Samantha:

Can you let Banu know the status of the CA?

Thanks!

Marie
 -----Original Message-----
From: 	Hendry, Brent
Sent:	Tuesday, July 03, 2001 12:48 PM
To:	Heard, Marie
Subject:	FW: AEGIS Confidentiality Agreement

Did you speak with Banu yesterday?  If not can you call her with an update?
Thanks, Brent

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	Ozcan, Banu
Sent:	Tuesday, July 03, 2001 12:09 PM
To:	Hendry, Brent
Cc:	Ryan Bekerman, Joana; Marcus, Larry
Subject:	RE: AEGIS Confidentiality Agreement

Hi Brent-

I will be out of the office in the next two weeks and will not have access to e-mail.. Could you please let Joana Ryan or Larry Marcus know about the progress with the AEGIS Confidentiality Agreement in my absence.. We are waiting for the agreement to be signed to progress with our work with them..

Thank you,
Banu Ozcan

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	Hendry, Brent
Sent:	Friday, June 29, 2001 2:27 PM
To:	Ozcan, Banu
Subject:	RE: AEGIS Confidentiality Agreement

I have not received any response as of yet.
 -----Original Message-----
From: 	Ozcan, Banu
Sent:	Thursday, June 28, 2001 2:42 PM
To:	Hendry, Brent
Subject:	FW: AEGIS Confidentiality Agreement

hi Brent-
Did we hear back from them? Is is still being negotiated? Please let me know..

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	Hendry, Brent
Sent:	Tuesday, June 26, 2001 2:14 PM
To:	'StephenByrne@aegislimited.com'
Cc:	Boyd, Samantha; Shackleton, Sara; Ozcan, Banu
Subject:	FW: AEGIS Confidentiality Agreement

I am attaching a revised Confidentiality Agreement modifying the agreement to cover both parties.  I have also attempted to incorporate language addressing the issues you raised below.  Please review my draft and contact me with any questions or comments.

 << File: AEGISCA06-26-01.doc >>

Regards,
Brent Hendry

Enron North America
1400 Smith Street
Houston Texas 77002
Phone:  713 853 7124
Fax: 713 646 3490

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	"Byrne, Stephen" <StephenByrne@aegislimited.com>@ENRON [mailto:IMCEANOTES-+22Byrne+2C+20Stephen+22+20+3CStephenByrne+40aegislimited+2Ecom+3E+40ENRON@ENRON.com]
Sent:	Monday, June 25, 2001 10:40 AM
To:	Shackleton, Sara; Bailey, Susan
Cc:	Bertrand, Ronald S.
Subject:	AEGIS Confidentiality Agreement

I have been assisting Ron Bertrand in reviewing the proposed Confidentiality Agreement between Enron and AEGIS.  The original proposal was for a confidentiality agreement running to the benefit of AEGIS.  A subsequent comment from Sara Shackelton, however indicates that a two-way agreement is necessary.  As such there are several issues clauses that must be included to address issues unique to underwriting insurance.  Specifically (a) confidential information supplied in order to induce AEGIS to underwrite an insurance policy must be warranted (as in any insurance application), (b) AEGIS needs the right to share such information with reinsurers (who can be held to a confidentiality agreement), and (c) if a policy is purchased AEGIS need to retain the information in case there are any enforcement disputes that might turn on the application information.  The AEGIS standard confidentiality agreement used in underwriting situations is attached.
With regard to the revised draft of June 22nd. I note, in addition to the issues mentioned above, that the governing law provision is somewhat contradictory to the arbitration provisions and that the assumption in section 7 that confidentiality provisions will be incorporated in to the definitive agreement is usually not true for insurance policies.
Please feel free to contact me directly (201-521-4691) to conclude this matter.
 <<underwriting.DOC>>

 - underwriting.DOC


Start Date: 1/6/02; HourAhead hour: 13;  No ancillary schedules awarded.  Variances detected.
Variances detected in Load schedule.

    LOG MESSAGES:

PARSING FILE -->> O:\Portland\WestDesk\California Scheduling\ISO Final Schedules\2002010613.txt

---- Load Schedule ----
$$$ Variance found in table tblLoads.
     Details: (Hour: 13 / Preferred: 354.08 / Final: 354.05)
  TRANS_TYPE: FINAL
  LOAD_ID: PGE3
  MKT_TYPE: 2
  TRANS_DATE: 1/6/02
  SC_ID: ENRJ


Vasant,

This list goes to Dave Delainey.

Please, make sure everything is current.

Vince


PLEASE READ THIS IMPORTANT INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ENRON STOCK FUND IN THE ENRON CORP. SAVINGS AND ESOP PLANS

On Friday, January 11, trading of Enron stock was suspended on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).  All Savings and ESOP Plan transactions, including 401(k) payroll contributions,  involving this fund were placed in a pending status until trading resumed.

As announced by Enron's Office of the Chair on Wednesday, January 16, Enron stock would now be traded Over The Counter (OTC).  Upon receiving this information, work began immediately to develop a process that allows for OTC trades in the plans.

On Thursday, January 17, Enron initiated a process to facilitate OTC trades of Enron stock inside the 401(k) and ESOP and all pending transactions were processed using Thursday's closing price.

Now that trading has resumed, we urge you to review your investment elections to ensure that they are consistent with your investment goals.

As things change, we will continue to update you.

Enron Benefits Department


Following please find the Weekly Management Report and the Daily Executive
Summary.

EnronOnline Executive Summary for 11/10/00
Transaction Summary
External Transactions Today	3,611
Average Daily External Transactions (30 day Trailing Avg)	3,238
Total Life to Date Transactions	427,224

EnronOnline Daily % of Entity's Total Transactions for 11/10/00	Trans	Percent
Enron North America	3,013	80
Enron Europe Limited	244	42
Global Products	144	31
Enron Metals	240	7

EnronOnline Percentage of Total Corporate Transactions
(30 day Trailing Avg)	48%

Gross Notional Value of EnronOnline Transactions	Total
Today	2,502,179,517
MTD	21,899,435,275
LTD	235,331,119,953
Average Daily Notional Value (30 Day Trailing Avg)	2,217,105,552

Notional Revenue from Physical Flows to Date	16,106,253,102

Counterparties, Users, and Products Offered
Counterparties having transacted to date	557
New Counterparties transacting for the first time today	3
Number of Products Offered Today	1,129
Total Number of External Users Logged on Today	2,580
Average # of External Users logged on (30 day Trailing Avg)	2,717

Also attached is the Weekly Public Domain Report, containing information
which is intended for use in presentations or reports which will be seen by
individuals outside Enron.


I deleted 2 meters from deal 418282 for 12/1/2000 - 3/31/2001.  Please make
sure the risk assignment is still ok.

Thanks


---------------------- Forwarded by Vince J Kaminski/HOU/ECT on 04/30/2001
05:19 PM ---------------------------

	From:  Jason Sokolov                           04/30/2001 05:03 PM

To: Vince J Kaminski/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc:
Subject: Energy Derivatives Project Tracy Pan Part 4

---------------------- Forwarded by Jason Sokolov/HOU/ECT on 04/30/2001 05:03
PM ---------------------------

Tracy Pan <pcp@pop.ruf.rice.edu> on 04/30/2001 11:11:35 AM
Please respond to pcp@rice.edu
To: Jason.Sokolov@enron.com
cc:
Subject: Energy Derivatives Project Tracy Pan Part 4

Jason,

I've send a total of 4 files to you.  If you find any problem with the
files, please let me know.

Thanks.

Tracy
-----Original Message-----
From: Jason.Sokolov@enron.com [mailto:Jason.Sokolov@enron.com]
Sent: Monday, April 30, 2001 8:16 AM
To: pcp@rice.edu
Subject: Re: About the Energy Derivative Project

Tracy,
Break it down into 8000 files of 1 kB, and send each one in a separate
mail.

Just kidding!
Try to send the whole thing.
If one of the servers refuses to accept it, then break it down into several
pieces.
I know for sure that I can take files as large as 2MB.

Jason

 - 665 Team Project--Tracy Pan Part 4.xls


What is the latest on Tractebel?  Have you had a chance to review the credit
terms for Idacorp amendment?

Thanks

Debra Perlingiere
Enron North America Corp.
1400 Smith Street, EB 3885
Houston, Texas 77002
dperlin@enron.com
Phone 713-853-7658
Fax  713-646-3490


Have I responded to you regarding this?

	Enron North America Corp.

	From:  Nicole Mendez                           09/26/2000 02:07 PM

To: Dana Davis/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc:
Subject: Projected Vacation Schedule

Dana,

Can you send me a copy of your requested days so that I can update the
vacation calendar?  Thanks.

Nicole


For your information and contemplation.

Kay
---------------------- Forwarded by Kay Mann/Corp/Enron on 01/04/2001 01:43
PM ---------------------------

michael.o.sandridge@us.abb.com on 01/04/2001 01:42:58 PM
To: ben.jacoby@enron.com, Kay.mann@enron.com
cc: david.onuscheck@us.abb.com, karla.hesketh@us.abb.com

Subject: Contract comments

Ben/Kay,
After reviewing the contract with Dave we found only a couple of points that
we
would like to mention;
1) 1.48 the Maximum Liability Amount should be $768,000 USD
2) The unit will not be delivered until the last 10% (ten percent) retention
is
paid and we will post the surety bond as shown in in Exhibit D
3) ABB would not buy back the unit except from Enron.

Please let me know if there is any way that we may further assist you.

MIKE


FYI
---------------------- Forwarded by John Ale/HOU/AZURIX on 06/29/2000 08:53
AM ---------------------------

"Keith Harris" <keith.harris@wessexwater.co.uk> on 06/29/2000 06:36:39 AM
Please respond to "Keith Harris" <keith.harris@wessexwater.co.uk>
To: "john coppack" <jb.coppack@wessexwater.co.uk>,
kevin.gibbs@wessexwater.co.uk, Gareth Jones/BTH/AZURIX@AZURIX, Keith
Willett/BTH/AZURIX@AZURIX, "legal" <legal@wessexwater.co.uk>, "'Chris Perry'"
<chris.perry@wessexwater.co.uk>, "Nigel Reed" <nigel.reed@wessexwater.co.uk>,
Jim.Wheaton@CliffordChance.com
cc: John Ale/HOU/AZURIX@AZURIX, Chris.Bright@CliffordChance.com,
colin.skellett@wessexwater.co.uk, sam.allen@wessexwater.co.uk, Libby
Gawith/BTH/AZURIX@AZURIX

Subject: contracts

All

Attached are the payment terms for 3 contract types agreed at Management Team
on Tuesday

1    O&M for existing standards & asset condition
2    Meeting new pre-determined standards
3    Meeting new discretionary standards and growth

The note is designed to be the parameters within which the contracts will be
structured

The objective is to move this note to Heads of Terms by the end on July

Please contact me if you have any problems.

In case Gareth has not told you the Clifford Chance team will be with us at
9.30 on Friday in Bristol to begin work on this.

Gareth - Where are you planning to meet

Keith

**********************************************************************
This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and
intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they
are addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify
the Wessex Water IT Support Centre on:

44-1225-732088 or email support@wessexwater.co.uk

This footnote also confirms that this email message has been swept by
MIMEsweeper for the presence of computer viruses.

www.mimesweeper.com
**********************************************************************
 - att1.htm
 - STRUCTURE OF CONTRACTS (4).doc


Tracy,

I drafted a list of main duties a contributor administrator would have. This
may help you decide if you would like to have an admin aside from the admin
for the Corp. application.

 <<Contributor Administrator.doc>>

Demetrics Tyson
Adaytum Consulting Services
214.704.5329


Rahul,

I shall be glad to meet with you. Please, give me a call
when you get here.

Vince

Rahul Kumar@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT
08/16/2000 09:49 AM
To: Vince J Kaminski@ECT
cc:
Subject: Interview

Vince,

We had spoken a few weeks back, but were unable to meet due to our
schedules.  I will be back in Houston next week (August 21st), and would
appreciate the opportunity to meet with you and take your advice.

As I may have mentioned to you, I am interested in exploring opportunities
that are more US focused.  I think Paula Corey has already forwarded my
resume to you.  However, I have attached it to this note just in case.

I would really appreciate the opportunity to meet with you next week, and
would be grateful if you could let me know what time fits best with your
schedule.  I look forward to hearing from you.

Regards,

Rahul


Market Participants:

CONTINGENCY ONLY OPERATING RESERVE AND IMBALANCE ENERGY

On March 12, 2001, the ISO notified Market Participants that the ISO was
proposing to give Market Participants the ability to indicate hourly whether
resources selected to provide Operating Reserves should be dispatched in the
absence of a Contingency or a System Emergency. The purpose of the proposal
is to increase the supply of Operating Reserves bid into the ISO markets and
to facilitate the ISO's ability to preserve Operating Reserves for use
during Contingencies and System Emergencies.

Giving Market Participants the flexibility to designate hourly whether
Operating Reserves can be dispatched in the absence of a Contingency or a
System Emergency requires changes to ISO software as well as changes to the
ISO Tariff. The ISO Board of Governors approved of the proposal and it was
included in Amendment No. 38 to the ISO Tariff filed yesterday at the FERC.

INTERIM OPTION FOR MARKET PARTICIPANTS

Prior to FERC action on Amendment 38, the ISO will continue to use its
discretion to dispatch Operating Reserves to supply Imbalance Energy. See
ISO Tariff o 2.5.22.3. The ISO strives to achieve the highest level of
effectiveness for Operating Reserves dispatched to maintain reliability
within the ISO Control Area. To accomplish this goal, the ISO must consider
the amount of Energy that can be dispatched from awarded Operating Reserves.
In order to assist the ISO in this assessment, the ISO asked Market
Participants to indicate, on an interim basis, whether resources selected to
provide Operating Reserves should be dispatched in the absence of a
Contingency or a System Emergency. If a Market Participant elects to so
designate a resource, it will be asked to provide certain operational
information (e.g., the number of available hours of operation, minimum run
time, minimum down time, etc.).

Market Participants will not be able to make this designation hourly as
proposed in Amendment 38. Rather, if a Market Participant designates that
the dispatch of a resource should be limited to Contingencies or a System
Emergencies, the designation will remain in place until the FERC acts on
Amendment 38. For the interim period, beginning March 20, participants were
requested to submit to the ISO any resource or external import (tie point
and interchange id) that was to be used in response to a system contingency
or emergency only. To the extent any such designated resource or import is
awarded Operating Reserve (OR) (Spin or Non-Spin), the energy associated
with the OR will only be called upon during a contingency or emergency.
These same resources are not precluded from submitting supplemental or
replacement reserve bids. However, only in the event the ISO is utilizing
the contingency-only reserves will supplemental and replacement reserve
associated with a contingency-only resource be called upon. If a Market
Participant wants a resource to be dispatched for Imbalance Energy in the
absence of Contingencies and System Emergencies, it should not designate the
resource.

LONG TERM SOLUTION

The long-term solution (as filed in Amendment 38), will allow for
participants to make hourly elections for contingency only designation. This
election will only be available for Spin and Non-Spin bids. Resources and
imports that are not successful in the OR capacity market (contingency only
or not) will still be able to submit bids for replacement reserve and
supplemental energy. Furthermore, to the extent that a resource has been
awarded OR, is designated as contingency only, and has additional capacity
available, that capacity can be bid into the replacement reserve market or
be submitted as a supplemental energy bid. However, any replacement reserve
or supplemental energy made available to the ISO will be used for Imbalance
Energy and not be reserved for contingency only.

The reporting of specific operational data will also be required for the
long-term solution for any resource awarded contingency only OR.

ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATIONS

Some resources are interested in providing contingency only OR because they
have very limited, not less than 2 hours, energy available behind the
resource. If such a resource is bid in for multiple hours, is dispatched,
and if all of its energy is exhausted, that resource is still responsible
for any OR awarded for future hours..

The ISO expects that resources providing contingency-only OR may schedule
Ancillary Service capacity in the Day Ahead Market for which available
Energy is insufficient to support Dispatch in all hours at the full
scheduled capacity. As required by ASRP 5.3.1 and 5.4.2, at least two hours
of Energy must support any scheduled OR. Therefore, the sum of scheduled OR
should not exceed the available Energy in any two consecutive hours. In the
event that the ISO has dispatched all available Energy, and OR is scheduled
in subsequent hours for which insufficient Energy is available, then the
Scheduling Coordinator should buy back in the Hour Ahead market any capacity
for which there is no available Energy.

If a Scheduling Coordinator fails to buyback scheduled OR capacity for which
no Energy is available, then "No Pay" will apply, and the capacity payment
will be eliminated to the extent that a resource is incapable of delivering
all Energy associated with OR capacity that is dispatched. The ISO will also
monitor performance and consider whether the ISO should use its existing
authority to impose additional penalties to encourage suppliers to bid and
schedule consistent with the availability of Energy. As with any OR, bid or
self provided, the ISO may conduct unannounced tests of contingency-only OR
when no contingency exists. Naturally such tests will be conducted in a
non-discriminatory manner. The ISO may also require each contingency-only
resource to specify the total Energy that is available in relation to
whatever capacity is scheduled in the DA market. This information could be
used in determining buy-back obligations.

If you have questions regarding this interim solution, please contact Brian
Rahman, Manager of Markets at 608-5883.

Byron Woertz
Director, Client Relations


Kent,

There have been no DDVC charges against Cottage Grove since June 1, 2001.
DDVC charges at Whitewater on days that Storage was allocated on ID/2 where true up's are not allowed during the Final 8am cycle are as follows:
June 20			DDVC charge 4,514.40
June 28			DDVC charge 1,645.20
June 17			DDVC charge    244.40

			Total	         6,404.00
DDVC charges at Whitewater on days that Storage was not allocated or not allocated on ID/2 and Final 8am cycle true up's were allowed are as follows:
June 13			DDVC charge 3,240.00
June 21			DDVC charge    443.20

			Total	         3,683.20

			Grand Total    10,087.20

John Buchanan


Yup, FX & Currency Option provisions added.  !  I hope to have our database
open to you soon so you can look and see what definitions are included.

	Laurel Adams
	06/01/2000 03:38 PM

		 To: Tana Jones/HOU/ECT@ECT
		 cc:
		 Subject: Re: J. Aron & Company

Tana,

Since I did not see FX trades excluded, I presume that we can confirm FX
trades and options under this master.  Please let me know.  Thanks


This makes me crazy.  I ask her to send me a document, and she copies TWO
partners on the transmittal, plus Fred and Rusty.
---------------------- Forwarded by Kay Mann/Corp/Enron on 09/18/2000 03:12
PM ---------------------------

"Way, Karen S. - CHI" <karen.way@piperrudnick.com> on 09/18/2000 02:58:55 PM
To: "'kay.mann@enron.com'" <kay.mann@enron.com>, "'rusty.stevens@enron.com'"
<rusty.stevens@enron.com>, "'fred.mitro@enron.com'" <fred.mitro@enron.com>
cc: "Gershon, Mark A. - CHI" <Mark.Gershon@piperrudnick.com>, "Shindler,
Donald A. - CHI" <Donald.Shindler@piperrudnick.com>

Subject: Option to Purchase Real Estate re TitanFehr.DOC

 <<Option to Purchase Real Estate re TitanFehr.DOC>>

Kay:
Per your previous email,  attached is the electronic version of the
Titan-Fehr Option for your review.  Please call with any questions.  Thanks!

Karen S. Way
Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe
203 N. LaSalle
Chicago, Illinois 60601
email:  karen.way@piperrudnick.com
(ph) 312-368-2152
(fax) 312-630-6347

____________________________________________________________________________
The e-mail address and domain name of the sender changed on November 1,
1999.  Please update your records.

The information contained in this communication may be confidential, is
intended only for the use of the recipient named above, and may be legally
privileged.  If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you
are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this
communication, or any of its contents, is strictly prohibited. If you have
received this communication in error, please re-send this communication to
the sender and delete the original message and any copy of it from your
computer system.
Thank you.

For more information about Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe, please visit us at
http://www.piperrudnick.com/
____________________________________________________________________________

 - Option to Purchase Real Estate re TitanFehr.DOC


Attached is a draft declaration of Dennis Benevides to be filed with our
brief in the UCCSU case tomorrow.  It contains in red some of my comments to
the initial draft written by outside counsel.  We are asking Dennis to make
certain comments about our hedging strategy and CTC exposure in support of
our case, and I want to make sure you are comfortable with how this reads.
We have tried to be very general and consistent with our prior message.

Since we have to file tomorrow, if you could send me any comments you have by
mid afternoon, that would be great.  Thanks.  MDS

---------------------- Forwarded by Mike D Smith/HOU/EES on 03/22/2001 05:04
PM ---------------------------

	Enron Energy Services

	From:  Mike D Smith                           03/22/2001 12:34 PM

To: Peggy Mahoney/HOU/EES@EES, Dennis Benevides/HOU/EES@EES
cc:
Subject: Dennis' Declaration

Please review my comments, attached.  I discussed this matter with our
outside counsel, and it is his belief that, since Dennis is testifying on
personal knowledge to rebut the Universities' specualtion about our "windfall
profits,"  we do not need all of the specific info about amounts of losses
and exposure, but can be more general.  I have attempted to address that with
the attached changes, which I hope will be easier for everyone to get
comfortable with.

Once we get this where we like it, I am going to walk it around to Dan and
others on the commercial side to make sure everyone is comfortable.  Peggy, I
will leave PR and IR to you.

 MDS


Sorry that I didn't get to call you on my way to the courthouse yesterday. I
was conducting lots of business back and forth with the Houston office during
the drive and just ran out of time.  We reconvene in court this morning, to
have what I hope will be final deliberation on sentencing, having found the
guy guilty on both counts,  (Prior to the start of a trial, the defendant
must choose either judge or jury to administer the sentence if the defendant
is found guilty - he chose the jury.)  I am in the office now for an 8:30
meeting with Jeff Skilling regarding the upcoming Associates PRC meeting, to
which I am a rep.  If I don't get a chance to reach you today, I will call
during my commute tomorrow.  --Sally

By the way, I thought that when I put "Energy Executive" as my occupation on
the jury summons form, that I would be deemed to be too conservative and too
corporate to be chosen for the jury.  Not the case!  In fact, Mark Koenig
(Enron's EVP of Investor Relations) was summoned for jury duty on Tuesday as
well, and he too was chosen to be on a different jury!  The whole thing is
actually very fascinating - just bad timing for me to be out so much this
week.  But then, there never is a good time.

Mike Jordan
11/29/2000 06:06 AM
To: Sally Beck/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc:
Subject: Re: Conference Call on Wednesday morning

Sally

It must be your honest face  - I never get picked as I always look like I am
on the extreme end of a right wing law and order party/movement  -ie serious
penalties for parking tickets etc. I am not like that but it is just a porr
perception !!

Look forward to the call otherwise we can catch up later

Mike

	Enron Capital & Trade Resources Corp.

	From:  Sally Beck                           29/11/2000 00:21

To: Mike Jordan/LON/ECT@ECT
cc:

Subject: Conference Call on Wednesday morning

I had to report for jury duty today (along with 500 others from Harris
County), and to my surprise I was selected to be a juror in a felony case.
The case will continue on Wednesday, so our scheduled time for a conference
call may not work.  I will try to reach you from my car while I am on my way
in for jury duty - probably around 8:30 or 9:00 Houston time.


This editorial was in today's Sacramento Bee.

Scott

http://www.sacbee.com/voices/news/voices01_20000922.html


Joanne Rozycki
Senior Administrative Assistant
Enron North America Corp.
1400 Smith Street, EB3880D
Houston, TX  77002
Phone:  (713) 853-5968     Fax:      (713) 646-3490
Email:   joanne.rozycki@enron.com


Purvi,

Glad to see you working on some good stuff : )

you need to pull out a black sholes calculation and input the varialbles that you were given
and then call a power options trader to ask for a marekt to check the resonableness of the model
models can be way off on options due to skew and market conditions

good luck

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	"Purvi Patel" <pnpatel@tecoenergy.com>@ENRON [mailto:IMCEANOTES-+22Purvi+20Patel+22+20+3Cpnpatel+40tecoenergy+2Ecom+3E+40ENRON@ENRON.com]
Sent:	Thursday, June 07, 2001 10:21 AM
To:	Quigley, Dutch
Subject:	i need your help....

I have this little project to do and i need a little help from you... (since you are an expert in this field!!)

ok-- i need to figure out what the premium is on an aug on- peak call option for power. Now , I know that power is not what you do, but I can use some ideas on how to get started.

Terms

Strike price  is $200/ MWH
Forward curve for Aug is $125/MWH
Aug 2001
Foward Volatility of 100%
Valuation Date is June 8, 2001
Interest Rate is 6%
On- Peak Call Option for 50 MW

SO far, I have looked at some forcasts for Aug, and seen which hours the market rate is above 200 to come up with a premium value.  I have an answer for this problem, but I was just curous as to see where you would start. Anything will work. Thanks!!

Purvi

P.S-- also, don't be hesitant to tell me that you have no clue--- You'll still be my favorite manager!!!


---------------------- Forwarded by Kay Mann/Corp/Enron on 06/06/2001 06:11
PM ---------------------------

"Wilson Montjoy" <wmontjoy@brunini.com> on 06/06/2001 04:26:00 PM
To: <Kay.Mann@enron.com>
cc:

Subject: Fwd: Form of Opinion of Hunt and Ross

Attached is Rod's draft opinion for David.
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Date: Wed, 06 Jun 2001 16:18:14 -0500
From: "Michelle Blackstock" <mblackst@brunini.com>
To: "Wilson Montjoy" <wmontjoy@brunini.com>
Subject: Form of Opinion of Hunt and Ross
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: application/x-WordPerfect6.1
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="enron power.wpd"
Content-Description: WordPerfect 6.1

 - enron power.wpd


-----Original Message-----
From: Cook, Mary
Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2001 5:34 PM
To: Jones, Tana
Subject: FW: Texas Monthly (November 2001): How Enron Blew It

-----Original Message-----
From: Gray, Barbara N.
Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2001 3:31 PM
To: Koehler, Anne C.; Cook, Mary; Shackleton, Sara; Taylor, Mark E (Legal); Sayre, Frank; Hendry, Brent
Subject: FW: Texas Monthly (November 2001): How Enron Blew It

FYI
-----Original Message-----
From: Lees, Lisa
Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2001 3:05 PM
To: Gray, Barbara N.
Subject: FW: Texas Monthly (November 2001): How Enron Blew It

-----Original Message-----
From: Denny, Jennifer
Sent: Wednesday, October 24, 2001 1:43 PM
To: Lees, Lisa
Subject: FW: Texas Monthly (November 2001): How Enron Blew It

-----Original Message-----
From: Puthigai, Savita
Sent: Wed 10/24/2001 11:11 AM
To: Engel, Thomas; Denny, Jennifer
Cc:
Subject: FW: Texas Monthly (November 2001): How Enron Blew It

 -----Original Message-----
From:   McKinney, Lara
Sent:   Wednesday, October 24, 2001 8:43 AM
To:     Enron London - EOL Product Control Group; Puthigai, Savita
Subject:        FW: Texas Monthly (November 2001): How Enron Blew It

FYI - it is a good article

 -----Original Message-----
From:   Connelly, Angela
Sent:   24 October 2001 10:59
To:     McKinney, Lara
Subject:        FW: Texas Monthly (November 2001): How Enron Blew It

This is a long one - but definitely worth reading.

Cover title: Enron's Cutthroat Culture
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How Enron Blew It
Less than a year ago, the Houston-based energy behemoth had everything: money, power, glitz, smarts, new ideas, and a CEO who wanted to make it the most important company in the world. Now its stock is down, wall street is bearish, and the CEO is gone. What went wrong?

by Mimi Swartz < <http://www.texasmonthly.com/mag/issues/authors/mimiswartz.php>>
THE ENRON SKYSCRAPER NEAR THE SOUTH END OF HOUSTON'S DOWNTOWN feels like the international headquarters of the best and the brightest. The lobby in no way resembles the hushed, understated entryways of the old-fashioned oil companies, like Shell and Texaco nearby. Enron, in contrast, throbs with modernity. The people hustling in and out of the elevators are black, white, brown; Asian, Middle Eastern, European, African, as well as American-born. They are young, mostly under 35, and dressed in the aggressively casual uniform of the tech industry-the guys wear khakis, polo shirts, and Banana Republic button-downs. Almost preposterously fit, they move through the building intently, like winners. Enron is nothing if not energetic: A Big Brother-size TV screen frantically reports on the stock market near a bank of elevators, while another hefty black television relaying the same news greets people entering from the garage. A sculpture of the corporate symbol, an E tipped at a jaunty angle, radiates colors as it spins frenetically on its axis; a Starbucks concession on the ground floor keeps everyone properly caffeinated. Multicolored, inspirational flags hang from the ceiling, congratulating Enron on its diversity and its values; one more giant banner between elevator banks declares Enron's simple if grandiose goal: "From the World's Leading Energy Company to . . . The World's Leading Company!"

For a while, that future seemed guaranteed, as Enron transformed itself from a stodgy, troubled pipeline company in 1985 to a trading colossus in 2000. It was a Wall Street darling, with a stock price that increased 1,700 percent in that sixteen-year period, with revenues that increased from $40 billion to $100 billion. "The very mention of the company in energy circles throughout the world creates reactions ranging from paralyzing fear to envy," notes a 2001 report from Global Change Associates, a firm that provides market intelligence to the energy business.

This Enron was largely the creation of Jeff Skilling, a visionary determined to transform American business. Hired sixteen years ago as a consultant by then-CEO Ken Lay, Skilling helped build a company that disdained the old formula of finding energy in the ground, hauling it in pipelines, and then selling it to refineries and other customers. Instead, it evolved into a company that could trade and market energy in all its forms, from natural gas to electricity, from wind to water. If you had a risky drilling venture, Enron would fund it for a piece of the action. If you wanted your megacorporation's energy needs analyzed and streamlined, Enron could do the job. If you were a Third World country with a pitiful infrastructure and burgeoning power needs, Enron was there to build and build. Basically, if an idea was new and potentially-and fantastically-lucrative, Enron wanted the first crack. And with each success, Enron became ever more certain of its destiny. The company would be the bridge between the old economy and the high-tech world, and in February of this year, Skilling reaped his reward when he succeeded Lay as chief executive officer. Enron, says Skilling, "was a great marriage of the risk-taking mentality of the oil patch with the risk-taking mentality of the financial markets."

The Enron story reflects the culture that drove American business at the end of the twentieth century. Like the high-tech companies it emulated, Enron was going to reinvent the American business model and, in turn, the American economy. Maybe it was natural that this Brave New World also produced a culture that was based on absolutes: not just the old versus the new, but the best versus the mediocre, the risk takers versus the complacent-those who could see the future versus those who could not. The key was investing in the right kind of intellectual capital. With the best and the brightest, a company couldn't possibly go wrong.

Or could it? Today Enron's stock trades at around $35, down from a high of $80 in January. The press cast Enron as the archvillain of California's energy crisis last spring, and Skilling caught a blueberry pie in the face for his relentless defense of the free market. A long-troubled power plant project in India threatened the company's global ambitions. Telecommunications, in which Enron was heavily invested, imploded. Wall Street analysts who once touted the company questioned its accounting practices. Some of the change in Enron's fortunes can be attributed to the economic downturn in uncertain times that has afflicted all of American business. But the culture that the company created and lived by cannot escape blame.

ENRON, JEFF SKILLING SAYS, HAD "a totally different way of thinking about business-we got it." At Enron, in fact, you either "got it" or you were gone-it was as simple as black and white. It is not coincidental, then, that the color scheme of Skilling's River Oaks mansion mirrors the corporation he once headed. Here, the living room's white walls shimmer against the mahogany floors. Black leather trims the edge of snowy carpets. Billowy sofas set off the jet-black baby grand. In the entry, white orchids cascade from a black vase on a black pedestal table that in turn pools onto cold, white marble. There is only one off-color note: After almost twenty years, Jeff Skilling is no longer associated with Enron, having resigned abruptly after just six months as CEO. Once, Skilling was hailed as the next Jack Welch (General Electric's masterful CEO), as one of Worth magazine's best CEO's in America (anointed in 2001), and even as a daredevil who hosted the kind of unchained adventure junkets in which, a friend told BusinessWeek, "someone could actually get killed." Today, he sounds more like Ebenezer Scrooge on Christmas morning. "I had no idea what I'd let go of," Skilling says of all the personal sacrifices he made while retooling Enron.

From a black chair in the white library, across from a huge black and white photograph of his daughter and two sons, Skilling clarifies. The demands of working 24-7 for Enron caused him to ignore his personal finances. Divorced, he lived in a 2,200-square-foot house without a microwave or a dishwasher. He almost missed his brother's wedding. "Learning a foreign language-I never learned a foreign language!" he exclaims. He never once took his youngest son to school. "I'm interested in the kids. You don't do kids in fifteen-minute scheduling." Travel: "You can't go to Africa for a week and get anything out of it!" Skilling includes the study of architecture and design on his list of missed opportunities, then he stops and sighs. "I'm not sure that fulfillment in life is compatible with a CEO's job," he says, finally. Then his eyes lock on mine, and his voice, which had softened, regains its pragmatic edge. "It would have been easy to stay," he says. "But that would not have been good for me."

He's a smallish, ruddy-faced man who keeps himself at fighting weight, handsome in the way of corporate titans, with piercing cheekbones and that assiduously stolid gaze. But the impatience Skilling once reserved for cautious underlings and dull-witted utility company executives is now targeted at reporters who have labeled his resignation "bizarre" and associates who are bitterly skeptical of his need for family time. His shrug stretches the limits of his shimmering blue button-down, and his matching blue eyes look put upon. "I'm surprised," he says, "that people have so much trouble understanding this."

PEOPLE WHO PASSED THROUGH DOWNTOWN HOUSTON in the late eighties or early nineties couldn't help but notice a funny and, for its time, novel scene unfolding throughout the workday at the base of the Enron Building. From nine to five and before and after, you could see people slipping out of the pristine silver skyscraper to smoke. They perched on the chrome banisters or lurked near the glass doors at the entry, puffing like mad. They always looked hurried and furtive, even ashamed. Whatever people knew about Enron in those days (and most people didn't know much), it was often associated with that scene: Enron boasted one of the first nonsmoking corporate headquarters in Houston, and there couldn't have been clearer evidence of its break with the energy world of the past. What macho engineer would have put up with such humiliation?

But this company was a child of another time, that period in the mid-eighties when chaos enveloped the gas business. Federal deregulation of natural gas turned a steady, secure industry, in which gas pipeline companies frequently enjoyed a monopoly in portions of the areas that they served, into a volatile free-for-all. The situation was compounded five years later by federal deregulation of the pipeline business. So it happened that a gentlemanly gas pipeline company, Houston Natural Gas (HNG) found itself under attack from Coastal Corporation, Oscar Wyatt's less than gentlemanly firm. HNG was then run by Lay, a sturdy, taciturn former economics professor and Transco chief operating officer who had a passion for military strategy. (His doctoral thesis at the University of Houston was on supply and demand in the Vietnam War.) Lay, who was from Missouri and never succumbed-at least outwardly-to Texas brashness, had done well enough: Thanks to canny expansions, HNG's pipelines stretched from Florida to California and throughout the state of Texas.

HNG fended off Coastal, but to protect the company from other takeover attempts, Lay nimbly engineered the sale of HNG in 1985 to a friendly Nebraska pipeline concern called InterNorth, one of the largest pipeline companies in the country at the time. Then, a funny thing happened: HNG started acting in a way that would characterize the company for years to come-a lot like Coastal. What the Nebraskans blithely labeled "the purchase" was being called "the merger" back in Houston, and before long, following some particularly brutal politicking between Omaha and Houston, the company's center of gravity started shifting toward Texas, and shortly after that, Ken Lay was running a new company called Enron. "Over time it became clear that Lay had a better vision of the future," says one person associated with Enron at that time. "He never fought change. He embraced change."

Lay had won, but what exactly did that mean? Enron was saddled with massive debt from the takeover attempt, and thanks to deregulation, no longer had exclusive use of its pipelines. Without new ideas-for that matter, a whole new business plan-the company could be finished before it really even got started.

LIKE MANY PEOPLE WHO TEAMED UP WITH ENRON IN THE EIGHTIES, Jeff Skilling had spent a lot of time in the Midwest, and he was self-made-at fourteen he had been the chief production director at a start-up TV station in Aurora, Illinois. (His mother would drop him off there every day after school.) "I liked being successful when I was working, and I was smart," he told BusinessWeek earlier this year. But unlike many of his Enron colleagues, Skilling wasn't deliberate and soft-spoken and happy to go home at five o'clock; he was anxious and excitable, and nothing, but nothing excited him more than what he would come to call "intellectual capital." He loved being smart, and he loved being surrounded by smart people. He graduated from Southern Methodist University, went into banking-assets and liability management-and took on Harvard Business School, where he graduated in the top 5 percent of his class. Then Skilling took the next step on what was then the new, souped-up path to American success: He joined Manhattan's McKinsey and Company as a business consultant, and that is where Ken Lay found him in 1985.

It is often said of Lay that his instincts for hiring the best are flawless, and his choice of Skilling probably saved the company. Skilling was above all an expert at markets and how they worked. While everyone else was worrying about the gluts and the shortages that defined the gas industry, he alone saw the parallels between gas and other businesses. And so in a world where credit was nearly impossible to come by, Skilling came up with what he called the Gas Bank, which contractually guaranteed both the supply and the price of gas to a network of suppliers and consumers. Enron would not be a broker but a banker. It would buy and sell the gas itself and assume the risk involved. And Enron would make money on transactions, much like an investment bank would.

Skilling worked up some numbers and found them "absolutely compelling." Then the McKinsey consultant took the idea to a meeting of about 25 Enron executives. He had a one-page presentation. "Almost to a person," Skilling says, "they thought it was stupid." Almost. After Skilling left the meeting dejected, he walked Ken Lay to an elevator and apologized. Lay listened and then said, "Let's go."

The Gas Bank was not an overnight success. For months Skilling woke up in a cold sweat, sure he had ruined not only his career but the careers of dozens of colleagues who had assisted him. In fact, he had come upon one of those divides that seem to define his life: "I believed this whole world would be different, a huge breakthrough" is the way Skilling puts it today, and even if he is typically immodest, he was right. Fairly soon after launching, the company sold $800 million worth of gas in a week. True to Skilling's character, success turned out to be a matter of old versus new: He says the joke around Enron was that if a company's CEO was under fifty, "We were in." And he was in too: In 1990 Skilling finally left McKinsey and joined Enron as the head of Enron Finance Corporation, a new division created just for him. In 1991 that company closed a deal that earned $11 million in profit. After that, says Skilling, "we never looked back."

Skilling and Lay also realized that the Gas Bank couldn't work unless it had a trading component. Myriad trades were needed to build the market that would make the project go. But by buying and selling enormous quantities of gas, Enron not only constructed a market but almost instantly came to dominate it. The company had the best contacts, the best intelligence, and the best access to supplies. That, in turn, attracted more customers who wanted to be part of the play. With so many customers in its pocket, Enron could better predict the direction of the market and could use that knowledge to make trades for its own benefit-Enron could in effect bet on which way the price of gas would go, as one might do with pork bellies or soybeans, but with startling accuracy, thereby generating profits higher than anyone could have ever imagined.

THIS CHANGE COULD NEVER HAVE OCCURRED without another change Skilling had made: He created, within Enron, a new culture to match its new trading business. The idea was to build a "knowledge-based business," which demanded a skill set not exactly prized by Enron's employees from the old HNG days. Most were deliberate, cautious, responsible, somewhat defensive people, most of them men, of course-the kind of people you'd expect to find working in an industry regulated by the federal government. But now the company needed bolder people for its bold new era: that included anyone who wanted to make money-lots of money-for themselves and for the company. "Enron was going to create a niche for itself or die," one former executive explains. "The people who had narrow views eventually were forced out, because if they had narrow views about other things, they had narrow views about the market."

Skilling wanted smart people but not just any smart people. He wanted the smartest people from schools like Harvard, Stanford, and maybe, Rice. And because his firm was now acting more like a bank than a pipeline company, he wanted to draw from the pool of recruits that would be attracted to the biggest and best investment banks, like Merrill Lynch or Credit Suisse First Boston. In addition to being smart, Enron people were also supposed to be "aggressive." You were right for Enron if you didn't want to wait until you were thirty to close your own deals or move up in an organization.

You could see what he was looking for on "Super Saturdays" at the Houston headquarters: eight fifty-minute interviews with ten minute breaks in between-the company might herd as many as four hundred people through in just one day. They were scored from 1 to 5 on their smarts, their problem-solving ability, their passion for hard work, and what at Enron was called "a sense of urgency." People who scored less than 2.5 were scratched. The shrewdest candidates knew how to work Enron before they were even hired: These were the types that automatically turned down the company's first offer, knowing Enron would come back with more. The starting salary was around $80,000. Maybe it wasn't a fortune-yet-but the signing bonus, about $20,000, was more than enough for a lease on the obligatory Porsche Boxster or one of the lofts being renovated close to downtown. (Enron people didn't live in far-flung suburbs. Suburbs were uncool and too far from the office.)

For the lucky winners, Enron offered the corporate equivalent of a gifted-and-talented program. New associates learned the latest techniques for structuring energy deals, and there were rotations at Enron offices around the globe. The hours were long, but every possible need was taken care of. A company concierge handled all the things important people couldn't be bothered with: picking up dry cleaning or prescriptions, shining shoes, cleaning the house, planning a vacation. Of course, a lot of people who worked for Enron never got to take vacations-they were too busy making money-but they could use the company gym and the company's personal trainers. If they were overweight or wanted to quit smoking, they could join Enron's Wellness Program. Massages were offered six days a week, from seven in the morning until ten at night. "They were so cutting edge," rhapsodizes someone involved with the company health care program at the time. "They really thought about the psychology and what it took to keep these people going."

Skilling handed out titles analogous to those at Wall Street firms-analysts, associates, directors, and managing directors-but everyone knew that those titles didn't really matter. Money did. Instead of competitive salaries and decent bonuses, Enron offered competitive salaries and merit-based bonuses-with no cap. "If you really worked hard and delivered results, you could make a lot of money," says Ken Rice, who stayed with Enron for 21 years until resigning recently as the head of the company's faltering broadband division. Or, as the saying goes, you got to eat what you killed. Gas traders with two or three years of experience could wind up with a $1 million bonus. And the more you produced, the closer you got to Jeff: Real hot dogs joined him glacier hiking in Patagonia, Land Cruiser racing in Australia, or off-road motorcycling in a re-creation of the Baja 1,000 race, ending at a spectacular Mexican villa. "Every time he'd speak, I'd believe everything he'd say," one loyalist says.

And why not? By 1995 Enron had become North America's largest natural-gas merchant, controlling 20 percent of the market. But at a company where the buzzword was "aggressive," that was no place to stop: Skilling and Lay believed the Gas Bank model could easily be applied to the electricity business. Firmly committed to the notion that a deregulated market meant better service at lower prices for consumers (and untold profits for Enron), they began barnstorming the country, pressing their case with entrenched power company presidents (who, with their multimillion-dollar salaries and monopoly service areas, had little incentive to change) and energy regulators (who were somewhat more receptive, thanks in part to Enron's generous lobbying efforts).

But the biggest winner of all was probably Jeff Skilling. In 1997 Ken Lay made him the president and chief operating officer of the company. By then, the division known as Enron Capital and Trade Resources was the nations largest wholesale buyer and seller of natural gas and electricity. The division had grown from two hundred to two thousand employees, and revenues from $2 billion to $7 billion. "Mr. Skilling's experience so far with the turmoil in the industry has convinced him that he is on the right track," the New York Times noted. Everyone would certainly have thought so: Enron and Skilling had totally transformed one industry and were well on their way to transforming another.

"FIRING UP AN IDEA MACHINE; Enron Is Encouraging the Entrepreneurs Within," sang the New York Times in 1999. "In the staid world of regulated utilities and energy companies, Enron Corp is that gate-crashing Elvis," crowed Fortune in 2000. Wall Street was demanding tech-size growth on a tech timetable, and Enron, in 2000, obliged with second quarter earnings of $289 million, up 30 percent from the previous year. That year the company seemed to discover a market a minute: Under Skilling, Enron was trading coal, paper, steel, and even weather. No one blinked when a London wine bar became an Enron client. People drank more in warm weather than cold, so why not buy a hedge against the usual winter downturn?

But most exciting to the financial world was Enron's entry into high-tech communications. Because of the company's marketing dominance, EnronOnline became another overnight success, handling $335 billion in commodity trades online in 2000. Enron, as usual, made its money on the spread between the bid price and the asking price. Then there was the broadband business: To Enron, trading excess capacity in large, high-speed fiber-optic networks (empty lanes on the fabled information highway) wasn't that different from trading the capacity of natural gas pipelines. So Enron created a market for what the industry calls bandwidth. Soon after, it also announced a twenty-year deal with Blockbuster to deliver movies on demand electronically to people in their homes. Enron looked like a company that couldn't lose. "Its strategy of building businesses, shedding hard assets, and trading various commodities can help it do well even in an uncertain market," BusinessWeek insisted.

There was, however, another reason Enron did so well in such a short time: the company's hard-nosed approach toward its customers. The old notion of customer service was based on the long haul-you had to nurse and coddle customers to keep them. But Enron had new markets and new ideas-customers had to come to it. Over time, the company stopping referring to its business clients as customers and began calling them "counterparties."

Skilling wanted the biggest profits on the shortest timetable: Gains were maximized by creating, owning, and then abandoning a market before it became overtaxed and overregulated. So if you wanted to launch a high-risk venture quickly-such as Zilkha Energy's new high-tech approach to drilling for oil-you got your financing from Enron because a bank would take forever to underwrite the project, if it ever would. But because Enron invented its markets and subsequently dominated them, Enron could set the terms of its deals, from the timeline to the method of accounting to whether the deal happened at all.

While many businesses used what was known in the industry as "mark-to-market accounting," for instance, Enron used it on an unprecedented scale. The company priced their deals at current market value-but it was always Enron's idea of the market value; companies that balked at their pricing didn't get deals. And while old-fashioned companies spread their profits out like annuities over a period of years, Enron took most of its profit up-front. However many millions would be made on a deal that covered several years, they went on the books in the current year. If a few analysts thought there might be something fishy about what they called "subjective accounting," investors didn't particularly care as long as the profits rolled in. As the market fluctuated and the landscape changed, the company might abandon a project that had been in the works for months because its profit margins weren't going to be high enough. "Enron is known for leaving people at the altar," says one former employee. Winning the highest possible profits for the company could even extend to Enron's attitude toward charity. When a fundraiser for the Houston READ Commission, a literacy group, called on Enron for a contribution, it was suggested that he start raising money for Enron's competing literacy charity: "Even the person who was supposed to give money away for Enron was supposed to make money for Enron," he says.

As Enron became more and more successful, the culture Skilling had created took on a dark side: The competition turned inward. As one member of the Enron family put it, "It became a company full of mercenaries." The change started at the bottom. As Enron's domination of the energy market grew, most of the recruiting frills fell away. New associates were treated much like the commodities the company traded. Global Change's Enron spies reported overhearing orders like "I need a smart person-go buy me one" or "Buy me an intelligent slave, quick." Enron had never been the kind of place where people sang to you on your birthday, but now the workaholism bordered on self-parody: A Random Acts of Kindness program lasted only a few months. It was too disruptive. People couldn't get their work done.

And, of course, Enron had a program for institutionalizing creative tension. The Performance Review Committee, which had initially been installed by Skilling in the Capital group, became known as the harshest forced ranking system in the country. Employees were rated on a scale of one to five, and those with fives were usually gone within six months. (The PRC's nickname quickly became "rank and yank.") It was a point of pride that Skilling's division replaced 15 percent of its workforce every year. As one Skilling associate put it, "Jeff viewed this like turning over the inventory in a grocery store." Skilling's approach to business-get in and get out-had become Enron's attitude toward its workers. In time, it would become many workers' attitude toward the company. Teamwork, never that valuable in a trading culture, went the way of the eyeshade and the abacus. If protocol required an Enron higher-up to come from Europe to help with a project in the Third World, he might help-or he might not, depending on whether another, potentially more lucrative project was pending elsewhere.

Everyone felt the pressure to perform on a massive scale at massive speed: "They were so goal oriented toward immediate gratification that they lost sight of the future," says one former employee. Anyone who couldn't close deals within a quarter was punished with bad PRC scores, as were the higher-ups who had backed them. Past errors and old grudges were dredged up so often as new ammunition in PRC meetings that the phrase "No old tapes" became an Enron clich?. "People went from being geniuses to idiots overnight," says one former Enron executive.

In such a hothouse, paranoia flowered. New contracts contained highly restrictive confidentiality agreements about anything pertaining to the company. E-mail was monitored. A former executive routinely carried two laptops, one for the company and one for himself. People may have been rich at Enron, but they weren't necessarily happy. One recruiter described the culture this way: "They roll you over and slit your throat and watch your eyes while you bleed to death."

BEFORE JEFF SKILLING COULD TRANSFORM ENRON from the world's leading energy company into the world's leading company, he had to make one more change: Just as he had done ten years before, Skilling had to purge the company of its remaining old order. Where Enron once prized cautious executives who dealt with tangible assets like pipelines, it now valued bold executives who dealt with intangible assets. Pipelines, power plants-they may have been Enron's pride, but Skilling wanted them gone. Expensive, long-term building projects had no place when Wall Street was devoted to quick profits and enormous returns on investment capital, and Skilling knew it. "It wasn't the time for long-term approaches," an Enron executive says of Wall Street's mood. "It was the technology era."

To rid Enron of the last vestiges of its past, Skilling had to take on Rebecca Mark, long considered his rival for the CEO's job. Mark was for many years the poster child for the Enron way: Young, attractive, aggressive-her nickname was Mark the Shark-she came from sturdy Midwestern stock but had the requisite Harvard MBA. Mark was largely responsible for the success of Enron International, the asset-heavy side of the company where she developed $20 billion worth of gas and power plants, which accounted for 40 percent of Enron's profits in 1998. For this she reaped breathtaking compensation-one Enron executive estimated $10 million-and adoring press clips, including two appearances on Fortune's list of the fifty most powerful women in corporate America.

But then Mark ran into trouble with a gas-fired power plant in Dabhol, India, one of the largest ever constructed. She had played the game the Enron way: Taking Enron into a new market, she had finagled low import taxes (20 percent instead of the usual 53) and hung in through 24 lawsuits and three changes in government. But the time and expense needed to make India and other Enron plants around the globe successful did not mesh with Enron's goals, and Skilling's impatience with Mark grew.

Forcing Mark out, however, was no easy matter. Key executives left, divisions were dismantled, but she remained. The truth was Enron didn't mind firing lower-level employees, but it hated to fire the kind of aggressive, relentless people it tended to promote. The company preferred humiliation-keeping a director in his cubicle, say, but failing to include him in the glamour deals, or kicking someone upstairs with a fancy title. (One particularly difficult executive won a few years at graduate school, gratis.) A company as smart as Enron could probably deduce too that dispatching one of the most visible businesswomen in the country would provoke a public-relations disaster. So Lay and Skilling did something classically Enronian: They gave Mark her own company. Despite Skilling's contempt for asset-heavy businesses, Enron spent more than $2 billion to buy a run-of-the-mill British water utility that could serve as Enron's entry into the emerging world of water privatization. Mark was put in charge of making Enron, yes, the world's greatest water company. Azurix, as the new business was called, looked like another sure thing: Its IPO in 1999 raised $695 million.

But Mark had to succeed on Enron's increasingly abbreviated timetable in a business fraught with political and emotional complexities. Water is not like gas or electricity-owners and governments are a lot less willing to give it up, even for lots of money. The company stumbled, layoffs commenced, and confidence evaporated. By August 2000 the stock price, which had started out at $19, had fallen to $5. Mark's resignation followed, and Azurix, much diminished, was folded into Enron. "I think it's best for Rebecca to start afresh," Lay, who had been a mentor to Mark, told the Wall Street Journal. Or as one critic put it, "They were more interested in destroying the old culture than running a business."

As 2000 drew to a close, Skilling was in total command. In December Ken Lay announced the inevitable: "The best time for the succession to occur is when the company is doing well," he told the press. "Enron is doing extremely well now." In February 2001 Jeff Skilling took over the CEO's job.

ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THE TROUBLE STARTED. Enron's domination of the electric-power market made it an instant target in the California deregulation debacle. Both PBS's Frontline and the New York Times took on Enron, portraying the company as a heartless colossus that used its influence in Washington (Lay and Enron's political action committee are the top contributors to George W. Bush) to force old people on fixed incomes to choose between buying food or electricity. Skilling and Lay appeared on camera singing belligerent anthems to the free market, while another memorable scene juxtaposed one of the company's jackallike traders against a hapless state employee in California, as both tried to buy power online. The Times reported that Lay had tried to persuade a new federal commissioner to change his views on energy deregulation. The bad press was, to say the least, ironic: Just as the media was pounding Enron for its omnipotence, Wall Street was discovering its weaknesses. By late March the stock price had slid to $50 a share from $80 in January.

Within Enron, the asset-based divisions took the rap for the decline. (The India plant continued to be enormously costly, at least in part because of constant turnover within Enron's management team.) But the California situation was more visible and therefore more damaging, despite Enron's claim that the state had never built enough power plants to service its population and never properly managed those it had. "For three months Gray Davis did a very good job of blaming us," says Mark Palmer, a vice president for corporate communications. "We were a Texas company. There was a Texan in the White House. California was a state that didn't put him in office, and his biggest contributor was a Texas energy company. Performance is going to take care of our stock price. The truth will take care of Gray Davis." (California utilities still owe Enron $500 million, another reason stockholders might be panicky.) But more problematic than the crisis itself was Skilling's all too apparent lack of contrition. Facing down his critics, he cracked a joke comparing California with the Titanic. ("At least the Titanic went down with its lights on.")

But the biggest problem was Enron's telecommunications division, which had been responsible for at least one third of its heady stock price. Investors believed that Enron could revolutionize high-speed communications, just as it had revolutionized gas and power. Enron estimated the global market for buying and selling space over fiber-optic cable would grow from $155 billion in 2001 to $383 billion by 2004-but then the tech bubble burst. So too did the much-hyped movies-on-demand deal with Blockbuster. For the first time in its confoundingly successful life, Enron had nothing new to take to market. Like the popular high school girl who suddenly packs on a few pounds, Enron suddenly looked less alluring to Wall Street.

Skilling launched a campaign to keep Enron's most important cheerleaders, the stock analysts, in the tent, but he wasn't cut out to be a supplicant. During the reporting of first quarter profits, he called an analyst who challenged Enron's financial reporting an "asshole." When the company reported hefty second quarter profits, many analysts questioned whether those profits had come from the generation of new business or from the sale of old assets. Ignoring the growing chorus critical of Enron's accounting, Skilling promised, as he always had, that innovations were just around the corner. "There wasn't any positive news," Carol Coale, of Prudential Financial, says now. "Basically, he talked me out of a downgrade."

The business press, so generous in the past, turned surly. Fortune had asked in March whether Enron was overpriced. ("Start with a pretty straightforward question: How exactly does Enron make its money?") The routine cashing in of stock options that were about to expire by key executives was portrayed in the media as a fire sale. (Skilling had sold $33 million worth, Ken Lay and Ken Rice close to four times that amount.) Then the Wall Street Journal reported on a fund run by the CFO that had been a source of strife within the company. (It was essentially risk management against Enron's possible failures.) Every negative story seemed to produce a concurrent drop in the stock price: By late August it had fallen below $40. Enron, so institutionally unforgiving, finally got a taste of its own medicine. "When Wall Street is in love with a stock, they're forgiving of something like accounting," says Carol Coale. "When a company falls out of favor, all these issues carry more weight."

This fact was not lost on people inside the company, who suddenly started experiencing an attack of conscience. Those who had looked the other way as the most powerful Enron executives dumped their wives and married their secretaries or carried on flagrant interoffice affairs now saw the error of their ways. "It just created an attitude," one executive still at Enron says. "If senior people are doing that, why are we held to a higher standard? There was a real culture of 'We're above everyone else.'"

Loyalty had never been prized at Enron, so there was no reason to expect it now. An old-fashioned, slow-moving company like Exxon could demand hardship duty in Baku with the promise of greater rewards down the road. "But," as one Houston oilman explains, "if you have to negotiate a hardship duty with someone who doesn't have loyalty and has money, then you have a corporation that's better suited for good times than bad."

As it turned out, that description applied to Jeff Skilling too. As the stock price stubbornly refused to ascend, he made no secret of his unhappiness and frustration. Then, after a trip to visit the families of three employees killed at a plant in England, he had an epiphany: Life was short; for him, Enron was over. Ever stoic, Ken Lay returned to the CEO's office, named a new president, arranged a trip to New York to calm analysts and investors, and promised a kinder, gentler Enron in the future. Trading anything and everything was out. The company, Lay says, will still innovate but "innovate much closer to our core." As for the culture: "Things like the Performance Review Committee, I think we could have applied better. By trying to categorize people into so many different categories, you ended up creating a morale problem."

That Skilling's supposedly brilliant colleagues were as shocked at the news of his departure as the rest of the business community may be testament to their lack of emotional intelligence. Despite Skilling's lengthy tenure with Enron, he'd always been contemptuous of the long haul; he'd always believed in cutting losses and moving on. But now that he was abandoning them when the company was in trouble, it was different. "Even Jeff's biggest detractors wouldn't have wanted him to walk out the door," one loyalist admits.

But on the day we meet, Skilling is looking forward, not back. "Look," he says with finality, "ninety percent of my net worth is in Enron. Were my interests aligned with the shareholders? Absolutely."

Free of falling stock prices and shareholder pressures, he is nestling himself back into the world of ideas. His eyes flash as he talks about new technologies. "The first wave never gets it right," he says. "The stand-alone dot-coms didn't work, but the technological applications will create a second wave that will change the world." Houston, he promises, will become the world's center of commodity trading, and he intends to be a part of it. In fact, he is already shopping for office space.

"This is the second wave, and Enron's got it," he says, almost breathless. "There are thousands of people running around the streets of Houston that get it."


---------------------- Forwarded by Darron C Giron/HOU/ECT on 05/09/2001
02:34 PM ---------------------------

Mark.Ebert@broadwing.com on 05/08/2001 10:47:59 AM
To: BryLad5@aol.com, dgiron@ect.enron.com, david.long@tdhca.state.tx.us,
keykeith@mindspring.com, george.ewton@unisys.com,
heather.hodnett@tdhca.state.tx.us, bjnelson81@uswest.net,
jw@cleartrading.com, kelang@mmm.com, keith.doran@tdhca.state.tx.us,
SPSMITHCPA@aol.com, swash@tdhca.state.tx.us
cc:
Subject: FW: Final Answer

 - Final Answer.jpg


FYI.
PL

---------------------- Forwarded by Phillip M Love/HOU/ECT on 10/24/2000
12:44 PM ---------------------------

Phillip M Love
10/24/2000 12:51 PM
To: Carla Nguyen/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc:
Subject: Re: Ontario, People, & Sithe Financial Liquidations

The FRED file for Ontario did not include flashed liquidations detail.  It
appears the files were not prepared by risk.  I have prepared the files and
attached them.  Do you mind including this in the FRED file and reissuing?
Thanks for your help, please call with questions.
PL


John,

FYI

Vince

---------------------- Forwarded by Vince J Kaminski/HOU/ECT on 11/29/2000
10:09 AM ---------------------------

"Dale M. Nesbitt" <dale.nesbitt@worldnet.att.net> on 11/28/2000 11:56:58 PM
Please respond to <dale.nesbitt@marketpointinc.com>
To: "Vincent Kaminski" <Vince.J.Kaminski@enron.com>
cc:
Subject: Test Project Proposal

Vince:

I did get the proposal out today, but after close of business your time.
Sorry for the brief delay.  You will find two attachments.  The first is our
time and materials contract, which will need to be executed if you want to
do the test project.  The second is an addendum to that time and materials
contract under Section H, which allows for specific work statements to amend
and supersede the general consulting agreement.  The general consulting
agreement (termsandconditions.doc) contains all the confidentiality, billing
rate, and other provisions that your contract people will probably want and
provides a general framework for doing business.  The work statement
(testproject.doc) contains the specific provisions for our standard weeklong
onsite test project.

I hope we get the opportunity to serve you and ultimately to make
MarketPoint available to you.  In light of the contiguity to the holidays, I
dont think it would be realistic to try to schedule this test project before
then, probably from your perpsective as well as ours.  Let's think about
doing it the first opportunity in January if you decide to go forward if
that is OK with you.

All the best.
Dale

 - testproject.doc
 - termsandconditions.doc


the end of the season is typically the best month to hold. Even if the first
part of the summer is weak, people will be hesistant to sell the back half.
Same with the winter.  That's why I'm long H2.  It has good correlation with
the front on up moves and tends to hold value on the down move.

	From:  Vladimir Gorny                           02/12/2001 02:44 PM

To: John Arnold/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc:
Subject:

Why Oct-01 and not any other Winter month? Vlady.


I'm a bachelor next week and would love to go to dinner.  Anywhere you want.
John


Mark, as discussed this morning.  When does Cedric get back?  I can go
through them in more detail but I thought these would help.
mike

---------------------- Forwarded by Mike McConnell/HOU/ECT on 07/10/2000
08:09 PM ---------------------------

	From:  Mike McConnell                           07/08/2000 02:17 PM

To: Cedric Burgher/Corp/Enron@ENRON
cc:
Subject: Analyst presentation comments

Cedric,

As a follow-up to our meeting,  below are a few comments and ideas regarding
the Net Works piece of the analyst presentation.

I know I sent you a lot of data and presentations, here are a few pages in
the various presentations that I think may be appropriate for the
presentation (or pieces of them) including:

? Why Enron?
? Recent Enron eCommerce Experience
? Lessons Learned
? Business Strategy
? Target Market Criteria
? Enron Today/Enron Tomorrow

Here are a couple of other thoughts and ideas.

We need to emphasize our new businesses outside the energy business
(obvious).  Clickpaper.com will be out and live just before the analyst
meetings.  This is very exciting and could take the industry by storm
(eventually).  Especially with Jeff,s comments with the analysts.  This
should be emphasized with the metals piece.  The concept is that here are 2
new areas where Enron is going to change the "old economy" businesses and
industries.  Clickpaper will have real time pricing which is different than
all the other 15 existing sites.  All of the others are charging 3% fees for
matching buyers and sellers in a bulletin board or auction type of
transactions. We will also have that functionality (and will charge 1% or $0
(we,ll update you later) but will also have an EOL type of real time pricing
component (this piece will be free).  This piece will not be ready for July
25th but will be announced publicly and in final development stages (should
be out by end of 3rd qtr.).  I believe that the link with Net Works with both
paper and metals is very important for providing a more complete picture than
just metals alone.  Also for your information, we are working on 2
acquisition deals that will be coming out soon, 1 is to buy a mill and could
be announced next week, which will also clarify and add to the story since we
will have access to physical pulp and paper.  Paper must be an important
piece of the presentation.  Greg Piper is the MD for Clickpaper and he can
answer any other questions and fill you in and answer more questions.  He can
be reached at ext. 36635.

Also, on the "Target Markets" page, I would reorder;  put Lumber underneath
pulp and paper and think about separating the others as potential markets.
That way we could actually check off the top 3 as "done" and the others are
in "incubation" and examination stages.

Please draft up your initial thoughts on these items and send me the latest
version and I,ll add additional commentary.  I will be in all next week.

Thanks,
mike


Rishi:
We are not going to send back this investor list anymore.  I am going to send
both you and James an update each night that we send something out, but only
you guys make changes to the Investor List.  Also make sure that you still
send the signed CA down to us even if there are not any changes to the CA, we
need to have our legal team go through it first.  Thanks!
Ben


453152   broker has .0075 - trader mistake/should be .0075 not .75

 450710  broker has .0075 - trader mistake/should be .0075

 451976  broker has .0075 - part of sleeve/either 451976 or 451977 should
have .0075 fee

 457489  broker has .0075 - no broker fee

 457465  broker has .0075 - no broker fee

 454511  broker has .0075 - part of sleeve/either 454511 or 454512 should
have .0075 fee

Would you like me to go ahead and make these changes? Please let me know.

Thanks,
Kate

Kerri Thompson@ENRON
11/15/2000 08:04 AM
To: Kate Symes/PDX/ECT@ECT
cc:

Subject: Broker Fees

can you check on the following fees:

453152   broker has .0075

450710  broker has .0075

451976  broker has .0075

457489  broker has .0075

457465  broker has .0075

454511  broker has .0075

thanks


Good point, I agree. ?The language also preserves the possibility of
competition in billing services. ?If the utilities want to charge too much
for the service, we'd like a chance to provide the state with private-label
billing. ?Peter

Peter Bray
The New Power Company
415-782-7810

	Kassandra Gough <kgough@calpine.com>

	02/07/01 12:35 PM
		? ? ? ?
		? ? ? ? To: ? ? ? ?"'Julia Wright'" <jwright@smithandkempton.com>, "'Aaron
Thomas'" <athomas@newenergy.com>, "'Allan Lippincott'"
<alippin@mail.arco.com>, "'Ann Cohn (e-mail)'" <cohnap@sce.com>, "'Ann Watson
(e-mail)'" <anw@cpuc.ca.gov>, "'Anna Ferrera (e-mail)'"
<Anna.Ferrera@SEN.CA.GOV>, "'Art Carter (e-mail)'" <debinorton@aol.com>,
"'assistant to John Fielder'" <moravekj@sce.com>, "Audra Hartmann (E-mail)"
<ath@cpuc.ca.gov>, "'Barbara Barkovich (e-mail)'"
<brbarkovich@earthlink.net>, "'Becky Kilbourne (e-mail)'"
<bakilbourne@calpx.com>, "'Bill Booth (e-mail)'" <wbooth@booth-law.com>,
"'Bill Dombrowski (e-mail)'" <cra@calretailers.com>, "'Bill Keese (e-mail)'"
<wkeese@energy.state.ca.us>, "'Bill Zobel (e-mail)'" <bzobel@mail.arco.com>,
"'Bob Foster (e-mail)'" <fosterrg@sce.com>, "'Bob Houston (e-mail)'"
<houstgrp@pacbell.net>, "Brian Kelly (E-mail)" <brian.kelly@sen.ca.gov>,
"'Carolyn McIntyre (e-mail)'" <cmcintyre@sempra.com>, "'Catherine Hackney
(e-mail)'" <hacknece@sce.com>, "'Charles Bacchi (e-mail)'"
<charles.bacchi@asm.ca.gov>, "'Dan Carroll (e-mail)'" <dcarroll@dbsr.com>,
"'Delaney Hunter'" <dhunter@smithandkempton.com>, "Delbert Fore (E-mail)"
<fore.delbert@epenergy.com>, "'Denice Cazalet (e-mail)'" <dcazalet@apx.com>,
"'Dennis Price (e-mail)'" <priced@epenergy.com>, "'Denny Samuel (e-mail)'"
<dsam@chevron.com>, "'Dominic DiMare (e-mail)'"
<dominic.DiMare@calchamber.com>, "'Dorothy Rothrock (email)'"
<drothrock@cmta.net>, "'Ed Yates (e-mail)'" <ed@clfp.com>, "'Eloy Garcia
(e-mail)'" <egarcia@ka-pow.com>, "'Evelyn Elsesser (e-mail)'"
<eke@aelaw.com>, "'Gary Heath (e-mail)'" <gheath@eob.ca.gov>, "'Gordon
McDonald (e-mail)'" <gordon.mcdonald@pacificorp.com>, "Greg Hardy (E-mail)"
<hardygl@texaco.com>, "'Jack Flanigan (e-mail)'"
<jackflanigan@flaniganlaw.com>, "'Jack Gualco (e-mail)'"
<Jackson_Gualco@gualcogroup.com>, "'Jack Stewart (email)'"
<jstewart@cmta.com>, "'James Boyd (e-mail)'" <jim@resources.ca.gov>, "'Jan
Smutny-Jones (e-mail)'" <smutny@iepa.com>, "Jeannie Cain (E-mail)"
<jeanne.cain@calchamber.com>, "'Jeff Dasovich (e-mail)'"
<jdasovic@enron.com>, "'Jerry Jordan (e-mail)'" <jordan@cmua.org>, "'Jim
Groniger (e-mail)'" <gronign@texaco.com>, "'Joe Lyons (e-mail)'"
<joseph.lyons@asm.ca.gov>, Joe Ronan <JoeR@calpine.com>, "'John Bridges
(e-mail)'" <bridgesj@epenergy.com>, "'John Fielder (e-mail)'"
<fielderjr@sce.com>, "'John Fistolera (e-mail)'" <johnf@ncpa.com>, "'John
Larrea (e-mail)'" <john.g.larrea@williams.com>, "'John Rozsa (e-mail)'"
<John.Rozsa@sen.ca.gov>, "'John White (e-mail)'" <vjw@cleanpower.org>,
"'Joseph Alamo'" <jalamo@enron.com>, "Julee Malinowski-Ball (E-mail)"
<jmball@ns.net>, "'Karen Edson (e-mail)'" <kedson@ns.net>, "'Karen Jarrell
(e-mail)'" <kjarrell@smurfit.com>, "'Karen Koyano (e-mail)'"
<kykoyano@calpx.com>, "'Karen Lindh (e-mail)'" <karen@klindh.com>, "'Karen
Mills (e-mail)'" <kmills@cfbf.com>, "'Kari harteloo (e-mail)'"
<klc@aelaw.com>, Kassandra Gough <kgough@calpine.com>, "'Kathy Brandenburg
(e-mail)'" <katherinebrandenburg@flaniganlaw.com>, "'Kay Grosulak (e-mail)'"
<kgrosulak@sppc.com>, "'Keith McCrea (e-mail)'" <kmccrea@sablaw.com>, "Kent
G. Smith (E-mail)" <ksmith@energy.state.ca.us>, "'Kevin Lynch (e-mail)'"
<Kevin.Lynch@pacificorp.com>, "'Kevin Smith (e-mail)'" <kevins@ncpa.com>,
"Kip Lipper (E-mail)" <kip.lipper@sen.ca.gov>, "'Lawrence Lingbloom
(e-mail)'" <lawrence.lingbloom@sen.ca.gov>, "'Lenny Goldberg (e-mail)'"
<iga@mother.com>, "'Louis Szablya (e-mail)'" <szablyal@epenergy.com>, "'Marc
Joseph (e-mail)'" <mdjoseph@adamsbroadwell.com>, "'Mark Monagan (Calpine)'"
<mrmonagan@aol.com>, "'Marwan Masri (e-mail)'" <mmasri@energy.state.ca.us>,
"'Mary McDonald (e-mail)'" <memcdonald@calpx.com>, "'Michael Alcantar
(e-mail)'" <mpa@aelaw.com>, "'Mie Florio (e-mail)'" <mflorio@turn.org>,
"'Mike Kahl (e-mail)'" <mikahl@ka-pow.com>, "'Mona Petrochko (e-mail)'"
<mpetroch@enron.com>, "'Pete Conaty (e-mail)'" <pcaceo@pacbell.net>, "Peter
Bray (E-mail)" <pbray@newpower.com>, "'Phil Nails (e-mail)'"
<phil.nails@asm.ca.gov>, "Phil Stohr (E-mail)" <pstohr@dbsr.com>, "'Ralph
Cavanagh (e-mail)'" <rcavanagh@nrdc.org>, "'Randy Chinn (e-mail)'"
<randy.chinn@sen.ca.gov>, "'Ray Thompson (e-mail)'"
<ray.thompson@sen.ca.gov>, "Richard Costigan III ESQ. (E-mail)"
<richard.costigan@asm.ca.gov>, "Richard Mesereau (E-mail)"
<richard.mesereau@asm.ca.gov>, "'Rick Counihan'"
<rick.counihan@greenmountain.com>, "'Robert Berry (e-mail)'" <berry@apx.com>,
"'Robin Larson (e-mail)'" <rlarson@caiso.com>, "Roderick A. Campbell
(E-mail)" <roderick.campbell@asm.ca.gov>, "Scott Tomashefsky (E-mail)"
<stomashe@energy.state.ca.us>, "'Sheryl Carter (e-mail)'" <scarter@nrdc.org>,
"'Steve Pike (e-mail)'" <pikes@epenergy.com>, "Steve Ponder (E-mail)"
<steve_ponder@fpl.com>, "'Stu Wilson (e-mail)'" <swilson@cmua.org>, "'Sue
Mara (e-mail)'" <smara@enron.com>, "'Susan Reeder (e-mail)'"
<sreeder@sppc.com>, "'Terry Winter (e-mail)'" <twinter@caiso.com>, "'Thomas
Dinkel (e-mail)'" <tdinkel@retx.com>, "'Tim Schmelzer (e-mail)'"
<tschmelz@energy.state.ca.us>, "'Tommy Ross (e-mail)'" <rosst@sce.com>,
"'Tony Braun (e-mail)'" <braun@cmua.org>, "'Victoria Schaefer (e-mail)'"
<schaefvl@sce.com>
		? ? ? ? cc: ? ? ? ?Steven Schleimer <sschleimer@calpine.com>, Alex Makler
<AlexM@calpine.com>, Joe Ronan <JoeR@calpine.com>, James Macias
<Jmacias@calpine.com>
		? ? ? ? Subject: ? ? ? ?Calpine Changes to AB 1X Amend

Hi All,

Calpine appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed amendments to
AB 1X. ?The proposed amendment would delete language now in section 80110
which provides: ?"The department shall have the same rights with respect to
the payment by retail end use customers for power sold by the department as
do providers of power to such customers."

That language is extremely useful for maintaining that the department may
directly bill customers if, for example, the CPUC does not adopt a
sufficient rate recovery mechanism. ? It is very important to use that we
keep that language intact. ?I don't believe this should be a problem for any
of you but please call me at (916) 443-2500 if it is. ?Thank you.

 - subscription protocols..doc


Please help me welcome Jill Chatterton to the Portland Enron office.  She begins her role as Administrative Assistant in West Power Trading on Thursday, May 10.  Jill has an extensive background in administrative work and is a welcome addition to our group.  She will be supporting Scheduling, Trading, and IT-Development.


He and I talked. You can stop bothering him for now. When we get him next
week will extract our pound of flesh and we will make him buy the beer.

From: Stephen Gray@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT on 12/06/2000 12:25 PM EST
To: Rob G Gay/NA/Enron@ENRON
cc:

Subject: Re: Meetings next week

Rob,

Does this mean Cliff won't be available for our call on Friday or to return
my three weeks of accumulated voice-mails and e-mails until next week?

If so, I'll stop trying to reach him.

Steve Gray


Jeff / Michelle,

Here's the Daily Update for the 15th.

Suzanne

 - IGSUpdate.xls


Below is the LNG Agreement file you can use for modifications if necessary.
---------------------- Forwarded by Janet Edwards/Corp/Enron on 06/07/2000
03:46 PM ---------------------------

"Bobby J. Gaspard" <bjgaspard@cmsenergy.com> on 05/30/2000 01:15:39 PM
To: Janet.Edwards@enron.com
cc:

Subject: Re: Agreement

Dear Janet:

Please find attached a draft discount letter documenting our potential deal
for
transportation service on Trunkline Gas Company.  Please review and provide me
your comments.

I am not available this week due to meetings.  Please leave me a message or
send
email and I will respond as soon as I can.

Questions, please let me know.

Thanks,

Bobby J. Gaspard

(See attached file: ena transport deal disc letter.doc)

Janet.Edwards@enron.com on 05/23/2000 03:31:39 PM

To:   Bobby J. Gaspard/Mktg/PPLC@CMSPanhandle
cc:
Subject:  Agreement

How is it looking to receive it today?

 - ena transport deal disc letter.doc


Are you coming to the game tonight?


I will be at Kenneally's at 6:45 p.m. if you are interested.


Kim -

Gary Heaton is going to ride with us to SA on Friday.  I'll pick him up at
noon and then we'll head down to you or to the Spires and leave from there.

SYT,
John


Start Date: 3/8/01; HourAhead hour: 23;  No ancillary schedules awarded.  No
variances detected.

    LOG MESSAGES:

PARSING FILE -->> O:\Portland\WestDesk\California Scheduling\ISO Final
Schedules\2001030823.txt

---- Energy Import/Export Schedule ----
*** Final schedule not found for preferred schedule.
     Details:

  TRANS_TYPE: FINAL
  SC_ID: ECTRT
  MKT_TYPE: 2
  TRANS_DATE: 3/8/01
  TIE_POINT: PVERDE_5_DEVERS
  INTERCHG_ID: EPMI_CISO_WATER
  ENGY_TYPE: FIRM


-----Original Message-----
From: 	Imai, Rika
Sent:	Wednesday, November 21, 2001 10:51 AM
To:	Black, Tamara Jae
Subject:	AGENDA FOR PIRA PRESENTATION

TJ,
Please send this out to all the traders
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

PIRA will be here on  Monday, December 3rd from 3:30-5:30.

The meeting will be located on the 6th floor in room 6980.

If you have any specific topics you would like to have covered, please feel free to send me an e-mail

Thank You

Rika

Electricity & Fuels Briefing
Allan M. Stewart, Managing Director

AGENDA

Agenda:  This Agenda sets out a broad set of topics which will be covered in handout charts and tables accompanying this briefing. Active participation is encouraged to help efficiently utilize the time of discussion in line with areas of greatest interest.  In addition any questions forwarded in advance will be addressed.

Briefing Objective:  Review and analyze key drivers of electricity & fuel prices at various regional markets throughout North America, with a special emphasis on those subregions of the Eastern Grids. Discuss the key factors/risks in PIRA's reference case outlook and explore important alternative scenarios. Principal timeframes will be now through 3Q2002 (short-term), and 2002-4 (medium-term). There will be a brief discussion of strategic issues and those relating to longer-term timeframes.

Short-Term Electricity & Fuels Outlook (Next 12 Months)
Electricity Price Outlook (vs. Current Consensus)
Overall Load, Resource & Price Assessments
Capacity Modeling & Results
Hydro, Fuels, & Environmental Developments
Implications for Natural Gas Demand/Prices

Medium-Term Electricity & Fuels Outlook (1 -3 Years)
Capacity Outlook
Survey Results & Implications For Prices & Asset Values
Structural Change Prospects and Potential Impacts
Strategic Implications For Traders/Asset Managers
Implications for Natural Gas Demand/Prices

Longer-Term & Strategic Issues for Future Electricity & Fuels Markets
	-	Outlook For Capacity Additions, Retirements, Environmental Factors & Prices
Potential Strategy Options For Consideration

Fuels & Emissions Markets
Natural Gas, Oil, and Coal Market Outlooks & Risks
Significant Emission Markets Developments


Jim & Nick,
In order to be consistent concerning the use of ICF curves or ENA curves in the Fort Pierce model, do you think that it is necessary to run the spread option model for ICF curves?  I believe that I need to have the capability to input Variable O&M and Per start expenses in the model that I am running with ICF curves.  Please advise.  Thank you.  Jennifer

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	Meyn, Jim
Sent:	Thursday, May 31, 2001 7:31 PM
To:	Bagwell, Jennifer; Gimble, Mathew
Cc:	Cross, Edith; Weldon, V. Charles
Subject:	Ft. Pierce Evaluation

Jennifer, attached is a summary model of the Ft. Pierce evaluation using Enron's curves.  Please note that there are two scenarios provided, based on a best case and worst case pipeline demand charge scenario.  The spread option model was dispatched based on the same assumptions as utilized by the gas group in developing their pipeline cost assumptions.  I've tried to add notes to the models outlining potential areas of additional value as there are some unique characteristics of this deal that should provide additional value to the project.  I'll be over to help review the cash flow model.

Thanks for everyone's help (Edith/Charlie)

- Jim

 << File: FP Dispatch Summary 5-30-2001.xls >>


Julie,

A few issues.

1. I would like to register 2 members of my group for both courses (in
Houston):

a. Paulo Issler
b. Alex Huang

I shall attend the course on weather only.

2. I have started the process to issue a check for 5,000 AUD for Lacima.
Shirley sent you an update on this. The 2nd installment comes from the budget
of our
office in Australia. I shall talk to Paul Quilkey today about it. Please, let
me know if there is any delay.

3. The book  will be used as textbook for the class I shall be teaching at
Rice.
Rice Univ bookshop is placing an order.

4. I would like to order 50 copies for my group. What is the ebst
way to place the order?  Can we pay in US dollars?

Vince

"Julie" <julie@lacima.co.uk> on 11/12/2000 02:05:40 PM
To: <Undisclosed-Recipient:@mailman.enron.com;>
cc:
Subject: Lacima Energy and Weather Derivatives Courses by Clewlow and
Strickland

Please find attached information?for our next two courses and  workshops:?
Energy Derivatives:? Pricing and Risk Management and
Weather Derivatives, which will be conducted in Houston and in London in  Feb
/ March 2001.? Instructors will be Dr Les Clewlow and Dr Chris  Strickland.
?
Because the course requires intense interaction, the courses will  be?limited
to a maximum of 15 people, so early registration is  encouraged.
?
If you require further information, or would like to register for either or
both?courses, please contact me via this email or our web site,?www.
lacimagroup.com
 - Energy.pdf
 - weather.pdf


Drew is okay with this.  I will email the list to FERC.
---------------------- Forwarded by Lindy Donoho/ET&S/Enron on 12/12/2000
11:33 AM ---------------------------

	From:  Drew Fossum                           12/12/2000 08:23 AM

To: Mary Kay Miller/ET&S/Enron@ENRON
cc: Lindy Donoho/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Steven Harris/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Glen
Hass/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Mary Darveaux/ET&S/Enron@ENRON

Subject: Re: FERC Request

Lindy, if all FERC wanted is  a list and contacts, this looks fine.  If they
wanted exact MDQ and usage numbers for each customer, let me know.  DF

	From:  Mary Kay Miller                           12/11/2000 05:39 PM

To: Lindy Donoho/ET&S/Enron@ENRON
cc: Drew Fossum/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Steven Harris/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Glen
Hass/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Mary Darveaux/ET&S/Enron@ENRON

Subject: Re: FERC Request

Not having received the request,  it seems like the quantity related to the
contract would provide them better info than a contact name and phone
number-  did they specifically ask for that inf0??  upon answer, work
directly with Drew as I'll be out.   MK

Lindy Donoho
12/11/2000 04:22 PM
To: Drew Fossum/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Mary Kay Miller/ET&S/Enron@ENRON
cc: Steven Harris/ET&S/Enron@ENRON

Subject: Re: FERC Request

Please see my original message below.  Are you okay with TW forwarding this
info to FERC?
---------------------- Forwarded by Lindy Donoho/ET&S/Enron on 12/11/2000
04:21 PM ---------------------------

Steven Harris
12/11/2000 04:19 PM
To: Lindy Donoho/ET&S/Enron@ENRON
cc:

Subject: Re: FERC Request

Maybe you should ask Drew or Mary K.

Lindy Donoho
12/11/2000 03:01 PM
To: Steven Harris/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Shelley Corman/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Steven
January/ET&S/Enron@ENRON
cc:

Subject: FERC Request

In response to a request of Steve January from FERC, I've put together a list
of Transwestern's "major" shippers to California with contact names and phone
numbers.  I've defined "major" as anyone with total firm contracts of
25,000/d or more.  Please see the attached list.  Is everyone okay with me
passing this along to Ray Montini at FERC?

Let me know if it's okay to go or if I need to run this by anyone else before
sending it out.

Thanks,
Lindy


I need to hear back from anyone whose group may be trading with this
counterparty.  Here's my issue.

We have been negotiating an amendment to the Password Application with this
counterparty.  The absolutely refuse to see a GTC.  I don't know if any of
you are trading gas, crude or power with them, but if you are, do you have a
master, or would the counterparty see a GTC.  I'm trying to figure out what
we have before we talk to them.

Thanks!


Power & Natural Gas
Mark-to-Market Brouhaha; Buy Energy Marketers

* Recent press has questioned accounting practices of energy
marketers.  Concerns center on use of "mark-to-market" accounting
* Stocks down 8.7% since Monday
* View concerns as unfounded
* Reiterate 1H (Buy, High Risk) ratings on Enron (ENE), Dynegy (DYN)
and 2M (Outperform, Medium Risk) on Duke Energy (DUK)

 <<trc71789.pdf>>

Raymond C. Niles
Power/Natural Gas Research
Salomon Smith Barney
(212) 816-2807
ray.niles@ssmb.com

s

 - trc71789.pdf


Dear Mr. LARRY CAMPBELL:

Thank you for your order.

You bought 10 JNPR May 80 Call at 0.250000.

ORDER DETAILS:
The tracking number for this order is: N-600-AABF-8088
Order entered at:                      14:28:35 on 05/08/01
Order processing began at:             14:28:36
Order executed at:                     14:28:41 on 05/08/01

ACCOUNT DETAILS:
Time and Date: 14:28:42 on 05/08/01
Your position in JNPR May 80 Call is 35 contracts
Your real cash total is $4,065.18

You will receive a printed Datek Online confirmation by postal mail, or by
electronic delivery if you are subscribed to that service.

Questions regarding this transaction? Contact our Customer Support department
by e-mailing support@datek.com. Please reference the order tracking number.


Hi.........Thanks for this information, I will update the Global Counterparty
system as appropriate. However, please let me know
if you have a list of the new phone numbers and what they are supposed to be
replacing?

Adnan-GCP
x58335


I can never get both of your email addresses right at the same time.
---------------------- Forwarded by Kay Mann/Corp/Enron on 01/05/2001 11:49
AM ---------------------------

Kay Mann
01/05/2001 11:40 AM
To: lee.johnson@ps.ss.ge.com, kent.shoemaker@ae.ge.com
cc:

Subject: CA Energy Development documents

Lee,

You should be receiving a package shortly containing the following:

1. Changed pages for CA Energy Development I and CA Energy Development II
facility agreements.  These are the same pages that were faxed to you and
Kent a few days ago.  I also included a couple of original pages (73, 74, I
think) which were missing from one of the originals.  This need to be
initialled and executed.
2. Acknowledgement letters for each of CAED I and CAED II which need your
Here's the form:

3. Assignment and assumption agreement to move the equipment from TurboPark
to the CAED I.  There will be one for CAED II as well.  This document is
being reviewed by the bank, so I'm not convinced it is in final form.  You
will note that there is an acknowledgement section for GE.  I cut and pasted
from the consent to assignment from the TurboPark documents, but shortened
the whole thing considerably.  Here's that document:

4.  Signature pages (signed by Enron) from the ESA deal, both the facility
agreement and the override letter.  Obviously, we need your signature.

I will forward the final CA facility agreements to you once again, along with
the blacklines against what you initialled.

Thanks,

Kay


So that we continue to drive our activities with our Public Affairs strategy,
we have asked Alhamd to coordinate our material and project timeline.  We are
also asking Jeanie Mandelker to take the lead in working through our
different material to put into one look and feel.

Please let Alhamd know of your activities so that we are able to better
coordinate any bottlenecks.  Also, please forward to Alhamd and Jeanie all
prior work that has been done so that they are in the loop.

Attached the original gameplan.

Jim


Dan,

On 12/29/00 deal # 548711 was entered into Sitara for a contract to be
attached.  Within this deal there were Special Handling Instructions which
read: "This is a firm, full requirements sale to Ormet.  Also served to
Cypress.  Please use the Transaction Agreement prepared by Dan Hyvl already
executed by Ormet, rather than generate a new confirm."

I created a GTC Sale Firm for this deal because the agreement mentioned in
red could not be found in the Global database.  Since the notes mentioned
that this particular agreement was prepard by you, I was hoping that you
could clarify if this agreement was circulated our way (meaning if it had
been sent to the Global Contracts group).  Please Advise.

Regards,
Bridgette Anderson
3-3818


FYI
---------------------- Forwarded by Todd Peterson/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT on
03/06/2001 07:22 PM ---------------------------

Larry Snyder@EES
03/06/2001 02:42 PM
To: Tony Galt/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT
cc: Todd Peterson/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT

Subject: Arvelund e:mail

Please review and edit the attached before I send it to Victor.  I tried to
keep it simple.


A seemingly unresolved issue is our right to prepay before the end of the
term of the swaps.  I believe this is something we want commercially, but
what is not clear to me is how we envision this working commercially.  In
other words, although any swap can be bought out, I do not believe the ISDA
documentation contemplates agreed terms for buy-out.  Rather, the party
seeking to get out early asks for the counterparty's offer and hits the offer
or not.  If RBC or Swapco was not willing to make an we are willing to
transact at, we might not be able to get out.  Perhaps Sara could advise if
my interpretation of the ISDA is right and, if so, Brian and Soma can confirm
how they see prepayment working without a specified prepayment right.

PK