When President Barack Obama decided last year to narrow the scope of the nine-year war in Afghanistan and Pakistan, he and his aides settled on a formulation that sounded simple: Eviscerate al-Qaida, but just 'degrade' the Taliban, reversing that movement's momentum. Now, after the bungled car-bombing attempt in Times Square with suspected links to the Pakistani Taliban, a new, and disturbing, question is being raised in Washington: Have the stepped-up attacks in Pakistan -- notably the Predator drone strikes -- actually made Americans less safe? Have they had the perverse consequence of driving lesser insurgencies to think of targeting Times Square and American airliners, not just Kabul and Islamabad? In short, are they inspiring more attacks on America than they prevent? It is a hard question. At the time of Obama's strategy review, the logic seemed straightforward. Only al-Qaida had the ambitions and reach to leap the ocean and take the war to America's skies and streets. In contrast, most of the Taliban and other militant groups were regarded as fragmented, regional insurgencies whose goals stuck close to the territory their tribal ancestors have fought over for centuries. Six months and a few attempted bombings later, including the near-miss in New York last weekend, nothing looks quite that simple. As commanders remind each other, in all wars the enemy gets a vote, too. Increasingly, it looks like these enemies have voted to combine talents, if not forces. Last week, a senior American intelligence official was saying that the many varieties of insurgents now make up a 'witches' brew' of forces, sharing money handlers, communications experts and, most important in recent times, bomb makers. Yes, each group still has a separate identity and goal, but those fine distinctions seem less relevant than ever. The notion that the various groups are at least thinking alike worries Bruce Riedel, who a year ago was a co-author of Obama's first review of strategy in the region. 'There are two separate movements converging here,' said Riedel, a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. 'The ideology of global jihad has been bought into by more and more militants, even guys who never thought much about the broader world. And that is disturbing, because it is a force multiplier for al-Qaida.' Riedel also notes, 'The pressure we've put on them in the past year has also drawn them together, meaning that the network of alliances is getting stronger, not weaker.' So what seemed like a mission being narrowed by Obama, focusing on al-Qaida and its closest associates (which included the Pakistani Taliban), 'now seems like a lot broader mission than it did a year ago.' Figuring out cause-and-effect when it comes to the motivations of Islamic militants is always tricky. Whenever he was asked whether America's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were goading Islamic militants into new attacks, President George W. Bush used to shoot back that neither war was under way on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001. When Obama came into office, the conventional wisdom held that the mere arrival of a black president with some Muslim relatives and an eagerness to engage the Islamic world would be bad news for al-Qaida and Taliban recruiters. One rarely hears that argument now. A year after Obama's now-famous speech to the Muslim world from Cairo, Pakistanis talk less about outreach than Predator strikes. And White House officials say they suspect that their strategy of raising pressure may explain the amateurish nature of the recent bombing attempts. The militants, they argue, no longer enjoy the luxury of time to train their bombers. To linger at training camps is to invite being spotted by a Predator. The tale told to interrogators by Faisal Shahzad, the suspect in the Times Square case, suggests that he hooked up with one set of militants and was passed off to another, and given only cursory bomb-making training. 'He wasn't the greatest student, but they weren't stellar teachers, either,' a senior administration official said last week, after reviewing the interrogation record. What Shahzad had was the one thing the insurgents most covet: easy, question-free ability to leave and enter the United States on a valid passport. Of course, the U.S. might more effectively identify citizens who pose a threat. But, similarly, terrorist groups could find ways to more effectively train recruits. As Riedel notes: 'You don't need a Ph.D. in electrical engineering to build a car bomb. You don't even need to be literate.' Indeed, the Pakistani Taliban have set off plenty of car bombs that worked well against the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies. It was those bombings that finally convinced the Pakistani government to go after the group. In Washington, officials differentiate between the relatively young Pakistani Taliban and the Afghan Taliban, which have deep political roots in its country. 'The Pakistani Taliban gets treated like al-Qaida,' one senior official said. 'We aim to destroy it. The Afghan Taliban is different.' In fact, one Pakistani Taliban leader, Baitullah Mehsud, was killed in a CIA drone attack last summer while receiving a massage on the roof of an apartment building. His successor was believed killed in a similar attack until he showed up on a recent video. As one American intelligence official said, 'Those attacks have made it personal for the Pakistani Taliban -- so it's no wonder they are beginning to think about how they can strike back at targets here.' To the disappointment of many liberals who thought they were electing an antiwar president, Obama clearly rejects the argument that if he doesn't stir the hornets' nest, American cities will not get stung. His first year in office he authorized more Predator strikes -- more than 50 -- than President Bush did in his last four years in office. In December, accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, Obama stated that sometimes peace requires war. 'I face the world as it is, and cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the American people,' he said. Negotiations 'could not have halted Hitler's armies. Negotiations cannot convince al-Qaida's leaders to lay down their arms.' In fact, recent history and the politics of a polarized Washington are pushing Obama to step up the pressure. The civil war that paved the way for the Afghan Taliban began when the first President George Bush pulled out of Afghanistan once the Soviets left. The Taliban took power and began sheltering Osama bin Laden on President Bill Clinton's watch; as vice president, Dick Cheney often criticized Clinton's approach to terrorism, saying he dealt with it as a criminal justice issue, not an act of war. The second Bush administration drove the Taliban from power, but the early histories of the Bush years largely agree that the Taliban saw their opportunity to return when the American war on terror refocused on Iraq. Even the U.S., they concluded, could not give its all to two wars at once. That narrative helped form Obama's argument, throughout his presidential campaign, that the Afghan-Pakistan border, not the Sunni triangle in Iraq, was the center of global terrorism. That, he said, was where all attacks on the U.S. and its allies had emanated. Now, six months after setting his course, Obama is discovering, on the streets of New York, the deeper meaning of his own words. 