for Chapter IV
- 1 A full history of American aid to
China is given in Romanus and Sunderland,
Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. I. The
troop strength of a Chinese division was about
that of a LT. S. regimental combat team, and
its supply requirements were much less. In
November 1941 the personnel strength of the
thirty divisions was set by the Chinese at
- 2 The President's signed declaration
is filed in AG 400.3295 (4-14-41), 1-A.
- 3 Until the spring of 1941,
when Mexico was safely in the U. S. camp, there
had also existed the possibility that a U.
S. oil embargo would cause the Japanese to
buy oil from Mexico.
- 4 For the views of the Chief of Staff
and Chief of Naval Operations on the proposed
oil embargo, see Admiral Stark's testimony
before the Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack, and a memorandum
from Admiral Turner to Admiral Stark on 19
July 1941, both in Pearl Harbor Hearings,
Part 5, pp. 2380-84. For a more detailed discussion
see Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission
to China, Ch. I.
- 5 See account of a meeting at the
White House with the Japanese ambassador on
24 July 1941, in L:. S. Department of State,
Foreign Relations of the United .States, Japan:
1931-1941 ( Washington, Government Printing
Office, 1943) (hereafter cited as U. S. Foreign
Relations, Japan: 1931-41), II, 527 -30. Admiral
Stark was present at this meeting.
- 6 For the current U. S. military estimate
in July 1941 of the Japanese oil situation,
see memo, Turner for Stark, 19 Jul 41, sub:
Study of Effect of an Embargo of Trade between
U. S. and Japan, Pearl Harbor Hearings,
Part 5, pp. 2382-84. For other accounts of
the Japanese oil situation, see: (1) Oil
in Japan's War, App to Rpt of Oil and Chem
Div, United States Strategic: Bombing Survey
(USSBS;, pp. 10, 12, 15: (2) Oil in Japan's
War, Rpt of Oil and Chem Div, USSBS, p.
1; (3) Judgment-International Military Tribunal
for the Far East, Part B, Ch VIII, pp. 934-35:
and (4) Morison, Rising Sun, pp. 63-64.
- 7 (1) Msg, Gen Marshall to Maj Gen
George Grunert [CG Phil Dept], 4 Apr 41, WPD
4402-8. (2) Memo, WPD [Col Anderson, Actg :ACofS1
for CofS, 15 Apr 41, sub: Stf Convs in the
Far East, W PD 4402-8. (3) Msg, Marshall to
Grunert, 16 Apr 41, 10. 845, WPD 4402-8. The
American delegates were Capt. William R. Purnell
, USN, Chief of Staff, Asiatic Fleet; Col.
Allan C. McBride, Assistant Chief of Staff
G-3, Philippine Department; and the naval and
military observers in Singapore, Capt. Archer
M. R. Allen, US, and Lt. Col. Francis G. Brink.
(See list in ABC 092.3 (27 Mar 41).
- 8 Rpt, Off of CinC, China Station,
27 Apr 41, title: American-Dutch-British Convs
Singapore, Apr 41 (short title, ADB), ABC 092.3
(27 Mar 41).
- 9 (1) Ibid. (2) The official
ADB report was not received in Washington until
9 June 1941. Memo, WPD for TAG, 9 Jun 41, sub:
ADB Cones, WPD 4402-18. (3) The British military
mission, however, had circulated a telegraphic
summary of the report in Washington on 6 May
1941. Memo, Sexy Br Mil Miss for CofS, CNO,
and Br Mil Miss, 6 May 41, sub: Rpt of Singapore
ADB Conf, Apr 41, WPD 4402-18.
- 10 Ltr, Gen Grunert, CG Phil Dept,
to ACofS WPD, 2 May 41, sub: ADB Convs of Apr
21-27, 1941, Held at Singapore, WPD 4402-18.
Grunert went on to point out that the conference,
though it had recommended the expansion of
ground and air forces in the Philippines, had
made the main object of Allied naval operations
the defense of Singapore, treating the support
of the Philippines as "more or less incidental."
He concluded, therefore: "More emphasis
on the defense and holding of the Philippines
is considered necessary."
- 11 (11 Ltr, Secy for Collaboration
to Secy Br Mil Miss, 7 Jun 41, sub: Rpt of
Singapore ADB Conf Apr 41, WPD 4402-18. (2)
Memo, WPD for CofS, 8 Jul 41, sub: Rpt of ADB
Convs, W PD 4402-18.
- 12 Ltr, CNO and CofS to Sp Army and
Nav Obsrs, London, 3 Jul 41, sub: Comment on
Rpt of ADB Convs, Singapore, Ape 41, WPD 4402-18.
Although dated as above, this letter was not
dispatched until 26 July 1941.
- 13 MacArthur, who had held the rank
of full general as Chief of Staff, had reverted
to the permanent rank of major general after
that tour. In December 1937, after thirty years'
service, he retired as a full general. He was
promoted to the rank of full general in December
- 14 For the correspondence preceding
the creation of USAFFE and General MacArthur's
appointment as its commanding general, sec
Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations,
- 15 (1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 30 Jul
41, sub: Add Armament for Phil, WPD 4560. (2)
Memo, G-1 for TAG through SGS, 31 Jul 41, sub:
Add Res Offs for Tng Phil Army, OCS 18136-40.
(3) Msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 9 Sep 41, as
quoted in memo, G-3 for CofS, 4 Nov 41, sub:
Reinforcement for Phil Dept, OCS 18136-103.
(4) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations,
- 16 Gerow Diary, 31 Jul 41 entry, Item
1, Exec 10.
- 17 (1) Memo, WPD for TAG, 31 Jul
41, sub: Reinforcements of USAFFE , W PD 4559.
(2) For a full account of the reinforcement
of the Philippines, see Louis Morton, The Fall
of the Philippines, a volume in preparation
for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD
WAR II, Ch. III. (3) See also Watson, Prewar
Plans and Preparations, Ch. XIII.
- 18 (1) Memo, Col Crawford, W PD, for
Gen Gerow, 15 Aug 41, sub: Reinforcements for
Phil, Tab A, Book A, Exec 8. (2) Memo, W PD
for CofS, 14 Aug 41, same sub, WPD 3251-55.
(3) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, Ch. III.
(4) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations,
- 19 Memo cited n. 18(2). The reinforcement
of the Philippines continued to hold a high
priority. During September the Chief of Staff's
approval was given to the shipment of the 192d
Tank Battalion, which was to sail in November,
and defense reserves for 50,000 men, except
for ammunition, were scheduled for completion
by February 1942. (1) Memo, WPD for TAG, 16
Sep 41, sub: Add Tnk Bn . . ., OCS 18136-60.
(2) Memo, WPD for TAG through Maj Gen Richard
C. Moore, DCofS, 23 Sep 41, sub: Supplies for
Phil Army . . ., WPD 4560-1.
- 20 The text of Ambassador Nomura's
proposal of 6 Aug 41 may be found in U. S.
Foreign Relations, Japan: 7931-41,
- 21 (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and
Hopkins, pp. 354-57. (2) Churchill, Grand
Alliance, pp. 43840. (3) Hull, Memoirs,
p. 1018. (4) U. S. Foreign Relations, Japan:
193l-4l, II, 556-57.
- 22 (1) "War Department Strategic
Estimate . . . October 1941," Vol. I,
p. 44, W PD 4150. (2) Memo, WPD for SW, 8 Oct
41, sub: Strategic Concept of P. L, WPD 3251-60.
A copy is filed under Tab A, Book A, Exec 8.
With this memorandum is a draft, apparently
unused, and an attached estimate of the situation
as of 2 October, summarizing the WPD view of
- 23 According to a tabulation from
a special War Department monthly report on
aircraft, on 30 April 1941 there were on hand:
12 B-17's; 38 B-17B's; and 59 B 17C's and B-17D's.
On order as of 30 April were 512 B-17E's. ('tabulation,
Tab J, Item 6, Exec 4.) Deliveries of the 512
B -17E's were scheduled to be completed by
the end of July 1942. Forty-two were to be
delivered by 30 November 1941. The rate of
deliveries was to rise thereafter, from 35
in December to 75 in June. ([AAF] Materiel
Division Estimated Schedule of Airplane Deliveries
under Approved and Prospective Contracts by
Type, Customer, and Model, as of November 30,
1941, Tab Heavy Bombers, Item 15, Exec 4.)
See also (1) Report of the Commanding General
of the Army Air Forces to the Secretary of
War, January 4, 1944, pp. 1-5, 9-11, and
(2) Craven and Cate, AAF I, p. 178.
- 24 A detailed analysis of the need
for heavy bombers was made by the AAF in September
1941 in AWPD/1. See (1) Chart 1, Sec I, and
(2) Tab 17, Sec II, both in Part III, App II,
JB 355, see 707.
- 25 Craven and Cate, AAF I,
p. 172.Twenty-one B -17D's, flown by members
of the 19th Bombardment Croup, had been ferried
from Hamilton Field, California, to Hickam
Field, Hawaii, on 13 May 1941. For the strength
of air forces in the Philippines in 1941,see
: (1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, Ch.
III, and (2) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations,
- 26 Craven and Cate, AAF I,
pp. 179, 185. Out of an estimated production
in the United States of 220 heavy bombers by
February 1942, 165 were scheduled for delivery
to the Philippines.
- 27 (1) Craven and Cate, AAF I,
pp. 180-82. (2) Memo, CofS for AWPD, 14 Aug
41, sub: Add Air Routes Hawaii to Phil, WPD
4571-1. (3) Ltr, TAG to CG USAFFE, 27 Oct 41,
sub: Add Ferry Routes from Hawaii to Phil,
WPD 4571-1. (4) Ltr, JPC; to JB, 28 Nov 41,
sub: Alt Route in Pacific for Mvmt of Land-Based
Airplanes to Far East, JB 349, ser 735.
- 28 The reinforcement of the Philippines
and the mobilization of the main part of the
Philippine Army were scheduled to be carried
out before the end of the winter 1941-42. (See
memo, WPD for DCofS (Gen Moore), 8 Oct 41,
sub: Phil, Tab A, Book :1, Exec 8 and memo
cited note 38.) Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton,
who was called to Washington in October 1941
for instruction prior to his assumption of
command of the U. S. Array Air Forces in the
Far Fast, was told that the War Department
recognized and was prepared to accept the risk
of attack during the next few months but was
going on the assumption that if hostilities
came they would not begin before 1 April 1942.
(See Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries
(New York, William Morrow and Company, 1946),
- 29 At the time the Army proposed sending
a square division to General MacArthur, it
had been planned to use the three ships which
the Navy proposed to concert to aircraft carriers,
transporting the entire force in two trips
across the Pacific. ( Memo, G 4 for CofS, 26
Aug 41, sub: Indef Postponement by Navy of
Conversion of Tr Transports Wakefield
(Manhattan), Mt. Vernon (Washington)
and the West Point (America) into Airplane
Carriers, G-4/ 29717-67.1 General MacArthur
had preciously stated that he would not need
a division from the United States. (For an
account of General MacArthur's reaction to
the Army proposal, see Morton, The Fall of
the Philippines, Ch. III, p. 63, MS.)
- 30 (1) Ltr, JPG to JB, 8 Oct 41, sub:
Conversion of Tr Transports, Wakefield
(Manhattan), Mount Vernon (Washington)
and West Point (America) into
Airplane Carriers. The Army had preciously
succeeded in getting the Navy to postpone the
contemplated conversion in May 1941. (2) Ltr,
JB to SW, 16 Oct 41, same sub. Both ltrs in
JB 320, ser 723.
- 31 The issue of the use of the three
vessels continued to be debated but, ultimately,
they were not converted to aircraft carriers.
- 32 Rpt, Shipping Situation at San
Francisco Port of Embarkation following Pearl
Harbor, prepared by Lt Col Edwin H. Cates,
SFPE, OCT HB, SFPE. Some of these ships had
been hastily concerted from passenger liners.
- 33 (1) Compilation of Papers, Tabs
1, 2, and 3, Folder Book 1, Exec 4. (2) Craven
and Cate, AAF I, p. 192. (3) Rpt cited
n. 32. The President Johnson, Bliss, Etolin,
and President Garfield turned back
to San Francisco and unloaded their troops
on 8 and 9 December after the Pearl Harbor
attack. (See below, pp. 148-51.)
- 34 There is considerable variation
in the calculations of troop strength in the
Philippines made in Washington and in the Philippine
Department on the eve of Pearl harbor-based
on different systems of accounting and time
of reporting. The figures cited here are based
on WPD sources. (See memo [WPD] for SW, 6 Dec
41, sub: Reinforcement of Phil, Tab 1, Folder
Book 1, Exec 4.) For detailed breakdowns of
U.S. Army personnel (by typo) in the Philippines
on the rye of Pearl Harbor see Watson,
Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 448-49,
and Morton, Fall of the Philippines, Ch. II.
The figures cited in the latter volume arc
largely based on the Philippine Department
Machine Records Unit strength reports at the
end of November 1941.
- 35 (1) Compilation of Papers, Tabs
1 and 3, Folder Book 1, Exec 4. (2) Memo, Col
Crawford for Gen Gerow, 1 Dec 41, sub: Airplanes
for P. I. (3) Memo, Crawford for Gerow, 1 Dec
41, sub: .50-Caliber Am, Phil. Both in Tab
A, Book A, Exec 8.
- 36 A full account of aid to China
during 1941 is given in Romanus and Sunderland,
Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. I.
- 37 Msg, Magruder to Marshall and Stimson,
28 Oct 41, No. 28, Tab B, Book A, Exec 8.
- 38 Memo, WPD for CofS, 3 Nov 41, sub:
Far Eastern Sit, WPD 4389-29. The Chief of
Staff used this paper as a basis of his presentation
on the subject to the Secretary of State on
4 November. (Note for rcd, Col Bundy, 6 Nov
41, WPD 4389-29.)
- 39 Memo, CofS and C10 for President,
5 Nov 41, sub: Far Eastern Sit, WPD 4389-29.
Another copy of this memo is filed in Tab B,
Book A, Exec 8, but bears the penciled date
of 4 Nov 41.
- 40 (1) Ltr, Stimson to Soong, 12 Nov
41, sub: Def of Yunnan and Burma Road, AG 400.3295
(4-14-41), 1-4. (2) Msg, Marshall to Magruder,
15 Nov 41, AMMISCA 82, AG 400.3295 (4-14-41
), 1-A. (3 ) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's
Mission to China, Ch. I. (4) Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack: Report of the Joint
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl
Harbor Attack, Doc 244, 79th Cong, 2d sess
(hereafter cited as Pearl Harbor Report), pp.
- 41 Memo, Gen Moore for CofS, 4 Nov
41, no sub, Def. Aid Div, China (Sect, 2. This
memorandum contains General Marshall's marginal
- 42 (1) Tel Convs, Col Taylor, Book
1, Def Aid Div. (2) General MacArthur rejected
a proposal to take obsolescent 2.95-inch howitzers
and "surplus" .30-caliber rifles
from the Philippines and ship them to China
in return for later replacement with more modern
equipment. Msg, TAG 'to CG USAFFE, 5 Nov 41,
No. 476, and msg, USAFFE to TAG, 10 Nov 41,
No. 814, both in AC 400.3295 (4-14-41) , 1.
( 3 ) Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global
Warfare, p. 238, MS.
- 43 Memo for red, Col Bundy, 1 Nov
41, sub: Immediate Aid to China, Tab B, Book
A, Exec 8.
- 44 (1) Memo, Gen Chancy for CofS,
1 Sep 41, sub: Draft Agreement ADB (Rev). (2)
Memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Nov 41, same sub. (3)
Draft Agreement on Outline Plan for Employment
of American, Dutch and British Forces in the
Far East Area in event of War with Japan (Short
title, ADB-2), August 1941. All in WPD 4402-18.
- 45 Msg, Admiralty, London, to Br Admiralty
Delegation, Washington, 5 Nov 41, WPD 4402-18.
- 46 Msg, CNO for SPENAVO, London, 6
Nov 41, WPD 4402-18.
- 47 Ltr, U.S. Secy for Collab to Jt
Secys, Br Jt Stf Miss, 11 Nov 41, sub: U. S.-Br
Commonwealth Cooperation in Far East Area,
- 48 Memo, WPD for TAG, 28 Nov 41, sub
cited n. 47, WPD 4402-112.
- 49 (1) Msg, MacArthur to Marshall,
1 Dec 41, No. 1045, Tab A, Book A, Exec 8.
( 2 ) Msg, MacArthur to TAG, 2 Dec 41, No.
1057, paraphrase filed WPD 4402-112. (3) Msg,
MacArthur to Marshall, 7 Dec 41, 1112,
WPD 4622-35. This message was received on 8
December. The action copy was sent by Maj,
Lawrence S. Kuter, Office of the Chief of Staff,
to Col. Thomas T. Handy, for file in WPD without
action, with the notation: "General MacArthur's
proposed lines of action are entirely satisfactory.
He states that he will go ahead unless the
Chief of Staff decides otherwise. Thus, this
paper would have required no answer even if
the War had not broken." The date on documents
used in this volume is determined by the time
zone at the point of origin, unless otherwise
- 50 Accounts published or soon to be
published fully cover the negotiations, intelligence
reports, and military orders of the final weeks
preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor. Much
of the evidence on the American side is contained
in the various investigations of the Pearl
Harbor disaster. See, in particular, Pearl
Harbor Hearings (a summary file of the pertinent
War Department Documents is contained in Items
7a and 7h, OPD Hist Unit File) and Pearl
Harbor Report (a one-volume report of
the joint Committee summarizing the evidence
and the committee's conclusions),. Other important
accounts are contained in: (1) Stimson and
Bundy, On Active Service; (2) Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins; (3) Hull, Memoirs;
(4) U.S. Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-41,
II; (5) Morison, Rising Sun; (6) Churchill,
Grand Alliance; (7) Herbert Feis,
The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1950) : (8) Edwin O. Reischauer,
The United States and Japan (Cambridge,
Harvard University Press, 1950): (9) Watson,
Prewar Plans and Preparations; (10)
Cline, Washington Command Post (11)
Morton, Fall of the Philippines; and (12) Rudolph
A. Winnacker, "The National Emergency,
July 1940-December 1941," a monograph
in OCMH Files.
- 51 Memo, Marshall and Stark for President,
27 Nov 41, sub: Far Eastern Sit, WPD 4544-13.
- 52 (1) Paraphrase of msg, Brink to
WD, recd in WD, 6 Dec 41, No. 96, Item 7B,
OPD Hist Unit File. (2) Msg, CINCAF Nav Opns,
6 Dec 41, Item 3, Exec 10. (3) Pearl Harbor
Report, pp. 424-25, 432. (4) Craven and
Cate, AAF 1, p. 191. (5) Stimson and Bundy,
On Active Service, pp 389-90. (6) Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp.
423 -24. (7) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations,
Ch. XIV. (8) Feis, Road to Pearl harbor,
pp. 313 337 38.
- 53 (1) Pearl Harbor Report,
pp. 224-25. (2) Watson, Prewar Plans and
Preparations, Ch. XIV.
- 54 For the store of the genesis of
Japanese planning for the attack on Pearl Harbor,
sec: (1) Pearl Harbor Report,
material from Japanese sources, pp. 52- 54;
(2) Pearl Harbor Hearings, Part 13,
pp. 413 ff.; (3) Morison, Rising Sun, Ch. V;
(4) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations,
Ch. XIV; (5) Morton, Fall of the Philippines,
Ch. IV, and a particularly valuable unpublished
manuscript, The Decision for War" and
(6) Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, pp.
191, 193, 217, 270, 292, 294, 303, 332. Both
Morton and Feis draw upon evidence gleaned
from Japanese sources, including reports of
the Japanese war trials.
- 55 According to Robert E. Sherwood,
the best informed opinion in Washington on
the we of Purl Harbor was that "further
Japanese aggression was imminent and that it
would come in the Southwest Pacific, its probably
objective bring the Kra Isthmus, which joined
the mainland of Thailand and Burma with the
Malay Peninsula, six thousand miles from Pearl
Harbor." (Roosevelt and Hopkins,
- 56 Published sources cover very fully
the sequence of events and reports on 7 December.
See Pearl Harbor Hearings and Pearl Harbor
Report, also memoirs of various public
figures, in particular the notes of Harry Hopkins
made at the close of the day (Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 430-34). Apparently
the first news of the attack that reached the
War Department was a Navy message stating "
This is not drill." It was signed by Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet, and delivered to the Office of
the Chief of Staff by a Navy enlisted roan.
The authors arc indebted to Maj. Gen. John
R. Deane and Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow for
filling a gap in the records with their recollections
on this point. (1) Ltr, Gen Deane to Maj Gen
Orlando Ward, 29 Mar 51. (2) Ltr, Gen Gerow
to Gen Ward, 21 Mar 51. Both in OCMH Files.
(3) See also Pearl Harbor Hearings,
Part 11, pp. 5235, 5351.
- 57 The only official paper on presidential
approval of Army execution of RAINBOW
5 is a penned note signed by General Marshall
which stated, "I read to the President
and Mr. Hull our message to MacArthur in Manila
and to Commanders of Defense Areas, overseas
garrisons, etc. They were approved orally."
General Gerow added, "Handed to me by
C/S 4:50 PM Dec, 7/41." (Filed with WPD
- 58 At the Army staff meetings, held
in the mornings of 8 through 12 December, the
War Plans Division was represented by its chief,
General Gerow, who was usually accompanied
by another officer from the division. The Army
Air Forces was represented by General Arnold
or Brig. Geri . Carl Spaatz, or by both. (OCS
Notes on Confs, Decisions by CofS, DCsofS,
and Other Info, Dec 41. Cf. min, Confs in OCofS,
8-12, Dec, WDCSA CofS Confs, IL) At the Joint
Board meetings held during the afternoon on
8, 9, 10, and 13 December, Generals Bryden
and Grow, and either General Spaatz or General
Arnold were also in attendance. (See min, JB
- 59 For movement of antiaircraft units
and equipment in the United States, and of
planes, ammunition, and units to Hawaii and
Panama, and Marshall's insistence on "follow
up," see minutes of meetings cited n.
58., For these arid other early movements of
troops and equipment, and staff action in connection
therewith, sec, in particular: (1) papers in
WPD Msg File 1, WPD 3449, 3807, 4622, 4624,
and (2) Hq ASF fibs under CofS, G-1,Mar-Jun
- 60 Craven and Cate, AAF I,
pp. 175-93, 201. The Far Eastern fir Force,
like the U.S. Army as a whole, was in the process
of being organized. Figures on planes give
some indication-but only an indication - of
how far it was from being ready. Of 165 modern
B-17's allocated, 35 were in the Philippines,
33 of which were in commission, Of 240 modern
pursuit planes allocated, 107 (P-40's) had
arrived, of which about 90 were in commission,
Larger total figures published on various occasions
incorporate numbers of obsolete or obsolescent
craft, of little or no value in combat.
- 61 Msg, MacArthur to TAG, 8 Dec 41,
. 1133, WPD Msg File 1, 108. The figure given
for pursuit planes includes P-35's. For the
full story, see: (1) Craven and Cate, AAF
I, Ch. VI, and (2) Morton, Fall of the
- 62 Toward the end of November the
eight destroyers and one of the two cruisers
of the Asiatic Fleet had been withdrawn to
the south in two forces, one to Balikpapan
on Makassar Strait, and one to Tarakan in the
Celebes Sea. The "striking force"
that remained in the Philippines-one light
cruiser (Houston) and a seaplane tender
(Langley )- was ordered south to Makassar
Strait on 8 December. (See Morison, Rising
.Sun, pp. 154, 193)
- 63 The Navy apparently reached the
conclusion very quickly that it was impossible
to get reinforcements to the Philippines under
existing circunstances. General Gerow so reported
at a meeting of the General Council on the
morning of 9 December. (1) See conf in Bryden's
Off, 9 Dec 41, OCS Binder 29. (21 The formal
statement of WPD is in memo, WPD for CofS,
12 Dec 41, sub: Brief Current Strategic Est,
- 64 Memo [WPD] for CofS [6 Dec 41],
sub: Transports for Phil, Tab 3, Folder Book
1, Exec 4. This paper lists current status
of transports for the Philippines as of 6 December.
The five ships escorted by the Pensacola after
the convoy left Hawaii were the Holbrook
and Republic, carrying troops and equipment,
and the Meigs, Bloemfontein,
and Admiral Halstead, carrying equipment and
- 65 Min, JB mtg, 9 Dec 41.
- 66 Msg (originator WPD) Marshall to
MacArthur, 7 Dee 41, No. 736. Marshall added
the pledge to the message drafted by WPD. (Sec
draft filed WPD 444-20.) This draft was evidently
extracted from the volume prepared by WPD (Folder
Book 1, Exec 4 cited n. 64) during the afternoon
and evening of 6 December and taken to Marshall
on the morning of 7 December to be gone over
with The President. The volume included proposed
messages to sand to commanders in the field
in the event of war with Japan. Marshall added
the pledge (and made one other addition) to
the proposed message for MacArthur, presumably
before receiving news of the attack, since
it does not include a reference to the attack.
The volume includes a copy of the message as
corrected by Marshall.
- 67 Min, mtg in OCofS, 0815 hours,
10 Dec 41, WDCSA CofS Conf, II. Gerow's assistants
were Colonels Bundy and Handy. Bundy, the chief
of the Plans Croup, WPD, was killed two days
later in the crash of a plane en route to Hawaii,
and Handy succeeded him as chief of the Plans
- 68 Min cited n. 67.
- 69 Min, JB mtg, 1445 hours, 10 Dec
- 70 (1) Msg, OpNav CTF 15, 10 Dec 41,
WPD msg File 1,383. (2) Memo, WPD for Comdr
D.H. Harries, RAN, Australian Attaché, Australian
Legation 12 Dec 41 sub: Msg to U.S. Mil Attaché,
Australia, WPD 4628-1. For measures taken by
the War Department to alert General Barnes
at sea and General MacArthur in Manila to the
change in instructions, see memo, WPD for CNO,
12 Dec 41, sub: lugs for Transmission ( Convoy
to Brisbane), W PD 4628, and memo, WPD for
CSigO, 12 Dec 41, sub: Msg for Transmission
(Convoy to Brisbane), WPD 4628. The message
was sent on the same day to MacArthur as message
- 71 Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 13
Dec 41, no number, Tab MacArthur, Book 1, Exec
8. This message was in answer to the War Department
message . 776, cited n. 70.
- 72 Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 14
Dec 41, no number, Tab MacArthur, Book 1, Exec
8. This message was in amplification of the
message of 13 December. It was followed by
a second message in amplification, in which
MacArthur stated that he was ordering Barnes
to dispose air units and start ferrying planes,
but that he could do nothing more till he had
an answer to his previous messages.
- 73 Msg, MacArthur to TAG, 12 Dec 41,
no number, WPD Msg File. 1, 707. The message
was received and circulated in the War Department
on the afternoon of 14 December. MacArthur
reported that he had in commission (as of 14
December) six B-17's, two B 18's eighteen P-40's,
six P-35's, and five obsolete observation planes.
(Msg, MacArthur to TAG, 15 Dec 41, no number,
WPD Msg File 1, 710.1
- 74 Stimson and Bundy, On Active
Service, pp. 395-96.
- 75 Msg (originator WPD), Marshall
to MacArthur, 15 Dec 41, No. 787, WPD 4544-31.
- 76 (1) Note for red, Gen Gerow, 15
Dec 41, Tab MacArthur, Book 1, Exec 8. (2)
Memo, Gen Arnold for CofS, 15 Dec 41, sub:
Aerial Reinforcements for Hawaii and P. L,
WPD Msg File 1, 772.
- 77 Memo (no originator) for CofS,
17 Dec 41, no sub, Hq ASF files under CofS,
GS (1), May-Jun 42.
- 78 Note for rcd cited n. 76 (1) .
- 79 Msg . 787 cited n. 75. Plans and
preparations for this movement had been under
way for a week. Sec (11 min, conf in OCofS,
9 Dec 41, WDCSA CofS Confs, II, and (2) memo,
Col Bissell for ACofS WPD, 9 Dec 41, sub: Mtg
in Gen Arnold's Off, 9:30 Dec 9, 1941, WPD
- 80 Msg, Magruder to SW, 11 Dec 41,
AMMISCA 95, WPD Msg File 1, 747.
- 81 For an interim War Department answer
to Magruder's message, cited n. 80, sec msg,
Stimson to Magruder, 13 Dec 41, Tab China,
Book 1, Exec 8. The President communicated
with the Generalissimo on 14 December making
the definite proposal for the conference in
Chungking. See Romanus and Sunderland,
Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. II.
- 82 Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 10
Dec 41, No. 198, WPD 4544-26. For early War
Department hopes of Soviet intervention in
the Far East, see: (1) min, mtg in OCofS, 10
Dec 41, WDCSA CofS Confs, II: (2) notes by
WPD offs with copy of msg ;No. 198, cited above,
WPD 4544-26: (3) WPD study, title: Gen Strategic
Review, incl with memo, WPD for CofS [23 Dec
41], sub: Gen Strategic Review, WPD 4402-136;
and (41 paper, no addresser, no sig, n.d.,
title: Assistance to the Far East, Tab A, Book
A, Exec 8.
- 83 Msg, Stalin to Chiang Kai-stick,
12 Dec 41, translated copy, initialed by Gen
Gerow and Brig Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, in
Tab China, Book 1, Exec 8. Ambassador Maxim
Litvinov had earlier stated to the President
the desire of the Soviet Government to remain
neutral. (See min cited n. 82 (1).)
- 84 (1) Memo, WPD for TAG, 2 Jan 42,
sub: Strategic Policy, Far Eastern Theater,
Tab Misc, Book 2, Exec 8. (2) Memo, WPD for
CofS, 3 Jan 42, sub: Relief of the Phil, WPD
4639-2. (3) Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 4 Feb
42, No 201. (4) memo, WPD for TAG, 8 Feb 42,
sub: Far Eastern Sit. Last two in Tab MacArthur,
Book 3, Exec 8.
- 85 See, for example, ltr, Col Brink
to CofS, 25 Dec 41, sub: Inter-Allied Conf,
Singapore, Dec 18, 20, 1941, WPD 4544-31. This
is the final report of the Singapore conference.
The American position is summarized in the
final sentence of a statement sent by General
MacArthur and Admiral Hart, which Colonel Brink
read and distributed: "We reiterate the
strategic policy enunciated by President Roosevelt:-The
Far East area is now the dominant locus of
the war and the most rapid and concentrated
effort should be made by convergent action
of the Allies."
- 86 For the President's proposal for
conversations in Moscow, sec copy of msg, President
to Stalin [15 Dec 41], Tab Collab, Book 1,
- 87 Msg, Brink to Marshall [via British
channels], 21 Dec 41, OCS 18136-179.
- 88 (1) Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade
in Europe (New York, Doubleday & Company,
Inc., 1948), pp. 17-22. (2) Paper, n.d., no
sig, title: Assistance to the Far East, Tab
A, Book A, Exec 8. 1 his paper probably represents
the first effort to stag what should be done
in the Southwest Pacific.
- 89 Memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Dec 41,
sub: Plan for Australian Base, WPD 4628-1.
General Eisenhower was the action officer.
- 90 Msg (originator WPD), Marshall
to Magruder for Brett, 17 Dec 41, WPD 4628.
- 91 (1) Msg (originator WPD), Marshall
to Brett, 17 Dec 41, No. 31, WPD 4628. (2)
Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to U.S. Mil
Attaché, Brisbane, for Barns, 17 Dec 41, No.
30, WPD Msg File 1, 972. (3) Ltr, Moore to
Brett, 19 Dec 41, AG 381 (12-31-41).
- 92 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service,
- 93 (1) Msg, Clagett to U.S. CsofS
[via Australian radio channels], 22 Dec 41,
Tab ABDA Reps, Book 1, Exec: 8. The message
was delivered to WPD by Commander Harries of
the Australian Navy just before noon on 23
December. (2) See msg, MacArthur to Marshall,
18 Dec 41, no number, WPD Msg File 1, 970,
for MacArthur's directions and expectations.
- 94 Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 22
Dec 41, No. 40, WPD Msg File 1, 1293.
- 95 Msg (originator WPD), Marshall
to MacArthur, 23 Dec 41, WPD Msg File 1, 1340.
- 96 (1) Msg, MacArthur to :Marshall,
21 Dec 41, No. 22, WPD Msg File 1, 1186. (2).
Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 22 Dec 41, No.
3, WPD Msg File 1, 1222.
- 97 Msg (originator WPD), Marshall
to MacArthur, 24 Dec 41, WPD 3633-27.
- 98 (1) Msg (originator WPD), Marshall
to Brett, 24 Dec 41, WPD Msg File 1, 1382.
(2) See also, msg (originator WPD), Marshall
to U.S. Mil Attaché, Melbourne, for Brett,
25 Dec 41, No. 41, WPD 4628-3, Tab ABDA Reps,
Book 1, Exec 8.
- 99 Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 2.5
Dec 41, no number, WPD Msg File 1, 1462. General
Brereton was in command of the B 17 force that
was moved south. The B-17's had bran operating
front Port Darwin for several days.
- 100 Notes on mtg at White House, beginning
at 1800, 24 Dec 41, of President and Prime
Minister and others, sent by Brigadier L. C.
Hollis of Br Jt Stf Miss to "Secretary
General to the United States Chiefs of Staff,"
Tab Collab, Book 1, Exec 8.
- 101 As approved by Marshall,
28 Dec 41. Sec extract from memo, AAF for CofS,
26 Dec 41, sub: Air Units . . ., WPD 3807-107.
created 10 January 2002
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