Attached please find, in ASCII text format, the Rebuttal Testimony of R.
Thomas Beach on behalf of the Indicated Electric Generators.

Please contact me if you have any questions.

Christa Goldblatt
Office Manager
Crossborder Energy
christag@crossborderenergy.com
510-649-9790
"There is hope, but not for us."  -- Franz Kafka
 - att1.htm

                                                   Exhibit No. 18

              BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
                    OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Investigation on the Commission's Own Motion to        )
Consider the Costs and Benefits of Various Promising   )
Revisions to the Regulatory and Market Structure       )    I. 99-07-003
Governing California's Natural Gas Industry and to          )
Report to the California Legislature on the            )
Commission's Findings.                       )
                                        )

             REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF R. THOMAS BEACH
           ON BEHALF OF INDICATED ELECTRIC GENERATORS
                         IN SUPPORT OF
            THE COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

                                   R. Thomas Beach
                                     Principal
                                   Crossborder Energy
                                   2560 Ninth Street, Suite 316
                                   Berkeley, California 94710
                                   Telephone: 510-649-9790
                                   Facsimile: 510-649-9793
                                   E-mail: tomb@crossborderenergy.com

                                   On behalf of
                                   Indicated Electric Generators

May 5, 2000,                          Subject Index

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

SCGC / TURN EXAGGERATE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PG&E AND
     SOCALGAS SYSTEMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
     The Commission Should Focus on a Statewide, Consistent Structure for the
Gas Utilities
          Moving Forward, Not on Whether PG&E and SoCalGas Have Had Similar
          Problems in the Past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
     SoCalGas' Backbone System Serves the Same Function as PG&E's, and Can Be
          Unbundled in a Manner Similar to the PG&E Gas Accord .3
     The Benefits of the Gas Accord's City-Gate Market Have Been Substantial
for Electric
          Generators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
     Customers Have Not Had to Hold Capacity or Pay Demand Charges to Realize
These
          Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

SCGC'S AND TURN'S COST / BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF TRANSMISSION UNBUNDLING
     IGNORES THE BENEFITS AND OVERSTATES THE COSTS . . . . . . .4
     SCGC / TURN Fail to Recognize the Benefits of Transmission Unbundling4
          Unbundling will provide competitive benefits in the city-gate
market4
          The Comprehensive Settlement reduces rates for EG customers6
          The Comprehensive Settlement reduces risks for EG customers6
     SCGC / TURN Greatly Overstate the Impact of Demand Charges.7
,              BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
                    OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Investigation on the Commission's Own Motion to        )
Consider the Costs and Benefits of Various Promising   )
Revisions to the Regulatory and Market Structure       )    I. 99-07-003
Governing California's Natural Gas Industry and to          )
Report to the California Legislature on the            )
Commission's Findings.                       )
                                        )

             REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF R. THOMAS BEACH
           ON BEHALF OF INDICATED ELECTRIC GENERATORS
                         IN SUPPORT OF
            THE COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

     My name is R. Thomas Beach. I am principal consultant with the firm
Crossborder
Energy. My business address is 2560 Ninth Street, Suite 316, Berkeley,
California 94710.  My
experience and qualifications are described in Attachment RTB-1 to the direct
testimony that I
served in this proceeding on May 4, 2000.

I.   INTRODUCTION

     This rebuttal testimony responds to the direct testimony of the Southern
California
Generation Coalition (SCGC) and The Utility Reform Network (TURN) in support
of their "Post-
Interim Settlement Agreement" (PISA), which was submitted to the Commission
on April 3,
2000.  The sponsors of this rebuttal testimony include past, present, and
future electric generation
customers of the Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas) and San Diego Gas
and Electric
(SDG&E).  The sponsors of this testimony are all signatories to and
supporters of the
Comprehensive Settlement Agreement that over 20 parties filed on April 17,
2000.  For the
reasons set forth below, the sponsors of this testimony do not support the
SCGC / TURN PISA
to the extent that it fails to unbundle intrastate transmission, a step that
is one of "the most
promising options" that the Commission has identified for the restructuring
of the SoCalGas
system.  I recommend, instead, that the Commission adopt the Comprehensive
Settlement
Agreement, which moves forward on all of the Commission's "most promising
options," including
unbundling intrastate transmission.  The Comprehensive Settlement Agreement
enjoys broad
support from the full range of stakeholder interests in the southern
California gas market.

II.  SCGC / TURN EXAGGERATE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PG&E
     AND SOCALGAS SYSTEMS.

     In D. 99-07-015, at page 14, the Commission identified the creation of a
system of firm,
tradeable intrastate transmission rights as one of its "most promising
options" for the further
restructuring of the SoCalGas system.  A significant element in that
determination was the
Commission's desire to follow the model of the PG&E Gas Accord, and thus to
encourage
statewide consistency in its gas restructuring program.  The SCGC / TURN PISA
now asks the
Commission to re-consider that finding, and to defer any further unbundling
of intrastate
transmission service on the SoCalGas system.  In support of that aspect of
the PISA, the
witnesses for SCGC / TURN testify (1) that the unbundled transmission system
adopted for
PG&E under the Gas Accord responded to a unique set of problems that have not
been present in
southern California, (2) that there are significant structural and
operational differences between
the PG&E and SoCalGas systems, and (3) that the Gas Accord structure has not
benefitted end-
use customers in northern California.  None of these assertions are correct.

     A.   The Commission Should Focus on a Statewide, Consistent Structure
for the
          Gas Utilities Moving Forward, Not on Whether PG&E and SoCalGas Have
          Had Similar Problems in the Past.

     SCGC / TURN witness Mr. Florio describes at length the problems that led
to the
adoption on transmission unbundling for PG&E in the Gas Accord settlement.
He views PG&E's
difficulties as far more extensive than those that SoCalGas now faces, thus
justifying more
"extreme measures" such as the unbundling of intrastate transmission.  SCGC /
TURN Testimony,
at Section 2.1.1.2.

     In my view, both PG&E and SoCalGas have faced the same types of
problems, even if the
economic distortions on the PG&E system have been greater.  On both systems,
shippers have not
had a system of firm capacity rights, allocated by non-discriminatory, open
access procedures, to
govern who had access to what receipt point.  On the PG&E system, the attempt
to discriminate
against PGT Expansion volumes that sought to use PG&E's Line 400 resulted in
the "crossover"
problems at Malin.  Similarly, SoCalGas' "windowing" procedures have not
provided firm, non-
discriminatory access at SoCalGas' receipt points.  "Windowing" has
restricted the access of
competitive gas supplies to receipt points such as Wheeler Ridge, just as the
"crossover ban"
limited the competition to sell gas at Malin onto PG&E's Line 400.

     Furthermore, SoCalGas has also faced the same sort of "conflict of
interest" charges as
PG&E.  SoCalGas' core procurement department has been criticized for
monopolizing the Hector
Road receipt point, to the benefit of SoCalGas' shareholders through the Gas
Cost Incentive
Mechanism.  See D. 99-07-015, at pages 15 - 18.

     However, the Commission should not decide the future structure for
California's gas
industry on the basis of whether SoCalGas' past problems have resembled
PG&E's past
difficulties. For electric generators, what is important is that the
structures that the Commission
adopts in both parts of the state should solve these problems and should be
consistent on a
statewide basis.  The new electric market is a statewide market.  There are
already at least two
merchant electric generators (Dynegy and Duke) and a number of QF projects
under common
ownership that operate in more than one gas utility service territory.
Another merchant plant
developer (Calpine) has made no secret of its intent to operate plants
statewide.  This trend
promises to increase competition in the electric market.  To encourage this
trend, the Commission
should focus on carrying through on D. 99-07-015's promise to increase the
statewide consistency
of California's natural gas restructuring program.  The unbundling of
intrastate transmission was a
key element of the PG&E Gas Accord, and should be a foundation of the further
restructuring of
the SoCalGas system, as well.

     B.   SoCalGas' Backbone System Serves the Same Function as PG&E's, and
Can
          Be Unbundled in a Manner Similar to the PG&E Gas Accord.

     Mr. Florio claims that the "network" nature of the SoCalGas system
argues against
following the Gas Accord model for unbundling backbone transmission service
for SoCalGas.
Yet Mr. Florio concedes that SoCalGas' mainline facilities that extend from
the Los Angeles basin
to the interstate pipelines on the California / Arizona border do resemble
interstate pipelines.
SCGC / TURN, at Section 2.1.1.3. SoCalGas' lines running north from the L.A.
Basin to the
Wheeler Ridge interconnects also are clearly backbone facilities similar to
PG&E's.  With respect
to local transmission, SoCalGas' network of local transmission lines inside
the L.A. Basin is
similar to PG&E's network of local transmission lines in its load centers in
the Bay Area and
Central Valley.  Indeed, both the PG&E and SoCalGas systems can be considered
to be "spokes"
of backbone lines transporting gas from the interstate pipeline receipt
points to "hubs" of
networked local transmission facilities.  The two systems differ in the
length and number of the
"spokes" (SoCalGas' are shorter and more numerous), but operationally these
components serve
the same function.  In my view, there is just as strong an operational basis
for unbundling
SoCalGas' backbone and local transmission facilities and services as there
was for unbundling
PG&E's.

     C.   The Benefits of the Gas Accord's City-Gate Market Have Been
Substantial
          for Electric Generators.

     Mr. Weil downplays the benefits that the Gas Accord has produced through
competition
among suppliers in the PG&E city-gate market that the Gas Accord created.
First, he appears to
cite the existing data as showing "average benefits of around 2 cents or more
per MMcf/d."
SCGC / TURN, at Section 2.2.2. As cited in my direct testimony, the actual
benefits have been
more than 2 cents per mmcf/d   $0.03 to $0.08 per Dth.  Mr. Weil opines that
such savings are
not significant for core customers.  Ibid., at Section 2.2.2. Regardless of
whether one agrees with
him, such competitive reductions in transportation costs are very important
for electric
generators, whose total transportation rate is likely to be roughly $0.35 per
Dth, and who, as Ms.
Yap states, "sell into a highly competitive PX market."  SCGC / TURN, at
Section 2.4.1. For an
electric generator, a 10 to 20% reduction in gas transportation charges is
well worth pursuing, as
shown by SCGC's active participation on SoCalGas BCAP issues that would lower
SoCalGas'
EG rates by far smaller amounts.

     D.   Customers Have Not Had to Hold Capacity or Pay Demand Charges to
          Realize These Benefits.

     Mr. Weil also asserts that the fact that relatively few end use
customers hold backbone
transmission capacity on the PG&E system shows that unbundling under the Gas
Accord has not
benefitted customers.  He opines that this is due to the high transaction
costs associated with
holding capacity.  SCGC / TURN, at Section 2.2.3. Ms. Yap also describes at
length how the
transaction costs associated with managing transmission capacity tends to
force end users to buy
from marketers.  Ibid., Section 2.3.1. She concludes that unbundling has been
"great for
marketers" but "not good for customers."  Ibid., at Section 2.3.1.

     This testimony ignores the fact that marketers do not exist independent
of their customers.
If a marketer's services do not add value for the customer, then that
marketer will not remain in
business for long. Under the Gas Accord, most noncore end users in northern
California have
been buying gas from marketers in the PG&E city-gate market.  However, the
available data on
PG&E city-gate gas prices   discussed above   show that end users have
realized significant
savings from these purchases, compared to the option of buying gas at the
California border and
managing their own transportation to the city-gate.  These city-gate
purchases have not involved
paying demand charges or incurring transaction costs associated with managing
capacity.
Competition among marketers has assured that customers benefit from
marketers' efficiencies in
managing transportation costs.

III. SCGC'S AND TURN'S COST / BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF TRANSMISSION
     UNBUNDLING IGNORES THE BENEFITS AND OVERSTATES THE COSTS.

     SCGC and TURN attempt to present a cost / benefit analysis of
transmission unbundling,
largely through the testimony of Ms. Yap, in an effort to show that the costs
outweigh the
benefits.  Ms. Yap ignores several significant benefits from unbundling,
greatly exaggerates the
possible costs, and presents unsubstantiated assertions about the impacts of
unbundling on
generators in the Los Angeles basin.

     A.   SCGC / TURN Fail to Recognize the Benefits of Transmission
Unbundling.

          1.   Unbundling will provide competitive benefits in the city-gate
market.

     The experience with transmission unbundling under the PG&E Gas Accord has
demonstrated that end use customers realize competitive benefits from the
creation of a city-gate
market.  The city-gate market moves gas-to-gas competition between suppliers
closer to the
customer, and allows the customer to avoid risks associated with paying
demand charges or
managing backbone transportation. Those customers who believe they can
achieve greater profits
by managing their own transportation have that option, and since not all
transportation rights on
the PG&E system are held by marketers, it is obvious that such customers do
exist.

     Mr. Weil doubts that the city-gate benefits seen on the PG&E system will
materialize, due
to "Southwest supply dominance" at SoCalGas receipt points.  SCGC / TURN, at
Section 2.2.2. Presumably this refers to the fact that gas prices tend to
trade within a narrow range of a few
cents per Dth at all of the receipt points into the SoCalGas system.  Ibid.,
at Section 2.3.1. The
price differentials at the SoCalGas receipt points are much lower than the
significant price
differentials that have existed between Topock, Arizona, and Malin, Oregon,
the two major
receipt points into the PG&E system.  However, recently the Malin / Topock
price difference has
been due almost entirely to the $0.10 to $0.12 per Dth transportation rate
differential between
PG&E's Redwood and Baja paths.  Over the most recent year for which data is
available, Malin
prices have been essentially equivalent to Topock prices, when adjusted for
the downstream
transportation rate differences.  This integration of the Malin and Topock
markets has been the
result of rising Canadian prices relative to U.S. markets, which has produced
a competitive
equilibrium between Canadian and domestic supplies serving northern
California.  Yet over this
year the benefits of PG&E city-gate purchases has actually increased, even
though there was very
little difference between Malin and Topock prices delivered to the end user.
From May 1999
through April 2000, PG&E city-gate prices have been $0.05 per Dth to $0.11
per Dth lower than
the comparable cost of border purchases plus PG&E's full backbone
transportation rates.  This
data is summarized in my Table 1.  Contrary to the SCGC / TURN testimony,
this recent
experience suggests that the price benefits from competition at a new
SoCalGas city-gate may be
just as large as those actually observed on the PG&E system.

Table 1

Natural Gas Market (May-99 through Apr-00)   $/MMBtu

Gas Prices
                             Malin
                             Topock
                         PG&E City-gate

California Border:
                              2.44
                              2.56

City-gate Market:

                              2.71

PG&E Transportation:
                            Redwood
                              Baja

                                                          Firm:
                                                           0.32
                                                           0.22

                                                  As-Available:
                                                           0.38
                                                           0.26

Price of Border
Purchases at City-gate

Firm:
2.76
2.78

As-Available:
2.82
2.82

Benefits of City-gate overBorder Purchases

Firm:
0.05
0.07

As-Available:
0.11
0.11

Data Source: Natural Gas Intelligence
              2.    The Comprehensive Settlement reduces rates for EG
customers.

          Transmission unbundling, as proposed in the Comprehensive
Settlement, will result in a
modest reduction in transportation rates for electric generators.  My direct
testimony discussed
how transmission unbundling under the Comprehensive Settlement will reduce EG
rates by $3
million per year in 2002, or about $0.01 per Dth, compared to the SoCalGas
rates adopted in the
recent BCAP decision, D. 00-04-060.  In addition, the Comprehensive
Settlement unbundles
transmission rates on an embedded cost basis, removing roughly half of the EG
rate from
SoCalGas' complex, contentious long-run marginal cost rate design.  This will
enhance the
certainty and stability of SoCalGas' EG rate   a particularly important
factor to EG customers
that may seek to build new gas-fired capacity on the SoCalGas system.

              3.    The Comprehensive Settlement reduces risks for EG
customers.

          Ms. Yap comments at length on how "if a generator's fundamental
risk increases, investors
demand more net income from the operation to compensate them for that
increased level of risk."
SCGC / TURN, at Section 2.4.3.  In my view, the Comprehensive Settlement
reduces a number
of important risks for electric generators, compared to the SCGC / TURN PISA,
as follows:

0         SoCalGas shareholders will assume 100% risk for the recovery of
unbundled backbone
          transmission costs.  This protects electric generation customers
from bearing higher
          backbone transmission costs if SoCalGas discounts backbone rates or
if declining
          throughput leads to reduced backbone transmission revenues.

0         The Comprehensive Settlement prices transmission services on an
embedded cost basis
          through August, 2006.  This removes the calculation and allocation
of marginal transmission
          costs as an issue in the next SoCalGas BCAP case.

0         The Comprehensive Settlement uses a defined 79% load factor to
price backbone
          transmission service through the term of the settlement.  This
removes the risk that declining
          throughput on the SoCalGas system could raise backbone transmission
rates in the next
          SoCalGas BCAP case.

0         The Comprehensive Settlement reduces customers' risk for revenues
from unbundled
          storage services to 25% in the second year (beginning in April,
2002), while the SCGC /
          TURN PISA maintains the 50% risk adopted in D. 00-04-060 through
2002.

0         The Comprehensive Settlement unbundles SoCalGas' transmission,
storage, and balancing
          services.  This will offer electric generators a number of new
opportunities to reduce their
          costs, including (1) city-gate gas purchases, (2) self-balancing or
competitive balancing
          services, and (3) new, competitive storage services.  In my
opinion, these opportunities
          reduce the risk that generators in the Los Angeles Basin will be
caught in a "price squeeze"
          between their gas costs and their electric revenues, because they
will have more ways in
          which to reduce their gas costs.

          B.  SCGC / TURN Greatly Overstate the Impact of Demand Charges.

          The use of demand charges for backbone transmission service appears
to be the focal point
of SCGC / TURN's opposition to transmission unbundling.  Throughout their
testimony, SCGC /
TURN overstate the impact of demand charges:

0         Ms. Yap's Figure 1, showing the impact of a customer's load factor
on its average
          transportation rate, assumes that the customer's entire rate is
collected in a demand charge.
          SCGC / TURN, at Section 2.4.1. She fails to note that the demand
charge for firm backbone
          transmission under the Comprehensive Settlement will be only about
22% of the total EG
          rate under the SFV rate option, and just 12% of the rate under the
alternative backbone rate
          with a 50% demand component.

0         Ms. Yap presents the results of "a study of more than half of the
generators in the Los
          Angeles basin" that purports to show that "SFV-style" demand
charges could increase
          annual fixed costs by "as much as 20 percent."  SCGC / TURN, at
Section 2.4.2. I have
          examined the workpapers for this study, obtained in by Southern
California Edison in
          discovery, and it is based on wholly unrealistic assumptions for
how generators will buy gas
          under the Comprehensive Settlement.  First, the study assumes that
each generator will
          contract at the SFV rate proposed in the Comprehensive Settlement
for a quantity of firm
          backbone capacity based on the generator's theoretical maximum gas
use in a day (that
          is, its generating capacity in MW, times its average heat rate,
times 24 hours).  Apparently,
          this assumption is made regardless of whether the plant has
actually ever used that much gas
          in a single day.  The plants studied are mostly intermediate-load
or peaking units, and almost
          certainly never operate at anything approaching full capacity for
all 24 hours of a day.  As a
          result of this assumption, the plants studied are assumed to
contract for 1,426 MDth per day
          of backbone capacity.  According to the study, these units
represent 43% (i.e. less than one-
          half) of the gas-fired capacity in the Los Angeles Basin.  If all
generators in the basin
          contracted for capacity in this way, electric generators alone
would demand 3,316 MDth per
          day of capacity, or 93% of SoCalGas' total receipt point capacity!
There is obviously no
          such demand today for firm service to electric generators on the
SoCalGas system.  Second,
          the study assumes that the generators will make no effort to
broker, release, or sell the
          massive amount of excess capacity that they have bought and will
derive no revenues from
          such off-peak capacity sales.

          Thus, the study's dire picture of the impact of demand charges on
low-load factor
     generators assumes that such generators massively over-contract for
capacity, and fail to
     take advantage of the numerous means available under the Comprehensive
Settlement to
     reduce or eliminate their demand charge risks:

          The Comprehensive Settlement offers an optional backbone rate with
a 50% demand
          charge that almost halves the demand charge risk, but offers the
same firm priority as the
          SFV demand charge.

          Under the comprehensive settlement, interruptible service at
volumetric rates is always
          available at no more than a 20% premium over firm backbone rates,
and may even be
          available at less than the firm backbone rates, particularly during
low-demand periods.
          With a backbone rate of $0.0719 per Dth, this premium is no more
than $0.0144 per Dth.
          Ms. Yap observes (in Section 2.3.1) that the interstate pipelines
supplying SoCalGas have
          at least 1,000 MMcf/d (or 30%) more capacity than SoCalGas'
intrastate system.  She
          does not recognize that SoCalGas' backbone system also has more
than 900 MMcf/d of
          excess capacity, plus substantial excess storage capacity.  Due to
this excess intrastate
          capacity, it is difficult to imagine a scenario, for the
foreseeable future, in which a low-
          load factor generator would ever have to pay more than the maximum
interruptible rate
          for "virtually firm" backbone service.

          I have re-calculated the results of the SCGC / TURN study, under
the assumption that
          generators in the Los Angeles basin take interruptible service, in
order to avoid demand
          charges, at the full $0.0144 per Dth premium for interruptible
service.  In this case, the
          generators' annual fixed costs increase by just six-tenths of one
percent (0.6%).  In
          reality, I expect that interruptible or released firm service will
be available for much of the
          year at all-volumetric rates that are much less than the maximum
interruptible rate.

          The Comprehensive Settlement will establish an active market for
the trading of
          backbone capacity on the SoCalGas system.  This will provide a
means for electric
          generators to rationalize their holdings of intrastate capacity,
and may be a source of firm
          capacity at volumetric rates.  Again, the SCGC / TURN study of the
impact of demand
          charges assumes that generators do not use this secondary market.

          Ms. Yap fails to recognize that low-load factor generators will be
able to avoid paying
          demand charges (and save money on intrastate transportation, as
well) by buying gas in
          the city-gate market.  Ms. Yap's primary concern with the city-gate
market appears to
          be the fear that marketers will be able to charge a significant
premium for city-gate sales
          during periods of capacity constraints.  SCGC / TURN, at Section
2.3.1. Ms. Yap's
          testimony fails to explain her assertion that the city-gate market
could become a
          "bottleneck" on the SoCalGas system.  Upstream of the city-gate
market, SoCalGas will
          have over 900 MMcf/d of excess backbone capacity, plus significant
amounts of unused
          storage capacity.

          Ms. Yap's "bottlenecks" and marketer-manipulated high prices have
not materialized in
          two years' of experience with the PG&E city-gate market, even
though PG&E has less
          excess transmission capacity and far less storage capacity than
SoCalGas.   PG&E city-
          gate prices did experience one brief spike, due to very high demand
during the cold snap
          just prior to Christmas in 1998, but on average PG&E city-gate
prices have provided
          significant benefits to end users, compared to purchases at the
California border.  In
          addition, the data that Mr. Weil cites on the parties holding
capacity on the PG&E system
          shows that 75 parties hold capacity on the Redwood path alone, and
does not suggest any
          undue concentration of capacity holdings on the PG&E backbone
system.  Ibid., Table 1,
          Section 2.2.3.

          Furthermore, the Comprehensive Settlement has numerous provisions
to ensure that any
          one marketer will be unlikely to accumulate a dominant share of
capacity to the SoCalGas
          city-gate market.  First, noncore end use customers will have the
initial two open seasons
          in which to subscribe to up to 50% of the available backbone
capacity, without
          competition from marketers.  This should ensure that end users that
are interested in
          holding capacity will be able to acquire the capacity that they
desire, and is likely to lead
          to an even greater number of holders of capacity than resulted from
the Gas Accord open
          season, in which end users and marketers competed together.
Second, the Comprehensive
          Settlement limits any one party from holding, at the end of the
open season process, more
          than 40% of the intrastate capacity from any individual SoCalGas
receipt point.  Third, if
          any party attempts to withhold firm intrastate capacity, in an
effort to drive up prices, that
          capacity will be available for SoCalGas to sell as interruptible
service, and SoCalGas will
          have a strong incentive to market such capacity, because it is 100%
at risk for the
          recovery of backbone transmission costs.

     The SCGC / TURN testimony tries to portray low-load factor generators as
caught in a
"price squeeze" between capped PX prices and increased fixed operating costs
due to the
imposition of demand charges for intrastate transmission.  SCGC / TURN,
Section 2.4.3.  The
testimony paints a grim picture of plants closing, and jobs lost, in the Los
Angeles Basin.
However, there are a number of elements in this picture that simply do not
add up:

0    The testimony appears to assume that low-load factor generators pay the
SFV demand
     charges, and take none of the steps discussed above to mitigate or
eliminate the impact of
     demand charges.

0    The testimony does not recognize that there will be a $3 million dollar
reduction in rates to
     the EG class as a result of the Comprehensive Settlement.

0    The testimony asserts that the increases in operating costs as a result
of demand charges will
     be serious enough to force plants to close.  Even accepting SCGC /
TURN's inflated figure
     of a 20% increase in fixed costs, SCGC / TURN provide no financial data
that substantiates
     their assertion that an increase of this magnitude is likely to force a
significant number of
     plants to close.

0    SCGC / TURN fail to appreciate the logical way to avoid the "price
squeeze" that they so
     fear: buy gas in the SoCalGas city-gate market.  City-gate buyers will
avoid paying demand
     charges, so their fixed operating costs will not increase.  In addition,
the SoCalGas city-gate
     market is likely to be the gas market that is most tightly linked to
electric prices in southern
     California, because it will be the closest market to the generators'
point of consumption and
     because almost 60% of noncore loads on the SoCalGas / SDG&E system are
electric
     generators.  As a result, generators buying gas in the SoCalGas
city-gate market will have
     the highest assurance that changes in their gas costs will be reflected
in changes in electric
     prices, thus reducing the risk of a "price squeeze between gas and
electric prices.  This has
     certainly been the case in northern California.  Straightforward
statistical analyses that I have
     performed show that the PG&E city-gate gas price is more highly
correlated to PX electric
     prices than are gas prices in any other market in the state, presumably
because electric
     generators in northern California use that market and because it is the
closest market to the
     generators' burner tips.

0    SCGC / TURN attempt to argue that the closure of low-load factor plants
in the Los
     Angeles Basin, due to the imposition of demand charges, will have
serious implications for
     electric reliability.  SCGC / TURN, at Section 2.4.5. At the same time,
SCGC / TURN argue
     that generators will not be able to recover demand charges because less
than 20% of the
     capacity in the basin is under Reliability Must-Run (RMR) contracts and
that there is
     "intense competition" for available RMR contracts.  Yet the lack of RMR
contracts in the
     basin is due to the fact that there is enough capacity in the basin to
provide more-than-
     adequate reliability and to assure that few generators can exercise
local market power.  If
     some generators in the Los Angeles Basin go out of business due to
demand charges, a more
     likely scenario than blackouts is that PX prices will rise in southern
California, the ISO will
     make available more RMR contracts in the basin, and those contracts will
provide a higher
     level of cost recovery, thus offsetting the impact of the demand charges.

     This completes my rebuttal testimony.


Start Date: 4/22/01; HourAhead hour: 7;  No ancillary schedules awarded.
Variances detected.
Variances detected in Energy Import/Export schedule.
Variances detected in Load schedule.

    LOG MESSAGES:

PARSING FILE -->> O:\Portland\WestDesk\California Scheduling\ISO Final
Schedules\2001042207.txt

---- Energy Import/Export Schedule ----
$$$ Variance found in table tblINTCHG_IMPEXP.
     Details: (Hour: 7 / Preferred:  12.00 / Final:  11.98)
  TRANS_TYPE: FINAL
  SC_ID: ECTRT
  MKT_TYPE: 2
  TRANS_DATE: 4/22/01
  TIE_POINT: PVERDE_5_DEVERS
  INTERCHG_ID: EPMI_CISO_ERNIE
  ENGY_TYPE: WHEEL

---- Load Schedule ----
$$$ Variance found in table tblLoads.
     Details: (Hour: 7 / Preferred:  55.71 / Final:  55.69)
  TRANS_TYPE: FINAL
  LOAD_ID: PGE3
  MKT_TYPE: 2
  TRANS_DATE: 4/22/01
  SC_ID: EPMI


Attached please find the Nov GA report.  Please call with any questions.

Jim


Please see the attached.  If you would like to be removed from this distribution, please let me know.

Thanks,
Kathy


---------------------- Forwarded by Daren J Farmer/HOU/ECT on 02/23/2001
01:26 PM ---------------------------

"Glover, Rusty" <rglover@halff.com> on 02/23/2001 12:46:11 PM
To: "JENNIFER (E-mail)" <JM.GLOVER@MERITENERGY.COM>, "KAK (E-mail)"
<kcameron@yahoo-inc.com>, "SHELLEY (E-mail)" <sacamero@jcpenney.com>, "DAREN
(E-mail)" <daren.j.farmer@enron.com>
cc:
Subject: FW: Contemporary Poetry

-----Original Message-----
From: Paul Billingsly [mailto:1pb@prodigy.net]
Sent: Thursday, February 22, 2001 12:49 PM
To: Ward; Tim Pyles; Tim & Vynetta Ryan; Stephen Wilson; Selman; Scott
Starnes; Rusty Glover; Ron Moore; Romberger; Robert Canright; Richard
Beasley; Quentin Mimms; Randall Bean; Monte and Jennifer Mann; Mike
Berryman; Michael Willoughby; Michael Dixon; Matt Oualline; Kellly
Parker; John Jordan; John Hendry; Jeff Weyandt; Jeff Mileger; Jack
Mimms; Hopkins, Rockwell; Gary Calvert; FRED RAINES; Fagen; Kent Smith;
MIKE_D_P; Palmer Weyandt; Roy Hale; Eddie Herring; david w cathey; David
Ashmore; Dan Holcomb; Alan Carson
Subject: Contemporary Poetry

Guys,
Just thought you might find this interesting.? I was forwarded this
poem, and told it was written by a high school student in Az.
Regardless, of who/where (not the point) I find it interesting, weirdly
amusing, and frighteningly fairly accurate.- PB

Now I sit me down in school
Where praying is against the rule
For this great nation under God
Finds mention of Him very odd.

If Scripture now the class recites,
It violates the Bill of Rights.
And anytime my head I bow
Becomes a Federal matter now.

Our hair can be purple, orange or green,
That's no offense, it's a freedom scene.
The law is specific, the law is precise.
Prayers spoken aloud are a serious vice.

For praying in a public hall
Might offend someone with no faith at all.
In silence alone we must meditate,
God's name is prohibited by the state.

We're allowed to cuss and dress like freaks,
And pierce our noses, tongues and cheeks.
They've outlawed guns, but FIRST the Bible.
To quote the Good Book makes me liable.

We can elect a pregnant Senior Queen,
And the 'unwed daddy,' our Senior King.
It's "inappropriate" to teach right from wrong,
We're taught that such "judgments" do not belong.

We can get our condoms and birth controls,
Study witchcraft, vampires and totem poles.
But the Ten Commandments are not allowed,
No word of God must reach this crowd.

It's scary here I must confess,
When chaos reigns the school's a mess.
So, Lord, this silent plea I make,
Should I be shot; My soul please take!

New Contact Numbers:
Paul Billingsly
1pb@prodigy.net
O. 972/396-1002
F.? 972/396-1954
M. 214/878-8767

475 W. Blondy Jhune
Lucas, Texas? 75002

?
 - Paul Billingsly.vcf


Once again you've made me proud!

Crystal Hyde
10/02/2000 11:29 AM
To: Chris Germany/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc:
Subject: Re: NYPA

Ok I guess I can take care of that for you.

adios amigo!


Do we need to talk about VP and MD nominations.


The file's password is headcount.

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	Brown, Sarah
Sent:	Friday, December 14, 2001 4:49 PM
To:	Slone, Jeanie; Scott, Laura; Douglas, Steve H.  (Tax); Oxley, David; Haedicke, Mark E.; Thode, Eric; Tholan, Scott; Deffner, Joseph; Sherman, Cris; Wilson, Garry D.; Mays, Wayne; Kaminski, Vince J; Virgo, Robert
Cc:	Schield, Elaine; Killen, Faith
Subject:	Headcount File

Please review this headcount file, and verify that this is an accurate list of current ENA employees as of today 12/14/01.  Please send changes by 12:00 noon on Monday, 12/17/01 to Elaine Schield.

Thanks for your cooperation,
Sarah Brown

 << File: Total Headcount.xls >>


PDF file of the 2000 annual report.

Marge
---------------------- Forwarded by Gary Peng/GPGFIN/Enron on 03/14/2001
05:20 PM ---------------------------

"Monica Zalta" <Monica.Zalta@darcyww.com> on 03/09/2001 03:20:38 PM
To: <gary.peng@enron.com>
cc: <jeannie.mandelker@enron.com>

Subject: PDF files from Jeannie

There are two batches of pages for easier downloading.

J.

 - front 1-14.pdf
 - front 15-end.pdf


I have not used table edit in over 2 years, I really don't think I am a candidate to test it.  I have told someone this already when asked a couple of weeks ago.  I also am very involved in testing the Preschedule workspace and Path confirmation, and don't want anything to get in the way of that.

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	Pate, Brett
Sent:	Monday, July 09, 2001 10:58 AM
To:	Bentley, Corry; Semperger, Cara
Cc:	Martin, Karen Y
Subject:	User Testing - Stage - Table Edit
Importance:	High

Corry, Cara,

There is a new version of Table Edit in Stage, ver. 1.0.0.33, which Counterparty Extensions and Aliases have been added to it.  Bill informed me that you two were the best candidates to look at this for user testing.  Please let me know how it looks, and if you have any questions.  Be sure to verify the version number.

Thanks,

Brett Pate
Enpower QA

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	Crooks, William
Sent:	Monday, July 09, 2001 12:35 PM
To:	Martin, Karen Y; Pate, Brett
Subject:	FW: New Version of Table Edit

QA:

	Let's move this to Stage and then contact Melissa regarding the Legal Entity Rule tab (she's best to test that.)  Corry and Cara can test the Couterparty Extensions & Aliases - just let them know that this is critical to Preschedule Workspace.

Regards,
Bill x53492

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	Venkataswami, Vishwanatha
Sent:	Monday, July 09, 2001 12:24 PM
To:	Pate, Brett; Martin, Karen Y
Cc:	Smith, Will; Luu, Duong; Crooks, William
Subject:	New Version of Table Edit

QA Team,

New Version of Tabledit.Exe 1.0.0.33 is moved to P:\PowerSys\Stage. Following tabs are added to this
?	Counterparty Extensions & Aliases
?	Legal Entity Rule

If you have any questions please do let me know,

Thanks,
Vish
X 53209


The Washington Post said today:

Surveys taken for the AFL-CIO found that . . .

* 76 percent of the workers who remembered receiving a flyer from
their union supported the endorsed candidates; and,
* Those who had a conversation about the election with a union
volunteer at the workplace or on the doorstep were 81 percent in support of
the union choices."

You need a strategy:

* Register your employees to vote;
* Get them the information they need to make informed decisions; and,
* Tell them these decisions impact their lives, their jobs and their
industry.

Need help?

We have the tools.  Click here www.politikit.com (create your own user name
and password).

The complete article follows . . . .

Democrats Tuning Up for Turnout
By David S. Broder
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, August 21, 2000; Page A01
LOS ANGELES -- Now that the hoopla of the Democratic National Convention is
past, it's time for Michael Whouley and his team to go to work.
Whouley is the Gore campaign consultant supervising the Democratic Party's
ground war--the man in charge of identifying voters who are likely to
support the vice president and other Democratic candidates and getting them
to the polls on Election Day.
With Democrats hoping for--and anticipating--a close battle for the White
House and both houses of Congress, the margin of victory could, they
believe, turn on the turnout operations run by the "coordinated campaign"
teams Whouley and his partners have been recruiting in the last few weeks.
As if there were not enough motivation in arming for battle at every level
from the legislatures up, the Republicans have raised the stakes by
announcing two weeks ago that they will funnel most of a $100 million
"Victory 2000 Fund" through their national and state parties into a similar
operation, targeted on ticket-splitters and weak partisans.
Democratic officials are not certain how seriously to take the threat and
are skeptical Republicans can match them in manpower--even if they spend
much more on the ground war than they have in the past.
But as Democratic National Committee Chairman Joe Andrew said, "Since we
don't know what the test will be, we are presuming it will be the toughest."
The job of getting people to the polls is harder than ever for both parties,
because of the shortage of high-intensity issues in a time of general
prosperity and the growing public cynicism about politics and elections. But
Republicans have an easier task. For months, more than 90 percent of their
self-identified partisans have been telling pollsters they support Texas
Gov. George W. Bush.
With those "base" voters highly motivated by the prospect of recapturing the
White House, Republicans plan to pour their resources into swing suburban
areas, find out which ticket-splitters are leaning to Bush, and deluge them
with mail and phone calls supporting the entire Republican ticket.
The counterpart Democratic effort or "coordinated campaign" will, according
to Andrew and Whouley, focus more on turning out the urban "base" of the
party, with a secondary push in selected ticket-splitting suburbs, in
districts and states where key House and Senate races are likely to be
decided.
Democrats have more experience than Republicans in running these turnout
efforts for their whole ticket. They have been using this model since 1988,
when the late Paul Tully, working at the DNC, convinced statewide candidates
and the unions supporting them in several key states that, rather than
working individually, they should pool funds and hire staff to register and
mobilize voters for all their races.
The Democrats have been expanding and improving their operation in every
cycle since then, and turnout programs employing targeted mailings, phone
calls and literature distribution, as well as "soft money"-financed "issue
ads," all aimed at African American voters, are credited with powering 1998
upset victories, especially in gubernatorial races in Alabama, Georgia and
South Carolina.
But this year, they face special challenges in the black and Latino
constituencies, and there is some nervousness about the pace of preparations
for the battle ahead.
New Jersey Sen. Robert G. Torricelli, chairman of the Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Committee, said: "The coordinated campaign is late starting this
year. In 1996, we did a good ad program for our base during the summer, and
I haven't seen anything like it so far."
Others, including some labor officials who have been critical in the past of
the youth and inexperience of the coordinated campaign directors dispatched
from Washington to the states, say that this year the DNC has a seasoned
corps of people heading the field operations.
The three top DNC staffers for the coordinated campaigns, Laurie Moskowitz,
John Giesser and Fred Humphreys, all were working states in 1988, when Tully
began setting up the model.
Andrew began prodding states to develop their game plans for this fall as
soon as he became party chairman in March 1999, having been convinced of the
value of direct voter contact during his previous job as Indiana Democratic
chairman.
With Democrats and Republicans tied in the Indiana state House going into
the 1998 election, Andrew targeted 15 districts for intensive voter contact
work and won 10 of them, giving the Democrats control.
With that experience as his talking point, Andrew has persuaded all 50 state
parties to submit their own coordinated campaign plans and budgets. At the
end of last week, 42 states had their coordinators chosen--if not always in
place.
Democrats declined to disclose their budget, but Andrew said they will be
outspent "at least 2 to 1" if Republicans actually put $100 million into
Victory 2000, as they have advertised.
But Andrew's figure does not include what labor unions supporting Gore and
other Democrats spend from their own treasuries mobilizing members and their
families. And it is that union effort which Republicans say is their biggest
worry.
After spending millions on issue ads in the 1996 campaign, AFL-CIO President
John Sweeney decided to switch those resources to a voter contact program,
with dramatic results. The union household share of the actual electorate
rose from 14 percent in 1994 to 23 percent in 1998, according to exit polls.
Surveys taken for the AFL-CIO found that 76 percent of the workers who
remembered receiving a flyer from their union supported the endorsed
candidates; those who had a conversation about the election with a union
volunteer at the workplace or on the doorstep were 81 percent in support of
the union choices.
With control of the House as important a target as Gore's victory, the
AFL-CIO has mobilized 5,000 "local coordinators" in 71 targeted
congressional districts. Unions that are part of the labor federation now
are dispatching staff members to coordinate the coordinators.
Sweeney, for one, argues that "without the machinery and the people we can
deploy, the Republicans' talk of a $100 million ground campaign is really
just a public relations ploy."
That may or may not prove to be true. Meanwhile, there were some complaints
at the convention from African American and Latino elected officials and
organizers about the planning--or lack of planning--for turnout programs in
their communities. One key California labor official, for example, charged
that a half-million-dollar program targeted on Latino voters had been
canceled after Tony Coelho, a former California congressman, left his post
as chairman of the Gore campaign.
Despite the static, Democrats are clearly serious about trying to win the
ground war. Detroit Mayor Dennis Archer, a central figure in the national
network of Democratic mayors whose political organizations will be competing
with those of the Republican governors in their states, said, "Winning this
election is not just Al Gore's job. We're taking the responsibility on
ourselves to get the message out about the stark differences between the
parties this year."
And then he noted, with a smile, "You know, the Auto Workers' new contract
makes Election Day a holiday for their members. Just watch 'em vote."
, 2000 The Washington Post Company


One of the reasons I asked about traders' reluctance to deal with Enron is the article below questions our ability to deliver on winter gas.  I would like to prepare an answer in case anyone asks.

POWER POINTS: Time For A Bronx Miracle In Houston
By Mark Golden

11/02/2001
Dow Jones Energy Service
(Copyright (c) 2001, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.)
A Dow Jones Newswires Column

NEW YORK -(Dow Jones)- With two outs in the bottom of the ninth and down by two runs with one man on, Enron Corp. (ENE) needs nothing less than a home run just to stay in the game.
This is the home run Enron must come up with: Full disclosure of the assets and liabilities of those troubled partnerships that have been kept off their balance sheet, and proof the corporation can cover the difference. It's what stockholders, bondholders and trading partners have been demanding, but time is running out, and Enron hasn't produced.
"We're going to get to that number soon and tell people. We have to do that," said a source at Enron, who didn't know how quickly the disclosure would come or whether it would be independently audited. "In this environment, we are going to be absolutely sure that it's accurate."
Enron has about $3.3 billion in debt on the two key partnerships payable in 2003. The company will sell the assets in those partnerships and, in a worse case scenario, will face a $1 billion shortfall that could be covered by selling stock and other company assets, Enron has said. The company hopes that when the time comes to issue new stock, shares will be trading closer to $20 than their current $11.
Investors, however, aren't acting as if they're reassured. Part of the trouble, analysts with credit-rating firm Standard & Poor's said Friday morning, is that until Enron sells the assets, nobody knows for sure what they're worth or how deep the partnerships are in the hole.
S&P is confident that Enron can raise enough capital to fill that hole, provided its trading partners in key energy markets continue to business with the company.
Credit Derivative Fizzle

To see the pickle the world's premier energy franchise is in, one needs to look no further than its credit derivatives trading desk. That relatively new and innovative operation was getting off the ground nicely, but the desk hasn't been able to transact for three weeks, since the value of Enron's stock and bonds began to plummet, according to another Enron employee.
Enron didn't respond to a request for comment, but the Enron Credit division in Europe said in a release that lines are "constrained" as the market continues to evaluate the company's credit position.
Until recently, customers would buy a credit derivative from Enron to cover its exposure to bankruptcy by a third company. A big supplier to a financially troubled company like Xerox Corp. (XRX) or Lucent Technologies (LU), for example, might pay Enron $1 million a year for a payout of, say, $10 million in the event of a bankruptcy.
But you wouldn't pay the premium on your insurance unless you were sure that the insurance company could pay your claims. Likewise, with Enron's creditworthiness in doubt, there's no reason to pay a lot of money just to exchange Lucent risk for Enron risk.
The same holds true, though less obviously, for Enron's core business of energy trading. Some utilities, large industrial companies and other energy trading companies could see their profits ruined if natural gas prices - already on the rise at $3 per million British thermal units - shoot to $10 this winter as they did last winter.
To guard against that risk, companies buy contracts now for delivery this winter at set prices. If a company wants to lock in winter gas at $3, should it turn to Enron? If gas were to rise to $10 in January and Enron couldn't deliver, Enron's counterparty paid a good price for no protection. And if Enron failed in a $10 gas market, that would send hundreds of companies scrambling for supplies. Gas could go to $20 in a heartbeat.
Leading Role An Asset

Enron does have a man on base. The company is so important to energy market participants that they desperately want Enron to survive. And any company that moves to lock Enron out of the market now could regret doing so if Enron survives as the big dog.
Enron's trading partners have a pretty consistent position at this point: They are continuing to trade with Enron, but are avoiding long-term deals that increase their exposure to the company. The only acceptable long-term deals are those that offset deals done earlier. Unless and until a bill goes unpaid, they'll keep delivering.
Enron, like the rest of the U.S. energy industry, paid its bills for September gas deliveries on Oct. 20 and for its September electricity deliveries on Oct. 25. Its next power and gas bills come due in the third week of November.
That means trading companies generally have just seven weeks of receivables at risk before Enron's creditworthiness faces another test. In exchange for taking on that small risk, they keep the great market maker in business.
Lenders Show Concerns

Lenders, whether through holding Enron bonds or providing loans, don't have the same luxury as energy trading companies that are keeping deals on a short leash. Lenders supply cash up front and for longer periods of time, usually years.
Outside of long-term commitments, what worries the banks, which presumably got a good look at Enron's books? If Enron is now unable to make the big bets with long-term energy deals that have kept it profitable for years, can it service all of its liabilities, known and unknown? If it has to sell profitable assets like pipelines and power plants, or otherwise put those assets at risk, will lower earnings be enough to pay rising credit costs? What happens if its greatest asset - its traders - leave in droves to work elsewhere?
If Enron is to have a chance, it needs energy trading profits to keep rolling in so that it can continue to service its debt. So far this year, trading and other wholesale operations have accounted for $2.2 billion out of $2.4 billion in net recurring income before interest and taxes. By comparison, Enron has made $617 million in interest payments so far this year.
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (JPM) and Citigroup Inc. (C) unit Salomon Smith Barney, at least, don't show much confidence Enron can do it. When they agreed to provide Enron with a $1 billion line of credit, they did so only after Enron posted valuable gas pipelines as collateral.
Bond traders - the most sophisticated investors in the world - make their money by understanding the probabilities. They're trading Enron debt at levels typically associated with distressed companies.
The lenders have chalked up their runs. Shareholders have ratcheted up the pressure.
Enron, now, must step up to the plate.
-By Mark Golden, Dow Jones Newswires; 201-938-4604; mark.golden@dowjones.com


---------------------- Forwarded by Jamie Lynn/ET&S/Enron on 05/03/2000 03:33
PM ---------------------------

Jamie Lynn
05/03/2000 02:06 PM
To: Oliver Brown/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Martin
Rosetta/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Pam
Newsome/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Ryan
Woods/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Mike
Layne/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Fred
Salinas/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Sean
Long/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Kevin
Ruffcorn/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Keith
Sparks/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Aaron
Mackey/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Braedi Craig/Enron
Communications@Enron Communications, Jennifer McClain/Enron
Communications@Enron Communications, John Garrett/Corp/Enron@Enron, Darrell
Schoolcraft/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Stanley Horton/Corp/Enron@Enron, Pamela
Carter/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Brandon
Whittaker/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Chris Williams/Enron@Gateway,
Johnny Mitchell/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Mike Bryant/OTS/Enron@ENRON, Rick
Buy/HOU/ECT@ECT, Bjorn Hagelmann/HOU/ECT@ECT, Tom Moran/HOU/ECT@ECT, Patrick
Hickey/Enron Communications@Enron Communications, Brant Reves/HOU/ECT@ECT,
Samantha T Davidson/HOU/ECT@ECT, Tangie Dykes/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Tara E
Turk/HOU/ECT@ECT, Dan Leff/HOU/EES@EES, Mark Pratorius/HOU/EES@EES, Brad
Peden/HOU/EES@EES, David Blankenship/Corp/Enron@Enron, Milton
Brown/HR/Corp/Enron@ENRON, Ken Reeves/HOU/ECT@ECT, Rory
Juneman/Corp/Enron@ENRON, Fred
Bridgewater/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Sandy
Roberts/Corp/Enron@ENRON, Derek Anderson/HOU/ECT@ECT, David
O'Dell/HR/Corp/Enron@ENRON
cc:  (bcc: Jamie Lynn/ET&S/Enron)

Subject: Spring Basketball Tournament

ENRON IS HAVING A BASKETBALL TOURNAMENT ON A MAY 13TH AND YOU ARE INVITED TO
PARTICIPATE!

On Saturday, May 13th, beginning at 9:00 a.m., The Enron Basketball
Association will be sponsoring our Spring 2000 Basketball Tournament for all
E.B.A. members. We are planning to limit the size of this tournament to the
first eight teams that reply.  While we encourage you to form your own teams,
please let us know if you do not have enough players and we will make sure
that you are placed on a team.  We will be having a captain's meeting on
Tuesday, May 9th, to discuss the rules, prizes, and other details related to
the tournament preparation.  Please have a representative from your team come
to this meeting prepared with rosters, a team name, and shirt sizes.  Lunch
will be provided.

If you are interested in placing a team in the tournament, or enter as an
individual, please contact one of the following by Monday, May 8th.

                  Jamie Lynn        ext. 3-9515
              Rick Dietz           ext. 3-5691
                             Steve Kleb          ext. 3-3959

If you have any questions, please give any of us a call.


Fault Pareto Work Request From Tom Nemila


Dear Derivatives Week subscriber:

Catch the latest breaking news in this week's issue by clicking here:
http://www.derivativesweek.com

Top stories this week:
______________________________________________
ITALIAN BANK TO BECOME MARKET MAKER FOR CREDIT.
Unicredito Banca Mobiliare is planning to become a market maker
for credit derivatives in Italy. It is looking at credit default swaps, total
return swaps, and credit default options, and will likely be a market
maker in these products by the second half of next year.

JUMBO CANADIAN PENSION FUND TO PUMP UP EQUITY DERIVATIVES USE.
The Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Board, with CAD72 billion (USD48.42
billion)
under management, is looking to explore equity derivatives strategies. One of
the
most sophisticated end users in Canada, the fund is looking at starting a
range
accrual options and options overwriting program.

INDIAN ASSET MANAGERS DIVE INTO SWAPS.
A bevy of Indian asset managers are jumping into the rupee-denominated
interest-rate
swap market for the first time, which market players believe could boost
liquidity. High
interest-rate volatility, a better brokered market, and more future interest
rate uncertainty
are drawing the asset managers in droves.
______________________________________________
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I talked to Paul Drexelius about this deal today. The reason it was on two
different tickets at CES,  two different pricing curves were being used. He
did say the price is wrong on the ticket and the price is wrong on the CES
deal printout that I gave to Victor. The trader at CES never corrected the
future months out. in CES system. Not sure if we still need two tickets or
one ticket at Enron.

I also told Paul and Noel Bartlo that I had to zero out several deal tickets
and create new ones, because the data dump that Enron received from CES was
not accurate. Paul and Noel will help check the pricing on all the East Desk
Tickets. Need Mark Friedman's group to printout a report that CES traders can
check to ensure the pricing is reflected correctly in Enron's system. We need
to do this ASAP, before we loose CES trader help.  Can Mark meet with us
tomorrow to discuss this and get an action plan to ensure the pricing is
correct?

Thanks!!!!!

Victor Lamadrid@ECT
01/10/2000 04:21 PM
To: Mark Friedman/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc: Robert Allwein/HOU/ECT@ECT, Katherine L Kelly/HOU/ECT@ECT, Joan
Veselack/Corp/Enron@ENRON, Joann Collins/Corp/Enron@ENRON, Chris
Germany/HOU/ECT@ECT

Subject: S. Jersey Deal on TCO

Hey Mark, Please take a look at S. Jersey Sale on TCO from CES.  Deal #
142776.  Their CES system says an IF TCO APPAL. price +.215 for two pieces of
11,000/day and 25,000/day.  We show TCO citygate mid internal publication
+.20 for the full 36,000/day.  Which one is right?  Joni also found a  few
other deals on TCO with price differences according to their books that we
were questioning.  Let me know what you think and how you want to review.
THANKS


Mike,

Please, draft a message to JS, DD and JL outlining the AGA
benefits and costs. This will be their decision.

Vince

	From:  Mike A Roberts                           07/27/2000 09:10 AM

To: Vince J Kaminski/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc:
Subject: Re: American Gas Association

Vince- - -

This project is getting lost in the cracks

Should we meet with Dave Delainy to get it off high center??

- - - Mike

---------------------- Forwarded by Mike A Roberts/HOU/ECT on 07/27/2000
09:08 AM ---------------------------

Elizabeth Linnell@EES
07/27/2000 08:41 AM
To: Mike A Roberts/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc: Richard Shapiro/HOU/EES@EES
Subject: Re: American Gas Association

Please see the string of messages below.
---------------------- Forwarded by Elizabeth Linnell/HOU/EES on 07/27/2000
08:36 AM ---------------------------

Carolyn Cooney@ENRON
07/27/2000 08:35 AM

To: Elizabeth Linnell/HOU/EES@EES
cc:
Subject: Re: American Gas Association

---------------------- Forwarded by Carolyn Cooney/Corp/Enron on 07/27/2000
09:44 AM ---------------------------

	From:  Allison Navin                           07/26/2000 05:23 PM

To: Cynthia Sandherr/Corp/Enron@ENRON
cc: Carolyn Cooney/Corp/Enron@ENRON

Subject: Re: American Gas Association

I actually called Stan Horton's office yesterday to find out if they knew
anything about the AGA membership, and Cindy Stark who works with Stan
informed me that Stan cancelled our associate membership with AGA effective
January, 2000.  I called Jay Copan with AGA back and left him a voicemail
with the information.  I asked him to call me if he had any questions and I
have not heard back from him.  I'll considered it closed unless I hear back
from him.

	From:  Cynthia Sandherr                           07/25/2000 08:08 PM

To: Carolyn Cooney/Corp/Enron@ENRON
cc: Allison Navin/Corp/Enron@ENRON

Subject: Re: American Gas Association

this is a Joe Hillings issue.

Carolyn Cooney
07/25/2000 11:01 AM

To: Allison Navin/Corp/Enron@ENRON
cc: Cynthia Sandherr/Corp/Enron@ENRON

Subject: Re: American Gas Association

I believe that Stan Horton's office handled the dues for AGA.

	From:  Allison Navin                           07/25/2000 10:33 AM

To: Cynthia Sandherr/Corp/Enron@ENRON
cc: Carolyn Cooney/Corp/Enron@ENRON

Subject: American Gas Association

Jay Copan with American Gas Assn. called.  Julie Caboose suggested that he
talk with you about Enron's AGA dues.  (He spoke to Rick Shapiro who said
that he has no knowledge of the dues situation).  Please call at 202-824-7020.


CALENDAR ENTRY:	APPOINTMENT

Description:
	Lynn - Oncall Martin Luther King/Holiday

Date:		1/15/2001
Time:		7:00 AM - 8:00 AM (Central Standard Time)

Chairperson:	Outlook Migration Team

Detailed Description:


Sally,

This morning I spent some time with David Maxwell of the Merchant Asset
group.  I am very intrigued by the work the group does.  Knowing that Todd
Hall has moved on to EGM and that the Merchant Asset Group is in transition
to report to Shona Wilson, I have a recommendation.  I would like for the
Merchant Asset Group to report to me.  Although I do not know all the
methodologies used by the group, I am familiar with the valuation of assets
and understand the underlying principals for most methods.  At Fleming I was
involved, at a much smaller scale, in the reporting of similar portfolios and
believe that I can be of assistance to the group in moving away from their
current spread sheet environment.  Also, I enjoyed talking with David Maxwell
and understand what he is up against.  I believe he and I would work really
well together.

Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

James


From November 14-17, Houston will host Gastech 2000, one of the worlds
largest international natural gas, LNG, and LPG conferences.  The conference
will take place at the George R. Brown Convention Center and is expected to
attract 3,000 delegates from around the world.

 Enron has played a leading role in this conference for many years and this
year we will participate as a sponsor and prominent exhibitor.  Exhibit space
and several speaking opportunities have been secured.  Ken Lay will serve as
a keynote speaker at the event.

 We particularly need your participation for the Enron exhibit booth.  Please
identify someone from your team to work with Dennis Vegas (713-345-6442) and
Hal Means (713-345-5384), who will serve as the overall coordinators for
Enron's participation.

 Please keep in mind, this year's Management Conference, for VPs and above,
is scheduled for November 15 - 17.

 Thanks for your help.


I thought I would go ahead and give you my cell no.
281.831.2062

b.


The contractual availability definition in the owner report  is the same used
throughout 2002 and implements the contractual availability definition upon
which annual availability warranty calculations are based.  Contractual
availability is defined (Survey - DT -RT -MT - LOT)/(Survey - LOT -
MTprorated) where Survey is the maximum possible number of hours in the
calendar period and MTprorated is the percent of the 48 hours of maintenance
per year credit that can be taken credit for.    DT, RT, MT, and LOT are
controller counters that accumulate the hours, to the nearest second, that
the turbine is in a downtime fault, repairtime, maintenance time, or line out
condition.   The DT, RT, MT, and LOT values are corrected for communication
loss at the beginning and ending of the time period of interest.  The
correction is based on counter values in the next or previous time interval
and is not based on an assumed 90% of communication loss rule.

I assume that Mr Marshall means wind direction curtailment by his phrase
"columnar shut-down".   The wind direction curtailment is not yet implemented
in the field and therefore there are no downtime losses.  The curtailment
info sent earlier by Mark Fisher was "utility" and not "wind direction
curtailment".

W.C. Marshall, as per the note below,  has already provided the availability
figures for Jan and Feb 2002.

The performance testing results must come from Engineering.  System
Performance Group is not involved.

The transfer function to compute m/s windspeed for the NRG #40 anemometers is
(0.765*Hz)+0.35.

Kurt Anderson
05/28/2002 08:41 AM
To: Bo Thisted/EWC/Enron@Enron, Mark V Walker/EWC/Enron@ENRON
cc: Hollis Kimbrough/EWC/Enron@ENRON

Subject: Desert Sky

Bo and Mark, I need some help on the note below. Please review Ward's e-mail
below and provide the information and or explanation as appropriate.

I am tied up on another project and would really appreciate your help, please
call if you have any questions.

Thank you

KA

---------------------- Forwarded by Kurt Anderson/EWC/Enron on 05/28/2002
08:51 AM ---------------------------

wcmarshall@aep.com on 05/28/2002 06:49:26 AM
To: Kurt.Anderson@enron.com
cc: rmalbarano@aep.com, rboteler@aep.com, peter.simpson@garradhassan.co.uk

Subject: Desert Sky

Can you help me find the following information for Peter Simpson. ?I have
attached the April Status Report which should answer the Jan and Feb
availability question.

Renee.............Kurt may need to know what availability and wind speed data
was sent to Peter.

The following information would also be helpful:

- definition of the availability figure given in the monthly
availability report, in particular the definition of the numerator shown
in the spreadsheet;

- duration of down-time due to columnar shut-down;

- availability figures for January and February 2002;

- if available, any results from performance testing undertaken to date;

- the transfer functions that have been applied to the wind speed data
provided.

Regards,

Peter Simpson

Ward C. Marshall
Director, Business Development
AEP Energy Services, Inc.

Office (614) 583-6607
Fax ? ? (614) 583-1627
Cell ? ? (614) 736-6022

Mailing Address:
PO Box 16036
Columbus, OH 43216-0036

Physical Address:
155 W. Nationwide Blvd.
Suite 500
Columbus, OH 43215
 - 0402 Desert Sky Monthly Site Report[1].pdf


Dear Vince,
Whenever feasible,for the software!
I was at a conference on bandwidth in Amsterdam on
Thursday which I found quite interesting.What about writing
a paper for EPRM together on bandwidth where,by essence,
all options SHOULD be swing options?
Helyette


Brain,
 Also Jackson Logan should not be in 103817, but should be in 103833.

 Mick Walters went to HPL, effective March 15.  And before then he was in
cost center 103833, not 103817.

P lease reclass and let me know when this is complete.

tThank you,

Irena


Hi John,

Please find attached the file with the points of delivery of the gas and the
bid's from the desk.  We need the mid's from the desk.

Thanks,

Dayem


From Southern Energy.

----- Forwarded by Ron Coker/Corp/Enron on 10/09/2000 09:47 AM -----

	"Green, Barbara E." <BEGreen@seiworldwide.com>
	10/09/2000 09:40 AM

		 To: "'Coker, Ron'" <ron.coker@enron.com>
		 cc: "Goodrich, Teri L." <tlgoodri@seiworldwide.com>, "Heinz, Kim A."
<kaheinz@seiworldwide.com>
		 Subject: Site Visit - West Assets

As instructed in the Data Room and Site Visit Procedures, Southern Energy,
Inc. would like to request the following dates for site visits:

LV Cogen - Thurs., Oct. 12th
Pastoria Energy Facility - Fri., Oct. 13th

We will have approximately 10 team members on our due diligence team and
will provide Enron with a list of names, titles and employer (for any
outside consultants, etc.) once we have been confirmed.

If you have any questions, please call me at 770-821-7623.  Thanks!


Daren,

 Hey,  sorry about not calling you last Thur & Fri - I was out sick.  I think
that were going to have to play this assistance thing on a day to day basis.
I know I will be catching up for missing those days & I need to get some
things in order this week for the new guy that starts next week.  So I'll
just have to call you when I can spare the time.  Sorry for any inconvenience
this may have caused you!

Thanks,
Kyle


Hey John, did CES take this gas for Jan, Feb, and Mar?  Wade would like to
see this deal in the system.

---------------------- Forwarded by Chris Germany/HOU/ECT on 04/04/2000 01:06
PM ---------------------------

Chris Germany
04/04/2000 12:02 PM
To: Colleen Sullivan/HOU/ECT@ECT, Mark Breese/HOU/ECT@ECT, Steve
Jackson/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc: John M Singer/Corp/Enron@ENRON, Mary Theresa Franklin/HOU/ECT@ECT, Dick
Jenkins/HOU/ECT@ECT, David Oliver/HOU/ECT@ECT, Joan
Veselack/Corp/Enron@ENRON, Robert Allwein/HOU/ECT@ECT, Joann
Collins/Corp/Enron@ENRON, Wade R Price/HOU/ECT@ECT, Scott Neal/HOU/ECT@ECT
Subject: Citygate Production

T&F Operating has sent ENA a "breach of contract" letter and is requesting to
terminate the contract effective 4/1/2000.

Colleen, I will give you a copy of the letter that was faxed to John Singer.

CES did a buy/sale behind Penn Fuel on CGAS for 1 year starting Nov 1, 1999.
T&F is the supplier and Glenn Gary was the market.   The market went away
effective 4/1/2000 and ENA/EES has no other market behind this part of Penn
Fuel's system.  We checked with the Penn Fuel asset management deal and
according to Penn Fuel, they can't take it either.

T&F is looking for their payment for Jan, Feb, and Mar, and T&F will waive
any and all "cover" cost that ENA would otherwise be liable for subsequent to
April 1, 2000.

John Singer wants to make sure we address the hedges in the books - will this
need to be included in the CES true-up?  Also, John wants to know if he
should sign the letter?.  Colleen, I told John you would anwser that question.


I will be on vacation Monday, April 17th thru Friday, April 21st.   Elizabeth
Soto will be backing me up on Monday and Ragayle Pellum will back me up the
remainder of the week.

If you have any questions regarding Brenda's calendar, need to make changes,
or need to set up a meeting with her please contact Chantelle Villanueva at
ext3.6279.

If you need assistance with anyone else's calendar who I support please
contact Ragayle.


Hi Boys,
?
Will you please email a list of "little" things  that Santa could bring you
for Christmas.? I need sizes, order of  preference.? The ski trip is your
present but,?you know your Mother, I  always have to have presents under the
tree for my favorite men.? I could  use a few suggestions for your gal pals
also.?  LU-M


-----Original Message-----
From: 	CustomerNotices, WGPHOU [mailto:WGPHOU.CustomerNotices@Williams.com]
Sent:	Monday, December 31, 2001 9:58 AM
Subject:	Market Area IT Availability - January 2, 2002

December 31, 2001

To:	Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation Customers
	and Shippers

Re:	Market Area IT Availability - January 2, 2002

The available interruptible transportation service (IT and
secondary FT) on Transco for pipeline day Wednesday, January
2, 2002 and continuing until further notice is summarized
as follows:

Tier I and Tier II (only Sta. 90 through
Sta. 180 affected)					0   MDt/day

South Virginia Lateral Compressor Station 167	144 MDt/day

Tier III (Station 180 through East)			0   MDt/day

Leidy at Centerville Regulator Station
(Only deliveries downstream of Centerville
regulator affected)					50 MDt/day

Leidy at Station 520 (Only deliveries		0  MDt/day
Downstream (east) of Station 520 affected)

Linden Regulator Station
(Located in Union County, New Jersey)		50 MDt/day

Mobile Bay Lateral			   		162 MDt/day

The above available interruptible transportation service
refers to deliveries into the affected area that have
receipts upstream of the bottleneck or affected area.

If you have any questions, please call John McGrath at (713)
215-2514 or Donna C. Long at (713) 215-4061.

J. E. McGrath
Manager
Operations Planning


fyi.
---------------------- Forwarded by Steven J Kean/NA/Enron on 04/30/2001
07:43 AM ---------------------------

Rosalee Fleming on 04/26/2001 04:00:22 PM
To: Steven J Kean/NA/Enron@Enron
cc:

Subject: On Market Power in California

Ken wanted you to have a copy
---------------------- Forwarded by Rosalee Fleming/Corp/Enron on 04/26/2001
03:51 PM ---------------------------

Willliam Hogan <William_Hogan@harvard.edu> on 04/25/2001 06:34:08 AM
To: ER:;
cc:
Subject: On Market Power in California

FYI.? The complete version of the following paper is available on my web page
at:

www.whogan.com

????????ON THE EXERCISE OF MARKET POWER THROUGH
STRATEGIC WITHHOLDING IN CALIFORNIA
Scott Harvey and William W. Hogan
April 24, 2001

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Beginning in June of 2000, the shock of unexpectedly high prices in the
California electricity market convinced everyone of the need for policies to
correct the apparent market failures.? The public debate and policy
discussions have been dominated by a focus on market power as a principal
problem amenable to regulatory solution.? However, design of effective
policies to moderate prices or mitigate their effects depends on the
diagnosis of the underlying causes.? High prices attributable largely to an
exercise of market power in electric generation would point to particular
market participants and behaviors that could be targeted for regulatory
action.? By contrast, high prices attributable to bad electricity market
design would indicate a need for changes in the design.? High prices
attributable to higher fuel prices, environmental constraints and capacity
shortages, on the other hand, would prompt actions to address the cost of
fuel and environmental limitations and indicate that retail loads should
receive the appropriate price signal for conservation.

Suppliers could affect market prices by strategically withholding some
capacity in order to profit on the capacity actually sold in the market.? But
charging high prices during periods of scarcity is not classified as
exercising market power if there is no strategic withholding of supply.?
Likewise, refusing to supply without being paid is not an exercise of market
power.? Although the potential for withholding exists for many suppliers, the
focus of attention has been on the exercise of market power by thermal
generators in California.

On its face, the experience of extremely high prices suggests that the
exercise of market power could be important.? But at the same time the data
show that there have been profound changes in the California market such that
the thermal generators have actually increased their production more than
demand has grown.? If anything, thermal generators that hit annual output
limits produced too much rather than too little in the summer of 2000.?
Furthermore, the widespread impacts of higher electricity prices throughout
the western market, both on and off peak,? indicate that if the exercise of
market power is important it is occurring to an extent and through channels
unprecedented in this or other electricity markets.? In short, this is a
complicated story, and there is ample room for further investigation of the
data and diagnosis of causes.

Examination of the major analyses of the exercise of market power reveals
that the estimated magnitude of the possible strategic withholding of
electric generation is small enough to make it important to verify the
simplifying assumptions.? If strategic withholding were large and pervasive,
then the real details of the California electricity market could be ignored.?
But it is by now apparent that the evidence is not clear, and any finding of
the presence or absence of strategic withholding of generation in the
California electricity market could turn on the simplifying assumptions used
in the analysis of the data.? For example, annual limits on production
dictate that plants should not run in many hours when prices are higher than
direct incremental costs; hence, examinations of output decisions for
individual hours or months are necessarily incomplete.? The variation in real
time conditions is large enough to produce significant reductions in output
compared to the expectations given day-ahead prices; hence, with capacity
constraints average optimal production is necessarily less than optimal
production at average prices.? Limits on the ramping rate of generation
units, start-up costs, minimum load costs and other operational
inflexibilities imply that a dispatch day is not just twenty-four separate
hours and must be analyzed chronologically, recognizing these factors.? And
so on.? Accounting for such effects can reverse the implications of the
previous evidence.? Unfortunately, the real details are neither simple nor
incidental.

It is difficult to conduct a study of market power based solely on publicly
available data.? A fuller analysis would require data available only to the
California Independent System Operator, and has not been done.? Many factors
contributed to higher electricity prices in California, and the market power
theme is only, at most, part of the story.? The import of the previous
analyses is not to prove that market power has been exercised in the
California electricity market but, rather, to suggest that it might be
important.? The import of the sensitivity analysis here is not to prove that
market power has not been exercised in the electricity market? but, rather,
to suggest that it is unlikely to be the dominant factor and may not even be
significant.? With the available data in the public domain, and the special
complications introduced by the California market design, the margin of error
in estimating the extent of the possible exercise of market power through
strategic withholding of electric generation is of the same order of
magnitude as the effect being measured.? On balance, to date the publicly
available data provides no reason for the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission to change its conclusion that there is no evidence of strategic
withholding nor any proof that no strategic withholding has occurred.

By contrast, there is general agreement that the California electricity
market design is &seriously flawed.8? Furthermore, there is evidence that the
policy responses that have been adopted in California have accelerated an
already serious market collapse.? Hence, without dismissing the possibility
of the exercise of market power, the principal policy focus should be on
fashioning workable solutions for the other more serious problems in market
design that relate to the underlying causes of the market meltdown.

Separate from market power mitigation, California should pay its bills, raise
incremental prices to retail customers, and move as quickly as possible to
operating a coordinated and efficient market with consistent pricing for all
that includes unit commitment, day-ahead scheduling, and real-time
balancing.? Although not a panacea, these steps would address immediate
problems and set the stage for longer-term initiatives to expand generation
capacity, transmission infrastructure, and the reach of an efficient market
to the western interconnected grid.

William W. Hogan
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
617-495-1317 (o)
617-495-1635 (f)
william_hogan@harvard.edu
web page: www.whogan.com
or
http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/people/whogan


Please note that we do not agree with the terms of the letter attached to the resume.  We have provided a contract for review by your company, and that agreement should govern.  With that, thanks for the resume.  Michelle Cash

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	"Ad Hoc Legal Resources Placement Office" <placement@ahlr.com>@ENRON [mailto:IMCEANOTES-+22Ad+20Hoc+20Legal+20Resources+20Placement+20Office+22+20+3Cplacement+40ahlr+2Ecom+3E+40ENRON@ENRON.com]
Sent:	Friday, September 21, 2001 1:19 PM
To:	Cash, Michelle
Subject:	Supplemental Presentation for Part-time Temporary Attorney Position

 - Supplemental Presentation for Temp PT Atty 09.21.01.dot << File: Supplemental Presentation for Temp PT Atty 09.21.01.dot >>
 - Resume of Amy Williams.doc << File: Resume of Amy Williams.doc >>


Hi Stephanie,

By chance are you available for lunch today?  Kim.


Good Morning Lauren,

I was glad to hear from you and to find out your not hurt this morning.  I will make this short and to the point. I know people can read your e-mail so I trust you will know what I'm talking about if I don't write it)  I want you to know that I'm not mad at you for the decisions you have made, although I don't understand them.  You were saying one thing while thinking another and if things would have been different yesterday would you be making the same decision today?  I wanted to do things right thing this time and now it seems I won't get the chance.  Maybe things happened for the best, because if things would have different yesterday I think you would have called me with a different decision and now I know by your actions it would not have been right choice.  I don't think you have followed through but I wanted you too more than anything.  Lauren, I hope you are doing the right thing for YOU.  I know life comes down to a few moments and this is one of them.  I believe in "FATE" do you?

-Me

P.S. I found what you were missing.............


Start Date: 4/18/01; HourAhead hour: 11;  No ancillary schedules awarded.  No
variances detected.

    LOG MESSAGES:

PARSING FILE -->> O:\Portland\WestDesk\California Scheduling\ISO Final
Schedules\2001041811.txt


FYI

Vince

---------------------- Forwarded by Vince J Kaminski/HOU/ECT on 03/28/2000
02:31 PM ---------------------------

"Vadim Pokhlebkin" <vpokhleb@ideaus.com> on 03/28/2000 09:47:58 AM
To: <Vince.J.Kaminski@enron.com>
cc: <vkamins@enron.com>
Subject:

Good morning Vince,

Sorry to have missed you at your office this morning.  Attached are today's
issues of our daily morning faxes:
1. Fixed Income Today - US treasuries, agencies, and corporates' analyses,
2. Financial Markets Today - FX majors and key bond markets' analyses.

How useful do you find our research?  Also, do you mind if contact your
colleagues directly to get their feedback?  That will save you time  from
forwarding this info to them daily.  Please let me know whom I may contact.

Best regards,
Vadim Pokhlebkin
Account Manager
vpokhlebkin@ideaglobal.com
tel. + 1 212 571 4332
fax  + 1 212 571 4334

IDEAglobal.com
140 Broadway, 21st Floor
New York, NY 10005, USA

Any views expressed in this message are those of the individual sender,
except where the sender specifically states them to be the views of
IDEAglobal.com. This email, its content and any files transmitted with it
are intended solely for the addressee(s) and may be legally privileged
and/or confidential. Access by any other party is unauthorized without the
express written permission of the sender. If you have received this email in
error you may not copy or use the contents, attachments or information in
any way. Please destroy it and contact the sender via the IDEAglobal.com
switchboard in one of the following three offices: New York +1 212 571 4332;
London +44 171 430 2888; Singapore +65 332 0700

 - FIT0328a.pdf
 - FMT0328A.pdf


Broker checked out incorrectly with Matt - deal has been changed to Nevada.

Kate

Evelyn Metoyer@ENRON
02/07/2001 07:59 AM
To: Kate Symes/PDX/ECT@ECT
cc:

Subject: deal 515363

Hi Kate,

For deal 515363 traded yesterday, Matt has the cp as Sierra Pacific however,
Prebon has Nevada Power Company.
Can you check with Matt for the correct cp name.

Thanks!


Sounds good to  me.

"Campbell, Carolyn" <CCampbell@KSLAW.com> on 04/11/2001 03:16:31 PM
To: "'Kay.Mann@enron.com'" <Kay.Mann@enron.com>
cc:

Subject: RE: Do we have a call in #?

Kay:

Since it's a small group, we decided not to use a call-in number.  Greg will
call me and I'll patch you in.

Carolyn M. Campbell
King;& Spalding
713-276-7307 (phone)
713-751-3280 (fax)
ccampbell@kslaw.com <mailto:ccampbell@kslaw.com>
;

-----Original Message-----
From: Kay.Mann@enron.com [mailto:Kay.Mann@enron.com]
Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2001 3:17 PM
To: ccampbell@kslaw.com
Subject: Do we have a call in #?

Thanks,  Kay

                    Confidentiality Notice
This message is being sent by or on behalf of a lawyer.  It is intended
exclusively for the individual or entity to which it is addressed.  This
communication may contain information that is proprietary, privileged or
confidential or otherwise legally exempt from disclosure.  If you are not the
named addressee, you are not authorized to read, print, retain, copy or
disseminate this message or any part of it.  If you have received this
message in error, please notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete
all copies of the message.


Beth,

Thanks for your e-mail.  This will put us in agreement.  I have incorporated
our changes as discussed in the following revised Section 13.  If you are in
agreement,  I will prepare execution documents.

Section 13 is further modified by inserting the following new Section 13.10:

Enron recognizes that, when NEGM is acting as Buyer hereunder, NEGM is
purchasing gas on behalf of certain gas companies (the &Repurchasers8) to
whom it immediately resells such gas at the Delivery Point(s).  The parties
further agree that the term &Transporter8 when used in this Contract,
including, but not limited to, in Sections 4 and 11., shall include any
company acting in the capacity of a transporter for any Repurchaser and agree
that Section 4.3 of the Contract will apply to invoices from such
Transporters for Imbalance Charges received from such Transporters to the
same extent as if such invoices were received by NEGM provided, that all
parties scheduled and nominated the same volumes as Enron and NEGM scheduled
and nominated on hehalf  of  such Repurchaser at the Delivery Point(s).

Many thanks for your assistance with this matter.

Regards,
Debra Perlingiere
Enron North America Corp.
Legal Department
1400 Smith Street, EB 3885
Houston, Texas 77002
dperlin@enron.com
Phone 713-853-7658
Fax  713-646-3490


Start Date: 1/27/02; HourAhead hour: 10;  No ancillary schedules awarded.  No variances detected.

    LOG MESSAGES:

PARSING FILE -->> O:\Portland\WestDesk\California Scheduling\ISO Final Schedules\2002012710.txt


Don't forget to meet us tomorrow evening from 5 - 8 p.m. at the Boaka Bar
downtown!  Located at 1010 Prairie, the Boaka Bar is right next door to the
Mercury Room and your first drink is free!

Bring a new member with you (who pays their dues onsite) and you'll be
entered into a drawing for HOUSTON TEXAN tickets!  The member who brings the
most guests will win tickets to this year's HOUSTON LIVESTOCK SHOW & RODEO,
so come out and bring your friends!

Also, mark your calendar for February 20th's Storage Economics Brown Bag...
email Lana Moore for details at lana.moore@nesanet.org.  The next Technical
Training class will be March 12-13 (Nominations thru Allocations)and Lana
can help with your registration on that as well.

Have a good week, and I'll see you at the Boaka Bar!

TERESA A. KNIGHT
Vice President, Member Services
teresa.knight@nesanet.org
(713) 856-6525
Fax (713)856-6199


this isn't porn is it


Stan felt it would be appropriate for the Policy Committee to review the
attached changes to the Analyst / Associate PRC process, prior to execution.
In summary, the following modifications have been developed by the heads of
the AAPRC Committees (Horton, Kean, and Sherriff) and A/A Program Management
(Lemmons):

? Most cross-calibration will be at the business unit level, since this is
where the best interaction and information gathering occurs.  Steps to ensure
consistency across the business units are outlined in the memo.  The final
PRC meeting will focus on business unit ranking distributions, and the
names/attributes of the top performers across the company.
? The PRC committees have been expanded to improve the quality of
representation, and to reflect the diversity of our workforce.  The additions
were selected from a pool of high performing VPs and Directors.  To ensure
fairness, only VPs and Directors will provide representation on the AAPRC
Committee.
? An attachment has been included to clarify program tenure and promotion
criteria.

Please let me know if you have any questions or would like to discuss by
mid-day Wednesday, May 9.  We are planning to release this information to the
memo distribution list that evening.

Regards,
Billy


I wanted to make sure that you saw this.
---------------------- Forwarded by Kay Mann/Corp/Enron on 01/26/2001 10:17
AM ---------------------------

Scott Laidlaw@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT
12/06/2000 03:41 PM
To: John Schwartzenburg/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT
cc: Ben Jacoby/HOU/ECT@ECT, Kay Mann/Corp/Enron@Enron, Chris
Booth/NA/Enron@Enron, Dan Shultz/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Matthew
Tezyk/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Frank R
Cervenka/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT

Subject: Westinghouse 501D5A damaged generator

john - thanx for your time on phone this afternoon.

a) just received cc of letter from westinghouse.  in it, they assert that:

"title to the existing generator passed to enron upon delivery into the
united states.  delivery occurred at houston on or about 23jul00.  as
required by the contract and incoterms 1990, risk of loss to the generator
passed to enron when the generator arrived (ddp) at houston while the
generator remained on board the common carrier.  the generator was delivered
in an undamaged condition.  title and risk of loss passed to enron before the
water damage to the generator occurred."

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

b) per the contract between enron and westinghouse:

section 15.1.2 title to Equipment - Title to the Equipment will pass to
Purchaser immediately upon entry into the united states.
section 15.2 risk of loss - Seller shall bear the risk of loss and damage
with respect to the Equipment until delivery of the Equipment to the Delivery
Point in accordance with Section 3.2.1.  Seller shall be required to inspect
the Equipment for damage at the Delivery Point.
section 3.2.1 - Seller shall cause the Equipment to be delivered to the
Delivery Point on a DDP basis in accordance with Sections 10.2.1 by the date
set forth therein.
section 3.2.2 - Seller shall be responsible for delivering the CT-Unit DDP to
the: (iii) u.s. port of export by any means of transport.
section 3.2.3 - Seller shall perform customs clearance for the Equipment
through u.s. customs and pay any import duties.
section 10.2.1 Guaranteed Unit Delivery Date - Seller will cause the CT-Unit
(author's note - includes the generator) to be delivered in an undamaged
condition in accordance with the Specification-CT to the Delivery Point (DDP)
in accordance with Schedule I below (the Guaranteed Unit Delivery Date).
(author's note - the date specified in the contract was later slipped per
agreement with enron).
section 10.2.3 Completion of Delivery - delivery of the CT-Unit to the
Delivery Point shall be considered complete for the purposes of Delivery
Liquidated Damages as it pertains to the delivery of Major Components
(author's note - includes the GT and generator) when the last Major Component
of such CT-Unit is delivered DDP to the Delivery Point in complete and
undamaged condition.  ...  Purchaser shall have the right to inspect the
Equipment for condition of the Equipment upon actual delivery.  Purchaser
reserves the right to reject damaged Equipment at any location; however, in
the event a portion of the Equipment is damaged or defective upon delivery to
the Delivery Point, Purchaser after making an initial assessment of the
damage or defect and consulting with Seller as to how such damage will affect
the installation , operation, performance, reliability, efficiency, and
warranty of the damaged Equipment may either:
(i) reasonable determine that such damage or defect is such that the
preceding criteria is so adversely affected that Purchaser cannot accept
delivery of the damaged Equipment and declare that delivery has not occurred,
or
(ii) after taking into account such criteria and Seller's proposed plan for
correcting such damage or defect in accordance with Section 9.5, declare that
delivery has occurred: in the event Purchaser discovers such a damage or
defect, it shall notify Seller of such as soon as practical.

c) facts of the case, as we know them:

common carrier ship carrying the generator supposedly arrived in port of
houston approx. 14jul00.  i.e., that was the ship's estimated time of arrival
(eta).
westinghouse is claiming that delivery occurred on or about 23jul00.
enron representative (frank cervenka) went to CTSS (i.e., the westinghouse
facility here in houston) on friday, 21jul00 to inspect the combustion
turbine.  during that inspection, westinghouse employees informed him that
the generator had salt water damage at the port.  as a result, the following
monday, 24jul00, he visited the port of houston with the siemens-westinghouse
insurance adjustor and saw the damaged generator.  note - this was just a
cursory visit to verify that in fact the unit had been damaged.  the full
extent of the damage and impact on the project was not known at that time -
e.g., repair or replace were still viable options.
enron received formal notification (faxed letter) of the damaged generator on
approx. 18aug00.
enron has already made progress payments to siemens-westinghouse in the
amount of 95% of the contract value of the gas turbine and generator.
DDP, per incoterms 1990, means delivered duty paid.
Westinghouse, despite 2 prior requests from enron, has not provided copies of
the customs clearance documentation.  i.e., we don't know the exact date that
the generator cleared customs, or if it cleared customs.
title means ownership, but does not imply either risk of loss or care,
custody, and control.  with title comes both ownership and the responsibility
for payment of taxes.

d) info not known by enron:

when did ship come into port?
when did damage to generator occur?
when, or if, u.s. customs duties were paid?

f) info known by enron:

generator is a total loss, as determined by westinghouse.
per section 10.2.3 of contract, enron was not given the formal opportunity to
inspect the damaged generator until a month after it arrived in port.  as
recalled by matt tezyk, westinghouse was then advised by enron in writing
that the generator was rejected and that delivery had not occurred.
(author's note - matt to find cc of that letter).

g) enron's assertions are that:

DDP was not satisfied.  i.e., delivery of the generator did not occur in
accordance with the terms of the contract.
title (i.e., ownership) remains with siemens-westinghouse.
risk of loss remains with siemens-westinghouse.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

john - plz assess the copy of the contract provided to you this afternoon
under separate cover.  we request a legal opinion as to whether delivery, in
accordance with the contract, of the CT-Unit occurred or not.  plz call with
any questions.  regards.  scott.


Uncle Clark,

How are things?  I hope this note finds you well.  I wanted to see if you
were going to be in town for the weekend of November 11th.  I plan on
bringing the whole group up for the KU-UT game that weekend.  I can't believe
it has almost been 4 years since we last visited up there.  We are doing well
here in Houston.  Everyone is getting ready for the school year.  In fact,
Kristi has already started back.  The kids begin on the 9th.  Enron still
seems to monopolize my time.  But it's a great place to work.  Let me know
about that weekend.  I hope you will be in town as  I am looking forward to
seeing you all.

DG