Southeast Asia's terrorist brotherhood on
the lists of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The FTO list
is one of the most effective diplomatic tools against terrorists.
Placement on these lists would subject each organization to
sanctions--including the refusal of visas, deportation of members,
prosecution of supporters that provide funds, and freezing the
organization's financial assets.
regional cooperation by the governments of Southeast Asia and their
allies. Southeast Asia's terrorist brotherhood works
closely together regardless of different political agendas.
Terrorist groups are able to exploit the lack of inter-governmental
cooperation in the region and move freely across national
- Support efforts
to suppress insurgent groups. For decades, Southeast Asian
governments have largely ignored separatist movements in
neighboring countries. This government neglect of regional security
has allowed the terrorists to flourish. It is time for Southeast
Asia's countries to support their neighbors to defeat violent
Dillon is Senior Policy Analyst in the Asian Studies
Center at The Heritage Foundation. This speech was delivered at
Nihon University, Mishsima, Japan, on November 19, 2004.