Interventions promoting collective action have been used to prevent domestic violence in a range of settings, but their mechanisms of operation remain unclear. We formalise and combine feminist theoretical approaches to domestic violence into a game-theoretic model of women’s collective action to change gendered social norms and outcomes. We show that social norms create a social dilemma in which it is individually rational for women to abstain from action to prevent domestic violence among neighbours, but all women suffer negative consequences if none take action. Promoting altruism among women can overcome the social dilemma. Discouraging women from tolerating domestic violence, imposing additional external punishment on men for perpetrating violence, or lowering costs to women of taking action against violence may not work or even backfire. We invite researchers on community mobilisation to use our framework to frame their understandings of collective action to prevent domestic violence.
Modelling collective action to change social norms around domestic violence: social dilemmas and the role of altruism