When federal safety investigators meet on Tuesday to determine the cause of the Asiana Flight 214 crash , they will have studied not only last summer 's deadly accident but also a little-known incident years earlier . In August of 2010 , Eugene Francis Arnold , one of the Federal Aviation Administration 's top test pilots , was descending into Seattle 's Boeing Field when he leveled off to avoid another plane . To his surprise , his speed fell 10 or 15 knots below his target speed , even though he believed the jet 's automated speed control , or auto-throttle , was engaged . Arnold pushed the throttle manually to increase the plane 's speed and landed safely . Arnold , investigators believe , experienced the same type of `` mode confusion '' that caught Asiana 's pilots off guard -- at a much lower altitude -- shortly before they plowed into the sea wall at San Francisco International Airport . In both cases , the pilots believed they had selected modes of autopilot and auto-throttle that would `` wake up '' the auto-throttle if necessary , much as a car 's cruise control kicks in when the car heads uphill . But they had n't . Complex system . There lies the big question before the National Transportation Safety Board when it meets Tuesday : Is Boeing to blame for creating a system so complicated that it befuddled even a top FAA test pilot ? Are the pilots to blame for not understanding the intricacies of the system and for failing to monitor the plane 's speed ? Or is Korea-based Asiana Airlines to blame for not adequately training its pilots ? At a December hearing on the crash , experts told the safety board that while automation has vastly improved aviation safety , it has a flip side . The same technology that makes it possible for pilots to fly coast to coast without touching a yoke are complicated and hard to master . Thus , flying is getting easier and harder at the same time . `` Automation can be extremely supportive of human operators if it is designed properly , '' expert Nadine Sarter of the University of Michigan testified . `` But we also have seen in a number of incidents ( where ) automation can actually get in the way . '' `` We have heard things like 'clumsy ' automation , where automation ... helps the most when the pilot actually might need the help the least . But when they need the help the most -- in very time-critical conditions -- it might be very difficult for them to actually operate the automation , '' she said . Different opinions . Not surprisingly , Asiana Airlines , the pilots union , and Boeing , which manufactured the 777 involved in the crash , have starkly different opinions of what role the pilots played in the crash , and the role of automation . `` The airplane and all airplane systems were functioning as expected prior to impact and did not contribute to the accident , '' Boeing said in a March submission to the safety board . The accident was caused by the pilots ' failure to monitor and control the plane 's airspeed and direction , and could have been avoided if they had initiated a timely go-around . Asiana , meanwhile , blamed Boeing and the pilots . The pilots , just three months before the accident , had received `` specific instruction '' about the possibility the airspeed protection would be disabled in a certain mode , Asiana said . The airline assigned blame to the pilots for not ensuring `` a minimum safe airspeed , '' and Boeing for creating an autopilot system that led to an `` unexpected disabling '' of speed protections . The warning system , the airline says , also did not give the pilots enough time to recover . The Asiana Pilots Union blamed crew training , saying pilots were not trained that a combination of autopilot and auto-throttle modes would not prevent the plane from going too slowly . `` In this case , a key piece of information was not provided as part of the normal training program at Asiana , '' the union said . Boeing said it was without fault . `` All airplane systems were functioning as expected prior to impact and did not contribute to the accident , '' it told the safety board . Asked why the `` hold '' mode did not protect against dangerous drop-offs in speed , Boeing told the board , `` To do this would violate ( Boeing 's ) design philosophy : the pilot is the final authority for the operation of the airplane . '' `` If the auto-throttle automatically ( switched mode to prevent an aerodynamic stall ) , it would be overriding the crew 's selection , '' Boeing said . Fly the plane manually . If pilots are confused by the technology , there is a simple solution : Fly the plane manually , Boeing said . `` This accident would have been avoided had the flight crew followed procedures and initiated a timely go-around , '' Boeing told the safety board . What no one contests is that by the time the plane 's captain recognized the plane was traveling too slowly , it was too late . At 11 seconds before impact , the plane 's low airspeed alert was triggered . Eight seconds before impact , one of the pilots pushed the throttles forward . But it takes engines seven to eight seconds to spool up from idle to full power . The plane slammed into the seawall , ripping off the landing gear , the tail and both engines . It spun 330 degrees in a shower of sparks and debris . Of the 307 people on board , three died . Almost 200 were injured . Asiana Airlines fined $ 500,000 for failing to help families . Asiana crash victims sue Boeing .
NTSB votes Tuesday on cause of 2013 Asiana crash in San Francisco . Focus is on pilots ' actions , automation . Pilots confused by auto-throttle modes . Will blame fall on pilots or designers ?