Coordinating Supply Chain with Revenue-Sharing Contract Under Asymmetric Information
The problem how to coordinate the supply chain with revenue-sharing contract under asymmetric information is studied,with a new model developed relevantly.In this model,the supplier as the leader has the decision-making right for wholesale price and revenue-sharing proportion,while the retailer as the follower has just the right to conceal the information on marginal cost and determine the ordering quantity.Discusses the supplier's optimal revenue-sharing strategy in case the retailer conceals the marginal cost,with a comparative analysis made under symmetrical information at the same time.A numerical simulation is done and the result shows that the supplier's optimal revenue-sharing strategy to spur retailer will pay a price for the unobservability of retailer's private information and reduce his/her profit,while the retailer can gain from that.
With Shanghai stock exchange market as a research object, this paper studies the complexity of the stock exchange market using the cellular automata theory and model. With the fractal theory as a tool, the R/S method is used to compare the real and the simulated data, which verifies the validity of the simulation. In the CA model, with different initial values and rules, we can improve the study on complexity in the stork exchange market.