Feynman devoted the latter half of his book What Do You Care What Other People Think? to his experience on the Rogers Commission, straying from his usual convention of brief, light-hearted anecdotes to deliver an extended and sober narrative. Feynman's account reveals a disconnect between NASA's engineers and executives that was far more striking than he expected. His interviews of NASA's high-ranking managers revealed startling misunderstandings of elementary concepts. For instance, NASA managers claimed that there was a 1 in 100,000 chance of a catastrophic failure aboard the shuttle, but Feynman discovered that NASA's own engineers estimated the chance of a catastrophe at closer to 1 in 200. He concluded that the space shuttle reliability estimate by NASA management was fantastically unrealistic, and he was particularly angered that NASA used these figures to recruit Christa McAuliffe into the Teacher-in-Space program. He warned in his appendix to the commission's report (which was included only after he threatened not to sign the report), "For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled." COUNT 5
QSN1 In which way did he write about his experience on the Rogers Commission? ANS1 sober narrative QSN2 Feyman's experience on the Rogers Commission was talked about is which of his books? ANS2 What Do You Care What Other People Think? QSN3 While the higher-ups said a failure was unlikely, at 1 in 100,000 odds, the scientists felt the odd were what? ANS3 1 in 200 QSN4 His writings about the Rogers Commission showed that trouble was brewing between scientists and executives at which prolific institute? ANS4 NASA QSN5 Who did NASA recruit by using flawed safety numbers? ANS5 Christa McAuliffe