Putnam's Naturalism and Realism Extended to Social Systems and Nonclassical Mereology by James Goetz National Coalition of Independent Scholars james.goetz@ncis.org Abstract Putnam proposed liberal naturalism and metaphysical realism that extends to normative judgments and coheres with the principle of bivalence. This paper extends Putnam's naturalism and realism to a model of social systems ranging from jawless vertebrates to legal systems while the systems exhibit nonclassical mereology. The model defines types of entities and material, and focuses on natural interactions that cause organization, the dynamics of scientific entities, and the composition of social groups which includes communication and the emergence of synergy. 1. Introduction Putnam (1975: 73) introduced the no miracles argument for scientific realism while he essentially said that realism is the only philosophy that does not turn the success of science into a miracle. He said this when he was an​ internal realist​, which means that he rejected the reality of facts, also known as ​objective truth​ or ​mind-independent truth​. Perhaps, his development of the no miracles argument had eventually convinced himself to become a ​metaphysical realist​, which means he accepts the reality of facts. In any case, Putnam (2015) clearly states that he shifted from internal realism to metaphysical realism. 1 This paper extends Putnam's (2015) liberal naturalism and realism to what I call ​verified social systems​. Verified social systems are quantifiable social systems that are verified by global scientific consensus. Examples of verified social systems are insect colonies, schools of fish, flocks of birds, herds of mammals, primate social groups, social norms, legal entities, and monetary systems. The quantifiable social systems are uncontroversial in their respective sciences such as zoology, sociology, jurisprudence, economics, human geography, demography, political 1 science, anthropology, and quantitative history. However, the social systems are controversial in the field of metaphysics, such as the theory of parts called ​mereology​. For example, metaphysicians typically hold to classical mereology which says an emergent entity cannot have parts while an entity with parts is the sum of its parts and any part of an entity exhibits transitivity. Also, Ruben (1983: 231–32) and Uzquiano (2004; 2018) argue that the US Supreme Court has a puzzling structure and is not a ​material entity​. Alternatively, Goetz (2014; 2016: 129–39) and Hawley (2017) argue that any court of law has a puzzling structure and nonetheless is a material entity, which implies nonclassical mereology. Also, Goetz proposes that all legal entities and their parts are material entities while noncontradictory paradoxes of legal entities include descriptions for ubiquitous government, coinciding governments, identity over time, and identical entities. 1 Jurisprudence combines legal theory and legal philosophy. 2 The rest of this paper describes Putnam's (2015) naturalism and realism; verified social systems; and a proposal for a nonclassical mereology and definitions for ​material​ and​ entity​ that correspond to the scientific descriptions of the verified social systems. 2 2. Putnam's Liberal Naturalism and Metaphysical Realism I focus on two points of Putnam's (2015) naturalism and realism. First, naturalism and realism extend to normative judgments and reason which are outside of Field's (1972) physicalism. Second, naturalism and realism cohere with the principle of bivalence. Consider bivalence in the case of scientific realism. Any ​interpretation of scientific data can be composed into a propositional statement or a series of propositions, while I define that a proposition is a clear statement that has one of two truth values, that is, true or false. Similarly, no unclear statement is a proposition. I emphasize the need for ​clarity​ of any proposition because unclear statements cause confusion. For example, two researchers must agree on the precise meaning of a statement before they can evaluate the truth value of the statement and avoid talking past each other. Also, conventional bivalence implies that the truth value ​true​ means ​completely true​. For example, a complex statement could be 75% true yet the truth value is false. This leads to the following definition for the principle of bivalence (PB): 2 I define that ​material ​is synonymous with ​substantial​ and ​substance​ in the context of metaphysics, apart from standard legal terminology. I also define that ​entity​ is synonymous with object​ in the context of metaphysics, apart from standard legal terminology. 3 (PB) ​Any propositional statement has one of two truth values, that is, completely true or not completely true. Alternatively, one could flip conventional bivalence and say that any propositional statement has one of two truth values, that is, completely false or not completely false. Nonetheless, I stick with my conventional definition for bivalence. Furthermore, one might wonder how Putnam could support bivalence and scientific realism while the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics proposes the uncertainty of quantum states. However, Putnam (1968; 1974) supported ​quantum logic​ which defines quantum mechanics in the context of bivalent logic while supporting the certainty of quantum states and the uncertainty of the evolution of quantum states. For example, quantum theory pioneer von Nuemann (1932) said that quantum mechanics can cohere with bivalent logic and the certainty of quantum states, while Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936) rigorously developed quantum logic. Also, see De Ronde, Domenech, and Freytes (n.d.) for extensive documentation of the storied history and development of quantum logic. Furthermore, Goetz (forthcoming: section 2.5.2) compares the bivalent uncertainty principle and the contradictory uncertainty principle. 3. Verified Social Systems 3.1 Entities and Material 3.1.1 Defining ​concrete​ and​ abstract I define that a ​concrete entity​ is anything that is not a mere abstract concept. Also, an ​abstract entity​ is anything that is a mere abstract concept. For example, the mere concept of a proposition 4 is an abstract entity, while human knowledge of a proposition or the institutionalization of a proposition is a phenomenon and likewise a concrete entity. 3.1.2 Defining ​scientific entity​ and​ material I define that a ​scientific entity​ is anything defined by science. Also, PB implies that the description of any scientific entity is completely true or not completely true. Similarly, PB implies the existence of what I call ​true scientific entities​ and ​false scientific entities​. For example, a false scientific entity typically possesses quantifiable phenomena that had not been correctly interpreted, while the description of the scientific theory or entity is not completely true. Scientists develop hypotheses about scientific entities and carefully test the hypotheses by collecting data, analyzing the data, and interpreting the results while using inductive reasoning. Some data collection involves controlled experiments, that is, experiments that are directly manipulated by the scientists, but controlled experiments are sometimes impossible because of ethical standards or constraints in technology. For example, astronomy is a natural science and astronomers rarely if ever perform controlled experiments while collecting astronomical data. Also, inductive reasoning by definition can never ​absolutely​ prove anything. However, scientific proof results from rigorous experiments and rigorous analysis that indicates compelling evidence for a scientific fact. Ironically, some scientific entities are ​unobservable entities​. Unobservable scientific entities cannot be directly detected by current technology while they nonetheless exhibit 5 quantifiable effects. Consider the case of gravity. Global scientific consensus says that gravity is a fundamental interaction of physics, but no unanimous consensus defines if the structure of gravity is a force or a forceless interaction (Goetz forthcoming: section 2.5). For example, Einstein (1961) developed his theory of gravity called ​general relativity​ while meticulously documenting the orbit of the planet Mercury. His theory states that gravity has no quantum fields and is caused by the forceless interaction between mass and relative spacetime. However, the majority of current gravitational physicists conjecture the existence of unobservable gravitational force (Dyson 2012). The majority say that Einstein's theory of forceless gravity has no nomological possibility of interacting with quantum systems such as photons and subatomic particles. They also say that a gravitational force field with zero mass coheres with quantum mechanics and Einstein's field equations for general relativity. However, no current or future technology could directly observe gravitational force because of the implied minuscule scale and extra dimensions. In other words, assuming the majority that says gravity is a force, then the observable effects of gravity are ubiquitous while no current or future technology can possibly detect the structure of gravity. Moreover, regardless if gravity is a forceless interaction or a force, then gravity is a fundamental entity of physics and an unobservable entity. Likewise, unobservable entities are fundamental to natural science. Next, I dismiss the Aristotelian concept of ​material​, while my definitions for ​material and ​entity​ overlap each other. For example, material includes anything that foremost derives from the fundamental interactions of physics. Also, the term ​material​ typically refers to something that is a part of an entity. Furthermore, my definitions of ​scientific entity​ and ​material imply the existence of observable material and unobservable material. 6 This paper applies my definition of ​scientific entity​ to the quantitative research of social systems in zoology and social science. Examples of the research focus on self-organization and collective behavior of social vertebrates (Couzin and Krause 2003); complex group behavior among primates (Silk and Kappeler 2017); prehistoric human societies (Ferraro 2012); and contemporary human social systems (Imai 2018). 3.2 Self-Organized Vertebrate Social Groups Social groups of vertebrates began to emerge over 500 million years ago. Any noninstitutionalized social group of animals exhibits quantifiable self-organization. The self-organization of social groups is a process where members of an animal group act together in noninstitutionalized behavior. Similarly, self-organization is a process that involves numerous interactions among local-level components of a system that cause the emergence of a global-level pattern in space and time. In the case of a social group, the members of the group are the local-level components of the self-organization, while the communication and movement of the members are the numerous interactions among the local-level components. Global scientific consensus verifies the existence of the following examples of self-organized vertebrate groups: 1. The first social vertebrates were jawless fish that exhibited self-organization. 2. Self-organized social groups that move together with coordinated unity in the same direction include schools of fish, flocks of birds, and herds of mammals (Couzin and Krause 2003). 3. Human crowds exhibit self-organization (Couzin and Krause 2003). 7 Also, collective behavior is a brief, excited state of social self-organization, such as a flock of birds that suddenly changes the direction of its flight. 3.3 Social Norms and Cultural Norms Social norms are the standards of behavior and the actual acceptable behavior of a social group. Also, cultural norms are social norms that passed down from one generation to the next. For example, various primate groups exhibit cultural norms (Silk and Kappeler 2017). Similarly, global scientific consensus verifies the existence of social norms and cultural norms. 3.4 Legal Entities Most Neolithic cultures developed into settled political entities (Ferraro 2012). Political entities such as a city or a sovereign state are a type of legal entity, while every settled political entity 3 has a defined territory, a human population, and a government. All legal entities possess rights and responsibilities (Deiser 1908; 1909a; 1909b). The three top types of legal entities are sovereign political entities, natural persons, and juristic entities. For example, a natural person is a human with rights and responsibilities; while every 4 human is a natural person, except for past cases of chattel slavery which horrifically reduced a human to a mere piece of property with no legal rights. Also, types of juristic entities include 3 The legal term ​legal entity​ is synonymous with ​legal person​. 4 The legal term ​juristic entity​ is synonymous with ​juristic person​, ​juridical entity​, ​juridical person​, ​artificial entity​, ​artificial person​, ​fictitious entity​ and ​fictitious person​. 8 subnational entities, incorporated public departments, private institutions, and private 5 businesses. Furthermore, any sovereign legal entity or juristic entity can create a departmental juristic entity, which can create a departmental juristic entity, which can create a departmental juristic entity.... A primary right of any legal entity is the right to own property. Two top types of property are tangible and intangible. Tangible property is made of matter or energy. Types of intangible property include financial assets and intellectual property. Also, the documentation of a piece of intangible property might be tangible, but nonetheless the property is intangible. The global consensus of anthropologists verifies that some prehistoric humans developed political entities. Also, the major schools of jurisprudence (that is, natural law theory, legal positivism, and legal realism) agree that legal entities, governments, political officials, and pieces of property are concrete entities. Furthermore, legal entities are analyzed by quantitative 6 research in various fields such as sociology, economics, human geography, demography, political science, anthropology, and quantitative history. 4. Social Systems and Metaphysics 4.1 Introduction The sciences have never disputed the reality of social systems. However, the field of metaphysics debates the reality versus unreality of social systems. As mentioned in section 1, Ruben (1983: 231–32) and Uzquiano (2004; 2018) argue that the US Supreme Court has a puzzling structure 5 Examples of subnational entities include provinces and cities. 6 The major schools of jurisprudence are also the major schools of legal philosophy. 9 and is not a material entity. Alternatively, Goetz (2014; 2016: 129–39) and Hawley (2017) argue that courts of law have a puzzling structure and nonetheless are a material entity. Also, Goetz (2014; 2016: 129–39) proposes that legal entities and their parts are material entities, while noncontradictory paradoxes of legal entities include descriptions for identity over time, ubiquitous government, coinciding governments, and identical entities. One might wonder how a structure with a puzzling description could be a material structure or how a paradox can be noncontradictory. However, Quine (1976: 1–18) defines that a paradox​ is an apparently successful argument that has a concluding statement that seems contradictory or absurd. Rigorous analysis of the argument can resolve the paradox in two possible ways. One, careful analysis reveals that the argument is fallacious. Two, careful analysis (1) reveals that the conclusion is actually true and (2) explains away the deceptive appearances. Also, Goetz describes ​noncontradictory paradoxes​: One may only partially comprehend a [noncontradictory] paradox because of limited information. Or debaters may defend contradictory positions. Or a set of legal codes may contain contradictions subject to amendment or termination. Regardless, there are no absolute contradictions. (Goetz 2014: 36) I define that a ​noncontradictory paradox​ or a ​coherent puzzle​ is a description of a thing that looks contradictory at some level while the description has no absolute contradiction. Possible reasons that they look contradictory at some level include the following: one, the paradoxical 10 description lacks precision; two, members of the audience of the noncontradictory paradox need more background on the complex content of the paradox. Goetz (2016: 129–39) also demonstrates that all noncontradictory paradoxes of legal entities and their parts cohere with a precisely stated law of absolute identity (LAI): (LAI)​ Anything is absolutely identical to itself and nothing else at any associated point of time. Also, Goetz (2014: 36) supports that noncontradictory paradoxes cohere with the law of non-contradiction (LNC): (LNC)​ There are no absolute contradictions. The following paradoxes cohere with LAI, LNC, and the global consensus of jurisprudence and other related social sciences: J1. A buyer can purchase a piece of tangible property with a piece of intangible property, such as paper currency. J2. International artisan copyright law distinguishes the tangible material of a statue from the intangible design of the statue. J3. An automobile with a vehicle identity number (VIN) can have all of it parts replaced an indefinite number of times, including the VIN label, while the VIN does not change. 11 Also, all of the original parts of the automobile could be reassembled into a working automobile that would require a new VIN for legal registration (Goetz 2014: 39). J4. A government of a political entity is made of political officials and legal rights while the government has authority over the entire territory and population of the political entity (Goetz 2014: 41). J5. A governmental entity can create a departmental entity while both entities have authority over the same territory and population (Goetz 2014: 41). J6. A sole proprietorship is an unincorporated business while a natural person is the sole proprietor who is inseparable from the business. The natural person is the authority of the business and has unlimited liability for all business losses (Goetz 2014: 42–46; 2016: 129–30). J7. A general partnership is an unincorporated business while multiple natural persons are the proprietors called ​general partners​ who are inseparable from the business. Each general partner is the authority of the business and has unlimited liability for all business losses (Goetz 2014: 42–46; 2016: 133). J8. A typical political official is a natural person with inseparable governmental authority while the political official and the natural person are two distinct concrete entities (Goetz 2014: 42; 2016: 129–39). J9. A natural person can simultaneously be multiple political officials. For example, Lepidus was simultaneously a natural person, the pontifex maximus, and an absolute triumvir (Goetz 2016: 136). 12 J10. An absolute coregency is a single rulership while multiple joint monarchs each possess the same absolute authority (Goetz 2014: 42–46; 2016: 129–39). Some readers may feel that the above legal examples of noncontradictory paradoxes are in no way noncontradictory, and that I merely defended Ruben's (1983: 231–32) and Uzquiano's (2004; 2018) proposals which say that no court of law is a material entity. However, I now defend the logic of social systems which includes the reality of legal entities and their parts. The first step in my defense is to describe the science and metaphysics of self-organized social groups. 4.2 The Science and Metaphysics of Self-Organized Social Groups I previously noted that vertebrate social groups began to emerge over 500 million years ago, that is, social groups of the first jawless fish. Any social group of fish is called a ​shoal​ while any shoal of fish that swims together in unified direction is also called a ​school​. For example, schools of herring began to emerge over 50 million years ago. I note the phenomenon of fish schools because they are obvious to the naked eye when the water is clear; an experienced radar technician cannot easily distinguish a fish school from a similar-sized whale or submarine; and the mathematics of fish school behavior has been carefully analyzed and documented. That said, metaphysicians debate if a self-organized social group is a material entity or not a material entity. Consider the self-organization and schools of fish described in section 3.2. Self-organization is a process that involves numerous interactions among local-level components of a system that cause the emergence of a global-level pattern in space and time. In the case of a 13 fish school, the local-level components are individual fish. Also, the process of the fish interaction causes a global-level pattern that is a fish school, while the fish school is a scientific entity. The associated process and entity imply the following proposition, that is, proposition 1: Proposition 1​:​ ​Any process of organization implies the existence of an organized entity and vice versa. Proposition 1 is coherent and nonetheless flouts classical mereology which implies that an emergent entity cannot have parts while any self-organized entity has components. Likewise, proposition 1 implies a nonclassical mereology while Seibt (2014) and Hawley (2017) also propose nonclassical mereologies. For example, Seibt proposes a process philosophy of mereology for the process of self-organization which rejects Aristotelian concepts of substances and entities and altogether rejects the existence of any types of substances and entities. I appreciate Seibt's rejection of real Aristotelian substances and entities, but I propose the existence of entities that correspond to verified scientific entities. For instance, a fish school is a dynamic entity that is always in the process of self-organization. One might object to proposition 1 while saying that a fish school is noncontiguous and likewise not a real entity. However, fish in a school are connected by communication, while the interaction of the fish in the school depends on the communication. Likewise, a fish school is composed of (1) multiple fish that are attracted to each other and (2) communication between the fish. The fish and the communication combine into a contiguous entity that is the fish school. Also, communication is a material phenomenon which is subject to scientific research. Similarly, 14 a social group is a contagious material entity composed of members who are attracted to each other and observable communication between the members. 4.3 The Science and Metaphysics of Social Norms As previously noted, social norms are the standards of behavior and the actual acceptable behavior of a social group. Also, zoologists and social scientists collect quantifiable data about social norms. Furthermore, if a social norm spontaneously emerges, then it is a product of self-organization and called a ​custom​. Alternatively, other social norms emerge from the governments of institutions. Either way, communication is a primary element of any social norm. Also, a social norm is a contiguous material entity based on an observable communication system described in section 4.2. For example, any social norm is composed of group members and communication between the members. 4.4 The Science and Metaphysics of Legal Entities 4.4.1 Introduction Courts of law do not defend their own existence. Any defense lawyer or defendant would face charges of contempt if they would argue that their trial is meaningless because there are no real legal entities or no facts about the past. Alternatively, the 'International Court of Philosophers' questions the existence of everything. Consider various legal philosophies. Aristotle (350 BCE) supported the reality of political entities, political officials, citizens, and property, but he never described their substance. Proto legal positivist Hobbes (1651) proposed that political entities are artificial entities formed by 15 group consent. Legal realist Moore (1923) proposed that political entities are formed by long-lasting group habits. Natural law theorist Goetz (2014; 2016: 129–39) proposed that political entities emerged from natural rights and the natural organization of human groups. Also, section 3.4 notes that the major schools of jurisprudence agree that political entities are concrete entities. Hobbes referred to a sovereign state as an artificial person. However, contemporary jurisprudence limits the term ​artificial person​ and all its synonyms listed in footnote 4 to legal entities other than a sovereign state or a natural person. For example, artificial persons include subnational entities, incorporated public departments, private institutions, and private businesses. Setting aside legal terminology, I propose that any human social norm and anything defined by law is artificial because it is made by humans. Also, anything defined by law is what I call a jurisprudential entity​. Similarly, I propose that any human social norms and any jurisprudential entity is a ​social artifact​ because it is made by humans, for instance, proposition 2: Proposition 2​: Any human social norm or any jurisprudential entity is a social artifact. Also, this subsection focuses on legal entities, so I trim proposition 2 to make proposition 3: Proposition 3​: Any jurisprudential entity is a social artifact. Furthermore, I propose that any social artifact is a material entity, for example, proposition 4: 16 Proposition 4​: Any social artifact is a material entity. Moreover, since this subsection focuses on legal entities, I modify proposition 4 to make proposition 5: Proposition 5:​ Any jurisprudential entity is a material entity. My analysis of proposition 5 begins by analyzing the composition of a sovereign political entity. Consider the Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933), Article 1. It says that a sovereign state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with the other states. First, the permanent population and the defined territory are clearly tangible entities. Second, the government is ruled by laws and has one or more members of the population, while the laws are based on an observable communication system. Third, the government's capacity to enter into relations with other states is also based on an observable communication system. Fourth, the property owned by a sovereign state is typically a combination of tangible property and intangible property. The above description implies that a sovereign state is an entity composed of observable jurisprudential entities and unobservable jurisprudential entities. Similarly, a sovereign state is composed of observable material and unobservable material. The population, territory, members of the government, communication system, and tangible property are the observable entities. The laws and the intangible property are the unobservable entities. The observable entities are evidently straight forward while the unobservable entities need a clear explanation. 17 The institution of laws began to emerge from Neolithic social norms while verified sovereign political entities began to emerge around 4000 BCE. The laws define the rights and responsibilities of legal entities, that is, the sovereign state, the natural persons, and any juristic entities. For example, legal rights permeate the territory and population of any political entity. Also, the communication of the legal rights is observable, but the permeation of the legal rights is unobservable. Next, intangible property is a social norm. Noncontradictory paradox J1 in section 4.1 describes that intangible property is sometimes used to purchase tangible property. This implies cases where intangible property and tangible property have equal values. For example, trade between humans is a social norm that emerged in prehistory while the trade of grain loans eventually emerged around 2000 BCE. The loans involved the tangible property of grain and the intangible property of the loan contract. The communication of the loan contract is observable, but the value of the contract is otherwise unobservable while legal terminology says the value is intangible. Laws and intangible property are metaphysical curiosities. They are beyond direct observation while their supporting communication system and effects are subjects of quantitative science. Also, consider the following: Research of past and current phenomena indicates strong evidence that legal persons sometimes generate enormous force. Great nations rise and fall. Government officials declare war and armies fight with tangible weapons. Legal persons buy and sell property. Universities grant academic degrees. A cartoon character is intangible property that 18 generates multibillions of US dollars per year. Banks and law enforcement foreclose mortgages of family residences. Governments and economies around the world operate according to the logic of law. (Goetz 2014: 36; 2016: 132–33) 4.4.2 The unobservable material of law Laws permeate every legal entity and piece of property while quantitative science and history indicate the reality of laws. I propose that laws are real and a product of​ synergy​, that is, the interaction of two or more objects that produce a combined effect greater than the sum of the separate effects. For example, self-organization exemplifies synergy, while I previously described scientifically verified evidence of self-organized social groups and social norms. However, social science defines that self-organization is limited to noninstitutionalized entities. For example, a social scientist can properly say that the first laws were social norms that emerged from self-organized social norms. Nevertheless, a social scientist would break convention if they say that laws are self-organized. Given the restrictions of this convention, I describe that law is synergistic material formed by humans. Law is extraordinarily flexible while it permeates all legal entities and pieces of property. For example, legal rights permeate all residents of a political entity. Also, the flexibility of standard jurisprudence supports the noncontradictory paradoxes J1–10 in section 4.1. Next, sections 4.4.3–6 describe various paradoxes of jurisprudential identity. 19 4.4.3 Jurisprudential material constitution A notable puzzle of material constitution involves a lump of material that was fashioned into a statue (Wasserman 2018). ​For example, a lump of gold is formed into a statue named ​Jupiter​. Some argue that the lump and Jupiter are two different material entities that coincide at the same space and time, while others argue that the lump made into Jupiter is one material entity. Points in favor of two different entities include the following: (1) the lump existed before Jupiter; (2) melting Jupiter would terminate Jupiter and leave the lump intact; and (3) hollowing out nonessential gold from Jupiter and selling the removed gold would divide the lump into two pieces of property and leave Jupiter intact. Alternatively, the argument for the lump and Jupiter being one entity focuses on the position that​ constitution is identity​ which is based on the grounds that two distinct entities cannot occupy the same place at the same time. I appreciate these points while I consider another angle. First, particle physics indicates that no two particles of matter can occupy the same place at the same time, but nonetheless multiple photons can occupy the same place at the same time. Likewise, the particle physics of photons refutes a foundation for constitution is identity. Second, J2 implies that ​international artisan copyright law distinguishes the tangible material of Jupiter from the intangible design of Jupiter.​ For example, destroying the tangible material of Juptier would not damage the intangible design of Jupiter. In the context of my definitions for ​observable material​ and ​unobservable material​, the lump is an observable entity while the design of Jupiter is an unobservable entity. Likewise, Jupiter is the combination of two entities, that is, tangible lump and the design of Jupiter. 20 4.4.4 Jurisprudential identity over time The metaphysics of identity over time and consequential change is called ​persistence​ or diachronic identity​. Diachronic identity has been debated since ancient history. For example, Plutarch (1914: ​49–51​) described the ancient philosophical debate about the ​legendary ship of Theseus. Theseus was the mythical founder and king of Athens, while​ the ​Athenians preserved Theseus's ship in the Athenian harbor by replacing the ship's decayed planks of wood with newer and stronger planks. Eventually, the Athenians replaced every tangible piece of the ship. Ancient philosophers debated when theorizing if the ship with replacement parts was the same ship. Some said it was the same ship while others said it was a different ship. Hobbes (1656: 84–85) defended that the ship was no longer Theseus's ship while enhancing the scenario with a custodian who collected all of the original worn pieces and reassembled them into a ship with the same design. This resulted in two ships with the same design while the original parts were reassembled and located elsewhere. However, Goetz (2014: 38–39) concludes that international custom with ancient origins implies that the ship was movable property owned by the city of Athens. This means that the identity of Theseus's ship in 7 the Athenian harbor remained the same regardless of how many times all of the tangible pieces were replaced and then reassembled by the Hobbesian custodian into an indefinite number of ships with the same design. 7 The terms ​movable property​ and ​personal property​ are equivalent while civil law systems use the former and common law systems use the latter. The terms refer to any property other than real estate. 21 Also, Goetz compares Theseus's ship and the Hobbesian custodian to a contemporary automobile with a vehicle identification number (VIN). The scenario follows: Despite any amount of vehicle repair using replacement auto parts, the VIN remains the same even if the VIN label needs replacement. Likewise, if a mechanic replaces all [tangible] parts of a respective automobile, the VIN remains the same. Also, if the mechanic later reassembles the original auto parts into a vehicle for use on public roads, then the second vehicle made from the original auto parts needs its own new VIN. (Goetz 2014: 39) I agree with these extraordinary cases of diachronic identity which are based on standard jurisprudence. Also, I propose that all diachronic identity results from material phenomena that I call a​ causal chain of persistence​. Furthermore, I agree with Goetz (2014: 37​–​40; 2016: 137​–​38) that legal entities and pieces of property with a title exhibit essential changes and nonessential changes, while I nonetheless dismiss the Aristotelian concepts of material and entity. Next, I preface my description of the changes and causal chains by describing Locke on persistence. Locke famously defended persistence for personal identity and other natural phenomena (Gordon-Roth 2019). He began by defining ​individuation​ and what some call the ​place-time-kind principle​. The place-time-kind principle proposes that (1) no two things of the same kind can be in the same place at the same time and (2) no individual can be in two different places at the same time. Locke applied the place-time-kind principle to natural objects such as atoms, masses of matter, plants, animals, and humans. Then, Locke described consciousness as the sole element 22 of persistence for the personal identity of a human by detailing ​hypothetical​ scenarios. Three of the scenarios follow. First, one personal consciousness switches from one body to another body while persistence of personal identity is unobstructed by the consciousness switching between bodies. Second, one personal consciousness switches from one immaterial soul to another immaterial soul while persistence of personal identity is unobstructed by the consciousness switching between souls. Third, two personal consciousnesses alternate in the same body while there are two personal identities despite one body. All in all, Locke defends that persistence of consciousness and nothing else causes persistence of personal identity. I appreciate Locke's 17th-century position of persistence. For example, it coheres with the diachronic identity of Thesus's ship and Goetz's automobile. Also, it coheres with the particle physics of matter which, as I described earlier, says that two or more particles of matter cannot exist at the same place and time. However, problems with the place-time-kind principle follow. First, as described earlier, the particle physics of photons indicates that multiple photons can exist at the same place and time. Second, quantum mechanics indicates that an entangled system can exist at two different places at the same time. Third, noncontradory paradox J5 says that multiple legal entities such as departments can exist at the same place and time. Fourth, noncontradictory paradoxes J6–10 are examples of identical entities that will be detailed in section 4.4.5. Given these exceptions to the place-time-kind principle, I begin to define individuation​ with LAI defined in section 4.1, that is, "Anything is absolutely identical to itself and nothing else at any associated point of time." Now, I describe the changes, causal chains, and diachronic identity of legal entities. First, any essential change of a legal entity causes the origination or termination of the legal entity. 23 Second, any nonessential change does not cause the origination or termination of the legal entity. Likewise, legal entities persist through nonessential changes. Third, the persistence through nonessential changes is caused by causal chains. Causal chains of persistence are ubiquitous in nature. For example, fundamental interactions permeate the spacetime universe and cause the persistence of particles (Goetz forthcoming: section 2.5). Also, the interdisciplinary science of synergetics indicates the diversity and ubiquity of self-organization in nature and society (Haken 1974–; 2008), while the self-organization implies the persistence of self-organized entities. Likewise, in many ways, natural interactions cause organization and persistence. Some causal chains of persistence are unclear. For example, two flocks of birds can unite into one larger flock or one flock can divide into two smaller flocks, while pinpointing the exact time of the unification or division is disputable depending on the criteria for unification and division. Also, the origination or termination of a legal entity is typically clear, but wars or legal action can cause disputes about the identity of some legal entities. In the rest of this third-level section, I focus on the diachronic identity of undisputed legal entities and pieces of property with a title. I start with describing essential changes of legal entities. First, essential changes of sovereign legal entities are caused by agreements and wars (Goetz 2014: 38). For example, ​on September 21, 1792, ​the ​Legislative Assembly terminated the Kingdom of France. ​Second, essential changes of natural persons are caused by birth and death (Goetz 2014: 37). Third, essential changes of juristic entities are caused by legislation and other agreements. 24 Any amount of tangible or intangible change to a legal entity that does not terminate the entity is a nonessential change. Likewise, the entity persists through the time and change. Also, a legal entity can create another legal entity. In this case, the creation of the legal entity is nonessential to the original legal entity and nonetheless essential to the latter legal entity. In the case of formula logic, diachronic identity implies that an entity persists without the persistence of absolute identicalness. This can be expressed in the formula for relative identity (RI) introduced by Geach (1967; 1969; 1977: 72–81): (RI)​ ​x​ and ​y​ are the same ​F​, but ​x​ and ​y​ are different ​G​s. RI implies the sameness of ​x​ and ​F​ and the sameness of ​y​ and ​F​; and the sameness does not imply transitivity because ​x​ and ​y​ are different from each other. These parts of RI cohere with Locke's position of personal identity and the standard jurisprudential position of diachronic identity. For example, ​F​ persists from time(0) to time(1) while ​x​ is the same as the properties of F​ at time(0) and ​y​ is the same as the properties of ​F​ at time(1). However, Geach also proposes that RI implies the anti-realism of all identicalness. In other words, Geach implies that ​x​ is not identical to ​x​; ​y​ is not identical to ​y​; et cetera. Alternatively, some hold to the reality of identicalness and use of the RI formula (Gupta 1980; van Inwagen 1988; Goetz 2014; 2016). Rea (2003) distinguished between Geach's RI and van Inwagen's RI by respectively calling them ​pure RI​ and ​impure RI​ because Geach's RI contains no elements of numerical identity (NI) while van Inwagen's RI contains elements of NI. Also, there are different ways to 25 combine NI and RI. For example, Goetz (2016: 134–39) combines LAI and RI while describing the standard jurisprudencial position of identity. Furthermore, Goetz (2016: 137) notes that his impure RI could also be called ​impure NI​ while the term ​pure NI​ refers to absolute identity and absolute identicalness. Instead, I refer to the combination of LAI and RI by defining ​impure identity​ (​II​): (II)​ ​x​ is absolutely identical to ​x​; ​y​ is absolutely identical to ​y​; ​x​ is identical to ​y​ and symmetrically vice versa while ​x​ and ​y​ lack absolute identicalness and absolute transitivity. In other words, II refers to the ​impure identicalness​ of ​x​ and ​y​. For example, ​F​ persists from time(0) to time(1) while ​x​ is absolutely identical to ​F​ at time(0) and ​y​ is is absolutely identical to F​ at time(1); ​x​ is ​impurely identical​ to ​y​ and vice versa while they are separated by a time interval; and ​x​ and ​y​ are different compositions because of ​F​'s changes between time(0) and time(1). In this case, II models diachronic identity which is ubiquitous in standard jurisprudence. 4.4.5 Special cases of synchronic impure identity (II) The most controversial cases of jurisprudential identity involve proprietors and political officials. I summarized them in J6–10. Here, I begin by describing proprietors and associated natural persons summarized in J6–7. Every living human is a natural person, that is, a legal entity. The only exceptions were in the past when horrific laws permitted the enslavement of some humans which reduced them to 26 mere pieces of tangible property with no legal rights. Considering the potential absence of legal rights helps one to understand legal rights and their implications for identity. For example, a living human is inseparable from their legal rights and responsibilities. This implies that a human is inseparable from their natural personality. Also, if a natural person becomes a sole proprietor while starting a sole proprietorship, then the natural person is inseparable from the proprietorship. For example, standard jurisprudence implies that the natural person has unlimited liability for the associated proprietorship and is the entire authority of the proprietorship. Likewise, the natural person is the same as the proprietorship. Furthermore, a general partnership is a proprietorship that has multiple natural persons who are the proprietors called ​general partners​. In this case, each general partner is a natural person who is inseparable from the partnership while each has unlimited liability for the partnership and is the entire authority of the partnership. Similarly, each general partner is the same as the partnership. Moreover, consider the differences between proprietorships and limited companies. Sole proprietorships and general partnerships originated from ancient customs while an associated business owner possesses unlimited liability for their business. Alternatively, limited companies such as business corporations and limited liability companies (LLC) originate from statutory laws in modern history while the laws artificially separate business owners from their businesses and limit the liability of the owners. The sameness of a natural person and a proprietorship exemplifies what I call ​synchronic II​. Synchronic II refers to the simultaneous impure identicalness of two entities. For example, a natural person who is a sole proprietor is identical to the sole proprietorship and vice versa. Also, each general partner of a general partnership is identical to the general partnership and vice 27 versa. However, the identicalness of a natural person and a proprietorship is impure because they lack absolute identicalness and absolute transitivity. For instance, a general partnership epitomizes synchronic II because each general partner is identical to the partnership and vice versa while absolute transitivity does not exist between each general partner and the partnership. Other cases of synchronic II involve natural persons and political officials described in J8–10. Comparable to proprietors, a natural person who is a political official is inseparable from their political office. Also, I categorize that an absolute ruler is a public official. Consider the example of Lepidus. He was pontifex maximus from 44 BCE to 14 BCE and a triumvir from 43 BCE to 36 BCE. During part of his life, he was simultaneously a natural person, the pontifex maximus, and a triumvir. Likewise, during a period of time, Lepidus was identical to the natural person; Lepidus was identical to the pontifex maximus; Lepidus was identical to the triumvir; and the natural person, the pontifex maximus, and the triumvir were three different concrete entities. Next, consider absolute coregencies that formed in ancient Egypt, Israel, Judah, and Rome, and medieval Byzantine. An absolute coregency is a single rulership while multiple joint monarchs each possess the same absolute authority. Other types of co-rulership such as a diarchy involve formal division between the corulers while absolute coregencies are undivided. For example, the Roman Senate in 44 BCE appointed Octavian, Lepidus, and Antony with absolute authority to rule Rome while their only limitation of authority was a term limit. They were an absolute triumvirate with no formal division while each triumvir was inseparable from the triumvirate. 28 The triumvirs and triumvirate epitomize synchronic II. Octavian, Lepidus, and Antony were three natural persons while each was impurely identical to the absolute triumvirate and vice versa. Furthermore, consider the parallels between natural persons, proprietors, and public officials. First, one human combined with respective jurisprudential material can be absolutely identical to (1) a natural person, (2) a proprietor, (3) a proprietorship, (4) a political official, or (5) a political office. Second, one human can be impurely identical to a natural person and (1) a proprietor and a proprietorship or (2) a political official and a political office. Third, a proprietor is impurely identical to the associated proprietorship while a political official is impurely identical to the associated political office. For example, a general partner is impurely identical to the associated general partnership while an absolute joint monarch is impurely identical to the associated absolute coregency. 4.4.6 Leibniz's Law Consider Leibniz's Law (LL): (LL) ​for every property ​F​, entity ​x​ has ​F​ if and only if entity ​y​ has ​F​, then ​x​ is identical to y​. LL is the standard account of identity and implies that ​x​ is identical to ​y​ only when ​x​ and ​y possess all the same properties. However, LL faces major problems with diachronic identity and synchronic II. 29 Deutsch and Garbacz (2018: section 2.1) note that some proponents of LL creatively support diachronic identity while other proponents of LL creatively avoid the reality of diachronic identity. For example, consider two photos of a dog named Oscar. Photo ​A​ shows Oscar as a puppy and photo ​B​ shows Oscar as an old dog with a gray nose. In other words, ​A​ has no gray nose while ​B​ has a gray nose. At first glance, ​A​ and ​B​ contradict LL because they are photos of the same dog while the photos have different properties. However, proponents of LL propose creative solutions to the puzzle. The two most popular solutions follow. One solution says that simple properties such as having a gray nose are ​relations to times​ that cohere with LL and diachronic identity. The other solution relies on the position of real temporal parts that implies Oscar is an entity that is extended in time in the same way that Oscar is extended in space while the puppy Oscar and the old Oscar with a gray nose are distinct parts of the whole temporally extended Oscar. In this case, ​A​ and ​B​ are not photos of Oscar but photos of different 8 parts of Oscar. The former solution implies that LL does not imply that identical entities exhibit absolute identicalness to each other. The latter solution implies that ​A​ and ​B​ are not identical because they are photos of different temporal parts of Oscar. In other words, all temporal parts of Oscar have always existed and will always exist while different ages of Oscar are different temporal parts of Oscar and likewise lack identicalness. I feel dissatisfied with both solutions. The former solution implies that ​A​ and ​B​ can have different properties in the context of LL. In other words, ​A​ and ​B​ do not correspond to the ​x​ and ​y​ in the LL formula. Ultimately, this 8 See Hawley (2015) for a description of ​temporal parts​. 30 interpretation of LL defines that Oscar is something other than all the properties of Oscar at any given time of Oscar's life. I agree with the former solution in that the identity of Oscar does not depend on all the properties of Oscar, but I nonetheless do not see that this solution does justice to LL because ​A​ and ​B​ do not correspond to ​x​ and ​y​ while I see no clear definition of ​x​ and ​y​. The latter solution does justice to LL while the solution implies that ​A​ and ​B​ do not correspond to ​x​ and ​y​. For example, the temporal parts solution relies on the B-theory of time or eternalism that imply all observations and experiences of tensed time are illusory. In this case, 9 A​ and ​B​ are different parts of Oscar and likewise LL stands while ​A​ and ​B​ are nonetheless related to each other because they are parts of Oscar. Also, temporal parts are real while diachronic identity is illusory. However, if all positions along the line of B-theory or eternalism are false, then the solution is nothing more than a hypothetical thought exercise based on unreality. For instance, Goetz (forthcoming: section 2.7) analyzes B-theory and eternalism while demonstrating that the theory of relativity does not imply B-theory or eternalism. Furthermore, if any proposal of temporal parts is true for some reason other than the theory of relativity, then temporal parts are irrelevant to scientific data collection and legal systems because nobody can possibly observe temporal parts that extend into the relative future. Likewise, in this case, the compelling illusion of diachronic identity is practical while details of real temporal parts in the relative future are unknowable and similarly irrelevant. Another problem for LL is standard jurisprudence in the cases of synchronic II, that is, natural persons who are proprietorships or political offices. For example, LL coheres with unreal II and uncoheres with any real II. 9 See Putnam (1967) and Miller (2013) for a description of ​eternalism​. 31 In sum, LL coheres with unreal diachronic identity and unreal standard jurisprudence, while likewise LL uncoheres with real diachronic identity and real standard jurisprudence. Also, this section supports a viable alternative to LL. 5. Moral Realism and Science 5.1 Moral Realism Putnam (2015) supports the objectivity of moral facts, that is, moral realism. For example, moral realism implies the reality of moral facts about any given social norm. Likewise, a social norm could objectively be morally good; morally neutral; morally bad; or any combination of good, neutral, and bad. Moral realism can combine with theism or nontheism, while the two primary types of moral realism are deontology and consequentialism. For example, deontology is based on moral duty (​Alexander and Moore 2016)​, while consequentialism is based on analyzing possible consequences (Railton 1986; ​Lutz and Lenman 2018​). Also, deontology and consequentialism can combine together. For instance, a deontologist can say that moral duty requires consideration of the possible consequences of decisions and actions. Any naturalistic moral realism, such as Putnam's, is a type of consequentialism. Alternatively, various types of consequentialism propose moral anti-realism while supporting the unreality of moral facts (Joyce 2016). For example, moral relativism says no moral judgement is objectively true or false while any moral judgement is true or false only relative to some individual or group. The next two subsections look at cases of global consensus that support moral realism. 32 5.2 Safety Science and Norms Goetz (2014: 34–35) notes that safety science demonstrates an interesting case of science and engineering influencing the development of international social norms and indicating moral realism. Consider the following: First, safety science focuses on interdisciplinary research in the science and technology of human and industrial safety (Dekker 2019). For example, the natural sciences describe how accidents occur while engineering discovers practices that reduce (1) the likelihood of the accidents and (2) the consequential suffering from accidents. Second, the safety standards developed by ASTM International, the International Organization of Standardization (ISO), and others have been institutionalized around the world by businesses and governments. Third, the global institutionalization of the standards implies global verification of the associated research. Fourth, the global verification of the research indicates that the research discovered facts about accidents and the reduction of suffering. Fifth, international norms imply that intentional disregard of safety standards without extenuating circumstances is bad. Sixth, the indication of facts about accidents and the reduction of suffering supports scientific realism and moral realism. For instance, the discovery of facts from empirical research supports scientific realism, while the discovery of facts from empirical research about international norms that reduce suffering supports moral realism. 5.3 Global Consensus of Human Rights versus Moral Relativism The global consensus of jurists endorse the reality of human rights (Nickel 2019). Alternatively, moral relativism rejects the reality of human rights and considers the reality of legal rights. 33 Consider an interesting case of moral relativism. The American Anthropological Association (AAA) in 1947 stated opposition to the Commision on Human Rights of the United Nations because the AAA supposed the commission would represent values only from Western Europe and America while excluding values from Asia and Africa (Executive Board 1947; Nickel 2019). However, human rights scholars achieved global consensus and the AAA eventually endorsed the reality of human rights (Committee for Human Rights 1999; Nickel 2019). Also, consider the case of past chattel slavery (Goetz 2014: 36). Every current legal system prohibits slavery, but societies and great minds from the past supported slavery. For example, Aristotle (350 BCE: 1.3–7) said that some humans are natural slaves while other humans are natural free persons. He somehow justified the Grecian enslavement of humans including various skilled artisans and pedagogues. In this case, a moral relativist cannot say that chattel slavery is objectively or mind-independently wrong while a moral realist can say that chattel slavery is mind-independently wrong despite past societies that legalized it and great minds such as Aristotle who justified it. I also speculate that if we could resurrect Aristotle and give him a few years to study contemporary social science, then he would recant his past support of slavery. 6. Conclusion I introduce a model of social systems and related nonclassical mereology that coheres with liberal naturalism and metaphysical realism. The primary points follow: First, all social animals possess a natural inclination to belong to a social group while group communication unifies any 34 social group. Second, primates possess a natural inclination to develop social norms. Third, prehistoric humans who developed farms possessed a natural inclination to develop legal systems. Fourth, science supports moral realism. Fifth, legal systems are a dualism of observable and unobservable material. Sixth, understanding natural organization and the existence of unobservable jurisprudential material resolves puzzles about identity and mereology. References Alexander, Larry and Michael Moore. (2016) 'Deontological Ethics'. ​In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy​, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/ethics-deontological/. Aristotle. (350 BCE) ​Politics​. Translated from Greek by Benjamin Jowett. http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.html. Birkhoff, Garrett and John von Neumann. (1936) 'The Logic of Quantum Mechanics'. ​Annals of Mathematics​ 37 (4): 823–43. Committee for Human Rights, American Anthropological Association. (1999) 'Statement on Human Rights'. http://humanrights.americananthro.org/1999-statement-on-human-rights/. Convention on Rights and Duties of States. (1933) http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp. Couzin, Iain D. and Jens Krause. (2003) 'Self-Organization and Collective Behavior in Vertebrates'. In Peter Slater, Jay Rosenblatt, Charles Snowdon, and Timothy Roper (eds.), ​Advances in the Study of Behavior​: Vol. 32 (San Diego: Academic Press), 1–75. 35 De Ronde, Christian, Graciela Domenech, and Hector Freytes. (n.d.) 'Quantum Logic in Historical and Philosophical Perspective'. ​Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy​, viewed December 28, 2019, https://www.iep.utm.edu/qu-logic/. Deiser, George F. (1908) 'The Juristic Person: I'.​ University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register​, 57 (3), 131–42. Deiser, George F. (1909a) 'The Juristic Person: II'. ​University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register​, 57 (4), 216–35. Deiser, George F. (1909b) 'The Juristic Person: III'.​ University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register​, 57 (5), 300–14. Dekker, Sydney. (2019) ​Foundations of Safety Science: A Century of Understanding Accidents and Disasters​. London: Routledge. Deutsch, Harry and Pawel Garbacz. (2018) 'Relative Identity'. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy​, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/identity-relative/. Dyson, Freeman. (2012) 'Is a Graviton Detectable?' https://publications.ias.edu/sites/default/files/poincare2012.pdf. Einstein, Albert. (1961) ​Relativity: The Special and the General Theory​. Translated from German by Robert W. Lawson. New York: Three Rivers Press. Executive Board, American Anthropological Association. (1947) 'Statement on Human Rights.' American Anthropologist​, 49 (4), 539–43. Ferraro, Joseph V. (2012) 'A Primer on Paleolithic Technology'. ​Nature Education Knowledge​, 4 (2), 9. 36 Field, Hartry. (1972) 'Tarski's Theory of Truth'. ​The Journal of Philosophy​, 69 (13), 347–75. Geach, Peter T. (1967) 'Identity'. ​The Review of Metaphysics​, 21 (1), 3–12. Geach, Peter T. (1969) 'Geach and Relative Identity: A Reply'. ​The Review of Metaphysics​, 22 (3), 556–559. Geach, Peter T. (1977) ​The Virtues​. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goetz, James. (2014) 'Natural Unity and Paradoxes of Legal Persons'. ​The Journal Jurisprudence​, 21, 27–46. Goetz, James. (2016) 'Identical Legal Entities and the Trinity: Relative-Social Trinitarianism'. Journal of Analytic Theology​, 4, 128–46. Goetz, James. (forthcoming) 'Theodicy, Supreme Providence, and Semiclassical Theism'. Theology and Science​, https://philpapers.org/archive/GOETSP-4.pdf. Gordon-Roth, Jessica. (2019) 'Locke on Personal Identity'. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy​, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/locke-personal-identity/. Gupta, Kumar A. (1980) ​The Logic of Common Nouns: An Investigation in Quantified Modal Logic.​ New Haven: Yale University Press. Haken, Hermann (founding ed.). (1974–) ​Springer Series in Synergetics​. 120 vols. Cham: Springer. Haken, Hermann.​ (2008) 'Self-Organization'. ​Scholarpedia​,​ ​3, 1401, last modified February 11, 2014,​ ​doi:10.4249/scholarpedia.1401​. 37 Hawley, Katherine. (2015) 'Temporal Parts'. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy​, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/temporal-parts/. Hawley, Katherine. (2017) 'Social Mereology'. ​Journal of the American Philosophical Association​, 3 (4), 395–411. Hobbes, Thomas. (1651) ​Leviathan​. https://archive.org/details/hobbessleviathan00hobbuoft. Hobbes, Thomas. (1656) ​Elements of Philosophy: The First Section, Concerning Body​. https://archive.org/details/cu31924014604007. Imai, Kosuke. (2018) ​Quantitative Social Science: An Introduction​. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Joyce, Richard. (2016) 'Moral Anti-Realism'. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy​, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-anti-realism/. Lutz, Matthew and Lenman, James. (2018) 'Moral Naturalism'. ​In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy​, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/naturalism-moral/. Miller, Kristie. (2013) 'Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block'. In ​Heather Dyke and Adrian Bardon​ (eds.), ​A Companion to the Philosophy of Time ​(Malden: Wiley-Blackwell​), 345–64. Moore, W. Underhill. (1923) 'Rational Basis of Legal Institutions'. ​Columbia Law Review​, 23 (7), 609–17. 38 Nickel, James. (2019) 'Human Rights'. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy​, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/rights-human/. Plutarch. (1914) 'Theseus'. In ​Plutarch's Lives​: Vol. 1. Translated from Greek by Bernadotte Perrin. (London: William Heinemann), 1–75. Putnam, Hilary. (1967) 'Time and Physical Geometry'. ​The Journal of Philosophy​, 64 (8): 240–47. Putnam, Hilary. (1968) 'Is Logic Empirical?'. In Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky (eds.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science​: Vol. 5 (Dordrecht :​D. Reidel​), 216–41. Putnam, Hilary. (1974) 'How To Think Quantum Logically'. ​Synthese​, 29, 55–61. Putnam, Hilary. (1975) ​Mathematics, Matter and Method​. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Putnam, Hilary. (2015) 'Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity'. ​Journal of the American Philosophical Association​, 1 (2), 312–28​. Quine, Willard V. (1976) ​The Ways of Paradox​:​ And Other Essays​. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Railton, Peter. (1986) 'Moral Realism', ​Philosophical Review​, 95, (2), 163–207. Rea, Michael C. (2003) 'Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity'.​ Philosophia Christi​, 5 (2), 431–45. Ruben, David-Hillel. (1983) 'Social Wholes and Parts'. ​Mind​, 92 (366), 219–38. Seibt, Johanna. (2014) 'Non-Transitive Parthood, Leveled Mereology, and the Representation of Emergent Parts of Processes'. ​Grazer Philosophische Studien​ 91, 165–90. 39 Silk, Joan B. and Peter M. Kappeler. (2017) 'Sociality in Primates'. In Dustin R. Rubenstein and Patrick Abbot (eds.), ​Comparative Social Evolution​ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 253–83. Uzquiano, Gabriel. (2004) 'The Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Justices: A Metaphysical Puzzle'. ​Nous​, 38 (1), 135–53. Uzquiano, Gabriel. (2018) 'Groups: Toward a Theory of Plural Embodiment'. ​Journal of Philosophy​, 115 (8), 423–52. Van Inwagen, Peter. (1988) 'And Yet They Are Not Three Gods, But One God'. In Thomas V. Morris (ed.), ​Philosophy and the Christian Faith​ (Notre Dame: University Of Notre Dame Press), 241–78. Von Neumann, John. (1932) ​Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik​. Berlin: Springer. Wasserman, Ryan. (2018) 'Material Constitution'. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy​, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/material-constitution/.