( CNN ) -- As U.S. President Barack Obama decides on the best strategy to deal with the threat posed by ISIS in Iraq , Syria and beyond , his final plan of action will undoubtedly include the participation of like-minded allied countries and regional partners . One such partner are the Kurds of northern Iraq who regard ISIS as the biggest threat since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003 . The Kurds , however , are hoping for a more robust and lasting U.S. commitment as part of rekindled Kurdish-American cooperation . Meanwhile , it might be timely for Washington to reassess its previous refusal to directly engage with Kurdish armed forces . As the last few weeks of military battles against ISIS show , when American assistance has not been forthcoming , the Iraqi Kurds have turned to Iran for help . In terms of identity , the Kurdish Regional Government ( KRG ) in northern Iraq stands apart from most of the rest of the Middle East due to its secular way of life and pro-Western orientation . And what the Kurds have put together here since securing autonomy from Baghdad in 2005 is antithetical to the primordial worldview of ISIS , which calls itself the Islamic State . Now , with its record of relative stability and nascent democracy in danger , officials in the KRG are once again turning to the United States . The Kurds have welcomed Washington 's decision to confront ISIS . At the same time , however , officials in Irbil are urging the Obama administration to start a long overdue process of helping the Kurds help themselves by empowering them militarily . The simplest of facts about the Kurdish armed forces -- the Peshmerga -- are hard to miss . Despite the heightened enthusiasm to repel ISIS , the Peshmerga continue to suffer from some elemental structural drawbacks . After years of semi-autonomous rule , Iraqi Kurds still lack an institutionalized , non-politicized armed force . The majority of the Peshmerga are still made up from armed members from the two largest political parties in the KRG : the Kurdistan Democratic Party ( KDP ) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan ( PUK ) . In the past the absence of an organized and well-trained armed force was accepted by the various Iraqi Kurdish parties as an inevitable but tolerable condition . The rise of ISIS , however , has rapidly changed that unsustainable attitude . The role of the U.S. To achieve a better organized and a more capable Kurdish military force requires more than just political horse-trading in Irbil . It requires American mediation and military assistance to the Kurds . The fact that the United States has good relations with all Iraqi Kurdish parties gives Washington leverage among the Kurdish parties . This leverage can be used to set out to help the Iraqi Kurds build up a more efficient military as they battle ISIS . But , before any practical steps can be taken , Washington first has to decide whether it wants to go down this path . Since the fall of Saddam 's regime , the U.S. has chosen not to train and equip the Kurdish Peshmerga directly . Washington 's policy on the provision of military assistance and training has been that all such efforts will have to go through the central government in Baghdad . The U.S. is still committed to Iraq 's territorial integrity as a principal policy and dealing with the Kurds over the head of Baghdad is seen as putting that policy in danger . And then there are the bureaucratic hurdles to overcome . Despite good relations with the leaderships of the KDP and the PUK , on paper both entities are still designated by the U.S. as Tier III terrorist organizations . That is why the Kurdish Peshmerga , numbering 150,000 of which some 110,000 are members of KDP or the PUK , can not receive U.S. military aid directly . As American policy-makers wrestle with this question in Washington , Iraq 's Kurds have had to look elsewhere for support . In June , following the barrage of military victories of ISIS , Iran was at first the only country that proved willing to come to the aid of the Kurds with military supplies and advisors . In a press conference with the Iranian foreign minister , Javad Zarif , in Irbil on August 26 , Masoud Barzani , President of Iraqi Kurdistan , said `` Iraqi Kurds will never forget Iran 's support that came at a crucial time beyond our expectation . '' But Iran 's appearance as the key backer of the Peshmerga is not cost-free . Under Tehran 's stewardship , Iranian-backed Shia militias from elsewhere in Iraq have come north to join the fight against ISIS . As much as the Kurds have welcomed Iran 's role in rolling back ISIS , there are fears about the longer-term impact of Tehran 's larger footprint in Iraqi Kurdistan . But given the imminent threat posed by ISIS , how Iranian military support has come about is for now a secondary concern for Iraq 's Kurds . They are simply pleased that Tehran has been there to provide much -- needed military aid when it was most wanted . Tehran , meantime , will not be blind to the fact that internal Kurdish divisions and a decentralized Peshmerga force provides it with opportunities to intervene and increase its influence in northern Iraq . As President Obama formulates a long-term strategy to neutralize the threat of ISIS , he can not ignore the pivotal role Kurdish fighters likely will play in such a campaign . It might also be an opportune moment to revisit some of the more archaic American policies that shape ties with Iraqi Kurdistan . As Washington looks for ways to better organize and militarily equip the Peshmerga against ISIS , the one undeniable fact is that the Iraqi Kurds are hoping for swift American action . They prefer the United States over other foreign partners but are hardly in a position to be overly selective given the imminent threat from ISIS . Read more : Time to turn ISIS crisis into opportunity .
U.S. President Barack Obama is set to announce his strategy for dealing with ISIS . Alex Vatanka and Sarkawt Shamsulddin say the Iraqi Kurds stand out as potential partners . The Kurdish Regional Government is secular and Western orientated , they say . They are also opposed to a possible partition of Iraq into Sunni - dominated areas in the north and Shia - majority areas in the south.