US Deploying Military to Syrian-Jordanian BorderPart of long-planned attempt to spur defections, divide and destroy Syria, as articulated in Brookings Institutions Assessing Options for Regime Change. While the idea of a buffer zone is meant to look like a knee-jerk reaction to recent escalations, in reality this has been planned since at least March 2012, where the idea was proposed by the corporate-financier funded Brookings Institution in their Middle East Memo #21: Assessing Options for Regime Change where it stated specifically (emphasis added): An alternative is for diplomatic efforts to focus first on how to end the violence and how to gain humanitarian access, as is being done under Annans leadership. This may lead to the creation of safe-havens and humanitarian corridors, which would have to be backed by limited military power. This would, of course, fall short of U.S. goals for Syria and could preserve Asad in power. From that starting point, however, it is possible that a broad coalition with the appropriate international mandate could add further coercive action to its efforts. page 4, Assessing Options for Regime Change, Brookings Institution. In addition, Israels intelligence services have a strong knowledge of Syria, as well as assets within the Syrian regime that could be used to subvert the regimes power base and press for Asads removal. Israel could posture forces on or near the Golan Heights and, in so doing, might divert regime forces from suppressing the opposition. This posture may conjure fears in the Asad regime of a multi-front war, particularly if Turkey is willing to do the same on its border and if the Syrian opposition is being fed a steady diet of arms and training. Such a mobilization could perhaps persuade Syrias military leadership to oust Asad in order to preserve itself. Advocates argue this additional pressure could tip the balance against Asad inside Syria, if other forces were aligned properly. page 6, Assessing Options for Regime Change, Brookings Institution. In response, Syria and its allies must provide a mutually convincing deterrent against this build-up and the threat it is meant to generate. With the fact that the West is openly arming, funding, and backing terrorists groups linked directly to Al Qaeda, not only in Syria, but in Libya, as well as their recent announcement of the delisting of terror group Mujahedeen e-Khalq (MEK), it would not be difficult for Syrias allies to build up international support to send a monitoring group, only upon Damascus request, to address in reality the humanitarian concerns on Syrias borders the West is only feigning to address. The presence of this monitoring group, which might include armed elements, would raise the stakes for Western policy makers and their proxies, and would discourage the influx of weapons and foreign fighters that have been costing Syrians their lives for over a year. On pages 8 and 9, the US Brookings Institutions Middle East Memo #21 Assessing Options for Regime Change it specifically states: The United States might still arm the opposition even knowing they will probably never have sufficient power, on their own, to dislodge the Asad network. Washington might choose to do so simply in the belief that at least providing an oppressed people with some ability to resist their oppressors is better than doing nothing at all, even if the support provided has little chance of turning defeat into victory. Alternatively, the United States might calculate that it is still worthwhile to pin down the Asad regime and bleed it, keeping a regional adversary weak, while avoiding the costs of direct intervention. pages 8-9, Assessing Options for Regime Change, Brookings Institution. linkwithin_text=Related Articles: 