Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: Even after Bin Ladin's departure from the area, CIA officers hoped he might return, seeing the camp as a magnet that could draw him for as long as it was still set up.
Sent 2: The military maintained readiness for another strike opportunity.
Sent 3: On March 7, 1999, Clarke called a UAE official to express his concerns about possible associations between Emirati officials and Bin Ladin.
Sent 4: Clarke later wrote in a memorandum of this conversation that the call had been approved at an interagency meeting and cleared with the CIA.
Sent 5: When the former Bin Ladin unit chief found out about Clarke's call, he questioned CIA officials, who denied having given such a clearance.
Sent 6: Imagery confirmed that less than a week after Clarke's phone call the camp was hurriedly dismantled, and the site was deserted.
Sent 7: CIA officers, including Deputy Director for Operations Pavitt, were irate."Sent 8: Mike" thought the dismantling of the camp erased a possible site for targeting Bin Ladin.
Sent 9: The United Arab Emirates was becoming both a valued counterterrorism ally of the United States and a persistent counterterrorism problem.
Sent 10: From 1999 through early 2001, the United States, and President Clinton personally, pressed the UAE, one of the Taliban's only travel and financial outlets to the outside world, to break off its ties and enforce sanctions, especially those relating to flights to and from Afghanistan.
Sent 11: These efforts achieved little before 9/11.
Sent 12: In July 1999, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Hamdan bin Zayid threatened to break relations with the Taliban over Bin Ladin.
Sent 13: The Taliban did not take him seriously, however.
Sent 14: Bin Zayid later told an American diploRESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 139 mat that the UAE valued its relations with the Taliban because the Afghan radicals offered a counterbalance to "Iranian dangers" in the region, but he also noted that the UAE did not want to upset the United States.

Output: Did Ben Ladin respond to the CIA?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: What group does the man claim to be affiliated with who says he hates foreigners?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: In what way did his fate turn?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: What two turns can the truck make that will affect his future?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: Why might Omar want Refsdal's face covered?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: What does Omar want the journalist to do and why?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: What does it mean if the truck turns right or left?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: Who did the Taliban kidnap in this story?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: What was the reason for kidnapping him?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: Did they drive or walk to the house?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: What was Norwegian journalist Paul Refsdal doing when contacted by the Taliban and what did they do?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: What are two forms of transportation Refsdal and the Taliban use to reach one of the villages?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: What difference did it is make if the pick-up truck made a left or right turn?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: Was he in more than one Taliban house?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: Was Refsdal kidnapped or was he an invited guest?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: How many Taliban commanders did he meet?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: What happened to Paul Refsdal in November 2009.?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: What is the name of the militant group driving the pick-up truck that Norwegian freelance journalist and kidnap victim, Paul Refsdal, is riding in?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: Why did Refsdal walk for several hours up a hillside on his way to meet the Taliban fighters?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: What is the terrorist group affiliation of the man who accused Refsdal of spying?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: (CNN) -- In November 2009, Norwegian freelance journalist Paul Refsdal is riding in a pick-up truck on a dusty track of Afghan road.
Sent 2: The Taliban have kidnapped him.
Sent 3: If the truck turns right, he knows he's being sold to another militant group.
Sent 4: A left turn means his kidnappers have decided to let him go.
Sent 5: His journey started when Refsdal, who wanted to document the daily lives of the Taliban, accepted the invitation of a Taliban commander to film him and his fighters.
Sent 6: Refsdal later accompanied another Taliban commander, Omar, to his hideout on a second embed.
Sent 7: As part of CNN's "Taliban" documentary, Refsdal talked with CNN's Anderson Cooper about going from invited guest to kidnap victim -- a harrowing experience that began the way it later ended, with Refsdal in a truck.
Sent 8: Here is an edited excerpt: REFSDAL: We rent a pickup truck and we drive into this valley that doesn't really have a road.
Sent 9: I'm told it is not possible to drive anymore.
Sent 10: We will have to walk for several hours up the hillside to one village, and we have to sneak a little bit.
Sent 11: Omar is very particular about I should cover my face.
Sent 12: I assume this is because they don't want informers to see that there's a foreigner coming.
Sent 13: And we sleep in a house, and everything seems OK. Then, the next day we are asked to go to another house, just 100 meters down the hillside.
Sent 14: We have to wait there, because they're going to have a meeting.
Sent 15: After a couple hours, one of the fighters comes and says he's from al Qaeda.
Sent 16: And he says that he has information that I was spying for the coalition, so both my translator and I will be executed tonight.
Sent 17: And he goes on, saying that we're going to be killed with a knife.
Sent 18: ... He explains how much he hates foreigners and he wants to eat the flesh of foreigners.

Output: What did the Norwegian freelance journalist want to do in Afghanistan?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: Rakal, her first officer, was staring pensively at his panel.
Sent 2: He was what this was all about.
Sent 3: She watched his graceful fingers ending in thick black claws tap out calculations on the panel.
Sent 4: His pointed ears swiveled back and forth, catching every sound from the bridge, while his long tail swished to the rhythm of his thoughts.
Sent 5: Only those of the Arrallin Insurrection inner team knew he was no common 'beta furry'.
Sent 6: His silken fur, which would be tawny golden and striped with jet black bands, was dyed perfectly to a pure black, and his mane trimmed and thinned as to be indistinguishable from the rest of his coat.
Sent 7: His eyes had been treated and darkened to a rich purple to disguise the brilliant golden yellow color that would mark him as an Alpha Arrallin, and leader of his hive.
Sent 8: Right now, he looked like an overgrown wolf who'd learned touch-typing.
Sent 9: The scout ship re-emerged from the hole - a brilliant speck emerging from a sphere of velvety blackness.
Sent 10: It's hail crackled across the comm, and Tara spun to retake her seat at the helm.
Sent 11: "Launch the second probe.
Sent 12: Won't Central be crushed to learn that another gateway has yielded little more than a class F planet and a white dwarf system.
Sent 13: Level 1 and 2 staffers should prepare to be briefed and move out.
Sent 14: This sounds like it's the one."Sent 15: The distinctive whuffle of pleasure rippled through the betas on the bridge, and Rakal let loose a small growl, as if to caution his charges against false hope.
Sent 16: They'd scouted twenty-seven gates so far, and none had turned up anything worth the Insurrection's time.
Sent 17: Tara would not let giddy hopes drag them onto a rock that would spell the end for the project, and the Arrallin species.

Output: Who was marked as an Alpha Arrallin?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: Rakal, her first officer, was staring pensively at his panel.
Sent 2: He was what this was all about.
Sent 3: She watched his graceful fingers ending in thick black claws tap out calculations on the panel.
Sent 4: His pointed ears swiveled back and forth, catching every sound from the bridge, while his long tail swished to the rhythm of his thoughts.
Sent 5: Only those of the Arrallin Insurrection inner team knew he was no common 'beta furry'.
Sent 6: His silken fur, which would be tawny golden and striped with jet black bands, was dyed perfectly to a pure black, and his mane trimmed and thinned as to be indistinguishable from the rest of his coat.
Sent 7: His eyes had been treated and darkened to a rich purple to disguise the brilliant golden yellow color that would mark him as an Alpha Arrallin, and leader of his hive.
Sent 8: Right now, he looked like an overgrown wolf who'd learned touch-typing.
Sent 9: The scout ship re-emerged from the hole - a brilliant speck emerging from a sphere of velvety blackness.
Sent 10: It's hail crackled across the comm, and Tara spun to retake her seat at the helm.
Sent 11: "Launch the second probe.
Sent 12: Won't Central be crushed to learn that another gateway has yielded little more than a class F planet and a white dwarf system.
Sent 13: Level 1 and 2 staffers should prepare to be briefed and move out.
Sent 14: This sounds like it's the one."Sent 15: The distinctive whuffle of pleasure rippled through the betas on the bridge, and Rakal let loose a small growl, as if to caution his charges against false hope.
Sent 16: They'd scouted twenty-seven gates so far, and none had turned up anything worth the Insurrection's time.
Sent 17: Tara would not let giddy hopes drag them onto a rock that would spell the end for the project, and the Arrallin species.

Output: What was the mission all about?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: Rakal, her first officer, was staring pensively at his panel.
Sent 2: He was what this was all about.
Sent 3: She watched his graceful fingers ending in thick black claws tap out calculations on the panel.
Sent 4: His pointed ears swiveled back and forth, catching every sound from the bridge, while his long tail swished to the rhythm of his thoughts.
Sent 5: Only those of the Arrallin Insurrection inner team knew he was no common 'beta furry'.
Sent 6: His silken fur, which would be tawny golden and striped with jet black bands, was dyed perfectly to a pure black, and his mane trimmed and thinned as to be indistinguishable from the rest of his coat.
Sent 7: His eyes had been treated and darkened to a rich purple to disguise the brilliant golden yellow color that would mark him as an Alpha Arrallin, and leader of his hive.
Sent 8: Right now, he looked like an overgrown wolf who'd learned touch-typing.
Sent 9: The scout ship re-emerged from the hole - a brilliant speck emerging from a sphere of velvety blackness.
Sent 10: It's hail crackled across the comm, and Tara spun to retake her seat at the helm.
Sent 11: "Launch the second probe.
Sent 12: Won't Central be crushed to learn that another gateway has yielded little more than a class F planet and a white dwarf system.
Sent 13: Level 1 and 2 staffers should prepare to be briefed and move out.
Sent 14: This sounds like it's the one."Sent 15: The distinctive whuffle of pleasure rippled through the betas on the bridge, and Rakal let loose a small growl, as if to caution his charges against false hope.
Sent 16: They'd scouted twenty-seven gates so far, and none had turned up anything worth the Insurrection's time.
Sent 17: Tara would not let giddy hopes drag them onto a rock that would spell the end for the project, and the Arrallin species.

Output: What was the second probe being sent out to find?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: Rakal, her first officer, was staring pensively at his panel.
Sent 2: He was what this was all about.
Sent 3: She watched his graceful fingers ending in thick black claws tap out calculations on the panel.
Sent 4: His pointed ears swiveled back and forth, catching every sound from the bridge, while his long tail swished to the rhythm of his thoughts.
Sent 5: Only those of the Arrallin Insurrection inner team knew he was no common 'beta furry'.
Sent 6: His silken fur, which would be tawny golden and striped with jet black bands, was dyed perfectly to a pure black, and his mane trimmed and thinned as to be indistinguishable from the rest of his coat.
Sent 7: His eyes had been treated and darkened to a rich purple to disguise the brilliant golden yellow color that would mark him as an Alpha Arrallin, and leader of his hive.
Sent 8: Right now, he looked like an overgrown wolf who'd learned touch-typing.
Sent 9: The scout ship re-emerged from the hole - a brilliant speck emerging from a sphere of velvety blackness.
Sent 10: It's hail crackled across the comm, and Tara spun to retake her seat at the helm.
Sent 11: "Launch the second probe.
Sent 12: Won't Central be crushed to learn that another gateway has yielded little more than a class F planet and a white dwarf system.
Sent 13: Level 1 and 2 staffers should prepare to be briefed and move out.
Sent 14: This sounds like it's the one."Sent 15: The distinctive whuffle of pleasure rippled through the betas on the bridge, and Rakal let loose a small growl, as if to caution his charges against false hope.
Sent 16: They'd scouted twenty-seven gates so far, and none had turned up anything worth the Insurrection's time.
Sent 17: Tara would not let giddy hopes drag them onto a rock that would spell the end for the project, and the Arrallin species.

Output: How had Rakal been disguised to prevent him from being recognized as a hive leader?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: Rakal, her first officer, was staring pensively at his panel.
Sent 2: He was what this was all about.
Sent 3: She watched his graceful fingers ending in thick black claws tap out calculations on the panel.
Sent 4: His pointed ears swiveled back and forth, catching every sound from the bridge, while his long tail swished to the rhythm of his thoughts.
Sent 5: Only those of the Arrallin Insurrection inner team knew he was no common 'beta furry'.
Sent 6: His silken fur, which would be tawny golden and striped with jet black bands, was dyed perfectly to a pure black, and his mane trimmed and thinned as to be indistinguishable from the rest of his coat.
Sent 7: His eyes had been treated and darkened to a rich purple to disguise the brilliant golden yellow color that would mark him as an Alpha Arrallin, and leader of his hive.
Sent 8: Right now, he looked like an overgrown wolf who'd learned touch-typing.
Sent 9: The scout ship re-emerged from the hole - a brilliant speck emerging from a sphere of velvety blackness.
Sent 10: It's hail crackled across the comm, and Tara spun to retake her seat at the helm.
Sent 11: "Launch the second probe.
Sent 12: Won't Central be crushed to learn that another gateway has yielded little more than a class F planet and a white dwarf system.
Sent 13: Level 1 and 2 staffers should prepare to be briefed and move out.
Sent 14: This sounds like it's the one."Sent 15: The distinctive whuffle of pleasure rippled through the betas on the bridge, and Rakal let loose a small growl, as if to caution his charges against false hope.
Sent 16: They'd scouted twenty-seven gates so far, and none had turned up anything worth the Insurrection's time.
Sent 17: Tara would not let giddy hopes drag them onto a rock that would spell the end for the project, and the Arrallin species.

Output: Why were the betas excited on the bridge?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Ladin's finances.
Sent 2: A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Sent 3: The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Ladin was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
Sent 4: The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
Sent 5: Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Sent 6: The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Sent 7: The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center.
Sent 8: Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
Sent 9: Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Sent 10: By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
Sent 11: The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis.
Sent 12: On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Sent 13: Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
Sent 14: Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
Sent 15: Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Output: WHERE DID THE FBI CONDUCT ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Ladin's finances.
Sent 2: A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Sent 3: The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Ladin was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
Sent 4: The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
Sent 5: Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Sent 6: The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Sent 7: The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center.
Sent 8: Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
Sent 9: Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Sent 10: By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
Sent 11: The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis.
Sent 12: On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Sent 13: Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
Sent 14: Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
Sent 15: Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Output: Which U.S. agency failed to connect the dots collected by a number of field offices concerning al Queda fundraising?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Ladin's finances.
Sent 2: A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Sent 3: The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Ladin was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
Sent 4: The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
Sent 5: Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Sent 6: The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Sent 7: The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center.
Sent 8: Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
Sent 9: Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Sent 10: By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
Sent 11: The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis.
Sent 12: On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Sent 13: Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
Sent 14: Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
Sent 15: Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Output: Was the Cia able to stop the flow of money, and what did they decide to do.?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Ladin's finances.
Sent 2: A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Sent 3: The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Ladin was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
Sent 4: The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
Sent 5: Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Sent 6: The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Sent 7: The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center.
Sent 8: Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
Sent 9: Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Sent 10: By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
Sent 11: The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis.
Sent 12: On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Sent 13: Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
Sent 14: Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
Sent 15: Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Output: WHAT OTHER SOURCES DID THE UNITED STATES FOCUS ON FOR OTHER SOUCES OF FUNDING?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Ladin's finances.
Sent 2: A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Sent 3: The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Ladin was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
Sent 4: The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
Sent 5: Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Sent 6: The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Sent 7: The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center.
Sent 8: Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
Sent 9: Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Sent 10: By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
Sent 11: The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis.
Sent 12: On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Sent 13: Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
Sent 14: Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
Sent 15: Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Output: What kept the U.S. government from being able to stop Bin Ladin's flow of money?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Ladin's finances.
Sent 2: A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Sent 3: The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Ladin was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
Sent 4: The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
Sent 5: Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Sent 6: The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Sent 7: The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center.
Sent 8: Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
Sent 9: Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Sent 10: By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
Sent 11: The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis.
Sent 12: On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Sent 13: Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
Sent 14: Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
Sent 15: Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Output: WHO WAS NOT ABLE TO FIND OR DISRUPT AL QUAEDA'S MONEY FLOW?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Ladin's finances.
Sent 2: A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Sent 3: The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Ladin was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
Sent 4: The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
Sent 5: Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Sent 6: The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Sent 7: The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center.
Sent 8: Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
Sent 9: Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Sent 10: By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
Sent 11: The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis.
Sent 12: On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Sent 13: Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
Sent 14: Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
Sent 15: Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Output: What was the new theory, and what did it if any conclusions were found?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Ladin's finances.
Sent 2: A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Sent 3: The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Ladin was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
Sent 4: The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
Sent 5: Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Sent 6: The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Sent 7: The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center.
Sent 8: Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
Sent 9: Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Sent 10: By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
Sent 11: The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis.
Sent 12: On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Sent 13: Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
Sent 14: Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
Sent 15: Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Output: What type of center did Clarke push funding for?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Ladin's finances.
Sent 2: A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Sent 3: The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Ladin was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
Sent 4: The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
Sent 5: Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Sent 6: The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Sent 7: The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center.
Sent 8: Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
Sent 9: Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Sent 10: By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
Sent 11: The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis.
Sent 12: On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Sent 13: Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
Sent 14: Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
Sent 15: Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Output: What did the FBI do after 9-11?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Ladin's finances.
Sent 2: A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Sent 3: The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Ladin was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
Sent 4: The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
Sent 5: Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Sent 6: The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Sent 7: The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center.
Sent 8: Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
Sent 9: Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Sent 10: By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
Sent 11: The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis.
Sent 12: On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Sent 13: Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
Sent 14: Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
Sent 15: Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Output: What different possible funding sources for Bin Ladin were considered?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Ladin's finances.
Sent 2: A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Sent 3: The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Ladin was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
Sent 4: The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
Sent 5: Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Sent 6: The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Sent 7: The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center.
Sent 8: Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
Sent 9: Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Sent 10: By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
Sent 11: The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis.
Sent 12: On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Sent 13: Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
Sent 14: Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
Sent 15: Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Output: WHEN DID THE U.S INTERAGENCY GROUP TRAVEL TO SAUDIA ARABIA?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Ladin's finances.
Sent 2: A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Sent 3: The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Ladin was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
Sent 4: The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
Sent 5: Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Sent 6: The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Sent 7: The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center.
Sent 8: Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
Sent 9: Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Sent 10: By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
Sent 11: The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis.
Sent 12: On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Sent 13: Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
Sent 14: Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
Sent 15: Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Output: Who were on opposite sides of the idea to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Ladin's finances.
Sent 2: A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Sent 3: The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Ladin was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
Sent 4: The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
Sent 5: Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Sent 6: The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Sent 7: The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center.
Sent 8: Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
Sent 9: Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Sent 10: By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
Sent 11: The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis.
Sent 12: On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Sent 13: Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
Sent 14: Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
Sent 15: Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Output: Where were field offices opened to investigate al Qaeda funding?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Ladin's finances.
Sent 2: A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Sent 3: The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Ladin was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
Sent 4: The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
Sent 5: Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Sent 6: The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Sent 7: The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center.
Sent 8: Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
Sent 9: Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Sent 10: By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
Sent 11: The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis.
Sent 12: On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Sent 13: Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
Sent 14: Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
Sent 15: Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Output: What type of center did Clarke push to establish before 9/11 to collect information related to terrorist funding?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Ladin's finances.
Sent 2: A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Sent 3: The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Ladin was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
Sent 4: The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
Sent 5: Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Sent 6: The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Sent 7: The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center.
Sent 8: Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
Sent 9: Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Sent 10: By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
Sent 11: The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis.
Sent 12: On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Sent 13: Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
Sent 14: Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
Sent 15: Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Output: What types of activities did the Treasury Department focus on while missing the boat on terrorist funding?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Ladin's finances.
Sent 2: A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Sent 3: The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Ladin was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
Sent 4: The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
Sent 5: Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Sent 6: The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Sent 7: The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center.
Sent 8: Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
Sent 9: Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Sent 10: By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
Sent 11: The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis.
Sent 12: On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Sent 13: Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
Sent 14: Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
Sent 15: Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Output: WHEN DID THE U.S GOVERNMENT TRY TO DEVELOP A CLEARER PICTURE OF BIN LADIN'S FINANCES?


Input:
Paragraph- Sent 1: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Ladin's finances.
Sent 2: A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances.
Sent 3: The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Ladin was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true.
Sent 4: The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators.
Sent 5: Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system.
Sent 6: The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows.
Sent 7: The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center.
Sent 8: Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources.
Sent 9: Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Sent 10: By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda.
Sent 11: The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis.
Sent 12: On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising.
Sent 13: Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud.
Sent 14: Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress.
Sent 15: Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Output: To what conclusion did this investagation conclude.?