Many social and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals within the framework of evolutionary game theory
[1]}, [2]}, [3]}, [4]}, [5]}, [6]}, [7]}, [8]}, [9]}.
The evolution of very large (infinite) populations can be then given by differential replicator equations which describe time changes of fractions of populations playing
different strategies [10]}, [11]}, [3]}, [5]}. It is usually assumed (as in the replicator dynamics) that interactions between individuals take place instantaneously
and their effects are immediate. In reality, all social and biological processes take a certain amount of time. Results of biological interactions between individuals
may appear in the future, and in social models, individuals or players may act, that is choose appropriate strategies, on the basis of the information concerning events in the past.
It is natural therefore to introduce time delays into evolutionary game models.
