What Makes Insurance Companies Voluntarily Share Proprietary Customer Information
Many markets, such as the insurance and credit markets, are characterized by information asymmetry between firms and their clients. A cornerstone of these markets are the information exchanges, which process and distribute the voluminous customer information that member companies report to them voluntarily. Such institutions greatly alleviate the problem of information asymmetry in the markets. This paper provides a novel game-theoretic explanation for why such voluntary information-sharing arrangements can be self-enforcing --- namely, why the information exchanges, organized as independent for-profit corporations, can count on insurance companies and banks to continue to report their private customer information to them.
With the use of data and concrete examples, such as ::: a mini-case study, and a focus on the top 20 global players, this ::: thesis aims at tackling Capex issues in the telecom industry by ::: covering: – Uses, levels, inefficiencies in Capex management, ::: notably via insider perspective, and their impacts on capital ::: allocation; – Financing of Capex via debt and the recent ::: development of asset monetization; – Specific trends (NSA, VNOs) ::: and M&A in the telecom industry and their impacts on Capex, via ::: the case study of the French SFR-Numericable ::: transaction.