DISCUSSION 91 th e o ry of te s ting is a p re lim in a ry to his th e o ry o f c o rro b o ra tio n , a n d th a t this la tte r th e o ry is a s o lu tion to the p ro b le m s : h o w d o we kn o w a n d wha t s hou ld we be lie ve ? Bu t P o p p e r trie s to s o lve the p ro b le m : how d o we le a rn? His a ns we r is : by critic iz ing o u r e rro rs . Th e ide a th a t a nyth ing we s a y ca n be a s ub je c t fo r a c ritica l e xa m in a tio n is the c o r e o f P o p p e r's ph ilo s oph ica l a ttitude . Mr. S tove vie ws P o p p e r's re c o m m e n d a tio n o f the c ritica l a ttitude a s a p a rt o f his th e o ry o f c o rro b o ra tio n , a nd h e trie s to s e e whe the r it is a ne ce s s a ry o r a n e limina ble p a rt o f it. He is thus pu tting the c a rt b e fo re th e hors e . P o p p e r ta ke s the c ritica l a ttitude a s funda me n ta l. C o rro b o ra tio n , a cco rd ing to h im, is o n e s o rt o f h a p p e n in g in the h is to ry o f s c ie nce which re s u lts fro m this a ttitude a nd to which, in tu rn , this a ttitude s hou ld b e a pplie d . Mr. S tove ta ke s it fo r g ra n te d tha t, to P o p p e r, a c o rro b o ra te d th e o ry is c o rro b o ra te d b e c a u s e it is tru e o r like ly to b e true o r c re d ib le . As I u n d e rs ta n d it, P o p p e r's p h ilo s o p h y con ta ins the ide a tha t we s hou ld ta ke no tice o f a we ll-c o rro b o ra te d th e o ry a nd try to e xpla in the fa c t th a t it wa s c o rro b o ra te d --a n d a va rie ty o f e xp la na tions m a y be a va ila b le , e a ch o f which s hou ld b e critica lly e xa mine d . Un d o u b te d ly, P o p p e r's ph ilo s ophy is c o n n e c te d with a long-s ta nd ing tra d ition ; bu t it is the critica l tra d ition o f Ga lile o a nd Boyle , of Ka n t a n d Whe we ll, ra th e r th a n the induc tivis t tra d ition o f Ba c o n , Ne wto n , a nd Mill. Unive rs ity o f Ho n g Kong . T H R E E Q UE S TIO NS F O R P R IO R O N TIME By JOHN KING-FARLOW P ro fe s s o r A. N. P rio r's vie ws on Tim e a re a s though tp ro vo kin g a s a n yo n e 's s ince Mc Ta g g a rt c la ime d to un ra ve l the con tra d ic tions o f te m p o ra l ta lk. To be p ro vo ke d , howe ve r, is no t to b e c o n vin c e d a nd I s hou ld like to a dd th re e que s tions to critic is ms a lre a dy a d va n c e d o ve r Tim e and Modality. (I) W ould Prior's am bition e lim inate De te rm inis m ? P rio r be gins his b o o k by confe s s ing to "a h a n ke rin g fo r we ll c o n s truc te d the orie s which m u c h c o n te m p o ra ry p h ilo s o p h y fa ils to s a tis fy". 1 Th e kind of we ll cons truc te d the o ry h e ha s ce n tra lly in m in d is a logica l s ys te m in which te ns e ope ra to rs p e rfo rm like Luka s ie wicz 's m o d a l o p e ra to rs in s uch a wa y tha t, toge the r with ce rta in ru le s o f in fe re nce , a xioms a nd tru th va lue s , va rious m e ta phys ica l p roc livitie s o f P rio r's a re s a tis fie d. His ma in c o n c e rn is 1 T . & M. , p re fa c e , p . vii. 92 J ÕN KING-FARLOW to b e n d logic to "b rin g ou t the logica l a s ymme try be twe e n p a s t a nd fu tu re which s e rious inde te rmin is m s e e ms to d e m a n d "Y He wou ld fo rma lis e th e vie w "th a t fro m th e fa c t th a t th e re is a s e a ba ttle going on it doe s n o t fo llow th a t th e re wa s going to be one , though it doe s fo llow th a t th e re will have be e n one "Y Th u s P rio r's firs t a n d in te ns e s t m o tiva tio n fo r a dve n tu ring with s ymbols is his de s ire th a t logic s hou ld p re ju d g e the de te rmin is t-inde te rmin is t is s ue . C o m m e n tin g o n this de s ire , L. J . C o h e n ha s writte n : "O rd in a ry log ic with its time le s s tru th e va lua tions is qu ite u n c o m m itte d to e ithe r s id e . Ne ith e r 'An y p o in t ins ta n t be long ing to a da y s u b s e q u e n t to the p re s e n t one is ne ce s s a rily o c c u p ie d by wh a te ve r occupie s it', n o r its c o n tra d ic to ry, is a the s is o f a ny fa milia r te xt b o o k s ys te m. If te ns e logic te nds to be g the que s tion in fa vo u r o f inde te rmin is m, th a t is ha rd ly a re a s o n fo r ca lling it 'g o o d logic ' e ve n if it is g o o d phys ics o r me ta phys ic s ". 4 In one wa y Cohe n 's c ritic is m goe s to o fa r a nd in a no the r wa y n o t ne a rly fa r e nough . If a me ta p h ys ic ia n s o be nds logic o r la ngua ge a s to m a ke it re fle c t his m e ta p h ys ic a l b ia s , th e n the fin is he d a rtic le is , b y his ca nons , a g o o d logic o r a g o o d la ngua ge . Bu t P rio r is n o t m e re ly mis ta ke n in a s s uming th a t te ns e logic is a ne ce s s ary conditiõ fo r s a tis fying the d e m a n d s o f s e rious inde te rmin is m. He is fu rth e r mis ta ke n in th inking th a t s e tting up s uch a logic s upplie s a n yth in g like a s u~c ie n t condition. As to de te rmin is m, in a n y o f the us ua l s e ns e s , I c e rta in ly a gre e with Cohe n , Do n a ld Willia ms 5 a nd o the rs th a t s ta n d a rd qua n tifica tion the orie s a re a g re e a b ly ne u tra l. O n the o th e r h a n d , wh e th e r o r n o t we be lie ve in the e xis te nce o f time le s s o r te m p o ra l tru th s a b o u t the fu tu re is no t a q u e s tio n the ne ga tive a ns we r to which qua lifie s us to be ca lle d inde te rmin is ts , in the a p p ro p ria te s e ns e o f de fe nde rs o f fre e will. (Th a t s e ns e o f inde te rmin is m is p re s u m a b ly wh a t P rio r's re fe re nce s to Aris to tle 's s e a -ba ttle ind ica te . 6) S uppos e , like C. D. Bro a d in S cienti]~c Thought, I re fu s e to ca ll a ny p ro p o s itio n true , fa ls e , true -o r-fa ls e , o r e ve n a p ro p o s ition unle s s it c o rre s p o n d s o r fa ils to c o rre s p o n d to a s u ita b le pa s t o r p re s e n t fa c t. Th is a ffords m e a ma gnifice n t a s ym m e try o f S pa ce a nd Time , pe rha ps , ye t it doe s no t p re ve n t m y be lie ving tha t th e re is n o s uch th ing a s h u m a n choice , tha t a ll p re s e n t a nd pa s t fa c ts o f h u m a n b e h a vio u r s how dis tre s s ing re gula ritie s n o le s s me cha n ica l th a n th o s e o f b ru te be a s ts o r fa lling bod ie s . It might be s ugge s te d th a t re s tric ting the in d e te rm in a te va lu e to ~P . 94. 3p . 95. Philosophi~-ul Qut, rlerly, 1958, p. 279. ~lournal o] Philosophy, 1951, pp . 457 ft. 6 Cf. De Interpre tatione , IX. DISCUSSION 93 fu tu re p ropos itions a b o u t h u m a n be ha viou r is wha t s e rious inde te rmin is m de ma nds . Th is ill fits P rio r's willingne s s to fo rs a ke the e xis te nce o f "fa c ts d ire c tly a b o u t" any obje c ts which d o no t ye t e xis t. We migh t m o ve a s ha de c los e r to re fle c ting inde te rmin is m if th e re we re a n a s ym m e try be twe e n re fe re n c e to h u m a n a nd to n o n -h u m a n fu tu re ob je c ts , b u t P rio r doe s n o t p ro vid e this . E ve n s o a n e u te r va lu e c o n c e rn in g fu tu re h u m a n b e h a vio u r cou ld e qua lly we ll re fle c t be lie f (a ) tha t m a n is u tte rly u n p re d ic ta b le (h e n c e n o t fre e , cf. Hu m e ) o r (b ) tha t the c o n tin u e d e xis te nce o f m e n is too p re ca rious fo r one to be c o m m itte d to a ny fu tu re a s s e rtion a b o u t the m. S o m y firs t que s tion is : wh y doe s te ns e logic re fle c t "s e rious inde te rmin is m" a ny m o re th a n de te rmin is m is e n fo rc e d b y time le s s tru ths ? (II) Do Prior's ju s tify ing re m a rk s abou t re fe re n c e to w h a t ts fu tu re s up'port or m e re ly fo,llo,w fro m his m e ta p h y s ic a l v ie w o] T im e ? In his (s e ve n th ) c h a p te r on C o m m o n No u n Lo g ic a nd a t e a rlie r s ta ge s P rio r is m a g n a n im o u s a b o u t d is pe ns ing with the re fe re n c e re s ource s we h a ve in o rd in a ry la ngua ge a n d qua ntifica tion the o ry. Th is is in s p ite of his ca mpa ign p romis e s to re s pe c t s ome ba s ic in tu itions o f the fo rm e r a nd n o t to ta m p e r with the la tte r. He write s in s e lf-jus tifica tion a t a n e a rly s ta ge : "I a m a little u n c o m fo rta b le a b o u t this vie w tha t we c a n n o t prope rly" n a m c obje c ts which h a ve ce a s e d to e xis t, like Buce pha lu s ; b u t I d o no t s e e a ny wa y of a vo id ing it - if we s a y th a t we can p ro p e rly n a m e th e m . . . we a re e xp o s e d to a ll the difficultie s which we re s hown e a rlie r to a ris e with the ge ne ra l th e o ry th a t the re a re non -e xis te n t obje c ts . Ins tinc tive ly, a ll the s a me , we a re h a p p ie r a b o u t g ra n ting tha t we c a n n o t p ro p e rly na me , a nd the re a ve ~o fa c ts d ire c tly a bou t, ob je c ts which d o n o t y e t e xis t". 7 P rio r goe g on to in vo ke in his s u p p o rt the "ve ry p o we rfu l" a rgume nts which P ro fe s s o r G ilb e rt R yle ra is e d in Dile m m a s a ga ins t na ming o r re fe rrin g to the n o n -e xis te n t) Tu rn in g to the s e "ve ry powe rfu l a rgume n ts " o f Ryle 's , we m e e t a ra th e r odd in fe re nce p a tte rn he a vily c o a te d with b lu ff) We a re o ffe re d the obvious p re mis e tha t we "c a n n e ve r p o in t to o r n a m e a p a rtic u la r h a p p e n in g a nd s a y o f it 'Th is h a p p e n in g wa s a ve rte d ' "--o b vio u s , th a t is , in the s e ns e th a t ta lking about wh a t d id no t h a p p e n is n o t e n tire ly like ta lking abou t wh a t d id ha ppe n . In the s a me wa y, R yle s a ys p la us ib ly e nough , if the Wa te rlo o o f 1814 h a d n o t b e e n fough t o r the p re s e n t R yle n o t b e e n born , th e n th e re wou ld be n o s uch e ve n t o r p e rs o n fo r h is to ria ns to de s c ribe : ce rta in ly th e re is a s e ns e o f de s cribe T . & M. , p. 33. P p . 33-34. D v , D ile m m a s , p p . 24-27. 94 J OHN KING-FARLOW a p p ro p ria te to Ryle 's c la im. Ho we ve r, Ryle move s o n confide n tly to p u t w h a t has no t y e t o c c u rre d on a logica l p a r with w h a t d id n o t occur a t s ome s pe cifie d pa s t time : in o the r words we a re e xp e c te d to b ra c ke t wh a t is n o t ye t th e ca s e with wha t n o w ca n n e ve r be the ca s e , a s if the y we re o f the s a me o rd e r o f s ubs ta n tia lity. Wh y the la tte r s hou ld be s o like the fo rm e r fro m a re fe re n tia l p o in t o f vie w we a re n e ve r to ld . Wh y in d e e d s hou ld the po te n tia l a nd p e rh a p s a ll b u t c e rta in s ta n d in th e s a me s o rt o f re la tion t o the re fe rre r a s th e now u tte rly impos s ib le non -e n tity? Th e me ta phys ica l vie w which wou ld le a d us to h o ld this is go ing to invo lve Bro a d 's a s ym m e try o f S pa ce a nd Time , wh e re b y to b e p re s e n t is "s imp ly to p re c e d e no th ing". R yle like Bro a d ins is ts o n a ra d ica l d iffe re nce b e twe e n p rophe c ie s a nd chronic le s . Th e re is a Bro a d ia n ring a b o u t Ryle 's a s s e rtion th a t n o p ro p h e t, h o we ve r vivid a nd a ccura te , c o u ld "ge t the fu tu re e ve nts the ms e lve s fo r the he roe s a nd he ro ine s o f his s to ry". Ryle ta lks th ro u g h o u t a s if a n e xa mina tion o f o u r c o m m o n -s e n s e wa ys o f ta lking ma ke s it impos s ib le to d iffe r with h im, b u t in the ca s e o f this la s t e xtra va g a n t m e ta p h o r n o a p p ro p ria te common-s e ns ib le s e ns e o f ge t is c le a r. It is th is c ru d e m e ta p h o r of ge tting which m o re th a n a n yth ing e ls e s ugge s ts th a t R yle ha s p re s u p p o s e d Bro a d 's b y n o m e a n s un ive rs a lly a c c e p ta b le p ic tu re o f h is to ry. He re a p ile o f h a rd s pe c ious -p re s e n t-s ize d e ve n ts --wh ic h , ha ving a lre a dy b e c o m e , we ca n re a lly ge t h o ld o f to re fe r t o - a r e o p p o s e d to the p ra c tica lly ine ffa b le va c u u m of wh a t is n o t ye t. S imila rly, P rio r in his p a p e r 'Tim e a fte r Tim e '1° ba u lks a t P e a rs ' ta lk o f the logic ia n 's tru ths a s time le s s s ha dows s e t in a s ymme trica l He a ve n . He p re fe rs to th in k o f e ve nts a s ca s ting the ir s ha dows o ve r wh a t will h a ve b e c o m e a fte r the m, s ha dows tha t le n g th e n with the pa s s a ge o f time . O n a riva l m e ta p h ys ic a l vie w, like th a t o f Willia ms , wh o vie ws the to ta lity o f e ve n ts a s s p re a d ou t s u b s pe c ie ae te rn ita tis in th e d ime ns ions o f S p a c e a n d Tim e a like , we ge t a s ym m e try which wou ld m a ke us wa n t to in te rp re t ma tte rs o f re fe re n c e ve ry d iffe re ntly. An o d d e r vie w might m a ke us wa n t to re s tric t the pos s ibility o f dire c t re fe re n c e to th ings p re s e n t a nd fu tu re . Ho w o rd in a ry la ngua ge c o u ld h e lp us to d e c id e be twe e n s uch riva l me ta phys ic ia ns a nd th e ir a ccoun ts o f re fe re n c e is obs cure ; ce rta in ly R yle a nd P rio r m a ke it a ll n o c le a re r. S o m y s e cond que s tion runs : a re n o t P rio r's a nd Ryle 's pa rs imonie s in th e m a tte r o f fu tu re re fe re n c e m e re ly c o n s e q u e n c e s of, n o t jus tifying re a s ons fo r, the ir que s tiona b le me ta phys ics o f Tim e ? ~o Min d , 1958, pp, 244-46. DISCUSSION 9 5 ( III) In s o Jar as Tim e can be m ade logically special, cannot S pace and Individuats be m ade special, too? In a tong s e c tion o f a p p e n d ix P rio r trie s to s how th a t th e re is s om e thing s pe cial a bou t Tim e . 11 Cons truc ting s ome inge n ious p la ce -log ica l a nd time logica l fo rmu la e h e a rgue s th a t we ca n e qua te a n e xpre s s ion me a n ing "it is the ca s e m mile s to th e le ft th a t it is the ca s e n mile s to th e le ft th a t f ' with a n o th e r e xpre s s ion in which a s ymbo l re p re s e n ts th e a lge bra ic s um o f m a nd n or, with a wide ra n g e o f d ire c tions , the ve c to r s um. But, h e ins is ts , th e re is n o s uch a na logy in the ca s e o f time -log ica l fo rm u la e : "fo r e ve n if it wa s the ca s e m da ys a go th a t p , it might no t h a ve b e e n true m p lus n da ys a go th a t it wa s going to be the ca s e n da ys la te r th a t p . F o r m p lus n da ys a go the is s ue migh t h a ve be e n in d e te rm in a te ". No a uxilia ry s ymbol pa ra lle l to the one in p la ce logic c a n obvia te th is ? 2 We h a ve a lre a dy re je c te d the the s is tha t we m u s t b rin g in a n e u te r va lue to s a ve fu tu re con tinge nc ie s : P rio r's a lle ge d ne e d fo r s pe c ia l va lue s re la tive to Tim e is s pe cious . A n e u te r va lue in the ca s e o f fu tu re s yie lds no t Inde te rmin is m, b u t s ome th ing like the un re a lity o f the fu tu re , a ve ry d iffe re n t me ta phys ica l pos itioñ Willia ms ha s re to rte d to Bro a d tha t we migh t e qua lly we i! pos it the tra g ic un re a lity o f the pa s t. Th is vie w cou ld e qua lly we ll bc re p re s e n te d --n o t prove n--in P rio r's Time -log ic by a s s igning n e u te r va lue s to a ll fo rm u la e a bou t the pa s t. Aga in , a m a n wa lking e ve r fo rwa rd s a long a s tra ight line migh t e qua lly we t! be lie ve in the u tte r no th ingne s s o f a ll he h a d le ft be h ind . In a b a c kwa rd s -fo rwa rd s logic h e cou ld re p re s e n t--n o t p ro ve --h is the s is b y a s s igning the s pe c ia l ne u te r va lue to a ll fo rm u la e a bou t the re g ions be h ind . Aga in , P rio r te lls us , th o u g h he doe s no t a rg u e in s uch de ta il, tha t th e re is s ome th ing s pe c ia l a b o u t time s a s o p p o s e d to individua ls . Bu t a P la ton is t c o u ld re p re s e n t the on to log ica l h ie ra rc h y of the Lin e pa ra b le in R e public Bo o k VI by a s s igning a n a s ce nding o rd e r o f tru th -va lue s to fo rm u la e me n tion ing the a s ce nd ing o rd e r o f gignomena a nd onta. S o m y fina l que s tion runs : s ure ly the on ly re s tric tion on m a kin g time s , p la ce s o r individua ls logica lly s pe cia l is th a t we mus t n o t m a ke th e m all s pe cia l a t once , o r e ls e n o n e o f th e m will be s pe cia l? Unive rs ity o f P itts burgh . ~ T . & M. , p p . 1 1 7 -1 2 1 . ,2 v. p p . 1 1 9 -1 2 0 .