A reading of Heidegger’s The
Beginning of Western Philosophy: Interpretation of Anaximander and Parmenides (trans,
Richard Rojcewicz, Indiana University Press, 2015) raises some important
questions about the role of science in his thought. I am concerned with evaluating the apparently
negative and unproductive role science seems to have in Heidegger’s work. Heidegger seems to dismiss science in his interpretation of
Anaximander:‘Indeed, what is not decisive is the magnitude in number or scope of the beings we explicitly know; and
how we scientifically know is utterly inconsequential’ (4).How is science
being defined here? Does this represent
a rejection of scientific disciplines per
se or rather of a dogmatic, totalising and reductive view of science (what
we might call scientism or reductionism)?
Is this to close down any scope for architectonics, for positively
defining and locating disciplines such that dynamic, reciprocal and creative
relations may arise and develop? Is
Heidegger’s relation to science entirely negative?

In
continuing to interpret Anaximander, Heidegger is once more dismissive of
science. He identifies genuine ‘presence’
with what we call appearance, something to be distinguished from the causal
sequences studied by science and from our perception of things. In these lectures he is attempting to
elaborate a pre-Socratic concept of appearance and this is not to be found in
science: ‘Not to be sought in the
abstract, arid, and sparse field of so-called chemistry and physics!’
(10). We have a reference to the
pastoral, rural and agricultural (arid and
sparse field) which has many echoes in Heidegger’s thought but also a reference
to ‘so-called’ chemistry and physics.
Are these not the true or genuine chemistry and physics? Would the genuine chemistry and physics need
to be philosophical or philosophically grounded (as Aristotelian and Kantian
sciences are)?

We also have
an apparent argument against architectonics: ‘… [I]n antiquity individual
regions of beings were not at all separated out yet. The delimitations arose for the most part
only in connected with the rise of the sciences and had the effect of diverting
and making murky the original comprehensive view of beings as a whole’ (12).It would
seem that there is a loss of original unity, something Heidegger finds in the
pre-Socratic concept of appearance as non-sequential and in ‘that which is’ as a
non-numerical whole of Being. Is this an
argument against the formation of disciplines?
Is Heidegger seeking to return to such a pre-disciplinary state? More questioning and thinking to come ...

A reading of Heidegger’s The
Beginning of Western Philosophy: Interpretation of Anaximander and Parmenides (trans,
Richard Rojcewicz, Indiana University Press, 2015) raises some important
questions about the role of science in his thought. I am concerned with evaluating the apparently
negative and unproductive role science seems to have in Heidegger’s work. Heidegger seems to dismiss science in his interpretation of
Anaximander:‘Indeed, what is not decisive is the magnitude in number or scope of the beings we explicitly know; and
how we scientifically know is utterly inconsequential’ (4).How is science
being defined here? Does this represent
a rejection of scientific disciplines per
se or rather of a dogmatic, totalising and reductive view of science (what
we might call scientism or reductionism)?
Is this to close down any scope for architectonics, for positively
defining and locating disciplines such that dynamic, reciprocal and creative
relations may arise and develop? Is
Heidegger’s relation to science entirely negative?

In
continuing to interpret Anaximander, Heidegger is once more dismissive of
science. He identifies genuine ‘presence’
with what we call appearance, something to be distinguished from the causal
sequences studied by science and from our perception of things. In these lectures he is attempting to
elaborate a pre-Socratic concept of appearance and this is not to be found in
science: ‘Not to be sought in the
abstract, arid, and sparse field of so-called chemistry and physics!’
(10). We have a reference to the
pastoral, rural and agricultural (arid and
sparse field) which has many echoes in Heidegger’s thought but also a reference
to ‘so-called’ chemistry and physics.
Are these not the true or genuine chemistry and physics? Would the genuine chemistry and physics need
to be philosophical or philosophically grounded (as Aristotelian and Kantian
sciences are)?

We also have
an apparent argument against architectonics: ‘… [I]n antiquity individual
regions of beings were not at all separated out yet. The delimitations arose for the most part
only in connected with the rise of the sciences and had the effect of diverting
and making murky the original comprehensive view of beings as a whole’ (12).It would
seem that there is a loss of original unity, something Heidegger finds in the
pre-Socratic concept of appearance as non-sequential and in ‘that which is’ as a
non-numerical whole of Being. Is this an
argument against the formation of disciplines?
Is Heidegger seeking to return to such a pre-disciplinary state? More questioning and thinking to come ...