Game Analysis of Government Information Disclosure and Citizen Participation in Environmental Risk
This paper studies the government's motivation about disclosing three types of environmental risk information,based on which the mechanism of citizen participation's promoting government disclosing environmental risk information is analyzed.The study shows that,without citizen participation,the government discloses the information of type I risk.On the other hand,the government never discloses the information of type II risk.Introducing the citizen participation however cannot push the government to disclose the information of type I risk.The government may choose to disclose the information of type III risk only if it convinces that the citizen participation occurs.As for the type II risk,the government discloses the environmental risk information and citizens take part in the former's decision-making only if the government assures the citizen participation occurs and citizens know the government will take measures to do with the risk at the same time.
Economic research on social capital usually finds that increments of social interaction improve health. Urban economists and planners naturally seek public projects that encourage residents to interact beneficially. Many such projects, such as public parks and playgrounds, beaches, policing and safety, local transportation, and improvements in shopping areas, can be expensive but it is likely that the city dweller tends to consider the expense only in general terms when voting whether to approve a tax increase. For this reason our approach here takes the insertion of such public goods as exogenous to the choice of the individual subject, maximizing his or her utility…