To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to study non-monetary mechanisms for the trade of data (bilateral data exchange). There has been, however, a growing literature on monetary data market mechanisms which we review here. The first set of papers in this area study data sharing among strategic agents/firms. These papers implement information sharing among competing agents via the use of an intermediary. In this literature the intermediary is treated as a welfare maximizer, and is limited to aggregating data from agents and sharing it with all others [1]}. [2]} and [3]} extend this literature to the case of a rent-seeking intermediary who can also distort data. In contrast to this literature, we do not consider competition among the agents in downstream markets, and we also do not pose corresponding restricting assumptions on trade and on utility functions. We allow for bilateral trade, both with and without intermediaries. In our study, the intermediary is a social-welfare maximizer and we also allow the intermediary to add noise to the model.
