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Realism Canadian Style

Joel Sokolsky

Visiting Canada-U.S. Fulbright Scholar, Bridgewater State College,
Massachusetts and Dean of Arts and Professor of Political Science at the Royal
Military College of Canada

February 25, 2004

This talk covers US-Canadian relations from the Canadian perspective.
Canada was conspicuously absent from the war in Iraq. That absence created ill
will. In Canada, there was a lot of talk about bilateral relations and the record
of Prime Minister Chrétien. Chrétien didn't make up his mind not
to participate in the war until January 2003. Canadian officers had already
gone to Tampa to work with the US command, and Canada was ready to commit 600
to 800 troops. At some point Chrétien got upset towards the Bush administration;
members of his staff even questioned President Bush's intelligence. Chrétien
said the war was not about WMD. He had floated a proposal to UN for more time
for inspectors.

So Canada stayed out of Iraq but recommitted to the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan. 2100 Canadians remain there.

With the Canadian rejection of Iraq, relations with the United States went
bad. Bush cancelled a visit to Ottawa.

Relations improved with Chrétien's exit. Prime Minister Martin is trying
to bring everything back to normal. He's untainted by the prior brouhaha.

What do the lessons of the Chrétien government tell us about future
relations?

Canada pursues its own interests. Many say the lack of defense spending shows
that the Chrétien government did not understand international relations.
But really Canada's leadership has long understood international relations,
and that's precisely why Canada does not spend on defense. The Chrétien
leadership was a cynical group who understand power and how to manipulate it.

Canada's defense problem is convincing America that Canada is not an American
problem. Canada answers the question of how much defense spending is enough
by asking how much is just enough. Canada tries to spend the minimum amount
necessary to maintain activity within its alliance with United States, some
level of interoperability, and the ability to participate in coalitions of the
willing. The top Canadian foreign policy priority is trade and keeping the border
open. To this end, US relations are a top priority. Defense spending feeds alliance
politics, which allows trade.

The United States always complains about low Canadian defense spending, but
the United States can't do more than complain given that Canada always participates
in US missions. Canada takes the Woody Allen approach to international politics:
90% of life is just showing up. The result is a strategic culture where Canada
always does something less than what its partners want but enough to stay in
their plans. Henry Kissinger saluted the wisdom of this approach, saying Canada
got a lot diplomatic punch for small amounts of spending.

Canadian politicians are savvy users of power. Recent governments have seen
a concentration of power even within the executive branch in the Privy Council
and Prime Ministers' office, the emergence of what some call friendly dictatorship.

There is view in Canada, and to lesser extent in the United States, that Canada
has been asleep in dealing with the United States for 13 years - that is, not
a good enough sidekick. This is due to low defense spending, which is less than
1% of GDP. The budget is the same as in 1991, $12 billion Canadian. Martin,
who cut the budget, is now Prime Minister.

There has been a lot of aggrandizement of the Pierce legacy, but it's true
that Prime Minister Pierce kept the United States happy. Canada never opposed
major US priorities. This was true for most of the Cold War.

But it's just not true that Canada has been inactive since the early nineties.
Actually Canada has been hyperactive in areas not related to its vital interests;
Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo, for instance. Canada has been doing a lot more since
the Cold War ended. In the Cold War, Canada avoided peacekeeping. Now Canada
does a lot of peacekeeping.

Canadian forces were happy with these missions, though that they wanted more
equipment. After the Cold War, the number of armed forces went from 80,000 to
60,000, with 20,000 in the Army. Interoperability with the United States remains
the cornerstone of force development.

There was a strong Chrétien / Clinton relationship based on these missions.
Canada did diverge from United States on "human security," pushing
the Landmine Treaty and the International Criminal Court. The US leadership
was a bit perturbed by this Wilsonian moralism. But by and large, the 1990s
were years of unprecedented US-Canadian cooperation outside North America.

In North America, there were few issues of contention during the 1990s. NORAD
radars were put into hibernation, and the Clinton administration was lukewarm
toward National Missile Defense and did not press Canada much on the issue.
Without the issue of Homeland Security, Canada was not seen as a relevant part
of the defense of the continental United States.

Canada had a problem with NATO expansion, in the sense that more states means
that Canada's role is reduced. But in a way, expansion was a great issue for
Canada, because it allowed Canada to get a lot of diplomatic power - Canada
ran NATO's office in Kiev.

Canada was concerned in the 1990s about rising American power, but comfortable
with Clinton's unilateralism with a smile, as opposed to Bush's unilateralism
with an attitude - and after 9/11, unilateralism with a vengeance.

For Canada, 9/11 had a special meaning. The emphasis on homeland security and
terrorism makes Canada an important piece of real estate again. Canada's geographic
relevance had been Cold War fantasy, but now it is real. Geography is back.
The border is back. The Saint Lawrence and the Great Lakes require security.
Immigration from Canada matters. Canada's shore line needs protection. Container
security in Canada is important - half of the containers entering Montreal are
headed for the United States border. Canada has become more important to US
security. A Cold War assumption was that Canada could not be a strategic liability
for United States. That sentiment is back.

NORAD is also back, dealing with internal airspace. NAV Canada works with the
FAA. The United States is standing up Northern Command, under the same head
as NORAD. The two nations are establishing a binational planning group at NORAD
headquarters to look at the sea and land defenses of the continent.

Canada, which had been wavering on missile defense, is now looking to get more
involved. There is talk about talks. If Canada does not agree that missile defense
will be a NORAD role, it will probably do something in another capacity. Canada
has drawn a distinction between the weaponization and the militarization of
space, but the United States is not asking much. Missile defense may become
a litmus test of sorts.

After 9/11, the Canadian government promised a $7 billion boost on defense
- $800 million on the armed forces, the rest on intelligence, the border, the
Coast Guard, and container security. The spending will focus on homeland security,
not the military per se. Canada's security spending is driven by the need to
keep the border open.

American calls for greater Canadian defense spending will then not accomplish
much beyond the homeland. Canada's budget surplus is all going to health care
and to pay down debt.

Right now there are 3800 Canadian personnel oversees. 2100 are in Afghanistan.
A Canadian general is in command of the International Security Assistance Force
in Afghanistan. Since 1991, Canadian ships have been in the Persian Gulf. Canada
has had a small peacekeeping force in Bosnia since 1992. Canadian forces don't
do a lot for UN missions, however. Canadian overseas work is mostly green helmet,
not blue helmet.

Canada will not add to its presence overseas. Canada's Afghanistan mission
will soon drop its number from 2100 to 500. Their Afghan base is for sale. Canada
will not do much more overseas but will do most of what the United States wants
on the border, intelligence, cargo, and arming the coast guard. The litmus test
for the relationship won't be the away game, it will be on the homefield.

Canadian military spending is $12-13 billion Canadian and holding. It is probably
in the US interest to encourage Canada to spend its resources on homeland security
as opposed to pure military. The Canadian government has said that in an emergency
it might have to recall troops to Canada. There is no national guard and it's
harder to move around Canada than in many less developed countries.

In sum, the lessons from the Chrétien years are that Canada will remain
supportive of the United States despite the patch of bad relations surrounding
Iraq. 9-11 gives Canada new importance to the United States. Canada has to spend
on homeland security to keep its border open. For US national security interests,
pushing to Canada spend more money on defense may be misguided.

Dr. Joel J. Sokolsky is a Visiting Canada-U.S. Fulbright Scholar at Bridgewater
State College. He is Dean of Arts and a Professor of Political Science at the
Royal Military College of Canada (RMC). Dr. Sokolsky, the author and editor
of several books, has served as a consultant to several government offices including
the Associate Assistant Deputy Minister of National Defence (Policy) and the
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. He has been a member
of the Secretariat Working Group of the NATO/Partnership for Peace Consortium
of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes.