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W E E K E N D   S Y S T E M S   A V A I L A B I L I T Y

F O R

April 27, 2001 5:00pm through April 30, 2001 12:00am
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SCHEDULED SYSTEM OUTAGES:

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OTHER SYSTEMS:
Impact:  EBS
Time:  Fri 4/27/2001 at  8:00:00 PM CT thru Fri 4/27/2001 at  9:00:00 PM CT
 Fri 4/27/2001 at  6:00:00 PM PT thru Fri 4/27/2001 at  7:00:00 PM PT
 Sat 4/28/2001 at  2:00:00 AM London thru Sat 4/28/2001 at  3:00:00 AM
Outage:  OSSPROD Server Move - Portland to Houston (EBS)
Environments Impacted:  All
Purpose: ECOMS is the EBS order management system. It is a mission ciritical
app, and the server is being moved to Houston.
Oracle does not function in a NAT environment, so network changes must be
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Backout: Put original ACL back in place
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UNIFY:
Impact:  CORP
Time:  Fri 4/27/2001 at  8:00:00 PM CT thru Sat 4/28/2001 at  12:00:00 AM CT
 Fri 4/27/2001 at  6:00:00 PM PT thru Fri 4/27/2001 at  10:00:00 PM PT
 Sat 4/28/2001 at  2:00:00 AM London thru Sat 4/28/2001 at  6:00:00 AM London
Outage:  Unify Server Name Changes
Environments Impacted:  Unify Development
Purpose: Full complinace with naming standard.
Backout: A full backup of the servers and Emergency Repair disk will be done
prior to the name change.
Contact(s):  Charles Ballmer    713-853-0684
  Darryl Vinson        713-345-8726

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-----Original Message-----
From: Vann, Suzanne
Sent: Wednesday, October 24, 2001 2:11 PM
To: Ward, Kim S (Houston)
Subject: FW: interesting article on Enron

How Enron Blew It

Texas Monthly

November 2001

Less than a year ago, the Houston-based energy behemoth had everything: money, power, glitz, smarts, new ideas, and a CEO who wanted to make it the most important company in the world. Now its stock is down, wall street is bearish, and the CEO is gone. What went wrong?

by Mimi Swartz <http://www.texasmonthly.com/mag/issues/authors/mimiswartz.php>

THE ENRON SKYSCRAPER NEAR THE SOUTH END OF HOUSTON'S DOWNTOWN feels like the international headquarters of the best and the brightest. The lobby in no way resembles the hushed, understated entryways of the old-fashioned oil companies, like Shell and Texaco nearby. Enron, in contrast, throbs with modernity. The people hustling in and out of the elevators are black, white, brown; Asian, Middle Eastern, European, African, as well as American-born. They are young, mostly under 35, and dressed in the aggressively casual uniform of the tech industry-the guys wear khakis, polo shirts, and Banana Republic button-downs. Almost preposterously fit, they move through the building intently, like winners. Enron is nothing if not energetic: A Big Brother-size TV screen frantically reports on the stock market near a bank of elevators, while another hefty black television relaying the same news greets people entering from the garage. A sculpture of the corporate symbol, an E tipped at a jaunty angle, radiates colors as it spins frenetically on its axis; a Starbucks concession on the ground floor keeps everyone properly caffeinated. Multicolored, inspirational flags hang from the ceiling, congratulating Enron on its diversity and its values; one more giant banner between elevator banks declares Enron's simple if grandiose goal: "From the World's Leading Energy Company to . . . The World's Leading Company!"

For a while, that future seemed guaranteed, as Enron transformed itself from a stodgy, troubled pipeline company in 1985 to a trading colossus in 2000. It was a Wall Street darling, with a stock price that increased 1,700 percent in that sixteen-year period, with revenues that increased from $40 billion to $100 billion. "The very mention of the company in energy circles throughout the world creates reactions ranging from paralyzing fear to envy," notes a 2001 report from Global Change Associates, a firm that provides market intelligence to the energy business.

This Enron was largely the creation of Jeff Skilling, a visionary determined to transform American business. Hired sixteen years ago as a consultant by then-CEO Ken Lay, Skilling helped build a company that disdained the old formula of finding energy in the ground, hauling it in pipelines, and then selling it to refineries and other customers. Instead, it evolved into a company that could trade and market energy in all its forms, from natural gas to electricity, from wind to water. If you had a risky drilling venture, Enron would fund it for a piece of the action. If you wanted your megacorporation's energy needs analyzed and streamlined, Enron could do the job. If you were a Third World country with a pitiful infrastructure and burgeoning power needs, Enron was there to build and build. Basically, if an idea was new and potentially-and fantastically-lucrative, Enron wanted the first crack. And with each success, Enron became ever more certain of its destiny. The company would be the bridge between the old economy and the high-tech world, and in February of this year, Skilling reaped his reward when he succeeded Lay as chief executive officer. Enron, says Skilling, "was a great marriage of the risk-taking mentality of the oil patch with the risk-taking mentality of the financial markets."

The Enron story reflects the culture that drove American business at the end of the twentieth century. Like the high-tech companies it emulated, Enron was going to reinvent the American business model and, in turn, the American economy. Maybe it was natural that this Brave New World also produced a culture that was based on absolutes: not just the old versus the new, but the best versus the mediocre, the risk takers versus the complacent-those who could see the future versus those who could not. The key was investing in the right kind of intellectual capital. With the best and the brightest, a company couldn't possibly go wrong.

Or could it? Today Enron's stock trades at around $35, down from a high of $80 in January. The press cast Enron as the archvillain of California's energy crisis last spring, and Skilling caught a blueberry pie in the face for his relentless defense of the free market. A long-troubled power plant project in India threatened the company's global ambitions. Telecommunications, in which Enron was heavily invested, imploded. Wall Street analysts who once touted the company questioned its accounting practices. Some of the change in Enron's fortunes can be attributed to the economic downturn in uncertain times that has afflicted all of American business. But the culture that the company created and lived by cannot escape blame.

ENRON, JEFF SKILLING SAYS, HAD "a totally different way of thinking about business-we got it." At Enron, in fact, you either "got it" or you were gone-it was as simple as black and white. It is not coincidental, then, that the color scheme of Skilling's River Oaks mansion mirrors the corporation he once headed. Here, the living room's white walls shimmer against the mahogany floors. Black leather trims the edge of snowy carpets. Billowy sofas set off the jet-black baby grand. In the entry, white orchids cascade from a black vase on a black pedestal table that in turn pools onto cold, white marble. There is only one off-color note: After almost twenty years, Jeff Skilling is no longer associated with Enron, having resigned abruptly after just six months as CEO. Once, Skilling was hailed as the next Jack Welch (General Electric's masterful CEO), as one of Worth magazine's best CEO's in America (anointed in 2001), and even as a daredevil who hosted the kind of unchained adventure junkets in which, a friend told BusinessWeek, "someone could actually get killed." Today, he sounds more like Ebenezer Scrooge on Christmas morning. "I had no idea what I'd let go of," Skilling says of all the personal sacrifices he made while retooling Enron.

From a black chair in the white library, across from a huge black and white photograph of his daughter and two sons, Skilling clarifies. The demands of working 24-7 for Enron caused him to ignore his personal finances. Divorced, he lived in a 2,200-square-foot house without a microwave or a dishwasher. He almost missed his brother's wedding. "Learning a foreign language-I never learned a foreign language!" he exclaims. He never once took his youngest son to school. "I'm interested in the kids. You don't do kids in fifteen-minute scheduling." Travel: "You can't go to Africa for a week and get anything out of it!" Skilling includes the study of architecture and design on his list of missed opportunities, then he stops and sighs. "I'm not sure that fulfillment in life is compatible with a CEO's job," he says, finally. Then his eyes lock on mine, and his voice, which had softened, regains its pragmatic edge. "It would have been easy to stay," he says. "But that would not have been good for me."

He's a smallish, ruddy-faced man who keeps himself at fighting weight, handsome in the way of corporate titans, with piercing cheekbones and that assiduously stolid gaze. But the impatience Skilling once reserved for cautious underlings and dull-witted utility company executives is now targeted at reporters who have labeled his resignation "bizarre" and associates who are bitterly skeptical of his need for family time. His shrug stretches the limits of his shimmering blue button-down, and his matching blue eyes look put upon. "I'm surprised," he says, "that people have so much trouble understanding this."

PEOPLE WHO PASSED THROUGH DOWNTOWN HOUSTON in the late eighties or early nineties couldn't help but notice a funny and, for its time, novel scene unfolding throughout the workday at the base of the Enron Building. From nine to five and before and after, you could see people slipping out of the pristine silver skyscraper to smoke. They perched on the chrome banisters or lurked near the glass doors at the entry, puffing like mad. They always looked hurried and furtive, even ashamed. Whatever people knew about Enron in those days (and most people didn't know much), it was often associated with that scene: Enron boasted one of the first nonsmoking corporate headquarters in Houston, and there couldn't have been clearer evidence of its break with the energy world of the past. What macho engineer would have put up with such humiliation?

But this company was a child of another time, that period in the mid-eighties when chaos enveloped the gas business. Federal deregulation of natural gas turned a steady, secure industry, in which gas pipeline companies frequently enjoyed a monopoly in portions of the areas that they served, into a volatile free-for-all. The situation was compounded five years later by federal deregulation of the pipeline business. So it happened that a gentlemanly gas pipeline company, Houston Natural Gas (HNG) found itself under attack from Coastal Corporation, Oscar Wyatt's less than gentlemanly firm. HNG was then run by Lay, a sturdy, taciturn former economics professor and Transco chief operating officer who had a passion for military strategy. (His doctoral thesis at the University of Houston was on supply and demand in the Vietnam War.) Lay, who was from Missouri and never succumbed-at least outwardly-to Texas brashness, had done well enough: Thanks to canny expansions, HNG's pipelines stretched from Florida to California and throughout the state of Texas.

HNG fended off Coastal, but to protect the company from other takeover attempts, Lay nimbly engineered the sale of HNG in 1985 to a friendly Nebraska pipeline concern called InterNorth, one of the largest pipeline companies in the country at the time. Then, a funny thing happened: HNG started acting in a way that would characterize the company for years to come-a lot like Coastal. What the Nebraskans blithely labeled "the purchase" was being called "the merger" back in Houston, and before long, following some particularly brutal politicking between Omaha and Houston, the company's center of gravity started shifting toward Texas, and shortly after that, Ken Lay was running a new company called Enron. "Over time it became clear that Lay had a better vision of the future," says one person associated with Enron at that time. "He never fought change. He embraced change."

Lay had won, but what exactly did that mean? Enron was saddled with massive debt from the takeover attempt, and thanks to deregulation, no longer had exclusive use of its pipelines. Without new ideas-for that matter, a whole new business plan-the company could be finished before it really even got started.

LIKE MANY PEOPLE WHO TEAMED UP WITH ENRON IN THE EIGHTIES, Jeff Skilling had spent a lot of time in the Midwest, and he was self-made-at fourteen he had been the chief production director at a start-up TV station in Aurora, Illinois. (His mother would drop him off there every day after school.) "I liked being successful when I was working, and I was smart," he told BusinessWeek earlier this year. But unlike many of his Enron colleagues, Skilling wasn't deliberate and soft-spoken and happy to go home at five o'clock; he was anxious and excitable, and nothing, but nothing excited him more than what he would come to call "intellectual capital." He loved being smart, and he loved being surrounded by smart people. He graduated from Southern Methodist University, went into banking-assets and liability management-and took on Harvard Business School, where he graduated in the top 5 percent of his class. Then Skilling took the next step on what was then the new, souped-up path to American success: He joined Manhattan's McKinsey and Company as a business consultant, and that is where Ken Lay found him in 1985.

It is often said of Lay that his instincts for hiring the best are flawless, and his choice of Skilling probably saved the company. Skilling was above all an expert at markets and how they worked. While everyone else was worrying about the gluts and the shortages that defined the gas industry, he alone saw the parallels between gas and other businesses. And so in a world where credit was nearly impossible to come by, Skilling came up with what he called the Gas Bank, which contractually guaranteed both the supply and the price of gas to a network of suppliers and consumers. Enron would not be a broker but a banker. It would buy and sell the gas itself and assume the risk involved. And Enron would make money on transactions, much like an investment bank would.

Skilling worked up some numbers and found them "absolutely compelling." Then the McKinsey consultant took the idea to a meeting of about 25 Enron executives. He had a one-page presentation. "Almost to a person," Skilling says, "they thought it was stupid." Almost. After Skilling left the meeting dejected, he walked Ken Lay to an elevator and apologized. Lay listened and then said, "Let's go."

The Gas Bank was not an overnight success. For months Skilling woke up in a cold sweat, sure he had ruined not only his career but the careers of dozens of colleagues who had assisted him. In fact, he had come upon one of those divides that seem to define his life: "I believed this whole world would be different, a huge breakthrough" is the way Skilling puts it today, and even if he is typically immodest, he was right. Fairly soon after launching, the company sold $800 million worth of gas in a week. True to Skilling's character, success turned out to be a matter of old versus new: He says the joke around Enron was that if a company's CEO was under fifty, "We were in." And he was in too: In 1990 Skilling finally left McKinsey and joined Enron as the head of Enron Finance Corporation, a new division created just for him. In 1991 that company closed a deal that earned $11 million in profit. After that, says Skilling, "we never looked back."

Skilling and Lay also realized that the Gas Bank couldn't work unless it had a trading component. Myriad trades were needed to build the market that would make the project go. But by buying and selling enormous quantities of gas, Enron not only constructed a market but almost instantly came to dominate it. The company had the best contacts, the best intelligence, and the best access to supplies. That, in turn, attracted more customers who wanted to be part of the play. With so many customers in its pocket, Enron could better predict the direction of the market and could use that knowledge to make trades for its own benefit-Enron could in effect bet on which way the price of gas would go, as one might do with pork bellies or soybeans, but with startling accuracy, thereby generating profits higher than anyone could have ever imagined.

THIS CHANGE COULD NEVER HAVE OCCURRED without another change Skilling had made: He created, within Enron, a new culture to match its new trading business. The idea was to build a "knowledge-based business," which demanded a skill set not exactly prized by Enron's employees from the old HNG days. Most were deliberate, cautious, responsible, somewhat defensive people, most of them men, of course-the kind of people you'd expect to find working in an industry regulated by the federal government. But now the company needed bolder people for its bold new era: that included anyone who wanted to make money-lots of money-for themselves and for the company. "Enron was going to create a niche for itself or die," one former executive explains. "The people who had narrow views eventually were forced out, because if they had narrow views about other things, they had narrow views about the market."

Skilling wanted smart people but not just any smart people. He wanted the smartest people from schools like Harvard, Stanford, and maybe, Rice. And because his firm was now acting more like a bank than a pipeline company, he wanted to draw from the pool of recruits that would be attracted to the biggest and best investment banks, like Merrill Lynch or Credit Suisse First Boston. In addition to being smart, Enron people were also supposed to be "aggressive." You were right for Enron if you didn't want to wait until you were thirty to close your own deals or move up in an organization.

You could see what he was looking for on "Super Saturdays" at the Houston headquarters: eight fifty-minute interviews with ten minute breaks in between-the company might herd as many as four hundred people through in just one day. They were scored from 1 to 5 on their smarts, their problem-solving ability, their passion for hard work, and what at Enron was called "a sense of urgency." People who scored less than 2.5 were scratched. The shrewdest candidates knew how to work Enron before they were even hired: These were the types that automatically turned down the company's first offer, knowing Enron would come back with more. The starting salary was around $80,000. Maybe it wasn't a fortune-yet-but the signing bonus, about $20,000, was more than enough for a lease on the obligatory Porsche Boxster or one of the lofts being renovated close to downtown. (Enron people didn't live in far-flung suburbs. Suburbs were uncool and too far from the office.)

For the lucky winners, Enron offered the corporate equivalent of a gifted-and-talented program. New associates learned the latest techniques for structuring energy deals, and there were rotations at Enron offices around the globe. The hours were long, but every possible need was taken care of. A company concierge handled all the things important people couldn't be bothered with: picking up dry cleaning or prescriptions, shining shoes, cleaning the house, planning a vacation. Of course, a lot of people who worked for Enron never got to take vacations-they were too busy making money-but they could use the company gym and the company's personal trainers. If they were overweight or wanted to quit smoking, they could join Enron's Wellness Program. Massages were offered six days a week, from seven in the morning until ten at night. "They were so cutting edge," rhapsodizes someone involved with the company health care program at the time. "They really thought about the psychology and what it took to keep these people going."

Skilling handed out titles analogous to those at Wall Street firms-analysts, associates, directors, and managing directors-but everyone knew that those titles didn't really matter. Money did. Instead of competitive salaries and decent bonuses, Enron offered competitive salaries and merit-based bonuses-with no cap. "If you really worked hard and delivered results, you could make a lot of money," says Ken Rice, who stayed with Enron for 21 years until resigning recently as the head of the company's faltering broadband division. Or, as the saying goes, you got to eat what you killed. Gas traders with two or three years of experience could wind up with a $1 million bonus. And the more you produced, the closer you got to Jeff: Real hot dogs joined him glacier hiking in Patagonia, Land Cruiser racing in Australia, or off-road motorcycling in a re-creation of the Baja 1,000 race, ending at a spectacular Mexican villa. "Every time he'd speak, I'd believe everything he'd say," one loyalist says.

And why not? By 1995 Enron had become North America's largest natural-gas merchant, controlling 20 percent of the market. But at a company where the buzzword was "aggressive," that was no place to stop: Skilling and Lay believed the Gas Bank model could easily be applied to the electricity business. Firmly committed to the notion that a deregulated market meant better service at lower prices for consumers (and untold profits for Enron), they began barnstorming the country, pressing their case with entrenched power company presidents (who, with their multimillion-dollar salaries and monopoly service areas, had little incentive to change) and energy regulators (who were somewhat more receptive, thanks in part to Enron's generous lobbying efforts).

But the biggest winner of all was probably Jeff Skilling. In 1997 Ken Lay made him the president and chief operating officer of the company. By then, the division known as Enron Capital and Trade Resources was the nations largest wholesale buyer and seller of natural gas and electricity. The division had grown from two hundred to two thousand employees, and revenues from $2 billion to $7 billion. "Mr. Skilling's experience so far with the turmoil in the industry has convinced him that he is on the right track," the New York Times noted. Everyone would certainly have thought so: Enron and Skilling had totally transformed one industry and were well on their way to transforming another.

"FIRING UP AN IDEA MACHINE; Enron Is Encouraging the Entrepreneurs Within," sang the New York Times in 1999. "In the staid world of regulated utilities and energy companies, Enron Corp is that gate-crashing Elvis," crowed Fortune in 2000. Wall Street was demanding tech-size growth on a tech timetable, and Enron, in 2000, obliged with second quarter earnings of $289 million, up 30 percent from the previous year. That year the company seemed to discover a market a minute: Under Skilling, Enron was trading coal, paper, steel, and even weather. No one blinked when a London wine bar became an Enron client. People drank more in warm weather than cold, so why not buy a hedge against the usual winter downturn?

But most exciting to the financial world was Enron's entry into high-tech communications. Because of the company's marketing dominance, EnronOnline became another overnight success, handling $335 billion in commodity trades online in 2000. Enron, as usual, made its money on the spread between the bid price and the asking price. Then there was the broadband business: To Enron, trading excess capacity in large, high-speed fiber-optic networks (empty lanes on the fabled information highway) wasn't that different from trading the capacity of natural gas pipelines. So Enron created a market for what the industry calls bandwidth. Soon after, it also announced a twenty-year deal with Blockbuster to deliver movies on demand electronically to people in their homes. Enron looked like a company that couldn't lose. "Its strategy of building businesses, shedding hard assets, and trading various commodities can help it do well even in an uncertain market," BusinessWeek insisted.

There was, however, another reason Enron did so well in such a short time: the company's hard-nosed approach toward its customers. The old notion of customer service was based on the long haul-you had to nurse and coddle customers to keep them. But Enron had new markets and new ideas-customers had to come to it. Over time, the company stopping referring to its business clients as customers and began calling them "counterparties."

Skilling wanted the biggest profits on the shortest timetable: Gains were maximized by creating, owning, and then abandoning a market before it became overtaxed and overregulated. So if you wanted to launch a high-risk venture quickly-such as Zilkha Energy's new high-tech approach to drilling for oil-you got your financing from Enron because a bank would take forever to underwrite the project, if it ever would. But because Enron invented its markets and subsequently dominated them, Enron could set the terms of its deals, from the timeline to the method of accounting to whether the deal happened at all.

While many businesses used what was known in the industry as "mark-to-market accounting," for instance, Enron used it on an unprecedented scale. The company priced their deals at current market value-but it was always Enron's idea of the market value; companies that balked at their pricing didn't get deals. And while old-fashioned companies spread their profits out like annuities over a period of years, Enron took most of its profit up-front. However many millions would be made on a deal that covered several years, they went on the books in the current year. If a few analysts thought there might be something fishy about what they called "subjective accounting," investors didn't particularly care as long as the profits rolled in. As the market fluctuated and the landscape changed, the company might abandon a project that had been in the works for months because its profit margins weren't going to be high enough. "Enron is known for leaving people at the altar," says one former employee. Winning the highest possible profits for the company could even extend to Enron's attitude toward charity. When a fundraiser for the Houston READ Commission, a literacy group, called on Enron for a contribution, it was suggested that he start raising money for Enron's competing literacy charity: "Even the person who was supposed to give money away for Enron was supposed to make money for Enron," he says.

As Enron became more and more successful, the culture Skilling had created took on a dark side: The competition turned inward. As one member of the Enron family put it, "It became a company full of mercenaries." The change started at the bottom. As Enron's domination of the energy market grew, most of the recruiting frills fell away. New associates were treated much like the commodities the company traded. Global Change's Enron spies reported overhearing orders like "I need a smart person-go buy me one" or "Buy me an intelligent slave, quick." Enron had never been the kind of place where people sang to you on your birthday, but now the workaholism bordered on self-parody: A Random Acts of Kindness program lasted only a few months. It was too disruptive. People couldn't get their work done.

And, of course, Enron had a program for institutionalizing creative tension. The Performance Review Committee, which had initially been installed by Skilling in the Capital group, became known as the harshest forced ranking system in the country. Employees were rated on a scale of one to five, and those with fives were usually gone within six months. (The PRC's nickname quickly became "rank and yank.") It was a point of pride that Skilling's division replaced 15 percent of its workforce every year. As one Skilling associate put it, "Jeff viewed this like turning over the inventory in a grocery store." Skilling's approach to business-get in and get out-had become Enron's attitude toward its workers. In time, it would become many workers' attitude toward the company. Teamwork, never that valuable in a trading culture, went the way of the eyeshade and the abacus. If protocol required an Enron higher-up to come from Europe to help with a project in the Third World, he might help-or he might not, depending on whether another, potentially more lucrative project was pending elsewhere.

Everyone felt the pressure to perform on a massive scale at massive speed: "They were so goal oriented toward immediate gratification that they lost sight of the future," says one former employee. Anyone who couldn't close deals within a quarter was punished with bad PRC scores, as were the higher-ups who had backed them. Past errors and old grudges were dredged up so often as new ammunition in PRC meetings that the phrase "No old tapes" became an Enron clich?. "People went from being geniuses to idiots overnight," says one former Enron executive.

In such a hothouse, paranoia flowered. New contracts contained highly restrictive confidentiality agreements about anything pertaining to the company. E-mail was monitored. A former executive routinely carried two laptops, one for the company and one for himself. People may have been rich at Enron, but they weren't necessarily happy. One recruiter described the culture this way: "They roll you over and slit your throat and watch your eyes while you bleed to death."

BEFORE JEFF SKILLING COULD TRANSFORM ENRON from the world's leading energy company into the world's leading company, he had to make one more change: Just as he had done ten years before, Skilling had to purge the company of its remaining old order. Where Enron once prized cautious executives who dealt with tangible assets like pipelines, it now valued bold executives who dealt with intangible assets. Pipelines, power plants-they may have been Enron's pride, but Skilling wanted them gone. Expensive, long-term building projects had no place when Wall Street was devoted to quick profits and enormous returns on investment capital, and Skilling knew it. "It wasn't the time for long-term approaches," an Enron executive says of Wall Street's mood. "It was the technology era."

To rid Enron of the last vestiges of its past, Skilling had to take on Rebecca Mark, long considered his rival for the CEO's job. Mark was for many years the poster child for the Enron way: Young, attractive, aggressive-her nickname was Mark the Shark-she came from sturdy Midwestern stock but had the requisite Harvard MBA. Mark was largely responsible for the success of Enron International, the asset-heavy side of the company where she developed $20 billion worth of gas and power plants, which accounted for 40 percent of Enron's profits in 1998. For this she reaped breathtaking compensation-one Enron executive estimated $10 million-and adoring press clips, including two appearances on Fortune's list of the fifty most powerful women in corporate America.

But then Mark ran into trouble with a gas-fired power plant in Dabhol, India, one of the largest ever constructed. She had played the game the Enron way: Taking Enron into a new market, she had finagled low import taxes (20 percent instead of the usual 53) and hung in through 24 lawsuits and three changes in government. But the time and expense needed to make India and other Enron plants around the globe successful did not mesh with Enron's goals, and Skilling's impatience with Mark grew.

Forcing Mark out, however, was no easy matter. Key executives left, divisions were dismantled, but she remained. The truth was Enron didn't mind firing lower-level employees, but it hated to fire the kind of aggressive, relentless people it tended to promote. The company preferred humiliation-keeping a director in his cubicle, say, but failing to include him in the glamour deals, or kicking someone upstairs with a fancy title. (One particularly difficult executive won a few years at graduate school, gratis.) A company as smart as Enron could probably deduce too that dispatching one of the most visible businesswomen in the country would provoke a public-relations disaster. So Lay and Skilling did something classically Enronian: They gave Mark her own company. Despite Skilling's contempt for asset-heavy businesses, Enron spent more than $2 billion to buy a run-of-the-mill British water utility that could serve as Enron's entry into the emerging world of water privatization. Mark was put in charge of making Enron, yes, the world's greatest water company. Azurix, as the new business was called, looked like another sure thing: Its IPO in 1999 raised $695 million.

But Mark had to succeed on Enron's increasingly abbreviated timetable in a business fraught with political and emotional complexities. Water is not like gas or electricity-owners and governments are a lot less willing to give it up, even for lots of money. The company stumbled, layoffs commenced, and confidence evaporated. By August 2000 the stock price, which had started out at $19, had fallen to $5. Mark's resignation followed, and Azurix, much diminished, was folded into Enron. "I think it's best for Rebecca to start afresh," Lay, who had been a mentor to Mark, told the Wall Street Journal. Or as one critic put it, "They were more interested in destroying the old culture than running a business."

As 2000 drew to a close, Skilling was in total command. In December Ken Lay announced the inevitable: "The best time for the succession to occur is when the company is doing well," he told the press. "Enron is doing extremely well now." In February 2001 Jeff Skilling took over the CEO's job.

ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THE TROUBLE STARTED. Enron's domination of the electric-power market made it an instant target in the California deregulation debacle. Both PBS's Frontline and the New York Times took on Enron, portraying the company as a heartless colossus that used its influence in Washington (Lay and Enron's political action committee are the top contributors to George W. Bush) to force old people on fixed incomes to choose between buying food or electricity. Skilling and Lay appeared on camera singing belligerent anthems to the free market, while another memorable scene juxtaposed one of the company's jackallike traders against a hapless state employee in California, as both tried to buy power online. The Times reported that Lay had tried to persuade a new federal commissioner to change his views on energy deregulation. The bad press was, to say the least, ironic: Just as the media was pounding Enron for its omnipotence, Wall Street was discovering its weaknesses. By late March the stock price had slid to $50 a share from $80 in January.

Within Enron, the asset-based divisions took the rap for the decline. (The India plant continued to be enormously costly, at least in part because of constant turnover within Enron's management team.) But the California situation was more visible and therefore more damaging, despite Enron's claim that the state had never built enough power plants to service its population and never properly managed those it had. "For three months Gray Davis did a very good job of blaming us," says Mark Palmer, a vice president for corporate communications. "We were a Texas company. There was a Texan in the White House. California was a state that didn't put him in office, and his biggest contributor was a Texas energy company. Performance is going to take care of our stock price. The truth will take care of Gray Davis." (California utilities still owe Enron $500 million, another reason stockholders might be panicky.) But more problematic than the crisis itself was Skilling's all too apparent lack of contrition. Facing down his critics, he cracked a joke comparing California with the Titanic. ("At least the Titanic went down with its lights on.")

But the biggest problem was Enron's telecommunications division, which had been responsible for at least one third of its heady stock price. Investors believed that Enron could revolutionize high-speed communications, just as it had revolutionized gas and power. Enron estimated the global market for buying and selling space over fiber-optic cable would grow from $155 billion in 2001 to $383 billion by 2004-but then the tech bubble burst. So too did the much-hyped movies-on-demand deal with Blockbuster. For the first time in its confoundingly successful life, Enron had nothing new to take to market. Like the popular high school girl who suddenly packs on a few pounds, Enron suddenly looked less alluring to Wall Street.

Skilling launched a campaign to keep Enron's most important cheerleaders, the stock analysts, in the tent, but he wasn't cut out to be a supplicant. During the reporting of first quarter profits, he called an analyst who challenged Enron's financial reporting an "asshole." When the company reported hefty second quarter profits, many analysts questioned whether those profits had come from the generation of new business or from the sale of old assets. Ignoring the growing chorus critical of Enron's accounting, Skilling promised, as he always had, that innovations were just around the corner. "There wasn't any positive news," Carol Coale, of Prudential Financial, says now. "Basically, he talked me out of a downgrade."

The business press, so generous in the past, turned surly. Fortune had asked in March whether Enron was overpriced. ("Start with a pretty straightforward question: How exactly does Enron make its money?") The routine cashing in of stock options that were about to expire by key executives was portrayed in the media as a fire sale. (Skilling had sold $33 million worth, Ken Lay and Ken Rice close to four times that amount.) Then the Wall Street Journal reported on a fund run by the CFO that had been a source of strife within the company. (It was essentially risk management against Enron's possible failures.) Every negative story seemed to produce a concurrent drop in the stock price: By late August it had fallen below $40. Enron, so institutionally unforgiving, finally got a taste of its own medicine. "When Wall Street is in love with a stock, they're forgiving of something like accounting," says Carol Coale. "When a company falls out of favor, all these issues carry more weight."

This fact was not lost on people inside the company, who suddenly started experiencing an attack of conscience. Those who had looked the other way as the most powerful Enron executives dumped their wives and married their secretaries or carried on flagrant interoffice affairs now saw the error of their ways. "It just created an attitude," one executive still at Enron says. "If senior people are doing that, why are we held to a higher standard? There was a real culture of 'We're above everyone else.'"

Loyalty had never been prized at Enron, so there was no reason to expect it now. An old-fashioned, slow-moving company like Exxon could demand hardship duty in Baku with the promise of greater rewards down the road. "But," as one Houston oilman explains, "if you have to negotiate a hardship duty with someone who doesn't have loyalty and has money, then you have a corporation that's better suited for good times than bad."

As it turned out, that description applied to Jeff Skilling too. As the stock price stubbornly refused to ascend, he made no secret of his unhappiness and frustration. Then, after a trip to visit the families of three employees killed at a plant in England, he had an epiphany: Life was short; for him, Enron was over. Ever stoic, Ken Lay returned to the CEO's office, named a new president, arranged a trip to New York to calm analysts and investors, and promised a kinder, gentler Enron in the future. Trading anything and everything was out. The company, Lay says, will still innovate but "innovate much closer to our core." As for the culture: "Things like the Performance Review Committee, I think we could have applied better. By trying to categorize people into so many different categories, you ended up creating a morale problem."

That Skilling's supposedly brilliant colleagues were as shocked at the news of his departure as the rest of the business community may be testament to their lack of emotional intelligence. Despite Skilling's lengthy tenure with Enron, he'd always been contemptuous of the long haul; he'd always believed in cutting losses and moving on. But now that he was abandoning them when the company was in trouble, it was different. "Even Jeff's biggest detractors wouldn't have wanted him to walk out the door," one loyalist admits.

But on the day we meet, Skilling is looking forward, not back. "Look," he says with finality, "ninety percent of my net worth is in Enron. Were my interests aligned with the shareholders? Absolutely."

Free of falling stock prices and shareholder pressures, he is nestling himself back into the world of ideas. His eyes flash as he talks about new technologies. "The first wave never gets it right," he says. "The stand-alone dot-coms didn't work, but the technological applications will create a second wave that will change the world." Houston, he promises, will become the world's center of commodity trading, and he intends to be a part of it. In fact, he is already shopping for office space.

"This is the second wave, and Enron's got it," he says, almost breathless. "There are thousands of people running around the streets of Houston that get it."  <outbind://13/Image2.gif>


I'm not at the office today, but I probably have a copy of the Option.  I
don't recognize the Memorandum of Option to Purchase.  Do you have a copy of
it to see if it gets my memory working?

	From:  Kathleen Carnahan                           10/09/2000 02:11 PM

To: Jeffrey Keenan/HOU/ECT@ECT, Kay Mann/Corp/Enron@Enron
cc:

Subject: North Carolina - Edgecombe County

I am trying to find: (i) an executed copy of the Option to Purchase Real
Estate; and (ii) recorded copy of the Memorandum of Option to Purchase Real
Estate in connection with the Edgecombe County NC property (between North
Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency and Tarheel Land Development Company,
L.L.C.).  The option extension is due at the end of the month and I would
like to get the extension documents ready.

Do either of you have copies of these documents?

Thanks -
Kathleen


Michele & Rick --

Please see the note below.  It is critical for you to call your clients (Jack in the Box/Burger King and Wendy's) to try and convince them to push their industry lobbyist to ask for a change in the date.

Call me at 713-853-7673 or 713-851-2499 (cell) to discuss.

Thanks,

Jim

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	Hedy Govenar <hgovenar@govadv.com>@ENRON [mailto:IMCEANOTES-Hedy+20Govenar+20+3Chgovenar+40govadv+2Ecom+3E+40ENRON@ENRON.com]
Sent:	Wednesday, September 05, 2001 4:50 PM
To:	Steffes, James D.
Cc:	Mara, Susan; Dasovich, Jeff; Kaufman, Paul; Mike Day (E-mail); Bev Hansen (E-mail); Scott Govenar (E-mail)
Subject:	Re: California Strategy - 9.5.01  12:00 PM

Rick Simpson from the Speaker's office, said there will be no amendments to the bill prior to its passing the Assembly.  They are still scrambling for votes and sent the Chamber and WSPA lobbyists out to shore up a few while I was in the office.  I talked to Mike Kahl, WSPA lobbyist, whose firm also represents the restaurant assn.  He argued that the 24th was in the bill for awhile and he called all of their clients to tell them to sign up by the 24th.  He said Enron should have done the same.  I argued that Enron did the best it could, but that negotiations with many entities take varying amounts of time.  So long as the date is past, and customers still have to pay exit fees, what was the relevant policy debate.  There can't be a gold rush now.  Scott pointed out to me that bothWendy's and Burger King probably belong to the restaurant assn., so our suggestion is that those entities contact Jot Condie at the assn to instruct his lobbyists to change the date to Sept. 1st.  This is time sensitive.  The Chamber lobbyist would love to see a Sept. 1 date, but was not optimistic that they could move the Governor's office.

Rick agreed to ask the Speaker to call Jeff Brown and ask for a delay until the Legislature has time to act.  He will say the bill is expected to pass his House tomorrow and changes will occur in the Senate which will give them direction.  Rick also expressed pessimism that Bowen's attempts at legislation will have a fruitful result.  I have been unable to speak to Burton directly about calling Brown, but hope to see him before the day is over.

Also I have a call in to Mayor Willie Brown, but so far I haven't heard back.

Jim, re the list of customers signing after July 1 - which ones would be affected by the Aug. 24th date?

"Steffes, James D." wrote:

> Per our conversation today --
>
> 1.      Sue Mara is working with AReM to (a) work on an alternative
> vehicle for DA - the Bowen bill, (b) get the "taking" argument for
> retroactive CPUC action to Norm Plotkin and Richard Katz, (c) call APS
> Energy Services to motivate Boeing, (d) getting AReM active on the date
> issue.
>
> By the way, Sue Mara heard that the CPUC has received "hundreds" of
> letters related to the CPUC decision.
>
> 2.      Everyone should be working to get customers focused on messaging
> to the (a) Governor's office and (b) trade associations.
>
> KEY MESSAGES:   1.      Don't have the CPUC Make Wrong Decision Tomorrow
>                         2.      SB78 can work if DA Suspension Date =
> Sept 1.01 or Later
>                         3.      Setting this DA Suspension Date Does NOT
> Mean that Customers Will Escape Fair Surcharges
>
> I am putting together a gameplan right now for who to call and the
> messages.
>
> 3.      I called Sandra Yamane (at Marathon Communications) re: CEO
> contacts.  Once I receive the list, we'll make a decision on how to
> proceed with that group.
>
> 4.      Hedy is working to get Hertzberg (and any others) to call the
> CPUC and seek another delay.
>
> 5.      Mike Day - can you please draft language to use on the Assembly
> floor to "fix" SB78 per our interests.  Hedy & Bev, who should support
> the amendment?  Don't we need a member to carry the provision?  Wouldn't
> it be better if we had CMTA or the CA Restaurant Association?  Is this
> possible?
>
> 6.      Scott Govenar is calling Boeing's lobbyist to get them
> "interested".
>
> Thanks everybody.  Keep up the great work!!!
>
> Jim
>
> **********************************************************************
> This e-mail is the property of Enron Corp. and/or its relevant affiliate and may contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient (s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient (or authorized to receive for the recipient), please contact the sender or reply to Enron Corp. at enron.messaging.administration@enron.com and delete all copies of the message. This e-mail (and any attachments hereto) are not intended to be an offer (or an acceptance) and do not create or evidence a binding and enforceable contract between Enron Corp. (or any of its affiliates) and the intended recipient or any other party, and may not be relied on by anyone as the basis of a contract by estoppel or otherwise. Thank you.
> **********************************************************************


I told you I'd be back!  Hopefully, the ease of today's electronic input
will help facilitate your response to our YPO Education Survey.  Therefore,
please complete the attached.

Since the initial response rate was not that great, I have begun discussions
with Hulk Hogan and The Rock.  Hopefully, we won't have to "go to the mat"
with them.

Please remember, we would like one survey completed by yourself and an
additional, separate survey completed by your spouse.

I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Bill Larkin

 - 2001-survey.doc


you are clearly deserving.  good luck!

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	Oh, Seung-Taek
Sent:	Wednesday, June  6, 2001 9:26 AM
To:	Neal, Scott
Subject:	Thanks

Scott

Thank you for recommending me for the trading track program.

As you probably already know, I have been accepted into the program.

Again, thank you very much for giving me this opportunity.

Seung-Taek


Start Date: 1/17/02; HourAhead hour: 23;  HourAhead schedule download failed. Manual intervention required.

    LOG MESSAGES:

PARSING FILE -->> O:\Portland\WestDesk\California Scheduling\ISO Final Schedules\2002011723.txt
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Alias: dbCaps97Data
Error: dbCaps97Data: Cannot perform this operation on a closed database


At the request of Melba Bowen the following meeting has been set:

To discuss the handling of funds due Enron Louisiana as the result of
reallocations on Transco.
Date:  Tuesday, August 3rd
Time:  3 p.m.
Location:  EB37C1

If you have a scheduling conflict , you can reach me at X36890.  If you have
a question regarding this meeting you can reach Melba at X35004.

Thanks,
Cecilia


To:SHACKLETON, SARA
Email:sara.shackleton@enron.com - 7138535620
?

Enron Wholesale Services - Office of the Chairman

?
From:??Mark Frevert, Chairman & CEO
??????Greg Whalley, President & COO
??????Mark Haedicke, Managing Director & General Counsel
?
Subject:??Confidential Information and Securities Trading
?
Enron Wholesale Services ('EWS') maintains official Policies and Procedures
Regarding Confidential Information and Securities Trading ('Policies and
Procedures'), which have been revised as of November 15, 2000 to reflect the
new EWS structure.  These policies and procedures are intended to allow us
simultaneously to pursue our diverse businesses and to protect confidential
information, our reputation for integrity, and EWS and its employees from
legal liability.
?
You are required to become familiar with, and to comply with, the Policies
and Procedures.  The newly revised Policies and Procedures are available for
your review on LegalOnline, the new intranet website maintained by the Enron
Wholesale Services Legal Department.  Please click on the attached link to
access LegalOnline:
?
http://legalonline.corp.enron.com/chinesewall.asp
?
You must certify your compliance with the Policies and Procedures within two
weeks of your receipt of this message.  The LegalOnline site will allow you
to quickly and conveniently certify your compliance on-line with your SAP
Personal ID number.  If you have any questions concerning the Policies or
Procedures, please call Lance Schuler at extension 3-5419, Mark Haedicke at
extension 3-6544, Alan Aronowitz at extension 3-3214, Bob Bruce at extension
5-7780 or Donna Lowry at extension 3-1939.


(See attached file: ng062002.pdf)

This message and any attachments (the "message") is
intended solely for the addressees and is confidential.
If you receive this message in error, please delete it and
immediately notify the sender. Any use not in accord with
its purpose, any dissemination or disclosure, either whole
or partial, is prohibited except formal approval. The internet
can not guarantee the integrity of this message.
BNP PARIBAS (and its subsidiaries) shall (will) not
therefore be liable for the message if modified.

                ---------------------------------------------

Ce message et toutes les pieces jointes (ci-apres le
"message") sont etablis a l'intention exclusive de ses
destinataires et sont confidentiels. Si vous recevez ce
message par erreur, merci de le detruire et d'en avertir
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d'assurer l'integrite de ce message, BNP PARIBAS (et ses
filiales) decline(nt) toute responsabilite au titre de ce
message, dans l'hypothese ou il aurait ete modifie.


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------
W E E K E N D   S Y S T E M S   A V A I L A B I L I T Y

F O R

November 3, 2000 5:00pm through November 6, 2000 12:00am
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------

SCHEDULED SYSTEM OUTAGES:

ARDMORE DATA CENTER - FACILITY OPERATIONS: No Scheduled Outages.

AZURIX: No Scheduled Outages.

EB34 DATA CENTER - FACILITY OPERATIONS: No Scheduled Outages.

EDI SERVER: No Scheduled Outages.

ENRON NORTH AMERICAN LANS:  No Scheduled Outages.

FIELD SERVICES:  No Scheduled Outages.

INTERNET:
Impact:  EOL
Time:  Sat 11/4/2000 at  7:00:00 PM CT thru Sat 11/4/2000 at  8:00:00 PM CT
                Sat 11/4/2000 at  5:00:00 PM PT thru Sat 11/4/2000 at
6:00:00 PM PT
                Sun 11/5/2000 at  1:00:00 AM London thru Sun 11/5/2000 at
2:00:00 AM London
Outage:  reboot eol net devices
Environments Impacted:  EOL
Purpose: Regular reboot to prevent such problems as memory corruption
Backout:
Contact(s):  John Shupak  713-853-7943

LOTUS NOTES: No Scheduled Outages.

MARKET DATA: No Scheduled Outages.

NT: No Scheduled Outages.

OS/2:  No Scheduled Outages.

OTHER SYSTEMS:  HR
Impact:  HR
Time:  Fri 11/3/2000 at  6:00:00 PM CT thru Fri 11/3/2000 at  10:00:00 PM CT
 Fri 11/3/2000 at  4:00:00 PM PT thru Fri 11/3/2000 at    8:00:00 PM PT
 Sat 11/4/2000 at  12:00:00 AM London thru Sat 11/4/2000 at  4:00:00 AM London
Outage:  HR DataMart (HR-DB-5/HR-DB-4) Database move
Environments Impacted:  Corporate, HR Datamart, Expertfinder, eHRonline,
Global Information System,
             Global Compensation System, and Performance Management
Purpose: Upgrade existing hardware / make room at Ardmore for PDU and air
handling unit.
Backout: Our backout plan is to move the servers back to their original
position with the original cards installed in them.
Contact(s):  Brandon Bangerter  713-345-4904
  Raj Perubhatla  713-345-8016
  Mark Calkin  713-345-3691

OTHER SYSTEMS:  UNIX
Impact:  ENS
Time:  Fri 11/3/2000 at  11:00:00 PM CT thru Fri 11/3/2000 at  11:30:00 PM CT
 Fri 11/3/2000 at    9:00:00 PM PT thru Fri 11/3/2000 at     9:30:00 PM PT
 Sat 11/4/2000 at    5:00:00 AM London thru Sat 11/4/2000 at  5:30:00 AM
London
Outage:  Add Redundancy to the Unix Server Network
Environments Impacted:  ENA
Purpose: Make this network redundant
Backout:
Contact(s):  George Nguyen  713-853-0691

OTHER SYSTEMS:  SAP
Impact:  SAP
Time:  Sun 11/5/2000 at  6:00:00 AM CT thru Sun 11/5/2000 at  6:30:00 AM CT
 Sun 11/5/2000 at  4:00:00 AM PT thru Sun 11/5/2000 at  4:30:00 AM PT
 Sun 11/5/2000 at  12:00:00 PM London thru Sun 11/5/2000 at  12:30:00 PM
London
Outage:  Remove trunking for SAP
Environments Impacted:  All
Purpose: SAP has migrated to Ardmore, will move the routing functionality to
Ardmore and remove the trunking
(no longer needed) from the links leading back to EB.
Backout: Move the routing functionality back to the EB
Contact(s):  Vincent Fox   713-345-7784
  Ron Pieronek  713-853-6683

SITARA:  No Scheduled Outages.

SUN/OSS SYSTEM: No Scheduled Outages.

TELEPHONY: No Scheduled Outages

TERMINAL SERVER:  No Scheduled Outages.

UNIFY:  No Scheduled Outages.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------
FOR ASSISTANCE

(713) 853-1411   Enron Resolution Center
(713) 853-5536   Information Risk Management

Specific Applications Help:
Unify On-Call      (713) 284-3757  [Pager]
Sitara On-Call     (713) 288-0101  [Pager]
RUS/GOPS/GeoTools/APRS   (713) 639-9726  [Pager]
OSS/UA4/TARP    (713) 285-3165  [Pager]
CPR      (713) 284-4175  [Pager]
EDI Support      (713) 327-3893  [Pager]
All Other Systems    (713) 563-5797  [Pager]
      or (713) 563-5987  [Pager]


broker has 25 mw instead of 50mw


Start Date: 1/9/02; HourAhead hour: 15;  HourAhead schedule download failed. Manual intervention required.


As most of you know we have been experiencing some problems with our
Network.  Tonight starting at 7:30 Cisco doing some troubleshooting with our
Networking team in Houston.  I have co-ordinated the outages with the Real
Time Schedulers.

Please feel free to contact me with any questions or concerns.

Thanks,
Diana


---------------------- Forwarded by Mary Hain/HOU/ECT on 02/04/2001 04:37 PM
---------------------------
From: Richard B Sanders on 02/04/2001 08:39 AM CST
To: rcarroll@bracepatt.com, dwatkiss@bracepat.com, Paul Kaufman/PDX/ECT@ECT,
Joe Hartsoe/Corp/Enron@ENRON, Mary Hain/HOU/ECT@ECT, James D
Steffes/NA/Enron@Enron
cc:
Subject: Phil Fantle's FERC filing

We have been asked to join in this filing. Any thoughts?
----- Forwarded by Richard B Sanders/HOU/ECT on 02/04/2001 08:36 AM -----

	"Fergus, Gary S." <GFergus@brobeck.com>
	02/02/2001 08:27 PM

		 To: "A. William Urquhart (E-mail)" <awu@qeuo.com>, "Alan Z. Yudkowsky
(E-mail)" <ayudkowsky@strook.com>, "Andrzej Kabarowski (E-mail)"
<andrzej_kabarowski@cargill.com>, "Arlen Orchard (E-mail)"
<aorchard@smud.org>, "Brian Currey (E-mail)" <bcurrey@omm.com>,
"'cfr@vnf.com'" <cfr@vnf.com>, "Cliff Gunter (E-mail)"
<cgunter@bracepatt.com>, "Davis Smith (E-mail)" <wdsmith@sempra.com>,
"Douglas Butz (E-mail)" <dmbutz@butzdunn.com>, "Douglas Thorpe (E-mail)"
<thord@perkinscoie.com>, "Elizabeth Sager (E-mail)"
<elizabeth.sager@enron.com>, "Gary Keltner (E-mail)" <gkeltner@jsslaw.com>,
"'gbd@vnf.com'" <gbd@vnf.com>, "Gordon P. Erspamer (E-mail)"
<gerspamer@mofo.com>, "Harry A. Olivar Jr. (E-mail)" <hao@qeuo.com>,
"'hes@vnf.com'" <hes@vnf.com>, "Jane Alfano (E-mail)" <jdalfano@srpnet.com>,
"Jean Frizzell (E-mail)" <jfrizzell@gibbs-bruns.com>, "Jeffrey D. (Dan)
Watkiss (E-mail)" <dwatkiss@bracepatt.com>, "John Fryer (E-mail)"
<john.fryer@pacificorp.com>, "John Heath (E-mail)" <jheath@fulbright.com>,
"John W. Stamper (E-mail)" <jstamper@omm.com>, "Ken Irvin (E-mail)"
<kirvin@mofo.com>, "'mbrosterman@stroock.com'" <mbrosterman@stroock.com>,
"'mgoldstein@stroock.com'" <mgoldstein@stroock.com>, "Michael Helms (E-mail)"
<mghelms@jsslaw.com>, "Nancy Loftin (E-mail)"
<nancy.loftin@pinnaclewest.com>, "Paul Fox (E-mail)" <pfox@bracepatt.com>,
"Phillip Fantle (E-mail)" <phillip_fantle@cargill.com>,
"'pjazayeri@stroock.com'" <pjazayeri@stroock.com>,
"'psteele@coral-energy.com'" <psteele@coral-energy.com>, "Richard B. Sanders
Esq. (E-mail)" <richard.b.sanders@enron.com>, "Richard Beitler (E-mail)"
<rbeitler@sempratrading.com>, "Richard Josephson (E-mail)"
<rcjosephson@stoel.com>, "Ronald Carroll (E-mail)" <rcarroll@bracepatt.com>,
"Shari Stack (E-mail)" <sstack@enron.com>, "Susan Bishop (E-mail)"
<sbishop@gibbs-bruns.com>, "'theftler@stroock.com'" <theftler@stroock.com>,
"Tim Bolden (E-mail)" <Timothy.Bolden@pinnaclewest.com>
		 cc:
		 Subject: Phil Fantle's FERC filing

 <<021210910001[1].gif>>

Thanks
Gary

=======================================================
This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may
contain confidential and privileged information. Any unauthorized review,
use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended
recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies of
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 - 021210910001[1].gif


People I am paying for :-

Myself
James New - Power, Gas and Credit
Mike Wellings - UK Power
Coralie Evans - Continental Power
Robert Yeo - UK and Continental Gas
Paul D'Arcy - Structured Products
David Wall - Credit
Andrew Cornfield - Metals Risk Manager

People who may come from EGM - Fiona, we should get them on same booking if
they confirm attendance ( Patti, could you let Fiona know ? )

Cindy Horn
Kenny Nicoll
Mark Fondren

---------------------- Forwarded by Mike Jordan/LON/ECT on 25/09/2000 16:19
---------------------------

Mike Jordan
12/09/2000 08:26
To: Sally Beck/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc:

Subject: Re: Invitation List for Operations Business Controller Offsite

Sally

Proposed list - of all potential candidates

Myself
James New - and his lead risk managers
Mike Wellings - UK Power
Coralie Evans - Continental Power
Robert Yeo - UK and Continental Gas
Paul D'Arcy - Structured Products
David Wall - Credit
Tim Poullain-Patterson - Metals Integration
Andrew Cornfield - Metals Risk Manager
Kevin Rhodes - Metals Controller ( there are in fact two controllers at
present Kevin for Financial Trading and Howard Carter for Merchanting )

I would leave Ralph Jaeger of Frankfurt out of the offsite if places are
restricted  - He is covered by the mainstream Accounting conferences, but I
would have Jan Erland, and Heidi and Tiong Hock from Singapore.

I am not sure Fernley would want to be there - but I can ask.

On others  - Simon Thurbin of liquids in london should be in Houston and
would be a good choice for inclusion. Brent may want his two London
controllers of Cindy Horn and Kenny Nicoll to also come

Would you invite Kristen to come with( in place of Barry? ).

A long list ( and we may want to cut back ) but all these individuals carry
the burden of operational risk assessment and management - standardising that
process would be an achievement indeed.

Mike

PS  - Shall we revisit Agenda and discuss who should start preparing
presentations - we had thought about engaging RAC, IT etc

	Enron Capital & Trade Resources Corp.

	From:  Sally Beck                           11/09/2000 21:49

To: Mike Jordan/LON/ECT@ECT
cc:

Subject: Invitation List for Operations Business Controller Offsite

Dates: Sunday, October 22 (late afternoon, early evening kick-off, reception
and dinner)
  Monday, October 23 (all day, with evening event)
  Tuesday, October 24 (through mid afternoon)

Confirmed speakers to date:  Jeff Skilling (Tuesday, October 24 - available
9:30 am to 1:00 pm)

Proposed list of attendees (Mike:  let's talk about the scope of this list on
Tuesday):

ENA
Gas - Steve Jackson
 Leslie Reeves
 Bob Hall

Power - Stacey White

Calgary - Peggy Hedstrom

EIM
Pulp, Paper, Lumber - Brenda Herod

EGM
General - Brent Price
Global Products - Scott Earnest
Weather - Todd Hall
Financial Products - Sheila Glover
? Kevin Sweeney

EEL
? Fernley Dyson
Mike Jordan
London - James New
Frankfort - Ralph Jaeger
Metals - Tim Pouillan-Patterson
Australia - Heidi Mason
Japan - Jan-Erland Beking

ESA
Scott Mills

EBS
Barry Pearce

EES
Wanda Curry ?

Global Risk Management
Sally Beck
Shona Wilson
Eugenio Perez
Mike Moscoso


---------------------- Forwarded by Vince J Kaminski/HOU/ECT on 12/22/2000
04:47 PM ---------------------------

Shirley Crenshaw
12/22/2000 12:14 PM
To: Pat Arnold/Remote/Eott@Eott, bobb.supertravel@wspan.com,
audrau@yahoo.com, Memaw1995@aol.com, Kathy.Crenshaw@inteq.com @ Enron, Kayla
Crenshaw/Enron Communications@Enron Communications, Carol_Fuentes@EOTT.com,
Renee Ingram/HOU/ECT@ECT, IMYoars@aol.com, jmcintyre13@hotmail.com, Vince J
Kaminski/HOU/ECT@ECT, emlea@usa.net, Kevin G Moore/HOU/ECT@ECT, William
Smith/Corp/Enron@ENRON, Kelly Summers/HOU/ECT@ECT, Rinetia
Turner/OTS/Enron@Enron, Laura Valencia/Corp/Enron@Enron, hmel5345@aol.com
cc:
Subject: MERRY CHRISTMAS

This is so neat!

 - Crimbo.exe


Is this a financial derivative?  Please advise. Sara

 -----Original Appointment-----
From: 	Wall, David
Sent:	Tuesday, October 02, 2001 10:04 AM
To:	Allen, Melissa; Jordan, Kevin D; Kinneman, Jeff; Hemsley, Simon; Cooper, Edmund; Shackleton, Sara
Subject:	Updated: Anker coal transfer - time is of the essence so please attend- Ed's office-6pm London Time
When:	Tuesday, October 02, 2001 12:00 PM-1:00 PM (GMT-06:00) Central Time (US & Canada).
Where:


Happy Friday......

Can any of you believe this McVeigh debacle?!

The only ISS available today and through the weekend is down hole transfer capacity at Ellisburg.

IT is available for the foreseeable future, that being the next few days.  Unfortunately we are not seeing the geographic arbitrage opportunity on the Niagara to Leidy path.  If some of you have attractive commodity prices along that path I am willing to discount the tariff IT rate to help you move it on our system.

Have a great weekend,
Abigail
716-857-6847
http://nfg.natfuel.com/gsweb1/


Hi,

    Previously I forwarded an email to you which contain a list of options products we are considering making markets in.

    Many of you have asked for more details on these (exotic) options products.

    In response to this request, I will be periodically forward modules to your attention which give further details on these options products.

    Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions, comments, etc.

Regards,
Iris
Power Options Trading Desk
x3-6711


OK.  Now either Mary Theresa Franklin or Angie needs to path out this deal in
Unify with a zero volume.

Gloria G Barkowsky
04/11/2000 12:42 PM
To: Chris Germany/HOU/ECT@ECT, Angie Zeman/Corp/Enron@ENRON, Mary Theresa
Franklin/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc:
Subject: Re: Devonian Resources

contract               mid                 acct              producer

8G1064             5089201        RP2109406         Devonian
8G1064             5105901        AT5105901         Devonian
8G1064             5118301        AT5118301         Devonian

Here they are - sorry it took so long to find.  Thanks, Gloria 3-7118

Chris Germany
04/04/2000 03:35 PM
To: Gloria G Barkowsky/HOU/ECT@ECT, Wade R Price/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc: John M Singer/Corp/Enron@ENRON, Mary Theresa Franklin/HOU/ECT@ECT, Angie
Zeman/Corp/Enron@ENRON, Victor Lamadrid/HOU/ECT@ECT
Subject: Re: Devonian Resources

OK this is metered production on CNG.

Gloria will let us know which CNG contract to path this deal with.
The meter numbers are 50089201, 5105901, and 5118301 and this is CES
production.

After Gloria lets us know which contract(s) to use, Angie will path this deal
in Sitara with a zero volume.

---------------------- Forwarded by Chris Germany/HOU/ECT on 04/04/2000 02:42
PM ---------------------------

	From:  John M Singer @ ENRON                           04/04/2000 02:31 PM

To: Chris Germany/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc:
Subject: Re: Devonian Resources

I believe that this is metered production.  We hav a fixed price contract
through Aug00.

Chris Germany@ECT
04/04/2000 01:59 PM
To: John M Singer/Corp/Enron@ENRON
cc:

Subject: Re: Devonian Resources

If this is metered production then its not cut (it just flows to the pool).
If its pool gas then it probably is cut, so you tell me.  Metered production
or pool gas on CNG?

	From:  John M Singer @ ENRON                           04/04/2000 01:39 PM

To: Chris Germany/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc:
Subject: Re: Devonian Resources

Why was this gas cut??

My Phone number is 330-493-7790.

John

Chris Germany@ECT
04/04/2000 01:01 PM
To: John M Singer/Corp/Enron@ENRON
cc: Angie Zeman/Corp/Enron@ENRON

Subject: Devonian Resources

I took the volume on deal 226742 (Devonian Resources) to 0 for April.

Hey John, give me a call when you get a chance so we can chat about this.
Also, send me your phone number.  I can't find it.


How does the New Product Type Approval process work?  We have received
several test messages but it is not clear how we look beyond the short
description in the e-mail to see the long description (can the short
description be set up as a hyperlink to the web-site?) or how we are supposed
to respond (my attempted reply was rejected as undeliverable).


Fred- as per our conversation, can you give me the name of a UBS person who can help me set up space in one of the two NYC UBS offices.  I will handle the details.

Moving forward, I'd appreciate if all requests related to Enron's business in NY be directed to the Senior person (me) who has been successfully running the business here for a year and a half.

Regards,
Caroline

-----Original Message-----
From: Zivic, Robyn
Sent: Mon 1/14/2002 1:57 PM
To: Lagrasta, Fred
Cc: Abramo, Caroline; 'cabramo@msn.com'
Subject: Office space in NYC as per your request

Fred,
UBS has their main trade floor in Stamford, CT. They are actually increasing the floor (size of football field) by 50% to move more people into the space (perhaps some Texans?!). This is probably the most realistic space for us to move to as it is their Head Office in North America.

There is also an office in Midtown Manhattan on Park at 44th street.

 I asked Bob and David hoog (Per's right-hand-men) cost of executive office space in manhattan (I think by their quick respnse time it is something that grp has also been looking into.)

They said:
Midtown 1500 sq ft for 3/4 people with a conference rm is approx $40-60/sq ft assuming it is wired plus approx $20/sq ft for utilities. And more people now willing to negotiate short term contracts and subleases

The woman most aware of how to arrange satellite offices is Paula Corey - she was in charge of our moves within NY and I believe she  is still with Enron in Houston.

She would know real estate brokers etc.

I honestly think that the NY situation is different from the Mexico office one as we are renting our current space from MG and by the time we may be asked to leave (end of Feb), you/we should know more abt the arrangements with UBS and where their vacancy is available for us.

Let me know if there is anything more we need to do from this end.

Have a good day
Robyn
--------------------------
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld (www.BlackBerry.net)


FYI.  Please see this notice indicating that any party wishing to comment on
the CPUC-SCE settlement must file same with the Federal Court in LA by 4:30
pm tomorrow, Wed. Oct. 3rd.   I am assuming that Enron will NOT file any
such comments, but wanted to pass along the deadline in case it was decided
to add our two cents.

Mike Day

-----Original Message-----
From: Cunningham, Becky C. [mailto:bec@cpuc.ca.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, October 02, 2001 3:53 PM
To: 'DavoodiKR@efaches.navfac.navy.mil'; 'LVanWagenen@sempra.com';
'NXK2@pge.com'; 'RJP2@pge.com'; 'ROTT1@aol.com';
'Slayman@energy.state.ca.us'; 'a0011038@cpuc.ca.gov'; 'abb@eslawfirm.com';
'ad046@detroit.freenet.org'; 'aglandenergy@earthlink.net';
'alexm@calpine.com'; 'anchau@shellus.com'; 'aorchar@smud.org';
'askaff@energy-law-group.com'; Hartmann, Audra; 'athomas@newenergy.com';
Premo, Anne W.; 'beth.fox@sce.com'; 'bfinkelstein@turn.org';
'bill.mccallum@ci.fresno.ca.us'; 'bill.wells@tyndall.af.mil';
'bill@jbs.com'; 'bishop@jrwood.com'; 'blaising@braunlegal.com';
'bloomje@la.whitecase.com'; 'bob_anderson@apses.com';
'bradylaw@pacbell.net'; 'brb3@pge.com'; 'brbarkovich@earthlink.net'; Khoury,
Dexter; 'btenney@landuselaw.com'; 'butzjh@apci.com'; Linsey, Steve;
'chilen@llgm.com'; 'chrism@mid.org'; 'christine_ferrari@ci.sf.ca.us';
'ckingaei@yahoo.com'; 'clpearce@duanemorris.com'; 'cmkehrein@ems-ca.com';
Walwyn, Christine M.; 'cpeyton@sacbee.com'; 'cread@steptoe.com'; Danforth,
Christopher; 'cwrmccv@worldnet.att.net'; 'cyounger@manatt.com';
'dcarroll@dbsr.com'; 'ddavie@hesinet.com'; 'deb@a-klaw.com';
'derkp@newsdata.com'; 'dgeorge@kroger.com'; 'dhuard@manatt.com';
'difellman@energy-law-group.com'; 'dkk@eslawfirm.com'; Lafrenz, Donald J.;
'dmarcus@slip.net'; 'doug.anderson@calenergy.com';
'douglass@energyattorney.com'; 'dpritchard@mofo.com'; 'drp6@pge.com';
'dws@keywaycorp.com'; 'ed@apx.com'; 'ed@clfp.com'; 'edwardoneill@dwt.com';
'ek@a-klaw.com'; 'ell5@pge.com'; 'emitchel@angnewspapers.com';
'epoole@adplaw.com'; 'firmiyas@dof.ca.gov'; 'fmo@sdcity.sannet.gov';
'foothill@lmi.net'; 'fosterbc@sce.com'; 'frank.cooley@sce.com';
'freedman@turn.org'; 'fspillman@akingump.com'; Fua, Faline;
'furutanj@efawest.navfac.navy.mil'; 'fwmonier@tid.org'; 'gdreed@sidley.com';
'gerhordt.herbert@msdw.com'; Kinosian, Robert; 'glsg@pge.com';
'gperrault@adelphia.net'; 'gtbl@dynegy.com'; 'harrington@ggra.org';
'hbd@gweiss.com'; 'hchoy@isd.co.la.ca.us'; 'hmoore@pcit.com';
'hodgesjl@pacbell.net'; 'honest@compuserve.com'; 'huse@eesconsulting.com';
'iberrio@greenlining.org'; 'j.p.shotwell@sce.com'; 'jbarthrop@electric.com';
'jbennett@gmssr.com'; 'jbradley@svmg.org'; 'jbushee@sablaw.com';
'jcpaine@stoel.com'; 'jdh@eslawfirm.com'; 'jeff@hmhresources.com';
'jerryl@abag.ca.gov'; 'jesse.avila@ci.fresno.ca.us'; 'jguzman@nossaman.com';
'jhay@sempra.com'; 'jhg@meyersnave.com'; 'jimross@r-c-s-inc.com'; Zeller,
Jason; 'jleslie@luce.com'; Lo, Jeanette; 'jlyoung@sempra.com';
'jmalkin@orrick.com'; Halligan, Julie; 'jnnc@chevron.com';
'joe.paul@dynegy.com'; 'joeyoung@ebmud.com'; 'jogg@jhenergy.com';
'jon.jacobs@paconsulting.com'; 'jparrott@sempra.com';
'jpbatmale@realenergy.com'; 'jpeck@sempra.com'; DeUlloa, Joseph R.;
'jskillman@prodigy.net'; 'jsmollon@newwestenergy.com'; 'jsqueri@gmssr.com';
Wong, John S.; 'jtachera@energy.state.ca.us'; 'julesan@aol.com';
'jweil@aglet.org'; 'jweisgall@aol.com'; 'jyf1@pge.com'; 'karen@klindh.com';
'kcheh@omm.com'; 'kduggan@capstoneturbine.com';
'keith-sappenfield@reliantenergy.com'; Lippi, Kimberly;
'kmccrea@sablaw.com'; 'kmcspadd@milbank.com'; 'kmelville@sempra.com';
'kmills@cfbf.com'; Kajopaiye, Kayode; 'kpoole@adamsbroadwell.com';
'ktilton@gralegal.com'; 'lgurick@calpx.com'; 'lifcentral@lif.org';
'lindseyhowdowning@dwt.com'; Krannawitter, Laura L.; 'lmh@eslawfirm.com';
Serizawa, Linda; 'luluw@newsdata.com'; 'lwhouse@el-dorado.ca.us';
'margery.a.neis@us.pwcglobal.com'; 'maxian_miriam@jpmorgan.com';
'mbazeley@sjmercury.com'; 'mbrubaker@consultbai.com'; 'mday@gmssr.com';
'mdjoseph@adamsbroadwell.com'; 'melanie_gillette@rmiinc.com'; Stevens, Maria
E.; 'mgomez1@bart.gov'; 'mhg@hetrading.com'; 'michael.neville@doj.ca.gov';
'mjaske@energy.state.ca.us'; 'mkramer@akingump.com'; 'mmattes@nossaman.com';
'mpa@a-klaw.com'; 'mpatel@sidley.com'; 'mrh2@pge.com';
'mschwebs@energy.state.ca.us'; 'mshames@ucan.org'; Vanko, Maria;
'napedersen@jonesday.com'; 'nryan@environmentaldefense.org';
'oshirock@pacbell.net'; 'patrickm@crossborderenergy.com';
'paul.harris@bridge.com'; 'pbray@newpower.com';
'peter_fox-penner@brattle.com'; 'phanschen@mofo.com'; 'picketse@sce.com';
'pjmuller@ricochet.net'; 'pjpowerlaw@aol.com'; Durgin, Pamela M.;
'pxo2@pge.com'; 'randy.chinn@senate.ca.gov'; 'randy_britt@mayco.com'; White,
Rosalina; Campbell, Rod; 'rbw@mrwassoc.com'; Cagen, Robert C.;
'riald@kindermorgan.com'; 'rick.counihan@greenmountain.com';
'rkeen@manatt.com'; 'rliebert@cfbf.com'; 'rmccann@cal.net';
'robert.d.schasel@fritolay.com'; 'rogerberliner@bcjlaw.com';
'ronknecht@aol.com'; 'rpernell@energy.state.ca.us'; 'rrcollins@n-h-i.org';
'rrh3@pge.com'; 'rschmidt@bartlewells.com'; 'rtavares@energy.state.ca.us';
Feraru, Robert T.; 'rtp1@pge.com'; 'sberlin@mccarthylaw.com';
'scottst@mid.org'; Roscow, Steve; Casey, Sean F.;
'sgreenberg@realenergy.com'; 'smoss@hooked.net'; 'smutny@iepa.com'; Ross,
Steve; 'ssmyers@worldnet.att.net'; 'thaines@smud.org';
'theresa_mueller@ci.sf.ca.us'; 'thoulihan@mdbe.com'; 'tknox@klalawfirm.com';
'tmberliner@duanemorris.com'; 'tom.oneill@abnamro.com';
'tomb@crossborderenergy.com'; 'tonywetzel@home.com'; 'tregtremont@dwt.com';
'troberts@sempra.com'; Pulsifer, Thomas R.; 'tsmegal@calwater.com'; Burns,
Truman L.; 'uwuaregion5@earthlink.net'; 'wbooth@booth-law.com';
'wendy@econinsights.com'; 'whe1@pge.com'; Yee, Helen W.; Tapawan-Conway,
Zenaida G.
Subject: Notice of Settlement with SCE (A.00-11-038, et al. Service List)

<<CPUC01-#107721-v1-Notice_of_Settlement_with_SCE.DOC>>


---------------------- Forwarded by Vince J Kaminski/HOU/ECT on 01/07/2000
12:29 PM ---------------------------

John Peyton
01/04/2000 11:12 PM
To: Vince J Kaminski/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc: Chris Hilgert/HOU/ECT@ect, Randal T Maffett/HOU/ECT@ECT, W Tom
Byargeon/HOU/ECT@ECT, Fred Lagrasta/HOU/ECT@ECT
Subject: Amerada Hess Day Rate Hedge numbers

Attached are the historical numbers for the Semi-submersibles 4th and 5th
generation day rates.  Their price is 155,000/day for the next 4 years.  I
would think that a floor of $100,000 would be the place to start Jan 1, 2001
through Dec 31, 2004.  We need to know the Call strike that would make it
costless.

I plan on making some examples discussion purposes to discuss with them on
Friday of this week.  I will update you ASAP on the balance of day rate
prices.  Let me know what else you will need to prepare the statistical
analysis.   The numbers include highs and lows; let me know your ideas on how
to address this in the quote.

Thanks,

John
30395


First, the Annual Report of the year, and now, this.  And I thought
----- Forwarded by Mark Palmer/Corp/Enron on 09/15/2000 03:37 PM -----

	Rahil Jafry@ECT
	09/15/2000 02:30 PM

		 To: Mark Palmer/Corp/Enron@ENRON, Kal Shah/HOU/ECT@ECT
		 cc:
		 Subject: NetMarketing: Category Winner Profiles: Enron

Congratulations guys.  Well deserved.

Rahil

******************************************************************************
**************
NetMarketing 200
Category Winner Profiles: Enron
Sally Duros

09/11/2000
B to B
30
Copyright (C) 2000 Crain Communications, Inc. All rights reserved.

  The home page of Enron.com invites visitors to "discover the power of
why." It then asks them to click and enter a Shockwave movie that lays
out an argument for choosing Enron's products. Market context, solution
and benefit to customer are explained and then backed up with a
slam-dunk quote from a Nobel Prize-winning scientist. It's a smart
marketing approach by a company that is on a very good run.

  The cause of that good run -- Enron was rated Fortune magazine's Most
Innovative Company for the fourth consecutive year -- is the company's
belief in the inherent wisdom of open markets, said Mark Palmer,
VP-corporate communications for Enron Corp.
  "We are about reliability and price," Palmer said. "We believe in the
strength of markets vs. the strength of proprietary markets."

  That "open" brand is conveyed in its Web image -- informative, easy to
navigate and engaging even to those scared off by complexity. A reader
can learn much from a casual click-through.

  Enron.com has thrown existing markets for energy products wide open
and created markets for products such as weather derivatives that did
not exist a few years ago.

  One area of the site allows buyers and sellers to close deals in
850-plus flavors of energy. Called Enrononline.com, the section, which
opened last November, has already logged transactions valued at $125
billion.

  Enron is a "principal" that both buys and sells energy. Through the
site, the company can fulfill customized requests for energy delivery by
assembling the order from various providers. Enron operates horizontally
in the market, picking and choosing among various providers.

  Palmer offers this advice to others seeking to make a market online:
"First create the commercial business of the site, then focus your
communications around the commercial core."

Folder Name: Rahil Jafry
Relevance Score on Scale of 100: 86

______________________________________________________________________

To review or revise your folder, visit http://www.djinteractive.com or
contact Dow Jones Customer Service by e-mail at custom.news@bis.dowjones.com
or by phone at 800-369-7466. (Outside the U.S. and Canada, call 609-452-1511
or contact your local sales representative.)
______________________________________________________________________

Copyright (c) 2000 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved


John:

I need you to assist me in repricing Kern River.  We are sending a package to
the customer on Monday and will need to reprice the gas swap before we do
so.

I am also attaching a spreadsheet, which includes delivery location and
monthly MMBTUs.  I would really appreciate it if you send me the model as
well because the monthly volumes will change with different scenarios.

Call me if you have any questions.

Thanks.

Maria


<<ESA_Electrobolt_Summary of Contract Terms-112800.doc>>

 <<ESA_Electrobolt_Exhibits.DOC>>

Here's what I think we should have on the ESA exhibits.  Let's see if it
will hunt.

Thanks,
Lee

 - ESA_Electrobolt_Summary of Contract Terms-112800.doc
 - ESA_Electrobolt_Exhibits.DOC


Hello there!  I know that you are out of the country.  Thanks for forwarding
the message from Andre Cangucu.  I have been through your materials but do
not find any involvement you may have had with specific swaps; the items I
found were generic and were in the form of law firm memoranda (e.g.,
"Derivatives and FX Transactions in Brazil", "Trading with Brazilian
Counterparties", etc.).  Am I missing something?  Look forward to seeing you
soon.  Sara


Hey,
Can Greg fit me in for about 30 minutes tomorrow afternoon?

--- Your secret admirer


Molly will chat with you about this and Molly just found out about it.

Hi Molly!!
---------------------- Forwarded by Chris Germany/HOU/ECT on 05/12/2000 01:14
PM ---------------------------

Brenda H Fletcher
05/10/2000 02:52 PM
To: Chris Germany/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc:
Subject: K#51407

Has this been done?
---------------------- Forwarded by Brenda H Fletcher/HOU/ECT on 05/10/2000
02:49 PM ---------------------------

Mark Feldman
04/17/2000 05:34 PM
To: Chris Germany/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc: Brenda H Fletcher/HOU/ECT@ECT
Subject: K#51407

Chris,
As we discussed, please get with Brenda Fletcher and set this up as a demand
to pay the .0153 storage fee, since the pathing does not allow me to pay
through the Volume system.  As long as it is on the deal, it will show up in
Settlements and I can pay.  Also, I need it done from January 2000 to current.

Thanks,
Mark


Until further notice, please set (and/or have your traders set) all of the curves to market representative numbers each day.  I hope that you have been doing so all along, but I heard today that this may not be happening on all desks.  Thanks for your help.  If you have any questions, please ask.
Regards,
Ed