A coalition proof equilibrium for a private information credit economy
SummaryThis paper examines an economy in which agents with private information about their own productive capabilities seek to raise capital to fund their investment projects. We employ an equilibrium concept which is closely related to Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium. In equilibrium, all agents who succeed in raising capital (entrepreneurs) are pooled; they all receive the same contract or consumption schedule. Entrepreneurs, however, are separated from those who fail to raise capital. This separation results in productive efficiency for the economy. If the economy has no viable alternative investment opportunity (other than agents' projects) then equilibrium allocations can be supported by a (non-intermediated) securities market. If there is a viable alternative, the equilibrium allocations cannot be supported by a securities market equilibrium. We interpret this case as suggesting the emergence of financial intermedary coalitions.
In this paper, we study the qualitative behavior of following open-access anchovy fishery model:    c x p y y y x d ax x v n n n n v n b n n    , where   , , , , , , , p v d c b a and the initial conditions 0 0 , y x are positive real numbers. More precisely, we investigate the necessary and sufficient condition for local asymptotic stability of the unique positive equilibrium point of this system. Some numerical examples are given to verify our theoretical results.