Radiometric fingerprinting can enhance the security of networks by enabling means of additional authentication based on physical layer properties of devices [1]}, [2]}, [3]}.
However, we found that an adversary can easily impersonate other devices exploiting the fingerprinting scheme proposed by Liu et al. [1]}.
We mount such an impersonation attack using an SDR as follows: we first compute the fingerprint of the SDR by connecting it to another receiver (e.g., another SDR, signal analyzer).
This needs to be done only once.
Next, we measure the fingerprint of the target device, which only requires the adversary to sniff one (encrypted or unencrypted) packet sent by the target device.
Knowing the proprietary fingerprint and that of a target, we can compute the phase offset on each subcarrier.
These phase offsets are added to the LTF subcarriers and all subcarriers in the succeeding OFDM symbols (cf. Fig. REF ) at the SDR.
Consequently, the fingerprint extracted by the receiver matches that of the target device.
The SDR provides flexible processing capabilities that allow us to introduce phase rotations to the transmission chain easily.
In Fig. REF , we demonstrate how accurately the SDR (i.e., adversary) can replicate the fingerprint of another device (i.e., victim).
