Trust model in E-commerce based on ESS equilibrium
A new model for trust mechanism in E-commerce by introducing concept of ESS equilibrium, which includes a game-theory study of trust in E-commerce was provided, including a process of trust diffusion and its algorithm. The model finds that an incomplete credit system leads to prevalent distrust behaviors in E-commerce deals and some factors, like the number of traders choosing trust strategy, convenience of information exchange between traders and payoff difference between honest traders and dishonest traders, determine diffusion of trust in this business. The simulation experiment shows the model improves credibility and fidelity of the trust analysis for E-commerce trade through overcoming the existing shortcomings of static study. Finally, we suggested some policies including reinforcing trust incentives, increasing comparative advantage in payoff received by honest traders and investing more in information exchange technology, etc.
Comparing construction enterprises alliances to firm and market from contract features, we studies the risks of enterprises alliances, such as assets specialty and knowledge leakage risk. To ensure the stability of the alliances, Third-party guarantee mechanism is a suitable choice which is adopted on alliances.