"The Fire Service was effectively 'outside the loop,' having no presence at the rendezvous point established by the Police, little awareness of what was happening at the Arena and only a very limited and belated presence," the report found. His report also found:

An early decision was taken to base crews at Philips Park Fire Station - about two miles away from the arena - rather than with police at the city's cathedral car park

This hampered communication and awareness of what was happening at the scene

The fire service was "effectively outside the loop [and had] little awareness of what was happening at the arena"

There were "strategic oversights" by police commanders that led to confusion over whether an "active shooter" was on the loose

"Poor communications" meant fire crews only arrived two hours and six minutes after the bombing. “Strategic oversights” by police commanders led to confusion with other 999 services over whether an “active shooter” was on the loose and poor communications between Greater Manchester Police (GMP) and Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) meant the “valuable” assistance of fire crews was delayed by two hours and six minutes after the bombing, which left 22 dead and scores injured. "There is a lot to be proud of in the response to the attack, both for the city region of Greater Manchester, and for the emergency services," Lord Bob Kerslake, the former Head of the Civil Service, said. The report, released Tuesday, makes 50 recommendations but said its panel of experts was not to answer the question: “Would the earlier arrival of GMFRS at the scene have made any difference to the medical outcomes of the injured?”

“This is a question that only the coronial inquests can decide,” it added. An independent report found that the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service did not arrive at the scene and played "no meaningful role in the response" to the suicide bomber attack that killed 22 people in May of last year. The police duty inspector in the Greater Manchester Police control room declared Operation Plato, a pre-arranged plan when it is suspected a marauding armed terrorist may be on the loose - and assumed, wrongly, other agencies were aware. But GMFRS and the North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) were only informed an hour and a half later and by then Operation Plato was effectively put on "stand by" as it emerged the attack was from a single suicide bomber and not the prelude to further armed attacks. The senior fire officer on duty, a national inter-agency liaison officer, came to believe an “active shooter” scenario was still in play and stuck to rules which dictate keeping emergency responders 500m away from any suspected “hot” zone of danger from a potential armed terrorist.
A United Kingdom panel, chaired by the former head of the Home civil service, Lord Bob Kerslake, issues a report which concludes that firefighters were prevented from attending the scene of the bombing for two hours. The report makes more than 50 recommendations.