The world is everything that is the case. 
 This is the first proposition of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. 
 The world is not composed of things, but of facts. 
 The above being the second proposition of the Tractatus, or a sub-proposition of the first, though I'm probably paraphrasing. 
 I haven't read the Tractactus. 
 Nor spelled it correctly. 
 I believe I gleaned that second proposition from wikipedia. 
 By which I mean the second sub-proposition. 
 Or rather the first sub-proposition of the first proposition. 
 It may also have been from another goodreads review of this book. 
 This book, incidentally, is definitively composed of facts, which I take to mean statements, rather than things. 
 As are Markson's later list-based anti-novels. 
 This is also a list-novel, but Markson has painstakingly built a world from his list of statements 
 Things, in this world, have a less definitive reality than statements, it would seem. 
 Is this also true of our world? 
 Wittgenstein was to regret and revise his original thoughts on this for reasons that may become clear to the reader. 
 To the presumed reader, a reader cannot be assumed. 
 Markson does not revise these thoughts but runs them out to bitter conclusion. 
 Here, statements appear to supersede things, even if such statement may be false. 
 Are false statements actually the case? If not, are they of the world? What if one believes them to be the case, or misremembers them. 
 It would seem that reality would be difficult to verify without outside corroboration. 
 What constitutes a reliable outside corroboration? 
 The last proposition, famously, although it is not contained within this novel, is something like: Of that which we cannot speak, we must be silent.