Planning began in earnest as the ships got underway , with a combined command center on Guam . On the morning of 3 January , the task force 's command questioned why they were not given the option of an amphibious landing and requested a tank landing ship be added to the task force ; the request was denied . A warrant officer who had previously served as a Marine Security Guard at the Mogadishu embassy during the mid @-@ 1980s was found . Despite Ambassador Bishop 's planning with Central Command , the task force was provided outdated information . The former MSG told planners that a new embassy had been planned and was under construction several years prior . In fact , the new embassy was located further inland and , after receiving updated information , task force commanders determined that a beach landing , requiring troops to fight their way across the city , was too risky . Initial plans had the ships launch their helicopters at 01 : 00 on 7 January . However , in response to indications from Ambassador Bishop that conditions in Mogadishu were deteriorating , planners considered 1 @,@ 050 @-@ nautical @-@ mile ( 1 @,@ 940 km ; 1 @,@ 210 mi ) and , later , 890 @-@ nautical @-@ mile ( 1 @,@ 650 km ; 1 @,@ 020 mi ) flights with the CH @-@ 53Es while the ships were still located in the northern Arabian Sea . The situation in Mogadishu stabilized somewhat and the mission was delayed until 5 January .