Corporate taxes and the location of intangible assets within multinational firms
Intangible assets, like patents and trademarks, are increasingly seen as the key to competitive success and as the drivers of corporate profit. Moreover, they constitute a major source of profit shifting opportunities in multinational enterprises (MNEs) due to a highly intransparent transfer pricing process. This paper argues that, for both reasons, MNEs have an incentive to locate intangible property at affiliates with a relatively low corporate tax rate. Using panel data on European MNEs and controlling for unobserved time–constant heterogeneity between affiliates, we find that the lower a subsidiary's corporate tax rate relative to other affiliates of the multinational group the higher is its level of intangible asset investment. This effect is statistically and economically significant, even after controlling for subsidiary size and accounting for a dynamic intangible investment pattern.
With the use of data and concrete examples, such as ::: a mini-case study, and a focus on the top 20 global players, this ::: thesis aims at tackling Capex issues in the telecom industry by ::: covering: – Uses, levels, inefficiencies in Capex management, ::: notably via insider perspective, and their impacts on capital ::: allocation; – Financing of Capex via debt and the recent ::: development of asset monetization; – Specific trends (NSA, VNOs) ::: and M&A in the telecom industry and their impacts on Capex, via ::: the case study of the French SFR-Numericable ::: transaction.