Abstract While some argue that market forces are imperative to stimulate the increased supply of critical products and services to address the COVID-19 crisis, others contend that dealing with the pandemic requires coordination and rapid adjustments in supply that may be constrained by a host of factors. Although discussions have centered on policies to promote financial liquidity, we examine whether the state apparatus-not only state-owned enterprises but also development agencies and investment funds-can innovate and adjust production processes to improve infrastructure and capabilities to prevent and treat the disease. Potential actions include public-private effort addressing both discovery and coordination problems-such as a collaborative effort to develop prevention and treatment technologies, as well as state capital to stimulate retooling and expansion of strategic infrastructure. The state apparatus can also help access remote and critical areas with relatively lower private returns. In contrast, support to industries must be implemented with caution, especially for sectors whose demand may suffer permanently due to lifestyle changes. Exit strategies must be carefully crafted to avoid the risk of perpetuating unjustified and ineffective state support, establishing milestones and termination clauses based on clear performance indicators. We argue that, although using the state apparatus as a countermeasure entails a set of risks, not using it may increase the risk of extending the crisis and end with an overloaded state sector (e.g., due to massive bailouts), challenging the implementation of subsequent adjustments.
Leviathan as a partial cure? Opportunities and pitfalls of using the state-owned apparatus to respond to the COVID-19 crisis/ ¿Leviatán como una cura parcial? Oportunidades y dificultades al usar el aparato estatal para responder a la crisis de COVID-19/ O Leviatã como uma cura parcial? Oportunidades e armadilhas no uso do aparato estatal para responder à crise da COVID-19