Delegative Dilemmas and Horizontal Logics: Subnational Industrial Policy in Spain and Brazil
Scholars of “decentralization” have recently revealed the importance of subnational industrial policy in responding to the challenges of globalization. But these treatments tend to make endemic assumptions about either the universal efficiency or inefficiency of decentralization. This article argues that subnational industrial policy performance is politically contingent and develops national patterns that are more composite than endemic. Political contingency is analyzed in terms of subnational incumbents' incentives to delegate authority and resources to industrial policy agencies and the degree of symmetry in authority and information flows across these agencies. A cross-regional/cross-national comparison of several subnational units in Spain and Brazil demonstrates that subnational industrial policy is implemented and maintained where incumbents delegate and policy-making agencies are symmetrically integrated.
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