Is the observation that causal order plays an important role in quantum mechanics in tension with the common view that there is no causation in fundamental physics? To answer this question, we must examine more closely the reasons usually offered for this view. Russell has a number of arguments, but perhaps his most enduring point is that causation is usually supposed to be asymmetric - if \(A\)  causes \(B\)  then \(B\)  cannot also be the cause of \(A\)  - whereas the fundamental laws of physics do not seem to be asymmetric or directed in any way: `The law makes no difference between past and future: the future“determines" the past in exactly the same sense in which the past “determines" the future.'[1]} This point continues to appear in the work of current philosophers - for example, Frisch suggests that the apparent time-symmetry of fundamental physical looks like a serious problem for causal fundamentalists, because `the (fact that) the notion of causation is asymmetric ... may even be thought to constitute the core of our notion of cause,'[2]}As we will see in section REF , Frisch subsequently offers a putative counterexample to the claim that fundamental physics is not in fact time-symmetric, and so argues that causal fundamentalism can be rescued. and Field points out that this argument still succeeds even if the fundamental laws are not time-symmetric: all that is needed to make it is that the laws of physics `have essentially the same character in both (temporal) directions,'[3]} which does seem to be the case for most of our fundamental physical lawsField does point out that certain interpretations of quantum mechanics seem to violate this criterion - most obviously collapse interpretations, since systems evolve differently after the collapse of the wavefunction. However we will not dwell on these cases here, as our purpose is to show that there can be a well-defined notion of causal order in fundamental physics even if it does not exhibit any directedness or asymmetries.. So there is apparently nothing intrinsically directed in fundamental physics which could play the role of causation, and therefore it seems natural to conclude that there is no causation in fundamental physics - causation arises at a macroscopic level, perhaps because of the thermodynamic gradient[4]} or due to the presence of agents who can play a role in an interventionist[5]}, [6]} or perspectival[7]} analysis.
