10.13125/CH/3712
Populism is currently one of the most studied socio-political topics. However, no shared definition is present at the moment. Fortunately, common features are emerging in recent studies, so that the possibility to devise a comprehensive concept of populism does not seem illusory anymore. In this article I evaluate whether an ontological determination of the concept is conceivable, according to a critical and dynamical perspective. This means that epistemological questions are considered as fundamental, and ontology looks at dynamical systems theories in order to conceptually organize the outcomes of scientific researches. Taking advantage of ontological and system theoretic categories, I try to delineate some not obvious issues in the current approaches to populism
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Simonluca Pinna
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Critical Hermeneutics
Issues in the Ontological Determination of Populism
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Simonluca Pinna
2019/06/01
10.13125/CH/3712
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Issues in the Ontological Determination of Populism
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Critical Hermeneutics, special (2019)               Articolo presentato il 19/4/2019
Biannual International Journal of Philosophy        Articolo accettato il 29/5/2019
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ISSN 2533-1825 (on line); DOI 10.13125/CH/3712


 Issues in the Ontological Determination of Populism


                                  Simonluca Pinna




Abstract
Populism is currently one of the most studied socio-political topics.
However, no shared definition is present at the moment. Fortunately,
common features are emerging in recent studies, so that the possibility
to devise a comprehensive concept of populism does not seem illusory
anymore. In this article I evaluate whether an ontological determina-
tion of the concept is conceivable, according to a critical and dynamical
perspective. This means that epistemological questions are considered
as fundamental, and ontology looks at dynamical systems theories in
order to conceptually organize the outcomes of scientific researches.
Taking advantage of ontological and system theoretic categories, I try
to delineate some not obvious issues in the current approaches to pop-
ulism.
Keywords:




1. Introduction
After a long oblivion, the notion of populism is now one of the most
debated in political sciences and political philosophy. The cause of its
reemergence can be easily found in the recent, resounding political
events in Western Countries. Examples are United States of America,
United Kingdom or Italy, where parties and leaders that won the last
national polls (or supported the referendum on the exit from the Euro-
pean Union) were deemed as exponents of a new populistic wave loom-
ing over the Democratic World. This grim view hardly matches with the
Simonluca Pinna, Issues in the Ontological Determination of Populism




old meaning of the term “populism” – which derived from historical
descriptions of political movements in the late 19th century (in U.S.A.
and Russia) or of South-American governments in the middle of 20th
century (see Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017). In these cases the notion
of populism have a positive meaning when it denoted a type of politics
battling against oligarchic regimes. On the contrary, “populism” in the
current connotation looks like a synonym of “demagoguery,” which is
generally attributed to political adversaries operating outside the usual
institutional and hierarchical party system.
     Moreover, we cannot see, in the current approaches to populism,
any shared definition of the term. Nevertheless, there are common
features in academic studies: populist groups and leaders turn out to
be essentially characterized for the opposition to elites, including intel-
lectual elites such as the academics. This is connected to another issue.
Scholars themselves seem to be invoked by institutional operators as
defenders of the classical image of representative democracy, where
the party system cannot accept the presence of tribunes of the people.
As a consequence, the antagonism should involve the academic anal-
yses, too. In fact, they often begin with a representation of populism
as a problem, an alteration or even a pathological state for the demo-
cratic societies.
     It is easy to see how such a situation brings about various prob-
lems to the scholars that decide to address the topic. A political junc-
ture that is seen as threatening (even beyond any actual evidence)
hardly can be the best motivation and create the prerequisites for a
serious academic research. Moreover, that the choice of the topic de-
pends, from the very beginning, on how political and media operators
define their adversaries cannot be an assurance of unbiased premises
– specially, if those definitions are used as starting points.
     Despite the present unsettling scenario, and the lack of a unique
shared definition, the opposition between people and elites remains the


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core of any scientific approach to populism (see Rooduijn 2018). This
makes less remote the possibility of conceiving a comprehensive idea
of populism and allows to distinguish the vulgar or journalistic views
from the academic ones.
     The scope of this paper is to discuss the first steeps of a conceptual
determination of populism. More specifically, my aim is to conceptual-
ize populism in ontological terms by taking into consideration recent
achievements, but also addressing the potential methodological prob-
lems that axiologically biased presuppositions can bring on the re-
search. The ultimate horizon of the ontological analysis should be in-
deed to harmonize the current conceptual studies with the phenomenal
models at the psychological, sociological and political level. Of course,
the present work amounts only to a preliminary and absolutely rhap-
sodic attempt and will leave many important points totally untouched.


Naturally, the first question here is why the determination I want to
reach has to be ontological. An answer could be the following. If ontol-
ogy is hypothetical1, categorical and stratified theory as it appears in
Nicolai Hartmann's work, then it could be the perfect framework for the
determination of a complex and undefined subject such as populism.
     Indeed, an hypothetical ontology allows to work on a debated no-
tion by developing different relational networks and without assuming
one of them as the ultimate or fundamental frame. The scope of the


1
  In Hartmann’s general view, ontology is the philosophia ultima from the point of
view of human knowledge, because the abstract determination it produces must de-
rive from the more concrete results of scientific researches, and not by pure deduc-
tion from self-provided principles (see Hartmann 1935). In fact, even if ontological
presuppositions stem from scientific theories, the interpretation of the theories is
inevitably philosophical in nature. This prompts ontology to remain hypothetical. In-
deed, any general assumption about the “being qua being” amounts to a metaphys-
ical thesis, and these are always to be considered as provisional starting points that
must be put into discussion when the results of empirical knowledge are at odds with
them. The necessary (limited) set of metaphysical presuppositions that any ontolog-
ical – but also scientific – theory assumes at the beginning, in Hartmann's view, is
the answer to problems that cannot be solved with certainty (see Hartmann, 1924).



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Simonluca Pinna, Issues in the Ontological Determination of Populism




ontological determination, indeed, is to point out the essential catego-
ries that are actually used in real models in order to predict processes
and explain data. The systemic connection with general theories is a
secondary aim depending on a more abstract research that can be ad-
dressed only in a successive step.
     The attention to categories (instead of objects) excludes the phil-
osophical obsession with the definitions that are based on the subject-
properties paradigm. The latter is dependent on a substantialist view
on ontology, and presupposes strong metaphysical choices. As widely
known, metaphysical preference for eidetic or super-individual entities
turns out to generate endless dispute about the reducibility of appar-
ently complex phenomena to more fundamental ones. Problems of this
kind are not surely avoidable for ontology in the long period, but –
again – can be seen as dependent on more abstract researches. Also,
decisions concerning basic metaphysical viewpoints might not change
the essential categories of the phenomenon at hand.
     In this context, moreover, the general ontological theory of a
stratified world may be highly helpful. From its perspective, indeed,
taking into account the contributions from various disciplines is man-
datory. In the stratified view any observer can identify different and
partially independent systems of phenomena at different levels of de-
scriptions or when adopting different parameters. This makes method-
ological pluralism licit, if not needed, from the beginning of the re-
search.
     Another important feature of Hartmann's critical ontology is the
conceptual connection with a system theoretic background and, in par-
ticular, with the framework of the dynamical system theories. The re-
lation between critical ontology and system theories is certainly histor-
ical – Hartmannian categorization in Philosophie der Natur (1950)
avowedly underlies the seminal Von Bertalanffy's General System The-




88
                                            Critical Hermeneutics, special (2019)




ory (1968) – but also “substantial.” The focus on dynamics and sys-
tems through the reference to categories of processes (instead of prop-
erties of substances) and to layers and spheres of being (instead of
isolated objects) is directly connected with the peculiar solutions to
epistemological and methodological questions (see Hartmann 1938;
1940). And these can become relevant even in the study of complex
phenomena such as populism.


    In the next section a brief survey of the essential aspects of four
current approaches to populism will be presented. I shall highlight
some questions they raise and the relevance for an ontological deter-
mination of the notion. The successive section will introduce - in purely
philosophical and untechnical terms – those features of dynamical sys-
tem theories and “systems ontology” that are most relevant for the
question of defining populism. In the concluding section I shall suggest
a potential route to address conceptual problems concerning studies
about populism.


2. Concepts and phenomena of populism
Populism has been studied by different perspectives and different dis-
ciplines. An exhaustive analysis of them is not my aim here, even if it
would be a necessary precondition for the complete determination of
populism from the viewpoint of critical ontology. This paper, instead,
has the humbler task of delineating a mere sketch of the basic prob-
lems that the phenomenon raises.
For this reason, I consider now only few conceptual accounts: three (or
four) derive from political sciences, one from philosophy. The choice
depends on the level of phenomenal complexity those disciplines take
into account. Supposing that populism is a socio-political phenomenon,




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Simonluca Pinna, Issues in the Ontological Determination of Populism




fine-grained (for instance, only sociological or only psychological) anal-
yses would have been too narrowed to encompass all aspects of the
question2.
     The “discursive” or “ideational account” of populism is apparently
the most considered in political sciences, though the so called “politi-
cal-strategic approach” is still well received, given its Realpolitik appeal
(see Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 2017). The former can actually be dis-
tinguished in an old version, the discursive view, and a more recent
one, the ideational approach. The discursive view sees populism as the
ideological content of actual discourses of populist leaders to their fol-
lowers in order to take advantage of their support. That content sus-
tains an antagonistic view of democracy in which the silent majority
supporting the leader corresponds to the “true people of the nation” –
a term that is not thought to have a real historical and social content.
People opposes minority forces, which nevertheless maintain the insti-
tutional power and are negatively connoted, according to the predom-
inant ideology (see Laclau, 1977; 2005). For its abstractions and gen-
eralizations this view is criticized by the new ideational approach (see
Mudde, 2017), which instead considers populism as a “thin” ideology
(Mudde, 2004), which is characterized by people-centrism, anti-elitism
and the moral opposition between the good majority and the evil mi-
norities (locally connoted). The elements of such a minimal ideology
does not need to be seen under the tenets of a systematic ethico-po-
litical theory (see Rooduijn, 2018). Some researchers, however, con-
tinue to consider essential for populism the specific content of public

2
  There is also a definition of populism from political economics that has the apt level
of specificity. It describes populism as a set of political activities that a government
voluntarily and irresponsibly carries out disregarding economic equilibria and even-
tually generating crises (Sachs, 1989; Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991). The lack of
any exemplary economic and political collapse in (nominally) paradigmatic cases of
populism reduced the interest in such an approach, but the recent (and next) events
in Venezuela or UK may change the situation. In this case, however, the above sum-
marized economical description of populism should undergo a substantial modifica-
tion.



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discourses rather than any implicit ideology (see Hawkins, 2010). How-
ever, though the distinction between ideology and content of actual
public discourses could be ontologically relevant, the defining feature
of populism remains the ethical opposition of two political adversaries,
the people and the elites. In this sense, populism is distinguished from
other thin ideologies, such as nativism, “which holds that states should
be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’)
and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally
threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (Mudde, 2007: 19).
    In the political-strategic approach (see Weyland, 2001) and in the
socio-cultural approach (see Ostiguy, 2009) the focus is on the relation
between the “people” and its leader, who is seen as a charismatic and
projective figure rather than a mere spokesperson. In the strategic or
organizational view, in particular, populism is the direct mobilization of
the unorganized majority by an individual leader in order to take and
exercise government power. The support from the unorganized major-
ity is gained through the use of an ideology instead of economic or
military forces. Again, the ideology itself is not particularly structured.
On the contrary, it is fluid and capable to change, if needed. Thus, its
content remains a secondary element of the phenomenon. The core
element is then the top-down relation between the charismatic leader
and the people, which turns out to be mere supporters of his/her power
(see Weyland, 2017).
    On the other hand, the cultural or performative approach concen-
trates on the style of those political actions that nourish the relation
between the leader and the unorganized supporters. The performance
and the narrative – in which the antagonism people-elites is solvable
thanks to the presence of the redeeming hero, the leader – causally
explain the possibility of an unorganized support for the individual
leader. Indeed, both content and style of leader's performances help




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Simonluca Pinna, Issues in the Ontological Determination of Populism




to build the shared socio- and politico-cultural identity the rapport be-
tween the two poles of populism turns around. Thus, the relation
leader-people is the core element in this case, too, but is not seen as
a mere top-down relation. It is, on the contrary, a “two-way phenom-
enon.” Indeed, it generates a process of identification between leader
and people. Also, it promotes a public assertion (“flaunting”) of their
cultural stance at a social and political level. This stance is called the
“low” (Ostiguy, 2017: 73–74). The low would consist in the choice of
vulgar, coarse, uninhibited, direct manners in social relations, and a
personalistic decision making in politics (Ostiguy, 2009).
     The socio-cultural approach – with its references to Weberian
themes, like charisma and “affectual narrative” (Ostiguy, 2017: 75),
and to the idea of identification – has many points in common with the
recent philosophical accounts of populism that see the phenomenon as
a pathological state of democratic societies and regimes. Such a patho-
logical approach is sometimes used in the context of political sciences
(see Rosanvallon, 2008). However, philosophers tend to widen the
purely analogical schema by giving specific definitions of the adopted
concepts, sometimes in an ontological fashion (see Hirvonen, 2018).
Moreover, some also proposes models for the phenomenon. An in-
stance are those that use a neo-Hegelian view on recognition and social
pathology. The process of recognition is then compared to a struggle
to obtain the public acknowledgment of one’s own identifying role, and
the society appears as an organism whose living functions can be im-
paired (see Honneth, 2014). Thus, it is argued that the structural cause
of populist phenomena is a deformed recognition of populists’ collective
identity due to the populists themselves. Their disposition to simplify
and reify social identities (projecting group’s idealized features onto
the leader) impedes the legitimate struggle for recognition. For a cor-
rect process of recognition is made impossible by the same quality of




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the public discourse that populist groups and leaders propose (see
Hirvonen and Pennanen, 2018).
    The four approaches to populism have various conceptual issues,
which are often highlighted in the debates among the scholars. For
example, the ideational approach is criticized for missing the crucial
point of the matter, the relation between the alleged “people” and the
charismatic leader. On the other hand, the strategic approach is con-
sidered an excessively narrow view, which underestimates the ideal
side of the relation, though the ideology is the only feature adoptable
to distinguish populism from forms of demagoguery or despotic power
– a distinction that, perhaps, the strategic approach does not want to
do. In general, the charge is that each approach is unable to encom-
pass all the recognized cases of populism. However, even the desire to
provide a nominal definition of the notion is contested. One reason is
that we are not able to identify the basic features of populism as a set
of actual phenomena. Some then suggests to look for an ordinal cate-
gory that distinguishes grades of populism (or characteristics whose
values in a certain situation can qualify a phenomenon as populism) or
anti-populism (see Ostiguy, 2017).
    From a philosophical point of view, the question could be even
more relevant, if one makes some basic epistemological considerations
about the possibility of determining all-encompassing categories. We
shall address the issue in the final section. Now, other two critical
points are to be noted. First, the problem of providing a shared defini-
tion is due to a simple fact: even in the restricted set of approaches
here considered, there is no agreement on the basic characteristics of
populism as a phenomenon. To be honest, not all the approaches see
populism as phenomenal. The ideational approach, indeed, considers
it as an ideology. Moreover, its supporters seem to judge as almost
immaterial whether populism is an ideal content, a narrative, or rather




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Simonluca Pinna, Issues in the Ontological Determination of Populism




a real relational phenomenon, an actual schema of documented dis-
courses, an exercised style, a particular organization of the political
power and so on (see Mudde, 2017; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser,
2017; Rooduijn, 2018).
     As one would expect, the question is by no means immaterial in
ontology. On the other hand, a second issue is ontologically relevant:
as said at the beginning, most of the attempts to define populism are
committed to an axiologically biased stance on populism itself. Exemp-
tions are the recent version of the ideational approach and, in part, the
socio-cultural approach, which indeed criticizes the extreme position of
the strategic approach. According to the latter, indeed, the antagonist
narrative (about the people being unjustly subjected by the power of
the elites), which is assumed by the populist leader, would be only
instrumental to take and keep the government thanks to the votes of
the followers. And this interpretation of leader's conscience as hypo-
critical is judged as epistemically problematic, if not untenable (Mudde,
2017; Ostiguy, 2017).
     Arguably, such an epistemological problem is less serious than an-
other one. The idea of a strategic bad conscience – or the slightly less
epistemically sententious view of populism as a pathological state for
representative democracy – presupposes that only inauthentic or de-
formed relations can explain the acquisition of power by not institu-
tionalized political agents from unorganized groups. Another, even
stronger presupposition is that the classical party system and its hier-
archical and impersonal organization of the authority would be – not
only normatively, but also descriptively – the natural state of demo-
cratic societies. In other words, those views are excessively static with
respect to the socio-political processes underlying the macro-phenom-
enon of democracy. From a more dynamical stance, we cannot cur-
rently say – without a previous aptly focused research – whether pop-




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ulism is an occasional perturbation of a stable structure (i.e., repre-
sentative democracy and party system), or its deadly crisis, or the
transition to another state of the socio-political system. The answer to
this question cannot come a priori or by stipulation, but should depend
on the (tested) results of a multidimensional – and hopefully multi-
disciplinary – study about the socio-political system itself. In this con-
text, an ontological research may be helpful to coordinate the categor-
ical analysis of the scientific results, especially if it is able to make use
of conceptual tools for a multidimensional (and multidisciplinary)
study. Tools of this kind come from the system theories.


3. Systems and dynamics
My primary assumption here is that critical ontology can be considered
for the regulative role in the conceptual analysis of populism studies –
especially, if those studies are part of a multidisciplinary research pro-
gram. Another premise of this work concerns the advantage of con-
necting critical ontology to the system theoretic framework. The con-
nection between critical ontology and system theory is based on the
shared interest in processes and ideal spaces representing the devel-
opment of processes. This link was seen not only in the earlier days of
system theory (see Bertalanffy, 1972), but also in more recent times.
Scholars both in ontology and general theory of systems have already
outlined a research program that adopts the conceptual and formal
instruments of the two frameworks in order to redefine complex multi-
disciplinary matters in an integrated manner (see, for instance, Rous-
seau et al., 2018)3.
     Now, coming back to the matter at hand, how may the system
theoretic framework be useful in the analysis of socio-political studies?


3
  In the most recent cases the connection with ontology consists of various references
to philosophical doctrines in system theory, but there is no direct mention of Hart-
mann’s work.



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Simonluca Pinna, Issues in the Ontological Determination of Populism




The answer to this question can derive, primarily, from considerations
concerning the so-called “dynamical approach” in science, which often
expresses the general philosophical viewpoint of system theories. The
dynamical approach is originally associated with metaphysical inter-
pretations of physical theories and has been connoted in various, even
antithetical ways 4 . According to the standard viewpoint of this ap-
proach, any phenomenon – whether natural or social – is (part of) an
evolving process whose dynamics can be described through mathe-
matical tools as a trajectory unfolding in an ideal space defined by apt
parameters. In particular, the “dynamical system theories” interpret
the evolution of processes as layered, and every layer (or level) is seen
as a relational network of interacting systems embedded in an active
environment, which in turn can be a single system at the higher level.
     This untechnical sketch might not say much to really envision the
potentiality of those theoretical tools when applied to complex phe-
nomena such as the social ones. Hopefully, a more technical presenta-
tion could be of help, but it cannot be exposed here in an proper man-
ner. It should start with saying that a dynamical system consists at
least of three mathematical entities, i.e., the triple < T, S, φt >. The
(ordered) set T represents time, which can be discrete or continuous,
while S is the state space, whose dimensions number depends on the
number of variables that are needed to describe the system states, and
of the parameters (time is one of them) that are used to define the
variables. The space can thus be even infinite-dimensional, and, again,


4
  Sometimes, despite its name, the dynamical approach expresses a static worldview.
This curious conclusion derives from the relatively renowned theory in philosophy of
physics according to which the nature of spacetime (its laws, structure and dynamics)
depends on the dynamical laws of matter and energy. This view is called “dynamical
approach” in spacetime philosophy (Huggett and Hoefer 2018). The approach stems
from a relational view on spacetime (space and time are not essential properties of
material entities and are relative to them) and has generated reductive and elimina-
tive theses about spacetime per se and, consequently, about the natural processes
– or what was considered to be a process from a phenomenological point of view
(Pinna, 2015).



96
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continuous or discrete. The states are defined through mathematical
objects like vector fields, which inhabit the space. The function φt is a
map from S to S that, given an initial state x0 of S at an initial time t0,
picks up another state xt of S at a different time point t in T. Such a
function (or family of functions) can be (explicitly or implicitly) defined,
for instance, by differential or difference equations (in a mathematical
theory), but also by algorithmic rules (in the program of a Turing ma-
chine).
     The very interesting feature of this kind of theorization is that it
strictly depends on the specific model that is actually used, rather than
the general laws governing systems evolution in the ideal space. This
is clear when the dynamical function (the fundamental law) is unable
to describe a state with the desired precision in the model in use – for
instance, because of the presence of perturbations, the complex nature
of the elements involved, or the dynamical complexity itself. In such
situations one can decide to try other ways: to consider only limit sets
of the system (small subsets of the state space that are invariant with
respect to the dynamics); to describe the dynamics of the system
rescaling the parameters; or, also, to build another ideal space where
to describe the change in the evolution of some variables as one or
more parameters are varied5.
     There are various attempts to expand this viewpoint and apply the
dynamical systems theories outside the realm of natural sciences in
the direction of sociology and psychology. Much of the work in this
sense turns around the possibility to use the mathematical tools for
predictive models. It would be surely the ultimate goal of such a sci-
entific enterprise, if eventually realized. However, the conceptual tools
of dynamical system theories – if adapted to the specific domains,


5
 Among the technical introductions to dynamical system theories, for instance, Bar-
Yam (1997) appears to be accessible and presents various philosophical and practical
suggestions.



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Simonluca Pinna, Issues in the Ontological Determination of Populism




hopefully, with the help of apt ontological categories – can be of great
help for the development of a global multilayered explanation of com-
plex socio-political phenomena and, consequently, for the historical un-
derstanding of crucial events and their repercussions in the evolution
of societies and states (see Bar-Yam, 2004; Bousquet and Curtis,
2011; Liu et al., 2014; Fellman et al., 2015).


4. Conceptual issues and ontological remedies
The best support to the proposal of using the tools of critical ontology
(and dynamical system theories) to delineate a multilevel definition of
populism is probably the direct analysis of some problems connected
to the topic. Of course, this paper has only the humble scope to open
the discussion about that kind of determination. Thus, what follows will
be a mere sketch of a proper conceptual analysis, which would require
a longer and deeper scrutiny of the present literature and, possibly, of
new material.
     Looking at the notion of populism from a critical perspective, the
most looming and threatening issue does not regard the absence of a
shared definition. Even the uncertainty about the ontological class of
the phenomenon is not on the top of the list. Both are certainly relevant
– and, also, fundamental – questions for ontology. However, an epis-
temological question is of much greater concern: the axiological pre-
suppositions in the study of populism.
     If the former are questions that can be resolved, hopefully, only
in a late stage of the research, the epistemological issue threatens the
very early steps of the study. Not properly addressing the issue can
prevent researchers from understanding the complexity level of the
study itself. Indeed, if something is relatively stable in the determina-
tion of what populism is, it is the opposition of populists to the elites,
intellectual elites included. That in the public discourse the term is ax-
iologically connoted (and often in a pejorative sense) even by scholars


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produces conversely charges against them as institutional scientists, in
particular charges of generating biased or fake theories. Such a situa-
tion, in turn, reinforces the opposition between subject and object of
study.
    In other words, the situation can be delineated as a sociological
case of “observer effect” at various levels. Generally, the effect denotes
the typical absence of isolation for the observational context, because
the observers do not restrict themselves to initially establish the con-
straints of that context, but interact as active parts of it. More specifi-
cally, it would also amount to an actual case of “cultural bias,” the
interpretation of the phenomenon being judged through the lenses of
conventions and models uncritically taken for granted as standards
also in the observed context.
    One could argue that, when observer and subject of observation
have the same socio-political background, as it may happen in the case
of populism, then the cultural presuppositions are not mistakenly taken
as standards. However, a couple of objections can be raised, also by
using the conceptual tools of ontology and dynamical system theories.
First, those alleged standards have a normative character and can be
well received only by specific social groups. At this point, if such an
assumption is viewed as unproblematic, one has to declare that the
planned study about populism must be ethically connoted from a spe-
cific viewpoint. And, clearly, this begs the question: the biased nature
of that study turns out to be not a problem, but a prerequisite.
    Second, from a dynamical perspective, we cannot know at the mo-
ment whether the phenomenon of populism is pathologic for the de-
mocracies, which are interpreted as a stable set of states in the evolu-
tion of human social systems. Namely, we are not currently able to
predict whether the cases of populist governments are perturbations,
crises or structural passages to new phases of social evolution. There
are not enough specific studies on the matter.


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Simonluca Pinna, Issues in the Ontological Determination of Populism




      Finally, the present tricky phase of populism studies might spark
off, as a reaction, new forms of “knowledge enterprise” competing for
methods and standards with the academic researches. The problem
could be analogous to that of the so-called “memorial histories,” i.e.,
non-academic productions that consist of direct, emotionally charged
testimonies and plastic reconstructions in films, documentaries or
other artistic works (see Thompson, 2000). They generally oppose ac-
ademic reconstructions of critical events involving social minorities or
economically weak groups as victims. Academics' works are contested
for partisan perspectives and biased conclusions due to their socio-
political connection with the offending groups in the described events.
Despite the general, negative opinion of professional historians about
memorial histories, the question the latter raise has nevertheless elic-
ited various deep epistemological debates among scholars (see
Chakrabarty, 2007; Attwood, 2008).
      Individual sciences, as in the case of contemporary history, are
actually less firm than they should and claim to be in their methodology
and standardized epistemic procedures. In the fluid area of multidisci-
plinary programs, moreover, the situation can be even worse, given
the scarcity of regulative figures. If ontology can be such a guide, it
remains to be seen. However, the history of scientific thought has
taught us that sometimes problems can be seen only if one has the
correct and “evolved” lenses to look at them. And the capability to see
new problems is what moves researchers towards unexpected and re-
defining goals – especially, when the situation seems to be stagnating.
      Among the problems of populism studies we can find also another
not obvious case that could benefit from the application of ontological
categories. It is the previously mentioned problem of finding a com-
plete definition of populism. Indeed, devising a concept able to catch
the whole set of the intuitively recognized cases of a phenomenon is




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not problematic merely because we do not possess any shared defini-
tion of populism either. Completeness per se is a problem, if we con-
sider the wanted definition from an ontological point of view that is
epistemologically consistent – i.e., a viewpoint that is aware that epis-
temological discourses are foundational for critical ontology, and that
the initial operation of critical ontology consists in integrating data from
sciences and not deducing theses from purely a priori assumptions.
The desired completeness presupposes that we can create a nominal
definition that can pick up every instance of what we intuitively call
populist – as if, from the very beginning, our intuitions were certain to
encompass any instance of a class of phenomena and, successively,
theoretical reasoning had only to conceptualize. This certainty, that we
can individuate by intuition precise and coherent classes, is not given.
Indeed, we should think that scientific knowledge is a linear process of
this sort: first, we have perfect eidetic intuitions that we apply to ex-
perience and, then, what remains for theorists to do is only verbal con-
ceptualization. To provide eidetic classes is, on the contrary, the con-
ceptual duty of scientific theorization for specific areas of study, and of
philosophy or ontology for the general framework of human knowledge
– after a long survey and scrutiny of scientific conceptualization. The
origin of this work comes from a mixture of both empirical intuitions
and pre-theoretical (ideal) insights, while its conclusions aim at reality.
Indeed, classes of events/phenomena and their precise theoretical def-
initions are core elements of models whose validity must be succes-
sively proved. In other words, scientific knowledge is always deter-
mined by a circular process. The hypothetical stance of Hartmann’s
critical ontology should remind theorists exactly of this point6.




6
  See in particular the long analyses in the third part of Hartmann (1938) about the
“circle of knowledge” and its formal-ontic characteristics.



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