The Economist Promotes A False Narrative About Attack DronesTom McNamara The Economist states that since drones can loiter over potential targets for hours before firing their missiles, they are more discriminating than either fast jets or helicopter-borne special forces and that the vast majority of people who have been killed in drone attacks appear to have been militants. These statements are disingenuous at best. The Economist further reports that drone strikes seem certain to stay the centrepiece of counter-terrorism efforts for many years to come and may well increase in reach and scale. This then begs a simple question. Are drone attacks an effective way to reduce the enemys will to fight? Figures out of Afghanistan are discouraging. The Brookings Institution, in another study, found that the number of attacks reportedly carried out by insurgents during the period of April to June 2012 was, in fact, 11% higher than that reported during the same period of 2011. The net result being almost 110 attacks a day during the month of June 2012. This was the highest number of attacks for that month since the beginning of the war. These statistics do not appear to be in line with an effective counterterrorism policy that is sapping the will of the enemy to fight. On the contrary, one could argue that drone strikes may be encouraging more violence on the part of the insurgents. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter should give us reason to pause. It expressly prohibits the threat or use of force by one state against another. One argument that proponents for drone attacks use is that since the attacks are being carried out on militants and insurgents, and mostly in regions where the rule of law has broken down, the phrase state doesnt apply and therefore nullifies this section of the Charter. Once more, this argument is dubious at best. If it were Iran, China, or Russia engaging in this type of behavior closer to US shores, say in Central or Latin America, there is no doubt that the US government would be in an uproar over the legality, and morality, of their use. The war in Afghanistan is now the longest war in Americas history. Perhaps some light could be shed on current events by looking back at Americas second longest war, the war in Vietnam. Here too, conventional wisdom held that if you just bombed them hard enough, and with enough precision, you would weaken the enemys resistance and will to fight. It was this thought process in the White House and Pentagon during the 1960s that led to the bombing campaign known as Operation Rolling Thunder. It was originally planned to last just twelve weeks and was designed to bring the enemy to his senses. It ended up lasting three years and nine months (March 1965 till November 1968), the longest strategic bombing campaign in US history. And the effect on the enemys will to fight? Limited, at best. In a study funded by the Defense Department, and carried out by the Rand Corporation, it was found that the bombing campaign did not have the intended effect on enemy morale. On the contrary, the study reported that enemy troops, despite increasing hardships and frustrations with no rewarding victories to show in return, have failed to reveal any signs of cracking. It went on to say that neither our military actions nor our political or psywar efforts seem to have made an appreciable dent in the enemys overall motivation and morale structure. The reports conclusion was that years of US bombing had not appreciably reduced fighting morale in the enemy. In fact, in all likelihood, it probably caused it to go up. After 11 years of fighting, the US has now been in Afghanistan longer than the Soviet Union. 2,000 US soldiers have died in combat, with over 17,000 wounded. The cost of the war is well over $1 trillion, and still counting. With a recent spate of green on blue attacks in which Afghan army forces have attacked NATO coalition forces, one would be hard pressed to make a case that current counterterrorism policies are weakening the fighting capabilities of the insurgents and local Afghan fighters. Drones are not the solution to Americas security problems. In fact, they could very well be aggravating it. Sources: 2,000 Dead: Cost of War in Afghanistan by Amy Bingham, October 1, 2012, ABC News. Accessed at: Afghanistan: Green-on-blue attacks show theres no easy way out by Sajjan Gohel, September 18, 2012, CNN. Accessed at: Afghanistan Index by Ian S. Livingston and Michael OHanlon, July 31, 2012, The Brooking Institute. Accessed at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/foreign%20policy/afghanistan%20index/index20120731.pdf Conversations with enemy soldiers in late 1968 / early 1969: A study of motivation and morale by Konrad Kellen, September, 1970. The Rand Corporation. Accessed at: Death from afar The Economist, November 3rd-9th, 2012. Accessed at: Do Targeted Killings Work? by Daniel L. Byman, Senior Fellow Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, July 14, 2009, The Brookings Institute. Accessed at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/07/14-targeted-killings-byman Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians From US Drone Practices in Pakistan the International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (Stanford Law School) and the Global Justice Clinic (NYU School of Law), September 2012. Accessed at: Operation Rolling Thunder: Strategic Implications of Airpower Doctrine by John K. Ellsworth, Colonel, USAFR, April 7, 2003, U.S. Army War College. Accessed at: The Charter of the United Nations June 26, 1945. Accessed at: The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2012 The New American Foundation. Accessed at: 