The first question that presents itself on the subject is,
whether a confederated government be the best for the
United States or not? Or in other words, whether the thirteen
United States should be reduced to one great republic,
governed by one legislature, and under the direction
of one executive and judicial; or whether they should continue
thirteen confederated republics, under the direction
and controul of a supreme federal head for certain defined
national purposes only?

This enquiry is important, because, although the government
reported by the convention does not go to a perfect
and entire consolidation, yet it approaches so near to
it, that it must, if executed, certainly and infallibly terminate
in it.

This government is to possess absolute and uncontroulable
power, legislative, executive and judicial, with respect
to every object to which it extends, for by the last clause of
section 8th, article 1st, it is declared "that the Congress
shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers,
and all other powers vested by this constitution, in the
government of the United States; or in any department or
office thereof." And by the 6th article, it is declared "that
this constitution, and the laws of the United States, which
shall be made in pursuance thereof, and the treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in
the constitution, or law of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
It appears from these articles that there is
no need of any intervention of the state governments, between
the Congress and the people, to execute any one
power vested in the general government, and that the constitution
and laws of every state are nullified and declared
void, so far as they are or shall be inconsistent with this
constitution, or the laws made in pursuance of it, or with
treaties made under the authority of the United States.--The
government then, so far as it extends, is a complete
one, and not a confederation. It is as much one complete
government as that of New-York or Massachusetts, has as
absolute and perfect powers to make and execute all laws,
to appoint officers, institute courts, declare offences, and
annex penalties, with respect to every object to which it
extends, as any other in the world. So far therefore as its
powers reach, all ideas of confederation are given up and
lost. It is true this government is limited to certain objects,
or to speak more properly, some small degree of power is
still left to the states, but a little attention to the powers
vested in the general government, will convince every candid
man, that if it is capable of being executed, all that is
reserved for the individual states must very soon be annihilated,
except so far as they are barely necessary to the
organization of the general government. The powers of
the general legislature extend to every case that is of the
least importance--there is nothing valuable to human nature,
nothing dear to freemen, but what is within its
power. It has authority to make laws which will affect the
lives, the liberty, and property of every man in the United
States; nor can the constitution or laws of any state, in any
way prevent or impede the full and complete execution of
every power given. The legislative power is competent to
lay taxes, duties, imposts, and excises;--there is no limitation
to this power, unless it be said that the clause which
directs the use to which those taxes, and duties shall be
applied, may be said to be a limitation: but this is no restriction
of the power at all, for by this clause they are to
be applied to pay the debts and provide for the common
defence and general welfare of the United States; but the
legislature have authority to contract debts at their discretion;
they are the sole judges of what is necessary to provide
for the common defence, and they only are to determine
what is for the general welfare; this power therefore
is neither more nor less, than a power to lay and collect
taxes, imposts, and excises, at their pleasure; not only [is]
the power to lay taxes unlimited, as to the amount they
may require, but it is perfect and absolute to raise them in
any mode they please. No state legislature, or any power
in the state governments, have any more to do in carrying
this into effect, than the authority of one state has to do
with that of another. In the business therefore of laying
and collecting taxes, the idea of confederation is totally
lost, and that of one entire republic is embraced. It is
proper here to remark, that the authority to lay and collect
taxes is the most important of any power that can be
granted; it connects with it almost all other powers, or at
least will in process of time draw all other after it; it is the
great mean of protection, security, and defence, in a good
government, and the great engine of oppression and tyranny
in a bad one. This cannot fail of being the case, if we
consider the contracted limits which are set by this constitution,
to the late [state?] governments, on this article of
raising money. No state can emit paper money--lay any
duties, or imposts, on imports, or exports, but by consent
of the Congress; and then the net produce shall be for the
benefit of the United States: the only mean therefore left,
for any state to support its government and discharge its
debts, is by direct taxation; and the United States have also
power to lay and collect taxes, in any way they please.
Every one who has thought on the subject, must be convinced
that but small sums of money can be collected in
any country, by direct taxe[s], when the foederal government
begins to exercise the right of taxation in all its parts,
the legislatures of the several states will find it impossible
to raise monies to support their governments. Without
money they cannot be supported, and they must dwindle
away, and, as before observed, their powers absorbed in
that of the general government.

It might be here shewn, that the power in the federal
legislative, to raise and support armies at pleasure, as well
in peace as in war, and their controul over the militia,
tend, not only to a consolidation of the government, but
the destruction of liberty.--I shall not, however, dwell
upon these, as a few observations upon the judicial power
of this government, in addition to the preceding, will fully
evince the truth of the position.

The judicial power of the United States is to be vested
in a supreme court, and in such inferior courts as Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish. The
powers of these courts are very extensive; their jurisdiction
comprehends all civil causes, except such as arise between
citizens of the same state; and it extends to all cases in law
and equity arising under the constitution. One inferior
court must be established, I presume, in each state, at
least, with the necessary executive officers appendant
thereto. It is easy to see, that in the common course of
things, these courts will eclipse the dignity, and take away
from the respectability, of the state courts. These courts
will be, in themselves, totally independent of the states, deriving
their authority from the United States, and receiving
from them fixed salaries; and in the course of human
events it is to be expected, that they will swallow up all the
powers of the courts in the respective states.

How far the clause in the 8th section of the 1st article
may operate to do away all idea of confederated states,
and to effect an entire consolidation of the whole into one
general government, it is impossible to say. The powers
given by this article are very general and comprehensive,
and it may receive a construction to justify the passing almost
any law. A power to make all laws, which shall be
necessary and proper, for carrying into execution, all powers
vested by the constitution in the government of the United
States, or any department or officer thereof, is a power
very comprehensive and definite [indefinite?], and may,
for ought I know, be exercised in a such manner as entirely
to abolish the state legislatures. Suppose the legislature
of a state should pass a law to raise money to support
their government and pay the state debt, may the Congress
repeal this law, because it may prevent the collection
of a tax which they may think proper and necessary to lay,
to provide for the general welfare of the United States?
For all laws made, in pursuance of this constitution, are
the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state
shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or
laws of the different states to the contrary notwithstanding.--By
such a law, the government of a particular state
might be overturned at one stroke, and thereby be deprived
of every means of its support.

It is not meant, by stating this case, to insinuate that the
constitution would warrant a law of this kind; or unnecessarily
to alarm the fears of the people, by suggesting, that
the federal legislature would be more likely to pass the
limits assigned them by the constitution, than that of an
individual state, further than they are less responsible to
the people. But what is meant is, that the legislature of the
United States are vested with the great and uncontroulable
powers, of laying and collecting taxes, duties, imposts, and
excises: of regulating trade, raising and supporting armies,
organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, instituting
courts, and other general powers. And are by this clause
invested with the power of making all laws, proper and necessary,
for carrying all these into execution; and they may
so exercise this power as entirely to annihilate all the state
governments, and reduce this country to one single government.
And if they may do it, it is pretty certain they
will; for it will be found that the power retained by individual
states, small as it is, will be a clog upon the wheels
of the government of the United States; the latter therefore
will be naturally inclined to remove it out of the way.
Besides, it is a truth confirmed by the unerring experience
of ages, that every man, and every body of men, invested
with power, are ever disposed to increase it, and to acquire
a superiority over every thing that stands in their way.
This disposition, which is implanted in human nature, will
operate in the federal legislature to lessen and ultimately
to subvert the state authority, and having such advantages,
will most certainly succeed, if the federal government succeeds
at all. It must be very evident then, that what this
constitution wants of being a complete consolidation of the
several parts of the union into one complete government,
possessed of perfect legislative, judicial, and executive
powers, to all intents and purposes, it will necessarily acquire
in its exercise and operation.