Per Mr. Steven Kean, of Enron Corp. please see below ( Appendix C - Order 888
"Allegations of Public Utilities Exercising Transmission
Dominance).

                                                                 APPENDIX C

          Allegations of Public Utilities Exercising Transmission Dominance

          I.  Examples From Proceedings Before Administrative Law Judges

               These are examples of allegations that various public

          utilities have refused to provide comparable service, either

          through refusals to wheel, dilatory tactics that so protracted

          negotiations as to effectively deny wheeling, refusals to provide

          service priority equal to native load, or refusals to provide

          service flexibility equivalent to the utility's own use.

               A.  American Electric Power Service Corp. (AEP)

               In 1993, AEP filed, on behalf of its public utility

          associate companies, an open access tariff that offered only firm

          point-to-point service with very limited flexibility.  It did not

          offer network service, flexible point-to-point service, or non-

          firm service.  Thus, it did not provide customers with the same

          flexibility that AEP itself has.  Nor did it provide a service

          priority equivalent to that enjoyed by native load.  The

          Commission set AEP's tariff for hearing and, on rehearing, held

          that in order not to be unduly discriminatory, the tariff had to

          offer comparable service.  American Electric Power Service Corp.,

          64 FERC 4 61,279 (1993), reh'g, 67 FERC 4 61,168 (1994).

               At hearing, Raj Rao of Indiana Michigan Power Agency (IMPA)

          (Ex. IMPA-1, Feb 23, 1994) and Kenneth Hegemann of American

          Municipal Power-Ohio, Inc. (AMP-Ohio) (Ex. AMPO-1, Feb 23, 1994),

          both senior management officials, testified concerning AEP's
,

                                        - 2 -

          alleged discriminatory practices. 1/  AMP-Ohio is an

          association of municipalities in Ohio, some of whose members

          depend on AEP for transmission and partial requirements service.

          IMPA is an association of municipalities in Indiana, and many of

          IMPA's loads are captive to the AEP transmission system.  The

          witnesses alleged as follows:

                    1.  In anticipation of high peak demands, AEP would

               contract for large blocks of available short-term power,

               withhold sale of short-term power, refuse to transmit third

               party short-term power, and require purchases from AEP at

               the emergency rate (100 mill/kwh) when an emergency might

               not exist.  Ex. AMPO-1 at 6.

                    2.  In December 1989, AMP-Ohio negotiated a 20 MW

               purchase of short-term power from Louisville Gas & Electric

               Company (LG&E).  AEP refused to wheel because LG&E had

               earlier that day told AEP it had no power to sell to AEP.

               AEP then bought the power from LG&E and offered to resell it

               to AMP-Ohio.  Ex. AMPO-1 at 6-7.

                    3.  In January 1990, AMP-Ohio solicited bids for

               February power purchases from a number of utilities

               including AEP.  AEP was not the winning bid.  AMP-Ohio made

               arrangements to purchase the power from four winning bidders

               and sought transmission through AEP.  When AMP-Ohio gave AEP

          1/   After the Rehearing Order expanding the scope of the
               proceeding, AMP-Ohio and IMPA withdrew this testimony as no
               longer necessary.  This withdrawal does not change the fact
               that the testimony was sworn to under oath.
,

                                        - 3 -

               the schedule for delivery, AEP refused to transmit the

               power, matched the average price of the winning bids, and

               made the sale itself.  Ex. AMPO-1 at 7.

                    4.  In August 1993, an AMP-Ohio member (Columbus, Ohio)

               was purchasing 10 MW of hourly non-displacement power from

               AEP and, after AEP raised its price to 60 mills/kwh, sought

               another source for the next hour.  Consumers Power Company

               and Detroit Edison Company both offered non-displacement

               power at 40 mills.  AEP refused to transmit, saying it had a

               600 MW unit out and could not resell power from another

               source. 2/  Columbus cancelled the transaction and had to

               buy 10 MW of power from AEP at 100 mills/kwh.  Ex. AMPO-1 at

               7-8.

                    5.  In July 1993, two AMP-Ohio members (Columbus and

               St. Mary's) had been buying hourly non-displacement power

               from AEP when the price rose to 35 mills.  Dayton Power &

               Light Company (DP&L) offered to sell at 23 mills and AEP

               agreed to transmit for one hour.  But for the next hour, AEP

               said it had problems with its system, refused to transmit

               the power, kept the power from DP&L for itself and offered

               to sell power to AMP-Ohio for Columbus and St. Mary's at 100

          2/   AEP generally limited its offer of short-term transmission
               to buy/sell transactions; that is, AEP would buy the power
               from the seller and resell it to the purchaser.
               Supplemental testimony of AEP Witness Baker (Ex. A-73) at
               27-29.  Often, the terms of the buy/sell transaction
               required transmission dependent utilities (TDUs) to maintain
               reserves and meet contractual commitments for at least a
               year.  Id.
,

                                        - 4 -

               mills.  Columbus increased its local generation, but St.

               Mary's purchased 8 MW at 100 mills.  For the next hour, AMP-

               Ohio arranged with DP&L for another 8 MW, hoping AEP would

               transmit under the 24 hour buy-sell agreement.  AEP did

               transmit this power.  Seven hours later in the day, St.

               Mary's Greenup Hydro project power was available and the 8

               MW from DP&L was no longer needed.  If St. Mary's had been

               receiving the hourly power that AEP had refused to transmit,

               St. Mary's could have switched to Greenup power.  But

               because AMP-Ohio had changed to daily service, St. Mary's

               had to pay a demand charge for the entire day, even though

               it used the power only 7 hours and would have paid less

               under the hourly rate.  Ex. AMPO-1 at 8-9.

                    6.  In January 1994, AMP-Ohio sought to transfer power

               from one member with generation to other members, which

               required transmission over AEP and Toledo Edison lines.

               Toledo Edison said yes, AEP said no.  AMP-Ohio's northern

               members purchased emergency power from Toledo Edison.  AMP-

               Ohio then reminded AEP that it had agreed not to deny

               transmission and AEP agreed to transmit.  Ex. AMPO-1 at 9.

                    7.  IMPA arranged to buy 80 MW of short-term power from

               LG&E and have it wheeled, using buy-sell arrangements,

               through Public Service Company of Indiana (PSI) and AEP to

               serve IMPA's load at Richmond (an IMPA member).  The

               delivered price was $.292 per kW-day plus a 1 mill adder.

               At the same time AEP arranged to buy 300 MW from PSI at $.30
,

                                        - 5 -

               per kW day plus out-of-pocket energy costs.  Hence, PSI was

               shipping a total of 380 MW to AEP with 80 MW of that amount

               to be delivered to IMPA's load at Richmond.  Then, on a day

               when IMPA should have received the 80 MW, AEP told IMPA that

               PSI had sold everything to AEP and that IMPA would have to

               buy from AEP at $.63 per kW day plus the cost of energy from

               AEP.  IMPA purchased from AEP under protest.  AEP used its

               control over transmission to intercept the 80 MW at a lower

               price and resell it as short-term power to IMPA.  AEP

               claimed that PSI had terminated its sales to AEP on that

               day.  But the 80 MW was independent of PSI's other sales to

               AEP and would not have been interrupted if AEP had not

               interrupted it.  IMPA-1 at 7.

                    8.  IMPA has combustion turbines owned by and located

               at one member, which IMPA would like to connect to the Joint

               Transmission System owned by IMPA, CINergy and Wabash Valley

               Power Association.  To do so, IMPA needed a metering

               agreement with AEP, to which AEP would not agree.  IMPA-1 at

               6.

                    9.  In January 1994, IMPA had power to sell from its

               turbines when AEP and others needed power.  IMPA offered

               power to AEP but AEP it said could not purchase the power

               without an existing contract.  Moreover, since there was no

               short-term tariff, IMPA could not sell the power to another

               utility.  IMPA-1 at 6.

                    10.  Another example of the utility engaging in
,

                                        - 6 -

               dilatory tactics that raised the customer's transaction

               costs and effectively denied transmission is the "sham

               transaction" provision proposed by AEP.  As filed, AEP's

               tariffs permitted it to deny service merely because a

               portion of the transmitted power might be used to serve a

               former retail customer of AEP.  See, e.g., Ex. BR&WVP-1 (J.

               Bertram Solomon testimony, February 23, 1994).  (As part of

               a settlement AEP filed the pro forma tariff and withdrew

               this provision.)

                    11.  Finally, AEP's originally filed tariff contained a

               "prodigal customer" provision.  Under this provision,

               transmission customers who sought to convert back to

               requirements service had to give AEP five years' notice, in

               which case AEP and the customer would enter into

               negotiations to determine whether AEP will provide service

               at all and if so under what rate, terms, and conditions.

               Ex. S-39 at 1 (Staff testimony).  AEP did not require notice

               from all new customers, only from prodigal customers.  Id.

               at 2.  That a potential customer was previously served by

               AEP is not a reason to treat the customer differently.  (AEP

               withdrew this provision when it filed the pro forma tariff.)

                    B.  Entergy Services, Inc. (Entergy)

               Entergy filed a partial settlement largely adopting the NOPR

          pro forma tariffs except for two provisions (headroom and

          ancillary services).  Because the settlement predated the filing

          date for customer testimony before the ALJ, the customers did not
,

                                        - 7 -

          address the need for Entergy to file a tariff.  However,

          customers did make allegations of discriminatory practices, as

          follows.

                    1.  Customers alleged that Entergy flat-out refused to

               wheel.  Louisiana Energy and Power Authority (LEPA) witness

               Sylvan J. Richard testified that LEPA's predecessor systems

               could not obtain interconnections from Entergy.  Ex. SJR-1

               at 50.

                    2.  Customers also alleged that Entergy refused to

               provide service priority equal to native load and refused to

               provide service flexibility equivalent to the utility's own

               use.  For example, LEPA witness Richard testified that even

               after state commissions ordered interconnections and other

               coordination services, LEPA's predecessors were still not

               able to obtain coordination services because Entergy was not

               willing to coordinate and because the transmission service

               it did offer was inflexible, unidirectional point-to-point

               service, which prevented economic coordination with others.

               Id. at 50-51.

                    3.  South Mississippi Electric Power Association

               (SMEPA) witness J. Bertram Solomon testified that Entergy's

               original "open access" tariff was restricted to point-to-

               point service, proposed separate charges for each operating

               company, and required the cancellation of existing

               agreements in order to take service under the proposed

               tariff.  Ex. SMEPA-10 at 28.  Entergy eventually filed a
,

                                        - 8 -

               network tariff, but proposed different local facilities

               charges for the various Entergy public utility operating

               subsidiaries.  Id. at 29.  Since these local facilities

               charges were higher than the transmission component of the

               subsidiaries' bundled rates, Entergy obtained a competitive

               advantage.  Id.

                    4.  The Arkansas Cities and Cooperatives (ACC) is a

               group of cities and cooperatives that own or operate

               electric generation or distribution systems in Arkansas.

               ACC Witness Steven Merchant testified that Entergy has

               segregated the wholesale market between two of its

               subsidiaries, Arkansas Power & Light Copmpany (APL) and

               Entergy Power, Inc. (EPI).  Ex. SMM-1 at 16.  In marketing

               power and energy in Arkansas, EPI is subject to an Arkansas

               Commission order that bars EPI from competing with APL for

               wholesale loads without first obtaining a waiver.  Id.

               Recently, EPI requested this waiver for all wholesale

               transactions in Arkansas except for wholesale customers

               currently served by an Entergy subsidiary; in other words,

               EPI requested the Arkansas Commission to expand competition

               for all wholesale customers except where EPI might compete

               with APL.  Id.  ACC witness Merchant concluded that, since

               EPI does not compete with APL, Entergy insulates APL's

               wholesale business from competition and denies those

               wholesale customers access to EPI as a source of power,

               thereby limiting alternative generation sources available to
,

                                        - 9 -

               ACC.  Id. at 17-19.  (Entergy's witness Kenney stated that

               Entergy has recently filed a joint motion with ACC to the

               Arkansas Commission seeking to extend the waiver and permit

               EPI to sell to APL's wholesale customers.  Ex. JFK-11 at 14-

               15.)

               C.  Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E)

               Northern California Power Agency (NCPA) attached several

          documents to its 1988 complaint in Docket No. EL89-4.  These

          documents were provided to support NCPA's claim that PG&E's

          unreasonable practices under the PG&E/NCPA Interconnection

          Agreement (IA) effectively denied NCPA access to transmission

          properly requested under the IA.  Although the parties eventually

          settled and the Commission terminated the docket with a letter

          order dated May 18, 1988, these documents provide allegations of

          PG&E using dilatory tactics that so protracted negotiations as to

          effectively equal a refusal to wheel. 3/

                    1.  PG&E stated that since transmission was not

               currently available, it was entitled to wait 72 months

               before providing transmission; that is, transmission access

               could not be granted before the passing of the 72-month

               notice period.  NCPA 1988 Complaint, Ex. 3.  However, the IA

          3/   All of these incidents are related to and examples of PG&E's
               conduct described in the NOPR (FERC Stats. & Regs. 4 32,514
               at 33,073 n.151), that is, the history of PG&E's attempt to
               avoid its commitments made to the California owners of the
               California Oregon Transmission Project (COTP).  However,
               these incidents are not exactly the same as the incidents
               described in the NOPR, because NCPA is not one of the owners
               of the COTP.
,

                                        - 10 -

               provided that transmission be provided when it becomes

               actually available.  PG&E also requested substantial

               additional information, which NCPA considered beyond that

               reasonably necessary for a study, but still provided.  PG&E

               then determined that transmission was not available,

               reasoning that transmission was unavailable unless all the

               transmission requested could be provided 8760 hours per year

               without restrictions or limitations, extending through the

               expiration of the agreement in 2013.  NCPA 1988 Complaint at

               9.

                    2.  On November 27, 1987, NCPA made a new transmission

               request to PG&E, seeking 50 MW of bi-directional

               transmission at Midway.  NCPA 1988 Complaint, Ex. 5.  On

               January 28, 1988, PG&E filed an interconnection agreement

               with Turlock Irrigation District (TID) that provided TID

               with 50 MW of bi-directional transmission at Midway.

               Pacific Gas & Electric Company, 42 FERC 4 61,406, order on

               reh'g, 43 FERC 4 61,403 (1988).  On February 22, 1988, PG&E

               advised NCPA that all firm transmission service available at

               Midway had been fully subscribed.  NCPA 1988 Complaint, Ex.

               6.  Then, on March 29, 1988, PG&E filed with the Commission

               an interconnection agreement with Modesto Irrigation

               District (MID), that provided MID with 50 MW of bi-

               directional transmission at Midway.  Pacific Gas & Electric

               Company, 44 FERC 4 61,010 (1988).  At about the same time

               (in the last week in March 1988), PG&E advised NCPA that the
,

                                        - 11 -

               allocations of transmission to TID, MID, and others,

               including a not yet finalized allocation to Sacramento

               Municipality Utility District, had used all the transmission

               available at Midway.  NCPA 1988 Complaint, Exs. 7 and 8.

               D.  Northeast Utilities Service Company (NU)

               This is the case where Northeast Utilities acquired Public

          Service of New Hampshire (PSNH) (Docket No. EC90-10).  New

          England Power Company (NEP) witness Robert Bigelow's direct

          testimony expressed concern over the "relatively restrictive

          transmission policies of both" NU, on behalf of Northeast

          Utilities' public utility subsidiaries, and PSNH.  Bigelow Direct

          Testimony at 21 (filed May 25, 1990).  In his cross rebuttal

          testimony, Mr. Bigelow testified that "NU has a poor track record

          as a provider of transmission service" and "PSNH also has an

          abhorrent track record as a provider of transmission services."

          Bigelow Cross Rebuttal Testimony, at 3 (filed June 20, 1990).

          Mr. Bigelow described both NU's and NEP's (his own company)

          failure to provide service flexibility equivalent to their own

          use.  Except for NEP's TDUs, both NEP and NU historically

          provided only point-to-point transmission, which required

          separate scheduling for each transaction.  Bigelow Cross Rebuttal

          at 4.

               E.  Southern California Edison Company and San Diego Gas and
                   Electric Company

               The evidence in this merger proceeding (Docket No. EC89-5)

          included testimony from a number of witnesses describing
,

                                        - 12 -

          instances of Edison's conduct.  Richard Greenwalt was the power

          supply supervisor for the City of Riverside, California.  He was

          responsible for scheduling all purchases of energy for Riverside

          and for the cities of Azusa, Banning and Colton, California.

          Greenwalt testimony at 1 (November 1989).  (These four cities and

          Anaheim, California, are collectively referred to as the Southern

          Cities or Cities.)  Joseph Hsu was the Director of Utilities for

          Azusa.  Hsu testimony at 1 (November 1989).  Gale Drews was the

          electric utility director of Colton.  Drews testimony at 1-2

          (November 1989).  Bill Carnahan was the director for Riverside.

          Carnahan testimony at 1 (November 1989).  Gordon Hoyt was the

          general manager of the Anaheim power department.  Hoyt testimony

          at 1 (November 1989).  Dan McCann was the power coordination

          supervisor for Anaheim.  He supervised Anaheim's load scheduling

          and is a former Edison employee, having worked for Edison for 20

          years.  McCann Testimony at 1-2 (November 1989).  These witnesses

          testified that Edison refused to wheel as follows.

                    1.  Edison's policy was to curtail the Cities any time

               it could be justified using any of a list of acceptable

               reasons to deny interruptible transmission service.  Id. at

               22-23.

                    2.  Edison would not generally provide transmission

               service when Edison could save money by itself purchasing

               the economy energy that would be wheeled.  McCann testimony

               at 19.  The Cities called Edison every hour to request

               interruptible transmission service.  Id..  Edison often
,

                                        - 13 -

               refused to sell energy available in the Western Systems

               Power Pool to the Cities and then made available higher cost

               contract energy or partial requirements service.  Id. at 19-

               20.

                    3.  When Anaheim requested Edison provide firm

               transmission of power from neighboring states, Edison would

               often agree to provide non-firm service but would not

               integrate the capacity for many years in the future, saying

               that its control area did not need capacity at that time.

               Hoyt testimony at 9.  Since the selling utility was

               interested in a sale of capacity, not just energy, the

               transaction would not occur.  Id.  Edison repeatedly used

               its control over transmission to deny Anaheim access to low-

               cost firm power.  Id. at 9-10.

                    4.  While Edison provided short-term firm transmission

               service to the Cities, it would only provide long-term firm

               service for three specific resources:  the SONGS nuclear

               plant, a specific IPP, and Hoover Dam power.  Hoyt testimony

               at 20.  One of Edison's reasons for denying long-term

               transmission was that Edison desired to reserve the

               transmission for its own future (unspecified) needs.  Id.

                    5.  In the 1970s, Edison refused to allow the Cities

               access to the Pacific Intertie.  Hoyt testimony at 21; Drews

               testimony at 7-8.

                    6.  In 1988, Edison refused to provide transmission

               service for a Cities power purchase from Public Service
,

                                        - 14 -

               Company of New Mexico (PSNM) from Palo Verde Nuclear

               station.  Hoyt testimony at 21.

                    7.  Edison has refused to provide requested firm

               transmission from

                    - California-Oregon border to Midway Station

                    - Nevada-Oregon Border to Sylmar Substation

                    - Palo Verde Switchyard to Vista

                    - SONGS Switchyard to Vista.

               Carnahan testimony at 15.

                    8.  Riverside requested transmission from Palo Verde

               and was told that such service was not available.  Carnahan

               testimony at 16.  Edison offered Riverside only 12 MW of

               curtailable transmission entitlement to provide Riverside's

               share of Palo Verde.  Id.  This service was neither large

                    enough or long enough, and Edison insisted on

                    unreasonable terms and conditions.  Id.

                    9.  Azusa, Banning and Colton had a contract with

               Edison that entitled them to use their Palo Verde firm

               transmission path to schedule energy to meet their contract

               energy obligation.  Edison refused to permit the three

               cities to use that path.  Edison did not contest that the

               contracts allowed this use, but said that the scheduling of

               such small amounts of energy for the three cities would be

               too burdensome.  Greenwalt testimony at 14.

                    10.  Edison would not respond in a timely manner to the

               Cities' requests, routinely taking months to respond.  Drews
,

                                        - 15 -

               testimony at 15.

                    11.  During the 1980s, Edison provided Colton with some

               transmission service to allow the Cities to reach certain

               suppliers, but limited the choices available to the Cities

               and imposed terms and conditions that increased the Cities'

               costs and placed Colton at a disadvantage against Edison.

               Drews testimony at 9.  Arranging alternative generation

               sources was difficult because the Cities always had to first

               get Edison to state whether it would provide transmission.

                    12.  During 1988 and 1989, a dispute arose between

               Edison and the Cities concerning the Hoover Uprating

               Project.  Drews testimony at 16.  Edison argued that for the

               months when units were out of service for uprating, and

               Southern Cities capacity was reduced to zero, Southern

               Cities would not receive an energy credit, even though

               energy was still available and used by Edison.  But the

               contracts allowed a participant who did not have capacity to

               still schedule its energy as non-firm energy on the capacity

               of another participant.  Id. at 16-17.

                    13.  In 1986, Azusa negotiated a power purchase

               contract with the California Department of Water Resources

               in increments of first 5 MW and then 2 MW (for a total of 7

               MW).  Hsu testimony at 14.  First Edison assured Azusa that

               the transmission for the additional 2 MW would not be a

               problem.  Id.  Then Edison would not agree to amend the

               transmission service agreement for the additional 2 MW.  Id.
,

                                        - 16 -

                    14.  In 1986, Azusa notified Edison of Special

               Condition 12 4/ purchases from PG&E and requested firm

               transmission service.  Id.  Two months before service was to

               begin, Edison notified the Cities of a problem with the

               transmission lines.  Id.  Transmission was eventually

               granted, but only after a four-month delay and substantial

               losses to the Cities.  Id.  Then Edison decided there was no

               problem with its transmission facilities.  Id. at 14-15.

                    15.  In 1986-87, the Cities purchased 20 MW from PG&E

               and 80 MW from Deseret G&T Cooperative.  Hoyt testimony at

               7-8.  Edison stated that without reinforcement of its

               transmission system, Edison would not provide the

               transmission.  Id.  There was a five-month delay during

               which the Cities were forced to purchase from Edison at a

               higher cost.  Id. at 8-9.  Then Edison decided that the

               transmission system did not need reinforcement.  Id. at 8.

                    16.  Edison also refused to provide a service priority

               equal to that of native load.  It would curtail the Cities

               in order to purchase more economy energy for itself.  McCann

               testimony at 28.  If Edison could make the purchase, it

               would curtail the City and use the energy for itself.  Id.

               When Edison curtailed the Cities, they were not able to

          4/   Special Condition 12 of the Integrated Operations Agreement
               between Edison and the Southern Cities defined certain
               Special Condition 12 resources and allowed the Cities to
               make certain uses of those resources, subject to certain
               restrictions.
,

                                        - 17 -

               purchase economy energy and instead purchased energy from

               Edison.  Id. at 24.

                    17.  According to Edison, the interruptible

               transmission it provided the Cities was interruptible for

               any reason.  Id. at 20.  A purchase could be terminated the

               hour after it is begun or even during the hour.  Id.  As a

               result, the Cities lost opportunities to make advantageous

               economy purchases.  Id. at 20-21.

                    18.  Edison also refused to provide customers

               flexibility similar to the flexibility Edison provided

               itself.  Edison's refusal to provide bi-directional

               transmission service restricted the Cities' abilities to

               purchase hydroelectric energy from the Pacific Northwest.

               Hoyt testimony at 22.  Because most contracts with Northwest

               utilities require a return of power, the Northwest utilities

               would not deal with the Cities without transmission to

               return energy.  Id. at 22-23.  Edison did provide bi-

               directional transmission to the Los Angeles Department of

               Water & Power (LADWP) to accommodate flows to and from

               Arizona.  Id.

                    19.  Riverside was unable to obtain non-firm service

               more than two hours in advance of need.  Carnahan testimony

               at 18.

                    20.  Riverside and Colton were both served out of

               Edison's Vista substation.  Although the two cities were on

               the same 69 kV bus, Edison would not allow them to sell
,

                                        - 18 -

               energy to each other.  Greenwalt testimony at 17.

                    21.  Riverside's agreement with Edison allowed

               Riverside to purchase a block of energy through the WSPP and

               divide it up among the four Cities (Azusa, Banning, Colton

               and Riverside).  Greenwalt testimony at 17.  When Riverside

               had excess energy from other sources, Edison would not

               permit it to sell that energy to the other three cities.

               Id.  For example, Riverside attempted to sell Deseret energy

               transmitted by LADWP to the Edison system.  Id. at 17-18.

               LADWP would not break out the Cities' shares of that energy,

               and Edison would not accept the energy as a delivery for all

               four cities.  Id. at 18.  Edison argued that because this

               energy was excess energy that Riverside could not use,

               Riverside did not have transmission rights to bring it into

               the control area.  Id.  As a result, Riverside paid for the

               energy delivered by LADWP to the Edison control area, but

               could not sell it to the other three cities, and gave it to

               Edison itself, which consumed the energy without making any

               payment for it.  Id.  Riverside tried a number of

               alternative paths, including using WSPP transmission where

               Riverside paid Edison 5 mills to connect to Azusa, 5 mills

               to connect to Banning, and 5 mills to connect to Colton for

               each megawatthour.  While this approach was successful for a

               while, eventually Edison refused to permit these sales.

                    22.  Edison claimed that the Cities only have

               transmission rights to bring in enough Special Condition 12
,

                                        - 19 -

               energy to satisfy the Cities' load.  Greenwalt testimony at

               18.

                    23.  Edison contended that the Cities' load

               requirements were satisfied first by integrated resources

               and then by Special Condition 12 and economy energy

               purchases.  Id. at 19.  When the Cities' integrated

               resources exceeded their load, any Special Condition 12

               resources became excess.  Under Riverside's Deseret

               contract, the Cities were required to take a minimum of 35

               MW each hour.  Id.  Edison acknowledged that it was

               obligated to buy, or allow the Cities to sell, any excess

               energy from Riverside's integrated resources.  Id.  However,

               Edison refused to give the Cities credit for excess Special

               Condition 12 energy brought into the area, claiming that the

               Cities could not have brought it in because they did not

               have transmission rights.  Id.

          II.  Other Examples of Transmission Disputes

               Disputes over transmission are not uncommon, contrary to

          EEI's suggestion.  Some recent examples taken from pleadings and

          other documents and from Commission orders reveal that it has

          been very difficult for various entities in the electric power

          industry to agree on transmission rights.  These examples also

          reveal that even after issuance of AEP and the Open Access NOPR

          with its proposed pro forma tariffs, there has been considerable

          controversy over whether various utilities' "open access" tariffs

          deviate from those tariffs.  (The Commission has allowed
,

                                        - 20 -

          utilities that adopt tariffs that match or exceed the non-rate

          terms and conditions in the NOPR pro forma tariffs to obtain

          certain benefits.)

                    A.  In a letter of February 3, 1995 to Mr. Gerald

               Richman of the Commission's Enforcement section in the

               Office of the General Counsel, Steven J. Kean, Vice

               President, Regulatory Affairs, Enron Power Marketing, Inc.

               (Enron) alleged that Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NiMo)

               refused to wheel power from Rochester Gas & Electric (RG&E)

               to Enron under RG&E's transmission contract with NiMo;

               however, when Enron revealed the buyer, NiMo did wheel power

               for RG&E to the buyer.  Mr. Kean alleged that this was not

               an isolated incident.  NiMo argued that the contract did not

               require it to provide RG&E with transmission to Enron.  It

               also said that the principle of comparability does not

               require the service.  Letter of November 21, 1994 from NiMo

               representative A. Karen Hill to Gerald Richman.

                    B.  The Commission's Task Force Hot Line (Hot

               Line) received a complaint that a member of the New

               York Power Pool (NYPP) refused to transmit power that

               another member bought from a power marketer.  In a

               letter of November 17, 1994, from Chair Moler to Mr.

               William J. Balet, Executive Director of NYPP, Chair

               Moler explained that the Commission's enforcement staff

               had investigated and found the allegation to be true.
,

                                        - 21 -

                    C.  In Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency

               v. Northern States Power Company (Minnesota), 73 FERC 4

               61,350 (1995), NSP and SMMPA had a contract under which

               NSP agreed to provide transmission service.  However,

               the parties had numerous disputes over the service.

               The Commission found that NSP had misinterpreted the

               contract in several ways.  For, example, SMMPA argued

               that it should be able to directly schedule its

               deliveries of energy out of the NSP control area and

               that it should not be limited to particular points of

               delivery.  NSP argued that only it was entitled to

               control the physical operation of scheduling.  The

               Commission found that the clear language of the

               contracts gave SMMPA the authority to schedule its own

               power.

                    D.  Mid-Continent Area Power Pool, 72 FERC 4 61,223

               (1995), involved MAPP's membership criteria, which made it

               impossible for a power marketer to join MAPP and obtain the

               benefits of certain transmission services available only to

               MAPP members.  The Commission found that the membership

               criteria may be unreasonable, particularly since there may

               be less burdensome ways of setting up membership criteria

               for non-traditional entities.

,


ANNOUNCING THE SPRING EVMBA WRITING WORKSHOP  -- March 3, 2001 -- 10:00 - 5:00
_________________________

Are you an adequate writer? In today's competitive business world, that's
not good enough! On Saturday, March 3 I'll lead a not-for-credit workshop
to help you write more effectively and pass the writing requirement with
ease.

(Passed the requirement but still want more writing tips? This workshop is
designed for ALL Evening MBA students interested in improving their
business writing skills.)

Through lecture and hands-on activities, you will learn techniques for
getting your messages across clearly, persuasively, and swiftly.
Topics include:
* Moving from ideas to final draft without getting "blocked"
* Writing effective introductions and solid arguments
* Revising for concise, concrete, and active language
* Avoiding problems with tense and time
* Common punctuation problems and solutions

...and, if we have time and enough interest...
* Writing effective email

The workshop will be held from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. Sign-up in the Evening MBA
Program office.  We will let you know the room number for the workshop in
an e-mail reminder.  If you have additional questions, please feel free to
contact me.  I look forward to seeing you there!

Ericka Lutz
EMBA Writing Consultant

=============================================================
Ericka Lutz
MBA Writing Faculty
Haas School of Business
University of California, Berkeley
Campus office: 510-643-8005
Home office: 510-336-1239

=============================================================


The NYISO is reserving hour beginning 11:00 in the February 5,
2002 Real-Time Market.

In addition, the NYISO is reserving the following hours in the February 5,
2002 Hour-Ahead Locational Reserve Market: 06:00-8:00, 10:00,12:00,13:00,
16:00-19:00, 21:00 and 22:00.

Prices in the February 6, 2002 Day-Ahead Market are correct.

This e-mail information is a copy of the official posting which can be
found at the following address of our website:
http://mis.nyiso.com/public/htm/OperMessages/CurrentOperMessages.htm#mm

---
You are currently subscribed to nyiso_tie as: benjamin.rogers@enron.com
To unsubscribe send a blank email to leave-nyiso_tie-628650Q@lyris.nyiso.com


What do you think?

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	Roberts, Mike A.
Sent:	Monday, August 06, 2001 10:03 AM
To:	Mckay, Jonathan
Cc:	Marquez, Jose
Subject:	Duke Football

hey John,

As a Blue Devil alumni, I have been able to do the impossible - actually was able to secure tickets to the Duke football game with some team from Georgia on 10/6

got an extra one in case you wanted to bring your girlfriend too!!

If you want to practice, check out the audio attached...

I'll see if we can crash my old fraternity's party as well!

- - - Mike


Teco Tap       20.000 / Enron


Thanks.  See you tomorrow.


----- Forwarded by Jeff Dasovich/NA/Enron on 02/15/2001 08:15 AM -----

	Joseph Alamo
	02/14/2001 11:50 AM

		 To: Paul Kaufman/PDX/ECT@ECT, Susan J Mara/NA/Enron, Sandra
McCubbin/NA/Enron, Jeff Dasovich/NA/Enron
		 cc: Lysa Akin/PDX/ECT@ECT
		 Subject: Sac Bee, Tues 2/13 Editorial: "Lawmakers failed to respond to
energy alarm"

---------------------- Forwarded by Joseph Alamo/NA/Enron on 02/14/2001 09:48
AM ---------------------------

	Joseph Alamo
	02/13/2001 04:57 PM

To: Miyung Buster/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT
cc:

Subject: Sac Bee, Tues 2/13 Editorial: "Lawmakers failed to respond to energy
alarm"

Lawmakers failed to respond to energy alarm

(Published Feb. 13, 2001)

Now that state lawmakers have begun an inquiry to determine what caused
California's energy crisis, they might want to take a look in the mirror.
Not at the infamous 1996 vote that triggered the partial deregulation of the
electricity industry. The remains of that law have been picked over enough.
Besides, most of the people who voted for it have already left the
Legislature, thanks to term limits.
But there was another vote last June, far less heralded and still little
known. It came just as warning bells were starting to signal the onset of
what has since become a crippling crisis. The Legislature not only ignored
those alarms, it stood in the way of the people who were trying to respond.
Why it did so remains something of a mystery. How it did so says a lot about
the way the Legislature works.
At issue was the now-defunct California Power Exchange. This was a
state-mandated auction, until recently the only place that utilities were
allowed to shop for the electricity that lights our homes and businesses. By
last June there were ominous signs that the power exchange, known as the PX,
wasn't working right. Prices were higher than anyone expected. The supply of
energy seemed thinner than was reasonable. There were enormous overhead
costs.
The power exchange was a bit like having a single automobile auction where
everyone who wanted to buy or sell a car had to do business. In times of
surplus this might work, because the sellers would underbid each other to
unload their cars to reluctant buyers. But in a shortage, the opposite would
be true. Buyers, with no place else to go, would pay ever-higher prices to
get what they needed. That's what was happening with electricity.
A majority of the Public Utilities Commission decided to do something about
it. The PUC voted 3-2 to allow privately formed exchanges to compete with the
state-sanctioned auction. At least two private exchanges were promising to
deliver more power at lower prices with fewer administrative costs. The
commission wanted to let them give it a try.
But before the PUC could even implement the change, the Legislature
intervened. Acting with unusual speed, lawmakers overturned the commission's
decision.
Assembly Bill 2866 was a classic legislative bill, in the worst sense. A
cobbled-together collection of 28 unrelated items, it was drafted in a hurry
as a companion to the new state budget. One of the bill's many parts was a
provision to subsidize California's film industry. That got a lot of
attention. The paragraph overturning the PUC's attempt to head off the energy
crisis got next to none. The bill was amended in the Senate on June 15 and
approved later that day. The Assembly passed it the next day, and Gov. Gray
Davis signed it.
The analysis of the bill that members saw in the Assembly was cryptic and
misleading. It said the bill would authorize the PUC to study the idea of
allowing competition for the state-mandated exchange. That was true as far as
it went. But the analysis omitted the fact that the bill's real intent was
just the opposite: to reverse a PUC decision and prohibit competing exchanges
for at least a year.
"California had made a big investment in the power exchange," said Sen. Jim
Brulte, R-Rancho Cucamonga, who was one of probably just a handful of
legislators who knew about the provision before it became law. "The PUC
decision would have put that investment at risk." Which is another way of
saying that the power exchange wasn't working and had to be protected from
competition.
Richard Bilas, the PUC commissioner who was pushing the hardest for the
reform the Legislature overturned, said he never liked the idea of mandating
a single exchange in which the utilities would have to buy all their power.
Bilas wasn't a member of the commission when the PUC restructured
California's electricity industry. But he said the result reminded him of the
former Soviet Union, where leaders declared that they were going to move to a
market economy and then appointed a group of central planners to figure out
how those markets should function.
"Markets are not based on fictitious or created exchanges," he said. "Markets
are based on buyers and sellers coming face to face to negotiate a deal. You
don't establish beforehand something that may not be necessary."
It's still not clear whether opening up the markets would have prevented the
price spikes that have since nearly bankrupted the utilities, forcing the
state to step in and buy electricity to keep the lights on. It might be a
stretch to suggest that any single policy change could have prevented the
crisis. But we will never know.
The Legislature, acting in haste and with little information, kept us from
finding out. The California Power Exchange, which the Legislature was so
eager to protect from competition, collapsed of its own weight anyway, and is
now out of business.
The law preventing other exchanges from entering the market was quietly
repealed two weeks ago, seven very long months after it was adopted.


I just spoke briefly with Brian Riley, who is working to restructure the Knig
Ranch contracts with Exxon, and put Coastal into the loop.  Yesterday I
forwarded each of you an E-mail from Steve Van Hooser which had drafts of
contracts attached.  As I talked with Brian, the King Ranch set up as he is
negotiating will be simplified.  The intent, as I understood it, is that we
will no longer buy at the wellhead.  Rather, Coastal is entering into a a
gathering agreement with HPL to buy at the wellhead and ship to the plant.
HPLC will buy at the tailgate of the plant, net of PVR.  So there will not be
future settlements with Exxon on liquids.  The paper has not been returned
from Coastal or Exxon yet, but the deal is effective 4/1/00.  Everything will
be under new agreements, with receipts and deliveries by different
counterparties.  The gas flow continues the same, just under new contracts
and different counterparties.

Daren, Pat and Stella:  Daren, Brian said he would get with you to discuss
the deal in further detail.  Please include Pat and Stella in the discussion
also.  The contracts should be reviewed and understood to ensure proper
scheduling.  As I mentioned to Greg Sharp and Brian, it is critical that we
be kept in the loop, especially on retroactive deals, as scheduling,
transport rates and risk are affected.

Thanks to everyone for ensuring the communication lines are in place.


Sending via Microsoft Outlook.  Does this work?  $3.7875 by $3.7925


Tara Rozen and I have reviewed the cost of living tables provided by our
outside vendor and determined the appropriate amount of daily per diem while
in London accompanied by family is $55.00/day.  You should expense this
through your expense reports for every day you are present in London and not
on full expenses paid by the Company.

Jane


Start Date: 10/19/01; HourAhead hour: 9;  No ancillary schedules awarded.  No variances detected.

    LOG MESSAGES:

PARSING FILE -->> O:\Portland\WestDesk\California Scheduling\ISO Final Schedules\2001101909.txt

Error retrieving HourAhead price data - process continuing...


USA: Broadband unit in strong shape, says Enron CEO.
Reuters English News Service, 03/23/01

Enron Corp. CEO: Core Businesses Are In 'Great Shape'
Dow Jones News Service, 03/23/01

Enron Says $3.1 Bln Portland General Sale Probably Won't Close
Bloomberg, 03/23/01

USA: Broadband unit in strong shape, says Enron CEO.

03/23/2001
Reuters English News Service
(C) Reuters Limited 2001.

HOUSTON, March 23 (Reuters) - Enron Corp.'s broadband unit will execute
nearly twice as many trades in the first quarter of 2001 as it did in the
fourth quarter of 2000, Enron President and Chief Executive Officer Jeff
Skilling said on Friday.
"My expectation is that we will see over 400, maybe over 500 transactions
this quarter which shows this business is absolutely developing, it is ahead
of plans," Skilling said in a conference call that sought to assuage investor
fears about Enron's stock and its broadband unit specifically.
That is more than all 321 transactions done last year, and about twice the
236 done in the last quarter of 2000, he said.
Skilling also said long supply and a weak telecom market is offering Enron
greater and cheaper access to bandwidth capacity, which means Enron Broadband
Services' capital expenditure budget should drop from $750 million to $250
million.
Some analysts have attributed two consecutive days of price drops in Enron's
stock - it dipped as low as $51.55 on Thursday, from 60.95 on Tuesday - to
false rumors of layoffs at the nascent broadband business and the market's
devaluation of that unit in light of weak technology and telecom sectors.

Copyright , 2000 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Enron Corp. CEO: Core Businesses Are In 'Great Shape'
By Christina Cheddar
Of DOW JONES NEWSWIRES

03/23/2001
Dow Jones News Service
(Copyright (c) 2001, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.)

NEW YORK -(Dow Jones)- After several days of decline, Enron Corp. (ENE)
shares were regaining ground Friday as Chief Executive Jeffrey Skilling
addressed the market's concerns about the company.
During a conference call, Skilling told investors that the Houston company's
core businesses are in "great shape."
The executive also reiterated the company's 2001 earnings target of $1.70 to
$1.75 a diluted share.
The company's outlook compares with a consensus estimate of $1.74 a share
published by Thomson Financial/First Call.
Enron shares recently traded hands at $58.60, up $3.58, or 6.3%, on volume of
5.3 million compared with average turnover of 4 million.
On Thursday, Enron shares set a 52-week low of $51.51.

Copyright , 2000 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Enron Says $3.1 Bln Portland General Sale Probably Won't Close
2001-03-23 13:48 (New York)

Enron Says $3.1 Bln Portland General Sale Probably Won't Close

     Houston, March 23 (Bloomberg) -- Enron Corp., the largest
energy trader, said its $3.1 billion sale of Portland General
Electric Co. to Sierra Pacific Resources probably won't be
completed.
     ``There's probably a 5 percent probability that Sierra
Pacific's purchase of Portland General will be consummated,''
Chief Executive Jeffrey Skilling said during a conference call
with investors.
     Enron said in January that Sierra Pacific might not be able
to sell a Nevada power-plant stake as needed to win regulatory
approval for the Portland General transaction. Enron blamed a
California law that barred public utilities from shedding
generators until 2005 because of an electricity shortage.
     Shares of Houston-based Enron rose $3.98 to $59 in
midafternoon trading. They had fallen 18 percent in the past week.

--Margot Habiby in Dallas (214) 740-0873, or
mhabiby@bloomberg.net, and Jim Polson in Princeton,
(609) 279-4000/slb


Mark,

I agree with David's comments - and furthermore, I would like to find a
solution which removed Australia from the day-to-day administration of
customer profiles, if the Australian criteria can be applied from a simple
ruleset. Adding another timezone to the process is not going to speed things
up.

Dave
---------------------- Forwarded by David Forster/LON/ECT on 03/20/2000 10:38
PM ---------------------------

David Minns@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT
03/20/2000 11:25 PM
To: Mark Taylor@ECT
cc: Paul Quilkey/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Paul
Smith/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Alan Aronowitz@ECT, David
Forster/LON/ECT@ECT

Subject: Re: Australian Approvals

Mark I am most happy to provide administrative support as required but I
would appreciate discussing this request with you. I am unsure as to what is
expected. I have formally advised there are no restrictions on "Australian
based" which I take to mean companies incorporated in Australia entering into
foreign transactions.

On a more general level I am facing a bit of a challenge with EnronOnline
communications out of Houston. Last week I counted requests from 7 different
persons in Houston all of who feel empowered to delegate tasks to or request
legal advice from me. I find myself answering the same question several times
and on occasions working with conflicting instructions.Clearly I recognise
the need to provide legal support to Enronline and that last week was a bit
extraordinary. But I believe the current arrangements can be substantially
improved. Would it be possible to delegate some contact points? My clear
preference on matters of an administrative nature would be to work through
Paul Smith who is co-ordinating the implementation of EnronOnline.

Interested in your thoughts.
---------------------- Forwarded by David Minns/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT on
03/21/2000 08:18 AM ---------------------------
From: Tana Jones@ECT on 03/20/2000 10:28 AM CST
To: Paul Smith/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT
cc: David Minns/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Mark Taylor/HOU/ECT@ECT

Subject: Re: Australian Approvals

1.  Per my discussion last week with David Minns, I sent him a spreadsheet so
he could scroll across the product list and see the full range of products
EnronOnline offers so he could determine whether an Australian based
counterparty will have any legal problems entering into any of the
EnronOnline products.  It was my understanding that he had not seen a
comprehensive list off all the products we offer.

2.  However, on a going forward basis, David Minns or someone in Legal will
need to see the daily spreadsheets reflecting any new Australian based
counterparties because every new counterparty requesting a password needs a
Credit and a Legal signoff for trading every products we offer, whether
physical, financial, power, gas, liquids, weather, p&p, US, European or other
country based product, etc..  Houston Legal does it every day for every new
Houston Credit based counterparty, London Legal does it every day for every
new London Credit based counterparty and Australian Legal will need to do the
same.  If some other system will be in place in Australia, David Minns will
need to discuss that with Mark Taylor and David Forster.


FYI.  Report from California's IPP trade association.
----- Forwarded by Jeff Dasovich/NA/Enron on 01/12/2001 07:42 PM -----

	"Julee Malinowski-Ball" <jmball@ns.net>
	01/12/2001 06:52 PM
	Please respond to "Julee Malinowski-Ball"

		 To: "Jan Smutny Jones" <smutny@iepa.com>, "Steven Kelley" <steven@iepa.com>,
"Katie Kaplan" <kaplan@iepa.com>
		 cc: "William Hall" <wfhall2@duke-energy.com>, "Tony Wetzel"
<twetzel@thermoecotek.com>, "Sue Mara" <smara@enron.com>, "Steven Kelley"
<steven@iepa.com>, "Steve Ponder" <steve_ponder@fpl.com>, "Stephanie Newell"
<stephanie-newell@reliantenergy.com>, "Roger Pelote"
<roger.pelote@williams.com>, "Robert Lamkin" <rllamkin@seiworldwide.com>,
"Richard Hyde" <rwhyde@duke-energy.com>, "Paula Soos"
<paula_soos@ogden-energy.com>, "Nam Nguyen" <nam.nguyen@powersrc.com>, "Marty
McFadden" <marty_mcfadden@ogden-energy.com>, "Lynn Lednicky"
<lale@dynegy.com>, "kent Palmerton" <kent.palmerton@williams.com>, "Ken
Hoffman" <khoffman@caithnessenergy.com>, "Kassandra Gough"
<kgough@calpine.com>, "Jonathan Weisgall" <jweisgall@aol.com>, "John Stout"
<john_h_stout@reliantenergy.com>, "Joe Ronan" <joer@calpine.com>, "Joe Greco"
<joe.greco@uaecorp.com>, "Jim Willey" <elliottsa@earthlink.net>, "Jeff
Dasovich" <Jeff.Dasovich@enron.com>, "Jack Pigott" <jackp@calpine.com>, "Hap
Boyd" <rboyd@enron.com>, "Greg Blue" <gtbl@dynegy.com>, "Frank DeRosa"
<fderosa@sanfrancisco.usgen.com>, "Ed Tomeo" <ed.tomeo@uaecorp.com>, "Duane
Nelson" <dnelsen@msn.com>, "David Parquet" <dparque@ect.enron.com>, "Curtis
Kebler" <curtis_l_kebler@reliantenergy.com>, "Carolyn Baker"
<cabaker@duke-energy.com>, "Bob Escalante" <rescalante@riobravo-gm.com>, "Bob
Ellery" <bellery@spi-ind.com>, "Bill Woods" <billw@calpine.com>, "Bill
Carlson" <william_carlson@wastemanagement.com>, "Craig Chancellor"
<craigc@calpine.com>, "Eric Eisenman" <eric.eisenman@gen.pge.com>, "Kate
Castillo" <ccastillo@riobravo-gm.com>
		 Subject: Legislative Weekly Report Week Ending 1/12

Date: 1/12/01
To:  Jan Smutny-Jones
      Steven Kelly
      Katie Kaplan
Cc: IEP Board of Directors
RE: Legislative Weekly Report Week Ending 1/12

RECENT EVENTS:

-- IEP has been meeting with legislators over the past two weeks.  Jan
and//or Katie and I have been attending these meetings.  Since Jan has been
in Washington DC we have rescheduled some of the more important meetings for
when he is back in town next week.  In general the meetings fall into two
categories and seem to be defined by party affiliation.  While this may not
be everyone's experience, our experience so far has showed that many of the
Republicans have embraced our message and are offering to lend support where
they are able.  Many of the Democrats have demonstrated extreme caution, are
interested in our message, but offering little or no support.  The major
theme for them is what they can take back to their districts.

The one exception on the Democratic side so far has been Senator Machado who
has requested IEP draft language on long-term contracting.  Senator Bill
Morrow (R) has requested assistance in drafting language on the NIMBY siting
issue, which we agreed to do so.  We have agree to assist both.

From hereon, we will focus on our meeting efforts on the new Assembly ECA
committee members and "meet and greets" with the new members in both the
Assembly and the Senate.  Because this meeting list was changing on an
hourly basis, it was impossible to forward to Board members.  Please be
sure, if you haven't already, to send us a list of your representatives so
we can contact you when a meeting with them has been confirmed.

-- Assembly U&C staff organized a meeting with the CEC and generators with
repower projects.  Generators in attendance included representatives from
Duke, Dynegy, Southern, AES and Sunrise (Williams was there but didn't
speak).  After each of the participants airing their grievances, we were
tasked with developing language, getting the generating industry to support
it and supporting it in the legislative process.  We were given until Friday
to hand in bill language to the U&C staff.  Such a commitment comes with
many promises and pitfalls which shuld be discussed next week on a
conference call which IEP will be setting up.

-- As reported in an e-mail yesterday, the first two special session bills
passed out of the new Assembly Energy Costs and Availability (ECA) committee
yesterday (ABX 5 and ABX6, both attached, but amended versions not in print
yet).  Both measures also passed off the Assembly floor today and are on
their way to the Senate for consideration in the Senate Energy Committee.
Members of that committee have not yet been announced.

-- The Governor had a press conference today to announce a plan to reduce
California's energy use by at least five percent within a week.  During the
Q&A portion of the press conference the Governor suggested the three members
of the new ISO Board should be the President of the CPUC, and the Chairs of
the EOB and the CEC.

UPCOMING EVENTS:

--  The Assembly Utilities and Commerce Committee is having an informational
hearing on Tuesday, January 16th at 1:30 pm in room 4202.  IEP will be
setting up a conference call to discuss IEP's involvement in this hearing.

--end--

Julee Malinowski-Ball
Senior Associate
Edson + Modsette
916-552-7070
FAX-552-7075
jmball@ns.net

 - 2001 Tracking Report.doc
 - abx1_5_bill_20010109_introduced.pdf
 - abx1_6_bill_20010111_introduced.pdf


John,
I have a draft that I have been working on revising--got pulled off to work
on Triple Lutz again and may not have anything to distribute until late next
week--I will be out of the office on Triple Lutz the rest of today and
tomorrow and then out of town until the 25th--I will try to get something to
you to look at before I go but can make no guarantees--

Sandi

	John Griffith@ENRON
	10/17/2000 08:17 AM

		 To: Sandi M Braband/HOU/ECT@ECT
		 cc:
		 Subject: Cornhusker

Sandi,

What is going on with Cornhusker?  Have we made any progress on the
agreement?  Please let me know where we stand.  Thanks.

John


Hardy Har Har......   I meant on the game itself not you drinking or not
drinking?   By the way why are you not drinking at the game


schedule 30 min to sit down with me either mon or tues after 430.  if you
want to get info, sending out an email survey is not the right way.  much
easier to respond to a question in voice rather than typing it out.

<cwomack@rice.edu> on 04/09/2001 04:17:59 PM
To: jarnold@enron.com
cc: cwomack@rice.edu
Subject: EnronOnline competitor questionnaire

Hello Mr. Arnold,

Thank you for speaking with me today with Kenneth Parkhill.  Unfortunately,
none of my teammates are available to meet with you today.  Would you please
review our questionnaire and reply back to me with your comments about the
questionnaire and answers to any questions that apply to your work.

We will follow up with you later this week if we have questions.  Thank you
for your help.

Charles Womack
2002 Rice MBA Candidate
281-413-8147
cwomack@rice.edu

 - Questionnaire.doc


Teresa G. Bushman
Enron North America Corp.
1400 Smith Street, EB 3835A
Houston, TX  77002
(713) 853-7895
fax (713) 646-3393
teresa.g.bushman@enron.com

----- Forwarded by Teresa G Bushman/HOU/ECT on 11/10/2000 02:06 PM -----

	Nora Dobin@ENRON
	11/08/2000 04:38 PM

		 To: Teresa G Bushman/HOU/ECT@ECT
		 cc: Tim Proffitt/HOU/ECT@ECT, Brenda L Funk/HOU/ECT@ECT
		 Subject: Joshua Tree

Teresa, as I mentioned, attached is revised term sheet intended to reflect
latest commercial changes but subject to legal review.  Please particularly
consider (with commercial and operational teams as appropriate) Engineering
(eligibility) Criteria applicable to proposed VPPs, and proposed terms of
Balancing Agreement, Master Natural Gas Purchase and Sale Agreement, and
Master Crude Oil Purchase and Sale Agreement.  Of course, any other thoughts
you have are most welcome.

We are having an internal meeting (global finance, accounting and tax) to
discuss term sheet at 2:00 PM on Friday, 11/10/00 in EB 2868.

If you can meet with us on Friday or otherwise give us feedback by Friday
afternoon, it would help facilitate finalization of term sheet and movement
to drafting of definitive documents.

Thanks, NJD

Nora J. Dobin
Senior Counsel
Enron Global Finance
Enron Corp.
1400 Smith Street
Houston, Texas  77002

713/345-7723 (phone)
713/853-9252 (fax)
E-mail:  nora.dobin@enron.com

----- Forwarded by Nora Dobin/Corp/Enron on 11/08/2000 04:18 PM -----

	"Robin Miles" <rmiles@bracepatt.com>
	11/08/2000 02:53 PM

		 To: <james.r.allred@bankofamerica.com>, <richard.stein@bankofamerica.com>,
<stephanie.pendleton@bankofamerica.com>, <nora.dobin@enron.com>,
<tim.proffitt@enron.com>
		 cc:
		 Subject: B of A/Phoenix Term Sheet

Attached is a redline and clean version of the term sheet.  Please call me or
Jim Allred with any questions or comments.

Robin

Mr. Robin J. Miles
Bracewell & Patterson, L.L.P.
711 Louisiana St., Suite 2900
Houston, Texas  77002
Ph:  713-221-1319
Fax: 713-221-2120
E-mail: rmiles@bracepatt.com

 - Phoenix Term Sheet Company Redline.pdf
 - Phoenix Term Sheet.pdf


Please mark your calendars.  Emory Ireland and Martin Weinstein of Foley &
Lardner will be conducting a presentation regarding the nuts and bolts of
Letters of Credit on Wednesday, May 23, 2001 from 8:45 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. in
EB5C2.  Please RSVP to Carolyn George at ext. 33439 or
carolyn.george@enron.com if you plan to attend.

Thank you,

Julia Heintz Murray
Enron Wholesale Services
Enron Industrial Markets LLC
1400 Smith Street, EB3838
Houston, TX  77002
(713) 853-4794
Fax:  (713) 646-3393
julia.murray@enron.com


Audrey D. Robertson
Transwestern Pipeline Company
email address:  audrey.robertson@enron.com
(713) 853-5849
(713) 646-2551 Fax

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	Garcia, Ava
Sent:	Wednesday, May 09, 2001 3:41 PM
To:	Berger, Larry; Buchanan, John; Zadow, Raetta; Kowalke, Terry; Bodnar, Michael; Blair, Jean; Carr, James; Daily, Leonard; Floyd, Jodie; Walden, Shirley; Perry, Katherine; Brostad, Karen; Carter, Zuela; Steele, Patricia; Trevino, Linda; Brown, Elizabeth; Dasilva, Esther; Hanagriff, Richard; Johnson, Alice; Lee, Dennis; Eldridge, Dale; Green, Alma; Bastida, Nancy; Davis, Larry; Vasquez, Josue; Lindley, Hilda; Carrillo, Alma; Cormier, Martha; Aldinger, William; Clapper, Karen; Collins, Marion; Coon, Galen; Cooper, Tim; Giambrone, Laura; Howard, Jack; Laferla, Lynda; Phillips, Mary; Cramer, James; Kuehl, Toby; Betancourt, Ramona ; Medeles, Gerry; Matheson, Maggie; Draemer, Mary ; Jaquet, Tammy; Black, Legale ; Studebaker, James ; Callans, Nancy; Locknar, MaryAnn; Porter, Diana; Washington, Kathy; Wilkens, Jerry; Bryan, Randy; McEvoy, Christine; Minter, Tracy; Ward, Linda; Hernandez, Albert; Mulligan, Amy; Rivers, Cynthia; Dykes, Tangie; McDaniel, Janet; Sturr, Kathy; Woodson, Harry; Janzen, Randy; Scurlock, Debra; Adams, Jean; Forbish, Sherry; Benningfield, Robert; Greaney, Chris; Vasquez, Josue; Perez, Kim; Ramirez, Pilar; Armstrong, Julie; Wehring, Linda; Robertson, Audrey
Cc:	Winters, Ricki; Green, Alma; Carrillo, Alma; Blair, Lynn; Corman, Shelley; Nacey, Sheila; January, Steven; Dietz, Rick
Subject:	Surprise Party

Audrey, Pilar, Linda, Julie and Kim please forward if to your group.

Thanks,
Ava


I'm not sure I understand MKM's comment.  We've all approved this deal so its
not urgent, but lets talk about it in our meeting today.  df
---------------------- Forwarded by Drew Fossum/ET&S/Enron on 07/27/2000
08:19 AM ---------------------------

	From:  Mary Kay Miller                           07/26/2000 12:52 PM

To: Christine Stokes/ET&S/Enron@ENRON
cc: Jeffery Fawcett/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Steven Harris/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Drew
Fossum/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Glen Hass/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Mary
Darveaux/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Kevin Hyatt/ET&S/Enron@Enron, Susan
Scott/ET&S/Enron@ENRON

Subject: Re: Transwestern Contract Approval Request

This may have been the case in others, but the IOS does say that it bid, if
less than max is not available.  If Drew and Susan are ok to sign off, I can
go with that and we do need to be specfic as to what we are going to include
in the contract in the IOS package.  Lets hope it doesn't come back to bite
us, assuming Drew and Susan sign off.  MK

Christine Stokes
07/26/2000 08:16 AM
To: Mary Kay Miller/ET&S/Enron@ENRON
cc: Jeffery Fawcett/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Steven Harris/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Drew
Fossum/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Glen Hass/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Mary
Darveaux/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Kevin Hyatt/ET&S/Enron@Enron, Susan
Scott/ET&S/Enron@ENRON

Subject: Re: Transwestern Contract Approval Request

Mary Kay -  In all of Transwestern's previous Interactive Open Seasons, the
only capacity which Transwestern had posted for bid purposes was the primary
capacity - no associated alternate flexibility was ever posted as being
available to the bidders.  We have traditionally relied on verbal
communication, only if asked by the shipper,  of any potential alternate
rights associated with the primary capacity being auctioned.  I do not feel
that in this recent IOS process that any shipper had possibly NOT increased
their bid due to the impression that there was no additional flexibility
beyond  the primary path rights of the capacity being auctioned.  However,  I
do think that the TW commercial group should discuss how we communicate to
any interested party those alternate rights  associated with future IOS bids
or EnronOnline bids.   Thank you for your comment, please contact me if you
need any additional feedback.

	From:  Mary Kay Miller                           07/25/2000 05:23 PM

To: Christine Stokes/ET&S/Enron@ENRON
cc: Jeffery Fawcett/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Steven Harris/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Drew
Fossum/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Glen Hass/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Mary
Darveaux/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Kevin Hyatt/ET&S/Enron@Enron, Susan
Scott/ET&S/Enron@ENRON

Subject: Re: Transwestern Contract Approval Request

I understand that this capacity is what was posted on the IOS, however,
these alternate point rights were not included in the posting as available,
is there a concern that not all were aware of this and therefore they could
have bid differently ?  MK

Christine Stokes
07/25/2000 02:45 PM
To: Jeffery Fawcett/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Steven Harris/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Drew
Fossum/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Mary Kay Miller/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Glen
Hass/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Mary Darveaux/ET&S/Enron@ENRON, Bill
Cordes/ET&S/Enron@ENRON
cc: Kevin Hyatt/ET&S/Enron@Enron, Susan Scott/ET&S/Enron@ENRON

Subject: Transwestern Contract Approval Request

TRANSWESTERN PIPELINE CONTRACT APPROVAL REQUEST

Please review the attached standard discount letter for Sempra Energy Trading
Corp.  Sempra was recently awarded 49,000 Dth/d of East of Thoreau (EOT) to
California capacity via Transwestern's Interactive Open Season Auction
process.  The capacity was awarded at a one-part rate of $.285/Dth/d for a
one year term of November 1, 2000 - October 31, 2001.  Sempra shall have
alternate delivery point rights at the California Border as well as alternate
receipt point rights in Transwestern's EOT Area.

Please confirm via REPLY WITH HISTORY.  All Officer approvals will be faxed
to Bill Cordes for final Officer approval.


-----Original Message-----
From: 	Keesler, Martha   On Behalf Of Del vecchio, Peter
Sent:	Friday, November 16, 2001 8:06 PM
To:	Ale, John; Cheek, Charles; Derrick Jr., James; Evans, Mark (London Legal); Fossum, Drew; Haedicke, Mark E.; Labanowski, Elizabeth; Mintz, Jordan; Newell, Eric; Rogers, Rex; Sharp, Vicki; Wallace, Stephen; Walls Jr., Rob; Tweed, Sheila; Hodge, Jeffrey T.; Sager, Elizabeth; Cash, Michelle; Butcher, Sharon; Taylor, Mark E (Legal); Gray, Barbara N.; Murray, Julia; Aronowitz, Alan; Rogers, Daniel R.; Lundstrom, Bruce; Novak, John; Henry, Joseph; Eickenroht, Robert; Donahue, Jeff; Muller, Mark S.; Sample, Molly; Place, Janet
Cc:	Del vecchio, Peter
Subject:	Memo regarding Enron/Dynegy Agreement and Plan of Merger - Compliance with the Conduct of Business Covenants
Importance:	High
Sensitivity:	Confidential

Please see the attached memo regarding Enron/Dynegy Agreement and Plan of Merger - Compliance with the Conduct of Business Covenants.

Sent on behalf of Peter del Vecchio
By:  Martha Keesler
Senior Administrative Assistant
Enron North America Corp.
1400 Smith, EB 3829
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 345-2423
(713) 646-3491 (Fax)


I know this is a duplicate email for some.  I am resending this email using a
more complete list of people.

Thanks.

_______________________________________________

Please see the attached memo.


Hi Brian,

Could you email me the MOU we are terminating?

Thanks,

Kay
---------------------- Forwarded by Kay Mann/Corp/Enron on 06/05/2000 10:06
AM ---------------------------

jeffreye.smith@ps.ge.com on 06/02/2000 07:10:57 PM
To: Kay.Mann@enron.com, william.danaher@ps.ge.com
cc: Brian.D.Barto@enron.com, patricia.gonzalez@ps.ge.com

Subject: RE: Letter agreement

Kay,
Here is a version of a "letter agreement" we came up with (2 pages).
Perhaps we can use the same company ID's that we are using in the contracts
themselves.  I will double check with our legal/tax/finance folks [Bill, can
you comment on this?]
Regards,
Jeff Smith

 <<Termination MOU.doc>>

-----Original Message-----
From:   Smith, Jeffrey E (PS, CommOps)
Sent:   Friday, June 02, 2000 6:46 PM
To:   Kay.Mann@enron.com; jeffreye.smith@ps.ge.com
Cc:   Brian.D.Barto@enron.com
Subject:   RE: Letter agreement

Kay,
I'm still in the office.  I assume you need the addresses of the parties
involved with the MOU to include in the "letter agreement".  (So the GE
entity named therein can send the money back to the Enron entity named
therein.)
I do not have access to that document at this time.  I can get access on
Monday.  If you have other names and addresses in mind, let me know.
Regards,
Jeff Smith

-----Original Message-----
From:   Kay.Mann@enron.com [mailto:Kay.Mann@enron.com]
Sent:   Friday, June 02, 2000 5:24 PM
To:   jeffreye.smith@ps.ge.com
Cc:   Brian.D.Barto@enron.com
Subject:   Letter agreement

Hi Jeff,

I'm preparing the letter agreement regarding payment.  Can you help me with
the name and address to use?

Thanks,

Kay


Done.

Errol


Start Date: 1/27/02; HourAhead hour: 20;  No ancillary schedules awarded.  No variances detected.

    LOG MESSAGES:

PARSING FILE -->> O:\Portland\WestDesk\California Scheduling\ISO Final Schedules\2002012720.txt


thanks  love you
 - kim2.txt


Once this is fixed in SAP I will be able to change it in PEP.  The Data
Integrity Team is being really strict on the name field.  It has to be
changed in SAP before I am allowed to change it in PEP.  Please let me know
when this has been done and I will make the change asap.

	Enron Capital & Trade Resources Corp.

	From:  Hector McLoughlin @ ENRON                           11/07/2000 02:24 PM

To: Susan Wimberley/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc: dfarmer@enron.com
Subject: Re: Personal Information Needs To Be Updated

is it possible that his first name show as "J Darren" ?   Daren is his middle
name and the name that everyone addresses him by.
We would also be glad to submit the change in SAP if the system will accept J
Darren as the first name.
Please advise.
Thanks for your help, hgm

Susan Wimberley@ECT
11/07/2000 02:12 PM
To: Hector McLoughlin/Corp/Enron@ENRON
cc: dfarmer@enron.com@ENRON

Subject: Re: Personal Information Needs To Be Updated

Please note that the name in Pep has to mirror what is in the source system.
Currently there is not a field in Pep for nicknames.

	Enron Capital & Trade Resources Corp.

	From:  Hector McLoughlin @ ENRON                           11/07/2000 01:48 PM

To: dfarmer@enron.com, Susan Wimberley/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc:
Subject: Re: Personal Information Needs To Be Updated

Susan,
Would you please take care of Mr. Farmer's request?   I am not able to change
names.
Thanks for your help, hgm

dfarmer@enron.com on 11/07/2000 01:15:08 PM
To: hector.mcloughlin@enron.com
cc:

Subject: Personal Information Needs To Be Updated

This message is from FARMER, JERRY D :

 My name should be changed from FARMER, JERRY D  to FARMER, J DAREN


just wanted to say that it was really fun meeting you and playing tennis yesterday.  What a nice afternoon!  So, now you have my email if you ever want to play.  Happy friday!
anna

Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com


Dear Mark

In Yasuyoshi Goto's view the agreements are well drafted and contain nothing
which is likely to cause a problem in Japan.  On the understanding that server
is to be located outside Japan, we have only the following comments:

Time of Execution

Section 3. (c) of the ELECTRONIC TRADING AGREEMENT provides that "Transaction
shall be deemed executed at the time that Enron first signifies its acceptance
of Counterparty's offer, accessible on the Website server."

We understand that this means a contract will be formed when Enron
"dispatches"
its acceptance to its Website server so that the acceptance can be seen by the
Counterparty's computer display (if he has not yet disconnected).  In other
words, the contract will be formed at that time even though the Counterparty
does not see Enron's acceptance (due to disconnection, communication error, or
some other reason).  If this is indeed the intention, the language could
perhaps
be clarified in this regard.  (Since the agreement is governed by New York
law,
we have no objection to the current language if this is clear under New York
Law.  Perhaps the UCC covers the point?)

Governing Law/Jurisdiction

We see no problem with the governing law and jurisdiction provisions as they
are.

Taxation

Would you please confirm the role if any to be performed by Enron Japan in
relation to this business, so that we can ensure that Enron Japan will not be
seen as a dependent agent (and therefore permanent establishment) of Enron
North
America Corp.

Best regards

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
--------
This is an e-mail from Baker & McKenzie - Tokyo Aoyama Law Office (Qualified
Joint Enterprise Offices). The contents of this e-mail may be privileged and
confidential and are intended only for the use of the addressee. No one else
may
copy, forward, disclose or use all or any of it in any form. If you are not an
intended recipient, please notify us immediately (by reply e-mail) and delete
this e-mail from your system. Thank you


Harry:

If you're done polishing up your resume (only kidding), would you let me know when I can expect to hear back on the various emails on the subject company offers?

Thanks.


I looked at the website and it looked great!  Alena's photo of Chris is
really good.  She has quite the eye.  And Chris's photo of the kitties looks
like it could be in a kitty calendar.  The photos of Daniel were really good,
especially that close up.  He really is a handsome baby.  I am going to have
to get one of those cameras so I can send Chris photos to post of the
Website.  Maybe we can start the Jones family monthly magazine and publish
stories, articles, etc.  one a month.  I can be the editor.  Chris can be the
layout guy.  What do you think of that.  We could require every family member
to send something in once a month!

	"Janet G. Jones" <janetgj@erols.com>
	02/06/2001 11:13 AM

		 To: "Tana Louise JONES" <Tana.Jones@enron.com>
		 cc:
		 Subject: pictures

Hi Tina,Check Chris's  website http://www.Ridgeway. Love  Ma


Attached, please find Governor Davis' letter to Spencer Abraham.

http://www.governor.ca.gov/state/govsite/gov_htmldisplay.jsp?BV_SessionID=@@@@
1334694208.0983391171@@@@&BV_EngineID=dalkffldejlbemfcfkmchcng.0&sCatTitle=Pre
ss+Release&sFilePath=/govsite/press_release/2001_02/20010228_abraham_letter_fr
om_GGD.html&sTitle=GOVERNOR+DAVIS+SENDS+LETTER+TO+SECRETARY+OF+ENERGY+ABRAHAM+
&iOID=13448


---------------------- Forwarded by Ann M Schmidt/Corp/Enron on 03/29/2000
01:14 PM ---------------------------

Missy Stevens
03/29/2000 12:58 PM
To: Ann M Schmidt/Corp/Enron@ENRON
cc:

Subject: Problem Solving

Hi - I can't find that buzz word bingo thing, but I did find this...  :)

---------------------- Forwarded by Missy Stevens/Corp/Enron on 03/29/2000
12:57 PM ---------------------------

John Walt
09/01/99 03:55 PM
To: Missy Stevens/Corp/Enron@Enron
cc:

Subject: Problem Solving

Is this the process you have put in place for budgeting?

 - problem-.jpg


You're a star.  I owe ya.  Next time you're in town, let me know in advance.
Maybe we can have lunch or something.  Hope all is well.

Best,
Jeff


FYI...anyone that deals with CAPS please read the message below. You can reach me after hours via cell phone: 503-807-7862

Michael S. Tully
Trade Floor Support, Portland
(503)464-7790 Desk
(503)807-7862 Cell
michael.tully@enron.com

He who runs behind car, often get exhausted.

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	Butler, TJ
Sent:	Friday, October 12, 2001 1:04 PM
To:	Tully, MIchael
Subject:	TJ Butler on vacation next week

Mike: I am out of the office next week.  Could you see to it to get my name off of the list to call if the users have a problem?

Thank you sir!

tnx

tjb

Cell: 281-686-7546
Pager: 713-768-8444


CPUC Delays QF Payment Vote
Sources believe that the delay in the PUC vote on paying the QFs 15% of  their undercollected debt is likely a result from both a concern about bankruptcy issues raised by issuing what could be seen as a "preference payment" to the QFs (the PUC does follow these issues out of necessity, given the current environment) and a lack of clarity regarding how to implement the 15% payment.  The delay was unsurprising and characteristic of how the PUC operates.  It is also noted that there are many claims on SoCal's and PG&E's cash flows currently.  Additionally, agreeing to pay 15% of debts to the QFs raises legal issues, in that the utilities would be paying debts to some creditors, but not others.  This could increase the likelihood of an involuntary bankruptcy filing against SoCal by the non-QF creditors.


CALENDAR ENTRY:	APPOINTMENT

Description:
	Manuel Schedule Mtg. conference room EB4194 Ava-35842

Date:		2/8/2001
Time:		3:00 PM - 4:00 PM (Central Standard Time)

Chairperson:	Outlook Migration Team

Detailed Description:


Hi Vince

It is my great pleasure to invite you to speak at POWER 2000 which will be
in Houston on 9 & 10 May 2000.

Would you be interested in chairing one of the streams on day 2 of the
conference? Or making a full presentation on one of the days? Please let me
know which talks interest you. Obviously, some of the talks are no longer
available but I would like to give you a choice as much as possible. Please
could you get back to me asap on 212 925 1864 Ext 151 or by return email.

I very much hope you can make the dates as I'm very keen to have you
participate at POWER. Not to flatter you unnecessarily, but I know that a
lot of people come to our conferences to hear what you have to say.

Best regards

Emma

 - Invite.doc


Chris,

I appreciate you forwarding this information to the appropriate people.  Now
I really owe you lunch.  let me know when you are available.

Thanks Again, Tom Clark

office 713-371-6766
home 713-864-0193
e-mail tom.clark@et.pge.com

 <<Tom Clark ResumeIII.doc>>

PG&E Energy Trading and any other company referenced herein which uses the
PG&E name or logo are not the same company as Pacific Gas and Electric
Company, the California utility.  These companies are not regulated by the
California Public Utilities Commission, and customers do not have to buy
products from these companies in order to continue to receive quality
regulated services from the utility.
 - Tom Clark ResumeIII.doc


You think I should submit the reimbursement now, before the semester ends, just to get it in the door?

They should reserve a place for Fessler at the same place Davis deserves to go--history's trash heap.  You know that Fessler works with Klauberg, right?  Some people you just can't get rid of....

Best,
Jeff


please forward to all East Desk members
---------------------- Forwarded by Scott Neal/HOU/ECT on 03/09/2001 12:01 PM
---------------------------

	From:  Mike A Roberts                           03/09/2001 11:43 AM

To: Cary M Carrabine/HOU/ECT@ECT, Richard Tomaski/Corp/Enron@Enron@ECT, Lee
Fascetti/Corp/Enron@Enron, Paul Burgener/Corp/Enron@ENRON, James
Simpson/HOU/ECT@ECT, Per Sekse/NY/ECT@ECT, Caroline Abramo/Corp/Enron@Enron,
Candace Spencer/CAL/ECT@ECT, Terri Brian/CAL/ECT@ECT, Lisa
McIsaac/CAL/ECT@ECT, Carlee Gawiuk/CAL/ECT@ECT, Gregory
Schockling/Corp/Enron@ENRON, Ragan Bond/Corp/Enron@ENRON,
dan.mccairns@bhlp.com, Brad Horn/HOU/ECT@ECT, Jay Knoblauh/HOU/ECT@ECT, Vince
J Kaminski/HOU/ECT@ECT, Jonathan McKay/CAL/ECT@ECT, Jean Mrha/NA/Enron@Enron,
Sunil Dalal/Corp/Enron, Stephanie Miller/Corp/Enron@ENRON, Charles
Varnell/NA/Enron@Enron, Tyrell Harrison/NA/Enron@Enron, Kevin G
Moore/HOU/ECT@ECT, Mike A Roberts/HOU/ECT@ECT, Theresa
Staab/Corp/Enron@ENRON, Nicole Cortez/NA/Enron@Enron, Eric Scott/HOU/ECT@ECT,
Gregory Schockling/Corp/Enron@ENRON, Ragan Bond/Corp/Enron@ENRON,
dan.mccairns@bhlp.com, Brad Horn/HOU/ECT@ECT, Jay Knoblauh/HOU/ECT@ECT,
Eileen Peebles/ET&S/Enron, Jeff Nielsen/ET&S/Enron, Mike Barry/ET&S/Enron,
Michael Nguyen/HOU/ECT, Joseph Hrgovcic/HOU/ECT, Rajib Saha/HOU/ECT, Brando
Hayden/HOU/ECT@ect, Todd Kimberlain/NA/Enron, David Ryan/Corp/Enron@ENRON,
Todd DeCook/Corp/Enron@Enron, Andy Pace/NA/Enron@Enron, Dean
Sacerdote/NA/Enron@Enron, David J Botchlett/HOU/ECT@ECT, Bill F
Briggs/HOU/ECT@ECT, Phil Clifford/HOU/ECT@ECT, Jim Goughary/HOU/ECT@ECT,
Mario de la Ossa/NA/Enron@ENRON, John J Lavorato/Corp/Enron, John
Arnold/HOU/ECT@ECT, Mike Maggi/Corp/Enron@Enron, Hunter S
Shively/HOU/ECT@ECT, Patrice L Mims/HOU/ECT@ECT, Brad McKay/HOU/ECT@ECT,
Scott Neal/HOU/ECT@ECT, Thomas A Martin/HOU/ECT@ECT, Phillip K
Allen/HOU/ECT@ECT, Mike Grigsby/HOU/ECT@ECT, Jim Schwieger/HOU/ECT@ECT,
Steven Vu/HOU/ECT, Geoff Storey/HOU/ECT@ECT, gateway1@pdq.net,
Rjenkins13@aol.com
cc:
Subject: Research's Summer Outlook

The Research Weather Group has posted the 2001 Summer Outlook on Research
Intranet Page, under the Afternoon Video Report.

The links are:
http://gasfundy.corp.enron.com/Gas/sections/weather/InHouse/MorningComents/dis
cussionContent.asp?item=Afternoon

and  http://enaresearch.corp.enron.com/research/framework/default.asp