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<mask> (20 October 1935 – 23 July 2007) was a Congolese politician who served as Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo from June 1991 to August 1992. He was chosen by the 1991 National Conference to lead the country during its transition to multiparty elections, which were held in 1992. He was also the founder and President of the Union for Democracy and the Republic (UDR-Mwinda), a political party. From 1993 to 1997, he was President of the National Assembly, and he was again a deputy in the National Assembly from 2002 to 2007. Early life and political career

A member of the Lari ethnic group, <mask>, one of four children in his family, was born in October 1935 in Mankondi, a village located to the south-west of the capital Brazzaville, in the Boko District of Pool Region. After his primary and secondary schooling in Brazzaville, <mask> earned a Master's Degree in Law at the University of Nancy, after which he studied at the École Nationale d'Administration (ÉNA) in Paris, graduating in 1964. That year is also known as the "Blaise Pascal generation" at ÉNA.He was among only four Congolese citizens to have graduated from ÉNA. Former Togolese prime minister Edem Kodjo was a classmate of <mask> at ÉNA. <mask> began his professional career in 1964 as the first National Treasurer (Trésorier Payeur Général) in the newly independent Republic of the Congo, a position he held for five years. In this position, he rigorously managed the country's public funds. After this, he became director of the country's foreign investments in 1969 (Directeur General des Investissements) at the Ministry of Planning, remaining in that position until 1973. Two prime ministers also enlisted his help as an economic policy advisor under the government of Marien Ngouabi. <mask> married Ndambo Marie-Therese Laurentine on 4 February 1967, and with her he had seven children.He was elected to the board of governors at the African Development Bank in the Ivory Coast in 1976, and represented eight African countries: Congo, Cameroon, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Niger and Mauritania. He held that position for 7 years, before being elected to the board of governors at the World Bank in Washington, D.C. in 1983, where he met his colleague Nicephore Soglo. He remained at the World Bank until 1990. In the early 1990s, the Republic of the Congo was going bankrupt because of the loss of support from the Soviet Union after the collapse of Communism. This led to the emergence of a new generation of African leaders like Nicéphore Soglo in Benin, Alassane Ouattara in the Ivory Coast and <mask>. At the end of the Sovereign National Conference of 1991, the Conference elected <mask> as Prime Minister on 8 June 1991. As Prime Minister, he was given executive powers and placed in charge of directing the country's transition to multiparty elections in 1992.The National Conference additionally assigned the positions of Minister of Defense and Minister of Mines and Energy to <mask>. <mask>'s government was dominated by members of the Lari and Bakongo ethnic groups. Tensions between the government and the army led to a serious crisis in January 1992. It was alleged that, in order to gain control of the army, members of <mask>'s government spread rumors that the army was plotting a coup. Furthermore, in moves viewed as being directed against loyalists of President Denis Sassou Nguesso, <mask> appointed Colonel Michel Gangouo, who had been implicated in a 1990 coup attempt against Sassou Nguesso, as Secretary of State for Defense on 2 January 1992. He made further changes to the military command, which he said were intended to fight tribalism, in mid-January. The army strongly opposed these changes and demanded that <mask> reverse them.The Higher Council of the Republic (CSR), which was acting as the transitional parliament, judged that the coup rumors had been created by members of <mask>'s government and requested that <mask> accede to the army's demands. <mask> refused to dismiss Gangouo, however, at which point soldiers took over the international airport as well as state radio and television, fired on <mask>'s supporters, killing several, and called for <mask>'s resignation. <mask> went into hiding and called for international assistance. Gangouo then resigned from his position and <mask> appointed a new Minister of Defense who was supported by the army; however, he also placed himself in supreme command of the army. Municipal elections were held on 3 May 1992, and <mask>'s government was widely criticized for its handling of these elections. The CSR told <mask> to form a new, national unity government. Interior Minister Alexis Gabou was particularly criticized for his role in the elections, and the CSR asked that he be replaced.<mask> named a new and much smaller government on 21 May. The CSR also transferred responsibility for handling the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for later that year from <mask>'s government to an electoral commission. In the August 1992 presidential election, <mask> ran as a presidential candidate, placing fourth with 10.18% of the vote. He received his strongest support in Brazzaville and Pool Region, with 21.6% and 16.5% respectively. The transitional period ended with the swearing-in of the election winner, Pascal Lissouba, on 31 August 1992. <mask> founded a political party, the Union for Democracy and the Republic (UDR-Mwinda: Union pour la Démocratie et la République; Mwinda means light in the Lari language), which he headed for the rest of his life. In the 1993 parliamentary election, he was elected to the National Assembly as the UDR candidate in Boko constituency, becoming one of two UDR deputies in the National Assembly.On 22 June 1993, <mask> was elected as the President of the National Assembly, remaining in that position until 1997. During the political violence of 1993, <mask> requested and obtained a ceasefire from both parties involved in the conflict, President Pascal Lissouba and opposition leader Bernard Kolélas. After the June–October 1997 civil war, in which Denis Sassou Nguesso returned to power, <mask> remained in the Congo,  stating that he had nothing to fear from the Sassou Nguesso's leadership. He asserted that the Republic of Congo belonged to all Congolese nationals. After the war, he was a member of the National Transitional Council (CNT). On 24 September 2001, <mask>'s candidacy for the next presidential election was announced by the Alliance for Democracy and Progress (ADP), a grouping of parties that supported him. <mask> accused the government of fraud in the January 2002 constitutional referendum, claiming that the "No" vote had actually won, and said that if he won the presidential election, he would initiate a "new political order" with a peace pact to end political violence and would allow all exiled politicians to return.On 8 March 2002, two days before the presidential election on 10 March, <mask> withdrew his candidacy, accusing Sassou Nguesso of rigging the vote. He said that party members were not allowed to observe the voting process, that there were areas where half of the ballot papers omitted his name, and that he had requested that the election be delayed. In the May 2002 parliamentary election, <mask> was elected to the National Assembly as the UDR-Mwinda's candidate in Boko constituency; he won the seat in the first round with 59.65% of the vote. Due to his status as the oldest deputy, he presided over the National Assembly's first meeting of the new parliamentary term, at which the bureau of the National Assembly was elected, on 10 August 2002. In the National Assembly, he became President of the UDR-Mwinda Parliamentary Group on 24 August 2002. In addition to heading the UDR-Mwinda, <mask> was the chairman of a coalition of 11 political parties (Front pour une Commission Electorale independante), an assembly of political parties calling for transparency and independence in the management of all future elections. <mask> ran for re-election to the National Assembly in the 2007 parliamentary election, but was defeated in the first round, held on 24 June.Following an illness, he died in a hospital in Paris on 23 July 2007, aged 71. In a statement on 24 July, Sassou Nguesso described <mask>'s death as "a great loss for the Congolese nation" and praised <mask> for his service as Prime Minister from 1991 to 1992. <mask> was laid in state at the Parliament building, where politicians paid tribute to him and Sassou Nguesso bestowed a posthumous high honor on him, before being buried at his residence on 20 August. References

Prime Ministers of the Republic of the Congo
École nationale d'administration alumni
Presidents of the National Assembly (Republic of the Congo)
Members of the National Assembly (Republic of the Congo)
1935 births
2007 deaths
Union for Democracy and the Republic (Republic of the Congo) politicians
Nancy-Université alumni
People from Pool Department

masks:
André Ntsatouabantou Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
André Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
Milongo
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Milongo
Milongo


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<mask> (24 February 1888 – 10 June 1917) was an Australian amateur golfer. He won both the Australian Open and the Australian Amateur in 1908 and was runner-up in the Australian Amateur three times. He was killed in Belgium during World War I. Early life
<mask> was born on 24 February 1888 in Hampden road, Hobart, Tasmania, the son of Edward and <mask>,  Bowman. He had an older brother, Roy, and a younger brother, Bruce. Golf career
As a 15-year-old <mask> played at the 1903 championship meeting at Adelaide. In the Australian Amateur he scored 103 and 95 and was last of those who completed the two qualifying rounds.He also competed in the 1903 Tasmanian Amateur, finishing tied for sixth place, with rounds of 101 and 99. In 1904 he improved to fourth place in the Tasmanian amateur. He played in the inaugural Australian Open at The Australian Golf Club. He finished down the field but was in the top 16 amateurs who qualified for the Australian Amateur. His opponent forfeited in the first round and in the quarter-finals he lost a close match against Jim Howden, the eventual winner, by one hole. In October he played in the Victorian Amateur Championship at Royal Melbourne. He led after a first round 76 but faded, and finished the 72-hole event tied for fifth place.<mask> came close to winning the 1905 Tasmanian Amateur at Launceston. He led by three strokes after a morning score of 84 and came to the final hole needing 5 to win. However he took 7, for an afternoon score of 90, one behind the winner Howard Giblin who took the title for the third time. The 1905 championship meeting was held at Royal Melbourne. There was no separate match-play competition, the amateur championship being won by the leading amateur in the Open. <mask>'s 87 was the best amateur score of the first morning, although he dropped 9 strokes behind Michael Scott after an afternoon 93. However he was then disqualified for incorrectly placing his ball, after getting relief from casual water.<mask> moved to New South Wales in 1906 and didn't play in the Tasmanian Amateur in September. The 1906 championship meeting was held at Royal Sydney. <mask> didn't challenge for the open but finished high enough to qualify easily for the amateur championship, as one of the leading 16 amateurs. He reached the final, losing, 5 and 4, to Ernest Gill from Queensland, who had finished 11 strokes behind him in the open. In September 1907 <mask> returned to Tasmania to compete in the amateur championship. He had rounds of 75 and 84 to win by 7 strokes, his first big championship success. The 1907 championship meeting was held at Royal Melbourne and, as in 1905, the amateur championship was won by the leading amateur in the Open.An amateur, Michael Scott, won both events, with <mask> finishing fifth in the open and runner-up amongst the amateurs. Tasmania played in the interstate competition for the first time. They met Victoria in the semi-finals, losing all six matches. <mask> lost heavily to Scott in the top match, finishing 9 down over the 18 holes. The 1908 Australian championship meeting at The Australian Golf Club in Sydney was <mask>'s only major meeting of the year. The Australian Open was the first important event, played on Friday 10 and Saturday 11 July. <mask> led by 7 strokes after the first day, with two rounds of 75.New Zealand amateur Arthur Duncan was second, with Dan Soutar the leading professional a further two strokes behind. <mask> took 86 on the final morning and dropped three behind Duncan, who had a 76. In the final round <mask> took 75 to win the championship with a score of 311. Soutar had rounds of 79 and 76 to finish runner-up, three behind <mask>, while Duncan had a final round 86 to drop to third place. <mask>'s rounds of 75 were the best of the event until Michael Scott scored 74 in the final round. The leading 8 amateurs in the open qualified for the Australian Amateur, the first two rounds being played on Monday and Tuesday of the following week with the final on the Saturday. All matches were over 36 holes.<mask> had a 10 and 8 win over Leslie Penfold Hyland in the quarter-final, scoring an approximate 73 in his morning round. He met Scott in the semi-final, Scott having beaten Duncan at the 37th hole in the first round. <mask> led Scott by four holes after the morning round and won the match, 6 and 5. On the Thursday, before the final, <mask> played for New South Wales in the interstate competition. Playing Victoria, he played in the top match against Scott and lost by two holes, Victoria winning the match. In the final of the amateur championship <mask> met Neptune Christoe. <mask> was five up after the morning round and won the match, 10 and 8.<mask> played in the Victorian Amateur Championship in August 1909 at Royal Melbourne. The event was over 72 holes of stroke-play. <mask> was tied with Michael Scott after the first day, and still tied after three rounds. However Scott scored 83 to <mask>'s 91 in the final round, to win the championship, <mask> finishing runner-up. The championship meeting was held at Royal Melbourne in September. <mask> played for Tasmania in the interstate competition. Playing in the top match against New South Wales he beat Oscar O'Brien, Tasmania winning by 5 matches to 1.In the final against Victoria he beat Scott. His brother Bruce also won, but Victoria won the remaining four matches to retain the title. In the Australian Open <mask> finished fifth, 17 strokes behind Claude Felstead. He beat his brother in the semi-finals of the Australian Amateur and met Scott in the final. In the final <mask> won the last two holes to level the match but Scott won the 37th hole to take the title. In July 1910, <mask> and his brother Bruce played in the South Australian Amateur at Royal Adelaide, the venue for the championship meeting the following month. Bruce led the qualifying with <mask> third.<mask> beat his brother in the semi-final and went on to win the championship, beating Bill Gunson, 6 and 4, in the final. In the Australian Open, <mask> finished fifth, behind his brother who finished in third place. He reached the semi-finals of the amateur championship, losing to Jim Howden, 4 and 3, Howden having beaten his brother Bruce in the previous round. <mask> and his brother Bruce spent most of 1911 on a trip to Britain, leaving Melbourne at the end of February and returning there in mid-November. Their first big event was The Amateur Championship at Prestwick Golf Club. <mask> lost to Bernard Darwin at the last-32 stage. He finished in a tie for 6th place in Golf Illustrated Gold Vase after rounds of 73 and 83 at Stoke Poges.The 1911 Open Championship was held at Royal St George's at the end of June. There was no qualifying and the first two rounds were played over three days. <mask> scored 81 and 84 and missed the cut by three strokes. <mask> won a three-day amateur event at Peterhead Golf Club in July, beating James Shaw in the final. His brother Bruce had won another Aberdeenshire event at Cruden Bay the previous week. They brothers played in the Irish Amateur Open Championship at Portmarnock at the end of August, both losing at the last-16 stage. In 1913 the stroke-play qualification stage of the Western Australian Amateur was opened up to professionals, becoming the first Western Australian Open Championship.It was played at the Fremantle links on 28 August, nearly 30 players competing. In both 1911 and 1912, Norman Fowlie had led the stroke-play stage but in 1913 he was challenged by <mask>. <mask> won the Open with rounds of 77 and 78, three ahead of Fowlie who had rounds of 83 and 75. <mask> would go on to win the Western Australian Amateur as well. Played two days later, he beat Fowlie, 4 and 2, in the 36-hole final. The 1914 Western Australian championship meeting was again played on the Fremantle links in late August. Norman Fowlie reversed the result of the 1913 Western Australian Open, winning by three strokes from <mask>, with rounds of 80 and 77.<mask> and Fowlie also contested the final of the Western Australian Amateur, Fowlie winning again by 4 and 3. Later life
In 1906 <mask> left Tasmania for his brother Roy's sheep farm near Corowa in the south of New South Wales. He became a member of Corowa Golf Club. in early 1912 <mask>, together with fellow golfer Claude Felstead, started farming near Pingelly, Western Australia. They bought the Chybarlis farm, between the townships of Pingelly and Mooterdine, south east of Perth. <mask> enlisted in May 1915. He was killed in Belgium on 10 June 1917 during the Battle of Messines.His remains were not recovered and his name is recorded on the Menin Gate memorial nearby. Tournament wins
1907 Tasmanian Amateur
1908 Australian Open, Australian Amateur
1910 South Australian Amateur
1911 Peterhead Amateur Tournament (Scotland)
1913 Western Australian Open, Western Australian Amateur

Team appearances
Australian Men's Interstate Teams Matches (representing Tasmania): 1907, 1909
Australian Men's Interstate Teams Matches (representing New South Wales): 1908

References

Australian male golfers
Amateur golfers
Sportspeople from Hobart
Australian military personnel killed in World War I
1888 births
1917 deaths

masks:
Clyde Bowman Pearce
Pearce
Emmeline Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Pearce
Clyde
Pearce
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Pearce
Pearce
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<mask> (20 July 1927 – 5 April 2015) was a feminist economist. Her work covers many topics from childcare and gender issues to poverty and Social Security. Bergmann was a co-founder and President of the International Association for Feminist Economics, a trustee of the Economists for Peace and Security, and Professor Emerita of Economics at the University of Maryland and American University. History
Bergmann's parents and grandparents, fleeing anti-Semitism, immigrated to the United States from Europe in 1914. She was born in 1927 to a Romanian-born mother and Polish-born father in the Bronx. Her parents worked instead of finishing school, but they expected <mask> to adhere to the standards and traditions of American life and eventually go to college. At the age of five, she started formulating ideas about feminism, pursuing equality for men and women, because she wanted to be an independent person when she grew up, and that required money and equality.During the Great Depression, Bergmann developed a strong belief that the government should provide resources and help to individuals who faced uncontrollable circumstances or did not have the resources and knowledge to provide for themselves. Bergmann received a scholarship to Cornell University and majored in mathematics. While in college pursuing her love for “creating models of simple processes that might or might not resemble what goes on in the actual economy,” she discovered Gunnar Myrdal’s book An American Dilemma that told of the racial inequality in the South. Myrdal's book ignited an interest in race discrimination that eventually developed into a concern for sex discrimination and followed Bergmann throughout her career. After Bergmann graduated with a B.A. in 1948, the recession, discrimination against Jews, and workplace sex segregation made it difficult to find a job that was interesting. Bergmann took a job with the federal government in the New York Office of the Bureau of Labor Statistics where she fielded public inquiries; she was head of the inquiries unit after a year.A firsthand experience with the discrimination of a black employee at the Bureau of Labor Statistics illuminated how real and pervasive race discrimination was at the time. Harvey Purdy was the only black employee at the New York office and, when <mask> managed to get him promoted, he was demoted shortly after and the job was given to someone else. Bergmann received her Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1959 and developed an interest in computer simulated economics, realizing that economics should be based more on observation and field research than solely theorizing. Research and experience has led <mask>n to develop theories and ideas about government policy, the implementation of observation into economics, and racial and gender equality. Organizational involvement
During the Kennedy administration <mask> was a senior staff member of the President's Council of Economic Advisors and she was a Senior Economic Adviser with the Agency for International Development. She also served as an advisor to the Congressional Budget Office and the Bureau of the Census. In 1965 she joined the University of Maryland, teaching there until 1988.From 1988 until 1997 she taught economics at American University. Bergmann was also involved in numerous national and international organizations that promote advancement and equality. She served as chair of the American Economic Association Committee on the Status of Women in Economic Professions, and president of the Eastern Economic Association, the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics, the American Association of University Professors (1990-1992), and the International Association for Feminist Economics (1999-2000). Awards
<mask>n received the 2004 Carolyn Shaw Bell Award for increasing the status of women in economics and creating an understanding of how women can advance in the academic field. Ideas
Bergmann has made two main contributions to economics. First, she has argued that discrimination is a pervasive characteristic of labor markets. Second, she has argued against the traditional economic methodology of drawing conclusions from a set of unrealistic assumptions.Economics
Bergmann argues that “a lot of what is bad does come from capitalism, but that can be corrected by appropriate government regulations, and by the generous government provision of important services and safety nets. But a lot of what is good and indispensable comes from capitalism too”. Bergmann studied microsimulation at Harvard University with computer generated simulation that provided a model with equations of macrovariables constructed on analogies of microeconomics. She believes that microsimulation provides “rigor, realism, and an ability to incorporate complexities revealed by more empirical investigations into the workings of business.” In a class with Professor Edward Chamberlin at Harvard, Bergmann discovered that economic theory, regardless of its ingenuity or prevalence in the field, can actually produce a different picture of the economy than reality. It was in a market experiment in Chamberlin's class that Bergmann started to believe that economic theory needed to be influenced by actual observation of individuals. One of her personal views of economics is “that true anecdotes may well contain more valuable information about the state of things in the world than do economists’ theories, which are by and large nothing but (possibly untrue) stories made up by economists sitting in their offices, with no factual input whatever”. Bergmann holds that observation and empirical evidence can lead to theories that actually reflect human behavior instead of producing theories on paper that do not always work in reality.She argues that macroeconomics can fix many social problems and economic policy can be used to enhance the lives of individuals, but economists are too persuaded by political affiliation to work toward a common goal. Gender equality
<mask>n notes that equality of the sexes was not present throughout civilization – around there is an economic and social division of labor between men and women historically. Although there has been an influx of women into the labor market and men are performing a larger amount of household labor, there is still an economic division between men and women. Bergmann views the best and most feasible option for equality to be “high commodification” where many of the household tasks and childcare predominantly performed by women are outsourced to organizations and individuals. “High commodification” would include government subsidies for childcare and availability for stipends for married couples and single mothers. Bergmann believes that an increase in commodificaion alone cannot bring about equality, but there also needs to be “an end to discrimination in employment, highly competitive behavior by women, and extra resources from government for families who are raising children.”  Bergmann has a passion for gender equality and desires to see government provisions for equitable treatment of women in the workforce. Death
<mask>n died by suicide at her home in Bethesda, Maryland on 5 April 2015.She was a longtime member of the Hemlock Society and advocate for assisted suicide. She is survived by her son, David Martin Bergmann, and her daughter, Sarah Nellie Bergmann, as well as three grandchildren. Her husband, Fred H<mask>, a microbiologist at the National Institutes of Health, whom she married in 1965, died in 2011. The International Association for Feminist Economics reported via social media that they were "saddened to learn of the recent death of <mask>n" and urged people to honour her memory by donating to the Barbara Bergmann Fellowship Fund. Bibliography

Books

  (new ed: )

Book chapters

Journal articles

1965 - 1969

1970 - 1974

1975 - 1979

1980 - 1984

1985 - 1989

1990 - 1994

1995 - 1999

Reprinted as:

2000 - 2004

2005 - 2009

2010 - 2015

Other

  Pdf. See also
Economics education
Economic simulation
Feminist economics
International Association for Feminist Economics
List of feminist economists
Labor economics
Welfare economics

Further reading

List of articles:

References

External links
 Profile: Barbara Bergmann College of Arts and Sciences, American University
 Home page International Association for Feminist Economics (IAFFE)
Home page Feminist Economics journal
 2004 Carolyn Shaw Bell Award announcement Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics Profession (CSWEP)

1927 births
2015 deaths
American feminists
American people of Polish-Jewish descent
American people of Romanian-Jewish descent
Economists from New York (state)
Feminist economists
Cornell University alumni
Harvard University alumni
Jewish American scientists
Jewish feminists
People from the Bronx
Presidents of the American Association of University Professors
American women economists
21st-century American Jews
21st-century American women

masks:
Barbara Rose Bergmann
Barbara
Barbara
Barbara Bergman
Barbara Bergmann
Barbara Bergman
Barbara Bergman
Barbara Bergman
. Bergmann
Barbara Bergman


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<mask> (February 9, 1909December 20, 1994) was the United States Secretary of State from 1961 to 1969 under presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, the second-longest serving Secretary of State after Cordell Hull from the Franklin Roosevelt administration. He had been a high government official in the 1940s and early 1950s, as well as the head of a leading foundation. He is cited as one of the two officers responsible for dividing the two Koreas at the 38th parallel. Born to a poor farm family in Cherokee County, Georgia, <mask> graduated from Davidson College and was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University, where he immersed himself in English history and customs. After teaching at Mills College in California, he became an army officer in the war against Japan. He served as a staff officer in the China Burma India Theater, becoming a senior aide to Joseph Stilwell, the top American general. As a civilian he became a senior official in 1945 at the State Department, rising to the number three position under <mask>.He became Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs in 1950. In 1952, <mask> left to become president of the Rockefeller Foundation. After Kennedy won the 1960 presidential election, he asked <mask> to serve as secretary of state. <mask> was a quiet advisor to Kennedy, rarely making his own views known to other officials. He supported diplomatic efforts during the Cuban Missile Crisis and, though he initially expressed doubts about the escalation of the U.S. role in the Vietnam War, he became known as one of its strongest supporters. He was a favorite of President Lyndon Johnson after Kennedy was assassinated in 1963. He left the secretary role in January 1969 and taught international relations at the University of Georgia School of Law.Childhood and education
<mask> <mask> was born in a rural Cherokee County, Georgia. The <mask> ancestors had emigrated from Northern Ireland around 1795. His father Robert Hugh <mask> (1868–1944) had attended Davidson College and Louisville Theological Seminary. He left the ministry to become a cotton farmer and school teacher. <mask>'s mother Elizabeth Frances Clotfelter was of German and Irish extraction, She had graduated from normal school, and was a school teacher. When <mask> was four the family moved to Atlanta where his father worked for the U.S. Post Office. <mask> came to embrace the stern Calvinist work ethic and morality.Like most white Southerners, his family was Democratic; young <mask>'s hero was President Woodrow Wilson, the first Southern president since the Civil War era. The experience of poverty made him sympathetic to black Americans. As a 9 year old, <mask> attended a rally in Atlanta where President Wilson called on the United States to join the League of Nations. <mask> grew up on the mythology and legends of the "Lost Cause" so common to the South, and he came to embrace the militarism of Southern culture as he wrote in a high school essay that "young men should prepare themselves for service in case our country ever got into trouble." At the age of 12, <mask> had joined the ROTC, whose training duties he took very seriously. <mask> had an intense reverence for the military and throughout his later career, he was inclined to accept the advice of generals. He was educated in the best of Atlanta's public schools, graduated from Boys High School in 1925, and spent two years working for an Atlanta lawyer before working his way through Davidson College, a Presbyterian school in North Carolina.He was active in the national military honor society Scabbard and Blade, becoming a cadet lieutenant colonel commanding the Reserve Officers' Training Corps battalion. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa in 1931. While at Davidson, <mask> applied the Calvinist work ethic to his studies. He excelled and won a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford University. He studied international relations, taking an MA in PPE (Politics, Philosophy and Economics). He immersed himself in English history, politics, and popular culture, making lifelong friends among the British elite. <mask>'s rise from poverty made him a passionate believer in the "American Dream", and a recurring theme throughout his life was his often expressed pride in his nation, a place in which he believed that anyone, no matter how modest their circumstances, could rise up to live the "American Dream".<mask> married the former Virginia Foisie (October 5, 1915 – February 24, 1996) on June 9, 1937. They had three children: David, Richard, and <mask>. <mask> taught at Mills College in Oakland, California, from 1934 to 1949 (except during his military service), and he earned an LL.B. law degree at the Boalt Hall law school in 1940. Career prior to 1961
While studying in England as a Rhodes Scholar at St. John's College, Oxford, he received the Cecil Peace Prize in 1933. <mask>'s experiences of the events of the early 1930s decisively shaped his later views, as he told Karnow in an interview: I was a senior in college the year that the Japanese seized Manchuria and I have the picture still etched in my mind from the newsreel of the Chinese ambassador standing before the League of Nations, pleading for help against the Japanese attack. I myself was present in the Oxford Union on that night in 1933, when they passed the motion that "this house will not fight for king and country" ...So one cannot have lived through those years and not have some pretty strong feelings ... that it was the failure of the governments of the world to prevent aggression that made the catastrophe of World War II inevitable.Military in Southeast Asia
During the 1930s <mask> served in the Army reserves. He was called to active duty in December 1940 as a captain. He served as a staff officer in the China Burma India Theater. During the war, <mask> had authorized an air drop of arms to the Viet Minh guerrillas in Vietnam commanded by his future enemy Ho Chi Minh. At war's end he was a colonel, decorated with the Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster. State Department 1945-1953

<mask> returned to America to work briefly for the War Department in Washington. He joined the Department of State in February 1945, and worked for the office of United Nations Affairs.In the same year, he suggested splitting Korea into spheres of U.S. and of Soviet influence at the 38th parallel north. After Alger Hiss left State in January 1947, <mask> succeeded him (as director of the Office of Special Political Affairs), according to Max Lowenthal. <mask> was a supporter of the Marshall Plan and of the United Nations. In 1948, he supported the Secretary of State George Marshall in advising Truman against recognizing Israel, fearing it would damage relations with oil-rich Arab states like Saudi Arabia, but was overruled by Truman's legal counsel, Clark Clifford, who persuaded the president to recognize Israel. When Marshall was asked to explain why he did not resign over the recognition of Israel, he replied that the secretary of state did not resign over decisions made by the president who had the ultimate control of foreign policy. <mask>, who admired Marshall, supported his decision and always quoted the remark made by Truman: "The president makes the foreign policy". In 1949, he was made deputy undersecretary of state under <mask>, who had replaced Marshall as secretary of state.Assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs
In 1950, <mask> was made assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, at his own request, arguing that he knew Asia the best. He played an influential part in the US decision to become involved in the Korean War, and in Japan's postwar compensation for victorious countries, as shown in the <mask> documents. <mask> was a cautious diplomat and always sought international support. <mask> favored support for Asian nationalist movements, arguing that European imperialism was doomed in Asia, but the Atlanticist Acheson favored closer relations with the European powers, which precluded American support for Asian nationalism. <mask> dutifully declared it was his duty to support Acheson. French Indochina
When question arose as to whether the United States should support France in maintaining control over Indochina against the Communist Viet Minh guerrillas, <mask> argued for support of the French government, stating that the Viet Minh were just the instruments of Soviet expansionism in Asia and to refuse to support the French would amount to appeasement. Under strong American pressure, the French granted nominal independence to the State of Vietnam in February 1950 under the Emperor Bao Dai, which the United States recognized within days.However, it was widely known that the State of Vietnam was still in effect a French colony as French officials controlled all of the important ministries and the Emperor bitterly remarked to the press: "What they call a Bao Dai solution turns out to be just a French solution." In June 1950, <mask> testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "This is a civil war that has been in effect captured by the [Soviet] Politburo and, besides, has been turned into a tool of the Politburo. So it isn't a civil war in the usual sense. It is part of the international war ... We have to look at in terms of which side we are on in this particular kind of struggle ... Because Ho Chi Minh is tied with the Politburo, our policy is to support Bao Dai and the French in Indochina until we have time to help them establish a going concern." Korean War
In April 1951, Truman sacked General Douglas MacArthur as the commander of the American forces in Korea over the question about whether to carry the war into China. At the time, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, called war with China "the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy". In May 1951, <mask> gave a speech at a diner sponsored by the China Institute in Washington, which he had not submitted to the State Department in advance, where he implied the United States should unify Korea under Syngman Rhee and should overthrow Mao Zedong in China.<mask>'s speech attracted more attention than he expected, as the columnist Walter Lippmann ran a column reading "Bradley vs. Rusk", accusing <mask> of advocating a policy of unconditional surrender in the Korean war. For embarrassing Acheson, <mask> was forced to resign and went into the private sector as the director of the Rockefeller Foundation. Rockefeller Foundation
<mask> and his family moved to Scarsdale, New York, while he served as a Rockefeller Foundation trustee from 1950 to 1961. In 1952 he succeeded Chester L. Barnard as president of the foundation. Secretary of State

Selection
On December 12, 1960, Democratic President-elect John F. Kennedy nominated <mask> to be secretary of state. <mask> was not Kennedy's first choice; his first choice, J. William Fulbright, proved too controversial. David Halberstam also described <mask> as "everybody's number two".<mask> had recently written an article titled "The President" in Foreign Affairs calling for the president to direct foreign policy with the secretary of state as a mere adviser, which had Kennedy's interest after it was pointed out to him. After deciding that Fulbright's support for segregation disqualified him, Kennedy summoned <mask> for a meeting, where he himself endorsed Fulbright as the man best qualified to be Secretary of State. <mask> himself was not particularly interested in running the State Department as the annual pay for secretary of state was $25,000 while his job as director of the Rockefeller Foundation paid $60,000 per year. <mask> only agreed to take the position out of a sense of patriotism after Kennedy insisted that he take the job. Kennedy biographer Robert Dallek explained <mask>'s choice thus:

Kennedy tended to address <mask> as "Mr. <mask>" instead of <mask>. <mask> took charge of a department he knew well when it was half the size. It now employed 23,000 people including 6,000 Foreign Service officers and had diplomatic relations with 98 countries.He had faith in the use of military action to combat communism. Despite private misgivings about the Bay of Pigs invasion, he remained noncommittal during the executive council meetings leading up to the attack and never opposed it outright. Early in his tenure, he had strong doubts about US intervention in Vietnam, but later his vigorous public defense of US actions in the Vietnam War made him a frequent target of anti-war protests. Just as had under the Truman administration, <mask> tended to favor hawkish line towards Vietnam and frequently allied himself in debates in the Cabinet and on the National Security Council with equally hawkish Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. Vietnam and Laos
Against the criticism made by Edward Lansdale of the embassy in Saigon, <mask> defended the performance of the State Department, saying South Vietnam was a difficult assignment. On 9 March 1961, the communist Pathet Lao won a notable victory on the Plains of Jars, and a for a moment the Pathet Lao seemed on the verge of seizing all of Laos. <mask> expressed considerable disgust when he learned that neither side in the Lao civil war fought very hard, citing a report that both sides had broken off combat to go celebrate a water festival for ten days before resuming their battle.<mask>, who had much experience of Southeast Asia during World War Two, expressed much doubt if bombing alone would stop the Lathet Lao, saying it was his experience that bombing only worked with ground troops to hold the ground or advance. Military plans
The undersecretary of state, Chester Bowles, wrote to <mask> in late March 1961, saying he heard rumors that Cuban emigres were being trained by the CIA for an invasion of Cuba, which he asked <mask> to stop, saying it was against the rules of the Organization of American States. <mask> did not pass on the memo to Kennedy nor did he himself speak out against the Bay of Pigs invasion, even his own military experience had convinced him that a single brigade "did not stand a snowball's chance in hell" of toppling's Cuba's government. In April 1961, when a proposal to send 100 more American military advisers to South Vietnam to make a total of 800 appeared before Kennedy, <mask> argued for acceptance even as he noted that it violated the Geneva Accords of 1954 (which had the United States had not signed, but promised to abide by), which limited the number of foreign military personnel in Vietnam to 700 at a time. <mask> stated that International Control Commission consisting of diplomats from India, Poland and Canada which was supposed to enforce the Geneva Accords should not be informed of the deployment and the advisers "be placed in varied locations to avoid attention". <mask> favored a hawkish line on Laos. Kennedy decided otherwise, on the grounds that Laos had no modern airfields and there was a risk of Chinese intervention.<mask> opened the Geneva conference on neutralizing Laos and predicted to Kennedy that the negotiations would fail. <mask> continued his Rockefeller Foundation interest in aiding developing nations and also supported low tariffs to encourage world trade. <mask> drew the ire of supporters of Israel after he let it be known that he believed the USS Liberty incident was a deliberate attack on the ship, rather than an accident. Asian affairs
On March 24, 1961, <mask> released a brief statement saying his delegation was to travel to Bangkok and the SEATO nations' responsibility should be considered if peace settlements were not realized. In 1961, <mask> disapproved of the Indian invasion of Goa, which he regarded as an act of aggression against NATO ally Portugal, but was overruled by Kennedy who wanted to improve relations with India and who also noted the Portuguese had no other option but to be allied to the United States. Earlier in 1961, a major rebellion had broken out in the Portuguese colony of Angola,

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 which increased Portugal's reliance upon its largest supplier of arms, the United States. In regards to the West New Guinea dispute about the Netherlands New Guinea, <mask> favored supporting the NATO ally Netherlands against Indonesia as he saw Sukarno as pro-Chinese.<mask> accused Indonesia of aggression by attacking the Dutch forces in New Guinea in 1962 and believed that Sukarno had violated the United Nations charter, but was again overruled by Kennedy. In a case of realpolitik, Kennedy argued the Dutch had no choice, but to be allied with the United States, meaning they could be taken for granted whereas he was highly concerned that Indonesia, which he called "the most significant nation in Southeast Asia", might become communist. To improve relations with Sukarno, Kennedy decided to support the Indonesian claim to Dutch New Guinea; <mask> later wrote he felt "queasy" about the way that Kennedy sacrificed the Dutch to win over Indonesia and had strong doubts that the "consultation" scheduled to determine the future of the territory in 1969 would be a free and fair one. Middle East
President Nasser of Egypt was regarded as a trouble-maker in Washington owing to Egypt's alliance with the Soviet Union and his plans for a pan-Arab state that would of necessity require overthrowing the governments of every Arab state, most notably American allies such as Saudi Arabia. In the Arab Cold War between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, <mask> favored the latter. However, at the same time, <mask> argued to Kennedy to Nasser was a spoiler who wanted to play off the Soviet Union against the United States to get the best possible bargain for Egypt, and if he leaned in a pro-Soviet direction, it was because the United States refused to sell Egypt arms out of the fear that they might be used against Israel whereas the Soviets by contrast were willing to sell Egyptians any arms they wanted short of nuclear weapons. <mask> noted the United States still had significant leverage over Egypt in the form of the PL 480 law that allowed the United States to sell surplus American agricultural production to any "friendly nation" in the local currency instead of U.S. dollars.In Egypt, the government subsidized the sale of staple foods like bread at cost or below cost prices, and Egypt's growing population, which outstripped the capacity of Egypt's agriculture, required Egypt to import food. Nasser had become very dependent upon the PL 480 food sales to provide food at cost to his people, and moreover the Soviet Union could not hope to match America's food sales to Egypt. Nasser argued in exchange for PL 480 food sales that he would not start a war with Israel, saying for that for all his fiery speeches he promised to keep the Arab-Israeli dispute "in the icebox". <mask> argued that to Kennedy and later Johnson that they should resist congressional pressure to end the PL 480 food sales to Egypt, stating that ending the PL 480 sales would only push Nasser closer to the Soviet Union and end the leverage that kept the peace between Egypt and Israel. When Nasser sent 70, 000 Egyptian troops into Yemen in September 1962 to support the republican government against the royalist guerrillas supported by Saudi Arabia, <mask> approved of increased arm sales to Saudi Arabia, which were an indirect way of supporting the Yemeni royalists. In common with decision-makers in Washington, <mask> felt that the United States had to support Saudi Arabia against Egypt, but he advised Kennedy against pushing Nasser too hard, saying that it would only drive him closer to the Soviet Union. On October 8, 1962, a "Food for Peace" deal was signed with Egypt under the United States committed itself to sell at cost $390 million worth of wheat to Egypt for the next three years.By 1962, Egypt imported 50% of its wheat consumed from the United States and owing to the PL 480 law was some $180 million per year at a time when Egypt's foreign reserves were almost deleted owing to a heavy level of military spending. In May 1963, out of anger at being trapped in the quagmire of fighting a guerrilla war in Yemen, Nasser ordered Egyptian Air Force squadrons in Yemen to start bombing towns in Saudi Arabia. With Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the brink of war, Kennedy decided with the support of <mask> to throw America's weight on the side of Saudi Arabia. Kennedy quietly dispatched several U.S Air Force squadrons to Saudi Arabia and warned Nasser that if he attacked Saudi Arabia, the United States would go to war with Egypt. The American warning had its effect and Nasser decided that discretion was the better part of valor. Despite all the tension in American-Egyptian relations, <mask> still argued that it was better to keep the PL 480 food sales to Egypt going than to end them, maintaining keeping the Arab-Israeli dispute "in the icebox" as Nasser phrased it depended upon the United States having leverage over Egypt. Cuba
During the Cuban Missile Crisis he supported diplomatic efforts.A careful review by Sheldon Stern, Head of the JFK Library, of Kennedy's audio recordings of the EXCOMM meetings suggests that <mask>'s contributions to the discussions probably averted a nuclear war. Overthrow of Vietnam President Diem
In August 1963, a series of misunderstandings rocked the Kennedy administration when, in reaction to the Buddhist crisis, a policy proposal urging the overthrow of President Diem of South Vietnam was presented to Kennedy. He stated he would consider adopting it if <mask> gave his approval first. <mask>, who had gone to New York to attend a session of the United Nations, cautiously gave approval out of the impression that Kennedy had approved it first. When it emerged that was not the case, Kennedy assembled his foreign policy team for a stormy meeting at the White House, with several, such as McNamara, Vice President Lyndon Johnson, and CIA director John McCone, all speaking for standing with Diem, while others like the Undersecretary of State George Ball, W. Avrell Harriman and Roger Hilsman argued for deposing Diem. Much to Kennedy's annoyance, <mask> maintained a stony silence, refusing to take a side. At the end of the meeting, Kennedy exclaimed: "My God, my government is falling apart!"On August 31, 1963, the diplomat Paul Kattenburg reported from Saigon that public opinion in South Vietnam was overwhelmingly hostile to Diem, which led him to suggest it was time "for us to get out honorably". All of the assembled officials rejected Kattenburg's idea, with <mask> saying "we will not pull out ... until the war is won." <mask> reassigned Kattenburg from South Vietnam to Guyana. Poor relationship with President Kennedy
As he recalled in his autobiography, As I Saw It, <mask> did not have a good relationship with President Kennedy. The president was often irritated by <mask>'s reticence in advisory sessions and felt that the State Department was "like a bowl of jelly" and that it "never comes up with any new ideas". In 1963, Newsweek ran a cover story on the National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy under the title "Cool Head for the Cold War". The author of the story wrote that <mask> "was not known for his force and decisiveness" and asserted that Bundy was "the real Secretary of State".Special counsel to the president Ted Sorensen believed that Kennedy, being well versed and practiced in foreign affairs, acted as his own secretary of state. Sorensen also said that the president often expressed impatience with <mask> and felt him under-prepared for emergency meetings and crises. As <mask> recounted in his autobiography, he repeatedly offered his resignation, but it was never accepted. Rumors of <mask>'s dismissal leading up to the 1964 election abounded prior to President Kennedy's trip to Dallas in 1963. Shortly after Kennedy was assassinated, <mask> offered his resignation to the new president, Lyndon B. Johnson. However, Johnson liked <mask> and refused his resignation, He remained secretary throughout Johnson's administration. When Johnson died in 1973, <mask> eulogized him when he lay in state.Defending South Vietnam
In June 1964, <mask> met with Hervé Alphand, the French ambassador in Washington, to discuss a French plan for neutralization of both Vietnams, a plan which <mask> was skeptical about. <mask> told Alphand: "To us, the defense of South Vietnam has the same significance as the defense of Berlin." In response, Alphand stated: "The loss of Berlin would shake the foundations of Western security. On the other hand, if we were to lose South Vietnam, we would not be losing much." By contrast, <mask> argued that the Berlin issue and the Vietnam war were all part of the same struggle against the Soviet Union and the United States could not falter anywhere. Distrusting Robert Kennedy
<mask> quickly became one of Johnson's favorite advisers, and just before the Democratic National Convention the two had a discussion about Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who was angling to be Johnson's running mate, much to the president's discomfort. Both Johnson and <mask> agreed that Kennedy was "freakishly ambitious" with an obsessive desire to one day be president.<mask> told Johnson: "Mr. President, I just can't wrap my mind around that kind of ambition. I don't know how to understand it." Vietnam in 1964
Just after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, <mask> supported the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. On August 29, 1964, amid the ongoing presidential election, <mask> called for bipartisan support to ensure that the US's foreign policy have both consistency and reliability and said Republican presidential nominee Barry Goldwater was creating "mischief". The following month, at a September 10 press conference in the main auditorium of the State Department, <mask> said that Senator Goldwater's critiques "reflect a basic lack of understanding" of a U.S. President's handling of conflict and peace. On September 7, 1964, Johnson assembled his national security team to seek a consensus about what to do about Vietnam. <mask> advised caution, arguing that Johnson should embark on military measures only after diplomacy had been exhausted.In September 1964, <mask> grew frustrated with the endless infighting amongst South Vietnam's junta of generals and after a failed coup d'état against Nguyễn Khánh  sent a message to Maxwell Taylor, the ambassador in Saigon, on September 14, stating he was to "make it emphatically clear" to Khánh and the rest of the junta that Johnson was tired of the infighting. <mask> also instructed Taylor to say: "The United States has not provided massive assistance to South Vietnam, in military equipment, economic resources, and personnel in order to subsidize continuing quarrels among South Vietnamese leaders." Reflecting the general vexation with South Vietnam's chronic political instability in Washington, <mask> argued to Johnson: "Somehow we must change the pace at which these people move, and I suspect that this can only be done with a pervasive intrusion of Americans into their affairs." Increasingly, the feeling in Washington was if South Vietnam could not defeat the Viet Cong guerrillas on its own, the Americans would have to step in and win the war that the South Vietnamese had proved incapable of winning. On September 21, <mask> said the US would not be pushed out of the Gulf of Tonkin and that the prevention of it becoming a "communist lake" would be assured by the continued presence of American forces there. In September 1964, a peace initiative was launched by the UN Secretary General U Thant who tried to set up secret peace talks in his native Burma, which were supported by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev who pressured Ho Chi Minh to take part in the projected peace talks, saying he would only increase Soviet aid to North Vietnam if the North Vietnamese took part in a diplomatic effort to end the war first. U Thant reported to <mask> that the Soviet pressure seemed to be working as North Vietnam's other arms supplier, China, could not match the hi-tech weaponry that only the Soviet Union could supply.<mask> did not press on this information on Johnson, saying to take part in the planned talks in Burma would have signaled "the acceptance or the confirmation of aggression". In October, the peace initiative was ended by Khrushchev being ousted and his successor, Leonid Brezhnev, was not interestd in U Thant's plan. On 1 November 1964, the Viet Cong attacked the American airbase at Bien Hoa, killing 4 Americans. <mask> told Ambassador Taylor that with the elections occurring in less than 48 hours, Johnson did not want to act, but after the election there would be "a more systematic campaign of military pressure on the North with all implications we have always seen in their course of action". Nasser
On December 23, 1964, Nasser decided to up the ante in his relations with the United States by delivering a violently anti-American speech in Port Said in which called Iran "an American and Zionist colony" and claimed Johnson wanted to reduce Egypt to the status of Iran. Through Nasser was hoping that his speech might force the United States to reduce military aid to Saudi Arabia, it had the opposite effect. Johnson, who was more pro-Israeli than Kennedy had been, was furious with the speech.<mask> later recalled: "We didn't expect Nasser to bow, scrape, lick our boots, and say 'Thank you Uncle Sam', but we did expect to at least moderate his virulent criticism of the United States. Instead, he got up in front of those big crowds in Cairo and shouted such things as 'Throw your aid into the Red Sea!'" On January 5, 1965, Johnson suspended all PL 480 aid to Egypt, an action that immediately plunged the Egyptian economy into a crisis. Nasser realized what he had done and began to lobby for the resumption of PL 480 food sales, but got nowhere. Through Nasser knew the best way of ending the crisis was to pull out of Yemen and seek a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the United States, he instead turned towards the Soviet Union to seek support for the rapidly contracting Egyptian economy. Robert Kennedy undercuts <mask>
In April 1965, Senator Robert Kennedy during a visit to the White House advised Johnson to sack <mask> and replace him with Bill Moyers. Johnson at first thought this was a joke, saying that Kennedy's brother had appointed him Secretary of State, and was astonished to learn that Kennedy was serious.The president replied: "I like Bill Moyers, but I'm not about to remove <mask>." Vietnam in 1965
In May 1965, <mask> told Johnson that the "Four Points" presented by the North Vietnam premier Dong as peace terms were deceptive because "the third of those four points required the imposition of the National Liberation Front on all South Vietnam". In June 1965, when General William Westmoreland requested of Johnson 180, 000 troops to Vietnam, <mask> argued to Johnson that the United States had to fight in Vietnam to maintain "the integrity of the U.S. commitment" throughout the world, but also wondered aloud if Westermoreland was exaggerating the extent of the problems in South Vietnam in order to have more troops under his command. However, despite his doubts about Westmoreland <mask> in a rare memo to the president warned that if South Vietnam were lost "the Communist world would draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war". At another meeting, <mask> stated the United States should have committed itself to Vietnam more heavily in 1961, saying that if  U.S. troops had been sent to fight then, the present difficulties would not exist. <mask> came into conflict with his undersecretary of state, George Ball, about Vietnam. When Ball argued the governing duumvirate of Thieu and Ky in South Vietnam were "clowns" unworthy of American support, <mask> replied: "Don't give me that stuff.You don't understand that at the time of Korea we had to go out and dig up Syngman Rhee out of the bush where he was hiding. There was no government in Korea,

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 either. We're going to get some breaks, and this thing is going to work." <mask> felt that Ball's memos arguing that American involvement in the war should be seen by as few as possible. At meetings of the National Security Council, <mask> consistently argued against Ball. Britain will not send troops
In 1964 and again in 1965, <mask> approached the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson to ask for British troops to go to Vietnam, requests that were refused. The normally Anglophile <mask> saw the refusal as a "betrayal".<mask> told the Times of London: "All we needed was just one regiment. The Black Watch would have done it. Just one regiment, but you wouldn't. Well, don't expect us to save you again. They can invade Sussex and we won't do a damn thing about it." Shortly before his death, Adlai Stevenson, the American ambassador to the UN, mentioned in an interview with the journalist Eric Severeid the aborted peace terms in Rangoon in 1964, saying the UN Secretary General U Thant was disappointed that <mask> had rejected the terms. When Johnson asked <mask> about the matter, the latter replied that in diplomacy "there is a difference between rejecting a proposal and not accepting it", a distinction that maintained that U Thant had missed.Bombing pause discussed
In December 1965, when McNamara first told Johnson that the "military action approach is an unacceptable way to a successful conclusion" and urged him to pause the bombing of North Vietnam, <mask> advised the president that there was only a 1 in 20 chance that a bombing pause would lead to peace talks. However, <mask> argued for the bombing pause, saying "You must think about the morale of the American people if the other side keeps pushing. We must be able to say that all has been done." When Johnson announced the bombing pause on Christmas Day 1965, <mask> told the press "We have put everything into the basket of peace except the surrender of South Vietnam." Some of the language that <mask> included in his offer for peace talks seemed to calculate to inspire rejection such as the demand that Hanoi must publicly vow "to cease aggression" and the bombing pause was "a step toward peace, although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped." On December 28, 1965, <mask> sent a cable to Henry Cabot Lodge Jr, the ambassador in Saigon, presenting the bombing pause as merely a cynical exercise in public relations as he wrote: "The prospect of large-scale reinforcements in men and defense budget increases for the next eighteen-month period requires solid preparation of the American public. A crucial element will be a clear demonstration that we have explored fully every alternative but the aggressors has left us no choice."<mask> ordered Henry A. Byroade, the ambassador in Rangoon, to make contact with the North Vietnamese ambassador to Burma with the offer that the bombing pause might be extended if North Vietnam made "a serious contribution to peace". The offer was rejected as the North Vietnamese refused to open peace talks until the bombing raids were stopped "unconditionally and for good". Like the other newly independent states in Africa and Asia, the North Vietnamese were extremely sensitive to any violation, real or perceived, of their newly achieved sovereignty, and the North Vietnamese Politburo regarded the bombing as a major violation of their nation's sovereignty. In a way that the Johnson administration had much trouble understanding, the North Vietnamese felt to negotiate with the Americans reserving the right to resume the bombing would be to accept a diminution of their country's independence, hence the demand for an unconditional bombing halt. In January 1966, Johnson ordered the Rolling Thunder bombing raids to resume. France versus NATO
After President of France Charles de Gaulle withdrew France from the common NATO military command in February 1966 and ordered all American military forces to leave France, President Johnson asked <mask> to seek further clarification from President de Gaulle by asking whether the bodies of buried American soldiers must leave France as well. <mask> recorded in his autobiography that de Gaulle did not respond when asked, "Does your order include the bodies of American soldiers in France's cemeteries?"Fulbright hearings on Vietnam
In February 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chaired by Fulbright held hearings on the Vietnam War and Fulbright had called as expert witnesses George F. Kennan and General James Gavin, who were both critical of the Vietnam War. <mask> who served as Johnson's principle spokesman on Vietnam was sent by the president together with General Maxwell Taylor to serve as his rebuttal witnesses before the Foreign Relations Committee. <mask> testified that the war was a morally justified struggle to halt "the steady extension of Communist power through force and threat". Historian Stanley Karnow wrote the televised hearings were a compelling "political theater" as Fulbright and <mask> verbally dueled about the merits of the Vietnam war with both men pouncing on any weaknesses in the other's argument. 1966 hawks versus doves
By 1966, the Johnson administration had become divided between the "hawks" and the "doves", through the latter term was somewhat misleading as the "doves" within the administration merely favored opening peace talks to end the war as opposed to pulling out U.S forces from Vietnam. <mask> together with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle "Bus" Wheeler and the National Security Adviser Walt Whitman Rostow were the leading "hawks" while the leading "doves" was <mask>'s former ally McNamara together with Harriman. <mask> equated withdrawal from Vietnam as "appeasement", through at times he was willing to advise Johnson to open peace talks as a way to rebut domestic criticism that Johnson was unwilling to consider alternative ways to end the war.1967 deescalation
On April 18, 1967, <mask> said the United States was prepared to "take steps to deescalate the conflict whenever we are assured that the north will take appropriate corresponding steps". In 1967, <mask> was opposed to the Operation Pennsylvania peace plan flouted by Henry Kissinger, saying "Eight months pregnant with peace and all of them hoping to win the Nobel Peace Prize". When Kissinger reported that the North Vietnamese would not begin peace talks unless the bombing was stopped first, Rust advocated continuing the bombing, telling Johnson: "If the bombing isn't having that much effect, why do they want to stop the bombing so much?" <mask> family issues
<mask>'s support for the Vietnam War caused considerable torment for his son Richard, who was opposed to the war but who enlisted in the Marine Corps and refused to attend anti-war demonstrations out of love for his father. The psychological strain caused the younger <mask> to suffer a nervous breakdown and led to a break between father and son. <mask> considered resignation in the summer of 1967, because "his daughter planned to marry a black classmate at Stanford University, and he could not impose such a political burden on the president", after it became known that his daughter, Peggy, planned to marry Guy Smith, "a black Georgetown grad working at NASA". In response, the Richmond News Leader stated that it found the wedding offensive, further saying that "anything which diminishes [<mask>'s] personal acceptability is an affair of state."He decided not to resign after talking to McNamara and the president. A year after his daughter's wedding, <mask> was invited to join the faculty of the University of Georgia Law School, only to have his appointment denounced by Roy Harris, an ally of Alabama Governor George Wallace and a member of the university's board of regents, who stated that his opposition was because of <mask>'s interracial marriage. The university nonetheless appointed <mask> to the position. <mask> sees communists in peace movement
In October 1967, <mask> told Johnson that he believed the March on the Pentagon was the work of "the Communists", and pressed Johnson to order an investigation to prove it. The investigation was launched involving the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and military intelligence, and found "no significant evidence that would prove Communist control or direction of the U.S. peace movement and its leaders." <mask> said that the report was "naive" and that the agents should had done a better investigation. Vietnam and 1968 election
When Johnson first discussed dropping out of the 1968 election at a National Security Council meeting in September 1967, <mask> was opposed, saying: "You must not go down.You are the Commander-in-chief, and we are in war. This would have a very serious effect on the country." When McNamara advised Johnson in October 1967 to agree to North Vietnam's demand that the United States cease the bombing campaign as the precondition for opening peace talks, <mask> opposed the idea of a "bombing pause" as removing the "incentive for peace", and urged Johnson to continue Operation Rolling Thunder. By this time, many at the State Department were concerned by <mask>'s drinking on the job with William Bundy later saying that <mask> was a like a "zombie" until he started to drink. McNamara was shocked when he visited him at Foggy Bottom in the afternoon and saw <mask> open his desk to pull out a bottle of scotch, which he proceeded to drink in its entirety. Unlike the abrasive McNamara, who was widely disliked at the Pentagon, <mask> was sufficiently liked by his colleagues in the State Department that none leaked their concerns about his drinking to the media. On January 5, 1968, notes by <mask> were delivered to Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin, pleading support from the US to "avoid recurrence of" claimed bombing of Russian cargo ships in the Haiphong North Vietnam port the day prior.On February 9, <mask> was asked by Senator William Fulbright over his possible information in regards to a US tactical nuclear weapons introduction in South Vietnam report. Like other members of the Johnson administration, <mask> was shaken by the surprise of the Tet Offensive. During a news briefing at the height of the Tet Offensive, <mask> who was known for his courteous manner, was asked how the Johnson administration was taken by surprise, causing him to snap in fury: "Whose side are you on? Now, I'm the Secretary of State of the United States, and I'm on our side! None of your papers or your broadcasting apparatuses are worth a damn unless the United States succeeds. They are trivial compared to that question. So I don't know why people have to be probing for things that one can bitch about, when there are two thousand stories on the same day about things that are more constructive."However, despite his rage at the media who he felt were misrepresenting the war, he admitted to finding signs that public opinion was shifting against the war. He later recalled that during a visit to Cherokee County in February 1968 that people were telling him: "<mask> if you can't tell us when this war is going to end, well then maybe we just ought to chuck it." <mask> added "The fact was that we could not, in any good faith, tell them." Shortly afterwards, in March 1968 <mask> appeared as a witness before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chaired by Fulbright that was examining allegations that the Johnson administration had been dishonest about the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964. Fulbright made his sympathies clear by wearing a necktie decorated with doves and olive branches. Through <mask> handled well himself under the relentless questioning by Fulbright, the televised hearings were another blow to the prestige of the Johnson administration as it became very apparent to the viewers that a number of senators were now opposed to the war or were only lukewarm in their support. When Fulbright asked <mask> to promise Congress a greater say in the war, <mask> replied that Johnson would consult "appropriate members of Congress".When Senator Claiborne Pell asked if the war was worth all the suffering, <mask> charged that he was suffering from "moral myopia" about "the endless struggle for freedom". On April 17, during an American Society of Newspaper Editors luncheon meeting, <mask> admitted that the United States has taken "some lumps" propaganda wise but the Johnson administration should persist in trying to find a location of neutrality for the peace talks to occur. The following day, <mask> added 10 sites to the 5 proposed initially, accusing Hanoi of having a propaganda battle over neutral areas for discussion during a press conference. Just before the peace talks in Paris were due to open on 13 May 1968, <mask> advocated bombing North Vietnam north of the 20 parallel, a proposal strongly opposed by the Defense Secretary  Clark Clifford who stated it would wreck the peace talks. Clifford persuaded a reluctant Johnson to stick by his promise of 31 March 1968 of no bombing north of 20 paraellel. <mask> continued his advocacy of bombing north of 20 parallel, telling Johnson on 21 May 1968 "We will not get a solution in Paris until we prove they can't win in the South". During a meeting on 26 July 1968, Johnson briefed all three presidential candidates about the state of the war and the peace talks.<mask> who attended the meeting agreed with Richard Nixon's statement that bombing provided leverage in the Paris peace talks, saying: "If the North Vietnamese were not being bombed, they would have no incentive to do anything". When Nixon asked "Where was the war lost? ", <mask> replied: "In the editorial rooms of this country". On June 26, <mask> assured Berlin citizens that the United States along with its North Atlantic Treaty partners were "determined" in securing Berlin's liberty and security, additionally criticizing the recent travel restrictions of East Germany as violating "long standing agreements and practice". On September 30, <mask> met privately with Foreign Minister of Israel Abba Eban in New York City for discussion on peace plans from the Middle East. In October 1968, when Johnson considered a complete bombing halt to North Vietnam, <mask> was opposed. On November 1, <mask> said long term allies of the North Vietnam bomb halt should pressure Hanoi to accelerate their involvement in the peace talks in Paris.End of term
Nixon won the election and <mask> prepared to leave office January 20, 1969. On December 1, 1968, citing the halt of bombing in North Vietnam, <mask> said that the Soviet Union would need to come forward and do what it could to forward peace talks in southeast Asia. On December 22, <mask> appeared on television to officially confirm the 82 surviving crew members of the USS Pueblo intelligence ship, speaking on behalf of the hospitalized President Johnson. In the last days of the Johnson administration, the president wanted to nominate <mask> to the Supreme Court. Through <mask> had studied the law, he did not have a law degree nor had he ever practiced law, but Johnson pointed out that the constitution did not require legal experience to serve on the Supreme Court and "I've already talked to Dick Russell and he said you'd be confirmed easily." However, Johnson failed to reckon with Senator James Eastland, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, who was also a white supremacist and a supporter of segregation. Through Eastland was a fellow Southerner, he had neither forgotten nor forgiven <mask> for allowing his daughter to marry a black man.Eastland announced he would not confirm <mask> if he were nominated to the Supreme Court. On January 2, 1969, <mask> met with five Jewish American leaders in his office to assure them the US had not changed its policy in the Middle East of recognizing the sovereignty of Israel. One of the

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 leaders, the American-Israeli Public Affairs committee's Irving Kane, said afterward that <mask> had successfully convinced him. Retirement

January 20, 1969 marked <mask>'s last day as Secretary of State, and upon leaving Foggy Bottom he delivered a brief valedictory: "Eight years ago, Mrs. <mask> and I came quietly. We wish now to leave quietly. Thank you very much". At a farewell dinner hosted by Dobrynin, the longest-serving ambassador in Washington, <mask> told his host: "What's done cannot be undone."After the dinner, <mask> drove away in a modest car that barely seemed to be working, which Dobrynin considered to an apt symbolic end to the Johnson administration. Upon his return to Georgia, <mask> suffered from a prolonged bout of depression and suffered from psychosomatic illnesses, visiting doctors with complaints of chest and stomach pains that appeared to have no physical basis. Unable to work, <mask> was supported throughout 1969 by the Rockefeller Foundation who paid him a salary as a "distinguished fellow". On July 27, 1969, <mask> voiced his support for the Nixon administration's proposed anti-ballistic missile system, saying that he would vote for it, were he a senator, from an understanding that further proposals would be reviewed if any progress would be made in Soviet Union peace talks. The same year, <mask> received both the Sylvanus Thayer Award and the Presidential Medal of Freedom, with Distinction. Following his retirement, he taught international law at the University of Georgia School of Law in Athens, Georgia (1970–1984). <mask> was emotionally exhausted after 8 years as Secretary of State and narrowly survived a nervous breakdown in 1969.Roy Harris, a university regent who served as the Georgia campaign manager for the presidential campaign of George Wallace in 1968, tried to block <mask>'s appointment under the ostensible grounds "We don't want the university to be a haven for broken-down politicians", but in reality because he was opposed to a man who had allowed his daughter to marry a black man. However, Harris's vote was overruled. <mask> found that the return to teaching in 1970 and the resumption of the academic career he had abandoned in 1940 was emotionally satisfying. The other professors remembered him as being like a "junior associate seeking tenure". <mask> told his son "the students I was privileged to teach helped rejuvenate my life and make a new start after those hard years in Washington." In the 1970s, <mask> was a member of the Committee on Present Danger, a hawkish group opposed to détente with the Soviet Union and distrustful of treaties to control the nuclear arms race. In 1984, <mask>'s son Richard, whom he had not spoken to since 1970 owing to the opposition of <mask> fils to the Vietnam War, surprised his father by returning to Georgia from Alaska to seek a reconciliation.As part of the reconciliation process, <mask>, who had gone blind by this point, agreed to dictate his memoirs to his son, who recorded what he said and wrote it down into what became the book As I Saw It. <mask>'s memoir
In a review of his memoir As I Saw It, the American historian Warren Cohen noted that little of the acrimony of <mask>'s relations with McNamara, Bundy and Fulbright appeared, but that <mask> was unremittingly hostile in his picture of Kennedy's closest adviser and right-hand man, his younger brother Robert, together with the UN Secretary General U Thant. In As I Saw It, <mask> expressed considerable anger at the media's coverage of the Vietnam War, accusing anti-war journalists of "faking" stories and images that portrayed the war in an unflattering light. <mask> spoke about what he called the "so-called freedom of the press", as he maintained that journalists from The New York Times and The Washington Post only wrote what their editors told them to write, saying, if there were true freedom of the press, both newspapers would have portrayed the war more positively. Despite his hawkish views towards the Soviet Union, <mask> stated during his time as Secretary of State that he never saw any evidence that the Soviet Union planned to invade Western Europe and he "seriously doubted" that it ever would. Cohen noted that in contrast to his years with Kennedy, <mask> was warmer and more protective towards Johnson, whom he clearly got on better with than he ever did with Kennedy. In a review of As I Saw It, the historian George C. Herring wrote that the book was mostly dull and uninformative when it came to <mask>'s time as Secretary of State, telling little that historians did not already know, and the most interesting and passionate parts concerned his youth in the "Old South" and his conflict and reconciliation with his son Richard.<mask> died of heart failure in Athens, Georgia, on December 20, 1994, at the age of 85. He and his wife are buried at the Oconee Hill Cemetery in Athens. <mask> Eating House, the first women's eating house at Davidson College, was founded in 1977 and is named in his honor. The <mask> International Studies Program at Davidson College is also named in his honor. <mask> Middle School, located in Canton, Georgia, was named in his honor, as was <mask> Hall on the campus of the University of Georgia. Legacy
The consensus of historians is that <mask> was a very intelligent man, but very shy and so deeply immersed in details and the complexities of each case that he was reluctant to make a decision and unable to clearly explain to the media what the government's policies were. Jonathan Coleman says that he was deeply involved in the Berlin Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, NATO, and the Vietnam War.Typically he was highly cautious on most issues, except for Vietnam:

Regarding Vietnam, historians agree that President Johnson relied heavily on the advice of <mask>, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and national security adviser McGeorge Bundy to the effect that a communist takeover of all of Vietnam was unacceptable, and the only way to prevent it was to escalate America's commitment. Johnson took their conclusions and rejected dissenting views. <mask>'s son Rich wrote about his father's time as Secretary of State: "With this reticent, reserved, self-contained, emotionally bound-up father of mine from rural Georgia, how could the decision making have gone any differently? His taciturn qualities, which served him so well in negotiating with the Russians, ill-prepared him for the wrenching, introspective, soul-shattering journey that a true reappraisal of Vietnam policy would have involved. Although trained for high office, he was unprepared for such a journey, for admitting that thousands of American lives, and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, might have been lost in vain." George Herring wrote about <mask> in 1992: "He is a man utterly without pretense, a thoroughly decent individual, a man of stern countenance and unbending principles. He is a man with a passion for secrecy.He is a shy and reticent man, who as Secretary of State sipped scotch to loosen his tongue for press conferences. Stolid and normally laconic, he also has a keen, dry wit. He has often been described as the 'perfect number two,' a loyal subordinate who had strong—if unexpressed—reservations about the Bay of Pigs operation, but after its failure could defend it as though he had planned it." Summarizing the views of historians and political scientists, Smith Simpson states:
Here was a man who had much going for him but failed in crucial respects. A decent, intelligent, well-educated man of broad experience in world affairs who, early in life, evidenced qualities of leadership, seemed diffidently to hold back rather than to lead as secretary of state, seeming to behave, in important ways, like a sleeve-plucking follower of presidents rather than their wise and persuasive counselor. Media
Appearances
 Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited. Produced for The Idea Channel by the Free to Choose Network, 1983.Phase I (U1015) (January 22, 1983)
 Featuring <mask>, McGeorge Bundy, Richard Neustadt, Edwin Martin & Donald Wilson in Atlanta, Georgia. Portrayal in media
Secretary <mask> was portrayed by actor Larry Gates in the 1974 ABC television docudrama The Missiles of October, dramatizing the Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962. Actor Henry Strozier played Secretary <mask> in another dramatization of the Cuban Missile Crisis Thirteen Days (2000), a theatrical film directed by Roger Donaldson. Publications
 "U.S. Foreign Policy: A Discussion with Former Secretaries of State <mask>, William P. Rogers, Cyrus R. Vance, and Alexander M. Haig, Jr.". International Studies Notes, Vol. 11, No. 1, Special Edition: The Secretaries of State, Fall 1984.(pp. 10-20)

See also

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References

Further reading
 Cohen, Warren I. <mask> (1980). Colman, Jonathan. "The 'Bowl of Jelly': The US Department of State during the Kennedy and Johnson Years, 1961–1968". The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 10.2 (2015): 172–196. online
 Harrington, Joseph F. "'I Like Your Guts, and I don't have many People around here with Guts' The Relationship Between President John F. Kennedy and Secretary of State <mask> <mask> and its Impact on American Foreign Policy".New England Journal of History(Spring/Fall 2019), Vol. 75/76 Issue 2/1, pp 129-159. Henry, John B., and William Espinosa. "The Tragedy of <mask>". Foreign Policy 8 (1972): 166–189. in JSTOR
 Loewenheim, F. L. "<mask> and the Diplomacy of Principle} in The Diplomats, 1939-1979 (Princeton University Press, 1994). pp.499-536. online

 Nuenlist, Christian. "The quiet man: <mask> and Western Europe". Journal of Transatlantic Studies 6.3 (2008): 263–278. Schoenbaum, Thomas J. Waging Peace and War: <mask> in the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (1988). Snyder, William P. "<mask> to John Foster Dulles, May–June 1953: The Office, the First 100 Days, and Red China". Diplomatic History 7.1 (1983): 79–86.Stupak, Ronald J. "<mask> on international relations: An analysis of his philosophical perceptions". Australian Outlook 25.1 (1971): 13–28. Zeiler, Thomas W. <mask>: Defending the American Mission Abroad (2000). online

Primary sources
 <mask>, and Ernest K. Lindley. Winds of Freedom-Selections from the Speeches and Statements of Secretary of State <mask>, January 1961-August 1962 (1963). online
 <mask>, as told to <mask>.As I Saw It (1990), memoirs told to his son online review

External links

 "A conversation with <mask>, former U.S. Secretary of State (1961-1969)" Part of the American Diplomacy and The Lessons of Crisis: Vietnam and the Cold War collections online at Duke University

 Dean Rusk Oral History Collection, from the Richard B. Russell Library
 Interview for WGBH series, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age

 Oral History Interviews with <mask>, from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

 Sully, François, "<mask> with General Khanh, Harkins and Wheeler and Lodge touring Vietnamese highlands." (photo/caption), April 1964; copyright Healey Library, UMass Boston; via openvault.wgbh.org. 1909 births
1994 deaths
People from Cherokee County, Georgia
Military personnel from Georgia (U.S. state)
American Presbyterians
Georgia (U.S. state) Democrats
Georgia (U.S. state) lawyers
United States Secretaries of State
American people of the Vietnam War
American legal scholars
United States Army colonels
United States Army personnel of World War II
Davidson Wildcats men's basketball players
UC Berkeley School of Law alumni
University of Georgia faculty
American Rhodes Scholars
Presidential Medal of Freedom recipients
Recipients of the Legion of Merit
Presidents of the Rockefeller Foundation
Lyndon B. Johnson administration cabinet members
Kennedy administration cabinet members
20th-century American politicians
Honorary Knights Commander of the Order of the British Empire
Alumni of St John's College, Oxford
20th-century American lawyers
Under Secretaries of State for Political Affairs
United States Assistant Secretaries of State
Trustees of charities
American men's basketball

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