With the government funding stream set to expire Sept. 30, all the senior GOP leaders on Capitol Hill, including House Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio), wanted to avoid the strategy of shutting down the federal government in an effort to thwart President Obama’s health-care law. “When the country’s in crisis and when a bipartisan agreement is needed, I’ve demonstrated on no fewer than four occasions that I can step into the breach and get an outcome that’s good for the country,” he said. (PHOTOS: The government reopens) 
 
 He was overtaken by Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), who swept in near the end to forge a bipartisan agreement, part of an attempt to shield Republicans from further damage and salvage his party’s chances of winning back the Senate next year. Hill veterans weren’t quite as shocked by the flip-flop as the utter breakdown of decorum between Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) and Boehner. McConnell was cornered, “caught in a cul-de-sac,” he said, with the “worst hand” he had ever been dealt. The spending cuts in the 2011 Budget Control Act — also know as the sequester cuts — represent real reductions in government funding that McConnell mentions every chance he gets. “It certainly wasn’t anybody’s intention to have the shutdown, and hopefully we’ve all learned some important lessons,” Sen. John Cornyn (R-Tex. “When you’re on the two-yard line and your offensive line is shaky, you’re trying to get a better position on the field,” McConnell said. He could shut down the government and risk default, but because of hard-line conservatives, Boehner couldn’t pass anything. McConnell began meeting with Republicans such as Sens. Despite reports that only 20 or 30 House Republicans were willing to shut down the government, the number was far higher — 80 or more — and Boehner’s leadership team got steamrolled in trying to avoid the shutdown. As bad as his hand was, McConnell thought he could secure a couple of conservative concessions in a deal, such as the repeal of an unpopular tax on medical devices that helps fund the Affordable Care Act. “The president gets up every day and reads the newspaper and thanks God that Ted Cruz is in the United States Senate,” a Republican senator pointedly told Cruz at a closed-door meeting.
– During a White House meeting on Oct. 2, a day into the shutdown, John Boehner slipped out for a smoke. Barack Obama followed him, demanding a private explanation for the shutdown. "John, what happened?" he asked. "I got overrun, that's what happened," Boehner replied. That anecdote kicks off Politico's behind-the-scenes look at the crisis. The Wall Street Journal has one too—with different bits of insider gossip. Here are the most interesting tidbits from both: Obama and Harry Reid decided on their no-negotiation strategy over the summer, believing that Boehner could never unite his fractured caucus behind anything. Republicans never believed the pair would stick to it. Boehner and Reid initially struck a deal in which Boehner would pass a sequester-level budget with an ObamaCare-defunding rider that the Senate could simply strip out. Boehner assumed—incorrectly—that his caucus only wanted a show vote. Boehner's former chief of staff was feeding the White House intelligence, telling it that Boehner would have to fight up until the debt ceiling deadline. Reid also took to monitoring Twitter for hints on the GOP's next move—a sign of how badly communication was flowing. Many Republicans turned to Joe Biden, hoping he would intervene. Biden told them he'd been "sidelined … at the direction of the president," one rep says. Reid, bitter about the fiscal cliff deal Biden negotiated, had wanted him out. At one point, Boehner brought up the idea of a "grand bargain" at a White House meeting; Reid laughed in his face. When Paul Ryan joined the fray at an Oct. 10 meeting, he told Obama that he would "miss his moment" and derail his whole term if he didn't strike a deal. But he also made what White House aides called a "Freudian slip," saying, "We’re going to have six weeks to negotiate the debt limit." That night, aides to Boehner, Cantor, and Obama began talking about a broader budget deal, and agreed to talk more in the morning. The White House never called. When Mitch McConnell finally decided he had to broker the deal, he partnered with Lamar Alexander—angering Susan Collins, who had worked far harder on the process, only to see her own deal torpedoed. McConnell picked Alexander because he had better conservative credentials, and was pals with Reid confidante Chuck Schumer. Alexander and Schumer brokered the deal behind the scenes, then passed it off to Reid and McConnell. McConnell tells the Washington Post that he saw himself as a backup quarterback thrown into the game. "I felt like I was on the two-yard line, I had a pretty weak offensive line, and the best I could hope for was to try to punt." Boehner made one last-ditch attempt to pass an alternative. "We're running out of time," he told his caucus. "Your 'no' vote has consequences." But as Reid and Obama had predicted, he couldn't convince them. With the ball back in McConnell and Reid's court, McConnell made a few last-minute demands. Reid rejected them. It took all of 15 minutes for McConnell to call back and accept Reid's terms.