… in Carter's Image

TimesMachine is an exclusive benefit for home delivery and digital subscribers.

About the Archive

This is a digitized version of an article from The Times’s print archive, before the start of online publication in 1996. To preserve these articles as they originally appeared, The Times does not alter, edit or update them.

Occasionally the digitization process introduces transcription errors or other problems; we are continuing to work to improve these archived versions.

The foreign policy and defense planks in the Democratic platform were also fashioned in the cautious, middle‐of‐the‐road image of the party's standard‐bearer.

Liberal statements are balanced by more conservative ones, providing something for almost any Democrat. Overall, it is a document sufficiently non‐controversial to meet the chief objective or Jimmy Carter's representatives in the drafting process: a platform around which Democrats can unite. As such, it provides only a few insights into the direction Mr. Carter will take if he is elected President.

The platform calls for seeking areas of cooperation with the Soviet Union but “hard bargaining for our own interest, recognition of continuing competition and a refusal to oversell the immediate benefits of such a policy to the American public.”

It demands a $5 to $7 billion cut in defense spending, but also a “strong American military deterrent” and “the foremost fleet in the world.”

In seeking peace in the Middle East, the “cornerstone” of policy is to be “a firm commitment to the independence and security of the State of Israel.”. But the platform also asks for “improved relations with other nations in the region.” It supports the Arab view that the United States must not “impose” a settlement and the Israeli view that “direct face‐to‐face negotiation between the parties” should be supported.

On China, “early movement” toward diplomatic relations with Peking is favored—which implies a break diplomatic relations with Taipei. But this is to be sought in the context of a “peaceful” resolulion of the future of Taiwan—something on which Peking has refused to commit itself for a quarter‐century.

More openness in foreign policy‐making and more Congressional involvement are favored; but at the same time Mr. Carter made it clear in a recent interview that he intended, if elected, to defend Presidential prerogatives.

This hedging of positions, leaving Mr. Carter with a substantially free hand, is characteristic of the prospective nominee. The Democratic leader recently pronounced himself for the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea, which struck some as a radical position. Now, perhaps as a result of criticism, Mr. Carter has drawn back somewhat, making withdrawal of American troops contingent on obtaining an undefined Soviet guarantee of South Korea's security.

Again, although the Democratic platform supports liberal Democratic efforts to postpone a decision on production of the B‐I bomber until a new Administration takes office, Mr. Carter now has indicated that he has not yet made up his mind on the B‐I bomber or the related debate over the air‐launched cruise missile. Both are critical issues for the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II) with the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the clearest point of disagreement Mr. Carter has emphasized with the Ford Administration is his opposition to the concept of limited nuclear war—and expenditures on strategic weapons designed for nuclear war‐fighting. He would return American strategic doctrine to its previous emphasis on deterrence in the belief that almost any use of nuclear weapons would lead quickly to an all‐out nuclear exchange.

It is this kind of concrete policy orientation on a wide range of subjects—little indicated in the Democratic platform—that Mr. Carter needs to enlarge upon as the campaign evolves.