An alternative version of this defence involves the assertion that scientific realism is in some way intrinsically linked to causal explanation: for example, ref [1]} states that `In our view, the most constructive way of defining ‘realities of Nature’ is as causal mechanisms acting on causal relata.' There is a Kantian element to this line of argument, since it seems to be proposing that causal concepts are an indispensable feature of any attempts we might make to formulate an idea of `reality.' Indeed, Nagel has expressed a more explicitly Kantian version of this view, writing that causation `is an analytic consequence of what is commonly meant by `theoretical science' ... it is difficult to understand how it would be possible for modern theoretical science to surrender the general ideal expressed by the principle without becoming thereby transformed into something incomparably different from what that enterprise actually is.'[2]} But history has shown that we should be cautious about assenting to these kinds of transcendental claims: after all, at one time Euclidean geometry[3]} and locality[4]} were also both regarded as indispensable features of our thought, but science has since dispensed with both in certain regimes, without thereby becoming unintelligible. So we should not be too quick to assume that causation is an essential feature of our attempts to describe reality.
