Integrity and validity of input data for the power system state estimation (PSSE) algorithm is crucial for the reliability of power grid operations as the output of the PSSE block is directly used by various EMS units such as forecasting of the load and analysis of contingency [1]}. As one of the major classes of cyberattacks to the PSSE, false data injection attacks (FDIAs) aim to compromise the measurement data to bypass the bad data detection (BDD) algorithm and make the attack unobservable
[2]}.
If the grid operator takes actions according to the false system state, s/he might jeopardize the security and reliability of the grid. Traditional BDD algorithms for detecting FDIAs are insufficient as stealth (unobservable) cyberattacks can easily dodge these algorithms.
Thus, FDIAs constitutes one of the most prominent threats to today's modern power grids.
