Occupational Safety and Health on the U.S.-Mexico Border
A number of trade agreements were adopted in the 1990s that promised economic growth for Mexico. The most significant was the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which promotes open trade between Mexico, the United States, and Canada. Like WTO, NAFTA focuses on the economic aspects of trade. Occupational safety and health issues were not specifically addressed by NAFTA. Despite the presence of domestic regulatory systems, concerns over working conditions persist on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border and the workforces face similar health problems. The upsurge in trade between the United States and Mexico must be accompanied by an international commitment to occupational safety and health in border areas. If government agencies cannot or will not intervene to reduce rates of workplace injuries and illnesses, civil coalitions must assume this role.
Abstract This study estimates the employment effects of industry-specific, collectively bargained minimum wages in Germany for two occupations associated with the construction sector. I propose a truly exogenous control group in contrast to the control group design used in the literature. Further, a difference-in-differences-in-differences estimator is presented as a robustness test for occupation-specific and/or industry-specific, time-varying, unobserved heterogeneity. I do not find a significantly negative employment effect, even though the minimum wage is binding in (East) Germany. Possible explanations include substitution effects, non-compliance and models of monopsonic competition.