On the convergence of genetic learning in a double auction market
Abstract We study the learning behavior of a population of buyers and a population of sellers whose members are repeatedly randomly matched to engage in a sealed bid double auction. The agents are assumed to be boundedly rational and choose their strategies by imitating successful behavior and adding innovations triggered by random errors or communication with other agents. This process is modelled by a two-population genetic algorithm. A general characterization of the equilibria in mixed population distributions is given and it is shown analytically that only one price equilibria are attractive for the GA dynamics. Simulation results confirm these findings and imply that in cases with random initialization with high probability the gain of trade is equally split between buyers and sellers.
It is well known that economic globalization for enterprise merging frequently is inevitable, which is the basic premise for making decisions to evaluate enterprises. Therefore the enterprises must choose and use methods of valuation reasonably. However, traditional methods of valuation of target enterprise have flaws. In view of the fact, this paper has constructed a scientific valuation model of target enterprise based on options&game theory in hope of providing instructions for merging practice.