Interjurisdictional competition and the efficiency of the public sector: The triumph of the market over the state?
It has been argued in the literature that, interjurisdictional competition forces the public sector to increase its efficiency and thus helps to tame Leviathan governments. The paper addresses this hypothesis by means of a simple taxcompetition model with a Leviathan state. It is seen that the effects of increased factor mobility on the efficiency of the public sector are ambiguous. A calibration of the model shows that a reduction in public-sector efficiency is possible for parameter constellations which are not unrealistic.
Purpose – This paper reports research undertaken into the practices, processes and outcomes of joint commissioning at five English localities. This paper reflects on the implications of this study for the practice of joint commissioning.Design/methodology/approach – A case study approach to the research was adopted where the assumptions about what joint commissioning should deliver in five “best practice” sites. These hypothesised relationships about organisational processes, services and outcomes were then tested through the collection of primary and secondary data. Methods of data collection included an online tool based on Q methodology, documentary analysis, interviews and focus groups.Findings – Very little of what we found seemed to relate directly to issues of joint commissioning. Respondents often spoke of joint commissioning conflating it with issues of commissioning or joint working more generally. We found a variety of different definitions and meanings of joint commissioning in practice sugges...