10.13125/2039-6597/1303
The manipulation of human DNA in the form of eugenic pursuit, cloning, genetic engineering etc., has become a well-established subject in science fiction for decades now. In our days, this thematic trend is probably the most prolific one when inspiring narratives in popular culture and also constitutes the source of much bioethical debate. A common pattern derived from these practices is that they generate dystopian scenarios where a community is oppressed and abused by scientific means thus portraying science and its agents as evil. In the case of clone fiction, the focus of this article, the inhumanity of the oppressive powers enhances the questioned humanity of the clones, a particularly complex and evolving type of character that is often commodified. This paper analyses the "evil science" construction and the semiotics of the human/clone identity it produces as displayed in the cases of Never Let Me Go (Kazuo Ishiguro, 2005), The Island (Dir. Michael Bay, USA, 2005), Moon (Dir. Duncan Jones, UK, 2009) and the TV series Orphan Black (created by Graeme Manson &amp; John Fawcett, Canada, 2013–). The cited examples provide references for typified patterns as well as for the development of both the clone figure and the scientific evilness component.
application/pdf
2039-6597
1303
8
en
Jimena Escudero Pérez
Between
evil
Sympathy for the Clone: (Post)Human Identities Enhanced by the ‘Evil Science’ Construct and its Commodifying Practices in Contemporary Clone Fiction
Text.Serial.Journal
https://ojs.unica.it/index.php/between
4
Narratives of the Technological Imagination
2014-12-02
2014-08-14
2014-11-30
2015-01-13
1
Jimena Escudero Pérez
2014/12/02
10.13125/2039-6597/1303
Universidad de Oviedo
2039-6597
8
evil
en
Sympathy for the Clone: (Post)Human Identities Enhanced by the ‘Evil Science’ Construct and its Commodifying Practices in Contemporary Clone Fiction
https://ojs.unica.it/index.php/between/article/download/1303/1099
4
Sympathy for the Clone: (Post)Human
  Identities Enhanced by the ‘Evil
     Science’ Construct and its
    Commodifying Practices in
    Contemporary Clone Fiction!
                              Jimena Escudero Pérez	



  Involving in and Depicting Science: SF’s Ambivalent
                        Effect	

     Science fiction (SF), in any of its artistic representations, serves as
an excellent platform to make science more appealing and accessible to
the general public. It can be a very valuable didactic tool, but it also
often foresees many scientific developments that eventually become
part of our everyday lives. This visionary quality has also led to new
disciplines within the scientific professions, such as SF Prototyping
(SFP), applied to envision future development possibilities for
engineering, medical or business technologies. But perhaps the most
outstanding contribution of the genre is its ability to arouse critical
thinking about our own nature and the way we relate to the issues that
most dramatically shape human experience, which often include
scientific discourse and practice. This is a double-edged sword, since
the messages conveyed through fiction can sometimes result in
popular misconceptions which in turn may affect scientific research
and performance and, consequently, society. In our days, biomedical
science is probably the most fertile ground to explore this ambivalent
mechanism, both for its abundance in fiction and for the crucial ethical
debates it ignites in our society, an obviously interrelated binomial. A


Between, vol. IV , n. 8 (Nov. 2014)
Jimena Escudero Pérez, Sympathy for the Clone



decade ago Joan Slonezewski and Michael Levy (2003: 175) already
acknowledged «Genetic engineering» and «Sexuality and
reproduction» as two of the five most enduring themes in 20thC SF.
The dangers of genetic manipulation seem to have, in fact, displaced
those of nuclear power in the shaping of a common suspicion of
science which reached its zenith after the Second World War. Two
illustrative examples of this shift, as Craig Cormick (2006: 182) has
pointed out, are the remakes of Spiderman (Dir. Sam Raimi, USA, 2002)
and Hulk (Dir. Ang Lee, USA, 2003): in both cases the superheroes'
powers, hitherto derived from nuclear radiation, now come as the
consequence of genetic alteration. !
      A popular character in SF narrative is "the mad scientist"- driven
by blind ambition for knowledge and accomplishment to a god-like
level-, a figure that particularly stands out in the biomedical subgenre.
But this stereotype, built upon a long tradition of literary and
cinematographic icons (e. g. Dr. Faustus, Victor Frankenstein or C. A.
Rotwang) is not the only agent to blame for science's depiction as
perverse: corporate greed and governmental control also take part in
such portrayal. All of these powers are the ones actually operating
behind the misuse of science; a misuse which, ironically, is not
perceived as such. Blame falls on the tool, not the user. This blurring of
responsibilities contributes to an established paradigm: that science is
uncontrollable per se. People cannot have control over science or
scientists; they escape law and ethics and might even be unable to
predict or repair the catastrophic consequences of their acts. Altering
the natural order of things is unavoidably and intrinsically wrong, a
discourse that prevailed in the depiction of nuclear power and that has
now, as we have mentioned, naturally been assimilated by biomedical
praxis. !
      Narratives that have genetic engineering or cloning as a structural
axis usually follow a more or less typified pattern: the aforementioned
techniques favour some members of the community and displace
others who are left out to different degrees. This is generally
accomplished through the fabrication of a lie or an alternate reality in


2
                                                Between, vol. IV , n. 8 (Nov. 2014)



which information is deliberately kept from the beneficiaries, the
victims, or both. The "less-than-human" status conferred to the clones
or the genetically inferior reflects the inhumanity of the scientific agent
that has brought them to this alienation and abuse. It is these
victimised characters who denounce the illegal/immoral practice to
their society and/or to the audience. Although the main question in
these works of fiction is precisely what it means to be human and who
can be catalogued as such, this is often accompanied by the sometimes
hidden message that cloning and genetic engineering can only result in
disastrous and immoral situations. Science, having enabled these
practices, is "evil", and everything scientific is contaminated by this
evilness.!
      But one undeniable advantage of SF, regardless of the negative
connotations, is that it forces us to reflect upon what hasn’t yet
happened. More than that just a warning, this has a preventive quality,
sparking essential debates in anticipation of the problems that can
create them. Thus, an evil depiction of the consequence does not
necessarily result in a bad reputation for the praxis. In fact, research
concludes that, contrary to a common belief and concern among both
SF advocates and detractors, fictional representations do not
particularly shape bad perceptions of science itself. For example, Jenny
Kitzinger’s questioning of what she has coined the “sci-fi alibi” found
that when people were invited to explain their concerns about stem
cells research, GM crops and nanotechnology, they would often avoid
fictional references or just use them metaphorically and instead
preferred to base their worries on historical precedents such as nuclear
disasters, Mad Cow or BSE crises, or scandals over weapons of mass
destruction (Kitzinger 2010: 75). Among other interesting conclusions
drawn from a previous study by Kitzinger, Henderson and Smart
(2002), indeed quite positive claims for SF, were that, as opposed to
news and media, fiction «is more likely to represent people as citizens
and activists, and to introduce characters with marginalised voices»;
that it «is more likely to explore ambivalence of opinion» as well as
emphasizing science’s unpredictability (Kitzinger 2010: 83). !


                                                                                 3
Jimena Escudero Pérez, Sympathy for the Clone



      Because the realm of the human gene, particularly cloning, strikes
to the core of human identity both with regards to the individual as
well as to the species, negotiations between fiction, potential risks,
uncontrolled science and inhumane consequences of its development
are of paramount interest in contemporary epistemology. In this article
I submit that humanity in artificially created beings is particularly
enhanced by diegesis that include the "evil science" construct; that
which is abstract and anonymous, often bordering science and fiction
and acquiring a halo of fantasy due to its intangibility. This depiction of
science as ungoverned always has to make use of the humanization of
its "products" to the point where these can't be governed either; when
they try to control their own destiny. In the case of cloning, as we will
see, this thematic field has become so much richer in recent years that
the rearrangement of power within those narrative frameworks that
seemed standardised, has likewise matured, introducing characters
whose (post)humanity (Haraway 1991; Hayles 1999) draws our own
into a new era for our species. This article, therefore, will be devoted to
analysing contemporary works of fiction dealing with human cloning
in literary and cinematographic discourses, paying close attention to
the construction of science as evil and to the new semiotics of the
human identity they display. With this aim, although other works will
be cross- referenced, the main corpus will include the novel Never Let
Me Go (Kazuo Ishiguro, 2005), the motion pictures The Island (Dir.
Michael Bay, USA, 2005) and Moon (Dir. Duncan Jones, UK, 2009), as
well as the TV series Orphan Black (created by Graeme Manson & John
Fawcett, Canada, 2013–). Such an eclectic sampling should provide an
outline for distinctive typified patterns while allowing room for their
transgressions, as a sign of the times and of genre.	

       !                                               Image 1. Clones
       !                                               being harvested

           !                                           in The Island.


           !

4
                                                 Between, vol. IV , n. 8 (Nov. 2014)




              Narrative Considerations on the Clone !
     Technology as a tool is rarely a problem. It becomes a problem
when we can no longer use it as such because it acquires a certain,
variable degree of autonomy and agency. This is particularly relevant
in fictions related to the biomedical sciences; those that deal with
human physiognomy or mind. Although human impersonation as a
source of identity conflict tends to be accompanied by the misused
science element, clones and genetically engineered characters
discursively differ from other human-resembling artificial creations.
They defy our capability of determining what human means or what a
person is, even more than replicant/AI/cyborg narratives do. In this
regard, the clone stands as a perfect discursive and biological exponent
of the concept of alterity: a clone is an identical individual, one
hundred percent human, who is nevertheless viewed as a subversion
of the self. It is precisely the lack of difference here which constitutes
the maximum threat to the cohesion of identity and ontology. !
     When exploring the narrative foundation of the clone we
inevitably have to consider the abundance of replicas of the self,
present in literature and cinema. As Hillel Schwartz highlights in The
Culture of the Copy: Striking Likenesses, Unreasonable Facsimiles (1996),
our society has always been fascinated by this concept. Two major
realizations of the human copy can be found in doubles1 and clones.
Both share many characteristics; the most significant being this quality
of imitating an original to the extent of becoming physically
indistinguishable from him or her. In most double narratives -mainly
folkloric ones - the double is unreal, a ghostly representation of the
original as a sort of Doppelgänger nonexistent outside the original’s

"1 An exhaustive analysis on the uncanny value of the double can be found in
 Otto Rank’s study Der Doppelgänger: Eine Psychoalnalystische Studie
 (Vienna/Leipzig/Zurich: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1925;
 English translation and edition by Harry Tucker Jr.: The Double: a Psychoa-
 nalytic Study. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press,
 1971).


                                                                                  5
Jimena Escudero Pérez, Sympathy for the Clone



mind; however, others do display a true double representation of their
referent. In the 1970’s, this inspired some terror and socially critical SF
like the iconic film The Stepford Wives (Dir. Bryan Forbes, USA, 1975)
based on the 1972 novel by Ira Levin. Still in these cases, as in clone
narrative, even if attention is not drawn to the enabling technology, the
scepticism of an “obscure”, dangerous science, typical of the
(post)Romantic period and of the second half of the twentieth century,
is blatant. Both types of narratives also pose the fundamental question
of identity: where is the boundary between the self and the other. For
postmodern western culture, obsessed with the concept of subjectivity,
both the copy and the clone threaten the individual and yet, their
discursive positioning is quite different.!
      In his article "Telling the Difference: Clones, Doubles and What’s
in Between" (2011/2012) Amit Marcus concludes that while narratives
of doubles often end in the death of the original, clone narratives
provide a way to extend life or even gain immortality. The double
threatens the physical, mental and spiritual survival of the original,
whereas the clone doesn’t. In spite of one's initial rejection of the figure
of the clone as an impostor, in most clone narratives there is no tension
or rivalry between the original and the clone(s): they either don’t co-
exist or are simply unaware of each other’s existence (e.g. Never Let Me
Go). However, when they do, conflictive dialectics arise, although in
these scenarios the tension is focused on the figure of the cloner, it
being a single person, an institution or a corporation. The cloner is the
"evil science" agent, never performing its duty for the benefit of the
clone and very rarely for the original.!

       !
           The Settings: the Evil Science Construct and its
                              Agents!
     In the Hollywood SF pastiche The Island, biomedical science is
portrayed as evil in its goal and its means. The clones are subjected to
unnecessary suffering and cruelty in their deaths and some of the


6
                                                Between, vol. IV , n. 8 (Nov. 2014)



people who work at "the compound", the fake sheltering community in
which clones are harvested, perform their duties in a rather sadistic
way. The company also operates secretly and illegally, hiding the truth
from society and its own clients. Since the entire medical personnel
collaborate, the evil is not restricted to Dr. Merrick who fully embodies
all the "mad scientist" stereotypes («I give life! »). The "outcasts", the
ones who are not scientists or have no scientific knowledge, are the
morally righteous characters even if they are killers or collaborate with
the clone factory. The dangerous message that knowledge, particularly
scientific, equals evilness is made blatant in this film. !
      Duncan Jones’ opera prima Moon is a far more exquisite and
evolved treatment of the theme. In this film, clones are stored and
progressively awakened to substitute the previous solitary worker at a
mine on the Moon. The prosthetic memory of the original worker, who
lives happily on Earth, is implanted into each new clone. This provides
him with identity and the technical knowledge his original had, thus
sparing the company time and training expenses running the complex.
The original does not gain benefit from the harm of cloning; in fact the
film suggests that he is not even aware of the situation, but he is also a
victim who has had his identity stolen. The "evil science" shows here its
full multidisciplinary potential: telecommunications, energy industry,
cloning, computational neuroscience, etc.: are all devoted to immoral
behaviour, illegality and abominations. Nevertheless, in the end,
redemption comes by way of Gerty, the AI unit whose command is to
«help Sam". The outstanding singularity of Gerty completely breaks
with all previous AI paradigms; while the embodiment of scientific
development, "he" displays a much higher degree of humanity than the
scientists themselves. With its unique approach to clone fiction, this
masterpiece has undoubtedly become a reference for the subgenre.!
      The evilness of the scientific element in Orphan Black, though quite
conservative in its characterization, is highly problematized by the plot
itself. To start with, there isn't just one source of evil, since there are
various enemies on the malevolent side. Secondly, evilness is attributed
in equal parts to science and to its antitheses. Sarah and her "siblings"


                                                                                 7
Jimena Escudero Pérez, Sympathy for the Clone



are chased by several antagonistic groups ranging from religious
extremism (the pseudo neo-luddite brotherhood of the Proletheans) to
unscrupulous experimentation (Dyad biotech corporation). Some evil
characters even agglutinate both extremes simultaneously like the
“New Age” Prolethean Hank, or the Neolutionist Dr. Leekie. One of
the “good clones”, Cosima, is not only a highly qualified scientist but
also «the science» (2x9; my emphasis) as she refers to herself in allusion
to the study being carried out within her in which she participates
actively. Finally, the clones’ genetic design seems to have provided
considerable biological advantages for Sarah’s child, Kira, who
survives a car accident completely uninjured. Although the clones are
instrumentalized and suffer the consequences of their “artificial”
nature, the engineering that has produced them itself is not so
categorically tainted with evilness. As Sarah wisely clarifies to Cosima,
she (Sarah) is «worried about scientists more than science» (1x8).
Science is obscure because it remains mysterious and untameable but it
is also tantalising thanks to Cosima, Kira and several other “good”
characters related to science. This duality is represented
cinematographically too, with the juxtaposition of light and dark in the
laboratory scenes, musical arrangements and DNA’s double helix used
as a motif for both the clones and their enemies. !
     In Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go, exceptionality resides mainly in the
conformism of the victims, but the contextual assembly also differs
significantly from any other clone narrative. Science and public
authorities together have integrated the cloning of humans in order to
supply for a donations programme that, although never specified in
the novel, seems to be part of the British health care system making
society as a whole guilty of the misuse. The novel does not take
pleasure in biomedical details but, in the end, both cloning and
transplantation are inevitably perceived as evil practices. Real science
is completely absent, both in the plausibility of the plot and in its
textual presence. Instead, a murkier science is suggested: not only is its
abuse legal and public, but it is also portrayed as unthinking, irrational



8
                                                  Between, vol. IV , n. 8 (Nov. 2014)



and, to a certain extent, naïve in its incapacity to foresee the obvious
ethical conflict into which the practice would lead:!

            [b]y the time they came to consider just how you were
     reared, whether you should have been brought into existence at
     all, well by then it was too late. (…) How can you ask a world that
     has come to regard cancer as curable, how can you ask such a
     world to put away that cure, to go back to the dark
     days?' (Ishiguro 2005: 257)!

     One persistent motto in fictions about clones is that the real control
of science, the top, cutting-edge science is always clandestine; it does
not serve the state, middle, or low-class civilians. That is one of the
reasons why Ishiguro’s proposal becomes so unbearable; for that and,
of course, for the implausible and despairing resilience with which the
clones face a destiny of agony and death.!

     !
     Biopolitics, Mercantile Purposes and Identity Crises!
      Clones are products of consumption in one way or another and
this is precisely what raises the debate over their human status,
otherwise indisputable in biological terms. Whether the purpose of
their creation and existence is for organ transplantation as in The Island
and Never Let Me Go, labour force as in Moon, or experimentation as in
Orphan Black, their bodies –and with them, their literal and holistic
integrity- are appropriated by others and disposed of at will, which
poses obvious political considerations. Surprisingly, none of these
fictions renders the reproductive usage of cloning, allegedly one of the
most controversial bioethical concerns the practice has traditionally
aroused. In 1997 Leon Kass objected to this application in his outraged
“The Wisdom of Repugnance: Why We Should Ban the Cloning of
Humans” as interfering with what he referred to as the «soul-elevating
power of sexuality» (Kass 1997: 692). One reproductive drive for
cloning that has haunted fiction has been that of copying prominent



                                                                                   9
Jimena Escudero Pérez, Sympathy for the Clone



figures to secure their survival, as in Ira Levin’s The Boys from Brazil
(1976), which nevertheless also objectifies the cloned subject as a
constituent for a greater plan. Still, the actual perpetuation of the self –
an identical self- in a parental sense does not seem to be as much of a
desirable fantasy as Kass feared. The originals in The Island cloned
themselves to have spare components for their own bodies, which is
quite far from the instinct of progeny. The disturbance that the idea of a
self clone causes might not only be due to the dangers it can imply in
terms of identity theft. Our genome holds our biological heritage so its
control, threatened by this technique, is an innate worry, the engine of
evolutionary processes. We are vehicles and, to a great extent, as
Richard Dawkins would claim (1976), subjects of our genes and, to this
date, cloning doesn’t seem to be a successful procedure to ensure their
conservation. Perhaps underlying the atavistic rejection to our own
clone is a survival mechanism for our genes.!
      By the end of Orphan Black’s first season a mystery that had been
haunting Cosima since she'd started analysing her genome, is solved.
When she finally is able to decipher what looked like a bar code, a text
unveils that reads «THIS ORGANISM AND DERIVATIVE GENETIC
MATERIAL IS RESTRICTED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY».
Encrypted in the clones’ DNA is the copyright of that same genetic
sequence, leaving no doubt as to the ownership of these women.
Cosima, astonished by the realization of this new level of their
commodified existence, reminds Sarah of the implications this might
also have with regards to her precious and clones-wise unique,
daughter: «Our bodies, our biology, everything we are, everything we
become belongs to them. Sarah, they could claim Kira» (1x10). Before
this, the women had to confront the reality that they were «clones,
experiments». Now they know that they are not only being serialized,
but that they are also patented. As subjects, they don't posses
themselves in any sense, not only because of their duplication, which
already contradicts the individual, but because the most genuinely
personal asset of themselves bears a legal bond to somebody else; they
are property.!


10
                                                      Between, vol. IV , n. 8 (Nov. 2014)




           Image 2. Clones’ DNA copyright in Orphan Black.



      It's interesting to note here how the copyright, one of the fiercest
emblems of capitalism, refers to the property itself almost
euphemistically -while maintaining its legal accuracy- as an "organism"
depriving it of any human recognition. Also worth noting is the
extension of that ownership towards future offspring, derogatorily
referred to as “derivative material", a far more nefarious sense of
ownership. Since the original genome is synthetic, it is treated as
intellectual property. The allusion here to Foucault’s concept of
biopower (1977-1978) seems inevitable, with the aforementioned
commercial binding standing out as a particularly perverse and literal
mechanism « [t]hrough which the basic biological features of the
human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general
strategy of power» (Foucault 1977-1978: 1).!
      Never Let Me Go does not show more indulgence with the clones.
As school children they are already told about their future prospect by
one of their teachers, who can no longer stand the students' fantasies of
adult freewill:!




                                                                                      11
Jimena Escudero Pérez, Sympathy for the Clone



               Your lives are set out for you. You’ll become adults, then
        before you’re old, before you’re even middle-aged, you’ll start to
        donate your vital organs. That’s what each of you was created to do.
        (...) You were brought into this world for a purpose, and your
        futures, all of them, have been decided. (Ishiguro 2005: 80, my
        emphasis)!

      This unofficial pronouncement stems from the profound
discomfort all the other humans in the novel experiment when
witnessing the clash between the very humane hopes of the clones
with their inhumane fate and purpose. Thus, the non-human quality
serves once again to energise an ontological problem as, a priori,
humanity is taken for granted in those who show their lack of it and
vice versa. Gabriele Griffin commented on the effect of the clones'
acceptance of their fate and the lack of redemption in the novel as
calling for «[t]he ‘innocent bystander’ position, the observer function
that has so haunted twentieth-century critiques of human relations at
intimate and global levels» (Griffin 2009: 658). This ‘innocent
bystander’ position may indeed haunt the reading of Never Let Me Go,
but the spectators' experience when witnessing clones on screen,
regardless of their instrumentalization by fellow humans and their
own reaction to it, implies a much more specific positioning to the
(sub)genre. We are alien to this in Ishiguro's fiction because, in its
narrative rareness, we never get to meet any other copies of the
characters we are introduced to. We know they are clones but we don't
have the originals or other reproductions. The representation and
discourse of the clones through visual text usually differs considerably
in this regard, since they strongly engage in the multiplicity of the
character(s), something which, according to anthropologist Debora
Battaglia, poses «[a] problem of identification for the grammar of the
film» (Battaglia 2001: 511). Leaning on L. Mulvey's (1975) spectatorship
theory of identification with the hero, Battaglia highlights that
«Because heroes here are multiple, not the autonomous egos of
Freudian theory, we are with the owner and the owned at once, if we
are with anyone; our subject-position identifies with a relation» (ibid.).


12
                                                               Between, vol. IV , n. 8 (Nov. 2014)



This relation is further complicated if the original from which the clone
has been copied takes part in the equation. In The Island, for instance
this spectatorship placement and the anti-science message are so
heavily stereotyped that identification with the hero and heroine does
not allow for the coexistence of original and clone; since clones are the
main characters towards whom all our empathy must be projected,
originals are -whether evil or not- condemned to death: Lincoln's
sponsor, Tom, gets killed and Jordan’s is left to die without the
required transplantation. !




    Image 3. Original will get killed after trying to kill his clone in The Island.

     !
     The search for “the original” is a common drive in most clone
narratives. But in addition to the search for paternal figures in the
maker that all artificially created beings go through - e.g. the "creature"
in Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (Mary Shelley, 1818) or the
replicants in Blade Runner (Dir. Ridley Scott, USA, 1982)-, we must add
the desperate search for the original self, the ultimate vessel of identity.



                                                                                               13
Jimena Escudero Pérez, Sympathy for the Clone



Obviously, as bystanders –using Griffin’s terminology- the less we get to
know about the originals, the better our identification with the clone
will be and the fewer his or her chances are of losing the heroic trait for
the spectator. Getting to know the original is a different aim from that
of learning the reasons why they were created. In some cases, as in
Never Let Me Go, this goal is presented as potentially enabling to
explain their existential profile. Unfortunately for Ishiguro’s clones,
more than a source of answers the figure of the original ends up being
perceived almost like a chimera, having inspired all sorts of
speculation and hypothesis within the group of friends who never get
to know who they have been cloned from. Griffin notes here that the
clones’ obsessive search for their biological origin in Never Let Me Go,
«[h]umanizes them, rendering them a companion species, in Donna
Haraway’s terms, rather than an other on a different, hierarchized
scale» (Griffin 2009: 657). Of course the quest for the original
presupposes knowledge of its existence and therefore, self-awareness
of being a clone. Another frequent obsession in these fictions,
whenever two or more copies confront each other, is determining who
the original is. The first reaction to an identical copy of oneself is that of
incredulity and rejection. In Moon, Sam2 and Sam3 engage in a heated
argument soon after meeting each other, each claiming to be the
original («I am Sam Bell! »). Admitting that the other is the original
would imply that the self is a copy. To their great despair all the Sams
finally learn the truth and have to resign to the fact that they all are just
that, clones.               !

        Image 4. Sams playing ping pong in Moon.!




14
                                                        Between, vol. IV , n. 8 (Nov. 2014)




      The Several Within One: Human Personhood and its
                    “Holy” Attributes!
      Because identity can only be defined in terms of opposition,
through difference, clone characters by lacking that input when facing
fellow clones, are condemned to an endless identity crisis. Acceptance
of this similarity develops powerful bonds between the subjects who
then take advantage of the knowledge about the other through the self.
This interesting alliance opens then an entire array of family-related
emotional practices, for once the barrier of rejection has been crossed,
understanding and reliance on one another naturalise the clone relation
as a perfectly normative fraternal one. After all, as Dawkins once
stated, «clones are simply identical twins»2. Although both Moon and
Orphan Black portray this same progress among the clones sooner or
later after the realization of the others’ existence, the manner between
them differs widely due to the fact that, unlike Orphan Blacks’, clones in
Moon share the same prosthetic memory and, therefore, the same mind.
The nature vs nurture distinction thus produces very different types of
clone characters too: those who have been raised in totally different
environments (Orphan Black) and those who share not only the same
genome but also the exact same history (Moon). In the TV series, this
disparity confronts Sarah with what at first is her total nemesis,
Helena, ironically her true mirror twin sister, who eventually becomes
part of “the clone club”. The behavioural footprint is highly
emphasized in the show providing the audience with "products" of
different upbringing: the street-smart, passionate Sarah, the orderly but
mentally unstable Alison, the self-assured, socially detached Rachel,
the pragmatic Cosima and the disturbed Helena, amongst others. The
range of identity features thus allows room for conservatism,
homosexuality –sexual taste and performance indeed plays a key role
in depicting the women’s personalities-, religious fanaticism and utter
scientificness within the same identical genome. !

2 “Nothing wrong with clones says Dawkins”, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/
tech/265878.stm, web (last accessed 05/8/2014).



                                                                                        15
Jimena Escudero Pérez, Sympathy for the Clone




        Image 5. Same genome, different personalities (Orphan Black).


      The characters’ heterogeneity, masterly portrayed by Tatiana
Maslany’s acting in Orphan Black, also constitutes yet another inspiring
analytical layer in Moon’s proposal. Although in this case the clones are
serialized bodies of the same age, kept in suspended animation, the
time lapse between their awakening and the present action
dramatically determines their character as well as their physical and
mental health. This setting serves as a perfect context to explore that
natural multiplicity of the self: the different selves, -tendencies, moods,
etc. - one bears within translate very adequately to a set of clones with
the same personal background. This phenomenon also offers the most
comical instances in the film, through their perception of one another,
recognised as a self, and the opportunity this provides for self-
knowledge:!

               «He’s got a problem. He scares me, Gerty»!

               «What is it about Sam that scares you? »!

               «He flies off the handle. I see it now. I see what Tess was
         talking about»!


16
                                                 Between, vol. IV , n. 8 (Nov. 2014)



      In the dialogue above, one of the Sams is sharing with Gerty his
concern about the other Sam’s aggressiveness. In seeing his clone’s
behaviour he now identifies with the claims his wife would make to
him. This mechanism functions in the opposite direction too, as each
clone is certain of, for example, the other’s moral values in spite of
having just met: «You can’t kill anybody. You can’t. I know you can’t
because I can’t».!
      In spite of their complex and troubled identities, clones’
categorization as human, as we have mentioned, is often put into
question. At times that category depends upon the labelling the
“human” characters in the story may choose; in Never Let Me Go, for
instance, clones are never allowed full humanity: « [p]eople did their
best not to think about you. And if they did, they tried to convince
themselves you weren’t really like us. That you were less than human, so
it didn’t matter» (Ishiguro 2005: 258, my emphasis). To be labelled “less
than human” implies the possession of certain humanness, yet,
insufficient to enjoy the privileges “human” denotes. Although a tacit
controversy always underlies the human category, because the biology
is human, reference to this nature is often avoided in clone narratives
in favour of a sort of metonymic relation with that of person. Since the
scope of their identities can never be constrained, these remain open
and undetermined. Because they are copies, what is questioned is their
subjectivity. !
      While subjectivity is indeed denied in the copy, such impediment
clashes with the hero/heroine constituency itself. If, as Battaglia
argues, we identify with a relationship not with a subject, it seems
improbable that we could experience any empathy with a clone
character. Yet their discursive construction, at least in the works we are
discussing here, seems indisputably personified. Clone characters draw
the audience into a three- stage process of identification: they first have
to be textually recognised as human –or almost human-, then their
artificiality has to be stressed and finally, from that objectified position
they reclaim their personhood thus gaining subjectivity. Battaglia
extends the main turn-of-the century anthropological concerns to


                                                                                 17
Jimena Escudero Pérez, Sympathy for the Clone



science culture, as recognizing « [h]uman personhood and
“technologies of the self” as social from the start» (Battaglia 2001: 495).
This acknowledgement helps to understand Moon’s complex case. In
spite of the fact that all the Sams share one personal memory and
therefore lack the socialization that could provide them with the
aforementioned personhood, the moment they begin to interact with one
another they automatically position themselves as subjects, regardless
of the artificiality of their previous self. Furthermore, interaction with
Gerty already allows a socializing network that can enable their
subjectivity. In this regard, Gerty’s own progressive ascription to a
subject paradigm is worth noting because, even if on a different level, it
runs parallel to that of the clones. When finalising the plan for escaping
from the lunar station, Sam can’t help to correct his robotic friend when
“it” mentions the next clone’s programming: «We’re not programmed;
we’re people». In this utterance, subjectivity is emphasised over the
dissolution of identity that cloning theoretically implies. The use of the
pronoun “we” here, however, renders an interesting ambiguity: it
could refer to all the Sams but, by the deliberate avoidance of the
adjective “human” it could also be including Gerty within the category.
This choice of “people” as Robin Stoate notes, « [i]s much more
inclusive a term than ‘human’, and is in the spirit of companionship
that Haraway’s thinking requires» (Stoate 2012: 209). !




  Image 6. Sam talking to happy Gerty in Moon.




18
                                                Between, vol. IV , n. 8 (Nov. 2014)



     !
      The lyrical indicator of humanity or, more appropriately, human
personhood par excellence is the soul. Although in principle the concept
of soul should be separated from the scientific dialectics, allusion to it
is recurrent in biomedical fictions. Interestingly, among all the
acceptations the word has had throughout history –originally
designating the quality of animated beings- the most reductive, Semitic
one prevails in these narratives, often raised by the scientists
themselves, as something exclusive to and distinctive of the human. In
the orthodox “mad scientist” sermon with which The Island’s Dr Merril
replies to the mercenary’s accusation of killing of the clones for
business, the doctor clarifies that they are «[s]imply tools, instruments;
they have no souls». Because they have no souls their killing does not
terminate with anything animated. “Agnates” (the clones) can barely be
considered to possess the qualities required to be alive as opposed to
he, who, in evident contrast, is capable of even giving life. A similar use
of the soul as a human person referent is made in Never Let Me Go,
where clones' artistic expression is intended to raise public awareness
of their spirituality, as Miss Emily eventually confesses to Katherine:
«‘We took away your art because we thought it could reveal your
souls. Or, to put it more finely, to prove that you had souls at
all’» (Ishiguro 2005: 255). In Orphan Black, Tomas asserts that
“abominations have no souls” (2x2) whereas his fellow Prolethean
Hank, sees clone Helena as a blessed creature from God.!
      The protagonism of the soul in clone narratives, nevertheless,
might not only obey the characteristic personhood vindication of
artificially created beings. In this case, as intangible as the concept of
soul might be, the connection with humanity is much more empiric
from a purely taxonomic perspective. Clone and genetic engineering
fictions tend to suggest that there is something spiritual about our
genome. A very human characteristic of our genes, that which must
distinguish us, not from other animals – a segregation understood to be
made in mere evolutionary terms- but from machines or the artificial, is



                                                                                19
Jimena Escudero Pérez, Sympathy for the Clone



to include imperfection. This is a message conveyed in all narratives
dealing with eugenics and inferred in those that specifically involve
cloning too, for the process rarely goes without some genetic
amendment. It seems trying to improve our genome can only lead to
disastrous social and biological consequences for the species. The
natural, original, DNA is to be preserved and treasured as it is. As
David A. Kirby states in reference to cinema dealing with eugenics
themes, «[b]ecause these films attribute spiritual significance to the
human genome as well as position it as the locus of personal identity,
they condemn any belief that our genome should be modified» (Kirby
2007: 84). The same science that profanes the "holy" gene by altering it
is the one to garnish it with such a numinous aura concurrently
exposing the paradox of the scientist-god. The genome is the essence of
the self and as such becomes mystified; it is the soul, in the language of
science. !

        !
                                      Conclusions!
      The fears embedded in the prospect of human cloning may indeed
project the ancestral survival programming of our own genes. Clone
fiction accepts the possibility of serializing humans, of producing the
same individual ad infinitum, but individuality requires uniqueness, a
clashing feature that has always stood as the basis of our subjectivity.
In its attempt to govern human nature, cloning cuts to the core of our
unpredictability through massive the reproduction of the self. The only
means to undertake such control being scientific, their characterization
plays a crucial role in articulating (post)humanity through fiction. The
agents and technologies holding this power have traditionally been
portrayed as pernicious to humankind because they endanger its
purity, and evil, because they desecrate the gene. Although the
positioning of science within its fault or misuse is not as dichotomised
in recent narratives, the sacredness attributed to the genome remains.
In Orphan Black both Sarah and her twin Helena are able to bear


20
                                                 Between, vol. IV , n. 8 (Nov. 2014)



children in spite of having been designed not to. The Prolethean leader
perceives this as “a miracle” (2x9) because it exposes the irrepressible
power of human nature as a divine design, which strives to make its
way through scientific constraints. To Kass’s delight, sexual
reproduction wins over both processes of cloning and genetic
manipulation.!
      The main focus of clone narrative -shared by any concerning
artificially created beings- resides, nevertheless, in the objectification of
the subject. Gabriele Griffin (2009) has noted that these fictions also
shift the controversy over how humans might be conceived -the
biotechnological-, to how humans might be raised and treated -the
social-. Undoubtedly, this is one valuable asset of the works here
analysed, but clone narratives engage us in a far more intricate
reflection upon ourselves which encompasses many more layers. As
happens in narratives about doubles, with clone fiction we are forced
to reconsider the traditional assumption of identity as something
unified and coherent. Whilst the double might interfere with this unity,
the clone simply exposes its fragility by confronting the individual
with the other in the same space. Thus, in a way, the figure of the clone
dissolves the concept of alterity by proposing alternative models of
individuality. The underlying semiotic value of the clone for examining
human subjectivity is further reinforced on the screen. As an additional
layer of complexity, the standard duplicity of the self when put into
image, multiplies in clone discourse where the self can be endlessly
reproduced. Contemporary narratives expand the process of
identification to a new level of sympathy for these characters. The
clone projects our conflicts with our cyborgization (Hables 2011) in
progress, with the technologically dominated self and with our
fledgling posthuman identity, while enhancing the serendipity of our
nature: one which transcends biological and environmental
constructions and allows subjectivity beyond singularity. !




                                                                                 21
Jimena Escudero Pérez, Sympathy for the Clone




                                    Works cited!
Battaglia, Debbora. "Multiplicities: An anthropologist's thoughts on
     replicants and clones in popular film", Critical inquiry 27.3 (2001):
     493-514.!
Cormick, Craig. "Cloning goes to the movies", História, Ciências, Saúde-
     Manguinhos, 13 (2006): 181-212.!
Dawkins, Richard, The Selfish Gene, New York, Oxford University Press,
        2006.!
Foucault, Michel, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de
     France 1977--1978, Vol. 4, Eds.Michel Senellart, François Ewald,
     and Alessandro Fontana, New York, Macmillan, 2009.!
Griffin, Gabriele. "Science and the cultural imaginary: the case of
        Kazuo Ishiguro's Never Let Me Go" Textual Practice, 23.4 (2009):
        645-663.!
Hables Gray, Chris. “Homo Cyborg: Fifty Years Old”, Teknokultura.
        Revista de Cultura Digital y Movimientos Sociales, 8.1 (2011): 83-104. !
Haraway, Donna J., Simians, Cyborgs, and Women. The Reinvention of
        Nature, New York, Routledge, 1991.!
Hayles, K., How we Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics,
        Literature, and Informatics, Chicago, The University of Chicago
        Press, 1999.!
Ishiguro, Kazuo, Never let me go, London, Faber and Faber Limited,
     2005.!
Kass, Leon R. "Wisdom of repugnance: why we should ban the cloning
        of humans, the", Val. UL Rev. 32 (1997): 679.!
Kirby, David A. "The devil in our DNA: a brief history of eugenics in
     science fiction films", Literature and medicine, 26.1 (2007): 83-108.!
Kitzinger, Jenny, et al. "Media coverage of the ethical and social
     implications of human genetic research", Sociology of Health and
     Illness, 25.1 (2002): 24-49.!




22
                                                 Between, vol. IV , n. 8 (Nov. 2014)



Kitzinger, Jenny. "Questioning the sci-fi alibi: a critique of how ‘science
     fiction fears’ are used to explain away public concerns about risk",
     Journal of Risk Research, 13.1 (2010): 73-86.!
Levin, Ira, The boys from Brazil, London, Corsair, 2011.!
Levin, Ira, The Stepford Wives: Introduction by Chuck Palanhiuk, London,
     Constable & Robinson, 2011.!
Marcus, Amit. "Telling the Difference: Clones, Doubles and What’s in
     Between", Connotations, 21.2-3 (2011/2012): 363-96.!
Rank, Otto. The Double, NC, The University of North Carolina Press,
     1971.!
Schwartz, Hillel, The Culture of the Copy: Striking Likenesses, Unreasonable
     Facsimiles, New York, Zone Books, 1996.!
Shelley, Mary, Frankenstein, London, Penguin Books, 1994.!
Slonczewski, Joan, and Michael Levy, "Science fiction and the life
     sciences", James, Edward, and Farah Mendlesohn, eds. The
     Cambridge companion to science fiction. Cambridge, Cambridge
     University Press, 2003: 174-185.!
Stoate, Robin. "‘We’re not programmed, we’re people’: Figuring the
     caring computer", Feminist Theory, 13.2 (2012): 197-211. !



                             Filmography!
Never let me go (Dir. Mark Romanek, UK, 2010)!
The Island (Dir. Michael Bay, USA, 2005)!
Moon (Dir. Duncan Jones, UK, 2009)!
The Stepford Wives (Dir. Bryan Forbes, USA, 1975)!
The Boys from Brazil (Dir. Franklin J. Schaffner, USA/UK, 1978)!
Blade Runner (Dir. Ridley Scott, USA, 1982) 	

Orphan Black (created by Graeme Manson & John Fawcett, Canada, 2013–)	


!
                                                                                 23
Jimena Escudero Pérez, Sympathy for the Clone




                                    The Author!
!       Jimena Escudero Pérez!
Jimena Escudero Pérez received her International PhD from the
University of Oviedo, after completing her thesis at the University of
Westminster, London. She was awarded with the Patricia Shaw Prize
2010 for her research by AEDEAN (Asociación Española de Estudios
Anglo-Norteamericanos) and was elected president of ASYRAS
(Association of Young Researchers on Anglophone Studies) in 2013.
She has lectured at the University of Oviedo since 2010 and her
research lines are focused on Anglophone literatures as well as on
cultural and media studies through literary, feminist and filmic
criticism, with special attention to Science Fiction. She regularly
participates in national and international conferences on these fields of
study and she is the author of Tecnoheroínas: Identidades Femeninas en la
Ciencia Ficción Cinematográfica. KRK Ediciones (2010), amongst other
publications.!
!       Email: jimescudero@gmail.com/escuderojimena@uniovi.es!



                                     The paper !
Date sent: 14/08/2014 !
Date accepted: 30/10/2014!
Date published: 30/11/2014!



                          How to quote this paper!
Jimena, Escudero Pérez, “Sympathy for the Clone: (Post)Human
Identities Enhanced by the ‘Evil Science’ Construct and its
Commodifying Practices in Contemporary Clone Fiction”, Between, Vol.
IV N.8 (Nov. 2014), http://www.Between-journal.it/!




24
