There is a rich literature on evolution in repeated games. A general summary of this literature can be found in the books by Axelrod [1]}, Nowak [2]}, and Sigmund [3]}, or in recent review articles [4]}, [5]}. Research in this area explores three broad themes. (i) It aims to identify strategies that can sustain cooperation [6]}, [7]}, [8]}, [9]}, [10]}, [11]}, [12]}, [13]}. (ii) It describes how likely such cooperative strategies evolve [14]}, [15]}, [16]}, [17]}, [18]}, [19]}, [20]} and persist [21]}, [22]}, [23]}, [24]} in a population. (iii) It evaluates to which extent the predicted strategies can be observed in humans [25]}, [26]}, [27]}, [28]} or other animal species [29]}. While our study speaks to all three aspects mentioned above, we are most concerned with a more general question. We ask how individuals themselves can learn to adopt beneficial strategies more effectively, when given the choice between different learning rules.
