Report
of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1483
(2003) and paragraph 12 of resolution 1511 (2003)

I. Introduction

1. The present report
is the second submitted pursuant to paragraph 24 of Security Council
resolution 1483 (2003) and the first submitted pursuant to paragraph
12 of resolution 1511 (2003). The report:

(a) Briefly
describes United Nations activities and key developments in Iraq
during the period between 17 July 2003, when my last report
(S/2003/715) was issued, and 19 August 2003;

(b) Sets out
the events of 19 August 2003, when the United Nations headquarters in
Baghdad was attacked with devastating consequences and implications,
and the actions taken by the United Nations in the aftermath,
including the eventual relocation of most international staff;

(c) Details
the United Nations relief, recovery and reconstruction planning
activities that have nonetheless been sustained throughout the
reporting period, primarily by national staff;

(d) Summarizes
key political developments in Iraq post-19 August;

(e) Outlines a
plan of action with regard to security, the deployment of the United
Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and the conduct of United
Nations relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Iraq.

The underlying principles that
I believe should guide future United Nations engagement in Iraq are
addressed in section VII.

II. Summary of United Nations activities and key developments in
Iraq between 17 July and 19 August 2003

2. My Special
Representative for Iraq, the late Sergio Vieira de Mello, came to New
York in late July 2003 to brief the Security Council and to introduce
my report (S/2003/715), which laid out a proposed concept of
operations for UNAMI. In his briefing he reiterated what he had
consistently proclaimed in Iraq, namely, that it was imperative for
Iraqis to regain as quickly as possible full control over shaping the
future of their country. Mr. Vieira de Mello stressed that democracy
could not be imposed from the outside; it had to evolve from within.
He emphasized the importance of articulating a clear timetable for the
full restoration of Iraqi sovereignty; he appealed for the
empowerment, to the maximum extent possible, of the Iraqi Governing
Council and related Iraqi institutions, to ensure Iraqi ownership of
key decisions taken in the lead-up to the formation of a fully
representative and sovereign Iraqi Government (see S/PV.4791).

3. My Special
Representative signalled his intention to intensify dialogue with
States in the region, in line with my strong belief that Iraq’s
neighbours have legitimate interests in and concerns about the nature
of developments in that country. To that end, he conducted a number of
regional tours just prior to and immediately following his briefing to
the Security Council on 22 July, with high-level meetings in Saudi
Arabia, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Kuwait, Turkey, Egypt and Jordan, as well as with the League of Arab
States.

4. Mr. Vieira de Mello
also indicated that he intended to consult with a large and diverse
spectrum of Iraqi society, including the Iraqi Governing Council, as
well as the Coalition Provisional Authority, to determine when and how
UNAMI could be of assistance to the people of Iraq, not only in the
areas in which the United Nations was already engaged — such as
humanitarian assistance, return of refugees and internally displaced
persons, emergency rehabilitation, political facilitation, human
rights and support for civil society — but also in a host of
additional areas. As noted in paragraph 99 of my report of 17 July
2003, these included constitutional and electoral processes; judicial
and legal reform; police training and restructuring and reform of
correctional systems; demobilization and reintegration of former
soldiers; public administration and civil service reform; the
institution of long-term strategies for economic reconstruction,
sustainable development and good governance; and technical assistance
to Iraqi Government ministries.

5. On 30 July, upon his
return to Iraq, my Special Representative met with the Governing
Council to discuss with its members the human rights situation in the
country and ways in which the United Nations could be of assistance.
The options included providing expert assistance to the Iraqis in
ensuring accountability for past human rights crimes establishing a
national human rights institution and developing a national human
rights action plan.

6. The members of the
Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority informally
indicated varying degrees of interest in United Nations involvement in
the areas of human rights and electoral assistance. They expressed
less enthusiasm for United Nations involvement in other areas noted in
paragraph 99 of my report to the Security Council of 17 July 2003.
They made no formal requests to my Special Representative for United
Nations involvement in any of the areas. This occurred at the last
meeting Sergio Vieira de Mello had with the Governing Council before
his tragic death.

7. My late Special
Representative undertook a number of activities with a view to
promoting human rights norms in Iraq. In collaboration with the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), he was in the final stages of
opening the human rights documentation centre at Baghdad University.
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
and UNDP will continue to look into the feasibility of opening such a
centre. Also, advisers to my Special Representative monitored the
first nationwide elections of the Iraqi Bar Association between 14 and
17 August. The advisers reported that the process was orderly, free
and fair. On 23 and 24 August, the Office of my Special
Representative, together with OHCHR and UNDP, organized a human rights
training workshop in Erbil.

8. A team from the
Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs
was dispatched to Iraq from 31 July to 13 August 2003. The team
consulted with a broad range of Iraqi actors, the Governing Council,
the Coalition Provisional Authority, representatives of the
international community and other members of the United Nations system
on the nature of the transitional elections in Iraq and the schedule
and challenges for their conduct. The team noted several key
challenges that needed to be addressed, such as how to ensure
inclusive criteria for voter registration, including Iraqis abroad;
the need for the promulgation of a political party law to define
political representation; and the importance of establishing a
credible and independent electoral institution to organize and conduct
elections. The team highlighted the logistical challenges of
conducting a complex operation under precarious security conditions.

9. At the beginning of
August 2003, the United Nations stood at a critical point with respect
to its role in Iraq and its engagement with the region with regard to
developments in Iraq.

10. On the one hand,
United Nations agencies, funds and programmes were playing a key role
in a variety of sectors, including food and nutrition assistance, the
delivery of medical supplies, educational materials and drinking
water, and emergency repairs of essential facilities, such as water
and sewage treatment plants. Thanks in part to United Nations support
for the efforts of the Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraqi
ministries and local authorities, improvements in the provision of
basic services were becoming noticeable.

11. The efforts of the
Coalition Provisional Authority to restore Iraqi capacities in the
field of law and order were beginning to bear fruit, a critical
requirement for establishing favourable conditions for future
reconstruction activities. The United Nations and the World Bank were
in the midst of conducting a detailed reconstruction-needs assessment,
in conjunction with Iraqi counterparts in line ministries, the
Coalition Provisional Authority and a variety of non-governmental
organizations. The needs assessment covered 14 priority sectors, as
agreed at the technical meeting on reconstruction held in New York on
24 June 2003.

12. Furthermore, the
formation of the Iraqi Governing Council on 13 July offered the
potential to provide a credible and representative Iraqi interlocutor
with which the United Nations could develop a comprehensive programme
of action across a broad spectrum of activities, including in support
of the political transition process. The Governing Council sent a
delegation to the meeting of the Security Council on Iraq on 22 July.
On 29 July it appointed a nine-member rotational leadership committee
from among its 25 members, and on 11 August the Governing Council
formed a 25-member constitutional preparatory committee. On 14 August,
in paragraph 1 of its resolution 1500 (2003), the Security Council
welcomed “the broadly representative Governing Council ... as an
important step towards the formation by the people of Iraq of an
internationally recognized, representative government that will
exercise the sovereignty of Iraq”.

13. These positive
developments could have established a favourable context for a new
phase of United Nations involvement in Iraq. However, major
uncertainties remained about the future role of the United Nations.
First, the Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority
had not expressed any clear or shared vision on the role to be played
by the United Nations in the remainder of the political transition
process and other key areas suggested in my report of 17 July. Second,
on this and other issues, divisions became apparent among Iraqis
within and outside the Governing Council. And third, armed attacks
against the Coalition forces, Iraqi institutions and other civilian
and international targets intensified in sophistication, scale and
breadth, precipitating a sharp downturn in the overall security
situation.

14. The deteriorating
security situation was acutely felt by the United Nations and other
international organizations, including during the period prior to the
attack on United Nations headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August. The
World Food Programme (WFP) office in Mosul, for instance, reported
attacks against its premises on 11, 12 and 13 July, including an
incident in which a grenade exploded inside the office. On 20 July an
Iraqi driver was killed and two aid workers were injured when
unidentified gunmen opened fire on an International Organization for
Migration vehicle 50 kilometres south of Baghdad. On 22 July
unidentified assailants killed a Red Cross aid worker and an Iraqi
driver near Hilla. On 28 July police guarding the United Nations
office in Mosul found a rocket in an open area 80 metres behind the
United Nations premises. In response to these incidents, the United
Nations enhanced the monitoring and control of road movement
throughout Iraq, particularly in contentious areas. In addition,
international staff members in Mosul were relocated to Erbil, where
the security situation was more stable.

15. There was a
significant change in the nature and scale of the attacks when, on 7
August, a truck bomb exploded outside the Jordanian Embassy in
Baghdad, killing at least 17 people and wounding dozens more; among
the injured were two national staff members of the World Health
Organization (WHO).

16. In short, by the time
the Security Council, in its resolution 1500 (2003) of 14 August,
authorized the establishment of UNAMI the situation was already
considerably different from that envisaged less than one month
earlier, when I outlined the proposed concept of operations for the
mission in my report of 17 July 2003.

III. 19 August 2003 attack on United Nations headquarters in
Baghdad and actions taken in its immediate aftermath

A.
Events of 19 August 2003

17. At approximately 1630
hours local time on Tuesday, 19 August, a flatbed truck carrying an
estimated 1,000 kilograms of high explosives was detonated on the
service road adjacent to the south-west corner of the Canal Hotel,
United Nations headquarters in Baghdad. The attack was carefully
planned and deliberately targeted at the compound’s weakest point,
with devastating effect. It resulted in the death of 22 persons (15 of
them United Nations staff members) and the wounding of more than 150,
some of them wounded extremely seriously. My Special Representative
for Iraq and United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Sergio
Vieira de Mello, was among those killed.

18. If not for the
immediate and highly professional assistance rendered by the Swedish
Rescue Service Agency at the scene, by the Iraqi emergency services
and medical personnel throughout Baghdad, and by the United States-led
Coalition forces — who brought all their formidable assets to bear to
medically evacuate and treat the wounded — the death toll might well
have been considerably higher. I express my deepest appreciation and
gratitude to all of them, as well as to the Government of Jordan and
the Government of Kuwait for receiving and providing medical care for
evacuated United Nations staff.

19. The United States
Federal Bureau of Investigation arrived at the scene within 40 minutes
of the attack and commenced a criminal investigation. The
investigation is still ongoing, with assistance from the Iraqi police.

20. Responsibility for
the attack remains uncertain. Although the Abu-Hafs al-Masri Brigades,
a group affiliated with Al-Qaida, among others, claimed responsibility
in a message published on the Internet and in Arabic newspapers, the
authenticity of the message has not yet been established.

B.
Action taken in the immediate aftermath of the bombing

21. On 21 August I
dispatched to Iraq an investigation team led by the senior security
officer of OHCHR and comprising members of the Office of the United
Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD), the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Office of Internal
Oversight Services. They were tasked with determining and recording
the events leading up to the explosion and immediately thereafter,
assessing the adequacy of preventive measures as defined in current
security policies and procedures, and making recommendations on
required adjustments to enable United Nations personnel to operate in
greater safety in the future. I also instructed Tun Myat, the United
Nations Security Coordinator, to visit Iraq from 23 to 30 August 2003
in order to review the security situation in all its dimensions and to
make recommendations to me on what reductions in the number of United
Nations personnel in the country might be required on security
grounds.

22. While these
investigations were under way, the detonation of a massive improvised
explosive device in the holy city of Najaf on Friday, 29 August,
resulted in hundreds of casualties and the death of one of the most
important Shi’ah leaders in the country, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqer
al-Hakim. I strongly condemned this sacrilegious terrorist attack.

23. My Security
Coordinator noted in his report to me, submitted on 2 September, that
the overall security situation in Iraq had deteriorated dramatically
in the month of August. Iraq had entered a new phase in which all
foreign organizations, as well as Iraqis cooperating with the
Coalition Provisional Authority, were potential targets of deliberate,
direct and hostile attack. This type of security threat had not been
anticipated. The United Nations had chosen offices in locations that
would facilitate contact with and accessibility to Iraqi partners and
beneficiaries. The more than 800 international United Nations
personnel deployed throughout the country were thus extremely
vulnerable to further attacks. Coalition forces were not in a position
to provide dedicated protection to all of them. Hence, the reduction
of international personnel, well under way before 2 September,
continued after the submission of my Security Coordinator’s report.

24. On 5 September the
Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Kieran Prendergast,
informed the Security Council in informal consultations of the
decision I had taken under the circumstances to withdraw all
international personnel other than those required for essential
humanitarian assistance activities and security and logistics support.
On the basis of those criteria, I had decided to reduce the number of
international staff in Baghdad from 400 to approximately 50 and in the
three northern governorates from 400 to approximately 30, and to
vacate United Nations offices in Basra, Hilla and Mosul.

25. In informing the
Security Council of my decision, the Under-Secretary-General for
Political Affairs emphasized that a number of fundamental questions
needed to be answered by the Council prior to deciding on the future
role of the United Nations in Iraq. Who was behind the attack and why?
Was the United Nations now considered to be indistinguishable from the
United States-led Coalition, and hence subject to the same threats? Or
did the United Nations retain an independent identity in the minds of
the Iraqis at large, but had been attacked nonetheless by those
seeking to undermine the Coalition and to make the country
ungovernable? Or was this an attack on the new constellation of power
represented in the Governing Council and on the United Nations
political role in seeking international recognition for it? What
needed to be done to enable United Nations staff to return to and
operate in the country in safety? Were the tasks that United Nations
staff were being asked to perform of sufficient importance to risk
their lives? And was the security threat that United Nations and other
international personnel were experiencing the primary challenge facing
the Security Council on Iraq, or was it rather a symptom of a much
deeper issue with serious implications for the future of the country
and the region in general?

26. In considering these
questions, I was also mindful of the reality that there are many
facets to the relationship between the United Nations and the Iraqi
people. Thirteen years of sanctions against and weapons inspections in
Iraq may have engendered ambivalent feelings towards the United
Nations. Much more needs to be done to change that general perception,
however misguided it may be, in order to win their confidence, trust
and good will.

C. Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of United Nations
Personnel in Iraq

27. Recognizing that the
attack of 19 August was a defining moment in the history of the United
Nations, and that it posed questions about the scope of the United
Nations presence in Iraq for the foreseeable future, on 22 September I
appointed an Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of United
Nations Personnel in Iraq. Led by Martti Ahtisaari, former President
of Finland, the Panel was tasked with, among other things, examining
the adequacy of United Nations security, management and practices
prior to the attack, the circumstances of the attack itself and the
actions taken by various parties in the immediate aftermath. The Panel
made recommendations for improving the safety and security of United
Nations personnel in Iraq and other similar operational environments.

28. The Panel submitted
its report on 20 October. It concluded that there was no place in Iraq
without risk and that a new security approach was needed in order to
ensure staff security in such a high-risk environment. It also argued
that the United Nations security management system was in need of
drastic reform, especially in the light of the new type of threat
faced in Iraq — and potentially elsewhere. It recommended a separate
and independent audit and accountability procedure to review the
responsibilities of key individuals in the decision-making processes
on security matters prior to the attack on 19 August. Accordingly, I
established a team on 4 November, headed by Gerald Walzer, former
Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, to determine accountability at
all managerial levels at Headquarters and in the field with respect to
relevant decisions taken prior to the 19 August attack. The team has
been asked to present its findings to me with the least possible
delay.

D.
Events leading to the further reduction of international staff

29. Meanwhile, also on 22
September, a second suicide attack was launched against United Nations
headquarters at the Canal Hotel in Baghdad, resulting in the death of
one Iraqi policeman and the wounding of others who were protecting the
compound. Two United Nations national staff were among the injured.

30. The month of October
was marked by a series of further well-planned and effective attacks.
On 9 October a Spanish diplomat was assassinated in front of his home.
On 12 October a car bomb exploded near the Baghdad Hotel, just two
kilometres from the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and UNDP
buildings in Baghdad. On 14 October a bomb exploded in the vicinity of
the Turkish diplomatic mission in Baghdad. On 26 October the Al-Rashid
Hotel, inside the “Green Zone”, was struck with rockets. One day
later, on the first day of Ramadan, a series of nearly simultaneous
bomb blasts rocked Baghdad, killing more than 30 people and wounding
more than 200 others. The first and largest, a suicide bombing,
targeted the headquarters of the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC). Two Iraqi employees of ICRC were killed. Ten other
people in the area were also reported killed and 22 wounded. The blast
caused extensive damage inside the ICRC building.

31. These security
incidents, and others directed at civilian foreign organizations,
coupled with the findings of the Panel led by former President
Ahtisaari, led me to draw down further the international United
Nations presence in Iraq during the months of September and October;
this included the relocation of international programme staff from
Baghdad after the attack of 22 September. This period of retrenchment
culminated with my decision, on 4 November 2003, to temporarily
relocate all international United Nations staff in Baghdad, pending a
comprehensive review of United Nations operations in Iraq and their
security implications, leaving only a small core presence of
international personnel in Erbil.

32. A series of recent
well-orchestrated attacks targeting Coalition forces, as well as
members of the diplomatic community, illustrates that the insurgents
have diversified their targets. Nineteen Italians, including 12
Carabinieri military, were killed in a suicide bombing at Nasariya on
12 November, and 7 Spanish intelligence officers were killed on 19
November. Two Japanese diplomats and one Colombian contractor were
killed on 29 November, and two contractors from the Republic of Korea
were killed on 30 November.

IV.
Sustainment of United Nations relief, recovery and reconstruction
planning activities post-19 August

33. Despite the
devastation of the Office of the Special Representative in the bomb
blast of 19 August and the subsequent relocation of the United Nations
international staff presence outside the country, a substantial number
of planned United Nations activities have continued. This is
particularly true with respect to (a) humanitarian relief and
emergency rehabilitation efforts, (b) the reconstruction needs
assessment process and the Madrid Conference and (c) the termination
of the oil-for-food programme. All three are addressed below.

A.
Humanitarian relief and emergency rehabilitation

34. After the initial
substantial reduction in international staff following the attack of
19 August, United Nations agencies made every effort to continue their
most essential humanitarian assistance activities while minimizing the
risk to the remaining staff. This challenge became even more acute
when the remaining international programme staff of the agencies had
to be withdrawn from Baghdad after the attack of 22 September. Some
activities had to be scaled down or delayed, and many new initiatives
that had been planned over the summer had to be put on hold.

35. Despite the sharply
reduced international presence inside Iraq, United Nations agencies
and programmes have managed to continue a broad range of essential
assistance activities in all parts of the country. This has been made
possible, first and foremost, through the unwavering commitment and
courage of our national staff in all 18 governorates of Iraq. They
have continued to implement and monitor programmes, working closely
with Iraqi and international partners, and have kept in close contact
with their international United Nations colleagues relocated in
neighbouring countries. Many agencies reintroduced procedures and
working methods they had adopted while international staff, having
been evacuated, were outside Iraq during the second half of March and
April. They also drew on experience gained in other emergencies around
the world in which, for security reasons, relief operations have had
to be supported from outside the affected countries, sometimes for
extended periods of time.

36. After the attacks of
19 August and 22 September, international staff were redeployed from
Baghdad, Basra and other area offices to neighbouring countries,
particularly Jordan and Kuwait, where they have continued to support
assistance operations inside Iraq. Several United Nations agencies
have been carrying out cross-border operations from the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Syrian Arab
Republic, delivering essential supplies to Iraqi counterparts
throughout the country. From outside the country, international staff
personnel have been able to provide logistics and administrative
support, as well as day-to-day guidance to national staff. Agencies
and programmes have held regular meetings with Coalition Provisional
Authority and Iraqi officials in the region and at agency
headquarters, including extensive consultations on the handover of the
oil-for-food programme, training workshops and other technical
meetings aimed at capacity-building at ministries and other Iraqi
institutions. These meetings have included round-table discussions
with Iraqi officials, academics and other members of civil society on
gender and the environment.

37. A key priority
throughout this period has been support for the public distribution
system, which remains a crucial lifeline for millions of Iraqis. The
importance of the ration system under the current circumstances was
again confirmed by a crop, food supply and nutrition assessment
conducted by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) and WFP. Although the report on the assessment, which
was issued on 23 September, indicated that the level of domestic
cereal production had increased, it also clearly showed that millions
of Iraqis had no access to food other than through the public
distribution system ration. To support this system, WFP has delivered,
since the start of its operation in April, more than 2 million metric
tons of food commodities to Ministry of Trade warehouses around the
country, providing enough food assistance for the entire population of
Iraq.

38. While the ration
system remains a vital form of support in the short to medium term,
agencies have also focused their efforts on assistance for agriculture
and domestic food production. With funding provided under the
oil-for-food programme, FAO procured large quantities of urgently
needed agricultural inputs and oversaw the purchase of high-quality
wheat and barley seeds from Iraqi farmers. In Basra FAO assistance has
aimed to meet the needs of vulnerable sectors engaged in agriculture,
particularly households headed by females, and to help rehabilitate
irrigation systems in war-affected areas.

39. Other priority
sectors identified in the revised humanitarian appeal of 23 June
included health and water and sanitation. Maintaining essential
operations in these sectors after 19 August has been a key priority,
in particular for UNICEF and WHO. UNICEF has continued to deliver an
average of 15 million litres of water per day and has helped
rehabilitate water and sewage treatment plants, pumping stations and
water networks. It has also provided fuel, chlorine gas and other
supplies to water and sewage facilities in Baghdad and other parts of
the country. Under the oil-for-food programme, the United Nations
Office for Project Services (UNOPS) had been responsible for upgrading
the water and sanitation system for the three main urban centres in
the northern governorates. By the end of the programme on 21 November
2003, UNOPS had finalized the development of master plans and
implemented six emergency water supply projects.

40. In the health sector,
WHO has continued to work closely with the Ministry of Health in a
broad range of areas, including disease surveillance, communicable
disease control, public and environmental health diagnostics,
capacity-building and the delivery of medical supplies. Specific
activities include support for Ministry of Health sentinel sites for
disease surveillance and the production of a “public health
verification list” in which potential public health concerns are
raised and monitored in coordination with the Ministry of Health. To
assist in communicable disease control, WHO has provided drugs and
diagnostic tools, treated bed nets and supported spraying and fogging
activities for leishmaniasis and malaria vector control.

41. UNICEF has played a
key role in supporting the national immunization campaign conducted by
the Ministry of Health, reaching about 1 million children in September
alone. It has also helped the Ministry of Health improve the delivery
of services for children and women through the rehabilitation of
primary health centres, reconstruction of delivery rooms and
continuous training of health workers. The targeted nutrition
programme is being restored through primary health centres and
community childcare units. Large-scale monitoring of children’s
nutritional status has also resumed.

42. A further focus of
the United Nations assistance has been emergency infrastructure
rehabilitation and employment generation. UNDP, in particular, has
conducted emergency repairs to electrical infrastructure,
labour-intensive infrastructure rehabilitation, and dredging and wreck
removal in Iraqi waterways, as well as providing microcredit to
vulnerable families.

43. As specifically
mandated by Security Council resolution 1483 (2003), the United
Nations has been assisting in the return and reintegration of refugees
and internally displaced persons. Under current conditions, the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is not
promoting the voluntary return of refugees to Iraq. It has, however,
continued to provide assistance, in close coordination with host
Governments, to individuals who insist on returning in spite of
current conditions and whose return is non-contentious. For example,
it has assisted in the repatriation of about 3,000 of the 5,000
refugees in the Rafha camp in Saudi Arabia. Three additional groups
have returned from Lebanon, and on 19 November the first organized
voluntary repatriation took place from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
In addition to the submission of requests for clearance to the
Coalition Provisional Authority, return assistance is currently
limited to the provision of basic non-food items and transportation.

44. Over the summer and
autumn a large proportion of Iraq’s hundreds of thousands of
internally displaced persons have tried to move back to their original
homes. Some are now living in tents pitched next to their destroyed
houses, while others have managed to move back into their former
homes, in some cases causing tension and further displacement. Since
early summer, UNHCR has been assisting internally displaced persons to
return to villages where there are no disputes about the ownership of
property. Assistance to internally displaced persons and monitoring of
their needs, as well as of internal population movements, has also
been provided by the International Organization for Migration and a
number of non-governmental organizations that are concentrating their
activities in priority governorates.

45. Support for refugees
inside Iraq has been another priority. Syrian refugees are currently
being registered in Baghdad, and assistance is being provided to those
in need. UNHCR also held discussions with the Government of Turkey and
the authorities in Iraq regarding the possible voluntary return of
Turkish refugees from northern Iraq, notably from the Makhmour camp
and the Dohuk area. There are also an estimated 80,000 Palestinian
refugees in Iraq, most of whom live in Baghdad. Registration of these
refugees, who face new problems following the fall of the previous
regime, continues. Assistance is being provided to some 400
Palestinian families who were evicted from their homes and are living
in tents in a Baghdad sports club. More than 100 of these families are
now being moved to rented accommodation, and suitable arrangements are
being worked out for the other evicted families.

46. United Nations
assistance activities during the reporting period have included the
education and culture sectors. UNICEF is supporting the distribution
of school supplies for 3.3 million primary school students and their
teachers in more than 8,700 schools, as well as the rehabilitation of
some 300 schools by the end of the year. Thirty-three million
textbooks printed in neighbouring countries are being delivered to the
directorates of education, and 11 million textbooks are currently
being printed in Iraq for delivery through the first quarter of 2004.
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) has conducted an extensive survey of Iraq’s secondary,
technical, vocational, teacher-training and higher education
institutions, identifying priority needs and providing a national
education database for the Iraqi Ministry of Education and Ministry of
Higher Education, reconstituting information and statistical files
lost during the conflict. National staff have been completing a
digital inventory of the Iraq Museum collection and have assisted in
rehabilitating the National Heritage Institute.

47. The United Nations
mine-action activities have been led by the Mine Action Coordination
Team that was established in Baghdad with the participation of
representatives of the United Nations Mine Action Service, UNDP,
UNICEF and WFP. In cooperation with the Coalition Provisional
Authority Mine Action Team, the United Nations has supported the
development of the Iraqi National Mine Action Authority, the Iraqi
Mine Action Centre in Baghdad and regional mine action centres in
Erbil and Basra. Up to the end of October, 281,785 mines and items of
unexploded ordnance had been destroyed. Mine-risk education was
conducted in four southern governorates, as well as in the three
northern governorates.

B.
Reconstruction needs assessment and the Madrid Conference

48. On 23 October I
attended the opening of the International Donors Conference for the
Reconstruction of Iraq in Madrid. The key document before the
Conference was the consolidated needs assessment report prepared
jointly by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and the World
Bank, with assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
While ongoing and planned consultations on the needs assessment with
Iraqi officials and civil society stakeholders were cut short by the
attack of 19 August, detailed consultations on a draft of the
assessment were held in late September 2003 in Dubai with members of
the Governing Council, several interim ministers and the Governor of
the Central Bank of Iraq. The assessment covered 14 priority sectors
most urgently in need of reconstruction assistance and estimated that
Iraq’s reconstruction needs in these sectors would be $36 billion over
the period from 2004 to 2007.

49. The Madrid Donors
Conference was held at the invitation of the Government of Spain, on
behalf of the European Union, Japan, the United Arab Emirates and the
United States of America. It was attended by representatives from 73
countries and 20 international organizations. At the end of the
Conference, participants announced overall pledges amounting to more
than $33 billion in grants and loans until the end of 2007, including
$20 billion from the United States of America, $5.5 billion from the
World Bank and the IMF and $5 billion from Japan.

50. In order to help
coordinate and channel contributions towards reconstruction and
development activities in Iraq, the United Nations and the World Bank
had been requested to present terms of reference for an international
reconstruction fund facility for Iraq in Madrid. To build on the
respective strengths and comparative advantages of both the United
Nations and the World Bank, the proposed facility comprises two trust
funds for Iraq, intended to be established by the end of this year,
one by the World Bank and the other by UNDG. The World Bank trust fund
will concentrate mainly on technical assistance, feasibility studies
and infrastructure support, whereas the United Nations-managed trust
fund will focus on technical assistance in relevant sectors,
quick-impact projects and transition activities that need to be
implemented in a rapid and flexible manner. The committees overseeing
the facility will work closely with relevant Iraqi authorities to
ensure that the activities financed are implemented as much as
possible by Iraqis themselves, with the aim of helping to develop
sustainable local capacities.

C.
Termination of the oil-for-food programme

51. In paragraph 16 of
its resolution 1483 (2003), the Security Council requested me to
terminate by 21 November 2003, in the most cost-effective manner, the
ongoing operations of the oil-for-food programme, both at Headquarters
and in the field, transferring responsibility for the administration
of any remaining activity under the programme to the Coalition
Provisional Authority.

52. The Security Council
has received regular updates from the Office of the Iraq Programme on
the phasing down and termination of the programme, most recently on 19
November. As I told the Security Council the following day, the United
Nations can take pride in the fact that we achieved an orderly
handover of the programme — one of the largest, most complex tasks
ever entrusted to the Secretariat — on time and in spite of the
difficult circumstances following the attacks against the United
Nations on 19 August and 22 September. I again want to pay tribute to
both the international and national staff who worked on the programme.

53. While all remaining
responsibilities under the oil-for-food programme have been handed
over to the Coalition Provisional Authority, the Authority has
requested several United Nations agencies to provide continued support
in certain areas formerly covered by the programme. This includes
technical and logistical support by WFP for the public distribution
system, as well as support by WHO for the Ministry of Health.

D. International Advisory and Monitoring Board

54. In accordance with
paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1483 (2003) and paragraph
23 of resolution 1511 (2003), the terms of reference of the
International Advisory and Monitoring Board were agreed upon by its
four member institutions on 21 October and noted by the Council on 24
October. The first organizational meeting of the Board is scheduled to
take place on 5 December. Further to the objective set forth in
paragraph 14 of resolution 1483 (2003), the Board will seek to ensure
that the Development Fund for Iraq is used in a transparent manner and
that export sales of petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas
from Iraq are made consistent with prevailing international market
best practices.

V. Key political developments post 19-August

55. There have been
significant political developments in Iraq post-19 August, especially
with respect to the provisions of resolution 1483 (2003). As discussed
below, these include (a) the appointment of interim ministers and the
completion of the preparatory constitutional committee’s report; (b)
the adoption of resolution 1511 (2003); and (c) the agreement reached
between the Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority
on the political transition process.

A.
Appointment of interim ministers and the work of the preparatory
constitutional committee

56. On 1 September the
Governing Council announced the appointment of interim ministers to
oversee the day-to-day operations of 25 ministries. New ministries
were formed in the areas of human rights, environment, immigration and
refugees, military affairs, electricity, finance and banking, while
the Ministries of Defence, Information, and Endowment and Religious
Affairs were disbanded. The cabinet’s composition mirrored the
political and sectarian affiliations of the Governing Council, with a
small Shi’ite majority (13) and equal representation of Kurds (5) and
Sunni Arabs (5). Christian and Turkmen minorities were also
represented. Only one woman was appointed interim minister (compared
with three in the Governing Council). The cabinet took office on 3
September after being sworn in by Governing Council members Ibrahim
al-Ja’afari, Jalal Talabani and Ahmad Chalabi. The newly appointed
ministers were expected to work in tandem with the Governing Council,
while a Coalition Provisional Authority-appointed adviser would remain
on staff in each ministry.

57. At the same time, the
Governing Council sought to develop contacts with neighbouring
countries and the region at large, in addition to international and
regional organizations. On 9 September the interim Iraqi Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Hoshyar Zebari, assumed Iraq’s seat at the League of
Arab States meeting of Foreign Ministers in Cairo. Although the League
of Arab States granted the interim Foreign Minister one-year
provisional recognition, it also received at its headquarters in Cairo
a delegation of Iraqis challenging the legitimacy of the Governing
Council to represent Iraq. Similarly, during the summit of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference in Malaysia, the Malaysian
President received the then acting President of the Governing Council,
as well as Iraqis representing groups outside the Governing Council.
On 2 October, on behalf of the Governing Council, its acting President
addressed the United Nations General Assembly, no objection having
been raised by any other Member State.

58. On 20 September Akila
al-Hashimi, one of three women on the Governing Council, was
assassinated, illustrating the severe risks facing Iraqis cooperating
with the Coalition Provisional Authority-led process. Since then,
serious threats and attempts against the lives of members of the
Governing Council, interim ministers and officials at the governorate
and municipal levels have continued. For example, Faris Al-Assam,
Deputy Mayor of Baghdad, was assassinated on 26 October.

59. Against this backdrop
of persistent and targeted violence, I voiced concerns to Member
States — at a meeting with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the
five permanent members of the Security Council held in Geneva on 13
September, and subsequently with other Council members and
neighbouring States, including at high-level meetings on the margins
of the general debate of the General Assembly at the end of
September — that the conditions in Iraq were less than conducive to an
early and inclusive process of nationwide consultations on a new
constitution or for the holding of elections soon. United Nations
experience in various post-conflict environments was that conducting
these critical democratization processes in sub-optimal conditions and
haste risked fuelling divisions rather than promoting genuine national
ownership of, and full legitimacy for, the new constitutional
arrangements. Conversely, if allowing the time needed for the
completion of these processes meant prolonging the occupation of Iraq,
this would be neither desirable nor likely to be sustainable.

60. For these reasons, I
urged consideration of de-linking the constitutional and electoral
processes from the early formation of a provisional but sovereign
Iraqi Government, so that the occupation could be brought to an end
sooner rather than later. I also appealed to members of the Security
Council to ensure that any role they considered assigning to the
United Nations in support of the political transition process took
full account of the events and prevailing security situation that had
precipitated the withdrawal of international United Nations staff from
the country.

61. The constitutional
preparatory committee, which had been formed on 11 August, reached
conclusions with respect to options for the drafting and adoption of a
new constitution for Iraq. In its report submitted to the Governing
Council on 30 September, the committee recommended that the new Iraqi
constitution be drafted by a directly elected body (constitutional
conference) and that, thereafter, the draft constitution be voted on
by the population as a whole through a general referendum. It favoured
asking that the process of electing delegates to the constitutional
conference be conducted under United Nations supervision. While
recognizing that this option would require at least one to two years,
the committee preferred it to less time-consuming options — such as
the drafting of the constitution by a partially elected or selected
body — because it placed primacy on the need for genuine and
widespread national ownership of the final product.

B.
Adoption of resolution 1511 (2003)

62. On 16 October the
Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1511 (2003). It will
be recalled that operative paragraphs 7, 9, 10, and 11 of that
resolution, in particular, had significant implications for future
United Nations political activities in Iraq. I was particularly
grateful to the sponsors for inserting the caveat “as circumstances
permit” with respect to the implementation of the original plans of
UNAMI, as well as in support of the formulation and implementation of
a timetable and programme for the drafting of a new constitution and
the holding of elections, with support from the United Nations “if
requested by the Governing Council”. In doing so, Security Council
members took into consideration my concerns that the United Nations
not take on responsibilities it could not successfully carry out.

63. As I had indicated on
a number of occasions in various forums, for United Nations engagement
to be successful, adequate measures for staff security needed to be in
place first. Furthermore, I indicated that in order for a United
Nations role in the political process to be effective, it needed to be
supported by all members of the Governing Council, key Iraqi figures
outside the process, the occupying Powers, key States in the region, a
united Security Council and major donor countries.

C.
The 15 November 2003 agreement on the political process

64. Meanwhile, on 15
November 2003 Jalal Talabani, then President of the Governing Council,
and Ambassadors L. Paul Bremer and David Richmond, on behalf of the
Coalition Provisional Authority, concluded an agreement on the
timetable and programme for the drafting of a new constitution and
holding of elections under that constitution, which the Security
Council, in operative paragraph 7 of resolution 1511 (2003), had
requested be submitted for its review no later than 15 December, as
well as on a course of action to restore full responsibility for
governing Iraq to the people of Iraq by 1 July 2004. United States
Secretary of State Colin Powell, Sir Jeremy Greenstock of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Mr. Talabani all
telephoned to brief me on the plans. Though the 15 November agreement
makes no specific mention of any role for the United Nations, all of
them, particularly Mr. Talabani, expressed their desire for the United
Nations to play an active part in its implementation.

65. The 15 November
agreement stipulates, in summary, that, through a Coalition
Provisional Authority-supervised process of caucuses held in the 18
governorates of Iraq, a transitional national assembly will be
established by 31 May 2004; that assembly will then elect an executive
branch and appoint ministers. By 30 June 2004, the new transitional
administration — whose scope and structures are to be set out in a
“fundamental law” to be approved by the Coalition Provisional
Authority and the Governing Council by 28 February 2004 — will assume
from the Coalition Provisional Authority full responsibility for
governing Iraq. The Authority and the Governing Council will be
dissolved at that time. The agreement also sets forth a specific
timetable for the constitutional process to be codified in the
fundamental law, with elections for a constitutional conference to be
held by 15 March 2005 and a popular referendum to be held to ratify
the constitution. Elections for a new Government under that
constitution are to be held by 31 December 2005, at which point the
fundamental law will expire. On the security issue, the 15 November
document calls for a security agreement to be signed by the Coalition
Provisional Authority and the Governing Council no later than the end
of March 2004, mainly to cover the status of the Coalition forces in
Iraq.

66. It will be recalled
that on 21 November the Permanent Representative of the United States
of America briefed the members of the Security Council on the
provisions of the political agreement of 15 November in further detail
(see S/PV.4869).

67. It will also be
recalled that, in a letter dated 23 November to the President of the
Security Council, Mr. Talabani formally submitted to the Security
Council the Governing Council’s response to the request contained in
paragraph 7 of resolution 1511 (2003). In that letter Mr. Talabani
indicated the same timetable and programme for the drafting of a new
constitution and the election of a new Government under that
constitution set out in the 15 November agreement, though without
reference to that document. Mr. Talabani’s letter also reiterated a
number of principles to be embodied in the fundamental law, which was
to be established by the Governing Council, including the
establishment of a unified multilateral democratic federal system that
respects the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people
while ensuring the rights of religions and sects.

68. Shortly after the
dispatch of Mr. Talabani’s letter, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani
expressed concerns about the approach of indirect caucus-style
elections for the transitional national assembly, favouring direct
general elections instead. This issue continues to be discussed within
the Governing Council, between the Governing Council and other Iraqi
leaders and between the Governing Council and the Coalition
Provisional Authority.

VI.
The way forward for United Nations activities in Iraq

69. The most recent
developments in the political transition process could have important
implications for the future role of the United Nations in Iraq. The
fact that a sovereign transitional Government of Iraq is envisaged to
be established by 30 June 2004 requires me to consider which United
Nations activities are appropriate now, as opposed to those that
should await its formation.

70. Humanitarian
assistance, emergency rehabilitation, technical assistance for
ministries related thereto and the initiation of critical
reconstruction activities cannot and should not wait. There are
immediate and pressing needs that must be urgently met. Furthermore,
all of these programmes can contribute to creating favourable
conditions for the key political processes that lie ahead. There is a
tremendous amount of work that needs to be done now and, as described
in detail earlier, the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes
continue to play a very active role in these areas, working on the
basis of requests from and very closely with their Iraqi counterparts,
and in close consultation with the Coalition Provisional Authority.
The United Nations could strengthen its role in these areas over time,
as called for by the Security Council in paragraph 8 of its resolution
1511 (2003), as circumstances permit.

71. It should also be
stressed that civil society, especially national human rights and
women’s organizations and national media, have an essential role to
play in the political dialogue on the future of their country. The
United Nations has a great deal of experience and expertise in
supporting civil society. As indicated in paragraph 98 of my report of
17 July 2003, this was intended to be one of the core areas of
activity for UNAMI. Ways and means need to be found for UNAMI and
United Nations agencies to play that role, as effectively and as
quickly as possible, as circumstances permit.

72. On the political front in the immediate to medium term, it
has yet to be established what role, if any, Iraqis and the Coalition
Provisional Authority would like the United Nations to play in the
formation of the transitional national assembly by 31 May 2004, how
substantive that role might be in relation to the evident security
risks and whether circumstances would permit the United Nations to
play any such role effectively, if requested to do so. It would be
important to have clarity both as regards what might be expected of us
and about respective new responsibilities.

73. Meanwhile, in a
letter dated 10 November, Jalal Talabani, then President of the
Governing Council, urged me to consider appointing a new Special
Representative for Iraq, who need not be resident in Iraq, but who
could come periodically for consultations as needed. In my response of
21 November, I assured Mr. Talabani that I remained determined that
the United Nations should continue to assist the Iraqi people, from
both inside and outside the country, as circumstances permit. I also
indicated that I intended to appoint a Special Representative for Iraq
in the not-too-distant future.

74. In addition to United
Nations activities, it should be recalled that in several of its
resolutions the Security Council recognized, as I have, the importance
of international support, particularly from countries in the region
and regional organizations, in taking forward expeditiously the
transition process in Iraq.

75. I therefore welcome
and encourage the further holding of meetings by the Foreign Ministers
of regional countries, such as that which took place in Damascus on 1
and 2 November. Also, I have established an advisory group on Iraq,
composed of neighbouring countries, Egypt and members of the Security
Council. My aim in doing so was to initiate an informal dialogue and
to see if we can develop a common basis for approaching the situation
in Iraq. I also intend to enhance contacts between the United Nations
and regional countries and regional organizations with a view to
building confidence at three levels: between Iraq and its neighbours,
within the region itself and between the region and the larger
international community.

76. In the longer term,
if the Iraqis so request and as circumstances permit, the United
Nations, as mandated by resolution 1511 (2003), will make available to
the Iraqi people its expertise on the constitutional and electoral
processes envisaged to take place in the latter half of 2004 and
throughout 2005.

77. The United Nations
has considerable experience in providing technical assistance and
organizing transitional elections. Electoral assistance has been given
in a variety of areas. The first involves the establishment of a legal
framework, including the formulation of the electoral system, in
particular the form and basis of representation for the bodies to be
elected; the eligibility criteria for voters and candidates; and the
definition of the electoral authority or authorities in charge of the
process. A second aspect revolves around the establishment of an
electoral administration, which entails the setting up of offices,
recruitment of personnel and development of procedures. A third area
of activity relates to the preparation, planning and conduct of the
various electoral operations, which may include the establishment of a
voters’ register in addition to the registration of political parties
and candidates, civic education, polling, counting and the
announcement of the results.

78. In preparations for
credible general elections in Iraq, the electoral process might
require assistance in each of these three areas. However, no
determination of electoral assistance by the United Nations can be
made without a specific request of the Member States, as well as the
launching of a needs assessment mission, as per standard United
Nations practices. It is the needs assessment mission that provides a
recommendation for any type of assistance based on the conditions of
the requesting country.

79. A constitution should
embody the core principles of a nation, including the extent and
manner of the exercise of its sovereign powers. It follows that it
must be wholly produced and owned by the people of Iraq. The document
should take into consideration the views and aspirations of all Iraqis
on relevant issues, including the structure of Iraq’s Government, the
role of religion and the articulation of a set of fundamental rights
and principles by which Iraqis wish to be governed.

80. My late Special
Representative had already begun to share with the people of Iraq the
lessons learned from the United Nations support for constitutional
processes in various post-conflict countries, with a view to helping
them make informed decisions on the design of a truly participatory
process. The United Nations stands ready to mobilize its resources to
assist an internally driven constitutional process, once work on
drafting a permanent constitution starts.

81. Irrespective of
whatever direct contribution the United Nations might make to the
political process in the immediate or long term, there is clearly
ample potential for the Organization to continue to play an important
role in Iraq. The key task is to develop a detailed plan of action
that takes into consideration the conditions and circumstances
required if the United Nations is to play that role effectively both
inside and outside the country. It would be helpful if re-emerging
Iraqi political institutions and the Coalition Provisional Authority
could be specific as regards the ways and means in which UNAMI might
be useful during the transition.

82. To that end, a
detailed planning process was initiated at a meeting held in Nicosia,
Cyprus, from 11 to 15 November. Representatives of 20 United Nations
departments, agencies, funds and programmes, including the United
Nations agency country team for Iraq, and UNAMI personnel
participated. The Nicosia meeting and subsequent deliberations
conducted at United Nations Headquarters have resulted in a plan for
future United Nations activities in Iraq in the immediate to medium
term, with respect to (a) security, (b) the deployment of UNAMI and
(c) criteria for revisions to the United Nations country strategy for
relief, recovery and reconstruction for 2004.

A.
Security

83. The following
assumptions regarding the security situation, for planning purposes,
were borne in mind throughout the substantive programmatic review of
United Nations activities in Iraq:

(a) The
security environment is unlikely to improve in the short to medium
term, and could deteriorate further;

(b) The United
Nations will remain a high-value, high-impact target for terrorist
activity in Iraq for the foreseeable future.

84. The acting United
Nations Security Coordinator assessed the current risk to United
Nations personnel in Iraq as falling in the high to critical category
(Security Phases IV/V), but considered that, over time, gradual
improvements in the security environment, coupled with the full
implementation of a range of protective measures, had the potential to
reduce the risk to medium to high (Phases III/IV). These measures
include:

(b)
Preparation and full implementation of enhanced Minimum Operating
Safety Standards (MOSS) to include security plans and procedures and
significant office and residential building upgrades. None of the
United Nations premises in Iraq is yet fully MOSS-compliant;

(c) The
establishment of an effective, well-trained and well-equipped security
management and coordination structure to include high-grade liaison
links with information sources and the capacity to analyse associated
information;

(d) Training
on security matters for staff at all levels;

(e) A highly
capable and responsive emergency medical support element;

(f) Protected
vehicles;

(g) A
comprehensive, far-reaching public information strategy that is
sensitive and responsive to security considerations and effectively
explains (to the uninformed) the role, capabilities and tasks of the
United Nations.

85. The stringent
measures recommended by the United Nations security professionals
respond to the substance and spirit of the findings of the Independent
Panel on the Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel in Iraq.
However, these protective measures will take a number of months to
institute and will constrain the effectiveness of certain United
Nations activities, which depend upon the accessibility and mobility
of staff throughout the country to meet with national partners and
beneficiaries alike.

86. The protective
measures that have been recommended will have significant financial
implications, particularly in respect of the provision of
MOSS-compliant facilities and quantities of equipment; of the
continued availability of safe access by air (presently made possible
by the provision by Belgium of a military aircraft with protective
equipment); and of additional security officers and logistics
specialists to manage construction.

87. In view of the
limited number of posts and worldwide security needs, UNSECOORD can at
present assign only two regularly funded field security coordination
officers to Iraq. An additional four such officers are financed
through voluntary contributions by Member States to the Trust Fund for
the Security of Staff Members of the United Nations System. These
funds are used to address personnel, equipment and operating costs. A
minimum of 19 field security coordination officers, as well as a
security operations information centre and a training facility, are
required to provide adequate security for the return of international
staff members in significant numbers to Iraq. Additional instructors
are also necessary to deliver the special training that will be
required for all United Nations staff members prior to their
re-entering Iraq, so as to permit them to deal with the high level of
risk involved. UNSECOORD, with the assistance of my acting Special
Representative, is continuing to seek voluntary contributions to
address these prerequisites.

88. Moreover, at every
step of the process, detailed discussions at various levels will be
required with Coalition forces or the multinational force to obtain
their assessment of what is operationally feasible. Ultimately, formal
agreements should be concluded between the United Nations and the
Coalition Provisional Authority with regard to protection, exchange of
information, emergency medical evacuation and the possible use of
Coalition or multinational force facilities as required.

89. In summary,
establishing the necessary security conditions will be a
time-consuming and expensive process. Under the circumstances, it is
difficult to envisage the United Nations operating with a large number
of international staff inside Iraq in the near future, unless there is
an unexpected and significant improvement in the overall security
situation.

90. It follows that in
the course of the coming months, the United Nations will need to rely
maximally on national staff to carry out in-country programmes, to the
extent that security and other conditions allow. We will also
implement a revised concept of operations for international staff
based outside the country to fulfil as many as possible of the tasks
that cannot be performed by national staff, including through
temporary visits inside Iraq, as security conditions permit.

91. Ensuring the security
and safety of staff will remain a significant challenge for some time
to come as United Nations agencies continue essential assistance
activities on the ground. Establishing secure facilities and other
measures to enhance physical protection are a central aspect of this
effort. But it is also clear that the United Nations, including all of
its agencies, funds and programmes, needs to rethink how it operates.
United Nations international capacity in Iraq will remain limited due
to security restrictions, at least in the short to medium term. As a
result, United Nations agencies will have to work more closely
together than ever before to make the most of that limited capacity.
To reduce exposure as much as possible, they will work as part of an
integrated team and adopt innovative approaches to the use of common
services. In this regard I have instructed the Office of Mission
Support of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to take the lead
in organizing a common services framework for UNAMI and related
agencies.

B.
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

92. The United Nations
Assistance Mission for Iraq was never envisaged to be a large
operation with a complex structure. Prior to 19 August it was expected
to consist initially of fewer than 400 staff in total (deployed
throughout the country within one of three key components: the Office
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General; the Office of
the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the
coordination of United Nations relief, recovery and reconstruction
activities; and an administrative and logistics support component), of
whom approximately half were to be nationally recruited. This number
was expected to increase if the United Nations was later asked to play
a significant electoral role.

93. It is impossible to
forecast, at this juncture, if and when circumstances will permit the
full deployment of UNAMI to Iraq. Clearly, the operation will need to
build up incrementally, at a pace and scope that cannot yet be
defined. At the same time, prudent contingency planning is required to
enable the United Nations to respond as quickly as possible to
requests for assistance from the Iraqi people, should circumstances
permit.

94. Therefore, I have
decided to commence the incremental process of establishing UNAMI by
setting up the core of the Mission outside of Iraq. The bulk of UNAMI
staff will be located temporarily in Nicosia. Additional UNAMI staff
will be deployed to a small office in Amman and to other locations in
the region, as required. I envisage an integrated core team of
approximately 40 international UNAMI staff in total — consisting of
political, human rights, public information, humanitarian and
developmental programme officers, as well as security and
administrative/logistics support specialists — to be in place by early
2004. This number would be expected to increase to up to 60
international staff (to cater for a personal security detail and
immediate front office staff) once a new Special Representative has
been appointed.

95. This core UNAMI team
will initially be managed by Ross Mountain, who will serve as acting
Special Representative, until such time as a new Special
Representative is appointed.

96. The core UNAMI team
will lead operational planning efforts for the eventual deployment of
UNAMI to Iraq, as well as coordinate the activities of and provide
guidance to the United Nations agencies. Furthermore, the political
and human rights officers will meet with Iraqis travelling in the
region to discuss with them the political and human rights situation
in the country. The political officers will also intensify engagement
and dialogue with key States in the region. As security conditions
permit, team members will visit Iraq to meet with Iraqi officials and
the Coalition Provisional Authority. The UNAMI core team will also
lead the articulation and subsequent implementation of a robust public
information strategy through media outlets based in the region and
national staff in Iraq.

C.
Relief, recovery and reconstruction assistance

97. During the Nicosia
consultations, much progress was made in working out modalities to
implement an integrated approach to the United Nations relief,
recovery and reconstruction activities. The basis for the United
Nations assistance efforts will be a fully integrated United Nations
country team strategy for 2004, which will be finalized by January
2004 and reviewed on a quarterly basis to reflect emerging needs and
changing circumstances. United Nations activities and strategies
within specific sectors will be integrated and coordinated by sectoral
teams and task managers, an approach that was also adopted
successfully during the needs assessment process earlier this year.
The implementation of United Nations programmes on the ground will be
led by an integrated implementation team.

98. It is also clear that
we have to do more to empower our national staff, who have borne
primary responsibility for implementing our programmes. This entails
providing them with increased management authority for finance and
personnel matters, as well as close consultation on all policy and
operational issues. At the same time, we have to ensure that increased
authority for our Iraqi colleagues does not increase their exposure to
threats. I am deeply concerned about the security of our national
staff, particularly as their profile has been raised in the absence of
international staff from most of the country. A number of steps have
already been taken and additional measures are planned to enhance
their safety, not only at work but also in their homes.

99. While the integrated
assistance strategy is still being finalized, certain basic criteria
and priorities for next year have already emerged. First, particularly
given the limitations on our capacity, United Nations agencies will
have to focus even more carefully on areas in which they have a clear
comparative advantage and can have a real impact on the ground, even
under current conditions. Second, our assistance should target the
most vulnerable groups, not only in large urban centres but in smaller
cities and deprived rural areas. Third, we should support the capacity
of national and local institutions, as well as civil society. To this
end, we will enhance our engagement with Iraqi partners, including
ministries, municipalities, professional associations, Iraqi
non-governmental organizations and the private sector.

100. The United Nations
agencies and programmes are planning a wide range of assistance
activities in 2004 that will be reflected in the integrated strategy
and country programme. Some examples are described below to illustrate
the overall approach:

(a) As part of
targeted food assistance efforts, a school feeding programme for
60,000 children is being planned in two governorates in the centre and
south of the country, in addition to the ongoing school feeding
programme in the three northern governorates. In parallel, WFP and
UNICEF have joined efforts with the Iraqi Nutrition Research Institute
to start a supplementary feeding project. Supplementary feeding
activities in the three northern governorates targeting 14,000
malnourished children and 43,000 pregnant and nursing mothers will
continue;

(b) In the
health sector, the emphasis of WHO activities will increasingly shift
to supporting the development of capacity within the Ministry of
Health and governorate health offices to run a health system that
offers accessible, affordable and equitable services in ways that
involve community groups, health professionals and other key actors;

(c) In
coordinating water and sanitation activities, UNICEF plans to focus on
increasing access to potable water and sanitation coverage;

(d) Protection
and assistance will focus on the most vulnerable internally displaced
persons and communities to which they intend to return. This includes,
for example, coordination by UNHCR of policy advice to Iraqi
authorities related to the return of internally displaced persons and
refugees, and pilot projects planned by the United Nations Human
Settlements Programme that will provide shelter to the most vulnerable
families in certain returnee communities;

(e) UNDP
intends to support local civil society organizations and to assist in
strengthening local governance, including urban management and
planning. Activities aimed at rapid employment generation will be
expanded to rural areas;

(f)
Assistance for the agricultural sector by FAO will be aimed at
rehabilitating critical infrastructure and restoring key services and
institutions, including irrigation and drainage schemes and damaged
animal- and seed-production facilities;

(g) The
establishment of the National Open University of Iraq will be
supported by UNESCO, utilizing distance-education methods to provide
quality education and skills training that will be specifically
targeted at disadvantaged groups, including women and the disabled.

101. Many of these planned
activities can be carried out through our national staff and with the
support of international personnel deployed in neighbouring countries.
As they do today, United Nations agencies intend to conduct
cross-border operations to deliver essential supplies, implement
projects through national staff and with Iraqi contractors and stay in
close contact with Iraqi counterparts, including through regular
meetings outside the country. Certain other types of activities, such
as direct capacity-building support within Iraqi ministries and
protection of internally displaced persons and other vulnerable
groups, will have to be reinforced once additional international staff
are able to return to Iraq.

VII.
Observations

102. I recognize that in
many areas, including the advancement of basic human rights such as
freedom of speech and of political assembly, as well as the provision
of basic services and the reconstitution of the local police, very
real progress has been made in Iraq in the past few months. This
progress should not be underestimated; nor should the efforts of the
Coalition Provisional Authority and newly emerging Iraqi institutions
be overlooked.

103. At the same time, the
dangers posed by insurgents, whose attacks have been growing in
sophistication and strength over the past months, are real. The
activities of these insurgents, about whose nature more needs to be
known, have inflicted serious damage on the United Nations, the
diplomatic community, international non-governmental organizations,
the International Committee of the Red Cross and Coalition forces, in
addition to killing a large number of Iraqis.

104. In order to mitigate
the possibility that this insurgency will grow over time,
quantitatively and qualitatively, various steps will need to be taken.

105. First and foremost, we
need to act on the recognition that the mounting insecurity problem
cannot be solved through military means alone. A political solution is
required. Such a solution entails making the political transition
process more inclusive, so as to bring in additional groups and
individuals that have thus far been excluded, or that have excluded
themselves. It means truly empowering Iraqi institutions to take the
decisions that will shape the political and economic future of their
country. And, in order to command widespread support, these
institutions need to function effectively and transparently. Political
steps of this kind would make it clearer that the foreign occupation
of Iraq is to be short-lived — and that it will soon give way to a
fully fledged Iraqi Government empowered to implement an Iraqi agenda
— hence making it more difficult for insurgents to rally support.
Within that context, the announcement in the 15 November agreement
setting forth a clear timetable and a precise date for the formation
of a sovereign Iraqi Government and the dissolution of the Coalition
Provisional Authority is an important step in the right direction.

106. Second, the
articulation of a national agenda that is seen to be truly
representative of all segments of Iraqi society, and one that respects
the independence and territorial integrity of Iraq, requires national
reconciliation. The politics of national unity, not of revenge and
collective punishment, is what is required. I believe that Iraqis of
all persuasions are more than capable of incorporating their regional,
ethnic and sectarian identities within their national identity. While
this will not be easy, particularly as Iraqis struggle to come to
terms with the miseries and abuses of recent decades, I am hopeful
that the Iraqi people can meet the challenge. They know that the
future of their nation, for generations to come, is at stake.

107. Third, intensified
efforts by Coalition forces to demonstrate that they are adhering
strictly to international humanitarian law and human rights
instruments — even in the face of deliberate and provocative terrorist
attacks, sometimes against vulnerable and defenceless civilians —
would make it that much more difficult for the insurgents to rally
support for their cause. In this connection, the use of lethal force
by the Coalition forces — in the context of military responses to
threats to Coalition forces, dispersal of demonstrations, raids on
homes and confrontations as well as at checkpoints — should, in
accordance with international humanitarian law, be proportionate and
discriminating. In this connection, special care needs to be taken to
avoid inflicting casualties on innocent Iraqi civilians. Moreover,
although they may fall into several different categories (prisoners of
war, political detainees, ordinary criminal suspects and those
suspected of attacks against Coalition forces), all detainees — of
which there are reportedly several thousand — should be protected in
accordance with Iraqi law and the Geneva Conventions.

108. More broadly, the
establishment of Iraqi capabilities in the areas of monitoring human
rights and the promotion and institutionalization of the rule of law
should be strongly encouraged, not least through the establishment of
an independent national human rights institution and the development
of a national human rights action plan. As soon as conditions permit,
the United Nations will continue to support these efforts, as
indicated in my last report.

109. Fourth, it is
essential that all those in the international community who are in a
position to support the implementation of an Iraqi agenda should do
so, and should be given a chance to do so. None of us can afford to
stand on the sidelines. Failure to put the rebuilding of Iraq on a
solid footing could have devastating consequences for the people of
Iraq, the people of the region and the international order as a whole.

110. In this regard,
although I have had to temporarily relocate most United Nations
international staff outside the country, the United Nations will not
disengage from Iraq. On the contrary, even following the tragic events
of 19 August 2003, the United Nations has carried out a massive amount
of assistance, in large measure through the skilled and heroic efforts
of its Iraqi staff, as well as those international staff who were
relocated to Amman, Kuwait and other locations in the region.
Furthermore, I have now set in motion the process of assembling in the
region a core of UNAMI so that the United Nations can be in a position
to move swiftly back to the country if the Iraqi people seek the
Organization’s assistance, and if circumstances on the ground permit.

111. On the political
front, I have been personally engaged with Heads of State and
Government and Foreign Ministers around the world, in an effort to
help forge an international consensus on the way forward. This
consensus, in which Iraq’s neighbours and key States in the region and
the Islamic world have a key role to play, is essential if we are to
bring to bear the full range of international assistance to the people
of Iraq in their hour of need. It was in order to help promote such a
consensus that I convened a meeting with regional and international
actors on 1 December. To the same end, I am considering ways and means
of ensuring that we consult closely and continuously with Iraq’s
neighbours as well as with regional organizations.

112. It goes without saying
that, as regards a physical presence inside Iraq, the United Nations
will continue to operate under severe constraints in the coming weeks
and months. I cannot afford to compromise the security of our
international and national staff. In taking the difficult decisions
that lie ahead, I shall be asking myself questions such as whether the
substance of the role allocated to the United Nations is proportionate
to the risks we are being asked to take, whether the political process
is fully inclusive and transparent and whether the humanitarian tasks
in question are truly life-saving, or not. I shall also, as always,
ask what the Iraqis themselves expect of the United Nations, and
whether our activities serve the cause of restoring to them, as soon
as possible, full control over their own destiny and resources.

113. Meanwhile, though the
context for their deployment will and must change soon, it is likely
that Iraq will continue to require assistance, in the form of a
substantial military presence, for a number of years to come. The
Iraqi people need to be reassured that, if and when a new Iraqi
Government requests such assistance on behalf of the Iraqi people, it
will be forthcoming, not only from the current contributors to the
United States-led Coalition, but from a broad range of other countries
as well.

114. In concluding, I would
like to state my conviction that the future of a nation of more than
26 million people and of a volatile region is at stake. The process of
restoring peace and stability to Iraq cannot be allowed to fail. The
consequences for Iraqis themselves, the region and the international
community as a whole would be disastrous. Too many Iraqis and
representatives of the international community, including deeply
respected and gifted United Nations colleagues, have sacrificed their
lives. Their sacrifice cannot be allowed to have been in vain.

115. I pay tribute to them
for that sacrifice. I extend my deepest sympathies to the families and
friends left behind. And I record my abiding gratitude for their
contribution. They will never be forgotten.