Prior to President Ma Ying-jeou's departure from Taipei May 26 for his Central America tour of Belize, Guatemala and El Salvador, mainly to attend the June 1 inauguration of El Salvador president-elect Mauricio Funes, he said at the airport that the journey proves that his advocacy of pragmatic diplomacy is working. Although he did not elaborate, observers knew Ma was referring to Taiwan's relations with El Salvador. After Funes won the presidency, fears had mounted in Taiwan that he might follow through on hints during his election campaign that he would switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The potential crisis was quickly defused, however, by China giving an apparent cold shoulder to Funes, paving the way for Ma's trip. The pillar of Ma's pragmatic diplomacy, which he calls a 'modus vivendi' strategy, is seeking a diplomatic truce with China. Ma's administration has never actually disclosed how it plans to define the concept of a diplomatic truce with Beijing, much less strike an agreement on the issue. The president has simply made public appeals that neither side should woo the allies of the other. The war for diplomatic turf between Taiwan and China began as an extension of the civil war between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese communists after the gunfire ended in 1949, with each side vying for recognition as the only legitimate regime governing China. It raged even harder after the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took power in Taiwan in 2000 after a half-century of KMT rule. Alarmed by the DPP's support for Taiwan independence, Beijing stepped up its efforts to quash Taiwan's international presence and any hints alluding to the country's sovereignty. In its eight years in power, the DPP administration under former President Chen Shui-bian lost nine allies to China while gaining three, resulting in an overall decline in the number of its allies from 29 in 2000 to 23 in 2008. The fight for diplomatic allies provided shrewd politicians in small, mainly impoverished Third World states with a chance to play one side against the other, alternating their loyalties between the two countries to squeeze maximum gains for their countries or themselves. This led to a bidding war, with both sides pitching for the other side's allies with open wallets -- the notorious 'checkbook diplomacy' -- which only went to prove in a number of cases that money could not buy long-term friendship. For example, the South Pacific island nation of Nauru switched its recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 2002 and then back to Taipei in 2005; Chad, a cash- strapped African state, restored official ties with Taiwan in 1997 and severed them in 2006. Senegal, also in Africa, resumed ties with Taipei in 1996 and terminated them in 2005. But the game grew increasingly costly. When Beijing persuaded Costa Rica to abandon Taipei in 2007, it pledged to purchase US$300 million-worth of the Central American country's bonds and to provide US$130 million in direct aid. This diplomatic maneuvering involved a large amount of backroom deals and gave corrupt local and foreign politicians ample opportunity to grease their palms. Notable examples include two middlemen who made away with US$30 million provided by Taiwan's Foreign Ministry after saying they could help the country forge ties with Papua New Guinea in 2006. In another glaring example that came to light, former National Security Council Secretary-General Chiou I-ren was accused of seizing US$500,000 from a US$1.6 million secret fund set aside by the Foreign Ministry to win the friendship of World Trade Organization Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi of Thailand in 2003. Rather than enhancing the country's international profile, these secret diplomatic dealings tarnished Taiwan's global image. Ma vowed to get rid of this practice. On May 28, during his visit to Belize, Ma lambasted Chen's administration for engaging in checkbook diplomacy and made a pitch for his own administration's pragmatic diplomacy. He also said that any diplomatic breakthrough for Taiwan depends on a breakthrough in its ties with China. Foreign Minister Francisco Ou believes Beijing will buy Ma's idea of a diplomatic truce -- if, that is, China puts a premium on its ties with Taiwan. 'With more than 170 allies around the world, Beijing can hardly increase its prestige by winning one or two of Taiwan's allies, but doing so would cost China goodwill from Taiwan,' Ou said. Beijing has not agreed to a truce with Taiwan, but it has refrained from luring away any of Taiwan's 23 remaining allies since Ma's inauguration in May 2008. In addition to El Salvador, Paraguay and Panama have also flirted with the idea of changing their allegiances but have not followed through on their threats, possibly after also being given the brush-off by China. In Ou's view, Beijing should not only forsake any attempt to lure away Taiwan's allies but should also reject any countries who approach Beijing seeking recognition, or it will inevitably harm Taipei's trust in Beijing. Ma's diplomatic truce with Beijing has also given Taipei more leeway in dealing with its allies' requests for aid, according to Ou. 'Although Taiwan is willing to help its allies, our ambassadors are now capable of asking their host countries to come up with detailed plans and practical requests for grants,' the minister said. However, Jaushieh Joseph Wu, Taipei's representative to the United States in former President Chen Shui-bian's administration, dismissed Ma's vow to give up checkbook diplomacy as mere rhetoric. According to Wu, the diplomatic budget of Ma's administration is no less than that of the preceding government, and in fact it has spent even more in some countries. 'Although Ma's administration hasn't lost any allies thus far, it is traveling on a dangerous path, as it has given up any efforts to win new friends out of deference to what it calls its `truce' with China,' Wu said. Meanwhile, Beijing is going to great lengths to improve its ties with Taiwan's allies, which could easily be converted into official ties, Wu warned. 'Forsaking efforts to foster friendship with non-allies and pinning all hopes on Beijing is very dangerous,' he pointed out. Taipei's 'abrupt reconciliation' with Beijing has also embarrassed those of its allies that have spoken out for Taiwan in its struggle with China, and has baffled other countries that are friendly to Taiwan, Wu claimed. 'They don't know whether they should continue to extend their support to Taiwan,' Wu further speculated. Lo Chih-cheng, a political science professor at Soochow University in Taipei, said the success of Ma's diplomatic truce should not be judged simply by the number of allies the country can count. 'What matters is Taiwan's substantive ties with countries that do not officially recognize it,' Lo said. 'By this measurement, President Ma can hardly claim any progress, because his leading ministers are still forbidden from setting foot in countries that are allies of Beijing -- which contrasts sharply with Ma's encouragement to Taiwan's allies to forge unofficial ties with Beijing,' he said. 'It doesn't take a diplomat to see who gets the upper hand from the truce,' he went on. Lo took particular issue with Ma's criticism of his predecessor's checkbook diplomacy in Belize, describing his comments as unbecoming for a head of state. 'It is more a piece of campaign rhetoric than a diplomatic statement, suggesting that our allies have got a lot of mileage out of Taiwan's dispute with China, ' he said. It remains to be seen how long Ma's truce with China will last. What is obvious, however, is that the war of words surrounding it will not end any time soon. 