Vaccination is a well-known method to protect the public against an epidemic outbreak, e.g., COVID-19. To this end, the government of a country or region would strive to achieve its target of vaccination coverage. Limited by the total vaccine capacity of public hospitals, the government may need to cooperate with private hospitals or clinics for more vaccination. Exploring in this paper government coordination of public and private resources for vaccination, we model a vaccine system consisting of a public hospital, a profit-maximizing private clinic, and self-interested individuals, under three scenarios: (1) without information sharing (concerning vaccine inventory and vaccine price), (2) with information sharing and subsidy, and (3) with information sharing and allocation. We find that, under scenario (1), the vaccine demand is fully satisfied by the public hospital and the private clinic cannot make any profit. Under scenario (2), the private clinic is willing to enter the vaccine market with a positive profit-maximizing vaccination coverage. Under scenario (3), the socially optimal vaccination coverage may be lower than that under scenario (1). Moreover, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to generate practical implications of the research findings for vaccination policy-making. Our results provide both theoretical and managerial insights on vaccine supply decision, government intervention, and vaccination coverage.
Information sharing and coordination in a vaccine supply chain