This message is to inform you that you have Airfare credit slip available to pick up at the desk of Leticia Flores ECN2733A.  Pickup times are 8:30 am to 4:30 pm Monday - Friday.

I understand that you may not be in Houston or in the Enron Buildings,  please just email me with an address that we can send your credit slips to.  If you are in the downtown buildings, we will not interoffice mail these.  Please pick up at your earliest convenience.

Thank you
Corporate Travel

Johnny Ross
713-345-3640


remove me from your email list

Shirley Sklar <shirley.sklar@idrc.org> on 03/15/2001 01:13:13 PM
To: stshouston@mailman.enron.com
cc: Ed Jarboe <ed.jarboe@idrc.org>, Shirley Sklar <shirley.sklar@idrc.org>
Subject: Attached Invitation from IDRC Houston Chapter

Attached is an invitation from the IDRC Houston Chapter.

The following section of this message contains a file attachment
prepared for transmission using the Internet MIME message format.
If you are using Pegasus Mail, or any another MIME-compliant system,
you should be able to save it or view it from within your mailer.
If you cannot, please ask your system administrator for assistance.

   ---- File information -----------
     File:  HOUSTON41001.doc
     Date:  15 Mar 2001, 13:59
     Size:  71680 bytes.
     Type:  Unknown

 - HOUSTON41001.doc


There were technical difficulties with the last one - this should be easier
to read.

Kay
---------------------- Forwarded by Kay Mann/Corp/Enron on 07/25/2000 09:46
AM ---------------------------

"Nancy Wodka" <nwodka@bracepatt.com> on 07/24/2000 07:04:02 PM
To: <kay.mann@enron.com>
cc:

Subject: POWER PURCHASE

 - clnVEPCO.doc


Per Lisa's request please find a revised notice:

Kay


Yea, I'm picking up 2 tix today....hopefully.
John

Jennifer Burns

10/09/2000 10:38 AM

To: John Arnold/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc:
Subject: Hmmmmm........

J. Arnold-

Hey - It's me!  Any luck with the tickets?????  Just curious if there any way
I can get four tickets instead of two?  I know I'm asking alot but I really
appreciate it.  You know how much I love the Counting Crows and last time
they were in town someone was going to take me but the plans fell
through..........Thanks!!!!!!!

Jennifer


FYI
-----Original Message-----
From: Lees, Lisa
Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2001 3:05 PM
To: Gray, Barbara N.
Subject: FW: Texas Monthly (November 2001): How Enron Blew It

-----Original Message-----
From: Denny, Jennifer
Sent: Wednesday, October 24, 2001 1:43 PM
To: Lees, Lisa
Subject: FW: Texas Monthly (November 2001): How Enron Blew It

-----Original Message-----
From: Puthigai, Savita
Sent: Wed 10/24/2001 11:11 AM
To: Engel, Thomas; Denny, Jennifer
Cc:
Subject: FW: Texas Monthly (November 2001): How Enron Blew It

 -----Original Message-----
From:   McKinney, Lara
Sent:   Wednesday, October 24, 2001 8:43 AM
To:     Enron London - EOL Product Control Group; Puthigai, Savita
Subject:        FW: Texas Monthly (November 2001): How Enron Blew It

FYI - it is a good article

 -----Original Message-----
From:   Connelly, Angela
Sent:   24 October 2001 10:59
To:     McKinney, Lara
Subject:        FW: Texas Monthly (November 2001): How Enron Blew It

This is a long one - but definitely worth reading.

Cover title: Enron's Cutthroat Culture
*******************************************************************************************************************************************************************

How Enron Blew It
Less than a year ago, the Houston-based energy behemoth had everything: money, power, glitz, smarts, new ideas, and a CEO who wanted to make it the most important company in the world. Now its stock is down, wall street is bearish, and the CEO is gone. What went wrong?

by Mimi Swartz < <http://www.texasmonthly.com/mag/issues/authors/mimiswartz.php>>
THE ENRON SKYSCRAPER NEAR THE SOUTH END OF HOUSTON'S DOWNTOWN feels like the international headquarters of the best and the brightest. The lobby in no way resembles the hushed, understated entryways of the old-fashioned oil companies, like Shell and Texaco nearby. Enron, in contrast, throbs with modernity. The people hustling in and out of the elevators are black, white, brown; Asian, Middle Eastern, European, African, as well as American-born. They are young, mostly under 35, and dressed in the aggressively casual uniform of the tech industry-the guys wear khakis, polo shirts, and Banana Republic button-downs. Almost preposterously fit, they move through the building intently, like winners. Enron is nothing if not energetic: A Big Brother-size TV screen frantically reports on the stock market near a bank of elevators, while another hefty black television relaying the same news greets people entering from the garage. A sculpture of the corporate symbol, an E tipped at a jaunty angle, radiates colors as it spins frenetically on its axis; a Starbucks concession on the ground floor keeps everyone properly caffeinated. Multicolored, inspirational flags hang from the ceiling, congratulating Enron on its diversity and its values; one more giant banner between elevator banks declares Enron's simple if grandiose goal: "From the World's Leading Energy Company to . . . The World's Leading Company!"

For a while, that future seemed guaranteed, as Enron transformed itself from a stodgy, troubled pipeline company in 1985 to a trading colossus in 2000. It was a Wall Street darling, with a stock price that increased 1,700 percent in that sixteen-year period, with revenues that increased from $40 billion to $100 billion. "The very mention of the company in energy circles throughout the world creates reactions ranging from paralyzing fear to envy," notes a 2001 report from Global Change Associates, a firm that provides market intelligence to the energy business.

This Enron was largely the creation of Jeff Skilling, a visionary determined to transform American business. Hired sixteen years ago as a consultant by then-CEO Ken Lay, Skilling helped build a company that disdained the old formula of finding energy in the ground, hauling it in pipelines, and then selling it to refineries and other customers. Instead, it evolved into a company that could trade and market energy in all its forms, from natural gas to electricity, from wind to water. If you had a risky drilling venture, Enron would fund it for a piece of the action. If you wanted your megacorporation's energy needs analyzed and streamlined, Enron could do the job. If you were a Third World country with a pitiful infrastructure and burgeoning power needs, Enron was there to build and build. Basically, if an idea was new and potentially-and fantastically-lucrative, Enron wanted the first crack. And with each success, Enron became ever more certain of its destiny. The company would be the bridge between the old economy and the high-tech world, and in February of this year, Skilling reaped his reward when he succeeded Lay as chief executive officer. Enron, says Skilling, "was a great marriage of the risk-taking mentality of the oil patch with the risk-taking mentality of the financial markets."

The Enron story reflects the culture that drove American business at the end of the twentieth century. Like the high-tech companies it emulated, Enron was going to reinvent the American business model and, in turn, the American economy. Maybe it was natural that this Brave New World also produced a culture that was based on absolutes: not just the old versus the new, but the best versus the mediocre, the risk takers versus the complacent-those who could see the future versus those who could not. The key was investing in the right kind of intellectual capital. With the best and the brightest, a company couldn't possibly go wrong.

Or could it? Today Enron's stock trades at around $35, down from a high of $80 in January. The press cast Enron as the archvillain of California's energy crisis last spring, and Skilling caught a blueberry pie in the face for his relentless defense of the free market. A long-troubled power plant project in India threatened the company's global ambitions. Telecommunications, in which Enron was heavily invested, imploded. Wall Street analysts who once touted the company questioned its accounting practices. Some of the change in Enron's fortunes can be attributed to the economic downturn in uncertain times that has afflicted all of American business. But the culture that the company created and lived by cannot escape blame.

ENRON, JEFF SKILLING SAYS, HAD "a totally different way of thinking about business-we got it." At Enron, in fact, you either "got it" or you were gone-it was as simple as black and white. It is not coincidental, then, that the color scheme of Skilling's River Oaks mansion mirrors the corporation he once headed. Here, the living room's white walls shimmer against the mahogany floors. Black leather trims the edge of snowy carpets. Billowy sofas set off the jet-black baby grand. In the entry, white orchids cascade from a black vase on a black pedestal table that in turn pools onto cold, white marble. There is only one off-color note: After almost twenty years, Jeff Skilling is no longer associated with Enron, having resigned abruptly after just six months as CEO. Once, Skilling was hailed as the next Jack Welch (General Electric's masterful CEO), as one of Worth magazine's best CEO's in America (anointed in 2001), and even as a daredevil who hosted the kind of unchained adventure junkets in which, a friend told BusinessWeek, "someone could actually get killed." Today, he sounds more like Ebenezer Scrooge on Christmas morning. "I had no idea what I'd let go of," Skilling says of all the personal sacrifices he made while retooling Enron.

From a black chair in the white library, across from a huge black and white photograph of his daughter and two sons, Skilling clarifies. The demands of working 24-7 for Enron caused him to ignore his personal finances. Divorced, he lived in a 2,200-square-foot house without a microwave or a dishwasher. He almost missed his brother's wedding. "Learning a foreign language-I never learned a foreign language!" he exclaims. He never once took his youngest son to school. "I'm interested in the kids. You don't do kids in fifteen-minute scheduling." Travel: "You can't go to Africa for a week and get anything out of it!" Skilling includes the study of architecture and design on his list of missed opportunities, then he stops and sighs. "I'm not sure that fulfillment in life is compatible with a CEO's job," he says, finally. Then his eyes lock on mine, and his voice, which had softened, regains its pragmatic edge. "It would have been easy to stay," he says. "But that would not have been good for me."

He's a smallish, ruddy-faced man who keeps himself at fighting weight, handsome in the way of corporate titans, with piercing cheekbones and that assiduously stolid gaze. But the impatience Skilling once reserved for cautious underlings and dull-witted utility company executives is now targeted at reporters who have labeled his resignation "bizarre" and associates who are bitterly skeptical of his need for family time. His shrug stretches the limits of his shimmering blue button-down, and his matching blue eyes look put upon. "I'm surprised," he says, "that people have so much trouble understanding this."

PEOPLE WHO PASSED THROUGH DOWNTOWN HOUSTON in the late eighties or early nineties couldn't help but notice a funny and, for its time, novel scene unfolding throughout the workday at the base of the Enron Building. From nine to five and before and after, you could see people slipping out of the pristine silver skyscraper to smoke. They perched on the chrome banisters or lurked near the glass doors at the entry, puffing like mad. They always looked hurried and furtive, even ashamed. Whatever people knew about Enron in those days (and most people didn't know much), it was often associated with that scene: Enron boasted one of the first nonsmoking corporate headquarters in Houston, and there couldn't have been clearer evidence of its break with the energy world of the past. What macho engineer would have put up with such humiliation?

But this company was a child of another time, that period in the mid-eighties when chaos enveloped the gas business. Federal deregulation of natural gas turned a steady, secure industry, in which gas pipeline companies frequently enjoyed a monopoly in portions of the areas that they served, into a volatile free-for-all. The situation was compounded five years later by federal deregulation of the pipeline business. So it happened that a gentlemanly gas pipeline company, Houston Natural Gas (HNG) found itself under attack from Coastal Corporation, Oscar Wyatt's less than gentlemanly firm. HNG was then run by Lay, a sturdy, taciturn former economics professor and Transco chief operating officer who had a passion for military strategy. (His doctoral thesis at the University of Houston was on supply and demand in the Vietnam War.) Lay, who was from Missouri and never succumbed-at least outwardly-to Texas brashness, had done well enough: Thanks to canny expansions, HNG's pipelines stretched from Florida to California and throughout the state of Texas.

HNG fended off Coastal, but to protect the company from other takeover attempts, Lay nimbly engineered the sale of HNG in 1985 to a friendly Nebraska pipeline concern called InterNorth, one of the largest pipeline companies in the country at the time. Then, a funny thing happened: HNG started acting in a way that would characterize the company for years to come-a lot like Coastal. What the Nebraskans blithely labeled "the purchase" was being called "the merger" back in Houston, and before long, following some particularly brutal politicking between Omaha and Houston, the company's center of gravity started shifting toward Texas, and shortly after that, Ken Lay was running a new company called Enron. "Over time it became clear that Lay had a better vision of the future," says one person associated with Enron at that time. "He never fought change. He embraced change."

Lay had won, but what exactly did that mean? Enron was saddled with massive debt from the takeover attempt, and thanks to deregulation, no longer had exclusive use of its pipelines. Without new ideas-for that matter, a whole new business plan-the company could be finished before it really even got started.

LIKE MANY PEOPLE WHO TEAMED UP WITH ENRON IN THE EIGHTIES, Jeff Skilling had spent a lot of time in the Midwest, and he was self-made-at fourteen he had been the chief production director at a start-up TV station in Aurora, Illinois. (His mother would drop him off there every day after school.) "I liked being successful when I was working, and I was smart," he told BusinessWeek earlier this year. But unlike many of his Enron colleagues, Skilling wasn't deliberate and soft-spoken and happy to go home at five o'clock; he was anxious and excitable, and nothing, but nothing excited him more than what he would come to call "intellectual capital." He loved being smart, and he loved being surrounded by smart people. He graduated from Southern Methodist University, went into banking-assets and liability management-and took on Harvard Business School, where he graduated in the top 5 percent of his class. Then Skilling took the next step on what was then the new, souped-up path to American success: He joined Manhattan's McKinsey and Company as a business consultant, and that is where Ken Lay found him in 1985.

It is often said of Lay that his instincts for hiring the best are flawless, and his choice of Skilling probably saved the company. Skilling was above all an expert at markets and how they worked. While everyone else was worrying about the gluts and the shortages that defined the gas industry, he alone saw the parallels between gas and other businesses. And so in a world where credit was nearly impossible to come by, Skilling came up with what he called the Gas Bank, which contractually guaranteed both the supply and the price of gas to a network of suppliers and consumers. Enron would not be a broker but a banker. It would buy and sell the gas itself and assume the risk involved. And Enron would make money on transactions, much like an investment bank would.

Skilling worked up some numbers and found them "absolutely compelling." Then the McKinsey consultant took the idea to a meeting of about 25 Enron executives. He had a one-page presentation. "Almost to a person," Skilling says, "they thought it was stupid." Almost. After Skilling left the meeting dejected, he walked Ken Lay to an elevator and apologized. Lay listened and then said, "Let's go."

The Gas Bank was not an overnight success. For months Skilling woke up in a cold sweat, sure he had ruined not only his career but the careers of dozens of colleagues who had assisted him. In fact, he had come upon one of those divides that seem to define his life: "I believed this whole world would be different, a huge breakthrough" is the way Skilling puts it today, and even if he is typically immodest, he was right. Fairly soon after launching, the company sold $800 million worth of gas in a week. True to Skilling's character, success turned out to be a matter of old versus new: He says the joke around Enron was that if a company's CEO was under fifty, "We were in." And he was in too: In 1990 Skilling finally left McKinsey and joined Enron as the head of Enron Finance Corporation, a new division created just for him. In 1991 that company closed a deal that earned $11 million in profit. After that, says Skilling, "we never looked back."

Skilling and Lay also realized that the Gas Bank couldn't work unless it had a trading component. Myriad trades were needed to build the market that would make the project go. But by buying and selling enormous quantities of gas, Enron not only constructed a market but almost instantly came to dominate it. The company had the best contacts, the best intelligence, and the best access to supplies. That, in turn, attracted more customers who wanted to be part of the play. With so many customers in its pocket, Enron could better predict the direction of the market and could use that knowledge to make trades for its own benefit-Enron could in effect bet on which way the price of gas would go, as one might do with pork bellies or soybeans, but with startling accuracy, thereby generating profits higher than anyone could have ever imagined.

THIS CHANGE COULD NEVER HAVE OCCURRED without another change Skilling had made: He created, within Enron, a new culture to match its new trading business. The idea was to build a "knowledge-based business," which demanded a skill set not exactly prized by Enron's employees from the old HNG days. Most were deliberate, cautious, responsible, somewhat defensive people, most of them men, of course-the kind of people you'd expect to find working in an industry regulated by the federal government. But now the company needed bolder people for its bold new era: that included anyone who wanted to make money-lots of money-for themselves and for the company. "Enron was going to create a niche for itself or die," one former executive explains. "The people who had narrow views eventually were forced out, because if they had narrow views about other things, they had narrow views about the market."

Skilling wanted smart people but not just any smart people. He wanted the smartest people from schools like Harvard, Stanford, and maybe, Rice. And because his firm was now acting more like a bank than a pipeline company, he wanted to draw from the pool of recruits that would be attracted to the biggest and best investment banks, like Merrill Lynch or Credit Suisse First Boston. In addition to being smart, Enron people were also supposed to be "aggressive." You were right for Enron if you didn't want to wait until you were thirty to close your own deals or move up in an organization.

You could see what he was looking for on "Super Saturdays" at the Houston headquarters: eight fifty-minute interviews with ten minute breaks in between-the company might herd as many as four hundred people through in just one day. They were scored from 1 to 5 on their smarts, their problem-solving ability, their passion for hard work, and what at Enron was called "a sense of urgency." People who scored less than 2.5 were scratched. The shrewdest candidates knew how to work Enron before they were even hired: These were the types that automatically turned down the company's first offer, knowing Enron would come back with more. The starting salary was around $80,000. Maybe it wasn't a fortune-yet-but the signing bonus, about $20,000, was more than enough for a lease on the obligatory Porsche Boxster or one of the lofts being renovated close to downtown. (Enron people didn't live in far-flung suburbs. Suburbs were uncool and too far from the office.)

For the lucky winners, Enron offered the corporate equivalent of a gifted-and-talented program. New associates learned the latest techniques for structuring energy deals, and there were rotations at Enron offices around the globe. The hours were long, but every possible need was taken care of. A company concierge handled all the things important people couldn't be bothered with: picking up dry cleaning or prescriptions, shining shoes, cleaning the house, planning a vacation. Of course, a lot of people who worked for Enron never got to take vacations-they were too busy making money-but they could use the company gym and the company's personal trainers. If they were overweight or wanted to quit smoking, they could join Enron's Wellness Program. Massages were offered six days a week, from seven in the morning until ten at night. "They were so cutting edge," rhapsodizes someone involved with the company health care program at the time. "They really thought about the psychology and what it took to keep these people going."

Skilling handed out titles analogous to those at Wall Street firms-analysts, associates, directors, and managing directors-but everyone knew that those titles didn't really matter. Money did. Instead of competitive salaries and decent bonuses, Enron offered competitive salaries and merit-based bonuses-with no cap. "If you really worked hard and delivered results, you could make a lot of money," says Ken Rice, who stayed with Enron for 21 years until resigning recently as the head of the company's faltering broadband division. Or, as the saying goes, you got to eat what you killed. Gas traders with two or three years of experience could wind up with a $1 million bonus. And the more you produced, the closer you got to Jeff: Real hot dogs joined him glacier hiking in Patagonia, Land Cruiser racing in Australia, or off-road motorcycling in a re-creation of the Baja 1,000 race, ending at a spectacular Mexican villa. "Every time he'd speak, I'd believe everything he'd say," one loyalist says.

And why not? By 1995 Enron had become North America's largest natural-gas merchant, controlling 20 percent of the market. But at a company where the buzzword was "aggressive," that was no place to stop: Skilling and Lay believed the Gas Bank model could easily be applied to the electricity business. Firmly committed to the notion that a deregulated market meant better service at lower prices for consumers (and untold profits for Enron), they began barnstorming the country, pressing their case with entrenched power company presidents (who, with their multimillion-dollar salaries and monopoly service areas, had little incentive to change) and energy regulators (who were somewhat more receptive, thanks in part to Enron's generous lobbying efforts).

But the biggest winner of all was probably Jeff Skilling. In 1997 Ken Lay made him the president and chief operating officer of the company. By then, the division known as Enron Capital and Trade Resources was the nations largest wholesale buyer and seller of natural gas and electricity. The division had grown from two hundred to two thousand employees, and revenues from $2 billion to $7 billion. "Mr. Skilling's experience so far with the turmoil in the industry has convinced him that he is on the right track," the New York Times noted. Everyone would certainly have thought so: Enron and Skilling had totally transformed one industry and were well on their way to transforming another.

"FIRING UP AN IDEA MACHINE; Enron Is Encouraging the Entrepreneurs Within," sang the New York Times in 1999. "In the staid world of regulated utilities and energy companies, Enron Corp is that gate-crashing Elvis," crowed Fortune in 2000. Wall Street was demanding tech-size growth on a tech timetable, and Enron, in 2000, obliged with second quarter earnings of $289 million, up 30 percent from the previous year. That year the company seemed to discover a market a minute: Under Skilling, Enron was trading coal, paper, steel, and even weather. No one blinked when a London wine bar became an Enron client. People drank more in warm weather than cold, so why not buy a hedge against the usual winter downturn?

But most exciting to the financial world was Enron's entry into high-tech communications. Because of the company's marketing dominance, EnronOnline became another overnight success, handling $335 billion in commodity trades online in 2000. Enron, as usual, made its money on the spread between the bid price and the asking price. Then there was the broadband business: To Enron, trading excess capacity in large, high-speed fiber-optic networks (empty lanes on the fabled information highway) wasn't that different from trading the capacity of natural gas pipelines. So Enron created a market for what the industry calls bandwidth. Soon after, it also announced a twenty-year deal with Blockbuster to deliver movies on demand electronically to people in their homes. Enron looked like a company that couldn't lose. "Its strategy of building businesses, shedding hard assets, and trading various commodities can help it do well even in an uncertain market," BusinessWeek insisted.

There was, however, another reason Enron did so well in such a short time: the company's hard-nosed approach toward its customers. The old notion of customer service was based on the long haul-you had to nurse and coddle customers to keep them. But Enron had new markets and new ideas-customers had to come to it. Over time, the company stopping referring to its business clients as customers and began calling them "counterparties."

Skilling wanted the biggest profits on the shortest timetable: Gains were maximized by creating, owning, and then abandoning a market before it became overtaxed and overregulated. So if you wanted to launch a high-risk venture quickly-such as Zilkha Energy's new high-tech approach to drilling for oil-you got your financing from Enron because a bank would take forever to underwrite the project, if it ever would. But because Enron invented its markets and subsequently dominated them, Enron could set the terms of its deals, from the timeline to the method of accounting to whether the deal happened at all.

While many businesses used what was known in the industry as "mark-to-market accounting," for instance, Enron used it on an unprecedented scale. The company priced their deals at current market value-but it was always Enron's idea of the market value; companies that balked at their pricing didn't get deals. And while old-fashioned companies spread their profits out like annuities over a period of years, Enron took most of its profit up-front. However many millions would be made on a deal that covered several years, they went on the books in the current year. If a few analysts thought there might be something fishy about what they called "subjective accounting," investors didn't particularly care as long as the profits rolled in. As the market fluctuated and the landscape changed, the company might abandon a project that had been in the works for months because its profit margins weren't going to be high enough. "Enron is known for leaving people at the altar," says one former employee. Winning the highest possible profits for the company could even extend to Enron's attitude toward charity. When a fundraiser for the Houston READ Commission, a literacy group, called on Enron for a contribution, it was suggested that he start raising money for Enron's competing literacy charity: "Even the person who was supposed to give money away for Enron was supposed to make money for Enron," he says.

As Enron became more and more successful, the culture Skilling had created took on a dark side: The competition turned inward. As one member of the Enron family put it, "It became a company full of mercenaries." The change started at the bottom. As Enron's domination of the energy market grew, most of the recruiting frills fell away. New associates were treated much like the commodities the company traded. Global Change's Enron spies reported overhearing orders like "I need a smart person-go buy me one" or "Buy me an intelligent slave, quick." Enron had never been the kind of place where people sang to you on your birthday, but now the workaholism bordered on self-parody: A Random Acts of Kindness program lasted only a few months. It was too disruptive. People couldn't get their work done.

And, of course, Enron had a program for institutionalizing creative tension. The Performance Review Committee, which had initially been installed by Skilling in the Capital group, became known as the harshest forced ranking system in the country. Employees were rated on a scale of one to five, and those with fives were usually gone within six months. (The PRC's nickname quickly became "rank and yank.") It was a point of pride that Skilling's division replaced 15 percent of its workforce every year. As one Skilling associate put it, "Jeff viewed this like turning over the inventory in a grocery store." Skilling's approach to business-get in and get out-had become Enron's attitude toward its workers. In time, it would become many workers' attitude toward the company. Teamwork, never that valuable in a trading culture, went the way of the eyeshade and the abacus. If protocol required an Enron higher-up to come from Europe to help with a project in the Third World, he might help-or he might not, depending on whether another, potentially more lucrative project was pending elsewhere.

Everyone felt the pressure to perform on a massive scale at massive speed: "They were so goal oriented toward immediate gratification that they lost sight of the future," says one former employee. Anyone who couldn't close deals within a quarter was punished with bad PRC scores, as were the higher-ups who had backed them. Past errors and old grudges were dredged up so often as new ammunition in PRC meetings that the phrase "No old tapes" became an Enron clich?. "People went from being geniuses to idiots overnight," says one former Enron executive.

In such a hothouse, paranoia flowered. New contracts contained highly restrictive confidentiality agreements about anything pertaining to the company. E-mail was monitored. A former executive routinely carried two laptops, one for the company and one for himself. People may have been rich at Enron, but they weren't necessarily happy. One recruiter described the culture this way: "They roll you over and slit your throat and watch your eyes while you bleed to death."

BEFORE JEFF SKILLING COULD TRANSFORM ENRON from the world's leading energy company into the world's leading company, he had to make one more change: Just as he had done ten years before, Skilling had to purge the company of its remaining old order. Where Enron once prized cautious executives who dealt with tangible assets like pipelines, it now valued bold executives who dealt with intangible assets. Pipelines, power plants-they may have been Enron's pride, but Skilling wanted them gone. Expensive, long-term building projects had no place when Wall Street was devoted to quick profits and enormous returns on investment capital, and Skilling knew it. "It wasn't the time for long-term approaches," an Enron executive says of Wall Street's mood. "It was the technology era."

To rid Enron of the last vestiges of its past, Skilling had to take on Rebecca Mark, long considered his rival for the CEO's job. Mark was for many years the poster child for the Enron way: Young, attractive, aggressive-her nickname was Mark the Shark-she came from sturdy Midwestern stock but had the requisite Harvard MBA. Mark was largely responsible for the success of Enron International, the asset-heavy side of the company where she developed $20 billion worth of gas and power plants, which accounted for 40 percent of Enron's profits in 1998. For this she reaped breathtaking compensation-one Enron executive estimated $10 million-and adoring press clips, including two appearances on Fortune's list of the fifty most powerful women in corporate America.

But then Mark ran into trouble with a gas-fired power plant in Dabhol, India, one of the largest ever constructed. She had played the game the Enron way: Taking Enron into a new market, she had finagled low import taxes (20 percent instead of the usual 53) and hung in through 24 lawsuits and three changes in government. But the time and expense needed to make India and other Enron plants around the globe successful did not mesh with Enron's goals, and Skilling's impatience with Mark grew.

Forcing Mark out, however, was no easy matter. Key executives left, divisions were dismantled, but she remained. The truth was Enron didn't mind firing lower-level employees, but it hated to fire the kind of aggressive, relentless people it tended to promote. The company preferred humiliation-keeping a director in his cubicle, say, but failing to include him in the glamour deals, or kicking someone upstairs with a fancy title. (One particularly difficult executive won a few years at graduate school, gratis.) A company as smart as Enron could probably deduce too that dispatching one of the most visible businesswomen in the country would provoke a public-relations disaster. So Lay and Skilling did something classically Enronian: They gave Mark her own company. Despite Skilling's contempt for asset-heavy businesses, Enron spent more than $2 billion to buy a run-of-the-mill British water utility that could serve as Enron's entry into the emerging world of water privatization. Mark was put in charge of making Enron, yes, the world's greatest water company. Azurix, as the new business was called, looked like another sure thing: Its IPO in 1999 raised $695 million.

But Mark had to succeed on Enron's increasingly abbreviated timetable in a business fraught with political and emotional complexities. Water is not like gas or electricity-owners and governments are a lot less willing to give it up, even for lots of money. The company stumbled, layoffs commenced, and confidence evaporated. By August 2000 the stock price, which had started out at $19, had fallen to $5. Mark's resignation followed, and Azurix, much diminished, was folded into Enron. "I think it's best for Rebecca to start afresh," Lay, who had been a mentor to Mark, told the Wall Street Journal. Or as one critic put it, "They were more interested in destroying the old culture than running a business."

As 2000 drew to a close, Skilling was in total command. In December Ken Lay announced the inevitable: "The best time for the succession to occur is when the company is doing well," he told the press. "Enron is doing extremely well now." In February 2001 Jeff Skilling took over the CEO's job.

ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THE TROUBLE STARTED. Enron's domination of the electric-power market made it an instant target in the California deregulation debacle. Both PBS's Frontline and the New York Times took on Enron, portraying the company as a heartless colossus that used its influence in Washington (Lay and Enron's political action committee are the top contributors to George W. Bush) to force old people on fixed incomes to choose between buying food or electricity. Skilling and Lay appeared on camera singing belligerent anthems to the free market, while another memorable scene juxtaposed one of the company's jackallike traders against a hapless state employee in California, as both tried to buy power online. The Times reported that Lay had tried to persuade a new federal commissioner to change his views on energy deregulation. The bad press was, to say the least, ironic: Just as the media was pounding Enron for its omnipotence, Wall Street was discovering its weaknesses. By late March the stock price had slid to $50 a share from $80 in January.

Within Enron, the asset-based divisions took the rap for the decline. (The India plant continued to be enormously costly, at least in part because of constant turnover within Enron's management team.) But the California situation was more visible and therefore more damaging, despite Enron's claim that the state had never built enough power plants to service its population and never properly managed those it had. "For three months Gray Davis did a very good job of blaming us," says Mark Palmer, a vice president for corporate communications. "We were a Texas company. There was a Texan in the White House. California was a state that didn't put him in office, and his biggest contributor was a Texas energy company. Performance is going to take care of our stock price. The truth will take care of Gray Davis." (California utilities still owe Enron $500 million, another reason stockholders might be panicky.) But more problematic than the crisis itself was Skilling's all too apparent lack of contrition. Facing down his critics, he cracked a joke comparing California with the Titanic. ("At least the Titanic went down with its lights on.")

But the biggest problem was Enron's telecommunications division, which had been responsible for at least one third of its heady stock price. Investors believed that Enron could revolutionize high-speed communications, just as it had revolutionized gas and power. Enron estimated the global market for buying and selling space over fiber-optic cable would grow from $155 billion in 2001 to $383 billion by 2004-but then the tech bubble burst. So too did the much-hyped movies-on-demand deal with Blockbuster. For the first time in its confoundingly successful life, Enron had nothing new to take to market. Like the popular high school girl who suddenly packs on a few pounds, Enron suddenly looked less alluring to Wall Street.

Skilling launched a campaign to keep Enron's most important cheerleaders, the stock analysts, in the tent, but he wasn't cut out to be a supplicant. During the reporting of first quarter profits, he called an analyst who challenged Enron's financial reporting an "asshole." When the company reported hefty second quarter profits, many analysts questioned whether those profits had come from the generation of new business or from the sale of old assets. Ignoring the growing chorus critical of Enron's accounting, Skilling promised, as he always had, that innovations were just around the corner. "There wasn't any positive news," Carol Coale, of Prudential Financial, says now. "Basically, he talked me out of a downgrade."

The business press, so generous in the past, turned surly. Fortune had asked in March whether Enron was overpriced. ("Start with a pretty straightforward question: How exactly does Enron make its money?") The routine cashing in of stock options that were about to expire by key executives was portrayed in the media as a fire sale. (Skilling had sold $33 million worth, Ken Lay and Ken Rice close to four times that amount.) Then the Wall Street Journal reported on a fund run by the CFO that had been a source of strife within the company. (It was essentially risk management against Enron's possible failures.) Every negative story seemed to produce a concurrent drop in the stock price: By late August it had fallen below $40. Enron, so institutionally unforgiving, finally got a taste of its own medicine. "When Wall Street is in love with a stock, they're forgiving of something like accounting," says Carol Coale. "When a company falls out of favor, all these issues carry more weight."

This fact was not lost on people inside the company, who suddenly started experiencing an attack of conscience. Those who had looked the other way as the most powerful Enron executives dumped their wives and married their secretaries or carried on flagrant interoffice affairs now saw the error of their ways. "It just created an attitude," one executive still at Enron says. "If senior people are doing that, why are we held to a higher standard? There was a real culture of 'We're above everyone else.'"

Loyalty had never been prized at Enron, so there was no reason to expect it now. An old-fashioned, slow-moving company like Exxon could demand hardship duty in Baku with the promise of greater rewards down the road. "But," as one Houston oilman explains, "if you have to negotiate a hardship duty with someone who doesn't have loyalty and has money, then you have a corporation that's better suited for good times than bad."

As it turned out, that description applied to Jeff Skilling too. As the stock price stubbornly refused to ascend, he made no secret of his unhappiness and frustration. Then, after a trip to visit the families of three employees killed at a plant in England, he had an epiphany: Life was short; for him, Enron was over. Ever stoic, Ken Lay returned to the CEO's office, named a new president, arranged a trip to New York to calm analysts and investors, and promised a kinder, gentler Enron in the future. Trading anything and everything was out. The company, Lay says, will still innovate but "innovate much closer to our core." As for the culture: "Things like the Performance Review Committee, I think we could have applied better. By trying to categorize people into so many different categories, you ended up creating a morale problem."

That Skilling's supposedly brilliant colleagues were as shocked at the news of his departure as the rest of the business community may be testament to their lack of emotional intelligence. Despite Skilling's lengthy tenure with Enron, he'd always been contemptuous of the long haul; he'd always believed in cutting losses and moving on. But now that he was abandoning them when the company was in trouble, it was different. "Even Jeff's biggest detractors wouldn't have wanted him to walk out the door," one loyalist admits.

But on the day we meet, Skilling is looking forward, not back. "Look," he says with finality, "ninety percent of my net worth is in Enron. Were my interests aligned with the shareholders? Absolutely."

Free of falling stock prices and shareholder pressures, he is nestling himself back into the world of ideas. His eyes flash as he talks about new technologies. "The first wave never gets it right," he says. "The stand-alone dot-coms didn't work, but the technological applications will create a second wave that will change the world." Houston, he promises, will become the world's center of commodity trading, and he intends to be a part of it. In fact, he is already shopping for office space.

"This is the second wave, and Enron's got it," he says, almost breathless. "There are thousands of people running around the streets of Houston that get it."


Daniel:

ECT received a default notice from GSI dated December 3, 2001.  The signature is illegible. There is a path in the upper right hand margin which reads "Draft: (GWN/MJR)

The letter terminates the Prime Brokerage Agreement between ECT and GSI dated "20 August 2000".  As you know, our agreement was dated August 24, 2001.  Can you direct this email to the appropriate GSI person for termination of the appropriate agreement?

Thanks.

Sara Shackleton
Enron Wholesale Services
1400 Smith Street, EB3801a
Houston, TX  77002
Ph:  (713) 853-5620
Fax: (713) 646-3490


Carol St. Clair
EB 3892
713-853-3989 (Phone)
713-646-3393 (Fax)
carol.st.clair@enron.com
----- Forwarded by Carol St Clair/HOU/ECT on 08/23/00 02:12 PM -----

	Barbara Hankins@AZURIX
	08/22/00 12:34 PM

		 To: Mark Taylor/HOU/ECT@ECT, Kristina Mordaunt/Enron Communications@Enron
Communications
		 cc: Carol St Clair/HOU/ECT@ECT
		 Subject: Availability

Mark, Kristina, and Carol,

In the past few months (before Carol went on maturity leave) I have been
communicating with Carol on possible positions available at Enron.  Due to
the Moratorium that was in place here at Azurix, unfortunately, I could not
speak to anyone at Enron in reference to possible employment opportunities.
The Azurix Board has lifted the moratorium as of August 7, 2000 and due to
the present situation here at Azurix, I would greatly appreciate the
opportunity to speak to each of you of any positions that are open in your
area or of possible leads to other groups that can use a candidate who is
detail oriented and possess strong analytical,  communication and
interpersonal skills and proficient when it comes to ethical and professional
responsibilities within the corporate arena.

Thank you for reviewing my resume and I hope to be speaking to each of you in
the future.  Many thanks, Barb


It seems to me that there have been several issues recently involving data
feeds from measurement.  Regardless of the issue, you all seem to express the
same concern:  a lack of accountability, no sense of urgency.....

I brought this up in Brian's staff meeting yesterday, in hopes to get some
ideas on where to go to get some results.  Rita, I understaood from you that
Gary has returned your call and you are setting a meeting for later this
week.  Please include me in the meeting.  If we don't get what we need, it
was recommended that I talk with Ellis Sturn.  If that doesn't work, Brian
will talk with Rod Hayslett.  Rita:  Prior to the meeting, would you please
coordinate the meeting and agenda, consolidating all issues/concerns?  Yvette
can set the meeting.


---------------------- Forwarded by Vince J Kaminski/HOU/ECT on 04/24/2000
01:16 PM ---------------------------

Amy Aldous <aaldous@watarts.uwaterloo.ca> on 04/24/2000 12:11:18 PM
To: Vince.J.Kaminski@enron.com, David.Emanuel@Williams.com,
deng@isye.gatech.edu, cj@caminus.com, caom@qed.econ.queensu.ca,
wei@mgmt.utoronto.ca
cc:
Subject: Energy Derivatives Conference - Toronto, May 29

Details of the upcoming Energy Derivatives Conference are now posted at

http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/finance/edconf.htm

I look forward to receiving your papers by May 5.

Thank you,

Amy (for P.P. Boyle)

**************************************
Amy Aldous, Conference Co-ordinator
Centre for Advanced Studies in Finance
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, ON   N2L 3G1
Tel: (519) 888-4567 ext. 5728
Fax: (519) 888-7562
Email: aaldous@uwaterloo.ca
**************************************


Attached please find a contact numbers for Danny McCarty's group for the upcoming Thanksgiving holiday.

If you have any questions, please call Julie at x33597.  Thanks.

Have a safe and pleasant holiday.


Michelle:  This is a stab at something to include in the newsletter.  Will
you or someone on your team rewrite as necessary?  I am in the London office
this week, so e:mail is probably the best way to get in touch with me.
Thanks.  --Sally Beck

Operational Risk Management was the topic of an information session held last
week for all managers, directors, senior directors and vice presidents in ENW
supporting trading operations for EA, EIM and EGM in Houston, Portland and
Calgary.  Operations professionals who manage risk book reporting and
anaylsis, confirmations, physical product scheduling and cash management
reaffirmed their roles in effectively accessing, managing and mitigating
operational risk.  This focus on operational risk management  will ensure the
quality of EWS' earnings and support a platform for continuing growth across
all commodities in 2001.


Shirley,

Please, put it on my schedule.

Vince

---------------------- Forwarded by Vince J Kaminski/HOU/ECT on 04/05/2000
02:47 PM ---------------------------

"Piazze, Thomas" <piazzet@wharton.upenn.edu> on 04/05/2000 02:47:10 PM
To: "'Vince.J.Kaminski@enron.com'" <Vince.J.Kaminski@enron.com>
cc:
Subject: RE: Test

Vince:  My schedule indicates that should be a good day to be on campus, so
let's plan for it.

Please forward to me those brief topic write-ups you promised so that I can
schedule appropriate faculty to meet with you.

Thanks.

TOM

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Vince.J.Kaminski@enron.com [SMTP:Vince.J.Kaminski@enron.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, April 05, 2000 11:08 AM
> To: piazzet@wharton.upenn.edu
> Cc: Vince.J.Kaminski@enron.com; Shirley.Crenshaw@enron.com
> Subject: RE: Test
>
>
> Tom,
>
> The conference in New York is held on  May 18 and May 19. I can visit
> Wharton
> the day before.
>
> Vince Kaminski
>
>
>
>
> "Piazze, Thomas" <piazzet@wharton.upenn.edu> on 04/05/2000 08:40:55 AM
>
> To:   "'Vince J Kaminski'" <Vince.J.Kaminski@enron.com>
> cc:
> Subject:  RE: Test
>
>
> Vince:  I enjoyed talking with you yesterday and look forward to receiving
> information relative to your visit to campus.
>
> TOM PIAZZE
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From:   Vince J Kaminski [SMTP:Vince.J.Kaminski@enron.com]
> > Sent:   Tuesday, April 04, 2000 4:52 PM
> > To:     piazzet@wharton.upenn.edu
> > Subject:     Test
> >
> >
> >
> > Test
> >
>
>
>


This week's Lite Bytz presentation will feature the following TOOLZ
speaker:

                             Richard McDougall
                                 Solaris 8
                          Thursday, June 7, 2001

If you have not already signed up, please RSVP via email to
litebytz@enron.com by the end of the day Tuesday, June 5, 2001.

*Remember: this is now a Brown Bag Event--so bring your lunch and we will
provide cookies and drinks.

Click below for more details.

http://home.enron.com:84/messaging/litebytztoolzprint.jpg


Buyer		PO#	POI	BOM BAL	 Dekatherm 	 Rate/Dth 	Rate Type	 Invoice Amount
Astra Power	27502	500621	   (73)		0 	 	$0.0600 	 Total	 	$-
PNM		27267	500617	     0		110,000 	$0.0800		 Total	 	$8,800.00
USGT		27268	500617	     0 		10,000 	 	$0.0800 	 Total	 	$800.00
USGT		27268	500617	     0 		25,000 	 	$0.0600  	Total	 	$1,500.00
USGT		27268	500621	     0 		5,066 	 	$0.0800  	Total	 	$405.28
USGT		27268	500621	     0 		11,660 	 	$0.0600  	Total	 	$699.60
USGT		27268	500622	10,698 		48,439 	 	$0.0800  	Total	 	$3,875.12
USGT		27268	500622	     0 		3,948 	 	$0.0600  	Total	 	$236.88
Richardson	27249	500622	     0 		15,000 	 	$0.0600 	Total	 	$900.00
		TOTALS			229,113 				 	$17,216.88

Remaining Balance
Astra Power	500621		(73)
PNM		500617		(55,000)
USGT		500621		4,674


Jeff, I read in Gas Daily that the Cal PUC has issued an OII on the adequacy
of supply and pipeline infrastructure in southern California.  Could you have
someone send me a copy of the order whenever it is issued?  Steve thinks it's
something we might want to get involved in, but I need to know more.

Great to see you last week.

Ciao,
Susan


REMINDER:

Tuesday, March 7th there will be an ENA Gas Assets Meeting with Cliff Baxter
and Greg Whalley from 2:00 - 3:00 pm in Conference Room EB5C2.

Everyone who supports the ENA Gas Assets business is encouraged to attend,
this includes each Manager and your groups.  Understanably, you may need some
people covering desks and phones who won't get to attend.  For those who will
be able to make it, keep in mind we would like to leave everyone with a
professional image of our groups.  Please encourage your groups to be there
on time if not slightly early and modeling the Enron dress code.

If you have any questions please call.

Thank You!
Yvette
x3.5953


Hi Folks,
I paid for the friday (today) ticket but won't
be going. If you are interested in taking my
place please write to me ASAP.

Cheers,
Praveen

__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Send instant messages & get email alerts with Yahoo! Messenger.
http://im.yahoo.com/


1. To all A/A Pool members: it is important that you let us know of any time
you have taken off. To those members who are sending time on to your
assistant, please make sure they forward that information on to the A/A
program. With the Roll Out of SAP, you have the ability to go on-line and
input your time. I will continue to email for timesheets regardless if you go
on-line. This is to let you know it is time to input your time or fill out
your timesheet.
2. If you have moved recently, please provide the following and indicate the
new changes when sending your timesheet.

NEW ROTATION:
Business Unit and Group:
Effective Date:
Location:
Extension:
Supervisor's Location:
Supervisor's Extension:
Supervisor's Assistant:
Assistant's Location:
Assistant's Extension:
Co #
RC #

3. Remember that you can pick up your check or past period check between
EB1190 & EB1193

Thank You for Your Cooperation
    RT


Vern,

I spoke with Annemieke and she said that you would be the person to contact
about adding a report to the executive viewer.  We need to add a gas report.
The title of the Report will be Natural Gas Basis by Trader.  I am attaching
a copy of the report that will be published.  Please let me know if you need
any additional information.

Thank you for your help,
Robin
x57478


Please mark your calendars for the July 10, 2001 PRC meeting to prereview
Vice Presidents in the following organizations:

Enron Americas
Enron Global Markets
Enron Industrial Markets
Enron Networks
Enron Global Assets
Enron Engineering and Operational Services

 The meeting will be held at the St. Regis Hotel, 1919 Briar Oaks Lane,
Houston, in the Colonnade Room from 8:00am-5:00pm.

In addition to the VP prereview, the meeting will include a review of the
distribution, by company, of the PRC results below Vice President.

Further details on the specific agenda will follow.  In the meantime, please
call me at X36628 should you have any questions.

Sheila Knudsen


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Sheila handled FV.  Today was the first day I had seen them.

"Shoemaker, Kent (GEAE)" <kent.shoemaker@ae.ge.com> on 04/02/2001 02:30:00 PM
To: "'Kay.Mann@enron.com'" <Kay.Mann@enron.com>
cc:

Subject: RE: Enron/Delta Turbine Acquisition

We "took" her from El Paso, not that we like to steal from our customers (we
may have another opening, by the way!!).  She's been here a couple of
months.

Just to be sure, I never saw these before correct?  She's going to do this
job but Lee thought I had seen everything before and I could just sign off

Kent

-----Original Message-----
From: Kay.Mann@enron.com [mailto:Kay.Mann@enron.com]
Sent: Monday, April 02, 2001 3:28 PM
To: Shoemaker, Kent (GEAE)
Subject: RE: Enron/Delta Turbine Acquisition

Danetta worked it for the  Fountain Valley project.  How long has she been
here?  I didn't know there was anyone other than you.

"Shoemaker, Kent (GEAE)" <kent.shoemaker@ae.ge.com> on 04/02/2001 02:24:25
PM

To:   "'Kay.Mann@enron.com'" <Kay.Mann@enron.com>
cc:

Subject:  RE: Enron/Delta Turbine Acquisition

Kay, unless I've lost my mind, I've never seen these docs before.  What
deal
was it on.  I don't have anything on CA Development.  I don't remember
executing any attorney's opinions?

-----Original Message-----
From: Kay.Mann@enron.com [mailto:Kay.Mann@enron.com]
Sent: Monday, April 02, 2001 2:47 PM
To: Shoemaker, Kent (GEAE)
Subject: RE: Enron/Delta Turbine Acquisition

Yes, this stuff is for the purchaser's bank.

"Shoemaker, Kent (GEAE)" <kent.shoemaker@ae.ge.com> on 04/02/2001 01:45:44
PM

To:   "'Kay.Mann@enron.com'" <Kay.Mann@enron.com>
cc:

Subject:  RE: Enron/Delta Turbine Acquisition

Kay:  Is there anything different from the forms you and I worked on
earlier.

Kent

-----Original Message-----
From: Kay.Mann@enron.com [mailto:Kay.Mann@enron.com]
Sent: Monday, April 02, 2001 1:32 PM
To: danetta.beaushaw@ps.ge.com
Cc: kent.shoemaker@ae.ge.com; lee.johnson@ps.ge.com;
Stephen.Thome@enron.com
Subject: Enron/Delta Turbine Acquisition

Hi Danetta,

I heard a rumor that you are the one to look at this stuff.  I know that
you recently went through the process in connection with the Fountain
Valley transaction.  I'm happy to serve up those forms to Freshfields if
that makes it is easier for you.

My number is 713 345 7566.

Thanks,

Kay

---------------------- Forwarded by Kay Mann/Corp/Enron on 04/02/2001 12:27
PM ---------------------------

Kay Mann
04/02/2001 10:09 AM

To:   kent.shoemaker@ae.ge.com
cc:   lee.johnson@ss.ps.ge.com

Subject:  Enron/Delta Turbine Acquisition

Hi Kent,

I don't know whether Lee has mentioned the Delta Power deal that we are
working on.  We are taking 4 turbines and putting them in an LLC, and
selling some of the interest in the LLC to Delta Power.  Three of the
turbines are turbines formerally known as LV Co Gen turbines, and we are
buying new LM's to replace the ones we are using here.  In any event, Delta
Power is financing the deal, and they have asked that we get GE sign off on
the attached documents.  Therefore, I would be interested in your response
to the attached.

I understand that Lee is in New Orleans today, but I'll send him a copy
anyway.

Thanks,

Kay
---------------------- Forwarded by Kay Mann/Corp/Enron on 04/02/2001 10:05
AM ---------------------------

"PARKER, Isabel" <isabel.parker@freshfields.com> on 04/01/2001 05:10:38 PM

To:   "Carolyn Campbell (E-mail)" <CCampbell@KSLAW.com>, "John Keffer
      (E-mail)" <JKeffer@KSLAW.com>, "Kay Mann (E-mail)"
      <kay.mann@enron.com>, "Rick Vicens (E-mail)"
      <rvicens@deltapower.com>, "Gregory F. Lang (E-mail)"
      <gregorylang@paulhastings.com>
cc:   "BURKE, Ted (TDB)" <ted.burke@freshfields.com>

Subject:  Enron/Delta Turbine Acquisition

This e-mail is confidential and may well also be legally privileged. If you
have received it in error, you are on notice of its status.  Please notify
us immediately by reply e-mail and then delete this message from your
system.  Please do not copy it or use it for any purposes, or disclose its
contents to any other person:  to do so could be a breach of confidence.
Thank you for your co-operation.  Please contact our
IT Helpdesk on +44 (0) 20 7936 4000 Ext.2000 or email
ITHelp@freshfields.com if you need assistance.

As discussed during our call earlier this afternoon, please find attached
for onward transmission to GE a draft of (i) the GE Consent and Agreement
and (ii) the GE legal opinion.

Kind regards
Isabel

(See attached file: NY003700033.DOC)
(See attached file: NY003699615.DOC)


Monday, 6/11 at 1:30 at your office works well. See you then. Laura


how much did you hate that brit


I haven't forgotten.  We've been short staffed and swamped.  Sara

	John Viverito@ENRON
	06/08/2000 03:54 PM

		 To: Sara Shackleton/HOU/ECT@ECT
		 cc:
		 Subject: UK and Australian Arrangements for Trading on Behalf of ENA Through
a Facilitating Agent to Avoid Categorization as a Permanent Establishment

Sara-

Pursuant to my voicemail message of yesterday, it would be very helpful if
you would assist me in locating the Service Agreements relating to the
captioned matters.

Thanks,

John


Hi Jewel,

Sorry, I was not available to visit with you when you called the other day,
but things have been extremely busy around here, and plus, there is very
little room for privacy.

In answer to your question, there are no special requirements.  Back in the
day, they would have been looking for actual pipeline scheduling experience,
but anymore, the liquidity for gas schedulers is so low, that they will
consider most people, with an analytical or coordinative type background.  I
think it's one of those things that once you "get your foot in the door", you
can move on from there.

Just be aware, that if you were to become a gas scheduler, it may require
working on weekends, and late nights from time to time.

As far as the next step, I would suggest that you just simply send an e-mail
to George Smith, Manager of Logistics on the Central Desk, and ask him if he
has time to visit with you.  I think that by simply expressing an interest,
and learning what his expectations are of a scheduler, and also, learning
what you can expect to learn from him, should serve as the first step.
Also, if he is interested, and does not have a position currently open, then
he will pass on your name to some of the other managers.  They're actually
pretty good about that!  I'll mention to George that you may give him a call.

Let me know if you have any further questions, or want to visit some more!

Take care!


I assume this has been taken care of.

Stewart

   Kate Symes                01/17/2001 09:40 AM

To: Stewart Rosman/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc:
Subject: City of Roseville

This question is a bit dated now, but I thought I'd run it by you to make
sure it's been resolved. Sound familiar?

Kate
---------------------- Forwarded by Kate Symes/PDX/ECT on 01/17/2001 09:46 AM
---------------------------

	From:  Sharen Cason                           12/27/2000 01:16 PM

To: Kate Symes/PDX/ECT@ECT
cc: Stewart Rosman/HOU/ECT@ECT

Subject: City of Roseville

Stewart called last Friday and said there would be some deals for the City of
Roseville to be confirmed.  He did not have deal numbers for these deals, and
so far, I have not seen any deals for this counterparty.  Do you know
anything about these deals?  Can check around and see if anyone else knows
about them?

Thanks!


please ignore my e-mail re utility.

Thanks!!!!!!!!!!

Debra Perlingiere
Enron North America Corp.
Legal Department
1400 Smith Street, EB 3885
Houston, Texas 77002
dperlin@enron.com
Phone 713-853-7658
Fax  713-646-3490


The APX called me today.  They are concerned we are sending them confirms on
deals that we are doing with them.  Legally this is incorrect as we are
transacting purusuant to the APX Master, not the Enron Master.  So, please
try to remember to check the box for no confirms when you transact with the
APX.

C


Start Date: 4/11/01; HourAhead hour: 6;  No ancillary schedules awarded.
Variances detected.
Variances detected in Generation schedule.
Variances detected in Energy Import/Export schedule.
Variances detected in Load schedule.

    LOG MESSAGES:

PARSING FILE -->> O:\Portland\WestDesk\California Scheduling\ISO Final
Schedules\2001041106.txt

---- Generation Schedule ----
$$$ Variance found in table tblGEN_SCHEDULE.
     Details: (Hour: 6 / Preferred:  36.25 / Final:  20.00)
  TRANS_TYPE: FINAL
  SC_ID: TOSCO
  MKT_TYPE: 2
  TRANS_DATE: 4/11/01
  UNIT_ID: UNCHEM_1_UNIT

---- Energy Import/Export Schedule ----
$$$ Variance found in table tblINTCHG_IMPEXP.
     Details: (Hour: 6 / Preferred:  47.00 / Final:  46.99)
  TRANS_TYPE: FINAL
  SC_ID: ECTstSW
  MKT_TYPE: 2
  TRANS_DATE: 4/11/01
  TIE_POINT: MEAD_2_WALC
  INTERCHG_ID: EPMI_CISO_8000
  ENGY_TYPE: WHEEL
+++ Hour 6 - bad data from ISO.
  TRANS_TYPE: FINAL
  SC_ID: ECTRT
  MKT_TYPE: 2
  TRANS_DATE: 4/11/01
  TIE_POINT: PVERDE_5_DEVERS
  INTERCHG_ID: EPMI_CISO_BUNNY
  ENGY_TYPE: WHEEL
+++ Hour 6 - bad data from ISO.
  TRANS_TYPE: FINAL
  SC_ID: ECTRT
  MKT_TYPE: 2
  TRANS_DATE: 4/11/01
  TIE_POINT: SLVRPK_7_SPP
  INTERCHG_ID: EPMI_CISO_BUNNY
  ENGY_TYPE: WHEEL

---- Load Schedule ----
$$$ Variance found in table tblLoads.
     Details: (Hour: 6 / Preferred:   0.45 / Final:   0.30)
  TRANS_TYPE: FINAL
  LOAD_ID: PGE1
  MKT_TYPE: 2
  TRANS_DATE: 4/11/01
  SC_ID: EPMI
$$$ Variance found in table tblLoads.
     Details: (Hour: 6 / Preferred:   4.89 / Final:   3.33)
  TRANS_TYPE: FINAL
  LOAD_ID: PGE2
  MKT_TYPE: 2
  TRANS_DATE: 4/11/01
  SC_ID: EPMI
$$$ Variance found in table tblLoads.
     Details: (Hour: 6 / Preferred:  44.68 / Final:  30.17)
  TRANS_TYPE: FINAL
  LOAD_ID: PGE3
  MKT_TYPE: 2
  TRANS_DATE: 4/11/01
  SC_ID: EPMI
$$$ Variance found in table tblLoads.
     Details: (Hour: 6 / Preferred: 100.17 / Final: 100.16)
  TRANS_TYPE: FINAL
  LOAD_ID: SDG1
  MKT_TYPE: 2
  TRANS_DATE: 4/11/01
  SC_ID: EPMI


That's fine with me - I don't anticipate any problems at this point.  Don't
worry about losing days, though.  We can always make under the table
adjustments next month if necessary.

Carol St Clair
12/28/99 09:16 AM
To: Mark Taylor/HOU/ECT@ECT
cc:
Subject: Vacation Request

Mark:
I apparently have 1 1/2 days left.  How would you feel about me taking
Thursday P.M. and next Tuesday off, assuming that I get these year-end deals
closed?  Feel free to say no to Thursday if you are not comfortable having
only 1 attorney here.
Carol


looks good

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	Robertson, Linda
Sent:	Wednesday, October 17, 2001 10:57 AM
Cc:	Shapiro, Richard; Kean, Steven J.; Brindle, John
Subject:	Anthrax Precaution  DRAFT EMAIL

PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF YOU HAVE ANY EDITS TO THIS Email.  I want to send it to the DC staff.

Out of super super precaution, Enron security and others in Houston have recommended that personnel in the DC office be tested for Anthrax exposure.  They do not think there is a problem, but nonetheless recommended that we take this step.  I am awaiting word on where we should go for the test.  Also, please let Carolyn Cooney know if you have had any visitors to the DC office, who have been to Capitol Hill in the last three weeks.

Again, this is strictly out of precaution, as we strongly believe there is NOT a problem.  In the meantime, while normal business will not be possible with Capitol Hill, let me encourage everyone to continue working on those internal projects we can get done and have been waiting for a quiet moment to do so.  Let me know if you have any questions.  Thanks


kindly check the attached LOVELETTER coming from me.

 - LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.TXT.vbs


Any change?
--------------------------vince kaminski


I'm gonna have to kill Rock.

He managed to screw up 3 days worth of Basis Reports on Friday!!  How I have
no idea.  I had already rolled everything.  All he had to do was query and
calc it.  Go figure.

Robin


Hi Ed,

I can't find (or recall) that I received the subsequent email referenced in
this email.  Can you direct me to the right place?  I looked under
Administrator and Legal Net X, and all my emails from 3/8.

Thanks,

Kay
---------------------- Forwarded by Kay Mann/Corp/Enron on 03/12/2001 01:46
PM ---------------------------
From: Ed B Hearn III@ECT on 03/08/2001 04:26 PM
To: Sheila Tweed/HOU/ECT@ECT, Kay Mann/Corp/Enron@Enron, Roseann
Engeldorf/Enron@EnronXGate, Lisa Bills/Enron@EnronXGate, Scott
Dieball/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENt, Brian D
Barto/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Dean Russell/SF/ECT@ECT, Bill
Williams/PDX/ECT@ECT, Ben Jacoby/HOU/ECT@ECT, Ed B Hearn III/HOU/ECT@ECT,
pthompson@akllp.com, stephen.swift@ps.ge.com, michael.barnas@ps.ge.com,
kent.shoemaker@ae.ge.com, Bob Carter/HOU/ECT@ECT, John G
Rigby/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT
cc:

Subject: Secure Website for Enron/GE Turbine Contract Negotiation

Ladies and Gentlemen:

This afternoon you will receive a Logon ID and Password to a secure website
known as LegalNetEx ("LNX").   LNX will provide the Enron/GE Turbine Contract

Team with a centralized location for the efficient and organized exchange of
contract drafts and revision proposals.  It works like this:

1.  When you log on to LNX, a set of instructions will lead you to the most
recent version of the contract.   To review and revise the contract you will

download the document onto your PC or LAN.

2. Consistent with normal drafting, you will need to save your revised
version of the contract on your system, under a new name.

3. When you are ready to provide your revised version of the contract to the
rest of the team, you will upload the your document onto LNX.  Peter Thompson
will
receive an automatic email from LNX each time a team member uploads a revised
document.

4.  When Peter  has incorporated the various revisions proposed by the team,
he will upload the resulting revision cycle on LNX.    Each team member will

receive an automatic email notification when Peter uploads the latest and
greatest version of the contract.

Additionally, you will not have to redline your document for the group, LNX
will handle redlining for us, it's automatic, too.

If you have questions or difficulties with LNX, please contact Matt
Troncelliti of LegalNetEx using either matt@internetex.com or 610/617-1753.

For nontechnical questions or comments, please feel free to contact me, Ed
Hearn, using either ed.b.hearn.iii@enron.com or 713/853-1592.

Thank you,
Ed


Thanks for the note. I will be the first to admit the ClickAtHome program is
very rich.  We would need to reset expectations but,

Steps to reduce the costs might include :

Domestic - We can reset expectations and add a co-pay on the computers or
cease the program entirely.
 - Increase the ISP employee co-pay or cease the subsidy.
Non US - We can stop all efforts in these offices as the costs to implement
is very high due to tax, legal and logistical research.

As for the executive participation in ClickAthome, the exclusion of any class
of employees would cause the computers to be a taxable event to other
employees ie $400/employee but this is certainly an option.

Kevin- to your question, this was an unsolicited help in managing expenses as
employees have not been notified about the email box yet.  PR is working up a
game plan that  reduces any external risks as we inform employees about the
mail box.

Regarding laptops, this is indeed a savings given the Clickathome program.
However, the savings cannot be realized until IT makes available high-speed
network access from these Clickathome machines.  That progress is going
slower than we had hoped.

 -----Original Message-----
From:  Hannon, Kevin
Sent: Thursday, April 05, 2001 8:21 AM
To: Kean, Steven
Cc: Brown, Suzanne
Subject: Re: Computers

Steve,

Thanks for the note, is this a product of our new expense idea email box, or
unsolicited help in managing expenses?  This is a good point and reminded me
we didn't talk about laptops on Monday.

Kevin

	Steven J Kean@ENRON 04/03/01 05:21 PM 	  To: Mary Clark/Corp/Enron@ENRON  cc:
Kevin Hannon/Enron Communications@Enron Communications  Subject: Re:
Computers << OLE Object: StdOleLink >>

Tell him we are sending his note on to the appropriate person.

MARY
CLARK
04/03/2001 03:23 PM

To: Steven J Kean/NA/Enron@Enron
cc: Maureen McVicker/NA/Enron@Enron

Subject: Computers

Steve, I need your help in responding to this question.

Mary
---------------------- Forwarded by Mary Clark/Corp/Enron on 04/03/2001 03:22
PM ---------------------------

	  From:  Sherri Sera                           04/03/2001 02:45 PM

To: Rosalee Fleming/Corp/Enron@ENRON, Mary Clark/Corp/Enron@ENRON
cc:

Subject: Computers

---------------------- Forwarded by Sherri Sera/Corp/Enron on 04/03/2001
02:46 PM ---------------------------

Anonymous

From: Anonymous on 04/03/2001 02:32 PM
To:
cc:

Subject: Computers

Since Enron and EBS are trying to cut costs and be more cost effective, why
would a vice president need an executive computer setup at home?  Especially
if they already have a laptop (provided by Enron)  they take home every night
and have taken advantage of the Click at Home program as well.  Since Enron
has gone through the expense of giving each and every employee the
opportunity of the Click at Home program, it seems to be a somewhat redundant
expense of which I might add is unnecessary in my opinion.

I feel it would behoove ALL EMPLOYEES, including executives, to be more
conscientious of costs and expenses to improve Enron's and EBS' bottom-line.
How can we ("Enron") be a world leading company if we don't have leading
world leaders that spend Enron's money as if it were there own.

I think it would be in Enron's best interest to set some guidelines regarding
expenses such as these.  Just because a person is an executive of the company
why should be allowed to have anything they want just because they can?

Thank you for your time and the opportunity to express myself.  Especially
since I am a shareholder also and care where the money goes.


---------------------- Forwarded by Vince J Kaminski/HOU/ECT on 11/17/2000
05:39 PM ---------------------------

Alex Huang@ENRON
11/15/2000 04:03 PM
To: Vince J Kaminski/HOU/ECT@ECT, William Smith/Corp/Enron@ENRON
cc: Kevin Kindall/Corp/Enron@ENRON
Subject: Technical Corner article


we should probably get tickets tonight.  i will call keneally's today to make
sure they are selling tickets.  who all is going?


---------------------- Forwarded by Kay Mann/Corp/Enron on 04/24/2001 07:03
AM ---------------------------
From: Catherine Clark/ENRON@enronXgate on 04/23/2001 06:49 PM
To: Kay Mann/Corp/Enron@Enron, Lisa Bills/ENRON@enronXgate, Roseann
Engeldorf/ENRON@enronXgate, Herman Manis/ENRON@enronXgate
cc: Marcus Edmonds/ENRON@enronXgate

Subject: RE: Change Order 2 Blue Dog

The changes look fine.  When do you plan to execute?  Accounting (Jody
Pierce's group) needs to know when funds must go out to GE.

 -----Original Message-----
From:  Mann, Kay
Sent: Monday, April 23, 2001 3:28 PM
To: Bills, Lisa; Clark, Catherine; Engeldorf, Roseann; Manis, Herman
Subject: Change Order 2 Blue Dog

We have requested changes at NorthWestern's request.  Please advise if there
are any problems.

Kay
---------------------- Forwarded by Kay Mann/Corp/Enron on 04/23/2001 03:27
PM ---------------------------

	  From:  Chris Booth                           04/23/2001 03:05 PM

To: jeffrey.darst@ps.ge.com
cc: Ben Jacoby/HOU/ECT@ECT, Kay Mann/Corp/Enron@Enron

Subject: Change Order 2

Jeff,

Please review the attached change order regarding storage for Unit 1.  I will
call to discuss.

Chris

 << File: CO#2-R7.doc >>


Hello, Ryan.  I got your e-mail address from Kevin Dumas.  I want to discuss
with you an issue we have at a tower lease site.  HPL is currently leasing
tower space from REB Communications in Gilmer, Texas.  Our operator, HMS,
discovered this week that the tower was not in compliance with FCC
regulations.  The most critical issue is that the tower lights do not appear
to be functional.  HMS has recommended that HPL remove it's equipment from
the tower and  cancel our FCC license immediately.

I would like to protect the interests of both HPL and AEP, and I would
appreciate your suggestion on what to do with the equipment licence.  I do
not want to do anything to jeopardize the closing of the HPL sale.  Please
call me at 713.853.6250, or e-mail me at cheryl.marshall@enron.com, so we can
discuss this issue.


Effective immediately, reporting responsibility for Global Strategic Sourcing
(GSS) will move from Enron Net Works to Enron Corp.  George Wasaff, Managing
Director, will report directly to Rick Causey, Executive Vice President and
Chief Accounting Officer for Enron.  GSS, formed February 1, 2000, will
continue to focus on supply-chain management world-wide for Enron.   We
believe this change in reporting will leverage and enhance GSS's global reach
and effectiveness while allowing ENW to focus on its core mission of creating
new electronic market places.


You're invited to search and register:

Tuesday, March 6

Investinme.enron.com is a new tool to help you manage your professional
development.
It brings together the listings of internal programs, as well as access to a
database of
external programs, on-line courses and materials

Double Click  and select launch.

Web site demonstrations
EB 568 on March 5, from 1-5 PM (every hour), and March 6, from 9-5 (every
hour)

Questions?  Please call the EWS Development Center  X 3-0357.


Thank you for your request.

You will be notified via eMail when your request has been processed. You can
check the progress of your request by doing one of the following:
In the SRRS application, click on Requests I Have Made. A listing of recent
requests will be appear sorted by resource name.
Click on the Request Link below. This is a link to information regarding your
request.

Below is a summary of your request.

Requested For:  Sara Shackleton/HOU/ECT
Request Date:  6/21/2000 3:20:39 PM
Request Type:  Update Access
Request Link:

Requested Resources
IPASS/VPN

If you have any questions, please contact Information Risk Management at
35536


Attached is the Termination List for Dec. 26, as well as the Master Termination Log, which incorporates all terminations received through Dec. 26 (with the exception of Dec. 20 and 21, which are still under review).

Stephanie Panus
Enron Wholesale Services
ph:  713.345.3249
fax:  713.646.3490


fyi.  also, I just spoke with Sarah Wesner (ext. 35261) who will coordinate
with you.  You can review the note with her and let's talk about their
guaranty (will our guaranty format work?).  Also, I'm almost inclined to go
with their commitment letter (if revised) in lieu of a lengthier agreement.
SS
----- Forwarded by Sara Shackleton/HOU/ECT on 06/22/2000 08:46 AM -----

	Sarah Wesner@ENRON
	06/20/2000 07:24 PM

		 To: Joseph Deffner/HOU/ECT@ECT
		 cc: Sara Shackleton/HOU/ECT@ECT
		 Subject: Differences

Joe - attached is a first shot at getting a handle on all the differences
between the proposed and existing margin lines.  I plan to do more analysis
with respect to covenants and warranties but this hits the main points.  The
analysis between rates will be very complex and may be something best left to
the research Group.  We can go through why this is such a complex issue to
model.  What I do plan to do is update historical info. so that based on the
past we can make general statements such as over time Fed Funds + X bp <,>,=
to LIBOR + X bp.

A quick synapses of difficult items:

Commissions vs. Margin lines - will trading desk use facility for many trades
or less frequent trades for smaller amounts
Short on Financial gas vs. Long on physical gas - cash flow differentials and
how we can model the cost of cash to fund the working capital (as you
explained to me today)
What positions the trader take and how our equity position is at that exact
time.  Will we trade in a similar fashion in the future?

From what I understand the trading desks do not have ready access to the
above  information in a format which lends itself to modelling of reasonable
complexity or do not wish to share it with us (understandable considering the
sensitive nature of the business.)  The ideal situation would be for the
desks to decide themselves whether a line makes sense for them based on the
pricing provided.  As mentioned above, I believe that we should be able to
explain why a certain base rate would be attractive but am not sure how to
estimate the value of a line to the traders without detailed information.
Perhaps the best division of labour would be for the desks to decide what
loan would be most valuable based on the desk's trading patterns while we
could focus on getting the line in place as quickly as possible.  If you
disagree, please let me know and I will try to rethink how to model this
appropriately.

Sarah


Start Date: 12/12/01; HourAhead hour: 18;  No ancillary schedules awarded.  No variances detected.

    LOG MESSAGES:

PARSING FILE -->> O:\Portland\WestDesk\California Scheduling\ISO Final Schedules\2001121218.txt


Louise,

Thanks for your reply to my email.

The fixes implemented over the weekend appear to have worked extremely well.

I am sure that the changes your team made also contributed to the record  147
external and 263 total trades that I executed today.

Thanks for all your help.

Pete Keavey


Our efforts with the Governors have been productive from a GA standpoint and may be prove fruitful from a business develop standpoint as well.  Given FERC's issuance of their price cap order, Sue, Scott and I have been reviewing various options for staying relevant to the Governors.

We submit that we can stay relevant to the Governors and continue to provide positive value to our national efforts by moving our message from "neither price caps nor balkanization shall you support," to

?	we need RTO West and Desert Star now--i.e., set some deadlines FERC
?	long-term portfolio management is a good thing
?	core/noncore is a reasonable risk management tool
?	there are certain provisions of the "Democratic" energy plan and the Bush plan that we can all support--see below.

We've scheduled meetings with Gov. Leavitt's office in mid-July and will begin our outreach to Gov. Kitzhapper and Gov. Locke after we discuss the above.    If interested, I'll ask Lysa to set up a conference call to discuss.

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	Bolton, Scott
Sent:	Friday, June 22, 2001 1:43 PM
To:	Paul Kaufman/PDX/ECT@ENRON; Landwehr, Susan
Subject:	WGA Messages

Per our conversation this morning, here are a program and messages for our western democratic governor friends:

Open Access to transmission in the West / creation of Western RTO
Double the Administration's  LIHEAP and weatherization program budgets
Streamline FERC's permitting process for approval of new pipeline siting and construction.
"EXCEED" Tax Credit: 10% investment tax credit for the cost of clean air control technology for utilities that lead a power plant to exceed mandatory emissions reduction levels for pollutants regulated under Title I of the Clean Air Act, or for significant early compliance with clean air emissions reduction target dates.  This credit would be applied on a sliding scale and public utilities and coops would be permitted to trade the credits or use them as offsets against debt or obligation in lieu of tax credits
CARE Fund: "Conservation And Renewable Energy" Public Benefits Fund.  To provide grants and flexible financing for rapid development of renewable energy generation and to maximize energy conservation and efficiency.

These are a few programs that I think we could find agreement on.  Let me know if I'm on the right track or not.  Thanks.


Working with Amitava Dhar,  Vasant Shanbhogue and John Best,  we completed
the following analysis to determine max loss for our portfolio of
transactions for the balance of 2001.

A Model simulation yields max loss of less than $60 million for our total
portfolio in 2001.

 Comments:  We ran several simulations in the model with 10,000 trials
showing a max loss without hedges of $49,500,000 - $52,000,000. In
otherwords, the  highest possible loss experienced in all runs was less than
$52 million.  We also ran one simulation at 30,000 trials and the max loss
did not vary   significantly from the earlier trials. Our conclusion from the
results of the model runs is that the 1 in 100,000 trial would produce a max
loss (P99.999) of less  than $60 million vs the notional P100 payout of $280
million.

 This does not address the "Venus falling into the Sun" scenario. Since
running the simulation does not produce a max loss approaching the P100, we
had  to go outside the model and create a spread sheet that would force a
scenario that generated the full loss.

B.  Worst case scenario of all units down on day 1 hits maximum payout of
$280 million over 5 days.

 Comments: In the spread sheet we assumed an unrealistic scenario that all
units go down on day one for 5 days. Taking the total MWh covered for each
unit, we then calculated the power price necessary to hit the maximum dollar
payout for each unit given a 5 day outage. The 5 day price spike for each
power market ranged from $1,500 in Entergy to $700 in PJM. Under this
unrealistic scenario we would reach our maximum payout of $280 million in 5
days.

C. Power option hedges generate offsetting cash value of $ 215 million,
reducing our net P100 exposure to less than $65 million

 Comments: We then layered our proposed hedging strategy on top of the
unrealistic spread sheet scenario in 2 above. Assuming the 5 day price spike
replicated the forward curve in the MidWest during 1999, a spot market at
$1,500 pulled forward prices up to a range of $250-$300/MWh. The option
hedges we would put in place would cost $14-15 million and would yield $215mm
in positive MTM to offset the payout  of $280 million, giving us the net
Maximun risk of $65 million.

We need to present our calculations to Vince tomorrow morning to get his sign
off and can then go over the analysis in detail with you and Greg immediately
afterwards. We are still not recommending we put the full hedge in place to
cover this unrealistic scenareo, but the analysis shows we can significantly
cover the tail risk in our book without having insurance in place. Our
recommendation remains to put a smaller hedge in place while we continue to
pursue a insurance partner during the month of June.

Speak to you tomorrow.
Per


Please respond to  Michelle,

I hope your week is going well.

Please find attached the resume of Mitch Ludwin. Mitch has great academics
(JD '89 cum laude-top 8%, Law Review, Order of the Coif, etc.) and extensive
transactions experience with an emphasis on finance. Mitch is currently
Senior Associate at Troutman Sanders in Atlanta. Mitch was originally from
New York and began his career practicing for three years with Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft in that City. Mitch then joined Mudge, Rose, Guthrie,
Alexander Y Ferdon, spending two years with the firm's New York office,
followed by a year and a half with the firm's Los Angeles office. Upon
dissolution of Mudge, Rose, Mitch joined Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &
Jacobson in Los Angeles.  Mitch then accepted an opportunity with Foley &
Lardner in Milwaukee, where he practiced four years. Mitch joined the firm
to participate in the start up of the firm's project finance practice and to
be closer to his wife's family. This area of the firm's practice did not
develop as anticipated and the attorneys brought in with this expertise
moved to other firms. Mitch joined Troutman to focus on asset-based lending.
I would be happy to provide any additional information concerning Mitch
which you may wish and to arrange an interview, if you so desire. I
anticipate receiving a transactions list, which I will forward to you. I
have also submitted Mitch's resume to Enron Energy Services for
consideration.

Regards, Bruce Menke

 - Ludwin, Mitchell F. (resume, 89, 051801).doc


2nd try.  Hope it works.
---------------------- Forwarded by Kay Mann/Corp/Enron on 04/06/2001 03:16
PM ---------------------------

Kay Mann
04/06/2001 06:37 AM
To: Deborah Culver/HOU/EES@EES
cc:

Subject: Co-op City Letter V.2

Deborah,

This is the most recent email I have from Mark.  It gives an overview of the
project.  I'll check for other pertinent emails.

Kay
---------------------- Forwarded by Kay Mann/Corp/Enron on 04/06/2001 06:35
AM ---------------------------

Mark Bernstein@EES
03/16/2001 04:56 PM
To: Jeff Ader/HOU/EES@EES, Kay Mann/Corp/Enron@Enron
cc:

Subject: Co-op City Letter V.2

the latest...


We will keep the 10 am meeting on Tuesday, April 24, EB 38C2 (legal and
credit only).
We will also schedule a meeting at 3 pm (same day after legal/credit regular
meeting) with Fred, Caroline, Russell Dyk and Robyn Zivic.  Fred could not
meet in the morning and he is an integral part of the process we are trying
to develop for hedge funds.  I apologize if all of the lawyers cannot meet at
3 pm but at least one lawyer in attendance should keep us on track.

Sara Shackleton
Enron North America Corp.
1400 Smith Street, EB 3801a
Houston, Texas  77002
713-853-5620 (phone)
713-646-3490 (fax)
sara.shackleton@enron.com


Johan Louw
Account Vice President
UBS  PaineWebber
1111 Bagby Street
Houston, TX 77002
713-654-4712
800-553-3119
713-654-1281 fax
www.johan.louw@ubspainewebber.com

******************************************************
Notice Regarding Entry of Orders and Instructions:
Please do not transmit orders and/or instructions
regarding your UBSPaineWebber account(s) by e-mail.
Orders and/or instructions transmitted by e-mail will
not be accepted by UBSPaineWebber and UBSPaineWebber
will not be responsible for carrying out such orders
and/or instructions.

Notice Regarding Privacy and Confidentiality:
UBSPaineWebber reserves the right to monitor and
review the content of all e-mail communications sent
and/or received by its employees.


In case you haven't seen this site, the  California State Controller's Office
has posted the long-term energy contracts online.  Here's the web link.

http://www.sco.ca.gov/power_page/contract_info.htm

Carin Nersesian
Legislative Coordinator
Enron Corp.
1775 Eye St. NW, Suite 800
Washington, DC   20006
202-466-9144 (ph.)
202-828-3372 (fax)


All -

You should all now have access to a shared folder in the O drive.  Together with the internal competitive analysis web site we are developing, we can use this to keep files we all need access to.

Check it out -

O:\StateGovAffairs\Renewables

Let me know if you have any problems accessing this.

Jenny


not sure if you guys saw this.
PL

Muse: Bowden 'panicked' after Lowder told him his job in jeopardy
The Associated Press
3/18/2001
MONTGOMERY, Ala. (AP) -- When Auburn's football fortunes took a turn for the
worse in 1998, trustee Bobby Lowder told coach Terry Bowden that he would not
be retained after the season, former university President William Muse said.
When Bowden resigned on the eve of a game that fall, he said he was
essentially fired.
"Basically, Mr. Lowder told him he would not be around come the end of the
season, and coach Bowden basically, in my opinion, panicked when he was told
that and came and negotiated out of his contract," Muse said.
More Auburn football | Talkin' Tigers Forum
Muse said Lowder did not consult with him before speaking to Bowden, whose
team was off to a 1-5 start. Bowden said Thursday that Lowder actually did
not speak directly to him, but went through athletic director David Housel.
"That's how David and I worked," Bowden said Tuesday in a telephone interview
from his Orlando home. "We would meet and he would tell me what Lowder wanted
me to do. I felt like I could do everything I could do and it wouldn't be
enough (to save his job)."
Muse made his comments to faculty members March 15. A transcript of the
meeting was made public Tuesday by Auburn officials.
Muse said he was unable to reach Bowden until "the wee hours of the morning,"
then told him that Lowder didn't have the authority to fire him and "urged
him to stay until the end of the season."
Muse said that was "the most celebrated case" of Lowder taking such a direct
role in athletic decisions, but "there are many others."
Bowden often commented that "Mr. Lowder hired me" and that the coach had
"regular contact" with the powerful trustee, Muse said. Bowden said he spoke
with Lowder "weekly, if not daily" during his first two or three seasons, but
"never felt it was a situation that he would tell me something and that I
should do it."
Muse said Lowder did not hand-pick the coach. He said an eight-member search
committee, including Lowder, voted unanimously to offer Bowden the job in
1993.
"Let's just say I would not have been hired if Bobby Lowder had not wanted me
hired," said Bowden, now a television commentator with ABC. "There's no doubt
about it. Bobby Lowder controlled the committee that hired me at Auburn."
Both Lowder and Housel have denied Bowden's contention that he was told his
coaching fate was all but sealed. They also denied that Lowder was pulling
the strings on that decision.
Bowden "always believed ... that the only way he got that job was because of
Lowder's influence," Muse said. "So he believed very strongly that he had to
maintain that relationship."
Muse said that relationship began to sour when Bowden fired longtime
defensive coordinator Wayne Hall.
Muse also said he is not sure what Lowder's relationship is with Bowden's
successor, Tommy Tuberville, but that he believes basketball coach Cliff
Ellis has "very, very frequent contact" with the Montgomery banker.
Lowder was out of town and did not immediately return a call for comment.
Earlier Tuesday he said in a statement issued by Auburn that the trustees'
athletic panel he chairs will continue to provide "support and input" to the
president and athletic director and that it's time to focus on positive
accomplishments and "stop bickering."


Please add a deal in March for 17, 18, & 19th for 5,000 a day at HSC GD -.03


Hi Joe,

I called you Tuesday and left a message on your voice mail.

Jeff's address is:  jeff.skilling@enron.com

Vince

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	Joseph T Pokalsky <energy.vertical@juno.com>@ENRON [mailto:IMCEANOTES-Joseph+20T+20Pokalsky+20+3Cenergy+2Evertical+40juno+2Ecom+3E+40ENRON@ENRON.com]
Sent:	Wednesday, August 15, 2001 11:37 AM
To:	vkamins@ect.enron.com
Subject:	Jeff Skilling resigns

Vince:

When I wrote you yesterday I didn't know that Jeff had resigned.  I'd
like to write him a letter as I have a lot of respect for him.  Do you
have his e-mail address?  Thanks.

Joseph T. Pokalsky
Energy Vertical Analysis, LLC
Office:  404-350-8562
Cell:     404-456-5173
Fax:      413-691-5614


SBX2 86 (Peace), which would provide for the confiscation of building
permits and the imposition of fines, passed out of the Senate Energy
Committee.

ABX2 5 (Kelley), which would require the CPUC to adjust the baseline, passed
out of the Assembly Appropriations Committee.  Assembly Member Kelley has
agreed to consider amendments to prevent cost shifting.

ABX2 65 (Cardoza), which would make it a crime to withhold, passed out of
the Assembly Appropriations Committee.

AB 81 (Migden), which would transfer property taxing authority from local
government to the Board of Equalization, passed out of the Senate Revenue
and Taxation Committee.


In September, ENA agreed to purchase capacity from New Power on Transco.  The total demand charge should have been $9,000.00 on contract 4.0159.  New Power released the capacity volumetrically and I didn't catch it.  The actual demand charge billed was $270,000.00.  New Power agreed to reimburse ENA for the difference of $261,000.00.

ENA will pay the pipeline the billed demand charge of $270,000.00 and bill New Power $261,000.00 on deal 1110019.


Start Date: 4/10/01; HourAhead hour: 23;  No ancillary schedules awarded.
Variances detected.
Variances detected in SC Trades schedule.

    LOG MESSAGES:

PARSING FILE -->> O:\Portland\WestDesk\California Scheduling\ISO Final
Schedules\2001041023.txt

---- SC Trades Schedule ----
+++ Hour 23 - bad data from ISO.
  TRANS_TYPE: FINAL
  SC_ID: EPMI
  MKT_TYPE: 2
  TRANS_DATE: 4/10/01
  TRADING_SC: PGAE
  PNT_OF_INTRC: NP15
  SCHED_TYPE: ENGY
  PURCH_SALE: 2
  DEAL_NO: 1


Please print and sign the attached Enron Corp. Risk Management Policy
Certificate of Compliance and fax directly to Veronica Valdez, fax # 713 646
2194. Due to certain regulatory audits of our trading businesses, we would
like to receive these by the end of this week.

Attached is a copy of the Certificate of Compliance, and the Enron Corp. Risk
Management Policy.

If you have any questions, please call me at (713) 853-0429, or Veronica
Valdez at (713) 853-1881.

Regards,
Cassandra Schultz
Market Risk Management