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<mask> (pseudonym Ikhorov, 1869–1942) – Russian professor, financier, economist, urban planning specialist, prose writer. Biography

Born in 1869 in a peasant family. He studied at a two-year folk school and showed such abilities there that teachers strongly advised and helped his mother arrange <mask> at the Chukhloma city school, and then he studied at the Kostroma gymnasium for a Susanin scholarship (1881–1889). After graduating from high school with a gold medal, he entered the law faculty of Moscow University. Under the leadership of professor I. I. Yanzhula engaged in economic sciences. After graduating from Moscow University with a diploma of the 1st degree, he was appointed in November 1893 as a junior candidate for judicial positions in the Moscow Court of Justice and from January 1894 left at the Department of Financial Law to prepare for a professorship. From March 1895 – privat-docent of Moscow University.In January 1896 he was sent on a scientific mission to Europe. In (Germany), England, France and Switzerland, he collected materials about the features of the development of tax systems and the basic principles of financial law, customs policy, the relationship of entrepreneurs and wage workers, the evolution of cooperation and so on. In 1898 he received a master's degree for his thesis "Income tax in England and the economic and social conditions of its existence". In February 1900 he defended his doctoral thesis "The main trends in the development of direct taxation in Germany in connection with economic and social conditions" and was appointed first extraordinary (1901), and since March 1903 – ordinary professor of the department of financial law of Moscow University. In the 1900s I. Kh. Ozerov won the reputation of one of the most respected Russian scholarlys – economists. Thanks to his lectures, Ozerov enjoyed the same respect and sympathy among the students of Moscow University (among his students and friends were the poets M. A. Voloshin and L. L. Kobylinsky).Ozerov had the idea of creating a Student Bank in Moscow to issue loans for education with the condition of repaying them after the end of the course, growing to its cliff: economic life waves are currently rising high, and it is necessary that a person know how to break away from cliffs in time, change places, adapt to new conditions, and here the state has major tasks – this is why the task of expanding the horizons of the population, the task public education plays a major role in the present". Ozerov was not a desk scientist, but a practical scientist, enthusiastic and tireless enlightener. "I, as the son of the working people, wanted to be useful, and, being raised at the expense of the people, climbing up through his shoulders, I wanted to be useful in spreading knowledge among him and awakening in him energy and creativity in economic life", –  he wrote. In 1901, he took part in the activities of the Moscow Society of Mutual Assistance of Mechanical Production Workers, created on the initiative of S. V. Zubatov. He organized popular lectures for workers in the Historical Museum in Moscow and drafted a charter for the Society. When it became known that the security department was involved in the creation of society, Ozerov did not give up lectures and convened something like an arbitration court of public figures, who found the lecturers useful. He told about his participation in the activities of the Company in detail in the book "Policy on the Work Issue in Russia over the past years".In the summer of 1907, <mask> was transferred to St. Petersburg University, while remaining at the same time a lecturer at Moscow University – was a private assistant professor at the faculty of law. He also taught at the Bestuzhev women's courses and at the highest women's courses of N. P. Raev in St. Petersburg, as well as at the Pedagogical Academy. In July 1911, he was again appointed an ordinary professor at Moscow University and headed the department of financial law until April 1917. At the same time, he was from October 1912 a supernumerary ordinary professor at the Moscow Commercial Institute, taught finance and a history of economic life and economics at the A. L. Shanyavsky Moscow city National University. Since 1914 – member of the legal test committee at Moscow University. Since 1909 – elected member of the State Council of the Academy of Sciences and universities. I. Kh.Ozerov spoke in many cities of Russia with public lectures. He took part in the work of various government commissions of the Ministry of Finance, trade and industry. With research and development goals going around Russia, getting acquainted with real production and banking activities, Ozerov gave entrepreneurs, engineers and accountants a wide variety of vital advice: "I saw that there was something to attach to the head torso or tail": so, he recommended that he buy a forest area in a paper mill so as not to depend on wood prices; cement plant – to build a driveway to use cheap Moscow region coals; Moscow Mayor – to use the coal burned in the mines near Moscow to light and heat the city. From January 1, 1914 – State Councilor; he was awarded the Order of St. Anne of the 2nd degree (1909) and the Order of St. Vladimir of the 4th degree (1912). In April 1917 he resigned from Moscow University. After the revolutionary year of 1917, the Ozerov, unlike many Russian bankers and entrepreneurs, did not follow in emigration and stayed in Russia, where he continued his scientific activities, in particular, he developed the concept of creating an agricultural bank, studied the financial problems of domestic and foreign trade, and studied the scientific organization of labor. In 1918, I. Kh.<mask> became the economic adviser to Hetman Skoropadsky in Ukraine. In 1919 he returned to Moscow. Lectured at the Industrial Institute. He served at the Institute for Environmental Research (since 1919), collaborated with the Financial and Economic Institute of the People's Commissariat of Finance. He taught at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Moscow State University (1920/1921); taught the course "Introduction to Financial Science". Cooperating with the Economist magazine of the industrial and economic department of the Russian Technical Society, he proposed effective, in his view, ways to get the country out of the chaos. In 1919–1921 he taught at the MFEU, taught the course "Fundamentals of Financial Science".In 1922, the possibility of expelling Ozerov on a "philosophical ships" was considered, but in the end the scientist was recognized as not dangerous. In 1927 he retired. He was arrested on January 28, 1930 and sentenced to capital punishment with the replacement of 10 years in prison. The whole of 1930 was in the Butyrka prison, then he served his sentence on Solovki and on the White Sea-Baltic Canal. In 1933, he was amnestied and he went to Voronezh, where his wife was exile. By a decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of June 19, 1935, his conviction was lifted and in 1936 he and his wife were settled in the Nursing House of Scientists in Leningrad. There Ozerov and died during the blockade of Leningrad; He was buried at Piskaryovsky cemetery.In St. Petersburg, in the Department of Manuscripts of the Public Library there are unpublished memories of Ozerov (F.541.Op.1.D..4). According to the conclusion of the USSR Prosecutor's office of January 21, 1991, it was fully rehabilitated. Economic views

At the beginning of the 20th century, I. Kh<mask> became famous for his numerous works on the modernization of the socio-economic and state system of Russia. Ozerov left behind more than 50 books, dozens of articles. <mask> was the author of the first and only before the revolution textbook "Fundamentals of Financial Science", which withstood five reprints. He is the author of the book "On the New Way.To the economic liberation of Russia, "" What does America teach us? "," The society of consumers. Historical sketch of their development in Western Europe, America and Russia "," Financial reform in Russia. Where does the state take money from us and what does it spend for them? "," The struggle of society and the state with bad working conditions "," The development of universal solidarity "," To fight against the people's darkness! " and others. He advocates, in particular, reforming the structure of the university social sciences teaching, the creation in classical universities of the faculties of economics, with the obligatory introduction of courses of national and world history, and the extensive professional training of management personnel for Russian industry and banking institutions.The main topics in the works of I. Kh. Ozerov were questions of the development of the domestic economy and the recovery of the financial system of the country. However, he paid no less attention to the problems of institutionalizing group interests, considering them in the context of changes in the economic life of Europe and the United States. His research echoed in general the theoretical developments of representatives of the German historical school (including in the analysis of specific historical and economic problems), as well as the findings of T. Veblen. Views on industrialization

Views on entrepreneurship and cooperation

Ozerov believed that "we need to create a new type of entrepreneur, with a broad outlook, on a large scale, with other methods" He spoke and wrote about the need to establish in Russia "an elastic social system that would give everyone the opportunity to develop their strength," advocated raising interest in science, raising "another generation with different heads and other habits," spoke in favor of switching from low-paid labor to highly paid. Ozerov was looking for more fair socially-organized forms of production and considered co-operation counter-monopoly. He believed that in a historical perspective, cooperation could make adjustments to the legal system, improve the budget, and reveal its potential.<mask> was the most consistent of the so-called consumer societies, capable of

masks:
Ivan Christoforovich Ozerov
Ivan
Ozerov
Ozerov
. Ozerov
Ozerov
Ozerov


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 uniting different classes, reducing or completely blocking social tensions that inevitably grow under capitalism. According to him, in the consumer society "people of different classes, estates <...> come together for a common cause, and they learn to appreciate each other and respect. The upper classes will not be so indifferent to the demands of the working class, and the workers, in turn, will become familiar with the production mechanism, marketing conditions, market influence on him, and will make practical demands". It is noteworthy that the Old Believers entrepreneurship relied on the ideas of Ozerov in their successful entrepreneurial activity. Views on state intervention in the economy

Ozerov was convinced that much depends on the government, that the far-sighted government will build Russia's economic well-being "on its natural foundation – the well-being of the Russian peasant. Otherwise, all this economic development will be ephemeral. " The economic life of Russia under Nicholas II reminded Ozerov "the life of a player depending on the harvest and crop failure".Ozerov emphasized that without a reversal of the general economic policy of the Stolypin agrarian reforms, which he hailed as a "creative" undertaking of the government of "great importance", "there can't be much confusion". Views on financial policy

Ozerov was outraged by the course of the Ministry of Finance, when huge sums were sent to the current accounts of foreign banks, feeding the foreign money market, instead of using these funds for the development of the national economy. Ozerov spoke out against setting up a wine-vodka foundation for the budget of agricultural Russia and called for "pumping up and pumping very energetically into the pockets of the population". The country has been practicing tax-paying taxation for decades – even for certain segments of the population. This, moreover, that the peasants had long been different in terms of property, and the landowners – who had become rich and who had gone bankrupt – and the heterogeneity of the trading brethren was clearly conspicuous. For years, Ozerov advocated the introduction of a differentiated (elastic) income tax, argued in the stimulating value of this innovation (long known in Europe and America) for the development of classes and economic life, for replenishing state coffers. Ozerov had his own ("non-partisan") program for the recovery of the Russian budget, which was mainly fed by consumption taxes.It provided for a redistribution of the tax burden in favor of the poor and a wider taxation of inheritances, review of official salary rates for senior officials, stopping the pernicious practices of unspoken budgets, strengthening the state control system and turning it into an effective force, nurturing conscientiousness with Russian taxpayers. In the book "How People's Money Is Spent in Russia" (1908), Ozerov writes:

Urban planning

In 1906 he published the book “Big Cities, Their Tasks and Management Tools”, becoming one of the founders of the theory of urban planning. Criticized Russian cities compared to European ones for backwardness of transport communications. Writing activities

At the beginning of the 20th century, under the pseudonym Z. Ikhorov published the artistic works "Confession of a Man", "Notes of a Suicide", "Songs of a Homeless Man". Commercial activity

In 1911, Ozerov was invited to the board of the Russian-Asian Bank A. I. Putilov. Then Ozerov in the "Russian Word" published an article about the speculation of Russian banks, for which all members of the board took up arms against him, and he was forced to leave the bank. Ozerov was a shareholder and board member of the Lena gold mines, the Erivan cement plant, the Tula land bank, the Khanzhonkov joint-stock company, the Russian paper-processing factory, the Sytin publishing house, the Lapshin match factory and others.offered I. D. Sytin cooperation for publishing his own newspaper in order to "gain influence on the formation of public opinion in our country", however, Sytin did not want to quarrel with the government, which gave orders for printing textbooks. Shortly before the February Revolution, Ozerov bought up the shares of the Erinsky cement plant for 105 rubles, and then sold them for 300, earning more than 1 million rubles. Lifestyle

I.Kh. Ozerov walked in the same clothes for years, did not chic in restaurants, traveled in second grade. However, this did not prevent him from giving in to various temptations: “he did not mind, in his words,“ drink and take a walk with ballerinas, ”he tried drugs, wrote screenplays for A. A. Khanzhonkov". In 1911, he bequeathed all of his capital to the economic education of the population, free distribution of millions of copies of his books and articles, "calling for creativity" in all villages, villages, parish governments, factories.In this act, he followed in the trail of a well-known entrepreneur-philanthropist Kh. S. Ledentsov, who was among the executors, fulfilling his testamentary will. Attitude towards revolutionary transformations

In 1915, Ozerov sharply criticized the current situation:

<mask>, more clearly than many (especially after the 1905 revolution), saw what misfortunes threatened Russia with the unresolved political, economic and social problems. The tsarist regime, he considered obsolete, barren, contrary to the interests of the country. In 1917, a scientist unflatteringly responded to the Provisional Government, whose ministers "did not argue about land reform, but about whether it was possible to allow meetings in the territory along which the trams pass and their rails run". In January 1918, Ozerov published in the newspaper "Our Time" an article entitled "Coming builders – cold and hunger." In it he writes:

Writings

Income tax in England and the economic and social conditions of its existence (1898; master's thesis);
"The main trends in the development of direct taxation in Germany" (1900; doctoral dissertation);
"What is a consumer society?How to establish and lead it "(St. Petersburg, 1896) – the gold medal at the World Exhibition in Paris (1900) and the prize of the law faculty of Moscow University;
"The results of the economic development of the XIX century" (St. Petersburg, 1902);
"Mail in Russia and abroad" (St. Petersburg, 1902);
"Factory committees and collective agreement" (Moscow, 1902);
"Consumer society. A historical sketch of their development in Western Europe, America and Russia. Brief Guide to the Foundation and Management of Consumer Societies "1st edition in 1894, 2nd augmented edition issued by" S. Dorovatovsky and A. Charushnikov "in 1899 with a circulation of 3200 copies. In 1909 it was reissued in an abbreviated form Sytin. "The development of universal solidarity" (Moscow, 1902);
"On the methods of studying financial science" (Moscow, 1903);
"America goes to Europe" (St. Petersburg, 1903);
"Sketches of the economic and financial life of Russia and the West" (2nd collection of articles, Moscow, 1904);
"Confessions of a person at the turn of the 20th century" (under pseudo. Ihor, M., 1904);
On the new path! To the economic liberation of Russia (Moscow, 1904)
"Financial right.Issue I. The doctrine of ordinary income "; issue II: “Budget, local finance, govt. credit ”(Moscow, 1905);
"The needs of the working class in Russia" (Moscow, 1905);
"Insurance of workers in Germany" (brochure). "Policy on the working question in Russia in recent years (according to unpublished documents)" (Moscow, 1906). "Financial Policy" (Oserow, I. Die Finanzpolitik. In: Melnik, J.(1906): Russen über Russland. Frankfurt a. M., Rütten & Loening, S. 208–250). The Russian Budget (1907);
"What does America teach us?" (1908)
"Mining plants of the Urals" (1910);
"Fundamentals of Financial Science" (university course; 4th edition, 1913. Ozerov I. Kh. Large cities, their tasks and management tools. With 15 diagrams (public lecture).– M., 1906. – 52 p.
Ozerov I. Kh. Basics of financial science. Budget. Forms of charging. Local finance. Credit / (reissue of 1906).– M .: YurInfor-Press, 2008. – 622 p. (inaccessible link)
Ozerov I. Kh. How are people's money spent in Russia? Criticism of the Russian expenditure budget and state control (according to unpublished documents). – M .: Type. T.-v. I. D. Sytin, 1908.– 305 p.
Ozerov I. Kh. Economic Russia and its financial policy at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century / Edition of DS S. Gorshkov. – M .: Type. t-va I. N. Kushnerev and Co., 1905. – 259 p.
I. Kh. From the life of work. Digest of articles.(Issue 1. Articles on the working question.) / D. S. Gorshkov’s publication. – M .: B.I., 1904. – 293 p.
Our higher school and life (for youth) // Journal "New Word" No. 1, 1914
Notes suicide (under pseudo. Ihor; M., 1911)
Songs of the homeless (under the pseudo.Ihor; M., 1912)

Modern edition

Ozerov I. Kh. How are people's money spent in Russia ?. – Society of Merchants and Industrialists of Russia, 2005. – 312 p. – (Economic history of Russia). Literature

Imperial Moscow University: 1755–1917: Encyclopedic Dictionary / Andreev A. Yu., Tsygankov D. A. .. – Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN), 2010.– p. 527—528. – 894 s. – 2 000 copies – . Volkov V. A., Kulikova M. V., Loginov V. S. Moscow professors of the XVIII – beginning of the XX centuries. Humanities and social sciences. – M .: Janus-K, 2006. – p. 180. – 300 p. – 2000 copies – .External sources
 М. Н. Барышников At the root of Russian institutionalism (from the creative heritage of I. Kh. Ozerov)
 M.N. Baryshnikov I. Kh. Ozerov: INSTITUTES, GROUP INTERESTS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY
 Evgeny Efimov Happy bitter life of <mask>v

References

1869 births
1942 deaths
20th-century Russian scientists
Russian economists
Recipients of the Order of St. Anna, 2nd class
Recipients of the Order of St. Vladimir, 4th class
Bankers of the Russian Empire
Members of the State Council (Russian Empire)
Economists of the Russian Empire
Soviet urban planners
Soviet rehabilitations
Victims of the Siege of Leningrad
Russian

masks:
Ozerov
Ivan Ozero


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<mask> (born 13 February 1981) is a Scottish former professional footballer and assistant manager of Grimsby Town

As a player, he was a defender who played from 1996 until 2015. He started his career with Queen of the South, where he made four appearances before being signed by Nottingham Forest in 1997. Having made 93 appearances for Forest, he was released in 2005. He joined Northampton Town, who he had previously played for on loan. In his first permanent season with Northampton, <mask> won promotion to League One before being released by the club in 2009. After spells abroad with Central Coast Mariners in Australia and Pelita Jaya in Indonesia, he returned to England with Aldershot Town in 2011. He then moved to York City, with whom he won promotion to League Two after playing in the 2012 Conference Premier play-off Final.He was released in 2013 before signing for Grimsby Town, where he later became assistant to Paul Hurst. He later followed Hurst to Shrewsbury Town and Ipswich Town to continue as his assistant. Club career

Queen of the South
Born in Dumfries, Dumfries and Galloway, Doig started his career with hometown club Queen of the South as an Associated Schoolboy. Graduating from Queen's youth programme, he played four league games for the side. Nottingham Forest
In 1997, <mask> joined Nottingham Forest in the club's youth system, going on to sign a professional contract on 7 March 1998. At Forest, Doig played 92 games scoring one goal against Rotherham United. He enjoyed a successful spell on loan in 2003 at Northampton Town.Northampton Town
Doig signed for former club Northampton on 30 June 2005 and finished his first season with 45 appearances and three goals, as the side earned promotion to League One as League Two runners-up. He was retained as club captain by Stuart Gray when he took charge on 2 January 2007, due to Scott McGleish, former club captain, being transfer listed. Shortly before the match against Huddersfield Town in April 2007, <mask> came third in the club's Player of the Year awards, behind Jason Crowe and Mark Bunn. Doig penned a two-year contract that would expire in 2009. Having made 32 appearances and scored 1 goal in the 2008–09 season, he was released by Northampton, with the side having been relegated to League Two. Central Coast Mariners
On 9 June 2009 he signed a two-year contract with the Central Coast Mariners of the Australian A-League. Pelita <mask> left the Mariners after no regular game time in the 2010–11 season.He then signed with Indonesia Super League side Pelita Jaya in February 2011. Aldershot Town
After returning from Indonesia, Doig played two pre-season games for Wycombe Wanderers. After not being offered a deal by Wycombe he joined League Two side Aldershot Town on a month-by-month deal on 8 December 2011. York City

After his deal with Aldershot ended, <mask> began a trial with former his club Northampton. He eventually signed for Conference Premier club York City on a contract until the end of the 2011–12 season on 2 February 2012. He made his debut in York's 1–0 victory at home to Ebbsfleet United in the FA Trophy third round on 14 February. He played in the 2–1 victory over Luton Town in the 2012 Conference Premier play-off Final at Wembley Stadium, seeing the club return to the Football League after an eight-year absence with promotion to League Two.Having finished the season with 15 appearances for York he signed a new one-year contract with the club in July 2012. <mask> started York's 2012–13 opening game away at League One Doncaster Rovers in the League Cup first round on 11 August 2012, which the side lost 4–2 in a penalty shoot-out following a 1–1 draw after extra time. He then played in York's first Football League fixture since their promotion, a 3–1 defeat at home to Wycombe Wanderers on 18 August 2012. <mask> finished the season with 16 appearances, before being released by York on 30 April 2013. Grimsby Town
<mask> signed for Conference Premier side Grimsby Town a one-year contract on 1 August 2013 as a player-coach, following a trial with the club. <mask> also took over as the club's reserve team manager. He made his debut in Grimsby's away fixture at Gateshead on 14 August 2013 and scored the winning goal in a 2–1 win, as he headed home from a Paddy McLaughlin cross.On 27 May 2014 <mask> signed a new contract as Grimsby's new player-assistant manager. International career
<mask> played for Scotland at schoolboy level before representing the under-18 team, making his debut as captain in a 3–0 defeat to France on 25 October 1999. He was capped again two days later to earn his second and last under-18 cap, with Scotland beating Armenia 2–1. <mask> made his under-21 debut less than a year later, coming on as a 63rd-minute substitute for Andrew Jordan in a 2–0 defeat to the Netherlands on 25 April 2000. His first start at under-21 level came in his next outing, which was a 1–1 draw with Northern Ireland on 29 May 2000. <mask> made his last under-21 appearance in a 3–1 defeat to Norway on 19 August 2003, meaning he finished his under-21 career with 14 caps. Coaching career
In 2014 <mask> was appointed as player/assistant manager at Grimsby Town under the stewardship of Paul Hurst.He later combined this role with managing the club's Reserve Team after he announced his retirement in the summer of 2015. When Hurst moved to League One side Shrewsbury Town in October 2016, <mask> was once again named as his assistant. <mask> later claimed he had no say on him or Hurst's departure from Grimsby to join The Shrews. <mask> added  "We got to the play-off places in League Two early in the season, then an offer came in for Paul to go to Shrewsbury, he went and I was included as part of the deal, and that’s the way it’s kind of gone. You’d need to ask Paul, but I think he knows I’m loyal and I’m honest, and I think he appreciates that. “When we’ve moved, it’s not really been a decision for me to make, it’s been made for me. When I left Grimsby, it was Paul that phoned me and said ‘a deal’s been done, we’re both leaving.When we both left Shrewsbury, Paul phoned me again, ‘deal’s done, we’re both going’. Nothing for me to decide really, I was included in things without having any real say as such." On 30 May 2018, <mask> joined Paul Hurst as assistant manager at Ipswich Town. However, <mask> the pair on 25 October 2018 after achieving one win in the opening 14 games of the 2018/19 season. In May 2019 <mask> followed Hurst once more to Scunthorpe United, but the pair were dismissed on the 30 January 2020 with the club struggling in EFL League Two. On 30 December 2020, Hurst and <mask> returned to Grimsby, signing 18 month contracts and replacing Ian Holloway who had resigned seven days earlier. Career statistics

Honours
Northampton Town
Football League Two runner-up: 2005–06

York City
Conference Premier play-offs: 2011–12

References

External links

1981 births
Living people
Sportspeople from Dumfries
Scottish footballers
Scottish expatriate footballers
Scotland youth international footballers
Scotland under-21 international footballers
Association football defenders
Queen of the South F.C.players
Nottingham Forest F.C. players
Northampton Town F.C. players
Central Coast Mariners FC players
Pelita Bandung Raya players
Aldershot Town F.C. players
York City F.C. players
Grimsby Town F.C. players
Scottish Football League players
Premier League players
English Football League players
National League (English football) players
A-League Men players
Liga 1 (Indonesia) players
Expatriate soccer players in Australia
Expatriate footballers in Indonesia
Scottish expatriate sportspeople in Australia
Scottish expatriate sportspeople in Indonesia
Grimsby Town F.C. non-playing staff
Shrewsbury Town F.C.non-playing staff
Ipswich Town F.C. non-playing staff
Scunthorpe United F.C. non-playing staff

masks:
Christopher Ross Doig
Doig
Doig
Doig
Jaya Doig
Doig
Doig
Doig
Doig
Doig
Doig
Doig
Doig
Doig
Doig
Doig
Doig
Doig
Doig
Doig
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<mask> was an Indonesian military officer, bureaucrat, and politician who served as the Mayor of Kupang from 1986 until 2007. Early life and education
<mask> was born in Surabaya, the capital of East Java, on 25 December 1945. He was the youngest child of L. Ch. P. <mask> and M. <mask>. He graduated from elementary school in 1957, junior high school in 1960, and senior high school in 1964. <mask> then attended the Animal Husbandry Faculty of the Udayana University, but dropped out several months later due to his interest in joining the Indonesian Army. He entered the Officer Candidate School in Cimahi after he dropped out and became a non-commissioned officer in 1965.Military career
<mask>'s first deployment in the military was in Kupang, where he became a section officer at the Wirasakti (East Nusa Tenggara) Military Resort Command. <mask> was rotated from his post two years later in 1967 and held the same position at the Belu Military District. <mask> returned to Kupang after three years and was put in command of a platoon in the city. As with other members of the armed forces at that time, <mask> joined the Golkar political organization after attending an indoctrination course held by Golkar in 1971. After holding command of a platoon in Kupang, <mask> underwent several other assignments in Kupang until 1980. He moved to Bali that year and became an officer at the Udayana Military Regional Command. He was reassigned in 1981 and became an assistant officer for American and European affairs in the army headquarters for three years.Speaker of the Kupang Regional People's Representative Council
Following his service in the army for two decades, <mask> became an appointee from the Armed Forces to the Kupang Regional People's Representative Council. He was elected as the council's speaker and installed on 12 August 1984. Several years before the end of his speakership, <mask> was promoted from the rank of major to lieutenant colonel on 1 April 1986. He resigned from the speaker's office following his appointment as a mayor. Administrative Mayor of Kupang
<mask> became the administrative mayor of Kupang on 26 May 1986, replacing Messakh Amalo who had served as mayor since the city's formation in 1978. <mask> undertook several courses during this period, such as a course on national alert held by the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1988 and a course on city management in 1996. Works
<mask>'s early years as administrative mayor saw him focusing on resolving the city's hygiene problem.He also took steps to improve the city's layout by constructing various monuments and statues. He also set up additional street lamps around Kupang, with emphasis around the Solor and Lahi Lai Bessi Kopam subdistrict. He instructed a mass plantation of various trees all over Kupang in order to freshen up the city's arid and dry climate. <mask> conducted a review of the city's spatial planning legislation. He stated that most of the land which was initially intended as an open space in the city had hundreds of houses, markets, and public facilities build over it. <mask> then put forward a proposal to demolish the buildings but stated that he would observe the situation before starting the demolition process. The provincial government formed a team led by the Chairman of the Provincial Development Planning Agency S. Therik to research solutions for the problem.The team approved <mask>'s plan to demolish the buildings and the process began on 4 March 1992. However, the demolition was reduced in scope to just 58 buildings that had no permits. The demolition process of a particular building, the partially finished Timor Beach Hotel, was personally led by <mask> and the regent of Kupang, Paul Lawarihi. Despite the development during his term as administrative mayor, Lerik still failed to resolve water shortage, a problem that has plagued the city since its formation. Although the city has an abundant supply of water during rainfall, water supply often declined sharply during the dry season. As a result of this, the city often experienced clean water crises, with one of the worst occurring during <mask>'s term from September to November 1990. City status
Kupang was an administrative city during this period, meaning that the city has no legislative body and the mayor is responsible to its parent region's government instead of the provincial government.<mask> pushed to elevate the city's status into an autonomous city during his term and his efforts finally bore fruit after the Regional Autonomy Advisory Council listed the city as one of the cities that would be made autonomous. Preparations for the status upgrade began in February 1996, and a group of parliamentarians from the armed forces and Golkar conducted an inspection into the preparation process that month. The city officially became autonomous with the enactment of law regarding Kupang's status on 11 April 1996. <mask> became the city's first mayor in an acting capacity and he was sworn into office on 25 April 1996. Mayor of Kupang

Election
After having an acting mayor for about a year, the city council decided to hold an internal election to choose a definitive mayor who would serve for a five-year term. The election was held at the end of March 1997 and saw <mask> winning with 15 out of 19 city council members voting in favor of him. <mask> was installed on 23 April 1997 by Minister of Home Affairs Yogie Suardi Memet.As <mask>'s first mayoral term was about to end, the city council began preparations to elect a new mayor. <mask> was nominated by the Golkar and the armed forces to serve for a second term as mayor, with bureaucrat Daniel Adoe as his running mate. The election, which was conducted on 23 March 2002, was held in three separate rounds. In the final round, <mask> and Adoe became the winner with 16 out of 30 city council members voting in favor of him. <mask>'s second-term victory became the subject of dispute when a city council member named Ferdinand "Ferry" A. T. Nonna resigned several hours after the election commenced. Ferry admitted that he had been bribed ten million rupiahs by an associate of <mask> and Adoe and that he resigned as part of his moral responsibility. Edwin Fanggidae, the chairman of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle — the nominator of Lerik's opponent — branch in Kupang, stated that he had formed a team to investigate fraud allegations in the elections.Due to this dispute, <mask>'s inauguration was delayed, and he kept serving as mayor in an acting capacity. The results were confirmed several months later and <mask> was sworn in for a second term on 6 July 2002. <mask>'s 21-year rule over the city finally ended on 6 July 2007 and Governor Piet Alexander Tallo became the acting mayor for about a month. 1998 riots
A few months after he was sworn into office, a religious riot occurred in Kupang. The riot was sparked after a group of people provoked masses standing in front of Kupang's main mosque, the At-Taqwa mosque. The provocateurs urged the masses to take revenge against church arsons by Muslims in Jakarta and Ketapang. The mob then set fire and ransack Bugis — a Muslim-majority ethnic — neighborhoods, markets, and kiosks.Eventually, several other larger buildings such as Muhammadiyah University, the Religious Bureau office, and several mosques, were also arsoned. As a result, transportation in Kupang went into a halt, with Kupang's main airport El Tari Airport being closed to prevent rioters from coming in and several ferry routes from Kupang being cancelled by port authorities. Access to main roads in Kupang were closed, food supply in the city began to decrease due to the closing of markets and neighborhoods in Kupang began organizing community patrol to prevent further riots. Lerik condemned the riots, stating that the riots was the worst incident the city had ever seen, and urged the responsible authorities to prosecuted the rioters. Corruption and nepotism
<mask>'s longevity in office was credited for his strong control of Kupang's civil service. Sylvia Tidey, an anthropologist from the University of Virginia, argued that Lerik was the manifestation of Bapakisme ("Fatherism") governance system that combined "strict authoritarianism with the clientelist dispersion of formal and informal favors to loyal subordinates". Most of Lerik's civilian appointment was based on relations and favoritism instead of merits and achievement.An example of this could be seen in <mask>'s choice for the city secretary post — the third highest office in the city, Jonas Salean. Although Salean placed lowest in a competency test for the office, and lacking in skill, authority and seniority, <mask> appointed him for the office nonetheless. <mask> made Salean as one of his cronies, and eventually his "corruption friend" and "collusion friend". According to longtime civil servants in the city, <mask> was often seen to have bypassed Adoe — who was not part of Lerik's inner circle — in favor of Salean in decision making processes. Family
<mask> was married to Maria Louisa <mask> Adu during his service in Belu on 3 August 1969. The couple has four children, namely M. Dinah Charlota, Viktor, Endang Susilowati, and Gustaf Eliezer. His son Viktor became the Speaker of the Kupang city council from 2009 until 2011 and a member of the East Nusa Tenggara provincial council from 2014 until 2018.Viktor attempted to follow his father's footsteps and run as the Mayor of Kupang in 2012 and 2017, but his candidacy was rejected by the local electoral commission. Death
<mask> died at the Syaiful Anwar Hospital in Malang on 17 August 2010. Previously, <mask> had been treated for kidney failure in the hospital since December 2009, and an implant was installed in his bone six days before his death. His body was laid at the Kupang mayor's office a day after his death and was buried at the Dharmaloka Public Cemetery in Kupang on 19 August 2010. Legacy
A street in Kupang was named after <mask>. The central hospital of Kupang was renamed to S. K. Lerik Regional Public Hospital in 2015. Awards
  Timor Military Campaign Medal () (1976)
  Star of Service, 2nd Category () (1988)
  Military Long Service Medals, 2nd Category () (1989)
  Social Welfare Medal () (1995)
  Star of Kartika Eka Paksi, 3rd Class () (1996)
 Health Medal, 2nd Class () (1996)

References

1945 births
2010 deaths
Indonesian military personnel
Mayors and regents of places in East Nusa Tenggara

masks:
Samuel Kristian Lerik
Lerik
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Lerik Laisina
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<mask>, MD (15 January 1913 – 24 January 2009) was an Australian physician and political activist who founded the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade (CACC). He made a number of speaking tours in the United States in the 1950s, and in 1960, he moved his base of operations to California. He was the author of the international bestseller, . Schwarz worked with his wife, <mask>, from abroad and, in his later years, at their Australian home in Camden, New South Wales, near Sydney. Early life
<mask> was born in Brisbane, Australia, the fourth of twelve children. His father was a Viennese Jew who emigrated to Australia after his conversion to Christianity. Schwarz obtained dual degrees in Arts and Science at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, and later completed a degree in medicine.He specialized as both a general practitioner and psychiatrist and from 1953 kept a private practice at home in the Sydney suburb of Strathfield. Career
In 1940, following a debate with an Australian communist, Schwarz felt compelled to study communist ideology. Eventually he became a recognised expert on Marxist-Leninist philosophy. He founded and was chairman of the not-for-profit Christian Anti-Communism Crusade (CACC), based originally in Sydney and later in Long Beach, California. He held that position until the late 1990s. During his time with the CACC, Schwarz gave lectures and seminars across the United States on the subject of communism, placing an emphasis on the role of education in understanding Marxism-Leninism from that movement's source documents by Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Mao Zedong, and others. Under Schwarz's leadership, the CACC financed an orphanage in India for underprivileged children.In the early 1960s, Schwarz gained a national following through his television network and powerful allies among southern California anticommunists: Walter Knott, founder of Knott's Berry Farm and member of the John Birch Society, and Patrick Frawley, a magnate whose portfolio included Paper Mate and Technicolor. Knott and Frawley provided financial support to Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential campaign, and they funded Schwarz's anticommunist rallies. Schwarz organized a "Southern California School of Anti-Communism" that filled the 16,000-seat Los Angeles Memorial Sports Arena from 28 August to 1 September 1961. The opening night's most popular speaker was Ronald Reagan. According to Morrie Ryskind, writing in The Los Angeles Times, "The evening sessions, featuring nationally known speakers, were televised, and those who should know tell me that some three million people listened in nightly. At any rate, I can honestly say that in my 25 years in Los Angeles I have never known a local event that so completely captured the enthusiasm of the city." A subsequent event, the three-hour "Hollywood's Answer to Communism" held at the Hollywood Bowl on 16 October 1961, featured such celebrities as Roy Rogers, John Wayne, James Stewart and U.S.Senator Thomas J. Dodd. Television critic John Crosby described it as "a monster three-hour concentration of pure venom on television... in which the patriots suggested again and again that the United States was largely peopled by traitors." Schwarz wrote three books and a fortnightly newsletter for nearly 40 years. His first book, You Can Trust the Communists (to be Communists), was published in 1960 and sold over one million copies worldwide. His second book was The Three Faces of Revolution, published in 1972 by Capitol Hill Press. His third book was the autobiographical Beating the Unbeatable Foe: One Man's Victory over Communism, Leviathan, and the Last Enemy, published in 1996. The foreword reproduces a letter in which US President Ronald Reagan, with whom Schwarz had been friendly for many years, wrote (on 4 January 1990): "<mask>, you're to be commended for your tireless dedication in trying to ensure the protection of freedom and human rights."The book included accolades by William F. Buckley Jr., Reed Irvine, John Stormer, and others. In acknowledgement of Schwarz's influence upon Reagan's anticommunist policies and rhetoric, speechwriter Anthony R. Dolan sent Schwarz a copy of Reagan's Evil Empire speech with the note: “I thought you might like to see the oak tree that has grown from the acorn which you planted so many years ago.”

Though some critics and supporters have sought to depict Schwarz as right wing, he eschewed the label, stating in Time magazine, "We are not angels; we have neither right wings, left wings or any wings." He insisted that the purpose of his work was bipartisan opposition to Communism grounded in a knowledge of its fundamental doctrines. In 1936, while a student at the University of Queensland, Schwarz established the University of Queensland Medical Society (UQMS), a medical student's union. He pursued industrial action before and after his graduation, successfully ensuring better treatment and higher wages for graduating medical students. In Schwarz's obituary Derek H. Meyers wrote, "Although this industrial action seemed scandalous to older doctors at the time, it is clear that every graduate of an Australian medical school since then owes a debt of gratitude to <mask>." As a notable authority on the ideology, Schwarz expressed sympathy for the appeal of Communism.Appearing on Firing Line with William F. Buckley, he asserted that arguments that Communists are unintelligent, "psychological misfits" are puerile, and that he considered the "Communist critique and analysis of capitalism" to be understandably persuasive to those convinced of capitalism's role in the creation of poverty and war. Schwarz was the father-in-law of leading Australian clinical cardiologist and medical scientist, Professor Murray Esler. References

External links
  - Interview conducted by William F. Buckley Jr. on television series Firing Line. Duration: 50 mins. Dr. <mask>, You Can Trust the Communists (To Be Communists) - excerpts from Schwarz' works
  - Semper Floreat, The University of Queensland Student Newspaper, October 26th 1944. 'Crusader Schwarz' (TIME magazine, 9 February 1962)
<mask>'s FBI files, hosted at the Internet Archive: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5
FBI files on the Dallas Freedom Forum, One of a series of "anti-communism schools" organized by <mask>rz: Headquarters file, Dallas Office file
FBI files on the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade: Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8,  Houston office file, Omaha office file, San Antonio office file

1913 births
Australian activists
People from Brisbane
Australian psychiatrists
Australian people of Austrian-Jewish descent
Australian Christians
Australian anti-communists
2009 deaths
American anti-communists

masks:
Frederick Charles Schwarz
Lillian Schwarz
Schwarz
Fred
Fred
Fred Schwarz
Fred Schwarz
Fred Schwa


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<mask> (March 30, 1913 – October 23, 2002) was an American government official and diplomat who served as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from 1966 to 1973. Helms began intelligence work with the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. Following the 1947 creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) he rose in its ranks during the presidencies of Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy. Helms then was DCI under Presidents Johnson and Nixon, yielding to James R. Schlesinger in early 1973. As a professional, Helms highly valued information gathering (favoring the interpersonal, but including the technical, obtained by espionage or from published media) and its analysis while prizing counterintelligence. Although a participant in planning such activities, Helms remained a skeptic about covert and paramilitary operations. Helms understood the bounds of the agency role as being able to express strong opinions over a decision under review, yet working as a team player once a course was set by the administration.It was the duty of the DCI to keep official secrets from press scrutiny. While working as the DCI, Helms managed the agency following the lead of his predecessor John McCone. In 1977, as a result of earlier covert operations in Chile, Helms became the only DCI convicted of misleading Congress. Helms last post in government service was Ambassador to Iran from 1973 to 1977. Besides, Helms was a key witness before the Senate during its investigation of the CIA by the Church Committee in the mid-1970s, 1975 being called the "Year of Intelligence". This investigation was hampered severely by Helms having ordered the destruction of all files related to the CIA's mind control program in 1973. Early career
<mask> began his career in intelligence by serving in the war-time Office of Strategic Services (OSS).Following the allied victory Helms was stationed in Germany, serving under Allen Dulles and Frank Wisner. In late 1945, President Truman terminated the OSS. Back in Washington, Helms continued similar intelligence work as part of the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), later called the Office of Special Operations (OSO). During this period, Helms focused on espionage in central Europe at the start of the Cold War, and took part in the vetting of the German Gehlen spy organization. The OSO was incorporated into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) when it was founded in 1947. In 1950 Truman appointed General Walter Bedell Smith as the fourth director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The CIA became established institutionally within the United States Intelligence Community.DCI Smith merged the OSO (being mainly espionage, and newly led by Helms) and the rapidly expanding Office of Policy Coordination under Wisner (covert operations) to form a new unit to be managed by the deputy director for plans (DDP). Wisner led the Directorate for Plans from 1952 to 1958, with <mask> as his Chief of Operations. In 1953 Dulles became the fifth DCI under President Eisenhower. John Foster Dulles, Dulles' brother, was Eisenhower's Secretary of State. Under the DDP Helms was specifically tasked in the defense of the agency against the threatened attack by Senator Joseph McCarthy, and also in the development of "truth serum" and other "mind control" drugs per the CIA's controversial Project MKUltra. From Washington, Helms oversaw the Berlin Tunnel, the 1953–1954 espionage operation which later made newspaper headlines. Regarding CIA activity, Helms considered information obtained by espionage to be more beneficial in the long run than the more strategically risky work involved in covert operations, which could backfire politically.Under his superior and mentor the DDP Wisner, the CIA marshaled such covert operations, which resulted in regime change in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954 and interference in the Congo in 1960. During the crises in Suez and Hungary in 1956 the DDP Wisner became distraught by the disloyalty of allies and the loss of a precious cold-war opportunity. Wisner left in 1958. Passing over Helms, DCI Dulles appointed <mask> as the new DDP, who had managed the U-2 spy plane. During the Kennedy presidency, Dulles selected Helms to testify before Congress on Soviet-made forgeries. Following the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco, President Kennedy appointed John McCone as the new DCI, and Helms then became the DDP. Helms was assigned to manage the CIA's role in Kennedy's multi-agency effort to dislodge Castro.During the Cuban Missile Crisis, while McCone sat with the president and his cabinet at the White House, Helms in the background supported McCone's significant contributions to the strategic discussions. After the 1963 coup in South Vietnam, Helms was privy to Kennedy's anguish over the killing of President Diem. A month later Kennedy was assassinated. Helms eventually worked to manage the CIA's complicated response during its subsequent investigation by the Warren Commission. Johnson presidency

In June 1966, <mask> was appointed director of Central Intelligence. At the White House later that month, Helm was sworn in during a ceremony arranged by President Lyndon Baines Johnson. In April of the prior year, John McCone resigned as DCI.Johnson then had appointed Admiral William Raborn, well regarded for his work on the submarine-launched Polaris missile, as the new DCI (1965–1966). Johnson chose Helms to serve as deputy director of Central Intelligence (DDCI). Raborn and Helms soon journeyed to the LBJ Ranch in Texas. Raborn did not fit well into the institutional complexities at CIA, with its specialized intellectual culture. He resigned in 1966. As DCI, Helms served under President Johnson during the second half of his administration, then continued in this post until 1973, through President Nixon's first term. At CIA <mask> was its first Director to 'rise through the ranks'.The Vietnam War became the key issue during the Johnson years. The CIA was fully engaged in political-military affairs in Southeast Asia, both getting intelligence information and for overt and covert field operations. The CIA, for example, organized an armed force of minority Hmong in Laos, and in Vietnam of rural counterinsurgency forces, and of minority Montagnards in the highlands. Further, the CIA became actively involved in South Vietnamese politics, especially after Diem. "One of the CIA's jobs was to coax a genuine South Vietnamese government into being." Helms traveled to Vietnam twice, and with President Johnson to Guam. Vietnam: Estimates
In 1966, Helms as the new DCI inherited a CIA "fully engaged in the policy debates surrounding Vietnam."The CIA had formed "a view on policy but [was] expected to contribute impartially to the debate all the same." American intelligence agents had a relatively long history in Vietnam, dating back to OSS contacts with the communist-led resistance to Japanese occupation forces during World War II. In 1953 the CIA's first annual National Intelligence Estimate on Vietnam reported that French prospects may "deteriorate very rapidly". After French withdrawal in 1954, CIA officers including Lt. Col. Edward Lansdale assisted the new President Ngo Dinh Diem in his efforts to reconstitute an independent government in the south: the Republic of Viet Nam. Nonetheless, CIA reports did not present an optimistic appraisal of Diem's future. Many of its analysts reluctantly understood that, in the anti-colonialist and nationalist context then prevailing, a favorable outcome was more likely for the new communist regime in the north under its long-term party leader Ho Chi Minh, who was widely admired as a Vietnamese patriot. A 1954 report by the CIA qualifiedly stated that if nationwide elections scheduled for 1956 by the recent Geneva Accords were held, Ho's party "the Viet Minh will almost certainly win."Yet that election was avoided and, in the cold war context, the 1959 CIA reports evidently saw Diem as "the best anticommunist bet" if he undertook reforms, but reporting also that Diem consistently avoided reform. As the political situation progressed during the 1960s and American involvement grew, subsequent CIA reports crafted by its analysts continued to trend pessimistic regarding the prospects for South Vietnam. "Vietnam may have been a policy failure. It was not an intelligence failure." Yet the Agency itself eventually became sharply divided over the issue. Those active in CIA operations in Vietnam, e.g., Lucien Conein, and William Colby, adopted a robust optimism regarding the outcome of their contentious projects. Teamwork in dangerous circumstances, and social cohesion among such operatives in the field, worked to reinforce and intensify their positive views."At no time was the institutional dichotomy between the operational and analytic components more stark." Helms later described the predicament at CIA as follows. From the outset, the intelligence directorate and the Office of National Estimates held a pessimistic view of the military developments. The operations personnel—going full blast ... in South Vietnam—remained convinced the war could be won. Without this conviction, the operators could not have continued their difficult face-to-face work with the South Vietnamese, whose lives were often at risk. In Washington, I felt like a circus rider standing astride two horses, each for the best of reasons going its own way.See section above "Elephant and Gorilla". Negative news would prove to be highly unwelcome at the Johnson White House."After each setback the CIA would gain little by saying 'I told you so' or by continuing to emphasize the futility of the war," author Ranelagh writes about the CIA predicament. In part it was DCI McCone's worrisome reports and unwelcome views about Vietnam that led to the exclusion from the President Johnson's inner circle; consequently McCone resigned in 1965. Helms remembered that McCone left the CIA because "he was dissatisfied with his relation with President Johnson. He didn't get to see him enough, and he didn't feel that he had any impact." Helms' institutional memory probably contested for influence over his own decisions as DCI when he later served under Johnson. According to CIA intelligence officer Ray Cline, "Up to about 1965/66, estimates were not seriously biased in any direction." As American political commitment to Vietnam surged under Johnson, however, "the pressure to give the right answer came along," stated Cline."I felt increasing pressure to say the war was winnable." Laos: "secret war"

The "second Geneva Convention" of 1962 settled de jure the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos, obtaining commitments from both the Soviets and the Americans. Nonetheless, such a neutral status quo in Laos soon became threatened de facto, e.g., by North Vietnamese (NVN) armed support for the communist Pathet Lao. The CIA in 1963 was tasked to mount an armed defense of the "neutrality" of the Kingdom. Helms then served as DDP and thus directed the overall effort. It was a secret war because both NVN and CIA were in violation of Geneva's 1962 terms. Thereafter during the 1960s the CIA accomplished this mission largely by training and arming native tribal forces, primarily those called the Hmong.Helms called it "the war we won". At most several hundred CIA personnel were involved, at a small fraction of the cost of the Vietnam war. Despite prior criticism of CIA abilities due to the 1961 Bay of Pigs disaster in Cuba, here the CIA for years successfully managed a large-scale paramilitary operation. At the height of the Vietnam war, much of royal Laos remained functionally neutral, although over its southeast borderlands ran the contested Ho Chi Minh trail. The CIA operation fielded as many as 30,000 Hmong soldiers under their leader Vang Pao, while also supporting 250,000 mostly Hmong people in the hills. Consequently, more than 80,000 NVN troops were "tied down" in Laos. At the time of Nixon's Vietnamization policy, CIA concern arose over sustaining the covert nature of the secret war.In 1970 Helms decided "to transfer the budgetary allocations for operations in Laos from the CIA to the Defense Department." William Colby, then a key American figure in Southeast Asia and later DCI, comments that "a large-scale paramilitary operation does not fit the secret budget and policy procedures of CIA." About Laos, however, Helms wrote that "I will always call it the war we won." In 1966, the CIA had termed it "an exemplary success story". Colby concurred. Senator Stuart Symington, after a 1967 visit to the CIA chief of station in Vientiane, the Laotian capital, reportedly called it "a sensible way to fight a war." Yet others disagreed, and the 'secret war' would later draw frequent political attack.Author Weiner criticizes the imperious insertion of American power, and the ultimate abandonment of America's Hmong allies in 1975. Other problems arose because of the Hmong's practice of harvesting poppies. Due to political developments, the war ultimately ended badly. Helms acknowledges that after President Nixon, through his agent Kissinger, negotiated in Paris to end the Vietnam war in 1973, America failed to continue supporting its allies and "abdicated its role in Southeast Asia." Laos was given up and the Hmong were left in a desperate situation. Helms references that eventually 450,000 Laotians including 200,000 Hmong emigrated to America. As the 'secret war' eventually became public it created a firestorm in Washington.While this Laotian struggle continued on the borderlands of the Vietnam War, DCI <mask> was blindsided when several senators began to complain that they had been kept in the dark about "CIA's secret war" in Laos. Helms recalls that three presidents, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, had each approved the covert operation, the "secret war", and that 50 senators had been briefed on its progress, e.g., Senator Symington had twice visited Laos. Helms elaborates on the turnabout:

In 1970, it came as a jolt when, with a group of senators, Senator Stuart Symington publicly expressed his "surprise, shock and anger" at what he and the others claimed was their "recent discovery" of "CIA's secret war" in Laos. At the time I could not understand the reason for this about-face. Nor have I since been able to fathom it.Symington's "shock" in 1973 was "viewed with undisguised scorn in the agency." Ranelagh (1978) p. 425 note. Often such "congressional huffing and puffing was for public consumption only" with the CIA being "privately congratulated" later for its efforts in Laos.Ranelagh at 610 note. Israel: Six Day War
Liaison with Israeli intelligence was managed by James Jesus Angleton of CIA counterintelligence from 1953 to 1974. For example, the Israelis quickly provided CIA with the Russian text of Khrushchev's Secret Speech of 1956 which severely criticized the deceased Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin. In August 1966 Mossad had arranged for Israeli acquisition of a Soviet MiG-21 fighter from a disaffected Iraqi pilot. Mossad's Meir Amit later came to Washington to tell DCI Helms that Israel would loan America the plane, with its up-until-now secret technology, to find out how it flew. At a May 1967 NSC meeting Helms voiced praise for Israel's military preparedness, and argued that from the captured MiG-21 the Israelis "had learned their lessons well". In 1967, CIA analysis addressed the possibility of an armed conflict between Israel and neighboring Arab states, predicting that "the Israelis would win a war within a week to ten days."Israel "could defeat any combination of Arab forces in relatively short order" with the time required depending on "who struck first" and circumstances. Yet CIA's pro-Israel prediction was challenged by Arthur Goldberg, the American ambassador to the United Nations and Johnson loyalist. Although Israel then had requested "additional military aid" Helms opines that here Israel wanted to control international expectations prior to the outbreak of war. As Arab war threats mounted, President Johnson asked Helms about Israel's chances and Helms stuck with his agency's predictions. At a meeting of his top advisors Johnson then asked who agreed with the CIA estimate and all assented. "The temptation for Helms to hedge his bet must have been enormous". After all, opinions were divided, e.g., Soviet intelligence thought the Arabs would win and were "stunned" at the Israeli victory.Admiral Stansfield Turner (DCI 1977–1981) wrote that "Helms claimed that the high point of his career was the Agency's accurate prediction in 1967." Helms believed it had kept America out of the conflict. Also, it led to his entry within the inner circle of the Johnson administration, the regular 'Tuesday lunch' with the President. In the event, Israel decisively defeated its neighborhood enemies and prevailed in the determinative Six Day war of June 1967. Four days before the sudden launch of that war, "a senior Israeli official" had privately visited Helms in his office and hinted that such a preemptive decision was imminent. Helms then had passed the information to President Johnson. The conflict reified America's "emotional sympathy" for Israel.Following the war, America dropped its careful balancing act

masks:
Richard McGarrah Helms
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Richard Bissell
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 between the belligerents and moved to a position in support of Israel, eventually supplanting France as Israel's chief military supplier. In the afternoon of the third day of the war, the American SIGINT spy ship USS Liberty, outfitted by the NSA, was attacked by Israeli warplanes and torpedo boats in international waters north of Sinai. This U.S. Navy ship was severely damaged with loss of life. The Israelis quickly notified the Americans and later explained that they "had mistaken the Liberty (455 feet long) for the Egyptian coastal steamer El Quseir (275 feet long). The US government formally accepted the apology and the explanation." Some continue to accept this position. Yet "scholars and military experts," according to author Thomas Powers, state that "the hard question is not whether the attack was deliberate but why the Israelis thought it necessary."About the Liberty Helms in his memoirs quotes the opinion of his deputy, DDCI Rufus Taylor, and mentions the conclusion of a board of inquiry. Then Helms adds, "I have yet to understand why it was felt necessary to attack this ship or who ordered the attack". On the morning of the sixth day of the war, President Johnson summoned <mask> to the White House Situation Room. Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin had called to threaten military intervention if the war continued. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara suggested that the Sixth Fleet be sent east, from the mid Mediterranean to the Levant. Johnson agreed. Helms remembered the "visceral physical reaction" to the strategic tension, similar to the emotions of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis."It was the world's good fortune that hostilities on the Golan Heights ended before the day was out," wrote Helms later. LBJ: Tuesday lunch
As a result of the CIA's accurate prognosis concerning the duration, logistics, and outcome of the Six-Day War of June, 1967, Helms' practical value to the President, Lyndon Baines Johnson, became evident. Recognition of his new status was not long in coming. Helms soon took a place at the table where the president's top advisors discussed foreign policy issues: the regular Tuesday luncheons with LBJ. Helms unabashedly called it "the hottest ticket in town". In a 1984 interview with a CIA historian, Helms recalled that following the Six-Day War, he and Johnson had engaged in intense private conversations which addressed foreign policy, including the Soviet Union. Helms went on:

And I think at that time he'd made up his mind that it would be a good idea to tie intelligence into the inner circle of his policy-making and decision-making process.So starting from that time he began to invite me to the Tuesday lunches, and I remained a member of that group until the end of his administration. <mask>' invitation to lunch occurred about three-and-a-half years into Johnson's five-year presidency and a year into <mask>' nearly seven-year tenure as DCI. Thereafter in the Johnson administration, Helms functioned in proximity to high-level policymaking, with continual access to America's top political leadership. It constituted the pinnacle of <mask>' influence and standing in Washington. Helms describes the "usual Tuesday lunch" in his memoirs. [W]e gathered for a sherry in the family living room on the second floor of the White House. If the President, who normally kept to a tight schedule, was a few minutes late, he would literally bound into the room, pause long enough to acknowledge our presence, and herd us into the family dining room, overlooking Pennsylvania Avenue.Seating followed protocol, with the secretary of state (Dean Rusk) at the President's right, and the secretary of defense (Robert McNamara, later Clark Clifford) at his left. General Bus Wheeler (the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) sat beside the secretary of defense. I sat beside Dean Rusk. Walt Rostow (the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs), George Christian (the White House Press Secretary), and Tom Johnson (the deputy press secretary) made up the rest of the table. In CIA interviews long after the war ended, Helms recalled the role played in policy discussions. As the neutral party, Helms could come up with facts applicable to the issue at hand. The benefit of such a role was the decisiveness in "keeping the game honest".Helms comments that many advocates of particular policy positions will almost invariably 'cherry pick' facts supporting their positions, whether consciously or not. Then the voice of a neutral could perform a useful function in helping to steer the conversation on routes within realistic parameters. The out-sized political personality of Johnson, of course, was the dominating presence at lunch. From his perch Helms marveled at the learned way President Johnson employed the primary contradictions in his personality to direct those around him, and forcefully manage the atmosphere of discourse. Regarding the perennial issues of Vietnam, a country in civil war, Helms led as an important institutional player in the political mix of Washington. Yet CIA people were themselves divided on the conflict. As the DCI, Helms' daily duties involved the difficult task of updating CIA intelligence and reporting on CIA operations to the American executive leadership.Vietnam then dominated the news. Notoriously, the American political consensus eventually broke. The public became sharply divided, with the issues being vociferously contested. About the so-called Vietnamese 'quagmire' it seemed confusion reigned within and without. Helms saw himself as struggling to best serve his view of America and his forceful superior, the President. Viet Cong numbers
Differences and divisions might emerge within the ranks of analysts, across the spectrum of the USG Intelligence Community. Helms had a statutory mandate with the responsibility for reconciling the discrepancies in information, or the conflicting views, promoted by the various American intelligence services, e.g., by the large Defense Intelligence Agency or by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the United States State Department.While the CIA might agree on its own Estimates, other department reports might disagree, causing difficulties, and making inter-agency concord problematic. The process of reaching the final consensus could become a contentious negotiation. In 1965, Johnson had substantially escalated the war by sending large numbers of American combat troops to fight in South Vietnam, and ordered warplanes to bomb the North. Nonetheless, the military put stiff pressure on him to escalate further. In the "paper wars" that followed, Helms at CIA was regularly asked for intelligence reports on military action, e.g., the political effectiveness of bombing Hanoi. The military resented such review of its conduct of the war. The American strategy had become the pursuit of a war of attrition.The objective was to make the Viet Cong enemy suffer more losses than it could timely replace. Accordingly, the number of combatants fielded by the communist insurgency at any one time was a key factor in determining whether the course of the war was favorable or not. The political pressure on the CIA to conform to the military's figures of enemy casualties became intense. Under Helms CIA reports on the Viet Cong order of battle numbers were usually moderate; CIA also questioned whether the strategy employed by the U.S. Army would ever compel Hanoi to negotiate. <mask> himself was evidently sceptical, yet Johnson never asked for his personal opinion. This dispute between Army and CIA over the number of Viet Cong combatants became bitter, and eventually common knowledge in the administration. According to one source, CIA Director <mask> "used his influence with Lyndon Johnson to warn about the growing dangers of U.S. involvement in Vietnam."On the other hand, Stansfield Turner (DCI 1977–1981) describes Helms' advisory relationship to Lyndon Johnson as being overly loyal to the office of president. Hence, the CIA staff's frank opinions on Vietnam were sometimes modified before reaching President Johnson. At one point the CIA analysts estimated enemy strength at 500,000, while the military insisted it was only 270,000. No amount of discussion could resolve the difference. Eventually, in September 1967, the CIA under Helms went along with the military's lower number for the combat strength of the Vietnamese Communist forces. This led a CIA analyst directly involved in this work to file a formal complaint against DCI <mask>, which was accorded due process within the Agency. Vietnam: Phoenix

As a major element in his counterinsurgency policy, Ngo Dinh Diem (President 1954–1963) had earlier introduced the establishment of strategic hamlets in order to contest Viet Cong operations in the countryside.From several antecedents the controversial Phoenix program was launched during 1967–1968. Various Vietnamese forces (intelligence, military, police, and civilian) were deployed in the field against Viet Cong support networks. The CIA played a key role in its design and leadership, and built on practices developed by Vietnamese, i.e., the provincial chief, Colonel Tran Ngoc Chau.<ref>Cf., Tran Ngoc Chau, Vietnamese Labyrinth: Allies, Enemies, and Why the U.S. Lost the war (Lubbock: Texas Tech University 2013), foreword by Daniel Ellsberg, e.g., at 229 re CIA and Diem. Yet Colonel Chau caustically writes:

Yet, CIA was not officially in control of Phoenix, CORDS was. DCI Helms, however, in early 1968 had agreed to allow William Colby to take a temporary leave of absence from the CIA in order to go to Vietnam and lead CORDS, a position with ambassadorial rank. In doing so, Helms personally felt "thoroughly disgusted"... thinking Robert Komer had "put a fast one over on him". Komer was then in charge of the CORDS pacification program in South Vietnam.Recently Helms had promoted Colby to a top CIA post: head of the Soviet Division (before Colby had been running the CIA's Far East Division, which included Vietnam). Now Colby transferred out of CIA, to CORDS to run Phoenix. Many other Americans worked to monitor and manage the Phoenix program including, according to Helms, "a seemingly ever-increasing number of CIA personnel". After receiving special Phoenix training, Vietnamese forces in rural areas went head to head against the Viet Cong Infrastructure, e.g., they sought to penetrate communist organizations, to arrest and interrogate or slay their cadres. The Vietnam War resembled a ferocious civil war; the Viet Cong had already assassinated thousands of Vietnamese village leaders. Unfortunately, in its strategy of fighting fire with fire, forces in the Phoenix program used torture, and became entangled in actions involving local and official corruption, resulting in many questionable killings, perhaps thousands. Despite its grave faults, Colby opined that the program did work well enough to stop Viet Cong gains.Colby favorably compared Operation Phoenix with the CIA's relative success in its "secret war" in Laos. Helms notes that the early efforts of Phoenix "were successful, and of serious concern to the NVN [North Vietnamese] leadership". Helms then goes on to recount the Phoenix program's progressive slide into corruption and counterproductive violence, which came to nullify its early success. Accordingly, by the time it was discontinued Phoenix had become useless in the field and a controversial if not a notorious political liability. Helms in his memoirs presents this situation:

PHOENIX was directed and staffed by Vietnamese over whom the American advisors and liaison officers did not have command or direct supervision. The American staff did its best to eliminate the abuse of authority—the settling of personal scores, rewarding of friends, summary executions, prisoner mistreatment, false denunciation, illegal property seizure—that became the by-products of the PHOENIX counterinsurgency effort. In the blood-soaked atmosphere created by Viet Cong terrorism, the notion that regulations and directives imposed by foreign liaison officers could be expected to curb revenge and profit-making was unrealistic.After the war, interviews were conducted with Vietnamese communist leaders and military commanders familiar with the Viet Cong organization, its war-making capacity, and support infrastructure. They said the Phoenix operations were very effective against them, reports Stanley Karnow. Thomas Ricks, in evaluating the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency tactics of the Marine Corps and of the Phoenix program, confirmed their value by reference to "Hanoi's official history of the war". If one discounts the corrupt criminality and its political fallout, the Phoenix partisans were perhaps better able tactically to confront the elusive Viet Cong support networks, i.e., the sea in which the fish swam, than the regular units of the ARVN and the U. S. Army. Yet the military lessons of the war in full complexity were being understood by the Army, later insisted Colonel Summers. Regarding the Phoenix legacy, a sinister controversy haunts it. Distancing himself, Helms summarized: "As successful a program as PHOENIX was when guided by energetic local leaders," as a national program it succumbed to political corruption and "failed".Colby admitted serious faults, yet in conclusion found a positive preponderance. "It was not the CIA," writes John Ranelagh, "that was responsible for the excesses of Phoenix (although the agency clearly condoned what was happening)." Author Tim Weiner compares the violent excesses of Phoenix to such associated with the early years of the Second Iraq War. Johnson withdraws

In America, what became the Vietnam quagmire lost domestic political support, and seriously injured the popularity of the Johnson administration. In the spring of election year 1968, following the unexpected January Tet offensive in Vietnam, the war issue reached a crisis. In March Helms prepared yet another special CIA report for the President and arranged for CIA officer George Carver to present it in person to Johnson. The diminutive Carver was then the CIA's Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs (SAVA).Helms writes, "In his typically unvarnished manner, George had presented a bleak but accurate view of the situation and again demonstrated that the NVN strength in South Vietnam was far stronger than had been previously reported by MACV." Carver "closed by saying in effect that not even the President could not tell the American voters on one day that the United States planned to get out of Vietnam, and on the next day tell Ho Chi Minh that we will stick it out for twenty years. With this LBJ rose like a roasted pheasant and bolted from the room." But Johnson soon returned. Helms described of what happened next. The President, who was a foot and a half taller and a hundred pounds heavier than George, struck him a resounding clap on the back and caught his hand in an immense fist. Wrenching George's arm up and down with a pumping motion that might have drawn oil from a dry Texas well, Johnson congratulated him on the briefing, and on his services to the country and its voters.As he released George, he said, 'Anytime you want to talk to me, just pick up the phone and come over.' It was a vintage LBJ performance. Earlier, a group of foreign policy elders, known as The Wise Men, having first heard from CIA, then confronted Johnson about the difficulty of winning in Vietnam. The president was unprepared to accept their negative findings. "Lyndon Johnson must have considered March 1968 the most difficult month of his political career," wrote Helms later. Eventually this frank advice contributed to Johnson's decision in March to withdraw from the 1968 presidential election. Nixon presidency

In the 1968 Presidential election, the Republican nominee <mask>. Nixon triumphed over the Democrat, Vice President Hubert Humphrey.Shortly after the election, President Johnson invited President-Elect Nixon to his LBJ Ranch in Texas for a discussion of current events. There Johnson introduced Nixon to a few members of his inner circle: Dean Rusk at State, Clark Clifford at Defense, Gen. Earle Wheeler, and DCI <mask>s. Later Johnson in private told Helms that he had represented him to Nixon as a political neutral, "a merit appointment", a career federal official who was good at his job. Nixon then invited Helms to his pre-inauguration headquarters in New York City, where Nixon told Helms that he and J. Edgar Hoover at FBI would be retained as "appointments out of the political arena". Helms expressed his assent that the DCI was a non-partisan position. Evidently, already Nixon had made his plans when chief executive to sharply downgrade the importance of the CIA in his administration, in which case Nixon himself would interact very little with his DCI, e.g., at security meetings. Role of agency
The ease of access to the president that Helms enjoyed in the Johnson Administration changed dramatically and for the worse with the arrival of President <mask> and Nixon's national security advisor Henry Kissinger.In order to dominate policy, "Nixon insisted on isolating himself" from the Washington bureaucracy he did not trust. His primary

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 gatekeepers were H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman; they screened Nixon from "the face-to-face confrontations he so disliked and dreaded." While thus pushing away even top officials, Nixon started to build policy-making functions inside the White House. From a secure distance he would direct the government and deal with "the outside world, including cabinet members". Regarding intelligence matters, Nixon appointed Kissinger and his team to convey his instructions to the CIA and sister services. Accordingly, Nixon and Kissinger understood that "they alone would conceive, command, and control clandestine operations.Covert action and espionage could be tools fitted for their personal use. Nixon used them to build a political fortress at the White House." In his memoirs, <mask> writes of his early meeting with Kissinger. "Henry spoke first, advising me of Nixon's edict that effective immediately all intelligence briefings, oral or otherwise, were to come through Kissinger. All intelligence reports? I asked. Yes."A Senate historian of the CIA observes that "it was Kissinger rather than the DCIs who served as Nixon's senior intelligence advisor. Under Kissinger's direction the NSC became an intelligence and policy staff." Under Nixon's initial plan, Helms was to be excluded even from the policy discussions at the National Security Council (NSC) meetings. Very early in the Nixon administration it became clear that the President wanted Henry Kissinger to run intelligence for him and that the National Security Council staff in the White House, under Kissinger, would control the intelligence community. This was the beginning of a shift of power away from the CIA to a new center: the National Security Council staff. Stansfield Turner (DCI 1977–1981) describes Nixon as basically being hostile to the CIA, questioning its utility and practical value, based on his low evaluation of the quality of its information. Turner, who served under President Carter, opines that Nixon considered the CIA to be full of elite "liberals" and hence contrary to his policy direction.Helms agreed regarding Nixon's hostility toward the CIA, also saying in a 1988 interview that "Nixon never trusted anybody." Yet Helms later wrote:

Whatever Nixon's views of the Agency, it was my opinion that he was the best prepared to be President of any of those under whom I served-Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. ... Nixon had the best grasp of foreign affairs and domestic politics. His years as Vice President had served him well. When Nixon attended NSC meetings, he would often direct his personal animosity and ire directly at <mask>, who led an agency Nixon considered overrated, whose proffered intelligence Nixon thought of little use or value, and which had a history of aiding his political enemies, according to Nixon. Helms found it difficult to establish a cordial working relationship to the new President. Ray Cline, former Deputy Director of Intelligence at CIA, wrote how he saw the agency under Helms during the Nixon years:

Nixon and his principal assistant, Dr. Kissinger, disregarded analytical intelligence except for what was convenient for use by Kissinger's own small personal staff in support of Nixon-Kissinger policies.Incoming intelligence was closely monitored and its distribution controlled by Kissinger's staff to keep it from embarrassing the White House... . " They employed "Helms and the CIA primarily as an instrument for the execution of White House wishes" and did not seem "to understand or care about the carefully structured functions of central intelligence as a whole. ... I doubt that anyone could have done better than Helms in these circumstances. Under the changed policies of the Nixon administration, Henry Kissinger in effect displaced the DCI and became "the President's chief intelligence officer". Kissinger writes that, in addition, Nixon "felt ill at ease with Helms personally." Domestic Chaos

Under both the Johnson and Nixon administrations, the CIA was tasked with domestic surveillance of protest movements, particularly anti-war activities, which efforts later became called Operation CHAOS. Investigations were opened on various Americans and their organizations based on the theory that they were funded and/or influenced by foreign actors, especially the Soviet Union and other communist states.The CIA clandestinely gathered information on Ramparts magazine, many anti-war groups, and others, eventually building thousands of clandestine files on American citizens. These CIA activities, if not outright illegal (the declared opinion of critics), were at the margin of legality as the CIA was ostensibly forbidden from domestic spying. Later in 1974, the Chaos operation became national news, which created a storm of media attention. With the sudden rise in America during the mid-1960s of the opposition to the Vietnam War, President Johnson had become suspicious, surmising that foreign communists must be supplying various protest groups with both money and organization skills. Johnson figured an investigation would bring this to light, a project in which the CIA would partner with the FBI. When in 1967 he instructed Helms to investigate, Helms remarked that such activity would involve some risk, as his agency generally was not permitted to conduct such surveillance activity within the national borders. In reply to Helms Johnson said, "I'm quite aware of that."The President then explained that the main focus was to remain foreign. Helms understood the reasons for the president's orders, and the assumed foreign connection. Later apparently, both the Rockefeller Commission and the Church Committee found the initial investigation to be within the CIA's legislative charter, although at the margin. As a prerequisite to its conduct of the foreign espionage, the CIA was first to secretly develop leads and contacts within the domestic anti-war movement. In the process its infiltrating agents would acquire anti-war bona fides that would provide them some amount of cover when overseas. On that rationale, the CIA commenced activity, which continued for almost seven years. Helms kept the operation hidden, from nearly all agency personnel, in Angleton's counterintelligence office.Eleven CIA officers grew long hair, learned the jargon of the New Left, and went off to infiltrate peace groups in the United States and Europe. The agency compiled a computer index of 300,000 names of American people and organizations, and extensive files on 7,200 citizens. It began working secretly with police departments all over America. Unable to draw a clear distinction between the far left and the mainstream opposition to the war, it spied on every major organization in the peace movement. At the president's command, transmitted through Helms and the secretary of defense, the National Security Agency turned its immense eavesdropping powers on American citizens.Weiner (2007) at 285–286. Yet the CIA found no substantial foreign sources of money or influence. When Helms reported these findings to the President, the reaction was hostile."LBJ simply could not believe that American youth would on their own be moved to riot in protest against U. S. foreign policy," Helms later wrote. Accordingly, Johnson instructed Helms to continue the search with increased diligence. The Nixon presidency later would act to extend the reach and scope of Chaos and like domestic surveillance activity. In 1969 intra-agency opposition to Chaos arose. Helms worked to finesse his critics. Lawrence Houston, the CIA general counsel, became involved, and Helms wrote an office memorandum to justify the Chaos operation to CIA officers and agents. Meanwhile, the FBI was reporting a steady stream of data on domestic anti-war and other 'subversive' activity, but the FBI obstinately refused to provide any context or analysis.For the CIA to do such FBI work was considered a clear violation of its charter. Nixon, however, "remained convinced that the domestic dissidence was initiated and nurtured from abroad." A young lawyer, Tom Charles Huston, was then selected by Nixon in 1970 to manage a marked increase in the surveillance of domestic dissenters and protesters: a multi-agency investigative effort, more thorough and wider in scope. Called the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (ICI), included were the FBI, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the CIA. It would be "a wholesale assault on the peace and radical movements," according to intelligence writer Thomas Powers. Yet the new scheme was delayed, and then the Watergate scandal 'intervened'. In late 1974, the news media discovered a terminated Operation Chaos.Soviet missiles
The Soviet Union developed a new series of long-range missiles, called the SS-9 (NATO codename Scarp). A question developed concerning the extent of their capability to carry nuclear weapons; at issue was whether the missile were a Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) or not. The CIA information was that these missiles were not 'MIRVed' but Defense intelligence considered that they were of the more potent kind. If so, the Soviet Union was possibly aiming at a first strike nuclear capacity. The Nixon administration, desiring to employ the existence of such Soviet threat to justify a new American antiballistic missile system, publicly endorsed the Defense point of view. Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security advisor, asked <mask> to review the CIA's finding, yet Helms initially stood by his analysts at CIA. Eventually, however, Helms compromised.Melvin Laird, Nixon's Secretary of Defense, had told Helms that the CIA was intruding outside its area, with the result that it 'subverted administration policy'. Helms, in part, saw this MIRV conflict as part of bureaucratic maneuvering over extremely difficult-to-determine issues, in which the CIA had to find its strategic location within the new Nixon administration. Helms later remembered:

I realized that there was no convincing evidence in the Agency or at the Pentagon which would prove either position. Both positions were estimates—speculation—based on identical fragments of data. My decision to remove the contested paragraph was based on the fact that the Agency's estimate—that the USSR was not attempting to create a first-strike capability – as originally stated in the earlier detailed National Estimate would remain the Agency position. One CIA analyst, Abbott Smith, viewed this flip-flop not only as "a cave-in on a matter of high principle", according to author John Ranelagh, "but also as a public slap in the face from his director, a vote of no confidence in his work." Another analyst at the United States Department of State, however, had reinserted the "contested paragraph" into the intelligence report.When a few years later the nature of the Soviet SS-9 missiles became better understood, the analysts at CIA and at State were vindicated. "The consensus among agency analysts was that Dick Helms had not covered himself with glory this time." Vietnamization
Nixon pursued what he called "peace with honor", or perhaps an elusive victory by another name; yet critics called its aim a "decent interval". The policy was called Vietnamization. To end the war favorably he focused on the peace negotiations in Paris. There Henry Kissinger played the major role in bargaining with the North Vietnamese. Achieving peace proved difficult; in the meantime, casualties mounted.Although withdrawing great numbers of American troops, Nixon simultaneously escalated the air war. He increased the heavy bombing of Vietnam, also of Laos and Cambodia, and widened the scope of the conflict by invading Cambodia. While these actions sought to gain bargaining power at the Paris conference table, they also drew a "firestorm" of college protests in America. Kissinger describes a debate over the mining of Haiphong harbor, in which he criticizes Helms at CIA for his disapproval of the plan. In Kissinger's telling, here <mask>' opposition reflected the bias of CIA analysts, "the most liberal school of thought in the government." When contemplating his administration's inheritance of the Vietnam War, Nixon understood the struggle in the context of the cold war. He viewed Vietnam as critically important.<mask> recalled him as saying, "There's only one number one problem hereabouts and that's Vietnam—get on with it." Nixon saw that the ongoing Sino-Soviet split presented America with an opportunity to triangulate Soviet Russia by opening relations with the People's Republic of China. It might also drive a wedge between the two major supporters of North Vietnam. While here appreciating the CIA reports Helms supplied him on China, Nixon nonetheless kept his diplomatic travel preparations within the White House and under wraps. To prepare for Nixon's 1972 trip to China, Kissinger ordered that CIA covert operations there, including Tibet, come to a halt. In the meantime, Vietnamization signified the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, while the brunt of the fighting was shifted to South Vietnamese armed forces. This affected all CIA operations across the political-military landscape.Accordingly, DCI Helms wound down many CIA activities, e.g., civic projects and paramilitary operations in Vietnam, and the "secret war" in Laos. The Phoenix program once under Colby (1967–1971) was also turned over to Vietnamese direction and control. The 1973 Paris Peace Accords, however, came after Helms had left the CIA. To sustain the existence of the South Vietnam regime, Nixon massively increased American military aid. Yet in 1975 the regime's army quickly collapsed when regular army units of the Communist forces attacked. "Moral disintegration alone can explain why an army three times the size and possessing more that five times the equipment of the enemy could be as rapidly defeated as the ARVN was between March 10 and April 30, 1975," commented Joseph Buttinger. American military deaths from the war were over 47,000, with 153,000 wounded.South Vietnamese military losses (using low figures) were about 110,000 killed and 500,000 wounded. Communist Vietnamese military losses were later announced: 1,100,000 killed and 600,000 wounded. Hanoi also estimated that total civilian deaths from the war, 1954 to 1975, were 2,000,000. According to Spencer C. Tucker, "The number of civilians killed in the war will never be known with any accuracy; estimates vary widely, but the lowest figure given is 415,000." Chile: Allende

Perhaps <mask>'s most controversial undertaking as CIA chief concerned the subversive efforts to block the socialist programs of Salvador Allende of Chile, actions done at President Nixon's behest. The operation was code-named Project Fubelt. After Allende's victory in the 1970 election, CIA jumped into action with a series of sharp and divisive maneuvers.Nonetheless, Allende was inaugurated as president of Chile. Thereafter, the CIA's efforts markedly declined in intensity, though softer tactics continued. Three years later (11 Sept. 1973) the military coup led by Augusto Pinochet violently ended the democratically elected regime of President Allende. During the 1970 Chilean presidential election, the USG had sent financial and other assistance to the two candidates opposing Allende, who won anyway. Helms states that then, on Sept. 15, 1970, he met with President Nixon who ordered the CIA to support an army coup to prevent an already elected Allende from being confirmed as president; it was to be kept secret. "He wanted something done and he didn't care how," Helms later characterized the order. The secret, illegal (in Chile) activity ordered by Nixon was termed "track II" to distinguish it from the CIA's covert funding of Chilean "democrats" here called "track I".Accordingly, the CIA took assorted covert steps, including actions to badger a law-abiding Chilean army to seize power. CIA agents were once in communication, but soon broke off such contact, with rogue elements of the country's military who later assassinated the "constitutionally minded" General René Schneider, the Army Commander-in-Chief. Following this criminal violence, the Chilean army's support swung firmly behind Allende, whom the Congress confirmed as president of Chile on November 3, 1970. CIA did not intend the killing. "At all times, however, Helms made it plain that assassination was not an option." Yet Nixon and Kissinger blamed <mask> for Allende's presidency. Thereafter, the CIA funneled millions of dollars to opposition groups, e.g., political parties, the media, and striking truck drivers, in a continuing, long-term effort to destabilize Chile's economy and so subvert the Allende administration.Nixon's initial, memorable phrase for such actions had been "to make the Chilean economy scream". Even so, according to DCI Helms, "In my remaining months in office, Allende continued his determined march to the left, but there was no further effort to instigate a coup in Chile." Helms here appears to parse between providing funds for Allende's political opposition ("track I") versus actually supporting a military overthrow ("track II"). Although in policy disagreement with

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