In this paper, we develop a game-theoretical framework to study how a strategic attacker can undermine the performance of a quantum detector by distorting the quantum states produced by the quantum system. Game-theoretic frameworks have been widely implemented in studying attacker-defender relationships in cyber-security [1]}, [2]}. In a generic quantum detection characterized by hypothesis testing scenario [3]}, the detector (He) receives a sample of quantum states drawn from an unknown ensemble characterized by a density operator. The detector aims to make a decision regarding the genuine density operator that produces the quantum state. In our adversarial scenario, an attacker (She) observes the true density operator, intercepts the original quantum states, and sends strategically distorted quantum states to the `naive' detector, who applies the decision rule as if the received quantum states were untainted. We model the relationship between the attacker and the naive detector as a Stackelberg game [4]}, where the attacker plays the role of a leader and the detector the follower.
