In the classical version of the Prisoner's Dilemma, two agents can choose
either cooperation or defection. Hence, there are four payoffs associated with
each pairwise interaction between the two agents. In consonance with common
practice [1]}, [2]}, payoffs are characterized by the reward
for mutual cooperation (\(R=1\) ), punishment for mutual defection (\(P=0\) ),
sucker's payoff (\(S=0\) ) and temptation to defect (\(T=b\) , where \(1<b<2\) ).
Note that this parametrization refers to the weak version of the Prisoner's
Dilemma game, where \(P\)  can be equal to \(S\)  without destroying the nature of
the dilemma. In this way, the constraints \(T > R > P \ge S\)  maintain the dilemma.
