-L-os-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 Analytic Idealism: A consciousness-only ontology A nalytic Idealism : A consciousness-only ontology DR. BERNARDO KASTRUP D R. BERN A RD O KA STRU P lis : ly A nalytic Idealism : A consciousness-only ontology DR. BERNARDO KASTRUP D R. BERN A RD O KA STRU P A nalytic Idealism : A consciousness-only ontology D R. BERN A RD O KA STRU P

-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 1 Analytic	Idealism: A	consciousness-only	ontology dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 2 Kastrup,	Bernardo Analytic	Idealism:	A	consciousness-only	ontology ISBN/EAN:	978-94-028-1400-2 Copyright	©	2016-2019	by	Bernardo	Kastrup.	All	rights	reserved. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 3 Analytische	Idealisme: Een	ontologie	met	alleen	bewustzijn Proefschrift ter	verkrijging	van	de	graad	van	doctor aan	de	Radboud	Universiteit	Nijmegen op	gezag	van	de	rector	magnificus	prof.	dr.	J.H.J.M.	van	Krieken volgens	besluit	van	het	college	van	decanen te	verdedigen	op	maandag	29	april	2019 om	14.30	uur	precies door dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup geboren	op	21	oktober	1974 te	Niterói,	Rio	de	Janeiro,	Brazilië. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 4 Promotiecommissie Promotor: prof.	dr.	M.	V.	P.	Slors Copromotor: dr.	ing.	L.	C.	de	Bruin Manuscriptcommissie: prof.	dr.	P.	J.	J.	M.	Bakker Prof.	B.	J.	Carr,	MA,	PhD Queen	Mary	University	of	London,	Verenigd	Koninkrijk Dr.	S.	Coleman University	of	Hertfordshire,	Verenigd	Koninkrijk dr.	V.	A.	Gijsbers Universiteit	Leiden,	Nederland dr.	D.	W.	Strijbos 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 5 Table	of	Contents Acknowledgments	..............................................................................................................................	7 1. Introduction	.................................................................................................................................	9 1.1 In	a	nutshell	........................................................................................................................................	9 1.2 The	big	picture	.................................................................................................................................	10 1.3 The	appendices	...............................................................................................................................	14 1.4 Preempting	misunderstandings	..............................................................................................	15 2. Conflating	Abstraction	with	Empirical	Observation: The	False	Mind-Matter	Dichotomy	..................................................................................	19 2.1 Abstract	..............................................................................................................................................	19 2.2 Introduction	......................................................................................................................................	19 2.3 The	epistemic	cost	of	explanation	by	abstraction	............................................................	22 2.4 Levels	of	explanatory	abstraction	...........................................................................................	26 2.5 Dispelling	the	mind-matter	dichotomy	................................................................................	28 2.6 Conclusion	.........................................................................................................................................	31 3. The	Universe	in	Consciousness	.........................................................................................	33 3.1 Abstract	..............................................................................................................................................	33 3.2 Brief	introduction	...........................................................................................................................	33 3.3 The	mainstream	physicalist	ontology	and	its	problems	...............................................	33 3.4 Consciousness	as	an	irreducible	property	of	matter	......................................................	35 3.5 The	questionable	logical	bridge	in	bottom-up	panpsychism	......................................	38 3.6 What	counts	as	a	fundamental	concrete	entity?	...............................................................	39 3.7 The	whole	universe	as	a	unitary	conscious	entity	...........................................................	40 3.8 The	key	questions	to	be	answered	.........................................................................................	44 3.9 Experiences	as	excitations	of	cosmic	consciousness	......................................................	44 3.10 Tackling	the	decombination	problem	................................................................................	45 3.11 At	what	level	does	cosmic	dissociation	occur?	...............................................................	48 3.12 Reducing	the	revealed	to	the	concealed	order	...............................................................	50 3.13 Explaining	the	correlations	between	brain	function	and	inner	experience	......	53 3.14 Explaining	our	shared	world	..................................................................................................	55 3.15 Conclusions	....................................................................................................................................	56 4. On	the	Plausibility	of	Idealism:	Refuting	Criticisms	.................................................	57 4.1 Abstract	..............................................................................................................................................	57 4.2 Introduction	......................................................................................................................................	57 4.3 The	felt	concreteness	objection	...............................................................................................	58 4.4 The	private	minds	objection	......................................................................................................	59 4.5 The	stand-alone	world	objection	............................................................................................	61 4.6 The	autonomy	of	nature	objection	.........................................................................................	63 4.7 The	shared	world	objection	.......................................................................................................	63 4.8 The	natural	order	objection	.......................................................................................................	64 4.9 The	equivalence	objection	..........................................................................................................	65 4.10 The	primacy	of	brain	function	objection	..........................................................................	66 4.11 The	unconscious	mentation	objection	...............................................................................	67 4.12 The	unconsciousness	objection	............................................................................................	68 4.13 The	solipsism	objection	............................................................................................................	69 4.14 The	cosmological	history	objection	....................................................................................	70 4.15 The	implausibility	of	cosmic	inner	life	objection	..........................................................	70 4.16 Conclusions	....................................................................................................................................	71 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 6 Analytic	Idealism 6 5. There	Is	an	'Unconscious,'	but	It	May	Well	Be	Conscious	......................................	73 5.1 Abstract	..............................................................................................................................................	73 5.2 Introduction	......................................................................................................................................	73 5.3 Defining	and	gauging	consciousness	.....................................................................................	75 5.4 Non-self-reflective	experiences	...............................................................................................	77 5.5 Dissociated	experiences	..............................................................................................................	79 5.6 A	model	of	dissociation	................................................................................................................	81 5.7 Discussion	..........................................................................................................................................	84 6. Self-Transcendence	Correlates	with	Brain	Function	Impairment	.....................	87 6.1 Abstract	..............................................................................................................................................	87 6.2 Introduction	......................................................................................................................................	87 6.3 Cerebral	hypoxia	.............................................................................................................................	88 6.4 Generalized	physiological	stress	.............................................................................................	88 6.5 Electromagnetic	impairment	....................................................................................................	89 6.6 Trance-induced	impairment	.....................................................................................................	89 6.7 Chemical	impairment	...................................................................................................................	89 6.8 Physical	damage	.............................................................................................................................	90 6.9 Discussion	..........................................................................................................................................	90 7. Concluding	Remarks	..............................................................................................................	93 7.1 Matter	as	the	outer	appearance	of	inner	experience	......................................................	93 7.2 Alternative	formulations	of	dissociation-based	idealism	.............................................	93 7.3 There	are	noumena,	but	they	are	experiential	..................................................................	95 7.4 The	conundrum	of	spacetime	...................................................................................................	96 7.5 Visualizing	the	ontological	primitive	..................................................................................	100 7.6 Future	work	...................................................................................................................................	100 Appendix	A. Not	Its	Own	Meaning:	A	Hermeneutic	of	the	World	.......................	103 A.1 Abstract	...........................................................................................................................................	103 A.2 Introduction	..................................................................................................................................	103 A.3 The	ontological	status	of	the	world	.....................................................................................	105 A.4 The	continuity	of	mind	and	world	.......................................................................................	109 A.5 The	implications	of	a	mental	world	....................................................................................	110 A.6 What	the	world's	traditions	have	to	say	...........................................................................	111 A.7 Discussion	......................................................................................................................................	112 Appendix	B. The	Physicalist	Worldview	as	Neurotic	Ego-Defense Mechanism	........................................................................................................	115 B.1 Abstract	...........................................................................................................................................	115 B.2 Introduction	..................................................................................................................................	115 B.3 Ego	protection	through	projection	......................................................................................	117 B.4 Egoic	control	.................................................................................................................................	120 B.5 The	question	of	meaning	.........................................................................................................	121 B.6 Conclusion	......................................................................................................................................	124 Bibliography	.....................................................................................................................................	127 Summary	............................................................................................................................................	141 Samenvatting	...................................................................................................................................	143 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 7 Acknowledgments I	would like to thank, first	of	all,	my	supervisors,	prof.	dr.	Marc	Slors	and	dr. Léon	de	Bruin,	for	their	guidance	and	the	productive	discussions	we	have	had in	the	run-up	to	the	completion	of	this	dissertation. The critical feedback and suggestions of anonymous reviewers have significantly	improved	the	papers	that	constitute	the	core	of	this	dissertation. The	gracious	support	of	Prof.	David	Chalmers	has	also	been	instrumental.	Not only	has	David	critically reviewed	key	parts	of	my	material,	he	has	also	given me	the	opportunity	to	participate-with	funding	from	the	Global	Institute	for Advanced	Studies	of	New	York	University,	which	I	gratefully	acknowledge-in a	workshop	focused	on	idealism,	in	Shanghai,	late	in	the	spring	of	2017. Discussions	with,	and	critical	feedback	from,	Prof.	Galen	Strawson	have	helped sharpen	key	points	made in this dissertation, for	which I am	very grateful to Galen. Discussions	with	many	other	colleagues	have	also	been	valuable.	With	the	risk of leaving important	names	out, I	would like to explicitly thank	philosophers Itay Shani, Daniel Stoljar,	Miri Albahari,	Michael Pelczar, Barry	Dainton and Philip	Goff. The feedback and encouragement I received from researchers of the Department	of	Psychiatry	and	Neurobehavioral	Sciences,	University	of	Virginia School	of	Medicine,	during	my	visit	there	in	the	spring	of	2016-for	which	I	also gratefully acknowledge funding-have been key to the effort that eventually resulted	in	this	dissertation.	I	am	particularly	grateful	to	Prof.	Edward	F.	Kelly for	his	continuing	encouragement	and	guidance. Neuroscientist Anil Seth has been of much help by pointing out to me the relatively	recent	literature	on	so-called 'no-report	paradigms' in	consciousness research. For	the	past five	years, I	have	also	been	very fortunate	to	be	able	to	count	on the	informal	guidance	of	Menas	C.	Kafatos,	the	Fletcher	Jones	Endowed	Chair Professor	of	Computational	Physics,	Chapman	University. Without	the	continuing	trust	of	Michael	D.	Lemonick,	Chief	Opinion	Editor	at Scientific	American,	the	ideas	discussed	in	this	dissertation	would	not	have	had the	level	of	mainstream	media	exposure	they	now	have. Last	but	not least,	without the loving	and reassuring	presence	of	my	partner, Claudia	Damian,	this	dissertation	would	never	have	come	true. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 8 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 9 1. Introduction 1.1 In	a	nutshell This dissertation elaborates on a	modern, analytic version of the ontology of idealism,	according	to	which	(a)	phenomenal	consciousness,	as	an	ontological category, is fundamental; and (b) everything else in	nature can	ultimately be reduced to, or grounded in, patterns of excitation of phenomenal consciousness. It posits a reduction base consisting of a single element: spatially unbound, universal phenomenal consciousness. Its key challenge is then	to	explain	how	the	seemingly	distinct	phenomenal	inner	lives	of	different subjects	of	experience	can	arise	within	this	fundamentally	unitary	phenomenal field. This is sometimes called the "decomposition problem" in the literature (Chalmers	2016a)	and	it	is	the	core	problem	this	dissertation	attempts	to	tackle. Along	the	way,	a	variety	of	other	challenges	are	addressed,	such	as:	how	we	can reconcile idealism	with	the fact that	we	all inhabit	a	common	external	world; why	this	world	unfolds	independently	of	our	personal	volition	or	imagination; why there are such tight correlations between measured patterns of brain activity	and	reports	of	experience;	etc. Idealism	has	had its	heyday in	Western	philosophy in the 18th (Berkeley) and early 19th (Hegel) centuries. Though it has enjoyed popularity amongst continental philosophers, analytic philosophers have, by and large, failed to take idealism seriously, perhaps because of its association with religious traditions	in	both	East	and	West.	With	this	dissertation,	I	hope	to	help	change this	by	offering	a	strictly	analytic,	conceptually	clear	articulation	of	idealism.	I also	hope to offer empirical neuroscientific evidence suggesting that idealism may	be	better	suited	to	make	sense	of	the	data	than	mainstream	physicalism	or constitutive	panpsychism. The	core	of	this	dissertation	consists	of	five	papers-each	a	piece	of	the	larger jigsaw	puzzle	assembled	in	this	volume-published	in	academic	journals.	They are	reproduced	here	without	any	change	of	substance.	The	order	in	which	they are presented is meant to help more effectively convey the overarching argument	of	which	each	individual	paper	is	a	part.	In	this	Introduction,	I	shall summarize	this	overarching	argument	so	to	help	readers	place	each	paper	in	its broader context, as they make their way through the dissertation. In other words,	here	I	shall	attempt	to	sketch	the	final,	completed	picture	of	the	jigsaw puzzle	before	each	piece	is	explored	in	more	detail. For this reason, however, readers should not expect the highly summarized argument presented in this Introduction to be strictly rigorous or complete. The goal is to first convey the general idea behind this dissertation, before elaborating on it with the rigor of the subsequent chapters. The appropriate literature reviews, as well as discussions on how the work presented here is situated	in	the	context	of	prior	efforts,	are	also	comprised	in	the	papers	ahead (chapter	2	to	6),	not	in	this	Introduction. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 10 Analytic	Idealism 10 1.2 The	big	picture It	has	now	become	trite	to	point	out	that	mainstream	physicalism	fails-unless one	subscribes	to	its	eliminative	formulation,	a	view	whose	absurdity	I	shall	not bother to argue for here1-to account for the sole given fact of reality: the existence of experience (e.g. Chalmers 2003). Physicalism is also arguably irreconcilable-insofar as it presupposes physical realism-with results emerging from physics laboratories around the world (e.g. Kim et al. 2000, Gröblacher	et	al.	2007,	Romero	et	al.	2010,	Lapkiewicz	et	al.	2011,	Ma	et	al.	2013, Manning	et	al.	2015,	Hensen	et	al.	2015,	etc.),	as	elaborated	upon	in	Section	A.3 of	Appendix	A.2	So	both in	terms	of its	explanatory	power	and its	consistency with	empirical	observations,	our	mainstream	ontology	is	found	wanting. I	mention	this	merely	to	highlight	the	need	for	an	alternative	ontology,	such	as that	offered	in	this	dissertation.	Other	than	a	brief	review	of	the	'hard	problem of	consciousness'	in	Chapter	3,	I	shall	not	focus	on	discussing	the	untenability of	mainstream	physicalism.	This has already	been	done in the literature (e.g. Levine	1983,	Chalmers	1996,	Rosenberg	2004:	13-30,	Strawson	et	al.	2006:	2-30, etc.).	What I shall attempt in the next chapter is something	more ambitious and-hopefully-more constructive: to point out the failures and internal contradictions of the very thought processes that underlie mainstream physicalism and related ontologies. Only by understanding these implicit, unexamined failures and contradictions can we hope to reform our thinking and	eventually	solve	(or	circumvent)	the	associated	dilemmas	and	paradoxes. In	this	context,	Chapter	2	discusses	what	is	perhaps	the	root	of	key	unresolved problems in contemporary analytic philosophy: the tendency to try to make sense of nature by replacing concrete observations with theoretical abstractions. Such attempts often consist of mere word games, played in thought	with	a	rich	and	shifting	phantasmagoria	of	concepts.	The	process	tends to	unfold so implicitly that	many	don't seem to even	notice	how	many steps of-epistemically unreliable-conceptual abstraction their reasoning entails. Chapter 2 attempts to	make these	word	games explicit. It also suggests	more epistemically reliable lines of reasoning that avoid unnecessary conceptual abstractions. By	pursuing	these	more	reliable	lines	of	reasoning,	Chapter	3-the	core	of	this dissertation-elaborates	on	an	analytic formulation	of idealism. It	argues that the	best	categorical	explanation for the facts	of	nature	entails that these facts 1	Interested	readers	can	peruse, instead,	an	excellent	recent	essay	by	Galen	Strawson, who has put it best: https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousnessdeniers/. 2 For a less technical approach, see two of my essays on Scientific American's Observations blog: https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/shouldquantum-anomalies-make-us-rethink-reality/ and https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/coming-to-grips-with-theimplications-of-quantum-mechanics/. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 11 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 11 are essentially phenomenal. All of existence consists, it is claimed, solely of ideas-thoughts, emotions, perceptions, intuitions, imagination, etc.-even though	not	one's	personal	ideas	alone. The ontology articulated in	Chapter 3 can	be summarized thus: there is only universal	phenomenal	consciousness.	We,	as	well	as	all	other	living	organisms, are dissociated alters of this universal consciousness, analogously to how a person with Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) manifests multiple disjoint centers	of	subjectivity	also	called	'alters.'	We,	and	all	other	living	organisms,	are surrounded by the transpersonal phenomenal activity of universal consciousness, which unfolds beyond the dissociative boundary of our respective alter. The inanimate	world3	we perceive around	us is the 'extrinsic appearance'-i.e.	the	phenomenal	image	imprinted	from	across	our	dissociative boundary-of this activity.	The living	organisms	we share the	world	with are the	extrinsic	appearances	of	other	alters. Instead of the mainstream physicalist postulate of an ontological category fundamentally	outside and independent	of	mind,4	Chapter 3	offers a	different categorical interpretation	of	what	we	call 'matter.' Indeed,	according to it the living	brain is	merely a	phenomenal	appearance of a	person's conscious inner life-her	thoughts,	feelings,	fantasies,	beliefs,	etc.-as	presented	on	the	screen of	perception	of	e.g.	another	person.	And	since	the	brain	is	made	of	matter,	this is	what	the	matter	in	a	living	brain is.	Chapter	3	then	goes	further	and,	in	the spirit of parsimony that underlies this entire dissertation, argues that this is also what all matter is: the phenomenal appearance of equally phenomenal activity	unfolding	across	a	dissociative	boundary.	The	matter constituting the inanimate	universe is, thus,	what transpersonal	experiences	unfolding	outside the	alters look like from the	point	of view	of an	alter, just as	a living	brain is what personal experiences look like. By construing all matter to be a phenomenal appearance of equally phenomenal activity, analytic idealism requires nothing more than phenomenality to offer a coherent categorical interpretation	of	nature. Many	criticisms	can	be-and	have	been-made	against	such	a	consciousnessonly	ontology. Indeed,	because	of the formidable cultural	momentum	behind the	notion	of	an	objective	physical	world	distinct	from	mind,	one	can	promptly leverage	a	ready-made,	culturally	sanctioned	list	of	objections	against	idealism. Chapter 4 lists many of these objections and tackles them one by one. It attempts	to	show	that	they	are	often	based	on	logical	fallacies	such	as	questionbegging, unexamined assumptions, misunderstandings of the implications of analytic	idealism,	etc. 3	Throughout this	dissertation, I use the	word 'inanimate' in the sense	of	non-living; i.e.	as	that	which	is	not	biology. 4	Throughout this dissertation-except in Chapter 5, where they are defined in a different	way-I	use the	words 'mind' and 'mentation' as synonyms	of	phenomenal consciousness	and	phenomenal	activity,	respectively. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 12 Analytic	Idealism 12 One objection is exceptional because it poses some legitimate difficulties: a necessary implication of the ontology proposed in Chapter 3 is that an organism's	metabolism-all	of	it-is	the	extrinsic	appearance	of	the	organism's conscious inner life. This is reasonable enough for certain patterns of brain activity	known	to	correlate	with	experiences	accessible through introspection, but what about metabolism beyond the brain, such as e.g. liver and kidney function?	And	what	about	the	metabolic	activity	taking	place	in,	say,	a	person's left	big	toe?	If	the	ontology	proposed	in	Chapter	3	is	correct,	then	liver,	kidney and	even	toe	function	must	all	correspond	to	experiences	as	well.	Yet,	try	as	we might,	these	experiences	do	not	seem	to	be	accessible	through	introspection. Moreover,	even	if	we	were	to	look	at	the	brain	alone,	ignoring	the	metabolism in the rest of the body, recent studies in psychology suggest the presence of seemingly	unconscious	mental	processes	in	the	brain	(e.g.	Hassin	2013).	This,	if true,	would	already	contradict	analytic	idealism. Chapter 5 bites these bullets and argues that, despite appearances to the contrary, there is no clear reason to believe that any	mental process is truly unconscious. Instead, it attempts to show that there are, in fact, very good reasons to think that what we regard as unconscious mental processes correspond merely to an illusion of unconsciousness, which results from dissociative	states	or	lack	of	metacognition.	And	once	these	two	mechanisms- dissociative	states	and lack	of	metacognition-are identified, they	can	explain why	experiences	corresponding	to	areas	of	the	living	body	beyond	the	nervous system	can't	be	accessed	through	introspection. The last	piece	of the	puzzle is that	of	empirical	evidence.	Chapter	6	compiles and discusses a broad list of instances of brain function impairment that are accompanied	by	enrichment of conscious inner life and	an	expansion of	one's sense of identity. The list includes cases as varied as asphyxiation, physical trauma	to	the	head,	the	consumption	of	psychoactive	substances	that	dampen brain	activity,	etc. Such correlations between impaired brain function and enriched conscious inner	life	are	at	least	counterintuitive	under	the	mainstream	physicalist	notion that conscious inner life is constituted or generated by brain activity. Under analytic idealism,	on	the	other	hand, they	are to	be	expected: if	normal	brain function is part of the extrinsic appearance of a	dissociated alter of universal consciousness, then some forms of reduction or impairment of normal brain function	should	be	the	extrinsic	appearance	of	a	reduction	or	impairment	of	the dissociation. And, of course, from a first-person perspective a reduction of dissociation must be experienced as an enrichment of conscious inner life: reintegrated	memories,	the	recovery	of	a	broader	sense	identity,	renewed	access to previously dissociated insights and emotions, reintegration of previously dissociated skills, etc.	Contrary to	physicalism, analytic idealism	can thus	not only	accommodate,	but	also	make	sense	of,	the	evidence	discussed	in	Chapter 6. Naturally, the argument in Chapter 6 is not that all impairment of brain function	should	be	accompanied	by	enriched	inner	life.	Otherwise,	the	smartest 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 13 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 13 and	most	creative	people	would	be	those	with	the	most	damaged	brains.	This	is clearly	not	the	case.	But	neither	does	analytic	idealism	require	it	to	be	the	case. Allow	me	to	elaborate. As	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	a	living	organism	corresponds	to	a	dissociated	alter of	universal	consciousness.	As	such,	each	person	can	be	regarded	as	a	segment of universal consciousness-meant here generically, without implying that universal	consciousness	necessarily	has	spatiotemporal	extension-comprising its own dissociated phenomenal states. Segments comprising many phenomenal states can be referred to as 'big alters,' whereas segments comprising few phenomenal states can be referred to as 'small alters.' It is reasonable	to	say,	for	instance,	that	human	beings	correspond	to	bigger	alters than,	say,	insects. Notice that, in principle, both big and small alters can be equally well dissociated. In other words, the relative amount of phenomenal states encompassed	by	an	alter	does	not	bear	relevance	to	how	well	dissociated	these phenomenal states are from the rest of universal consciousness. It is entirely coherent,	within	the	logic	of	analytic	idealism,	that	a	small	alter	could	be	more strongly	dissociated	from	universal	consciousness	than	a	big	alter,	or	the	other way	around. Now, since brain activity is part of the extrinsic appearance of an alter's dissociated phenomenal states, it stands to reason that some-even	most- types	of	brain	function	impairment	should	correspond	simply	to	a	reduction	of the	phenomenal states	of the	alter.	These types	of	brain function impairment will	not	disrupt	the	dissociation	itself,	but	only	stifle	whatever	is	circumscribed by the dissociative boundary. The alter will become smaller, cognitively compromised, but still equally well dissociated. This is why, under analytic idealism,	many or even	most types of brain function impairment should still come	accompanied	by	cognitive	deficit,	not	awareness	expansion. Only	some	specific	types	of	brain	function	impairment,	which	somehow	affect the	dissociative	mechanisms	themselves-as	opposed	to	the	phenomenal	states encompassed	by the alter-should correlate	with an enrichment	of conscious inner life. They make the dissociative boundary 'porous,' so to speak. At present, however, it is not yet known	what precise aspects of brain function correspond to these dissociative mechanisms, even though some tantalizing indications are discussed in Chapter 6. For this reason, it is currently impossible to	predict	with accuracy	what types of brain function impairment should	lead	to	what	type	of	effect:	awareness	expansion	or	cognitive	deficit. What distinguishes the predictions of analytic idealism from those of mainstream physicalism is this: under analytic idealism, some types of brain function	impairment	should,	in	principle,	lead	to	enriched	conscious	inner	life. Under	mainstream	physicalism,	however,	this	is	much	more	difficult	to	argue, as	elaborated	upon in	Chapter	6.	More rigorously	put,	my	claim is this: there are some types of brain function impairment-which under mainstream physicalism should correlate with cognitive deficit and under analytic idealism 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 14 Analytic	Idealism 14 with enriched inner life-that	have been shown to be accompanied	by enriched inner	life. Notice	that,	because	of	the	inherent	limitations	of	gauging	consciousness	from a	secondor	third-person	perspective,	the	playing	field	isn't	level:	many	types	of brain function impairment	may	cause	both	an	enrichment	of conscious inner life and compromise the subjects' ability to report this enrichment. For instance, language or	motor centers,	memory pathways or a variety of other communication-critical functions in the	brain	may	be	compromised,	harming or eliminating the subjects' ability to speak or	write. For all we know,	many subjects could be lying in hospital with severe head trauma or other brain ailments,	having	unfathomable	inner	experiences,	and	yet	be	utterly	incapable of relating any of it to family or medical staff. If brain areas essential to metacognition	are	compromised,	subjects	may	not	even	be	able	to	report	their experiences to themselves, as discussed in Chapter 5. Consequently, the potential for evidence that corroborates analytic idealism is restricted by conflicting requirements: the corresponding brain function impairment	must be sufficient to affect dissociative mechanisms-not just dampen the phenomenal states encompassed by the alter-whilst preserving enough cognitive function so subjects can report their expanded awareness. These conflicting requirements aren't trivial to meet concurrently. It is, thus, if anything,	surprising	that	so	many	case	reports	exist	in	the	literature	that	seem to	corroborate	analytic	idealism,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	6. Chapter 7 then discusses some important issues related to, but left insufficiently	addressed	by,	chapters	2	to	6.	It	also	points	to	potential	areas	of future	investigation. 1.3 The	appendices The	analytic	case	for	idealism	is	laid	out	in	chapters	2	to	6.	Nonetheless,	there are two topics that, despite not being part of the core argument of this dissertation, arise so forcefully from it that it would have been negligent to leave them unaddressed. I have thus added two papers-also originally published	in	academic	journals-that	tackle	these	topics	in	two	appendices,	A and	B,	respectively. Appendix	A	addresses	the	following	question:	If	analytic	idealism	is	true,	what are	its	implications?	In	other	words,	how	does	it	change	the	way	we	look	upon life and the world? Indeed, whereas mainstream physicalism denies the meaning	of	the	world	by	construing	it	to	be	a	mechanical	contraption	governed by blind laws and mere chance, analytic idealism regards the world as the extrinsic appearance	of intrinsic, universal phenomenal activity.	According to it,	nature	holds	hidden	but inherent	semantic	meaning: it	points	symbolically to	something	beyond	its	face-value	appearance.	This is	unpacked	in	Appendix A,	in	an	attempt	to	highlight	the	relevance	of	idealism	to	life. Because it was originally published as a self-contained paper, Appendix A- more	specifically,	Section	A.3-includes	an	empirical	argument	to	substantiate 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 15 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 15 its starting	hypothesis that the	world is essentially phenomenal. It elaborates upon	the	experimental	evidence	for	what	is	technically	called	'contextuality'	in physics: the notion that physical quantities are fundamentally dependent on observation and have no definite existence before being observed. The link between	contextuality	and	idealism	is	also	made	explicit	in	Appendix	A. Attentive readers will notice that, throughout Appendix A, I use the word 'meaning'	to	denote	'sense'	(as	in	the	sense	of	a	word	or	phrase), 'significance' (as	in	the	significance	of	a	historical	moment)	and	'purpose'	(as	in	the	purpose of an action), freely conflating all three usages. This conflation is intentional and	implicitly	reflects	the	very	conclusion	of	the	appendix:	that	the	purpose	of life	is	to	unveil	the	sense	and	significance	of	the	world.	Thus	the	meaning	of	life in the world is simultaneously life's purpose and the world's sense and significance. Indeed, the very linguistic versatility of the word 'meaning' amplifies	the	argument	in	Appendix	A:	'purpose'	is	intrinsically	connected	with 'sense'	and	'significance.'	Perhaps	language	captures	and	preserves-like	a	time capsule-ancient	intuitions	we	have	since	allowed	to	escape	us. The	second	question	that	naturally	arises	if	one	finds	the	argument	for	analytic idealism	compelling	is	this:	What	drove	the	formidable	momentum	behind	the mainstream adoption of physicalism over the past 200 years or so, if a	more plausible	and	viable	alternative-unaffected	by	fundamental	problems,	such	as the	'hard	problem	of	consciousness'-has	existed	all	along? Appendix	B	argues	that	a	key	motivation	for	the	development	and	mainstream adoption of physicalism has been	psychological, as opposed to philosophical. This	may	come	as	a	surprising	assertion,	for	physicalism	is	often	regarded	as	a purely fact-based interpretation	of reality,	untarnished	by	subjective	biases	or covert wish-fulfillment maneuvers. Appendix B argues that this may not be true,	for	there	are	compelling	reasons	to	believe	that	the	physicalist	worldview protects	and	validates	the	ego,	even	in	view	of	formidable	threats	such	as	death. Perhaps even more surprisingly, behind physicalism's apparent denial of meaning there operate-it is argued-psychological	mechanisms that seek to enhance	one's	sense	of	meaning	in	life. For	these	reasons,	I	argue	that	it	is	not	surprising	that	physicalism,	despite	its inherent problems, has come to amass the formidable level of support it has today among the intellectual elites, particularly in academia. As is often the case	with views that come to define a culture, there is	more to physicalism's success	than	its	philosophical	merits. 1.4 Preempting	misunderstandings While discussing the ideas presented in this dissertation with other philosophers,	it	has	become	clear	to	me	that	a	few	observations	should	be	made upfront, in order to facilitate the correct understanding-and, perhaps	more importantly, preempt misunderstandings-of what is claimed in the papers ahead. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 16 Analytic	Idealism 16 A claim	made already in the title of Chapter 3 is that, according to analytic idealism, the universe is in consciousness. This is liable to	misinterpretation: insofar	as	analytic	idealism	entails	that	consciousness	is	the	categorical	basis- the	underlying	essence-of	all that	exists, shouldn't	one	say, instead, that the universe	is	consciousness? This	would indeed be so if I took the	word 'universe' to denote 'all there is.' After	all,	if	the	universe	is	all	there	is	and	it	is	'made	of'	consciousness,	then	to say that the universe is in consciousness would amount to saying that consciousness	is	in	consciousness. However, throughout this dissertation, I take the word 'universe' to denote what we perceive and measure. In other words, I am using the operational definition	of	'universe'	in	physics,	as	opposed	to	a	metaphysical	one.	The	claim is then that this perceived universe is in consciousness since, according to analytic idealism, it consists of particular patterns of excitation of universal consciousness.	The	universe	is	thus	in	consciousness	for	the	same	reason	that ripples	are	in	water. A second point prone to misunderstanding is the following: as discussed in Chapter 3, an important contribution of this dissertation is the notion that dissociation-at a universal scale-is what creates the appearance of fragmentation of universal consciousness into multiple disjoint centers of experience, such as you and	me. Yet, at a human scale, dissociation is often thought of as presupposing intentionality, or 'aboutness.' Allow me to elaborate. Many of our human phenomenal states entail intentionality: we think about buying	the	car	we	saw	at	the	dealership;	we	feel	bad	about the	news	we	heard on	the	radio;	etc.	These	thoughts	and	feelings	are	thus	about	things	or	events	in the 'world out there': they are anchored in some content of sense perception accessible through episodic memory (Chalmers 1996: 19). When dissociation happens	at the	human level, it is	often	episodic	memory	access that	becomes compromised as a reaction to trauma: traumatic memories are no longer accessible	through	the	chains	of	cognitive	association	that	characterize	regular psychic	life	(American	Psychiatric	Association	2013). The possible misunderstanding is then this: if dissociation presupposed intentionality,	then	the	argument	in	Chapter	3	would	fail	because	it	posits	that dissociation-at	a	universal	scale-is	what	enables	intentionality	to	begin	with, by creating a boundary between an alter and its surrounding environment. Without	this	boundary	there	would	be-it	is	argued-no	sense	perception,	no 'world	out	there'	about	which	we	could	think	or	feel. The	misunderstanding	lies in	assuming	that	dissociation	is	defined in terms	of intentional	content,	simply	because	it	often	happens,	in	humans,	in	connection with	intentional	content.	However,	dissociation	entails	merely	the	cessation	of an otherwise normal cognitive association between two phenomenal states- say, a thought and a feeling-regardless of whether these states have intentional	content	or	not. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 17 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 17 A	thought	experiment should	make this clear: it is	possible to	conceive	of an infant	kept	from	birth	in	an	ideal	sensory-depravation	chamber.	Such	an	infant would not only have abstract thoughts and feelings, but there	would also be natural cognitive associations across these thoughts and feelings. If some of these	cognitive	associations	were to	cease,	one	would	still	be	able to	speak	of dissociation, even though the infant would have never experienced sense perception.	In	other	words,	it	seems	perfectly	possible	that	phenomenal	states could	become	dissociated	from	each	other,	even	if	they	don't	have	phenomenal content.	Therefore,	the	argument	in	Chapter	3	holds. The	final	point	of	possible	misunderstanding	has	to	do	with	the	argument	laid out in	Chapter 2. There, I attempt to show that the notion of an ontological category	outside	and independent	of	phenomenal	consciousness is	not	only	a theoretical	abstraction-as	opposed to	an	empirical	observation-it is	also	an epistemically unreliable abstraction. Readers of that paper have, however, tended	to	assume	that	I	was	seeking	to	make	an	affirmative	metaphysical	point based on this epistemic basis (see the Open Peer Commentaries in Kastrup 2018b).	This	is	incorrect. So let me be clear upfront: what Chapter 2 attempts is to highlight that different ontologies inherently carry different epistemic costs-i.e. degrees of epistemic confidence-even if these ontologies are both internally consistent and	consistent	with	empirical	observations.	And	whereas	this	is	admittedly	not a	metaphysical	argument,	it	undoubtedly	has	great	relevance	in	informing	one's choice of	metaphysics, since all that is available for	making such a choice is one's	knowledge.	The	degree	to	which	one's	knowledge	is	reliable	should	be	a factor-perhaps	even	a	defining	factor-in	the	choice. Having	made	these	upfront	clarifications,	I	am	now	ready	to	begin	elaborating on	analytic idealism	by, first, laying	out its epistemic	basis and	motivation in the	next	chapter. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 18 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 19 2. Conflating	Abstraction	with	Empirical	Observation: The	False	Mind-Matter	Dichotomy This	paper	first	appeared	in	Constructivist	Foundations,	ISSN	1782-348X,	Vol.	13, No.	3,	in	July	2018. 2.1 Abstract The	alleged	dichotomy	between	mind	and	matter is	pervasive.	Therefore, the attempt to explain	matter in terms of mind (idealism) is often considered a mirror image of that of explaining mind in terms of matter (mainstream physicalism), in the sense of being structurally equivalent despite being reversely	arranged.	I	argue	that	this	is	an	error	arising	from	language	artifacts, for dichotomies	must reside in the same level of abstraction. Because	matter outside	mind	is	not	an	empirical	observation	but	rather	an	explanatory	model, the	epistemic	symmetry	between	the	two	is	broken.	Consequently,	matter	and mind	cannot	reside	in	the	same	level	of	abstraction.	It	then	becomes	clear	that attempting	to	explain	mind	in	terms	of	matter	is	epistemically	more	costly	than attempting to explain matter in terms of mind. The paper highlights the primacy of perceptual constructs over explanatory abstraction on both epistemic	and	ontic	levels. 2.2 Introduction The	(unexamined)	assumption	that	mind	and	matter	are	jointly	exhaustive	and mutually	exclusive	concepts is	pervasive	today.	In	other	words,	many	scholars implicitly take every aspect of existence to be either mental (e.g. thoughts, emotions, hallucinations) or physical (e.g. tables and chairs), mentality and physicality being polar opposites in some sense. Originating with René Descartes and Immanuel Kant (Walls 2003: 130), this dichotomy has been firmly entrenched in Western thought since at least the early nineteenth century. Eminent scholarly publications of the time, such as The British Cyclopaedia of Natural History, lay it out unambiguously: "as mind is the opposite of matter in definition, the perfection of its exercise must be the opposite	of	that	of	the	exercise	of	matter"	(Partington	1837:	161).	From	the	early twentieth	century	onwards,	more	nuanced	formulations	of	the	dichotomy	were proposed.	Alfred	North	Whitehead (1947), for instance, considered	mind and matter co-dependent opposites. Even	Henri Bergson, whose conception of an élan	vital	was	meant	to	dilute	the	Cartesian	split,	was	careful	not	to	completely eradicate	the	dichotomy	(Catani	2013:	94). Indeed, this trend towards more nuanced formulations endures to this day. Philosopher	David	Chalmers,	for	instance,	wrote	that	the	"failure	of	materialism leads	to	a	kind	of	dualism:	there	are	both	physical	and	nonphysical	[i.e.	mental] features	of	the	world"	(1996:	124).	He	speaks	of	property	dualism	(ibid.: 125)	to 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 20 Analytic	Idealism 20 distinguish it from the discredited substance dualism of Descartes. Nonetheless,	the	essence	of	the	dichotomy	persists	intact.	Public	endorsements of	property	dualism	by	influential	science	spokespeople,	such	as	neuroscientists Christof Koch (2012a: 152) and Sam Harris,1	lend academic legitimacy to it. Harris, for instance, claims that mind and matter each represent "half of reality,"	making	the implicit	assumption	that they	have	comparable	epistemic status	(that	is,	that	matter	is	as	confidently	knowable	as	mind).	So	pervasive	is this	assumption	that	it	has	become	integral	to	our	shared	cultural	intuitions. Whilst	a	fundamental	dichotomy	between	mind	and	matter	is	readily	accepted by large segments of the population-perhaps for psychological reasons (Heflick et al. 2015)-in philosophical circles the corresponding dualism is properly regarded as unparsimonious. For this reason, philosophy has historically attempted to explain one member of the alleged dichotomy in terms	of the	other.	The	ontology	of idealism, for instance,	attempts	to	reduce "all sense data to mental contents" (Tarnas 2010: 335), whereas mainstream physicalism-perhaps better labelled as 'materialism,' but which I shall continue to refer to as 'mainstream physicalism' for the sake of consistency with	some	of	the	relevant	literature-attempts	to	reduce	all	mental	contents	to material	arrangements	(Stoljar	2016).	To	be	more	specific,	idealism	entails	that mind is nature's fundamental ontological ground, everything else being reducible to, or grounded in, mind, whereas mainstream physicalism posits that nature's fundamental ontological ground is matter outside and independent of mind, everything else being reducible to, or grounded in, matter. The	problem	is	that	the	ingrained	cultural	intuition	that	mind	and	matter	have comparable epistemic status tends to creep-unexamined-even into philosophical thought, leading to the tacit conclusion that idealism and mainstream	physicalism	are	mirror	images	of	each	other,	in	the	sense	of	being structurally	equivalent	despite	being	reversely	arranged.	In	the	present	essay,	I contend that this tacit conclusion is false because it overlooks important epistemic	considerations:	we	do	not-and	fundamentally	cannot-know	matter as	confidently	as	we	know	mind.	By	incorrectly	positing	that	idealism	incurs	an epistemic	cost	comparable	to	that	of	mainstream	physicalism	in	at least	some important sense, the tacit conclusion undervalues idealism and overvalues physicalism. This confusion	may be a key enabler of physicalism's success in underpinning our present-day mainstream worldview. Once the tacit conclusion is properly examined and rectified, as attempted in this essay, idealism may emerge as a more plausible ontology than mainstream physicalism,	at	least	in	terms	of	its	epistemic	cost. Like Gilbert Ryle (2009), I argue that mind and matter do not form a dichotomy.	My	argument,	however,	does	not	depend-as	Ryle's	controversially 1	See	Harris's	video	titled	"You	Are	More	Than	Your	Brain"	on	Big	Think,	4	September 2016, available at https://www.facebook.com/BigThinkdotcom/videos/10153879575418527/. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 21 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 21 does (Webster 1995: 483)-on equating mind with behaviours. Indeed, Ryle attempts	to	refute	the	alleged	dichotomy	by	effectively	relegating	mind	to	the status of	mere illusion (ibid: 461).	My argument, instead, rests on the notion that mind and matter are not epistemically symmetrical-a concept I shall formally	define in section	2.5-as	members	of	a	dichotomy	must	be. I	do	not deny mind, because it is epistemically primary: all knowledge presupposes mind. That the notion of physically objective matter-that is, matter outside and independent of mind-is now largely taken for granted suggests cultural acclimatization to what is a mere hypothesis. After all, physically objective matter is not empirically observable, but a conceptual explanatory device abstracted	from	the	patterns	and	regularities	of	empirical	observations-that	is, an explanatory abstraction (Glasersfeld 1987; more on this in section 2.4). Indeed, there seems to be a growing tendency in science today to mistake explanatory abstraction for	what is available to us empirically. This has been extensively documented before, but mostly in regard to clearly speculative ideas such as superstring theory and multiverse cosmologies (Smolin 2007). When	it	comes	to	the	everyday	notion	of	physically	objective	matter,	however, many	fail	to	see	the	same	conflation	at	work. To	illustrate	and	highlight	the	conflation	with	an	admittedly	extreme	example, the next section briefly reviews the ontology of pancomputationalism,	which posits	ungrounded	computation	as	the	primary	element	of	existence	(Piccinini 2015). Indeed, the idea of replacing physicalism with ontic pancomputationalism	should	provide	a	visceral	demonstration	of	the	epistemic cost of substituting explanatory abstraction for empirical observation. In this context,	my	suggestion	is	that	an	analogous	epistemic	disparity	exists	between idealism	and	mainstream	physicalism.	In	other	words,	if	one	is	convinced	that ontic	pancomputationalism	is	absurd	in	comparison	to	physicalism,	then-and on	the	same	basis-one	has	reason	to	question	the	plausibility	of	mainstream physicalism	in	comparison	to	idealism. Section 2.4 then elaborates more systematically on the different planes of abstract	explanations	used	in	science	and	philosophy.	It	provides	the	basis	for the	refutation	of	the	alleged	dichotomy	between	mind	and	matter	later	carried out in section	2.5,	which forms the	core	of this essay.	Finally, the	Conclusion sums	it	all	up. Before we start, however, some terminology clarifications are needed. Throughout this essay, I use the word 'mind' in the sense of phenomenal consciousness. Following Thomas Nagel's (1974) original definition of the latter-which	has	since	been	further	popularized	by	Chalmers	(1996,	2003)-I stipulate	that,	if	there	is	anything	it	is	like	to	be	a	certain	entity,	then	the	entity is	minded.	As	such,	mind-as	the	word	is	used	here-is	epistemically	primary, an	assertion further	substantiated in	section	2.4. In this	sense,	mind	does	not necessarily entail higher-level functions such as metacognition-that is, the knowledge	of	one's	knowledge	(Schooler	2002:	340)-or	even	a	conscious	sense of self as distinct from the world. It necessarily entails only the presence of 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 22 Analytic	Idealism 22 phenomenal properties, in that it is defined as the substrate or ground of experience. Moreover, insofar as what we call 'concreteness' is itself a phenomenal property associated with the degree of clarity or vividness of experience,	mind is the sole	ground	of concreteness.	Anything	allegedly	nonmental	cannot,	by	definition,	be	concrete,	but	is	abstract	instead,	in	the	sense of	lacking	phenomenal	properties. I	am	well	aware	that	the	word 'mind' is	used	in	entirely	different	ways-often decoupled from	experience-in	other contexts, such as philosophy	of biology (Godfrey-Smith 2014) and artificial intelligence (Franklin 1997). Yet, I believe the	usage	I	am	defining	here	is	adequate	for	the	context	of	the	present	paper. And	given	this	usage,	experience	can	be	coherently	regarded	as	an	excitation	of mind,	whereas	mind	can	be	coherently	regarded	as	the	substrate	or	ground	of experience. 2.3 The	epistemic	cost	of	explanation	by	abstraction By postulating a material world outside mind and obeying laws of physics, physicalism can accommodate the patterns and regularities of perceptual experience.	But	it	fails	to	accommodate	experience	itself.	This	is	called	the	'hard problem	of	consciousness'	and	there is	now	a	vast literature	on it (e.g.	Levine 1983,	Rosenberg	2004: 13-30	and	Strawson	et al.	2006:	2-30). In	a	nutshell, the qualities of experience are irreducible to the parameters of material arrangements-whatever	the	arrangement	is-in	the	sense	that	it	is	impossible, even in	principle, to	deduce those	qualities from these	parameters (Chalmers 2003). As I elaborate in section 2.5, the "hard problem" is not merely hard, but fundamentally insoluble,	arising	as it	does	from	the	very	failure	to	distinguish explanatory	abstraction	from	empirical	observation	discussed	in	this	paper.	As such, it implies that we cannot, even in principle, explain mind in terms of matter. But because the contemporary cultural ethos entails the notion that mind and	matter constitute a dichotomy, one	may feel tempted to conclude that	there	should	also	be	a	symmetrical	'hard	problem	of	matter'-that	is,	that we should	not, even in	principle,	be	able to	explain	matter in terms	of	mind. The natural next step in this flawed line of reasoning is to look for more fundamental ontological ground preceding both mind and matter; a third substrate	to	which	matter	and	mind	could	both	be	reduced. A good example of this line of reasoning is brought by ontic pancomputationalism,	which	posits	that	ungrounded	information	processing	is what	makes	up the	universe	at its	most fundamental level (Fredkin	2003).	As such, ontic pancomputationalism entails that computation precedes matter ontologically.	But "if computations	are	not	configurations	of	physical	entities, the	most obvious alternative is that computations are abstract,	mathematical entities, like numbers and sets" (Piccinini 2015). According to ontic 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 23 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 23 pancomputationalism, even mind itself-psyche, soul-is a derivative phenomenon	of	purely	abstract	information	processing.2 To gain a sense of the epistemic cost of this line of reasoning, consider the position	of	physicist	Max	Tegmark (2014).	According to	him, "protons,	atoms, molecules, cells and stars" are all redundant "baggage" (ibid: 255). Only the mathematical	parameters	used	to	describe	the	behaviour	of	matter	are	real.	In other words, Tegmark posits that the universe consists purely of numbers- ungrounded information-but nothing to attach these numbers to. The universe	supposedly	is	a	"set	of	abstract	entities	with	relations	between	them," which "can be described in a baggage-independent way" (ibid: 267). He attributes	all	ontological	value	to	a	description	while-paradoxically-denying the	existence	of	the	very	thing	that	is	described	in	the	first	place. Clearly, ontic pancomputationalism represents total commitment to abstract mathematical concepts as the foundation of existence. According to it, there are	only	numbers	and	sets.	But	what	are	numbers	and	sets	without	the	mind	or matter where they could reside? It is one thing to state in language that numbers and sets can exist	without	mind	and	matter, but it is another thing entirely to explicitly and coherently conceive of	what-if anything-this	may mean.	By	way	of	analogy,	it	is	possible	to	write-as	Lewis	Carrol	did-that	the Cheshire Cat's grin remains after the cat disappears, but it is another thing entirely	to	conceive	explicitly	and	coherently	of	what	this	means. Ontic pancomputationalism appeals to ungrounded information-pure numbers,	mathematical	descriptions-as	ontological	primitive, i.e.,	as	the	sole fundamental	aspect	of	existence.	But	what	exactly	is	information?	Our	intuitive understanding	of	the	concept	has	been	cogently	captured	and	made	explicit	by Claude	Shannon	(1948):	information	is	given	by	state	differences	discernible	in a system. As such, it is a property	of a system-associated	with the system's possible configurations-not an entity or ontological class unto itself. Under mainstream physicalism-that is, materialism-the system whose configurations constitute information is a material arrangement, such as a computer. Under idealism, it is mind, for experience entails different phenomenal states that can be qualitatively discerned from one another. Hence,	information	requires	a	mental	or	material	substrate	in	order	to	be	even conceived	of	explicitly	and	coherently.	To	say	that	information	exists	in	and	of itself	is	akin	to	speaking	of	spin	without	the	top,	of	ripples	without	water,	of	a dance	without	the	dancer,	or	of	the	Cheshire	Cat's	grin	without	the	cat.	It	is	a grammatically	valid	statement	devoid	of	any	semantic	value:	a language	game less	meaningful than fantasy, for internally consistent fantasy can at least be explicitly	and	coherently	conceived	of	and,	thereby,	known	as	such.	But	in	what way	can	we	know	information	uncouched	in	mind	or	matter? One assumes that serious proponents of ontic pancomputationalism are	well aware	of	this line	of	criticism.	How	do	they	then	reconcile	their	position	with 2 See Fredkin's online draft paper titled "On the Soul," available at: http://www.digitalphilosophy.org//wp-content/uploads/2015/07/on_the_soul.pdf. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 24 Analytic	Idealism 24 it? A passage by Luciano Floridi-well-known advocate of information as ontological primitive-may provide a clue. In a section titled "The nature of information,"	he	states: Information is notoriously a polymorphic phenomenon and a polysemantic concept so, as an explicandum, it can	be associated	with several	explanations,	depending	on	the	level	of	abstraction	adopted	and the cluster of requirements and desiderata orientating a theory. ... Information remains an elusive concept. (Floridi 2008: 117, emphasis added) Such	ambiguity	lends	ontic	pancomputationalism	a	kind	of	conceptual	fluidity that renders it impossible to pin down. After all, if the choice of ontological primitive	is	given	by	"an	elusive	concept,"	how	can	one	definitely	establish	that the choice is	wrong? In admitting the possibility that information	may be "a network	of logically interdependent	but	mutually irreducible concepts" (ibid.: 120),	Floridi	seems	to	suggest,	even,	that	such	elusiveness	may	be	unresolvable. While vagueness	may be defensible in regard to natural entities conceivably beyond	the	human	ability	to	apprehend,	it	is	at	least	difficult	to	justify	when	it comes	to	a	human	concept	such	as	information.	We	invented	the	concept,	so	we either	specify	clearly	what	we	mean	by	it	or	our	conceptualization	remains	too ambiguous to	be	ontologically	meaningful. In the latter case, there is literally no sense in attributing ontological value to information and, hence, ontic pancomputationalism	is-once	again-strictly	meaningless. Although ontic pancomputationalism is an admittedly extreme example, an analogous attempt to reduce concreteness-that is, the felt presence of conscious perception (Merleau-Ponty 1964)-to	mere explanatory abstraction lies behind both mainstream physicalism and the alleged mind-matter dichotomy,	as	I	shall	argue	in	the	next	section.	At	the	root	of	this	concerning state of affairs is a generalized failure to recognize that every step of explanatory abstraction away from the concreteness of conscious perception implies a reduction in epistemic confidence: we do not know that abstract conceptual	objects	exist	with	the	same	level	of	confidence	that	we	do	know	that our perceptions-whatever their source or underlying ontic nature	may be- exist.	I	do	not	know	that	subatomic	particles	outside	and	independent	of	mind exist	with	the	same	level	of	confidence	that	I	do	know	that	the	chair	I	am	sitting on,	which	I	am	directly	acquainted	with	through	conscious	perception,	exists. Worse	still,	with	what	confidence	can	we	know	that	a	loosely	defined,	possibly incoherent	concept such	as	ungrounded information lies	at the foundation	of existence?	As	such,	steps	of	explanatory	abstraction	can	only	be	justified	if	the relevant empirical observations cannot be explained without them, lest we conflate science	and	philosophy	with	meaningless language	games.	This is an important	claim,	so	allow	me	to	dwell	on	it	a	little	longer	before	proceeding	to the	next	section. It could be argued that the existence of perceptual illusions indicates that conscious perception entails less epistemic confidence than abstract formal systems.	For	instance,	in	the	well-known	"checker	shadow"	illusion	created	by 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 25 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 25 the Perceptual Science Group of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, two identically coloured squares-A and B-of a checkerboard are initially perceived	to	be	of	opposite	colours	because	of	the	different	contexts in	which they are perceived (see Figure 2.1). Should we then declare that conscious perception is fundamentally unreliable?	Well, notice that it is also conscious perception	that	eventually	dispels the illusion:	by	looking	at	one	of	the	squares as	it	is	moved	to	the	other's	context,	one	sees	that	it	indeed	has	the	same	colour as	the	other	square.	So	even	in	the	case	of	perceptual	illusions,	it	is	still	direct, concrete	experience that	provides	us	with the	epistemic	confidence	necessary to	recognize	the	illusion	for	what	it	is. Figure	2.1:	The	"checker	shadow"	illusion.	Despite	appearances	to	the	contrary, squares	A	and	B	are	the	same	shade	of	grey. Further supporting the claim that abstracting away from direct experience implies a reduction in epistemic confidence is the anti-realist view in philosophy of science. According to it, abstract theoretical entities-such as subatomic	particles,	invisible	fields	and	any	other	postulated	entity	that	escapes our	ability to	directly	perceive-are	but	"convenient fictions,	designed	to	help predict	the	behaviour	of	things	in	the	observable	world"	(Okasha	2002:	61;	see also	van	Fraassen	1990). In	other	words, the	best	we	can	say	about	subatomic particles	and	other	abstract	entities is that the	observable	world	behaves	as if these abstract entities existed. This does not entail or imply that the entities exist	as	such,	which	we	cannot	be	certain	of	either	way	(van	Fraassen	1980).	In this sense, explanatory abstraction again implies reduction in epistemic confidence, insofar as	we do	not know that subatomic particles and invisible fields	exist	with	the	same	level	of	confidence	that	we	do	know	that	the	world we	consciously	perceive	exists. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 26 Analytic	Idealism 26 2.4 Levels	of	explanatory	abstraction Like	ontic	pancomputationalism,	mainstream	physicalism	is	no	stranger	to	the epistemic cost of explanatory abstraction: the existence of a material world outside and independent of mind is a theoretical inference arising from interpretation	of	sense	perceptions	within	a	framework	of	complex	thought,	not an empirical observation. After all, what we call the world is available to us solely as 'images'-defined here broadly, so as to include any sensory modality-on the screen of perception,	which is itself	mental. Even physicist Andrei Linde, one of the founders of the theory of cosmic inflation, acknowledged this in a 1998 talk titled "Universe, Life, Consciousness," delivered at the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences (CTNS), Berkeley,	California:3 Let us remember that our knowledge of the world begins not with matter but with perceptions. I know for sure that	my pain exists, my 'green'	exists,	and	my 'sweet' exists	...	everything	else is	a theory.	Later we find out that our perceptions obey some laws, which can be	most conveniently formulated if we assume that there is some underlying reality beyond our perceptions. This	model of	material world obeying laws of physics is so successful that soon	we forget about our starting point and say that	matter is the only reality, and	perceptions are only helpful	for	its	description. Now,	we	know that	mind is capable	of autonomously	generating the imagery we associate with matter: dreams and hallucinations, for instance, are often qualitatively indistinguishable from the so-called 'real world.' Therefore, the motivation for postulating an objective material world must go beyond the mere	existence	of	this	imagery.	And	indeed,	what	the	notion	of	objective	matter attempts	to	make	sense	of	are	certain	patterns	and	regularities	observable	in	the imagery,	such	as: • The	correlations	between	observed	brain	activity	and	reported	inner	life (see, e.g. Koch 2004 for a scientific take on the neural correlates of consciousness, but consider also the obvious effects of e.g. alcohol consumption and head trauma-both of which disrupt regular brain activity-on	inner	experience); • The	observation	that	we	all	seem	to	inhabit	the	same	world;	and • The	observation	that	the	dynamics	of	this	world	unfold	independently	of our	personal	volition. After	all,	if	mind	is	not	a	product	of	objective	arrangements	of	matter,	how	can there	be such tight correlations	between	brain	activity and	experience? If the world	is	not	made	of	matter	outside	our	individual	minds,	how	can	we	all	share the	same	world	beyond	ourselves?	If	the	world	is	not	independent	of	mind,	why can	we	not	change	the	laws	of	nature	simply	by	imagining	them	to	be	different? 3At the time of this writing the transcript of this talk was available online at: http://web.stanford.edu/~alinde/SpirQuest.doc. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 27 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 27 Clearly, thus, the non-mental world posited by physicalism is largely an attempt to make sense of these three basic observations. As such, it is an explanatory abstraction, not itself an observation. We conceptually imagine that there is a non-mental world underlying our perceptions-and in some sense isomorphic to these perceptions-because doing so helps explain the basic observations (see	Figure 2.2).	Nonetheless,	whatever ontological class is pointed to by this conceptual abstraction remains perforce epistemically inaccessible,	a	recognition	already	present	in	Immanuel	Kant's	Critique	of	Pure Reason. Figure	2.2:	Levels	of	explanatory	abstraction.	Grey	and	dotted	parts	represent steps	of	abstraction. Explanatory	abstraction	does	not	stop	at	this	first	level.	After	imagining	a	nonmental world isomorphic to our perceptions, we are left with the task of explaining	how	and	why	this	world	behaves	the	way	it	does.	Why	do	objects	fall when	dropped?	Why	does a piece of amber attract chaff	when rubbed?	How can certain metals magnetically attract other metals? To answer these questions,	we	must attribute to the	material	world certain properties that go beyond perceptual isomorphism. We say, for instance, that matter has the properties	of	mass,	charge	and	spin.	These	properties	constitute	a	second-level of	explanatory	abstraction	beyond	direct	experience	(see	Figure	2.2	again). Naturally, there can be even	more levels of explanatory abstraction involved. Superstring theory, for instance, attempts to explain the properties of	matter through the particular modes of vibration of imagined hyper-dimensional strings	(Greene	2003).	But	the	two	levels	illustrated	in	Figure	2.2	are	sufficient for	the	discussion	that	follows. The defining characteristic of explanation by abstraction is a progressive movement away from Edmund Husserl's (1970) "life-world," from the concreteness	of	direct	experience.	First,	one	posits	a	world	devoid	of	qualities (Varela,	Thompson	and	Rosch 1993)	and,	as	such,	devoid	of	concreteness too, Mind Material	world Proper.es of	the material world First-level	of	abstrac.on (perceptual	isomorphism) Second-level	of	abstrac.on (extra	proper.es	a>ributed) Explains	behavior of	the	material	world Explains	basic	observa.ons on	the	screen	of	percep.on 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 28 Analytic	Idealism 28 for concreteness is a	quality	of experience.	Then,	one	progressively loads this world with properties that entail no direct isomorphism to experience. For instance,	we	do	not see electric charge or spin;	we	only see the	behaviour of matter	that	these	abstract	properties	supposedly	explain,	such	as	attraction	and repulsion.	Similarly,	we	do	not	feel	mass;	we	only	feel	the	weight	and	inertia	of objects,	which	the	property	of	having	mass	supposedly	explains	(Okasha	2002: 58-76). Because	concreteness	is	the	intuitive	foundation	of	what	we	consider	real,	each step	in	this	movement	away	from	concreteness	takes	us	farther	from	what	we intuitively	sense	to	be	real	(Merleau-Ponty	1964).	One	may	then	become	lost	in a forest	of intellectually	appealing	but	ultimately	arbitrary	conceptualizations. This,	again,	is	the	epistemic	cost	of	explanation	by	abstraction. 2.5 Dispelling	the	mind-matter	dichotomy By definition, the two members of a dichotomy are jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive.	Ontologically, this	means that if one	member is the case, then the	other is	necessarily	not the	case,	and	vice-versa.	For instance, in the context	of	biological	organisms,	if	life	is	not	the	case,	then	death	is	necessarily the case. In the context of a job application, if success is the case (i.e. the applicant	gets	the	job),	then	failure	is	not	the	case.	And	so	on.	As	such,	a	single test	suffices	to	acquire	knowledge	about	the	ontological	status	of	both	members of	a	dichotomy.	If	I	can	perform	a	test	to	determine	if	a	person	is	alive,	then	I will	automatically	know	whether	the	person	is	dead,	without	having	to	test	for death	separately.	If	I	can	set	a	criterion	for	success,	then	that	same	criterion	will automatically	determine	whether	failure	is	the	case,	without	my	having	to	set	a separate	criterion	for	failure.	And	so	on.	I	shall	call	this	property	of	a	dichotomy epistemic symmetry. When two concepts are epistemically symmetrical, knowledge	of	one	implies	knowledge	of	the	other. Now	notice	that	epistemic	symmetry	can	only	hold for	concepts residing in the same	level	of	explanatory	abstraction.	If	they	do	not,	then	there	necessarily	is	at least	one	extra	inferential	step	necessary	to	know	whether	one	of	the	concepts obtains.	This breaks the symmetry, for then	we cannot acquire knowledge	of the	ontological	status	of	both	concepts	with	a	single	test. Here	is	an	example:	the	presence	of	a	negative	feeling	can	be	tested	for	directly through	introspection-thus	entailing	no	inferential	steps-whereas	testing	for the	presence	of	a	positive	electric	charge	requires	an	inference	by	observation of the associated behaviour of matter. Because of this need for an extra inferential step, knowing the	negative feeling cannot imply knowledge of the positive	electric	charge.	The	negative	feeling	and	the	positive	electric	charge	are not,	therefore,	epistemically	symmetrical	and	cannot	constitute	a	dichotomy. Conversely,	positive	and	negative	electric	charges	are	both	properties	of	matter, residing	in	the	second	level	of	explanatory	abstraction	illustrated	in	Figure	2.2. As such, they are epistemically symmetrical and can constitute a dichotomy. Indeed,	every	level	of	explanatory	abstraction	can	encompass	dichotomies.	For 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 29 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 29 instance, the	size	of	material	objects is isomorphic	to	perceptual	qualities:	we can subjectively test	whether an object is big or small in relation to another object. As such, bigness and smallness both reside in the first level of explanatory	abstraction	and	are	epistemically	symmetrical;	they	can	constitute a	dichotomy	(see	Figure	2.3). Figure	2.3:	Dichotomies	in	their	respective	levels	of	explanatory	abstraction. But-and	here	is	the	key	point-mind	and	matter	do	not	reside	in	the	same	level of explanatory abstraction. Mind-as defined in Section 2.2-is the ground within	which, and	out	of	which, abstractions	are	made.	Matter, in turn, is an abstraction	of	mind	(see	Figure	2.2	again).	This	breaks	the	epistemic	symmetry between them:	we	do	not	know	matter in the same	way that	we	know	mind, for-as	cogently	argued	by	Linde in the	earlier	quote-matter is an inference and mind a given. Consequently, although mind can encompass polar opposites-such as the feelings of love and fear in the context of a situation where someone feels passionate about a particular aspect of someone else (assuming	that	other	passions, such	as	hate,	which is	arguably	a form	of fear, are	particular	instances	of	love	or	fear)-it	cannot	itself	be	the	polar	opposite	of matter or	matter's properties. It follows that we have no reason to conclude that	reducing	matter	to	mind	is	as	challenging	as	reducing	mind	to	matter,	and there is thus no substantiation for a 'hard problem of mind.' Stronger still, insofar as what we call 'matter' can be parsimoniously construed as phenomenal	patterns	of	excitation	of	mind,	matter	is	on	an	epistemic	par	with mind	and	can,	in	principle,	be	reduced	to	the	latter,	for	both	already	reside	in the	same	ontological	domain.	This	move	takes	mind	itself	to	be	an	ontological primitive and eliminates any conceivable 'hard	problem	of	mind,' since	mind now	does	not	need	to	be	reduced. The	notion	of	a	dichotomy	between	mind	and	matter	arises	from	language.	In order	to	speak	of the	substrate	of	experience	we	must	give it	a	name,	such	as 'mind'	or 'consciousness,' thereby linguistically	objectifying the subject.	Then, we conflate language with what language attempts to describe, implicitly assuming	that	mind	is	an	object	just	as	matter	allegedly	is.	We	forget	that	there is	no	epistemic	symmetry	between	the	two. Material world Proper.es	of	the material	world	Mind Posi.ve charge vs. Nega.ve charge Big vs. Small Love vs. Fear 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 30 Analytic	Idealism 30 Indeed, because the concept of	mind-independent	matter, as an explanatory abstraction, arises in	mind, as an 'excitation' of mind, to say that mind and matter constitute a dichotomy is akin to saying that ripples and water constitute	a	dichotomy.4	Dichotomies	can	exist	only	between	different	kinds	of ripples-say,	those	that	flow	mostly	to	the	right	versus	those	that	flow	mostly to the left-not	between	ripples	and the	substrate	where they ripple.	Mind is the	substrate	of	the	explanatory	abstraction	we	call	matter,	so	when	we	speak of	a	mind-matter	dichotomy	we	fall into	a	fundamental	"category	mistake,"	as Ryle	(2009)	put	it.	However,	contrary	to	what	Ryle	suggests, it is	matter	that	is the	abstraction,	not	mind. The notion that idealism and mainstream physicalism are mirror images of each other arises from a failure to grasp this point. Lucid contemplation of these ontologies shows that idealism attempts to reduce an explanatory abstraction	(physically	objective	matter)	to	that	which	articulates	and	hosts	the abstraction	in	the	first	place	(mind).	This	is	prima facie	eminently	reasonable. Mainstream physicalism, in turn, attempts to reduce mind to mind's own explanatory abstractions, an obvious paradox that constitutes the crux of the 'hard	problem.' There would be no 'hard problem' if one did not conflate explanatory abstractions with concrete ontological primitives, if one did not attempt to paradoxically reduce	mind to	abstractions	of	mind.	The 'hard	problem' is	not something	empirically	observed	but	the	salient	result	of	internal	contradictions in	a	logico-conceptual	schema;	contradictions	that	I	hope	to	have	helped	make explicit	with	the	present	paper. Naturally, circumventing the 'hard problem' in the way suggested above ultimately forces us to	make do	with	mind alone as an ontological primitive and thereby entertain some form of idealism-more specifically, a form of idealism	wherein	mind is the experientially given	ground	of existence,	whose manifestations comprise the concrete phenomenality you and I undergo in everyday life. And whereas idealism in the West has had its heyday in the eighteenth	(e.g.	Berkeley)	and	early	nineteenth	(e.g.	Hegel)	centuries,	it	is	now enjoying renewed interest (Chalmers 2018) for having been updated and revitalized	with compelling new formulations (e.g. Kastrup 2017b and 2017e,5 Yetter-Chappell 2018, as	well as Fields et al. 2017, insofar as the latter can	be construed as a form of idealism). These are sometimes proposed under new names, such	as 'cosmopsychism' (e.g.	Shani	2015,	Nagasawa	and	Wager	2016), which, as the	name suggests, posits that the cosmos as a	whole is essentially 4	Allow	me	to	insist	on	an	observation	already	made	in	Section	1.4:	this	is	an	epistemic point.	Mind-independent	matter	can	only	be	known	as	a	concept	that	arises	in	mind, for	we have no direct access to the hypothesized ontological category the concept denotes. Therefore, insofar as we can know it, mind-independent matter is an excitation	of	mind	and, as such, cannot form	a	dichotomy	with	mind for the same reason	that	ripples	cannot	form	a	dichotomy	with	water. 5	See	also	Chapter	3	of	this	dissertation. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 31 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 31 phenomenal. Even 'radical constructivism' can be construed as a form of idealism, insofar as its claims are not merely epistemic, but ontic: "Radical constructivism	...	develops	a	theory	of	knowledge	in	which	knowledge	does	not reflect an 'objective' ontological reality, but exclusively an ordering and organization of a world constituted by our experience" (Glasersfeld 1987: 24, emphasis added). Finally, the strongest objections usually leveraged against idealism	have	recently	also	been	tackled	(Kastrup	2017c6). Having said all this, it should be noted that, in and of itself, the argument provided in this paper, despite being supportive of idealism, does not necessarily	imply	idealism.	I	have	focused	on	epistemic	cost	considerations	and did	not show	whether or	how idealism	can account for all relevant empirical observations	we	make	of	nature.	Indeed,	an	articulation	of	an	idealist	ontology is	not	within	the	scope	of	this	paper.	But	if	it	is	demonstrated-as	some	of	the papers cited above claim to do-that idealism can account for all empirical observations that mainstream physicalism allegedly accounts for, then epistemic cost considerations certainly tilt the balance in favour of idealism, due to the latter's lack of reliance on inflationary, epistemically unreliable, paradoxical	abstractions.	As such, the	core	claim	of this	essay is	not so	much the validity of idealism as that physically objective matter is a doubtful cognitive	construct,	in	the	strict	constructivist	sense:	insofar	as	we	believe	to	see matter outside and independent of	mind	when	we look at the	world around ourselves, we are conflating a rational-linguistic construction with what is empirically	observed. 2.6 Conclusion The	pervasive	but	unexamined	assumption	that	mind	and	matter	constitute	a dichotomy	is	an	error	arising	from	language	artifacts.	Members	of	dichotomies must be epistemically symmetrical and, therefore, reside in the same level of abstraction. Physically objective matter-as an explanatory model-is an abstraction	of	mind.	We	do	not	know	matter in the same	way that	we know mind, for	matter is an inference	and	mind	a	given.	This	breaks the	epistemic symmetry between the two and implies that mainstream physicalism and idealism	cannot	be	mirror	images	of	each	other. Failure	to	recognize	that	different	levels	of	epistemic	confidence	are	intrinsic	to different levels	of	explanatory	abstraction	lies	at	the	root	not	only	of	the	false mind-matter dichotomy, but also of attempts to make sense of the world through increasingly ungrounded explanatory abstractions. Lest we conflate science	and	philosophy	with	hollow	language	games,	we	must	never	lose	sight of the difference between an abstract inference and a direct observation. Keeping	this	distinction	in	mind	allows	us	to	construct	useful	predictive	models of nature's behaviour-which ultimately is what science is meant to do- without restrictive and ultimately fallacious inferences about what nature is. 6	See	Chapter	4	of	this	dissertation. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 32 Analytic	Idealism 32 This, in	turn, liberates	us	from	thought	artifacts	such	as	the	"hard	problem	of consciousness"	and	opens	up	whole	new	avenues	for	making	sense	of	self	and world. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 33 3. The	Universe	in	Consciousness This paper first appeared in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, ISSN 13558250	(print),	Vol.	25,	No.	5-6,	pp. 125-155, in June	2018.	A	summary	of its	core idea	has	appeared	in	Scientific	American	on	18	June	2018.1 3.1 Abstract I propose an idealist ontology that makes sense of reality in a more parsimonious and empirically rigorous	manner than	mainstream	physicalism, bottom-up panpsychism and cosmopsychism. The proposed ontology also offers	more	explanatory	power	than	these	three	alternatives,	in	that	it	does	not fall	prey	to	the	hard	problem	of	consciousness,	the	combination	problem	or	the decombination	problem,	respectively.	It	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	there	is only cosmic consciousness.	We, as	well as all other living organisms, are but dissociated alters of cosmic consciousness, surrounded by its thoughts. The inanimate world we see around us is the extrinsic appearance of these thoughts. The living organisms we share the world with are the extrinsic appearances	of	other	dissociated	alters. 3.2 Brief	introduction This paper seeks to articulate an ontology that overcomes the principal limitations of the most popular alternatives. The first half of the paper comprises	a	detailed	analysis	of	relevant	literature,	highlighting	what	advances have been made and what problems have been created or left unsolved by recent	developments in	analytic	philosophy. In the second	half, starting from what	I	consider	to	be	the	most	promising	current	platform,	I	propose	an	idealist framework	that	may	open	viable	new	avenues	for	addressing	the	key	questions left	unanswered	by	this	current	platform.	At	the	end,	I	hope	to	offer	a	coherent view of the nature of reality that accounts for all relevant facts without incurring	any	fundamental	problem. 3.3 The	mainstream	physicalist	ontology	and	its	problems The	mainstream ontology of physicalism posits that reality is constituted by irreducible entities-which, like Galen Strawson (2006: 9), I shall call 'ultimates'-outside and independent of phenomenal consciousness. These ultimates, in and of themselves, do not instantiate phenomenal properties: there is nothing it is like to be an ultimate, the capacity for experience 1	At	the	time	of	this	writing,	the	Scientific	American	essay	was	freely	available	online	at: https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/could-multiple-personalitydisorder-explain-life-the-universe-and-everything/. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 34 Analytic	Idealism 34 emerging	only	at	the	level	of	complex	arrangements	of	ultimates.	They	are	also sometimes	held	to	lack	objective	qualities:	in	and	of	themselves,	ultimates	may have	no	color, flavor,	smell,	etc.	Indeed,	according	to	mainstream	physicalism qualities	may	exist	only in the	phenomenal field	of the	experiencer,	which in turn	is	a	product	of	the	operation	of	a	sufficiently	complex	nervous	system.	It	is the specific arrangement of ultimates in a nervous system that, allegedly, somehow	constitutes	or	generates	its	phenomenal	properties. The key problem of mainstream physicalism centers on how our subjective experience	of	qualities-what	it	is	like	to	feel	the	warmth	of	fire,	the	redness	of an apple, the bitterness of disappointment, etc.-can arise from mere arrangements of ultimates. These ultimates do possess abstract relational properties such as mass, spin, momentum and charge, but there is nothing about mass, spin, momentum or charge, or the relative positions and interactions across ultimates, in terms of which one could deduce what the warmth	of	fire,	the	redness	of	an	apple	or	the	bitterness	of	disappointment	feel like, subjectively. As long as they fit with the broadly observed correlations between	neural	activity	and	reported	experience,	mappings	between	these	two domains	are	entirely	arbitrary:	in	principle,	it	is	as	(in)valid	to	state	that	spin	up constitutes or generates the phenomenal property 'coldness' and spin down 'warmth' as it is to say the exact opposite. There is nothing intrinsic about spin-or	about	any	other	property	of	ultimates	or	arrangements	thereof-that would	allow	us	to	make	the	distinction. This central-and arguably insoluble-problem has been referred to by different	names,	such	as	the	'explanatory	gap'	(Levine	1983)	and,	more	recently, the 'hard problem of consciousness' (Chalmers 1996, 2003): the qualities of experience are irreducible to the observable parameters of physical arrangements-whatever the arrangement may be-in the sense that it is impossible	even in	principle to	deduce those	qualities from	these	parameters. More generally, the argument here is that there is no entailment from facts about	ultimates	to	facts	about	experience:	there	is	no	fact	about	ultimates	that implies	a	priori	a	fact	about	experience. Greg	Rosenberg	(2004:	13–30)	articulated	what	is	perhaps	the	best	refutation	of entailment	from	facts	about	ultimates	to	facts	about	experience.	His	argument begins	with	the	recognition	that	all	facts	about	ultimates	are	merely	patterns	of bare	differences.	This echoes	Bertrand	Russell's point (2009) that science can only	characterize	things	and	phenomena	in	terms	of	how	they	differ	from	other things	and	phenomena.	For	instance,	an	ultimate	with	positive	electric	charge is characterized in terms of how its relevant behavior differs from that of a negatively	charged	ultimate.	Charge	is	thus	a	relational	property	defined	on	the basis of bare differences. Nothing can be scientifically stated about what a charge,	in	and	of	itself,	intrinsically	is.	The	same	can	be	argued	about	all	other facts	about	ultimates. Rosenberg then proceeds to show that facts about experience-phenomenal properties-cannot be entailed by patterns of bare differences, even though qualitative differences between experiences can admittedly instantiate a 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 35 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 35 structure of bare differences. Therefore, phenomenal properties cannot be reduced	to	facts	about	ultimates.	Allow	me	to	unpack	this. There	are	qualitative	differences	across	our	experiences	of	various	colors:	what it is like to see yellow is different from what it is like to see red. These qualitative differences can even be graded along relevant dimensions: the qualitative difference between seeing yellow and red seems bigger than the qualitative	difference	between	seeing	yellow	and	orange.	If	one	were	to	assign	a number	to	represent	each	of	these	degrees	of	difference,	one	could	abstract	out a	purely	quantitative-that	is,	bare-difference	structure	from	the	experiences of seeing various colors. However, that a bare difference structure can be abstracted out from	phenomenal properties does not imply that phenomenal properties	are	entailed	by	bare	difference	structures.	Maintaining	so	inverts	the logic	of	the	situation: it is	phenomenal	properties	that	ground	bare	difference structures	in	the	first	place. To	bring	this	point	home,	Rosenberg	offers	the	following	thought	experiment: imagine	a	field	of	tightly	packed	yellow	and	red	dots.	If	one	observes	this	field from	a sufficient	distance,	one sees the	color	orange. It could then	be	argued that	the	phenomenal	property	'orange'	arises	from	a	pattern	of	bare	differences associated with the delta in wavelength between yellow and red photons, as well as the relative size	and	distribution	of the	dots.	However, if	one	were to choose	another	pair	of colors	with the same	delta in	wavelength-say,	yellow and green-and otherwise maintain the same relative structure of dots, a phenomenal	property	different	from	'orange'	would	result.	In	other	words,	the same	pattern	of	bare	differences	would	yield	a	different	phenomenal	property. Hence,	phenomenal	properties	are	not	entailed	by	patterns	of	bare	differences and	cannot	be	reduced	to	properties	and	arrangements	of	ultimates. This and other arguments along similar lines render	mainstream	physicalism arguably	untenable. 3.4 Consciousness	as	an	irreducible	property	of	matter At	least	since	the	time	of	René	Descartes,	the	most	recognizable	alternative	to physicalism has been 'substance dualism': if one cannot reduce phenomenal properties	to	physical	elements,	then	the	phenomenal	and	the	physical	may	be two distinct, fundamental ontological classes. There are different versions of substance	dualism,	but	the	most	intuitive	one	is	arguably	'interactionism':	since phenomenal	events	seem	to	cause	physical	events	(as	in	when	felt	pain	causes me to move	my arm) and vice versa (as in when a needle piercing	my arm causes	me	to	feel	pain),	then	the	phenomenal	and	the	physical	must	be	causally connected. However, a problem with interactionism is summarized by Chalmers	(2016b:	23): if	the	physical	domain	is	causally	closed-as	it	seems	to be	in	so	far	as	we	have	been	able	to	ascertain	through	the	scientific	method- then	causal	influences	we	intuitively	attribute	to	the	phenomenal	domain	must ultimately be, in fact, physical. There is arguably no place for phenomenal properties in the causal nexus. Possible dualist answers to this have been 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 36 Analytic	Idealism 36 proposed	but,	as	acknowledged	by	Chalmers	himself	(who	admits	to	sympathy towards dualism), "there is at least a prima facie case against dualism here" (ibid.: 24). Chalmers then posits an "Hegelian synthesis" (ibid.) between mainstream	physicalism	and	substance	dualism,	in	the	form	of	the	notion	that ultimates	themselves	may	be	fundamentally	conscious. Indeed, under mainstream physicalism, ultimates are elementary subatomic particles-quarks, leptons, gauge bosons and scalar boson(s)-with certain fundamental properties. These properties are relational and abstract, such as mass,	charge,	spin	and	momentum.	Mainstream	physicalism's	key	problem,	as we	have	seen,	is	its	inability	to	account	for	phenomenal	properties.	So	the	most straightforward	way	out	is	to	posit	that	at	least	some	elementary	particles	also have fundamental phenomenal properties. In Strawson's words, "Assuming, then,	that	there	is	a	plurality	of	physical	ultimates,	some	of	them	at	least	must be	intrinsically	experiential,	intrinsically	experience-involving"	(2006:	24). I shall call these experiencing elementary particles 'phenomenal ultimates'. I shall also generally refer to the	broad	ontological outlook	described above as 'bottom-up panpsychism,' even though I am aware that there are many variations	of it that	would	be	better	discriminated from	one	another (such	as 'panexperientialism,' 'constitutive micropsychism,' 'panprotopsychism,' 'deferential	monadic	panpsychism,'	etc.).	Be	that	as	it	may,	the	key	general	idea here	is	that,	by	positing	phenomenal	properties	to	be	fundamental,	bottom-up panpsychism	evades	the	need	to	reduce	these	properties	and	thereby	avoids	the hard	problem	altogether.	Moreover,	bottom-up	panpsychism	places	these	new fundamental properties seamlessly alongside existing abstract relational properties, as the categorical basis of the latter. This neatly integrates phenomenal properties in the framework of scientific thinking, for they now occupy	a	proper	place	within	the	causal	nexus. To see why this seemingly elegant approach nonetheless fails, notice that, according	to	bottom-up	panpsychism,	the	unitary	phenomenal	life	of	a	human being is supposedly constituted by micro-level phenomenal parts. At some point	in	the	remote	past	phenomenal	ultimates organized into increasingly complex forms, both experiential and	nonexperiential ,	by	many	processes	including	evolution	by	natural	selection. And just	as there	was	spectacular	enlargement	and fine-tuning	of	nonexperiential forms (the bodies of living things), so too there was spectacular	enlargement	and	fine-tuning	of	experiential	forms.	(ibid.:	27) However, the idea that micro-level phenomenal states can combine to form unitary macro-level phenomenal states is arguably incoherent. It leads to a variety of 'combination problems' (Chalmers 2016a), at least one of which is arguably as insoluble as the hard problem itself (Carruthers and Schechter 2006,	Goff	2006,	2009). The	best	argument	against	bottom-up	panpsychism	is	perhaps	Sam	Coleman's (2014). As bottom-up panpsychists themselves seem to agree, "'experience is impossible	without	an	experiencer,'	a	subject	of	experience"	(Strawson	2006:	26, 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 37 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 37 emphasis added). Therefore, bottom-up panpsychism implies that each phenomenal	ultimate,	by	virtue	of	bearing	phenomenal	properties,	instantiates a micro-level subject. Moreover, it implies that macro-level subjects with a seemingly unitary perspective, such as you and me, must somehow arise through	some	form	of	bottom-up	combination	of	micro-level	subjects.	This is called	the	'subject	combination	problem.' Coleman	connects subjectivity	with the	presence	of a	perspective, or	point of view: That	a	given	subject	has	a	particular	phenomenological	point	of	view	can be taken as saying that there exists a discrete 'sphere' of conscious experiential goings-on corresponding to this subject, with regard to which	other	subjects	are	distinct	in	respect	of	the	phenomenal	qualities they	experience,	and they	have	no	direct (i.e. experiential) access to the qualitative field enjoyed by the first subject. A subject, then, can be thought of as a point of view annexed to a private qualitative field. (Coleman	2014:	30,	emphasis	added) Notice Coleman's emphasis on the private character of the qualitative field annexed	to	a	subject.	I	shall	return	to	this	point	later. Bottom-up panpsychism attempts to model the combination of phenomenal states	after	the	way	ultimates	combine	physico-chemically.	After	all, the force and appeal of its argument rests on the analogous treatment of phenomenal properties and standard physical properties such as mass, spin and charge. Therefore, Coleman also makes explicit what combination means in this physico-chemical	sense: Combination,	thus,	is	the	formation	of	a	whole	from	components	where the components continue to exist in the whole, but are intrinsically altered	by	combining	with	one	another.	(ibid.) For instance, an oxygen and two hydrogen atoms combine to form a water molecule:	they	become	intrinsically	altered	in	the	process	of forming	covalent bonds with one another, but continue nonetheless to exist in the resulting molecule. In this framework, bottom-up panpsychism implies that the private point of view of each phenomenal ultimate that constitutes you becomes intrinsically altered	in	the	process	of	combining	to	form	the	private	point	of	view	you	enjoy right	now-that is, your "unique	experiential	portal to reality," as	put	by Itay Shani (2015: 399).	But each	must nonetheless continue to exist in you, just as quarks	continue	to	exist	in	protons,	protons	continue	to	exist	in	oxygen	atoms, and	oxygen	atoms	continue	to	exist	in	water	molecules. However, Coleman argues, "points of view cannot combine" in this manner (2014: 32). If a first constituent lower-level subject sees, say, only blue, and a second sees only red, then only the qualitative contents of their respective perspectives can conceivably survive-possibly in altered form-as combined ingredients	of	the	resulting	higher-level	subject's	phenomenal field	(e.g. if the latter sees	purple).	But the	original constituent	points of view cannot survive, 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 38 Analytic	Idealism 38 for they	entail seeing	only red	and	only blue, respectively. Since the resulting higher-level subject has, ex hypothesi, a single compound portal to reality, it cannot	both	see	only	red	and	only	blue.	At	least	one	of	the	constituent	lowerlevel	points	of	view	will	thus	necessarily	disappear-in	fact,	both	will	disappear if the higher-level subject sees purple-which is not consistent with combination	in	the	physico-chemical	sense. One	may	argue	that	what	happens	instead	is	that	the	phenomenal	state	of	the higher-level	subject	"is	a	novel	state	which	in	some	way	'absorbs'	or	supersedes the mental states of the constituents" (Seager 2010: 179). In this so-called "combinatorial	infusion"	(ibid.)	scenario,	the	lower-level	points	of	view	cease	to exist	in	the	process	of	forming	the	compound	higher-level	one.	By	parting	with combination	in	the	physico-chemical	sense,	this	scenario	negates	much	of	the force	and	appeal	of	the	bottom-up	panpsychist	argument.	But	the	panpsychist can	be	spared	this	regret,	for-as	Coleman	argues-the	scenario	does	not	work anyway. Coleman's	reasoning	is	that,	to	avoid	the	appeal	to	magic	entailed	by	brute	or strong emergence, "lower-level properties must contribute to their novel product in virtue of their metaphysical nature, or, otherwise put, while remaining true to what they are" (2014: 35, original emphasis). But "a set of points	of	view	have	nothing	to	contribute	as	such	to	a	single,	unified	successor point	of	view.	Their	essential	property	defines	them	against	it:	in	so	far	as	they are points of view they are experientially distinct and isolated" (ibid.: 37, original emphasis). So the resulting higher-level point of view cannot be explicated	in	terms	of	the	lower-level	constituent	points	of	view. In conclusion, bottom-up panpsychism fails because there is no explicit and coherent way to ground the existence of macro-level subjects in micro-level phenomenal ultimates. Subject combination arguably requires-just as mainstream	physicalism	does-the	appeal	to	magic	entailed	by	brute	or	strong emergence. Yet, it was precisely this requirement that, in the case of mainstream	physicalism,	motivated	the	conception	of	bottom-up	panpsychism as	an	alternative	in	the	first	place. 3.5 The	questionable	logical	bridge	in	bottom-up	panpsychism Bottom-up panpsychism is motivated by the idea that, since physics only models	the	behavior	of	physical	entities	and	says	nothing	about	their intrinsic nature	(Russell	2009),	phenomenal	consciousness	may	be	this	intrinsic	nature. This is	eminently	reasonable,	since	the	only	physical	entity	we	are	acquainted with 'from within' is our own nervous system, whose intrinsic nature surely seems to	be	phenomenal (Eddington 1928).	But	bottom-up	panpsychism	then makes	an	extra	claim:	that	phenomenal	consciousness	has	the	same	fragmented structure	that	matter	has	on	the	screen	of	perception.	In	other	words,	since	our body	is	constituted	by	myriad	elementary	particles	insofar	as	we	can	perceive	it, our phenomenal inner-life must itself be constituted by micro-level phenomenal	parts-or	so	the	argument	goes. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 39 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 39 This extra claim rests on a questionable logical bridge: it attributes to that which	experiences	a	structure	discernible	only	in	the	experience	itself.	Allow	me to	elaborate. The concept of elementary particles-ultimates-arises from experiments whose	outcomes	are	accessible	to	us	only	in	the	form	of	conscious	perception (even when delicate instrumentation is used, the output of this instrumentation is only available to us as conscious perception). Such experiments	show	that	the	images	on	the	screen	of	perception	can	be	divided up	into	ever-smaller	elements,	until	we	reach	a	limit.	At	this	limit,	we	find	the smallest	discernible	constituents	of the images,	which	are thus	akin to	pixels. As such, ultimates are the 'pixels' of experience, not necessarily of the experiencer.	The	latter	simply	does	not	follow	from	the	former. Therefore, that human bodies are made of elementary particles does not necessarily	say	anything	about	the	structure	of	the	experiencer:	a	human	body is itself an image on the screen of perception, and so will necessarily be 'pixelated' insofar	as it is	perceived.	Such	pixelation	reflects the idiosyncrasies of the screen	of perception,	not	necessarily	the	structure	of	the	human	subject itself. As an analogy, the pixelated image of a person on a television screen reflects the idiosyncrasies of the television screen; it does not	mean that the person	herself	is	made	up	of	pixels. As suggestive as it	may be, the hypothesis that phenomenal consciousness is the intrinsic nature of the physical does not imply that the fragmented structure	of	matter	on	the	screen	of	perception	is	the	fundamental	structure	of phenomenal	consciousness	itself. 3.6 What	counts	as	a	fundamental	concrete	entity? We	have	seen	in	the	previous	section	that	elementary	particles	are	the	building blocks or 'pixels' of what is perceived, not necessarily of the subject that perceives. But we can ask a yet deeper question: Are elementary particles fundamental concrete entities on their own merit? Both mainstream physicalism	and	bottom-up	panpsychism,	in	taking	ultimates	to	be	the	discrete building	blocks	of	nature,	seem	to	assume	so. There	are,	however,	strong	reasons	to	believe	that	at	least	the	entire	inanimate universe	is	one	integrated	whole	without	ultimate	parts.	Jonathan	Schaffer,	for instance,	points	out	that, physically, there is good evidence that the cosmos forms an entangled system and good reason to treat entangled systems as irreducible wholes.	Modally,	mereology	allows	for	the	possibility	of	atomless gunk, with	no	ultimate	parts	for	the	pluralist	to	invoke	as	the	ground	of	being. (2010:	32,	original	emphasis) Terry	Horgan	and	Matjaž	Potrč	(2000)	also	contended	that	only	the	universe	as a	whole	can	be	considered	a	concrete	entity	on	its	own	merit,	which	they	called the	'blobject.' 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 40 Analytic	Idealism 40 The	physical	substantiation	for	this	line	of	thought	is	not	recent.	As	early	as	in the 1930s, John von Neumann (1996) reasoned that, when two inanimate quantum	systems	interact,	no	measurement	is	actually	performed	but,	instead, the two systems become entangled with one another, forming an indivisible whole. If the resulting whole then interacts with a third system, they, too, become	entangled,	forming	a	new	and	larger	whole;	and	so	forth.	These	are	the so-called	'von	Neumann	chains'	and,	since	everything	in	the	universe	ultimately is	a	quantum	system,	the	entire	inanimate	universe	must	constitute	one	single von Neumann chain-that is, one indivisible whole (von Neumann also remarked that observation by a conscious, living human	being clearly breaks the chain, since living humans demonstrably can perform a quantum measurement.	Therefore,	conscious	living	beings	must	be	left	out	of	the	present argument). The implication is that, physically, there are arguably no such things as fundamental microscopic ultimates. Although this may violate popular assumptions	and	intuitions,	it	also	points	the	way	to	a	third	avenue	of	enquiry that	holds	some	promise	as	an	alternative	to	both	mainstream	physicalism	and bottom-up	panpsychism. 3.7 The	whole	universe	as	a	unitary	conscious	entity The	idea	that	the	(inanimate)	universe	may	be	an	indivisible	whole	has	proven tempting to those seeking an alternative to bottom-up panpsychism, so to avoid	the	subject	combination	problem:	they	posit	that	"the	cosmos	as	a	whole is the only ontological ultimate there is, and that it is	conscious" (Shani 2015: 408,	original	emphasis).	With	this,	there	is	no	longer	any	need	to	explicate	how lower-level subjects combine to form higher-level subjects, for the highestpossible-level	subject	is	already	the	starting	point. This general outlook is called 'cosmopsychism' (Mathews 2011, Jaskolla and Buck 2012, Shani 2015, Nagasawa and	Wager 2016). The seminal insight that freed cosmopsychism from the limitations of bottom-up panpsychism was arguably that of Freya Mathews (2011): she realized that, even under the hypothesis that phenomenal consciousness is the intrinsic aspect of the physical, there is no need to attribute the fragmented structure of	matter to phenomenal	consciousness	itself.	In	her	words,	"an	extension	of	subjectivity	to physical	reality	generally	[i.e.	"force	fields	and	even	space	itself"],	rather	than	its restriction	merely	to	matter,	does	seem	to	be	required"	(ibid.:	144). Now the problem cosmopsychists face is the 'decombination problem' (also called the 'decomposition problem' in Chalmers 2016a): How do seemingly separate lower-level	subjects-which, from	now	on, I shall follow	Shani (2015: 415)	in	referring	to	as	'relative	subjects'-form	within	the	conscious	cosmos?	To paraphrase	Coleman	(2014:	30),	how	do	they	acquire	their	private	point	of	view, whose associated	qualitative field	other relative subjects	have	no	direct-that is, experiential-access to? After all, I cannot read your thoughts and, presumably,	neither	can	you	mine. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 41 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 41 Before we address this problem, however, notice that there are at least two possible	interpretations	of	cosmopsychism.	The	first	one	sticks	to	the	bottomup panpsychist view that a phenomenal ultimate has both phenomenal and non-phenomenal	properties.	This	way,	whereas it takes	the	cosmos	as	a	whole to	be	the	sole	phenomenal	ultimate	there	is,	this	interpretation	grants	that	the abstract relational properties of the cosmos are not phenomenal. For this reason, I shall call this interpretation 'dual-aspect	cosmopsychism.'	According to it, the intrinsic aspect of the cosmos is phenomenal, but its extrinsic aspect-the physical structure we can objectively measure in a scientific sense-is	non-phenomenal	and	circumscribes the	cosmos's	phenomenal field. In a sense, the extrinsic, physical aspect of the cosmos bears phenomenality within	in. Another interpretation of cosmopsychism entails that the sole ontological primitive there is is cosmic phenomenal consciousness-or simply 'cosmic consciousness' for	ease	of reference.	Nothing	exists	outside	or independent	of cosmic consciousness.	As such, under this interpretation one should say that the cosmos is constituted by phenomenality, as opposed to bearing phenomenality. In other words, here the perceivable cosmos is in consciousness,	as	opposed	to	being	conscious. The	latter	interpretation	is	Shani's	(2015)	position.	Indeed,	according	to	him	the external, physical aspect of the cosmos is 'its appearance as an exterior complement	to	...	subjective	realities'	(ibid.:	412,	emphasis	added).	Appearances are, of course, phenomenal in nature. I shall thus call this interpretation 'idealist	cosmopsychism,'	since	its	reduction	base	is	purely	phenomenal. Shani	does	still	postulate	a	duality	in	cosmic	consciousness	to	account	for	the clear qualitative differences between the outer	world	we, as relative subjects, perceive and	measure and the inner world of our thoughts and feelings. He calls	it	the	'lateral	duality	principle'	(ibid.:	410)	and	describes	it	thus: [Cosmic	consciousness]	exemplifies	a	dual	nature:	it	has	a	concealed	(or enfolded,	or	implicit)	side	to	its	being,	as	well	as	a	revealed	(or	unfolded, or explicit) side; the former is an intrinsic	dynamic	domain	of creative activity,	while	the	latter	is	identified	as	the	outer,	observable	expression of	that	activity.	(ibid.,	original	emphasis) What	is	important	to	emphasize,	though,	is	that	this	duality	does	not	entail	or imply	two	distinct	ontological	classes.	Everything	is	still	phenomenal. Now, one must ultimately ground the revealed side of the cosmos in its concealed side, not only to eliminate what would otherwise be an arbitrary boundary, but also to accommodate the empirically undeniable causal links between	the	revealed	order	of	the	physical	world	we	perceive	and	the	concealed order of thoughts and feelings. After all, revealed physical things and phenomena-think of psychoactive drugs, bodily trauma, electromagnetic fields, etc.-causally affect our concealed thoughts and feelings. Causal links operating	the	other	way	around	are	also	undeniable:	our	thoughts	and	feelings can lead to physical manifestations in the form of bodily behaviors. If the 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 42 Analytic	Idealism 42 revealed	order	were	not	grounded	in	the	concealed,	but	constituted	a	separate phenomenal domain instead, how could these cross-influences take place? Indeed,	Shani	acknowledges	as	much	when	he	writes	that	"the	revealed	order	of reality	is	grounded	in	the	concealed"	(ibid.:	416). Yet,	Shani	is	not	explicit	in	regards	to	how	this	grounding	works.	He	states	that the	physical	world	we	perceive	is	the	way	the	structural	patterns	of	the	creative activity of cosmic consciousness are represented in relative subjects, such as you and	me (ibid.: 412). This is fair enough as far as it goes, but	what is the mechanism of representation whereby concealed phenomenal activity translates into revealed order from the perspective of relative subjects?	How does the formation of a relative subject lead to such a significant qualitative transition	as	the	representation	of	thoughts	and	feelings	(the	concealed	order) in	the	form	of	perception	(the	revealed	order)? To tackle the decombination problem, Shani posits that the conscious perspective	or	point	of	view	of	each relative subject	has	both	a specific	and	a generic	character	(ibid.:	423).	Since	a	relative	subject	corresponds	to	a	segment of	cosmic	consciousness,	its	specific	character	is	derived	from	the	local	pattern of phenomenal activity taking place in that segment. Its generic character, in turn, is	derived from	the intrinsically subjective, perspectival nature	of cosmic consciousness	as	a	whole.	Let	me	unpack	this. Shani	posits two intrinsic features of cosmic consciousness as constituents of the generic character of each relative subject: sentience and core-subjectivity (ibid.:	426).	In	other	words,	each	relative	subject	is	phenomenally	conscious	by virtue of the fact that cosmic consciousness is itself intrinsically capable of experience.	Also,	each	relative	subject	has	'ipseity,	or	I-ness,	by	which	is	meant an	implicit	sense	of	self	which	serves	as	the	dative	...	of	experience,	namely,	as that to	whom	things	are	given,	or	disclosed,	from	a	perspective'	(ibid.,	original emphasis).	The	claim	is	then	that	the	sense	of	I-ness	of	each	relative	subject	is the sense of I-ness intrinsic to cosmic consciousness as a whole. One could argue	that	sentience	and	core-subjectivity,	so	defined,	are	inextricable	from	one another.	But	even	in	this	case,	it	is	still	useful	to	distinguish	between	these	two cognitively salient aspects of what would admittedly be a single intrinsic feature	of	cosmic	consciousness.	So	I	shall	continue	to	speak	of	sentience	and core-subjectivity. In summary, according to Shani a relative subject is grounded, on the one hand, in the intrinsic sentience	and	core-subjectivity	of cosmic	consciousness as	a	whole	and,	on	the	other	hand,	in	the	local	patterns	of	phenomenal	activity taking	place	in	the	particular	segment	of	cosmic	consciousness	associated	with the relative subject. The question now is: What are these local patterns of phenomenal	activity	that	give	rise	to	a	private	qualitative field, inaccessible to other	relative	subjects,	as	required	by	Coleman	(2014)? Shani posits that the smallest cohesive elements of nature correspond to the revealed appearance of micro-level relative subjects (2015: 415-16). In other words,	he returns to the bottom-up panpsychist view that elementary particles are	subjects.	Shani	motivates	this	with	a	metaphor: 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 43 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 43 A	relative	[subject]	is	a	'vortex'	surging	from	the	oceanic	background	[of cosmic	consciousness].	It	is	a	cohesive	system.	(ibid.) He	uses	the	image	of	a	vortex	to	refer	to	localization	of	phenomenal	activity. Consider ... the most elementary 'vortices'. [Their corresponding] localization	process consists, then, in the intensification	of experience, as well as in the concentration of focus, within limited and relatively well-defined	boundaries ...	which serves to separate the system's inner reality	from	the	inner	reality	of	the	ocean	surrounding	it	...	The	result	is an individual self (however primitive) engulfed in its own experiences and	concerns	while	being	ignorant	of	the	deeper	layers	which	bind	it	to the	ground	of	all	things	...	[T]he	theory	implies	that	simple	[vortices]	are veritable	subjects.	(ibid.:	418,	emphasis	added) Having effectively returned to the idea of	micro-level phenomenal ultimates, Shani then	argues that	macro-level relative subjects, such	as	you	and	me,	are formed by micro-level relative subjects coming together. The rather technical core	of	his	argument-which	I	shall	not	reproduce	here,	for	it	is	not	relevant	to this paper-is that, by grounding the	micro-level relative subjects in cosmic consciousness, he circumvents Coleman's (2014) attack on bottom-up panpsychism. Even	if the latter	point is	valid-and	I	have	no	reason	to	believe	otherwise-I see	multiple problems	with this	move. For one, once one starts from cosmic consciousness, it seems	unnecessary	and	rather	convoluted to	descend	all the way down to micro-level subjects, just to turn around again and go up to macro-level subjects. The only motivation I see for doing so is the arguably flawed notion, discussed earlier, that the 'pixels' discernible on the screen of perception	must	be the	building	blocks	of the	experiencer, as	opposed to the experience. By	making a concession to this physicalist intuition, Shani forces two problems upon himself: he has to explain (a) how the cosmic subject seemingly	breaks	up	into	myriad	micro-level	relative	subjects,	and	then	(b)	how these micro-level relative subjects come together again to form macro-level relative	subjects. Moreover, recall that, as per Coleman's definition, subjects entail "a point of view	annexed	to	a	private	qualitative	field"	(Coleman	2014:	30).	So	micro-level relative subjects must have private phenomenal fields inaccessible to other subjects. To tackle the decombination problem, one	must explain how these private	fields	form	within	the	ocean	of	cosmic	consciousness.	But	Shani	seems to address this only in a vague, tangential	manner. For starters, it is unclear how	or	why	a	mere	"localization	process"	in	the	ocean	of	cosmic	consciousness would	lead	to	local	"intensification	of	experience"	and	"concentration	of	focus" (Shani	2015:	418).	But	even	if	we	grant	that	it	somehow	does,	a	"concentration of focus	within limited	and	relatively	well-defined	boundaries"	does	not seem sufficient "to separate the system's inner reality from the inner reality of the ocean surrounding it" (ibid.). By way of analogy, while	my visual focus right now	rests	on	the	characters	I	am	writing,	I	am	not	unaware	of,	or	separate	from, the	contents	of	my	peripheral	vision;	I	still	have	direct-that	is,	experiential- 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 44 Analytic	Idealism 44 access to them.	Moreover, it is hard to imagine that an electron could have sufficiently rich phenomenal properties to become "engulfed in its own experiences	and	concerns"	(ibid.).	It	seems	highly	unlikely	that	there	is	enough cognitive	complexity-if	there	can	be	cognition	at	all-at	that	microscopic	level to	justify	such	an	appeal	to	mere	self-absorption	as	the	mechanism	behind	the separation	of	the	electron's	inner	reality. I do think Shani is on the correct general path here, but a more elaborate, explicit and precise case, with stronger empirical substantiation, seems to be necessary	to	tackle	the	decombination	problem. 3.8 The	key	questions	to	be	answered The principle of parsimony implies that, of the two interpretations of cosmopsychism discussed above, idealist cosmopsychism is	more economical and,	therefore,	should	be	preferred	if	it	can	account	for	all	relevant	facts.	I	shall thus take idealist cosmopsychism as my starting point and then attempt to address each of its problems and limitations. The goal is to account for all relevant	facts	with	cosmic	consciousness	alone	in	the	reduction	base.	Because	I do not feel the need to invent new names for ideas that have historically established	names,	I	shall	call	the	resulting	ontology	simply	idealism. Specifically, here are the key problems of, and questions not sufficiently or explicitly	addressed	by,	idealist	cosmopsychism	that	I	now	set	out	to	tackle: a) Grounding experience in cosmic consciousness: How do myriad, ephemeral experiential qualities arise in one enduring cosmic consciousness? b) The decombination problem: How do private phenomenal fields form within cosmic consciousness? Why can I not read your thoughts by simply	shifting	the	focus	of	my	attention? c) Reducing	perception:	How	can	the	revealed	order	of	nature	(the	physical world we measure) be explained in terms of its concealed order (its underlying	thoughts)?	Why	are	the	respective	qualities	so	different? d) Explaining	the	correlations	between	brain function	and inner	experience: If	brain	function	does	not	constitute	or	generate	phenomenality,	why	do they	correlate	so	well? e) Explaining a seemingly shared, autonomous world: If the world is imagined	in	consciousness,	how	can	we	all	be	imagining	essentially	the same	world	outside	the	control	of	our	personal	volition? 3.9 Experiences	as	excitations	of	cosmic	consciousness The first step is to clarify the relationship	between	cosmic	consciousness	and experience.	After	all,	the	two	are	not	interchangeable:	cosmic	consciousness	is, ex	hypothesi,	something	relatively	enduring	and	stable,	whereas	experiences	are relatively ephemeral and dynamic. Yet, idealism posits that cosmic 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 45 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 45 consciousness	is	nature's	sole	ontological	primitive,	so	how	does	the	variety	and dynamism	of	experience	come	into	the	picture? I submit that (a) experiences are patterns of self-excitation of cosmic consciousness	and that (b)	cosmic	consciousness	has the inherent	disposition to self-excitation. As such, experiences are not ontologically distinct from cosmic	consciousness,	just	as	a	dance	is	not	distinct	from	the	dancer.	There	is nothing to a dance but the dancer in	motion. In an analogous way, there is nothing	to	experience	but	cosmic	consciousness	'in	motion.' Particular experiences correspond to particular patterns of self-excitation of cosmic consciousness, just as particular choreographies correspond to particular	patterns	of	self-excitation	of	the	dancer.	These	patterns	can	evolve	in time and differ across different segments of cosmic consciousness. It is the variety	and	dynamics	of	excitations	across	the	underlying	'medium'	that	lead	to different	experiential	qualities.	(One	must	be	careful	at	this	point:	by	referring to cosmic consciousness as a 'medium' I may appear to be objectifying it. Language	forces	me	into	this	dilemma.	But	cosmic	consciousness	is	subjectivity itself,	not	an	object.)	This	way,	even	if	the	'medium'	is	eternal	and	immutable, its	self-excitations	can	come	and	go	in	myriad	patterns. This	notion	is	entirely	analogous	to,	and	consistent	with,	how	modern	physics attempts to reduce the variety and dynamics of natural phenomena to an enduring	primary	substrate:	quantum	field	theory, for instance,	posits that	all fundamental particles are particular modes of self-excitation of a quantum field,	which	is	inherently	disposed	to	self-excitation.	Superstring	theories	posit essentially the same, but now the self-excited substrate is hyper-dimensional strings.	Finally,	according	to	M-theory	the	patterns	of	nature	consist	of	modes of self-excitation of a hyper-dimensional membrane. Idealism, as I am formulating it here, essentially entails porting the evolving mathematical apparatus	of	modern	physics to	cosmic	consciousness itself, as	opposed to	an abstract conceptual object. This should require but a straightforward and seamless	transposition,	implying	no	loss	of	predictive	power. 3.10 Tackling	the	decombination	problem Cosmic consciousness comprises a variety of phenomenal contents- experiences, patterns of self-excitation-such as thoughts and feelings. If we take	the	human	psyche	as	a	representative	sample	of	how	cosmic	consciousness operates-which is the best we can do, really-we can infer that, ordinarily, these phenomenal contents are internally integrated through cognitive associations:	a	feeling	evokes	an	abstract	idea,	which	triggers	a	memory,	which inspires a thought, etc. These associations are logical, in the sense that, for instance, the	memory inspires the thought	because	of a certain implicit logic linking the two. Ordinary phenomenal activity in cosmic consciousness can thus	be	modeled	as	a	connected	directed	graph.	See	Figure	3.1a.	Each	vertex	in the graph represents a particular phenomenal content and each edge a cognitive association logically linking contents together. Every phenomenal 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 46 Analytic	Idealism 46 content	in	the	graph	of	Figure	3.1a	can	be	reached	from	any	other	phenomenal content	through	a	chain	of	cognitive	associations. Figure	3.1:	A	connected	graph	(a)	illustrating	normal	integration	of	phenomenal contents,	and	a	disconnected	graph	(b)	illustrating	dissociation	and	the corresponding	formation	of	an	alter	(inner	subgraph	in	grey). Each vertex in Figure 3.1 represents a particular pattern of self-excitation of cosmic consciousness. Each edge represents thus an association	between two patterns of self-excitation, each pattern with its particular constituent harmonics.	When	the	two	patterns	of	self-excitation	are	concurrently	present- that is, when the two associated phenomenal contents are experienced together-the association can be seen as a combination of the respective harmonics, like in a	musical chord	wherein	multiple notes are played at the same	time.	When	the	association	unfolds	in	temporal	sequence-as	e.g.	in	the case of a thought that fades away to make room for the experience of the memory it evokes-it can be visualized as a transition from the first to the second	pattern	of	self-excitation,	like	notes	played	in	sequence	in	a	melody. However,	we	know	from	the	psychiatric	literature	that	sometimes	"a	disruption of	and/or	discontinuity	in	the	normal	integration"	of	phenomenal	contents	can occur in the human psyche (Black and Grant 2014: 191). This is called dissociation and is	well recognized in psychiatry today (American	Psychiatric Association	2013).	Dissociation	entails	that	some	phenomenal	contents	cease	to be	able to	evoke	others.	A	person	suffering from	a	particularly	severe form	of dissociation, called Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), exhibits multiple "discrete centers of self-awareness" (Braude 1995: 67) called	alters. Each alter corresponds	thus	to	a	particular	segment	of	the	psychic	space	wherein	it	forms. Dissociation	can	be	visualized	as	what	happens	when	the	graph in	Figure	3.1a becomes disconnected, such as shown in Figure 3.1b. Some phenomenal contents can then no longer be reached from others. The inner subgraph is thus	a	representation	of	an	alter,	corresponding	to	a	particular	segment	of	the originally	integrated	psychic	space. a b 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 47 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 47 There is compelling empirical evidence that different alters can remain concurrently conscious. In Morton Prince's well-known study of the "Miss Beauchamp'	case	of	DID,	one	of	the	alters	"was	a	coconscious	personality	in	a deeper sense. When she was not interacting with the world, she did not become	dormant,	but	persisted	and	was	active"	(Kelly	et	al.	2009:	318).	Braude's more	recent	work	(1995)	corroborates	the	view	that	alters	can	be	co-conscious. He	points to the struggle of different alters for executive control of the	body and	the	fact	that	alters	"might	intervene	in	the	lives	of	others	[i.e.,	other	alters], intentionally interfering	with their interests and activities, or at least playing mischief on them" (ibid.: 68). It thus appears that alters can not only be concurrently conscious, but that they can also vie for dominance with each other. Clearly, the evidence indicates that different alters entail-to paraphrase Coleman	(2014)	again-different	co-conscious	points	of	view	annexed	to	private qualitative fields, these	private	qualitative fields	being	carved	out	by	virtue	of dissociation. In other words, different alters are different subjects. The connected subgraph of phenomenal contents associated with an alter (see Figure 3.1b again) represents its private qualitative or phenomenal field. Moreover, alters form within a single overarching psyche, so the process of their formation entails a decomposition of an original subject into multiple lower-level	subjects. I	submit	that	dissociation	in	cosmic	consciousness	is	what	leads	to	the	formation of relative subjects. Each relative subject is thus an alter of cosmic consciousness, its private qualitative field corresponding to a segment of the latter's	self-excitatory	'medium.' By virtue of corresponding to a segment of cosmic consciousness, each alter retains-as Shani (2015) posited-the intrinsic features of sentience and coresubjectivity. But the local pattern of dissociative phenomenal activity in its respective segment is what bestows an alter its specific character, its unique perspective. In	other	words, the	primary	sense	of I-ness	of	all	alters is that	of cosmic consciousness itself; the very consciousness of the alters, as an ontological 'medium,' is	cosmic	consciousness.	But	the	particular	phenomenal field	of	an	alter,	which	defines	its	identity	as	a	seemingly	separate	individual,	is demarcated by a local dissociative process-analogous to DID-in the corresponding segment of the 'medium.' Naturally, because alters are fully grounded in cosmic consciousness, it is incoherent to say that they become separated from it; only an illusion of separation arises as a particular phenomenal	content	in	the	alter's	dissociated	qualitative	field. The key to my argument is the notion that dissociation can demarcate and carve	out	a	private	phenomenal	field.	This	way,	alters	must	become	blind	to	all phenomenality	taking	place	outside	their	respective	field,	which	then	explains why I cannot read your thoughts. And indeed, there is strong empirical evidence for the literally blinding power of dissociation: in 2015, doctors reported on the case of a German woman who exhibited a variety of alters (Strasburger	and	Waldvogel	2015).	Peculiarly,	some	of	her	alters	claimed	to	be 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 48 Analytic	Idealism 48 blind	while	others	could	see	normally.	Through	EEGs,	the	doctors	were	able	to ascertain that the	brain	activity	normally	associated	with	sight	wasn't	present while	a	blind	alter	was in	control	of the	woman's	body,	even	though	her	eyes were open. When a sighted alter assumed control, the usual brain activity returned. Clearly thus-if nothing else, for sheer empirical reasons- dissociation is	a sufficiently	powerful	potential solution to the	decombination problem. 3.11 At	what	level	does	cosmic	dissociation	occur? The challenge we must now address is the so-called "boundary problem for experiencing	subjects"	(Rosenberg	2004:	77-90):	What	measurable	structures	in nature	correspond	to-that	is,	are	the	revealed	appearance	of-alters	of	cosmic consciousness?	As	we	have seen,	Shani (2015)	posits that	elementary	particles are	akin	to	micro-level	alters,	which	in	turn	come	together	to	compose	higherlevel relative subjects.	However, as already	mentioned, I	believe this to	be	an unnecessarily convoluted notion. Instead, I submit that cosmic dissociation happens	precisely	at	the	level	of	living	beings	with	unitary	consciousness,	such	as you	and	me.	You	and	I	are	alters	of	cosmic	consciousness. There	are	several	arguments	for	this.	The	first	has	already	been	hinted	at:	given that	we	ordinarily	experience	an	integrated	phenomenal	field,	there	is	no	direct reason	to	conjecture	that	this	field	is	a	composite	of	lower-level	constituents. Secondly, we have seen that von Neumann's reasoning regarding quantum measurement (1996) implies that the entire inanimate universe	must be one unfathomable	'von	Neumann	chain'-that	is,	an	entangled	indivisible	whole.	As such, it is arbitrary-physically speaking-to carve out any segment of the inanimate	universe	and	posit	it	to	be	the	revealed	appearance	of	an	alter.	Von Neumann	did,	however,	exclude	conscious	living	organisms	from	the	embrace of	von	Neumann	chains,	since	at	least	we,	conscious	human	beings,	clearly	can perform quantum measurements. On this basis, only conscious living organisms can correspond to alters of cosmic consciousness, not elementary particles	or	any	other	subset	of	the	inanimate	universe. Thirdly,	as	observed	by	Mathews,	"the	individuation	of	[inanimate]	objects	...	is not	consistently	objectively	determined	...	many	of	our	individuations-of	rocks and	mountains, for instance-have basically nominal status" (2011: 144). Take what	we	call	a 'car': though	based	on	structural	and	functional	reasoning	that helps the business of transportation, its delineation is ultimately arbitrary. If one argues that, say, the spark plugs are integral to the car because	without them the car cannot function, by the same token one would also have to include the fuel that makes its engine run, the environment air that allows combustion	and	cools	the	engine,	the	road	gripped	by	the	tires,	the	ground	that sustains the road, the gravity that enables grip, and so on. The decision of where to	stop is	motivated	by	convenience.	An	analogous	rationale	applies to whether	we	distinguish	the	handle	from	the	mug,	the	hood	from	the	jacket,	the river from the ocean, etc. This relative arbitrariness in the way we delineate 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 49 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 49 their boundaries renders inanimate objects problematic candidates for the revealed appearance of alters of cosmic consciousness. After all, in	Mathews' words,	"the	boundaries	between	subjects	are	not	nominal.	The	individuation	of subjects,	or	centers	of	subjectivity,	is	objectively	determined"	(ibid.). Mathews is giving us an important clue here. Indeed, the boundaries of our own	body are not nominal.	Our ability to	perceive ends at the surface of the body:	our skin, retinas, eardrums, tongue	and the	mucous lining	of	our	nose. We	cannot	perceive	photons	hitting	a	wall	or	air	pressure	oscillations	bouncing off a window, but we can perceive those impinging on our retinas and eardrums,	respectively.	Moreover,	our	ability	to	act	through	direct	phenomenal intention	also	ends	at	the	surface	of	the	body:	we	can	move	our	arms	and	legs simply by consciously intending to move them. However, we cannot do the same	with tables and chairs. Clearly, thus, the delineation of our body is an empirical fact.	I	cannot	just	decide	that	the	chair	I	am	sitting	on	is	integral	to my	body,	in	the	way	I	can	decide	that	the	handle	is	integral	to	the	mug.	Neither can	I	decide	that	a	patch	of	my	skin	is	not	integral	to	my	body,	in	the	way	I	can decide that the hood is not integral to the jacket. The criterion here is not merely	a	functional	or	structural	one,	but	the	range	of	phenomenality-sensory perception, intention-intrinsically associated with our body. Based on this objective	criterion,	there	is	no	freedom	to	move	boundaries	at	will. What	these	considerations	suggest	is	clear:	the	physical	boundary	of	the	body	is the revealed appearance of the dissociative boundary of our phenomenal field. And	in	so	far	as	we	can	assume	that	all	living	organisms	have	phenomenal	inner life in some way akin to our own, the conclusion can be generalized: living organisms	are	the	revealed	appearance	of	alters	of	universal	consciousness;	they are	carved	out	of	their	context	by	virtue	of	cosmic	dissociation. But can we assume that all living creatures have phenomenal inner life? I believe	we can: insofar as it resembles our own, the extrinsic behavior of all metabolizing organisms is suggestive of their having dissociated phenomenal fields analogous to ours in some sense. This is obvious enough for cats and dogs, but what about plants and single-celled organisms such as amoebae? Well, consider this: "many types	of	amoeba	construct	glassy shells	by	picking up	sand	grains	from	the	mud	in	which	they	live.	The	typical	Difflugia	shell,	for example,	is	shaped	like	a	vase,	and	has	a	remarkable	symmetry"	(Ford	2010:	26). As for plants, many recent studies have reported on their surprisingly sophisticated	behavior, leading	even	to	a	proposal for	a	new	field	of scientific enquiry	boldly	called	"plant	neurobiology"	(Brenner	et	al.	2006).	Clearly,	thus, even plants and single-celled organisms exhibit extrinsic behavior somewhat analogous to our own, further suggesting that they, too, have dissociated phenomenal	fields.	Of	course,	the	same	cannot	be	said	of	any	inanimate	object or phenomenon (those that have been engineered by humans to merely simulate the behavior of living beings, such as robots, natural language interfaces,	etc.,	naturally	don't	count). Finally,	we	have	good	empirical reasons to	believe that	normal	metabolism is essential	for	the	maintenance	of	our	dissociated	phenomenal	fields,	for	when	it 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 50 Analytic	Idealism 50 slows	down	or	stops	the	dissociative	boundary	seems	to	become	phenomenally porous (Kastrup 2017a 2 ). So metabolism-the shared and differentiating characteristic of all living organisms-seems, again, to be the revealed appearance of alters of cosmic consciousness. The unique features of metabolism-think of DNA, morphogenesis, transcription, protein folding, mitosis, etc.-unify all life into a unique, clearly distinct natural category, despite the	widely	different forms	organisms	can take.	This	category	provides the unambiguously demarcated "something in nature" that Rosenberg was looking	for	(2004:	77–90). In	conclusion,	I	posit	that	cosmic	dissociation	happens	precisely	at	the	level	of individual living organisms. Each living organism is an alter of cosmic consciousness. 3.12 Reducing	the	revealed	to	the	concealed	order Notice that the revealed side of nature relative to any given alter consists of images	on	the	screen	of	the	alter's	conscious	perception.	Therefore, if	one	can reduce perceptions at the level of individual alters to non-perceptual phenomenal	contents	at	the	level	of	cosmic	consciousness	as	a	whole,	one	will have	reduced	nature's	revealed	to	its	concealed	order. Before	we	address	this	challenge,	however,	we	need	some	further	background on dissociation. By definition, phenomenal contents inside an alter cannot evoke	phenomenal	contents	outside	the	alter,	and	vice	versa.	But	they	can	still influence each other. Indeed, phenomenal impingement across a dissociative boundary is empirically known. John Lynch and	Christopher	Kilmartin (2013: 100), for instance, report that dissociated feelings can dramatically affect thoughts	and	corresponding	behaviors,	whereas	David	Eagleman (2011: 20-54) shows that dissociated expectations routinely mold our perceptions. Indeed, the entire clinical field of depth psychology is based on the notion that dissociated	phenomenal contents in	deeper layers	of the	psyche continuously impinge	on	the	executive	ego	(Kelly	et	al.	2009:	301–34).	We	can	visualize	this as in	Figure	3.2a,	wherein the	partial	overlap	of	adjacent	vertices internal	and external	to	an	alter	represents	impingement	across	its	dissociative	boundary. Figure	3.2b illustrates the	same	thing	according	to	a	simplified	representation unrelated	to	graph	theory:	the	broader	psychic	space	is	represented	as	a	white circle,	with	an	alter	represented	as	a	grey	circle	within	it.	These	circles	are	no longer	graph	vertices	but represent sets	of	phenomenal contents.	The	dashed arrows represent the impingement of external and internal phenomenal contents-not	explicitly	shown-on	each	other,	across	the	alter's	boundary.	For the avoidance of doubt, notice that these dashed arrows no longer represent cognitive associations. I shall use this simplified representation henceforth. 2	See	Chapter	6	of	this	dissertation. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 51 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 51 Moreover, for simplicity's sake, from now on I shall also refer to all nonperceptual	phenomenal	contents	simply	as	'thoughts.' Figure	3.2:	Phenomenal	contents	impinging	on	the	dissociative	boundary	of	an alter,	illustrated	in	two	different	but	equivalent	ways,	(a)	and	(b). I	submit	that,	before	its	first	alter	ever	formed,	the	only	phenomenal	contents of cosmic consciousness were thoughts. There were no perceptions. The formation	of	the	first	alter	then	demarcated	a	boundary	separating	phenomenal contents within the alter from those outside the alter. This newly formed boundary	is	what	enabled	perceptions	to	arise	relative	to	an	alter:	the	thoughts surrounding	the	alter	impinged	on	its	dissociative	boundary	from	the	outside. And since phenomenal contents are particular patterns of self-excitation of cosmic consciousness, this impingement can be regarded as an interference pattern between excitations within and outside the dissociative boundary, respectively (see Figure 3.2a again).	What	we call perception, or the revealed side	of	nature,	is	the	alter's	experience	of	this	interference	pattern	(cf.	Kastrup 2017e). It follows that the revealed side of nature can be grounded in its concealed side: the former arises from excitatory interference between dissociated but mutually impinging thoughts. Indeed, I submit that the formation of dissociative boundaries is what partitioned the cosmos into revealed	and	concealed	sides.	See	Figure	3.3. The	thoughts	of	an	alter	can	also	impinge	on	its	dissociative	boundary	from	the inside and thereby influence the surrounding phenomenal activity of cosmic consciousness	(not	shown	in	Figure	3.3).	This	corresponds	to	the	effects	on	the world	of	the	presence	and	actions	of	a	living	organism	within	it. a b 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 52 Analytic	Idealism 52 Figure	3.3:	Thoughts	in	cosmic	consciousness	cause	perceptions	in	an	alter. The revealed or extrinsic appearance of an alter's boundary is an organism's sense organs. In our case, these are our skin, eyes, ears, nose and tongue. Therefore,	even	if	the	outside	stimulation	is	very	faint	and	subtle,	evolution	has had	billions	of	years	to	optimize	the	sensitivity	of	our	sense	organs-our	alter's boundary-to	pick	up	on	these	faint	signals. But	how	can	a	mere	dissociative	boundary	give	rise to	a	qualitatively different category of experience? If you recall, this is a question I raised earlier, motivated by the fact that perceptions feel undoubtedly very distinct from thoughts. To answer it, let us first consider Donald Hoffman's interface theory of perception (2009): it asserts that evolution emphasizes perceptual qualities conducive	to	fitness,	not	to	truth.	In	other	words,	we	have	evolved	to	perceive not the phenomenal contents that are really out there-that is, outside our alter-but just	a	phenomenal	representation thereof that	helps	us	survive	and reproduce. Hoffman uses the analogy of a computer desktop: although a computer	file	is	represented	in	it	as,	for	instance,	a	blue	rectangle,	this	does	not mean that the file itself has the qualities of being	blue and rectangular.	As a matter	of	fact,	the	actual	file	does	not	have	those	qualities	at	all:	it	is	a	pattern of	open	and	closed	microscopic	switches	in	a	silicon	chip.	In	an	analogous	way, my	hypothesis	is	that	the	qualities	we	experience	on	the	screen	of	perception- colors,	sounds,	flavors,	textures,	etc.-are	not	the	qualities	experienced	by	the segment	of cosmic consciousness that surrounds	our alter, but their 'desktop representation'	instead.	Our	perceptions	do	not	feel	like	the	thoughts	of	cosmic consciousness because a	qualitative transition between these two experiential categories	has	helped	our	ancestors	survive	and	reproduce. Thoughts Thoughts (corresponding to	the	physical world) Cosmic	consciousness Alter 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 53 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 53 The	work	of	Friston,	Sengupta	and	Auletta	(2014)	has	similar	implications	but, significantly, is derived from an entirely different line of reasoning. Their results are	based	on	abstract	mathematical considerations	and, therefore, can in principle be leveraged under any ontology. They show that whenever a Markov	blanket (Pearl 1988)	defines the	boundary of an individual organism, internal	states	of	the	organism	will	evolve	to	optimize	for	two	conflicting	goals: (a)	to	reflect	external	states	of	the	world	beyond	the	Markov	blanket;	and	(b)	to minimize their own entropy or dispersion. Goal (a) is about allowing the organism	to	know	what	is	going	on	in	the	world	outside,	so	it	can	take	suitable actions	to	survive	in	that	world.	Goal	(b)	is	about	preventing	the	organism	from losing	its	internal	structural	and	dynamical	integrity	because	of	the	second	law of thermodynamics. In our case, the dissociative boundary of an alter is the Markov	blanket,	whose	revealed	appearance	is	our	skin	and	other	sense	organs. The	key	insight	of	Friston,	Sengupta	and	Auletta	can	be	paraphrased	as	follows: a hypothetical organism with perfect perception-that is, able to perfectly mirror	the	phenomenal	states	of	the	surrounding	external	world	in	its	internal states-would not have an upper bound on its own internal entropy, which would then increase indefinitely. Such an organism would dissolve into an entropic	soup.	To	survive,	organisms	must,	instead,	use	their	internal	states	to actively represent relevant states of the outside	world in a compressed, coded form,	so	to	know	as	much	as	possible	about	their	environment	while	remaining within entropic constraints compatible with their structural and dynamical integrity. This way, my hypothesis is that the qualities of perception experienced by an alter are just compressed, coded representations of how surrounding thoughts of cosmic consciousness are experienced from the concealed	perspective.	As	such,	while	there	must	be	a	correspondence	between perception and surrounding thoughts, the respective experiential qualities do not	need	to	be	the	same.	In	fact,	they	will	be	very	different	if	it	helps	organisms resist entropy. Our perceptions do not feel like thoughts because they are coded	representations	thereof. 3.13 Explaining	the	correlations	between	brain	function	and	inner experience A	principal	argument	for	the	mainstream	physicalist	position	that	the	material brain somehow constitutes or generates consciousness is the empirically undeniable correlation between measurable brain function and inner experience (e.g. Koch 2004). The way the idealist ontology proposed here accommodates this fact was already implicit in the previous section: a metabolizing body-which includes a functioning brain-is simply the revealed appearance	of	the	dissociated	phenomenal	field	of	an	alter.	The	former	correlates with the latter simply because the former is what the latter looks like from across	a	dissociative	boundary.	Indeed,	this	can	be	empirically	substantiated	in a	rather	direct	manner. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 54 Analytic	Idealism 54 In	a	2014	study	of	dissociation	(Schlumpf	et	al.),	doctors	performed	functional brain	scans	on	both	DID	patients	and	actors	simulating	DID.	The	scans	of	the actual patients displayed clear differences when compared to those of the actors, showing that dissociation has an identifiable extrinsic appearance. In other words, there is something rather particular that dissociative processes look like. This further substantiates the notion that living organisms such as you	and	me	are	the	revealed	appearance	of	cosmic-level	dissociative	processes. After all, we now know empirically that dissociation is identifiable when observed from across the dissociative boundary. Metabolizing bodies are to dissociation	in	cosmic	consciousness	as	certain	patterns	of	brain	activity	are	to DID	patients. Let me elaborate further on this important point. For any given alter A1 of cosmic	consciousness,	it	is	the	phenomenal	contents	surrounding	A1	that	cause its perceptions of the world around it. Dissociated phenomenal contents corresponding	to	another	alter	A2	can	be	part	of	the	phenomenal	environment surrounding A1. As such, the inner experiences of A2 can also indirectly stimulate A1's boundary-by impinging on their shared phenomenal environment-and thereby cause	A1's perceptions of	A2. This is	what gives	A1 access	to	the	revealed	appearance	of	the	inner	experiences	of	A2	in	the	form	of A2's	metabolizing body. See Figure 3.4. And since	A2's brain is integral to its body, it follows that	A2's inner experiences cause the perception by	A1 of the activity in	A2's	brain.	This causal link	explains the	correlations	between inner experience	and	corresponding	patterns	of	brain	activity. Figure	3.4:	A	metabolizing	body	is	the	revealed	appearance	of	an	alter's dissociated	phenomenal	field. Thoughts Thoughts Cosmic	consciousness Thoughts A1 Thoughts A2 Perceptions 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 55 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 55 In	essence,	the	claim	here is that	there is	nothing	to	a	metabolizing	body	but the	revealed	side-the	extrinsic	appearance-of	the	corresponding	alter's	inner experiences.	Yet,	one	may	object	to	this	by	arguing	that	many	parts	of	the	body seem	entirely	unrelated	to inner	experience:	whereas	certain	patterns	of	brain activity	correlate	with	subjective	reports	of	experience,	a	lot	seems	to	go	on	in the	brain that subjects	have	no introspective access to (Westen 1999,	Hassin, Ulleman and Bargh 2005, Dijksterhuis and Nordgren 2006, Augusto 2010, Hassin	2013).	Moreover,	what	kind	of	inner	experience	does,	say,	liver	function correspond	to?	What	about	big-toe	function? The answer to this objection is precise and compelling, but elaborate and specialized enough to have required its own paper (Kastrup 2017d3). Here, I shall	simply	remind	the	reader	that	a	subject's lack	of	metacognitive access to an	experience	precludes	reporting	of	the	experience	to	self	or	others,	but	does not imply	absence of the experience from the subject's	qualitative field.	With the	emergence	of	no-report	paradigms in	neuroscience	(Vandenbroucke	et al. 2014,	Tsuchiya	et	al.	2015),	we	now	know	that	much	is	experienced	that	cannot be	reported	even	to	self,	for	subjects	are	often	not	aware	that	they	have	certain experiences. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, there are normal internal dissociations in the human psyche-the foundational claim of depth psychology-that	render	much	of its	phenomenal	contents inaccessible	to	the reporting	ego	(Kelly	et	al.	2009:	301-34).	So	the	hypothesis	I	am	positing	here	is not	defeated	by the	objection: all bodily	metabolism-yes, even liver and toe function-can	still	correspond	to	concealed	phenomenal	contents,	even	though these	contents	may	not	be	introspectively	accessible. 3.14 Explaining	our	shared	world The final explanatory burden that needs to be addressed is the undeniable empirical	fact	that	we	all	inhabit	seemingly	the	same	environment,	and	that	the laws that govern the dynamics of this environment operate independently of our personal volition. After all, if the world is imagined-as implied by idealism-how come we are all imagining seemingly the same autonomous world? Notice that the existence of a phenomenal environment wherein all metabolizing	organisms	are	immersed-a	shared	world-is	a	direct	implication of	the	argument	already	developed.	To	bring	this	out,	we	simply	need	to	extend Figure	3.3	to	multiple	alters,	as	illustrated	in	Figure	3.5.	All	alters	are	immersed, like	islands	of	a	single	ocean,	in	the	thoughts	that	constitute	the	concealed	side of the inanimate cosmos. These thoughts surround all alters and cause their mutually-consistent perceptions by impinging on their respective dissociative boundaries. And since the volition of an alter is a phenomenal content also dissociated	from	the	rest	of	cosmic	consciousness,	it	follows	that	alters	cannot 3	See	Chapter	5	of	this	dissertation. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 56 Analytic	Idealism 56 change	the	laws	of	nature.	From	the	dissociated	perspective	of	alters,	the	world is	thus	autonomous. Figure	3.5:	Alters	are	immersed	in	a	common	phenomenal	environment. 3.15 Conclusions I	have elaborated	on an idealist ontology that can	be summarized as follows. There is	only	cosmic	consciousness.	We,	as	well	as	all	other living	organisms, are	but	dissociated	alters	of	cosmic	consciousness,	surrounded	by	its	thoughts. The inanimate world we see around us is the revealed appearance of these thoughts. The living organisms we share the world with are the revealed appearances	of other	dissociated alters.	This idealist ontology	makes sense	of reality in a more parsimonious and empirically rigorous manner than mainstream	physicalism,	bottom-up	panpsychism	and	cosmopsychism. It also offers	more	explanatory	power	than	these	three	alternatives,	in	that	it	does	not fall	prey	to	the	hard	problem	of	consciousness,	the	combination	problem	or	the decombination	problem,	respectively. Thoughts Alter	1 Th ou gh ts Alter	n Tho ugh ts Alter	2 Thoughts (shared	environment) Cosmic	consciousness 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 57 4. On	the	Plausibility	of	Idealism:	Refuting	Criticisms This paper first appeared in	Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy, ISSN:	0873-626X,	Vol.	9,	No.	44,	pp.	13-34,	in	May	2017. 4.1 Abstract Several alternatives vie today for recognition as the	most plausible ontology, from physicalism to panpsychism. By and large, these ontologies entail that physical structures circumscribe consciousness by bearing phenomenal properties	within their physical boundaries. The	ontology of idealism, on the other hand, entails that all physical structures are circumscribed by consciousness in that they exist solely as phenomenality in the first place. Unlike	the	other	alternatives,	however,	idealism	is	often	considered	implausible today, particularly by analytic philosophers. A reason for this is the strong intuition	that	an	objective	world	transcending	phenomenality is	a	self-evident fact.	Other	arguments-such	as	the	dependency	of	phenomenal	experience	on brain	function,	the	evidence	for	the	existence	of	the	universe	before	the	origin of	conscious	life,	etc.-are	also	often	cited.	In	this	essay,	I	will	argue	that	these objections	against	the	plausibility	of	idealism	are	false.	As	such,	this	essay	seeks to	show	that	idealism	is	an	entirely	plausible	ontology. 4.2 Introduction The mainstream physicalist ontology posits that reality is constituted by irreducible	physical	entities-which	Strawson	(2006:	9)	has	called	"ultimates"- outside and independent of phenomenality. According to physicalism, these ultimates, in	and	of themselves,	do	not instantiate	phenomenal	properties. In other words, there is nothing it is like to be an ultimate, phenomenality somehow	emerging	only	at	the	level	of	complex	arrangements	of	ultimates.	As such, under physicalism phenomenality is not fundamental, but instead reducible	to	physical	parameters	of	arrangements	of	ultimates. What I will call 'microexperientialism,' in turn, posits that there is already something	it	is	like	to	be	at	least	some	ultimates	(Strawson	et	al.	2006:	24-29), combinations of these experiencing ultimates somehow leading to more complex experience. As such, under microexperientialism phenomenality is seen as an irreducible aspect of at least some ultimates. The ontology of panexperientialism	(Griffin 1998:	77-116,	Rosenberg	2004:	91-103,	Skrbina	2007: 21-22) is analogous to	microexperientialism, except in that the former entails the	stronger	claim	that	all	ultimates	instantiate	phenomenal	properties. Micropsychism	(Strawson	et al. 2006: 24-29)	and	panpsychism	(Skrbina	2007: 15-22) are analogous-maybe even identical-to microexperientialism and panexperientialism, respectively, except	perhaps in that some formulations	of 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 58 Analytic	Idealism 58 the	former	admit	cognition-a	more	complex	form	of	phenomenality-already at	the	level	of	ultimates,	as	an	irreducible	aspect	of	these	ultimates. While microexperientialism, panexperientialism, micropsychism and panpsychism	entail	that	bottom-up	combinations	of	simple	subjects	give	rise	to more complex ones, such as human beings, cosmopsychism (Nagasawa and Wager 2016) takes the opposite route. Indeed, "the first postulate of cosmopsychism is that the cosmos as a	whole is the only ontological ultimate there	is,	and	that	it	is	conscious"	(Shani	2015:	408,	original	emphasis). Finally, the ontology of idealism is characterized by a combination of two propositions: (a)	phenomenal consciousness is irreducible;	and (b) everything else-the	whole	of	nature-is	reducible	to	a	unitary	and	universal	phenomenal consciousness	(henceforth,	I	shall	refer	to	phenomenal	consciousness	simply	as 'consciousness'). Idealism	may	be	consistent	with-even	identical	to-certain	interpretations	of cosmopsychism.	According	to	Shani, for instance,	cosmopsychism	entails that "an	omnipresent	cosmic	consciousness is	the	single	ontological	ultimate	there is"	(2015:	390).	This	perfectly	embodies	the	defining	tenet	of	idealism	insofar	as it implies that everything-including the physical-can be reduced to the phenomenal.	Shani	also	writes	that	matter	is	the	cosmos	"in	its	appearance	as exterior complement to the subjective realities of created selves" (2015: 412, emphasis added). The notion that matter is the phenomenal appearance of equally phenomenal dynamics is also eminently idealist. Therefore, these interpretations of cosmopsychism are essentially indistinguishable from idealism	and	I	shall,	henceforth,	refer	to	them	simply	as	idealism. Other possible interpretations of cosmopsychism entail that the cosmos as a whole bears phenomenal properties-that is, has inner life-but also has an aspect-the physical universe we can measure-that is irreducible to these phenomenal	properties.	Naturally,	this	implies	a	form	of	dual-aspect	monism,	a la	Spinoza	(Skrbina	2007:	88).	Indeed,	under	these	views	the	cosmos	can	still	be said	to	be	conscious,	but	not in consciousness.	In	the	former	case,	the	cosmos bears phenomenality; in the latter-which is the idealist view-the	cosmos is constituted by phenomenality. Interpretations of cosmopsychism that are	not consistent	with	idealism	shall	not	be	further	addressed	in	this	paper. In what follows, I will attempt to rebut the	most common objections to the plausibility	of idealism.	I	will	seek	to	show	that	these	objections	are	based	on circular reasoning, conflation, unexamined assumptions and several other misconceptions. 4.3 The	felt	concreteness	objection English	writer	Samuel	Johnson	is	said	to	have	argued	against	Bishop	Berkeley's idealism	by	kicking	a large	stone	while	exclaiming: "I refute it thus!" (Boswell 1820:	218).	Johnson	was	clearly	appealing	to	the	felt	concreteness	of	the	stone	to suggest that it could not be just a figment of imagination. Indeed, the felt 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 59 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 59 concreteness	of the	world is	probably the	main reason	why	people intuitively reject	the	notion	that	reality	unfolds	in	consciousness.	If	a	truck	hits	you,	you will	hurt,	even	if	you	are	an	idealist. However, notice that appeals to concreteness, solidity, palpability and any other	quality	that	we	have	come	to	associate	with	things	outside	consciousness are still appeals to phenomenality. After all, concreteness, solidity and palpability are qualities of experience. What else? A stone allegedly outside consciousness, in and by itself, is entirely abstract and has no qualities. If anything, by pointing to the felt concreteness of the stone Johnson was implicitly suggesting the primacy of experience over abstraction, which is eminently	idealist. We	have	come	to	automatically interpret the	felt	concreteness	of	the	world	as evidence that the world is outside consciousness. But this is an unexamined artifact	of	subliminal	thought-models.	Our	only	access	to	the	world	is	through sense	perception,	which	is	itself	phenomenal.	The	notion	that	there	is	a	world outside and independent of the phenomenal is an explanatory	model, not an empirical	fact.	No	phenomenal	quality	can	be	construed	as	direct	evidence	for something	outside	phenomenality. 4.4 The	private	minds	objection As discussed in Section 4.2, under idealism there is only one universal consciousness. Yet, at a personal level, our mental lives are clearly separate from one another. I do not have direct access to your thoughts and feelings and,	presumably,	neither	do	you	to	mine.	Moreover,	I	do	not	seem	to	be	aware of	what	is	happening	across	the	galaxy	and,	presumably,	neither	are	you.	So,	if all reality is reducible to one universal consciousness, how can there be separate	private	minds	such	as	yours	and	mine? To	make sense of this under idealism,	we	need to review a	mental condition called	dissociation	(Braude	1995,	Kelly	et	al.	2009:	167-174	&	348-352,	Schlumpf et	al.	2014,	Strasburger	and	Waldvogel	2015).	Indeed,	it	is	now	well	established in psychiatry that mental contents can undergo "a disruption of and/or discontinuity in [their] normal integration" (Black and Grant 2014: 191). This normal	integration	of	mental	contents	takes	place	through	chains	of	cognitive associations: a perception may evoke an abstract idea, which may trigger a memory,	which	may	inspire	a	thought,	etc.	These	associations	are	logical,	in	the sense that e.g. the	memory inspires the thought because of a certain implicit logic linking the two. Integrated	mentation can thus be	modeled, for ease of visualization,	as	a	connected	directed	graph.	See	Figure	4.1a.	Each	vertex	in	the graph represents a particular mental content and each edge a cognitive association	logically	linking	mental	contents	together.	Every	mental	content	in the	graph	of	Figure	4.1a	can	be	reached	from	any	other	mental	content	through a chain of cognitive associations. Dissociation, in turn, can be visualized as what	happens	when	the	graph	becomes	disconnected,	such	as	shown	in	Figure 4.1b. Some mental contents can then no longer be reached from others. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 60 Analytic	Idealism 60 Following the psychiatric convention, I shall refer to the subgraph	with grey vertices	as	a	(dissociated)	alter. Figure	4.1:	A	connected	graph	(a)	illustrating	normal	integration	of	mental contents,	and	a	disconnected	graph	(b)	illustrating	dissociation	and	the corresponding	formation	of	an	alter	(subgraph	in	grey). Because cognitive associations are essentially logical, as opposed to spatiotemporal, the scheme of representation in Figure 4.1 allows for the simultaneous experience of multiple mental contents linked together in a connected subgraph.	This is empirically justifiable: a	perception, for instance, can	be	experienced	at	the	same	time	as	the	thoughts	it	evokes	and	the	emotions evoked by these thoughts. Moreover-and by the same token-the two disconnected subgraphs in Figure 4.1b can also represent two concurrently conscious	subjects	of	experience.	The	substantiation	for	this	is	again	empirical: there	is	compelling	evidence	that	different	alters	of	the	same	psyche	can	be	coconscious	(Kelly	et	al.	2009:	317-322,	Braude	1995:	67-68). An alter loses direct access to mental contents surrounding it, but remains integral to the	underlying consciousness that constitutes it.	The	disconnection between	an	alter	and	surrounding	mental	contents is logical,	not	ontic.	As	an analogy, a database	may contain entries that are not indexed and, therefore, cannot	be	reached,	but	this	does	not	physically	separate	those	entries	from	the rest	of	the	database. Dissociation can coherently explain	how seemingly separate	but concurrently conscious subjects of experience-such as you and me-can form under idealism: each is an alter of universal consciousness. And because each alter becomes	unable	to	evoke	the	mental	contents	of	another,	their	respective	inner lives	acquire	a	seemingly	private	character,	even	though	they	remain	integral	to the	underlying	consciousness	that	constitutes	them. a b 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 61 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 61 4.5 The	stand-alone	world	objection If all there is is consciousness, does the world continue to exist when not consciously observed by a living being? A negative answer to this question seems extremely implausible yet difficult to avoid under idealism. Bishop Berkeley	has	famously	attempted	to	circumvent	it	by	appealing	to	a	divinity,	as captured	in	Ronald	Knox's	limerick,	God	in	the	Quad: There	was	a	young	man	who	said	"God Must	find	it	exceedingly	odd To	think	that	the	tree Should	continue	to	be When	there's	no	one	about	in	the	quad." Reply: "Dear	Sir:	Your	astonishment's	odd; I	am	always	about	in	the	quad. And	that's	why	the	tree Will	continue	to	be Since	observed	by,	Yours	faithfully,	God." Legitimate	as	an	appeal	to	a	divinity	might	have	been	in	Berkeley's	time,	today more	rigor	is	expected	from	a	viable	ontology.	So	how	do	we	solve	the	problem of	a	stand-alone	world	under	idealism? With reference to the discussion in the preceding section, notice that, by definition,	mental contents inside an alter of universal consciousness cannot directly	evoke	mental	contents	outside	the	alter,	or	vice-versa.	But	they	can	still influence or impinge on each other. Indeed, mental impingement across a dissociative	boundary	is	empirically	known.	Lynch	and	Kilmartin	(2013:	100),	for instance,	report	that	dissociated	feelings	can	dramatically	affect	our	thoughts, while Eagleman (2011: 20-54) shows that dissociated expectations routinely mold our perceptions. We can visualize this as in Figure 4.2a, wherein the partial	overlap	of	adjacent	vertices	internal	and	external	to	the	alter	(cf.	Figure 4.1b)	represents	mental	impingement	across	its	dissociative	boundary. Figure 4.2b illustrates the exact same thing according to a simplified representation:	the	broader	consciousness	is	represented	as	a	white	circle	with an	alter	represented	as	a	grey	circle	within	it.	The	dashed	arrows	represent	the impingement of external and internal	mental contents on each other, across the	alter's	boundary.	I	will	henceforth	use	this	simplified	representation. Now notice that	mental contents of universal consciousness that surround- but	remain	external	to-an	alter	can	impinge	on	the	alter's	boundary	from	the outside.	Under	idealism,	it	can	be	coherently	argued	that	this	is	what	gives	rise to	sense	perceptions:	the	physical	world	around	us	is	the	extrinsic	appearance on	the	screen	of	perception	of	phenomenality	surrounding	our	respective	alter. See	Figure	4.3. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 62 Analytic	Idealism 62 Figure	4.2:	Mental	contents	impinging	on	the	dissociative	boundary	of	an	alter, illustrated	in	two	different	ways	(a)	and	(b). Figure	4.3:	Mental	contents	of	universal	consciousness	surrounding	an	alter	can cause	the	alter's	sense	perceptions	by	impinging	on	its	dissociative	boundary. The stand-alone	character	of the	world	can thus	be	coherently	explained: the world is a perceptual representation of phenomenality dissociated from our personal psyche and, as such, independent of our personal inner life. That which	underlies	the	physical	world	we	perceive	continues	to	exist-in	the	form of	phenomenality	outside	our	respective	alter-even	as	we	sleep. a b Ideas Ideas (corresponding to	the	physical world) Universal	consciousness Alter 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 63 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 63 4.6 The	autonomy	of	nature	objection A closely related objection is this: nature unfolds according to patterns and regularities-the 'laws of nature'-independent of our personal volition. Human beings cannot change these laws. But if nature is in consciousness, should	that	not	be	possible	by	a	mere	act	of	imagination? This objection can be rebutted along the same lines as the previous one. However, there is a more direct and intuitive refutation. Notice that the implicit assumption	here is that all	mental activity is acquiescent to volition, which	is	patently	false	even	in	our	own	personal	psyche.	After	all,	by	and	large we cannot control our dreams, nightmares, emotions and even	many of our thoughts. They come, develop and go on their own terms. At a pathological level, schizophrenics cannot control their visions and people suffering from obsessive-compulsive disorder are constantly at the mercy of oppressive thoughts.	There	are	numerous	examples	of	conscious	activity	that	escapes	the control	of volition.	Often,	we	do	not even recognize this activity as	our	own; that	is,	we	do	not	identify	with	it.	It	unfolds	as	autonomous,	seemingly	external phenomena, such as dreams and schizophrenic hallucinations. Yet, all this activity is unquestionably within consciousness. We perceive it as separate from	ourselves	because	the	segment	of	our	psyche	that	gives	rise	to	this	activity is	dissociated	from	the	ego,	the	segment	with	which	we	do	identify. So	that	there	is	activity	in	universal	consciousness	that	we	do	not	identify	with and	cannot	control is	entirely	consistent	with idealism.	This	activity is	simply dissociated	from	our	ego	and	its	sense	of	volition. 4.7 The	shared	world	objection If all reality is in consciousness, then the	world is akin to a dream.	As such, idealism	implies	that	we	are	all	partaking	in	roughly	the	same	dream.	Yet,	since our	bodies	are	separate,	we	cannot	be	sharing	a	dream;	or	so	the	objection	goes. The objection begs the question by implicitly assuming that the body circumscribes dreaming consciousness, as opposed to the other way around. Only	under this assumption	does the impossibility of sharing a	dream follow from	the	fact	that	bodies	are	separate.	But	under	idealism,	it	is	the	body	that	is in	universal	consciousness,	not	consciousness	in	the	body.	Once	this	is	properly understood according to the framework developed in the preceding sections, the rebuttal of this objection becomes rather straightforward:	we all seem to inhabit the same world because our respective alters are surrounded by the same	universal field	of	phenomenality, like	whirlpools in	a single stream.	See Figure	4.4,	which	simply	extends	Figure	4.3	to	multiple	alters. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 64 Analytic	Idealism 64 Figure	4.4:	Alters	of	universal	consciousness	and	their	shared	world. 4.8 The	natural	order	objection The world we perceive around ourselves is governed by stable and orderly natural laws. Therefore, if the contents of perception are a representation of phenomenality in universal consciousness, then this phenomenality must be stable and orderly at root. But our own personal thoughts and emotions are notoriously	unstable	and	disorderly.	So	how	plausible is it that the	order	and stability we discern in the laws of nature represent thoughts or emotions in universal	consciousness? The misconception here, of course, is that of anthropomorphization: to attribute	to	universal	consciousness	as	a	whole	cognitive	characteristics	known only in small dissociated segments of it, such as human beings. Nothing in idealism precludes the possibility that phenomenality in universal consciousness unfolds according to very stable and orderly patterns and regularities,	whose	extrinsic	appearance	corresponds	to	the	laws	of	nature.	That our human thoughts and emotions seem rather reactive and unstable is a product	of	evolution	under	the	pressures	of	natural	selection	within	a	particular planetary ecosystem. At a universal level, consciousness has not undergone such	evolutionary	pressures. Ideas Alter	1 Id ea s Alter	n Idea s Alter	2 Ideas (shared	world) Universal	Consciousness 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 65 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 65 Under physicalism, the laws of nature are seen as irreducible causal patterns somehow built into the fabric of the cosmos. It is the dynamic unfolding of these	patterns	that	leads	to	the	order	and	complexity	we	see	around	ourselves. Under idealism, such irreducible causal patterns are posited to be somehow built into universal consciousness itself, instead of an objective fabric of spacetime. Yet, beyond this distinction, they are the same patterns that physicalism	entails,	as	inherent	to	consciousness	as	physical	laws	are	allegedly inherent to the fabric of spacetime. Idealism poses no extra difficulty than physicalism	in	this	regard. This	can	be	better	understood	with	a	simple	terminology	move.	Certain	schools of psychology speak of 'psychological archetypes': innate, built-in templates according to	which	mental dynamics unfold (Jung 1991).	As such,	we can say that, under idealism, the laws of nature are the archetypes of universal consciousness.	They	are	built-in templates	according to	which the 'vibrations' of universal consciousness-that is, phenomenality-develop, analogously to how	the	physical	constraints	of	a	vibrating	surface	determine	its	natural	modes of	vibration. 4.9 The	equivalence	objection As	we	have seen in	Sections	4.5 to	4.7, idealism	acknowledges that there is a world outside personal psyches, since personal psyches are but dissociated segments	of	a	broader	universal	consciousness.	The	objection,	then,	is	that	the notion of a broad stream of phenomenality outside personal psyches is equivalent	to	the	physicalist	postulate	of	a	world	outside	consciousness. Except for solipsism, any viable ontology must entail at least one inference beyond	direct	experience.	This	is	necessary	to	make	sense	of	the	fact	that	we	all inhabit the same world beyond ourselves and are unable to change its governing laws.	For this reason,	physicalism infers the	existence	of	a	universe outside	consciousness,	which	we	all	inhabit.	Idealism,	on	the	other	hand,	infers simply that consciousness itself extends beyond its face-value personal boundaries. This way, while physicalism postulates a fundamentally new ontological class next to experience, idealism simply extrapolates the boundaries of consciousness-the sole undeniable ontological class and primary datum of existence-beyond those we can probe directly. To put it metaphorically, while idealism makes sense of reality by inferring that the Earth	extends	beyond	the	visible	horizon,	physicalism	does	so	by	inferring	the existence of an isomorphic but ontologically distinct 'shadow' Earth. Clearly, the	former	is	a	more	parsimonious	inference	and,	as	such,	not	equivalent	to	the latter. More importantly, the implications of idealism are radically different from those of physicalism. For instance, while physicalism implies that consciousness ends upon the death of the body, idealism implies	merely the end of the corresponding dissociation, not of consciousness proper. I have 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 66 Analytic	Idealism 66 elaborated	on	further	differences	in	implications	elsewhere	(Kastrup	2015:	185198). 4.10 The	primacy	of	brain	function	objection Not only are there (a) clear correlations between specific patterns of brain activity	and	reported	inner	experience	(Koch	2004),	we	know	that	(b)	physical interference	with	the	brain-such	as	head	trauma	and	the	use	of	psychoactive drugs-can influence one's inner life rather dramatically. This may seem to suggest an arrow of causation pointing from a physical body outside consciousness	to	phenomenality,	which	would	contradict	idealism. To make sense of observation (a), we need to briefly recapitulate earlier discussions. As we have seen in Section 4.4, under idealism private	minds- such as our own human psyche-can be explained as dissociated alters of universal	consciousness.	We	have	also	seen	in	Section	4.5	that	the	standalone world	around	us	can	be	explained	as	the	extrinsic	appearance	of	phenomenality surrounding-but	outside-our	respective	alter.	Now,	from	the	point	of	view	of a	given	alter	A,	nothing	prevents the	dissociated	mental activity	of an	alter	B from	being	part	of	the	phenomenality	surrounding	A.	B	is	then	part	of	A's	world and, as such, must also have an extrinsic appearance on A's screen of perception. In other words, there	must be something alters look like from a second-person	point	of view.	And since	we	know from	direct experience that our private inner life extends only to the boundaries of our metabolizing body-after	all,	we	cannot	perceive	things	that	do	not	impinge	on	our	skin	or other sense organs, or move anything beyond our own body through direct intention-metabolizing	bodies	seem	prima	facie	to	be	the	extrinsic	appearance of	dissociated	alters	of	universal	consciousness.	If	so,	this	means	that	all	living beings	have	private inner lives in some	way	analogous to	our	own,	but tables and chairs do not. The latter are simply aspects of the inanimate universe, which, as a whole, is the extrinsic appearance of phenomenality outside all alters. Brain	activity,	of	course, is integral	to	a	metabolizing	human	body.	Therefore, under idealism, brain activity is simply part of what one's private inner experiences-self-reflective	and	otherwise,	as	I	will	elaborate	upon	in	the	next section-look like from	across	a	dissociative	boundary.	To	put it	another	way, one's	brain	activity is	part	of	a	phenomenal representation	of	one's inner life. And	of	course,	a	representation	must	correlate	with	the	phenomenal	process	it is the appearance of, without requiring anything ontologically distinct from consciousness. That this correlation is empirically observed is thus entirely consistent	with	idealism. A	possible	counterargument	here	is	this:	the	patterns	of	neural	activity	one	can measure	with	functional	brain	scanners	can	be	enormously	complex	in	terms	of information	content;	perhaps	more	complex	than	the	contents	of	consciousness we have introspective access to. What does the extra complexity then correspond to? The key to answering this question is in the next section, 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 67 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 67 wherein	a	distinction	will	be	made	between	contents	of	consciousness	we	have introspective access to-that is, can self-reflect upon-and contents of consciousness that, despite still being experienced, fall outside the reach of introspection. The extra complexity, insofar as it indeed is the case, corresponds	to	the	latter. Regarding	observation	(b)	of	the	objection,	the	suggested	arrow	of	causation	is based	on	an	unexamined	but	pervasive	assumption:	that	the	physical	is	in	some sense distinct from, yet causally effective upon, the phenomenal. This is precisely what idealism denies. Under idealism, the physical is simply the contents	of	perception, a	particular type	of	phenomenality.	As such,	what	we call 'physical interference with the brain' is the extrinsic appearance of phenomenality external to an alter that disrupts the inner experiences of the alter	from	across	its	dissociative	boundary.	The	disruption	'pierces	through'	the boundary,	so	to	speak.	And	that	certain	types	of	phenomenality	disrupt	other types of phenomenality is not only entailed by idealism, but also empirically trivial. After all, our thoughts disrupt our emotions-and vice-versa-every day.	For	the	same	reason	that	thoughts	disrupt	emotions,	'physical	interference with the brain' disrupts an organism's inner life. None of this contradicts idealism. 4.11 The	unconscious	mentation	objection In	Libet's	now	famous	experiments	(1985),	neuroscientists	were	able	to	record, a fraction of a second before subjects reported making a decision to act, mounting brain activity associated with the initiation of a simple voluntary action.	At	first	sight,	this	would	seem	to	indicate	that	decisions	are	made	in	a neural substrate outside consciousness, thereby contradicting idealism. I use Libet's experiments here	merely as an example, for today we know of many other	instances	of	seemingly	unconscious	mentation,	such	as	moving	one's	foot halfway to the brake pedal before one becomes aware of danger ahead (Eagleman	2011:	5).	Under	idealism,	since	everything	is	in	consciousness,	there cannot	be	such	a	thing	as	unconscious	mentation.	So	what	is	going	on? The misconception here is a conflation of consciousness proper with a particular configuration of consciousness. Indeed, to report an experience- such as making a decision to act or seeing danger ahead-to another or to oneself,	one	has	to	both	(a)	have	the	experience	and	(b)	know	that	one	has	the experience,	which	Schooler	(2002)	called	a	"re-representation."	In	other	words, one can only report phenomenality that one is self-reflectively aware of at a metacognitive level. But self-reflection is just a particular configuration of consciousness, whereby consciousness turns in upon itself to experience knowledge	of	its	own	phenomenality	(Kastrup	2014:	104-110).	Nothing	precludes the possibility that phenomenality takes place outside the field of self529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 68 Analytic	Idealism 68 reflection. In this case, we cannot report the phenomenality-not even to ourselves-because	we	do	not	know	that	we	experience	it.1 The argument above is not idiosyncratic, for the existence of unreportable phenomenality is	well	established in	neuroscience	today	(Tsuchiya	et al.	2015, Vandenbroucke et al. 2014). Indeed, as elaborated upon by Schooler (2002), reportability is an extra function at a metacognitive level, on top of phenomenality proper. So the possibility that presents itself to us is that all mentation	is	actually	conscious,	even	though	we	cannot	report	much	of it.	As such, the decisions made by Libet's subjects could well have been made in consciousness, but outside the field of self-reflection. The corresponding phenomenality then entered this field a fraction of a second later, thereby becoming reportable. Analogously, drivers	may consciously see danger ahead before	they	can	tell	themselves	that they	see	danger	ahead.	The	appearance	of unconscious	mentation	due	to	unreportability	does	not	contradict	idealism. 4.12 The	unconsciousness	objection Along	similar	lines,	the	idea	here	is	that,	when	we	e.g.	faint	or	undergo	general anesthesia, we become seemingly unconscious. Yet, we do not cease to exist because	of	it,	which	may	seem	to	contradict	the	idealist	tenet	that	our	body	is the	extrinsic	appearance	of	conscious	inner	life. Let	us	consider	this	more	carefully.	Imagine	that	you	wake	up	in	the	morning after	hours	of	deep	sleep.	You	may	remember	nothing	of	what	happened	during those	preceding	hours,	concluding	that	you	were	unconscious	all	night.	Then, later in the	day,	you	suddenly remember that	you	actually	had	a	very intense dream.	So	you	were	not	unconscious	all	night,	you	simply	could	not	remember your	experiences. Indeed,	all	we	can	assert	with	confidence	upon	coming	round	from	episodes	of seeming	unconsciousness	is	that	we	cannot	remember	phenomenality	occurring during those episodes. The actual absence of phenomenality is impossible to assert	with	confidence.	As	a	matter	of fact,	many	things	we	have	traditionally associated	with	unconsciousness	are	now	known	to	entail	intense	experiences. For instance, fainting caused by e.g. asphyxiation, strangulation or hyperventilation	is	known	to	correlate	with	euphoria,	insights	and	visions	(Neal 2008:	310-315,	Rhinewine	and	Williams	2007,	Retz	2007).	G-force-induced loss of	consciousness	(G-LOC)	is	also	known	to	correlate	with	"memorable	dreams" (Whinnery and Whinnery 1990). There is even evidence for "implicit perception"	during	general	anesthesia	(Kihlstrom	and	Cork	2007). Sleep,	of	course,	is	known	to	correlate	with	dreams.	But	even	during	phases	of sleep wherein electroencephalogram readings show no dream-related neural activity,	there	are	other	types	of	activity	that	may	correlate	with	non-recallable phenomenality distinct from dreams. Indeed, this is precisely what a recent 1	This	is	elaborated	upon	in	much	more	detail	in	Chapter	5	of	this	dissertation. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 69 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 69 study	points	out: "there	are	good	empirical	and theoretical reasons for saying that	a range	of	different types	of sleep	experience, some	of	which	are	distinct from	dreaming,	can	occur	in	all	stages	of	sleep"	(Windt,	Nielsen	and	Thompson 2016: 871, emphasis added). The authors identify three different categories of sleep	experiences	distinct from	dreams: (a)	non-immersive imagery	and sleep thinking, (b) perceptions and bodily sensations, and (c) 'selfless' states and contentless sleep experiences that may be similar to those reported by experienced	meditators. As such, what the empirical data shows is that episodes of seeming unconsciousness	are	associated	with	an	impairment	of	memory	access,	but	not necessarily	with	absence	of	phenomenality.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	there	are	strong indications,	as	mentioned	above,	that	the	opposite	is	true. 4.13 The	solipsism	objection Some conflate idealism with solipsism, the notion that the world is one's personal	dream,	all	other	living	creatures	being	just	figments	of	one's	personal imagination.	Under	solipsism,	there	is	nothing	it	is	like	to	be	other	people;	they have	no	inner	life;	they	exist	only	as	appearances	in	the	personal	psyche	of	the dreamer.	As	such,	whatever	empirical	evidence	one	brings	to	bear	and	whatever one	says	to	a	solipsist	must	be	regarded	by	the	solipsist	as	figments	of	his	or	her own	imagination,	which	renders	solipsism	unfalsifiable.	So	the	objection	here	is that, by being unfalsifiable, solipsism-and therefore idealism-is beneath philosophical	debate. Naturally,	idealism	is	not	solipsism.	Under	idealism,	there	is	something	it	is	like to	be	other	living	creatures;	they	also	have	private	inner	lives.	So	idealists	take other	people	seriously	as	legitimate	sources	of	reported	experiences	and	views, not	just	as	figments	of	one's	own	imagination.	Moreover,	idealists	acknowledge that there is a world outside and independent of their personal (dissociated) psyche,	as	discussed	in	Sections	4.5	to	4.7.	They	simply	do	not	acknowledge	that this world is ontologically distinct from consciousness itself. Indeed, by acknowledging that dissociation in universal consciousness implies a world outside	their	own	personal	mentation, idealists look	upon	this	world	in	a	way entirely	compatible	with	naturalism	and	scientific	inquiry. Unlike	solipsism,	idealism	has	the	burden	to	explain	observations	non-trivially. Consider	three	basic	facts	that	are	often	used	to	justify	physicalism:	(a)	the	laws of	nature	are independent	of	our	personal	volition; (b)	we	all seem	to inhabit the	same	world;	and	(c) there	are tight	correlations	between	observable	brain activity and reported inner life. Solipsism trivializes all three facts in lieu of actually making sense of them: the solipsist allegedly dreams them all up, rather	arbitrarily.	The	idealist,	on	the	other	hand,	by	acknowledging	the	inner lives	of	other	people	and	the	autonomous	nature	of	the	world,	has	the	burden to reconcile these three facts with the notion that reality unfolds in consciousness.	If	idealism	is	correct,	(a)	how	come	we	cannot	simply	imagine	a different	and	better	world?	If	the	world	is	akin	to	a	dream	in	consciousness,	(b) 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 70 Analytic	Idealism 70 how	come	we	are	all	having	the	same	dream?	If	consciousness	is	not	generated by the brain, (c) how come there are such tight correlations between brain activity	and	inner	experience?	These	questions	have	already	been	answered	in Sections 4.6, 4.7 and 4.10, respectively. The important point here is this: idealism	is falsifiable in that, if it	cannot	answer these	and	other	questions in terms	of	universal	consciousness	alone,	it	must	be	discarded. 4.14 The	cosmological	history	objection There is overwhelming evidence for the existence of the universe before conscious	life	arose.	Therefore-or	so	the	objection	goes-it	is	untenable	to	say that the universe exists in consciousness. This may strike some readers as obviously	question-begging-which,	of course, it is-but	please	bear	with	me for	the	sake	of	completeness. The	implicit	assumption	here	is	that	consciousness	arises	only	with	biology,	as a product of biology.	Naturally, this is precisely	what idealism	denies.	Under idealism, biology is merely the extrinsic appearance of dissociated, local differentiations of consciousness (that is, alters), not the constituent or generator of consciousness. There was universal consciousness before such dissociated, local differentiations arose.	And there	was phenomenality in this universal consciousness corresponding to the inanimate	universe	prior to the origin	of	life. 4.15 The	implausibility	of	cosmic	inner	life	objection The	last	objection	I	will	address	in	this	essay	is,	like	the	first,	purely	intuitive.	It asks	rhetorically:	How	plausible	is	it	that	the	inanimate	universe	as	a	whole	is the extrinsic appearance of some kind of universal inner life? The intuitive appeal	of	the	question	is	understandable.	After	all,	we	only	have	introspective access	to	our	own	(dissociated)	personal	inner	life,	so	to	gauge	the	presence	of other or broader inner life we depend on perceivable external indicators. In other people and animals, these indicators are their behavior. But	within the extremely	small	range	of	space	and	time	in	which	we	live	our	lives-and	even	in which	human	history	as	a	whole	has	unfolded-we	simply	cannot	perceive	any intuitively-appealing	indicator	of	universal	inner	life. Yet, we can approach the question from a different angle. Consider a living brain	exposed	by	surgeons	during	an	operation.	It	is	a	very	concrete	object	that can	be	seen,	touched,	cut,	cauterized,	etc.	It	is	composed	of	the	same	types	of atoms	and	force	fields	that	make	up	the	universe	as	a	whole.	There	is	nothing magical	about	a	brain	insofar	as	we	can	gauge	on	the	screen	of	perception.	And neither can we discern any intuitively-appealing indicator of inner life by simply	looking	at	an	exposed	brain. Nonetheless,	we	all	know	that	'behind'	the	living	brain	lies	the	entire	inner	life of	a	person,	with	love	affairs	and	heartbreaks,	successes	and	disappointments, great adventures and quiet introspective insights, great joy and indescribable 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 71 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 71 suffering. 'Behind' that very concrete	object	under the surgeon's scalpel there lies	a	world	of	phenomenality.	Counterintuitive	or	not,	this	is	the	way	nature	is: what we call physical structures-such as living brains-can correspond in some	way	to	rich	phenomenality.	We	may	not	know	how this	is	so,	but	we	do know	that	it	is	so. Therefore,	unless	we	solve	the	'hard	problem	of	consciousness'	(Chalmers	2003) and explain what makes brains different from the inanimate universe as a whole	in	this	regard,	if	brains	correspond	to	inner	life	it	is	not	at	all	implausible that	the	inanimate	universe	as	a	whole	could	as	well.	After	all,	brains	are	made of	the	same	'stuff'	that	the	rest	of	the	universe	is	also	made	of. One could argue at this point that only particular structural and functional organizations of this 'stuff,' as found in brains, are conducive to the kind of information	processing	associated	with	human	inner	life.	For	instance,	Tononi (2004) has shown that reportable experiences correlate only with complex networks	of	information	integration	in	the	brain.	Although	it	has	recently	been shown	that	there	are	structural	similarities	between	brains	and	the	universe	at its largest scales (Krioukov et al. 2012), 2 it is implausible that analogous information integration takes place at a universal level. The distances and signal	propagation	times	involved	do	not	permit	it	(Siegel	2016). However, the	hypothesis	offered	here is	not that the	universe	has	human-like cognition and associated information integration. As a matter of fact, the hypothesis	is	not	even	that	the	universe	has	cognition,	defined	as	the	capacity to	acquire	knowledge	or	understanding.	Instead,	the	claim	is	simply	that	there is	raw experience-qualia,	pure	and	simple-associated	with the	universe	as	a whole,	which	does	not	require	anything	like	the	kind	of	information	integration underlying	human	self-reflection. 4.16 Conclusions Idealism is	a	unique	ontology in that,	unlike	physicalism	and	panpsychism, it asserts	that	physical	structures	are	circumscribed	by	consciousness,	as	opposed to	the	other	way	around.	Yet,	analytic	philosophy	has	traditionally	considered idealism	implausible.	In	this	essay,	I	have	argued	that	the	alleged	implausibility of	idealism	is	based	on	misconceptions,	such	as: • Unfounded intuition-e.g. taking the concreteness of the world to indicate its independence from consciousness, or asserting the implausibility	of	universal	inner	life; • Lack	of	philosophical imagination-e.g. assuming that	multiple	private minds	and	a	stand-alone	world	cannot	be	coherently	reduced	to	a	single universal	consciousness; 2	This conclusion	has	been	confirmed	and	amplified	by	a later study	done	by	Franco Vazza	and	Alberto	Feletti	(2017). 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 72 Analytic	Idealism 72 • Demonstrably wrong assumptions-e.g. that all mental activity is acquiescent	to	volition; • Question-begging-e.g. arguing that different people cannot share a dream	because	their	bodies	are	separate,	and	arguing	that	the	universe cannot	be	in	consciousness	because	it	existed	before	conscious	life	first arose; • Anthropomorphization-e.g. taking all conceivable processes in consciousness	to	necessarily	be	unstable	and	disorderly; • Failure	to	understand	the	implications	of	idealism-e.g.	asserting	that	a field of phenomenality outside personal psyches is equivalent to a physical	world	outside	phenomenality; • Unexamined assumptions-e.g. that the physical is in some sense distinct	from,	yet	causally	effective	upon,	the	phenomenal; • Conflation-e.g. conflating consciousness proper with self-reflection, conflating unconsciousness with failure to recall phenomenality, and conflating	idealism	with	solipsism. As such, idealism is an entirely plausible ontology that may offer the most parsimonious	and	explanatorily	powerful	option	yet	to	make	sense	of	reality. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 73 5. There	Is	an	'Unconscious,'	but	It	May	Well	Be	Conscious This	paper	first	appeared	in	Europe's	Journal	of	Psychology,	ISSN:	1841-0413,	Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 559-572, in August 2017. A summary of this paper has also appeared	in	Scientific	American	on	19	September	2017.1 5.1 Abstract Depth	psychology	finds	empirical	validation	today	in	a	variety	of	observations that suggest the presence of causally effective mental processes outside conscious experience. I submit that this is due to misinterpretation of the observations: the subset of consciousness called 'meta-consciousness' in the literature is often mistaken for consciousness proper, thereby artificially creating space for an 'unconscious.'	The implied	hypothesis is that	all	mental processes	may	in	fact	be	conscious,	the	appearance	of	unconsciousness	arising from our dependence on self-reflective introspection for gauging awareness. After	re-interpreting	the	empirical	data	according	to	a	philosophically	rigorous definition of consciousness, I show that two well-known phenomena corroborate this hypothesis: (a) experiences that, despite being conscious, aren't re-represented during introspection; and (b) dissociated experiences inaccessible	to	the	executive	ego.	If	consciousness	is	inherent	to	all	mentation, it	may	be	fundamental	in	nature,	as	opposed	to	a	product	of	particular	types	of brain	function. 5.2 Introduction The foundational theoretical inference of the clinical approach called 'depth psychology'-whose	origins	can	be	traced	back	to	the	works	of	Frederic	Myers, Pierre	Janet,	William	James,	Sigmund	Freud	and	Carl	Jung-is	that	the	human psyche comprises two main subdivisions: a conscious and an unconscious segment	(Kelly	et	al.	2009:	301-334).	The	conscious	segment	comprises	mental activity to which one has introspective access. The so-called 'ego' is the felt sense of personal self that arises in association with a subset of this introspectively-accessible activity-e.g. some bodily sensations, images, thoughts, beliefs, etc.-and it is in this sense that I use the word 'ego' throughout	this	paper.	In	contrast,	the	unconscious	segment	comprises	mental activity to which one has no introspective access. Inaccessible as it may be, depth	psychologists	contend	that	mental	activity	in	the 'unconscious'-a	term often	used as a noun-still can and	does influence one's conscious thoughts, feelings	and	behaviors.	A	more	modern	articulation	of the	notion	of	a	mental unconscious-as opposed to what has historically been called "unconscious 1	At	the	time	of	this	writing,	the	Scientific	American	essay	was	freely	available	online	at: https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/consciousness-goes-deeper-thanyou-think/. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 74 Analytic	Idealism 74 cerebration" (Kelly et al. 2009: 340-352)-can be found in the writings of Kihlstrom	(1997),	for	example.2 Recent empirical results seem to corroborate the hypothesis of a mental unconscious by revealing the presence of mental activity individuals cannot access through introspection, but which nonetheless causally conditions the individuals' conscious thoughts, feelings and behaviors (e.g. Westen 1999, Augusto 2010, Eagleman 2011). Hassin goes as far as insisting, "unconscious processes can carry	out every fundamental	high-level function that conscious processes can perform" (2013: 196). He reviews empirical evidence indicating that the unconscious is capable of cognitive control, the pursuit of goals, information broadcasting and even reasoning (Hassin 2013: 197-200). This echoes Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, whose experiments indicate that the unconscious can encompass "all psychological phenomena associated with thought, such as choice, decision making, attitude formation and attitude change, impression formation, diagnosticity, problem solving, and creativity" (2006: 96). Even practitioners of cognitive therapy, who have traditionally ignored the unconscious, have more recently found clinical value in interpreting	possible indirect	manifestations	of inaccessible	mental activity in the form of dreams (Rosner, Lyddon and Freeman 2004). This new scientific approach to the hypothesis of an unconscious has been called "the new unconscious"	(Hassin,	Uleman	and	Bargh	2005). Clearly, there is significant evidence for the presence of causally-effective mental activity that we ordinarily cannot access through introspection. The question, however, is whether mental activity inaccessible through introspection	is	necessarily	unconscious.	It	is	true	that,	from	the	perspective	of clinical psychology, these two modalities are operationally indistinguishable, since the	clinicians' sole	gauge	of their	patients' range	of	consciousness is the patients'	own	introspective	reports.	However,	from	a	theoretical	standpoint, it is	conceivable	that	mental	activity	the	ego	cannot	access	through	introspection could still be conscious, in the sense of being phenomenally experienced somewhere in the psyche. If so, this has significant implications for our understanding	of	the	nature	of	consciousness-and	of	its	relationship	to	brain function-in the fields of neuropsychology, neuroscience and philosophy of mind. Indeed,	although	the	conflation	between	lack	of	introspective	access	and	lack	of consciousness is operationally justifiable in a clinical setting, the widespread use	of	the	qualifier 'unconscious'	today	suggests	an	intrinsic	dichotomy	in	the 2	Throughout	this	dissertation,	I	use	the	word	'mental'	as	a	synonym	of	'phenomenal'; except	in	this	chapter.	Because	this	chapter	was	originally	published	as	an	article	in	a psychology journal, here the word 'mental' is associated with cognitive activity, instead of qualia. According to this definition, mental processes aren't necessarily conscious, for cognition can conceivably take place unconsciously. And if they are conscious, mental processes then entail the acquisition of knowledge and/or understanding,	which	implies	more	than	just	the	presence	of	phenomenality. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 75 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 75 nature	of	mental	processes:	some	supposedly	aren't	experienced	whilst	others, somehow, are. This implies that consciousness is not fundamental to mentation, but a property that emerges from particular arrangements or configurations of neurons. Primed and driven by this assumption, significant resources	are	spent	in	neuropsychology	and	neuroscience	today	in	an	effort	to figure	out	what	these	arrangements	or	configurations	are.	Hypotheses	currently under	investigation	vary	from	vast	topologies	of	information	integration	across neurons (Tononi 2004) to microscopic quantum processes within neural microtubules	(Hameroff	2006). The	present	paper,	on	the	other	hand,	elaborates	on	the	possibility	that	these efforts are misguided, for introspectively-inaccessible mental processes may still	be	conscious:	they	may	be	phenomenally	experienced	in	a	manner-or	in	a segment	of	the	psyche-that	escapes	egoic	introspection.	This	way,	the	notion of	an	unconscious,	despite the	broad	use	and influence	of the	term	in	today's psychology, may at root be a linguistic inaccuracy originating from mere operational	convenience. If so, then	consciousness	may	not	be the	product	of specific arrangements or configurations of neural activity, but a fundamental property of all mentation. The implications of this possibility for neuropsychology, neuroscience and philosophy of mind are hard to overestimate. 5.3 Defining	and	gauging	consciousness Before we can meaningfully discuss unconsciousness-the alleged lack of consciousness-we	must,	of	course,	have	clarity	regarding	the	meaning	of	the word 'consciousness.' What does it mean to say that a mental process is conscious? In this paper, I shall use a rigorous definition well-accepted in neuropsychology, neuroscience and philosophy of mind: mental activity is conscious if,	and	only	if,	there	is	something-anything-it	is	like	to	have	such mental	activity	in	and	of	itself	(Nagel	1974,	Chalmers	2003).	(A	less	rigorous	but more easily understandable formulation of this definition is this: mental activity is conscious if there is something it feels like to have such mental activity	in	and	of	itself.	The	verb	'to	feel,'	however,	is	too	ambiguous	to	be	used in a rigorous definition, so philosophers of mind have reached consensus around the formulation I originally proposed above.) This way, if mental activity is	unconscious,	then	there is	nothing	it is like	to	have	such	activity in and	of itself,	even	if it, in	turn,	causes	or influences	conscious	activity.	Notice that	this	definition	of	consciousness	honors	our	intuitive	understanding	of	the word: you only consider yourself conscious right now because there is something	it	is	like	to	be	you	while	you	read	this	paper.	Otherwise,	you	would necessarily	be	unconscious. To	remain	consistent	with	our	intuitive	understanding	of	words,	I	shall	also	say that	mental activity corresponds to experience if, and only if, it is conscious. You	experience	reading	this	paper	because	you	are	conscious	of	it	right	now.	If you	were	not,	what	sense	would	there	be	in	saying	that	you	experience	it? 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 76 Analytic	Idealism 76 According to these definitions, higher-order thought (as defined in Schooler 2002: 340) is unnecessary for there to be consciousness. The presence of the mere	qualities	of raw	experience-which	philosophers	of	mind	call	qualia-is already sufficient for a mental process to be considered conscious. In this context, the categorization proposed by Schooler is helpful: he distinguishes between "non-conscious (unexperienced), conscious (experienced), and	metaconscious (re-represented)" mental processes (2002: 339). Only the latter entails	higher-order	thought. Now	notice	that	direct	insight	into	one's	conscious	inner	life	is	limited	to	those experiences	one's	ego	can	access	through	introspection	and	then	report	to	self or others. In the words of Klein, "It is only in virtue of knowledge by acquaintance that we know our mental states. ... Accordingly, the use of introspective	reports	as	a	reliable	and	informative	source	of	information	about mental states has seen a resurgence over the past few decades" (2015: 361, original emphasis). For this reason, the study of the Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCCs) still largely consists in correlating objective measurements of neural activity	with introspective assessments (Koch 2004): patterns	of	neural	activity	accompanied	by	reported	experience	are	considered NCCs. Indeed, as Newell and Shanks recently wrote, "Whereas issues about how to define and measure awareness were once highly prominent and controversial,	it	now	seems	to	be	generally	accepted	that	awareness	should	be operationally	defined	as	reportable	knowledge"	(2014:	15). The	problem	is that,	as I shall shortly	elaborate	upon, for the	subject's	ego	to access	and	report	an	experience	there	must	be:	(a)	an	associative	link	between the	ego	and	the	experience;	and	(b)	a	meta-conscious	re-representation	of	the experience. Therefore, while subjects can report non-dissociated metaconscious processes, they fundamentally cannot distinguish between truly unconscious processes and conscious processes that simply aren't metaconscious,	for	both	types	are	equally	unreportable	to	self	and	others.	This	is	an alarming conclusion, for much of the work indicating the presence of an unconscious is	based	on	(the lack	of) introspective	reports	of	experience.	The next	two	sections	expand	on	all	this. In what follows, I shall assume that introspective reports are as good as "reliable,	relevant,	immediate,	and	sensitive"	(Newell	and	Shanks	2014:	3).	This is charitable towards the hypothesis of an unconscious, for-as Newell and Shanks argued (2014)-much of the evidence behind this hypothesis can be attributed to methodological artifacts: delayed introspective assessments leading to impaired	recall,	experimenters	not	providing	sufficient	opportunity for subjects to report the introspective insights they actually have, cross-task confusion,	etc.	My	goal is to	show	that,	even if the	research	underpinning	the existence	of	an	unconscious	were	free	of	methodological	artifacts,	there	would still be compelling reasons to posit that	mental processes unaccompanied by introspective	reports	of	experience	can	be	conscious	nonetheless. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 77 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 77 5.4 Non-self-reflective	experiences To	gain introspective	access to	an	experience it is	not	enough	to	merely	have the	experience;	we	must	also	consciously	know	that	we	have	it.	After	all,	what introspective insight could	we gain about an experience of	which	we are not explicitly	aware?	Schooler	elaborates: Critical to both the centrality of the conscious/non-conscious distinction, and its equation	with reportability, is the assumption that people	are	explicitly	aware	of	their	conscious	experiences.	However,	this assumption	is	challenged	when	subjective	experience	is	dissociated	from the explicit awareness of that experience. Such dissociations demonstrate the importance of distinguishing between consciousness and	'meta-consciousness.'	(2002:	339.) The conscious knowledge	of the experience-which comes in addition to the experience	itself-is	what	Schooler	calls	a	"re-representation": Periodically attention is directed towards explicitly assessing the contents of experience. The resulting meta-consciousness involves an explicit re-representation of consciousness in which one interprets, describes,	or	otherwise	characterizes	the	state	of	one's	mind.	(2002:	339340,	emphasis	added.) Although re-representation is necessary for introspection, it is largely absent, for instance, in dreams (Windt and Metzinger 2007). This demonstrates compellingly	that	mental	activity	does	not	need	to	be	re-represented	in	order	to be experienced-after all, who can seriously doubt that dreams are experienced?-but	only	to	be	introspectively	accessed.	During	ordinary	dreams we	simply	experience,	without	consciously	knowing	that	we	experience. More formally, suppose that one has an experience	X. To gain introspective access to X one must have conscious knowledge N of X. But N-the "rerepresentation"-is	a	separate	experience	in	its	own	right.	One	experiences	the knowing	of	X	as	a	quality	closely	related	to,	but	distinct	from,	X itself.	N	is	not encompassed, entailed or implied by	X. Indeed, Schooler highlights the fact that	re-representations	can	even	misrepresent	the	original	experiences: Once meta-consciousness is triggered, translation dissociations can occur if the re-representation process misrepresents the original experience.	Such	dissociations	are	particularly likely	when	one	verbally reflects on non-verbal experiences or attempts to take stock of ambiguous or subtle perceptual experiences. (2002: 340, emphasis added.) To	make	these	abstract	considerations	more	concrete,	consider	your	breathing right	now:	the	sensation	of	air	flowing	through	your	nostrils,	the	movements	of your diaphragm, the inflation and	deflation of your lungs, etc.	Were you	not experiencing these	sensations	a	moment	ago,	before I	directed	your	attention 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 78 Analytic	Idealism 78 to	them?3	Or	were	you	just	unaware	that	you	were	experiencing	them	all	along? By	directing	your	attention	to	these	sensations,	did	I	make	them	conscious	or did I simply cause you to experience the extra quality of knowing that the sensations	were	conscious?	Clearly,	even	waking	experiences	can	occur	without re-representation. Re-representations are the product of a self-reflective configuration of consciousness,	whereby the latter turns in upon itself so to objectify its own contents	(Kastrup	2014:	104-110).	In	humans,	this	usually	occurs	through	the	use of	"semiotic	mediation"	(Valsiner	1998),	which	is	our	ability	to	re-represent	our experiences	by	naming	them	explicitly	or	implicitly.	Gillespie	gives	an	example: "In	order	to	obtain	dinner	one	must	first	name	...	one's	hunger	...	This	naming, which	is	a	moment	of	self-reflection,	is	the	first	step	in	beginning	to	construct, semiotically,	a	path	of	action	that	will	lead	to	dinner"	(2007:	678). Naturally,	nothing	prevents	experiences	from	occurring	outside	the	field	of	selfreflection-that is, occurring without being explicitly or implicitly named. Nixon,	for	instance,	calls	these	"unconscious	experiences"	(2010:	216),	which	in my	view	is	an	oxymoron	but	illustrates	the	subtlety	of	the	point.	He	lists	several examples: blindsight (Stoerig and Cowey 1997), prosopagnosia (Sacks 1985), sleepwalking,	post-hypnotic	suggestion,	etc.	Indeed,	the	emergence	of	so-called "no-report paradigms" in contemporary neuroscience attests to the abundant presence	of	waking	experiences	that	are	unreportable	because	they	fall	outside the	field	of	self-reflection	(Tsuchiya	et	al.	2015,	Vandenbroucke	et	al.	2014). Moreover, the neural activity patterns of the NCCs themselves suggest circumstantially-yet compellingly-that	many	NCCs correspond	merely to a self-reflective	configuration	of consciousness.	To see this,	notice first that the conscious	knowledge	N	of	an	experience	X	is	triggered	by	the	occurrence	of	X. For instance, it is the occurrence of a sense perception that triggers the realization	that	one	is	perceiving	something.	N, in	turn,	evokes	X	by	directing attention	back	to	it:	the	realization	that	one	is	perceiving	something	naturally shifts	one's	mental	focus	back	to	the	original	perception.	So	we	end	up	with	a back-and-forth	cycle	of	evocations	whereby	X	triggers	N,	which	in	turn	evokes X,	which	again	triggers	N,	and	so	forth.	See	Figure	5.1	for	an	illustration. 3 Notice that attention is required to explicitly assess an experience at a metacognitive-that	is,	self-reflective-level. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 79 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 79 Figure	5.1:	Illustrative	caricature	of	oscillatory	evocations	between	an experience	(X)	and	the	meta-conscious	knowledge	of	the	experience	(N). As	it	turns	out,	recent	characterizations	of	the	NCCs	show	precisely	this	pattern of reverberating back-and-forth communications between different brain regions (Dehaene and Changeux 2011, Boly et al. 2011, van Gaal et al. 2011). When damage to the primary visual cortex presumably interrupts this reverberation,	patients	display	blindsight	(Paller	and	Suzuki	2014:	387)-that	is, the ability to correctly discriminate moving objects despite the reported inability to see them. This is precisely what one would expect if the reverberation in question	were the oscillations between	X and	N: the objects are consciously perceived-therefore explaining how the patients can discriminate them-but the patients do not know that they consciously perceive	the	objects. I	thus	submit	that	many	NCCs	are, in	fact,	the	correlates	only	of	a	potentially very small subset of consciousness-namely, meta-consciousness or selfreflection-instead of consciousness proper. The introspectively inaccessible character of experience that isn't re-represented constitutes the first mechanism	through	which	seemingly	unconscious	mental	activity	may,	in	fact, be conscious.	There is yet another	mechanism,	which	will be explored in the next	section. 5.5 Dissociated	experiences Dissociative states are well recognized in psychiatry today, featuring prominently in the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association 2013). Their hallmark is "a	disruption	of	and/or	discontinuity in the	normal integration	of consciousness, memory, identity, emotion, perception, body representation, motor control, and behavior" (Black and Grant 2014: 191). In other words, dissociation	entails	fragmentation	of	the	contents	of	consciousness. There	are	different	forms	of	dissociation.	Klein	(2015),	for	instance,	discusses	a form in	which the subject's ego loses the sense of ownership of some of the subject's own mental states. This occurs when consciousness can no longer N	X 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 80 Analytic	Idealism 80 "relate to its object in a particular, self-referential way" (Klein 2015: 362).	He lists	several	examples,	such	as	the	case	of	a	man	who,	after	an	accident,	could accurately report the content of his	memories but "was unable to experience that	content	as	his	own"	(Klein	2015:	368).	Notice,	however,	that	the	man's	ego could	still	access	the	content;	just	not	identify	with	it. In	what	follows,	I	shall	focus	on	a	strong	form	of	dissociation	in	which	the	ego cannot even access certain contents of consciousness. In its pathological variations, this is known as Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID). A person suffering from	DID exhibits	multiple, disjoint centers of consciousness called alters.	Each	alter	experiences	the	world	as	a	distinct	personality	(Braude	1995). Although	there	has	been	debate	about	the	authenticity	of	DID	as	a	psychiatric condition-after	all, it is	conceivable	that	patients	could	fake	it-research	has confirmed	DID's legitimacy (Kelly	et al. 2009: 167-174	& 348-352).	Two recent studies	are	particularly	interesting	to	highlight.	In	2015,	doctors	reported	on	the case of a German woman who exhibited a variety of alters (Strasburger and Waldvogel). Peculiarly, some of her alters claimed to be blind while others could	see	normally.	Through	EEGs,	the	doctors	were	able	to	ascertain	that	the brain	activity	normally	associated	with	sight	wasn't	present	while	a	blind	alter was	in	control	of	the	woman's	body,	even	though	her	eyes	were	open.	When	a sighted	alter	assumed	executive	control,	the	usual	brain	activity	returned.	This is a sobering result that shows the literally	blinding power of dissociation. In another study (Schlumpf et al. 2014), investigators performed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) brain scans on both DID patients and actors simulating DID. The scans of the actual patients displayed clear and significant differences when compared to those of the actors. Undoubtedly, thus,	DID	is	real. Normally,	only	one	of	the	alters	has	executive	control	of	the	body	at	any	given moment.	The	important	question	for	the	purposes	of	the	present	paper	is	then this:	Can	the	other	alters,	who	are	not	in	control	of	the	body,	remain	conscious or	do	they	simply	fade	into	unconsciousness?	If	they	can	remain	conscious,	the implication is that a person can have multiple concurrent but dissociated centers of consciousness, as originally hypothesized by Frederic Myers and Pierre Janet (Kelly	et al. 2009: 305-317).	Presumably, then, each	center	has its own	private,	parallel	stream	of	experiences. Occasionally,	however,	the	dissociation	isn't	bilateral:	a	first	alter	is	able	to	gain partial access to the experiences of a second,	without the second alter being able to access the experiences of the first. This rare kind of unilateral dissociation provides tantalizing indications that alters can remain conscious even	when	not	in	control	of	the	body.	In	Morton	Prince's	well-known	study	of the 'Miss	Beauchamp	case'	of	DID,	one	of the	alters-called	Sally-"was	a	coconscious	personality	in	a	deeper	sense.	When	she	was	not	interacting	with	the world,	she	did	not	become	dormant,	but	persisted	and	was	active"	(Kelly	et	al. 2009:	318).	Sally	maintained	that	she	knew everything Miss Beauchamp ... does at the time she does it,-knows what she thinks, hears	what she says, reads	what she	writes, and sees 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 81 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 81 what	she	does;	that	she	knows	all	this	as	a	separate	co-self,	and	that	her knowledge	does	not	come	to	her	afterwards	...	in	the	form	of	a	memory. (Prince,	as	quoted	in	Kelly	et	al.	2009:	318) Stephen	Braude's	more recent	work reinforces the	view that	alters	can	be	coconscious "discrete centers of self-awareness" (1995: 67). He points-as evidence for this hypothesis-at the struggle of different alters for executive control of the body and the fact that alters "might intervene in the lives of others [i.e. other alters], intentionally interfering with their interests and activities, or at least playing mischief on them" (Braude 1995: 68). It thus appears that	alters can	not	only	be	concurrently conscious,	but that they	can also	vie	for	dominance	with	each	other. Strong dissociation is not restricted to DID-its extreme form-or to pathology, for that matter. Indeed, the foundational hypothesis of depth psychology entails a form of natural dissociation between the conscious ego and the so-called 'unconscious.' As such, it is plausible-in fact, there is overwhelming	clinical	evidence for it in	the	annals	of	depth	psychology-that we all have at least one dissociated	mental subsystem that	we cannot access through introspection. Ernest Hilgard (1977) conceived of these dissociated subsystems	as	conscious,	much	as	Myers,	Janet	and	Braude	did. Thus, the possibility that presents itself to us is that	we	may all have one or more	conscious	'others'	within	ourselves,	dissociated	from	our	ego.	If	this	is	so, then (a) our ego ordinarily has no introspective access to the experiences of these 'others';	and,	consequently,	(b)	the	study	of	the	NCCs	is largely	blind	to the	potentially idiosyncratic	patterns	of	neural activity corresponding to such dissociated experiences. This is the second mechanism through which apparently	unconscious	mental	activity	may,	after	all,	be	conscious. 5.6 A	model	of	dissociation Wegner (2002) proposes an analogy for explaining alters: different operating systems running on the same hardware. This way, the transfer of executive control from one alter to another would be analogous to shutting down Windows and rebooting the computer with Linux. This, of course, only accounts	for	strictly	alternating	personalities	and	thus	fails	to	explain	much	of the	clinical	data	cited	above.	Nonetheless,	it	still	suggests	a	starting	point	for	a plausible	model	of	dissociation. If	we	define	an	experiential frame	as	the	set	of	all	qualities	we	experience	at	a given	moment-encompassing	our	conscious	perceptions,	thoughts,	emotions, bodily	sensations,	imagination,	etc.-conscious	life	can	be	modeled	as	a	chain of experiential frames. This is graphically illustrated in Figure 5.2, wherein experiential frames	F1 to	Fn are shown.	Each frame is	evoked	by the	previous frame through cognitive associations, in the sense that e.g. our particular thoughts in the present moment largely determine which emotions we experience in the	next	moment;	or that	our	emotions in the	present	moment largely determine our actions-and therefore perceptions-in the next 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 82 Analytic	Idealism 82 moment;	and	so	on.	These	cognitive	associations	are	represented	by	the	arrows linking	frames	together	in	Figure	5.2. Figure	5.2:	Conscious	life	as	a	chain	of	experiential	frames	connected	through cognitive	associations. Wegner's suggestion can then be visualized as in Figure 5.3. The chain of experiential	frames-denoted	F-corresponding	to	a	first	alter	is	interrupted	by experiential frames-denoted F'-corresponding to a second alter. The key point	is	that,	once	executive	control	is	assumed	by	the	experiential	frames	F'	of the	second	alter,	the	corresponding	experiential	frames	F	of	the	first	alter	cease to	exist.	There	is	no	parallelism	of	experience:	either	the	mental	contents	of	the first alter are experienced or those of the second alter; never those of both concurrently.	As such, this is a sequential	model of dissociation and, as	we've seen,	it	isn't	sufficient	to	explain	the	clinical	data	cited. Figure	5.3:	The	sequential	model	of	dissociation	in	the	context	of	DID. Alternatively,	we	can	hypothesize	that	the	chains	of	experiential	frames	of	both alters	are	always	present,	concurrently	and	in	parallel.	Executive	control	of	the body	simply	switches	between	the	two	parallel	chains,	as	shown	in	Figure	5.4. Experiential frames drawn in grey represent those	without executive control, but	still	conscious.	This	is	thus	a	parallel	model	of	dissociation,	which	illustrates the hypothesis of "co-consciousness" (a term originally coined by Morton Prince,	as	discussed	by	Kelly	et	al.	2009:	317). F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 Fn	... F1 F2 F'3 F'4 F5 Fn	... Alter	1 Alter	2 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 83 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 83 Figure	5.4:	The	parallel	model	of	dissociation	in	the	context	of	DID. We	have	seen	that	DID	is	a	pathological	form	of	dissociation,	but	that	we	may all	naturally	have strongly	dissociated	mental subsystems that	never-or	very seldom-vie	for	executive	control	of	the	body.	These	would	constitute	the	socalled 'unconscious' of depth psychology. Figure 5.5 illustrates how such strongly dissociated	mental subsystems can be	modeled under the proposed framework. For simplicity, only the ego and one dissociated subsystem are shown. The 'other' in this case-represented by the dissociated chain of experiential frames F'-is content to live its inner life in the background of egoic	activity.	It	only	manifests	its	presence	through	indirect,	subtle	influences on	egoic	experiences,	as	represented	by	the	dashed	arrows	vertically	linking	the two	chains.	These	subtle influences	can	take	many	forms,	such	as:	dissociated emotions influencing	our	egoic thoughts	and	behaviors (Lynch	and	Kilmartin 2013: 100); dissociated beliefs and expectations influencing our egoic perceptions (Eagleman	2011: 20-54);	dissociated	drives	manifesting themselves symbolically	in	the	form	of	dreams	(von	Franz	and	Boa	1994,	Jung	2002,	Fonagy et	al.	2012);	etc. Figure	5.5:	The	parallel	model	of	dissociation	in	a	depth-psychological	context. Admittedly,	limitations	in	our	ability	to	gauge	consciousness	currently	prevent us	from	asserting	with	certainty,	on	an	empirical	basis,	that	the	parallel	model of	dissociation is	correct.	However,	by	the	same	token,	we	can	also	not	assert that it isn't. The brain seems to have sufficient resources for this kind of ... ... Alter	1 Alter	2 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 Fn F'3 F'4 F'5 F'n	F'1 F'2 ... ... Ego	chain Dissociated	chain F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 Fn F'3 F'4 F'5 F'n	F'1 F'2 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 84 Analytic	Idealism 84 parallelism	and,	if	anything,	the	clinical	data	is	suggestive	of	its	validity	(again, Kelly et al. 2009: 305-322 and Braude 1995). The parallel model should, therefore,	be	considered	not	only	plausible	but	perhaps	even	probable,	in	which case it further	substantiates	the	notion	that	the 'unconscious'	may	be-well- conscious. 5.7 Discussion I	have elaborated	on the	hypothesis that there	may	be	no such	a thing	as an unconscious mental process. All mental processes may be conscious, in the sense	that	there	may	be	something it is like	to	have	such	mental	processes in and	of	themselves.	Our	impression	that	some	mental	processes	are	unconscious may arise from (a) their consisting in non-self-reflective experiences not amenable to introspection or (b) their being strongly dissociated from the executive	ego	and,	therefore,	inaccessible	to	it. Underlying this entire paper is the differentiation between consciousness proper and particular configurations of consciousness, such as self-reflection and dissociative states. It is rather disturbing how often these notions are conflated not only in general psychology, but also in neuroscience and philosophy of	mind. For instance, a relatively recent article (Gabrielsen 2013) talks about the emergence of consciousness in human babies when what is discussed is-as per the argument developed in this paper-likely to be the emergence	of	meta-consciousness.4 Dijksterhuis	and	Nordgren	also	"define	conscious	thought	as	object-relevant	or task-relevant cognitive or affective thought processes that occur while the object or task is the focus of one's conscious attention" (2006: 96, emphasis added).	They	insist,	"it is	very	important	to	realize	that	attention is the	key	to distinguish [sic] between unconscious thought and conscious thought. Conscious	thought	is	thought	with	attention"	(Dijksterhuis	and	Nordgren	2006, emphasis	added).	In	appealing	to	attention,	as	opposed	to	experience	or	qualia, they are implicitly associating consciousness with self-reflection or rerepresentation,	as	discussed	in	Section	5.4. Even	more	strikingly,	Cleeremans	(2011)	explicitly	defines	consciousness	as	selfreflection. He overtly conflates experience with meta-consciousness and reportability: Awareness, on the other hand, always seems to minimally entail the ability	of	knowing	that	one	knows.	This	ability,	after	all,	forms	the	basis for the verbal reports we take to be the most direct indication of awareness.	And	when	we	observe	the	absence	of	such	ability	to	report	on the	knowledge	involved	in	our	decisions,	we	rightfully	conclude	that	the decision	was	based	on	unconscious	knowledge.	Thus,	it	is	when	an	agent 4	For clarity, by "emergence of meta-consciousness" I mean here the early, or even precursor,	stages	of	meta-consciousness. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 85 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 85 exhibits	knowledge	of	the	fact	that	he	is	sensitive	to	some	state	of	affairs that we take this agent to be a conscious agent. This second-order knowledge, I argue, critically depends on learned systems of meta representations, and forms the basis for conscious experience. (Cleeremans	2011:	3) This	isn't	a	recent	problem.	When	one	reads	the	original	texts	of	the	founders of	depth	psychology	whilst	holding	the	distinction	between	consciousness	and meta-consciousness in mind, one quickly realizes that, when they spoke of unconsciousness,	the	founders	often	meant	a	lack	of	meta-consciousness-not of experience proper. This is abundantly evident, for instance, in an essay written	by	Carl	Jung	in	the	1920s	or	early	1930s,	called	"The	Stages	of	Life"	(Jung 2001:	97-116). It could be argued that the distinction between experience and metaconsciousness	is	merely	a	semantic	point.	However,	consider	this:	by	conflating consciousness proper with self-reflective consciousness, we also indirectly equate non-self-reflective consciousness with unconsciousness; we absurdly imply that dreams-which largely lack self-reflection (Windt and Metzinger 2007)-aren't experienced. Instead of the three categories proposed by Schooler-namely, "non-conscious (unexperienced), conscious (experienced), and	meta-conscious (re-represented)" (2002: 339)-we are left	with only two: non-conscious	and	meta-conscious.	Consequently,	we	are	forced	to	collapse	the conscious	onto	the	non-conscious	and,	in	the	process,	end	up	disregarding	the extraordinary	phenomenon	of	qualities	of	experience.5	Clearly,	this	isn't	merely semantic. Most importantly, the philosophical implications of mistaking consciousness for	meta-consciousness are significant. If some mental processes were truly unconscious	while	others	are	conscious, it	would follow that	consciousness is the product of some specific anatomical and/or functional arrangements of brain	activity.	In	other	words,	consciousness	would	be	derivative,	as	opposed	to fundamental. Philosophically, this would corroborate the ontology of physicalism (Stoljar 2016) while contradicting alternatives like panpsychism (Strawson et al. 2006), cosmopsychism (Shani 2015) and idealism (Kastrup 2017b). It would leave us with no way to circumvent the arguably insoluble 'hard	problem	of	consciousness'	(Chalmers	2003). On the	other	hand, if consciousness is inherent to all	mental	processes, then the specific anatomical and/or functional parameters of different processes correspond merely to different contents and/or configurations of consciousness-that	is,	to	the	particular	qualities	that	are	experienced-but	do not	determine	the	presence	or	absence	of	consciousness	itself.	This	allows	us	to circumvent the 'hard problem of consciousness' altogether, by inferring that consciousness	is	primary.	While	it's	not	my	intent	in	this	paper	to	argue	for	or against any particular ontology of	mind, it is significant that a lucid, critical 5	That is, we end up sweeping the 'hard problem of consciousness' (Chalmers 2003) under	the	rug. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 86 Analytic	Idealism 86 interpretation of the available empirical data leaves more avenues of philosophical	inquiry	open. If	we	are	true	to	the	spirit	of	the	words	'consciousness'	and	'experience,'	diligent in our interpretation of empirical observations-both experimental and clinical-and rigorous in our use of concepts, we are led not only to the conclusion	that	all	mental	processes	may	be	conscious,	but	that	consciousness itself	may	be	fundamental. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 87 6. Self-Transcendence	Correlates	with	Brain	Function Impairment This paper first appeared in the Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics, ISSN: 2166-5087,	Vol.	4,	No.	3,	pp.	33-42,	in	January	2017.	A	summary	of	this	paper	has also	appeared	in	Scientific	American	on	29	March	2017.1 6.1 Abstract A broad pattern of correlations between mechanisms of brain function impairment and self-transcendence is shown. The pattern includes such mechanisms as cerebral hypoxia, physiological stress, transcranial magnetic stimulation, trance-induced physiological effects, the action of psychoactive substances and	even	physical trauma to the	brain. In all these cases, subjects report self-transcending experiences often described as "mystical" and "awareness-expanding," as well as self-transcending skills often described as "savant."	The	idea	that	these	correlations	could	be	rather	trivially	accounted	for on the basis of disruptions to inhibitory neural processes is reviewed and shown to be implausible. Instead, this paper suggests that an as-of-yet unrecognized	causal	principle	underlying	the	entire	pattern	might	be	at	work, whose further elucidation through systematic research could hold great promise. 6.2 Introduction In	this	paper,	'self-transcendence'	is	defined	as	the	abrupt-thus	not	gradual- broadening	of	one's sense	of self through	a	step-function	enrichment	of	one's subjective	inner	life.	This	can	happen,	for	instance,	when	one	suddenly	acquires (a)	a	feeling	that	one	is	no	longer	confined	to	the	spatio-temporal	locus	of	the physical	body; (b)	entirely	new	mental skills that	one	has	never	attempted to develop through learning or training; or (c) unfamiliar emotions, insights or inner	imagery.	This	essay	attempts	to	show	that	there	is	a	consistent	pattern	of correlations between self-transcendence-so defined-and a broad variety of brain	function	impairment	mechanisms.	In	other	words,	several	types	of	brain function impairment	are	consistently	accompanied	by	richer inner life.	This is counterintuitive	and	suggests	a	common	underlying	causal	principle	yet	to	be understood	in	its	full	scope. In	the	next	sections,	several	mechanisms	of	brain	function	impairment	and	the resulting	self-transcendence	effects	will	be	reviewed.	The	goal	is	to	establish	a broad pattern by highlighting the similarities of the mechanisms and their effects. 1	At	the	time	of	this	writing,	the	Scientific	American	essay	was	freely	available	online	at: https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/transcending-the-brain/. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 88 Analytic	Idealism 88 6.3 Cerebral	hypoxia Fainting	or	near-fainting	caused	by	restrictions	of	oxygen	supply	to	the	brain	is known to induce liberating feelings of self-transcendence. For instance, the potentially	fatal	'choking	game'	played	by	teenagers	worldwide	(Macnab	2009) is	an	attempt	to	induce	such	feelings	through	partial	strangulation	(Neal	2008: 310-315). The psychotherapeutic technique of holotropic breathwork (Rhinewine and	Williams 2007), as well as more traditional yogic breathing practices, use hyperventilation to achieve similar effects: by increasing blood alkalinity levels, they interfere with normal oxygen uptake in the brain and ultimately lead to what is described as an expansion of ordinary awareness (Taylor 1994). Even straightforward hyperventilation outside a therapeutic context can lead to self-transcending experiences, such as described in this anecdotal-though	representative-report: One	of	us	stood	against	a	tree	and	breathed	deeply	for	a	while	and	then took a very deep breath.	Another pushed	down	hard on	his ribcage	... This	rendered	the	subject	immediately	unconscious	...	When	I	tried	it,	I didn't	think	it	would	work,	but	then	suddenly	I	was	in	a	meadow	which glowed	in	yellow	and	red,	everything	was	extremely	beautiful	and	funny. This	seemed	to	last	for	ages.	I	must	say	that	I	have	never	felt	such	bliss ever	again.	(Retz	2007) Finally, pilots undergoing G-force induced Loss of Consciousness (G-LOC)- whereby	blood	is	forced	out	of	the	brain,	causing	hypoxia-report	"memorable dreams"	phenomenologically	similar	to	near-death	experiences	(Whinnery	and Whinnery	1990),	which	are	notoriously	self-transcending	in	character. 6.4 Generalized	physiological	stress Near-Death	Experiences	(NDEs)	are	the	prime	examples	of	self-transcendence associated	with	dramatically reduced	brain function	due to	e.g. cardiac	arrest (van	Lommel	2001).	They reportedly	entail life-transforming	phenomenality- encompassing insights, emotions and rich inner imagery-far surpassing the envelop of ordinary experiences (Kelly et al. 2009: 367-421), despite overwhelming disruption to the brain's ability to operate.	A recent and	wellpublicized	NDE,	which	occurred	while	the	patient	was	under	close	supervision of	medical	staff,	captures	this	self-transcendent	dimension.	In	the	patient's	own words: I	certainly	don't feel reduced	or	smaller in	any	way.	On	the	contrary, I haven't ever	been this	huge, this	powerful,	or this	all-encompassing.	... [I]	felt	greater	and	more	intense	and	expansive	than	my	physical	being. (Moorjani	2012:	69) In	a	related	manner,	traditional	initiatory	rituals	in	pre-literate	cultures	sought to reveal the true nature of self and world through physical ordeals (Eliade 2009).	It is	reasonable	to	imagine	that	these	ordeals-such	as	long	sessions	in sweat	lodges,	exposure	to	the	elements,	extreme	exertion	and	even	poisoning- 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 89 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 89 physically compromised brain function through generalized physiological stress,	thereby	inducing	self-transcending	experiences. 6.5 Electromagnetic	impairment The use of transcranial	magnetic stimulation can inhibit activity in localized areas of the brain by impairing the associated electromagnetic fields. As reported in a study (Blanke et al. 2002), when neural activity in the angular gyrus	of	a	patient	with	epilepsy	was	inhibited	in	this	way,	self-transcending	outof-body	experiences	were	induced. 6.6 Trance-induced	impairment During the practice of so-called 'psychography,' an alleged	medium enters a trance state and writes down information allegedly originating from a transcendent	source	beyond	the	medium's	ordinary	self.	A	neuroimaging	study (Peres	2012)	revealed	that	experienced	mediums	displayed	marked	reduction	of activity in key brain regions-such as the frontal lobes and hippocampus- when	compared	to	regular,	non-trance	writing.	Despite	this,	text	written	under trance scored consistently higher in a measure of complexity than material produced	without trance. As an observant science journalist remarked,	more complex	writing typically	would	require	more	activity	in	the	frontal	and	temporal	lobes- but that's precisely the opposite of what was observed. To put this another way, the low level of activity in the experienced mediums' frontal lobes should have resulted in vague, unfocused, obtuse garble. Instead,	it	resulted	in	more	complex	writing	samples	than	they	were	able to	produce	while	not	entranced.	Why?	No	one's	sure.	(DiSalvo	2012) 6.7 Chemical	impairment Psychedelic	substances	have	been	known	to	induce	powerful	self-transcending experiences	(Strassman	2001,	Griffiths	et	al.	2006,	Strassman	et	al.	2008).	It	had been assumed that they did so by exciting parts of the brain. Yet, recent neuroimaging studies have shown that psychedelics do largely the opposite (Carhart-Harris et al. 2012, Palhano-Fontes et al. 2015, Carhart-Harris et al. 2016). 2 In an article he wrote for Scientific American Mind, neuroscientist Christof Koch (2012b) expressed his surprise at these results. Carhart-Harris (2012:	2138),	for	instance,	reported	"only	decreases	in	cerebral	blood	flow"	under the	influence	of	a	psychedelic.	Perhaps	even	more	significantly,	"the	magnitude 2	A later study performed at the University of Zürich has confirmed this further, showing	that	a	psychedelic	causes	"significantly	reduced	absolute	perfusion"	(that	is, blood flow) in just about every region of the brain, whilst leading to "profound subjective	drug	effects"	(Lewis	et	al.	2017). 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 90 Analytic	Idealism 90 of this decrease [in brain activity] predicted the intensity of the subjective effects" of the psychedelic (ibid.). As such, the significant self-transcending experiences that follow psychedelic intake are-counterintuitively- accompanied	by	reductions	of	brain	activity. 6.8 Physical	damage If	the	trend	above	is	consistent,	we	should	expect	some	types	of	physical	brain damage to	also	correlate	with self-transcending	experiences.	And indeed, this has	been reported. In	a recent study (Cristofori 2016),	CT	scans	of	more than one hundred Vietnam	War veterans showed that damage to the frontal and parietal lobes increased the likelihood of self-transcending "mystical experiences." In a	previous study (Urgesi	et al. 2010),	patients	were evaluated before and after brain surgery for the removal of tumors, which caused collateral damage in surrounding tissue. Statistically significant increases in feelings	of	self-transcendence	were	reported	after	the	surgery. The	self-transcending	character	of	experiences	that	accompany	certain	types	of brain	injury	has	been	evocatively	described	by	neuroanatomist	Jill	Bolte	Taylor, following	a	stroke	that	damaged	her	brain's	left	hemisphere: my	perception	of	my	physical	boundaries	was	no	longer	limited	to	where my	skin	met	air.	I	felt	like	a	genie	liberated	from	its	bottle.	The	energy	of my	spirit	seemed	to	flow	like	a	great	whale	gliding	through	a	sea	of	silent euphoria.	(Taylor	2009:	67) The similarity to Moorjani's experience quoted earlier (2012: 69) is striking, despite	the	latter	having	been	caused	by	generalized	physiological	stress,	not	a left-hemisphere	stroke. Not only 'mystical experiences' correlate with brain damage, but also the emergence	of	new	mental	skills.	The	literature	reports	many	cases	of	so-called 'acquired savant syndrome,' wherein an accident or disease leading to brain injury gives rise to genius-level abilities (Lythgoe et al. 2005, Treffert 2006, Treffert	2009:	1354,	Piore	2013).	There	are	examples	of	such	abilities	arising	after meningitis, bullet wounds to the head and even with the progression of dementia	(Miller	et	al.	1998,	2000). 6.9 Discussion As	we've	seen,	there	is	a	broad	pattern	associating	a	variety	of	brain	impairment mechanisms with self-transcending experiences. A potential explanation for this	is	that	brain	function	impairment	could	disproportionally	affect	inhibitory neural processes, thereby generating or bringing into awareness other neural processes associated with self-transcending experiences. There are, however, problems	with	this	explanation. Under the physicalist assumption that experience is constituted or generated by	brain	activity,	an	increase	in	the	richness	of	experience-as	often	entailed	by 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 91 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 91 self-transcendence-must be accompanied by an increase in the	metabolism associated	with	the	neural	correlates	of	experience	(Kastrup	2016b).	This is	so because	(a)	there	supposedly	is	nothing	to	experience	but	its	neural	correlates; and	(b)	richer	experience	spans	a	broader	information	space	in	awareness	that only increased	metabolism can create in the physical substrate of the brain. Any other alternative would decouple experience from the workings of the living	brain	information-wise,	contradicting	physicalism.	As	such,	it	is	difficult to	see	why	a	reduction	of	oxygen	supply	to	the	brain	as	a	whole-as	in	partial strangulation,	hyperventilation,	G-LOC,	cardiac	arrest, etc.-would selectively affect	inhibitory	neural	processes,	while	maintaining	enough	oxygen	supply	to feed	an	increase	in	the	neural	correlates	of	experience. Alternatively,	one	could	speculate	that	self-transcending	experiences	occur	only after	normal	brain function	resumes, subsequent to	e.g. restoration	of	oxygen supply.	This,	however,	cannot	account	for	several	of	the	cases	reviewed	above. For instance, during the neuroimaging studies of the psychedelic state (e.g. Carhart-Harris et al. 2012) researchers collected subjective reports of selftranscendence while concurrently monitoring the subjects' reduced brain activity levels. The same holds for the neuroimaging study of psychography (Peres 2012). Similarly, in the case of acquired savant (e.g. Treffert 2006, Treffert	2009:	1354)	new	mental	skills	are	also	concomitant	with	the	presence	of physical damage in the brain. And even in the case of NDEs, there are arguments for why confabulation after resumption of normal brain function cannot	account	for	some	of	the	reported	experiences	(Kelly	et	al.	2009:	419-421). Appeals to impairment of inhibitory processes to explain acquired savant syndrome are particularly difficult to defend.	They	necessarily entail that the savant skills are pre-developed in the brain but remain inhibited. Brain function	impairment	occasioned	by	e.g.	trauma	then	supposedly	unlocks	these dormant skills by shutting down inhibitory processes. One must wonder, however,	how	the	brain	could	have	developed	extraordinary	skills,	such	as	e.g. prodigious	aptitude	for	calculations,	without	any	training.	And	if	these	skills- many	of	which	are	advantageous	for	survival-were	latent	in	us	all,	why	would the	brain	have	evolved	to	keep	them	inhibited	in	the	first	place? It is conceivable that individual cases of self-transcendence could have their own	idiosyncratic	explanation,	unrelated	to	the	other	cases,	and	that	the	overall pattern suggested in this paper is a red herring. For instance, one could tentatively	explain	(a)	the	euphoric	effects	of	hypoxia	by	speculating	that	it	e.g. somehow triggers the brain's reward system, while accounting for (b) the expansion	of	one's	sense	of	identity	beyond	the	physical	body-as	reported	by Taylor (2009:	67)-through	e.g.	damage to the	orientation	association	area	of the	left	brain	hemisphere.	But	given	the	sometimes-striking	similarities in	the phenomenality	reported	across	the	cases	reviewed	and	the	fact	that	all	cases- despite their different mechanisms of action-entail impairment of brain function, the question is whether it is plausible that no common causal principle	is	at	work. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 92 Analytic	Idealism 92 The current data is at least suggestive of a single, yet-unrecognized causal principle	underlying	all	cases.	More	systematic	studies	of	the	subjective	effects of brain function impairment-leveraging e.g. psychedelic compounds and trans-cranial	magnetic	stimulation-in	specific	brain	regions	could	help	unveil this principle. Could one e.g. reliably trigger savant skills or mystical experiences by inhibiting neural activity in particular areas under controlled conditions?	What	would	the	implications	of	such	a	scenario	be?	Questions	such as	these	hold	not	only	great	public	interest,	but	also	high	significance	for	both neuroscience	and	neurophilosophy. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 93 7. Concluding	Remarks 7.1 Matter	as	the	outer	appearance	of	inner	experience The	ontology	discussed	in	this	dissertation	has	at	its	foundation	an	observation as	simple	as	it	is	far-reaching:	matter	is	the	outer	appearance	of	inner	experience. This,	and	only this,	is	what	matter	is.	Nature	generously	teaches	us	this	lesson every	time	we	look	at	a	living	organism's	brain:	the	neural	activity	we	discern	is part	of	what	the	organism's	inner	life	looks	like	when	registered	from	a	secondperson perspective; that is, from across a dissociative boundary. The	matter constituting those neurons is the extrinsic appearance of feeling, emotion, thought, imagination, etc. And since this is what matter is, the inanimate universe-also made of matter-must itself be the extrinsic appearance of universal	inner	life.	After	all,	why	would	matter	be	one	thing	under	one	set	of circumstances-namely,	when	constituting	a	living	brain-and	then	something else under another set of circumstances-namely, when constituting the inanimate	universe	of	rocks,	clouds	and	stars?	This	indicates	that	the	inanimate universe	as	a	whole	must	be,	in	a	certain	sense,	akin	to	a	brain.	And	indeed,	the network topology	of the	universe at its largest scales	does resemble that of a brain (Krioukov	et al. 2012); so	much	so that	astrophysicist	Franco	Vazza	and neuroscientist	Alberto	Feletti	considered	the	similarity	"truly	remarkable"	and "striking": It is truly	a	remarkable fact that	the	cosmic	web is	more	similar to	the human	brain than it is to the interior	of	a	galaxy;	or that the	neuronal network	is	more	similar	to	the	cosmic	web	than	it	is	to	the	interior	of	a neuronal body.	Despite extraordinary differences in substrate, physical mechanisms,	and	size,	the	human	neuronal	network	and	the	cosmic	web of galaxies,	when considered	with the tools of information theory, are strikingly	similar.	(2017) Allow	me	to	reiterate	my	point,	in	the	hope	that	repetition	helps	reveal	its	full force: 'matter' is merely the name we give to the extrinsic appearance of conscious	experience,	as	perceived	from	across	a	dissociative	boundary.	There	is nothing	more	to	it.	This	painfully	simple	insight,	repeatedly	intimated	in	nature, is	all	one	needs	to	come	to	a	categorical interpretation	of	natural	phenomena that	answers	all fundamental	questions	and	avoids	all fundamental	problems, such as the 'hard problem of consciousness' and the 'subject combination problem.' 7.2 Alternative	formulations	of	dissociation-based	idealism The	formulation	of idealism	developed	in	this	dissertation	rests	on	the	notion of dissociation-a localized blockage in the excitatory dynamics of universal consciousness-as a primary causal phenomenon inherent to the possible behaviors	of	nature's	sole	ontological	primitive.	In	other	words,	dissociation	is thought	to	explain	life	and	the	world,	as	opposed	to	being	explained	by	them. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 94 Analytic	Idealism 94 But	the	formulation	presented	Chapter	3	is,	in	principle,	not	the	only	one	that could	be	woven	around	this	ground-level	notion	of	dissociation.	One	could,	for instance,	conceive	of	an	alternative	formulation	based	on	the	observation	that regular	dream	images	are	directly	generated	by	our	dreaming	psyche-through self-excitation-already in the very form that they are experienced. In other words,	dream	images	aren't	coded	phenomenal	representations	of	some	other phenomenal dynamics; they aren't extrinsic appearances of qualitatively different intrinsic	views. Instead, they	are	a self-contained	movie	directly	and autonomously generated by our dreaming psyche. So an alternative formulation of idealism could be this: instead of thinking of the inanimate universe as the extrinsic appearance of the states of a transpersonal phenomenal field, the corresponding images could be generated at a level of universal	consciousness	prior	to,	or	underlying,	dissociation	already	in	the	form we	experience	them. To	visualize	this,	imagine	that	alters	of	universal	consciousness-that	is,	living organisms such as you and me-are analogous to the seemingly separate branches of a shrub,	which ultimately come together at the hidden rhizome. This way, dissociation is the process that creates branches by seemingly separating segments of the shrub. But this process operates somewhat superficially, in that it	doesn't	affect the	unitary rhizome. In this	analogy, the inanimate	universe	we	all	seem	to	co-inhabit	is	a	collective	dream	generated	by the rhizome and then broadcast-after some perspectival filtering and adaptation-to	all	branches	already	in	the	form	it is	experienced.	The	Jungian notion	of	a	'collective	unconscious'	(Jung	1991)	capable	of	producing	archetypal dreams	fits	nicely	with	the	hypothesis	I	am	trying	to	describe	here:	according	to it,	the	world	is	the	waking	dream	generated	by	the	'collective	unconscious'	and then	broadcast	to	each	of	our	individual	psyches. This	isn't	as	far-fetched	as	it	may	sound	at	first.	Indeed,	as	discussed	in	Chapter 5, there is an empirically known form of dissociation according to which subjects lose the sense of ownership of their own phenomenal states (Klein 2015).	In	this	context,	it	is	not	unreasonable	to	imagine	that	empirical	reality	is a collective stream of imagination that we lose our sense of ownership of, thereby mistakenly concluding that it corresponds to a world outside and independent	of	consciousness. Nonetheless, such a seemingly elegant formulation of idealism fails because, whereas	it	can	parsimoniously	explain	the	inanimate	universe,	it	cannot	explain the	presence	of	other	conscious	organisms in it.	If	the	collective	dream	we	call 'the	world'	were	broadcast	from	the	rhizome	to	the	individual	branches,	why	or how would one branch experience the presence of other branches-that is, other people and living organisms-in its dream?	After all, two TV receivers tuned	to	the	same	channel	can	display	the	same	movie,	but	not	images	of	each other	within	that	movie. For the same reason that this alternative formulation of idealism does away with	a	transpersonal	phenomenal field	surrounding	the	alters, it	must	also	do away	with the conscious inner life of other living organisms. This effectively 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 95 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 95 reduces	it	to	solipsism	and	renders	redundant	the	very	need	to	explain	a	shared world	to	begin	with. The key difference between this alternative formulation and the analytic idealism	elaborated	in	Chapter	3	is	this:	the	former	entails	that	the	images	on our	personal	screen	of	perception	are	themselves	irreducible.	The	latter,	on	the other	hand,	posits	that	personal	perceptions	are	grounded	in	the	phenomenal states of a transpersonal field, which in turn are qualitatively different from personal	perceptions. Bishop	Berkeley's	formulation	of	idealism	is	similar	to	the	alternative	discussed here, insofar as it also entails that personal perceptions are irreducible. As explained	by	Barfield,	"Berkeley	held	that	...	the	representations	as	such	[that	is, personal	perceptions], are sustained	by	God in the	absence	of	human	beings" (2011: 36, original emphasis). Even some present-day academic philosophers continue to entertain the idea that the contents or qualities of personal perception are themselves irreducible: "In perception, our finite unities of consciousness	come	to	literally	overlap	with	the	unity	of	consciousness	that	is reality"	(Yetter-Chappell	2018).	So	the	phenomenal	states	one	experiences	when one	sees	the	world	are	supposedly	the	same	phenomenal	states	encompassed	by "the	unit	of	consciousness	that is	reality,"	with	which	one	overlaps	during	the act	of	perceiving. I believe that all formulations of idealism entailing such irreducibility of personal perceptions fail, either because of the difficulties discussed in the previous	section	or	at	least	because	of	the	consequences	of	trying	to	circumvent these	difficulties. 7.3 There	are	noumena,	but	they	are	experiential By	maintaining	that	personal	perceptions	are	partially	grounded	in	something outside the	personal self-that is,	outside	alters	of	universal	consciousness-I am positing something at least analogous to what Barfield called the "unrepresented"	(2011)	and	Kant	the	"noumenal."	Indeed,	I	am	maintaining	that there is a shared reality beyond the alters-namely, the experiential states beyond our respective dissociative boundaries-underlying our personal perceptions	of	the	world.	This	shared	reality	would	still	exist	even	if	we	and	all other living	beings	ceased to	be.	So the	noumenal	does	exist,	my	point	being simply that its essential	nature is experiential; the	noumenal itself consists	of experiences, even though these experiences are qualitatively different from personal	perceptions.	In	summary,	according	to	the	ontology	defended	in	this dissertation,	there	are	noumena	but	they	are	experiential.	1 1 Here I am deliberately avoiding the word 'phenomenal'-using the qualifier 'experiential' instead-to avoid confusion: Kant uses the term 'phenomenal' exclusively	in	connection	with	intentional	content,	whereas	I	use	it,	throughout	this dissertation, in its modern analytic sense. According to Ned Block, for instance, "Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 96 Analytic	Idealism 96 Indeed,	Kant	and	Barfield	expressly	did	not	specify	the	ontological	character	of the noumenal and the unrepresented, respectively, so neither is necessarily dichotomous with the experiential. The experiential states that	make up the noumena are not perceptual states of alters, but constitute a transpersonal qualitative	field	surrounding	the	alters. 7.4 The	conundrum	of	spacetime Space	and	time	are	built	into	language:	any	statement	about	what	nature	is	or how	it	works	presupposes	a	spacetime	scaffolding.	Without	extension	in	at	least one dimension, the various states of nature would overlap and become indistinguishable from	one	another. Information	about	nature-as	defined	by Shannon	(1948)-would thus	vanish	and there	would remain literally	nothing to	be	said	about	it. My	earlier	analogy	between	experiences	and	vibrations	of	consciousness	seems to	also	presuppose	a	spacetime	scaffolding	circumscribing	consciousness.	After all, vibrations entail some form of movement in space and time (think of a guitar	string	playing	a	musical	note:	it	moves	up	and	down	as	time	passes).	So	it could be argued that analytic idealism, in addition to consciousness itself, assumes a spacetime scaffolding as extra ontological primitive, wherein consciousness	can	then	'move'	so	to	have	or	produce	particular	experiences.	But this	would	contradict	my	core	claim	that	universal	phenomenal	consciousness is	the	sole	ontological	primitive. For this core claim to	obtain, both space and time	must, instead, be	nothing more	than	qualities	of	experience.	Time	must	exist	only	insofar	as	what	we	call 'past' is an experiential quality characteristic of memory and 'future' an experiential quality characteristic of imagined possibilities or expectations. Space, in turn, must exist only insofar as it is the experiential quality of a certain relationship between perceived objects. This way, spacetime	must be only	an	amalgamation	of	qualities-amenable	to	mathematical	modeling-that themselves exist only in universal consciousness. This is only plausible if (a) physics	remains	viable	without	a	fundamental	spacetime	scaffolding	and	(b)	the felt	sense	of	temporal	flow	associated	with	experience	is	an	illusion. Starting with (a), Einstein's relativity theory arguably implies a static 'block universe'	wherein	the	passage	of	time	is	illusory.	This	realization	has	motivated attempts	by	physicists	to	recast	the	laws	of	physics	without	time	(Barbour	1999, Rovelli 2018) or space (Smolin 2013). Now,	modern quantum gravity theories posit that both space and time-spacetime-are emergent from more fundamental quantum processes (Crowther 2014). Clearly, thus, physics remains viable without the postulate that the spacetime scaffolding is fundamental;	it	may	even	require	that	it	not	be	so. state is	what it is like to be in	that	state"	(1995:	227,	emphasis	added).	According	to this modern definition-and unlike Kant's usage-even purely endogenous experiences,	with	no	intentional	content,	are	phenomenal	states. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 97 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 97 However,	this	may	seem	to	pose	a	problem	for	analytic	idealism,	as	argued	by philosopher	Susan	Schneider: Suppose that our ordinary sense of duration is just an illusion, and reality is timeless. If this is the case, the point shouldn't be that the fundamental	layer	of	reality	is	experiential.	The	point	should	be,	instead, that	fundamental	reality	is	nonexperiential.2 The	conclusion	is	derived	from	Schneider's	intuition	that, if there is no time ... how could there be experience? Conscious experience has a felt quality that involves flow; thoughts seem to be present in the "now," and they change from moment to moment. Timeless	experience	is	an	oxymoron.3 So if time is not fundamental, then neither can experience be-or so her argument	goes. To secure the plausibility of analytic idealism I must, therefore, show that Schneider's intuition here is flawed. Indeed, whereas demonstrating that spacetime is an illusion would likely require multiple doctoral dissertations across a variety of fields, I believe it is possible to show-rather easily-that, insofar	as	Schneider	is	appealing	to	phenomenal	introspection,	her	assertion	that "timeless	experience	is	an	oxymoron"	is	false.4 To	see	it,	consider	these	questions:	Where's	the	past?	Is	it	anywhere	'out	there'? Can	you	point	at	it?	Clearly	not.	What	makes	you	conceive	of	the	idea	of	a	past is the fact that	you	have	episodic	memories.	But these	memories can	only	be referenced	insofar	as	they	are	experienced	now,	as	memories.	There	has	never been	a	point	in	your	entire	life	in	which	the	past	has	been	anything	more	than memories	experienced	now. The	same	applies	to	the	future:	Where's	the	future?	Is	it	anywhere	'out	there'? Can you point at it and say "there is the future"? Clearly not. Our idea of a future	arises from	expectations	and imaginings	experienced	now, always	now, as expectations and imaginings. There has never been a point in your life in which the future has been anything	more than expectations and imaginings experienced	now. Therefore, as far as careful phenomenal introspection can reveal, experience lacks	any	true	temporal	flow.	It	only	ever	happens	now.	Timelessness	seems	to be	precisely	an	intrinsic	property	of	experience.	Time,	on	the	other	hand,	seems 2 See Schneider's essay on Scientific American's Observations blog at: https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/spacetime-emergencepanpsychism-and-the-nature-of-consciousness/. 3	ibid. 4	I	have	published	a	slightly	more	elaborate	version	of	the	argument	that	follows	also on Scientific American's Observations blog, which is available at: https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/do-we-actually-experience-theflow-of-time/. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 98 Analytic	Idealism 98 to	be	merely	a	particular	phenomenal	state	experienced	timelessly;	a	cognitive construct	or	story	we	tell	ourselves	now,	always	now.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	there is compelling empirical evidence supporting the	notion that time is indeed a cognitive	construct	(e.g.	Buonomano	2018,	Eagleman	2009). To	avoid	confusion,	allow	me	to	explicitly	relate	these	ideas	to	the	ontological theses	of	presentism	(the	notion	that	only	present	things	exists,	not	the	past	or the	future)	and	eternalism	(the	notion	that	past,	present	and	future	things	all exist):	with	presentism,	my	claim is that	only the	now can	be	known	to	exist; there is nothing other than the	now insofar as	we can introspectively access; past	and	future,	as	ontological entities outside the	now,	are	merely	theoretical abstractions. However, with eternalism, I also claim that the experiential contents we label as 'past' and 'future'-and which motivate the theoretical abstractions	of	a	past	and	a	future	ontologically	distinct	from	the	now-are	as real as what we call the 'present,' in that	all three exist solely as phenomenal states experienced in the	now.	In	this	latter	sense,	past,	present	and	future	are ontologically equivalent. Indeed, the partitioning of the salient conceptual space	between	presentism	and	eternalism is	not the	most	appropriate for the ideas I am attempting to convey here, and hence should be regarded with caution. To sum it	up, it seems to	be the case that (a)	physics remains entirely viable without	a	fundamental	spacetime	scaffolding	and	(b)	the	felt	sense	of	temporal flow associated	with experience is-at least insofar as	we can assess through careful introspection-an illusion, a story we tell ourselves timelessly. The plausibility of analytic idealism is thus preserved: there is currently no refutation	of	the	notion	that	spacetime	is	merely	an	amalgamation	of	qualities of experience. On the contrary: there are tantalizing signs that spacetime emerges	as	a	cognitive	construct	within	consciousness. But	in	this	case,	I	must	somehow	reconcile	the	hypothesis	that	spacetime	isn't fundamental with the earlier analogy between experiences and vibrations of consciousness.	This	is	what	I	now	set	out	to	do. To	begin	with,	the	analogy	must	be	regarded	solely	as	such:	as	an	analogy.	This way,	experiences	are	like	vibrations	of	consciousness.	The	intent	of	the	analogy is	to	help	one	visualize	how	various	experiences	can	be	distinct	from	each	other without	requiring	that	there	be	anything	to	them	but	consciousness	itself.	As	a matter of fact, I defined experiences as excitations-as opposed to outright vibrations-of consciousness in the hope that the term 'excitation' wouldn't commit	me	as	much	to	dimensional	extension. The	problem	is	that,	if	one	wants	to	talk	about	the	nature	of	reality,	one	must presuppose a metaphorical spacetime scaffolding. This is an unavoidable concession to the limitations of language.	5	Nonetheless, acknowledging that 5 It could be argued here that Kant wrote about the noumena, the things-inthemselves,	without	using	spatiotemporal terms.	Notice,	however, that	Kant	merely postulated	the	existence	of	the	noumena-merely	pointed to them-whilst	insisting, at the same time, that they are fundamentally unknowable and cannot be 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 99 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 99 this	dimensional	scaffolding	is	simply	a	kind	of	illusion	inherently	imposed	by the structure of our cognition doesn't change the practical problem at hand: whatever reality	precedes spacetime	ontologically is	unreachable	by linguistic reasoning. At best, one can articulate projections of this otherwise ineffable reality	onto	the	cognitive	scaffolding	of	spacetime. Here	is	an	analogy	to	illustrate	what	I	mean:	one	cannot	read	a	letter	written	in a	piece	of	paper that	has	been folded	multiple times	over into	a	small,	nearly dimensionless crumple. The characters overlap and the information they contain	becomes indiscernible.	Only	by	unfolding	the	crumple-i.e.	extending the	piece	of	paper-can	one	make	sense	of	the	message	it	bears.	Reality	prior	to spacetime is, in	a sense, like the	paper	crumple:	one	needs to	unfold it along the dimensions of space and time to render it amenable to linguistic articulation. Does	this	mean	that	spacetime-bound	language	can	never	articulate	valid	and meaningful	conclusions?	No.	All it	means	is	that	the	conceptual	systems	built within the framework of spacetime cannot be ultimately true. After all, ex hypothesi, spacetime is merely a cognitive construction. However, those conceptual systems can still be	penultimately true in the sense that they can accurately	correspond	to	something	ontologically	prior	to	dimensionality.	Valid spacetime-bound conclusions can thus be regarded as projected images of ultimate truths, adapted to the requirements and limitations of human reasoning	by	dimensional	extension. This way, to say that experiences are vibrations of universal phenomenal consciousness	admittedly	cannot	be	ultimately	true,	for	consciousness-as	sole ontological	primitive-does	not	occupy	a	spacetime	scaffolding	prior to itself. But it can still	be true in the	penultimate sense that	vibrations	correspond to something true-though ineffable-about consciousness prior to	dimensional extension; that vibrations are akin to an accurate projected image of what ultimately	happens	in	consciousness	when	it	experiences. That	one	cannot	directly	say	something	coherent	about	an	ultimate	truth	does not invalidate penultimate conceptual constructs. They can still tell one something	indirectly	true	about	what	reality	is	and	how	works. characterized.	He	also	did	not approach the	problem	of explaining	how	perception arises	from	the	noumena.	If	Kant	had	made	any	attempt	to	say	something	about	the noumena,	he	would	have	immediately	faced	the	linguistic	limitations	indicated	here, and would have had to adopt spatiotemporal terms. As a matter of fact, in an incoherent	move	already	criticized	by	Arthur	Schopenhauer	in	The	World	as	Will	and Representation (1818),	Kant	talks	of	the	noumena	as	causes	of	perception.	Causality, of course, presupposes spacetime extension, so here we have Kant implicitly characterizing	the	noumena	in	spatiotemporal	terms,	even	though	they	are	supposed to	exist	outside	spacetime. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 100 Analytic	Idealism 100 7.5 Visualizing	the	ontological	primitive As a	matter of fact, space itself can be coherently regarded as the quality of human experience that corresponds most closely to universal phenomenal consciousness, different segments of the latter corresponding to different regions	of	space.	Indeed,	that	two	living	organisms-the	extrinsic	appearances of alters-never occupy the same volume of space reflects the notion that different	alters	are	located	in	different	segments	of	universal	consciousness,	as discussed	in	Chapter	3. Moreover,	that	we	think	of	empty	space	as	a	void,	a	nothing,	reflects	the	notion that unexcited universal consciousness cannot, by definition, be experienced. Even the idea that	unexcited	universal consciousness	must still	have intrinsic properties-otherwise	there	would	be	nothing	to	eventually	get	excited-finds a	correspondence	in	how	we	think	of	space	at	least	since	the	early	20th	century: empty	space,	too,	is	believed	to	be	a	void	with	intrinsic	properties. The	correspondences	here	are	clear:	there	is	a	strong	sense	in	which,	as	far	as human cognition is concerned, empty space is universal consciousness, the contents	of	space	being	excitations	of	universal	consciousness.	Moreover,	since space is simply	a facet	of spacetime, I suggest that it is closer to the truth to think	of	spacetime	as	universal	consciousness	than	as	a	scaffolding	occupied	by universal	consciousness. If one is to	make and talk about	philosophy, it is	unavoidable to frame	one's thoughts	and	discourse in terms	of	spacetime	extension.	For the	true	analytic idealist, this is admittedly a concession, for spacetime is not in the idealist's reduction	base.	The	assertions	made	should	thus	not	be	regarded	as	ultimate. But	they	are	still	true	and	meaningful	as	far	as	they	go. 7.6 Future	work This dissertation is perhaps a first step in reviving idealism in the context of contemporary analytic philosophy. As such, it opens up more avenues of inquiry	than	it	closes.	Here,	I	shall	mention	two	important	topics	that	I	believe deserve	more	thorough	analysis. The first is the philosophical understanding of dissociative processes in the human	psyche	and	the	application	of	Dissociative	Identity	Disorder	(DID)	as	an analogy for universal-level dissociation. An often-repeated criticism against analytic	idealism	is,	for	instance,	that	although	alters	of	universal	consciousness can	clearly	experience	one	another	from	a	second-person	perspective-the	way a	person	can	see	and	even	shake	hands	with	another-the	same	allegedly	isn't the case for the alters of a	DID patient. In other	words, there allegedly isn't anything a first dissociated personality of a DID patient looks like from the perspective	of	a	second	dissociated	personality	of	the	same	patient. The most straightforward answer to this criticism is, of course, that DID is merely	an	analogy:	the	claim	is	not	that	universal	consciousness	literally	suffers from	DID,	but	that	something	like	DID	happens	at	a	universal	level.	There	does 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 101 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 101 not need to be a complete correspondence between human-level DID and universal-level	dissociation	for	the	argument	to	be	valid. Having said that, there are tantalizing indications that the correspondence is more far-reaching than hitherto suggested in this dissertation. For instance, research	has	shown	that	different	alters	of	a	DID	patient	can-and	do-appear as characters in the dreams of the patient (Barrett 1994: 170-171). So there actually	is	something	other	dissociated	personalities	look	like	from	the	point	of view	of	the	host	personality	having	the	dream. More	significantly, the	same	research	has	also	shown	that	different alters of a DID patient can experience the same dream concurrently, each from its own subjective point of view within the dream. This is so significant that one illustrative	example	deserves	extensive	quoting: The	host	personality,	Sarah,	remembered	only	that	her	dream	from	the previous	night involved	hearing a girl screaming for	help.	Alter	Annie, age	four,	remembered	a	nightmare	of	being	tied	down	naked	and	unable to	cry	out	as	a	man	began	to	cut	her	vagina.	Ann,	age	nine,	dreamed	of watching	this	scene	and	screaming	desperately	for	help	(apparently	the voice in the host's dream). Teenage Jo dreamed of coming upon this scene	and	clubbing	the	little	girl's	attacker	over	the	head;	in	her	dream he	fell	to	the	ground	dead	and	she	left.	In	the	dreams	of	Ann	and	Annie, the	teenager	with	the	club	appeared,	struck	the	man	to	the	ground	but he	arose	and renewed	his attack	again.	Four	year	old	Sally	dreamed	of playing with her dolls happily and nothing else. Both Annie and Ann reported	a	little	girl	playing	obliviously	in	the	corner	of	the	room	in	their dreams. Although there was no definite abuser-identified alter manifesting at this time, the presence at times of a hallucinated voice similar to Sarah's uncle suggested there might be yet another alter experiencing	the	dream	from	the	attacker's	vantage.	(ibid.:	171) Taking this at face value for the sake of argument,	what it seems to show is that, while dreaming, a dissociated human psyche can manifest multiple, concurrently	conscious	alters	that	experience	each	other	from	a	second-person perspective,	just	as	a	person	sees	and	shakes	hands	with	another	in	waking	life. The	alters'	experiences	are	also	mutually	consistent,	in	the	sense	that	the	alters all	seem	to	experience	the	same	series	of	events,	each	from	its	own	subjective perspective.	The	correspondence	with	what	is	argued	to	happen	in	the	case	of universal-level	dissociation	is	uncanny. One	may	nonetheless object to this correspondence by pointing out that the alters	of	a	DID	patient	can	only	experience	one	another	from	a	second-person perspective if the host is in a particular state of consciousness-namely, dreaming. But notice that, since universal consciousness is, ex hypothesi, all there is, there is no 'outside world' at its level. So the only state of consciousness conceivably available to it is one entailing self-generated experiences analogous to dreaming. Might we then be alters of universal consciousness	experiencing	one	another	within	a	universal 'dream,' just	as	the alters	of	a	DID	patient	experience	one	another	during	the	patient's	dream? 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 102 Analytic	Idealism 102 It is important to point out, however, that, despite decades of clinical work, research	on	DID	is	still	in	its	infancy.	Indeed,	only	in	the	past	few	years	has	the existence of DID been scientifically established. Our understanding of the psychic processes underlying dissociation is still fairly limited; particularly when it	comes to the	dream-life	of	DID	patients.	As	research	on	human-level dissociation	advances,	we	should	be	in	a	better	position	to	understand	the	true extent	to	which	DID	serves	as	an	analogy	for	universal-level	dissociation. The	second	topic	of	future	work	that	deserves	attention	is	our	understanding	of meta-consciousness and its modeling under the excitation metaphor of experience. I've described this metaphor in Chapter 3: experiences can be regarded as self-excitations of universal phenomenal consciousness. I've also claimed	in	Chapter	5	that	meta-consciousness	reflects	a	particular	configuration of	consciousness.	Bringing	these	two	metaphors	together	is	certainly	feasible:	if we imagine universal phenomenal consciousness as a	membrane-just as	Mtheorists imagine their 'branes'-experiences can	be regarded	as vibrations	of this membrane and meta-consciousness as a particular topological configuration	of the	membrane.	More specifically,	meta-consciousness can	be visualized	as	the	membrane	folding	in	on	itself,	so	that	the	patterns	of	vibration in a first segment of the membrane induce corresponding vibrations in a second	segment	folded	on	top	of	the	first.	The	patterns	of	vibration	in	the	first segment	constitute	a raw	experience,	whereas the	patterns	of	vibration in the second segment constitute the	meta-conscious realization that one is having the	raw	experience. However, since there are many nuances inherent to the notion of metaconsciousness that were not explored in this dissertation, more work is required here. For instance, does meta-consciousness presuppose, entail or imply	a	Heideggerian	sense	of	a	separate	self inhabiting	the	world?	If	so,	how could	this	sense	be	accommodated	by	the	topological	analogy	discussed	above? What	are the	qualitative	differences	between	a raw	experience	and the	metaconscious realization that one is having the raw experience? How do these differences	arise	and	how	can	the	corresponding	mental	processes	be	modeled according	to	the	topological	metaphor?	And	so	forth. It remains	my hope that this dissertation	motivates analytic philosophers to reconsider	idealism	not	only	as	a	viable,	but	perhaps	even	the	most	promising, avenue	for	circumventing	the	fundamental	problems	faced	today	in	ontology.	I hope the ideas presented here are but the seeds for a wave of new developments in the	coming	years	and	decades,	which	will	pursue	with	more depth	and	detail	the	many	avenues	of	reasoning	opened	up	by	this	dissertation. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 103 Appendix	A. Not	Its	Own	Meaning: A	Hermeneutic	of	the	World This	paper	first	appeared	in	Humanities,	ISSN:	2076-0787,	Vol.	6,	No.	3,	Article No.	55,	in	August	2017. A.1 Abstract The contemporary cultural mindset posits that the world has no intrinsic semantic value. The meaning we see in it is supposedly projected onto the world by ourselves. Underpinning this view is the mainstream physicalist ontology,	according	to	which	mind	is	an	emergent	property	or	epiphenomenon of	brains.	As	such,	since	the	world	beyond	brains	isn't	mental,	it	cannot	a	priori evoke anything beyond itself. But a consistent series of recent experimental results suggests strongly that the world may in fact be mental in nature, a hypothesis	openly	discussed	in	the	field	of	foundations	of	physics.	In	this	essay, these experimental results are reviewed and their hermeneutic implications discussed.	If the	world is	mental, it	points	to	something	beyond	its face-value appearances	and	is	amenable	to	interpretation,	just	as	ordinary	dreams.	In	this case,	the	project	of	a	Hermeneutic	of	Everything	is	metaphysically	justifiable. A.2 Introduction To	be	amenable to interpretation, things and	phenomena	must	point	beyond themselves, thereby embodying semantic value or sense. For instance, these squiggles	of	ink	on	paper-which	we	call	written	words-mean	more	than	just squiggles of ink on paper: they point to something beyond themselves. Similarly, the inner imagery we experience in dreams points to something beyond	their	face-value	appearances,	which	has	motivated	depth	psychologists to	develop	extensive	hermeneutics	of	dreams	(e.g.	Ackroyd	1993,	von	Franz	and Boa 1994, Jung 2002, Fonagy et al. 2012). Finally, the symbolisms of religious myths point to something that transcends the face-value appearances of the symbols	themselves	and	engages	people	at	an	emotional	level	(Kastrup	2016a). Influenced by twentieth century positivism and existentialism, the contemporary cultural mindset posits that things and phenomena only have semantic value insofar as we project this value onto them. Summarizing the essence	of	this	mindset,	Sartre	wrote:	"there	exist	concretely	alarm	clocks	...	But ... then I discover myself suddenly as the one who gives its meaning to the alarm clock ... the one who finally makes the values exist" (1992: 77). Analogously,	squiggles	of ink	mean	more	than	squiggles	of ink	only	insofar	as we	stipulate	by	convention	that	they	do	so.	To	the	extent	that	alarm	clocks	and written	words are inventions of human	beings, it is reasonable to assert that their	meaning	consists	in	what	we	project	onto	them. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 104 Analytic	Idealism 104 However, the	contemporary	cultural	mindset	extends this	notion	of	projected meaning	to	nature	itself.	Fire	only	represents	"the	inseminating	fury	of	sex	and the	ardor	of	the	ascetic"	(Ronnenberg	and	Martin	2010:	84)	insofar	as	we	project passion	onto	it.	Stones	only	represent	eternity	(ibid.:	106)	insofar	as	we	project timelessness	onto	them.	Without	our	projections,	stones	mean	just	stones;	fire means just fire. In and of itself, the	world supposedly is its own	meaning. It does	not	inherently	point	to	anything	beyond	its	own	appearance	on	the	screen of	perception.	Whatever	sense	we	may	see	in	a	fact	of	the	world	is	supposedly	a confabulation	of	human	cognition,	not	intrinsic	to	the	fact	itself.	"In	this	case," as	Zemach	put it, "one	may	say	either that this fact	has	no sense,	or that the only	sense	it	has	is	provided	by	its	form"	(2006:	363).	In	other	words,	"The	sense of the	world is identical	with its form" (ibid.: 367).	Ortiz-Osés put it perhaps most	simply:	"When	taken	'existentially,'	existence	seems	to	lack	sense,	whereas sense	taken	'essentially'	would	appear	to	lack	existence"	(2008:	65). As	a	result,	our	culture	believes	that	the	semantic	value	of	the	world	is	simply an	artifact	of	human	minds.	The	world	doesn't	have	a	story	to	tell,	a	suggestion to make or an insight to convey. It isn't saying anything. There is nothing meaningful to be gleaned from the world, just utilitarian predictions to be made about its behavior. Under such ethos, projects such as Ortiz-Osés'- meant to formulate a symbolic hermeneutic of the world premised on the notion that "the	whole	of existence	contains	an	almost secret essence" (2008: 1)-become	metaphysically	precarious,	which	Ortiz-Osés	himself	seems	to	have acknowledged	(ibid.:	65). At the root of this state of affairs is the split between	mind and world that characterizes our present worldview. Indeed, according to the mainstream physicalist ontology, the fundamental building blocks of reality are physical elements	that	exist	independently	of	mind	(Stoljar	2016).	The	latter,	in	turn,	is supposedly	constituted	or	generated	by	particular local	arrangements	of	these physical	elements,	such	as	brains	inside	skulls.	Consequently,	mind	is	insulated from	the	external	world	surrounding	it	beyond	the	skull. The	problem,	of	course,	is	that	only	mind	can	host	intrinsic	semantic	value,	for the latter consists of cognitive associations: the intrinsic meaning of an experience	is	the	emotions,	insights	and	inner	imagery	it	evokes.	For	instance, the	feeling	of	hunger	may	evoke	inner	imagery	related	to	food	because	there	is a cognitive association	between the feeling and the imagery.	A	memory from childhood	may evoke the emotion of happiness because there is a cognitive association	between	the	memory	and	the	emotion.	These	associative links	are an	exclusive	feature	of	mentation. So	if	semantic	value	is	essentially	mental	and	mind	is	insulated	from	the	world beyond	the	skull,	then	semantic	value	cannot	exist	in	the	world.	A	non-mental world	can	be	evoked,	but	it	cannot	intrinsically	evoke	anything.	Such	separation between	meaning and world is what motivates our contemporary culture to consider	the	world	semantically	mute. "The	human	mind	has	abstracted from the	whole	all	...	meaning,	and	claimed	[it]	exclusively for itself,"	wrote	Tarnas (2010:	432). 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 105 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 105 Within	mind,	cognitive	associations	can	go	on	indefinitely,	as	endless	chains	of evocations:	a	daydream	may lead	to	a thought,	which	may	evoke	an	emotion, which	may trigger a	memory,	which	may lead to another thought, and so	on (Karunamuni 2015: 2-3). But once we leave the inner space of mentation by evoking an external fact in the world, the chain	must end. The	world is the chain's	final	destination,	for	it	cannot	a	priori	evoke	anything	else	in	turn.	This semantic	end	point	is	what	we	call	a	'literal	fact.'	Everything	prior	to	it	is	sign, simile or allegory-roundabout, indirect ways to arrive at the destination. According to our contemporary cultural mindset, the value of these indirections is entirely conditioned upon their ability to ultimately point at literal	facts.	Anything	short	of	it	is	considered	delusion,	for	it	allegedly	can't	be anchored	in	truth. But	does	our current scientific	understanding	of reality truly corroborate this split	between	mind	and	world,	inside	and	outside?	Are	we	justified	in	taking	for granted	that	the	world	'out	there'	is	fundamentally	distinct	or	separate	from	the mind 'in here'? If not, could the	world carry intrinsic semantic value and be amenable to interpretation, just as dreams are? Could there be a valid hermeneutic of the	world, a vision	of it as symbolic, suggestive	of something beyond its own face-value appearances on the screen of perception? What would	the	implications	of	this	possibility	be	for	the	way	we	relate	to	the	world? These	are	the	questions	addressed	in	this	essay. In Section A.3, the latest experimental results emerging from the field of quantum	physics	will	be	briefly	reviewed.	They	empirically	indicate	that	mind and	world	aren't,	after	all, fundamentally	distinct	or	separate.	Section	A.4	will show	how	this	continuity	between	mind	and	world	can	explain	why	the	axioms of rational thought	describe	and	model the	world so	uncannily accurately. In Section	A.5,	the	hermeneutic	implications	of	the	mental	world	hypothesis	will be	discussed.	Section	A.6	then	compares	the	analysis	in	Section	A.5	with	what some	of	the	world's	philosophical	and	spiritual	traditions	have	to	say	about	the nature	and	meaning	of	the	world.	Finally,	Section	A.7	concludes	this	essay	with a	brief	discussion. A.3 The	ontological	status	of	the	world The	mainstream	physicalist	notion	that the	world is	outside	and independent of mind is an abstract explanatory model constructed in thought, not an empirical	observation.	After	all,	what	we	call	'the	world'	is	available	to	us	solely as	'images'-defined	here	broadly,	so	to	include	any	sensory	modality-on	the screen of perception, which is itself mental. We interpret the contents of perception	as	coming	from	a	world	outside	mind	because	this	seems	to	explain the	fact	that	we	all	share	the	same	world	beyond	the	boundary	of	our	skin,	as well as the fact that the laws that govern this world do not depend on our personal volition. Stanford physicist Prof. Andrei Linde, well known for his theories	of	cosmological	inflation,	summarized	it	thus: 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 106 Analytic	Idealism 106 Let us remember that our knowledge of the world begins not with matter but with perceptions. I know for sure that	my pain exists, my "green" exists, and	my "sweet" exists. I do not need any proof of their existence, because these events are a part of me; everything else is a theory. Later	we find out that our perceptions obey some laws,	which can be	most conveniently formulated if we assume that there is some underlying	reality	beyond	our	perceptions.	This	model	of	material	world obeying laws of physics is so successful that soon	we forget about our starting	point	and	say	that	matter	is	the	only	reality,	and	perceptions	are only helpful for its description. This assumption is almost as natural (and	maybe as false) as our previous assumption that space is only a mathematical tool for the description of matter. But in fact we are substituting	reality	of	our	feelings	by	a	successfully	working	theory	of	an independently existing	material	world.	And the theory is so successful that	we	almost	never think	about its limitations	until	we	must	address some	really	deep	issues,	which	do	not	fit	into	our	model	of	reality.	(1998: 12) This	model	of reality	has intuitive implications	amenable	to	confirmation-or refutation-through	subtle	experimental	arrangements,	which	Linde	alluded	to when he spoke of "some really deep issues." Indeed, the properties of a physicalist	world	should	exist	and	have	definite	values	even	when	this	world	is not	being	observed: the	moon should	exist and	have	whatever	weight, shape, size and color it has even if nobody is looking at it.	Moreover, a	mere act of observation should not change the values of these properties: the weight, shape,	size	and	color	of	the	moon	should	not	become	different	simply	because someone	happened	to	look	at	it. Operationally, these intuitive tenets of physicalism are translated into the notion	of	'non-contextuality':	the	outcome	of	an	observation	should	not	depend on	the	way	other,	separate	but	simultaneous	observations	are	performed.	After all, the properties being observed are supposed to be independent of observation.	What	I	perceive	when	I	look	at	the	night	sky	should	not	depend	on the	way	other	people	look	at	the	night	sky	along	with	me,	for	the	properties	of the night sky uncovered by my observation should not depend on theirs. Clearly-and in line with physicalism-non-contextuality implies that the world is independent of perception, insofar as perception constitutes observation.	My perceptions should simply reveal what the properties of the world	are	in	and	of	themselves. The problem is that, according to quantum theory, the outcome of an observation can depend on the way another, separate but simultaneous observation	is	performed.	For	instance,	if	two	particles	A	and	B	are	prepared	in a special way, the properties of particle A as seen by a first observer-say, Alice-are predicted to correlate with the way another observer-say, Bob- simultaneously looks at particle B. This is so even when A and B-and, therefore, Alice and Bob-are separated by arbitrarily long distances. For instance,	what	Alice	sees	when	she	looks	at	particle	A	in,	say,	London,	depends on	the	way	Bob	concurrently	looks	at	particle	B	in,	say,	Sydney.	If	the	properties 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 107 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 107 of	the	world	were	outside	and	independent	of	Alice's	and	Bob's	minds-that	is, outside and independent of their perceptions-this clearly shouldn't be the case; unless there is some	observation-independent	hidden	property, covertly shared	by	A	and	B	and	entirely	missed	by	quantum	theory,	which	could	account for	the	correlations.	This	was	Einstein's	point	when	he	(in)famously	suggested that quantum theory was incomplete (Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen 1935). However, as mathematically proven by John Bell (1964), the correlations predicted by quantum theory cannot be accounted for by these kinds of observation-independent	hidden	properties. Consequently, quantum theory appears to contradict non-contextuality and render	physicalism	untenable.	A	conceivable	way	to	avoid	this	conclusion	while accepting	quantum	theory	would	be	to	posit	that	particles	A	and	B,	or	Alice	and Bob themselves, somehow 'tip each other off' during observation, instantaneously and at a distance, so to	coordinate their	actions	and	produce the predicted correlations. This, however, would require faster-than-light communication	and	fly	in	the	face	of	the	overwhelmingly	confirmed	theory	of special	relativity. Alternatively,	a	physicalist	could	attempt	to	salvage	non-contextuality	and	the notion of a world outside and independent of mind by rejecting quantum theory itself. Yet, as it turns out, since Alain Aspect's seminal experiments (Aspect, Grangier and Roger 1981, Aspect, Dalibard and Roger 1982, Aspect, Grangier	and	Roger	1982)	the	predictions	of	quantum	theory	in	this	regard	have been repeatedly confirmed, with ever-increasing rigor. For instance, in an experiment performed in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1998 (Tittel et al.), the particles	A and	B	were separated by	more than 10 km-as opposed to the 12 meters of Aspect's original experiment (1981)-reducing the already low likelihood that they could	be creating the correlations	predicted	by	quantum theory	through	some	kind	of	signal	exchange.	Despite	this	greater	separation, the	predictions	of	quantum	theory	were	again	confirmed. Then, still in 1998 but this time in Innsbruck, Austria, another experiment (Weihs et al.) was done to eliminate another far-fetched possibility: that, in advance of the preparation of particles	A and	B, 'Alice,' 'Bob' and the system responsible for the	preparation	could somehow	be 'pre-agreeing'	on	a	hidden plan	of	action,	so	to	later	create	the	correlations	without	need	for	faster-thanlight communication ('Alice' and 'Bob,' in this case, were automated measurement apparatuses). To close this unlikely 'conspiracy' loophole, the behaviors of 'Alice' and 'Bob' were programmed randomly and only after particles A and B had already been prepared. Nonetheless, the correlations predicted	by	quantum	theory	were	yet	again	confirmed. Critics continued to speculate about other far-fetched loopholes in these experiments.	In	an	effort	to	address	and	close	all	conceivable	loopholes,	Dutch researchers have recently performed an even more tightly controlled test, which-unsurprisingly	by	now-echoed	the	earlier	results	(Hensen	et	al.	2015). This	latter	effort	was	considered	by	the	periodical	Nature	the	"toughest	test	yet" 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 108 Analytic	Idealism 108 (Merali 2015). Given all this, it seems now untenable to argue against the veracity	of	quantum	theory. The only alternative left for physicalists is to try to circumvent the need for faster-than-light signal	exchanges	by imagining	and	postulating	some form	of non-locality: nature must have-or so they speculate-observationindependent hidden properties that are	not confined to particular regions of spacetime,	such	as	particles	A	and	B.	In	other	words,	the	argument	is	that	the observation-independent hidden properties allegedly missed by quantum theory	are	'smeared	out'	across	space	and	time.	It	is	this	omnipresent,	invisible but objective background that supposedly orchestrates the correlations predicted	by	quantum	mechanics.	Non-contextuality	and	physicalism	can	thus be	salvaged;	or	can	they? The	problem,	of	course, is	that	non-local	hidden	properties	are	arbitrary:	they produce no predictions beyond those already made by standard quantum theory. As such, it could be argued that they represent an effort "to	modify quantum	mechanics	to	make	it	consistent	with	[one's]	view	of	the	world,"	so	to avoid	the	need	"to	modify	[one's]	view	of	the	world	to	make	it	consistent	with quantum	mechanics"	(Rovelli	2008:	16). Be it as it may, it turns out that certain specific correlations predicted by quantum	theory	are	incompatible	with	non-contextuality	even	for large	classes of	non-local	hidden	properties	(Leggett	2003).	Studies	have	now	experimentally confirmed	these	correlations	(Gröblacher	et	al.	2007,	Romero	et	al.	2010),	thus putting non-contextuality in even more serious jeopardy. To reconcile these results with physicalism would require a profoundly counterintuitive redefinition	of	what	we	call 'objectivity.'	And	since	our	contemporary	cultural mindset	has come to	associate	objectivity	with reality itself, the science	press felt compelled to report	on some	of these results	by	pronouncing, "Quantum physics	says	goodbye	to	reality"	(Cartwright	2007). More recent experiments have again contradicted non-contextuality and confirmed that, unlike what one would expect if the world were separate or distinct	from	mind,	the	observed	properties	of	the	world	indeed	cannot	be	said to	exist	prior	to	being	observed	(Lapkiewicz	et	al.	2011,	Manning	et	al.	2015).	For all intents and purposes, the world we perceive is a product of observation. Commenting	on	this,	physicist	Anton	Zeilinger	has	been	quoted	as	saying	that "there	is	no	sense	in	assuming	that	what	we	do	not	measure	[that	is,	observe] about	a	system	has	[an	independent]	reality"	(Ananthaswamy	2011). So the question now is: Can some form of physicalism survive the failure of non-contextuality?	We	have	seen	earlier	that	the	intuitive	tenets	of	physicalism are: (a) there exists a world outside	mind; and (b)	mere observation doesn't change this independently existing world. The failure of non-contextuality clearly	rules	out	(b).	Can	(a)	still	make	any	sense	in	the	absence	of	(b)?	If	it	can, then	the	world	outside	mind	must	somehow	physically	change,	instantaneously, every	time	it is	observed.	The	plausibility	of	this	notion	aside,	notice	that	one never	gets	to	see	the	observation-independent	world,	for	it	supposedly	changes instantly, in an observation-dependent manner, the moment one looks at it. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 109 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 109 Clearly, the	only	motivation to	entertain this	notion is to try to salvage some rather	artificial	and	counterintuitive form	of	physicalism.	And	even if	such	an attempt were to succeed, the world we actually experience would still be conditioned by mind, insofar as it would be an outcome of conscious perception. For the purposes of this paper, therefore, the result would be indistinguishable	from	a	truly	mental	world. Already in	2005, Johns	Hopkins	physicist and	astronomer	Prof.	Richard	Conn Henry	had seen enough. In an essay	he	penned for	Nature, he claimed, "The universe	is	entirely	mental.	...	There	have	been	serious	[theoretical]	attempts	to preserve	a	material	world-but	they	produce	no	new	physics,	and	serve	only	to preserve	an	illusion"	(Henry	2005:	29).	The	illusion	he	was	referring	to	was,	of course,	that	of	a	world	outside	mind. Naturally, Conn Henry's position is controversial and debate around it continues to	unfold.	Nonetheless, the	experiments	do	show	that the idea	of	a mental	world	must	be	taken	seriously,	if	nothing	else	for	the	sheer	power	of	the empirical evidence now accumulated. Moreover, philosophers have recently proposed coherent ontologies that can, at least in principle, make sense of reality without the need to postulate anything distinct from mind itself (Kastrup 2017e, Nagasawa and Wager 2016, Shani 2015). These ontologies provide	coherent	frameworks	in	which	the	experimental	results	can	be	placed and	interpreted. Finally,	notice that, although the	argument in this section	has	been	based	on quantum	mechanical experiments carried out on	microscopic particles under laboratory	conditions,	we	know	that	the	implications	of	quantum	theory	apply to	our	macroscopic	world	of	tables	and	chairs	as	well.	Indeed,	quantum	effects have been experimentally demonstrated for macroscopic objects at room temperature (Lee et al. 2011, Klimov et al. 2015). As such, the failure of noncontextuality	indicates	that	the	seemingly	objective	world	we	live	in	is	a	result of mental process at work and, as such, akin to a transpersonal dream: the tables,	chairs,	stars	and	galaxies	we	perceive	within	it	do	not	have	an	existence independent	of	our	minds. A.4 The	continuity	of	mind	and	world In	a	famous	paper	titled	"The	Unreasonable	Effectiveness	of	Mathematics	in	the Natural	Sciences,"	physicist	Eugene	Wigner	(1960)	discussed	"the	miracle	of	the appropriateness	of	the	language	of	mathematics	for	the	formulation	of	the	laws of	physics."	Indeed,	abstract	methods	and	results	developed	purely	in	thought have,	again	and	again,	succeeded	in	precisely	describing	concrete	phenomena. That	axiomatic	intuitions	turn	out	to	correctly	predict	and	model	the	structure and dynamics of the world at large is difficult to make sense of under physicalism,	this	probably	being	the	reason	why	Wigner	used	the	word	'miracle' twelve times in his paper. After all, lest we incur the fallacy of circular reasoning,	under	physicalism	we	cannot	logically	argue	for	the	validity	of	logic 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 110 Analytic	Idealism 110 beyond	our	own	minds,	so	the	world	could	very	well	be	absurd	(Albert 1985). That	it	is	not	is	Wigner's	"miracle." If the world is mental, however, the correspondence between the intuitive foundations of rational thought and the way the world works is perfectly natural. That we take the basic tenets of logic and mathematics to be selfevident	truths	betrays	their	archetypal	nature	in	the	Jungian	sense:	they	reflect deeply ingrained	mental templates according to	which thought	unfolds (Jung 1991).	As	a	matter	of	fact,	psychologist	Marie-Louise	von	Franz	went	as	far	as	to argue that the natural numbers themselves are archetypal (1974). Then-and here is the key point-the fact that these archetypes extend into the world clearly	indicates	that	the	world	itself	is	mental	and	continuous	with	our	minds.	If there is no intrinsic separation between our minds and the objects of perception, naturally these objects should comport themselves in a way consistent	with	mental	archetypes.	Perceptual	objects	should	be	an	expression of archetypal patterns in just the same way that thoughts are, so the world should	be	consistent-as	it is-with	our	logic	and	mathematics.	The	apparent eeriness	of	Wigner's	"miracle"	melts	away. To visualize all this consider the following analogy: if mind is like a guitar string, then particular conscious experiences are like particular notes or patterns	of	vibration	of	the	string.	In	this	case,	the	mental	archetypes	discussed above are analogous to the elasticity, mass and length of the string, which determine its normal	modes of vibration. Some of the archetypically-defined normal	modes	of	mind	thus	correspond	to	the	laws	of	nature,	which	we	discern as regularities	on the screen	of	perception: they reflect some	of the 'notes' in which	mind	naturally	'plays'	in	the	world	at	large. Wigner's "miracle" is not only explainable by, but also constitutes further evidence for, the mental world hypothesis. As such, it is high time we considered	the	implications	of	this	hypothesis	for	how	best	to	live	our	lives. A.5 The	implications	of	a	mental	world Strong empirical evidence pointing to the conclusion that the world we experience	is	a	result	of	transpersonal	mental	processes	at	work	has	now	been reviewed. There is no fundamental separation between mind 'in here' and world 'out there,' which explains why the archetypes of rational thought describe nature so well. Yet, the latter point is not the sole implication of a mental	world: if our	minds are continuous	with the environment	we inhabit, nothing	prevents	the	world	from	intrinsically	evoking	mental	contents	beyond perception,	such	as	insights	and	emotions. Indeed, according to	analytical	psychology,	our	nightly	dreams	carry intrinsic semantic value because they are manifestations of deeply ingrained psychological archetypes seeking to express themselves (Jung 1991). By interpreting	the	archetypal	messages	our	dreams	present	to	us	in	symbolic	form we	can,	therefore,	achieve	meaningful	insights	that	escape	the	reach	of	ordinary waking	introspection	(Ackroyd	1993,	von	Franz	and	Boa	1994,	Jung	2002).	Now, 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 111 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 111 if	the	world	is	akin	to	a	collective	dream	also	produced	by	mental	archetypes,	as discussed	in	the	previous	section,	then the same rationale should	apply to	our waking	lives.	The	meanings	we	think	to	discern	in	the	world	may	not,	after	all, be	mere	personal	projections,	but	actual	properties	of the	world.	All	empirical facts may be archetypal symbols: extrinsic appearances of immanent mental dynamics. The entire cosmic	narrative	may	be	hinting at something prior to, and	beyond,	itself. In	a	mental	world, the images	we	perceive	on the screen	of	perception	aren't essentially different from	our own imagination, except in that the former are shared across observers. This collective 'world dream' symbolically points to underlying	transpersonal	mental	dynamics,	just	as	regular	dreams	symbolically point	to	underlying	personal	mental	dynamics.	As	such,	the	world	is	amenable to	hermeneutics: it	means something; it	points to something	beyond its facevalue	appearances;	it	evokes	something	a	priori;	it	is	not	its	own	meaning. A.6 What	the	world's	traditions	have	to	say Curiously,	despite empirical evidence for the	mental	world	hypothesis	having become available only in relatively recent times, philosophical and spiritual traditions have been hinting at the intrinsic semantic value of the world for millennia. For instance, based on his in-depth study of ancient Islamic mysticism,	Henry	Corbin	suggested	that	the	purpose	of life is to interpret	the world	as	a	metaphor	of	transcendent	meaning.	He	wrote: To	come	into	this	world	...	means	...	to	pass into	the	plane	of	existence which	in	relation	to	[Paradise]	is	merely	a	metaphoric	existence.	...	Thus coming into this world has	meaning only with a view to leading that which	is	metaphoric	back	to	true	being.	(As	quoted	in	Cheetham	2012:	59, emphasis	added.) That the	world isn't literal	but	metaphorical implies that it isn't the end	of a chain	of	cognitive	associations.	Instead,	its	very	purpose	is	to	evoke,	to	point	to cognition	beyond	its	face-value	appearances. Analogously,	in	a	clear	suggestion	that	the	things	and	phenomena	of	the	world are symbols of transpersonal mental patterns, Hong Zicheng wrote in the sixteenth	century: The	chirping	of	birds	and	twittering	of	insects	are	all	murmurings	of	the mind.	The	brilliance	of	flowers	and	colors	of	grasses	are	none	other	than the	patterns	of	the	Dao.	(2006:	105,	emphasis	added.) Still along similar lines, the Hermetic tradition suggests that the world is a mental	creation	in	a	transpersonal	mind: That	Light,	He said, am I, thy	God,	Mind	...	Mind is Father-God.	...	He [God]	thinketh	all things	manifest	...	[and]	manifests	through	all things and	in	all.	(Mead	2010:	3,	23,	emphasis	added.) 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 112 Analytic	Idealism 112 It then proceeds to suggest that the world is the symbolic image of these immanent,	transpersonal	mental	processes: Holy	art	Thou,	O	God	...	of	whom	All-nature	hath	been	made	an image. (Mead	2010:	11,	emphasis	added.) In	the	West,	the	inception	of	these	notions	goes,	of	course,	all	the	way	back	to Plato and	his 'Theory	of Ideas,' according to	which the	ontological ground	of reality is archetypal thoughts in a transpersonal	mind (Ross 1951).	The	visible world	around	us is supposedly	modeled	after the	patterns	of these	archetypal thoughts,	which	it	thus	symbolically	points	to. Echoing all this, Nisargadatta Maharaj, a twentieth-century exponent of the Advaita	Vedanta	tradition	in	India,	said: When	you	see	the	world	you	see	God.	There	is	no	seeing	God	apart	from the	world.	Beyond	the	world	to	see	God	is	to	be	God.	(1973:	58) Thus,	our	only	access	to	God	is	through	the	images	on	the	screen	of	perception that we call the world. These images are the extrinsic appearance of God's conscious	inner	life.	Beyond	them,	the	only	way	to	know	God	is	to	gain	direct access	to	God's	inner	life-that	is,	to	be	God. I	will	mention	just	one	more	example,	since	an	exhaustive	review	of	how	these ideas	are	represented	in	the	world's	traditions	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	brief essay.	Christian	mystic	and	scientist	Emanuel	Swedenborg	wrote	extensively	of the "correspondences" between the natural and spiritual worlds (2007: 63). These correspondences imply that the things and phenomena of the natural world are symbolic images of deeper, transcendent truths. The "correspondences"	were Swedenborg's attempt to formulate a hermeneutic of the	world.1 A.7 Discussion Physicalism has served important practical purposes over the past couple of centuries. It has provided scientists and engineers with an effective-if simplistic and ultimately wrong-picture of the world, conducive to the development	of technology.	By	thinking	of	objects	and	natural	phenomena	as having	standalone	reality	independent	of	their	own	minds,	practitioners	could achieve	the	degree	of	detachment	and	objectivity	necessary for	describing	the world without bias. The predictive	models of nature's behavior that resulted from	this	effort	now	lie	at	the	foundation	of	our	technological	civilization. 1	Here it would have been interesting to mention the vast literature of medieval scholasticism in Europe that resonates directly with the ideas presented in this dissertation.	For	instance,	in	his	analysis	of	the	thought	of	medieval	scholars,	Owen Barfield, based	mostly	on the	writings	of	Thomas	Aquinas, says that, to them, "the world	is	the	thought	of	God"	(2011:	95).	Allowing	for	some	leeway	regarding	the	use	of the	word	'God,'	this	is	precisely	a	conclusion	of	Chapter	3. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 113 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 113 But	whilst valuable in a utilitarian sense, this focus on nature's behavior-as opposed to	nature's	meaning-is extraordinarily limiting to the	human spirit. We are meaning-seeking animals (Frankl 1991, Tillich 1952). A long and productive life enabled by continuous advances in technology is ultimately vacuous and sterile if devoid of meaning. And the same worldview that facilitates the advancement of technology precludes us from finding and appreciating the	meaning	of life in the	world.	This, in	essence, is	perhaps the greatest	dilemma	of	the	contemporary	zeitgeist. In such a context, the alternative notion that the	world points to something beyond its face-value	appearances	offers	enriching	new	perspectives.	After	all, the	world	we	inhabit	now	carries	intrinsic	semantic	value;	a	message.	Like	the Voynich	manuscript	(Reddy	and	Knight	2011), it is	akin	to	a	book	written	in	a yet-undeciphered language,	clamoring for	a suitable	hermeneutic.	Ortiz-Osés' project (2008) turns out to rest on solid metaphysical foundations after all. Each	of	us, as individuals, can	now	give	ourselves	permission to	dedicate	our lives to finding meaning in the world, reassured by the knowledge that this meaning	is	really	there	even	if	we	can't	immediately	apprehend	it.	And	whereas the	world's	meaning	won't	disappear	if	we	refuse	to	look	for	it,	the	point	is	that the	option	to	look	is	given	legitimacy. Because of its preoccupation with measurement and predictive modeling, contemporary	culture	is	forgetting	to	read	the	letter	for	the	sake	of	describing the envelope. The physical universe we can	measure is	merely the carrier of something implied. Exaggerated focus on the predictive models of science, crucial as they are for the development of technology, may distract us from fulfilling	what	may	be	our	natural and innate telos. In the	words	of	Ortega	y Gasset,	"Scientific	truth	is	an	exact	truth,	but	incomplete	and	penultimate,	that is forcedly integrated in another kind of truth, ultimate and complete yet inexact"	(as	quoted	in	Ortiz-Osés	2008:	30). Looking upon the world interpretatively, as a scholar looks upon an ancient text while trying to decipher its meaning, is not only metaphysically and teleologically sound, it can also make life more wholesome. Psychotherapist Thomas	Moore	offers	us	an	example:	by looking	upon	our family	members	as characters and	our family stories as episodes	of a great saga,	meant to subtly evoke	something	above	and	beyond	its	pedestrian	literal	appearances,	we	open ourselves up to the deeper archetypal sense they express (2012: 32). By extrapolating	this	powerful idea further,	we	can look	upon	our	entire life	as	a small but crucial element of an unfathomable, symbolic cosmic drama. The experiences we go through are no longer literal and pedestrian, but carry deeper,	hidden	significance.	Indeed,	in	a	mental	world	it	is	as	unreasonable	to interpret	life	literally	as	it	is	to	interpret	dreams	literally.	Whoever	thinks	that	a dream	is	exactly	what	it	appears	to	be	at	face	value?	Most	people's	instinct	upon having	an	intense	dream	is	to	immediately	ask	themselves:	What	does	it	mean? Looking	upon	life	in	the	same	way-and	asking	oneself	the	same	question-can bestow	on	it	a	much	more	spacious,	open	and	wholesome	outlook. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 114 Analytic	Idealism 114 With its focus on closed, literal explanations, the physicalist ontology that informs the contemporary zeitgeist decrees that the world has no intrinsic meaning. Instead	of an	open	book	waiting to	be	deciphered	and	grasped, the world becomes just pixels to be measured; an endless string of quantifiable parameters	carrying	no	message.	Instead	of	the	starting	point	of	an	open,	epic journey along endless cognitive associations, wherein the meanings evoked constitute	and	ultimately reveal the	uncanny reflection	of the	observer in the observed,	the	world	becomes	the	end	point	of	a	botched	quest	that	never	even gets started. By doing this, the physicalist ontology gives us permission to procrastinate	in	semantic	nihilism	and	an	engineered	sense	of	closure.	It	stops us	from	pursuing	what	the	Islamic	mystics	studied	by	Corbin	thought	to	be	the purpose	of	life.	For	the	ultimate	meaning	of	it	all	may	not	be	discernible	in	any particular	end	point	or	conclusion,	but	only	in	the	cognitive	gestalt	entailed	by a circumambulation-to use a handy Jungian term-of associative threads. It may be discernible only in a "galaxy" of semantic fields that "are intimately connected, and their significations influence one another, so that the most important sense is found	diffuse in its	whole" (Ortega y	Gasset, as quoted in Ortiz-Osés	2008:	28). Historically	speaking,	the	denial	of	the	intrinsic	symbolic	meaning	of	the	world is a recent aberration (Tarnas 2010). The antidote for this aberration is an extension	of	the	application	of	hermeneutics	beyond	all	discernible	boundaries. What we need is a hermeneutic of the entire cosmos; a Hermeneutic of Everything. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 115 Appendix	B. The	Physicalist	Worldview	as	Neurotic	EgoDefense	Mechanism This paper first appeared in SAGE Open, ISSN: 2158-2440, Vol. 6,	No. 4, doi: 10.1177/2158244016674515,	in	October	2016. B.1 Abstract The	physicalist	worldview	is	often	portrayed	as	a	dispassionate	interpretation	of reality	motivated	purely	by	observable	facts.	In	this	article,	ideas	of	both	depth and	social	psychology	are	used	to	show	that	this	portrayal	may	not	be	accurate. Physicalism-whether it ultimately turns out to be philosophically correct or not1-is hypothesized to be partly motivated by the neurotic endeavor to project onto the world attributes that help one avoid confronting unacknowledged aspects of one's own inner life.	Moreover, contrary to	what most people assume, physicalism creates an opportunity for the intellectual elites	who	develop	and	promote	it	to	maintain	a	sense	of	meaning	in	their	own lives through fluid compensation. However, because this compensatory strategy	does	not	apply	to	a	large	segment	of	society,	it	creates	a	schism-with corresponding tensions-that may help explain the contemporary conflict between	neo-atheism	and	religious	belief. B.2 Introduction A	worldview	is	a	narrative	in	terms	of	which	we	relate	to	ourselves	and	reality at	large.	It	is	a	kind	of	cultural	operating	system	that	gives	us	tentative	answers to	foundational	questions	such	as	'What	are	we?'	'What	is	the	nature	of	reality?' 'What	is	the	purpose	of	life?'	and	so	on	(Kastrup	2014).	Although	many	different worldviews vie for dominance today, the academically endorsed physicalist narrative defines the	mainstream, despite its	many difficulties (Kastrup 2014, 2015,	Nagel	2012).	This	reigning	worldview	posits	that	physical	entities	outside consciousness are the building blocks of reality. Consciousness, in turn, is supposedly an epiphenomenon or emergent property of certain complex arrangements	of	these	entities.	As	such,	under	physicalism,	consciousness	must be	reducible to	physical	arrangements	outside	and independent	of	experience (Stoljar	2016). Physicalism	is	often	portrayed	as	a	worldview	that,	in	contrast	to,	for	example, religion or spirituality, is based solely on objective facts. The present article, however, hypothesizes that the formative principles and motivations 1	As I have extensively articulated earlier in this dissertation, my position is that physicalism is demonstrably inferior to idealism on both logical and empirical grounds.	Yet,	since	the	scope	of	this	particular	paper	is	restricted	to	psychology,	my tone	had	to	be	neutral	regarding	philosophical	matters. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 116 Analytic	Idealism 116 underpinning the	physicalist	narrative-whether it ultimately turns	out to	be philosophically correct or not-are partly subjective, reflecting neurotic egodefense	maneuvers	meant,	as	described	by	Vaillant, to "protect the individual from	painful emotions, ideas, and drives" (1992: 3). This becomes clear	when one	lifts	core	concepts	of	depth	psychology	to	the	social	and	cultural	spheres. However, as a mostly clinical approach, depth psychology requires some elaboration	before	being	applied	at	a	theoretical	level. The	modern	understanding	of	depth	psychology	can	be	traced	back	to	the	late 19th and early 20th centuries, in the works of Frederic Myers, Pierre Janet, William James, Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung (Kelly et al. 2009). Its foundational inference is that the human psyche comprises two main subdivisions: a conscious and an 'unconscious' segment. The conscious segment	of	the	psyche	comprises	experiences	a	person	has	introspective	access to	and	can	report.	According	to	the	analytical	school	of	depth	psychology,	the "ego"	is	defined	as	the	experiential	center	of	this	segment	(von	Franz	1964:	161), and	it	is	in	this	specific	sense	that	I	use	the	word	'ego'	throughout	the	present article.	In	contrast,	the	so-called	'unconscious'	segment	of	the	psyche	comprises mental contents the	person	has	no introspective	access to	and	cannot report. Nonetheless,	depth	psychologists	assert	that	'unconscious'	mental	contents	can, and	do,	influence	the	person's	manifest	thoughts,	feelings	and	behaviors. Because	the	ability	to	report	an	experience	is	a	metacognitive	capacity	on	top	of the experience itself (Schooler 2002), a more rigorous articulation of the difference	between	the	conscious	and 'unconscious'	segments	of the	psyche is this:	conscious	mental	contents	are	those	a	person	both	experiences	and	knows that	he	or	she	experiences	them. 'Unconscious'	mental	contents,	on	the	other hand,	are	those	the	person	either	does	not	experience	or	does	not	know	that	he or she experiences them (Kastrup 2014: 104-110). In other words, conscious mental	contents	fall	within	the	field	of	egoic	self-reflection	and,	therefore,	can be reported, whereas 'unconscious' mental contents escape this field and, therefore,	cannot	be	reported.	Indeed,	the	existence	of	mental	contents	that	are experienced	but	cannot	be	reported-even	to	oneself-is	now	well	established in neuroscience, which has prompted the emergence of so-called "no-report paradigms"	(Tsuchiya	et	al.	2015). However,	as	clinical	psychologists	can	only	gauge	consciousness	based	on	what their patients report, anything outside the field of self-reflection is indistinguishable from true unconsciousness. This explains the somewhat inaccurate	terminology	choice	of	the	founders	of	depth	psychology.2 Some	critics	have	questioned	the	existence	of	an	'unconscious'	segment	of	the psyche on philosophical grounds (Stannard 1980: 51-81). However, recent 2 See Chapter 5 for a much more extensive elaboration on the nature of the 'unconscious,' including the role	of	dissociation,	which I	have	not	discussed in this particular	article.	In	a	nutshell,	my	position	is	that	there	is	no	actual	unconscious,	but simply	conscious	mental processes inaccessible to egoic introspection	because they (a)	escape	the	field	of	self-reflection	or	(b)	are	strongly	dissociated	from	the	ego. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 117 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 117 empirical	results	in	neuroscience	show	the	presence	of	broad	cognitive	activity that individuals cannot report,	but	which	nonetheless causally conditions the individuals'	manifest thoughts, feelings	or	behaviors (Augusto	2010,	Eagleman 2011,	Westen	1999).	Recent	neuroimaging	studies	of	the	psychedelic	state	have also corroborated the depth-psychological view that ego suppression-in the form of reduction of neural activity in the brain's default mode network- brings	otherwise	'unconscious'	mental	contents	into	awareness	(Carhart-Harris et	al.	2012,	Carhart-Harris	et	al.	2016,	Palhano-Fontes	et	al.	2015). On	the	basis	of	these	empirical	results,	the	core	idea	of	depth	psychology-that is, that a segment of the psyche that escapes self-reflective introspection can causally	condition	our	thoughts,	feelings	and	behaviors-cannot	be	dismissed. And	because	cultural	narratives	are	the	compound	result	of	an	aggregation	of the thoughts, feelings and behaviors of individuals, depth-psychological insights are valid starting points for an analysis of the psychological underpinnings	of	our	culture's	mainstream	worldview. In	Sections	B.3	and	B.4,	I	review	ways	in	which	the	physicalist	narrative	can	give us permission to avoid confronting unwanted affects in the 'unconscious' segment of our psyche. In Section B.5, I elaborate on how physicalism can conceivably even	nurture its proponents' sense of	meaning in life. This latter section	is	based	on	theories	of	social	psychology,	rather	than	depth	psychology, but it still leverages the notion of an 'unconscious': in hypothesizing that physicalism is an expression of fluid compensation, it presupposes that cognitive processes outside the field of self-reflection influence the feelings, thoughts	and	opinions	subjects	express.	Finally,	Section	B.6	briefly	sums	up	the key	ideas	defended	in	this	article. B.3 Ego	protection	through	projection According	to	depth	psychology,	a	neurosis	is	the	expression	of	an	inner	psychic conflict caused by the ego's refusal to acknowledge, confront and ultimately integrate unwanted affects rising from the 'unconscious' (Jung 2014: 137). To keep	these	affects	at	bay,	the	ego	uses	a	variety	of	defense	mechanisms,	among which	denial, distortion, dissociation, repression and so on (Vaillant 1992).	A particularly common defense mechanism is projection (ibid.), whereby one circumvents the need to confront ego-threatening forces within oneself by ascribing the corresponding attributes to the outer environment. As such, projections	can	be	said	to	partly	hijack	and	manipulate	one's	worldview	in	an attempt to prevent short-term suffering. My hypothesis is that, through projection,	the	physicalist	worldview	gives	us	permission	to	avoid	confronting some	of	what	we	find	disagreeable	within	ourselves.	This	can	be	achieved	in	a variety	of	subtle	ways. For instance, we all have a sense of our own existence and identity. Lucid introspection reveals that the root of this sense is our consciousness-our capacity	to	be	subjects	of	experience.	After	all, if	we	were	not	conscious,	what could we know of ourselves? How could we even assert our own existence? 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 118 Analytic	Idealism 118 Being	conscious	is	what	it	means	to	be	us.	In	an	important	sense-perhaps	even the	only important sense-we are first and foremost consciousness itself, the rest	of	our	self-image	arising	afterward,	as	thoughts	and	images	constructed	in consciousness. From this perspective, the physicalist narrative's attempt to reduce consciousness	to	physical	entities	outside	subjectivity	is	counterintuitive,	for	it divorces	the	alleged	nature	of	consciousness	from	our	felt	sense	of	identity.	We do	not feel	as though	we	were	a	bunch	of	physical	particles	bouncing	around inside	our	skull.	Instead,	we	feel	that	we	are	the	subjective	'space'	wherein	our experiences	unfold,	including	our	ideas	about	physical	particles.	Hence,	there	is a	sense	in	which	the	physicalist	narrative	can	be	said	to	project	the	felt	essence of	ourselves	onto	something	distinctly	other.	According	to	it,	we	are	not	really 'here,'	grounded	in	our	subjective	sense	of	being,	but	somewhere	'over	there,'	in an	abstract	world	fundamentally	beyond	the	felt	concreteness	of	our	inner	lives. As	such,	the	physicalist	narrative	entails	an	emptying	out	of	what	it	means	to	be us; a kind of secular kenosis. "I am no ghost, just a shell," laments the art character	Annlee	(Huyghe	and	Parreno	2003:	35),	whose	predicament	is	that	of many	of	us	in	contemporary	society. The	kenosis	entailed	by	the	physicalist	narrative	can	exonerate its	proponents from	responsibility	for	their	choices	and	actions.	Consider	this	passage	by	Sam Harris:	"Did	I	consciously	choose	coffee	over	tea?	No.	The	choice	was	made	for me by events in	my brain that I	... could not inspect or influence" (2012: 7-8, emphasis added). The projection of responsibility here is clear and the corresponding	release	described	by	Harris	himself:	"Losing	a	belief in	free	will has	not	made	me	fatalistic-in	fact,	it	has	increased	my	feelings	of	freedom.	My hopes, fears, and neuroses seem less personal" (2012: 46, emphasis added). Indeed,	under the ethos	of such a	worldview, there is	no concrete reason for guilt	or	regret,	for	we	allegedly	are	not	what	we	experience	ourselves	to	be.	We are	not	responsible	for	what	happens	here	because	we	are	not-and	have	never been-really	here.	We	are	not	ghosts	in	the	machine	but	ghosts	conjured	up	by the	machine.	In	a	significant	sense,	we	do	not	really	exist. As	a	matter	of	fact,	some	proponents	of	the	physicalist	narrative	go	as	far	as	to deny	that	consciousness	exists.	"Consciousness	doesn't	happen.	It's	a	mistaken construct."	These	words	of	neuroscientist	Michael	Graziano	(2016)	should	give anyone pause for thought. Here we have consciousness-whatever it may intrinsically	be-denying	that	consciousness	exists.	Philosopher	Daniel	Dennett (1991) also claimed that consciousness is an illusion, a claim that seems to immediately contradict itself. After all, where do illusions occur if not in consciousness? 3 By appealing to metaphysical abstractions fundamentally 3	In	the	words	of	David	Bentley	Hart,	"The	entire	notion	of	consciousness	as	an	illusion is, of course, rather silly. Dennett has been making the argument for most of his career,	and	it	is	just	abrasively	counterintuitive	enough	to	create	the	strong	suspicion in	many	that	it	must	be	more	philosophically	cogent	than	it	seems,	because	surely	no one would say such a thing if there were not some subtle and penetrating truth hidden behind its apparent absurdity. But there is none. The simple truth of the 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 119 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 119 beyond	experience,	such	denials	of	our	felt	selves	achieve	a	form	of	deliverance somewhat	analogous	to	religious	absolution.	Surprisingly,	as	we	will later	see, they	even	help	restore	a	sense	of	meaningfulness in life, following	what I	will call	'ontological	trauma.' The structure of these denials is fairly clear: first, consciousness weaves the conceptual notion that certain aspects of its own dynamics somehow exist outside itself; then, it projects its own essence onto these aspects. The corresponding dislocation of identity is apparent-and its neurotic character easy	to	grasp-with	an	analogy: imagine	a	painter	who,	having	painted	a	selfportrait,	points	at	it	and	declares	himself	to	be	the	portrait.	This,	in	essence,	is what physicalists do, whether it is philosophically justifiable or not.4	Their consciousness	conceptualizes	self-portraits	within	itself.	Sometimes	these	selfportraits	take	the	form	of	electrical impulses	and	neurotransmitter	releases in the	brain	(Koch	2004).	Other	times,	they	take	the	shape	of	quantum	transitions or potentials (Tarlaci and Pregnolato 2016). Whatever the case, their consciousness	always	points to	a	conceptual	entity it creates	within itself	and then	declares itself to	be this	entity. It	dismisses its	own	primary, first-person point of view in favor of an abstract third-person perspective. Consider Dennett's	words:	"The	way	to	answer	these	'first-person	point	of	view'	stumpers is	to	ignore	the	first-person	point	of	view	and	examine	what	can	be	learned	from the	third-person	point	of	view"	(1991:	336,	emphasis	added).	The	contempt	for the	subject	of	experience-the	primary	datum	of	existence	and	one's	own felt identity-is	palpable	here;	the	kenosis	nearly	total. The physicalist narrative may also give us permission to carve out and dismiss-again	through	the	kenosis	of	projection-the	most	difficult	aspects	of our	inner	lives:	our	felt	emotions.	According	to	it,	the	feeling	of	an	emotion	is the internal perception of an "action program" triggered by certain stimuli (Damasio 2011). Although the action program itself is important insofar as it helps	us survive and reproduce, the accompanying feeling	of emotion is, in a sense,	a	mere	side	effect	of	the	program's	execution.	For	instance,	the	sight	of another	human	being facing	a	predicament is	a stimulus that triggers	actions meant to	help the	victim	and, consequently, increase the social cachet	of the action	taker.	The	feeling	of	compassion,	in	turn,	is	supposedly	nothing	but	the inner perception of this evolutionarily useful reactive schema (ImmordinoYang et al. 2009); it allegedly has no primary or fundamental significance. Under	such	a	narrative,	it	is	easier	to	go	into	denial	about	our	emotional	lives when	the	going	gets	tough.	We	feel	justified	to	dismiss	or	repress	our	traumas and	demons,	avoiding	the	often-painful	work	of	psychological	integration.	The matter	is	that	Dennett	is	a	fanatic:	He	believes	so	fiercely	in	the	unique	authority	and absolutely	comprehensive	competency	of	the	third-person	scientific	perspective	that he	is	willing	to	deny	not	only	the	analytic	authority,	but	also	the	actual	existence,	of the	first-person	vantage"	(2017). 4	For clarity, and at the cost of repeating myself, my position is that this is not philosophically	justifiable,	as	I	have	extensively	argued	earlier	in	this	dissertation. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 120 Analytic	Idealism 120 physicalist	narrative	provides	a	foundation	for	rationalizing	the	choice	of	living an	unexamined, superficial life.	To	a	person	desperate to	avoid the specter	of immediate	and	pungent suffering, the	benefits	of this stance	may	seem	to far outweigh	its	potential	long-term	implications. Surprisingly, the physicalist narrative can even offer us reassurance about death. According to it, there is literally nothing to fear about death itself, because it is allegedly the end of all experience, including the experiences of fear	and	pain.	All	of	our	problems	and	suffering	are	guaranteed	to	end	at	that point.	The	great	and	scary	unknown	of	the	experiential	realm	beyond	physical existence vanishes in one fell swoop; the greatest angst of humankind is conquered.	The	psychological	allure	of	this	idea	is	powerful,	yet	most	people	do not seem to ever stop to consider it.	We have come to take for granted the comforts	that	our	mainstream	worldview	grants	us. To	sum	it	up,	by	denying	our	felt	sense	of	existence	and	identity,	the	physicalist narrative	creates	an	opportunity	to	clear	the	ego	of	ultimate	responsibility.	By denying the fundamental reality of emotions, it creates an opportunity to protect the ego from a confrontation with far	more powerful forces. And by projecting	our	ontological	essence	onto	ephemeral	arrangements	of	matter, it creates	an	opportunity to	protect the	ego from	what	has	historically	been	the greatest	angst	of	humankind:	the	experiential	unknown	of	the	after-death	state. B.4 Egoic	control It	has	been shown that religiosity can reflect a form	of compensatory control (Kay et al. 2010): by believing that transcendent forces aligned with one's convictions govern the world, the ego avoids the anxiety associated with its own inability to overcome uncertainty. This way, religiosity creates an opportunity	for	control	by	proxy:	although	the	ego	cannot	determine	the	course of nature, an external agency far superior to it is believed to do so in a	way consistent with the ego's preferences. The ego's need to avoid anxiety by exerting	control	is	thus	indirectly	fulfilled. Going beyond religiosity, the physicalist narrative enables a sense of direct egoic control over nature. Indeed, a recent empirical study has shown that "believing	that	science	is	or	will	prospectively	grant	...	mastery	of	nature	imbues individuals with the belief that they are in control of their lives" (Stavrova, Ehlebracht and Fetchenhauer 2016: 234).	Of course, by associating itself	with science-in a philosophically questionable move that is nonetheless widely accepted-the physicalist narrative has become the enabler and ontological foundation	of	this	belief.	And	because	direct	control-the	notion	that	one	can personally	steer	or	at	least	predict	what	is	going	to	happen-is	known	to	be	a key	contributor	to	mental	well-being	(Langer	and	Rodin	1976,	Luck	et	al.	1999), it	stands	to	reason	that	the	allure	of	physicalism	in	this	regard	could	potentially be	even	stronger	than	that	of	religious	control-by-proxy. The	opportunity for	direct	control	offered	by the	physicalist	narrative	goes	as far as conquering death itself: if consciousness is just an epiphenomenon or 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 121 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 121 emergent property of physical arrangements outside experience, it becomes conceivable	that,	through	smart	engineering,	we	could	create	means	to	upload our consciousness into more durable substrates such as silicon computers (Kurzweil	2005).	Some	physicalists	even	offer	detailed	roadmaps	for	achieving this	(Sandberg	and	Boström	2008).	The	possibility	of	eternal	life	thus	seems	to open up, provided that consciousness can be instantiated in a computer by programming the computer	with the	patterns of information flow found in a person's	brain. This, however, is premised on the notion that a simulation of a mental phenomenon is equivalent, in essence, to the phenomenon itself. There are many compelling arguments against this notion in philosophy of mind, the most well known of which is perhaps John Searle's (2004). To gain some intuition about what these arguments generally entail, consider this: Do we have	any	reason	to	believe	that,	by	performing	a	perfectly	accurate	simulation of kidney function in a computer, the computer will begin urinating on its desk? Clearly not. There is an essential difference between a computer simulation	and	the	phenomenon	it	simulates;	they	are	not	the	same	thing,	no matter how accurate the simulation. Yet, those hoping to 'upload consciousness'	under	the	physicalist	narrative	seem	to	become	so	engrossed	in abstraction that they lose touch with basic intuitions of plausibility. Their neurosis	is,	in	this	sense,	comparable	with	religious	dogmatism. Although	both	the	religious	and	physicalist	narratives	create	an	opportunity	for conquering	death,	the	Promethean	door	to	immortality	opened	by	physicalism invests	the	ego-not	deities-with	the	power	to	control	transcendence	through technology. This is seductively more direct, its only weakness-from a psychological standpoint-being that it is	promissory: at	present,	nobody	has ever	managed to	upload	consciousness.	Yet, some	popular	physicalist authors argue	that	consciousness	uploading	may	be	achievable	still in	our	own lifetime (Kurzweil 2005, Sandberg and Boström 2008), which actualizes the potential allure	of	their	worldview. As seen in Section B.3 and this section, the implications of the physicalist narrative	consistently	help	protect	and	invest	the	ego	with	authority.	This	is	not to say that physicalism is entirely motivated by neurotic ego-defense maneuvers, for there is a philosophical argument behind it that cannot be dismissed. Nonetheless, the question is whether it is plausible that physicalism's	significant	ego-defense	potential	has	not	been,	to	some	degree,	an unexamined	motivation	for	its	development,	promotion	and	adoption. B.5 The	question	of	meaning Meaning-in the sense of significance and purpose-is probably the greatest asset	any	human	being	can	possess.	Psychotherapist	Victor	Frankl	(1991),	who practiced	and	led	groups	while	detained	in	a	concentration	camp	during	World War	II,	asserted	that	the	will-to-meaning	is	the	most	dominant	human	drive,	in contrast to	Nietzsche's	will-to-power and	Freud's	will-to-pleasure.	Meaning is 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 122 Analytic	Idealism 122 so	powerful	that,	as	Jung	remarked,	it	"makes	a	great	many	things	endurable- perhaps	everything"	(1995:	373).	Philip	K.	Dick's	alter	ego	Horselover	Fat,	in	the novel Valis, embodies the essence of this drive: "Fat had no concept of enjoyment;	he	understood	only	meaning,"	wrote	Dick	(2001:	92).	Like	Fat,	many of	us	see	meaning	as	a	higher	value	than	power	or	pleasure.	Our	motivation	to live rests in there	being	meaning in	our lives.	Today,	we	need	meaning	more than	ever, for as	Paul	Tillich (1952) lucidly	observed, the	greatest anxieties	of our	culture	are	precisely	those	of	doubt	and	meaninglessness. And here is where an argument is often made for the impartiality of physicalism: as a worldview that, by turning the universe into a mechanical contraption fueled by	mere chance, drains the	meaning out of life, it cannot possibly be a neurotic ego-defense mechanism-or so the argument goes. Instead, the physicalist narrative must represent a courageous admission by "tough	people	who face the	bleak facts" (Watts 1989:	65). It	must	embody	an objective assessment of reality, not an emotional, irrational wish-fulfillment maneuver akin to religion.	Compelling as it	may seem	at first, this argument fails	careful	scrutiny,	for	its	premise	is	false. Indeed, according to the Meaning Maintenance Model (MMM) of social psychology	(Heine,	Proulx	and	Vohs	2006)-which	is	perhaps	better	seen	in	the context	of	a	broader	theory	of	psychological	defense	(Hart	2013)-we	can	derive a	sense	of	meaning	from	four	different	sources:	self-esteem,	closure,	belonging, and	symbolic	immortality.	In	other	words,	we	can	find	meaning	in	life	through (a)	cultivating	a	feeling	of	personal	worth,	(b)	resolving	doubts	and	ambiguities, (c)	being	part of something	bigger and longer-lasting than	ourselves, and (d) leaving	something	of	significance	behind-such	as	professional	achievements- in the form of which we can 'live on' after physical death. A society's mainstream cultural narrative conditions how	meaning can be derived from each	of	these	four	sources. The	key	idea	behind	the	MMM	is	that	of	fluid	compensation	as	an	ego-defense mechanism:	If	one	of	the	four	sources	of	meaning	is	threatened,	an	individual will	tend	to	automatically	compensate	by	seeking	extra	meaning	from	the	other three	sources.	For	instance,	threats	to	self-esteem	may	cause	the	individual	to reaffirm	his	or	her	model	of	reality,	thereby	bolstering	closure. As van Tongeren and Green (2010) have shown, a transcendent source of meaning, such as religion, plays the same role in fluid compensation as the other four sources. For instance, individuals tend to reaffirm their religious beliefs	following	disruption	to	their	meaning	system,	in	an	effort	to	protect	the latter. Van Tongeren's and Green's experiments have not only empirically substantiated	the	MMM,	they	have	also	shown	that	even	subliminal threats	to meaning	trigger	fluid	compensation,	strongly	indicating	that	the	'unconscious' is	integral	to	the	process. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 123 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 123 With this as background, my suggestion is that the physicalist narrative, in addition	to	being	a	rational	hypothesis	for	making	sense	of	the	world,5	may	be an expression of fluid compensation by intellectual elites. In other words, instead	of	a	threat	to	meaning,	the	physicalist	narrative	may	actually	reflect	an attempt	by these	elites to	protect	and	restore their	sense	of	meaning	through bolstering closure, self-esteem	and symbolic immortality.	The	disruption that may	have	originally led	to	this	compensatory	move	occurred	around	the	midto late-19th	century. Indeed, it	was	at that time that	we lost	our	ability to spontaneously relate to religious	myths	without	linear	intellectual	scrutiny.	"With	Descartes	and	Kant, the	philosophical	relation	between	Christian	belief	and	human	rationality	had grown ever more attenuated. By the late nineteenth century, with few exceptions, that relation	was effectively absent,"	wrote	Tarnas (2010: 311).	The myths that had hitherto offered us meaning through the promise of literal immortality	and	metaphysical teleology	became	untenable.	Taylor,	who	richly chronicled this historical transition, characterized the corresponding loss of meaning rather broadly and generally as "a wide sense of malaise at the disenchanted	world,	a	sense	of	it	as	flat,	empty"	(2007:	302).	He	even	hinted	at fluid compensation when speaking of "a multiform search for something within, or beyond [the	world],	which could compensate for the	meaning lost with	transcendence"	(ibid.). While acknowledging that this generalized malaise was the matrix of what followed,	I	submit	that	a	more	specific,	forceful	and	personal	threat	to	meaning was	necessary	to	mobilize	the	extraordinary	level	of	academic	and	intellectual endorsement amassed by physicalism. After all-as Taylor himself described through	what	he	called	"the	nova	effect"-the	malaise,	in	and	by	itself,	fostered not	only	physicalism	but	also	an	explosion	of	myriad	other	worldviews. I	hypothesize	that	a	profound	and	disturbing	change in	the intellectual	elites' understanding of the nature of their own being-that is, an ontological trauma-was	the	specific,	forceful	and	personal	trigger	that	helped	congeal	the physicalist	narrative.	Having	lost	religion,	the	elites	were	left	with	the	prospect of	physical	deterioration	without	the	path	to	transcendence	previously	offered by	an	immortal	soul.	Hence,	they	were	forced	to	face	the	inexorability	of	their own approaching death. And as we know from Terror Management Theory, mortality salience is a formidable threat to	meaning (Pyszczynski,	Greenberg and Solomon 1997) empirically shown to motivate investment in palliative worldviews	(Burke,	Martens	and	Faucher	2010).	Ontological trauma	may	have thus	triggered fluid	compensation	and	ultimately led	to	the intellectual	elites' championing	of	the	physicalist	narrative. Indeed,	many	studies	have	shown	that	mortality	salience	leads	to	a	heightened need for closure (Landau et al. 2004). This is fluid compensation in action. 5	Again,	here	I	am	making	a	charitable	concession	to	physicalism	because	the	limited scope	of	this	particular	article-focused,	as	it	is,	on	psychology-prevented	me	from arguing	against	it	philosophically. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 124 Analytic	Idealism 124 Notice	also	that	the	physicalist	narrative	is	humanity's	most	significant	attempt yet	to	achieve	closure	in	our	worldview.	As	multibillion-dollar	experiments	like the	Large	Hadron	Collider-whose	primary	purpose is to 'close' the Standard Model	of	particle	physics,	with	no	immediate	practical	applications-illustrate, physicalism	embodies	an	unprecedented	effort	to	produce	a	causally	complete, unambiguous	model	of reality.	Nothing	else in	millennia	of	preceding	history has come anywhere near it. I suggest that this is not coincidental: the physicalist narrative may reflect the elites' ego's attempt to regain, through heightened closure, the	meaning it lost along with religion.	Moreover, other modalities	of	fluid	compensation	may	be	at	play	here	as	well:	by	distinguishing themselves	as	a	segment	of	society	uniquely	capable	of	understanding	facts	and concepts	beyond	the	cognitive	capacity	of	others,	the	scientists	and	academics who promote the physicalist narrative stand to gain in self-esteem. The cosmological	scope	of	the	scientific	work	they	produce	and	leave	behind	upon their	deaths	can	also	be	seen	as	a	boost	to	symbolic	immortality.	Finally,	recall Tillich's	observation:	doubt	and	meaninglessness	anxiety	dominate	our	culture's mindset. Is it humanly plausible that our mainstream narrative would have evolved	to	tackle	only	doubt	and	leave	meaninglessness	anxiety	unaddressed? All in	all, the	physicalist	narrative	does	not	necessarily represent	a	net loss	of meaning for the intellectual	elites	who	produced	and	continue to	promote it. The	transcendent	meaning	lost	along	with	religion	may	be	compensated	for	by an increase in closure, self-esteem and symbolic immortality. Unfortunately, however,	this	compensatory	strategy	cannot	work	for	most	ordinary	people:	the men and women on the streets do not have enough grasp of contemporary scientific	theories	to	experience	an	increase	in	their	sense	of	closure.	Neither	do they	gain in	self-esteem,	because	they	are	not	part	of the	distinguished	elites. Finally,	insofar	as	ordinary	people	do	not	produce	scientific	work	of	their	own, no	particular	gain	in	symbolic	immortality	is	to	be	expected	either. In	conclusion, the	physicalist	narrative	may	serve the	egoic	meaning	needs	of the	intellectual	elites	who	develop	and	promote	it,	but	constitutes	a	significant threat	to	the	sense	of	meaning	of	the	average	person	on	the	streets.	Perhaps	for this reason, a large segment of society seeks meaning through alternative ontologies	considered	outdated	and	untenable	by	the	intellectual	elites,	such	as religious dualism (Heflick et al. 2015). This creates a schism-with corresponding tensions-between different segments of society, which may help explain the contemporary conflict between neo-atheism and religious belief. B.6 Conclusion The	physicalist	narrative, in	contrast to	the	way it is	normally	portrayed,	may not be dispassionate. It may be partly driven by the neurotic endeavor to project onto the world attributes that help us avoid confronting unacknowledged aspects of our own inner lives.	Moreover, contrary to what most people assume, physicalism creates an opportunity for the intellectual elites	who	develop	and	promote	it	to	maintain	a	sense	of	meaning	in	their	own 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 125 Doctoral	Dissertation Radboud	University	Nijmegen dr.	Bernardo	Kastrup 125 lives through fluid compensation. However, because this compensatory strategy	does	not	apply	to	a	large	segment	of	society,	it	creates	a	schism-with corresponding tensions-that may help explain the contemporary conflict between	neo-atheism	and	religious	belief. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 126 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 127 Bibliography Ackroyd, E. (1993). A Dictionary of Dream Symbols. London, UK: Cassell Illustrated. Adelson, EH (1995). Checker shadow illusion. 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Berkeley,	CA:	Shoemaker	&	Hoard. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 141 Summary This dissertation elaborates on a	modern, analytic version of the ontology of idealism,	according	to	which	(a)	phenomenal	consciousness,	as	an	ontological category, is fundamental; and (b) everything else in	nature can	ultimately be reduced to, or grounded in, patterns of excitation of phenomenal consciousness. It posits a reduction base consisting of a single element: spatially unbound, universal phenomenal consciousness. Its key challenge is then	to	explain	how	the	seemingly	distinct	phenomenal	inner	lives	of	different subjects	of	experience	can	arise	within	this	fundamentally	unitary	phenomenal field. This is sometimes called the "decomposition problem" in the literature and	it	is	the	core	problem	this	dissertation	attempts	to	tackle.	Along	the	way,	a variety of other challenges are addressed, such as: how we can reconcile idealism	with the fact that	we	all inhabit a common	external	world;	why this world	unfolds	independently	of	our	personal	volition	or	imagination;	why	there are such tight correlations between measured patterns of brain activity and reports	of	experience;	etc. The core of this dissertation consists of five papers published in academic journals. They are reproduced here, in chapters 2 through 6, without any change	of	substance. Chapter 2 discusses what is perhaps the root of key unresolved problems in contemporary	analytic	philosophy:	the	tendency	to	try	to	make	sense	of	nature by	replacing	concrete	observations	with	theoretical	abstractions.	Such	attempts often	consist	of	mere	word	games,	played in thought	with	a rich	and	shifting phantasmagoria of concepts. Chapter 2 attempts to make these word games explicit. It also suggests more epistemically reliable lines of reasoning that avoid	unnecessary	conceptual	abstractions. By	pursuing	these	more	reliable	lines	of	reasoning,	Chapter	3-the	core	of	this dissertation-elaborates on an analytic formulation of idealism. It can be summarized thus: there is only universal phenomenal consciousness.	We, as well as all other living organisms, are dissociated alters of this universal consciousness,	analogously	to	how	a	person	with	Dissociative	Identity	Disorder (DID)	manifests	multiple	disjoint	centers	of	subjectivity	also	called	'alters.'	We, and all other living organisms, are surrounded by the transpersonal phenomenal activity of universal consciousness, which unfolds beyond the dissociative	boundary	of	our	respective	alter.	The	inanimate	world	we	perceive around	us is the 'extrinsic	appearance'-i.e. the	phenomenal image imprinted from	across our dissociative boundary-of this activity. The living organisms we	share	the	world	with	are	the	extrinsic	appearances	of	other	alters. Chapter	4 lists	possible	objections	against	such	a	consciousness-only	ontology and	tackles	them	one	by	one.	It	attempts	to	show	that	they	are	often	based	on logical fallacies such as question-begging, unexamined assumptions, misunderstandings	of	the	implications	of	analytic	idealism,	etc. One objection is exceptional because it poses some legitimate difficulties: a necessary implication of the ontology proposed in Chapter 3 is that an 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 142 Analytic	Idealism 142 organism's	metabolism-all	of	it-is	the	extrinsic	appearance	of	the	organism's conscious inner life. This is reasonable enough for certain patterns of brain activity	known	to	correlate	with	experiences	accessible through introspection, but what about so-called 'unconscious' mental processes and metabolism beyond	the	brain,	such	as	e.g.	liver	and	kidney	function? Chapter 5 argues that, despite appearances to the contrary, there is no clear reason to believe that any mental process is truly unconscious. Instead, it attempts	to	show	that	there	are, in	fact,	very	good	reasons	to	think	that	what we	regard	as	unconscious	mental	processes	correspond	merely	to	an	illusion	of unconsciousness, which results from dissociative states or lack of metacognition.	And	once these two	mechanisms-dissociative states	and lack of metacognition-are identified, they can explain why experiences corresponding	to	areas	of the living	body	beyond	the	nervous	system	can't	be accessed	through	introspection. Finally, Chapter 6 compiles and discusses a broad list of instances of brain function impairment that are accompanied by enrichment of conscious inner life	and	an	expansion	of	one's	sense	of	identity.	The	list	includes	cases	as	varied as	asphyxiation,	physical	trauma	to	the	head,	the	consumption	of	psychoactive substances	that	dampen	brain	activity,	etc.	Such	correlations	between	impaired brain function and enriched conscious inner life are at least counterintuitive under	the	mainstream	physicalist	notion	that	conscious	inner	life	is	constituted or	generated	by	brain	activity.	Under	analytic	idealism,	on	the	other	hand,	they are	to	be	expected:	if	normal	brain	function	is	part	of	the	extrinsic	appearance of	a	dissociated	alter	of	universal	consciousness,	then	some	forms	of	reduction or	impairment	of	normal	brain	function	should	be	the	extrinsic	appearance	of	a reduction	or	impairment	of	the	dissociation.	And,	of	course,	from	a	first-person perspective	a	reduction	of	dissociation	must	be	experienced	as	an	enrichment of	conscious	inner	life:	reintegrated	memories,	the	recovery	of	a	broader	sense identity, renewed access to previously dissociated insights and emotions, reintegration of previously dissociated skills, etc. Contrary to physicalism, analytic	idealism	can	thus	not	only	accommodate,	but	also	make	sense	of,	the evidence	discussed	in	Chapter	6. 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 143 Samenvatting Dit	proefschrift	stelt	voor	een	moderne,	analytische	versie	van	de	ontologie	van idealisme. Volgens deze zo genoemde 'analytische idealisme,' (a) fenomenaal bewustzijn, als een ontologische categorie, is fundamenteel; en (b) elk waarneembaar	aspect	van	de	natuur	kan	uiteindelijk	worden	gereduceerd tot, of	geaard	in,	patronen	van	opwinding	van	fenomenaal	bewustzijn.	Het	poneert een reductiebasis bestaande uit een enkel element: ruimtelijk ongebonden, universeel	fenomenaal	bewustzijn.	De	belangrijkste	uitdaging	is	dan	om	uit	te leggen hoe de schijnbare gescheiden fenomenale innerlijke levens van verschillende subjecten zich kunnen voordoen binnen dit fundamenteel eenvormige fenomenale veld. Dit wordt in de literatuur soms het 'decompositieprobleem' genoemd en het is het kernprobleem dat dit proefschrift probeert aan te pakken. Onderweg komen er een aantal andere uitdagingen	aan	de	orde,	zoals:	hoe	we	analytische	idealisme	kunnen	verzoenen met	het	feit	dat	we	allemaal	een	gemeenschappelijke	externe	wereld	bewonen; waarom	deze	wereld	zich	ontvouwt	onafhankelijk	van	onze	persoonlijke	wil	of verbeeldingskracht; waarom er zulke strakke correlaties zijn tussen gemeten patronen	van	hersenactiviteit	en	ervaringsrapporten;	enz. De	kern	van	dit	proefschrift	bestaat	uit	vijf	papers	gepubliceerd	in	academische tijdschriften. Ze worden hier weergegeven, in hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 6, zonder	enige	verandering	van	inhoud. Hoofdstuk 2 bespreekt wat misschien de oorzaak is van de belangrijkste onopgeloste	problemen	in	de	hedendaagse	analytische	filosofie:	de	neiging	om te	proberen	de	natuur	toe	te	lichten	door	concrete	waarnemingen	te	vervangen door theoretische abstracties. Zulke pogingen bestaan vaak uit louter woordspelletjes, gespeeld in gedachten met een rijke en veranderende fantasmagorie van concepten. Hoofdstuk 2 probeert deze woordspelletjes expliciet te	maken.	Het suggereert	ook	meer	epistemische	betrouwbare lijnen van	redenatie	die	onnodige	conceptuele	abstracties	vermijden. Door deze	meer betrouwbare redenaties na te streven, gaat	Hoofdstuk 3-de kern	van	dit	proefschrift-in	op	een	analytische	formulering	van	idealisme.	Het kan als volgt worden samengevat: er is alleen universeel fenomenaal bewustzijn.	Wij, evenals alle andere levende organismen, zijn gedissocieerde 'alters' van dit universeel bewustzijn, analoog aan hoe een persoon met Dissociatieve Identiteitsstoornis meerdere disjuncte centra van subjectiviteit manifesteert,	ook	wel	'alters'	genoemd.	Wij,	en	alle	andere	levende	organismen, worden	omringd	door	de	transpersoonlijke	fenomenale	activiteit	van	universeel bewustzijn, die zich ontvouwt voorbij de dissociatieve grens van ons respectieve alter. De levenloze	wereld die	we om ons heen	waarnemen is de 'extrinsieke	verschijning'-d.w.z.	het	fenomenale	beeld	dat	is	afgedrukt	vanuit onze	dissociatieve	grens-van	deze	activiteit.	De levende	wezens	waarmee	we de	wereld	delen	zijn	de	extrinsieke	verschijningen	van	andere	alters. Hoofdstuk 4 somt	mogelijke bezwaren op tegen zo een ontologie	met alleen bewustzijn en pakt ze een voor een aan. Het probeert te laten zien dat de bezwaren	vaak	gebaseerd	zijn	op	logische	drogredenen	zoals	cirkelredenering, 529173-L-bw-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 PDF page: 144 Analytic	Idealism 144 foutieve impliciete veronderstellingen,	misverstanden over de implicaties van analytische	idealisme,	enz. Eén bezwaar is uitzonderlijk omdat het enkele legitieme moeilijkheden oplevert: een noodzakelijke implicatie van de in Hoofdstuk 3 voorgestelde ontologie is dat de hele metabolisme van een organisme de extrinsieke verschijning is van de bewuste innerlijke leven van het organisme. Dit is redelijk	voor	bepaalde	patronen	van	hersenactiviteit	waarvan	bekend	is	dat	ze correleren	met ervaringen die toegankelijk zijn via introspectie,	maar hoe zit het met de zogenaamde 'onbewuste' mentale processen en het metabolisme buiten	de	hersenen,	zoals	b.v.	leveren	nierfunctie? Hoofdstuk	5	stelt	dat	er,	ondanks	het	schijn	van	het	tegendeel,	geen	duidelijke reden	is	om	te	geloven	dat	een	mentaal	proces	ooit	echt	onbewust	is.	In	plaats daarvan	probeert	het	te	laten	zien	dat	er	in	feite	zeer	goede	redenen	zijn	om	te denken	dat	wat	we	beschouwen	als	onbewuste	mentale	processen	alleen	maar overeenkomen met een illusie van onbewustzijn, die het gevolg is van dissociatieve toestanden of gebrek aan metacognitie. En zodra deze twee mechanismen-dissociatieve	toestanden	en	gebrek	aan	metacognitie-worden geïdentificeerd, kunnen ze verklaren waarom ervaringen die corresponderen met gebieden van het levende lichaam voorbij het zenuwstelsel niet toegankelijk	zijn	via	introspectie.

-L-os-Kastrup Processed on: 18-2-2019 Analytic Idealism: A consciousness-only ontology A nalytic Idealism : A consciousness-only ontology DR. BERNARDO KASTRUP D R. BERN A RD O KA STRU P lis : ly A nalytic Idealism : A consciousness-only ontology DR. BERNARDO KASTRUP D R. BERN A RD O KA STRU P A nalytic Idealism : A consciousness-only ontology D R. BERN A RD O KA STRU P