Well known threat modelling frameworks such as STRIDE [1]} and OCTAVE [2]} typically formulate the modelling process by first defining a high-level abstraction of a target system, its sub-systems and interfaces for profiling potential system attackers, their methods and associated objectives.
This definition provides a model of system security contexts that allows for the creation of a catalogue of possible threats to the system and selection of security controls which can be used to address them; based on the severity of the threat and the risk it poses to the system.
In this manner, traditional threat modelling frameworks generate “stationary” representations of a system with predefined attacker profiles.
This approach has practical limitations for effective and resilient threat modelling in 5GCNs.
This is because they are dynamic and heterogeneous by design with system security contexts, which adapt continuously based on evolving configuration of the 5GCN instance (e.g. multi-tenancy application services, network slicing, quality of service, elastic compute, and software-defined radio access).
