While the prisoner's dilemma has been instrumental in modeling human cooperation, there are other natural rankings of the game's payoffs. These alternative rankings result in weaker forms of conflict. To further explore the relative performance of FMTL, we consider generalized social dilemmas, defined by three properties [1]}, [2]}, [3]}: (i) the payoff for mutual cooperation exceeds the payoff for mutual defection, \(R>P\) ; (ii) when players choose different actions, a defector obtains a larger payoff than a cooperator, \(T>S\) ; and (iii) irrespective of their own action, players prefer their opponent to cooperate, \(R>S\)  and \(T>P\) . In addition to the prisoner's dilemma and the so-called harmony game (in which establishing cooperation is trivial [4]}), there are two more games that qualify as generalized social dilemmas [5]}: the stag hunt [6]} and the snowdrift [7]}, [8]} games.
