[1]} discusses the conceptual space as basic features, or an embodiment or grounding [2]}, by which concepts and objects can be compared.
In neuroscience, this is supported by the fact that, in different brain regions, maps have been discovered that code, e.g., for visual appearance, sound, and function.
For instance, the concept “cat” includes
the information that a cat has four legs, is furry, meows, can
move, or can be petted [3]}.
As another example, consider the recall of the concept “hammer”, represented in the index layer. This might excite brain
areas indicating a typical hammer appearance, the sound of hammering, and the required motor movement of hammering,
all represented in the biological equivalence of representation layer [4]}. In our model, since the representation layer is activated by visual input, the embeddings will mostly be visually grounded.
 In terms of [2]}, the embeddings are modality-specific (here: visual), and the indices represent
(supramodal, multimodal, polymodal) convergence zones.
As [6]} puts it: “Every cortical site holds its own specialized piece of knowledge”.
